IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, :

Carmen Febo San Miguel, James Solomon, :

John Greiner, John Capowski, Gretchen :

Brandt, Thomas Rentschler, Mary Elizabeth :

Lawn, Lisa Isaacs, Don Lancaster, Jordi :

Comas, Robert Smith, William Marx, :

Richard Mantell, Priscilla McNulty, :

Thomas Ulrich, Robert McKinstry, :

Mark Lichty, Lorraine Petrosky, :

Petitioners :

:

v. : No. 261 M.D. 2017

:

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; :

The Pennsylvania General Assembly; :

Thomas W. Wolf, In His Capacity :

As Governor of Pennsylvania; :

Michael J. Stack III, In His Capacity As :

Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania And :

President of the Pennsylvania Senate; :

Michael C. Turzai, In His Capacity As :

Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of :

Representatives; Joseph B. Scarnati III, :

In His Capacity As Pennsylvania Senate :

President Pro Tempore; Robert Torres, :

In His Capacity As Acting Secretary of :

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; :

Jonathan M. Marks, In His Capacity :

As Commissioner of the Bureau of :

Commissions, Elections, and Legislation :

of the Pennsylvania Department of State, :

Respondents :

ORDER

NOW, this 8th day of February, 2018, upon consideration of the 

Motion of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to Report 
Unreported Opinion and petitioners’ answer thereto, said motion is granted. It is 

hereby ordered that the Memorandum and Order filed November 22, 2017 shall be 

designated OPINION rather than MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, and it shall be 

reported.

 

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, :

Carmen Febo San Miguel, James Solomon, :

John Greiner, John Capowski, Gretchen :

Brandt, Thomas Rentschler, Mary Elizabeth :

Lawn, Lisa Isaacs, Don Lancaster, Jordi :

Comas, Robert Smith, William Marx, :

Richard Mantell, Priscilla McNulty, :

Thomas Ulrich, Robert McKinstry, :

Mark Lichty, Lorraine Petrosky, :

Petitioners :

:

v. : No. 261 M.D. 2017

:

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; :

The Pennsylvania General Assembly; :

Thomas W. Wolf, In His Capacity :

As Governor of Pennsylvania; :

Michael J. Stack III, In His Capacity As :

Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania And :

President of the Pennsylvania Senate; :

Michael C. Turzai, In His Capacity As :

Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of :

Representatives; Joseph B. Scarnati III, :

In His Capacity As Pennsylvania Senate :

President Pro Tempore; Robert Torres, :

In His Capacity As Acting Secretary of :

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; :

Jonathan M. Marks, In His Capacity :

As Commissioner of the Bureau of :

Commissions, Elections, and Legislation :

of the Pennsylvania Department of State, :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: November 22, 2017
2

Presently before the Court for disposition are various discovery matters, 

which raise, inter alia, the applicability of Article 2, Section 15 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution, also known as the Speech and Debate Clause. Respondents the 

Pennsylvania General Assembly, Speaker of Pennsylvania House of Representatives

Michael C. Turzai, and President Pro Tempore of the Pennsylvania Senate Joseph B. 

Scarnati III (Legislative Respondents) contend that much, if not all, of the discovery 

that Petitioners seek in this matter is barred by the immunity afforded under the 

Speech and Debate Clause, which Legislative Respondents maintain is absolute. 

Petitioners, by contrast, contend that federal courts hearing gerrymandering 

challenges throughout the country have recognized only a qualified legislative 

privilege, allowing discovery of the type that Petitioners seek here. See, e.g., 

Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 114 F. Supp. 3d 323 (E.D. Va. 2015). 

Petitioners also directed the Court to the Florida Supreme Court decision in League 

of Women Voters of Florida v. Florida House of Representatives, 132 So. 3d 135 

(Fla. 2013) (LWV of Fl.), which also recognized only a qualified legislative privilege 

in the context of a gerrymandering challenge.

Pennsylvania’s Speech and Debate Clause provides, in relevant part: 

“The members of the General Assembly . . . for any speech or debate in either House 

. . . shall not be questioned in any other place.” Pa. Const., Art. 2, § 15. The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the scope of Pennsylvania’s Speech and 

Debate Clause is indistinguishable from its counterpart in the United States 

Constitution. Consumers Educ. and Prot. Ass’n v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 675, 681

(Pa. 1977). Following United States Supreme Court precedent, the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court held that the Speech and Debate Clause must be construed “broadly

in order to protect legislators from judicial interference with their legitimate 
3

legislative activities.” Id. at 680-81 (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court has 

further explained the breadth of the protection as follows:

[T]he immunity of the legislators must be absolute as to 

their actions within the “legitimate legislative sphere.” 

To accomplish this we must not only insulate the legislator 

against the results of litigation brought against him for acts 

in the discharge of the responsibilities of his office, but 

also relieve him of the responsibility of defending against 

such claims.

Consumer Party of Pa. v. Cmwlth., 507 A.2d 323, 331 (Pa. 1986), abrogated on 

other grounds by Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. 

Cmwlth., 877 A.2d 383 (Pa. 2005). “It is undisputed that legislative immunity 

[under the Speech and Debate Clause] precludes inquiry into the motives or purposes 

of a legislative act.” Government of the Virgin Islands v. Lee, 775 F.2d 514, 522

(3d Cir. 1985).

Not all activities of state legislators, however, are protected. To be 

protected, the activity in question must fall within “the sphere of legitimate 

legislative activity.” Id.; see Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624-25 (1972); 

Firetree Ltd. v. Fairchild, 920 A.2d 913, 920 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), appeal denied, 

946 A.2d 689 (Pa. 2008); but see United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972) 

(noting that legislators often engage in activities—e.g., constituent service and 

newsletters—that are not purely legislative and thus not protected by Speech and 

Debate Clause of United States Constitution). The protections of the Speech and 

Debate Clause are not, however, confined to the walls of the Pennsylvania House or 

Pennsylvania Senate Chambers. They also extend to “fact-finding, information 

gathering, and investigative activities,” which “are essential prerequisites to the 

drafting of bills and the enlightened debate over proposed legislation.” Government 

of the Virgin Islands, 775 F.2d at 521. It is also now well-settled that the protections 
4

of the Speech and Debate Clause extend to legislative staff. See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 

616-22.

Underlying the speech and debate privilege is the preservation of the 

structure in our state constitution of separate but equal branches of government: 

“Two interrelated rationales underlie the Speech or Debate Clause: first, the need to 

avoid intrusion by the Executive or Judiciary into the affairs of a coequal branch, 

and second, the desire to protect legislative independence.” United States v. Gillock, 

445 U.S. 360, 369 (1980) (emphasis added). “In our system, ‘the clause serves the 

additional function of reinforcing the separation of powers so deliberately 

established by the Founders.’” Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 

502 (1975) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966)). As a coequal 

branch with the Pennsylvania General Assembly, Pennsylvania state courts are so 

constrained. Federal courts, however, are not. Federal courts are not compelled to 

honor state constitutional protections afforded to state legislatures. This explains 

why the federal gerrymandering cases on which Petitioners rely are neither 

dispositive nor persuasive. The opinions in those cases invariably address only 

whether state legislators are entitled to “state legislative immunity,” a qualified

privilege sourced not in constitutional law, but in federal common law. 

In Bethune-Hill, an opinion Petitioners rely upon, the plaintiffs initiated 

a federal lawsuit, challenging certain state house districts as unlawful racial 

gerrymanders in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 

Constitution. The plaintiffs served discovery on the Virginia House of Delegates 

(Va. House), seeking both internal and external communications relating to the 

redistricting process. The Va. House asserted “legislative privilege” to shield the 

production of certain documents. In addressing the claim of privilege, the District 
5

Court distinguished legislative immunity and privilege for federal legislators, which 

is derived from the Speech and Debate Clause of the United States Constitution, 

from state legislative immunity recognized by federal courts:

[F]ederal legislators are entitled to an absolute legislative 

immunity grounded in the Constitution for any civil or 

criminal action based in substance or evidence upon acts 

performed within the “sphere of legitimate legislative 

activity.” This immunity is further safeguarded by an 

absolute legislative privilege preventing compelled 

testimony or documentary disclosure regarding legislative 

activities in support of such claims.

. . .

State legislative immunity differs, however, from 

federal legislative immunity in its source of authority, 

purpose, and degree of protection. Unlike federal 

legislative immunity, which is grounded in constitutional 

law, state legislative immunity in federal court is governed 

by federal common law. Moreover, the principles 

animating immunity for state legislators under common 

law—while significant—are distinguishable from these 

principles underlying the constitutional immunity 

afforded federal legislators.

Bethune-Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 332-33 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The 

District Court specifically noted that the “separation of powers” concerns implicated 

where a federal court interferes in the affairs of Congress are of greater weight and 

importance than any concern about federal interference in a state legislative process. 

Id. at 333. Moreover, the District Court cited to the Supremacy Clause of the United 

States Constitution as empowering the federal courts to enforce federal law over any 

competing state protections. Id. Under federal common law, state legislative 

privilege and state legislative immunity is “qualified based on the nature of the claim 

at issue.” Id. at 334.
6

Legislative Respondents clearly are not invoking qualified legislative 

privilege and immunity under federal common law; rather, they are invoking 

absolute legislative privilege and immunity based on the Speech and Debate Clause 

of the Pennsylvania Constitution. This Court is as duty bound to honor this 

constitutional provision in a lawsuit involving the actions of state legislators as is a 

federal court bound to honor the identical absolute legislative privilege and 

immunity sourced in the United States Constitution in a lawsuit involving the actions 

of federal legislators.1

Relying, then, on relevant state and federal precedent in this area, the 

Court concludes that Legislative Respondents in this case enjoy absolute legislative 

immunity under Article 2, Section 15 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. This 

immunity extends to activities within the “sphere of legitimate legislative activity.” 

In their Petition for Review, Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of 

the 2011 reapportionment of Pennsylvania’s congressional seats and the resulting 

congressional district maps. It is undisputed that Pennsylvania drew 

the 2011 congressional map through a legislative process, which resulted in the 

Congressional Redistricting Act of 2011, Act of December 22, 2011, P.L. 599, 

25 P.S. §§ 3596.101-.1510 (Act 131 of 2011). Accordingly, the consideration and 

 

1 Petitioners’ reliance on LWV of Fl. is similarly misplaced. Although that case, like this 

one, involved a state court challenge to a congressional redistricting plan and the assertion of a 

legislative privilege in response to discovery requests, different substantive law dictated the 

outcome in that case. Specifically, as the Florida Supreme Court noted in its opinion, the Florida 

Constitution does not include a speech and debate clause. LWV of Fl., 132 So. 3d at 143. In the 

absence of an express legislative privilege, the Florida Supreme Court, recognizing separation of 

powers concerns, opted to adopt a common law qualified legislative privilege, similar to that 

recognized by federal courts. See Bethune-Hill. Additionally, the state supreme courts in Virginia 

and Rhode Island, states that have a speech and debate clause in their state constitutions, have held 

that the speech and debate clause precluded access to legislative materials regarding redistricting. 

See Edwards v. Vesilind, 790 S.E. 2d 469 (Va. 2016); Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976 (R.I. 1984). 
7

passage of Act 131 of 2011 was unquestionably a legitimate legislative activity. It is 

also beyond question that the activities of state legislators and their staff that fall 

within the sphere of this legitimate legislative activity are protected under the Speech 

and Debate Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Accordingly, this Court lacks 

the authority to compel testimony or the production of documents relative to the 

intentions, motivations, and activities of state legislators and their staff with respect 

to the consideration and passage of Act 131 of 2011.

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2017, with the foregoing legal 

principles in mind, the Court now considers the current discovery disputes relating 

to the 2011 Plan2as raised in (1) the objections of Legislative Respondents to 

Petitioners’ notice of intent to serve subpoenas pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 4009.21, 

filed with this Court on August 9, 2017, (2) Legislative Respondents’ objections to 

Petitioners’ notice of intent to serve a subpoena pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 4009.21 

on Thomas W. Corbett, former Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

(Governor Corbett), filed with this Court on August 28, 2017, (3) Petitioners’ motion 

to strike objections to their notice of intent to serve subpoenas, filed with this Court 

on September 12, 2017, (4) Legislative Respondents’ and the General Assembly’s 

response to Petitioners’ motion to strike objections to their notice of intent to serve 

subpoenas filed with this Court on September 26, 2017, and (5) assertions of 

privilege by Legislative Respondents with respect to Petitioners’ first set of 

interrogatories and document requests, and makes the following rulings:

 

2 For purposes of the subpoenas, Petitioners define the “2011 Plan” as 

the 2011 Congressional Redistricting Plan for Pennsylvania that was signed into 

law in 2011 by the Governor of Pennsylvania, any preliminary or draft plans that 

preceded the 2011 Congressional Redistricting Plan, and any proposal, strategies 

or plans to redraw Pennsylvania’s congressional districts following the 2010 

Census.
8

1. Legislative Subpoenas: Legislative Respondents object to 

the 11 subpoenas noticed by Petitioners and directed to the following individuals 

whom Legislative Respondents describe as current and/or former employees,

legislative aides, consultants, experts, and agents of Legislative Respondents: Tony 

Aliano, Erik Arneson, Heather Cevasco, Krysjan Callahan, Drew Crompton, Glenn 

Grell, John Memmi, William Schaller, Dave Thomas, Gail Reinard, and David W. 

Woods (collectively referred to as the Legislative Subpoenas). The Legislative 

Subpoenas are hereby QUASHED, as the Court lacks the authority under the Speech 

and Debate Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution to compel the production of the 

documents sought therein. In light of this ruling, the Court need not consider the 

other bases for objection raised by Legislative Respondents. 

2. Third-Party Subpoenas: Legislative Respondents object to 

the subpoenas noticed by Petitioners and directed to the Republican National 

Committee (RNC), the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), the 

Republican State Leadership Committee (RSLC), and the State Government 

Leadership Foundation (SGLF) (collectively, Entities), and to Adam Kincaid and 

Thomas B. Hofeller (Individuals), whom Legislative Respondents believe are or 

have been associated with the RNC or the NRCC (collectively, the Third-Party

Subpoenas).

3

 The subpoenas directed to the Entities seek: 

1. All documents referring or relating to the 2011 Plan, 

including, but not limited to:

a. All proposals, analyses, memoranda, notes, and 

calendar entries in whatever medium (e.g., paper, 

computerized format, e-mail, photograph, 

 

3

In addition to objecting based on the Speech and Debate Clause, Legislative Respondents 

also raised objections on the bases of a privilege under the First Amendment, attorney-client 

privilege, attorney work product doctrine, the deliberative process privilege, and the executive 

privilege, and that the requests are overly broad and not relevant to Petitioners’ claims. 
9

audiotape) they are maintained referring or relating 

to the 2011 Plan.

b. All documents referring or relating to all 

considerations or criteria that were used to develop 

the 2011 Plan, such as compactness, contiguity, 

keeping political units or communities together, 

equal population, race or ethnicity, incumbent 

protection, a voter[’s] or area’s likelihood of 

supporting Republican or Democratic candidates, 

and any others.

c. All documents referring or relating to how each 

consideration or criterion was measured, including 

the specific data and specific formulas used in 

assessing compactness and partisanship. 

d. All documents referring or relating to how each 

consideration or criterion affected the 2011 Plan, 

including any rule or principle guiding the use of 

each consideration or criteria in developing the 

2011 Plan. 

e. All communications since January 1, 2009, 

referring or relating to the 2011 Plan, including all 

communications to, from, or between the following 

organizations or individuals referring or relating to 

the 2011 Plan: [the RNC, the RSLC, REDMAP, the 

SGLF, Governor Corbett, former State Senators 

Pileggi and Brubaker, State Senators Scarnati, 

McIlhinney, Corman, Folmer, White, State 

Representatives Metcalfe, Grove, Cox, Dunbar, 

Evankovich, Gabler, Grell, Hahn, Kauffman, 

Knowles, Krieger, Mustio, Roae, Schlegel-Culver, 

Stern, any other member of the General Assembly, 

Thomas B. Hofeller, David W. Woods, Erik 

Arneson, John Memmi, William Schaller, Drew 

Crompton, Dave Thomas, Krysjan Callahan, Tony 

Aliano, Glenn Grell, Gail Reinard, Heather 

Cevasco, and the Republican Party of 

Pennsylvania.]

f. All communications with any consultants, 

advisors, attorneys, or political scientists referring 

or relating to the 2011 Plan.
10

g. All communications with any committees, 

legislators, or legislative staffers referring or 

relating to the 2011 Plan.

2. All documents referring or relating to the planning, 

purpose, execution, and results of Project REDMAP from 

its inception through the date of service of this subpoena.

3. All communications and reports to donors or 

contributors to the [RSLC] or the [SGLF] that refer, 

reflect, or discuss the purpose of or the strategy behind the 

REDMAP project or which report or evaluate the success 

or effectiveness of the REDMAP project in bringing about 

the reapportionment of congressional districts following 

the 2010 Census.

4. All PowerPoint slides from any training on redistricting

presented to members of the Pennsylvania General 

Assembly (or their agents, employees, consultants, or 

representatives) or to Pennsylvania Governor Thomas 

Corbett. 

The requests set forth in paragraph 1 of the subpoenas directed to the Individuals 

seek all documents referring or relating to the 2011 Plan, including, but not limited 

to: 

a. All proposals, analyses, memoranda, notes, and 

calendar entries in whatever medium (e.g., paper, 

computerized format, e-mail, photograph, audiotape) they 

are maintained referring or relating to the 2011 Plan.

b. All documents referring or relating to all considerations 

or criteria that were used to develop the 2011 Plan, such 

as compactness, contiguity, keeping political units or 

communities together, equal population, race or ethnicity, 

incumbent protection, a voter[’s] or area’s likelihood of 

supporting Republican or Democratic candidates, and any 

others.

c. All documents referring or relating to how each 

consideration or criterion was measured, including the 

specific data and specific formulas used in assessing 

compactness and partisanship. 

d. All documents referring or relating to how each 

consideration or criterion affected the 2011 Plan, 
11

including any rule or principle guiding the use of each 

consideration or criteria in developing the 2011 Plan. 

e. All communications since January 1, 2009, with any 

affiliate of the Republican Party, including, but not limited 

to, the [RNC, the NRCC, the RSLC, REDMAP, or the 

SGLF that refer or relate to the 2011 Plan.

f. All communications with any consultants, advisors, 

attorneys, or political scientists referring or relating to the 

2011 Plan.

g. All communications with any committees, legislators, 

or legislative staffers referring or relating to the 2011 Plan.

Paragraph 1(g) of each of the Third-Party Subpoenas is hereby 

STRICKEN based on the Speech and Debate Clause of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution.

Paragraph 1(e) of the subpoenas directed at the Entities is hereby 

STRICKEN based on the Speech and Debate Clause of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution to the extent that it seeks communications with former State Senators 

Pileggi and Brubaker; State Senators Scarnati, McIlhinney, Corman, Folmer, and 

White; State Representatives Metcalfe, Grove, Cox, Dunbar, Evankovich, Gabler, 

Grell, Hahn, Kauffman, Knowles, Krieger, Mustio, Roae, Schlegel-Culver, Stern, 

any other member of the General Assembly; David W. Woods, Erik Arneson, John 

Memmi, William Schaller, Drew Crompton, Dave Thomas, Krysjan Callahan, Tony 

Aliano, Glenn Grell, Gail Reinard, and Heather Cevasco.

As to the remaining categories of documents sought in the Third-Party 

Subpoenas, it is not clear from the wording that any and all responsive documents 

from the Entities and Individuals would fall within the scope of the indemnity and 

privilege protected by the Speech and Debate Clause of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution. Accordingly, the Court will not strike the Third-Party Subpoenas 

outright. Nonetheless, recognizing the Court’s inability to compel production of 
12

testimony or documents with respect to matters protected by the Speech and Debate 

Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the remaining categories of documents 

sought in the Third-Party Subpoenas SHALL BE INTERPETED as excluding those 

documents that reflect the intentions, motivations, and activities of state legislators 

and their staff with respect to the consideration and passage of Act 131 of 2011.

3. Governor Corbett Subpoena: Legislative Respondents object to 

Petitioners’ notice of intent to serve a subpoena pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 4009.21 

on Governor Corbett, filed with this Court on August 28, 2017.

4

 The subpoena seeks 

all documents referring or relating to the 2011 Plan, including, but not limited to:

a. All proposals, analyses, memoranda, notes, and 

calendar entries in whatever medium (e.g., paper, 

computerized format, e-mail, photograph, audiotape) they 

are maintained referring or relating to the 2011 Plan.

b. All documents referring or relating to all considerations 

or criteria that were used to develop the 2011 Plan, such 

as compactness, contiguity, keeping political units or 

communities together, equal population, race or ethnicity, 

incumbent protection, a voter or area’s likelihood of 

supporting Republican or Democratic candidates, and any 

others.

c. All documents referring or relating to how each 

consideration or criterion was measured, including the 

specific data and specific formulas used in assessing 

compactness and partisanship. 

d. All documents referring or relating to how each 

consideration or criterion affected the 2011 Plan,

including any rule or principle guiding the use of each 

consideration or criteria in developing the 2011 Plan. 

e. All communications since January 1, 2009 with any 

affiliate of the Republican Party, including, but not limited 

 

4

In addition to objecting based on the Speech and Debate Clause, Legislative Respondents 

also raised objections on the bases of a privilege under the First Amendment, attorney-client 

privilege, attorney work-product doctrine, deliberative process privilege and executive privilege, 

and that the requests are overly broad and not relevant to Petitioners’ claims. 
13

to, the [RNC, the NRCC, the RSLC, the REDistrictring 

Majority Project (REDMAP), or the SGLF] that refer or 

relate to the 2011 Plan.

f. All communications with any consultants, advisors, 

attorneys, or political scientists referring or relating to the 

2011 Plan.

g. All communications with any committees, legislators, 

or legislative staffers referring or relating to the 2011 Plan. 

It not clear from the wording that any and all responsive documents 

from Governor Corbett would fall within the scope of the indemnity and privilege 

protected by the Speech and Debate Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 

Accordingly, the Court will not strike the subpoena outright. Nonetheless, 

recognizing the Court’s inability to compel production of testimony or documents 

with respect to matters protected by the Speech and Debate Clause of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution, the categories of documents sought from Governor 

Corbett SHALL BE INTERPETED as excluding those documents that reflect the 

intentions, motivations, and activities of state legislators and their staff with respect 

to the consideration and passage of Act 131 of 2011.

4. Nothing in this Memorandum and Order precludes Legislative 

Respondents from contesting the admissibility of any document secured from a third 

party on the basis of legislative immunity and privilege under the Speech and Debate 

Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. To the extent that the categories set forth 

in the subpoenas may be overbroad or not likely to lead to relevant evidence, the 

parties and recipients of the subpoenas shall work together to refine the categories 

in an appropriate and expeditious manner. Nothing in this Memorandum and Order 

precludes the recipients from interposing their own timely objections following 

service. Finally, Legislative Respondents cannot raise the Governor’s deliberate 

process privilege or the executive privilege.
14

5. Attorney-Client Privilege and Attorney Work Product Doctrine: 

Legislative Respondents cannot raise objections based on attorney-client privilege 

or attorney work product doctrine on behalf of entities or persons to whom a 

subpoena will be directed. 

6. Privilege Log: Every responsive document withheld pursuant to 

any asserted privilege or doctrine must be identified on a privilege log served with 

the response to the subpoena. 

7. Petitioners are DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Order with any 

subpoenas served pursuant to the Order. 

8. Petitioners’ First Set of Requests for Production and First Set of 

Interrogatories: Petitioners have served on all Respondents a First Set of Requests 

for Production and First Set of Interrogatories, to which Legislative Respondents 

interposed objections and claimed privileges, including the protections of the Speech 

and Debate Clause. The Court, having reviewed the document requests and 

interrogatories, concludes, based on the above legal analysis, that the Court lacks the 

authority to compel Legislative Respondents to produce documents or provide 

information responsive to the interrogatories, as all topics set forth therein fall within 

the sphere of legitimate legislative activity under the Speech and Debate Clause of 

the Pennsylvania Constitution. It is, therefore, unnecessary for the Court to address 

the other objection and privileges raised by the Legislative Respondents.

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge