2024 IL App (1st) 221750-U

No. 1-22-1750 

Order filed March 14, 2024 

Fourth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

GABRIEL DATHEY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County. 

No. 18 CR 801

Honorable 

Michael Clancy, 

Judge, presiding. 

PRESIDING JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Martin and Ocasio concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Defendant’s conviction for criminal sexual assault is affirmed over his contentions 

that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt both that he penetrated the 

victim’s anus and that he knew she was unable to consent, and that the trial court 

abused its discretion in granting the State’s motion to admit other-crimes evidence.

¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant Gabriel Dathey was convicted of one count of criminal 

sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(2) (West 2012)) and sentenced to four years in prison. On 

appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, arguing that the State failed 

to prove both penetration of the victim’s anus and that he knew the victim was unable to consent. 
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He also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the State’s motion to admit 

other-crimes evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant’s conviction arose from the events of February 24, 2012. Following arrest, 

defendant was charged by indictment with two counts of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-

1.20(a)(2) (West 2012)) and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-

1.30(a)(4) (West 2012)). The indictment alleged that he knowingly committed acts of sexual 

penetration upon N.M., knowing she was unable to give knowing consent. Count I specified the 

penetration as contact between defendant’s penis and N.M.’s “sex organ,” while count II specified 

the penetration as contact between defendant’s penis and N.M.’s “anus.” Counts III and IV 

mirrored the first two counts, adding an allegation that the respective act of penetration was 

perpetuated during the course of the commission of another felony, i.e., kidnapping. 

¶ 5 A. Motion to Allow Other-Crimes Evidence

¶ 6 Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to allow other-crimes evidence pursuant to section 

115-7.3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2018)). 

The State’s motion identified three prior incidents. Relevant here, the State alleged in its motion 

that on September 29, 2002, defendant sexually assaulted L.B., a college student, near her Chicago 

residence hall. The State alleged that L.B. had gone to a local bar with rugby teammates and 

became extremely intoxicated. She “stumbled” home alone but was too inebriated to open the door 

to her dormitory. As she unsuccessfully attempted to use her ID card to gain entry, defendant, 

whom she did not know, appeared and led her to a bench a few feet away. He pushed her to the 

ground, got on top of her, forced his hand into her pants, and tried to force his finger into her 
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vagina. He then put on a condom and “began to rape L.B.,” stopping when the condom broke. 

After asking L.B. whether she was on birth control, he fled. L.B. vomited numerous times 

overnight and felt too sick and intoxicated to walk. The next morning, she reported the incident. 

The police recovered a condom near the bench, and, in 2017, DNA from the condom was linked 

to defendant. 

¶ 7 The State alleged in the motion that, in the instant case, N.M. was at a Chicago nightclub 

when defendant introduced himself to her and then bought her two drinks. Her memory “started 

to get fuzzy” and she felt unlike any other time she had felt when drinking alcohol. The next thing 

she remembered was waking up in a car defendant was driving. Between blackouts, she 

remembered waking up in her bed, naked from the waist down, with defendant on top of her. 

Although N.M. told defendant to stop and said she was sick, he rubbed his penis against her inner 

thigh. N.M. recalled vomiting numerous times before blacking out again. When she woke hours 

later, defendant “walked out and said goodbye as if nothing happened.” Feeling that she had been 

drugged and raped, N.M. sent defendant a text message asking if there had been a sexual encounter. 

Defendant responded that they only kissed. N.M. went to the hospital where a sexual assault kit 

was administered. Semen was identified in her vaginal and anal swabs and, eventually, defendant’s 

DNA was linked to her case.

¶ 8 The State argued in its motion that the other-crimes evidence was admissible under section 

115-7.3 of the Code to prove defendant’s propensity to commit sexual assaults. The State asserted 

that the incidents involving L.B. and N.M. were proximate in time and factually similar, and that 

“other facts and circumstances” weighed in favor of admission in that the other-crimes evidence 

would show N.M.’s assault was not an isolated incident, speak to N.M.’s credibility, and rebut the 
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defense of consent. The State further argued that the other-crimes evidence was admissible to 

prove motive, intent, identity, lack of consent, and modus operandi. 

¶ 9 At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel argued that L.B.’s case had no similarities 

to N.M.’s, contested the fact pattern presented by the State regarding L.B.’s case, and asserted that 

the cases were not proximate in time but, rather, occurred almost 10 years apart. Counsel further 

argued that the prejudice in admitting the other-crimes evidence would be “tremendous.”

¶ 10 The trial court ruled on the State’s motion as follows:

“All right. As to the State’s motion to admit evidence of other crimes to show lack 

of consent, absence of mistake, intent and propensity to commit nonconsensual sex, it’s 

going to be granted as to [L.B.’s case and another case]. 

As to the request to admit those, as to the request to admit [the other case] as modus 

operandi, that will be denied. I don’t think there’s enough similarity. 

The issue in the case clearly is consent. As you point out, there are issues, if you 

like, with each case. But as the State points out, there’s enough similarity to show the lack 

of consent, absence of mistake and intent, I think, and I’m sure I think way more 

prejudicial—it’s way more probative rather than it is prejudicial to the defendant in this 

case. So I shouldn't say it’s unfair but prejudicial. That’s what I should say.” 

¶ 11 B. Trial

¶ 12 At trial, N.M. testified that in 2012, she was 21 years old and lived with a roommate, 

Patricia Korbackova, in a Chicago apartment. On the night in question, N.M. met a coworker, 

Ricardo, at his home and had “a few” drinks. N.M. and Ricardo then went to a Chicago nightclub, 
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Berlin, to meet a group of Ricardo’s friends. Among the group was Patrick Wedge, whom N.M. 

met for the first time that night.

¶ 13 While at Berlin, a man named Gabe offered to buy N.M. a drink.1 She accepted the drink, 

a cranberry vodka. N.M. thought Gabe, who was “very kind” and “very nice,” was gay. They 

danced a little and chatted a little. About 30 minutes to an hour after having a second drink, which 

Gabe had handed to her, N.M. started to feel like she never had before or since. She described the 

sensation as follows: “It almost feels like you can’t feel your body. You are just kind of floating. 

You get very sick, confused, unsure where you are going or who is even around you, and just 

vomiting, and blacking out, coming back, blacking out sick, coming back again, and yeah.” 

¶ 14 N.M. clarified that she did not vomit at Berlin. At some point, she left the nightclub. When 

asked whether she wanted to leave, she answered, “I don’t know. Like I said it’s just you don’t 

know where you are, who you are with, you can’t feel your body, that kind of experience I felt 

when I was leaving the nightclub.” N.M. did not recall getting into a vehicle but remembered an 

“image *** looking towards Gabe in a car.” During the ride to her apartment, she was “kind of a 

little bit in and out.” She vaguely remembered stumbling into her home with her clothes “messed 

up.” 

¶ 15 The next image in N.M.’s memory was Gabe rubbing his penis on her thigh and her telling 

him to stop because she was very sick. She clarified in court that “[i]t was a very dizzy confusing 

sick” and she “felt like [she] was dying.” When asked whether she had vomited before that point, 

she answered, “I’m not sure. I don’t know.” 

1 N.M. did not identify defendant in court.
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¶ 16 N.M. testified that, after telling Gabe to stop, she remembered “[m]ore vomiting.” When 

she next woke, she was lying at the foot of her bed “like how a dog lays,” naked from the waist 

down. Gabe was in the bed “up front,” but she did not realize he was there until he started tossing 

and turning. N.M. threw up on the floor. She then went upstairs, where she threw up again, and 

spoke with Korbackova. Shortly thereafter, Gabe gathered his belongings, said goodbye, gave her 

his phone number, and left. 

¶ 17 N.M. testified that she threw up “[a]ll over” her apartment and was “dry-heaving a lot.” 

She took a shower, explaining, “I was recalculating the night, and I did a self-examination and as 

woman you can tell if you just been recently penetrated. So it felt very looser than usual down 

there and that really scared me to call the police.” Korbackova called the police for her. When they 

arrived, N.M. related what happened and had them call an ambulance to take her to the hospital. 

There, personnel administered a sexual assault kit. 

¶ 18 In 2017, N.M. received a phone call from a detective regarding her case. N.M. met with 

the detective and viewed a photo array but was unable to identify anyone. Finally, when asked 

whether she had agreed to have “any sexual relationships” with defendant, she said she did not.

¶ 19 On cross-examination, N.M. stated that she “did not agree to have sex with” defendant. 

She said she texted him “the next day,” asking whether they had sex. He responded, “LOL, no, we 

just kissed.” N.M. acknowledged that she no longer had access to that message, even though she 

had asked whether it “could have been pulled up.” She asserted that she mentioned the text 

message to the police and to hospital personnel. She did not recall whether she showed the text to 

anyone at the hospital. She also did not remember at what point in the night Gabe gave her his 

phone number.
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¶ 20 N.M. agreed that she was “buzzed” before she arrived at Berlin. She acknowledged that 

before going to Berlin, she smoked marijuana and, “[m]aybe *** definitely before” going to the 

nightclub, took Adderall, which she had been prescribed in the past. When asked whether she was 

“pretty drunk” before Gabe bought her two drinks, she answered, “I don’t know.” She also did not 

know how many drinks she had at Berlin other than the two cranberry vodkas Gabe bought for 

her. N.M. clarified that she went up to the bar with Gabe when he bought her the first drink, which 

she received directly from the bartender, but that Gabe brought her the second drink and handed it 

to her. 

¶ 21 N.M. did not remember whether she told her friends she was leaving Berlin or whether she 

agreed to have Gabe take her home. She recalled that, when she was walking into her apartment, 

she was stumbling around and one of her breasts came out of her outfit. She also remembered that 

Korbackova was in the living room. Korbackova did not stop her and defendant but, rather, went 

back to her room “[j]ust to kind of leave us alone I guess.” When asked whether Korbackova would 

have helped her out if she were in danger, N.M. answered, “If I was in danger, yes. But Gabe, like 

I said, he had a persona. He was very friendly, very kind, very nonthreatening type of guy. So I

believe that she believed that at that time that I was not in danger[.]”

¶ 22 When asked about vomiting, N.M. clarified that she “remember[ed] visions of puking, 

waking and puking. It was consistent dry-heaving probably for the whole night.” She clarified that 

when defendant was rubbing his penis on her leg, her leg was bare, even though she had worn 

pants to Berlin. 

¶ 23 On redirect examination, N.M. stated that although she had smoked marijuana in the past, 

she did not remember whether she smoked marijuana the night she went to Berlin. 
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¶ 24 Patrick Wedge testified that on the night in question, he went to Berlin with a coworker, 

Ricardo Muniz. There, he met N.M. and “clicked” with her right away. They spent the majority of 

the evening talking with each other. Although there was a span of “a couple of hours” when he did 

not see N.M., Wedge saw her again when he was exiting the nightclub. Wedge had had two to four 

drinks over the course of the night and was not heavily intoxicated. He did not know how many 

drinks N.M. had. He described her as “pretty even keel” until the end of the night, when she became 

heavily intoxicated. He stated that her speech was slurred, her eyes “were starting to go,” and she 

looked “mopey.” 

¶ 25 Wedge testified that when he left Berlin, he saw N.M. in a taxi, lying across the back seat. 

Her eyes were rolled back, she was “slobbering” out the side of her mouth, and she “was just 

clearly completely out of it.” A man who had introduced himself as “Angel” was in the front seat 

of the taxi. Wedge described him as “really a nice guy” whose demeanor made him feel comforted 

and assured. Angel told Wedge that “he was here to take care of her and he was going to make 

sure that she was taken home safe.” Angel and N.M. then left in the car. 

¶ 26 When Wedge got back to Muniz’s residence, he began to have a bad feeling that caused 

him to worry about N.M. He called her about 10 times but could not reach her, and then called the 

police and a few hospitals, trying to find her. Wedge received a phone call from N.M. the next 

afternoon. She was upset, confused, and “frazzled,” and was looking for answers as to what had 

happened. 

¶ 27 In December 2017, Wedge received a call from a Chicago detective. In court, Wedge 

pointed out defendant and stated, “That does look like the gentleman I saw that night. That does 
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look like him, yes.” The court determined that the record would not reflect an in-court 

identification. 

¶ 28 On cross-examination, Wedge stated that he did not know if N.M. had any drinks at Berlin 

and that he had “pretty level conversation” with her the whole night. When asked whether he told 

the police or the State’s Attorney that N.M. had been “drooling,” he answered that it “may have 

got lost in translation, but I’m putting that on record today.” When asked whether he was sure the 

man N.M. left Berlin with said his name was Angel, as opposed to Gabe, Wedge answered, “Well, 

I believe so. He could have said Gabriel and maybe I associated it with Angel because Gabriel and 

Angel go hand in hand. What I remember is Angel. *** It was either Gabriel or Angel. I remember 

Angel. That’s what my memory serves me.” Wedge also stated that he had a vague memory of 

meeting the man inside Berlin earlier in the night, but was not 100% sure, and that, while he 

believed the car the man was driving was a taxi, it may have been an Uber or another ride share.

¶ 29 Chicago paramedic Elizabeth Kirk testified that she was dispatched to N.M.’s residence at 

5:21 p.m. on February 24, 2012. N.M.’s heart rate was irregular and slightly elevated, and she 

appeared very anxious. 

¶ 30 Julia Busta, a registered nurse who examined N.M. at the hospital, testified that she was 

certified as a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) at that time and had performed hundreds of 

sexual assault examinations over the course of her career. When she met N.M. around 6:45 p.m., 

she explained to her the process of conducting a sexual assault kit and obtained her consent to do 

so. As part of the kit, Busta wrote down N.M.’s report of what led her to come to the hospital. 

N.M. told Busta she had gone to Berlin with a coworker the night before and met a man who 

bought her a drink. After the second drink she felt drugged. She then remembered “driving home, 
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being in auto, coming to [her] apartment with Gabriel,” and vomiting nonstop. N.M. said she 

awakened to Gabriel rubbing his penis on her leg. N.M. told him to stop and that she was sick. She 

then blacked out. N.M. told Busta that Gabriel was in her bed and she did not remember removing 

her pants and underpants. She later texted Gabriel to ask if they had sex and he wrote back that 

they kissed.

¶ 31 N.M. told Busta that before coming to the hospital, she had urinated, showered, wiped and 

washed her genitals, vomited, and changed her clothes. Busta collected N.M.’s underpants and 

then conducted a complete physical examination “from head to toe,” collecting evidence as she 

did so. Among other things, she swabbed N.M.’s labia, vaginal vault, and anus. Relevant here, she 

specifically “move[d] the q-tip around the opening of the anus and around the tissue around the 

anus.” She did not observe any physical injuries to N.M.’s body other than a small abrasion on her 

right elbow. Busta’s findings were “sexual assault exam findings consistent with the patient’s 

version of events.” 

¶ 32 On cross-examination, Busta testified that it was common, “more often than not,” that there 

will be no signs of trauma with sexual assaults. She stated that she did not recall whether N.M. 

told her about any pain during her examination. She agreed that nothing was documented showing 

that N.M. complained “that she had pain or she felt like she was anally penetrated.” N.M. told 

Busta that she was unsure whether defendant had penetrated her vagina and anus. Busta agreed 

that the swab looks like “a q-tip with a long handle.”

¶ 33 She explained how anal and vaginal swabs are conducted as follows:

 “A. Collecting an anal swab is done by first examining the anus, you spread apart 

the folds of the tissue surrounding the anus and then there is like a it’s almost—I don’t 
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know the terminology but there is like a neck portion, excuse me, of [the] anus. You use 

some sterile saline and you swab right at the neck entrance of the anus and around in the 

folds. 

Q. And for the vaginal swab, how do you swab it?

A. For the vaginal swab, the vaginal swab in my practice is done in what I would 

determine—what I would call a blind swab. I take the swabs, insert them into the vaginal 

canal and in circular motion swab and then remove.

Q. So the difference between an anal swab and a vaginal swab is in a vaginal swab 

you go into the vagina to the canal and in an anal swab you go on the rim outside? 

A. That’s correct.” 

¶ 34 The parties stipulated that, if called as a witness, Kenan Hasanbegovic, a forensic scientist 

with the Illinois State Police, would have testified that, in 2012, he processed a criminal sexual 

assault evidence collection kit containing vaginal, anal, and oral swabs collected from N.M. 

Examination of the swabs indicated the presence of semen on the vaginal and anal swabs, but not 

the oral swabs. No sperm cells were observed on the microscope slide prepared with a portion of 

the vaginal swabs. The vaginal and anal swabs were preserved for future DNA analysis.

¶ 35 The parties stipulated that, if called as a witness, Meredith Misker, a forensic scientist with 

the Illinois State Police, would have testified that in 2014, she was assigned to analyze evidence 

in N.M.’s case. Testing revealed male DNA on the vaginal swabs, but a DNA profile could not be 

detected due to the ratio of female DNA to male DNA being “too high.” DNA analysis conducted 

on the “sperm fraction” of the anal swabs resulted in the identification of a partial male DNA 

profile. Analysis of the “mixed fraction” of the anal swabs resulted in the identification of a 
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complete male DNA profile which was consistent with having originated from the same male 

donor from the sperm fraction of the anal swabs. 

¶ 36 Misker would have further testified that the complete male DNA profile was searched in a 

database. The search detected an association to a male DNA profile identified in a 2002 case where 

a condom was submitted by Chicago police in a case involving a victim named L.B.

¶ 37 Chicago police detective Jacquelin Mok testified that in 2016, she collected a buccal swab 

from defendant. The parties stipulated that the swab was sent to the Illinois State Police Crime 

Laboratory for analysis. 

¶ 38 Angela Kaeshamer, a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police whom the court 

qualified as an expert in forensic DNA analysis, testified that she developed a full DNA profile 

suitable for comparison from defendant’s buccal swab. She then compared that profile with the 

male profiles generated from N.M.’s anal swabs. Kaeshamer testified that the results of her 

comparison were that defendant could not be excluded from having contributed to the male profile 

identified in the sperm fraction of the anal swabs, and could not be excluded from having 

contributed to the male profile identified in the mixed fraction of the anal swabs. She specified 

that approximately 1 in 9.7 million unrelated Black individuals could not have been excluded from 

having contributed to the sperm fraction and approximately 1 in 43 quadrillion unrelated Black 

individuals could not have been excluded from having contributed to the mixed fraction.

¶ 39 Kaeshamer also compared defendant’s DNA profile with a DNA profile generated from 

swabs taken from the interior and exterior of a condom that was inventoried in L.B.’s case. 

Defendant could not be excluded from contributing to the male DNA profile identified on the 

interior and exterior sperm fractions of the condom swabs. Kaeshamer specified that 
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approximately 1 in 120 trillion unrelated Black individuals could not have been excluded from that 

profile. 

¶ 40 On cross-examination, Kaeshamer acknowledged that she did not know how semen “got 

to” N.M.’s anal area. She agreed that it could have been through wearing underwear, but stated, 

“It’s a possibility, but probably unlikely.” She also agreed that it could have happened by someone 

ejaculating on the area or from “leaking” from a different area of the body, and agreed with 

counsel’s statement that “[i]t does not have to mean that there was actual contact between a penis 

and an anus for the sperm to get there.” 

¶ 41 Proof of other crimes witness, L.B., testified that, on September 28, 2002, she was a 

freshman at a Chicago university. That night, she went to a neighborhood bar with rugby 

teammates. While at the bar, she drank alcohol but did not pay for the drinks herself. Teammates 

bought pitchers of beer, “some gentlemen at the bar” bought beer for the team, and a man or men 

purchased her two shots of tequila. L.B. was “heavily intoxicated or kind of out of it.” 

¶ 42 L.B. had no recollection of leaving the bar or walking home to her dormitory. In court, she 

described herself as “essentially blackout drunk.” Her next memory was attempting to use her 

“swipe card” to enter the building. While she was doing so, a man L.B. had never seen before 

appeared, grabbed both of her hands, and said, “[L]et’s go over here.” He led L.B. to a nearby 

bench in an area that was not well-lit, sat her on the bench, and kissed her. He put his hand down 

her pants and touched the outside of her vagina. He then laid her on the ground, pulled her pants 

and underwear down around her knees, got on top of her, and attempted to have intercourse with 

her. L.B. felt pressure at the opening of her vagina but explained that she was wearing a tampon 

at the time, so the man was “having difficulty actually achieving full sexual congress.” The next 
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thing L.B. recalled was the man telling her that his condom broke and asking her if she was “on 

the pill.” L.B. told him she was not. The man walked away and L.B. pulled up her pants. When 

asked in court whether she consented to the man’s actions, she said she did not and explained that 

while she remembered pulling her pants up, she did not actually remember the man pulling them 

down. 

¶ 43 L.B. got up and used her swipe card to enter the dormitory building. She was having 

difficulty standing up but was able to take the elevator to the floor where she lived. After she exited 

the elevator, she collapsed to the floor. She crawled down the hallway, vomiting along the way. 

As she approached her room, she felt her arms and legs “giving out” and ended up having to “army 

crawl” with her elbows to her room. Once there, she vomited “over and over and over and over 

again” for hours and showered in her clothes. 

¶ 44 In the morning, L.B. woke to find herself in her bed, amid “piles” of vomit and vomit 

trailing down her face, although she had no recollection of getting into the top bunk or vomiting 

while she was there. She reported the incident to a resident assistant and then spoke with the 

campus police. A condom and condom wrapper were found by the bench. Finally, L.B. testified 

that she had never felt her body “give out like that” or “just fully shutting down” any time before 

or since that night, even when she had been drinking heavily. 

¶ 45 On cross-examination, L.B. testified that “the next day,” she went to the hospital, where a 

sexual assault kit was administered. Afterwards, she spoke to two detectives in an interview room 

at the hospital. According to L.B., they “were essentially shouting at me for drinking underage and 

not taking any notes.” L.B. denied telling the detectives that she agreed to kiss the man on the 

bench. 
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¶ 46 Defense counsel made a motion for a directed finding. He argued, in relevant part, that the 

State had not proved contact, however slight, between defendant’s penis and N.M.’s “sex organ” 

or “anus.” He further argued that the State had not proved that, if there was contact, it was not 

consensual, or that defendant knew at the time that N.M. could not consent. The trial court denied 

the motion.

¶ 47 Defendant did not testify or present any evidence. 

¶ 48 In closing, the State argued it had proved all four charges. Defense counsel adopted his 

arguments from the motion for a directed finding, adding, inter alia, arguments that the State had 

only presented circumstantial evidence of penetration, and that L.B.’s testimony was “not 

propensity.” 

¶ 49 The trial court found defendant guilty of criminal sexual assault premised on contact 

between his penis and N.M.’s anus (count II) and acquitted him of the other three charges. In the 

course of explaining its guilty finding on count II, the court reviewed the facts of the case. Relevant 

here, the court noted that it had considered N.M.’s testimony that, after consuming the second 

drink from defendant, she felt strange, was blacking out, and was in and out of consciousness 

during the ride to her apartment. The court considered that N.M. remembered stumbling into her 

apartment, her breast falling out of her clothing, and telling defendant to stop because she was sick 

when he rubbed his penis on her bare thigh. The court considered that N.M. remembered vomiting 

in several locations in her apartment throughout the night, stating as follows:

“While mindful that the evidence is not established the sequence of vomiting 

relative to the sexual activity, it’s still highly relevant. That the vomiting occurred prior to 

the sexual activity. Clearly the defendant would be on notice of the victim’s severe 
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impairment and an inability to give consent. However, even if the multiple accounts of 

vomiting occurred after the sexual encounter, it’s still relevant as it supports that the victim 

was severely impaired or intoxicated when leaving the club and when at her apartment. 

The multiple occasion[s] of vomiting support the conclusion that the victim was severely 

impaired and intoxicated.

The victim’s inability to recall multiple periods of time during the evening and early 

morning hours including and inability to recall being sexually penetrated supports severe 

impairment and intoxication.” 

The court also considered N.M.’s testimony that she did not agree to have sex with defendant and 

that when she asked him whether they had sex, he lied about their sexual encounter, texting, “LOL, 

no, we just kissed.” The trial court stated that it found N.M. credible and truthful throughout her 

testimony. 

¶ 50 The court further stated it found Wedge’s testimony to be relevant regarding N.M.’s severe 

impaired condition at the time she left Berlin. 

¶ 51 The court then noted that L.B.’s other-crimes testimony was admitted to show lack of 

consent, absence of mistake, intent, and propensity to commit nonconsensual sex, but not modus 

operandi. The court stated it was mindful that the incident concerning L.B. took place 

approximately nine and a half years prior to N.M.’s case. It was also mindful of dissimilarities 

between the two cases, including that, in L.B.’s case, there was no contact between L.B. and 

defendant prior to the sexual incident and the assault took place outside. The court reviewed the 

facts of L.B.’s case, including that she had been drinking heavily at a bar, described herself as 

“blackout drunk” at the time she left the bar to walk home, that she did not consent to having sex 
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with defendant, and that she eventually had to crawl to her dorm room and vomited numerous 

times. The court stated it found the incident involving L.B. relevant to the issue of consent.

¶ 52 The court concluded that it was clear from the three witnesses’ testimony that defendant 

did not “require, need or look for consent,” but, rather, “looks for the opportunity that heavily 

intoxicated and impaired women provide for him to easily and without much effort sexually assault 

them.” Based on the testimony, the court found N.M. was unable to give consent to the act of 

sexual penetration due to her severe impairment and that defendant knew N.M. was unable to give 

consent. 

¶ 53 With regard to the issue of penetration, the court noted that there was no requirement of 

“anal or rectal intrusion,” but, rather, “any contact however slight between the sex organ of one 

person and the anus of another person.” The court noted that Busta, the nurse who administered 

the sexual assault kit at the hospital, swabbed the outside rim of N.M.’s anus, moving the swab 

around the anal opening and folds. The court further noted that defendant could not be excluded 

from having contributed to the male DNA profile generated from testing of the anal swabs. 

¶ 54 The court concluded its findings as follows:

 “I find that the direct and circumstantial evidence has established that [defendant] 

committed an act of sexual penetration on [N.M.]. Specifically, any contact however slight 

between [defendant’s] penis and [N.M.’s] anus. 

I find that based on [defendant’s]—I find that based on [defendant’s] opportunity 

to observe [N.M.’s] impaired condition for a lengthy period—lengthy and extended period 

of time at Berlin, during the drive to the victim’s apartment, at the victim’s apartment, and 

in her bedroom that he knew she was unable to give consent. 
No. 1-22-1750 

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I find that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] 

knowingly committed an act of sexual penetration on [N.M.], contact however slight 

between [defendant’s] penis and [N.M.’s] anus knowing that [N.M.] was unable to give 

consent.”

¶ 55 Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or a new trial, arguing, among other 

things, that the State had failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that the court 

had erred in admitting evidence of L.B.’s allegations. With regard to the sufficiency of the 

evidence, defendant contended that the State had not proved “actual contact” between his penis 

and N.M.’s anus, but, rather, had only offered pure speculation. As to the other-crimes evidence, 

defendant contended that the incident involving L.B. was not proximate in time, was factually 

dissimilar to N.M.’s case, and had not been proven. 

¶ 56 Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The court stated that it had made 

reasonable inferences based on the evidence in determining that the State had proved the element 

of penetration. The court also found that the pretrial ruling allowing other-crimes evidence was 

appropriate. 

¶ 57 The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to four years in prison. Defendant filed a 

timely notice of appeal.

¶ 58 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 59 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 60 On appeal, defendant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict. 

¶ 61 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is whether, after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 
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have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine the credibility 

of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, to resolve any conflicts in the evidence, 

and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and a reviewing court will not substitute its 

judgment for that of the trier of fact on these matters. People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35. 

Reversal is justified only where the evidence is “so unsatisfactory, improbable or implausible” that 

it raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt (People v. Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307 (1989)) 

or where proof of an element of a crime is wholly lacking (People v. Sweigart, 2021 IL App (2d) 

180543, ¶ 56).

¶ 62 A person commits criminal sexual assault, as charged in this case, if he “commits an act of 

sexual penetration” and “knows that the victim is *** unable to give knowing consent.” 720 ILCS 

5/11-1.20(a)(2) (West 2012). “Sexual penetration” means “any contact, however slight.” 720 ILCS 

5/11-0.1 (West 2012). To establish penetration for purposes of criminal sexual assault, the State 

must prove “actual contact” between a defendant’s sex organ and the sex organ or anus of the 

victim; evidence of touching “an area near the complainant’s sex organ or anus is insufficient.” 

People v. Atherton, 406 Ill. App. 3d 598, 609 (2010). “Consent” means “a freely given agreement 

to the act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct in question.” 720 ILCS 5/11-1.70(a) (West 2012). 

¶ 63 1. Sexual Penetration

¶ 64 The trial court found defendant guilty on count II, which charged defendant with sexual 

penetration of N.M.’s anus with his penis. 

¶ 65 Defendant first contends that the State failed to prove the element of penetration where it 

did not establish “actual contact” between his penis and N.M.’s anus. He maintains that the 
No. 1-22-1750 

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presence of semen near, but not inside, N.M.’s anus is not evidence of penetration, and that proof 

of contact “around” or “near” N.M.’s anus is insufficient to sustain his conviction. He argues that 

Busta’s explanation of how she performed the anal swab failed to prove anything other than that 

semen was found near N.M.’s anus. He asserts that Busta’s testimony:

“clearly shows she swabbed on the anus, on the neck portion of the anus, ‘the tissue around 

the anus,’ and the [sic] around the folds. It, therefore, cannot even be determined whether 

the semen found on that swab was recovered from N.M.’s anus, as required, or the areas 

near her anus or the butt cheeks folds. Consequently, [defendant’s] semen found on the 

swab cannot be accepted as proof beyond a reasonable doubt that his penis made any 

contact with N.M.’s anus.”

¶ 66 Defendant further notes that Kaeshamer, the State’s DNA expert, agreed semen could have 

arrived at N.M.’s anal area by N.M. wearing underwear, by someone ejaculating on that area, or 

from semen leaking from a different part of N.M.’s body. He argues that the evidence from the 

swab only proves, at most, that his semen was transferred to N.M.’s body after it was discharged 

from his penis. He maintains that this transfer could have occurred in “endless ways,” for example, 

from N.M.’s sheets, or from her hand when she performed a self-examination in the shower, or if 

his penis “just hover[ed] around the area of N.M.’s anus when he ejaculated,” and that the trial 

court should have found the anal swab to be of limited evidentiary value because the State failed 

to present evidence negating the possibility of another method of transfer. Defendant maintains

that the trial court’s conclusion that the transfer occurred via actual contact was pure speculation. 

¶ 67 Statutorily, “sexual penetration” means “any contact, however slight.” 720 ILCS 5/11-0.1 

(West 2012). As noted above, penetration for purposes of criminal sexual assault requires proof of
No. 1-22-1750 

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“actual contact” between a defendant’s sex organ and the sex organ or anus of the victim, and 

evidence of touching “an area near the complainant’s sex organ or anus is insufficient.” Atherton, 

406 Ill. App. 3d at 609. Whether sexual penetration occurred is a question of fact to be determined 

by the trier of fact. People v. Janusz, 2020 IL App (2d) 190017, ¶ 71. “The trier of fact is entitled 

to draw all reasonable inferences from both circumstantial and direct evidence, including an 

inference of penetration.” People v. Hillier, 392 Ill. App. 3d 66, 69 (2009). An inference of 

penetration is unreasonable only if the victim denies that penetration occurred. Id. 

¶ 68 After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court could reasonably infer that 

penetration occurred. First, N.M. did not deny that defendant penetrated her anus. Rather, she 

testified that defendant rubbed his penis on her thigh and that the next morning she found that her 

pants and underwear were removed and could tell she had “just been recently penetrated.” 

Although she did not specify the penetration, i.e., contact, occurred to her anus, the State’s 

evidence showed the presence of semen, sperm, and defendant’s DNA on the anal swabs taken 

from N.M. during the sexual assault evidence collection examination. We find that a reasonable 

inference from this evidence is that there was contact, however slight, between defendant’s penis 

and N.M.’s anus. See People v. Hills, 2021 IL App (4th) 200220-U, ¶ 37 (finding a reasonable 

inference of contact between the victim’s anus and the defendant’s penis where an anal swab 

contained the defendant’s DNA); Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023) (nonprecedential orders 

entered on or after January 1, 2021, may be cited for persuasive purposes); see also People v. 

Betance-Lopez, 2015 IL App (2d) 130521, ¶¶ 42-46 (finding a reasonable inference of contact 

between the victim’s anus and the defendant’s penis where the defendant admitted to contact 
No. 1-22-1750 

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“around the rim” and a swab of the “external and internal parts of the anus” tested positive for 

semen).

¶ 69 In reaching this conclusion, we reject defendant’s argument that Busta’s testimony 

regarding how she conducted the anal swabs cannot lead to a conclusion that his DNA was present 

on N.M.’s anus, as opposed to an area “near” her anus. Busta is a registered nurse and, at the time 

of her examination of N.M., was a certified SANE and had performed hundreds of sexual assault 

examinations. There is no evidence demonstrating that she performed the swab tests here 

incorrectly. On cross-examination, Busta specifically explained that an anal swab is conducted by 

spreading apart the folds of the tissue surrounding the anus and swabbing “right at the neck 

entrance of the anus and around in the folds.” She also agreed that when conducting an anal swab, 

“you go on the rim.” When describing how she performed the anal swab on N.M., Busta testified 

that she moved the swab, described as a q-tip with a long handle, “around the opening of the anus 

and around the tissue around the anus.” The anus is defined as the “opening of the rectum to the

outside of the body.” Anus, NIH National Cancer Institute, 

https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms/def/anus (last viewed Mar. 6, 

2024). Contrary to defendant’s argument, we find that the trial court could have reasonably 

determined from Busta’s testimony that she swabbed the anus, not “the areas near her anus or the 

butt cheeks folds,” as defendant suggests. See Hills, 2021 IL App (4th) 200220-U, ¶ 39 (finding 

the jury could have reasonably inferred that a nurse’s testimony that she collected an “anal swab” 

meant that she collected a swab from the victim’s anus); Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023) 

(nonprecedential orders entered on or after January 1, 2021, may be cited for persuasive purposes). 
No. 1-22-1750 

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¶ 70 Moreover, we note that the case defendant has cited for the proposition that “semen found 

near, but not inside, a victim’s vagina or anus is not evidence of penetration,” People v. Spicer, 

379 Ill. App. 3d 441, 457 n.9 (2007), held no such thing. In Spicer, the State’s DNA expert testified 

that a “semen stain” was found on the victim’s nightgown and housecoat, but her vaginal, oral, 

and rectal swabs did not contain semen. Id. at 447. In a footnote, this court noted, “The semen 

found on the victim’s housecoat is not evidence of penetration.” Id. at 457 n.9. Contrary to 

defendant’s assertion in his brief, Spicer did not hold that semen must be found “inside” a victim’s 

vagina or anus to constitute evidence of penetration. 

¶ 71 We also reject defendant’s argument that, because his semen could have arrived at N.M.’s 

anus in “endless ways,” the trial court’s conclusion that the transfer occurred via actual contact 

between his penis and her anus was pure speculation. On cross-examination, the State’s expert in 

forensic DNA analysis agreed that semen could have been transferred through N.M. wearing 

underwear, by someone ejaculating on the area, or from semen “leaking” from a different area of 

her body. However, a “trier of fact is not required to accept any possible explanation compatible 

with the defendant’s innocence and elevate it to the status of reasonable doubt.” People v. 

Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 229 (2009). The State is not required to disprove or rule out all 

possible factual scenarios and, merely because a hypothetical factual scenario is possible, it does 

not mean that a trier of fact cannot rely on reasonable inferences that flow from the evidence. 

People v. Newton, 2018 IL 122958, ¶ 27. Rather, as discussed above, the trial court could draw a 

reasonable inference from the DNA evidence that there was contact, however slight, between 

defendant’s penis and N.M.’s anus. We find that this evidence was sufficient to establish the 

element of penetration. 
No. 1-22-1750 

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¶ 72 2. Unable to Consent

¶ 73 Defendant next contends that the State failed to prove that he knew N.M. was unable to 

consent. He asserts that N.M.’s testimony that she was intoxicated when she entered her apartment 

and vomited multiple times “is not supported.” He notes that although N.M. confirmed at trial that 

her roommate, Korbackova, would have helped her if she ever appeared to be in danger, she also 

testified that Korbackova did not stop him and N.M. when they entered the apartment and instead 

left them alone. He asserts that this circumstance contradicts N.M.’s claimed level of insobriety 

and appearance. Defendant further argues that Wedge’s testimony exaggerated N.M.’s intoxication 

level and is belied both by his failure to provide a description of N.M.’s incapacity to investigators 

prior to his testimony and by the circumstance that N.M. gave her address to the person who drove 

her home. 

¶ 74 Defendant also maintains that the trial court’s reliance on N.M.’s testimony about the 

ferociousness and persistence of her vomiting bouts was unreasonable where no other witness 

testified to seeing her vomit, the State did not introduce photographs of her vomit, and Busta did 

not describe N.M.’s clothes as having vomit on them. Finally, defendant argues that “it defies all 

logic” that, if he had known N.M. was unable to consent, he would have remained in a bed in 

which she threw up until she woke, given her his real name and number, and said goodbye. 

¶ 75 As noted above, in the context of criminal sexual assault, “consent” refers to the victim’s 

“freely given agreement to the act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct in question.” 720 ILCS 

5/11-0.1 (West 2012).2 An otherwise competent person may be found to be unable to consent 

2 At the time of the offense in 2012, the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) did not include a definition 

of the term “unable to give knowing consent.” See 720 ILCS 5/11-0.1 (West 2012). In 2023, the legislature 

amended the Code to define “unable to give knowing consent” as including “when the victim has taken an 

intoxicating substance or any controlled substance causing the victim to become unconscious of the nature 
No. 1-22-1750 

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because she is unconscious, asleep, or severely intoxicated. See People v. Vaughn, 2011 IL App 

(1st) 092834, ¶ 37; People v. Fisher, 281 Ill. App. 3d 395, 403 (1996). 

¶ 76 “Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that the 

fact exists.” 720 ILCS 5/4-5 (West 2012). Whether a person acted with knowledge may be inferred 

from circumstantial evidence. People v. White, 2016 IL App (2d) 140479, ¶ 37. “Circumstantial 

evidence is proof of certain facts and circumstances from which the trier of fact may infer other 

connected facts that human experience dictates usually and reasonably follow.” Id. Inferences as 

to the mental state of a defendant are a matter particularly within the province of the trier of fact. 

People v. Doolan, 2016 IL App (1st) 141780, ¶ 52. The only limitation on the use of circumstantial 

evidence is that the inferences drawn from the evidence must be reasonable. In re Gregory G., 396 

Ill. App. 3d 923, 929 (2009). 

¶ 77 In determining whether a defendant had knowledge that the victim was unable to give 

knowing consent to sexual contact, “the focus is on what the defendant knew or reasonably should 

have known regarding the victim’s willingness or ability to give knowing consent.” People v. 

Roldan, 2015 IL App (1st) 131962, ¶ 19. It follows that, if the defendant had reason to believe the 

victim was unable to give consent, he should have “abstain[ed] from engaging in any sexual 

contact with the victim.” Id. 

¶ 78 After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court could reasonably infer from the 

direct and circumstantial evidence presented at trial that defendant knew or should have known 

that N.M. was incapable of giving knowing consent to sexual acts. N.M. testified that about 30 

of the act, and this condition was known or reasonably should have been known by the accused.” See Pub. 

Act 102-1096, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending 720 ILCS 5/11-0.1).
No. 1-22-1750 

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minutes to an hour after having a second drink at Berlin, she began to feel like she never had before 

or since. She described the sensation as “almost *** like you can’t feel your body,” and stated she 

was confused and unsure of whom she was with and where she was going. Wedge testified that 

N.M. was heavily intoxicated before she left the nightclub. He stated that her speech was slurred, 

her eyes “were starting to go,” and she looked “mopey.” Then, outside Berlin, he saw her lying 

across the back seat of a car being driven by “Angel,” “completely out of it,” with her eyes rolled 

back and “slobbering” from the side of her mouth. See People v. Rossato, 2022 IL App (2d) 

210698-U, ¶ 52 (in affirming the defendant’s conviction for criminal sexual assault, finding that a 

defendant seeing an individual being helped walk up stairs and being put to bed in an intoxicated 

condition “would certainly have shown him that she was unable to knowingly consent to sex”); 

Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023) (nonprecedential orders entered on or after January 1, 

2021, may be cited for persuasive purposes).

¶ 79 In addition, N.M. testified that she did not remember entering the car, was “in and out” 

during the ride to her home with defendant, and, once there, stumbled inside with her clothes in 

disarray. The next thing she remembered was waking to defendant rubbing his penis on her thigh 

and telling him to stop because she was very sick. Although she was not sure if she vomited before 

that point, she testified to vomiting and dry-heaving repeatedly through the night. See Hills, 2021 

IL App (4th) 200220-U, ¶ 34 (in affirming the defendant’s conviction for criminal sexual assault, 

finding that, where an individual is unable to walk as a result of her intoxication, it “would be 

obvious” to a defendant that she is also unable to give knowing consent to sexual activity); Ill. S. 

Ct. R. 23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023) (nonprecedential orders entered on or after January 1, 2021, may 

be cited for persuasive purposes). 
No. 1-22-1750 

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¶ 80 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as we must, we 

conclude that a reasonable fact-finder could find, based on N.M.’s and Wedge’s testimony, not 

only that N.M. was severely intoxicated, but also that defendant had ample opportunity to observe 

her condition and thus was aware of her inability to give consent to sexual activity due to her 

impairment. Although defendant urges us to discredit N.M.’s and Wedge’s testimony regarding 

N.M.’s level of intoxication and illness, it is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine the 

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 

35. The trial court specifically found N.M. to be a credible witness and stated it found Wedge’s 

testimony to be relevant regarding N.M.’s severe impaired condition at the time she left Berlin. 

We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court regarding issues of credibility. See 

id. 

¶ 81 B. Admission of Other-Crimes Evidence

¶ 82 Defendant’s final contention on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in 

granting the State’s motion to admit other-crimes evidence. He argues that the trial court did not 

engage in even a “cursory assessment” of the other-crimes evidence. He asserts that the court’s 

failure to explain its ruling on the record or in a written order is, by itself, reason to reverse and 

remand for a new trial as, without the benefit of a record, this court should not assume that the trial 

court cautiously considered and meaningfully assessed the probative value of the evidence against 

its prejudicial impact. With regard to L.B.’s allegations specifically, defendant argues that they 

should not have been admitted because they were not proximate in time to the charged offenses, 

did not share any degree of factual similarity, and were unproven at the time of admission. 
No. 1-22-1750 

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¶ 83 “Other-crimes evidence” refers to misconduct or criminal acts of the defendant that 

occurred before or after the charged conduct, including acts of misconduct for which the defendant 

was not charged or convicted. People v. Sims, 2019 IL App (3d) 170417, ¶ 28. Evidence of other 

crimes may be admissible to show a defendant’s intent, modus operandi, identity, motive, or 

absence of mistake but, in general, inadmissible to show a defendant’s criminal propensity. People 

v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 170 (2003); see also Ill. R. Evid. 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). A 

“[d]efendant is entitled to have his guilt or innocence evaluated solely on the basis of the charged 

crime” and evidence of propensity to commit the charged offense raises the risk that a fact finder 

will convict a defendant because he is a “bad person deserving punishment.” Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 

at 170. 

¶ 84 However, section 115-7.3 of the Code, which applies to certain enumerated sex offenses, 

including criminal sexual assault, allows evidence of the defendant’s commission of another of the 

listed offenses to be admissible for “any matter to which it is relevant.” 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3(a)(1),

(b) (West 2018). “Any matter” specifically includes a defendant’s propensity to commit sex 

offenses. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 176; People v. Adams, 2023 IL App (2d) 220061, ¶ 69. This court 

has recognized that, in enacting section 115-7.3, the legislature intended to single out sex offenders 

in recognition of their propensity to repeat sex offenses. Adams, 2023 IL App (2d) 220061, ¶ 68

(citing People v. Childress, 338 Ill. App. 3d 540, 549 (2003)). 

¶ 85 Even if the State offers other-crimes evidence for a permissible purpose, the evidence may 

nevertheless be precluded if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. 

People v. Bochenek, 2020 IL App (2d) 170545, ¶ 56; see also 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3(c) (West 2018). 

In weighing the probative value against undue prejudice, the statute provides that a court may 
No. 1-22-1750 

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consider the proximity in time to the charged offense, the degree of factual similarity, or other 

relevant facts or circumstances. 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3(c) (West 2018). While other-crimes evidence 

must have some threshold similarity to the charged offense, “[w]here such evidence is not being 

offered under the modus operandi exception, ‘mere general areas of similarity will suffice’ to 

support admissibility.” Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 184 (quoting People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 372-

73 (1991)). Whether to admit other-crimes evidence is a decision that rests in the sound discretion 

of the trial court. Bochenek, 2020 IL App (2d) 170545, ¶ 56. An abuse of discretion occurs where 

the trial court’s determination is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person 

would take the view adopted by the trial court. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 182.

¶ 86 Here, we find that the trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion in admitting L.B.’s 

testimony. We agree with the court that “enough similarity” existed between N.M.’s and L.B.’s 

experiences to support admission of the other-crimes evidence. Both N.M. and L.B. were young 

women who had been drinking at a bar in Chicago, and both consumed drinks that they did not 

receive directly from a bartender. Both women reported feeling a level of impairment they had 

never experienced before or after the nights they were assaulted, including not being able to 

remember complete series of events. Both N.M. and L.B. described having disjointed or absent 

memories of leaving the respective bars they had been patronizing and of being driven or walking 

home. Defendant assaulted both women after they had showed outward signs of significant 

impairment; among other things, N.M. was lying down and “slobbering” in a car and then stumbled 

into her home, and L.B. was unable to work a swipe card to unlock her dormitory building’s entry 

door. Following the assaults, both women experienced prolonged bouts of repeated vomiting. 
No. 1-22-1750 

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¶ 87 We are aware that several differences exist between the two offenses, including, as 

defendant notes in his brief, that L.B. was assaulted outside by a person she had no recollection of 

seeing before, while N.M. spent a portion of her evening interacting with defendant at Berlin before 

their sexual encounter inside her home. However, the existence of some differences between 

offenses does not defeat admissibility, as no two independent crimes are identical. Donoho, 204 

Ill. 2d at 185. Moreover, the trial court did not admit evidence of L.B.’s case for purposes of 

showing modus operandi. As such, “general areas of similarity” between the incidents were 

sufficient to support admission. Id. at 184. Given the similarities between N.M.’s and L.B.’s 

experiences, we cannot say it was unreasonable, fanciful, or arbitrary for the trial court to 

determine that the probative value of the other-crimes evidence substantially outweighed its 

prejudicial effect. See id. at 182. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion. 

¶ 88 As a final matter, we address defendant’s assertion that the trial court did not engage in 

even a “cursory assessment” of the other-crimes evidence, and that its “failure to explain its ruling 

on the record or in a written order is by itself a reason to reverse this matter and grant [defendant] 

a new trial.” In making this argument, defendant relies on the following exhortation made by our 

supreme court in Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 186: “[W]e urge trial judges to be cautious in considering 

the admissibility of other-crimes evidence to show propensity by engaging in a meaningful 

assessment of the probative value versus the prejudicial impact of the evidence.”

¶ 89 Contrary to defendant’s argument, we find that the record shows the trial court in this case 

weighed the probative value of the other-crimes evidence against the prejudicial effect. The trial 

court noted that there were “issues” with the three other-crimes cases offered by the State and 

ultimately found the other-crimes evidence in L.B.’s case and one other case (which the State did 
No. 1-22-1750 

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not present at trial) bore “enough similarity” to N.M.’s case for admission for purposes other than 

to show modus operandi. Having made that finding, the trial court concluded that admission of 

L.B.’s evidence would be “way more probative rather than it is prejudicial to the defendant in this 

case.” 

¶ 90 While the trial court was not as verbose in its explanation as defendant wishes, the record 

nevertheless reveals that the court was not only aware of its duty to weigh the probative value 

against the prejudicial impact of the other-crimes evidence, but actually conducted that balancing 

test. See People v. Adams, 2023 IL App (2d) 220061, ¶ 72 (finding error where the trial court failed 

to make any reference to balancing the probative value and the prejudicial effect of other-crimes 

evidence offered pursuant to section 115-7.3). Accordingly, defendant’s argument fails.

¶ 91 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 92 For the reasons explained above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 93 Affirmed.