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S. HRG. 111–778 

FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN THE FY11 

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BUDGET 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 24, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Clinton, Hon. Hillary R., Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, DC .................................................................................................................. 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senators: 

John F. Kerry ............................................................................................ 40 

Richard G. Lugar ....................................................................................... 69 

Russell D. Feingold ................................................................................... 109 

Jim Webb ................................................................................................... 114 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 3 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut, prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 40 

(III)

(1) 

FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN THE FY11 

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BUDGET 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, Menendez, 

Cardin, Casey, Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, Lugar, Isakson, Risch, 

DeMint, and Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing will come to order. 

Madam Secretary, we are delighted to welcome you back here before the committee. If I can just say quickly, as soon as we have 

a quorum, Madam Secretary, we are going to interrupt for a goal 

that I know you will support wholeheartedly, which is to get a 

bunch of State Department nominations out of here. [Laughter.] 

And a couple of legislative items. So if you don’t mind, we will 

interrupt to do that. This was a meeting that we had scheduled 

during the snowstorm. So it obviously didn’t take place. 

I don’t think any of us could think of a time in our history when 

we have had a greater need for energetic diplomacy to make the 

case for America globally. And we appreciate your incredibly hard 

work and your many travels in the effort to do just that, and we 

welcome the chance to hear from you today. 

The international affairs budget is the backbone of our civilian 

efforts worldwide. And from fighting HIV/AIDS to supporting our 

aid workers and our diplomats on the front-line states like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, this budget secures the tools that we need 

for a more effective foreign policy. 

I think the Secretary would join me in agreeing that the funds 

we have are not all that many of us wish we could have. But we 

are living in a difficult fiscal environment, and they are, nevertheless, vitally needed for our national security. 

As Defense Secretary Gates said in expressing his regret that 

America effectively abandoned Afghanistan after the 1980s, ‘‘If we 

abandon these countries once we are in there and engaged, there 

is a very real possibility that we will pay a higher price in the end.’’ 

It is with this history in mind and the lessons learned the hard 

way that we turn to the budget today to have this discussion. This 

2 

year’s total international affairs budget request of $58.5 billion represents a 2.8-percent increase over fiscal year 2010 amounts, including this year’s supplemental. This money is a fraction of a fraction—just 1.4 percent—of the overall budget of our country. 

We are discussing just one-sixteenth of our national security budget, and compare that with the 2011 Defense budget of $708 

billion. It is clear, at least to this Senator, that our foreign policy 

is somewhat out of balance. 

This year’s budget represents the beginning of our efforts to 

change that and to move funds that had migrated elsewhere back 

to the State Department budget. One-quarter of the additional $6 

billion in this budget for Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan is for programs previously funded through the Defense Department, including Iraqi police training and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund. As we grow our civilian capacity, we are going to have 

to defend civilian budgets for programs that are literally vital to 

our security no matter how they are funded. 

As we discussed last year, I believe that Congress ought to get 

back into the business of writing authorizing legislation. Senator 

Lugar and I have recently introduced legislation authorizing the 

State Department’s management and operations and passed the 

Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act out of this 

committee. 

Madam Secretary, I am pleased to support your budget request 

for robust funding for the international affairs budget, and I look 

forward to hearing from you, as I know all the members of the committee do here, on a full range of foreign policy challenges, which 

is always what these hearings take advantage of. 

For my part, if I can just say very, very quickly, I am really 

pleased to see that this budget includes a 38-percent increase in 

funding to address international climate change, especially in the 

wake of Copenhagen. I want to just say something about that. 

A lot has been said about what wasn’t accomplished at Copenhagen. But the fact is that all the parties who went there knew 

there wasn’t going to be, nor was there an expectation of a final 

treaty or agreement. What was accomplished has not received the 

attention that it deserves. 

The Copenhagen Accord united the world’s foremost emitters and 

most of the rest of the nations behind an unprecedented new commitment to reduce emissions and report on their progress. And for 

the first time, nations agreed to financing targets. We were able to 

convince others to take action in large part because we made commitments ourselves. 

President Obama told the world, ‘‘I am confident that America 

will fulfill the commitments that we have made—cutting our emissions in the range of 17 percent by 2020, and by more than 80 percent by 2050 in line with final legislation. We have charted our 

course, we have made our commitments, and we will do what we 

say.’’ And those are the words of the President. 

As a country, we have put our credibility on the line, and I look 

forward to working with members of this committee and others, as 

we are now with Senator Graham, Senator Lieberman, and others, 

to get a comprehensive energy, jobs, energy independence, pollution 

reduction, and climate bill through the Senate. 

3 

Madam Secretary, I am eager to hear your thoughts about how 

you think we can keep our word on the range of issues, not just 

from the Copenhagen Accord, but the adaptation assistance and 

the other issues. Needless to say, there are more issues on the 

table perhaps than at any time in recent memory, all of them consequential—from Iran to North Korea, the Middle East—and you 

are engaged in all of them. We look forward to having a good discussion with you about them today. 

Let me just thank you again on behalf of the country. I think all 

of us are appreciative of your extraordinary expenditure of energy. 

And we are particularly grateful to your Department and others for 

the emergency response to Haiti. It has been a tremendous effort. 

I want to thank many of the people that we have worked with 

directly who have helped families through a very difficult period, 

some in Massachusetts, and elsewhere. We are grateful to you and 

to our country, really, for the response. It has been a remarkable 

response and, I think, appropriate. 

Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Secretary 

Clinton. We are pleased to have the opportunity to examine not 

only the State Department budget, but also the priorities and policies reflected in its numbers. 

Our discussion of the foreign affairs budget comes at a time of 

great domestic economic stress. Many American families are dealing with lost jobs, falling income, and declining security. Our 

Nation is also attempting to address a national debt situation that 

limits our policy options and could have grave economic consequences in the near future. In this context, our foreign affairs 

budget must efficiently deal with our most immediate problems, as 

well as address negative trends that could undermine the breathing space necessary to promote domestic recovery and solvency. 

We should start with the recognition that secure international 

conditions are inherently fragile. We have to expect and prepare for 

international political, economic, and security shocks such as wars, 

terrorist attacks, energy disruptions, and even natural disasters, as 

we have seen in Haiti. World events can undercut our own economy’s ability to recover and necessitate emergency expenditures that 

put further pressure on the national budget. This is especially true 

at a time of global economic stress. We know from history that societies living with severe economic conditions often do not make good 

political choices. Economic desperation can spawn ethnic rivalries, 

demagogic governments, extremism, and violent conflict within and 

between nations. 

The United States is heavily engaged in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 

Pakistan. These front-line states will require substantial resources, 

and it is vital that these funds are used effectively. Each of these 

countries presents unique and difficult transparency challenges. If 

our investments are to be successful, we must ensure that strong 

implementation, monitoring, and review mechanisms are in place 

that can account for the vast amounts projected to be spent in the 

coming years. 

4 

Beyond areas of heavy diplomatic and military presence, the 

most critical expenditures are those that prevent problems from 

spiraling into crises. In my judgment WMD proliferation, energy 

insecurity, and global food shortages are the underlying threats 

most likely to create the type of instability that can lead to conflict 

and thereby derail our domestic agenda. I know the President and 

Secretary Clinton share my concern with these problems. 

I appreciate that additional funding is being devoted to the State 

Department’s nonproliferation and energy diplomacy activities. 

Countering the spread of biological, nuclear, and chemical threats 

requires robust engagement around the globe, and Department 

nonproliferation experts are making important contributions in the 

former Soviet States, Iraq, and elsewhere. State Department efforts 

to expand the Nunn-Lugar programs in front-line states will only 

grow in the years ahead. Likewise, bolstering multilateral nonproliferation mechanisms, such as the International Atomic Energy 

Agency is a vital contribution to meeting the threats of WMD. 

The Foreign Relations Committee has paid much attention to the 

impacts of energy security on our foreign policy. I am encouraged 

that more emphasis is being given to energy concerns at high levels 

of the State Department. Our energy crisis is not defined by any 

single threat. Our current energy mix produces near-term concerns 

of foreign oil supply manipulation and price volatility, which will 

grow over time. Wasted economic gains from attainable energy efficiencies are a drag on economic recovery. We are also concerned 

about the possible crises that could occur if dramatic climate 

change takes hold. While some threats share solutions, others require us to prioritize policies commensurate with the relative immediacy of these threats. 

I especially appreciate the strong and visible commitment that 

Secretary Clinton has made to addressing global hunger. Unless 

nations work together to reverse negative trends in agricultural 

productivity, we may experience frequent food riots and perhaps 

warfare over food resources. We almost certainly will have to contend with mass migration and intensifying global health issues 

stemming from malnutrition. 

With these factors in mind, Senator Casey and I introduced the 

Global Food Security Act last year. We are hopeful that it will 

serve both as a practical starting point for improving the efficiency 

of U.S. and global efforts in this area and as a rallying point for 

those who agree that food security should play a much larger role 

in our national security strategy. 

The Lugar-Casey bill, which was passed by the Foreign Relations 

Committee on May 13, 2009, is the product of more than 2 years 

of study involving numerous foreign country visits and consultations with agriculture and development experts. 

Over the course of the last year, the administration, under Secretary Clinton’s leadership, has undertaken its own intensive study 

of food security. As we have compared notes with administration 

officials, it has become clear that the Secretary’s Global Hunger 

and Food Security Initiative has reached many of the same conclusions as we reached on the most efficient ways to expand food production and address hunger. Both the Lugar-Casey bill and the 

Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative focus on increasing 

5 

agricultural productivity and incomes, promoting research and 

technology, being attentive to the special role of women farmers, 

and emphasizing the nutritional needs of children. Both initiatives 

would construct partnerships with host country governments, indigenous organizations, institutions of higher learning, and the private sector. I look forward to working with Secretary Clinton to 

pass the Global Food Security bill. 

I would also mention the importance of fixing our foreign assistance programs. If we are to avoid inefficient experimentation, 

USAID must have a decisionmaking role and the capacity to evaluate programs and disseminate information about best practices and 

methods. These goals are reflected in the bill that Senator Kerry 

and I introduced last year, S. 1524, the Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act. 

I am eager to review the State Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and the National Security Council’s 

Presidential Study Directive on Development when they are ready. 

But in the meantime, Congress should be offering its own ideas on 

how to improve our Government’s development capacity. And the 

Kerry-Lugar foreign assistance reform bill has strong support in 

the aid community and is cosponsored by a bipartisan group of 24 

Senators, 11 of whom are members of the Foreign Relations Committee. This level of backing for a bill related to foreign assistance 

is extremely rare. The bill has garnered wide support because it 

strengthens USAID and emphasizes greater evaluation and transparency of our foreign assistance programs to ensure we maximize 

the dollars that are available. I am hopeful that the executive 

branch will recognize that a bill cosponsored by a majority of the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee and nearly a quarter of the 

full Senate should be given substantial weight in its review 

process. 

We appreciate very much that Secretary Clinton is with us 

today. We look forward to our discussion on these and other 

matters. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. 

We do have a quorum now. Let me move quickly to the agenda 

so we can get to the Secretary’s testimony. 

[Recessed.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Madam Secretary, thank you for letting us do 

that, and we look forward to your testimony. I appreciate it. 

STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY R. CLINTON, SECRETARY OF 

STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee. It is a real pleasure to be 

back here in the Senate, to be with all of you and participate in 

this important hearing. 

When I was last here to discuss our budget, I emphasized my 

commitment to elevating diplomacy and development as core pillars of American power. And since then, I have been heartened by 

the bipartisan support of this committee and the rest of Congress. 

I want to thank the chairman and the ranking member and all 

of the members for your bipartisan support in moving State 

6 

Department nominees. One hundred fourteen were confirmed in 

2009. We are now looking to get up and get nominated for your 

consideration the leadership team at AID, and we are very grateful 

for the expeditious support, and we hope they can move quickly 

when they hit the floor. But I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And let me also take this opportunity to express appreciation on 

behalf of the men and women who work every day at the State 

Department, at USAID, here in our country and around the world 

to put our foreign policy in action. 

The budget we are presenting today is designed to protect America and Americans and to advance our interests and values. Our 

fiscal year 2011 request for the State Department and USAID 

totals $52.8 billion. That is a $4.9 billion increase over 2010. 

But as the chairman has pointed out, of that increase, $3.6 billion will go to supporting efforts in front-line states—Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, and Iraq. Other funding will grow by $1.3 billion, which 

is a 2.7-percent increase that will help address global challenges, 

strengthen partnerships, and ensure that the State Department 

and USAID are equipped with the right people and resources. 

Over the past 6 weeks in Haiti, we have been reminded yet again 

of the importance of American leadership. I am very proud of what 

our country has done, and we will continue to work with our Haitian and international partners to address ongoing suffering and 

transition from relief to recovery. 

But I am also acutely aware that this is a time of great economic 

strain for many of our fellow Americans. As a former Senator, I 

know what this means for the people you represent every single 

day. 

So, for every dollar we spend, as Senator Lugar said, we have to 

show results. That is why this budget must support programs vital 

to our national security, our national interests, and our leadership 

in the world, while guarding against waste, duplication, irrelevancy. And I believe that we have achieved those objectives in this 

budget. 

Now, these figures are more than numbers on a page. They tell 

the story of challenges we face and the resources needed to overcome them. We are fighting two wars that call on the skill and sacrifice of our civilians, as well as our troops. 

We have pursued a dual-track approach to Iran that has exposed 

its refusal to live up to its responsibilities and helped us achieve 

a new unity with our international partners. Iran has left the 

international community little choice but to impose greater costs 

for its provocative steps, and we are now working actively with our 

partners to prepare and implement new measures to pressure Iran 

to change its course. 

We have also achieved unprecedented unity in our response to 

North Korea’s provocative actions, even as we leave the door open 

for a restart of the six-party talks. And we are moving closer by 

the day to a fresh nuclear agreement with Russia, one that 

advances our security while furthering President Obama’s longterm vision of a world without nuclear weapons. 

With China, we seek areas of common purpose while standing 

firm where we differ. We are making concrete our new beginning 

with the Muslim world. We are strengthening partnerships with 

7 

allies in Europe and Asia, with friends in our hemisphere, and with 

countries around the world, from India to Indonesia to South 

Africa, Brazil, and Turkey. And we are working, under the leadership of former Senator George Mitchell, to end the impasse between Israelis and Palestinians. 

At the same time, we are developing a new architecture of cooperation to meet transnational global challenges like climate 

change and the use of our planet’s oceans. With regard to the latter, I want to reiterate my support for U.S. accession to the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Our country stands to gain immensely from this treaty. Everything we know from what we are 

picking up with respect to other countries’ use of the tools under 

the Law of the Sea demonstrates that we will lose out in economic 

and resource rights, in terms of environmental interests, and 

national security. 

In so many instances, our national interest and the common interest converge. We are promoting human rights from Africa to 

Asia to the Middle East, the rule of law, democracy, Internet freedom. We are fighting poverty, hunger, and disease, and we are 

working to ensure that economic growth is broadly shared, principally by addressing the role of girls and women. 

And I want to applaud the chairman and the subcommittee 

chairwoman, Barbara Boxer, for putting this issue on the map of 

the Foreign Relations Committee. 

Now, our agenda is ambitious because our times demand it. 

America is called to lead. I think we all believe that. And therefore, 

we need the tools and the resources in the 21st century to exercise 

that leadership wisely and effectively. We can bury our heads in 

the sand and pay the consequences later, or we can make hardnosed, targeted investments now. Let me just highlight three areas 

where we are making significant new investments. 

First, the security of front-line states. In Afghanistan, we have 

tripled the number of civilians on the ground. Civilians are embedded with our troops in Marjah, in the combat operations going on. 

As soon as an area is cleared, they are part of the American team, 

along with our international allies, who go in to hold and build. 

Our diplomats and development experts are helping to build institutions, expand economic opportunities, and provide meaningful 

alternatives for insurgents ready to renounce violence and join 

their fellow Afghans in the pursuit of peace. 

In Pakistan, our request includes $3.2 billion to combat extremism, promote economic development, strengthen democratic institutions, and build a long-term relationship with the Pakistani people. That is the vision of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman initiative, and 

this includes funding for that. And I want to thank you again, Mr. 

Chairman and Senator Lugar, for your leadership. 

Our request also includes a 59-percent increase in funding for 

Yemen, Senator Feingold, to help counter the extremist threat and 

build institutions and economic opportunity. 

In Iraq, we are winding down our military presence and establishing a more normal civilian mission. Our civilian efforts will not, 

and cannot, mirror the scale of our military presence, but rather, 

they must provide assistance consistent with the priorities of the 

Iraqi Government. 

8 

So our request includes $2.6 billion for Iraq. These are resources 

that will allow us to support the democratic process and ensure a 

smooth transition to civilian-led security training and operational 

support. 

As these funds allow civilians to take full responsibility for pro- grams, the Defense budget for Iraq will be decreasing by about $16 

billion. That is a powerful illustration of the return on civilian investment and illustrates the point that the chairman was making 

that this is really part of the security budget for the United States 

and should be seen as part of that whole. 

We are blessed with the best troops in the world, as we have 

seen time and again. But we also need to give our civilian experts 

the resources to do the civilian jobs, and this budget takes a step 

in that direction. It includes $100 million for a State Department 

complex crisis fund, replacing the 1207 fund through which the 

Defense Department directed money toward crisis response. And it 

includes support for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability 

Fund, which previously fell under the Defense Department as well. 

Secretary Gates and I are working literally hand in hand and are 

committed to having a seamless relationship between the Defense 

Department and the State Department and USAID to further 

American security. 

The second major area is investing in development. And this 

budget makes targeted investments in fragile societies, which, in 

our interconnected world, bear heavily on our own security and 

prosperity. These investments are a key part of our effort to get 

ahead of crisis rather than just responding to it, positioning us to 

deal effectively with threats and challenges that lie ahead. 

The first of these is in health. Building on our success in treating 

HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis, our Global Health Initiative will 

invest $63 billion over 6 years, starting with $8.5 billion in FY11, 

to help our partners address specific diseases and, equally importantly, build strong, sustainable health systems as they do. This administration has also pledged to invest at least $3.5 billion in food security over 3 years, and this year’s request includes 

$1.6 billion, of which $1.2 billion is funded through the State 

Department. And I greatly appreciate the work that Senator Lugar 

and Senator Casey have done to help target the United States 

effort when it comes to global hunger and food security. So this 

funding will focus on countries that have developed effective, comprehensive strategies where agriculture is central to prosperity and 

hunger remains widespread. 

On climate change, we could not agree with the chairman more. 

Therefore, we have requested $646 million to promote the United 

States as a leader in green technology and to leverage other leaders’ cooperation, including through the Copenhagen Accord, which, 

for the first time—to underscore the chairman’s point—brings 

developing and developed countries together. 

This is such an important initiative. We need leadership from the 

rest of the world. This is an opportunity for us to push this initiative and to ensure that we have support to give to core climate 

change activities and to spread the burden among other countries 

so that they share part of the responsibility in meeting this global 

challenge. 

9 

The budget also includes $4.2 billion for humanitarian assistance 

programs. Our efforts in Haiti have made clear that State and 

USAID must be able to respond quickly and effectively. 

All of these initiatives are designed to enhance American security, help people in need, and give the American people a strong 

return on their investments. Our aim is not to create dependency. 

We don’t want to just pass out fish. We want to teach people to 

fish. And we want to help our partners devise solutions they can 

sustain over the long term. And essential to this is a focus on advancing equality and opportunity for women and girls. They are 

the key drivers for economic and social progress. 

And that brings me to the third area that I want to highlight. 

None of this can happen if we do not recruit, train, and empower 

the right people for the job. 

The State Department and USAID are full of talented, committed public servants. But unfortunately, we have too often failed 

to give them the tools they need to carry out their missions on the 

ground. Rather than building their expertise, we have too often relied on contractors, sometimes with little oversight and often with 

greater cost to the American taxpayer. 

This budget will allow us to expand the Foreign Service by over 

600 positions, including an additional 410 positions for the State 

Department and 200 for USAID. It will also allow us to staff the 

stand-by element of the Civilian Reserve Corps, a critical tool for 

responding to crises. 

Now, while deploying these personnel generates new expenses in 

some accounts, it does reduce expenses in others by changing the 

way we do business. We are ending an overreliance on contractors 

and finding opportunities to save money by bringing these functions into Government and improving oversight. 

So, Mr. Chairman, one thing should be very clear from this 

budget. The State Department and USAID are taking a lead in carrying out the United States foreign policy and national security 

agenda. As we finish the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and as the White House finishes the coordination of 

the Presidential Directive, we have a unique opportunity to define 

the capabilities we need and then to match resources with priorities. 

The QDDR will help ensure that we are more effective and accountable. And I want to thank all of you for your individual contributions on so many of these issues that are important not only 

to your constituents, but to our country and the world. 

And Mr. Chairman, I look forward to continuing to work closely 

with this committee, and I would be pleased to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Clinton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, it is a pleasure 

to be with you today. When I was last here to discuss our budget, I emphasized my 

commitment to elevating diplomacy and development as core pillars of American 

power. Since then, I have been heartened by the bipartisan support of this committee and the rest of Congress. Let me take this opportunity to thank you, on behalf of the men and women who work every day around the world to put our foreign 

policy into action. 

10 

The budget we are presenting today is designed to protect America and Americans 

and to advance our interests. Our fiscal year 2011 request for the State Department 

and USAID totals $52.8 billion—a $4.9 billion increase over 2010. Of that increase, 

$3.6 billion will go to supporting efforts in ‘‘frontline states’’—Afghanistan, Pakistan, 

and Iraq. Other funding will grow by $1.3 billion, a 2.7-percent increase that will 

help address global challenges, strengthen partnerships, and ensure that the State 

Department and USAID are equipped with the right people and resources. 

Over the past 6 weeks in Haiti, we have been reminded yet again of the importance of American leadership. I’m proud of what our country has done, and we continue to work with our Haitian and international partners to address ongoing suffering and transition from relief to recovery. 

This is a time of great economic strain for many Americans. As a former Senator, 

I know what this means for the people you represent. For every dollar we spend, 

we have to show results. That is why this budget must support programs vital to 

our national security, our national interests, and our leadership in the world, while 

guarding against waste. I believe it achieves those objectives. 

OUR PRIORITIES

These figures are more than numbers on a page. They tell the story of challenges 

we face and the resources we need to overcome them. 

We are fighting two wars that call on the skill and sacrifice of our civilians as 

well as our troops. We have pursued a dual-track approach to Iran that has exposed 

its refusal to live up to its responsibilities and helped us achieve a new unity with 

our international partners. Iran has left the international community little choice 

but to impose greater costs for its provocative steps. We are now working actively 

with our partners to prepare and implement new measures to pressure Iran to 

change its course. 

We have also achieved unprecedented unity in our response to North Korea’s provocative actions, even as we leave the door open for a restart of six-party talks. And 

we are moving closer to a fresh nuclear agreement with Russia—one that advances 

our security while furthering President Obama’s long-term vision of a world without 

nuclear weapons. 

With China, we are seeking areas of common purpose while standing firm where 

we differ. We are making concrete our new beginning with the Muslim world. We 

are strengthening partnerships with allies in Europe and Asia, with friends in our 

hemisphere, and with countries around the world, from India to Indonesia to South 

Africa, Brazil, and Turkey. And we are working to end the impasse between Israelis 

and Palestinians. 

At the same time, we are developing a new architecture of cooperation to meet 

global challenges like climate change and the use of our planet’s oceans. With regard to the latter, I want to reiterate my support for U.S. accession to the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Our country stands to gain immensely from the treaty— 

in terms of economic and resource rights, in terms of environmental interests, in 

terms of national security. 

In so many instances, our national interest and the common interest converge, 

and so from our own hemisphere to Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, we are promoting human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and Internet freedom; we are 

fighting poverty, hunger, and disease; and we are working to ensure that economic 

growth is broadly shared. 

Our agenda is ambitious because our times demand it. America is called to lead— 

and we need the tools and resources to exercise our leadership wisely and effectively. We can bury our heads in the sand and pay the consequences later, or we 

can make hard-nosed, targeted investments now—addressing the security challenges of today while building a foundation for security and prosperity in the future. 

Let me now highlight the three areas where we are making significant new 

investments. 

INVESTING IN SECURITY

First, the security of frontline states. 

In Afghanistan, we have tripled the number of civilians on the ground, and this 

presence will grow by hundreds more with the $5 billion in this budget. Our diplomats and development experts are helping build institutions, expand economic opportunities, and provide meaningful alternatives for insurgents ready to renounce 

violence and join their fellow Afghans in the pursuit of peace. 

In Pakistan, our request includes $3.2 billion to combat extremism, promote economic development, strengthen democratic institutions, and build a long-term relationship with the Pakistani people. This includes funding of the Kerry-LugarVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:32 Jan 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\111TH CONGRESS\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINT
11 

Berman initiative, and I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, for 

your leadership on this legislation. Our request also includes a 59-percent increase 

in funding for Yemen, to help counter the extremist threat and build institutions 

and economic opportunity. 

In Iraq, we are winding down our military presence and establishing a more normal civilian mission. Our civilian efforts will not and cannot mirror the scale of our 

military presence, but rather provide assistance consistent with the priorities of the 

Iraqi Government. Our request includes $2.6 billion for Iraq—resources that will 

allow us to support the democratic process and ensure a smooth transition to civilian-led security training and operational support. As these funds allow civilians to 

take full responsibility for programs, the Defense budget for Iraq will be decreasing 

by about $16 billion—a powerful illustration of the return on civilian investment. 

We are blessed with the best troops in the world, as we have seen time and again 

in today’s wars. But we also need to give our civilian experts the resources to do 

civilian jobs. This budget takes a step in that direction. It includes $100 million for 

a State Department complex crises fund—replacing the 1207 fund through which 

the Defense Department directed money toward crisis response. And it includes support for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, which previously fell 

under the Defense Department as well. 

INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT

The second major area is investing in development. This budget makes targeted 

investments in fragile societies—which, in our interconnected word, bear heavily on 

our own security and prosperity. These investments are a key part of our effort to 

get ahead of crises rather than just responding to them, positioning us to deal effectively with the threats and challenges that lie ahead. 

The first of these investments is in health. Building on our progress treating HIV, 

malaria, and tuberculosis, our Global Health Initiative will invest $63 billion over 

6 years, starting with $8.5 billion in FY11, to help our partners address specific diseases and build strong, sustainable health systems as they do so. 

The administration has also pledged to invest at least $3.5 billion in food security 

over 3 years, and this year’s request includes $1.6 billion, of which $1.2 billion is 

funded through the State Department. This funding will focus on countries that 

have developed effective, comprehensive strategies, where agriculture is central to 

prosperity and hunger remains widespread. 

On climate change, our request of $646 million seeks to promote the United 

States as a leader in green technology and to leverage other countries’ cooperation— 

including through the Copenhagen Accord, which for the first time brings developed 

and developing countries together on this challenge. This is part of the administration’s total request of $1.4 billion to support core climate-change activities in developing nations. 

Our request also includes $4.2 billion for humanitarian assistance programs. Our 

efforts in Haiti have made clear that State and USAID must be able to respond 

quickly and effectively to human tragedies. 

These initiatives are designed to enhance American security, help people in need, 

and give the American people a strong return on their investment. Our aim is not 

to create dependency, but to help our partners devise solutions they can sustain 

over the long term. Essential to this is a focus on advancing equality and opportunity for women and girls, who are the key drivers of economic and social progress 

in the developing world. 

INVESTING IN THE RIGHT PEOPLE AND TOOLS

That brings me to our third area of investment. None of this can happen if we 

do not recruit, train, and empower the right people for the job. 

The State Department and USAID are full of talented and committed public servants, but we have too often neglected to give them the tools they need to carry out 

their missions on the ground. Rather than building their expertise, we have too 

often relied on contractors, sometimes with little oversight. 

This budget will allow us to expand the Foreign Service by over 600 positions, including an additional 410 positions for the State Department and 200 for USAID. 

It will also allow us to staff the standby element of the Civilian Reserve Corps, a 

crucial tool for responding to crises. 

While deploying these personnel generates new expenses in some accounts, it will 

reduce expenses in others by changing the way we do business. We are ending an 

overreliance on contractors and finding opportunities to save money by bringing 

functions into government and improving oversight. 

12 

A YEAR OF RESULTS

One thing should be very clear from this budget: the State Department and 

USAID are taking a lead in carrying out the United States foreign policy and national-security agenda. As we finish the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, we have a unique opportunity to define the capabilities we need and 

to match resources with priorities. This budget aligns our investments with the strategic imperatives of our time. 

The QDDR will also help ensure that we are more effective and accountable. Jack 

Lew, the first Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources, has put 

his skill to work in developing this budget and in reviewing it over and over to make 

sure that every item is economical and effective. 

At a time of change and challenge at home and abroad, these investments will 

enhance the security of Americans, assure the future American leadership, and help 

build the foundations of peace, stability, and prosperity in the years ahead. I look 

forward to working with all of you as we move forward, and I would be pleased to 

take your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary. 

We will do 7-minute rounds. 

Recently, I came back from Pakistan, and one of the things that 

they repeatedly brought to my attention was the fragility of the 

economy, but also the sort of balancing act that they have to perform, which you are well aware of, in terms of their public opinion, 

their relationship with the United States, and what they are being 

called on to do. 

They pointed out that they are about to undergo another round 

of IMF negotiations. And the pressures already of the IMF restraints have been significant in terms of price increases and other 

things that their citizens are feeling. I wonder if you would comment on what other steps we might contemplate that can have an 

impact? 

We have a very significant amount of money going in. We have 

got additional assistance, the $3.2 billion you have talked about. 

But it strikes me that there is a broader economic challenge and 

a provision of services challenge to their people that is going to 

have a profound impact on the outcome of what is happening in 

western Pakistan and, ultimately, Afghanistan. 

And you are no stranger, Madam Secretary, to our thinking that 

what happens in Pakistan is going to be almost as important, if not 

far more important to the outcome of Afghanistan and some of 

what happens on the ground in Afghanistan. Therefore, should we 

be thinking about a free trade agreement or a broader trade agreement or something that is going to send a stronger signal from us 

about the economic possibilities? 

Or should we work with the IMF to make sure that the next 

round doesn’t result in unpalatable, unacceptable pressures on 

their citizens so that we undo the good that we are trying to do 

in all of these other efforts, I wonder? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Chairman Kerry, you have asked one 

of the most important questions that we have to figure out how to 

answer. To the credit of the Pakistani Government and President 

Zardari, they have complied with the IMF conditions. They raised 

the price of wheat. They have raised the price of electricity. They 

have demonstrated a political will which has resulted in some positive economic outcomes for them. 

But they have a very difficult road to negotiate ahead of them 

for several reasons, and I will tell this committee what I told a 

13 

group of Pakistani business leaders with whom I met when I was 

there. It was a very large, prestigious group, representing a broad 

cross-section of the Pakistan economy. And I told them that we did 

need to do more to promote trade, and I think the ROZs, the reconstruction opportunity zones, that legislation has been pending in 

the Senate. That would send a very strong signal to Pakistan. It 

would use trade instead of aid to promote economic growth. 

We have committed to some large signature energy projects because part of their economic challenge is keeping the power on and 

keeping those factories humming. And so, I have ordered a redirection of our aid so that we produce results that are in line with the 

needs and aspirations of the Pakistani people. 

I think we should explore additional opportunities that might 

increase more trade, remove more barriers. We could try it for a 

limited period of time, see what the results are, but I think the 

Pakistanis have to do more as well. 

And I told the business group, after we had finished talking 

about the aid we give and the support we are giving and the KerryLugar initiative, Pakistan has one of the lowest tax rates in the 

world. They don’t tax income. They don’t tax land, and a lot of the 

wealth is held in these huge feudal estates. 

Some of you might have seen a program on television last night 

showing the failure to build schools, to staff schools, to equip 

schools. They have no public education system to speak of, and it 

is because the very well off, of whom there is a considerable number, do not pay their fair share for the services that are needed in 

health and education primarily. 

So I think there is more we could do and more the international 

community could do. But increasingly, Senator Kerry, I am looking 

for ways that the IMF, the World Bank, the United States as a 

donor, other donors can say to countries that want our help, ‘‘You 

have a lot of rich people’’—and those rich people make a lot of 

money out of their country, and yet the people of their country are 

mired in poverty—‘‘And you are going to have to raise your tax 

GDP percentage rate from 7 percent to 9 percent.’’ 

You know, United States, we fluctuate between 16 and 22 percent. They don’t have the resources or the opportunity to do that. 

But we can’t continue to allow these countries’ elite not to do their 

fair share for the people of their countries. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, to their credit, I will say they are now in 

the midst of a significant legislative initiative and government initiative to do exactly that. And I know some of it is at your urging 

and other people’s urging. 

One last question so I don’t overly abuse the time here. But this 

is sort of a macroquestion that I would like to ask you. As you travel around as Secretary of State, you are engaged in any number of 

efforts to leverage our interests globally, whether it is arms control 

or economic interests or counterterrorism, et cetera, et cetera. 

I don’t want to draw you into a fight. But the gridlock here in 

Washington and the inability of us to leverage our own economy 

and to begin to show the world signs of economic strength, I have 

certainly run into many questions as I travel around, ‘‘Where is 

America going?’’ 

14 

And I would like to know if you could maybe share with this 

committee—which is the appropriate place to think about this, or 

at least start to—as you talk to people, to what degree is our 

domestic situation, our financial situation, our lack of cohesion 

with respect to responses affecting our status and leverage and position as we try to pursue our interests on a global basis? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, you travel also, and you encounter the same questions and, to some extent, anxiety that I do 

as I travel. The world wants the United States to lead, even if that 

is not what they tell you or what they say to their own press. But 

they want us to lead. They look to us. They also look to us as the 

world’s oldest democracy, and they want to see us produce results 

and solve problems. 

So I do think that we have to do a better job in demonstrating 

what we know is our core strength, which is this extraordinary 

country that we all love and have the privilege of serving. It is 

capable of doing anything once we put our minds to it. 

But I think that this is not a partisan issue. It is not an executive versus legislative issue. It is really an American issue. And 

you mentioned climate change at the very beginning of your remarks, and I cannot say how important it would be—I cannot overstate it that we do what we can to show that we are a leader in 

this area. 

I would say for political reasons, global political reasons, some of 

you may have read accounts of the President and I kind of crashing 

a meeting that the Chinese, the Indians, the Brazilians, and the 

South Africans were having without us to try to figure out how 

they could avoid some of the questions, the hard questions we were 

asking. But at the end of a tough negotiating session, they agreed 

to this Copenhagen Accord. 

And this accord is the first time in probably since post-World 

War II that there has been any international agreement and the 

very first time that developing and developed countries have 

assumed the kind of equal responsibilities to show up, sign up, 

report, and verify what they are going to do. So the political imperative for the United States to lead, to be seen as leading, to manage this incredibly complex, interconnected world I think is absolutely paramount. 

Second, on the facts on climate change, I know that Senator 

Kerry, Senator Boxer, others of you have been really leading on 

this. This clean energy economy is going to be captured by other 

countries. 

I mean, the idea that we, the intellectual capital of the world 

that invented so many of these component parts and processes, 

could be outflanked and outproduced and outgenerated in terms of 

income by other countries, led principally by China, is deeply disturbing to me. This is an industry of the future, and we have jobs 

that are going to go by the wayside if we are not prepared to get 

in there. 

Now, to me, the domestic progress that was made in 2009 with 

passing a House bill and what Senator Boxer did and what you are 

doing on a bipartisan basis gives us a foundation. But this is a 

political issue, and this is an economic issue. 

15 

People also know it is an environmental issue and a moral issue, 

but I focus on what are the strategic interests that the United 

States has? We have to continue to show leadership on a global 

issue, and we have to get our economy moving in a direction where 

we are going to reap the benefits. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Madam Secretary, I have three short items and 

two longer ones. I will commence with the short ones. First of all, 

I very much appreciate your commendation of the efforts of your 

Department and, likewise, our shared efforts in crafting the LugarCasey bill on food security. I am hopeful that the recent work between your staff and the staff of this committee will continue—— 

Secretary CLINTON. Yes. 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Intensively in the days and weeks 

ahead. Perhaps the chairman will entertain another hearing on the 

suggestions we have both made, so we can move this along. The 

Lugar-Casey bill has passed out of our committee, and I think it 

has broad support in the Congress as a whole. 

Second, I just note that the budget calls for 8 to 10 American 

centers of public diplomacy, and it is not clear where those would 

be located. You will have to determine that. 

The Chinese, according to our records, have now established 60 

Confucius centers here in the United States, but they are permitting only four of our centers to be built in China. I call this to your 

attention so that you may consider potential negotiations with Chinese friends as we try to extend this important idea of diplomacy 

centers. 

Furthermore, I appreciate your mention of the Law of the Sea 

Treaty. I have just come from a conference in which Russia and 

Russian aspirations were discussed. It was pointed out that with 

the melting of the Arctic, huge oil reserves, perhaps larger than 

those of Saudi Arabia have been uncovered there. The Russians 

immediately sent a ship to the area and planted a flag. This was 

a grandiose gesture. It does not establish that they are going to be 

drilling shortly. 

But the fact is that this is going to be an area of huge contention, 

and there is a need to have some structure in place where American interests can come to the fore. The issue has always been sovereignty with regard to that, and sovereignty is the issue. But we 

have got to pin down our sovereignty. It is very important. 

Secretary CLINTON. That is exactly—— 

Senator LUGAR. Let me just bring up the issue of plans to construct a new Embassy in London. In the past few days news reports and drawings of our proposed new $1 billion Embassy in London have been in the media. The thought is that the sale of three 

U.S.-owned properties in London, including Grosvenor Square Embassy, would net us at least $1 billion as an offset. Furthermore, 

we are refusing to pay the value-added tax assessed by Great Britain of 17 percent. 

How is the financing of this undertaking going? And what com- ments can you make regarding the need for the new $1 billion 

building, as well as this dispute over the value-added tax? 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you so much, Senator Lugar. 

16 

Just very briefly, our staff looks forward to continuing to work 

with yours and that of this committee, and we want to deepen our 

partnership on global hunger and food security. 

On the Confucius centers, the Chinese Government provides each center with $1 million to launch, plus they cover operating 

expenses that exceed $200,000 per year. We don’t have that kind 

of money in the budget. So we are limited in the numbers that we 

can do. And we are also raising the issue of reciprocity with Chinese officials. So we are very aware of the concerns that you have 

pointed out. 

Thank you for what you said about the Law of the Sea. I could 

not agree with you more. The Law of the Sea provides commercial 

rights to the mining of what is in the seabeds of the territories that 

are claimable under sovereignty provisions in the treaty. 

I believe, with all my heart, that we are going to be so sorry if 

we don’t get this up and going. And I know that you and the chairman are committed to doing so. And if there is more that we need 

to do from the administration side, Mr. Chairman, I will get it 

done. You give me the date, and we will have the people here to 

testify because I want everybody on the committee and the Congress to know what is at stake here. 

Finally, on the London Embassy, the construction of the Em- bassy is estimated at between $500 million to $700 million. It is 

self-financed because we are selling, I forget, maybe 11 sites that 

we currently own because we are consolidating everything in one 

place. We have sold the old Grosvenor Square Embassy, although 

we will inhabit it until we move to the new Embassy. 

We have—also we are selling the Navy annex. We are going to 

realize a significant return on these sales, and the estimated cost 

of the construction, as I said, $500 million to $700 million. The site 

predeveloped was $426 million. The VAT is $46 million. So when 

you add it all up, because of the expense of doing business in London, among other reasons, it is going to be around $1 billion. 

And we are going to work very hard to get the VAT exception, 

but we are not coming in for any appropriations. This is really consolidating sites and becoming more efficient. And it will also be a 

green building, which we value. We think that is a great signal to 

send. 

Senator LUGAR. Let me ask a final question, this one regarding 

the budget for Pakistan. There is obviously a submission for considerable expenditures this year. But I just want to inquire as to how 

expenditures are going from the 2010 budget. 

The reason I ask this is that it appears expenditures are going 

slowly, and there are arguments as to how much should be channeled through NGOs as opposed to Pakistani officials, whether they 

be local, regional, or national. What are your feelings on the general progress of expenditures, whether they are part of the KerryLugar $1.5 billion or otherwise? 

Secretary CLINTON. We are making progress, Senator. But we 

are trying to be very thoughtful about how we distribute this 

money because it is a significant investment in Pakistan. We have 

spent money already on some of the energy projects, which we 

think are paying off, both in terms of what they are doing for the 

people of Pakistan, but also because we are connected to them. 

17 

It is challenging because we do want to go through Pakistani institutions and NGOs wherever we can. But they have to be vetted, 

and we have to feel that they are going to perform in a way that 

I can come before this committee and report to you is in keeping 

with our efforts. 

So we can give you a very thorough readout of where the money 

is in the pipeline. But we have been spending a lot of time—and 

Jack Lew, I think, has talked with this committee about that—in 

making sure that we are spending it right, or as right as we can 

make it. 

Senator LUGAR. That would be very helpful to keep us up to date. 

It is challenging, as you say, but it is critical in terms of maintaining the confidence of the American people in appropriations of this 

size with Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

Thank you very much. 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks, Senator Lugar. 

Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

this hearing. And Madam Secretary, just before I ask you some 

questions, I would just like to note that your identification of the 

150 account as a national security budget is absolutely right on the 

mark. 

A stronger State Department is vital to our Nation’s security, as 

is expanding and strengthening our work in such areas as economic development, good governance, respect for human rights, respecting the rule of law, and conflict resolution. By ensuring these 

programs are well funded, we can help our foreign partners combat 

the recruitment and operation of al-Qaeda while also strengthening 

and protecting our Nation here at home. So I appreciate that very 

much. 

Madam Secretary, on a number of subjects, I have noted that enhancing our diplomatic capacity is vital to our Nation’s security. At 

the same time, as you well know, with skyrocketing deficits, we 

have to look at ways to eliminate wasteful or inefficient spending. 

And I think one glaring example of wasteful spending is a program 

that has for years now been found to be mismanaged and ineffective: Radio and TV Marti at the Broadcasting Board of Governors. 

Given the multiple GAO reports highlighting the many problems 

that plague the Office of Cuba Broadcasting and the urgent 

national security and human rights priorities we face around the 

world, can you please tell me why the administration wants to continue funding Radio and TV Marti near previous levels in FY 2011, 

and does this allocation of resources really match our national 

security and human rights priorities? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, we are taking a hard look at 

all of our aid programs for Cuba. Frankly, my goal is to be effective 

in what we spend so that it actually assists those Cubans who are 

fighting for freedom, who are standing up against the abuses of the 

Cuban Government. And we are looking at everything. 

I mean, I can’t come before you and say that any program is sacrosanct because I want to be sure that we are getting our money’s 

worth. And with new forms of communication and new ways of getting information into Cuba to help support the efforts of people on 

18 

the ground, I think we have to look at this expenditure like every 

other one. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Appreciate that answer. 

On a very different topic, in Africa, let us say a bit about our policy toward the Lord’s Resistance Army, or the LRA, the rebel group 

from northern Uganda that is now operating across three countries—northeastern Congo, Southern Sudan, and the Central African Republic. It continues to kill at an alarming rate. 

As you probably know, I have authored a bill that now has 63 

cosponsors and which requires more strategic attention and resources to help address this violence. And Madam Secretary, without sort of getting into all the weeds of this, how does responding 

to and seeking to end the LRA’s reign of terror throughout the region fit into the fiscal year 2011 budget? And does the administration have any kind of a specific plan and dedicated resources to 

help address this issue? 

Secretary CLINTON. Senator, we are deeply concerned and share 

your views about protecting civilians who have been suffering at 

the hands of the Lord’s Resistance Army now for years in Southern 

Sudan and the DRC and Central African Republic. We have provided support to improve the effectiveness of military responses to 

the LRA. We have helped to support and supply some of the militaries in the area. 

Thus far, $6.4 million has been provided. Additional funds will 

be notified to Congress soon. Resources have come from reimbursements from the U.N. for U.S. support for peacekeeping operations. 

We believe our support of these operations has helped to degrade 

the capacity of the LRA. 

We have encouraged the military forces seeking to defeat the 

LRA and the U.N. peacekeeping missions in the region to put a 

very high priority on civilian protection. There needs to be better 

coordination, information, and intelligence-sharing. As you know, 

we tried that once, very unfortunately, not to the result we were 

seeking. But we are going to continue to work with existing militaries and U.N. peacekeepings. 

I want to be specific here because we have also provided assist- ance for civilian victims in the DRC, CAR, Southern Sudan—$1.7 

million for NGOs in Southern Sudan, $1.1 million to the International Organization for Migration for relocation efforts in Southern Sudan, $1 million to the World Food Programme for U.N. 

humanitarian air service in Central African Republic, and of 

course, contributions to the UNHCR. 

You know, I have been following the Lord’s Resistance Army for 

more than 15 years. I just don’t understand why we cannot end 

this scourge. And we are going to do everything we can to provide 

support we believe will enable us to do that. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for that commitment. 

Madam Secretary, I have concerns about supplemental spending 

bills, given that they fall outside of the normal budget process. But 

in this case, I would like to ask about the INCLE funds requested 

for Pakistan in the FY 2010 supplemental, the majority of which 

will go toward training and other support for Pakistani police, 

including to do such things as to better confront the spread of 

extremism. 

19 

Given the documented problems of police abuse in Pakistan from 

your own State Department human rights report, including allegations of torture, rape, and extrajudicial killings and continuing impunity for such crimes, and given the latest report’s caution that 

‘‘corruption within the police was rampant,’’ what efforts are being 

taken to ensure that our assistance to the police forces does not inadvertently end up fueling the spread of extremism, rather than 

addressing the problems we sought to address? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, this is something that we are 

very focused on because, obviously, we have both legal and moral 

requirements as to how money that we provide to anyone is expended and what is done under the rubric of that kind of aid program. And what we have done is provide training, provide support 

to the Pakistanis so that they understand what we expect from 

them, what we are looking to see. 

We have worked with the Pakistani military to try to better create more accountability, and we have asked that they respond 

whenever any issue is raised with us. I can’t sit here and say that 

we know everything that is going on. But we are making a concerted effort to try to provide more oversight and expect more 

accountability in these funds. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you so much, Madam Secretary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. 

Senator DeMint. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

I appreciate your professionalism in representing our country all 

over the world. The more I delve into foreign policy, the more I 

believe you probably have the hardest job in the administration. 

A couple of points. First, I want to thank you for your leadership 

in Honduras. As you know, that was a situation that appeared to 

be moving out of control, and I think you and your Department 

have got it on a good track, trying to restore relationships within 

and around Honduras. I get very good reports there from what the 

State Department is doing. 

Let me just mention a couple of things. In Iran, obviously, that 

is a big issue. My concern is timing. You have, I think, taken an 

international leadership role in, I think, raising the pressure levels 

in Iran. But in my conversations with people in Israel and their 

concern that—well, my concern is that we may be only a few 

months away from some type of action that could destabilize the 

region. 

And I don’t sense in the Congress the urgency of timing here of 

what we need to do and how quickly. And again, I appreciate you 

taking the sanction idea a step further, but I would like to hear 

a comment there and just ask for your comment in a few other 

areas. 

One, and you have mentioned, and several others have mentioned, human rights. And I have long been a supporter of engagement with countries like China and trade with China, but it seems 

increasingly over the last year or two that human rights, religious 

freedom in China, Egypt, India, Vietnam, other countries, more 

and more reports that there is less religious tolerance, that there 

20 

is more problems. And perhaps that is just a matter of what gets 

to the news, but I am hearing from a lot of people directly in my 

office that are suggesting a deteriorating situation. 

And meeting with people from Georgia, a lot of representatives, 

again I hear a concern that our emphasis is more on Russia and 

even to the point of them not getting equipment they need for basic 

protection, such as parts for their rifles. So some pretty important 

concerns there, specifically on Georgia. 

So if I could just ask you to comment on the urgency and timing 

of Iran, possible scenarios there, and just maybe your perception of 

human rights, as well as a comment on Georgia? 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you so much, Senator. 

On Iran sanctions, we are intensely engaged with countries 

around the world. In the last month, I attended the London conferences on Afghanistan and Yemen and held numerous bilateral 

meetings with countries to lay out evidence about Iran to urge that 

they join with us on the pressure sanctions track. 

I just came back from Saudi Arabia and Qatar and have also met 

last week with the Prime Minister of Turkey. I will be going next 

week to Latin America, including Brazil. 

So we are—and it is not just I. It is the top levels of the State 

Department are engaged very, very directly in working the need for 

sanctions. We are beginning the process in the Security Council in 

New York, where language is being hammered out based on the 

work that has been done by the Treasury Department and the 

State Department in coordination. 

We are targeting a lot of these proposed sanctions against the 

Revolutionary Guard, which we believe is playing an increasingly 

important role in the politics and the economy of Iran. So we are 

working it as hard as we can. 

I have to say that we have been heartened by the positive response from Russia. They, I think, in their response prove the wisdom of the President’s policy of engagement. We have made it clear 

from President Obama’s inauguration that we will reach out our 

hand if the other side unclenches its fist. And our very clear commitment to engagement has created space for a lot of these countries to now consider supporting sanctions that they might not 

have otherwise because we have demonstrated the strategic patience to exhaust the international efforts of convincing Iran to do 

the right thing without sanctions. 

So I think, Senator, we are very focused on this. We hope that 

the next 30 to 60 days will see a sanctions resolution emerge in 

New York, and we also have made clear with others of our allies 

and partners that whatever comes out of New York, we may pursue bilateral or multilateral sanctions on top of whatever can be 

the result of the Security Council deliberations. So this is the highest priority for the Obama administration. 

On human rights, I share your concern. It is a kind of good news/ 

bad news story. I mean, we see breakthroughs and positive actions, 

and then, unfortunately, we do get evidence of backsliding, discrimination, oppression, violence that is religiously based. 

We are working with a number of Muslim majority countries to 

devise an alternative to their proposal of defamation of religion, 

which we reject because we think that in a robust society, free 

21 

expression should be protected. But we also recognize the sensitivity of criticizing or undermining the religious feelings and attitudes of people. 

So we are looking to see if there is a way to come up with a resolution that will suit our constitutional concerns, and we are working hard with a number of countries to do that. But we speak out 

vigorously against human rights abuses and, in particular, religious freedom and discrimination complaints and will continue to 

do so. 

And finally, with respect to Georgia, Georgia remains a high priority to this administration. We have had a number of high-profile 

visits to Georgia—Vice President Biden, Deputy Secretary Steinberg, Special Representative Holbrooke. We have had a very clear 

message that we are supporting the Government of Georgia. 

For the FY11 budget, we are requesting $90.1 million in aid, 

which is an overall increase of 8 percent from the FY10 level of 

$73.77 million. The bulk of that will be trying to help the Georgians sustain their work in democracy, to enhance public confidence within their own country and in the region in their direction. 

We also are continuing to provide funding for nonproliferation, 

antiterrorism, demining, and related programs, and we are heavily 

supporting their military deployment to Afghanistan with new 

equipment, new training. 

So I think that what we are doing is a very positive story, and 

we stand up for Georgia in many international settings against the 

very strong attitudes expressed by their Russian neighbors. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you much. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator DeMint. 

Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Secretary Clinton, I just want to say that I think all of 

America is very proud of the job you are doing. 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you. 

Senator BOXER. And I think you are just being so effective, and 

I was really glad to hear that expressed in a bipartisan way today. 

I want to talk to you about women in Afghanistan. And just yesterday, Senator Casey, Senator Wicker, and I held a hearing, which 

our chairman sanctioned, to examine the status of females in 

Afghanistan. And what we discussed with your wonderful Ambassador Verveer and with Dr. Sima Samar, who I know you are 

aware of, it was not good. It was alarming. 

Today, the life expectancy of an Afghan woman is 44 years. Can 

you imagine—44? Afghanistan has the second-highest maternal 

mortality rate in the world. One out of every five children born in 

Afghanistan dies before the age of 5, and over half of all marriages 

in Afghanistan are forced or involve girls under the age of 16. 

Yesterday, we talked about a forced marriage of an 11-year-old 

girl to a man 20 years her senior. And this child set herself afire 

to get out of the situation, and it is just—it just touches your heart. 

She is now back with her own family. 

But here is what I wanted to discuss with you. We all know how 

hard our military is working right now. Oh, Lord, we all pray this 

22 

is a success. And we all know that reconciliation is what we are 

trying to achieve to get these Taliban to give up their ways. 

And what worries some of us is that women could be used as a 

bargaining chip in the reconciliation process, unless they are at the 

table at every single stage. Because we can’t forget these are the 

same Taliban who required the windows of Afghan homes to be 

painted over to conceal the fact that there was a woman inside and 

who take pride today in throwing acid in the faces of Afghan girls. 

Now we know you are a tireless champion for women around the 

world, and we also know you have worked hard to raise this issue 

of women being at the table in this reconciliation process. But I 

thought I would use today as an opportunity to get you to commit 

to us and to the Afghan women that you work to ensure that these 

women are given a clear, transparent, and meaningful role at every 

level of the reconciliation process—to protect their right to education, to health care. 

Because you know that they are not allowed to see a male doctor, 

and that is why so many of them die in childbirth because it is considered—they are shunned if they see a male doctor. And there are 

no female doctors anymore. There are some, but there are not as 

many as there once were. So, so many of them are dying in childbirth. And they need to have freedom of movement, and they need 

to be free of violence. 

So will you make that commitment to fight to get them into a 

key decisionmaking role in the reconciliation process? And will you 

personally reach out to President Karzai, because I know you have 

a close relationship with him, to make sure that this happens? 

Secretary CLINTON. The answer is yes to both, Senator Boxer. It 

is a very deep, longstanding concern of mine, which I share with 

you. 

In our regional stabilization strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, we lay out how we wish to advance the rights of Afghan 

women and girls with key initiatives that we are pursuing. And I 

would hope that this could become part of the record, Mr. Chairman, the entire report. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The report ‘‘Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional 

Stabilization Strategy’’ was too voluminous to include in this 

printed hearing. It will be retained in the permanent record of the 

committee.] 

Secretary CLINTON. But on the specifics with respect to women, 

I am not going to sugarcoat how hard this is. This is a very difficult 

challenge that we are making common cause with the women and 

girls of Afghanistan. I am very proud of the work that Ambassador 

Verveer is doing. 

I have personally spoken several times about this to President 

Karzai, and I will continue to advocate, as I did at the London conference, to make sure that women are included in the political process. Any kind of reconciliation or reintegration effort has to take 

into account the rights of women, and we are going to do everything we can to try to protect and advance that. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. Thank you so much. 

My second question kind of dovetails on Senator DeMint’s on 

Iran. Just recently, the IAEA released a report stating that it 

23 

found extensive evidence of activities by Iran’s military ‘‘related to 

the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.’’ 

And this is chilling to all of us. Iran’s behavior not only poses a 

grave security threat to Israel and the greater Middle East, but 

also to efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear materials and 

weapons around the globe. And I am very pleased that the administration is focused like a laser beam on this. 

And I know you recently traveled to the region to discuss the 

threat from Iran and that national security adviser James Jones 

traveled there, Mike Mullen, Vice President Biden. And in addition, the U.S. Government announced a new set of sanctions on 

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard. 

Now I understand you are seeking a set of new sanctions 

through the U.N. Security Council, which will require the support 

of all five permanent members, including China. So I want to ask 

you about China. 

You were recently in Saudi Arabia, which is now exporting more 

oil to China than ever. Reports have suggested that Saudi Arabia 

may be able to provide China the stable supply of oil it needs, thus 

reducing China’s reliance on Iranian oil. And this, in turn, could 

make China more willing to support sanctions against Iran. 

Do you feel better about the situation with China? Do you feel 

that this diplomacy of yours at the U.N. could yield the right outcome? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, we are working at it every 

single day. And the IAEA report gave us one more piece of evidence 

to present to doubting countries about conclusions regarding Iran’s 

nuclear ambitions. 

We also are making the argument in public that China’s dependence on oil from the gulf should cause it to make a strategic calculation to support sanctions because, in the absence of pressure 

that changes the Iranian efforts to obtain a nuclear weapon, there 

will be an arms race in the gulf, and that will further destabilize 

the gulf. It could lead even to conflict, which could dramatically undermine the delivery of oil from the gulf. So our argument, joined 

by other countries, including some in the gulf, to China is that if 

you are concerned about your market access to the Arabian Gulf 

for oil, then you should join the rest of the world in sanctions. 

And we were very successful when nobody thought that we could 

get China on board for the North Korean sanctions, 1874 out of the 

Security Council. And even today, the South Africans stopped a 

ship carrying North Korean weapons bound for the Congo to cause 

more terrible violence and kill even more people there. 

Because we got the international community behind us and that 

is what we are seeking and we are making that argument vigorously, and lots of people are joining us to try to convince China to 

join with the rest of the world. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, thank you for your service to our country. 

24 

Yesterday, Orlando Zapata Tamayo, a Cuban prodemocracy 

human rights activist and political prisoner who was first incarcerated during the 2003 crackdown on dissidents in Cuba, died following a hunger strike protesting the Castro regime’s brutal 

abuses. Amnesty International recognized him as a prisoner of conscience, and it is in his memory and the sacrifice that he made and 

hundreds of others of political prisoners who languish in Castro’s 

jails that I want to ask you about some concerns I have with reference to how we are pursuing our Cuba democracy programs. 

I sent a letter in January to Administrator Shah, who I have not 

heard an answer from yet, asking what is the intent of an e-mail 

that they sent to the grantees and contractors for programs in 

Cuba? Basically, that e-mail suggested, as the Department has suggested, that groups not travel to Cuba to conduct our democracy 

programs there, and that is a real concern. 

Now there are some people have suggested that the United 

States only provide support to the Cuban people, when every single 

activity under these programs is specifically sanctioned by the Castro regime. It is naive to think that independent groups would be 

allowed permission from the Castro regime to carry out those activities when even members of this committee who have sought 

visas to visit human rights activists and political dissidents inside 

of Cuba as part of an agenda have been denied those visas by the 

regime in a clear attempt to stop anyone who wants to visit those 

entities, those individuals inside of Cuba. 

So I would not expect the regime to welcome anyone to help engage with human rights activists, political dissidents, independent 

journalists in trying to promote civil society inside of Cuba. 

So we have a long history in the United States of supporting 

groups around the world in groups who have lived under the iron 

fist or behind what was the Iron Curtain. We have done that in 

Eastern Europe. We did that with Lech Walesa. We did it with 

Vaclav Havel. We did it with Alexander Solzhenitsyn. We did it 

with so many others, and we did not seek permission from those 

countries in the world. 

For some reason, it seems to me that when it comes to Cuba, the 

recent actions by the regime to arrest an American citizen have totally frozen our actions. And I have even noticed that in the 2011 

budget request stating what our democracy programs would do, a 

critical statement that existed in the 2010 request was eliminated. 

So my question is, Are we going to have a permanent freeze on 

having entities that are trying to create peaceful change for civil 

society inside of Cuba? Is that the policy of the State Department? 

Secretary CLINTON. No, Senator. Let me first express the U.S. 

Government’s sympathies to the family, friends, and supporters of 

Orlando Zapata Tamayo. 

We were concerned about his welfare. We raised this with the 

Cuban delegation during the migration talks. We urged that he be 

given medical attention and care, and we are deeply distressed by 

his death during a hunger strike on behalf of his rights and to send 

a signal of the political prisoner situation and oppression in Cuba, 

where we think there are in excess of 200 other prisoners of 

conscience. 

25 

We are very supportive of the work that we believe should be 

done to support those people of conscience inside Cuba. As I said 

earlier, we are trying to figure out the best ways to be effective in 

doing that. We are currently reviewing the risks in the wake of the 

baseless arrest of Mr. Gross in Cuba so that people who are traveling in furtherance of the mission of advocating for freedom, providing services, providing supplies and material to Cubans will 

take the necessary precautions when traveling. 

This is an issue of great importance to us. We do want to do 

everything we can to try to assist Cubans who are struggling 

against a continuing, longstanding regime of oppression. So we are 

not in any way taking a position against travel or against the kind 

of actions that we think will produce positive results. But we are 

engaged in a very intense review so that what we do we think will 

have greater chances of being successful. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I appreciate your answer. However, let 

me just say that the e-mail that came out of AID and the statements that have come out subsequently have basically chilled any 

activity in the promotion of the democracy programs that the President in his own budget put again, which we are pleased to see. 

But at the end of the day, if a regime, whether that be in China, 

whether that be in any other country in the world, can ultimately 

deter the United States from its engagement of human rights activists and political dissidents, then that pillar of our diplomacy crumbles. 

Secretary CLINTON. I know. But that is not what we are doing. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I would like to see—I would like to see 

what we are doing because right now we are not doing very much. 

So I will follow up with that. I hope we get a response from the 

administrator. 

I would like to ask you two other questions. One is Senator 

Kerry, Lugar, Corker, and myself have written legislation with reference to reforming our foreign assistance institutions. You mention the Quadrennial Defense and Diplomacy Review. I would like 

to know where we are at? When can we expect to see some tangible 

changes? What might these changes look like? 

And my second question is, as you know, there are more than 

40,000 Turkish troops occupying Cyprus. No one in the world 

accepts the proposition that they are there to protect Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots, and even the European Parliament on 

February 10 passed a resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus. 

Yet, Madam Secretary, America’s Ambassador to Turkey, Ambassador Jeffrey, very recently said in a newspaper interview that 

Turkey has ‘‘security concerns on Cyprus.’’ Certainly, he can’t be 

supporting this rationale for keeping Turkish troops on Cyprus. 

Did he misspeak? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, first, with respect to foreign assistance, 

the QDDR will be finished this summer. We look to it to help us 

coordinate with this committee and with the Congress on the foreign assistance reforms that we believe should be undertaken. Our 

goal is to enhance the capacity and effectiveness of American foreign assistance, to better coordinate among the various aspects of 

the American Government that provide assistance. 

26 

We have everything from USDA to Treasury with its funding of 

the international financial institutions to, of course, State, to 

USAID and other entities as well. We want to more clearly state 

the mission, more clearly resource that mission. 

The White House is currently simultaneously conducting its own 

review of development, bringing in all the other stakeholders 

because, of course, we are only looking at State and USAID. But 

I think that many of our findings will be very much in line with 

the direction and the aspiration that this committee has set forth 

in the legislation. 

With respect to Cyprus, we strongly support the continuing negotiations under U.N. auspices for a bizonal, bicommunal resolution 

on Cyprus. We have been heartened by some of the intense consultations going on between the Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leadership, but there is a long way to go. 

And I think that—I can’t speak for our Ambassador, but I 

assume he was stating the opinion of the Turkish Government. 

That is something that we do not ascribe to because we want to 

see the entire Cyprus situation resolved. But we certainly understand that is the stated position of the Turkish Government, not 

the American Government. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Menendez. 

Let me just say so the record reflects it, Senator Menendez, that 

the committee has taken note formally—I spoke on the floor in 

December about our efforts to try to review the democracy promotion programs. And we all agree that the goals are laudable, and 

we want to help the Cuban people, but we also want to make sure 

that we are doing the most effective things and that the programs 

are working. 

So we are looking at that. We are going to work with the administration. I think it is important to try to just look at it and evaluate it. And we are going to continue our review, and we will work 

with you and with the Secretary to try to measure this. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I appreciate that. 

But what I am concerned about is turning a page that we have 

never permitted in our history, which is having an oppressive regime anywhere in the world tell us how we are going to ultimately 

engage in our democracy programs. And that is the core. 

We all want to see the most effective democracy programs, but 

for anyone to expect that we will get a stamp of approval from a 

regime to pursue it—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody expects that, Senator. And I think that 

you are, in a sense, postulating a subjective criteria that doesn’t 

exist here. There is no stamp of approval necessary. We will do 

what we think is in our best interests, and I am confident the 

administration will do that and want us to do that. 

It is simply a question of measuring the effectiveness of what we 

are doing against all outcomes, and I think we need to do that. So 

we will work with you. We will have a good dialogue about it. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And I am happy, as long as we do that 

worldwide, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. We probably should. And I think that is important. 

Senator Casey. 

27 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, thank you for your testimony today and your 

work. 

I was thinking, as we were preparing for this hearing, that one 

area of our discussion that often doesn’t get enough of attention is 

the budget itself and the management of a huge enterprise that the 

State Department is. And I have always believed whatever level of 

government we are talking about that the strength of any government, especially the U.S. Government, can only be maintained by 

the strength or integrity of its agencies and the management of 

those agencies. 

And I know it is difficult enough to deal with the issues that you 

are confronted with, but you also have to run a big agency, and we 

are grateful for the way you have managed that and the team you 

have put in place to help you do that. 

I was also struck by something that you said in your testimony 

on the section on development, where you highlighted the areas of 

development that the State Department is focused on, whether it 

is health or food security or climate change and clean technology 

jobs. But the last section of that, I thought we cannot say this 

enough. And I am quoting here. ‘‘These initiatives are designed to 

enhance American security, to help people in need, and, third, to 

give the American people a strong return on their investment.’’ 

Often, when—and you know this from traveling our country. You 

know this from your work in the Senate that when people are confronted with the question, ‘‘How do we save money?’’—an important 

question these days—they often point to cutting foreign aid as a 

bonanza, as a place where we can save all kinds of money that the 

reality we know is otherwise. 

I was noting that the international affairs budget is about 1.4 

percent of the total budget of the United States, despite all of the— 

I guess the perceptions or misperceptions that somehow there is a 

lot of areas to eliminate. And I think you are demonstrating that 

every day that we can’t at this time in our history, especially in 

light of our security concerns, do that. 

Let me ask you about two or three areas. One involves our domestic economy and the horrific recession that so many families 

have lived through. Pennsylvania has a lower unemployment rate, 

but 560,000 people out of work. And you mentioned that in the 

opening, you mentioned the challenge of our domestic economy in 

the opening comments you made. 

Sometimes that connection between the international affairs 

budget and the investments we make around the world may not 

seem to translate into the domestic economy. But I note here that 

since 2005, the U.S. Export-Import Bank, which is funded through 

the international affairs budget, has financed $3.06 billion in exports from Pennsylvania, supporting 223 companies, 112 communities. There are other examples as well. 

But I would like to have you talk about that because it is not 

something that we talk about enough, and I think there is a story 

to tell here that the American people don’t often hear. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator Casey, I can’t thank you 

enough for asking that question because I think you are 100 percent right. 

28 

I obviously believe that what we are doing is part of our security, 

and I think that case is certainly more understandable for people 

today since 9/11 than it might have been beforehand. But I also 

think it is essential to our economy. 

You illustrate one example of that, the Export-Import Bank. We 

really believe that we can do even more through the Ex-Im Bank, 

and I am going to try to encourage that approach. Somebody asked 

me what I would like to do. I said I would like to put Ex-Im Bank 

on steroids because I think it does so much good work for American 

companies, and I want American businesses to know that. 

We are also working on a much more extensive export-driven 

strategy that the President has announced and has spoken about 

with business leaders. I have asked Under Secretary Bob Hormats 

to lead our efforts inside the State Department because we think 

there is more we can do. We can do more on our own. We can do 

more in partnership with the Commerce Department, and we 

intend to do that. And to reach out particularly to small and 

medium-size businesses about how they can export, more lessons 

that perhaps can be conveyed to them, work with more chambers 

of commerce in partnership on this issue. 

We want to do more to highlight American business. We are in 

an economic competition, as we are in every other aspect of the 

world today, and American business needs to have a partner in the 

U.S. Government. Other businesses from other countries have a 

strong partnership with their government, whether it is stateowned enterprises from China or private companies from Europe. 

They often have much more support from their governments than 

we have in recent years given to our businesses. 

So I think in many ways we can do more to impress upon the 

American public the importance of what happens at the State 

Department in opening doors and in working with other Government agencies here in the United States to promote jobs in 

America. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

And maybe one more area before—I have got about a minute left. 

But it is on nonproliferation. I was giving a speech yesterday about 

the topic generally, and I especially appreciate the approach that 

you have taken and your team, the President, the Vice President, 

from a position of strength that our No. 1 objective and No. 1 

obligation is the security of the American people. And one of the 

fundamental goals of the nonproliferation strategy is to have a 

safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. 

I wanted to have you talk about that in the context of not just 

the—I guess not just the funding and the investments we have to 

make in this budget to make sure that we have a safe and secure 

and effective arsenal, but also in the context of our broader security 

agenda. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, I appreciate your recognition that this 

budget and, of course, President Obama are committed to our safe 

and secure nuclear arsenal, but at the same time, the President’s 

vision of a world without nuclear weapons. And some have asked 

me how can those two coexist? And I said, well, they can only 

coexist. 

29 

I mean, realistically, we know that the goal of a nuclear weapons 

free world is off in the distance. So what are the steps we need to 

take in order to move toward that? And in his Prague speech outlining his vision, as well as in the State of the Union, the President 

made clear that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United 

States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. 

Infrastructure repair is critically important in order to sustain 

our nuclear security enterprise. And therefore, the budget request 

supports programs that are important to implementing all of the 

President’s nuclear security agenda. What can we do to fund the 

stockpile support activities that enhance our deterrent, that make 

deeper reductions through negotiations like what we are involved 

in with Russia on START? How do we make the case to the Senate 

surrounding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? How do we fund 

the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program? 

There is just—every piece of this fits together. So it is an issue 

that, of course, Senator Lugar has been a champion of for a very 

long time, but I think you are so right to be raising this issue in 

audiences that you speak to. Because it is one of the most important issues confronting humanity, and we are trying to walk the 

line of being committed to a goal of zero, but being smart about 

how we protect and maintain our deterrent now. 

So that is the tension, but we think it is the realistic way 

forward. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Clinton, thank you very much. We very much appreciate your leadership. I particularly want to underscore how important your statements about American foreign policy priorities 

including human rights have been received internationally. 

Senator Wicker and I were recently in an international meeting 

of the OSCE, and your statements particularly about the importance of human rights, but also that we are going to evaluate our 

own performance was very well received, and it has helped us. And 

I encourage you to continue with your strong commitment in that 

area. 

I want to talk about the direction of our foreign aid program. I 

strongly support what you are trying to do, including providing 

more resources and more aggressive use of our involvement internationally. But I am concerned about our Government partners 

when there is a significant leakage of funds because of corruption. 

Corruption is a problem in so many places in the world. And 

when we try to provide a partner with money and that money gets 

used for other than its intended purpose, we are not only denying 

the taxpayers of our own country the accountability that is 

demanded, but we are denying the purpose for which the foreign 

assistance was being made available. 

I also mention in this context the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which Senator Lugar and I are encouraging a 

much stronger participation by the United States in the EITI. As 

you know, oil wealth and mineral wealth for many countries is a 

curse because it fuels corruption rather than development within 

a country. And I would just encourage you, as we go through forVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:32 Jan 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\111TH CONGRESS\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINT
30 

eign assistance reform, to make sure that we have strong accountability built into the programs and an expectation that there must 

be progress in dealing with the corruption issues among our partner countries. 

Secretary CLINTON. I could not agree more, Senator. First, thank 

you for your continuing work with the OSCE. We view that as an 

important forum. We are trying to become more engaged and involved. We have a new Ambassador teed up to go. So we are very 

much focused on what we need to do to support the broad initiative, broad agenda of the OSCE. 

On the question of corruption, this is the cancer that eats away 

at societies, and it is particularly apparent in these resource-rich 

societies where it is the oil curse. You know, when you go to a 

country like Nigeria, whose social indicators are falling despite the 

increase in oil wealth, and the corruption is so endemic that people 

are just discouraged and turned off by their own country’s efforts, 

it is so distressing because think of what could be done properly 

managed. 

So we are doing several things. We are working very hard in support of anticorruption initiatives internationally. The U.N. has 

some efforts underway. We want this to be a topic in other multilateral fora, including the OSCE, where I think it could be quite 

important. 

We are also pushing the Extractive Transparency Initiative because we agree with you that this mineral wealth should be protected as much as possible so that the revenues flowing from it are 

used for the benefit of the people. And we look forward to working 

with you and others on how we enhance the tools that we have on 

the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. 

I think we have to think outside the box, so to speak. How do 

we get more accountability? And I think we have to have more conditions-based aid. I know that a lot of people see aid as something 

that America should do, and in certain instances, like in the aftermath of Haiti, I agree with that. But it is always a choice. 

There are many priorities in the world that we could spend the 

hard-earned taxpayer dollars on. And so, when we are looking at 

aid, I think we have to have more of an approach that says what 

are you going to do in return for that aid? And how do we prevent 

the diversion? What are the techniques that we use? 

Some of the diversion is straight-out corruption. It goes into people’s pockets. It goes into Swiss bank accounts. But some of it is 

diversion so that if we are putting money into a health program, 

then the government takes their money out of the health program. 

So we are not getting additive. And you wonder why we are never 

getting ahead because we keep putting money in. Other partners 

keep putting money in. We have to enhance the contributions from 

the local communities. 

A simple example is when we used to give away malaria nets, 

they weren’t as effective as when we made people pay just a little, 

tiny something for it. So there is a lot of best practices and good 

lessons learned that we are trying to apply in our aid programs 

going forward, and the more we can enhance transparency of all 

kinds—and I will just end with this because I could go on about 

it. 

31 

But we are trying to use technology as an anticorruption tool. So 

when we help to fund cell phones going into the hands of people, 

they then can do mobile banking. So, for example, in a country like 

the Democratic Republic of Congo, where there is no banking system, where there are very few roads in the entire country, in order 

to pay the military, a bag of money starts off in Kinshasa, and by 

the time it gets to the troops in Goma, there is nothing left. 

But if we can set up a mobile banking system, we cut out the 

middle people. And one of the biggest differences we could make 

with our aid investments is helping to build transparent, anticorrupt e-government systems. And some countries are very open 

to that, and we are working with them. And we are also sending 

this sort of little SWAT team we have of high-tech young people 

around the world, working to enhance these programs. But we are 

taking this anticorruption campaign very seriously. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, I appreciate that response. There is nothing wrong with conditioning aid because Americans expect there is 

accountability in the use of our taxpayer dollars. 

Secretary CLINTON. That is right. 

Senator CARDIN. So we have a right to expect that the countries 

are fighting corruption. I would also add to that list the gender 

issues, that they are integrating women into the programs. You 

have been a leader on that and gives us a chance to advance that 

issue. 

Let me, in the minute I have left, I want to just continue to raise 

the concern of the refugees from Iraq that are in Syria and Jordan. 

There was a student at Goucher University in Baltimore who was 

an Iraqi refugee living in Syria that was fortunate enough to be 

able to make it to the United States, his story about so many people in his family that didn’t make because of the refugee status. 

We have a responsibility in regards to the people who are still 

refugees from the Iraq conflict, and I would just urge you to continue our attention to get Iraq, the region, and the international 

community, along with the United States, focused on how we can 

help the lives of those people. 

Secretary CLINTON. We completely agree with that, and we have 

a concerted effort that is looking at how we can do more to help 

Iraqi refugees and try to resettle them back in Iraq, if that is their 

choice. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cardin. As chairman, I want 

to thank you for your terrific diligence in pursuing the Helsinki 

Commission efforts. You have been a real leader at that, and we 

appreciate it enormously. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome, Secretary Clinton. We are delighted to have you 

here and very much thank you and appreciate the leadership that 

you are providing to the Department of State and to our diplomatic 

efforts all around the world. Thank you. 

Last week, I had the opportunity to travel to the Balkans with 

Senator Voinovich, who, as I am sure you know, is quite a hero in 

32 

the Balkans, just as former President Clinton is. And it was remarkable to see the progress that has been made there. 

But as you know, that region still is the missing piece as we seek 

to see a Europe that is whole and free and at peace. And Bosnia, 

in particular, I think remains a concern. I was pleased to see your 

recent speech about the future of NATO and the commitment to 

leave the door open for prospective NATO members who meet the 

alliance’s criteria. 

I hope and I appreciate the leadership that you are providing to 

say to those countries in the Balkans that if they can achieve the 

alliance’s criteria, they will be welcomed as members of NATO, and 

I wonder if you could speak to that? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, first, Senator, as I expressed to Senator 

Voinovich earlier in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, thank you for going to southern Europe and the Balkans. There is a lot of unfinished business there. We can be proud 

of the role that the United States played, but we can’t rest on any 

laurels because there are still some volatile situations that have to 

be addressed. 

With respect to NATO membership, I believe strongly in leaving 

the door open. I also believe it needs to be left open for the European Union, although we have no direct role in that. And I think 

it is particularly important for Bosnia. 

Now we have been trying to persuade Bosnia-Herzegovina to do 

the necessary constitutional reform that will enhance the prospects 

for unity and not division within that country. And some people 

have argued, well, that should be the carrot that is held out to 

them so that if they do the constitutional reform, then they can get 

into the MAP process for NATO. Others have said, no, let them in 

and then don’t let them become members until they do it. 

However you look at it, I think that we want Bosnia to be looking toward Europe. We want Bosnia to stay united. We want Bosnia to be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic Alliance. So we are constantly trying to figure out what is the best way to achieve that. 

And the door remains open. When they begin to walk through it, 

that is something we are still trying to work out. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, we heard some real concern on the part 

not just of Bosnia, but some of the other countries in the region 

about enlargement fatigue, particularly when it comes to the EU. 

But also I think with respect to NATO concern that perhaps there 

were other reasons why their MAP process was not viewed favorably at this point. 

So I hope that the administration will continue to remain engaged with the EU to keep an open process and an open effort to 

encourage the countries of the Balkans to consider future membership. And maybe you could talk about what we are doing to try and 

encourage that to continue? 

Secretary CLINTON. Senator, we are encouraging the European 

Union to do more to demonstrate the benefits to Bosnia of European integration and to work with the Government of Bosnia to try 

to understand what it must do to be eligible for EU membership. 

There are other countries that are also seeking that kind of path. 

Serbia, which I think is very important, to be focused on Europe 

and the West. 

33 

So it has been one of my highest priorities in terms of our European policy. I am not satisfied with where we are because I think 

that there has been changes going on in Europe with post-Lisbon. 

There was a desire on the part of the Europeans to kind of take 

care of their own business first, but we are keeping them focused 

on the Balkans. 

We have a lot of work to do, and we don’t want to see any moves 

to break up Bosnia. And we worry about that a lot. So this is a 

long list of concerns. But the NATO piece of it I am watching very 

closely because I share your concerns that we want BosniaHerzegovina to feel like they are welcome. And they may not be 

there yet, but with a little bit more effort they could be. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

And let me just be clear when I was referring to concern over enlargement fatigue in the EU, it wasn’t just in Bosnia-Herzegovina 

that we heard that. It was in Serbia and the other parts of the Balkans. So I think that is a very real concern and one that we should 

continue to pursue with our friends in the EU. 

With respect to NATO, as I said, I very much appreciated the 

speech that you gave recently on NATO. As the strategic concept 

draft is being developed, what are your main priorities for that new 

concept? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, as I spoke about in my speech and as 

Secretary Gates reiterated the following day, we believe that NATO 

must continue to be a strong, effective alliance in the 21st century, 

just as it was in the 20th. And we have to take a hard look at how 

we are defining our roles and responsibilities within NATO. We 

have to reform NATO so that it is more streamlined, more manageable than many people believe it is now. 

We have to look at what the sort of out-of-area challenges are— 

from piracy to cyber terrorism—and figure out what response we 

are going to have. We have to determine the way forward on missile defense, which we think is critical to NATO’s future. There is 

just a long list of what are new responsibilities for NATO to 

assume. 

But Madeleine Albright is chairing the strategic concept committee and doing an excellent job. So I think we will get a good 

result out of that work, and then it will be up to the member countries to hammer out the actual content of it. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. 

Senator Kaufman, the perpetual winner of the patience award. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Madam Secretary. I, frankly, don’t know how you do 

this. [Laughter.] 

Really, I watch sometimes the amount of travel and then trying 

to run the State Department at the same time, it is an incredible 

challenge. And I really appreciate your service in doing this. 

These are really tough times for us economically. But I am very 

pleased to see that the administration has decided to have a sizable 

increase in Department of State funding. I mean, I have traveled 

to Afghanistan and Iraq several times, and our troops are magnificent. But when you are there, you have to kind of be not thinking 

to say, how do we stop this from happening before it happens? 

34 

And I think that anyone that thinks about that, for having a 

strong, smart, big Department of State can act as an incredible 

prevention so we don’t have to send our magnificent troops out 

there and put them in harm’s way and go through what we go 

through today. And I know that you have no better supporter in 

this, and it is really a great time, and that is Secretary of Defense 

Gates. I mean, he really is articulate about it. 

So I noticed that in this bill, you mention in your statement that 

the complex crisis fund, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability 

Fund is being transferred from DOD to State. Can you talk a little 

bit about why that makes sense in light of the roles of State and 

Defense? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, thank you so much, Senator Kaufman. 

Thank you for your service to this committee before you were a 

member of it. 

Secretary Gates, before I ever was Secretary of State, understood 

from his many decades in Government service, and particularly 

over at the Defense Department now, that our national security 

was out of balance at the end of the first decade of the 21st century. We had come to rely so heavily on our military, and it wasn’t 

just for their being warriors on behalf of our security, but they 

were doing development, reconstruction, humanitarian projects, 

just so much. 

And they are so good at it, and they have more than, what, 12 

times the resources that the State Department and USAID do. But 

it wasn’t the kind of balanced national security policy that is in the 

long-term interest of the United States. So Secretary Gates started 

sounding this alarm 2 years ago, and I am very grateful for his 

support. 

So what we are trying to do is to rebalance by moving back and 

maybe for the first time into the State Department and USAID 

what were known as ‘‘1206 funds,’’ the kind of pre- and post-conflict work that should be led by civilians. There is a lot of room for 

partnership with the military, but we have got to train up a civilian capacity to be able to do this work. 

And look at what is happening in Iraq. It is a perfect example. 

We have a deadline to withdraw our troops. It is a deadline negotiated with the Iraqi Government. So we are expected to leave. 

But the Iraqi Government has certain requests that it has made 

of us. One of them is to do advanced-level police and law enforcement training. The military has been doing that. They have all the 

resources. They have the helicopters. They have the hardened 

facilities. We don’t have any of that. 

So if we are going to have a chance of getting in and doing what 

is expected of us, we have to have the resources to plan for and 

then execute and deliver on what that mission is. So I think that 

this is not easy to do, and we are asking for some additional 

resources to be able to do it. 

But even with our just—our Civilian Response Corps is in the infancy, but we sent people to Haiti. We sent people to Afghanistan. 

We are beginning to have more expeditionary personnel and the 

resources to match. 

There will always be a role for the military in humanitarian 

assistance, as we saw in Haiti. We could not have done what was 

35 

done absent our military being there in force. But we have got to 

be better positioned to do our part on the civilian side, and that 

is what we are attempting to achieve. 

Senator KAUFMAN. That is great. Can you talk a little bit about 

public diplomacy and how you see the future of public diplomacy 

in your budget and what you are doing in terms of new ideas and 

things that we can do to encourage public diplomacy? 

Secretary CLINTON. I would strongly encourage the committee 

members who are interested in public diplomacy to get a briefing 

from our new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy. You know, 

this is not faulting anyone because when we merged USAID and 

all the other public diplomacy elements of our Government that 

had done so well during the cold war in the late 1990s into the 

State Department, they were still independent agencies. The mission was not clear. 

To give the Bush administration their due, they tried to figure 

out how best to do this. It is really hard, and it is not a PR job. 

It is not a propaganda job. It is a management job. We have enormous resources spread around the world. We need a clear line of 

communication and a message that is repeated over and over 

again. And let me just give you two quick examples. 

When we went into Haiti, it was a joint military-civilian operation, but obviously, the military had a much bigger footprint. 

There were some media outlets around the world who immediately 

put a negative picture out there of the United States. And the attitude previously was, well, what can you expect from these countries? They are anti-American or their outlets are anti-American. 

We said, no, we are going to go right at them, and we did. We 

called them up, and we said that is wrong. That story is unfair. We 

will give you people who you can talk to. So we are actively engaging with even outlets and countries that are not always considered 

friendly to our interests. We can’t leave these stories just out there 

to become conventional wisdom. 

In Pakistan, there were a number of stories, and our Embassy 

personnel had historically been told not to respond. If there is a 

story, don’t respond to it. Well, that is not the way modern communications work. 

So we are—every single day, we monitor what is said on the public media. We need to know what is being said to people in countries where we are operating. And then if we think they are saying 

something that is not true about the United States, we try to get 

in there with an alternative point of view. 

So our Under Secretary, Judith McHale, came from Discovery. So 

she was a media executive, not an advertising person or a PR person. So she knows how to look at this systematically. And that is 

what we are trying to do, to change the message, to change the 

urgency. 

When I was in Qatar, I met with the board of Al Jazeera. We 

are putting people on there. We are responding. This is one of the 

most powerful media presences in the world that we are engaged 

with. So we are not saying, well, what can you expect? We are saying, no, you can do better. We will give people to talk. We will give 

you somebody to get on that television show and put out the American point of view. 

36 

Now we are not going to change their perspective overnight, but 

we are not going to let it go unanswered either. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Well, March 10, Under Secretary McHale is 

coming. We are having a hearing on public diplomacy with former 

Under Secretary Lieberman, Hughes, and Glassman. 

Secretary CLINTON. Great. 

Senator KAUFMAN. So I think this is absolutely incredibly important as we look at the world. It is a much more complex world, and 

how we handle public diplomacy is key. 

Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kaufman. 

I think what the Secretary just said is terrific, and I am delighted to hear it, as I am sure we all are. 

Just a few quick wrapups before we close off, unless Senator 

Lugar has additional questions. But can you just share with us 

very quickly the current status of the plans to assess and assist on 

the Haiti rebuild? 

Secretary CLINTON. Yes. First, there will be a donors conference 

on March 31 that the United States is cohosting with the U.N. and 

other major donor countries at the U.N. in New York. We have 

been engaged with the EU, with lead countries like France and 

Brazil and others who have put forward—and Canada—significant 

contributions. But every country in our hemisphere has contributed 

something. And so, we are working to enhance those contributions. 

There is an effort underway to coordinate the Haitian Government and the United Nations with the United States and other 

donors through a development authority that the Haitian Government would set up and run, but which would be given lines of accountability from the donor countries as well. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, we had a plan, a well-developed 

plan that we had worked on with our Haitian partners prior to the 

earthquake, and we are working to implement that, as part of the 

recovery, with certain changes. For example, focusing on agriculture is one of the big issues we are trying to further. 

So we will give you in probably about 2 to 3 weeks a very thorough report. We will also include all the information we have about 

what other countries are doing because this—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Who is heading this up for the State Department? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Raj Shah is the lead person named by 

the President and my chief of staff, Cheryl Mills, is our State 

Department contact. 

The CHAIRMAN. Is there going to be one single person coordinating all of it? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, right now, Raj Shah is the designated 

director. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right now, you say that. 

Secretary CLINTON. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. And the timing of a supplemental request, any 

sense of that? 

Secretary CLINTON. We hope within the next few weeks. 

37 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. On the QDDR and the coordination with the 

Presidential study, are we going to have two different concepts 

here, or what is going to happen? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, that is certainly not our intention. We 

are working very hard to coordinate those and to have one voice 

coming from the administration. Now there will be other elements 

in the PSD because of the IFIs and Ex-Im and all the rest of it. 

But we want the general concepts to be adopted administration 

wide. 

The CHAIRMAN. And finally, just on the PCCF, which is going to 

come to you guys directly this time. But last year, when it came 

to you, you funneled it directly over to the Defense Department 

again. And as we try to redo this, I guess that doesn’t make sense. 

Is that going to happen this year, or are you up and ready to—— 

Secretary CLINTON. We are up and ready. We are going to be 

administering it this year. 

The CHAIRMAN. Terrific. That is great to hear. 

Do you mind? Senator Risch just quickly wanted to make a comment, I think. 

Senator RISCH. Very briefly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Clinton, as you know, the people who were held recently in Haiti as a result of their travel there to attempt to assist 

some children in Haiti, most of them were from Idaho. And as a 

result of that, they were held for some period of time. Their families in Idaho were very stressed over the situation that they were 

being held at. 

And I just want to thank you on behalf of them. Your team, both 

the team that you assigned here in Washington, DC, and the team 

that was on the ground in Haiti, particularly Ted Coley from your 

operation and Catherine Farrell, who was on the ground there in 

Haiti, were very, very helpful to the people in Idaho and were very 

responsive when some of us from the congressional delegation 

jumped in and attempted to assist those people. 

As you know, many Americans are unaware of the difficulties 

they face when they get ensnared in the criminal system in other 

countries, and it can be very befuddling. They don’t understand 

why they don’t have the same constitutional rights. They don’t 

understand that the facilities in which they are being held aren’t 

up to the same type of facilities here in the United States. 

But your organization was very, very responsive. I want to thank 

you for that. When the media asked me, I told them Secretary 

Clinton runs a tight ship, particularly in these kinds of instances. 

So I wanted to pass that on to you. 

We have also received communication from some of the families, 

thanking us and thanking your organization. So I wanted to pass 

that on to you. Thank you so much for what you did. 

Without any reference to what the facts of the situation were 

there or what actually happened as far as the factual situation, 

just as far as what the State Department was able to do, you did. 

And we are appreciative of that. Thank you. 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you very much. And I will pass on 

those kind words, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Risch. I appreciate it. 

Senator Lugar. 

38 

Senator LUGAR. Secretary Clinton, I have just three quick items 

that I will mention, and I ask for your comment on any of them. 

First of all, the policy statement that you gave in your speech at 

the Newseum on Internet security and cyber security was just tremendously important. I am curious as to whether there are any 

available budget figures or additional positions that that would 

buttress the position that you took. 

Second, we have worked actively in this committee on the 

PEPFAR program, and I think there has been recognition by the 

former Global AIDS Coordinator, Mark Dybul, and the present one, 

Eric Goosby, and others that we cannot treat our way out of these 

problems. Prevention is terribly important. 

I have concerns that prevention efforts might be in for reduction 

in the budget. I ask that you take a look at prevention strategies 

and explain the rationale for potentially reducing the program. I do 

know that the program does continue on a very broad scale and it 

treats patients in a very humane way. 

And finally, I am just curious, given the outcome of the election 

in Ukraine, what new initiatives we might be pursuing there. Obviously, many of the things we have attempted to do there have been 

frustrated largely by problems within the administration of the 

government. That may still be the case, but hope springs eternal. 

Clearly, the affairs in Crimea are very important. So just as a 

sidebar, I wanted to raise a thought about that. 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you, Senator. 

We are very serious about implementing a robust comprehensive 

Internet security, cyber security policy. It has got many aspects to 

it. We are reorganizing within the State Department so that we 

can be more effective in the whole arena of cyber security and better interact with our intelligence community, Defense Department, 

and others who are similarly focused. 

With respect to our efforts to open up the Internet and keep it 

open to protect the freedom of expression and the virtual freedom 

of assembly in countries like Iran, we are going after this with intense focus. We are providing funding to groups. We are working 

with private sector partners that often have the intellectual property and the access that is needed. It would be perhaps of some interest to you and other members of the committee to give you a 

classified briefing at some point in the future. 

And on our prevention and treatment efforts, we are attempting 

to maintain and certainly fulfill our obligations on the treatment 

side, even increasing. But we are moving more aggressively on the 

prevention side and in building systems. So I will give you an 

answer in detail about that because Eric Goosby has given a lot of 

thought to how we can best do that, and partnering with some 

countries that were not our partners to any great extent before, 

like South Africa, where we are now very deeply engaged in helping them. 

And finally, on Ukraine, Gen. Jim Jones will lead our delegation 

to the inauguration tomorrow, and we are going to begin exploring 

what we can do. We want to be responsive and supportive of this 

free, fair, and credible election process, which has led to a new 

President. 

39 

It is difficult. We have to wait to see how the government is 

formed and what their attitudes might be. But we want Ukraine 

to know the United States stands ready to be a positive partner 

with them for the future. 

Senator LUGAR. Surely the idea that the new Ukrainian President is going to Europe first and to Russia second was a significant 

statement. 

Secretary CLINTON. That is right. 

Senator LUGAR. Maybe offers some promise. 

Secretary CLINTON. I agree. I agree. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Madam Secretary, as we wrap up, I wanted to 

give you just a chance to perhaps say a word, if you want to, about 

one issue before the Congress, before us and you right now, and 

that is the conference on the Iran sanctions bill. 

Deputy Secretary Steinberg wrote us expressing concerns that 

the legislation would ‘‘weaken rather than strengthen international 

unity and support for our efforts.’’ I know you have submitted a 

number of proposed changes at this point. So do you want to just 

share what you might hope would come out of the Congress and 

why at this moment? 

Secretary CLINTON. I appreciate this opportunity, Mr. Chairman. 

We very much support congressional action. We want a very broad 

global sanction regime that isolates Iran, encourages it to change 

its strategic calculus, and we think that there can be a very good 

partnership between the Congress and the Obama administration 

in order to achieve that. 

Our goal is to support the purpose and principles of the congressional bills that have been passed that are now in conference, but 

to work closely with you with some suggestions about how they 

would better fit into our agenda in the Security Council, in the 

multilateral world, to give the President some flexibility so that we 

can come out of the legislative process with a really strong tool and 

not just a statement of concern that won’t really dovetail with what 

we are trying to achieve. 

So we have a team led by Assistant Secretary Rich Verma ready 

and willing to work with the Congress, the conference committee, 

in order to explore how we can come out with the best result. 

The CHAIRMAN. Good. Well, I appreciate your comments on it. 

We tried within the Senate before the passage to get some of that 

done. It wasn’t possible. But hopefully, in the conference, we can 

get there, and I appreciate what you are trying to do. 

Thank you so much. I think you have covered an incredible 

amount of ground and done so with clarity. And we are enormously 

appreciative of how comprehensive the afternoon has been. So 

thank you very, very much. 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you so much, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

40 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing, and, Madam Secretary, thank 

you for being here. 

We meet at a time of great potential and great challenge on the world stage. 

The nation of Haiti remains foremost in our thoughts, as the Haitian people 

struggle to recover and rebuild in the wake of a devastating earthquake. 

Our European allies face new economic challenges, and with the rise of new powers around the world, we face a newly competitive global economic landscape. 

In the Middle East, despite the good work of our witness and Senator Mitchell, 

the Israeli-Palestinian peace process remains tenuous, with serious and direct 

American involvement needed to enact and implement an agreement. 

And even as our troops begin to come home from Iraq, our new strategy is beginning to take hold in Afghanistan, where our mission requires as much of our diplomatic resources as of our military resources. 

Madam Secretary, we have much to discuss. And I look forward to hearing from 

you on all of these issues. 

But I’d like to use a few moments here, if I could, to talk about Latin America. 

I just returned from a trip to Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and 

Nicaragua. These are five different countries, but the challenges they face, and potential opportunities are tied together, and tied to America. 

I’ve often said that Latin America isn’t our backyard. Instead, we share a neighborhood, and as good neighbors know, our collective futures are tied to one another. 

Central America is plagued, for example, by public insecurity related to increased 

drug trafficking—and America plays an unfortunately huge role in that problem due 

to the demand for narcotics in our country. 

That public insecurity is endemic to the region—as are the related issues of economic inequality. And while our neighbors can’t look to us to solve all of their problems, America must be part of the solution, 

Our country rightly focuses on border security, to keep harmful elements out. But 

we need to extend the definition of border security to include keeping drug money 

and arms from flowing from the United States to the region. 

More in line with the State Department’s jurisdiction, we need to revitalize and 

refocus the Merida Initiative. Senator Leahy and I fought to include funding for 

training and prevention programs, along with other important civil society initiatives critical to a holistic attack on the drug problem. It is important that this funding remain strong, and that we get it to the countries that need it. 

We also need to give USAID more flexibility—and more authority—to perform its 

critical development function under Merida, especially with regards to civilian capacity and rule of law programs. 

And we need to encourage our partners in the region to think of the problem as 

one that affects the entire region. Our approach to Latin America has too often overlooked the importance of treating this region as a region, rather than as a collection 

of unrelated nations. And other countries, concerned with maintaining sovereignty, 

have made the same mistake. 

That means we are missing opportunities to improve our neighborhood. But I 

have confidence in this administration, led so ably by Secretary Clinton, to make 

course corrections where necessary so that we can tackle not only the challenges in 

Latin America, but the wide range of challenges we face on the global stage. 

And I look forward to discussing them with you today. 

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. There has been a lot of discussion of the need to empower and transfer 

responsibility to local Afghans after the military has secured areas. Yet, too often, 

the critical legs of counterinsurgency—governance and development—are not in 

place to capitalize on security gains. 

• Can you give us examples of where ‘‘clear, hold, build, and transfer’’ has 

worked, especially in the south? Particularly the last part—the transfer? 

• The pool from which future Afghan civil servants can be drawn is far too shallow. For starters, decades of civil war have left a whole generation vastly undereducated. What can we do to overcome this lack of human infrastructure? 

41 

Answer. Our civilians and military personnel are working closely with Afghan 

partners to provide security, governance, and development in areas where there had 

been only Taliban control and brutality. Our training programs for both security 

forces and civilians are creating conditions that will enable full Afghanization, when 

we can be reasonably certain that the changes we are creating with our Afghan 

partners are sustainable by the Afghans. In other, more secure parts of the country, 

we have cooperated with Afghan Government officials and civil society to enable 

greater Afghan control of governance, security, and development. We will follow that 

same approach in the south, when there is a minimum baseline of security required 

to allow the cooperation with the Afghan civilian authorities to continue to move 

toward transfer. 

Thirty years of war has taken a heavy toll on Afghan Government capacity. Since 

2002, USAID and our Provincial Reconstruction Teams have invested hundreds of 

millions of dollars in education projects in Afghanistan to expand access to basic 

education by training teachers, constructing and rehabilitating schools, distributing 

supplies, and offering accelerated learning programs to out-of-school youth, particularly girls, who were denied an education under the Taliban. USAID is also supporting higher education and nonformal literacy and productive skills education for 

both youth and adults, as well as supporting capacity development for Afghanistan’s 

Ministry of Education. School enrollment is now at the highest level in Afghanistan’s history, with approximately 6 million students in school—an estimated 35 

percent of them being girls. 

While our education efforts will take time to bear fruit, we are also focusing on 

near term solutions to assist Afghan Government institutions directly. We are increasing significantly the number of civilian technical advisers in key central government ministries and in the provinces and district centers to help make Afghan 

Government institutions more visible, effective, and accountable. We are working to 

certify Afghan ministries and institutions so that they can receive direct U.S. assistance, thereby enhancing ministerial capacity, improving the effectiveness of our 

assistance, and decreasing reliance on contractors. 

We also are expanding subnational capacity-building efforts, focused mainly in 

key population centers in the East and South, through new civ-mil initiatives such 

as the District Development Working Groups and District Support Teams. We at the 

same time, we are focused on programs that give Afghans a greater stake in their 

government, like the National Solidarity Program. 

We are continuing our support for capacity-building in governance and development through our Provincial Reconstruction Teams and District Support Teams in 

the countryside. Our civilian and military personnel from these teams have been 

working hard over the last few years to develop and enhance the capabilities of local 

government officials including provincial governors, district subgovernors, provincial-level officials representing their ministries back in Kabul, Provincial Councils, 

and Provincial Development Councils. Through our investment in time and effort, 

we are developing a cadre of local government personnel who are increasingly capable of running government affairs at the provincial level. 

This top-down, bottom-up, whole-of-government approach is designed to build 

human capacity at all levels of government in Afghanistan, and also ensure that the 

next generation of Afghan Government officials possess the capabilities they need 

to perform their duties and serve the Afghan people. 

With respect to the first part of your question, we do not yet have an example 

of a successful ‘‘transfer’’ in the south. We are just now engaging in a major way 

in Afghanistan’s south, as that region has heretofore been under the primary responsibility of our U.K. and Canadian allies, with support from other allies and 

partners, and us. The Marjah operation will be an excellent test case for our clear, 

hold, build, and transfer approach. We should not expect to see quick successes in 

this regard. As you rightly alluded to in your question, war has ravaged Afghanistan for the last three decades. Our efforts to help the Afghans to extend governance 

into the south and east will be somewhat groundbreaking in that government presence has been rather thin in those regions over the last 30 years, and even farther 

back in history. It will be critical that we remain flexible and properly resourced 

and manned, and that our Afghan counterparts work with us throughout this process. Sustained security will be critical to transfer. 

Question. With Kai Eide stepping down from UNAMA this spring and with the 

United States and NATO stepping up its commitments this year, civilian leadership 

in Afghanistan is more important than ever. UNAMA’s mandate has always been 

more moral, lacking the executive authority to really tackle donor coordination 

issues, for example. For 8 years now, there has been an uneven and uncoordinated 

civilian effort with multiple Afghanistan envoys, ambassadors, assistance coordinaVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:32 Jan 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\111TH CONGRESS\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINT
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tors, and aid agency representatives running around in Kabul with no one clearly 

in charge to coordinate the massive international effort. 

• How can we effectively tackle problems of civilian leadership among international partners of Afghanistan? 

• Should we be more willing to place our own development efforts under greater 

international control? 

Answer. Our allies and partners are sustaining and, in many cases, increasing 

their military and financial commitments in Afghanistan, often in the face of deep 

public opposition. There is broad international consensus to empower the Afghan 

Government by aligning international assistance with Afghan priorities and, where 

possible, channel assistance through the Afghan Government. UNAMA, working 

closely with key reformers in the Afghan Government, has developed a strategy to 

integrate donor activities on the ground in accordance with shared objectives and 

in coordination with the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). Our international partners have greatly improved their coordination and information-sharing. 

We firmly believe that the new U.N. leadership and NATO civilian leadership recognize the need to enhance donor coordination efforts in Afghanistan and they have 

begun to do so. 

With regard to U.S. development assistance, considerable progress has been made 

in the past year. We work closely with our international partners in every developmental sector. The appointment of Ambassador Anthony Wayne as the Coordinating 

Director for Development and Economic Affairs (CDDEA) in Kabul (June 2009) has 

greatly enhanced our ability to manage USG assistance. In addition, Ambassador 

Wayne has been working closely with his Afghan counterparts to certify different 

Afghan ministries, so that they may receive direct USG assistance. He also leads 

Embassy efforts to coordinate our assistance programs with the Afghan Government, UNAMA, and bilateral and multilateral donors. 

Question. The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) runs 

the successful National Solidarity Program (NSP), a program in which the United 

States and others have invested hundreds of millions of dollars. The new MRRD 

Minister confirmed by Parliament is Jarullah Mansouri —a political pick who lacks 

competence and experience to run programs like NSP. Mansouri has made public 

comments suggesting he plans to scale back NSP drastically, which would jeopardize perhaps the greatest success story we have in Afghanistan and the lives of 

millions. 

• How will the administration work with the new MRRD Minister to make sure 

programs like NSP are not jeopardized? 

Answer. Minister Mansoori was confirmed in President Karzai’s second round 

Cabinet submission on January 16, 2010, and has stated that he strongly supports 

the National Solidarity Program. Minister Mansoori has stressed he would be 

guided by two principles during his tenure: national inclusion-allowing participation 

of the Afghan people to develop a sense of ownership in Ministry-led programs; and 

a focus on sustainability and capacity-building. Both are key elements of the National Solidarity Program. 

The USG is working closely with MRRD and other donors including the World 

Bank to ensure that programs like the NSP are not jeopardized. On Wednesday, 

March 3, Minister Mansoori led an NSP monthly donors meeting where he reaffirmed his support to the program. 

Question. Pakistan Security Assistance.—The Department is also requesting funds 

in the $140 million International Narcotics and Law Enforcement account line for 

Pakistan, to support ‘‘an expanded border security aviation fleet.’’ 

• What exactly are we planning to buy, and how much is it going to cost? 

• How has it been coordinated with the other security assistance we are providing? 

Answer. The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) 

plans to use $42.5 million of the $140 million FY 2011 request for the aviation program. However, INL does not plan to use FY 2011 funds to procure additional aircraft. Funds will provide maintenance, support, and operating expenses for the 

USG-established Ministry of Interior Air Wing (50th Squadron), including five additional Huey IIs that were added to the program in 2009 (through reprogramming 

of funds) and those INL anticipates purchasing with FY 2010 funds (four Huey II 

helicopters). In addition, funds will support the positioning of aircraft at a forward 

operating location (FOL) in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) which INL 

plans to establish with FY 2010 funds. This will allow the Air Wing to more efficiently conduct operations in the FATA and NWFP a critical element of support to 

43 

law enforcement as it works to ensure continued security once military operations 

have concluded in these areas. In total, the FY 2011 request is needed to provide 

maintenance, support and operating expenses for the current fleet of 17 aircraft, including 14 Huey II helicopters and 3 Cessna Caravans, in addition to the 4 Huey 

II helicopters which will be procured with FY 2010 funds, for a total of 21 aircraft. 

These aircraft remain a powerful tool for Pakistani law enforcement by performing critical surveillance functions; supporting operations against traffickers, 

criminals, and militants; and playing a role in the interdiction of illegal drug and 

weapons shipments. The operational tempo in 2009 was the highest in the history 

of the program and requests for aviation support to law enforcement agencies under 

the MOI is only expected to grow throughout FY10. 

INL support is coordinated with DOD and other USG entities through the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) at Embassy Islamabad, an Embassy Border Coordinator, as well as other coordinating mechanisms in Washington and in Pakistan. 

Question. In Secretary Clinton’s Executive Budget Summary for FY2011, she 

writes that the State Department and USAID ‘‘have identified a limited number of 

joint high priority performance goals that reflect both agencies’ high priorities and 

will be a particular focus for the two agencies from now through FY 2011.’’ On 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, the goal is to ‘‘strengthen the host country capacity to 

effectively provide services to citizens and enhance the long-term sustainability of 

development efforts by increasing the number of local implementers that can 

achieve a clean audit to clear them to manage civilian assistance funds.’’ 

• Please describe what steps the administration will take in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan to achieve this commendable goal. What type of program monitoring 

and evaluation will be taken to measure success? 

Answer. We recognize from our attempts to strengthen the host country capacity 

to provide services that some ministries fare better than others. We have a system 

for certifying ministries to receive U.S. funds directly which we will expand in both 

countries. We are using fewer big contractors, reducing the bureaucratic layers 

through which our assistance flows, ensuring that more assistance money actually 

reaches those in need. And we are dramatically increasing the numbers of USAID 

officers and inspectors to monitor our aid. 

Additionally, President Karzai has announced several measures to reduce corruption and create a climate more conducive to achieving this goal, including: the simplification of administrative systems through the anticorruption commission, thus 

reducing the opportunity for corruption and improving basic services for the population, and the streamlining of international donor coordination through the Afghan 

Government. In terms of progress, Afghanistan has established its Major Crimes 

Task Force and is creating a commission against corruption. 

Several U.S. agencies work with a range of Afghan counterparts on training and 

building such capacity. There is also a crucial role to be played by the Afghan people 

themselves—through civil society organizations, media debate, and Parliament and 

other institutions—to set out what they need from their government and what they 

will be able to give in return. 

On Pakistan, as is consistent with best practices in international development, 

U.S. assistance will be directed increasingly through a broad range of Government 

of Pakistan institutions, as well as local nongovernmental organizations (including 

the private sector) with the capacity to implement programs effectively and accountably. This approach will help increase host country ownership, and U.S. commitment to building a long-term partnership with the Afghan Government and people. 

Procedures are being developed in Pakistan at both the national and provincial 

levels for channeling resources through governmental agencies with the capacity to 

implement programs effectively. Implementation letters for the provincial governments have been drafted and are under review. The USAID mission in Pakistan has 

also begun conducting preaward surveys of governmental and nongovernmental institutions that will likely be recipients of U.S. assistance resources. 

The U.S. Government will provide funds to the Pakistani Government and qualified Pakistani organizations through a variety of mechanisms: direct sector budget 

support; direct funding for federal government projects and programs; direct funding 

for provincial government projects and programs; direct funding to Pakistani NGOs; 

direct funding to Pakistani contractors; multidonor trust funds; and public-private 

partnerships. Where appropriate, such as for technical assistance to the Government of Pakistan and assistance in sectors where Pakistani entities do not have the 

proficiency or sufficient capacity, the U.S. Government will engage U.S and international firms and NGOs. 

This transition will take time. Current activities being implemented via U.S. 

firms and NGOs will not be terminated before systems are in place to provide servVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:32 Jan 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\111TH CONGRESS\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINT
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ices via Pakistani organizations in an accountable manner. Moreover, a ramp-up of 

infrastructure programs will require a short-term increase in the need for architectural and engineering, monitoring and evaluation services, and other specialized 

U.S.-based experts. 

Question. Pakistan Security Assistance.—The Department’s budget request for FY 

2011 includes $1.2 billion for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund 

(PCCF) and another $296 million for Pakistan in Foreign Military Financing 

(FMF)—not counting the hundreds of millions of dollars in reimbursements for Pakistani counterterror operations that we will likely pay with Coalition Support 

Funds. This higher funding trend really started with last summer’s supplemental 

request; so that in the last two fiscal years Congress has already provided a combined $1.1 billion for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, and more than $500 

million for Foreign Military Financing. 

• (a) What measures have you used to evaluate the effort’s progress, how much 

ground have gained in the last year on those measures, and how much farther 

do we have to go? 

Answer (a). Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund/Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCF/PCCF): FMF and 

PCCF help Pakistan improve its counterinsurgency capabilities and modernize 

equipment. Specifically, FMF builds our long-term security relationship with Pakistan, including its will to fight violent extremism, while PCCF provides Pakistan 

with focused capabilities to support immediate counterinsurgency operations along 

the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. FMF has provided Pakistani security forces with 

air mobility and enhanced communication capabilities, and increased border security capacity. 

We are building our relationship with the Pakistanis in this area. Progress is 

evident in a number of areas. For example, over the past year, Pakistan’s counterinsurgency operations in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North West Frontier 

Province) and tribal areas have increased in scope and improved in quality, in large 

part due to U.S. assistance. However, the challenge we and the Government of Pakistan faces in combating extremism cannot be understated. We will only achieve success through sustained effort and continued funding of security assistance programs 

is integral to ensure progress. 

We measure progress through a number of ways, to include such metrics as: a 

significant reduction in insurgent safe havens and prevention of their return; 

acceptance by Pakistan’s security forces of U.S. training; and increased cooperation 

to share information in support of operations against terrorist groups. The Exchange 

on Defense Planning also provides the opportunity for the United States to engage 

with Pakistan’s military on strategic planning and procurement. 

• (b) How well are you able to track exactly how Pakistani security forces are 

making use of the equipment we have been providing them? 

Answer (b). The equipment has been procured through U.S. security assistance is 

critical to the fight. For example, the F–16 is used almost exclusively by the Pakistanis to target insurgents in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). According to the Pakistan Air Force, Pakistan flew 891 

F–16s sorties between August 2008 and August 2009. Additionally, the Pakistan 

Navy has used its P–3 aircraft to conduct interdiction efforts to patrol its borders 

and to support Combined Task Force 150 (CTF–150), the multinational naval patrol 

force that engages in marine monitoring and interdiction activities in support of 

Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Also, equipment like 

night vision goggles, has allowed Pakistan’s security forces to operate at night which 

is a significant advantage over insurgents. 

• (c) How much longer do you plan this level of funding to train and equip Pakistan’s security forces? 

Answer (c). PCCF is designed to respond to changing operational requirements on 

the ground, it is difficult to predict, the level of counterinsurgency assistance that 

may be required in future years. Reiterate the scope of the challenge we and they 

are facing, making clear that it is likely that we will have PCCF needs in outyears. 

Question. The Obama administration has gone to some lengths to emphasize that 

the United States is not in the nation-building business in Afghanistan despite the 

investment of billions in economic assistance, including a $3.8 billion request for FY 

2011. On January 25, at a talk before the Center for American Progress, National 

Security Advisor Jim Jones emphasized again that we were not involved in ‘‘nation 

building’’ in Afghanistan, but rather ‘‘capacity building.′′ 

45 

• How does the Obama administration define ‘‘nation building’’? Is the United 

States currently involved in nation-building anywhere, and if so, please provide 

specific examples? • How does the Obama administration define ‘‘capacity building’’? How does it 

apply in the Afghanistan context? • How does ‘‘capacity building’’ differ from ‘‘nation building’’ in Afghanistan? • Is the United States involved in ‘‘capacity building’’ in Pakistan? ‘‘Nation building’’? Please explain how the framework of our Pakistan assistance strategy differs from our economic assistance strategy for Afghanistan, given the similar 

institutional weaknesses and other similarities in both countries. 

Answer. As the administration has said publicly, we are accelerating the hunt for 

al-Qaeda and its extremist allies in Afghanistan through a surge in troops. Simultaneously, we are accelerating training for the Afghan National Security Forces and 

capacity-building assistance for the Government of Afghanistan. Both efforts will 

allow the Afghan Government to take the lead in Afghanistan. Neither effort is an 

open-ended commitment. 

Nation-building normally connotes development for development’s sake or the 

type of wholesale recovery assistance the United States applied to Germany and 

Japan in the post-World War II era. We are doing neither in Afghanistan. The 

Afghan people and government are building Afghanistan, and the nature of the 

future Afghan state will be defined by the Afghans themselves. We are building 

their capacity to build their nation themselves. Building Afghanistan’s capacity to 

stand on its own and provide for its own security is in our national interest. It will 

ensure that Afghanistan is never again a safe haven for terrorists targeting the 

United States. 

In terms of capacity-building in Afghanistan and its implementation, our strategy 

reflects the urgency President Obama has directed to reverse negative trends in the 

region. It consists of the following key elements, which are integrated and synchronized with military activities to achieve short-, medium-, and long-term objectives. The success of civilian programs depends on an improving security environment in Afghanistan. 

Reconstruction and Development: Job creation is critical to undermine extremists’ 

appeal in the short term and for sustainable economic growth in the long term. Our 

top reconstruction priority is implementing a civilian-military (civ-mil) agriculture 

redevelopment strategy to restore Afghanistan’s once vibrant agriculture sector. 

This will help sap the insurgency of fighters and of income from poppy cultivation. 

Creating links to cross-border trade, while also increasing the Afghan Government’s 

capacity to secure its borders and increase customs revenue, will support sustainable long-term economic growth and job creation in the agriculture and other sectors. Simultaneously, we are sustaining efforts to build the Afghan Government’s 

capacity to provide improved health and education services. 

Improving Governance: Our governance efforts are helping to develop more 

responsive, visible, and accountable institutions in Kabul, particularly at the provincial, district, and local level, where most Afghans encounter their government. We 

continue to increase the number of civilian technical advisers in key central government ministries, as well as provincial capitals and district centers, to partner with 

Afghans in this capacity building effort. We also are supporting the Afghan Government’s reinvigorated plans to fight corruption, with measures of progress toward 

greater accountability. 

Rule of Law: Justice and rule of law programs focus on creating predictable and 

fair dispute resolution mechanisms to eliminate the vacuum that the Taliban have 

exploited. Our rule of law efforts complement ISAF’s expanded emphasis on training 

capable Afghan National Police and support Afghan-led anticorruption efforts. 

Advancing the Rights of Afghan Women: Investing in women helps advance our 

civilian stabilization efforts and strengthen Afghan communities’ capacity to withstand the threat posed by extremism. Sustaining and expanding critical gains in 

women’s rights and empowering Afghan women is also critical to unleashing the full 

economic potential of the Afghan people. Integrated into our programming are key 

initiatives focused on: women’s security; women’s leadership in the public and private sector; women’s access to judicial institutions, education, and health services; 

and women’s ability to take advantage of economic opportunities, especially in the 

agricultural sector. 

Focused Civilian Assistance: The President’s resource request for our strategy includes a sizable amount for civilian assistance to implement our programs. Aligned 

with our national security objectives, civilian assistance helps to build Afghan 

capacity in key areas and also reassure Afghans that our commitment is long term. 

We are decreasing reliance on large contractors and increasing our direct assistance 

to select Afghan ministries we have certified for transparency and accountability. 

46 

Recognizing that we cannot abandon Afghanistan as we did in 1989 following the 

Soviet withdrawal, our civilian effort must be sustained beyond our combat mission 

so Afghanistan does not become a safe haven for al-Qaeda. 

Expanded Civilian Presence: Accompanying an increase in civilian assistance is an 

ongoing, significant increase in civilian experts—beyond the tripling of deployed 

U.S. civilians that occurred over the past year, from 320 civilians on the ground in 

Afghanistan in January 2009 to over 950 on the ground today. Civilian experts partner with Afghans to enhance the capacity of government institutions and help rehabilitate Afghanistan’s key economic sectors. 

In terms of capacity-building in Pakistan, we are partnering with a nation with 

much greater capacity and a more developed infrastructure than in Afghanistan. We 

are working with the international community in helping Pakistan overcome the 

political, economic, and security challenges that threaten its stability, and in turn 

undermine regional stability. And we seek to build a long-term partnership with 

Pakistan based on common interests, including a recognition that we cannot tolerate 

a safe haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose intentions are clear. 

We are making a sizable, long-term commitment of economic assistance, consistent with the landmark Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation that authorized $7.5 billion in U.S. civilian assistance over 5 years, with the following objectives: 

• Helping Pakistan address immediate energy, water, and related economic crises, thereby deepening our partnership with the Pakistani people and decreasing the appeal of extremists; 

• Supporting broader economic and democratic reforms necessary to put Pakistan 

on a path toward sustainable job creation and economic growth, which is necessary for long-term Pakistani stability and progress; and helping Pakistan 

build on its success against militants and the elimination of extremist sanctuaries. 

Additional U.S. assistance is helping Pakistan build a foundation for long-term 

development and strengthen ties between the American and Pakistani people. Both 

are demonstrating that the United States is committed to addressing problems that 

affect the everyday lives of Pakistanis. Where security and capacity allows, the 

United States Government will provide assistance through Pakistani implementers 

to enhance the long-term sustainability of our efforts. As in Afghanistan, the security environment, particularly in the North West Frontier Province and Federally 

Administered Tribal Areas, will impact the success of some assistance programs. A 

particular emphasis in those areas is strengthening Pakistani communities against 

extremism in part by assisting marginalized citizens, including women and youth. 

Question. Last year Congress provided separate funding to begin reversing the deferral of our contributions to international organizations until the very end of the 

fiscal year. But this year’s budget request does not explicitly request additional 

funding to continue that effort. 

• Are you seeking funding to continue the process of reversing our deferral of payments to international organizations—particularly those carrying out key 

national security missions such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the 

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization? 

• If you haven’t requested such funds, why not? 

Answer. The Department did not include a specific request for funds for reversing 

deferral in the FY 2011 budget. The administration had to make many difficult decisions during the FY 2011 budget process, balancing competing priorities within the 

constrained level of the Department’s overall budget request for State Operations. 

The Department anticipates completing the process of reversing deferral at the 

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with funds available for this purpose in FY 

2010. If any FY 2010 funds still remain after reversing deferral at OPCW and 

NATO, the funds would go to beginning the process of reversing deferral at the 

International Atomic Energy Agency. 

Question. The President’s budget requests $350 million to fund voluntary U.N. 

organizations and agencies, representing a 10 percent decrease from FY10. Among 

those organizations receiving decreases in funding is the U.N. Development 

Program. 

Answer. The FY 2011 President’s Budget includes $350.55 million for voluntary 

contributions through the International Organizations and Programs account. Due 

to the constrained overall budget level, the FY 2011 request for this account is a 

slight decrease from the FY 2010 request level of $356.66 million. The FY 2011 reVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:32 Jan 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\111TH CONGRESS\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINT
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quest for the U.N. Development Program, however, is the same level requested in 

FY 2010. 

Question. What are your plans for nominating someone to fill the position of Representative of the United States to the United Nations for U.N. Management and 

Reform? 

Answer. We share the committee’s view of the importance of U.N. budget and reform issues, including increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of U.N. programs 

and ensuring budget discipline. The administration is currently considering candidates for the position of Representative of the United States to the United Nations 

for U.N. Management and Reform to help advance this agenda. The USUN Management and Reform Section is currently being led by Ambassador Joseph Melrose 

(retired). 

Question. 

• Please describe the transition between the U.N. procurement task force and its 

integration into the OIOS. How many investigators from the Procurement Task 

Force have been hired by OIOS? Is the investigations department of the OIOS 

[in] operation? How many investigations are currently ongoing? Why did the 

U.N. not renew funding for the Procurement Task Force? 

• Robert Appleton, who headed to the Procurement Task Force, applied to be 

OIOS’s director of investigations more than a year ago. But after a hiring panel 

selected him and 3 other finalists from a pool of 73 candidates, another board 

recently decided to restart the process, because all 4 finalists were American 

males, according to U.N. officials in media reports. What is the process of hiring 

a director of investigations? What is the status of Robert Appleton’s candidacy? 

What steps is USUN and IO taking to ensure this position is filled and that 

OIOS is operational and continues the investigative work started by the Procurement Task Force? 

• The U.N.’s investigative and oversight chief Inga-Britt Ahlenius is being accused of systemic mismanagement and favoritism in a letter from her staff, copied to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and all staff of her Office of Internal 

Oversight Services. 

• Please comment on the overall effectiveness of the head of OIOS, Inga-Britt 

Ahlenius. 

Answer. Following the General Assembly’s decision to transfer the Procurement 

Task Force’s (PTF) functions and caseload into the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) Investigations Division (ID) in December 2008, Undersecretary General 

Inga-Britt Ahlenius established, with our strong support, a distinct unit within the 

ID to handle financial, economic, and administrative misconduct cases and the remaining PTF cases. This new headquarters unit was to be staffed with at least eight 

permanent investigators headed by a Unit Chief at the P–5 level (senior investigator). Initially, three former PTF staff were hired full-time to this unit. An additional nine people (eight of whom were former PTF staff) were hired temporarily 

to help with the PTF transition. According to OIOS, six former PTF staff are currently employed with OIOS, four of them elsewhere in the ID. Currently, there are 

50 investigators and 214 open active investigations (32 of which are former PTF 

cases) within the ID. The U.N. did not renew funding for the PTF as it was meant 

to be a temporary body to deal immediately with a vulnerable area of procurement 

and financial fraud within the Secretariat following the oil-for-food scandal. 

The process of hiring the director of investigations begins with advertisement of 

a vacancy announcement on the U.N. Web site. Once the announcement closes, a 

short list of selected candidates is developed by the head of OIOS based on the recommendations of a panel of experts established to assist the head of OIOS. The final 

selection or selections by the head of OIOS are submitted to the Secretary General 

for his approval and appointment. 

In the fall of 2008, OIOS Head Inga-Britt Ahlenius selected Robert Appleton as 

the best candidate following a unanimous recommendation by the panel and presented him as her choice to be the next director of investigations. The Secretary 

General rejected the appointment because of the failure of Ms. Ahlenius to follow 

the U.N. rules generally on recruitment and appointment of senior level officials 

which includes a requirement to submit three final candidates, one being a woman. 

The vacancy was then readvertised, and following another selection process, Mr. 

Appleton was again submitted by Ms. Ahlenius to the SYG as the most qualified 

candidate, but again she refused to submit three candidates, one being a woman. 

Unfortunately, the Secretary General and Ms. Ahlenius still have not reached agreement over this appointment. Ambassador Rice has raised this issue directly with the 

48 

Secretary General and Ms. Ahlenius, and continues to press for robust and vigorous 

work on investigations. 

Ms. Ahlenius was appointed to head OIOS in July 2005 due to her extensive experience in the area of audits and strong reputation for promoting high ethical standards and transparency. She has been at the forefront of the U.N. in promoting these 

goals. However, despite her strong principles and background in audits, her management of the OIOS has not been effective in the area of investigations. Ms. 

Ahlenius relied heavily on Mr. Appleton and his expertise when he served as chairman of the PTF. When the PTF ended and Mr. Appleton departed, the management 

of investigations suffered. 

Question. In January 2011, Southern Sudan is scheduled to hold a referendum on 

the question of unity or separation under the terms of the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement. Over the next 10 months, Sudan—both North and South—must continue to work to complete critical arrangements over borders, citizenship, revenue, 

and other critical issues. At the same time, Southern Sudan must prepare for the 

challenges of potential independence while confronting growing violence within its 

own borders. Please summarize the contours of U.S. support for Southern Sudan. 

• How much are we providing in assistance and what are our goals for FY 2010 

and FY 2011? Given the urgency of the timeline on the ground there, how much 

of this assistance can be expected to be programmed prior to January 2011? 

Answer. The promotion of a peaceful and stable Sudan, whether as a unified state 

or two separate entities coexisting peacefully, and full implementation of the 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) continue to be top United States Government (USG) priorities within the Sudan Strategy. In FY 2010, the USG is focused 

on ensuring stability, as well as promoting security and the rule of law in Sudan. 

Whether the decision is independence or to remain a semiautonomous region of a 

unified Sudan, our assistance is designed to help the Government of Southern 

Sudan (GOSS) prepare to govern responsibly. The USG spent approximately $900 million in FY 2009 humanitarian assistance 

funding in Sudan and eastern Chad related to Darfuri refugees. The nonhumanitarian budget for FY 2009 assistance to Sudan is $376.7 million. For FY 2010, the 

USG budget for nonhumanitarian assistance to Sudan is $427.8 million. Because 

humanitarian assistance is allocated on a worldwide, as needed basis throughout 

the year we do not yet have the humanitarian budget totals for Sudan for FY 2010 

or FY 2011. For FY 2011, the administration has requested $439.9 million in nonhumanitarian assistance for Sudan. 

Though the operating environment is uncertain for the coming year, it is anticipated that the FY 2009 funding and a significant portion of the FY 2010 funding 

will be programmed in the lead up to the January 2011 referenda. Given the urgency of the January events, every effort will be made to program the resources as 

quickly as possible. Of the FY 2010 funding, approximately $20 million is going to 

support the January 2011 referenda or referenda related programs. While FY 2011 

funds will not likely be available prior to the referenda, the FY 2011 budget request 

for nonhumanitarian assistance of approximately $439.9 million will be critical to 

support the above initiatives in Southern Sudan, the Three Areas of Abyei, Blue 

Nile, and Southern Kordofan, and possibly other vulnerable regions in Sudan following the referenda, regardless of outcome. In order to prepare Southern Sudan for 

the potential of independence or permanent semiautonomous unification with the 

North, USG assistance is focused on improving peace and security, increasing capacity for just and democratic governance by the (GOSS), investing in the needs of the 

people of Southern Sudan, and providing the necessary tools and training to foster 

economic growth. Additionally, the USG envisions that significant humanitarian 

assistance will continue to be needed over FY 2010 and FY 2011 to address ongoing 

humanitarian needs. The USG is continuing to provide assistance for reintegration 

of southern Sudanese returnees and refugees from the Democratic Republic of 

Congo currently in Southern Sudan. The USG partners with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which is involved in ongoing contingency planning 

in the leadup to the January 2011 referendum. 

In FY 2011, the USG will also address the threat of new or renewed conflict by 

increasing attention and funding for conflict prevention and mitigation programs 

that focus on peace dividends, local solutions to community conflict, successful implementation of important political processes, and the peaceful mediation by state 

authorities of local conflict. Support will be provided for efforts to resolve post-2011 

issues, including cross-border development, security and movement, interethnic relationships, and oil security. 

A key USG objective for FY 2010 and FY 2011 is the professionalization and 

training of the GOSS military and the Southern Sudan Police Services (SSPS). In 

49 

particular, the USG recognizes the significance of assisting the SSPS with strategic 

planning, training, literacy, resources, and infrastructure development so that they 

can develop the capacity to mitigate security threats and enforce the rule of law. 

The transformation of the GOSS military and police forces are crucial to promoting 

the long-term stability and security of Southern Sudan. Another key goal of the FY 

2010 and FY 2011 budgets is supporting just and democratic governance in Southern Sudan. More specifically, USG assistance will contribute to existing efforts to 

strengthen core government institutional development and build capacity at the various levels of government, facilitate consensus-building, strengthen the postelections legislative assembly, and strengthen civic participation in the interim and 

post-CPA periods. Our funds will enable the government to expand the delivery of 

services and deepen the accountability, transparency, and responsiveness of key government institutions in the South, as well as the Three Areas. In FY 2011, we will 

build on existing programs to improve key public sector executive functions in the 

GOSS and strengthen anticorruption efforts, financial governance, civil service reforms, and GOSS efforts toward decentralization. USG assistance will also go toward promoting greater civil society involvement, civic education, and government 

responsiveness to the views of Southern Sudanese constituents. 

The USG is committed to assisting the GOSS invest in its people by engaging 

local stakeholders in rebuilding health and education systems at central, state, and 

county levels. Our FY 2011 budget is focused on health care delivery in target areas, 

specifically through the strengthening of maternal and child health services and the 

expansion of access to high-quality voluntary family planning and reproductive 

health care services and information. USG assistance will support interventions 

that target priority health threats, improve potable water and sanitation resources, 

nutrition, and reduce the burden of infectious diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, polio, and neglected tropical diseases. In order to address these 

goals, the FY 2011 budget will support improvements in six health system components: health governance in administration, human resources, health management 

information systems, financial management, logistics, and service delivery. 

In terms of education, the USG will continue to work on affecting systemic 

changes at the subnational, state, and county levels for more equitable gender-based 

policies and practices in education. Funds will be used for formal and nonformal 

education activities to improve the quality and access of basic educational services, 

particularly for girls and women. USG assistance will provide teacher training, curriculum reform and development, and government capacity-building to plan, budget, 

administer, and manage education delivery, all in an effort to help build long-term 

sustainability of Southern Sudan educational services. 

Last, USG funds for FY 2010 and FY 2011 will be focused on improving economic 

capacity and business opportunities across Southern Sudan to rebuild a growing private sector economy, especially agriculture-based, which is critical to increasing jobs 

for the unemployed youth and increasing nonoil revenues for the GOSS. USG assistance will build and improve roads in order to facilitate local and regional trade and 

service delivery; we will also enhance modern energy services in the key towns of 

Southern Sudan. In order to meet our economic growth objective, USG assistance 

will seek to create an enabling and fiscally disciplined environment for business and 

new employment opportunities, as well as to improve the capacities of the GOSS 

in fiscal management, policy, regulatory matters, budget planning, and procurement. We will provide technical assistance and business training to Sudanese construction firms for rebuilding the country, and we will promote private sector development by supporting entrepreneurship through microfinance lending, assistance 

with land-reform policies, and establishing new agriculture activities. In terms of 

agricultural production, expansion, and reform, the underlying objective of U.S. assistance will be to improve overall food security. 

Question. The Global Health Initiative (GHI) calls for substantially increased 

spending, programmatic development, and monitoring and evaluation. Will additional staffing, with funding, be provided for posts to carry out these expanded 

duties? 

Answer. In addition to the efficiency gains we fully expect through improved GHI 

coordination and collaboration, we are currently reviewing the staffing patterns at 

USAID to ascertain what changes are necessary to support the GHI in both the field 

and Washington. In addition, the GHI Plus countries will have access to the GHI 

Reserve Fund and can request funds based on what is most needed on the ground, 

whether that be additional technical assistance, management, or other staffing 

needs. Finally, we will continue building the USAID workforce through the Development Leadership Initiative (DLI), employing new health officers through this proVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:32 Jan 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\111TH CONGRESS\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINT
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gram to further strengthen the Agency’s capacity to execute, monitor and evaluate 

health programming. 

Question. I am concerned about a $50 million cut in proposed support for the 

Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Turberculosis, and Malaria from the enacted level for 

FY 2010. At the same time, the Consultation Document for the GHI offers little information on how implementers of this plan will work with the Global Fund. Please 

describe the planned interaction between the U.S. Global Health Initiative and the 

multilateral Global Fund. 

• Could you explain the rationale for this cut from the enacted level for FY 2010? 

Answer. Global AIDS Coordinator Eric Goosby, who serves as the U.S. Government Global Fund Board Member, has consulted with Global Fund Executive Director Michel Kazatchkine about the GHI. Deputy Global AIDS Coordinator Ann 

Gavaghan held consultations with other Board donor and implementing bloc delegation members about the GHI at the Global Fund Board meeting in November 2009 

in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The GHI Consultation Document outlines the broad 

themes for interaction between the U.S. GHI and multilateral donors, including the 

Global Fund: ‘‘Strengthening and leveraging other efforts: The GHI is built on the 

recognition that improving global health outcomes is a shared responsibility. The 

needs are too vast and the challenges too great for any one country or organization 

to address alone. The U.S. Government will join multilateral efforts involving the 

United Nations and others to make progress toward achieving Millennium Development Goals 4, 5, and 6. Indeed, a key principle of the GHI is to strengthen and 

leverage key multilateral organizations, global health partnerships, and private sector efforts . . . the GHI will strengthen the U.S. Government’s already close collaboration with the Global Fund . . . the GHI will emphasize accountability for achieving substantive outcomes and rigorously monitor impact without increasing the 

reporting and administrative burdens on partner countries. Indeed, harmonizing 

and reducing these reporting requirements is a key element of the GHI’s approach 

to monitoring and evaluation.’’ 

Question. Multidrug resistant (MDR) TB represents a grave and growing health 

threat globally and potentially in the United States as well. Enhancing laboratory 

capacity is a critical component of addressing MDR–TB and a core feature of health 

systems strengthening as outlined in the GHI. The designated target in the GHI, 

of detecting and treating 57,200 multidrug resistant cases of TB, however, is significantly lower than the objective set out in the Lantos-Hyde legislation to support the 

diagnosis and treatment of 90,000 new MDR cases by 2013. Please explain the 

rationale for this lower target and the practical implications of this and other differences regarding targets for tuberculosis between the GHI and Lantos-Hyde. 

Answer. We established conservative targets that took into account the impact of 

currently available diagnostics and drugs. The treatment of 57,200 cases of MDR 

TB in USAID priority countries represents a significant increase compared to the 

mere 6,000 cases of MDR TB that were treated according to international standards 

globally in 2008. However, these targets could be surpassed substantially with the 

introduction of new technologies and enhanced donor contributions to the Global 

Fund and other TB control programs. We are working with public-private partnerships on the development and introduction of new diagnostics and drugs, and once 

clinical trials and country level evaluations are completed, we anticipate that these 

new tools will help to accelerate TB case detection and shorten treatment duration. 

In addition, country level evaluations of more rapid tests for MDR TB are already 

underway in numerous countries, and the clinical trials on several new drugs to 

treat TB are promising. These developments could substantially increase our 

impact. 

Question. Climate Change.—The United States recently associated itself with the 

Copenhagen Accord and pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the range 

of 17 percent by 2020. There are now over a hundred countries associated with the 

Copenhagen Accord, of which approximately 60 countries have voluntarily inscribed 

carbon pollution reduction pledges. 

• (a) What are the next steps in implementing this Accord and what role do you 

see the administration playing in these efforts? 

• (b) How does the administration plan to deliver on its contribution to the global 

climate finance goal of $100 billion annually by 2020? Recognizing that this 

finance goal will be reached through a combination of support from both the 

public and private sectors, what mechanisms do you find most promising for 

mobilizing these sectors? 

51 

• (c) Do you believe that domestic legislation is necessary to fulfill our mitigation 

commitment? How would failure to pass legislation impact the implementation 

of the Copenhagen Accord and the ability of the global community to achieve 

necessary reductions? 

Answer (a). To date, 120 countries have associated with the Copenhagen Accord, 

accounting for more than 80 percent of global greenhouse emissions. We will continue to encourage countries to associate with the Accord and inscribe their commitments to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time, we are now 

working with partners in a variety of fora to operationalize all elements of the 

Accord, including the provisions on mitigation, transparency, and financing. 

Answer (b). In Copenhagen, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and 

transparency on implementation, we committed to working with other developed 

countries to jointly mobilize USD$100 billion a year by 2020. We anticipate continued scaling-up of public financing through bilateral and multilateral channels, particularly to support adaptation, capacity-building, and other developing country 

climate priorities, as well as work to reduce barriers to market-based approaches. 

However, private sector finance driven by carbon markets is anticipated to account for the majority of funding flows to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. While 

governments cannot direct private capital, creating the right incentive structure can 

help accelerate an already strong trend toward low-carbon investment. Domestic 

mitigation targets will be essential in directing investment flows toward low-carbon 

alternatives in each sector, and efficient and liquid carbon markets will be important in transmitting the carbon price signal throughout the economy. 

Strong federal legislation with a cap-and-trade component could significantly 

assist our efforts to meet these climate finance objectives—in particular, through 

auctioning set-asides and international offset provisions. 

Answer (c). The administration supports the passage of comprehensive clean energy and climate legislation to bolster the American economy, enhance our national 

security, set the United States on a path to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions 

and be a leader in clean energy technology. Failure to pass legislation would negatively impact the leadership position of the United States in the climate negotiations 

and the ability of the global community to achieve necessary greenhouse gas reductions. 

Question. Last year, when asked about modernizing the U.S. foreign assistance 

apparatus, you responded that it was something you would pursue vigorously. Since 

that hearing, you authorized the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, 

meant to provide ‘‘short-, medium-, and long-term blueprint for our diplomatic and 

development efforts’’ and guidance on ‘‘how we develop policies; how we allocate our 

resources; how we deploy our staff; and how we exercise our authorities.’’ In a similar vein, the White House announced a Presidential Study Directive on Global 

Development Policy meant to be a whole-of-government review of U.S. development 

policy. 

• What legislative outcomes do you expect to come from the QDDR? Will requested legislation be similar in scope to S. 1524—the Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act, passed out of this committee last November? 

Answer. The QDDR addresses many aspects of the Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act and shares its overarching objective of strengthening 

the capacity of USAID and State to establish and implement effective global development policies and programs [note: the QDDR does not deal with other agencies]. 

During Phase 2 of the QDDR, task forces are being instructed to identify any legislative changes that would be necessary to implement their recommendations. Thus, 

while it is possible that some QDDR recommendations will require legislative action, it is premature to determine whether or not that is the case. The QDDR’s recommendations will also be reflected in the FY 2012 budget request. We look forward 

to engaging with you and hearing your views on the QDDR Phase 2 priority areas. 

Question. Relationship Between the Department of Defense and the State Department.—In the FY11 budget request, the State Department asks Congress to fund 

three items (‘‘to begin to rebalance roles between DOD and State’’) that in past 

years have been entirely or largely funded through the DOD budget: Pakistan 

Counterinsurgency Capability Fund ($1.2 billion), Iraq Police Training ($295 million), and the USAID Complex Crises Fund for reconstruction, security and stabilization activities ($100 million). 

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). The Department is requesting $1.2 billion for the PCCF and another $296 million for Pakistan in Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Could you cite some specific examples to explain why you 

need the PCCF because FMF would not work? Could you explain how the two acVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:32 Jan 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\111TH CONGRESS\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINT
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counts will be managed and executed differently? Last year when Congress provided 

the State Department $700 million for the PCCF, the Department transferred all 

of the money as soon as it got it, in one fell swoop, to the Defense Department for 

it to manage. Are you going to do the same thing this time? How will it be different? 

Answer. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) is designed to 

complement Foreign Military Financing (FMF), not replace it. Both tools are designed to support our foreign policy objectives. PCCF is designed to focus funds on 

a specific country—Pakistan—with a specific need—enhancing counterinsurgency 

(COIN) capability. It authorizes assistance for the full range of Pakistani security 

forces relying upon selected Foreign Assistance Act authorities as well as the FMF 

authority under the Arms Export Control Act. FMF will enhance the ability of Pakistan’s military to mitigate against existing and emergent threats, participate in 

international stability operations, and meet its legitimate defense needs. Our use of 

FMF to support Pakistan’s COIN requirements will be targeted toward providing capabilities that bridge the immediate requirements met by PCCF to more enduring 

transformational solutions. 

The Department is continuing to develop our oversight and management procedures for PCCF with the goal of preserving the flexibility and agility needed to support the requirements in the field while ensuring that this is truly a State Department-managed program. Both State and DOD are committed to the successful 

implementation of PCCF as a State Department-managed program in FY 2011 with 

the goal being a seamless transition of the program. A major difference in the management of PCCF will be increased State Department oversight and involvement 

throughout the execution process, which will ensure that this major assistance program aligns with our broader foreign policy objectives in Pakistan. 

As is true with FMF and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF), DOD will 

continue to be the primary program executor. We are currently engaged in discussions with our DOD counterparts over how best to manage PCCF so that it preserves the flexibility and agility needed to support requirements in the field. 

Question. Complex Crises Fund.—The administration has requested $100 million 

for the Complex Crises Fund which it will use in a similar manner to DOD’s $100 

million section 1207 authority—to respond to emerging or unforeseen crises through 

support for reconstruction, security, or stabilization. Who will administer this fund? 

What criteria will guide which projects will be funded? Will this replace section 

1207 funds? 

Answer. The goal of the Complex Crises Fund (CCF) is to advance peace and stability through the prevention of and/or timely response to emerging or unforeseen 

complex crises overseas, and to seize opportunities to advance peaceful transitions, 

democratic governance, and development progress. The CCF was created in the FY 

2010 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (SFOAA) (Div. F, P.L. 111–117), consolidating what had been separate 

budget requests for a Rapid Response Fund and a Stabilization Bridge fund. For FY 

2010, the SFOAA directs USAID to administer the $50 million fund, in consultation 

with the Secretary of State. FY 2010 is the last year for security, reconstruction, 

and stabilization-related funding under section 1207 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109–163), as amended, which 

authorizes DOD to transfer up to $100 million to the Secretary of State by September 30, 2010. These funds could be used by any agency undertaking appropriate 

foreign assistance activities at the direction of the Secretary of State. Section 1207 

program decisions have been made under an interagency concurrence mechanism 

managed by State (the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization), which is independent of the CCF. In FY 2010, section 1207 funds total $100 

million; thus, together with CCF funds, $150 million is available during FY 2010 

between the two accounts. USAID has established a standing interagency working 

group to help administer CCF projects and guide their development and execution. 

The administration’s FY 2011 request of $100 million for the CCF is lower than the 

combined total of section 1207 and CCF funds available in FY 2010. It is the first 

year, however, that all of the funds and authorities to prevent or respond to emerging or unforeseen complex crises overseas are sought to be granted to the Secretary 

of State. 

Question. On December 15, 2009, Secretary Gates sent a memo to Secretary Clinton in which he proposed a ‘‘Shared Responsibility, Pooled Resources approach’’ for 

DOD and State to work together on security assistance with funding mechanisms 

for security capacity-building, stabilization, and conflict prevention overseas. What 

is your reaction to Secretary of Defense Gates’ proposal to have ‘‘shared responsiVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:32 Jan 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\111TH CONGRESS\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINT
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bility and pooled resources?’’ Who would be in charge of those funds and the personnel in the field? 

Answer. My staff is carefully reviewing this proposal, which touches on topics that 

are currently being addressed in the QDDR and other ongoing administration reviews. The concept of pooled resources is an intriguing one that has been proposed 

in various forms over the past decade. It is one of many concepts that are being 

evaluated in our ongoing reviews which contemplate a variety of implementation 

mechanisms. The outcomes of these reviews will inform the FY 2012 budget and legislative cycle, which I expect will provide a more comprehensive direction on security capacity-building, stabilization, and conflict prevention activities overseas. It is 

critical that we find mechanisms which provide adequate funding, but also ensure 

that all assistance activities support our broader foreign policy goals. 

Question. Police Training.—There have been significant criticisms over the way in 

which the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) oversees and implements police training worldwide. For example, 

the Special Inspector General for Iraq (SIGIR) recently released a report asserting 

that the State Department cannot account for more than $1 billion it paid out to 

contractor DynCorp to train police during the first years of the Iraq war. This raises 

questions about whether INL has sufficient capacity to appropriately oversee this 

important function. Yet, the FY10 war supplemental will shift responsibility for police training in Iraq from DOD to State, requesting $517.4 million to fund this 

effort, INL is also responsible for an estimated 2.5 billion dollars’ worth of funds 

spent on training police around the world. 

There have been significant criticisms over the manner in which the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs oversees police training. Does INL have the personnel and organizational capacity to properly 

oversee and implement police training? 

Answer. The Department acknowledges that the rapidly expanding demand for 

trained police in both Iraq and Afghanistan at times strained our efforts to provide 

optimal oversight. The Department recognized the need to expand contract oversight 

for our police training programs and is taking all appropriate steps to add staffing 

and standardize procedures. The Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is in the process of adding significantly more 

contract officers on the ground and reviewing INL contract management business 

processes and management controls, and establishing detailed Standard Operating 

Procedures the contract officers. This will enable the successful implementation of 

existing quality assurance surveillance plans. We have learned from the continually 

evolving program demands in Iraq and Afghanistan that we must respond with 

greater oversight by adding specialized personnel with technical skills necessary to 

effectively oversee and manage INL police training programs. 

INL does have the personnel and organizational capacity to properly oversee and 

implement police training programs. INL has operated numerous successful police 

missions throughout the world including those in Bosnia, Kosovo, Liberia, Georgia, 

and East Timor. In each of these missions, INL has demonstrated the ability to 

work with multinational partners and host governments in providing effective police 

training services and facilitating police reform. INL conducted the first civilian police (CIVPOL) mission in Haiti in 1994. Since then, over 7,000 U.S. law enforcement 

personnel have participated in police development missions in 16 nations. The missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, conducted in hostile environments, have been particularly challenging as police training needs must be flexible and responsive to fluctuating demands driven by military operations. 

In Iraq, INL is designing the future Iraq police development program to include 

a much higher proportion of USG direct hire personnel—approximately one USG 

employee for every six contractors to ensure proper management and oversight. 

Overall INL will employ 350 senior law enforcement officials and subject matter experts—supported by additional program staff in Washington and Baghdad—to focus 

on institutional development and capacity building in the Iraqi police services ensuring sustainability of police reform in Iraq. 

Question. What steps are being taken to strengthen INL’s ability to oversee this 

function? Should we consider transferring responsibility of this function to another 

entity—such as USAID or the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction 

(S/CRS)? Does INL rely too heavily on contractors to implement police training— 

does the State Department need to build in-house capacity to handle this function? 

Answer. As outlined in the response to Senator Kerry’s question above, the 

Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has significant experience with managing police training programs 

54 

throughout the world. Large-scale programs in Iraq and Afghanistan present unique 

challenges and INL is responding with greater oversight and the addition of personnel with technical skills necessary to effectively oversee and manage these police 

training programs. 

INL is the only USG entity with the operational experience, technical expertise 

and the mandate to implement such foreign police training missions. The Office of 

the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was established to coordinate USG interagency resources and institutionalize USG civilian capacity to 

prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations. S/CRS has begun to build police and 

rule of law expertise within its Civilian Response Corps Active component. Though 

this is vital to U.S. efforts in reconstruction and stabilization around the world, 

S/CRS cannot replace regional and functional bureau expertise. S/CRS can provide 

assistance but lacks the operational background and subject matter expertise to conduct a sustained, advanced skill-based police development program such as that 

planned for Iraq. To require S/CRS to perform this function would detract from its 

core mission. 

Likewise, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) does not have 

police training as a core function, and lacks INL’s depth of expertise to conduct 

broad-based international police development programs around the world. USAID 

has conducted limited training in community policing and INL will use lessons 

learned from its own programs and that of USAID’s as it designs the curriculum 

for the Iraq police development program. 

Although the Department of State and its interagency partners historically have 

relied on contracts to secure subject matter expertise for its police development efforts, INL is exploring different mechanisms that will allow it to tap other sources 

of police training expertise, such as a recent Memorandum of Understanding signed 

with the New York City Police Department to support the police training mission 

in Haiti. Specific to Iraq, INL is designing the future police development program 

to include a much higher proportion of USG direct hire personnel—approximately 

one USG employee for every six contractors. In addition, INL’s program offices in 

both Baghdad and Washington, DC are expanding the number of USG subject matter experts to manage directly the police program in the field and in Washington. 

This in-house capacity will serve as the foundation of continuing police development 

efforts in Iraq. 

Question. Turning Over Civilian Police Training to the Military in Afghanistan.— 

The President’s new strategy depends heavily on training the Afghan army and police to defend their country. While you have been supportive of the President’s determination to devote more resources to this critical task, you recently mentioned 

in an op-ed in Politico in December that meeting the objective will require more 

than additional trainers. A report sent to Congress at the end of October summarized the dismal state of the Afghan police. We have spent $6.2 billion on police and 

the Ministry of Interior since 2002, but only about a third of recruits can read and 

write, and roughly 1 in 10 trained units is capable of operating independently. 

Using private contractors, the State Department has tried for years—and spent billions of dollars—to train a civilian police force with limited success. Now the task 

is being handed over to the Pentagon, which is scheduled to take over police training this March. This is a pivotal change, and many are concerned that we will end 

up training a paramilitary adjunct for the counterinsurgency fight versus a civilian 

police force. 

• Given General McChrystal’s expressed and understandable desire for the police 

to play a counterinsurgency role and the shift in training to the Pentagon, what 

does this mean for the prospects of a real civilian police force to promote the 

rule of law at the local level? This is something that I think we both agree is 

vital. 

Answer. DOD has had the lead for development of Afghan security forces since 

2005 and has transferred funding to State to implement a police training program 

on its behalf since 2007. The transfer of contract responsibility for police training 

is an effort to eliminate a larger management layer so that resourcing, funding and 

other management issues for this large-scale training mission are more efficient. 

The use of law enforcement experts is expected to remain a focal point of the program, and the Department of State will continue to play a role in Afghan law enforcement training through program policy, oversight, and overall direction for the 

police program through Ambassador Eikenberry. Instruction in human rights, women’s issues, values, ethics, drug awareness and first responder duties all remain core 

elements of the police curriculum to provide recruits with essential civilian policing 

skills required for effective engagement with local populations. 

55 

Question. There are reports that the Pentagon in on the verge of awarding the 

police training contract to Xe Services, the firm formerly known as Blackwater. 

Even though the State Department doesn’t have jurisdiction over the awarding of 

this contract, does a new contract for a company with Blackwater’s track record and 

reputation make sense from a political and public relations point of view? What 

kind of message does it send to the Afghan people? 

Answer. The State Department does not know which company will be awarded 

the police training contract by the Defense Department. The ability of the Afghan 

National Police—and the international personnel who support, train, and mentor 

them—to conduct their duties with professionalism and respect for others is essential to the development of a police force which can be trusted. We expect that the 

requirements of the police training program—which includes regular interaction 

with Afghan police and local populations—will be met by whichever company is 

awarded the contract. 

Question. The FY11 budget request and FY10 war supplemental do not include 

additional funds to support Haiti rebuilding. Thus far, all of the funds being used 

to support Haiti relief efforts have come from existing accounts and emergency 

humanitarian funds. For example, apparently USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster 

Assistance has reduced programming funds in all other regions by 40 percent to 

cover Haiti relief. What is the status of plans to assess and assist with rebuilding 

Haiti? Who is leading this effort in the State Department—do you plan to assign 

a single coordinator to handle all aspects of the recovery? 

Answer. The Department of State is reviewing USG policy and assistance efforts 

in Haiti in light of the January 12 earthquake. Our goal is to help Haiti build back 

better. This will require careful coordination with the Government of Haiti and 

international donors. Shortly after assuming office, Secretary Clinton designated her 

Chief of Staff, Counselor Cheryl Mills, to be the lead for our policy in Haiti. A decision has been made to name a single coordinator to oversee, under Counselor Mills’ 

direction, all aspects of our policy and assistance vis-a-vis Haiti. 

Question. Who is in charge of coordinating the Haiti 2020 team? 

Answer. Counselor Mills’ Policy Advisor, Meghann Curtis, is the Policy Planning 

Director of Haiti 2020. Ms. Curtis has been Policy Advisor to Counselor Mils since 

April 2009. Rueben Brigety is the Coordinator of the Haiti 2020 team. Mr. Brigety 

is a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration. 

Question. What is the timing of the supplemental request for Haiti and what 

funding level is anticipated? What do you anticipate as the potential U.S. share of 

an international effort to support Haiti’s recovery over the next 5 years? 

Answer. We are working with OMB to determine both dates and dollar amounts 

of a special fiscal year 2010 Haiti supplemental. Once these are determined, we will 

be in a better position to urge generous contributions from the international community. 

Question. According to the latest U.N. figures, over 1.3 million people are living 

in makeshift tent cities that have popped up in parks, public spaces, and even in 

a golf course by people made homeless by the earthquake. According to the U.N. 

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), only 24 percent of people living in these so-called ‘‘spontaneous settlements’’ have received basic tents or 

tarpaulins that can shield them from the elements. These figures are especially 

troublesome since the rainy season comes in April—followed by the hurricane season in June. Will there be universal coverage by the time the rains start? Are there 

plans to put in place more permanent housing? What is the timeframe? 

Answer. For emergency shelter, the immediate relief goal is for every household 

in need (est. 240,000–300,000 households) to receive some form of assistance (two 

plastic sheets or one family-size tent) by 1 May. To date, 160,000 plastic sheets and 

24,500 family-size tents have been delivered to serve approximately 185,000 families. The 29 humanitarian agencies reporting to the Emergency Shelter Cluster 

(ESC) lead agency are on track to deliver emergency shelter assistance (2 plastic 

sheets or 1 family-size tent) to 258,000 families by May 1. 

An estimated 600,000 of the 1.29 million displaced by the earthquake have left 

Port-au-Prince; 95 percent are living with family or friends in other towns and cities. For the intermediate term, shelter programs funded to date will assist an estimated 23,000 households with transitional shelter before hurricane season. The 

transitional shelter kits will be in-country and distributed by end of April; the package includes cement, timber, steel hurricane strap, roof nails, nails and piping. An 

estimated 33 percent of the total could be completed and occupied by beneficiaries 

56 

by June 1 with the remainder to be completed within 6–12 months. The Shelter 

Cluster has set a goal of providing transitional shelter to 120,000 households within 

12 months of the disaster. 

Question. An estimated 1.1 million people require access to emergency latrines. 

What steps are being taken to address this need? What is the timeframe? How is 

this being coordinated by donors—who is doing what? How many actual latrines 

need to be built in order to meet the need for 1.1 million? 

Answer. In water and sanitation, 1.2 million people are now receiving treated 

water; 196 IDP sites have been assessed and 46 of these sites require immediate 

sanitation interventions. The goal is to construct 11,000 latrines. Approximately 

2,750 latrines have been constructed, and an additional 800–1,000 latrines should 

be completed by mid-March. An estimated 7,400 trench latrines will be completed 

by April 15. The goal is to have one latrine for every 100 people in 3 months, one 

latrine for every 50 people in 6 months, and one latrine for every 20 people in a 

year. Thirty-six million dollars in OFDA funding has been committed to accomplish 

this goal. Key U.S. NGO partners working on hygiene issues and latrine construction include, Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in 

Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI/VOCA), CARE, Adventist Development and 

Relief Agency (ADRA), American Red Cross (ARC), Action Contra La Faim (ACF) 

and many others. 

Question. Your administration has announced the launching of a Global Health Initiative, a 6-year, $63 billion integrated plan that seeks to build on U.S. work in 

combating HIV/AIDS and malaria with a new emphasis on women and girls and a 

more holistic approach to fighting disease and helping countries build health systems. These are all welcome developments, and I look forward to continuing to work 

with you on this Initiative. The Global Health Initiative calls for substantially increased spending, programmatic development, and monitoring and evaluation. Will 

additional staffing, with funding, be provided for posts to carry out these expanded 

duties? 

Answer. In addition to the efficiency gains we fully expect through improved GHI 

coordination and collaboration, we are currently reviewing the staffing patterns at 

USAID to ascertain what changes are necessary to support the GHI in both the field 

and Washington. In addition, the GHI Plus countries will have access to the GHI 

Reserve Fund and can request funds based on what is most needed on the ground, 

whether that be additional technical assistance, management, or other staffing 

needs. Finally, we will continue building the USAID workforce through the Development Leadership Initiative (DLI), employing new health officers through this program to further strengthen the Agency’s capacity to execute, monitor and evaluate 

health programming. 

Question. You have had an ambitious agenda for global women’s issues since the 

beginning of your tenure. However, the Global Women’s Issues office has had to 

scrape a budget together for staffing and travel, and their program funds come from 

the Human Rights Democracy Fund and Development Assistance funds. 

• What budget are you requesting for that office? Is that level sufficient for the 

office to fulfill the ambitious mandate you have given it? Do you envision that 

the budget will grow in order to increase the office’s capacity? Will that office 

have specified program funds? 

Answer. We are working to increase S/GWI’s capacity to meet the ambitious mandate that we have given it. Specifically, we are requesting $3.483 million in FY 2011 

operating funds to support S/GWI’s continued growth in staffing and office capacity. 

S/GWI is using funding granted for FY 2010 to purchase 8 additional slots above 

the 11 that the office currently possesses. The acquisition of these eight slots will 

occur over the course of 2010 and 2011 and will be used to increase the number 

of staff with grants and programmatic expertise. 

At present, S/GWI oversees the Iraqi Women’s Democracy Initiative, which is 

funded through the Human Rights Democracy Fund, to expand training and capacity-building for Iraqi women political leaders. We fully expect S/GWI will continue 

to administer this Initiative in the future. Additionally, S/GWI will continue to work 

with its bureau counterparts inside the State Department and with USAID to maximize programming resources for women as well as develop a strategy to leverage 

private sector resources to support programs aimed at combating against women 

and promoting women’s social, economic, and political empowerment. 

Question. Global Engagement.—The President is requesting $100 million to support ‘‘Global Engagement’’ that will forge ‘‘a new beginning with Muslim communities around the world.’’ This request stems from the President’s speech on human 

57 

rights and democracy in Cairo in 2009. Few details are provided as to what programs this fund will actually support. 

• Can you please provide greater clarity as to how this fund will be used to support the broad goal of ‘‘global engagement?’’ How will these programs complement those already undertaken by ECA? Can you provide a list of the target 

countries and how much money is budgeted for each? Where do these funds fit 

into the State Department budget? 

Answer. In June 2009, President Obama delivered a speech at Al Azhar University in Cairo that called for engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect with Muslims around the world. We plan to use the President’s request for 

$100 million of ESF funds for Global Engagement activities in the FY 2011 budget 

to establish and expand programs that address areas in which he pledged that we 

would invest and engage and that further the goals of deepening and broadening 

our relationships with Muslim communities. Funding requested for Global Engagement activities will be targeted at Muslim-majority countries and Muslim communities. This funding will help to fill gaps in these focus areas for FY 2011 and we 

will seek to transition to base funding in FY 2012. 

Please note that President Obama’s speech was a vision statement for our relationship with Muslims around the world. Democracy and human rights were areas 

of emphasis in that speech, among many others. These programs, however, do not 

focus specifically on just democracy and human rights. They focus on building partnerships that will advance human development, science and technology, and economic opportunity. 

To support economic opportunity, Global Engagement plans to invest $35 million 

in FY 2011 in a Global Entrepreneurship Program (GEP). The GEP is focused on 

supporting and empowering entrepreneurs by marshalling partners around specific 

areas considered essential for creating a successful ecosystem for entrepreneurs. The 

GEP is the concrete, programmatic fulfillment of the Obama administration’s commitment to use America’s strength as an entrepreneurial culture to develop entrepreneurship around the world. Entrepreneurs are known to be a key ingredient in 

driving job growth, which underpins political stability and civil society. Initial partner countries include Egypt, Indonesia, and Turkey, with planned expansion to 

Pakistan next year. Specific program areas include Entrepreneurs in Residence, 

which will establish locally based entrepreneur/mentors to build a network of expertise in developing countries. Angel investing networks will be created in countries 

where no such support exists. The Entrepreneurship Bridge program will pair U.S. 

and foreign partners to structure appropriate incubators/accelerators/centers of commercialization to help take innovation from lab to main street, and E-Mentor Corps, 

a Web-based matching of mentors and entrepreneurs in developing countries, will 

be the focal point for knowledge exchange. 

With $25 million under the Human Development element, the Department will 

scale some of the most effective programs of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural 

Affairs so that they will have broader reach and by seeding and launching new programs in high priority countries that ECA does not presently have the resources to 

launch, helping to expand both the depth and range of our exchange efforts in high 

priority countries. This includes New Beginnings in Education for Economic Opportunity and New Beginnings in Science and Technology which will provide community college scholarships and faculty exchanges, targeting future scientists, activists, 

and innovators. A complementary New Beginnings in American English Initiative 

will provide English training, teaching and scholarships to expand access to media 

and journalist training, and to encourage civic action. Funds will also be used to 

support the Special Representative to Muslim Communities’ initiatives to promote 

empowerment through education and access to information. 

Science and Technology (S&T) is the third focus area of Global Engagement, with 

$40 million allocated to advance scientific collaboration among priority countries 

and the United States. The Department and USAID, in collaboration with partner 

agencies and partners in the region, are developing four scientific Centers of Excellence that will serve as loci of collaboration and support for scientists in the region 

who are seeking to address the challenges associated with climate change, water, 

renewable energy, and health. Work on these centers is already underway, but funding is needed to launch them. The location of the centers will be chosen based on 

the ability to leverage existing institutions as well as support from other government and private partners. S&T Funding will also support a Global Digital Science 

Platform to encourage collaboration and close knowledge gaps around key development challenges, and build local S&T capacity through an International Science 

Partnership. Finally, S&T funding will target science and technical training for 

58 

young women through University partnerships that encourage knowledge-sharing, 

teacher and administrator exchanges, and online collaboration. 

Question. The FY10 joint spending plan for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative includes $31.7 million for policy and plans, including ‘‘extensive interagency planning 

and coordination.’’ Can you please provide me in greater detail the specific activities 

associated with this figure and how much each activity and subactivity will be funded? 

Answer. The $31.7 million allocated to ‘‘Policy and Plans’’ in the FY10 joint spending plan funds the direct staff (72 fulltime FS and GS employees), working in the 

immediate Office of the Coordinator, and the offices of Planning, Strategic Communications, Conflict Prevention, Resource Management, and Knowledge ManagementInformation Technology. The $31.7 million also funds an additional 72 contractor 

positions (19 for Knowledge Management-Information Technology and 53 distributed across the other above offices of S/CRS), and 5 of the 12 detailees (remaining 

7 are nonreimbursable) from other USG agencies who are assigned to S/CRS. It also 

covers all operating expenses of S/CRS as noted below. 

The personnel of S/CRS serve as core staff actively engaged in whole-of-government planning and conflict assessment, international outreach, public and congressional affairs, and providing administrative and IT support to S/CRS, which forms 

the backbone to the activities of the Civilian Response Corps. The majority of these 

personnel also regularly deploy for either specialized missions and/or as Standby 

members of the Civilian Response Corps. 

The $31.7 million does not include funding for the S/CRS Office of Civilian Operations, which is covered under the allocation entitled ‘‘CRC Operations Support’’ in 

the FY 2010 joint spending plan. 

A more specific breakdown of the $31.7 million is included in the following table: 

Expense FY 2010 Notes 

Labor and Fringe Benefits ............... $10,665,648 Covers labor and fringe for 72 FTE with 28% fringe. 

IRM Desktop Support ....................... 1,000,000 Central IRM LAN support; 3 locations 200 seats. 

KMIT Contractor Support ................. 2,298,056 Funds 19 contractors to augmented staff to develop KMIT solution, 

provide internal user support in 3 locations, and enhance S/CRS 

web presence. 

IRM MOU .......................................... 216,000 Reimbursable senior level support. 

Bandwidth for VTC .......................... 750,000 Usage of VTC to support dispersed locations. 

Reserve/Detailees ............................. 1,000,000 For unbudgeted requirements and reimbursable detailees. 

PC Applications ............................... 1,200,000 To develop user applications/databases. 

IT Technical Refreshment ................ 400,000 Establishes the base for periodic refreshment of existing equipment. 

DS Security SA-18 ........................... 484,240 A new cost associated with Springfield Annex. 

Alterations/Space ............................. 100,000 To continue to tailor SA-18 for CRC use. 

Shuttle Service ................................. 300,000 Provides scheduled transportation to connect SA-18 with other S/CRS 

locations. 

Contractor Support .......................... 7,865,480 Funds 53 contractor support positions, including support to expanded 

S/CRS operations. Includes common-servicing to CRO, e.g. administration, travel, facilities. 

Utilities/Building Services ............... 274,049 Pays for billed water, after hours HVAC, electrical, trash, laborers 

and trucks and other miscellaneous costs when not included in 

rental. 

Telephones ....................................... 500,000 Basic and long distance landlines. 

Portable devices/cell phones ........... 300,000 Equipment and monthly charges for government-issued equipment 

(e.g. Blackberries). 

Travel ............................................... 1,015,288 Outreach and all non-deployment travel, including staff developmentrelated travel. 

Printing ............................................ 75,000 Supports briefing materials and publications, including ‘‘Civilian 

Response.’’ 

Rent ................................................. 2,500,000 Includes partial rent due for SA-18; will increase in FY 2011 for full 

year. 

Overtime/Awards .............................. 160,000 Funds Bureau-managed personnel costs not funded under Central 

Salaries, including performance awards. 

Staff Development ........................... 250,000 Provides for non-CRC professional staff development training. 

Total ................................... $31,653,761 

Question. Iraq.—The administration is requesting $517m in FY 2010 supplemental funding for the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement account for 

59 

police training in Iraq. Please explain the transition of police training from the 

Department of Defense to the Department of State. 

What steps is the State Department taking to take over responsibility from DOD 

for the training of Iraqi police forces? Why must there be significant increases in 

funding for this purpose in the FY 2010 supplemental and FY 2011 budget, if the 

State Department is not expecting to assume responsibility until the beginning of 

FY 2012? 

Answer. The Department of State (State) is working closely with the Department 

of Defense (DOD) to ensure a smooth transition of responsibility for police development in Iraq. In March 2009, State led an interagency Joint Transition Planning 

Team (JTPT) assessment with a view to identify future program priorities through 

consultations with Government of Iraq (GOI) officials and USG personnel. This visit 

served as the basis for developing a new, State-led police development program 

which will be significantly smaller in size and scope than the current DOD program, 

which consists of thousands of military servicemembers. The State program will 

shift away from the previous counterinsurgency oriented mission toward a civilian 

police model focused on community policing. As requested by the GOI, we will no 

longer concentrate on force-generation, but will instead emphasize advanced professional, management, and leadership skills for senior officials that will further build 

the capability to effectively manage internal security operations and support the 

rule of law. 

State and DOD are coordinating closely to ensure a smooth transition of responsibility for police development from DOD to State. DOD’s drawdown plans are taking 

into consideration the future police program structure. As the transition date nears, 

the current DOD program will closely mirror the future State program. State and 

DOD also have been working together to identify equipment and resources that 

DOD may be able to provide or leave behind in an effort to minimize costs and 

leverage the assets of each agency. To ensure planning efforts remain closely linked, 

State has deployed senior personnel to work within United States Forces—Iraq’s 

(USF–I) Iraq Training and Assistance Mission (ITAM). ITAM, in turn, has provided 

a military planner to State. 

Although responsibility for the police training mission does not transfer to State 

until October 1, 2011, there are numerous startup requirements and myriad long 

lead-time tasks which require funding 12–18 months in advance. These include necessary base camp and aviation facility upgrades, significant security infrastructure 

costs to meet the necessary Diplomatic Security standards for Chief of Mission personnel that are different than those under which the military operates, and the procurement of aircraft for transportation between program hubs and field locations. 

The FY 2010 supplemental request will fund these one-time, startup expenses. 

FY 2011 funds are needed to cover salary and operating expenses in August and 

September of 2011, in order to have the State, International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement (INL) program up and running on October 1, 2011. The remainder of 

the funds will be spent to cover early FY 2012 operating expenses, and will carry 

the program through until INL receives FY 2012 funding. 

Question. When will this transition be complete? What are the goals of the police 

training program, and what are the metrics that will be used to assess these goals? 

Answer. The transition of Iraq police training from the Department of Defense 

(DOD) to the Department of State (State) will be complete on October 1, 2011. 

The goal of the police training program is to support the Iraqi Ministry of Interior 

(MOI) in its progress toward becoming a self-sufficient organization and the primary 

provider of internal security, while protecting human rights and supporting the rule 

of law. As requested by the Government of Iraq (GOI), State will provide focused, 

high-level advising and consulting in core areas of police leadership, management, 

strategic planning, curriculum development, and other advanced skills. 

State is currently developing a set of metrics to assess progress toward these 

goals. The metrics will allow State to determine which areas within the MOI need 

additional focus and which are adequately developed, so that advisors may make adjustments to the program as necessary. The metrics will be a useful tool in measuring the effectiveness of the program and will serve as a resource for evaluating 

the success of the program. Currently being drafted, some key indicators of success 

include an improved capacity to conduct complex investigations, increased reliance 

on physical evidence, a strong relationship with civil society, improved public trust 

in the Iraqi police to enforce the law, a robust MOI internal affairs program and 

effective leadership and management controls. 

60 

Question. What lessons have been learned from previous State Department efforts 

at police training, as well as the experience of the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT)? 

Answer. The State Department has extensive institutional knowledge in police 

training, gained from over 15 years of experience managing, leading, and participating in police training missions in 16 nations throughout the world. State’s police 

development experts draw on that extensive knowledge as they form new programs. 

In Iraq, we have been involved in police training since 2003 and have worked with 

the Department of Defense (DOD) on Civilian Police Assistance Training Teams 

(CPATT) since 2004. 

Each country, including Iraq, presents unique challenges and programs must be 

developed to address those circumstances. State performs assessments and conducts 

extensive consultations with police officials to develop effective training programs. 

We do not merely import existing police training models used in other countries as 

this would not adequately address host-nation civilian police training needs. 

Another factor we consider is the level of development within the police structure 

as that helps to determine the type of training program needed in a given country. 

For example, focusing on force generation and increasing the number of police officers trained is an inadequate strategy in many countries if the program does not 

also develop the management and leadership infrastructure to supervise those 

forces. Building organizational and personnel capacity requires that reform begin at 

the highest levels. It is also critical that all facets of the criminal justice system, 

including, police, the judiciary, and corrections, develop simultaneously to guarantee 

that reform is consistent and sustainable. 

Additionally, there are recurring criminal justice development issues throughout 

the world that State has experience and developed tools to address. Some illustrative examples include: the need to combat corruption within the police force; the 

importance of developing a plan to address local, informal justice systems; the need 

to delineate areas of responsibility among multiple entities with shared interests; 

developing the capacity for strategic planning; and the importance of increasing 

public trust in the police, just to name a few. 

The CPATT mission began with force generation and an emphasis on counterinsurgency operations. Although these efforts were necessary and successful, effective management infrastructure within the Ministry of Interior (MOI) is also needed 

and, if not developed, could result in short-lived progress. This situation could leave 

the Iraqi police unable to transition from a paramilitary counterinsurgency force to 

a civilian policing institution. 

The future State-led program in Iraq will build upon the success of CPATT efforts 

by instituting training that focuses on advising and consulting with senior MOI officials. This work will build capacity within the senior ranks to administer an enormous institution (with over 500,000 personnel) and allow the GOI to effectively sustain the progress made under the CPATT program. 

Question. The administration is requesting nearly $1.57 billion in the FY 2010 supplemental request and $1.8 billion in FY 2011 for diplomatic operations in Iraq. 

• How will the reduction of U.S. troop levels to 50,000 in FY 2010 and to zero 

by the end of 2011 impact diplomatic operations? 

Answer. The Departments of State and Defense are working closely to ensure that 

the reduction of troops will minimally impact diplomatic operations in Iraq. The 

joint plan for reducing PRTs reflects careful planning between the two Departments 

to ensure a smooth transition during and after the U.S. troop drawdown and continuing to contribute to a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. 

There are currently 22 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq, with one 

PRT in each of the 15 provinces outside of the Kurdistan Regional Government 

(KRG) area, one team for the KRG located in Erbil, one embedded PRT (ePRT) in 

Anbar and five ePRTs in Baghdad. The ePRTs will consolidate into 16 PRTs by the 

end of August 2010, when the U.S. military will drawdown to 50,000 troops. As the 

military draws down from 50,000, the Departments of State and Defense have 

determined a suitable drawdown plan for 11 of the 16 PRTs, with the majority of 

PRTs closing down between spring and summer 2011, as the military resources 

become unavailable. By October 1, 2011, the Department of State will assume full 

responsibility for all roles, including security and logistics support, previously performed by military units at the five remaining provincial presence posts—Kirkuk, 

Ninewa, Basrah, Diyala, and Erbil. 

PRTs slated to close will preserve and hand over key contacts so the five enduring 

provincial presences and the U.S. mission can maintain key engagements in these 

provinces. For example, the Basrah provincial presence post will be engaged with 

Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Maysan provinces through a combination of visits by U.S. 

61 

officials to meet with provincial leaders, and Iraqi staff resident in each of the three 

provinces who would take direction from the post in Basrah. The other posts would 

have similar relationships with their neighboring provinces to ensure the United 

States continues to maintain relationships and influence with provincial leaders and 

communities and maintains situational awareness of threats to. 

The vast majority of current military activities will transfer to the Iraqis with the 

USG only assuming responsibility where necessary. Ambassador Hill and General 

Odierno oversee this review process in Baghdad. In Washington, there is an interagency group, chaired by the Department of State, which meets to ensure appropriate coordination and support. The Vice President is actively engaged in overseeing the transition and holds regular meetings with senior staff, as well. 

Question. The administration is requesting nearly $1.57 billion in the FY 2010 

supplemental request and $1.8 billion in FY 2011 for diplomatic operations in Iraq. 

How many diplomats do we currently have at Embassy Baghdad and roughly how 

many do we expect to have in January 2011 and January 2012. 

Answer. As of March 12, 2010, there are 647 American State Department staff 

at Embassy Baghdad. This number includes Foreign Service officers and specialists, 

eligible family members (EFMs), Civil Service employees on limited, noncareer appointments (LNA), 3161 Civil Service employees, and personal services contractors 

(PSCs). It excludes locally engaged staff (LES), other agency staff, and security, life 

support, and maintenance contractors. The Chief of Mission has ultimate authority 

regarding staffing size and composition. Staffing numbers for 2011 and 2012 are 

estimates only. 

At this time, utilizing the categories above, current estimates are 595 State 

Department staff in Embassy Baghdad in 2011 and 588 in 2012. 

Question. According to the supplemental request, the Department plans to establish two consulates (in Basrah and ‘‘northern Iraq’’), three Provincial Diplomatic 

Teams (Ninewah, Diyala, Kirkuk), as well as maintaining the PRTs in Najaf and 

Anbar open through 2011. 

• (a) When are the consulates and PDTs expected to open? How will the three 

PDTs, two consulates and two remaining PRTs differ in function? 

Answer (a). There are currently 22 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 

Iraq, with one PRT in each of the 15 provinces outside of the Kurdistan Regional 

Government (KRG) area, one team for the KRG located in Erbil, one embedded PRT 

(ePRT) in Anbar and five ePRTs in Baghdad. The ePRTs will consolidate into 16 

PRTs by the end of August 2010. All but five PRTs will close between spring and 

summer 2011, with the Najaf and Anbar PRTs closing last on September 30, 2011. 

PRTs in Basrah, Erbil, Ninewah, Diyala, and Kirkuk will remain past October 1, 

2011. The Department of State has committed to assume full responsibility for all 

operations related to the five enduring provincial presences, including logistics and 

security support, by that date. 

The five provincial presences will become increasingly strategic between now and 

October 1, 2011, and carry forward the most crucial lines of operation of their predecessor PRTs. The overall mission of the five enduring provincial presences will be 

to contribute to a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq by (1) mitigating and mediating Arab-Kurd, Sunni-Shia, and provincial-Baghdad tensions; (2) strengthening 

the capacity of provincial institutions in key flashpoint locations; (3) balancing foreign interference; (4) providing a platform for the United Nations (U.N.) and other 

organizations; (5) promoting the safe return and resettlement of displaced persons; 

(6) encouraging foreign investment and economic development; (7) reporting on strategic trends, events, and drivers of Iraqi instability; (8) presenting American policy 

and promoting American culture to the Iraqi people; and (9) providing limited services to American citizens. 

The specific mission of each provincial presence will vary and individual teams 

will emphasize different parts of the overall mission statement depending on particular dynamics of the province, the mix of destabilizing forces and the strategic 

opportunities presented. 

Two of the five provincial locations after October 1, 2011, will ultimately convert 

into U.S. consulates. We intend to have consulates in Basrah and a second location, 

pending discussions with and approval by the new Government of Iraq and U.S. 

congressional notification. The consulates will carry out the same missions as the 

other provincial presences, in addition to providing services for American citizens 

and possibly other traditional consular functions. Our goal is to have the two consulates inaugurated and providing limited services for Americans by December 31, 

2011. 

62 

• (b) What portion of the Iraq operations budget is expected to be spent PDTs and 

PRTs in FY 2010 and FY 2011? What will the security costs be? 

Answer (b). If the FY 2010 supplemental request is passed, the funding expected 

to be obligated in FY 2010 for the PDTs and PRTs is $897.7 million. This includes 

funds carried forward from the FY 2009 supplemental, the FY 2010 enacted funding 

for Iraq Operations, and the FY 2010 supplemental request, if enacted. Of the estimated $897.7 million, $574.1 million is expected to be for security costs. 

Based on current estimates, $1.3 billion will be obligated in FY 2011 for PDT/PRT 

operations including $885.1 million for security related costs, if the FY 2010 supplemental is enacted. 

• (c) How will the State Department engage with the majority of provinces not 

home to consulates, PDTs or PRTs? 

Answer (c). The United States is committed to maintaining nationwide reach in 

Iraq even as our military forces drawdown. By October 1, 2011, the Department of 

State will assume full responsibility for five provincial presences outside the Embassy, in Basrah, Erbil, Ninewah, Diyala, and Kirkuk. The Department of State will 

use these five regional diplomatic presences to monitor developments and maintain 

key relationships in their areas of responsibility. For example, the Basrah provincial 

presence will also be engaged with Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Maysan provinces 

through a combination of visits by U.S. officials to meet with provincial leaders, and 

Iraqi staff resident in each of the three provinces who would take direction from the 

post in Basrah. The other posts would have similar relationships with their neighboring provinces to ensure the United States continues to maintain relationships 

and influence with provincial leaders and communities, and maintains situational 

awareness of threats to stability. 

Question. The FY 2011 budget request includes $400 million for the West Bank 

and Gaza. Please provide a breakdown of how this funding will be used. Also, please 

provide a breakdown on the assistance provided, as well as pledges, by other international donors. 

Secretary Clinton pledged $900 million at the ‘‘International Conference in Support of the Palestinian Economy for the Reconstruction of Gaza’’ at Sharm el-Sheikh 

in March 2009. Please provide the committee with a status update of this pledge. 

Answer. The Department’s $400.4 million request in FY 2011 for the West Bank 

and Gaza ESF program provides support for the Palestinian Authority (PA) to build 

transparent, accountable, and credible institutions of government; encourage economic development that can provide jobs for the Palestinian people; deliver higher 

quality government services; promote the rule of law in areas under the PA’s control; and continue humanitarian and recovery assistance to the people of Gaza. Our 

assistance matches the priorities in PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s 2-year reform and institution-building program, which aims to establish the foundations of 

a future independent, viable Palestinian state that is a responsible neighbor to 

Israel and that can meet the needs of its citizens without reliance on external donor 

support. 

The Department’s FY 2011 request for ESF will support the PA’s priorities in the 

following areas: 

• $200 million in direct budget support to the PA. 

• $72.5 million for the delivery of basic education, health, and water services. 

• $81.4 million in programs to help develop the environment for growth in the 

Palestinian private sector. 

• $15.5 million in food, medical, and other humanitarian assistance for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. 

• $31 million to enhance democratic reform, respect for human rights and the 

rule of law, and increase civic engagement. 

Donors largely have met their commitments from the 2007 Paris Donors’ Conference. According to conference organizers, donors have contributed $5.5 billion in 

assistance to the PA over the past 2 years against total pledges of $7.7 billion in 

support for the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (2008–2010). We continue 

to pursue an aggressive outreach strategy to ensure timely delivery of assistance, 

and coordinate closely with other donors through the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee 

and local donor coordination mechanisms. 

To date, the United States has provided a total of $761 million against the more 

than $900 million pledge that Secretary Clinton made at the Sharm al-Sheikh 

donors’ conference in March 2009. The pledge had three components: 

63 

Pledge Component: $200 million in budget support to the PA 

• The $200 million in budgetary support was transferred to the Palestinian 

Authority in July 2009. 

Pledge Component: Up to $300 million for urgent humanitarian needs 

• The United States has obligated $208 million to date for assistance to the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza through UNRWA, the World Food 

Programme, and other international and U.S. nongovernmental organizations. 

Pledge Component: Up to $400 million in support for the Palestinian Reform and 

Development Plan (PDRP) 

• The United States has obligated $353 million to date toward project assistance 

and security sector reform. 

Question. Please provide to the committee, in a classified or unclassified format 

as appropriate, detailed information on the efforts the United States Government 

has undertaken to secure the release of four American citizens held in Iran: Shane 

Bauer, Joshua Fattal, Sarah Shourd, and Kian Tajbakhsh. 

Answer. The Department of State is committed to ensuring fair and humane 

treatment for U.S. citizens detained overseas, and we stand ready to assist detained 

citizens and their families within the limits of our ability and authority in accordance with international law. 

However, in countries, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the United 

States does not have diplomatic or consular relations, the Department of State is 

limited in its ability to assist U.S. citizens who are detained or missing. 

The Swiss Government, acting through its Embassy in Tehran, serves as protecting power for U.S. interests in Iran and provides consular services to U.S. citizens detained in Iran. 

During consular visits with detained U.S. citizens, the Swiss often provide such 

items as reading material, letters from family members, food, changes of clothing, 

and toiletries. 

U.S. citizens Shane Bauer, Joshua Fattal, and Sarah Shourd were detained in 

Iran during a hiking vacation in Iraqi Kurdistan, allegedly for crossing the unmarked border with Iran on July 31, 2009. Since then, the Swiss have been granted 

consular access to the three on two occasions; the most recent visit was on October 

29. On March 9, the hikers were permitted to phone their families in the United 

States. This marks the first time in over 7 months that the families heard the voices 

of their loved ones. 

Unfortunately, during the two consular visits with the hikers, Iranian officials did 

not permit the Swiss to present, either verbally or in written form, a Privacy Act 

Waiver, which would authorize the Department to share information about their 

cases. Without a Privacy Act Waiver, the Department of State is prohibited from 

providing further details on this case. 

The Swiss have not been granted consular access to Kian Tajbakhsh or Reza 

Taghavi, who are dual Iranian-American citizens. The Iranian Government does not 

recognize dual citizenship and will not permit the Swiss to provide protective services for U.S. citizens who are dual Iranian nationals. We are in frequent contact 

with the families of both Dr. Tajbakhsh and Mr. Taghavi in the United States. 

In the case of Robert Levinson, who disappeared during a business trip to Kish 

Island in March 2007, the United States continues to call on the Government of the 

Islamic Republic of Iran to provide any information on Mr. Levinson’s whereabouts 

and follow through on its promise to share the results of its investigation with the 

Levinson family or the Swiss Embassy in Tehran. 

In these and similar cases involving American citizens abroad, we use a variety 

of diplomatic tools to ensure that the host government understands the U.S. Government’s concern for the welfare of its citizens abroad. One such tool is to issue 

official statements; the most recent such statement was issued on March 9, 2010, 

on the third anniversary of Mr. Levinson’s disappearance. The text of the statement 

is noted below. 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Office of the Spokesman 

——————————————————————— 

For Immediate Release 

March 9, 2010 

2010/279 

STATEMENT BY PHILIP J. CROWLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS 

64 

Case of Missing U.S. Citizen Robert Levinson 

Today marks the three-year anniversary of the disappearance of U.S. citizen Robert Levinson, who went missing in Iran during a business trip to Kish Island in 

2007. Mr. Levinson will remain a priority for the United States until he is reunited 

with his family. 

He is the father of seven children and grandfather of two—his second grandchild 

was born in his absence. The Levinson family misses him desperately and hopes he 

will be able to walk his daughter down the aisle later this year. 

In December 2007, Mrs. Levinson first met with Iranian officials who expressed 

a willingness to share information about their investigation into her husband’s disappearance with the family. We ask that Iran stand behind its commitment to provide full details about their authorities’ investigation. 

The United States also calls on Iran to resolve the cases of the five American citizens who are unjustly detained in Iran: Joshua Fattal, Shane Bauer, Sarah Shourd, 

Kian Tajbakhsh, and Reza Taghavi. 

We ask anyone who may have information about Mr. Levinson to contact us or 

the Levinson family via their website: www.helpboblevinson.com 

Question. While the State Department has proposed an overall increase in assistance to Yemen in its FY 2011 proposal, there has been a significant shift in the 

accounts that are used. For example, the Global Health and Child Survival and Economic Support Fund accounts increase from $8m and $5m, respectively, FY 2010 

to a proposed $21m and $34m in FY 2011, while the budget proposal eliminated the 

Development Assistance account altogether in FY 2011 from $35m in FY 2010. 

• Why were such significant shifts in the Yemen accounts necessary? 

• What impact do the shifts have on program continuity? 

Answer. As part of our policy review of Yemen that began last year, USAID has 

developed a new 3-year country stabilization strategy for Yemen, which it will begin 

to implement in the coming months. The shift in accounts is simply to better reflect 

the nature of programs being funded. These funds will continue to go to the same 

programs articulated under the 3-year development stabilization strategy. The 

shift will have no effect on program continuity. For example, the increase in 

ESF is for USAID interventions designed to improve livelihoods and basic service 

delivery in communities in the country’s most unstable areas. The increase in 

GHCS funding for Yemen will improve health care services for vulnerable populations. For further information, USAID’s Yemen Country Strategy is available online at: http://www.usaid.gov/locations/middleleast/documents/yemen/USAIDYemen 

2010-2012Strategy.pdf. 

Question. Please detail the limitations and constraints placed on USG personnel 

as a result of Yemen’s challenging security context. 

• To what extent are U.S. direct-hire staff able to access and oversee projects and 

programs, especially outside of Sana’a? 

Answer. The challenging security environment does place limits on the movement 

of U.S. Government civilian personnel. However, the U.S. Government is working 

with Yemen and its international partners to help implement and oversee muchneeded projects that address Yemen’s challenging economic, social, and governance 

issues. USAID implements all programs through grantees and contractors with a 

presence in Sana’a as well as in governorates where programs are active. Their local 

staff members do not face the same security constraints as U.S. Government personnel, and thus have considerable geographic access and mobility. 

Despite the deteriorating security situation, USAID continues to meet its development goals—especially in basic health and education—in areas where it continues 

operations, such as Shebwa and Amran governorates. In other areas, however, 

USAID has been compelled to reduce operations. USAID health and education activities in Sa’ada governorate were reduced in recent months because of the HouthiGovernment of Yemen conflict. A similar situation exists in al-Jawf governorate 

because of ongoing tribal conflicts there. 

Due to the urgent situation in Yemen and increased levels of development assistance, USAID recently devised a new 3-year strategy focusing on stabilization and 

addressing drivers of instability through integrated local development in targeted 

areas. Given security constraints and limited staffing, USAID will effectively implement the new strategy by investing in a robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 

project. This will enable continuous monitoring of individual project inputs and outcomes, as well as analysis of the overall impact of USAID programs on stability in 

Yemen. We look forward to briefing you further on our efforts as they develop. 

65 

Question. The United States is a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), a multilateral treaty which grants individual foreign nationals a 

right of access to his or her consulate, and ensures that consular officials can visit 

their nationals and arrange for their legal representation. Additionally, the United 

States was a party to the VCCR Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, which gave the International Court of Justice jurisdiction over 

disputes related to the VCCR. In Avena and other Mexican Nationals, the ICJ ruled 

that the United States must provide ‘‘review and reconsideration’’ for a group of 

Mexican nationals who were arrested and denied their consular rights and are now 

on U.S. death rows. In October 2009, I, along with Senators Leahy, Franken, Feingold, and Cardin sent a letter to Secretary Clinton and Attorney General Holder, 

requesting the administration’s input on how to ensure that the United States comply with its obligations under Avena and the VCCR. At the present time, we have 

not received a response. Please provide your views on what steps the administration 

and Congress can take to address this issue in a timely manner. 

Answer. The Department shares your desire to ensure that the United States 

complies fully with its international obligations to provide consular notification to 

foreign nationals, and your goal of ensuring compliance with the ICJ’s Avena judgment. We look forward to working with Congress to address this issue. 

Question. Burma.—All of us are deeply concerned by a Burmese court’s recent, politically motivated decision to sentence U.S. citizen Nyi Nyi Aung to 3 years of hard 

labor following several months of detention and mistreatment. The Department has 

made concerted efforts to secure Mr. Aung’s release, proceeding in a manner and 

at a level that it believes holds the best chance of producing a desirable outcome. 

These exertions have regrettably not produced the results we all seek. 

What is your current assessment of Mr. Aung’s treatment and his overall physical 

condition? Is he being afforded regular access to his family and consular officials? 

Answer. Consular officials have repeatedly made clear to Burmese officials the 

need to respect the rights of Kyaw Zaw Lwin (also known as Nyi Nyi Aung) and 

international conventions concerning the treatment of foreign prisoners. 

During a March 12 consular visit, Mr. Lwin reported the current prison is more 

relaxed than Insein prison was, as he is able to communicate with other inmates 

during his twice daily exercise, and he is also able to purchase food and other goods 

from the outside the prison. Mr. Lwin reported no mistreatment. Mr. Lwin reported 

he is in good health except for recurring leg pain, for which prison officials have 

assured they will provide medical attention. 

The Department of State has repeatedly requested immediate and more frequent 

consular access to Mr. Lwin. The Embassy will have consular access to Mr. Lwin 

again in 2 weeks, when his aunts will also be allowed to visit. 

Question. Given that ongoing departmental efforts have not secured Mr. Aung’s 

release, is the Department considering pressing his case at a higher level to signal 

the priority the U.S. Government attaches to his freedom? 

Answer. Throughout the detention of Kyaw Zaw Lwin (aka, Nyi Nyi Aung), the 

Department of State has engaged Burmese authorities at senior levels to press for 

his fair treatment, protest reported mistreatment, and urge more frequent consular 

access. We have repeatedly made clear to the Burmese Government that Mr. Lwin’s 

immediate release is a high priority for the United States Government, both within 

the administration and within the Congress. We will continue to work to secure his 

release in a manner that we believe has the best chance of achieving the outcome 

we all seek in this case. 

Question.Climate/Environment.—The United States recently associated itself with 

the Copenhagen Accord and pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the 

range of 17 percent by 2020. There are now over a hundred countries associated 

with the Copenhagen Accord, of which approximately 60 countries have voluntarily 

inscribed carbon pollution reduction pledges. 

(a) What are the next steps in implementing this Accord and what role do 

you see the administration playing in these efforts? 

(b) How does the administration plan to deliver on its contribution to the 

global climate finance goal of $100 billion annually by 2020? Recognizing that 

this finance goal will be reached through a combination of support from both 

the public and private sectors, what mechanisms do you find most promising 

for mobilizing these sectors? 

(c) Do you believe that domestic legislation is necessary to fulfill our mitigation commitment? How would failure to pass legislation impact the implementaVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:32 Jan 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\111TH CONGRESS\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINT
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tion of the Copenhagen Accord and the ability of the global community to 

achieve necessary reductions? 

Answer (a). To date, 104 countries have associated with the Copenhagen Accord, 

accounting for more than 80 percent of global greenhouse emissions. We will continue to encourage countries to associate with the Accord and inscribe their commitments to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time, we are now 

working with partners in a variety of fora to operationalize all elements of the 

Accord, including the provisions on mitigation, transparency, and financing. 

Answer (b). In Copenhagen, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and 

transparency on implementation, we committed to working with other developed 

countries to jointly mobilize USD$100 billion a year by 2020. We anticipate continued scaling-up of public financing through bilateral and multilateral channels, particularly to support adaptation, capacity-building, and other developing country climate priorities, as well as work to reduce barriers to market-based approaches. 

However, private sector finance driven by carbon markets is anticipated to account for the majority of funding flows to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. While 

governments cannot direct private capital, creating the right incentive structure can 

help accelerate an already strong trend toward low-carbon investment. Domestic 

mitigation targets will be essential in directing investment flows toward low-carbon 

alternatives in each sector, and efficient and liquid carbon markets will be important in transmitting the carbon price signal throughout the economy. 

Strong federal legislation with a cap-and-trade component could significantly 

assist our efforts to meet these climate finance objectives—in particular, through 

auctioning set-asides and international offset provisions. 

Answer (c). The administration supports the passage of comprehensive clean energy and climate legislation to bolster the American economy, enhance our national 

security, set the United States on a path to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions 

and be a leader in clean energy technology. Failure to pass legislation would negatively impact the leadership position of the United States in the climate negotiations 

and the ability of the global community to achieve necessary greenhouse gas reductions. 

Question. Black carbon soot is estimated to be a significant contributor to rising 

global temperatures, with recent studies estimating that it is responsible for 18 percent of the planet’s warming, compared to 40 percent for carbon dioxide—placing it 

in the top three of the strongest climate-forcing agents. Last July, the G8 Leaders 

Statement committed to addressing these soot emissions. The administration took 

a step forward in December when it announced in Copenhagen that it would commit 

$5 million to jump start international cooperation on a strategy to reduce black carbon emissions in the Arctic. What else are you doing to follow up on the G8 commitment to take rapid action to address black carbon and what more needs to be done 

in terms of international cooperation on black carbon? 

Answer. There are at least two important fronts for international cooperation on 

black carbon. The first is mitigation. As you note in your question, recent scientific 

studies have indicated that black carbon is a potent warming agent. The $5 million 

initiative that we announced in Copenhagen last December was an important step 

forward, but it was never intended to be sufficient by itself. We are working with 

our partners in the Arctic Council to build this into a broader initiative that will 

include active participation by all Arctic countries. We’ve started in the Arctic on 

account of its strong sensitivity to black carbon pollution, but we expect that United 

States and Arctic Council leadership on this issue will lead to even broader efforts 

in the very near future. 

The second front for international cooperation is in research. While we know that 

black carbon is cause for concern, we still have much to learn about the nature of 

its sources, transport, and impacts. We’re proud of the work that U.S. scientists 

have done to promote international cooperation on these research topics, through 

the Arctic Council’s Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program and its Taskforce 

on Short-Lived Climate Forcers, as well as in an emerging effort under the UNECE 

Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP). An expert group 

under LRTAP has been convened to consider whether there are ways to specifically 

address black carbon as part of ongoing efforts under LRTAP to look at mitigation 

of particulate matter emissions. We also continue to promote bilateral research initiatives involving scientists from NOAA and EPA, among others. Such research 

efforts are critical to improve our understanding of black carbon as a pollutant and 

to inform effective mitigation efforts. 

Question. In the FY 2011 budget, there is $57 million allocated to State Department for climate adaptation efforts and $187 million for USAID. Please describe the 

67 

types of efforts you expect State and USAID to engage in that provides the best benefits to people adapting to the impacts of climate change. More specifically, please 

describe the role you see for ecosystem based adaptation or the use of biodiversity 

and ecosystem services as part of an overall adaptation strategy within State and 

USAID. 

Answer. Our funds will focus on helping countries adapt to and build resilience 

to the impacts of climate change. We will particularly target our resources to the 

least developed countries (LDCs), small island developing states (SIDS), and African 

countries, which will be the most severely affected by the impacts of climate change. 

FY 2011 adaptation assistance will build on the significant new funding for adaptation in the enacted FY 2010 budget. 

Programming will support investments in science and analysis for decision making; promote governance systems that are inclusive, transparent, and responsive to 

the needs of their constituents; and implement climate solutions as integrated components of other development activities that are compromised by climate change. 

In FY 2011, we also propose to launch a new USAID program to benefit the Pacific islands that focuses on climate change adaptation. USAID programs will extend 

the Famine Early Warning System and other climate forecasting technology systems 

such as SERVIR to help vulnerable counties adapt. The State Department will make 

contributions to the multilateral Least Developed Country Fund and Special Climate Change Fund, which both focus on adaptation assistance for the most vulnerable countries, and to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 

(UNFCC) for its adaptation work. 

Ecosystem-based adaptation will play an important role in USG adaptation assistance. For example, climate change is expected to alter rainfall patterns, which will 

exacerbate erosion and groundwater retention problems in degraded ecosystems. 

One way to achieve the adaptation goals of improving water supply and quality is 

by improving the state of the watershed ecosystem services. 

A concrete example: USAID’s East Caribbean Regional Mission is developing an 

adaptation program that will combat climate stresses on water and coastal resources through watershed restoration and the use of natural processes. This natural approach has the multiple benefits of providing shade, reducing erosion on hillsides, promoting groundwater recharge, and reducing pollutant discharges to reefs 

and fisheries, which provide for food and attract tourists. 

Question. Last year, the administration proposed a joint initiative with Mexico 

and Canada to use the Montreal Protocol to phase down hydrofluorocarbons, or 

HFCs, a significant greenhouse gas used in refrigeration, mobile air conditioning, 

and foam-blowing. What proactive steps will the administration take to promote the 

phase-down of HFCs this year? 

Answer. The administration recognizes the considerable climate benefits which 

could arise from a phase down in the consumption and production of HFCs. We continue to support an amendment to the Montreal Protocol to address HFCs, and are 

working with Canada and Mexico on a proposal for consideration in 2010. We will 

also work with other key developing countries, such as China and India, to better 

understand their concerns and find ways to make progress on this important issue. 

Question. As part of the $10 billion per year fast-start funding for 2010–12, specifically what types of initiatives and climate finance efforts do you see funded and 

do you envision the noncarbon dioxide fast-action strategies as part of this effort? 

Answer. The U.S. contribution to collectively provide, with other developed countries, funding approaching $30 billion for the period 2010–12 will be composed of 

a mix of direct assistance programming through USAID and the State Department 

and programming (through both Treasury and State Department mechanisms) to 

multilateral funds such as the Climate Investment Funds, Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, Least Developed Countries Fund, and Special Climate Change Fund. 

The USG’s approach combines bilateral assistance with multilateral initiatives to 

help ensure our developing country partners have the capacity to take advantage 

of new multilateral funds and private-sector financing. 

Within the U.S. climate change assistance ‘‘pillars’’ of Clean Energy and Sustainable Landscapes, we will place particular emphasis on partnering with developing 

countries that support the Copenhagen Accord and are willing to create and implement Low Carbon Development Strategies. USAID will also continue to partner 

with EPA, the UNFCCC, and other donors to help countries meet their new obligations under the Accord to complete national greenhouse gas inventories every 2 

years. Our bilateral assistance will begin laying the groundwork that will enable 

developing countries to take part in emerging international carbon markets and 

develop new low carbon sectors of their economies. 

68 

The Department of Treasury is the primary vehicle by which the U.S. Government provides contributions through multilateral delivery channels, including the 

Climate Investment Funds and the Global Environment Facility. Multilateral assistance promotes institutional structures governed jointly by developed and developing 

countries, which are needed for a coordinated, global response to climate change. 

Multilateral institutions complement bilateral assistance by leveraging contributions 

from other donors, making capital investments in infrastructure, providing a range 

of tailored financial products, and working across a number of countries. 

We believe that addressing noncarbon dioxide, short-lived climate forcers such as 

black carbon, methane, and tropospheric ozone is also an important part of the overall strategy to combat climate change. These types of activities are a feature of several of the programs and initiatives mentioned below. 

In Copenhagen, the United States announced several new initiatives. The United 

States and five other developed countries collectively pledged $3.5 billion over the 

2010–12 periods for REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) activities. We also joined four other countries in the 5-year, $350 million Renewables and Efficiency Deployment Initiative (Climate REDI), which will promote 

improved appliance and efficiency standards, expansion of markets for solar lanterns and solar home devices, the new multilateral Scaling Up Renewable Energy 

Program (SREP, one of the Climate Investment Funds), and a clean energy information platform. We have committed $85 million over 5 years to this initiative. In addition, the United States committed $5 million ‘‘toward international cooperation to 

reduce black carbon emissions in and around the Arctic.’’ We anticipate other countries will also contribute to this effort. 

In addition to the initiatives announced in Copenhagen, we intend to support initiatives developed under the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF) 

process. We also intend to continue funding the multilateral Methane to Markets 

Initiative, which focuses on innovative ways to capture, store, and use methane from 

such sources as landfills, mining shafts, leaking gas pipelines, agriculture, and 

flared gas. 

Question. In your talk last year to the Antarctica Consultative Group, you mentioned other noncarbon dioxide gases, the so called short-term forcers, which include 

black carbon, hydrofluorocarbons, methane, and ground-level ozone. What role do 

you see the United States playing to help develop fast-action mitigation and carbonnegative strategies? Have you considered the benefits of a governmentwide task 

force on fast-action mitigation strategies targeting increased use of biochar or promoting enhanced urban albedo, the white roofs Secretary Chu is calling for to reflect 

solar radiation back into our atmosphere? What other strategies could help advance 

this promising effort? 

Answer. On short-lived forcers, the United States has taken a clear leadership 

role internationally. From our Arctic black carbon initiative to our trilateral North 

American proposed amendment to the Montreal Protocol to the continuing strong 

work of the Methane to Markets partnership, we have worked to bring nations together to act on a broad range of short-lived forcers. This same range of strategies, 

including catalytic initiatives, international conventions, and public/private partnerships, can be leveraged to promote additional mitigation strategies as they are identified. 

Question. Multilateral climate negotiations remain high on the international agenda. It is widely believed that increased help to the developing countries, to reduce 

their carbon emissions from forest destruction (REDD), will be a key to success. To 

what extent is the administration’s $347 million request for sustainable landscapes 

focused on capacity-building activities for REDD as distinct from traditional conservation activities? Can you provide a quantitative breakdown of the funds for 

these two purposes? 

Answer. Our $347 million request for sustainable landscapes in FY 2011 is distinct from our traditional conservation activities (AKA biodiversity program), although there may be a small overlap in places. Biodiversity and Sustainable Landscapes funds will be programmed toward their respective objectives, the former 

being conserving priority species and ecosystems, the latter being transitioning 

countries toward long-term emissions reductions and increased sequestration related to forests (REDD-plus). 

Prior to FY 10, much of our biodiversity funding was also intended to contribute 

to our climate change objectives. Beginning with FY10 and continuing with FY11, 

the President has requested funding specific to climate change, including Sustainable Landscapes. These requests are aligned with the intent of the FY 2010 Appropriations bill’s Statement of Managers, which directed that Sustainable Landscapes 

69 

funding should be used to support activities to maximize climate change mitigation 

and should not duplicate efforts implemented through biodiversity programs. 

The administration’s formal FY 2010 guidance on implementing Sustainable 

Landscapes Programs says that such programs must not be attributed to other foreign assistance objectives. In addition, those programs should address one or more 

of the following policy priorities: 

1. Creation or implementation of national or subnational REDD-plus strategies; 

2. Greenhouse gas inventories and accounting; 

3. Forest carbon market readiness; 

4. Targeted field demonstrations and investments. 

We anticipate that FY 2011 guidance will be similar. 

In addition to the $175 million for USAID Sustainable Landscapes program in the FY 2011 request, the $347 million total includes: $20 million for the Tropical Forest 

Conservation Act; $95 million and $15 million for the World Bank’s Forest Investment Program and Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (both with a specific climate 

change focus), respectively; $32 million to the Global Environment Facility for 

projects to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from forests and landscapes; and an additional $10 million to international agencies, including the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, IUCN, and the International Tropical Timber Organization. 

There is the potential that Sustainable Landscapes and biodiversity funds may be 

used in projects that meet the objectives of both programs, in which case they will 

be accounted for separately. The administration’s FY 11 Congressional Budget 

Justification (CBJ) narrative (which will be posted online shortly at http:// 

www.state.gov/documents/organization/137936.pdf), will have break-outs for both 

these initiatives. 

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY CLINTON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. The administration’s FY 2011 request calls for $100 million in new Economic Support Funds (ESF) to help fund some of the initiatives to reach out to the 

world’s Muslim communities that President Obama articulated in his June 4, 2009 

Cairo speech. 

We understand from staff briefings that the baseline funding for these kinds of 

programs in FY 2010 is about $700 million. Given the importance of the Cairo 

speech and the emphasis that the President has placed on forging new partnerships 

with the Muslim world, is an increase of $100 million (about 14 percent) sufficient 

for the transformative kind of engagement envisioned by the President? 

Answer. The vision that the President called for in his Cairo speech is to reframe 

our relations with Muslims around the world based on partnership; to seek a ‘‘New 

Beginning’’ based on working together and building alongside each other in areas 

of mutual interest and the areas that people care most about in their everyday lives. 

This is a long-term vision. 

It is also important to note that this new funding is meant to build upon and complement our broader engagement efforts, including our existing foreign assistance 

and development work, public diplomacy and our day-to-day diplomatic efforts in 

USAID missions and embassies around the world. Fully integrated with our broader 

efforts, new programming will have a much greater impact than if it were treated 

as a separate, standalone effort. 

Still, we do not expect to transform people’s lives completely in the first year of 

this effort. But, we do expect to make it clear that we are in fact delivering on the 

President’s words and vision with deeds and with tangible programs and partnerships that address peoples’ needs and their aspirations. 

In the near-term we want to lay the foundation for our efforts and deliver tangible 

programs and partnerships that substantiate the President’s and Secretary’s vision. 

The $100 million of new funds requested will support programs we are developing 

in key areas of focus: Economic Opportunity, Science & Technology, and Human 

Development with an emphasis on youth and women and girls. Programs will build 

on local capacity and have a wide reach—both in terms of the people impacted and 

the symbolic resonance of the effort undertaken. We want these programs to be developed in partnership with local stakeholders and to have a demonstrable impact 

on people and communities in the areas where they are established. 

We expect to leverage that funding in several ways, so that it will have a multiplier effect. In some cases, small investments of funding could provide local stakeholders the tools and platforms—and attract other funders—to support those local 

70 

efforts. In other cases, funding will help develop the enabling environment needed 

to attract other donor support or investment. In addition, we are bringing a ‘‘wholeof-government’’ approach to this effort so that we can capitalize on resources available in other U.S. Government agencies, ranging from Overseas Private Investment 

Corporation to the National Science Foundation. 

By working on programs with a wide base of partners and stakeholders and by 

leveraging the expertise and capabilities of the private sector, we expect that these 

programs and partnerships will achieve a wider reach and produce deeper developmental results. 

Question. What kind of plans are in place to ensure the sustainability of any new 

programs that are launched? 

Answer. Sustainability will be vital to the ‘‘New Beginning’’ and one of our key 

measurements for success. There are three primary keys to sustainability. The first 

is our focus on local ownership. We will identify the most proven and effective local 

groups. These are the groups that are in communities: that are vested and will be 

there for the long-haul. Our aim will be to provide the most effective USG tools and 

private sector tools to support, advance, and scale their efforts. By supporting what 

is already there and has already demonstrated success, we will help to ensure the 

durability and sustainability of those efforts. 

For example, as part of our goal to support entrepreneurship, USAID recently organized an outreach ‘‘listening session’’ in Cairo with representatives of the local 

and regional private sector exploring issues associated with entrepreneurs’ access to 

finance. We have involved USG participation across U.S. Government agencies in 

these listening sessions, and are feeding the resulting information into our program 

planning. These listening sessions are a vehicle not only to benefit from the perspective of local stakeholders, but to identify the most effective and impactful groups, 

who are already delivering for their communities. These are the groups we aim to 

partner with and support—thereby unleashing unfulfilled potential at the local level 

for long-term durability and success. 

Second, we will build on our existing approach to public-private partnerships. Our 

focus will be interest-based collaboration. We are spending time with key private 

sector partners to better understand their objectives and interests and attempting 

to forge partnerships based on shared interests—which will help those partnerships 

to endure and be sustainable. 

Finally, USAID, as the operating home for this effort, will work closely with the 

Department of State to ensure that the programs funded through Global Engagement are integrated and leveraged with existing programming, that these efforts are 

sustainable, and that they are best suited to enhancing our Muslim engagement 

policies. For example, we hope to implement a new holistic approach to youth programming with the aim to promote a responsible and successful transition to adulthood. Current programs typically address challenges from a single-sector such as 

Economic Growth or Health. This funding would be used instead to support programs that cut across sectors. For example, we will advance basic education linked 

to opportunities for higher education, vocational training, or employment; reduce 

barriers and increase opportunities for decent work through policy reform, skills 

training, mentoring and public-private partnerships; and support access to quality 

health and social services. 

For all the programs and activities in this area, we are working with our missions 

abroad to develop these programs to be both developmentally sound and responsive 

to local expression of priorities and need. We are using USAID’s strategic resource 

management tools to ensure that programs are results-driven and have a strong 

monitoring and evaluation component built in from the beginning. 

Question. Is the administration seeking to develop new public-private partnerships in this realm? 

Answer. Yes. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are the framework for the vast 

majority of the programming in this area. The President’s Cairo speech generated 

great enthusiasm from private sector actors for working with the USG to further 

the President’s vision and goals. Funding requested will help to establish a range 

of programs which will help us to leverage and harness private sector enthusiasm 

both at home and overseas. In addition, one of the primary objectives of this effort 

is building people-to-people ties and working together—this is best achieved through 

building programs with a wide base of partners around a shared effort. 

We have already begun private sector outreach leveraging USAID’s Global Development Alliance, State’s Global Partnership Initiative and the broader interagency 

team’s existing network of partners; in addition we are reaching out to and cultivating new partners, who have been interested in working with the USG in reVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:32 Jan 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\111TH CONGRESS\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINT
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sponse to the President’s speech. We have asked our embassies in key countries to 

engage with their host country’s private sector to explore public-private partnerships to advance the New Beginning. As the Special Representative to Muslim Communities visits with civil society leaders in Muslim communities around the world, 

she is consistently seeking out the best civil society organizations with whom embassies can partner at the local level. At home, we are exploring collaboration with 

leading Silicon Valley companies, NGOs and foundations. There is very high interest and a wide range of exciting opportunities. Funds requested will help to seed 

and catalyze many of these partnerships. 

Question. We understand that the Director of Policy Planning (S/P) has the lead 

in coordinating ideas for implementation of vision articulated in the Cairo speech. 

Without operational capacity of its own, S/P will have to hand off day-to-day management of these initiatives, however. How do you envision this process playing out? 

Answer. S/P has the lead in coordinating the specific ‘‘deliverables’’ of the Cairo 

speech, while S/SRMC has the overall policy lead on Muslim engagement at the 

Department of State. S/P, S/SRMC and USAID work closely together, and will work 

jointly to ensure that programs meet our policy objectives. USAID has the global 

reach, technical expertise, and procurement capability to be the operational home 

for this effort. We view this as an opportunity to model State-USAID collaboration 

across both agencies. 

Another key to making this a success is the effort already underway to develop 

a results-based framework. This framework will set clear performance objectives for 

all three baskets of activities and will include strict criteria against which proposed 

activities will be reviewed before funding decisions are made. A rigorous monitoring 

and evaluation component will also be applied in order to ensure our programs are 

having the desired measurable impact. 

Question. The administration’s FY 2011 foreign assistance budget request highlights support for Yemen as a key foreign policy objective. Please elaborate on plans 

for increased assistance for Yemen. At the late January meeting in London of the 

‘‘Friends of Yemen,’’ participants are reported to have agreed to a five-point plan 

to help address the multitude of challenges Yemen faces, including the need for improved coordination among international donors. How has the United States altered 

its approach to providing assistance to Yemen in the aftermath of this meeting? 

Answer. President Obama has recognized the need to intensify our efforts in 

Yemen, as is reflected in our increasing foreign assistance to Yemen. Foreign assistance has been steadily increasing, from $17.2 million in FY 2008 to $40.3 million 

in FY 2009. The latter figure does not include approximately $67 million in FY 2009 

1206 funds or other humanitarian funds. We estimate FY 2010 assistance will be 

$67.2 million, and the President’s FY 2011 budget requests $106.6 million for 

Yemen, representing a 59-percent increase over FY 2010. 

Yemen is a key foreign policy priority for this Administration. Our basic strategy 

is two-pronged. We are simultaneously working with the Government of Yemen to 

improve its capacity to combat terrorism in the short term while seeking longer 

term improvements in the government’s capacity to govern the country and meet 

the population’s essential services needs. The United States will provide assistance 

and support, but Yemen is a sovereign nation responsible for its own development 

and security. 

We are seeking to stabilize the country through a variety of training and development programs to improve governance, defense and counterterrorist forces’ capabilities, and maritime and border security. As part of a U.S. policy review of Yemen 

that began last year, USAID has developed a new country strategy for Yemen, 

which it will begin to implement in the coming months. USAID intends to spend 

$121 million over the next 3 years, subject to the availability of funds, on stabilization initiatives in Yemen to increase youth employment and other economic opportunities (including agriculture); improve government service delivery in education and 

health care; support transparent, decentralized governance; and empower youth, 

women, and other marginalized groups to participate in the political process. Middle 

East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) projects address key administration priorities including offering positive futures for Yemeni youth, empowering Yemeni women, promoting job creation and education, and encouraging political reform and peaceful 

civic participation for all Yemeni citizens. A Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights 

and Labor (DRL) program in Yemen is increasing public awareness and understanding of religious freedom and tolerance with a particular focus on youth. New 

programs will support independent media and access to information to promote government transparency and accountability. Through these efforts, we intend to 

change the base conditions that make Yemen a fertile breeding ground for al-Qaeda. 

72 

We are also increasing our multilateral efforts to help Yemen confront its immediate economic, social, political, and security challenges while paving the way for 

necessary long-term reforms. At January’s London Meeting on Yemen, the international community reaffirmed its shared goal of a peaceful, prosperous, and united 

Yemen. This meeting was not a donor’s conference, but sought to consolidate international support for Yemen’s political and economic reform efforts. It launched the 

Friends of Yemen process, which will provide sustained international engagement 

with Yemen to address the broad range of challenges facing the country. The 

Friends of Yemen will seek to identify priority immediate and long-term actions for 

the Yemeni Government to take, through two working groups focusing specifically 

on (1) economy and governance and (2) justice and the rule of law. The Government 

of Yemen and the group of Friends will discuss ways and means of implementing 

Yemen’s National Reform Agenda, including through better donor coordination on 

the ground. 

Neither the London meeting, nor the subsequent Friends of Yemen process, has 

altered the U.S. approach to providing assistance to Yemen. Increased U.S. engagement with and assistance to Yemen are the result of a policy review that the administration conducted in 2009; USAID’s new stabilization strategy for Yemen, which 

will guide its programs there, predated the London meeting, as did MEPI’s comprehensive programmatic interventions. USAID is currently reviewing proposals for 

its new program, which should be implemented in the coming months. While foreign 

assistance to Yemen is increasing, it is important to note that the U.S. Government 

will not program these funds directly through the Yemeni Government. The U.S. 

Government did not make any new funding commitments at the London meeting. 

Question. Three American citizens—Sarah Shourd, Shane Bauer, and Josh 

Fattal—have been imprisoned in Iran since July 2009 for illegally entering the 

country while they were trekking in the mountains along Iran’s border with Iraq. 

They have since been charged with espionage. Separately, the Iranian regime has 

jailed other U.S. or dual nationals, including Reza Taghavi, who has been detained 

without charges since May, 2008; and Dr. Kian Tajbakhsh, who was jailed in July 

2009, in a crackdown against protesters following the June 12 elections. Meanwhile, 

the Iranian Government has provided little information on the whereabouts or wellbeing of Robert Levinson, a U.S. citizen who went missing in Iran in 2007. What 

is the status of the administration’s efforts to resolving these and other such cases, 

and what is the strategy for overcoming the obstacles that have thus far prevented 

their resolution. 

Answer. The Department of State is committed to ensuring fair and humane 

treatment for U.S. citizens detained overseas, and we stand ready to assist detained 

citizens and their families within the limits of our ability and authority in accordance with international law. 

However, in countries, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the United 

States does not have diplomatic or consular relations, the Department of State is 

limited in its ability to assist U.S. citizens who are detained or missing. 

The Swiss Government, acting through its Embassy in Tehran, serves as protecting power for U.S. interests in Iran and provides consular services to U.S. citizens detained in Iran. 

During consular visits with detained U.S. citizens, the Swiss often provide such 

items as reading material, letters from family members, food, changes of clothing, 

and toiletries. 

U.S. citizens Shane Bauer, Joshua Fattal, and Sarah Shourd were detained in 

Iran during a hiking vacation in Iraqi Kurdistan, allegedly for crossing the unmarked border with Iran on July 31, 2009. Since then, the Swiss have been granted 

consular access to the three on two occasions; the most recent visit was on October 

29. On March 9, the hikers were permitted to phone their families in the United 

States. This marks the first time in over 7 months that the families heard the voices 

of their loved ones. 

Unfortunately, during the two consular visits with the hikers, Iranian officials did 

not permit the Swiss to present, either verbally or in written form, a Privacy Act 

Waiver, which would authorize the Department to share information about their 

cases. Without a Privacy Act Waiver, the Department of State is prohibited from 

providing further details on this case. 

The Swiss have not been granted consular access to Kian Tajbakhsh or Reza 

Taghavi, who are dual Iranian-American citizens. The Iranian Government does not 

recognize dual citizenship and will not permit the Swiss to provide protective services for U.S. citizens who are dual Iranian nationals. We are in frequent contact 

with the families of both Dr. Tajbakhsh and Mr. Taghavi in the United States. 

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In the case of Robert Levinson, who disappeared during a business trip to Kish 

Island in March 2007, the United States continues to call on the Government of the 

Islamic Republic of Iran to provide any information on Mr. Levinson’s whereabouts 

and follow through on its promise to share the results of its investigation with the 

Levinson family or the Swiss Embassy in Tehran. 

In these and similar cases involving American citizens abroad, we use a variety 

of diplomatic tools to ensure that the host government understands the U.S. Government’s concern for the welfare of its citizens abroad. One such tool is to issue 

official statements; the most recent such statement was issued on March 9, 2010, 

on the third anniversary of Mr. Levinson’s disappearance. The text of the statement 

is noted below: 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Office of the Spokesman 

——————————————————————— 

For Immediate Release 

March 9, 2010 

2010/279 

STATEMENT BY PHILIP J. CROWLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS 

Case of Missing U.S. Citizen Robert Levinson 

Today marks the three-year anniversary of the disappearance of U.S. citizen Robert Levinson, who went missing in Iran during a business trip to Kish Island in 

2007. Mr. Levinson will remain a priority for the United States until he is reunited 

with his family. 

He is the father of seven children and grandfather of two—his second grandchild 

was born in his absence. The Levinson family misses him desperately and hopes he 

will be able to walk his daughter down the aisle later this year. 

In December 2007, Mrs. Levinson first met with Iranian officials who expressed 

a willingness to share information about their investigation into her husband’s disappearance with the family. We ask that Iran stand behind its commitment to provide full details about their authorities’ investigation.The United States also calls 

on Iran to resolve the cases of the five American citizens who are unjustly detained 

in Iran: Joshua Fattal, Shane Bauer, Sarah Shourd, Kian Tajbakhsh, and Reza 

Taghavi. 

We ask anyone who may have information about Mr. Levinson to contact us or 

the Levinson family via their website: www.helpboblevinson.com. 

PAKISTAN

The FY 2010 budget for Pakistan reflects a Foreign Assistance amount very close to the Kerry-Lugar Pakistan bill authorization level of $1.5 billion. An additional 

$344 million is requested in the administration’s 2010 supplemental budget request. 

Question. a. Have all FY 2009 Foreign Assistance resources for Pakistan been expended? What if any remain in what sectors? 

Answer. No, the majority of the FY 2009 supplemental funds have not yet been 

expended. However, they will all be obligated prior to the end of September 2010. 

Please see attached chart. 

Question. b. What have been the primary challenges in spending the amounts 

appropriated? 

Answer. Challenges to the effective implementation of U.S. and other donor assistance programs include: the poor security situation and presence of extremist elements in many parts of the country; Pakistan’s limited capacity to absorb and effectively use external resources; public sector corruption; suspicion of U.S. intentions 

and long-term commitment; and the possibility that the Government of Pakistan 

may take time to implement key policy reforms that will help sustain U.S. and other 

donor assistance. These challenges underscore the importance of designing programs 

that help build implementation capacity and rigorous performance monitoring, and 

of intensifying diplomatic efforts to persuade Pakistan to implement much-needed 

policy reforms. 

Question. c. Would you provide the committee the amount of FY 2010 appropriations expended to date by purpose and type of implementation mechanism, in percent of total and dollars? The implementation mechanism is intended to inform 

Congress of the manner in which the resources are channeled to implement the program—e.g., through direct programming through a U.S. contractor/local contractor, 

through a trust fund mechanism, through quasi-governmental Pakistani entity/ 

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NGO, through Pakistan Government entity Federal/Provincial/local, or other channel. 

Answer. We anticipate submitting the FY 2010 Spend Plan to Congress shortly. 

Question. d. Would you provide a similar breakdown as described above (b) of remaining resources expected to be expended in FY 2010 for Pakistan? 

Answer. Challenges faced in FY 2009 will likely remain in FY 2010. Security concerns will continue to prevent U.S. personnel from direct monitoring and evaluation 

in conflict-affected areas. We will rely on alternative mechanisms, such as monitoring and evaluation by locally employed staff (LES) and independent Pakistani 

CPA firms, as well as the use of a geographic information system. 

Most of our new implementation partners will have management capacity issues 

that will require USAID to provide institutional strengthening and collaborative 

oversight. As Pakistan’s government structures and civil service, especially in the 

FATA, KPk, and Balochistan, continue down a lengthy path of reform and capacitybuilding, we should expect their absorption capacity to be limited at first, and grow 

with time. Potential areas of institutional vulnerability include budget and procurement systems, internal control, accounting, and institutional policies. By investing 

in these areas, we are accepting the risk of loss of funds through inefficiency, theft, 

or general lack of capacity to handle large amounts of funding. 

It will also take time for the GOP to implement key policy reforms needed to accelerate transformation of the economy, and the GOP will require ongoing support 

and pressure from the international community to maintain its commitments. 

Benchmarks the GOP will need to meet by the next IMF review in August include: 

implementing the Value-Added Tax; meeting deficit targets and setting a sound 

macroeconomic framework for the next fiscal year; and adjusting energy prices and 

performance to eliminate subsidies. 

Question. e. Would you provide a prospective purposes, timetable, and implementation mechanism for the planned expenditure of the $344 million additional resources requested in the FY 2010 supplemental budget request? 

Answer. Please see attached FY 2010 supplemental budget request which describes the purposes of the funding. Resources are needed to implement our civilian 

assistance strategy and help the Government of Pakistan address urgent demands 

for improved power supply, water sanitation, income support to families affected by 

conflict, and policing. The specific timetable and implementation mechanisms will 

be set upon date and level of appropriation; however, it is our intention to fully obligate all of these resources within the near future. 

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AFGHANISTAN

The FY 2010 Foreign Assistance budget for Afghanistan is currently estimated to 

be $2.89 billion following upon $2.76 billion in FY 2009. An additional $1.77 billion 

is requested in the administration’s 2010 supplemental budget request. 

Question. a. Have all FY 2009 Foreign Assistance resources for Afghanistan been 

expended? What if any remain and in what sectors? 

Answer. The majority of the FY 2009 supplemental funds have been obligated but 

not yet expended. 

Question. b. What have been the primary challenges in spending the amounts 

appropriated? 

Answer. Challenges to the effective implementation of U.S. and other donor assistance programs include: the poor security situation and presence of insurgents in 

the south and the east. We have also been challenged by Afghanistan’s limited capacity to absorb and effectively use external resources, and our desire to attempt 

to ensure that our resources do not contribute to the level of corruption in Afghanistan. 

These challenges underscore and highlight the importance of designing programs 

that help build sustainable implementation capacity and rigorous performance monitoring to ensure meaningful oversight. 

Question. c. Would you provide the committee the amount of FY 2010 appropriations expended to date by purpose and type of implementation mechanism, in percent of total and dollars? The implementation mechanism is intended to inform 

Congress of the manner in which the resources are channeled to implement the program—e.g., through direct programming through a U.S. contractor/local contractor, 

through a trust fund mechanism, through quasi-governmental Afghan entity/NGO, 

through Afghan Government entity Federal/Provincial/local, or some other channel. 

80 

Answer. We anticipate submitting the FY 2010 Spend Plan to Congress shortly. 

Question. d. Would you provide a similar breakdown as described above (b) of remaining resources expected to be expended in FY 2010 for Afghanistan? 

Answer. Challenges faced in FY 2009 will likely remain in FY 2010. As our military clears additional areas of Afghanistan, as we transition to hold-build operations, and our capacity-building begins to take hold, we expect to encounter fewer 

challenges to dispersing funds. Security and other concerns will, however, continue 

to make it difficult or constrain U.S. personnel from direct monitoring and evaluation of some of our programs and projects in conflict-affected areas. We will rely on 

alternative mechanisms, such as monitoring and evaluation by locally employed 

staff (LES) as well as the use of a geographic information system. For more information, please refer to our FY 2010 Spend Plan that will provide more details. 

Question. e. Would you provide the prospective purposes, a timetable, and the 

respective implementation mechanism for the requested $1.77 billion in additional 

resources requested in the FY 2010 supplemental budget request? 

Answer. Please see attached FY 2010 supplemental budget request, which describes the purposes of the funding. Resources are needed urgently. The specific 

timetable and implementation mechanisms will be set upon date and level of appropriation; however, it is our intention to fully obligate all of these resources within 

the very near future. 

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AGRICULTURE IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

Question. In an attempt to accelerate development programming in the prime economic sector of agriculture, the administration has sought to employ multiple agencies, especially the U.S. Department of Agriculture, through additional deployment 

of personnel and resources generally associated with the U.S. Agency for International Development. 

Please provide the committee with a description of the activities that will be carried out in Afghanistan and Pakistan as part of an agricultural strategy. Include 

data on the amount of funding anticipated for each activity and identify the agency 

that will be in the lead with regard to implementation. 

Answer. In Afghanistan, the U.S. Government’s (USG’s) top reconstruction priority is to restore Afghanistan’s once vibrant agriculture sector. To that end, the 

USG has developed an Agricultural Assistance Strategy for Afghanistan with two 

goals: (1) increase agricultural-sector jobs and incomes and (2) increase confidence 

of Afghans in their government. Achieving this requires a whole-of-government approach and drawing upon the assets and capabilities of multiple departments and 

agencies. 

Activities that USAID will carry out in Afghanistan as part of the agricultural 

strategy will focus on the following objectives: 

FY 2010 base 

Programmatic Focus ($Millions) 

Agricultural development fund (ag credit) ........................................................... $50 

Support for ag university, research, and extension ............................................ 20 

Regionally focused agricultural development programs (southeast and southwest at $20 million each) ................................................................................... 40 

Value chain development ...................................................................................... 5 

Watershed and irrigation management and technology transfer ...................... 4 

Program Support Costs ......................................................................................... 6 

Total ................................................................................................................. $176 

In FY 2010, USDA anticipates receiving funding from State/USAID at the following levels for each activity: 

FY 2010 base 

Programmatic Focus (Strategy Objective) ($Millions) 

Watershed management and irrigation (Obj. 1.3) ............................................... 15 

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FY 2010 base 

Programmatic Focus (Strategy Objective) ($Millions) 

Direct assistance to MAIL (Obj. 2) ....................................................................... 48 

MAIL capacity building (Obj. 2) ........................................................................... 20 

Agricultural Trilateral Activities .......................................................................... 3 

Total ................................................................................................................. $86 

In Pakistan, State/USAID is asking USDA to implement activities in accordance 

with the USDA investment strategy for Pakistan, developed in coordination with 

USAID in Islamabad and Washington, DC. The investment strategy calls for $20 

million of FY10 funding in activities as follows: 

FY 2010 base 

Programs ($Millions) 

Wheat Production Enhancement Imitative ......................................................... $1 

Control of Animal Diseases ................................................................................... 1 

Water Management ............................................................................................... 1 

U.S./Pakistan Secretariat for Strategic Initiatives on Agriculture (SSIA) ........ 1 

Cotton Productivity Enhancement Program ........................................................ 7 

APHIS/NAPHIS Collaboration .............................................................................. 3 

Agricultural Economic Information Agency ......................................................... 3 

Soil Salinity Reduction Program .......................................................................... 1 

Aquaculture Enhancement Program .................................................................... 1 

USDA Exchange Program ..................................................................................... 1 

Total Budget .................................................................................................... $20 

Question. How will the agriculture strategy be complemented by related development activities? How are these activities being coordinated in the field? 

Answer. USAID is the lead development agency in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

USDA supports USAID activities in the field and Kabul by focusing on ministryto-ministry support (in this case, building the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock in Afghanistan and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in Pakistan). In addition, USDA draws from land grant universities and its 

agencies to provide direct technical assistance. 

USDA is a member of the Agricultural Policy Working Group (AWPG) at the U.S. 

Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad. All agriculture projects and activities USDA 

undertakes in Afghanistan and Pakistan are vetted and approved by the APWG, 

which has members from USAID, State, and other U.S. Government entities working in the agricultural sector. 

Question. Please describe for the committee how function 150 funds that are 

transferred to other USG agencies will be monitored and evaluated for effectiveness. 

What agency is in charge of this M&E function? 

Answer. USDA will assume responsibility for monitoring and evaluating funds it 

receives from USAID via a 632(a) transfer agreement and place monitoring and 

evaluation staff in country. This staff will oversee projects’ fiscal operations and ensure that projects are achieving their stated goals. USDA and USAID will provide 

the committee with regular joint reports on the use of these funds. 

Question. What is the level of funding for FY 2010 and planned for FY 2011 that 

will consist of direct support to Afghanistan and Pakistan Government agencies? 

What will be the purpose of these transfers and what agencies, U.S. or otherwise, 

will be accountable for M&E? 

Answer. In Afghanistan, USDA will provide in FY10 $48 million in direct support 

to the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL). The purpose of this funding will be to support capacity-building efforts within MAIL, including the creation of a grants management unit that will enable MAIL to implement 

and manage agriculture projects. USDA will be responsible for the monitoring and 

evaluation of these funds transferred to MAIL. 

In Pakistan, none of the $20 million in funding for projects USDA will implement 

will be directly transferred to the Government of Pakistan. Funds will be used to 

implement projects in partnership between USDA and Pakistani agencies, such as 

USDA’s APHIS and Pakistan’s NAPHIS. 

Question. The budget justification indicates that funding for extractive industries 

transparency had been eliminated? What was the reasoning? Given that the State 

Department has launched an initiative on this front, how will that be funded and 

to what amount? Why is the administration not seeking funds for the EITI 

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multidonor trust fund? Are bilateral programs a better use of limited funds? If so, 

why? 

Answer. The Obama administration remains a strong supporter of the Extractive 

Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and we will continue to support this important effort into the future. The administration sees EITI as a key part of our 

broader governance promotion and anti-corruption strategies. While the administration does not request specific funding for EITI, as an EITI supporting country, we 

provide ‘‘in-kind’’ political support, promote the initiative publically, and work with 

foreign governments through our Embassies to facilitate implementation. The State 

Department participates in the EITI Board and State and USAID participation in 

the World Bank’s Multi-Donor Trust Fund Facility. All of the $4.5 million FY 2010 funding for EITI provided by Congress will go into 

the EITI Multi-Donor Trust Fund facility (MDTF) that is administered by the World 

Bank and overseen by a Management Committee which includes State and USAID 

representation. In FY 2008 and FY 2009 Congress provided at total of $6 million 

in funding for the MDTF. State and USAID recently attended the annual meetings 

for the EITI and helped approve the authority to disburse MDTF resources to civil 

society groups in EITI countries to help ensure that actors outside of government 

and the extractive industry are able to play an active role in the EITI process. 

EITI is only one of the extractive sector governance efforts that the administration supports. As a complement to multilateral efforts like EITI, our embassies and 

USAID missions overseas regularly engage with host countries on broad governance 

and transparency promotion efforts including USG efforts to address rule of law and 

governance reforms, increase public sector capacity, and strengthen independent 

media and civil society checks and balances. 

The Department’s new Energy Governance and Capacity Initiative (EGCI) seeks 

to leverage USG expertise to provide technical support to governments of developing 

countries that are on the verge of receiving sizable financial windfalls and that demonstrate the political will to build transparent and accountable energy sector governance. EGCI will complement EITI and other reform efforts and will be tailored 

to the specific needs of individual countries. By providing USG technical assistance 

to the next generation of energy producers, we help them maximize the value, efficiency, and development potential of energy production and revenue flows. We are 

providing $1.4 million in FY 2010 to launch this initiative. 

Question. Through the Global Health Initiative, representatives from the administration have stated that the budget should not focus on specific diseases, but on integrated programs and strengthening health care systems. Is the administration 

abandoning congressional intent of fully funding the HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis programs that was enacted in 2008? 

Answer. No. The Global Health Initiative (GHI) is an umbrella of management, 

integration, and coordination among existing U.S. Government health programs. 

PEPFAR is the cornerstone of the GHI, and PEPFAR and other disease-specific programs will be part of the GHI but remain distinct, consistent with their legislative 

authorizations. At the same time, the unified whole-of-government approach across 

health issues under the GHI will enable these disease-specific programs to better 

achieve their goals and improve the health of people living with HIV, tuberculosis, 

and malaria. The administration looks forward to continuing to engage and consult 

with Congress on the strategy and implementation of the GHI to ensure maximization of global health resources consistent with congressional intent. 

Question. During the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic the Federal Government 

learned a lot of lessons about emergency preparedness in terms of everything from 

monitoring and evaluation to the distribution of vaccines. What role do you think 

the State Department should play in addressing the shortcomings found, and is adequate resources dedicated to ensure that we are better prepared for future 

pandemics? 

Answer. The State Department plays two major roles in pandemic preparedness: 

coordinating the USG international efforts to combat animal and pandemic influenza and engaging political leadership in affected and donor nations through bilateral interactions and multilateral forums. Our engagement with international 

partners works to strengthen pandemic preparedness and response by promoting 

transparent efforts to share information and best practices. Our work also aims to 

maintain international commitment to this important topic as there is a potential 

for complacency resulting from the mild H1N1 pandemic. Many of these activities 

are undertaken under the U.S. initiated International Partnership on Avian and 

Pandemic Influenza which includes a yearly ministerial meeting (see below) and a 

‘‘Core Group’’ chaired by the Department’s Special Representative for Avian and 

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Pandemic Influenza (Dr. Kerri-Ann Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, 

Environment and Science). In response to the 2009–H1N1 outbreak, the Department initiated and continues to host a series of coordinating meetings with the 

2009–H1N1 vaccine donor countries, the World Health Organization (WHO), United 

Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the Office of the U.N. System Influenza 

Coordinator (UNSIC). 

In collaboration with USDA, USAID, and HHS/CDC, the Department is working 

closely with the WHO, UNSIC, the Government of Vietnam, and the European Commission in preparing for the International Ministerial Conference on Animal and 

Pandemic Influenza (IMCAPI), scheduled for April 19–21, 2010, in Hanoi, Vietnam. 

IMCAPI will seek to ensure continued action by governments, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to build 

long-term capacity to control the spread of animal influenza and prepare for the 

next influenza pandemic. This is an essential step for ongoing preparedness. 

The Department of State is contributing to the HHS led interagency 2009–H1N1 

After Action Review. We will also be playing a leading role in international efforts 

to assess the response to the H1N1 pandemic by WHO, other international bodies, 

and donor countries. The Department is committed to ensuring that governments 

and international and regional organizations continue to regard preventing and responding to outbreaks of H5N1 in poultry and other animals, as well as preparing 

for a potentially catastrophic human pandemic, as priorities of the highest order. 

These goals remain a key U.S. foreign policy objective in our efforts to strengthen 

international security. 

To further the Department’s efforts to combat pandemic influenza, we have allo- cated $450,000 to host a series of multilateral workshops aimed at working toward 

a better understanding of how planning for avian influenza affected the response 

to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and how future pandemic planning can be improved. 

We recently regularized pandemic and influenza staffing by establishing four permanent direct hire positions with a focus on global pandemic preparedness. USAID 

mobilized assistance during the H1N1 pandemic through its Humanitarian Pandemic Preparedness (H2P) initiative, taking measures to identify populations most 

at risk, train staff and volunteers, and get out messages to reduce disease spread. 

USAID is also providing technical and operational support to the WHO’s efforts to 

provide vaccine to developing countries. USAID will continue providing support to 

ensure provision of timely data from countries across Africa, Latin America, the 

Middle East, and Asia to identify vulnerable populations; strengthen surveillance 

and laboratory capacities for rapid H1N1 diagnosis in 26 countries (16 in Africa and 

10 in South America); support sample transport in 17 countries to regional laboratories; inform local pandemic planning; and help ensure post-marketing surveillance 

of vaccination efforts. 

Question. Since the disaster in Haiti, substantial attention has been given the 

Haitian orphans. In addition to the situation in Haiti, it is estimated that 132 million children are orphaned worldwide due to HIV and other illnesses, conflict, natural disasters, severe poverty, and abandonment. 

As part of your confirmation last year, I asked you about the administration’s 

commitment to the plight of orphans. You stated the orphans and vulnerable children will remain a high priority for the Obama administration and that six agencies 

were working in this area. You also said that an interagency task force was updating and refining the strategy toward orphans in light of the worldwide economic crisis that was making more children vulnerable. What conclusions did the interagency 

group come to in addressing the needs of this population? What resources has the 

administration committed? 

Answer. As noted in the Third Annual Report to Congress on Public Law 109– 

95, the interagency group concluded that the strategic priorities for FY 2010 and 

beyond are to collaborate across U.S. Government agencies to: (a) increase support 

for child welfare and child protection system strengthening; (b) increase support for 

the economic strengthening of poor households to keep families intact; (c) improve 

assistance to children living outside of family care; and (d) improve the monitoring 

and evaluation of these, and other, common priorities. In FY 2008, the latest year 

for which final figures have been compiled, seven USG agencies provided over $5 

billion in assistance to highly vulnerable children and their families. 

Question. Today’s papers were full of stories regarding the expense of the new 

Embassy in London. The Department has assured us in the past that the costs for 

the new building would be covered by the sale of the present buildings in Grosvenor 

Square. 

Please provide a breakdown of the costs of the new Embassy in London including 

land acquisition, site preparation, and anticipated construction costs. Please demVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:32 Jan 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\111TH CONGRESS\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINT
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onstrate how these costs will be offset based on sales of USG properties in London 

by listing the final amounts received for each property and who the buyer was. It 

is my understanding that a dispute still exists with the British Government regarding a 17 percent value added tax (VAT) charge that the United States is refusing 

to pay—what is the status of that negotiation. Last, how does the cost of this building compare with our Embassy in Baghdad? 

Answer. In 2006, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) developed 

a Long-Range Facilities Plan (LRFP) that analyzed several multiyear plans to renovate the existing London Chancery and compared those options against 

constructing a new embassy compound, hereafter referred to as the New London 

Embassy (NLE). 

OBO determined the cost of a complete renovation of the current chancery would 

be about $600 million and would take about 7 years; however, even a renovated current chancery would still not meet all security standards, significantly due to a lack 

of required setback that cannot be remedied. In addition, OBO did not have funding 

for this option. 

The OBO analysis concluded an NLE is the only feasible alternative to meet U.S. 

diplomatic requirements and provide a secure, safe, modern, and functional embassy 

in London. The LRFP recommended and the Department implemented a self-financing approach using revenue from the sale of Department properties in London to 

fund an NLE. 

It is important to note that the cost of the property plays a large part in project 

costs as well as local construction costs. Independent sources routinely place London 

as the top second or third most expensive real estate market in the world. Office 

rents and housing prices, regardless of the state of economy, are high—which results in high residual land values. This, combined with a dearth of sites for development plus normally high demand for land, keeps prices at a premium. 

The following provides a breakdown of the costs of the self-financed NLE project. 

Some of these costs are estimated and may vary depending on the exchange rate. 

New London Embassy Expenditures 

Real Estate Transaction and Chancery Lease Back Costs a ............... $183,000,000 

Acquire Nine Elms Site b ....................................................................... 184,000,000 

Construction Costs c ............................................................................... 737,000,000 

Value Added Tax (VAT) (Construction) ............................................... 46,000,000 

Total ................................................................................................. $1,150,000,000 

a includes leaseback costs of $165 million and brokerage fees. 

b includes VAT. 

c includes construction and construction related costs (planning, design, supervision, security 

management). 

Sales Proceeds 

Property and Purchaser Income 

Navy Annex (sold)—Grosvenor Square Limited, a private consortium led by entrepreneur Richard Caring ....................................... $494,000,000 

Chancery* (under contract)—Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment 

Company (owned by Qatar Investment Authority) ......................... 520,000,000 

MSGQ* (to be sold)—The MSGQ will be sold at a later date ............ 10,000,000 

Chancery Leaseback Rent Refund* ...................................................... 144,000,000 

Total ................................................................................................. $1,168,000,000 

*Estimated; based on projected 2012 exchange rates. 

As noted above, total expenditures for the NLE and site are estimated at 

$1,150,000,000 and the total estimated income from sales proceeds is 

$1,168,000,000, resulting in an estimated net gain for the USG of $18,000,000. 

The Department continues to engage the British Government concerning the relief 

of all taxes associated with the acquisition and construction of the NLE. In December 2008, the Department requested an exoneration (whether through an exemption 

or reimbursement) of VAT applicable to the purchase of the new embassy site, as 

well as on the locally acquired materials and services needed to construct the facility. In May 2009, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) informed the Embassy that Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) was unable to accommodate this request. We have, however, successfully obtained, for the first time in the U.K., an 

exemption from the imposition of the stamp tax associated with this project. Additionally, because the land acquisition closed prior to December 31, 2009, VAT was 

assessed at a 15 percent rate, rather than the standard 17.5 percent rate. On JanuVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:32 Jan 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\111TH CONGRESS\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINT
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ary 8, 2010, the VAT that was required for the land purchase was paid. The U.S. 

Government will continue to pursue reimbursement of the VAT on the site purchase 

as well as exoneration of VAT on construction materials and services, currently at 

a rate of 17.5 percent. 

The Baghdad New Embassy Compound, awarded in FY 2005, cost $620.2 million 

in OBO funds. In addition to OBO funds ($620.2 million), the Department used approximately $240 million of Diplomatic and Consular Program funds for follow-on 

projects. 

Question. In your testimony to the committee, you stated that, ‘‘we have too often 

relied on contractors, sometimes with little oversight’’ and that one of the intentions 

of the FY 2011 budget is to hire full-time staff in order to reduce the need for such 

contractors. 

In which fields are you intending to replace contractors with these new FTE and 

roughly how many contract positions are you seeking to eliminate? 

Does the Department have an accurate count on the number of contractors that 

are working in substantive areas, both as contractors and as employees, and what 

functions they are doing? Can you share with the committee the number and examples of the nonpersonal security work that contractors perform at the Department? 

Answer. We are now conducting the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) effort at State and USAID, one area of which focuses on developing a more balanced workforce. As part of this process, the Department is preparing guidance and criteria, based on guidance from the Office of Management and 

Budget, that will enable bureaus to examine their workforce and make determinations as to where in-sourcing may be appropriate. The guidance will direct bureaus 

to review functions on a regular basis consistent with the criteria to ensure inherently governmental and mission critical functions are performed by government employees. These reviews will also aim to ensure that other functions are performed 

with an appropriate balance of government and third party contract personnel as 

necessary to adequately manage contractor performance and retain a sufficient degree of core capabilities. 

This balanced workforce initiative will transcend all domestic Department of State 

bureaus and offices; however it is too early in our process to identify the specific 

fields in which we would replace contractors with FTE or to estimate the overall 

number of positions to be in-sourced. To provide some perspective, the Department 

currently has 22,772 domestic employees, of which approximately 8,800 are contractors. Our information regarding the type of work these contractors perform is limited to broad job categories such as information technology support and language 

services. We are currently working to develop a system to better inventory the number of service contractors by job function, as mandated by Public Law 111–17, Division C, Section 743. 

Question. Would a third term for President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia present obstacles for support of funding Plan Colombia and for the ratification of a free trade 

agreement with Colombia? In addition, how would President Uribe’s continuation in 

office affect Colombian-Venezuelan relations? 

Answer. On February 26, Colombia’s Constitutional Court ruled 7–2 that the constitutional amendment process to allow President Alvaro Uribe to run for a third 

term could not legally go forward. As we have said consistently, this was an issue 

for the Colombian people and Colombian institutions to decide. This democratic 

process and President Uribe’s statesmanlike response that he would abide by the 

Court’s decision show why Colombia is a vibrant and mature democracy, and a valued partner for the United States. 

Question. Despite strong support from the United States, sustained international 

participation in Haiti is vital for its recovery. It is especially important that the 

international community provide governance assistance to the Haitian people. The 

failures and corruption of past Haitian governments contributed greatly to the 

stress felt by the Haitian people before the earthquake, and the limitations of the 

current government constrain the prospects for recovery. 

These harsh realities, compounded by the significant loss of life that has weakened the government and other institutions in Haiti, compel the international community to consider creative measures. Because of the devastation, Haiti’s condition 

approximates that of a failed state. If the U.N. plays an increased security and recovery role, I believe Haitians will more quickly gather their bearings and begin to 

rebuild their lives and their country. 

Going forward the relationship between the United Nations and the Haitian Government should be a consensual, cooperative arrangement that preserves Haitian 

98 

participation in recovery decisions, while ensuring that the resources and expertise 

of the international community are brought to bear on the daily problems of Haiti. 

In this regard, should we consider an enhanced role for the United Nations in the 

daily operations of the Haitian Government until the country is stable and less dislocated? This would include the provision of food and shelter, reconstruction activities, budgetary affairs, security, and other aspects of governance vital to the Haitian 

people. The United Nations has the credibility and capacity to perform this role. 

Answer. The undertaking to assist Haiti in recovery and rebuilding is massive; 

it will require the Government of Haiti to lead a well-coordinated, well-funded effort 

assisted by the United States, the United Nations, other nations, international organizations, the Haitian diaspora, and nongovernmental organizations. Actors from 

across the U.N. system provided assistance to the government and people of Haiti 

long before the tragic January 12 earthquake, and we expect that they will continue 

their work, in close partnership with the Government of Haiti, for a long time to 

come. This includes not only efforts in the security sphere—where the MINUSTAH 

peacekeeping mission has bolstered and helped to train the Haitian National Police—but also the U.N.’s work on relief, recovery, and reconstruction. 

The relationship between the U.N. and the Haitian Government has been and 

should be a consensual, cooperative arrangement, with the U.N. and other international actors recognizing the Haitian Government’s central role and authority. 

The Haitian Government’s primacy in the relief effort is critical to gaining the trust 

and support of the Haitian people and diaspora. It is important to underscore that 

there has been consistent agreement among major international donors for our efforts to be conducted ‘‘in cooperation with and support of’’ the Haitian Government. 

Demonstrating its commitment, the U.N. will cohost and provide the venue for the 

‘‘International Donors’ Conference Towards a New Future for Haiti’’ on March 31. 

The donors’ conference, cohosted by the U.N. with the United States, in cooperation 

with the Government of Haiti, and with the support of Brazil, Canada, the European Union, France, and Spain, will seek to mobilize international support for the 

development needs of Haiti to begin to lay the foundation for Haiti’s long-term recovery. At the donors’ conference, Haiti will present its vision for its future and how 

international support can assist. Donor countries, international organizations, and 

other partners will have an opportunity to pledge resources, to coordinate in support 

of Haiti’s long-term recovery, and to commit to a sustained effort to support Haiti. 

Question. a. How does the administration plan to engage with recently elected 

President Yanukovych and what has been your approach to Crimea, the status of 

which has been an ongoing source of tension within Ukraine? 

b. What is the status of economic development and confidence building projects 

in Crimea, including exchange programs with the United States and the opening of 

a U.S. presence post, which was a component of the 2008 U.S.-Ukraine Charter on 

Strategic Partnership? 

Answer a. The administration looks forward to deepening our strategic partnership with Ukraine in collaboration with President Yanukovych, who was elected in 

a vote that international and domestic observers assessed as essentially free and 

fair. President Yanukovych himself has spoken publicly about implementing this 

strategic partnership. The United States fully supports Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, and recognizes no spheres of influence in the region. A strong and independent Ukraine contributes to the security and prosperity 

of Europe. 

The United States bases its friendship with Ukraine on the principles of the U.S.- 

Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership of December 2008. In addition to our support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, these principles include the belief that democracy is the guarantor of prosperity and freedom, 

and the importance of defense and security cooperation. To implement the charter, 

the United States and Ukraine established the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership 

Commission in July 2009. The commission’s inaugural meeting took place last 

December in Washington; we look forward to a next session in Kyiv after the new 

government is in place. 

We are conducting high-level engagement with the new leadership to pursue U.S. 

priorities, including critical economic and energy sector reform, as well as Ukrainian 

cooperation on nonproliferation issues in the leadup to the Nuclear Security summit 

in Washington in April. President Obama raised all these issues with then-President-elect Yanukovych during a February 11 telephone call. National Security Advisor General Jones discussed these priorities further with President Yanukovych at 

the February 25 inauguration in Kyiv. President Yanukovych has responded positively to our contacts, indicating that he intends to pursue a strong relationship 

with the West, and that he will attend the Nuclear Security summit. 

99 

In Crimea, we will continue our outreach efforts to strengthen the region’s further 

integration with the rest of Ukraine, and to promote mutual understanding between 

the United States and Crimea. Ambassador Tefft will visit Crimea the week of 

March 8. The United States will continue its assistance efforts to support the region’s development and contributing to stronger linkages between Crimea, other 

parts of Ukraine, and Europe. 

Answer b. The U.S. mission in Kyiv is actively leading outreach efforts aimed at 

all inhabitants of Crimea, including youth and Tatar audiences. We have conducted 

exchanges, media outreach, and cultural diplomacy in an effort to promote mutual 

understanding of U.S. society and values, and strengthen academia, civil society, 

and local government capacity. In addition, Embassy Kyiv recently established centers in Simferopol and Sevastopol to advise Crimean youth about U.S. educational 

opportunities. We have also established low-cost Internet centers at the main public 

library in Simferopol and elsewhere in Crimea, as well as throughout Ukraine. Onetime assistance funding of $850,000 from a Georgia war-related supplemental has 

permitted this increased public diplomacy spending in Crimea during FY09 and 

FY10. 

In recognition of the region’s importance, the U.S. significantly expanded its aid for 2009 and 2010 to Crimea. We provided $27.8 million in assistance to Crimea in 

FY 2008–09, $19. 5 million of which was part of an FY08 supplemental. USAID and 

other programs focus on promoting economic development, health, democracy in Crimea. The U.S. mission in Kyiv works with businesses, local governments, and civil 

society to provide tangible economic and social gains, including improvements in the 

delivery of key economic and public health services. Aid to improve the business and 

investment environment will help diversify the Crimean economy. Health programs 

will help control tuberculosis. Media assistance will strengthen the reach and effectiveness of the region’s independent media, providing meaningful alternatives to 

existing sources. Governance initiatives will build leadership skills in key constituencies, including Crimean Tatar youth. Programs to improve Ukraine’s energy security support modernization of the municipal heating network and assist municipalities with energy planning and energy efficiency strategies. 

The Obama administration is reviewing plans on opening new diplomatic posts 

abroad, including one in the Crimean capital of Simferopol, one of the elements of 

the December 2008 U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership. Further review 

by both the Department and Ukrainian authorities would be necessary before such 

a presence post can be established. Such a post would expand exchanges and promote mutual understanding between the United States and Crimea. 

Question. The State Department is asking for authority to retain and spend all 

passport and consular fees, providing a new stream of funding for the Department 

outside of the regular appropriations process. 

• For FY 2011, what is the estimate of the amount of fees that would be received? 

How much currently goes to the U.S. Treasury, and how much would go to the 

Department of State? • If this permanent authority is provided by the Congress, under the Department’s suggested language, what role does the Congress have in guiding the use 

of these fees? Does usage of the funds require an appropriation, or only a notification and a year-end report? 

Answer. Currently, the Department of State has authority to retain certain consular fees, including the Machine Readable Visa and Border Crossing Card fees, the 

border security surcharge on passport and immigrant visa applications, the expedited passport fee, the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative surcharge on passport 

applications, the diversity visa lottery fee, the fee for an affidavit of support, and 

the fee to process requests from participants in the Department’s Exchange Visitor 

Program for a waiver of the 2-year home-residence requirement. Other consular fees 

must be deposited in the general fund of the Treasury and may not be retained by 

the Department of State. Consular fees are based on the cost of providing consular 

services to the public, and retaining the fees will allow us to offset the expenses 

associated with these services. These expenses include the purchase of supplies and 

equipment, and the salary of personnel. 

Under the consular fee proposal in the President’s FY 2011 budget request, the 

Department would be able to retain any revenues from passport and other consular 

fees that are currently deposited in the Treasury, including the passport application 

fee, the passport execution fee, immigrant visa application fees, and fees for other 

consular services including American Citizen Services that are provided primarily 

overseas. 

Currently, the Department expends significant appropriated resources to support 

these activities because the associated fees for these services are deposited in the 

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Treasury. The total projected revenue for FY 2011 under the proposed authority is 

approximately $782 million. Planned use of the retained fee revenue would be included in the Department’s annual financial plans which are submitted to the Congress soon after the appropriations legislation for each fiscal year is signed into law. 

Question. During President Obama’s recent State of the Union Address, the President stated that it would be the administration’s goal of doubling American exports 

over the next 5 years under the ‘‘National Export Initiative.’’ The goal of increasing 

U.S. exports is one that I applaud and support. Multiple governmental agencies including the Department of State as well as the Department of Commerce, the 

United States Trade Representative, and others have been designated to be involved 

in this effort. Yet, I struggle to see evidence of the National Export Initiative reflected in this proposed budget of the Department of State. For example, the U.S. 

Trade and Development Agency budget increases at a rate below the average increase for non-Frontline State spending. This is an agency whose primary purpose 

is to promote U.S. exports and reports that every dollar is spent by the agency results in $40 in U.S. exports. 

• Please explain how the National Export Initiative is reflected in this budget and 

how it might be reflected in future budgets. 

Answer. The National Export Initiative (NEI) is an interagency effort coordinated 

by the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC) led by the Commerce 

Department. We support the administration’s request for increases in FY 2011 

budget requests for the Commerce Department and other TPCC agencies to support 

export promotion efforts. In the USAID budget, $10 million has been allocated to 

the Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade Bureau for this initiative. These foreign assistance funds will complement U.S. commercial diplomacy by helping our 

partners in key developing country markets to streamline customs and other import 

administration procedures, thereby lowering the cost of U.S. products to customers 

in those markets. 

State Department officers work in a close partnership with their Commerce 

Department colleagues, particularly in our embassies and consulates abroad where 

Commercial Service officers are part of our country teams. Our embassies and consulates also work to leverage the resources and support for exporters offered by the 

Export-Import Bank (ExIm), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the 

Small Business Administration and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency. 

I have sent a message to all U.S. Ambassadors to highlight the importance of 

commercial diplomacy in their support for U.S. business abroad. We are working 

closely with our TPCC colleagues to strengthen the advocacy process to ensure that 

high-level U.S. Government officials are prepared to discuss commercial issues with 

foreign government officials. We are working with the Commerce Department in 

support of foreign trade missions and encouraging our Chiefs of Mission to engage 

with the U.S. business community when they are in the United States to encourage 

interest in markets abroad. 

Much of what the State Department does to advocate for business interests 

abroad does not require additional resources at this time. This could change given 

the transitional nature of the domestic and global marketplace and scope of this initiative in the future. Our U.S. embassy and consulate staffs offer U.S. exporters 

assistance every day by providing country-specific expertise on markets and potential customers. Embassy officers assist in investment and commercial disputes and 

provide U.S. firms with critical insight into local political and judicial systems in 

foreign countries. We also work closely with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and other agencies to enforce international trade rules to help level the playing 

field for U.S. companies. We also support efforts to negotiate new balanced trade 

agreements that improve market access for U.S. manufacturing, agricultural and 

services exports. 

Question. During your testimony, you discussed the increased role of the ExportImport Bank (ExIm Bank) in this initiative. As Exim Bank is an independent, selfsustaining executive agency which only receives funds from the 150 Account for expenses of the Inspector General of Exim Bank, how will the Department of State 

increase Exim Bank’s effectiveness in financing and increasing U.S. exports? 

Answer. The National Export Initiative is an interagency effort, and the Department of State and other agencies of the USG, are working to increase U.S. exports. 

As we proceed to reach out to the U.S. business community, in Washington and 

through our embassies overseas, we are highlighting and promoting ExIm’s programs more than ever. In fact, the State Department’s Bureau of Economic, Energy 

and Business Affairs will be hosting an Internet seminar on ExIm Bank programs 

in March for embassy officers worldwide. 

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Question. Given the focus of the National Export Initiative, how is the Department of State working to minimize the impact on U.S. exports and job loss due to 

the ongoing cotton dispute with Brazil? 

Answer. The administration continues to prefer a resolution to the cotton dispute 

that does not include Brazil resorting to countermeasures. We are disappointed to 

learn that Brazil’s authorities decided to proceed with countermeasures against U.S. 

trade in this dispute. Working closely with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, we are consulting with Congress and American stakeholders, and we plan to 

continue to engage Brazil on this issue. 

ORGANIZING FOR CIVILIAN CRISIS RESPONSE

While you and Secretary Gates have indicated, side by side, the importance of 

right-sizing the foreign assistance budget for our own national security, you have 

both also indicated the necessity to organize our civilian agencies for this role in 

the 21st century. As you well know, I have long supported such efforts, to include 

strengthening the ability of civilian agencies to deploy personnel as effective partners to our troops and independently where necessary. I am pleased to see that the 

Civilian Stabilization Initiative remains a priority in the budget and hope to see it 

organized and led with the resources and personnel appropriate to this important 

security-related response capacity. 

While the Department of Defense has embraced the clear necessity to organize for 

the deployment of civilians in crisis areas around the world through policy decisions 

(3000.5) and reorganization (creation of the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce– 

CEW), it appears the State Department is not moving with the same urgency or 

commitment. 

Question. Why has the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) lacked priority and emphasis within the administration in the face of growing and persistent requirements for civilians from State, 

USAID, and other civilian agencies to deploy to places determined to be of the highest priority by the President such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and perhaps 

places such as Haiti or even Yemen in the future? 

Answer. Robust funding for S/CRS and further development and employment of 

the CRC and other tools continues to be a priority for me, for the Department as 

a whole, and for the President. Although it is true that S/CRS is not leading our 

civilian response efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan, its tools and personnel 

have been involved in our efforts in all three places, particularly in Afghanistan. 

Currently, S/CRS has approximately 20 members of the Civilian Response Corps 

and S/CRS staff serving in Afghanistan and who are central to our efforts at civilmilitary planning, support for the U.N., and strategic communications. S/CRS has 

assisted in our Haiti effort and is just finishing a civilian-led assessment and planning process for our Embassy and USAID mission in Sana’a. 

In the coming months, as S/CRS continues to grow, my senior staff and I expect 

that Ambassador Herbst and his team will take on a more central coordinating and 

operating role in our most important conflict prevention and conflict response challenges. 

Question. What are your intentions with regard to matching the commitment you 

made with Secretary Gates to lead our lead civilian foreign policy agency to be an 

effective locus of organization for deployment of civilians? Is it possible to innovate 

upon S/CRS advances made to date in order to organize and coordinate for reconstruction and stabilization missions determined by the President to be in our interests? 

Answer. I remain fully committed to ensuring that the State Department, along 

with USAID, has the necessary civilian capacity effectively to respond to the nation’s most important national security challenges. S/CRS has made very significant 

strides already, and, in the past few months has achieved a new level of readiness 

and maturity. In connection with the QDDR process this year, I am confident that 

we will build on S/CRS’s successes and make further advances to create a larger 

and even more effective State, USAID and whole-of-government civilian response 

capability. 

Question. How will you ensure the hard-fought progress made through S/CRS to 

date is not lost and that the utility of its tools, such as a planning capacity, its innovation and coordination across agencies, its collaboration with DOD, as well as critical learned lessons and resident knowledge are collected and maintained as civilians return from difficult assignments in crisis zones? 

102 

Answer. S/CRS is continuing to develop a database of best practices by capturing 

lessons learned from reconstruction and stabilization operations and incorporating 

them in doctrine, training, and future operations. After Action Reviews (AARs) of 

individual engagements are a primary means of distilling lessons and best practices. 

Evaluations are conducted while operations are ongoing, and final AARs are drafted 

after consulting with a wide range of interagency experts and external partners in 

both face-to-face meetings and online surveys. Such AARs are studied to glean best 

practices and lessons learned. 

S/CRS is working closely with USAID, DOD, and the Center for Complex Operations at the National Defense University in the establishment of a ‘‘Whole-ofGovernment Lessons Learned Hub.’’ With S/CRS as the policy lead, an integrated 

civilian-military, multiagency pilot project is underway on Afghanistan and Iraq 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams that will institutionalize a standing interagency 

lessons-learned capacity. This interagency collaboration includes participating civilian agencies (DOS, USAID, USDA, and DOJ) as well as the Defense Department 

and a number of DOD entities. In managing the PRT lessons-learned project, the 

CCO has partnered with USIP and the Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training to interview returning civilian PRT members, using an interagency-agreed questionnaire. An interservice team is interviewing military personnel using the same 

materials. We are looking to create direct links to the field for rapid implementation 

of best practices. 

Question. Resources are an essential element of the Civilian Stabilization Initiative and should be properly located to achieve their purpose. Although I am pleased 

to see my persistent call for a Crisis Response Fund to be housed at State rather 

than relying on DOD section 1207 funds for the same purpose I wonder how State 

has organized to continue with the proper use of such funds. Why does USAID appear to have a parallel account? Is it for Stabilization and Reconstruction purposes? 

Answer. We welcome your support for the proposed FY 2011 Complex Crisis Fund 

(CCF), which we see as the natural successor to the 1207 funding program. While 

specific decisions will have to wait for the conclusion of the legislative process, 

USAID, S/CRS, and F are currently consulting on the best way to organize to implement the CCF, building on the expertise S/CRS has developed in managing the 1207 

program. While the FY 2010 CCF was appropriated to USAID, we see this as being 

used for purposes similar to 1207, or for conflict prevention and conflict response 

activities, which is also how we envision the FY 2011 CCF. 

Question. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and its agency, USAID, responded as they have done so well over the years in cooperation with the Department of Defense and others in the immediate humanitarian response following the 

earthquake. As the humanitarian crisis settles the U.S. must decide on the path 

ahead for our engagement which I have noted earlier should encourage an international effort. 

• Why was the designated Deputy Assistant Secretary within the PRM Bureau 

for the Haiti Task Force not seconded to S/CRS in order to directly employ the 

resident S/CRS planning and coordination tools including the engagement of the 

nascent Civilian Response Corps (CRC) mechanism? 

Answer. The 12 January earthquake in Haiti came on the heels of a 9-month-long 

process to review the USG’s policy and assistance on Haiti lead by my Counselor 

and Chief of Staff Cheryl Mills. The selection of Deputy Assistant Secretary Reuben 

Brigety of the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, to lead this process 

under Mills allowed us to bridge steady state with crisis response planning, particularly given DAS Brigety’s background linking national security, humanitarian affairs, human rights, and foreign assistance reform. S/CRS reached into its staff as 

well as Active and Stand-by members of the Civilian Response Corps to provide the 

majority of the staffing for Task Force IV, which had the lead on this effort. In addition, S/CRSs signature whole-of-government planning process and coordination tools 

were enlisted in the effort, which within days had successfully convened over 150 

experts from 45 federal offices and agencies to lend their expertise to a complex and 

rapidly evolving planning environment. In the space of 3 weeks, Task Force IV produced a compendium of planning products from situation analysis and future assessment needs to policy issues and a supplemental budget justification in support of 

the USG’s strategy for recovery and reconstruction in Haiti from immediate transitory measures to a 5-year horizon. 

Question. Was there a conscious decision to bypass S/CRS and the years of development we in Congress have encouraged since 2003? If so, why? 

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Answer. USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah was designated the unified Haiti disaster coordinator by the President since the earthquake relief was so clearly a 

humanitarian task for which rapid food, medical, and search and rescue assistance 

was needed. USAID’s Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance 

has the mandate to provide humanitarian assistance in natural disasters, and has 

extensive experience in rapidly and effectively coordinating with international and 

nongovernmental humanitarian assistance providers and other USG agencies, including the U.S. military in such situations. 

S/CRS was and continues to be important as we manage our response to this tragedy, primarily by supporting our forward planning efforts and by coordinating some 

of the interagency contributions to the effort. 

Question. How will the State Department continue to build upon the resources 

dedicated to building an effective civilian response capacity in the Crisis Response 

Corps (CRC), as well as the tools to help in the planning, training, and coordination 

of all civilian agencies providing personnel for deployment? 

Answer. I am confident the QDDR process will point the way forward for the further development of the function pioneered and practiced by S/CRS and funded by 

the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI). As part of the QDDR process we are looking at everything—filling all the gaps in our ability to respond to complex challenges, possible new authorities needed, resource gaps, and the necessary scope and 

size of our ‘‘tools.’’ One thing is for sure; continued building of our response capacity 

will require continued funding, in 2011, 2012, and beyond. I would also ask you to 

help us recruit, train, and employ a robust and effective force with flexible hiring 

authority, an expansion of the definition of personnel able to serve in the CRC, and 

the ability to offer dual compensation to USG retirees who want to come back and 

contribute to this effort without losing their pension. 

Question. The administration’s CSI request includes $69.6 million for CRC deployments. The State Department FY 2011 Congressional Budget Justification indicates 

that there is a ‘‘growing demand for CRC [deployments] in sub-Saharan Africa and 

South Central Asia,’’ and that the Secretary has already committed one such deployment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

• Are deployments to these areas to be made in FY 2010 or FY 2011? Specifically, 

how many and what size deployments does that administration contemplate for 

the remainder of FY 2010 and for FY 2011? • How many members of the CRC are currently deployed? Where are they deployed, and what functions are they serving? What contribution have S/CRS 

and the CRC made to the civilian surge in Afghanistan? What contribution are 

they making in response to the Haiti earthquake? 

Answer. The demand for CRC deployments continues to grow as we progress in 

fully staffing the CRC and the capability becomes more widely known throughout 

the government. The deployments to sub-Saharan Africa and South Central Asia are 

in FY 2010 but we expect them to continue into FY 2011. Unfortunately, due to the 

demand driven nature of the work, we can only provide specific numbers of CRC 

that we anticipate deploying for the remainder of FY 2010. CRC deployments scheduled for the next 3–6 months include: 10–15 CRC to Sudan; 5 to the DRC; 20-plus 

to Afghanistan; and a handful to a number of other countries. We anticipate that 

demand will continue to grow for CRC deployments in FY 2011. 

Currently, 25 CRC are deployed. In addition, 15 S/CRS staff are deployed to countries including Yemen and Kyrgyzstan. Afghanistan is the largest deployment with 

13 CRC members currently supporting joint civilian-military planning efforts, strategic communications, and corrections issues. In addition, there is one CRC member 

embedded with CENTCOM to support joint planning efforts in Afghanistan. One 

CRC–S Standby member is deployed to Chad working with MINURCAT on upcoming elections and one CRC–A member is in Sudan. In the DRC, there are two CRC 

members who were part of a larger CRC team conducting assessments in a variety 

of areas—including gender based violence, SSR, minerals trade—at the request of 

Embassy Kinshasa. In Pakistan, one CRC member is strengthening strategic communications and outreach efforts of the Embassy. At SOUTHCOM, S/CRS has one 

CRC Standby member from the Department of Commerce working on reconstruction 

and stabilization issues in Haiti. In Haiti itself, the CRC has deployed five members 

to conduct a variety of different missions related to the post-earthquake reconstruction and stabilization. In Sri Lanka, one CRC member is supporting the ongoing 

DDR activities in country. 

Question. I have long sought to strengthen the institutional Inspector General offices and find it is especially important given the vast resources being dedicated to 

U.S. efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Effective institutional oversight is 

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the currency for greater confidence from Congress in our expenditures overseas. 

While Special Inspectors General were established in Afghanistan and Iraq and 

were granted authorities, such as the hiring of annuitants and retirees, similarly 

helpful authorities and significant resources were not provided for the oversight offices within State and USAID. 

• (a) It is not a matter of resources alone however. Please explain why our institutional Inspector General offices are not given the authorities and resources 

deemed essential to the Special IG entities? 

Answer (a). OIG Response: Resources—For FY 2011, the President’s budget request for State OIG ($63 million) will not substantially inhibit our audits, inspections, or investigations. In accordance with the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 

amended, the Department fulfilled its obligation to apprise Congress of the OIG 

funding request to the Department (FY 2011 CBJ, Vol. 1). OIG’s original FY 2011 

request, $76 million, was based on our current and projected requirements. In FY 

2010, OIG’s base funding ($54 million), plus all supplemental funding available is 

$68.9 million. OIG appreciates Department and Congressional interest in our 

resources and the trust placed in OIG by both to undertake a swift but prudent 

expansion of our oversight portfolio. 

Authorities—In 2008, the State Department delegated OIG its statutory authority 

to hire personal services contractors (PSCs) for international work. 

In 2009, OIG responded to SFRC questions on needed OIG authorities, which 

were undertaken by the committee, specifically for: 

(1) Expansion of PSC authority to include domestic authority, and 

(2) New Civil Service and Foreign Service annuitant hiring authorities, which 

now are being coordinated by SFRC with committees with related jurisdiction. 

These personnel authorities would increase OIG’s capability to respond to oversight needs across the globe, however, only Congress can provide OIG additional 

statutory authorities such as 5 U.S.C. 3161, the use of PSCs domestically, and the 

expanded use of Civil Service and Foreign Service annuitant through partial retirement offset reduction. Recently, OIG requested that the SFRC provide 5 U.S.C. 3161 

authority to OIG. 

• (b) How are you building the institutional capacity within State and USAID IG 

offices to be more responsive to the significant challenges and tasks associated 

with our foreign policy and foreign assistance commitments in places such as 

Pakistan and Afghanistan? How are you ensuring there is no dropoff in productivity across the rest of the globe as resources and personnel are directed to 

Afghanistan and Pakistan? 

Answer (b). OIG Response: OIG continues to hire and train new personnel to meet 

oversight requirements and achieve full staffing levels. OIG makes the best use of 

its limited resources by prioritizing its work, focusing on high-risk, high-dollar programs and placing the greatest emphasis for new growth on sustaining oversight 

in post-conflict and crisis countries and regions. In 2008, with additional resources 

available, OIG launched new offices to address emergent oversight needs. These new 

officers are the Middle East Regional Office (MERO) and Middle East Investigative 

Branch (MEIB). 

OIG will continue to expand its oversight efforts in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, 

and West Bank/Gaza, and its focus on issues important to Congress such as global 

health initiatives, global women’s issues, and trafficking in persons. OIG will also 

continue to respond to new areas requiring oversight as evidenced by its announced 

review of the Department’s response to the disaster in Haiti. 

In Afghanistan, OIG–MERO currently has assigned four staff members fulltime—two auditors, including the audit-director, an auditor-analyst, and an office 

support specialist. This staff is supported with a budget of $2.5 million in FY 2010 

and $3.5 million in FY 2011. 

In Pakistan, OIG–MERO has hired or identified positions for three staff members 

to be assigned full-time—an audit-director and two auditor-analysts. This staff is 

supported with a budget of $2 million in FY 2010 and $3.6 million in FY 2011. 

The full-time staff in Pakistan and Afghanistan is in addition to staff deployed 

from the U.S. on a temporary duty (TDY) basis from Washington, DC, and those 

assigned TDY from the MERO and MEIB hub offices in Cairo and Amman, respectively. 

Beyond the work of MERO and MEIB, all OIG offices have conducted oversight 

work in countries within the Middle East and South Asia regions in recent years. 

For example, the OIG recently released its inspection of Embassy Kabul and the inspection report on Embassy Islamabad will be issued this spring. In October 2009, 

OIG published its report on the Audit of the Construction and Design of the New 

105 

Embassy Compound in Baghdad, Iraq and in June 2009, OIG’s Office of Audits released a joint report with the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction on 

‘‘Joint Audit of Blackwater Contract and Task Orders for Worldwide Personal Protective Services in Iraq.’’ 

Meanwhile, OIG continues to provide oversight of programs and offices for the 

Department of State, Broadcasting Board of Governors and the International 

Boundary and Water Commission, with prioritized oversight activity, both domestically and overseas. 

From FY 2008 to FY 2010, the Office of Investigations increased its staff of criminal investigators from 10 to 36 and anticipates an increase to 38 by the end of FY 

2010. In FY 2009, the OIG created the Middle East Investigative Branch (MEIB) 

within the Office of Investigations to conduct investigations in support of the 

Department’s expanding Middle East and South Asia mission. MEIB’s primary mission is to respond to criminal allegations and support investigative activities concerning Department programs, employees, and contractors in the Middle East and 

South Asia, with focused concentration on high-value, high-risk areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. 

MEIB has a total of eight criminal investigators, with three stationed domestically 

and five stationed in Amman, Jordan, Baghdad, Iraq, and Cairo, Egypt, respectively. This translates to more than 22 percent of INV’s entire investigative staff 

dedicated to the Middle East and South Asia region. From these locations, OIG can 

move its personnel easily, as needed, throughout the region. During FY 2010, INV 

plans to add another criminal investigator to MEIB. 

This shift of resources to the Middle East and South Asia has corresponded with 

a large increase in INV’s overall domestic and worldwide workload. The number of 

OIG Hotline complaints processed rose from 533 in FY 2007 to 1,004 in FY 2009 

(an increase of 88 percent) and is on pace in FY 2010 to surpass last year’s total 

by a wide margin. The number of cases opened also rose from 37 in FY 2007 to 126 

in FY 2009 (an increase of 240 percent). 

To adjust to the increased workload, INV has taken measures to enhance productivity. For example, INV has also procured a new electronic Case Management System (CMS), which is due to come online during FY 2010 and will replace an outmoded system in use since 1999 that is not accessible remotely. This new system 

will, for the first time, enable INV personnel stationed overseas to instantly update 

case files, communicate much more efficiently with Washington and greatly increase 

productivity. 

• (c) After strong congressional pressure there are now 3 USAID IG staff in Afghanistan and a similar number of State IG staff, while there is 20 staff on the 

ground working for the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) 

which was established only a short while ago. Washington, DC, staff is similarly 

overweight within the SIGAR relative to the institutional IG offices. 

Æ (i) What changes have been made or will be made to strengthen the institutional IG offices? 

Æ (ii) How will you ensure the institutional capacity for audit and oversight 

are sufficient to each and every environment within which we expect to employ foreign assistance and other foreign policy resources? 

Æ (iii) Please break out the amounts from the FY2010 and FY2011 budgets 

intended for State IG and USAID IG use by total and by region, and where 

possible for Afghanistan and for Pakistan.iv. Why does the FY2010 Supplemental Budget Request include $14 million for SIGAR on top of $30.2 million for FY2010 while OIG request is for only $3 million? 

Æ (iv) Why does the FY2010 Supplemental Budget Request include $14 million for SIGAR on top of $30.2 million for FY2010 while OIG request is for 

only $3 million? 

Answer (i). OIG Response: OIG has received a substantial amount of resources 

since 2007, as detailed below, to increase its oversight capabilities. This corresponded with equal or larger increase in oversight responsibilities for the increasing budget and programs in the Department, in addition to the work on post-conflict 

and crisis regions. 

OIG has judiciously used these resources to strengthen its existing offices and create an overseas presence for the first time. The large increase in OIG oversight 

products and investigations in crisis and post conflict areas since 2007 speaks for 

itself. OIG also coordinates and deconflicts its work with other institutional and special OIGs in organizations such as the Southwest Asia Planning Group and the 

International Contract Corruption Task Force. As for Afghanistan, OIG has deterVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:32 Jan 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\111TH CONGRESS\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINT
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mined that its current mix of overseas and domestically based personnel best supports its oversight mission there. 

OIG personnel stationed in Amman and Cairo provide oversight of major U.S. 

Government programs in crisis and post-conflict areas, including Afghanistan. Staff 

members in these offices conduct audits, program evaluations, investigations and financial attestations of contracts and grants on performance and procurement issues, 

as well as program oversight by management. The temporary satellite office in 

Kabul, with assistance from the regional offices and Washington, DC, provides direct oversight of the same types of Department-funded programs in Afghanistan. 

This configuration of personnel provides OIG the greatest operational flexibility, 

while incurring substantially lower risk and life support costs. In addition, it avoids 

unnecessary duplication of oversight with SIGAR and reduces the administrative 

support burden on Embassy Kabul. 

In terms of strengthening OIG’s resources base, since 2008 OIG has received an 

array of additional funding. In 2008, the base funding was $33 million. If the 2011 

President’s budget is enacted, the base funding level will be $63 million. A major 

part of the increase was a result of the need to include the MERO and MEIB offices 

in the base funding. Before 2011, these two offices were funded by supplemental 

funding, which OIG understands will not be available in FY 2011. 

In response to the question on OIG authorities, the OIG supports the new proposed authorities and other OIG-related provisions that SFRC (See page 2.) is now 

considering for the reauthorization of the Foreign Relations Act. 

On overseas staffing, MERO and MEIB provide oversight to post-conflict and crisis locations overseas. MERO maintains 80 percent of its staff based overseas, and 

an additional 10 percent in TDY-deployable status. MEIB maintains its entire staff 

overseas or in TDY-deployable status. These offices are continuing to assign additional staff overseas. 

The Office of Inspections has, since its inception, deployed domestically based staff 

overseas on inspections trips that can include multiple-post reviews and onsite, thematic reviews of programs at work overseas. 

Answer (ii). OIG Response: Congress plays a key role in ensuring that OIG maintains sufficient institutional capacity by providing sufficient resources and maximum personnel authorities that permit us the flexibility to staff our teams with the 

best mix of talent and experience. 

Answer (iii). OIG Response: 

FY 2010 

$54M = regular appropriation 

$2M = ESF Pakistan 

$2.4M = Egypt 

$2.5M = Jordan 

$2.5M = Iraq 

$2.5M = Afghanistan 

$2.0M = Pakistan 

$1.0M = Gaza 

FY 2011 

$63M = regular appropriation request 

$2.0M = Pakistan ESF transfer 

$2.4M = Egypt 

$2.5M = Jordan 

$2.5M = Iraq 

$3.5M = Afghanistan 

$3.6M = Pakistan 

Answer (iv). OIG Response: OIG is not in a position to answer this question. 

Question. I appreciate the higher profile attention you are giving to international 

energy matters. We must work to push forward on cleaner and renewable energy 

sources for the future, while also working to secure the reliable oil and natural gas 

supplies that are so critical to the global economy. An area of particular importance 

is opening the Southern corridor to link Central Asian and Caucasian energy 

sources with consumers in Europe. Special Envoy Morningstar has put a great deal 

of effort into this project, and his work is commendable. Yet, some in the region still 

question U.S. commitment, particularly in comparison to the Clinton administration 

support for the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline project. Could you please update us 

progress on Nabucco, and also comment on how Nabucco progress fits with our 

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efforts related to the complicated issues of Nagorno-Karabakh and Turkey-Armenia 

relations? 

Answer. We strongly support Europe’s efforts to bring natural gas to Europe 

through new, diverse routes, including the Nabucco pipeline. Let me be clear. We 

strongly support Nabucco, but it will ultimately be built only if and when the case 

has been made that it makes commercial sense. That is why Ambassador 

Morningstar and his team have put so much effort into encouraging the parties 

whose interests are most directly engaged (Europeans, producer countries, transit 

countries, Turkey) to lay the necessary groundwork so that appropriate investment 

decisions can be made. 

There have been several positive developments regarding Nabucco. The Intergovernmental agreement was signed by all partner countries in July 2009. Since that 

time, the Parliaments in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey have ratified the agreement. Commercial negotiations between the Nabucco partners and several gas suppliers, including Azerbaijan are underway. Negotiations between Turkey and Azerbaijan regarding gas sales and transit are nearing completion. Politics are playing 

a role in these negotiations but we believe that an agreement is in the commercial 

and strategic interests of both Turkey and Azerbaijan and have encouraged both 

countries to finalize the agreement as soon as possible, so that companies can make 

appropriate investment decisions. 

With respect to BTC, the situation today is more complex than it was 10 years 

ago. The Europeans, for example, are much more involved in Nabucco (and a Southern corridor) than they were in BTC. European companies will be buying the gas, 

and as much European unity as possible will be necessary for successful completion 

of the project. The world and the region are very different places in other ways as 

well. We will continue to work as hard as possible to guide Nabucco and the Southern corridor to a positive conclusion and believe that our efforts will be successful. 

Question. Please specify funding and personnel requests for the global critical energy infrastructure program and explain any reductions in support for this program 

and priorities in FY 2011. 

Answer. The Coordinator of Counterterrorism (S/CT) has the lead for implementing the global critical energy infrastructure protection (GCEIP) program within 

the Department of State. S/CT does not submit a separate budget request for 

GCEIP but supports this program through Anti-terrorism Assistance program 

funds. S/CT devoted approximately 1–1.3 FTE to the implementation of GCEIP in 

FY 2010 and expects to continue this effort at a similar level in FY 2011. Most of 

this activity involves outreach to potential foreign partners. The GCEIP program 

assumes that foreign partners will pay the costs for specific assistance requested of 

the United States. This is already occurring with respect to a sizeable and growing 

program with a major energy producer. 

Question. G20 leaders made a pledge to phase out ‘‘inefficient fossil fuel subsidies’’ 

(CBJ p. 597). How is the efficiency, or lack thereof, of energy subsidies being 

assessed? What is the plan of action for implementation of this pledge outside of 

the United States? 

Answer. In Pittsburgh, the Leaders of the G20 countries made a critical commitment to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies over the medium term while providing targeted support for the poorest. This groundbreaking effort will encourage 

the conservation of energy, improve our energy security, and provide a downpayment on our commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 

Fossil fuel subsidies displace important public investments and drain government 

finances, worsen balance of payments, lead to underinvestment in infrastructure, 

and can contribute to energy shortages. Eliminating fossil fuel subsidies and using 

some of those freed resources for targeted social assistance could significantly improve the quality of life of low-income households. 

Cutting energy subsidies leads to reduced consumption, lower import demand and 

increased availability of energy for export—all helping to reduce the likelihood of 

a future supply crunch. 

The OECD and IEA estimate that eliminating fossil fuel subsidies worldwide 

would reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by 10 percent or more by 2050. Removing fossil fuel subsidies helps eliminate market distortions, strengthening incentives for investments in energy efficient technologies and nonfossil energy supply. 

Following the Pittsburg summit, G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors called on the IEA, OPEC, OECD, and World Bank to produce a joint report 

on energy subsidies. This analysis will inform G20 efforts to craft implementation 

strategies and timeframes, based on national circumstances, for rationalizing and 

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phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, and for providing targeted assistance 

programs. 

The State Department is making implementation of the G20 commitment to 

phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies a key element our international energy policy. Pressing for expeditious implementation of the commitment will be an important part of our bilateral engagement with other G20 partners. 

Question. New authorizing language and new expenditure of $5 million is being 

proposed for the International Renewable Energy Agency. What office would be the 

U.S. representative to IRENA? What role would the U.S. representative play in expenditure of proposed funds through IRENA? What, if any coordination, will be institutionalized between IRENA and the IEA and IAEA? 

Answer. The State Department’s Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science 

(OES) Assistant Secretary will serve as the U.S. focal point for IRENA. In this capacity, OES works closely with other Bureaus within the State Department, including The Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs (EEB), The Office of the 

Legal Adviser for Ocean International Environmental & Scientific Affairs (L/OES), 

The Bureau of International Organizations (IO) and the various regional bureaus. 

Additionally, the State Department coordinates U.S. Government involvement with 

IRENA through an interagency process that includes the Department of Energy 

(DOE), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Commerce 

(DOC), the National Security Council (NSC), the Export-Import Bank of the United 

States (EXIM), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 

The United States currently participates in the Preparatory Commission that is 

working to establish the policies, work program, and organizational structure of 

IRENA prior to IRENA coming into force. If Congress authorizes U.S. participation 

in IRENA before it enters into force, then the United States is expected to be a 

member of the IRENA Council which has the authority and responsibility to ‘‘consider and submit to the Assembly the draft work program and the draft budget of 

the Agency.’’ It is within that capacity that the United States would exercise its responsibility and authority to help ensure that the expenditure of funds conforms to 

the mission and objectives of the organization. 

The IRENA founding statue calls on IRENA to cooperate closely with existing institutions to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. The United States, along with 

other like-minded participating countries, is seeking to ensure that IRENA’s work 

plan and programmatic portfolio complements and does not compete with or conflict 

with ongoing efforts. In State Department discussions with the leadership of the 

IEA and IRENA, both Secretariats have indicated strong interest and willingness 

to coordinate and cooperate with each other. For example, IRENA has included IEA 

representatives in a variety of the workshops that IRENA has sponsored, and 

IRENA’s 2010 work program includes stocktaking of global renewable energy activities among multilateral fora, such as the IEA. As nuclear energy is not within 

IRENA’s mandate, there is not expected to be any institutionalized relationship 

established between IRENA and the IAEA. 

Question. The CBJ (p.766) states: ‘‘A primary focus of the Department’s diplomatic 

efforts in the area of energy security is promoting the development and implementation of policies in foreign governments designed to foster growth in the clean energy 

sector.’’ Please clarify if ‘‘clean energy’’ includes nuclear power and advanced coal 

technologies. 

Answer. In its diplomatic efforts to promote energy security (using State Department operational funds), the Department includes both nuclear power and advanced 

coal technologies—defined as Carbon Capture and Storage and Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) technologies—as technologies that have the potential 

to reduce global and national greenhouse gas emissions. With regard to international assistance funding, in accordance with congressional directives in the FY 

2010 appropriations bill, we will only use FY 2010 ‘‘clean energy’’ funds to promote 

the sustainable use of renewable energy technologies and end-use energy efficiency 

technologies, carbon sequestration, and carbon accounting. The primary objective of 

these programs will be to reduce, mitigate, and/or sequester emissions of greenhouse 

gas emissions. We would like to have a further dialogue with Congress on this issue 

for FY 2011 and beyond. 

Question. Please explain the proposed budget reduction for ‘‘Caspian Basin Energy 

Diplomacy’’ within EEB. 

109 

Answer. In fact, it is not actually a decrease but rather shifting of internal accounting within a centralized budget in EEB as we were building the full capacity 

of the Office of the Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy. 

Question. What, if any, funds beyond assessed contributions are likely for the 

International Energy Agency given its increased role relative to the G20, UNFCCC 

negotiations, and enhanced engagement with China and India? 

Answer. The International Energy Agency (IEA) is an important vehicle to help 

advance our collective energy security goals and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 

I believe the IEA is the premier source for developing best practices and policies 

for new energy technologies and energy efficiency—which are integral to the transformation to a low carbon economy. The agency’s efforts to improve the transparency of energy data and its wide-ranging analysis are laudable and enhance its 

global credibility. 

Given this, I have encouraged senior State officials to commit voluntary State 

funding to support the IEA’s work on new energy technologies, more efficient energy 

markets and training, outreach to important new consumers such as India and 

China, and on developing low carbon technology platforms. Funding will also support G20 developing country members in meeting commitments to eliminate inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, and help provide training for developing country government officials in statistical analysis and transparent reporting of data concerning 

energy markets, fuel reserves, and energy consumption. 

Question. What funds and personnel are being proposed for the Office of the International Energy Coordinator? 

Answer. David Goldwyn was sworn in as Coordinator for International Energy 

Affairs on August 17, 2009. The office of the Coordinator currently has four full time 

personnel, with plans to increase staffing by an additional three full time positions, 

for a total of seven (including the Coordinator). Broken down, this includes one SES, 

two Foreign Service positions, two civil service positions, a schedule C and a contractor. In addition, the Department is utilizing matrix management so that all personnel focusing on energy matters within the Department of State can be called 

upon by the Coordinator as appropriate. We are currently finalizing the financial 

plan for FY 2010 and the FY 2011 budget has been submitted. We expect to have 

sufficient resources to fund the operations of the Office of the International Energy 

Coordinator to ensure it can carry out its mandate. 

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY CLINTON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. Secretary Clinton, as you know, defeating al-Qaeda and dealing with 

the broader problem of violent extremism requires that we use all of the tools at 

our disposal, including important nonmilitary tools provided by the international 

affairs budget. In the FY11 function 150 budget request, some of these tools come 

under explicitly terrorism oriented budget lines, like the new countering violent extremism program. However, there are a number of other budget lines supporting activities—such as economic development, good governance, respect for human rights 

and the rule of law, and conflict resolution—that can help to counter al-Qaeda’s ability to recruit and operate. How do you plan to reach out across the different relevant 

programs to ensure we maximize and coordinate some of the potential benefits of 

these various initiatives with our broader counterterrorism efforts? Can you also tell 

us more about the countering violent extremism program—such as how a country 

would be determined a priority for the funding and how the program will relate to 

the wider assistance effort we are undertaking in a specific country? 

Answer. The Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program uses all of the relevant diplomacy, development, and defense tools at our disposal in order to maximize and coordinate programs and potential benefits with broader counterterrorism 

efforts. The Department of State coordinates accounts and agencies’ planning, budgeting, and implementation efforts to ensure that U.S. Government responses meet 

the complex challenges posed by CVE. The Department of State makes decisions 

about resource allocation in a coordinated, coherent way so as to maximize the 

leverage and effectiveness of U.S. Government assistance on this multifaceted problem. In budget formulation, for example, we examine assistance requests through 

both a country program lens as well as from a global, sectoral perspective to ensure 

that programs in each country and region complement each other, avoid duplication 

of effort, and support U.S. strategic objectives. This applies to counterterrorism programming just as in other areas of assistance. 

110 

Various U.S. Government agencies have done an impressive job in recent years 

to further the U.S. Government’s understanding of the radicalization process and 

the underlying factors that foster extremism. This knowledge is based on significant 

research and analyses conducted by the intelligence community as well as the many 

studies conducted by the private sector and academics. The Department of State 

then applies this knowledge in developing programs that will make a genuine 

difference in communities vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment toward 

violence. 

Before beginning new programs in any country, the Department of State assesses 

that country’s radicalization problem. These assessments are based on polling and 

surveys and other means of assessing individual and community attitudes. The results are examined in light of the contextual information described above, to guide 

programming and serve as a baseline to measure program effectiveness. 

Additionally, the Department of State considers programs that are already in 

place to address CVE issues, threat assessments from the intelligence community, 

and a country’s capacity and willingness to work with us. 

The first task is to identify the at-risk populations. To successfully develop and 

implement CVE programs, we seek to understand the specific dynamics of the cohorts we are focusing on, not just by country, but sometimes even down to the community or neighborhood level. Every cohort and community possesses unique demographics, grievances, and, in many cases, ties to overseas family members—factors 

that influence the cohort’s potential vulnerability to extremist pressures. 

The second task is to develop programs that fit the characteristics of the intended 

audience. We develop programs in concert with the interagency community in Washington, our missions in the field, partner nation governments, local community leaders, and civil society organizations, who are best positioned to identify points for 

intervention. CVE is also a regular subject of discussion at our Regional Strategic 

Initiative meetings. Our success depends, in part, on having local programs 

delivered by credible people who can help vulnerable individuals become resistant 

to extremist messages. We know that programs that are not tailored to the specific 

cohort or community are likely to have limited appeal, and, ultimately, to be 

ineffective. 

CVE is approached from many perspectives and organizations within the Department of State, including the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the 

Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the 

Office of the Special Representative to Muslim Communities, and regional bureaus. 

We also coordinate with several Bureaus in the U.S. Agency for International Development and other agencies to make sure that efforts to engage civil society and 

counter radicalizing narratives through existing programs are focused in the right 

areas. 

We have an excellent relationship with the Department of Defense (DOD), which 

informs our CVE programming. Together the State and Defense Departments can 

complement each other’s strengths and efforts in the field, and determine which 

CVE efforts are best done by the military and which are best handled by civilians. 

A number of offices that fund CVE projects and research in the DOD and its combatant commands have expressed a desire to collaborate with us on new programs. 

We are also working with foreign CVE partners. For example, in November 2009 

the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism hosted a Multilateral ‘‘Countering 

Violent Extremism (CVE)’’ Workshop with Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, the 

Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom as a first step in developing a more 

cooperative multilateral approach to CVE. Participants discussed approaches, target 

audiences, specific interventions designed to counter terrorists’ recruiting efforts, 

and information-sharing. Programs that gave participants insight into the challenges of police work with diaspora communities in the United Kingdom and Australia generated a lot of interest as possible templates. A follow-on workshop is 

planned for mid-May with the same international partners plus Denmark and 

France. 

Question. At the Senate Intelligence Committee’s annual threat assessment hearing, the Director of National Intelligence testified that, ‘‘looking ahead over the next 

5 years, a number of countries in Africa and Asia are at significant risk for a new 

outbreak of mass killing . . . [and] among these countries, a new mass killing or 

genocide is most likely to occur in Southern Sudan.’’ Madam Secretary, I know you 

share my concern about the rising violence in southern Sudan and that you are well 

aware of the potential for it to worsen in the runup to and then after the South’s 

vote on self-determination next January. I know State is working hard to prevent 

the resumption of conflict between the parties of the CPA, but could you tell me, 

Secretary Clinton, what steps are being taken to prevent violence between commuVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:32 Jan 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\111TH CONGRESS\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINT
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nities within Southern Sudan and whether you believe our efforts are commensurate with the risk of mass killings and genocide as stated by the DNI? 

Answer. Since the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 

began in 2005, there has been progress in Southern Sudan in working to build a 

stable political environment devoid of the overt threat of violence. The United States 

Government (USG) has worked throughout the implementation process with the 

Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) to build effective political capacity and 

responsible governance, foster the conditions and capacities for longer term development, and mitigate the risk of renewed conflict. However, we are aware of the increasing intercommunal violence in the South, and we share the DNI’s concern regarding the escalation of violence between communities within Southern Sudan and 

the potentially destabilizing effect it could have on the region. This violence is especially troubling as the national elections and referendum on southern self-determination draw closer. 

Since 2005, the USG has focused its assistance programs to support the implementation of the CPA, with a specific conflict-mitigating lens to address potential 

threats to the agreement, including providing peace dividends that help maintain 

the CPA’s viability and addressing the root factors that fuel conflict. Currently, the 

USG has a program that is focusing on community security through a fast-starting, 

quick-implementation, flexible small-grants mechanism to support southern Sudanese authorities, institutions, and organizations. We are utilizing southern Sudanese NGOs and companies in order to invoke local ownership of the conflict mitigation efforts. Activities are concentrated in two clusters of counties in Southern 

Sudan as well as in Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. This community security program started in Southern Sudan in October and is already showing early 

signs of success in terms of increasing the capacity of local authorities to manage 

conflict. 

In addition to this program, the USG is in the process of standing up new conflict 

mitigation programs in Sudan in response to the spike in violence seen in Southern 

Sudan in 2009. The aim of these programs will be to address the factors that contribute to conflict in order to prevent it while simultaneously building government 

and local capacity to prepare for and respond to conflicts when they do arise. In an 

effort to prevent and alleviate conflict effectively and appropriately, conflict mitigation programs will focus on addressing fundamental weaknesses in existing conflict 

mitigation and response efforts, as well as supporting state and local institutions 

to prevent breakdown of law and order in Southern Sudan. 

Specifically, the USG will assist institutions at the state and local levels to implement a conflict management communication and information system that enables 

southern Sudanese authorities in high-risk areas to network with communities and 

civil society groups to identify and respond to destabilizing conflicts and violence. 

We will also coordinate with local and international partners to help state governments to develop stabilization strategies and to build up early warning and response 

capacities. Additionally, we will facilitate the implementation of resolutions from 

local reconciliation agreements among parties to conflicts in high risk areas. Finally, 

we will assist U.N. agencies’ civil affairs partner efforts to inform and educate the 

local population on the various stabilization initiatives and planning processes. 

The USG is now playing a leading role in preventing violence in Southern Sudan 

and the Three Areas. Sudan is a priority for the administration, and we continue 

to work tirelessly at all levels of the government to ensure peace and security for 

all people in Sudan. 

Question. Critical to addressing this violence sustainably is helping the Government of South Sudan transform its army and police into disciplined and accountable 

security forces that prioritize civilian protection. Could you tell me what steps we’re 

taking to help build this capacity, where dedicated funds will come from in the FY11 

budget, and how this effort will be coordinated with other agencies undertaking 

such work and among our other Sudan priorities, of which I know there are many? 

Answer. Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, 

the United States Government (USG) has supported the transformation of the 

Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and Southern Sudan police forces into more 

disciplined and accountable security and service forces that can better respond to 

security threats. 

The USG is assisting with the transformation of the SPLA through unit-level 

training of rank-and-file soldiers, as well as a series of train-the-trainer courses for 

officer staff skills, military police, and noncommissioned officers. The USG is also 

facilitating the development of centralized management of army resources, including 

the establishment of procurement regulations and plans for improved accountability. 

Finally, the USG is also providing communications systems and training to support 

112 

command and control of the SPLA between the General HQ outside of Juba and the 

SPLA’s divisions throughout the south. 

Assistance from the USG to reform the GOSS police force, the Southern Sudan 

Police Service (SSPS), includes funding police, judicial, and corrections advisors to 

the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) as they help develop local police and 

SSPS through training, advising, and mentoring. This training varies widely from 

basic policing to elections security and crowd control. UNMIS is also helping the 

SSPS establish ‘‘cattle units’’ to address cattle raids which are one of the instigators 

of tribal violence in the south. USG assistance also funds equipment for SSPS specialized units, which are intended to respond quickly to security threats during the 

April 2010 elections and the referendum in 2011. From FY 2005–09, the USG provided $159 million of PKO funding and $27.326 

million of INCLE funding to support security sector reform of the SPLA and SSPS, 

respectively. For FY 2010, the USG intends to provide $44 million of PKO funding 

and $11.25 million of INCLE funding to continue these efforts. For FY 2011, the 

administration requested $42 million of PKO funding and $24.35 million of INCLE 

funding. 

Coordination of security sector reform efforts is accomplished through weekly 

interagency working group meetings, weekly conference calls with stakeholders on 

the ground, Interagency Policy Coordination meetings, and ad hoc meetings and 

conference calls as needed. In addition, USG efforts are coordinated with other 

donors and international institutions as appropriate. Because of the destabilizing 

effects of renewed violence on CPA implementation, governance, civil society, and 

regional development, the USG has made security sector reform in Southern Sudan 

one of our highest priorities. 

Question. A large portion of our resources in the function 150 FY11 budget request— about 7 percent— is directed to Afghanistan. I am pleased that the administration is attempting to balance our massive military presence in Afghanistan with 

a new civilian strategy, but I remain concerned that no matter how good a civilian 

strategy we have, with a flawed military strategy, we may be undermining our efforts. Are you concerned about the impact of our funding for civilian programs when 

you see that even these huge portions of our State and International Programs 

budgets for Afghanistan are dwarfed by DOD spending? 

Answer. Our plans rely on seamless civilian-military integration. Establishing security requires military engagement, which is costly in budgetary and human terms, 

but essential for the civilian elements of our strategy to take effect. Similarly, longterm success and drawdown of our troops requires success of our civilian efforts. 

Military and civilian leaders spent last year getting the inputs right in Afghanistan, 

putting into place the structures, the concepts, and organizations necessary for a 

comprehensive civil-military campaign. President Obama announced a more focused 

policy in December at West Point; the necessary resourcing to support our objectives, however, had begun months earlier, with additional troops and civilians 

already in place and many more on the way. 

The operation in Marjah is the initial step of what will be a 12- to 18-month civmil campaign. The Afghan Government, with the active support of the United 

States and United Kingdom Embassies, is already launching the delivery of essential public services. The rapid delivery of governance and development to a ‘‘cleared’’ 

area is essential to executing our new population-centric strategy of forcing the 

Taliban to work from the ‘‘outside in,’’ instead of from the ‘‘inside out.’’ Key development activities will include the rapid expansion of USAID’s agricultural stabilization and cash-for-work program (2,500 residents will be employed immediately), 

technical and logistical support for the lead Afghan official in Marjah, resources to 

recruit and train qualified local Afghans to fill civil servant positions, and the construction of a highway connecting the area to the provincial capital. 

Civilian engagement is vital to the initial security operations and on-going stability, and it should be resourced sufficiently to play its part. The recent budget request reflects our expanded effort and the need for additional resources to fund our 

civilian activities. 

Question. Secretary Clinton, given the recent spotlight on Yemen, I was not sur- prised to see an increase of $22.5 million in FMF funding for Yemen—one of the 

largest country-specific increases in the function 150 budget request. Last month, 

State Department officials testified before this committee that the Houthi rebellion 

in the North and a secessionist movement in the South contribute to Yemen’s instability and have distracted the Government of Yemen from the fight against alQaeda. I was pleased to see a cease-fire agreement with the al-Houthi reached last 

week, but we’ve seen cease-fires before, only to have a return to arms. In light of 

all of this, what are we doing, in addition to the legally required Leahy vetting, to 

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ensure accountability and transparency in the use of our resources, so that FMF 

funding for Yemen isn’t utilized for these conflicts, now or in the future, undermining our counterterrorism efforts in the country? 

Answer. The United States uses Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to train and 

assist Yemen’s Central Security Forces (CSF) and other Yemeni Government organizations engaged in counterterrorism operations. Those organizations include the 

Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior security forces, the Yemeni Coast 

Guard, Air Force, and Special Forces, and the Central Security Force’s Counterterrorism Unit (CTU). They all have discrete responsibilities focused on counterterrorism and border control. All equipment transferred to Yemeni forces is covered by 

end-use agreements, which ensure transparency by requiring Yemen to grant the 

U.S. Government full access to monitor how the equipment is being used. 

The United States welcomes the cease-fire in Government of Yemen—Houthi conflict. We understand a mediation commission representing all parties is monitoring 

compliance with the terms of the cease-fire. We hope efforts will begin the urgent 

process of reconciliation and reconstruction to bring the conflict to a permanent end. 

Question. Diplomatic reporting plays a critical and underappreciated role in keeping our government informed about what is going on around the world. In many 

situations, our Embassy officials—through completely open channels—may be better 

suited to obtaining information than the intelligence community. Yet there is no 

interagency strategy that would ensure that the State Department’s role in meeting 

our government’s overall information needs is reflected in its budget. Do you agree 

that diplomats are often the eyes and ears of our government, and do you also agree 

that our capabilities in this area would be strengthened if there were an interagency 

strategy that identified where the need is greatest and ensured that the appropriate 

resources were provided? 

Answer. I agree that our diplomatic reporting provides crucial and unique insights 

into what is going on around the world. For example, we’re gratified that the intelligence community regularly includes diplomatic reporting as one of its most credible, reliable, and frequent sources. The State Department hopes to appreciably increase our hiring to ensure that our staff overseas can not only continue to provide 

its valuable insights, but also can increase it significantly. 

State continually solicits input from foreign affairs agencies to highlight areas in 

which we’re meeting their information needs, identify areas where more focus would 

be welcome, help us target our efforts, and support our requests for additional resources. While not focused exclusively on reporting, we employ a highly developed, 

formal system that annually develops strategic plans at the mission, Bureau, and 

Department level. We use that system to plan strategically, manage our performance, and request resources. Always produced with interagency input, those plans 

articulate multiyear, forward looking strategic plans and foreign policy priorities, 

and identify our highest priority funding and personnel needs. Additionally, State 

this year launched a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) to 

ensure that State has a short-, medium-, and long-term blueprint to guide our diplomatic and development efforts. 

We are confident that our extensive informal and formal planning and feedback 

tools ensure that we can identify where the need for diplomatic reporting, personnel, 

and funding is greatest. 

Question. As you know, the last few months have seen political paralysis in 

Nigeria resulting from President Yar’Adua’s extended absence. A few weeks ago the 

Nigerian National Assembly made the Vice President Acting President, an important first step in ending this paralysis, but regional and religious tensions persist 

and the potential for instability remains high. I held a subcommittee hearing on this 

issue just yesterday as the Nigeria situation would seem to be a pretty clear-cut 

case requiring sustained diplomatic engagement at very senior levels. And I certainly commend you and your colleagues at State as I recognize the significant outreach underway to address Nigeria’s political crisis and ensure it doesn’t worsen or 

turn into a full-blown conflict. Accordingly, as you seek to enhance our diplomatic 

capacity, how does the FY11 budget request anticipate the short-term needs of crisis 

and conflict prevention around the world as well as the longer term work of protecting democratic gains and mitigating tensions, before we’ve reached a crisis 

point? 

Answer. We are closely following developments in Nigeria. We are pleased that 

the Nigerian National Assembly took steps to address the political vacuum, granting 

the Vice President executive powers as Acting President. We continue to engage 

with our Nigerian counterparts at senior levels to ensure that democratic principles 

and rule of law are respected. In the FY 2011 Congressional Budget Justification 

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(p.p. 134–139), we have requested almost $648 million for Nigeria. Though the majority of funding—nearly $568 million—is for health and HIV–AIDS programs, the 

request includes $4 million for conflict mitigation and reconciliation, almost $5 million for other security assistance, $15 million for education programs, $25 million 

for democracy and governance programs, and $31 million for economic growth 

programs. 

Conflict prevention is an important area of attention in foreign policy diplomacy 

and foreign assistance globally. Based on analysis, we know that some conflicts 

might be avoided through carefully structured and targeted programs, while others 

are perhaps unavoidable. Our FY 2011 budget requests $824 million for conflict 

mitigation and reconciliation activities in 22 countries with ongoing problems, including over $600 million for Afghanistan. Our request for USAID’s Bureau of 

Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) includes $38 million to 

help missions assess the risk of future conflict and how to address conflict prevention or mitigation. In addition, since our budget requests are made too far in advance to know for certain where crises will emerge, we have requested FY 2011 resources under the Complex Crises Fund ($100 million) and the Transition Initiatives 

account ($48 million) to address emergent situations. Of course, in such situations, 

existing funds are also examined to see if reprogramming is a possibility to address 

new, high priority needs. 

In addition to conflict prevention and mitigation, the State Department and 

USAID implement a broad range of foreign assistance programs that build the foundations for stable, prosperous, and well-governed states that meet the needs of their 

populations by advancing democracy and good governance, broad-based economic 

growth, and investing in people. In FY 2011, the President requested nearly $20 billion for these programs throughout the world. 

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY CLINTON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JIM WEBB

Question. Despite the administration’s stated intent to reengage Asia, a comparative examination of regional spending does not reflect this commitment. Of the six 

regional Bureaus in the State Department, the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 

Affairs has the smallest FY11 budget request, totaling $169 million. Additionally, 

Foreign Military Financing for East Asia is 1.3 percent of the overall FMF request 

($70 million out of $5.4 billion). East Asia also has the lowest International Military 

Education and Training (IMET) allocation with only $9.3 million, compared to 

Europe with $30.5 million, Africa with $16 million and the Near East with $18.6 

million. In contrast, funding for Frontline States (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq) 

accounts for 18 percent of the overall budget and 60 percent ($6.1 billion) of the 

budget’s growth. 

• How much funding did the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP) initially request during the State Department’s internal budget deliberations? 

Answer. The FY 2011 budget request balances the many pressing needs for increased staffing and programs at our overseas posts. The strategic importance of the 

East Asia and Pacific region to U.S. national security, economic prosperity, support 

of human rights, and environmental initiatives was carefully considered as part of 

this process, and the FY 2011 request reflects the Secretary’s and the President’s 

priorities for this region within the global context. The ongoing Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review is continuing to look at how we can better implement foreign policy initiatives worldwide and may identify further enhancements for 

our activities in this vital region. 

• Given the administration’s goal of reengaging Asia, please provide a detailed 

rationale for providing EAP with the lowest level of funding among regional 

bureaus. 

Answer. The United States has made a substantial commitment and investment 

in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, and we must ensure that commitment is fully 

supported. Any tradeoffs are applied worldwide, not only to the East Asia and 

Pacific region. 

• To what extent does the comparatively low level of funding for State Department activities and foreign assistance in East Asia reflect a tradeoff in favor 

of activities in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq? 

Answer. The United States has made a substantial commitment and investment 

in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, and we must ensure that commitment is fully 

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supported. Any tradeoffs are applied worldwide, not only to the East Asia and 

Pacific region. 

Question. Of the 565 new Foreign Service and Civil Service positions requested 

in the budget, how many of these positions will be dedicated to EAP? 

Answer. Of the 565 new Foreign Service and Civil Service positions for which 

funding was requested in the Department’s FY 2011 budget, 292 are for the regional 

bureaus. Of the 292 regional positions requested, 130 are for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and 27 are intended for EAP. 

Question. Why does East Asia have the lowest IMET allocation? Does this low 

funding prevent the United States from expanding military-to-military relations in 

the region? How does it impact regional military capacity? 

Answer. IMET is allocated by country and is based on the training requirements 

and absorptive capacity of each recipient country. Since training requires a certain 

level of English proficiency, we are limited in the amount and types of courses we 

can offer to several countries in this region. For those countries, a major component 

of our IMET program is English language training, which increases the pool of students eligible for a broader range of IMET-funded opportunities. 

The amount of IMET funding allocated for the East Asia and Pacific region for 

FY 2008 through FY 2010 increased by 44 percent. The request for FY 2011, while 

a more modest percentage increase than in previous years, is still an increase in 

absolute terms over FY 2010 levels. 

IMET funding is only one of many security cooperation programs and activities 

that we use to enhance our military-to-military relations in the region. Other security assistance funding, such as Foreign Military Financing and Peacekeeping Operations/Global Peace Operations Initiative, as well as a wide range of DOD programs 

such as ship visits, exercises, and visits/meetings between senior DOD officials and 

military leaders of those countries strengthen our relationships and improve regional military capacity. 

Question. Does the Department of State have a plan to address the need for a new 

Embassy in Hanoi? How high does the Department rank this project in terms of our 

various embassy construction priorities around the world? 

Answer. Hanoi is on the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) Top 80 

list for new construction. 

Congress directed the Department to follow the Secure Embassy Construction and 

Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (SECCA) for replacement of facilities at vulnerable 

posts. The process for identifying and prioritizing projects begins with review of the 

Vulnerability List mandated by SECCA. This list, published each year by the 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), ranks facilities according to their vulnerability 

across a wide variety of security threats. 

The Vulnerability List is then used to establish the Top 80 list of posts where new 

embassies (NEC), new consulates (NCC), new office buildings (NOB), and new 

annex buildings (NOX) are needed to reduce security vulnerability. The Department 

last updated the Top 80 list in 2008. Embassy Hanoi is ranked No. 58 on the Top 

80 list. The list will again be updated in summer 2010, after DS releases a revised 

Vulnerability List. 

From FY 2010 through FY 2019, the Department plans to construct, on average, 

six capital projects (NECs, NCCs, etc.) each year. Accordingly, the Department 

expects to award contracts for about 60 capital projects over the next 10 years. 

Consistent with Embassy Hanoi’s current ranking at No. 58 on the Top 80 list, the 

Department is on track to award an NEC contract there in FY 2020. 

Regardless of post’s ranking on the Top 80 list, the construction of an NEC in 

Hanoi is predicated on acquiring a site. While the Department has identified an appropriate site, it has not been able to reach an agreement with the Government of 

Vietnam (GOV) on reciprocal property rights. The GOV wants the right to acquire 

property in the United States; however, the GOV is not willing to extend equivalent 

property rights to the United States. The Department continues to raise this reciprocity issue with the GOV, with Under Secretary for Management Patrick Kennedy 

due to visit Hanoi in April 2010 to address the issue with the GOV. 

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