The Honor able Richa rd J. Arcara , Chief J udg e, United States District Court for the 1 Western District of Ne w York, sitting by desig nation. 1 07

- 31 25

- cv I s l and P ark, LL C v. C SX Tra ns portat i on, I nc. 1 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS 2 3 F OR THE S EC OND C IR C U IT 4 5 6 7 August Term, 2008 8 9 (Argued: Octobe r 16, 2008 De cided: Mar ch 4, 2009 10 Amended: Ma rch 4, 2009) 11 12 Docke t No. 07-3125-c v(L ), 07-3281- cv(X AP), 07-3283-c v(CON), 07- 3288-cv( CON) 13 14 15 16 I S L AND P A RK , L L C, 17 18 Plain tif f- Ap pe lle e -C ro ss- Ap pe lla nt, 19 20 –v.– 21 22 CSX T R ANS PO R TATI ON AN D C ONS OL I DATE D RA I L C OR PO R ATI ON , N A T I O N A L RAI L R OAD 23 P A SS EN G ER S ER VI CE (“A MTRAK ”), T H O M A S J. M ADI S ON J R ., I N H I S CA PA CI T Y A S C O M M I SS I O N ER 24 OF THE S T A T E O F N EW Y O RK D EP A RT M EN T O F T R ANS PO R TATI ON (“N YSDOT”) AND D EN NI S ON P. 25 C O T T RE LL , I N H I S CA PA CI T Y A S D I RE CTOR OF THE P AS S EN GE R AND F R E I GH T S AF ETY D I V I SI O N O F 26 NYSDOT, 27 28 Defendants-A ppellants-Cross-Appellees

. 29 30 31 32 Be fore : 33 J A COBS , Chief Judge , W ES L EY , Circuit Judge , and A RCARA , District Judge

. 1 34 35 Appea l from a judg ment of the United States District Court for the Northe rn District of 36 New Y ork (Ka

hn, J .), ente red on June 26, 2007, inte r a lia , g r an t i n gp l a i n t i f f Is l an d P ar k , LLC 37 summa

ry jud g me nt sua sponte on its claim that the New Y ork State De partment of2 1 Transpor

tation’s closure of

a private ra il crossing pursuant to N.Y. Railroa d L aw § 97( 3) wa s 2 pre- empted by

the Interstate Commerc e Commissi on Termination Ac t (“I CCTA”). Ne w York 3 State’s closure of this private ra il crossing does not burden r ailroad ope rations and ther efor e does 4 no t f

a ll w ith in t

he de fi nit ion

of “ tr ans po rt atio n” on

the g ro un d th at it

is “ pr op e rt

y . . . r e late d to 5 the movement of pa sseng ers or proper ty . . .by rail.” 49 U .S.C. § 10102(9)(A). The exercise of 6 state authority

to close the ra il crossing at issue pursuant to N.Y. Ra ilroad L aw § 97( 3) is not pre7 empted under

I CCTA or the Fe dera l Railroad Safe ty Act (“ FRSA”). T he judg ment of the district 8 court is REVERSED and the c ase is REMANDED to the district court (1) so that it may enter 9 summa

ry jud g me nt i n f

avo r o f d e fe nd ants CSXTr ans po rt atio n Inc ., Con so lid ate d Ra il 10 Corporation and A mtrak, and de fenda nts Madison and Cottrell on I sland Park’s pr e-e mption 11 c la im, and

(2 ) f or fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s o n I sla

nd Park ’s fo ur

th c la im. 12 13 14 15 16 C A RT ER P H I LLI PS ( G

. P a u l M o at e s , P a

u l A

. H e m m e r s b a

u g han d M at th e wJ. 17 Warren, on the brief ), Sid le y Au sti n L L P, Wa sh ing ton , D C, a nd Sus an C. 18 Roney and B enjamin Dwyer, N ix on Peabody , L L P, Buff alo, NY for 19 Appellants CSX Tr ansportation Inc. &Consolidat ed Rail Corporation. 20 21 F RAN K B R ADY , Assistant Sol icitor Gene ral, for Andre w M. Cuomo, Attorney 22 Gene ral of the State of Ne w York, for Ap pe lla nts Ma dis on an d Co ttr e ll. 23 2 4 J. M I CH A EL N AUGHTON , YoungSommer, L L C, Albany , NY, for Ap pe lle es. 25 26 27 28 29 W ES L EY , Circuit Judge : 30 Many

a pp e a ls r e qu ir e thi s Co ur

t to c ha rt the po int at w hic h s tate a

uth or ity yie lds to 31 fede ral powe r. In this case, that inter section is not merely theore tical. The que stion presented 32 here is whether N ew Yor k’s attempt to close a

railroa d crossingover a

private r oad is pre- empted 33 by

the fe dera l statutory

scheme g overningour nation’s ra ilroads. We hold that it is not. 34 Acc ording ly , we r ever se the judg ment of the United States District Court for the Northe rn 35 District of Ne w York ( Kahn, J .). 36The followingundisputed fac ts derive f rom the par

ties’ statements of material fa cts. 2 De fe nd ant C on so lid ate d Ra il Co rp or atio n ( “ Conra il” ) o wn e d th e Hu ds on L ine pr ior

to 3 CSXT’s acquisition of Conrail’s intere st. Defe ndant National Railroa d Passeng er Ser vice Cor po ratio n ( “ Am tr ak” ) m a int a ins po rt ion s o f t he Hu ds on

L ine . CSX T, Conra il a

nd Am tr ak w ill collectively

be re fer red to a s the “Railroa d Def endants.” 3 1 F AC TS 2 Plaintiff I sland Park, L L C (“I sland Park”) owns and ope rate s a 400 ac re nur sery outside 3 Albany , New Y ork. Railroad tra cks owne d by Def endant CSX Tra

nsportation, Inc. (“ CSXT”) 2 4 intersec t I sland Park’s pr operty . The tra cks ar e par t of the “H udson L ine,” a heavily trave led, 5 primarily

passeng er- based r ailroad line that runs betwee n Albany and Ne w York City

. The 3 6 Hudson L ine consists of two sets of pa rallel ra ilroad trac ks that are raised a nd border ed by

steep 7 em b an km en t s o nb o ths i d es . I s l an d P ark p o s s es s es an ea s em en tt o u s e ap ri v at e r ai l cr o s s i n g, 8 re fe rr edt o b y

th e p art i es an d

th e d i s tri ctco urtas “A b el e’ s C ro s s i n g, ” a n d ac ce s s edth ro u gh 9 private unpa

ved roa ds. No automated w arningsy stem is connecte d to the crossing . I sland Park 10 sto re s tr a c tor s and c ult ivatio n e qu ipm e nt o n o ne sid e of the tr a c ks and

us e s th e ra il c ro ssi ngto 11 rea ch the f

ields on the other. 1 2 B y w ay o f b a c k g r o un d , i nA u g u s t1 9 8 1 , th e p r i o r o w n e r s o f

th e Is l an d

P ar k p r o p e rty, 13 J ohn Abele, H arr y Abele a nd Fr ancis Schmidt (henc e the name “Abe le’s Crossing ”) br oug ht an 14 a c tio n in

Ne w Y or k St ate Sup re me Cou

rt , Re ns se la e r C ounty , s e e kin gan o rd e r e njo ini ngConra il 15 from interf

eringwith their use of the crossing . The pa rties re ache d a settlement in 1988 that 16 require d Conrail to restore the cr ossing, to pay the Abele s a sum of money , and to “c ease and 17 desist from interfe ringwith said crossingof the plaintiffs a nd their pre dece ssors and succ essors 18 in interest from now until all time.” In J une 1989, the state court re duced the stipulation t o an4 1 order

and dire cted Conra il to “restore the ra ilroad cr ossing a nd maintain said crossingin the 2 prese nt and in the future at def endant’ s sole expense.” Pursuant to that orde r, Conrail and/or 3 Amtrak made improvements to the cr ossing, suc h as installing g ates a nd war ning sig ns, and 4 pavin gthe surf

a c e of the c ro ssi ng . A c c or din gto I sla nd Park , th e c ro ssi ngha s b e e n u se d a s a 5 pr ivate fa

rm c ro ssi ngon

a c on tin uo us ba sis fr om 1 98 9 unti l th e pr e se nt. 6 In Fe bruar y 2005, NYSDOT c ommenced a n administrative proc eedingpursuant to N.Y. 7 Railroad L aw § 97( 3) to deter mine if the cr ossing “ should be altere d or closed a nd discontinued.” 8 Followinga public hea ring , an Administrative L aw Judge (“A L J ”) r ecommende d that the 9 crossingbe close d and discontinued for safe ty rea sons. The AL J noted that I sland Park uses the 10 crossingto transport hea vy , slow-moving f

arm e quipment and that hig h-spee d passeng er tra ins 11 fre quently

pass throug h the cr ossing. The trac ks are “super elevat[ ed]” to acc ommodate the 12 high- speed tra ins on the Hudson L ine, there by cre atinga “hump” for ve hicles cr ossing the tr acks. 13 The AL J found that the substantial g rade of the a pproac hes to the cr ossing, the “ hump” in the 14 c ro ssi ng , a

nd the lim ite d s ig ht d ist anc e du e to t ra c k c ur vatur e pr e se nte d v e ry

se ri ou s sa fe ty 15 conce rns bec ause the se conditions “adve rsely aff ect[ed] the time it t akes to c ross.” In addition, 16 a lth ou g h th e AL J re c og nize d th at th e e vid e nc e c le arl y e sta bli sh e d th at “ the c ro ssi ngse rv e s a s a 17 c onve nie nt a c c e ss p oint,” it a lso no te d th at “ re a so na ble a lte rn ativ e s, ” i.e ., sa fe r p oints o f a c c e ss 18 to I sla

nd Park ’s pr op e rt

y , e xiste d. Th e re a ft e r, in M arc h 2 00 6, De fe nd ant D e nn iso n P. Cottr e ll, 19 NYSDOT’s D irec tor of the Passeng er a nd Fr eig ht Safety

Division, signed a

closure or der a

nd 20 direc ted CSXT to remove the c rossing surfa ce a nd install barrica des pre ventingthe use of the 21 crossing

. 22 Shortly

afte r re ceipt of the closure or der, I sland Park commenc ed this action in fede ralTh e c omp la int a lso name d th e fo llo wi ng“ State De fe nd ants ” : T ho ma s J. Ma dis on Jr., in 4 his capa city

as Commissi oner of

NYSDOT a

nd Dennison P. Cottrell, in hi s capa city as Dire ctor of the Passeng er a

nd Fr eig ht Safety

Division of NYSDOT.

5 1 district court see king a perma nent injunction enjoining the Ra ilroad De fenda nts from enfor cing 2 or executingNYSDOT’s or der. The c omplaint asserted the following claims: (1) the c losure 4 3 order

was pre -empted by

the Interstate Commerc e Commissi on Termination Ac t (“I CCTA”) and 4 the F e de ra l Ra ilr oa d Sa fe ty Ac t ( “ F RSA ” ); (2 ) t

he State De fe nd ants de pr ive d I sla nd Park of its 5 pr op e rt

y int e re st w ith out du e pr oc e ss o f l aw i n v iol atio n o f 4 2 U .S. C. § 19 83 ; ( 3) the State 6 Def

endants’ a ctions constituted a takingof its property interest without just compensation or due 7 proce ss in violation of 42 U.S.C . § 1983; and (4) pur suant to the 1989 state cour t judgment, the 8 Railroad De fenda

nts were obligated to keep the crossingopen. The district court issued a 9 te mpo ra

ry re str a ini ngor de r a

nd a ll D e fe nd ants su

bs e qu e ntl y

mov e d f or summa ry jud g me nt t o 10 dismiss the complaint. I sland Park cr oss-moved for summary judgme nt on its second and third 11 cause s of ac tion. 12 Th e dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d I sla

nd Park ’s mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, but su a s

po nte 13 g rante d it summ ary judgme nt on its pre-emption claim. See Island Park, LLC v. CSX T ransp., 14 Inc ., No . 1 :06 -C V- 31 0, 20 07 WL18 51 78 4 (N. D. N. Y. June 26 , 2 00 7) . T he c ourt pe rm ane ntl y 15 enjoined (1) the State Def endants fr om employing N .Y. Railroad L aw § 97( 3) to order the 16 c los ur e of

the c ro ssi ng , a

nd (2 ) t he Ra ilr oa d D e fe nd ants “ fr om u nd e rt akin gany

a c tio ns to 17 barr icade [t he cr ossing] pursuant to the orde r issued by State Def

endants . . .” Id. at *1 5. As a 18 result of g rantingsummary judgme nt to I sland Park on its pre- emption claim, the cour t dismi ssedThe c ourt also par tially g rante d the summary

judgme nt motions of the Railroa d 5 Def endants a nd the State Def

endants dismissing I sland Park’s se cond and third c laims (due proce ss and taking s). 2007 WL1851784, at *4-*9. Although I sland Park cr oss-appe aled, its appe al must be dismissed because it does not 6 seek to modify

the district court judg ment. The judg ment g rante d I sland Park a pe rmane nt inj un c tio n, wh ic h w a s a ll the re lie f i t r e qu e ste d. “ [N]o c ro ss- a pp e a l w a s n e c e ssa

ry to b ri ngthe se contentions befor e us if they can be considere d otherwise. T hey would simply

be alter native g rounds on which the judg ment below could be supported.” Doro v. She et Me tal W orkers’ I nt’l Ass’n , 4 9 8 F. 3 d

1 5 2 , 1 5 6 n . 4 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Raines , 362 U.S. 17, 27 n.7 (1960)) . We theref

ore c onsider the a

rguments I sland Park make s in support of its cross-appe al as argume nts fo r a ff

ir min gthe dis tr ic t c ourt

jud g me nt. 6 1 its fourth claim seekingto enforc e the 1989 state court judg ment as moot. Id. at *14. 5 2 On appe al, both the Railroad a nd State Def

endants a rgue that the district cour t 3 err oneously

deter mined that the closure order was pre -empted by

fede ral law . The Railroa d 4 De fe nd ants a lso c ha lle ng e the pr op ri e ty of the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s sua sponte g rant of summar y 5 jud g me nt t o I sla

nd Park wi tho ut p ri or

no tic e , whic h th e y

argue de nie d th e m th e op po rt un ity to 6 pr e se nt e vid e nc e and le g a l argume nt i n o pp os iti on to s umm ary

jud g me nt. I sla

nd Park , in 7 addition to defendingthe district court’s de termination, adva nces two a lternate g rounds on which 8 thi s Co ur

t sh ou ld a ff

ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt

jud g me nt –

i.e ., that it

wa s d e pr ive d o f i ts p ro pe rt y 9 interest in the cr ossing without due pr ocess of law, and that the closure or der c onstitut ed a taking 10 of prope rty

without justcompensation. Be cause we a g ree with the Def endants that ne ither 6 11 I CCTA nor FRSA pre- empts the state closure order , the district court judg ment g rantingI sland 12 Park summary

judgme nt on its pre-emption claim must be re verse d. We further conclude that 13 the district court c orre ctly reje cted I sland Park’s due proce ss and taking s claims; thus, we dec line 14 to affir

m the district court judg ment on those alterna tive g rounds. L astly , we r emand to the 15 district court for

further proce eding s on I sland Park’s f ourth claim (whic h soug ht enforc ement ofI t is we ll e sta bli sh e d th at w e re vie w a

dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt de 7 novo . See A &J ProduceCorp. v. Bronx Ov erall Econ. De v. Corp. , 542 F.3d 54, 57 ( 2d Cir. 2008). 7 1 the 1989 state c ourt judg ment) bec ause that claim is no longe r moot in light of our r ever sal of the 2 dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt. 3 DI SCU SSIO N 4 A par

ty is entitled to summ ary

judgme nt only

if “the ple ading s, the discover y and 5 disclosure mate rials on file, a nd any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue a s to any 6 mate ri a l f

a c t and that th e mov ant i s e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 7 56(c) . “[A] determination reg ardingpree mption is a conc lusion of law, and we there fore revie w 8 it de novo .” Drakev. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings , 4 5 8 F. 3 d 4 8 , 5 6 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 6 ). Al th o u gh

7 9 “[d] istrict courts have the discre tion to gra nt summary

judgme nt sua sponte, eve n without notice 10 in c e rt a in c ir c ums ta nc e s, ” we have c a

uti on e d th at “ c are sh ou ld b e take n b y the dis tr ic t c ourt

to 11 de te rm ine tha

t th e pa rt y a g a ins t w ho m summa

ry jud g me nt i s r e nd e re d h a s h a d a fu ll a nd fa ir 12 opportunity

to meet the proposition that there is no ge nuine issue of mate rial fa ct to be tried, a nd 13 that the par

ty for whom summary

judgme nt is render ed is entitled there to as a matter of law.” 14 Schwan-Stabilo Cosmetics GmbH &Co. v. PacificLink Int’l Corp. , 401 F.3d 28, 33 ( 2d Cir. 15 2005) (c itation, internal quotation marks and a lterations omitted). In this case, while the district 16 c ourt

may have be e n il l- a dv ise d in

g ra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt su a s

po nte to I sla nd Park on thi s 17 difficult pre -emption question, it did not err in concludingthat this case wa s suitable for 18 re so lut ion

by summa ry jud g me nt. Th e mate ri a l f a c ts a re un dis pute d a

nd the pr e -e mpt ion

iss ue is 19 a question of law that has bee n fully

briefe d by

the par ties. Acc ording ly , a re mand to the district 20 court for

a trial on this issue is not required. F or the re asons that follow, we reve rse a nd direc t8 1 entry

of summary

judgme nt for De fenda

nts dismi ssing I sland Park’s pr e-e mption claim. 2 I. P re- em ption 3 The Suprema cy Clause, Article VI , cl. 2 of the United States Consti tution, provides that 4 the laws of the United States “shall be the supreme L aw of the L and; . . . any

Thing in the 5 Constit ution or L aws of a ny state to the Contrary

notwithstanding.” Thus, “state la ws that 6 ‘interf

ere with, or are contra

ry to,’ fede ral law ” must be invalidated. Hillsborough County, Fla. 7 v. Automated M

ed. Labs., Inc. , 4 7 1 U. S

. 7 0 7 , 7 1 2 (1 9 8 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Gibbons v. Ogde n , 22 U.S. (9 8 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) ). The Supre me Court has longrec og nized that “‘[t] he purpose of 9 Congr ess is the ultimate touchstone’ in eve ry pre- emption case .” Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 1 0 S

. C t

. 5 3 8 , 5 4 3 (2 0 0 8 ) ( al t er at i o ni no ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g Medtronic, I nc. v. Lohr , 518 U.S. 470, 485 11 (1996)) . Congr essional intent “primar ily is discerne d from the languag e of the pre- emption 12 statute and the statutory fra mework sur

roundingit.” Gree n Mountain R.R. Corp. v. Vermont , 404 1 3 F. 3 d

6 3 8 , 6 4 1 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Me dtron ic , 518 U.S. at 485-86). 14 Pre-e mption may be express or implied. “Express pre emption arises whe n ‘a f eder al 15 statute expressly

direc ts that state law be ouste d.’” Air Transp. Ass ’n of Am. v. Cuomo , 520 F.3d 1 6 2 1 8 , 2 2 0 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( p er

cu ri am ) ( qu o t i n g Ass’n of Int’l Auto. Mfrs. v. Abrams , 84 F.3d 602, 17 607 (2d Cir. 1996)). I n the abse nce of

an express direc tive from Cong ress, pre -emption may “be 18 inferr ed if the sc ope of the statute indicates that Cong ress intende d fede ral lawto occupy the 19 leg islative field, or if ther e is an a ctual conf lict betwee n state and f

eder al law.” Altria Group , 2 0 1 2 9 S

. C t

. at5 4 3 (c i t i n g Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick , 5 14 U. S. 2 80 , 2 87 (1 99 5) ); se e als o 21 English v. Gen. Ele c. Co. , 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). Implied pre-e mption ex ists when “the 22 perva siveness of the f eder al re g ulation prec ludes supplementation by the States, wher e the9 1 fede ral intere st in the field is sufficiently dominant, or wher e the objec t sought to be obta ined by 2 the fe dera l law and the c hara cter of oblig ations imposed by it revea l the same purpose .” 3 Schneide wind v. ANR Pipeline Co. , 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988) (c itation, internal quotation marks 4 and alter ations omitt ed). The Supreme Court has c autioned, howe ver, that the prese nce of an 5 express pre- emption clause in a fede ral statute “ does not immediately end the inquiry

beca use the 6 question of the substance and scope of Cong ress’ displac ement of state law still remains.” Al tri a 7 Group , 129 S. Ct . at 543. Indeed, when cour ts are c alled upon to addr ess questions of express or 8 implied pre-e mption, the analy sis alway s beg ins “‘with the assumption that the historic police 9 power s of the States [are] not to be superse ded by the Fe dera l Act unless that was the clea r and 10 manifest purpose of Cong ress.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Rice v . Santa Fe Elev ator Corp. , 331 U.S. 218, 230 11 (1 94 7) ); see CSX Transp., Inc. v . Easterwood , 507 U.S. 658, 663-64 (1993). 12 Two fe dera l statutes – I CCTA and FRSA – potentially pre- empt NYSDOT’s r ail crossing 13 closure or der. I sland Park’s c omplaint alleg es that the c losure orde r wa s pre- empted by both. 14 The district cour

t concluded that the order was pre -empted by

I CCTA and did not reac h the issue 15 of pre -emption under F RSA. 16 A. The Interstate Com m erc e Com m ission Term ination Act 17 Congr ess has e x erc ised broad r egulatory authority over r ail transportation for 122 y ear s. 18 In 1887, the Interstate Commerc e Ac t (“I CA”) c reated the Interstate Commerc e Commissi on 19 (“I CC”). The I CA was “a mong the most pervasive a nd compre hensive of f

eder al re g ulatory 20 sc he me s and

ha s c on se qu e ntl y

pr e se nte d r e c ur

ri ngpr e -e mpt ion

qu e sti on s f

ro m th e tim e of

its 21 enac tment.” Chi. & N. W . Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick &Tile Co. , 4 5 0 U

. S

. 3 1 1 , 3 1 8 ( 1 9 8 1 )

. In 22 J anuar

y 1996, I CCTA abolished the I CC and replac ed it with the Surfac e Tra nsportation Boa

rd49 U. S.C. § 1 05 01 (b ), state d in fu ll, pr ov ide s: 8 The jurisdiction of the B oard ove r – (1 ) t ra ns po rt atio n b y

ra il c arr ie rs , a

nd the re me die s p ro vid e d in thi s p art wi th r e sp e c t to rate s, c la ssi fi c atio ns , r

ule s ( inc lud ingc ar s e rv ic e , inte rc ha ng e , a nd oth e r o pe ra

tin gru le s) , p ra c tic e s, routes, ser

vices, a nd fac iliti es of suc h car

riers; a nd (2 ) t he c on str uc tio n, a c qu isi tio n, op e ratio n, a ba nd onme nt, or

dis c on tin ua nc e of sp ur , in du str ia l, team, switching , or side tra cks, or f acilities, eve n if the trac ks are located, or intended to be located, e ntirely

in one State, is ex clusive. Except as otherw ise provided in this part, the r emedies pr ovided under this part with respec t to regulation of rail tra nsportation are exclusive and pree mpt the remedie s provided under F eder al or State law

. 10 1 (“STB ”), which continues to per form many of the func tions formerly perf ormed by the I CC. See 2 I CC T e rm inatio n A c t of 19 95 , Pu b. L . N o. 10 4- 88 , 1 09 Stat. 8 03 (c od if ie d g e ne ra lly

at 49 U. S.C. 3 §§ 10 10 1- 16 10 6) . T he STB is v e ste d w ithbr oa d ju ri sd ic tio n o ve r “ tr ans po rt atio n b y ra il 4 car

riers.” 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(1). G ener ally speaking , 5 I CCTA repea led much of the economic r egulation previously conducte d by

the 6 I CC and

by state ra ilr oa d r e g ulator s w or kin gin c on

jun c tio n w iththe I CC. In s o 7 do ing , Co ng re ss r e c og nize d th at c on tin uin gstate re g ulatio n –

of int ra state ra il 8 rate s, for e x ample – would “r isk the balkanization and subversion of the Fe dera l 9 scheme of minimal regulation for this intrinsically interstate f

orm of 10 transportation.” 11 12 Io wa, Chi . &E. R. R. Cor p. v . W as h. Cou nty , 3 84 F .3 d 5 57 , 5 59 (8 th C ir . 2 00 4) (q uo tin gH. R. 13 Rep. No. 104-311, at 96, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 793, 808). 14 I CCTA’s jurisdictional provision also contains an express pre -emption clause – “the 15 reme dies provided unde r this part with respe ct to regulation of rail tra nsportation are exclusive 16 and

pr e e mpt the re me die s p ro vid e d und e r F e de ra l or State law. ” 49 U. S.C. § 1 05 01 (b ). Ra il 8 17 “ tr ans po rt atio n” is d e fi ne d to inc lud e : 18 (A) a

locomotive, car , vehicle, ve ssel, war ehouse, wharf , pier, doc k, y ard,11 1 pr op e rty

, fa c ili ty , in str

ume nta lity , o r e qu ipm e nt of any kind related to the 2 mo v e me nt o f pa sse nge rs o r p ro

pe rty , o r b oth , b

yra il , reg ardle ss of owner ship or 3 an a g re e me nt c on c e rn ingus e ; and (B ) s e rv ic e s r e late d to that mo ve me nt, 4 i n cl u d i n g re ce i p t , d el i v ery , el ev at i o n , tra n s fe r i ntra n s i t , re fr i ger at i o n , i ci n g, 5 v e n t i l at i o n , s t o r a g e , h a n d l i n g , an d

i n t e r c h an g e o f

p a s s e n g e r s an d

p r o p e rty. 6 49 U. S.C. § 1 01 02 (9 ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . I CCT A “ pr e e mpt s a ll ‘ state laws that ma y re a so na bly 7 be said to have the ef fec t of manag ing or

g overningrail transpor

tation, while permitting the 8 continued application of laws havinga more remote or incidental ef

fec t on rail transportation.’” 9 N.Y

. Susquehanna &W

. Ry. Corp. v. J

ackson , 5 0 0 F. 3 d

2 3 8 , 2 5 2 (3 d

C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Fla. E. 10 Coast Ry. Co. v. City of W . Palm Beac h , 266 F.3d 1324, 1331 ( 11th Cir. 2001)). The pr e11 e mpt ion

inq uir y fo c us e s o n “ the de g re e to whic h th e c ha lle ng e d r e g ulatio n b ur de ns ra il 12 transportation.” N.Y . Susquehanna , 500 F.3d at 252. 13 Th e dis tr ic t c ourt pr e mis e d it s p re -e mpt ion c on c lus ion

on its de te rm inatio n th at a

“ ra il 14 crossing ” fa lls withi n I CCTA’s definition of “tra nsportation” by

rail ca rrier s. 2007 WL1851784, 15 at *1 2 ( c iti ng49 U. S.C. § 1 05 01 (b )) . T he c ourt ob se rv e d th at th e te rm

“ tr ans po rt atio n” is 16 define d broadly

and includes “ proper

ty . . . of any

kind relate d to the movement of pa sseng ers or 17 proper

ty , or both, by

rail, re g ardle ss of owner ship or an agree ment conce rninguse.” Id. (quoting 18 42 U.S.C. § 10102(9)). The court then e mploy ed its own definition of ra il crossing – “an 19 improvement to railroa d trac ks that allows vehicles, e quipment, and per sons to traverse the 20 trac ks.” Id. Acc ordingto the court, “ [a] ny phy sical improvements made to railroad tr acks – suc h 21 as those made to construct a c rossing – will necessa rily impact and be involved in the movement 22 of passe ng ers a

nd proper ty passingover those tr acks.” Id. Thus , th e c ourt he ld t hat th e ra il 23 crossingclosure w as within the STB’s jurisdiction. Id. 24 The district cour t further noted that other c ourts have “ long r ecognized Congre ss’sW e a g r e e , h o w e v e r , w i thth e d i s tr i c tc o urtth ata r a i l c r o s s i n gi s n o ta

r a i l “ f a c i l i ty” 9 under 49 U .S.C. § 10102(9). The cour t observed that I CCTA “does not def ine ‘fa cility ’ or ‘fa cilities’ specific ally

to include g rade crossing s,” and e x plained that “a fac ility is a structure de signe d to ho us e sp e c if

ic op e ratio ns , a

nd no t an im

pr ov e me nt t o th e tr a c ks tha t a llo ws the m to be cr ossed by

traff ic.” 2007 WL1851784, at *12. We concur and thus reje ct I sland Park’s ar g u m e n tt o th e c o n tr ar

y. 12 1 g ener al intent to ensure the perva sive and c omprehe nsive fede ral re g ulation of railroa d 2 operations, and the I CCTA’s broad pr eemptive e ffe ct.” Id. at *13. The c ourt deter mined that the 3 closure or der w as “not the ty pe of pr edictable , g ener ally applicable regulation that the [S econd] 4 Circuit envisioned withstanding the I CCTA’s pree mption clause.” Id. (c i t i n g Gr e e n M ou nta in , 5 404 F.3d at 643). 6 In o ur

vie w, the te rm

ra il “ tr ans po rt atio n” do e s n ot e nc omp a ss t he c los ur e of

thi s p ri vate 7 rail cr ossing. Rail transpor tation does include “ proper ty . . . related to the movement of 8 pa sse ng e rs or

pr op e rt y . . . b y ra il, ” 49 U. S.C. § 1 01 02 (9 )( A) , and a ra il c ro ssi ngdo e s c on sti tut e 9 9 “an improve ment to railroad tr acks that allows vehicles, e quipment, and per sons to traverse the 10 tr a c ks .” 20 07 WL18 51 78 4, at *1 2. B ut w e c ann ot c on c lud e that all state ac tion related to a 11 ra ilr oa d c ro ssi ngis p re -e mpt e d. Th e a pp ro pr iate qu e sti on s a

re : w hat do e s th e state se e k to 12 regulate and doe s the proposed r egulation burden ra il transportation? 13 Her e, the state wants to terminate the use of a private r oadwa

y that trave rses ra ilroad 14 tr a c ks . N e w Y or k d oe s n ot s e e k to imp os e its a uth or ity ov e r t he tr a c ks the mse lve s o r o ve r “ ra il 15 car

riers” that use the tra cks. Rather , the re sult of the state re g ulation at issue here is the 16 termination of I sland Park’s use of the c rossing . I f we adopted a definition of ra il transportation 1 7 f o r p r e - e mp t i o np ur

p o s e s th ati n c l u d e s th e m o v e m e n to f p e o p l e an d

p r o p e rty ac ro ss railroa d 18 tr a c ks , th en an y

en t i ty – an au t o m o b i l e, b i cy cl e o r e v en a p ed es tri an p as s i n g o v er th e c ro s s i n g –Such an expansive def inition m ight e ven ca ll into questi on state public saf ety laws that 10 prohibit trespassingon railroa d proper ty

. See, e .g. , N.Y. Penal L aw § 140.10( g ). We emphasize that this appeal does not re quire us to dec ide whethe r state r egulation of 11 rail cr ossings, a s a g ener al matter, is pre -empted unde r I CCTA. Bec ause the limit ed state a ction in this case does not burde n or interf ere with rail transportation, it i s not pre-e mpted. S e e N

. Y. Susquehanna , 500 F.3d at 252. 13 1 would arguably

be beyond the re ach of

state re g ulatory

authority

. NYSDOT’s or der c losing the

10 2 rail cr ossing doe s not “rela te[] to” “the move ment of passe ng ers or proper ty

. . by ra il .” 49 3 U.S.C. § 10102(9)(A) (empha sis added). 4 To the e xtent th e re is a n im pa c t on ra il tra ns po rt atio n, it i s c on fi ne d to e lim inatin gthe ri sk 5 of a c oll isi on be tw e e n a

tr a in a nd on e of I sla nd Park ’s ve hic le s o r e qu ipm e nt a tte mpt ingto c ro ss 6 the trac ks. As the AL J noted, the Hudson L ine enter tains signific ant ra il traffic , often including 7 high spe ed tra ins. Bec ause of that traff ic and the poor

sight distance cause d by

the cur vature and 8 e le vatio n o f t

he tr a c ks , th e AL J det e rm ine d th at it wa s d ang e ro us fo r I sla

nd Park ’s ve hic le s to 9 cross the tra cks. Instead of bur deningrail transpor tation, see N.Y

. Susquehanna , 500 F.3d at 252, 10 the closure order

fac ilitates rail transportation by removinga potential hazar d. 11 11 In a re cent c ase f rom the F ifth Circuit, which noted “the paucity of pre cede nt. . . relating 12 to I CCTA preemption vel non for r ailroad c rossing s,” the c ourt held that I CCTA ex presslypre13 e mpt e d a

pr op e rt y owne r’ s st ate -l aw a c tio n to e njo in a ra ilr oa d f ro m r e mov ingfo ur

pr ivate 14 railroa d crossing s on its right of wa y . Franks Inv . Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. , 534 F.3d 443, 447 15 (5th Cir. 2008). The F ifth Circuit took the view that the ca se turned on “ whether railroa d 16 c ro ssi ng s f

it w ith in t he purv ie w o f ‘ tr ans po rt atio n b y ra il c arr ie rs ,’ the re by

e vin c ingCon g re ss’ 17 intent to preempt state- law cla ims relatingto ownership of the crossing s.” Id. at 445-46. The 18 court c oncluded that r ailroad c rossing s fell within I CCTA’s pre- emption provision because theyI sland Park cites nume rous ca ses wher e state r egulation was pre -empted. H oweve r, 12 eac h involved some form of inter fer ence with rail operations. See, e .g. , Buffalo S. R.R. Inc. v. Vill. of C roton-On-Hudson, 434 F. Supp. 2d 241, 248-49 (S.D.N.Y . 2006) (e nteringpreliminary injunction in favor of r ail car rier c oncer

ning its rig ht to use leased pr operty upon finding that I CCTA pre-e mpted local re g ulation and exercise of eminent domain power); W is. Cent. Lt d. v. City of M ar sh fie ld , 160 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1013 (W.D. Wis. 2000) (I CCTA pre-e mpted a city ’s use of c ondemnation authority over a railroa d trac k as the c ity

would be “e x erc ising c ontrol -- the 14 1 met the “e x tremely broad” definition of transpor tation, which cove red a ll “proper ty . . . or 2 e qu ipm e nt of any kind related to the movement of pa sseng ers or proper ty , or both, by

rail.” Id. at 3 449 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 10102(9)) (e mphasis in origina l). The c ourt also endor sed the district 4 court’s f

inding that “ crossing s aff ect sa fety , draina g e, and ma intenance , which nec essar ily aff ect 5 rail trave l,” id. at 446, and c ited the district court opinion in the prese nt case for the pr oposition 6 that rail cr ossings fa ll within t he def inition of rail “transpor

tation.” Id. B ut Franks involved a 7 private individual’s attempt to prevent a r ailroad f rom closingprivate r ail crossing s, thereby 8 interfe ringwith railroad ope rational de cisions. This case, how ever , measure s the ability of a 9 state to order

the closure of a c rossing for sa fety rea sons. 10 We t

hink it imp or tant t o e mph a size that a lth ou g h I CCT A’ s p re -e mpt ion langua g e is 11 unquestionably

broad, it does not categ orica lly swee p up all state re g ulation that touches upon 12 ra ilr oa ds – inte rf

e re nc e wi th r a il tra

ns po rt atio n mu st a lw ay s b e de mon str ate d. F or e xamp le , in 13 Friberg v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. , the Fif th Circuit held that I CCTA pre-e mpted a Te x as 14 “Anti-B lockingStatute” that prohibited a r ailroad f rom allowinga standingtrain to block a 15 crossingfor more than five minutes. 267 F .3d 439, 443-44 (5th Cir. 2001). The court e x plained 16 that “[r]egulating the time a train ca n occupy a ra il crossing impacts, in such ar eas a s train spee d, 17 le ng th a

nd sc he du lin g , th e wa

y a ra ilr oa d o pe ra

te s it s tr a ins , w ithc on c omi tant e c on omi c 18 ramifica

tions.” Id. at 444. Howeve r, seve ral c ourts and the STB have de clined to find pre

12most ex treme ty pe of c ontrol -- ove r ra il transportation as it is defined in [49 U.S.C. §] 10 10 2( 9) ” ); Burlington N . Santa Fe Corp. v. Anderson , 9 59 F . Su pp . 1 28 8, 12 94 (D . M on t. 19 97 ) ( I CCT A p re -e mpt e d s tate re g ulator y a uth or ity ov e r r a ilr oa d s e rv ic e a g e nc ie s) ; CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ga. Pub. Se rv. Comm’n  ̧ 944 F. Supp. 1573, 1581 (N.D . Ga. 1996) (same) ; Burlington N

. R.R. Co. v. Page Grain Co. , 545 N.W.2d 749, 824 (Neb. 1996) ( I CCTA preempted state c ourt jurisdiction over ra il carr ier’s r ail service ag encie s). 15 1 emption where the state or loc al re g ulation does not interfe re w ith rail operations. S e e N

. Y. 2 Susquehanna , 500 F.3d at 253-54 (holdingthat I CCTA does not pre-e mpt state regulation where 3 the re g ulatio n d oe s n ot u nr e a so na bly burd e n r a il o pe ratio ns and do e s n ot d isc ri min ate a g a ins t 4 ra ilr oa ds ); Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. , 266 F.3d at 1326, 1339 (holding that I CCTA does not pre-e mpt 5 a city ’s application of zoni ngand occ upational license ordinanc es ag ainst the opera tions of a 6 railroa d lessee be cause it “does not constitute ‘re g ulation of rail tra nsportation’” a

nd it “does not 7 frustrate the objec tives of fe dera l railroad policy”); Ma um e e &W . R .R . Co rp . a nd

RM W Ve ntu re s, 8 LLC

- Petition for Declaratory Orde r , STB F inance Docke t No. 34354, 2004 STB L EXI S 140, 9 *3, 2004 WL395835, *1 (S.T.B. Ma rch 2, 2004) (obser

ving that “state a

nd local re g ulation 10 [af

fe c tin gra ilr oa d p ro pe rt

y ] is p e rm iss ibl e wh e re it d oe s n ot i nte rf e re wi th i nte rs tate ra il 11 op e ratio ns , a

nd loc a lit ie s r e ta in c e rt a in p oli c e po we rs to p ro te c t pu bli c he a lthand

sa fe ty” ). In th is 12 c a se , I sla

nd Park sim ply c ann ot s ho w that th e state re g ulatio n at is su e – th e c los ur e of a pr ivate 13 ra il c ro ssi ngto a

no n- ra il c arr ie r –

int e rf e re s w ithor

burd e ns ra il o pe ratio ns . 14 Finally , I sland Park ar g ues that our de cision in Gr e e n M ou nta in supports the district 15 court’s de cision. The district cour t took the view that the closure proce ss constituted a leng thy 16 administrative proc ess, direc ted at a pa rticular r ailroad c rossing in which state off icials wer e 17 vested with broa d discretion to deter mine the closure question. See2007 WL1851784, at *12. 1 8 C i t i n g Gr e e n M

ou nta in , 404 F.3d at 643, the district court conc luded that this was “not the ty pe16 1 of pre dictable, g ener ally applicable regulation that [ we] envisioned withstanding the I CCTA’s 2 pree mption clause.” 2007 WL 1851784, at *12. 3 In Gr e e n M ou nta in , a ra ilr oa d s ou g ht t o b uil d tr ans -l oa din gfa c ili tie s o n it s p ro pe rt y in 4 Ve rm on t. T he State argue d th at th is ty pe of fa c ili ty wa s su bje c t to a state e nv ir onme nta l la

nd us e 5 statute mandatingpre- construction per mits. See404 F.3d at 638, 640. We held that the pre6 construction per

mit requirement wa s pre- empted by I CCTA beca

use it “(i) unduly

interfe re[d] 7 wi th i nte rs tate c omm e rc e by g ivi ngthe loc a l bo dy

the a bil ity to d e ny the c arr ie r t

he ri g ht t o 8 construct f

acilities or conduc t operations; and (ii) it can be time-c onsuming, a llowing a local 9 body

to delay construction of r ailroad f acilities almost indefinitely .” Id. at 643 (interna l citation 10 and quotation marks omitted). We re cog nized that 11 states and towns may exercise tra ditional police power s over the de velopment of 12 ra ilr oa d p ro pe rt y , at le a st t o th e e xtent th at th e re g ulatio ns pr ote c t pu bli c he a lth 13 and

sa fe ty , a re se ttl e d a

nd de fi ne d, c an b e ob e y e d w ithre a so na ble c e rt a int

y , e nta il 14 no extended or open- ended de lay s, and ca n be appr oved (or

reje cted) without the 15 e xer c ise of dis c re tio n o n s ub

je c tiv e qu e sti on s. 16 17 Id. We further

noted that “[e]lectrica l, plumbing and f ire c odes, direc t environmental 18 re g ulatio ns e na c te d f or the pr ote c tio n o f t

he pu bli c he a lthand

sa fe ty , a nd oth e r g e ne ra lly 19 applicable , non-discriminatory regulations and permit re quirements would see m to withst and 20 pree mption.” Id. We expl ained that the le g islative history of I CCTA supported this approac h, 21 noting “ [a] lthough States re tain the police powe rs re serve d by the Constitut ion, the Fe dera l 22 scheme of ec onomic regulation and der egulation is int ended to a ddress a nd encompa ss all such 23 regulation and to be complete ly exclusive.” Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 96 (1995), 24 re

pr inte d in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 793, 808). In Gr e e n M ou nta in , it

wa s u nn e c e ssa ry fo r u s to 25 “dra

w a line that divide[d] l ocal r egulations betwee n those that are pree mpted and those that a re17 1 not.” Id. The state pr e-c onstruction permit law wa s pre- empted bec ause it re strained the r ailroad 2 “ fr om d e ve lop me nt u nti l a pe rm it i s is su e d; t

he re qu ir e me nts fo r t

he pe rm it a

re no t se t f

or th i n 3 any

schedule or re g ulation that the railroa d can c onsult in order to assure compliance ; and the 4 issuance of

the per mit awaits and depe nds upon the discre tionary ruling s of a state or loca l 5 ag ency .” Id. Fe dera l regulation of the ra ilroad industry trumped loca l conce rns that wer e vague, 6 time consuming, a nd limit ed only

by the discre tion of local off icials whose pr ovincial conc erns 7 may

not appre ciate the need f or the ra ilroad’s propose d action. 8 Although N .Y. Railroad L aw § 97( 3) vests NYSDOT w ith broad discre tion to determine 9 whether

a ra il crossing should be altere d or closed, Gr e e n M ou nta in never

theless does not control 10 for one fundame ntal rea son – the state ac tion in thi s case does not interfe re w ith railroad 11 operations. See N.Y . Susquehanna , 500 F.3d at 252. I n Gr e e n M ou nta in , we de termined that 12 “the pr oposed transloa ding a nd storag e fa cilities [ wer e] integr al to the ra ilroad’s ope ration,” a nd 13 thus, the permit proce ss “nec essar ily interfe re[d] wit h Gre en Mountain’s a bility to construct 14 fac iliti es and c onduct ec onomic activities.” 404 F .3d at 644 (interna l citation and quotations 15 omitted). No such oper ational interfe renc e exists here. 16 B. The Fe deral Railroad Saf ety A ct 17 Our holdingthat I CCTA does not pre-e mpt the state closure order is further suppor

ted by 18 another

fede ral statute – F RSA – that pertains to railroa d safe ty and expressly

addre sses the issue 19 of ra ilroad cr ossings. See49 U.S.C. § 20134 (entitled “Gra de cr ossings a nd railroa d rig hts of 20 wa

y ” ). In d e te rm ini ngwh e the r C on g re ss i nte nd e d to pr e -e mpt state re g ulatio n o f r a il c ro ssi ng s, 21 the district court e rre d in failing to consider the impac t of FRSA. 22 In 1970, Congr ess ena cted F RSA to “promote safe ty in ever y are a of r ailroad ope rationsThe Administrator of the Fe dera l Railroad Administration “shall ca rry out . . . (1) 13 duties and powe rs re lated to ra ilroad saf ety vested in the Sec reta

ry [of Transportation].” 49 U.S.C. § 103(g) (1). 18 1 and to re duce r ailroad- related ac cidents and inc idents.” 49 U.S.C. § 20101 (forme rly 45 U.S.C. § 2 43 4) ; see ge nerally CSX Transp. , 5 07 U. S. at 66 1- 66 2. To a c c omp lis h th is p ur po se , F RSA 3 confe rs authority

upon the Secr etar

y of Tra nsportation to “pre scribe r egulations and issue order s 4 for e very

are a of r ailroad sa fety .” 49 U.S.C. § 20103(a)

. Recog nizi ngthat rail cr ossings have 13 5 an inher ently

local tint, the statute specif ically direc ts “the Secr etar

y of Tra nsportation [t o] 6 maintain a coor dinated ef fort to deve lop and ca

rry out soluti ons to the railroa d g rade crossing 7 problem.” Id. § 20134. FRSA also has a n express pre- emption provision that contemplates 8 continued state r egulation of railroa d safe ty

. See49 U.S.C. § 20106. The statute beg ins by 9 pr ov idi ngthat th e “ L aws , r e g ulatio ns , a nd or de rs re late d to ra ilr oa d s a fe ty

. . . s ha ll b e natio na lly 10 un if

or m to the e xtent pr a c tic a

ble .” 49 U. S.C. § 2 01 06 (a )( 1) . T he statut e pe rm its a state to 11 “adopt or

continue in forc e a la

w, re g ulation, or order

related to railroa d safe ty

. . . until the 12 Secre tary

of Tra nsportation (with respe ct to railroa d safe ty matters) . . . pr escr ibes a re g ulation or 13 issues an orde r cove ring the subject matter

of the State re quirement.” Id. (empha sis added). The 14 statute also allows a state to “adopt or c ontinue in force an additional or more stringe nt law, 15 re g ulatio n, or

or de r r e late d to ra ilr oa d s a fe ty

. . . whe n th e law, re g ulatio n, or or de r - (A ) i s 16 nece ssary

to eliminate or re duce a

n essentially

local saf ety or sec urity

hazard; (B ) is not 17 incompatible with a law, r egulation, or order of the United States Gove rnment; and (C) doe s not 18 unrea sonably

burden inter state commer ce.” 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2) . The Supreme Court has 19 indicated that r egulations issued by the Secr etar

y of Tra nsportation that mere ly

“touch upon” or 20 “re late to” the sa me subject matter

as a state safe ty

law ar e insuffic ient to establish pre-e mption19 1 beca

use “‘ cover ing’ is a more r estrictive ter m which indicates that pre-e mption will lie only if the 2 fede ral re g ulations substantially subsume the subject matter of the re levant state la

w.” CSX 3 Transp. , 507 U.S. at 664. 4 Severa l circuits that have examined the interplay betwee n I CCTA and FRSA have 5 c on c lud e d th at th e fe de ra l st atut or y sc he me pla c e s p ri nc ipa l f e de ra l r e g ulator

y a uth or ity fo r r a il 6 sa fe ty

wi th t he F e de ra l Ra ilr oa d A dmi nis tr atio n ( “ F RA ” ), no t th e STB . We a g re e . T hu s, F RSA 7 pr ov ide s th e a

pp ro pr iate ba sis fo r a

na ly zingwh e the r a

state law, re g ulatio n o r o rd e r a ff e c tin gra il 8 safe ty

is pre-e mpted by

fede ral law

. See, e .g. , Boston & Me. Corp. v. SurfaceTransp. Bd. , 364 9 F .3 d 3 18 , 3 21 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 4) ; Iowa, Chi. & E. R.R. Corp. , 3 84 F .3 d at 56 1; Ty rre ll v . No rfo lk 10 S. Ry. Co. , 248 F.3d 517, 523 ( 6th Cir. 2001). 11 In Ty rre ll , the Six th Circuit rever sed a district c ourt dec ision concluding that I CCTA pre12 empted an O hio track c lear ance regulation that the plaintiff used a s a basis for his neg lige nce pe r 13 se cla im under the F eder al Employ ers’ L iability Act (“ FELA”) . 248 F.3d at 520. The district 14 c ourt

ha d v ie we d th e Oh io s tatut e a s p ri mari ly a “ c on str uc tio n r e qu ir e me nt” and

lim ite d it s 15 analy sis to I CCTA’s pre- emption provision, 49 U.S.C . § 10501(b). Ty rre ll , 248 F.3d at 521. 16 That sec tion provides the STB with exclusive jurisdiction to regulate ra il carr iers’ c onstruction 17 and oper ation of ra il switches, side trac ks, and fa cilities. Id. at 521. The district c ourt indicated 18 that even if

it assumed the state re g ulation addre ssed workpla ce sa fety , I CCTA was still t he 19 pr op e r s tatut e fo r p re -e mpt ion ana ly sis be c a

us e on e of

the e xpre ss p ur

po se s o f I CCT A w a s to 20 encour ag e saf

e and suitable workingconditions in the railroad industry

. Id. 21 The Six th Circuit recognized that “the STB must adhe re to fe dera l policies encour ag ing 22 ‘saf

e and suitable workingconditions in the railroad industry ,’” but c oncluded that “ I CCTA andThe c ourt found “unpe rsuasive” the ra ilroad’s a rgument that the bridg es we re be ing 14 repla ced f or re asons of “ highw ay

improvement,” a

nd not “ra il safety .” Id. at 560. The c ourt 20 1 its legislative history contain no evide nce that Congre ss intended for the STB to supplant the 2 FRA’s a

uthority over r ail safe ty .” Id. at 523 (quoting49 U.S.C. § 10101(11)). The court 3 de te rm ine d th at th e STB and the F RA ’s “ c omp le me nta ry e xer c ise of

the ir statut or y a uth or ity 4 acc urate ly

ref lects Cong ress’s intent for the I CCTA and FRSA to be construe d in pa ri m ate ria .” 5 Id. The c ourt conc luded: 6 Ba sed on the fe dera l railway statutes, the STB a

nd FRA’s jurisdictional 7 mana g e me nt, and the re su lti ngre g ulator

y sy ste ms, Con g re ss v e ste d th e F RAwi th 8 pr ima

ry a uth or ity ov e r n atio na l r a il s a fe ty

po lic y and a ssi g ne d th e STB the duty to 9 en co ura ge “ s af e a n d s u i t ab l e w o rk i n g co n d i t i o n s ” f o r r ai l wa y

em p l o y ee s th ro u gh 10 its assessment of individual railway proposals subject to its authority . As 11 statutory

“re peals by

implication are disfa

vored” and ther e is no positive 12 re pu g na

nc y be tw e e n F RSAand

the I CCT A’ s juri sd ic tio na l pr ov isi on s, thi s 13 statutory

construction prope rly

ref lects Cong ress’s pur

pose. 14 15 Id. Acc ording ly , the Ty rre ll court he ld that FRSA “provides the applicable standard f or asse ssing 16 fede ral pre emption” of the state rail saf ety law. Id. at 524. 17 Simi larly , in Iowa, Chi. & E. R.R. , the Eig hth Circuit rejec ted a r ailroad’ s argument that 18 an I owa statute r equiringit to pay for the r eplac ement of f

our bridg es (two c arr

ying the rail line 19 over a

highw ay and two ca

rry ing the highw ay

over the rail line) wa s pre- empted by I CCTA. The 20 ra ilr oa d a

rgue d th at th e state statut e wa s a n “ e xpre ssl y

pr e e mpt e d e c on omi c re g ulatio n, ” and , to 21 the extent it pertained to rail bridg es over the hig hway , it impermissi bly regulated ra il “fac iliti es.” 22 38 4 F .3 d at 55 9. Th e Ei g hth Cir c uit c ha ra c te ri zed thi s a rgume nt a s “ de c e pti ve ly

sim ple ” be c a us e 23 it “ignor e[ed] relevant fe dera l statutes that were enac ted bef ore I CCTA, that are a dminist ere d by 24 one or more ag encie s other than the I CC or the STB, and that Congre ss left intact in ena cting 25 I CCTA.” Id. at 559. The c ourt furthe r re cog nized that “Congr ess for ma ny deca des has f

org ed 14state d th at “ [t]he re a so ns fo r r e pla c ingthe br idg e s a s st ate d in the sti pu late d r e c or d c le arl y include a sa fety

component.” Id. The c ourt furthe r conc luded that if the ra ilroad wa s “ar g uing that ‘ra il safety ’ for

purposes of F RSA preemption does not include the hig hway safe ty risks cre ated at rail crossing s, that cra mped re adingof the F RSA is i nconsistent with 49 U.S.C. § 20 13 4( a ), wi th t

he fe de ra l r a il c ro ssi ngre g ulatio ns dis c us se d [by the Sup re me Court ] in Easterwood , and with common sense.” Id. The c ourt noted that “[m] ore importantly , the argument ignor es other f

eder al statutes that spec ifically addre ss the problem of de teriorating or inadequate ra ilway -hig hway bridg es.” Id. 21 1 a fe de ra l- sta tere

gu lator ypa rtn e rsh ip to deal with problems of ra il an d h i g h w ay sa

fe ty and 2 highw ay

imp ro ve me nt i n g e ne ra l, a nd the re pa ir

and re pla c e me nt o f d e te ri or ate d o r o bs ole te 3 railwa

y -hig hway

bridg es in particula

r,” which I CCTA did not address. Id. at 56 1 ( e mph a sis 4 added) . Thus, the cour t concluded that I CCTA’s “silence cannot r efle ct the re quisite ‘clea r and 5 manifest purpose of Cong ress’ to pr eempt tra ditional state regulation of public roads a nd bridg es 6 that Congr ess has e ncoura g ed in numerous other statutes.” Id. 7 In th e pr e se nt c a se , it is a bund antl y c le ar t hat th e c los ur e or de r s uf

fi c ie ntl y imp lic ate s r a il 8 safe ty

conce rns such that F RSA and not I CCTA is the principal g overningstatute in determining 9 wh e the r s tate a

uth or ity is p re -e mpt e d. As no te d e arl ie r, F RSAa llo ws state s to imp os e ra il s a fe ty 10 require ments as longas they are not inconsistent with federa l mandates. I sland Park points to no 11 fede ral ra il safety regulation that cover s rail cr ossing c losures. Ac cording ly , the state c losure 12 order

is not pre-e mpted by

FRSA. 13 II. Island P ark’s Alte rnate G rounds for Aff irm ance 14 As a lte rn ate g ro un ds fo r a ff ir min gthe dis tr ic t c ourt , I sla nd Park argue s th at th e State 15 Def

endants de prived it of its proper ty interest in the cr ossing without due pr ocess of law and that 1 6 th e c l o s ur e o r d e r

e f f e c tu at e d a “ t ak i n g ” o f

i t s p r o p e rty w i th o u tj u s tc o mp e n s at i o n . S p e c i f i c a l l y, 1 7 as t o d

u e p ro ce s s , i tas s ert s th atb ec au s e t h e S t at e d i d n o tal s o i n i t i at e c o n d em n at i o np ro ce ed i n gsN.Y. Railroad L aw § 97( 5) authorizes the NY SDOT Commis sioner “to a cquire any rea l 15 pr op e rt y , e a se me nts , r ig hts -o f- wa y or sim ila r r ig hts ne c e ssa

ry fo r t he purp os e s o f t

his art ic le in the same ma

nner a s proper

ty is acquire d for state highw ay purposes” pursuant to N.Y. Highway Law§ 3 0 an d

E D P L. As of the fi lin gof

thi s o pin ion , th at matte r r e ma ins pe nd ingbe fo re the Ap pe llate 16 Division, Third Depar

tment. 22 1 under the New Y ork Eminent Domain Proce dure L aw ( “EDPL ”), the closure of the c rossing 15 2 vio late d d

ue pr oc e ss. 3 A. Due P r oc e ss 4 I sland Park’s due proce ss argument err oneously conflates two distinct state law 5 proce dures – the c ondemnation proc eeding s set forth in EDPLand the r ail crossing 6 alteration/closure proc eeding s in N.Y. Railroad L aw § 97( 3). The que stion of whether the 7 closure or der at issue was ente red pur suant to a proc ess that comporte d with due proc ess is one 8 se pa

rate fr om whe the r t

he c ro ssi ngc los ur e wa s als o a “taking” trig g eringstate conde mnation 9 proce eding s. I sland Park ca nnot demonstrate that its due proc ess rig hts were violated in the 10 c los ur e pr oc e e din gc on te xt by sim ply a lle g ingthat N YSD OT did no t ad dit ion all yinitiate a 11 condemnation procee ding unde r EDPL . In any event, this claim is more prope rly direc ted to a 12 Ne w Y or

k s tate c ourt

in a pr oc e e din gfo r j ud ic ia l r e vie w und e r a rt ic le 78 of

the N. Y. Civ il 13 Practice L aw a

nd Rules – a re medy

I sland Park has a lrea dy

invoked. See H

ellenic Am

. 14 Neighborhood Action Comm. v. City of New Y ork, 101 F.3d 877, 881- 82 (2d Cir. 1996). 16 15 To the extent I sland Park’s a rgument can be viewed a s a cha lleng e to the constitutional 16 adequa cy

of the proc edure s set forth in N.Y. Railroa d L aw § 97( 3), the a rgument lacks mer it. 17 I sland Park wa s clea rly aff orded pr e-de privation notice a nd an opportunity

to be hea rd. The 18 rec ord bef

ore us de monstrates that NYSDOT c onducted f our day s of hea

ring s on the question of23 1 wh e the r t

he ra il c ro ssi ng“ sh ou ld b e a lte re d o r c los e d a nd dis c on tin ue d. ” In th os e pr oc e e din g s, 2 I sland Park appe are d with counsel, cr oss-examined witnesses, pre sented e vidence , and submitted 3 memoranda

in support of its posit ion. I sland Park does not point to any additional proce dural 4 safe g uard that would have e nhance d the dec ision-making pr ocess. The pre- deprivation notice 5 and extensive hea

ring s g ave I sland Park ample oppor tunity to be hea rd at a meaning ful time and 6 in a meaning ful manner

. See ge nerally Matthews v. Eldridge , 4 24 U. S. 3 19 , 3 35 (1 97 6) ; Brody 7 v. Vill. of Port Chester , 434 F.3d 121, 136 ( 2d Cir. 2005). 8 B. Taki ngs 9 We h ave pr e vio us ly he ld t hat a takin g s c la im i s n ot r ipe if “ a re me dy po te nti a lly

is 10 available under the state constitution’s provision.” Villager Pond, Inc. v . Town of Darien , 56 11 F .3 d 3 75 , 3 80 (2 d Ci r. 19 95 ); see also W illiamson County Reg’ l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton 12 Ba nk

of J oh ns on City , 473 U.S. 172, 187-88 (1985). B efor e a f eder al taking s claim ca

n be 13 asser

ted, compensation mustfirst be soug ht from the state if it has a “‘r easona

ble, ce rtain and 14 adequate provision for obtainingcompensation.’” Villager Pond , 56 F.3d at 379-80 (quoting 15 W

illiamson , 473 U.S. at 194). A plaintiff must pursue “ relief under a state compe nsation 16 proce dure . . . e ven whe re it re mains unsure a nd undevelope d.” Id. at 380 (interna l quotations 17 marks omitted). “Ripene ss is a jurisdictional inquiry ,” and thus we must consider it at the outset. 18 Murphy v . New Milford Z oning Comm’n , 402 F.3d 342, 347 ( 2d Cir. 2005). 19 Un de r t

he Ne w Y or

k St ate Con sti tut ion , “ [p]r ivate pr op e rt y sh a ll n ot b e take n f

or pu bli c 20 us e wi tho ut j us t c omp e ns atio n. ” N. Y. Con st. , A rt . I , § 7( a ). State law v e sts the Court of Cla ims 21 with jurisdiction to determine claims ar ising fr om the acquisition of re al prope rty by the State of 22 New Y ork. SeeN.Y. Em. Dom. Proc. L aw § 501( A). Assumingfor pur poses of this argument24 1 that the closure order eff ectuated a “ taking ,” the district cour t properly reje cted I sland Park’s 2 c la im a s unr ipe be c a us e it f a ile d to se e k c omp e ns atio n f ro m th e State be fo re c omm e nc ingthi s 3 action. 4 CO NC LU SION 5 New Y ork State’s c losure of this private rail cr ossing doe s not burden ra ilroad oper ations 6 and

the re fo re do e s n ot f

a ll w ith in t

he de fi nit ion

of “ tr ans po rt atio n” on

the g ro un d th at it

is 7 “prope rty

. . . related to the movement of pa sseng ers or proper ty . . .by rail.” 49 U .S.C. § 8 10102(9)( A). The exercise of state authority

to close the ra il crossing at issue pursuant to N.Y. 9 Railroad L aw § 97( 3) is not pre-e mpted under I CCTA or FRSA. 10 Ac c or din g ly , th e jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is REV ERS ED and

the c a se is 11 REMANDED to the district cour t (1) so that it may

enter summary judgme nt in favor of 12 de fe nd ants CSXTr ans po rt atio n Inc ., Con so lid ate d Ra il Co rp or atio n a nd Am tr ak, and

de fe nd ants 13 Madison and Cottrell on I sland Park’s pr e-e mption claim, and (2) f or fur ther proc eeding s on 14 I sla

nd Park ’s fo ur

th c la im.