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S. HRG. 114–650 

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND, 

UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND AND 

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 8, 2016 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

MARCH 8, 2016 

Page 

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND AND

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND ............................................... 1 

Austin, General Lloyd J., III, USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command ........ 5 

Rodriguez, General David M., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command .......... 26 

Votel, General Joseph L., USA, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command ..................................................................................................................... 35 

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 75 

(III)

(1) 

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND, 

UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND AND 

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS 

COMMAND 

TUESDAY, MARCH 8, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in Room 

SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain 

(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, 

Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, 

Lee, Graham, Reed, Nelson, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, 

Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and King. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Senator MCCAIN. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services 

Committee meets this morning to receive testimony on the posture 

of U.S. Central Command [CENTCOM], Africa Command 

[AFRICOM], and Special Operations Command [SOCOM] in the 

context of our review and oversight of the fiscal year 2017 defense 

budget. 

We are pleased to welcome our witnesses, General Austin, General Rodriguez, and General Votel. We thank each of you for decades of distinguished service and for your leadership of our men 

and women in uniform. I would like to extend special thanks to 

General Austin and General Rodriguez, as this may be their last 

appearance before this committee. 

Our Nation’s most distinguished national security leaders have 

testified before this committee repeatedly that we are witnessing 

the unraveling of the rules-based international order. Nowhere is 

this unraveling more visible or more dangerous than the Middle 

East. From North Africa to South Asia, state authority and the balance of power are breaking down. 

This emerging vacuum has been filled by the most extreme and 

anti-American of forces: Sunni terrorist groups, such as Islamic 

State of Iraq and the Levant [ISIL] and al Qaeda; Shiite extremists, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and its proxies; and the 

imperial ambitions of Putin. As a result, almost every Middle Eastern country is now a battleground or combatant in one or more 

wars, to wit, this morning’s New York Times entitled, ‘‘Pentagon 

plan to fight ISI[L] in Libya includes barrage of airstrikes.’’ 

2 

These are diverse, complex, and transregional threats that our 

military confronts every day across CENTCOM, AFRICOM, and 

SOCOM lines of responsibilities. 

As this committee continues its review of the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act, we are interested to hear our witnesses’ views as to whether 

the current structure best enables us to succeed in the strategic environment of global and transregional threats in the 21st century 

and what reforms we might consider. This is critical because there 

are already too many obstacles to success as it is. 

Time and again, politically driven strategy, micromanagement, 

and misguided reductions in defense spending have made our military’s job more difficult. This has been especially true for our Special Operations Forces [SOF]. More than 15 years of continuous deployments, due in part to an overreliance on their unique capabilities, has led to unprecedented stress on the force. 

As the threats we face impose greater demands on our special operators and their families, we must be vigilant and provide the necessary support to maintain their vital capabilities, not just in direct 

action, but in building partnership capacity across CENTCOM and 

AFRICOM. 

While we marvel at our Special Operations Forces, we must remember they are just one part of our force and our strategy. They 

are not a magic solution to every problem or a substitute for a coherent strategy, as the administration’s ‘‘light footprint’’ approach 

in the Middle East has demonstrated repeatedly. 

Despite temporary relief from the arbitrary spending caps imposed by the Budget Control Act, we are still facing an unnecessary 

and dangerous burden on the backs of our servicemembers in the 

CENTCOM and AFRICOM theaters. President Obama’s fiscal year 

2017 defense budget request does little to relieve that burden. 

Secretary Carter has said the military is at a major inflection 

point, requiring urgent and simultaneous investments in next-generation technologies and in current operations, such as a 50 percent increase in funding for the fight against ISIL. In view of these 

needs, President Obama should have requested a defense budget 

that reflects the scale and scope of the national security threats we 

face. 

Instead, he chose to request lowest level of defense spending authorized by last year’s budget agreement and submitted a defense 

budget that is actually less in real dollars than last year, despite 

the fact that operational requirements have grown. 

This comes as little surprise from an administration that for the 

past seven years has sought to scale back America’s involvement 

in and commitment to the Middle East. In moments of consequence—Iran’s Green Revolution, Libya after the fall of Muammar Qadhafi, the withdrawal from Iraq, and the crossing of the 

chemical redline in Syria—this President walked away and ignored 

the lessons of history that power abhors a vacuum, that wars do 

not end because politicians say so, that the perils of indecision and 

inaction often outweigh the risks of action, and that while America 

cannot solve the problems of the Middle East, American leadership 

is indispensable to managing them. 

With major policy decisions hanging in the balance right now, 

our Nation cannot afford to ignore these lessons again. In AfghaniVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:21 Jun 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25682.TXT WILDA
3 

stan, the President has told our enemies that we will proceed with 

a calendar-based decision to cut United States troop presence in 

half by the end of this year, and he has yet to explain the consequences of reducing U.S. troop levels from 9,800 to 5,500; significant reductions to information, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

[ISR] and close-air support capacity; diminished operational flexibility of U.S. counterterrorism forces; and perhaps most damaging 

of all, the end of the U.S. train, advise, and assist mission at all 

but the highest level of the Afghan military precisely when their 

support is needed most. 

What all this translates to is risk: risk that problems and contingencies once addressed in days will be addressed in months, that 

is if they are addressed at all; risk that sudden tactical or operational setbacks that would have been in our power to reverse will 

put Afghanistan on a path to strategic failure we will be powerless 

to stop; and risk that the gains won by the sacrifices of American 

and Afghan troops will be squandered. 

In Iraq and Syria, the artificial limitation on troop levels ties the 

hands of our military commanders and makes our troops more vulnerable to attack and much less likely to succeed. The President 

has inched forward with incremental increases in needed capabilities, but this misguided gradualism serves only to allow the enemy 

to adjust before these capabilities ever make a difference. 

It is clear to me from my conversations with our military commanders both on the ground and in the Pentagon that they have 

been reduced from considering what it will take to win to, ‘‘What 

will I be allowed to do?’’ It is our troops and our national security 

that are paying the price. 

Africa has emerged as the next front of the global war on terror 

with ISIL, al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and al Shabaab commanding 

territory and launching successful attacks throughout the continent. 

Most alarming, ISIL now commands an army of 5,000 fighters in 

Libya. While the threat in Africa continues to metastasize, our 

military commanders are being forced to do more with less, starved 

for resources and denied timely and flexible authorities to take advantage of battlefield opportunities and halt the advance of extremism. 

In the Gulf, the President is failing to live up to the promises 

made at the Camp David summit in May 2015. For example, the 

President committed to fast-tracking arms transfers to our Gulf 

partners with fighter aircraft sales for Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain 

that could help thwart Iranian hegemonic ambitions. They are languishing on the shelf gathering dust. Once again, American credibility is disintegrating as the malign influence of Iran and Russia 

continues to grow. 

This administration’s great failure to date has not been that it 

makes mistakes. It is rather that it has failed or perhaps refused 

to learn from them. Unless we chart a new course, it may well be 

this administration’s lasting legacy. 

Senator Reed? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

4 

I too want to join you in commending and thanking General Austin and General Rodriguez for their extraordinary service, since 

this is likely to be their last appearance before the committee. 

It has been a privilege to work with you for many years. Your 

professionalism, skill, and commitment to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that you lead is without parallel. Thank you, 

gentlemen, both. 

General Votel, we appreciate your appearance here today as a 

Special Operations Commander, and we will see you again tomorrow, I suspect, as you have been nominated to be the successor to 

General Austin in Central Command. Again, your service is also 

deeply appreciated. 

Earlier this year, I traveled to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Djibouti to 

see firsthand some of the pressing challenges that we have been 

talking about. 

In Iraq, the diplomatic and military officials I met universally 

agreed that the Iraqi security forces’ successful retaking of Ramadi 

in June was critical for providing momentum for upcoming operations. While ISIL has now lost considerable territory that it once 

held in Iraq, the more difficult military task is still ahead. 

In the coming months, the combination of a newly trained Iraqi 

security force, enabled by coalition intelligence and airstrikes, 

should be able to continue to make progress in evicting ISIL from 

population centers. We look forward to our witnesses’ assessment 

of what we can expect realistically in the coming months as Iraqi 

special forces and security forces turn their attention particularly 

to Mosul. 

In addition, Iraq’s political leadership must confront the longstanding questions related to political reconciliation in Iraq. 

General Austin, I look forward to your assessment of the political 

atmosphere in Baghdad and whether you believe the conditions are 

set for a political dialogue, which will stabilize the political situation to complement military actions taking place. 

In Syria, the cessation of hostilities agreement appears to be tenuously holding, and tenuously at best. It remains unclear, however, 

this incremental step will be sufficient to set the stage for meaningful political negotiations, which every side said is the ultimate 

solution to their issue. 

ISIL remains in control of much of eastern Syria. Syrian Kurdish 

armed fighters with the assistance of coalition airstrikes and Special Operations Forces have made gains in northern Syria, but the 

battlefield dynamic continues to present many challenges. 

As General Philip Breedlove discussed last week, the 

weaponization of refugees by Russian and regime activity in Syria 

presents military, political, and humanitarian issues that we have 

not seen in the modern era. I hope our witnesses will provide their 

assessment of the situation in this respect. 

Iran continues to be a cause of significant concern to the committee, particularly its recent missile test and ongoing support to 

nonstate actors across the Middle East. 

General Austin, I hope you will provide your updated assessment 

of Iran’s activities in the wake of the [JCPOA] Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s implementation day. 

5 

In Afghanistan, the past year has been one of significant security 

and political transition. We must continue to evaluate how we can 

best enable efforts by the Government of Afghanistan to protect 

and govern its population. 

I know that General John Nicholson, the new commander of Resolute Support, is now conducting an assessment of what capabilities and associated troop levels he believes will be required to 

achieve our objectives in Afghanistan throughout the rest of 2016 

and into 2017. As I said before, his recommendations must be given 

most serious consideration, since he is on the battlefield and the 

closest to the issue. 

General Austin, General Votel, your thoughts, again, on this 

issue would be deeply appreciated. 

General Rodriguez, one of the results of CENTCOM’s operations 

against ISIL in Iraq and Syria has been ISIL metastasizing into 

Libya and other places, as we have talked about. Your command 

has undertaken a number of operations against ISIL in Libya. The 

lack of a functioning government in Tripoli or a unified Libyan 

military makes it difficult to sustain progress. I hope, again, you 

will give us your insights on this issue. 

While in Djibouti, I was made more familiar with the operations 

in Somalia. As you know, General Rodriguez, the AMISOM, African Union Mission in Somalia, has been functioning, but it is coming under increasing pressure. We, in turn, have been helping 

them. Just recently, there was a significant airstrike by U.S. 

Forces to help support their efforts. I would like your assessment 

of the situation there, and, as we go forward, what we can do. 

There is one issue that cut across all the areas I visited, and that 

was that we seem to be losing the information war of messaging, 

of getting our message to the people of all these countries about 

our support for the legitimate government, for reasonable, decent 

government. That is ironic, to say the least. Your comments about 

how we can reverse this tide and, in fact, win the information war 

and win the population to our side would be appreciated. 

Again, General Votel, finally, as the chairman has noted, your 

Special Operations Forces have sustained extraordinary operational tempo over the last years. We know what they have done. 

They have done extraordinary work, and we appreciate your leadership. We all would like you to commend them personally, and 

their families, for what they have done. 

I would be remiss if I did not recognize the senior enlisted personnel that are here. Thank you, gentlemen, for your leadership. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Welcome, General Austin. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, USA, 

COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

General AUSTIN. Good morning, Chairman McCain, Ranking 

Member Reed, distinguished members of the committee, I want to 

thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to discuss the 

current posture of your United States Central Command. 

I am pleased to appear here this morning alongside General 

David Rodriguez and General Joe Votel. 

6 

Today’s global security environment is incredibly complex. Most 

of the challenges that we face transcend borders. I cannot ask for 

two better teammates than the gentleman beside me to work 

through these challenges on a daily basis. 

Ladies and gentlemen, this past year has been an especially challenging one for the governments and for the people of the central 

region. We have seen an almost unprecedented level of turmoil and 

conflict among regional, state, and nonstate actors, along with increasing involvement by external state actors such as Russia and 

China. 

At the same time, many of the countries that make up the central region are under growing economic pressure. Of course, the 

combination of these and other factors makes this strategically important region vulnerable to conflict and to increased instability. 

Presently, the United States Central Command is involved in or 

supporting multiple military operations, and they include the campaign to counter ISIL in Iraq and Syria, and our Resolute Support 

mission in Afghanistan. We are providing limited support for the 

Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. We continue to prosecute the fight 

against terrorism and extremism throughout our area of responsibility. We are also dealing with the mischief that we see throughout the region that is caused by Iran. 

I will talk briefly about a few the situations, in particular as they 

continue to demand a large portion of our attention and our resources. I will start with the fight against ISIL. 

Ladies and gentlemen, we are defeating this enemy in Iraq and 

Syria, and we are pressuring ISIL on more fronts than at any other 

point in time since they marched into Mosul some 18 months ago. 

We are doing so by degrading the enemy’s military capability, by 

taking back territory, by diminishing his economic resources, and 

by removing his senior leadership from the battlefield. We are also 

slowing the flow of foreign fighters joining his ranks. 

All of these actions in combination are contributing to a force 

that is less capable and increasingly demoralized and paranoid and 

prone to defections. 

While we are defeating ISIL in Iraq and Syria, we see increased 

efforts by this enemy to expand into other areas of the globe, mainly North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and South Asia. He is expanding into these and other areas in part because he knows that 

he is losing in Iraq and Syria, and he needs to find other ways to 

maintain his legitimacy. 

Halting this expansion will require a concerted effort by the 

international community going forward. 

In the meantime, Iraq’s security forces are performing better 

with time through our capacity-building efforts. Of note, the Kurdish Peshmerga remain critical to our efforts on the ground in the 

northern part of the country. They are irreplaceable, and we must 

do all that we can to support them. 

In Syria, we continue to work with indigenous forces, including 

Syrian Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and others as they take the fight 

to the enemy. Together, they are achieving tremendous results, including securing more than 18,000 square kilometers of territory 

previously held by the enemy. 

7 

Ladies and gentlemen, the fight against ISIL in Iraq and Syria 

remains incredibly complex. While the defeat of ISIL will take time 

and it will not be easy, you can rest assured that we will get it 

done. 

Meanwhile in Afghanistan, the security forces continue to hold 

their own. They have come a long way over the past 14-plus years, 

and we want to ensure that they maintain momentum going forward. This past year, the Afghans underwent multiple transitions 

that together have shifted the operational environment. I still assess that the Afghan security forces are capable of holding their 

gains against the Taliban, however, like with any plan, changing 

conditions on the ground may require a reevaluation of our planning assumptions. 

We have invested a great deal in that country. It is an important 

country for a number of reasons, and we want to do what is necessary to help the Afghans be successful in the long term. 

Finally, with respect to Iran, while we are hopeful that the implementation of the JPOA agreement and the results of the recent 

elections will lead to more responsible behavior by the Iranians, we 

have not yet seen any indication that they intend to pursue a different path. The fact remains that Iran today is a significant destabilizing force in the region. 

Ladies and gentlemen, some of the behavior that we have seen 

from Iran of late is certainly not the behavior that you would expect to see from a nation that wants to be taken seriously as a respected member of the international community. We will continue 

to keep a close eye on Iran going forward. 

Today, despite the many challenges that exist in CENTCOM, we 

do see progress being made in a number of areas. Of note, our decades of investment are paying off, and we are seeing our regional 

partners assume a greater share of security responsibilities in the 

region. They are effectively dealing with extremist threats in their 

own countries while conducting military operations as a part of a 

counter-ISIL coalition in Iraq and Syria. 

We are encouraged by what we are seeing, and we remain committed to working with our partners in support of our shared goals 

and objectives. 

Ultimately, we want to see a strategically important central region move in the direction of increased stability and security. We 

must be properly resourced to do what is required to effectively 

protect and promote our interests. 

We do appreciate this committee’s strong, continued support. In 

closing, Chairman McCain and Ranking Member Reed, members of 

the committee, I want to thank you most importantly for the strong 

support that you continue to show to our servicemembers, our civilians, and their families. I am incredibly proud of them, and I know 

that you are as well. Thank you again for the opportunity. I look 

forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Austin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL LLOYD J. AUSTIN III 

INTRODUCTION

This is an extraordinarily challenging time throughout the Central Region. We see 

an almost unprecedented level of activity, turmoil, and conflict among regional state 

8 

and non-state actors, along with increasing involvement by external state actors including Russia and China. Many of the challenges facing the region, most notably 

the threat posed by the violent extremist organization (VEO), the Islamic State of 

Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), transcend borders. They are symptoms of a wider set 

of challenges plaguing that strategically-important part of the world. The most fundamental challenge remains the heightened instability that is fueled, in large part, 

by certain root causes or ‘‘underlying currents.’’ The prevailing current is the ethnosectarian competition that exists between groups and chiefly among Shiite and 

Sunni and Arab and Persian populations. 

The regional security environment is incredibly complex. The sharp decline in 

global oil prices is greatly impacting those countries that are highly-dependent upon 

oil revenues. The economic uncertainty is adding to the instability, while limiting 

partner nations’ purchasing power. The region continues to struggle with a largescale humanitarian crisis caused primarily by the wars in Syria and Yemen. The 

situation is further challenged by malign actors and poisonous ideas that serve to 

radicalize individuals and generate movements that threaten our core national interests and the interests of partner nations. Adding to this challenge, the world 

today is more interconnected than ever before. The information space is borderless 

and physical borders are less clearly defined, if not absent altogether. As a result, 

events that occur in one location can and often do affect other parts of the globe. 

Thus, we have a vested interest in helping our regional partners to address existing 

challenges and, to the extent possible, prevent potential problems from developing 

further. 

We have an important role to play in providing for the security of the Central Region. That said, we also recognize that we cannot solve every challenge through direct U.S. military action alone. While supporting and enabling the efforts of partner 

nations, we must help them build additional needed military capacity. The goal is 

to empower them to provide for the security of their sovereign spaces and confront 

regional security challenges such as those posed by Iran. We must also encourage 

our partners to actively counter radical ideologies and address the ‘‘underlying currents’’ that contribute in large part to the instability in the region. American efforts, 

including the U.S. military, can buy time and we may encourage others to do what 

is necessary. However, we cannot do it for them. Only the people of the region can 

bring about the needed changes. 

Today, despite the many challenges that exist in U.S. Central Command’s 

(USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), we do see progress being made in a 

number of areas. We are hurting our adversaries, while helping our partners assume a larger role in providing for the security of the region. Their conventional 

military capabilities far outreach those of any possible hostile adversary, and our 

core partnerships remain strong. At the same time, while weaker and under threat, 

political institutions throughout the region, including in Iraq and Afghanistan, are 

withstanding pressure from extremist groups and outside actors. Moreover, we have 

84,000 U.S. troops in the AOR with an unmatched ability to provide rapid reinforcement in response to unforeseen contingencies. They are the best and most capable 

military forces in the world. Their presence and many contributions are making a 

significant difference in what is a very important part of the world. The Central Region is an area of great consequence and one that merits our continued, strong investment. We will need to remain present, properly postured, and actively engaged 

there for the foreseeable future. 

A RETROSPECTIVE LOOK

This past year, we worked through a number of tough challenges throughout the 

Central Region. Five specific areas required a larger share of our energy and attention. Foremost among them is Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Syria. American military action, coupled with our leadership of the 66-member international coalition, has achieved substantial progress in combatting ISIL. We have degraded the 

organization, which was Phase I of the military campaign, and we are well along 

in Phase II operations which focus on dismantling ISIL. The forging of a whole-ofgovernment effort has maximized the effectiveness of military and diplomatic actions. At the same time, we are providing support to the Gulf Cooperation Council 

(GCC)-led Coalition in Yemen. Additionally, we maintain pressure on extremist networks and actively pursue terrorists in the region on a daily basis. Next, we continue to support operations in Afghanistan where we have transitioned to a mission 

focused on helping the Afghans to build needed capability and fortify their security 

forces, while we continue to take direct action against al Qaeda (AQ), ISIL– 

Khorasan Group (ISIL–KP), and others that present a threat to U.S. and coalition 

forces. Finally, we keep a close eye on Iran. We are hopeful that the controls put 

9 

in place as a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement 

will discourage Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon. Regardless, Iran maintains 

hegemonic ambitions and will continue to pose a threat to the region through the 

employment of various anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, theater ballistic missile and cyber capabilities, aggressive maritime activities, and the destabilizing activities of the Iranian Threat Network (ITN) and its Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Forces (IRGC–QF), and other proxies operating in the region. 

The command’s primary focus this past year has been the ongoing fight against 

transnational VEOs, and namely ISIL or what is referred to by many in the region 

as ‘‘Daesh.’’ While the group’s military capabilities have been degraded in Iraq and 

Syria, which represents the center of ISIL’s self-proclaimed Caliphate, the group remains a legitimate terrorist threat in both countries and has expanded its reach to 

other parts of the globe, including Egypt, Afghanistan-Pakistan, Yemen, Libya, West 

Africa, and parts of the Pacific. ISIL’s presence undermines nation-states while driving competition for leadership among global jihadists. This competition has led to 

increased activity by ISIL and AQ which, although its capability is degraded, remains relevant and active throughout the region. ISIL’s insidious activities perpetuate sectarian conflict and, if not effectively addressed, could serve to spark a broader regional sectarian war. For these and a host of other reasons, ISIL poses the 

most immediate security threat to our interests and the interests of our partners 

and allies. It must be—and it will be—defeated. 

Over the past year we have seen a trend emerge as countries have begun to take 

more seriously the threat from transnational and trans-regional VEOs. Many of our 

regional partners historically did not prioritize the threat from VEOs. They were 

less concerned that these organizations would attack them at home. However, ISIL 

has changed that paradigm. Countries, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, now are 

dealing with a very real threat from Sunni extremists that they did not encounter 

in the past. They recognize that they can no longer afford to dismiss these threats. 

In the same way, countries outside of the Central Region, particularly throughout 

Europe and Turkey, have experienced a relatively high number of terrorist attacks 

conducted by or inspired by VEOs in the region, including ISIL and AQ. As partner 

nations’ perceptions begin to change, we should seize the opportunity and work with 

them to build additional needed capability. 

The most prevalent challenge facing the Central Region continues to be the ‘‘underlying currents’’ that fuel many of the destructive behaviors that plague that strategically-important part of the world. These currents include a growing ethno-sectarian divide; the ongoing religious struggle between violent extremists and moderates; and, the rejection of corruption and oppressive governance. They also include 

the ‘‘youth bulge,’’ which consists of young and unemployed or under-employed and 

disenfranchised individuals who feel marginalized and thus are ripe for recruitment 

by extremist elements. While there appears to be a greater recognition of the negative effects of these currents, we have yet to see sufficient improvements made to 

address them. Indeed, they are becoming even more pronounced. In many parts of 

the region, ethnic and sectarian affiliation has taken on greater importance, moving 

to the forefront of individuals’ and nation-states’ identities. For example, it is more 

important for some to be Sunni or Shiite, Kurdish or Arab, than to be an Iraqi or 

a Syrian. Stakeholders recognize this changing dynamic, and they have not only 

sought to benefit from the growing instability, many actively exploit the sectarian 

tensions to promote their own goals and objectives. All of this has the effect of seriously weakening the nation states in the region. 

Progress with respect to the root causes of the instability can only be achieved 

by the governments and the people of the region with our continued support. They 

must actively work to address the growing ethno-sectarian divide, elevate the voice 

of moderates, root out corruption, guard against freedom of movement and expanding influence by terrorist groups in ungoverned and under-governed spaces, and ensure the young people of the region have access to better opportunities and are able 

to contribute to society in meaningful ways. We need to see responsive governments 

in place and taking an active role in addressing these and other challenges facing 

the region. 

The international community must also do its part to address the radical 

ideologies that serve to inspire extremist behaviors. It should be noted that the fight 

against ISIL is not simply a fight against a VEO. ISIL is an ideologically-motivated 

movement and must be addressed as such if we hope to achieve lasting, positive effects. We are beginning to see some positive trends with an increasing number of 

state leaders, senior clerics, and religious leaders from Arab countries speaking out 

against radical extremism. We are hopeful that such ventures will bear fruit, and 

we will do all that we can to support them going forward. 

10 

What should concern us all, beyond the sectarian nature of today’s conflicts, is the 

growing risk that the increased malign activity by proxy and surrogate actors could 

lead to perpetual armed conflict and resulting widespread instability in the region. 

The ‘‘underlying currents’’ are common to many of the problems that exist, and activities in one area often fuel challenges in other parts of the region. We will have 

to keep a close eye on these and other challenges present throughout our area of 

responsibility. 

USCENTCOM’S MISSION. 

USCENTCOM’s mission statement is: ‘‘With national and international partners, 

USCENTCOM promotes cooperation among nations, responds to crises, deters or defeats state and non-state aggression, and supports development and, when necessary, 

reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability and 

prosperity.’’ 

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT. 

The Central Region is one of the most strategically-important regions, holding 

about half of the world’s proven oil reserves and plentiful natural gas deposits, 

which are crucial to the global energy market. The U.S. and our partners have core 

national interests in the region; they include the free flow of resources through key 

shipping lanes, the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 

and the defense of our Homeland against the persistent threat of terrorism and extremism. It also is an area plagued by violence and instability, political discord, economic stagnation, resource shortages (e.g., water), ethnic and religious tensions, and 

wide expanses of ungoverned or under-governed spaces. These provocative factors 

make for a volatile environment that puts our interests and those of our partners 

at risk. When things go badly in the Central Region, it has a clear and sizeable impact on the affected countries and other parts of the globe. For this reason it is an 

area of the world that merits our continued focus and dedicated efforts. 

USCENTCOM PRIORITIES. 

At U.S. Central Command, our aim is to see a positive transformation of the region over time, achieved ‘‘by, with, and through’’ our regional partners. Looking 

ahead, USCENTCOM will remain ready, engaged and vigilant. Our priority efforts 

include: 

• Dismantle and eventually defeat ISIL in order to prevent further trans-regional 

spread of sectarian-fueled radical extremism, and to mitigate the continuing 

Iraq-Syria crisis. • Continue support to Afghanistan, in partnership with NATO, to assist Afghanistan as it establishes itself as a regionally integrated, secure, stable, and developing country; continue planning and coordination for the enduring United 

States and NATO partnerships in Afghanistan beyond the end of 2016. • Defeat al Qaeda, deny violent extremists safe havens and freedom of movement, 

and limit the reach of terrorists, to enhance protection of the United States 

Homeland and allies and partner nation homelands. 

• Counter the Iranian Threat Network’s malign activities in the region, to include 

the impacts of surrogates and proxies. 

• Support a whole of government approach to developments in Yemen, preventing 

Yemen from growing as an ungoverned space for AQ/VEOs; and supporting regional stability efforts that retain U.S. CT capacity in the region. 

• Maintain a credible deterrent posture against Iran’s evolving conventional and 

strategic military capabilities. 

• Prevent, and if required, counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; disrupt their development and prevent their use. 

• Protect lines of communication, ensure free use of the global commons and 

cyberspace, and secure unimpeded global access for legal commerce. 

• Shape, support, incentivize, and maintain ready, flexible regional Coalitions and 

partners, as well as cross-CCMD and interagency U.S. whole-of-government 

teams, to support crisis response; optimize military resources. 

• Develop and execute security cooperation programs, improving bilateral and 

multi-lateral partnerships, building partnered ‘‘capacities,’’ and improving information sharing, security, and stability. 

CRITICAL FOCUS AREAS. 

While we remain focused on the broad range of challenges present today in the 

Central Region, there are several areas that merit a larger share of our attention 

11 

and resources. These areas are strategically-important because of their potential impact on our core national interests and the interests of partner nations. 

Operation Inherent Resolve (Iraq-Syria). We remain intensively focused on the 

crisis in Iraq and Syria and the ongoing fight against the terrorist organization, 

ISIL. Our military campaign to defeat ISIL requires that we rely on indigenous 

forces and that we support and enable their efforts using our precision air operations and by advising and assisting their leadership and training and equipping 

their ground forces. Eighteen-plus months into the campaign, we are putting increased pressure on ISIL throughout the depth and breadth of the battlespace. We 

are achieving good effects against the enemy; we completed Phase I of the military 

campaign (Degrade) and are well into Phase II (Dismantle). 

In Iraq, the Iraqi Security Forces, which include Iraqi Army and Counter-Terrorism Services (CTS) forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, and various Sunni and Shiite volunteer elements, with the support of United States and Coalition air operations and 

advisors and materiel donations, have effectively halted ISIL’s advance. The enemy 

is now almost exclusively focused on defending his strongholds rather than projecting combat power. Additionally, ISIL’s counter-attack capability has been reduced as a result of battlefield losses, although we see the group conducting deadly 

terrorist attacks against Iraqi forces in Anbar and west of Baghdad, and, 

worryingly, civilian targets—including in areas far from its control, in Baghdad and 

parts of the Shiite-populated south. 

In Syria, we are supporting and enabling the efforts of the indigenous forces, including Syrian Kurds, Arabs, Christians, Turkmen, and others. These forces are 

putting increased pressure on the enemy as they push south towards the capital of 

ISIL’s self-proclaimed Caliphate in Raqqa. They have retaken more than 18,000 

square kilometers of territory and cut a number of ISIL’s key lines of communication (LOC). They also secured key border crossings between Syria and Turkey, impacting ISIL’s ability to send in reinforcements and much-needed re-supply. It is 

quite possible that the military efforts underway in Syria could progress more rapidly given that we now have a growing number of willing and capable partners on 

the ground. 

Since commencing air operations in early August 2014, Coalition air crews from 

19 partner nations have conducted more than 10,700 strikes. They are taking the 

fight to the enemy, and have greatly enabled the reach and effectiveness of the indigenous ground forces. Coalition airstrikes have removed several thousand enemy 

fighters from the battlefield, to include more than 160 of ISIL’s leaders. We have 

destroyed thousands of the enemy’s vehicles, tanks, and heavy weapon systems, 

along with training sites and storages facilities, command and control structures, 

and oil production facilities. We have helped to retake more than 40 percent of the 

territory in Iraq that ISIL held when we began airstrikes in August 2014, and we 

have restricted the enemy’s freedom of movement along key routes in both Iraq and 

Syria. We have expanded our targeting of ISIL’s oil enterprise, one of his primary 

sources of revenue and destroyed several bulk cash storage sites. This is further restricting ISIL’s access to critical funds and other resources. This enemy hides among 

the civilian population; and so, we must be as precise as possible to avoid causing 

unnecessary civilian casualties and destruction of critical infrastructure, thereby 

generating resentment among the local populace. The high level of precision 

achieved by our air crews has ensured minimal collateral damage. 

The situation in Iraq and Syria is made even more complex by the involvement 

of external actors, specifically Russia and Iran. It is apparent through Russia’s actions that their primary objective in Syria is to bolster the Assad Regime, principally by targeting those Syrian moderate opposition forces that pose a threat to 

the Regime. Through its actions, Russia is effectively prolonging the civil war in 

Syria, which over the past five years has caused the deaths of well over 250,000 

innocent men, women, and children. Assad would almost certainly not be in power 

today were it not for the robust support provided to the Regime by Iran and Russia. 

Russia’s involvement in Syria exacerbates sectarian tensions as it appears they are 

supporting the Shiite states against the Sunnis. By putting the full range of their 

military capability on display in Syria, the Russians hope to impress regional actors 

and assert global power. Ultimately, they want to enhance their regional influence 

to counter the U.S. as the indispensable power player in the Middle East. None of 

Russia’s military actions have helped stabilize Syria or end the suffering of the Syrian people. The recent Cessation of Hostilities process is an opportunity for Russia 

to demonstrate a renewed commitment to play a constructive role in Syria. We will 

continue to judge Russia by its actions, not by its words. 

Of note, Russia’s cooperation with Iran appears to be expanding beyond near-term 

coordination for operations in Syria and is moving towards an emerging strategic 

partnership. The potential for a more traditional security cooperation arrangement 

12 

1 U.S. Agency International Development (USAID). 

between Russia, a state actor and member of the UN Security Council, and Iran 

is cause for significant concern given Iran’s existing relationship with the Syrian Regime and Lebanese Hezbollah. We already see indications of high-end weapon sales 

and economic cooperation between the two countries. 

We are making progress militarily in our efforts to defeat ISIL, as demonstrated 

by the recent victories in Ramadi and Shaddadi. However, military success will be 

lasting only if corresponding political progress is achieved in both Iraq and Syria. 

The Government of Iraq must take the necessary steps towards greater inclusiveness. Iraq will not remain a unified state long-term without the support of the major 

ethno-sectarian groups. In Syria, President Bashar al Assad’s actions and his deplorable treatment of the Syrian people created enormous instability in the country 

that allowed ISIL to flourish. ISIL will remain difficult to defeat as long as Assad 

remains in power. He needs to be replaced and a stable, responsive government 

must be established to prevent safe haven for VEOs like ISIL. 

To defeat ISIL we must do as President Obama said and ‘‘squeeze its heart [in 

order to] make it harder for ISIL to pump its terror and propaganda through the 

rest of the world.’’ This remains the foundation of our Military Campaign Plan— 

to degrade, dismantle, and eventually defeat this enemy in Iraq and Syria. This is 

essential; however, it is not sufficient. Beyond its strongholds in Iraq and Syria, 

ISIL has expanded to other parts of the globe, including to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 

Libya, Yemen, and Afghanistan-Pakistan. Expansion is a necessary element of 

ISIL’s declared end-state of a global Caliphate. It also demonstrates that we are degrading the enemy’s capability in Iraq and Syria; as a result, ISIL is attempting 

to gain a foothold in alternate locations. Moreover, the increased activity helps to 

distract the international community from the setbacks that ISIL is experiencing in 

Iraq and Syria. To maintain its legitimacy, ISIL must achieve real or perceived military victories and it must expand territorially. While the priority must be the defeat 

of ISIL’s core in Iraq and Syria, we also will need to address the ISIL affiliates and 

franchises that exist in other parts of the region and globe. Additionally, we will 

need to continue in our efforts to curb the flow of foreign fighters, and take away 

the enemy’s ability to resource himself. 

The U.S. military is not doing any of this alone. The military campaign is just 

one component of the broader U.S. Government (USG) strategy which consists of 

nine lines of effort (LOE), to be executed by all elements of the USG with the support of our coalition partners. The military is responsible for two of the nine LOEs, 

LOE #2 and #3. LOE #2—‘‘Denying ISIL Safe Haven’’ is being accomplished through 

our support to indigenous ground forces in Iraq and Syria, primarily through our 

precision airstrikes, employment of available Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and our advise and assist efforts. LOE#3—‘‘Building Partner 

Capacity’’ includes our train and equip program and advise and assist efforts in 

Iraq. Critically important are the many contributions being made by the 66 partners 

that make up the Counter-ISIL Coalition; the Coalition represents the strength of 

the military campaign. 

We made it clear at the outset of the campaign that the defeat of ISIL would take 

time. There is tough work still ahead. We must remain vigilant and keep pressure 

on this enemy, recognizing the high stakes involved. 

Afghanistan (Operation Freedom’s Sentinel/Resolute Support Mission). The Afghan’s National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have been challenged over 

the past several months in what was an especially tough fighting season. During 

the first full year in which the ANDSF were fully responsible for the security of 

their country, the ANDSF managed to deny the Taliban lasting gains. The Taliban 

saw the opportunity to exploit weaknesses in the Afghans’ still-maturing capabilities. Although the Taliban achieved some initial success, the ANDSF have retaken 

and reestablished security in key areas, such as Kunduz. Most important, the 

ANDSF continue to learn from their experiences and look to grow stronger and 

more capable. The ANDSF also benefit from a supportive government that values 

the strong partnership between the United States and Afghanistan. The National 

Unity Government (NUG), led by President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah 

Abdullah, continues to mature as both leaders work together on behalf of the country. 

Meanwhile, we see positive developments across the populace. Of note, adult life 

expectancy has risen by 22 years from 42 years in 2002 to 64 years in 2012 1. We 

have seen the various state institutions develop and mature; and, the Afghans continue to make progress in the areas of governance, the judiciary, and respect for 

human rights, women’s rights, and education. In 2001, less than 900,000 Afghans 

were enrolled in primary and secondary schools and almost none of them were girls. 

13 

2 Afghan Central Statistics Organization (2014). 

Today, there are more than 8 million students enrolled in school; 36 percent of them 

are girls 2. Progress in Afghanistan has been significant over the past 14+ years, 

and the United States-led Coalition and the ANDSF have provided the necessary 

security to enable these advancements. There is a strong desire to continue to make 

lasting improvements in all areas, including education, the economy, healthcare, infrastructure, and communications. 

While the ANDSF have made significant progress, critical capability gaps do exist 

in some areas, including leadership, aviation, aerial fires, ISR, logistics, and 

sustainment. Many of the systems that support Afghan warfighters have not fully 

matured, and our continued support remains critical to their development and longterm success. 

The ANDSF still face a significant insurgency complicated by the presence of a 

number of extremist elements in the region including the Taliban, Haqqani Network, AQ, and the newly-formed ISIL—Khorasan Province (ISIL–KP). ISIL–KP 

poses a concern for the United States and our Afghan partners given the evolving 

security dynamic. The group’s efforts to date have produced mixed results; however, 

they instability, violence, and potential for regional growth require effective pressure to deny the establishment of a safe haven. Persistent action must be taken by 

the Afghan Government with the support of the United States, NATO, and regional 

partners to disrupt the expansion of ISIL–KP and other VEOs in the region. 

The Afghanistan and Pakistan (AFG–PAK) relationship remains a delicate one. 

Some progress was made this year, and both sides indicate a continued willingness 

to participate in multi-lateral and bilateral discussions. Despite long-standing distrust between elements in each country, the United States is encouraged by both 

nations’ continued cooperation and collaboration towards trans-regional security and 

stability. 

On 15 October 2015, President Obama announced that the United States would 

maintain up to 9,800 United States forces in Afghanistan through most of 2016, before drawing down to 5,500 United States forces by January 2017. This decision allows for the continued training, advising, and assisting of the ANDSF through the 

2016 fighting season. By maintaining the current level of forces through much of 

2016, the United States will be able to: (1) reassure Afghanistan, our partners, and 

allies of our enduring strategic commitment; (2) continue to conduct the train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission at the Afghan National Army (ANA) corps level and 

Afghan National Police (ANP) equivalent levels; and, (3) support our counter-terrorism (CT) efforts against AQ and ISIL–KP. TAA at the operational-level for select 

ANDSF special forces units has paid significant dividends, as evidenced by the expeditionary advising performed during operations in Northern Helmand and Kunduz 

at the end of the 2015 fighting season, and will remain a critical component of 

building capacity and institutionalizing long-term ANDSF sustainment systems. 

By sustaining our current troop levels through 2016, we also demonstrate a strong 

commitment to our NATO allies and other partner nations, many of whom have 

since reaffirmed their troop commitments in support of the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission. NATO’s continued participation is integral to the development of the 

ANDSF and will also help ensure donor nations provide much-needed financial support to the ANDSF. Finally, our presence sends a clear message to the Taliban that 

the United States supports the Afghan government and the ANDSF and encourages 

broader reconciliation efforts and lasting peace achieved through dialogue, rather 

than through violence and a continued insurgency. 

Afghanistan remains a worthwhile and strategically-necessary investment. The 

Afghans continue to demonstrate that they are willing partners. Together, we have 

invested many lives and precious resources with the goal of improving stability in 

that country. We want to preserve those hard-earned gains and to enable the Afghans continued success going forward. 

Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremist Organizations. A variety of factors 

that include poor governance, economic disparity, disenfranchised populaces, and deficient security forces contribute to creating conditions that promote the activities 

of VEOs, including ISIL and AQ. The VEOs are able to plan and launch attacks, 

undermine local governments, and exercise malign influence from ungoverned or 

under-governed spaces. In doing so, they threaten regional security and U.S. core 

national interests, including the defense of our Homeland. 

Perhaps the most significant development in recent years is the proliferation of 

transnational and trans-regional VEOs that desire and, in some cases, demonstrate 

the ability to shape and even dominate the security environment in ways that we 

have not seen before. These transnational extremist groups are ideologically opposed 

to and often target the nation states in the region. They conduct attacks and terVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:21 Jun 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25682.TXT WILDA
14 

rorize local populaces in an effort to undermine and eventually topple existing governments. This further contributes to increased instability in the region. 

One related dynamic that we see developing is a growing competition between 

transnational extremist groups. For a long period of time, AQ was the unchallenged 

leader of global jihad. Then, in late spring of 2014, ISIL seized large swaths of territory in Iraq, in addition to the territory it seized in Syria. It declared a Caliphate 

and suddenly AQ was facing a rival. Going forward, there is significant potential 

for increased expansion among VEOs as ISIL and AQ compete for resources and recruits. This will compel both groups to conduct more spectacular operations and to 

employ more aggressive messaging campaigns. As ISIL and AQ look to expand their 

influence, we can expect other VEOs to attempt to align with these groups. The resulting struggle and heightened activity will contribute to increasing instability 

across the region. 

We must take direct military action where appropriate to counter this growing 

threat. We cannot allow VEOs to operate uncontested in the region, permitting 

them to grow stronger and expand their global reach. The long-term defeat of VEOs 

will require that our regional partners provide for the security of their sovereign 

spaces, with the U.S. and its allies providing support where possible. Until they 

have sufficient capability to do so, we must be prepared to take active direct measures to counter these VEOs. 

Yemen. Yemen remains embroiled in a complex civil war that is exacerbated by 

sectarian tensions. In January 2015, the Huthis, a group of Zaydi Shiite fighters led 

by Abdul Malik al Huthi and aligned with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, displaced the legitimate government of Yemen led by President Abd Rabbu Mansur 

Hadi. On each side, there are a number of competing factions, including the Huthis, 

Saleh loyalists, southern secessionists, and tribal alliances with competing agendas 

that further complicate the situation on the ground. These groups are attempting 

to assert control over Yemen as a whole or at least gain greater autonomy within 

their respective areas of influence. 

Iran has provided support to the Huthis, likely to gain leverage against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). This could potentially enable the Iranians to complicate 

maritime LOCs, including the Bab al Mandeb Strait, from the Red Sea to the Gulf 

of Aden and beyond. Iran has a long history of seeking to protect the Shiite populace 

in the Gulf and using this rationale to justify a broad array of actions. Conversely, 

KSA desires a stable Yemen with a pro-Saudi government that effectively protects 

its border, prevents an Iranian proxy from gaining undue influence over strategic 

terrain that includes the Bab al Mandeb, and protects against safe havens for al 

Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and other VEOs. The KSA-led Coalition 

has sought to counter the Huthis and associated forces with the goal to return the 

legitimate displaced Hadi government to power. While the coalition has experienced 

some significant challenges and we have expressed concerns about Coalition strikes 

on targets that lead to civilian casualties and damage Yemen’s already poor infrastructure. Nevertheless, the Coalition’s efforts have proven problematic for the 

Huthis. 

Yemen is the poorest country in the Central Region and the ongoing conflict continues to exacerbate the very serious humanitarian crisis plaguing the country. 

Much of Yemen’s infrastructure has been destroyed, food production is at a standstill, international trade is severely degraded, medical supplies are critically short, 

and little humanitarian aid is reaching those in need. The ousting of the Republic 

of Yemen Government (RoYG) created a large security vacuum which has greatly 

benefited AQAP, as well as the newly-formed ISIL affiliate, ISIL—Yemen (ISIL–Y). 

AQAP is strengthening and expanding its reach in the absence of a significant CT 

effort. Prior to the unseating of the Hadi Government, the United States maintained 

a physical presence in Yemen and an effective CT partnership with the Yemeni security forces. We conducted operations against AQAP and had significantly degraded its capacity. We were also in the process of building the Yemeni forces’ capacity through our advise and assist and train and equip efforts. The reduced capability coupled with the lack of a U.S. presence presents a vulnerability that must 

be addressed. 

Since these groups pose a national security risk to the U.S. and partner nations, 

it is imperative that we seek a way to resume a partnered approach to CT operations against Yemen-based VEOs and their support networks. It is in our national 

interest and the interest of our partners to resolve the civil war and reinstate the 

legitimate government that can work to address the many challenges facing Yemen 

today. We are looking at how to best move this forward. The additional capability 

would enable them to better secure their borders and guard against internal threats 

from violent extremists. 

15 

Iran. Iran continues to pose a significant threat to the region despite the restrictions placed on its nuclear program as a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 

Action (JCPOA) agreement. In this post-JCPOA period, the Iranian Threat Network’s (ITN) Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Forces (IRGC–QF), proxies 

(e.g., Lebanese Hezbollah), and Iranian-backed Shiite militant groups remain very 

active. Iran also maintains a large and diverse theater ballistic missile arsenal, 

along with significant cyber and maritime capabilities. Despite the fact that President Rouhani’s administration has indicated an interest in normalizing relations 

with the international community, there are hardline elements in the country intent 

on undermining the efforts of the moderates. They maintain substantial influence 

over Iran’s foreign policy and military activities. 

Iran continues to pursue policies that enflame sectarian tensions and threaten 

U.S. strategic interests in the Central Region. Their primary focus is countering the 

ISIL threat in Iraq and preserving the Assad Regime in Syria. They also continue 

to support some Shiite surrogate groups in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, Huthis in 

Yemen, and Lebanese Hezbollah, with a combination of money, arms, and training. 

Iran’s emerging relationship with Russia further complicates the security environment as they look to expand their cooperation in areas that include the sale of highend weapons. We must consider that when ISIL is defeated and Syria stabilizes, we 

and our partners will face an enhanced ITN bolstered by warfighting experience, a 

multi-ethnic supply of radicalized Shiite fighters, expanded partnerships, and an intense sectarian climate. There are additional developments within the ITN that we 

will have to closely monitor to fully appreciate the nature of this evolving threat. 

For example, Iranian-backed Shiite militia groups are becoming entrenched within 

Iraq’s formal security institutions through the Popular Mobilization Forces, a development that could provide these groups with increased resources and legitimacy and 

greatly complicate our relationship with Iraq’s security forces going forward. Additionally, it is possible that Iran will have challenges commanding and controlling 

an expanded ITN, something we are already seeing play out in several places across 

the region. Iran exerts a considerable degree of influence over the multiple external 

proxies and surrogates that comprise the ITN. However, the larger the ITN becomes 

through the proliferation of Shiite militant groups, the more difficult it may be for 

Iran to control their activities, especially when their interests diverge. 

Our relationship with Iran remains a challenging one. We will continue to pay 

close attention to their actions, while supporting our regional partners and helping 

them to improve their capacity to counter Iran and mitigate the effects of Iran’s malign activity in the region. 

A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE. 

In many ways our military-to-military relationships continue to represent the cornerstone of America’s partnerships with the nation states in the USCENTCOM 

AOR. Below are synopses of the status of those relationships, along with the current 

state of affairs in each of the 20 countries, save Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, 

and Iran which were addressed in the previous section, ‘‘Critical Focus Areas’’ (see 

pages 9–21): 

The Gulf States 

The Gulf States remain steadfast partners and continue to support the Counter 

ISIL Coalition’s operations in Iraq and Syria, primarily through the provision of robust access, basing, and overflight permissions critical to the conduct of regional operations. This support played out against the backdrop of some key developments 

over the past year, GCC support for the JCPOA agreement, and the GCC-led campaign in Yemen, which remains the Gulf State’s primary focus. 

Last year, we witnessed an increased willingness by our Gulf partners to attempt 

to actively shape and influence the regional security environment, most recently in 

the campaign in Yemen. Several of the Gulf States have demonstrated an unprecedented level of unity and military cooperation in operations against the Huthis in 

Yemen, and we continue to emphasize the importance of pursuing a political solution that will lead to the reinstatement of the internationally-recognized government. We are working with the Saudi-led coalition to help mitigate civilian casualties and to ensure that humanitarian assistance flows into Yemen. Nevertheless, we 

are deeply concerned by the devastating toll of the crisis in Yemen, both in terms 

of civilian casualties and the dire humanitarian situation that Yemen faces. We continue to urge all sides to undertake proactive steps to minimize harm to civilians, 

including by exercising restraint, distinguishing between military objectives and civilian objects, and not positioning armaments or military equipment in areas where 

civilians are known to be present, as the Huthis have done. 

16 

Our GCC partners have also indicated a desire to collaborate more closely with 

the U.S. on the threat posed by AQAP and the newly ascendant ISIL–Y. However, 

the pace and scope of activity has challenged the Gulf States’ ability to sustain operations, and to conduct the same level of military-to-military engagements, training, 

and exercises as in previous years. Now, more than ever, there is a need for strong 

U.S. engagement, vision, and leadership aimed at increasing participation and cooperation amongst and between our GCC partners. 

We have worked hard to strengthen our strategic partnership with the Kingdom 

of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in support of shared security objectives. Going forward, we 

can expect KSA to continue to exercise influence among Sunni States throughout 

the Central Region. 

The Kingdom continues to balance a wide range of external security challenges, 

including the fight against ISIL in Iraq and Syria, operations in Yemen against the 

Huthi-Saleh alliance, and the growing threat posed by AQAP, ISIL–Y, and other 

VEOs. While KSA is a member of the Counter-ISIL Coalition, over the past several 

months their primary focus has been leading the coalition in Yemen. The ongoing 

campaign in Yemen has provided KSA with valuable experience in building and sustaining coalitions and conducting coalition-supported operations. It also has provided some opportunities for us to identify reforms that KSA could undertake to increase their capabilities. 

The Saudis continue to support the fight against ISIL. After postponing air operations for a period while they focused on Yemen, KSA recently staged F–15s at 

Incirlik, Turkey and will commence operations inside of Syria beginning in early 

March. While operational demands continue to limit the amount of support that the 

Saudis are presently able to devote to the Counter-ISIL Campaign, we anticipate 

that as the conflict in Yemen approaches a negotiated settlement, Saudi support for 

ongoing efforts against ISIL and other VEOs will expand. 

Kuwait remains a model for stability in the Gulf Region. It provides one of the 

most supportive environments for access, basing, overflight, and burden-sharing. As 

a Gulf leader, Kuwait has been able to mitigate rifts between and among partner 

nations, while at the same time helping to promote a regional response to crises 

emanating from the region (e.g., Iraq, Syria, and Yemen). We want to continue to 

encourage and enable the Kuwaitis in their efforts to achieve increased cooperation 

among the GCC partner nations. 

The bilateral relationship between the United States and Kuwait remains strong. 

With robust air and sea ports, as well as modern military bases and infrastructure, 

Kuwait provides a critical platform for USCENTCOM to project power in response 

to regional contingencies. Most notably, Kuwait is home to the forward operating 

headquarters of USCENTCOM’s United States Army component, United States 

Army Central (USARCENT). The support provided by the Kuwaitis has been integral to the planning and execution of Operation Inherent Resolve (Iraq and Syria) 

and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel/Resolute Support Mission (Afghanistan). 

This year marks the 25th anniversary of the liberation of Kuwait from Iraq. The 

occasion provides an opportunity to acknowledge the significant contributions made 

by the U.S.-led coalition in 1991, while showcasing the gains made over the past 

quarter of a century as a result of the security cooperation agreement that exists 

between both countries. It is also an opportunity for pursuing additional steps to 

deepen and broaden our partnership with Kuwait. We remain committed to working 

together to address emerging threats. Although Kuwait has been largely unaffected 

by the fight in Iraq and Syria, it did suffer a significant bombing of a mosque in 

Kuwait City in June 2015 for which ISIL claimed responsibility. We remain committed to assisting the Kuwaitis in their efforts to prevent ISIL from achieving further inroads within Kuwait’s borders. 

Our military-to-military relationship with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) continues along its historically positive trajectory. The UAE shares our concerns with 

respect to the regional spread of violent extremist ideologies, and the Emirates recognize the threat posed to their internal security—and overall regional stability— 

by ISIL and its adherents and affiliates. In response to this shared threat, the UAE 

has undertaken several complementary lines of effort designed to counter the rise 

of groups like ISIL–Y and AQAP. Our continued support is critical to enabling the 

Emirates’ ‘‘lead by example’’ approach to regional security, both on the ground and 

in the information domain. Given our shared enduring security interests, the U.S.- 

UAE relationship will almost certainly grow in importance in the coming days. 

The UAE’s military capability is arguably the most mature among the Gulf 

States. The Emirates have demonstrated the ability and political willingness to plan 

and conduct expeditionary military operations, as evidenced by their recent deployment of forces in support of the Saudi-led operation in Yemen. They also provide 

critical support for coalition operations in Afghanistan. Going forward, we will look 

17 

to strengthen our security cooperation partnership with the UAE through continued 

engagement and a robust Foreign Military Sales program. We also will pursue opportunities for increased collaboration in support of CT initiatives across our AOR. 

Qatar continues to play an influential diplomatic and military role throughout the 

Central Region and has demonstrated a commitment to strengthening relations with 

the United States. This year, the Qataris played a central role in the Counter-ISIL 

Coalition operations in Syria, in addition to providing forces to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. It is the first time Qatar has supported two simultaneous operations 

outside its borders. These dual track efforts place significant demand on the Qatari 

military’s 11,000-member force. The Qataris, with our support, will need to find 

ways to manage the demand while they take steps to enhance the capability of their 

military forces. In 2014, Qatar was the largest FMS customer in the world with $11 

billion in new cases (Patriots, Apaches, and Javelin). Qatar is also looking to further 

expand its Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) system by acquiring Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and Early Warning Radar capabilities. Qatar’s 

efforts to modernize its military and increase its self-defense capabilities, present 

an opportunity for the U.S. to enhance its interoperability with an important regional partner. We will coordinate those missile defense efforts as part of our broader engagement with the GCC on ballistic missile defense. 

We value our strong military-to-military relationship with the Qataris. Over the 

past 20 years, Qatar has provided the U.S. with unmatched regional access through 

basing of American forces at Camp Al Sayliyah and Al Udeid Air Base (AUAB). Of 

note, AUAB is the single-largest U.S. logistical hub in theater and the Combined 

Air Operations Center at AUAB provides critical oversight and direction to all U.S. 

air operations in the region. Qatar’s long-demonstrated history of open partnership 

makes it one of our strongest partners in the Central Region. 

The United States enjoys a historically strong and productive partnership with 

the Kingdom of Bahrain. Bahrain hosts the headquarters of United States Fifth 

Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces in Manama (Naval Support Activity Bahrain 

and Isa Air Base), and it enjoys status as a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally. Bahrain is also a member of the Counter-ISIL Coalition; its air crews 

participated in the initial airstrikes in Syria in September 2014. Additionally, the 

Bahrainis remain active supporters of the Saudi-led operations in Yemen. The Kingdom faces a persistent threat from Iran via malign proxy activity within its borders. 

USCENTCOM actively supports the Bahrainis in their efforts to counter this threat. 

Our military-to-military relationship improved in recent months since full resumption of U.S. FMS after a three-year delay. Bahrain also seeks to make improvements to its aviation capabilities, specifically by purchasing new F–16s and upgrading its ageing fleet. We continue to urge the Bahrainis to further their commitment 

to political reconciliation and dialogue, which is fundamental to mitigating the risks 

posed by sectarian radicalization. The Bahraini government has implemented a 

number of reforms since 2011. We are encouraging them to pursue and mature 

these reforms and other similar institutions, as it is imperative that internal security gains against tangible threats do not lead to harsh restrictions on legitimate 

and non-violent expressions of political disagreement. 

The U.S. and Oman maintain close relations based upon a shared desire for a 

peaceful and prosperous Gulf Region, and we greatly appreciate Sultan Qaboos bin 

Said al Said’s leadership. Oman is strategically positioned on the Arabian Sea and 

provides critical support to the United States in the form of access, basing, and 

overflight permissions that greatly enable coalition efforts in the region. While 

Oman’s strategic approach does occasionally cause tension between Oman and its 

GCC neighbors, it also presents USCENTCOM with opportunities to work with the 

Sultanate as an intermediary between adversarial states. In general, our bilateral 

military-to-military relationship with Oman remains strong, underpinned by the 

U.S. and Oman’s shared interest in maintaining open sea lines of communication 

in the Gulf and strengthening land borders in order to prevent the infiltration of 

AQ and other VEOs into the Sultanate. 

The Levant 

The Greater Levant sub-region is the epicenter of ethno-sectarian tensions and 

conflict in the USCENTCOM AOR. The volatility reflects the makeup of the subregion’s populace with Sunnis, Shiite, Kurds, Christians, Druze and others living together in mixed neighborhoods. Also adding to the unrest is the growing competition 

between AQ and ISIL. AQ shifted some of its command and control to Syria to support its most prominent affiliate, al Nusrah Front. At the same time, the core of 

ISIL’s self-proclaimed Caliphate resides in the Levant. Thus, the Levant is where 

you have two organizations’ senior leadership in competition for global jihad. At the 

same time, the sub-region is struggling to manage the effects of the civil war in 

18 

Syria. If not contained, the conflict, now in its fifth year, risks sparking a broader 

regional war. It also has caused a burgeoning humanitarian crisis affecting Jordan, 

Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq. Stability in the Levant is impacted by the competition 

for influence by outside actors, principally Iran, China, and Russia. The instability 

in the Levant also threatens Israel, an important United States ally. The close coordination between USCENTCOM and United States European Command is essential given Turkey and Israel’s role in the Levant’s security environment. 

Lebanon is an important and valued partner in the region. Lebanon faces an 

array of interlocking challenges that include sustained threats from ISIL and other 

VEOs; a steady influx of refugees that only exacerbates long-standing sectarian tensions and ongoing humanitarian and economic crises; and a political deadlock in 

Beirut that has left Lebanon without a president for over 19 months with none of 

the major political institutions of the state—the presidency, parliament, and the 

cabinet—functioning adequately today. ISIL and AQ affiliate Al Nusrah Front pose 

potential threats to Lebanon’s security and stability along Lebanon’s border with 

Syria, but also in urban areas deep within the country’s border. In November 2015, 

ISIL conducted coordinated suicide attacks against Shiite targets in Southern Beirut 

killing 41 civilians. The attacks threatened to ignite increased Sunni-Shiite tensions, but tensions were diffused by an immediate and coordinated response by Lebanese security forces. These attacks were at least partly in response to Lebanese 

Hezbollah’s (LH) active involvement in the Syria conflict. Although Lebanon’s official contributions in support of the Counter-ISIL Campaign have been limited to CT 

efforts inside of Lebanon’s borders, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have been 

heavily engaged in the fight against extremists with near daily engagements along 

Lebanon’s border with Syria. 

Lebanon faces a refugee crisis of historic proportion with more than 400,000 Palestinian refugees and 1.5 million Syrian refugees, which is equal to a quarter of 

Lebanon’s population. The latter presents an economic and humanitarian burden for 

Lebanon, while also posing a security threat as some Syrian refugees may be vulnerable to Sunni extremist influences. In order to effectively cope with the refugee 

crisis resulting from the Syria conflict, Lebanon will require significant international assistance long-term. Meanwhile, top Lebanese officials have suggested 

that there may be a need for an international intervention to address the presidential vacancy and political impasse which has resulted in poor government services and large-scale public demonstrations. 

In the context of these challenges, the LAF is one of Lebanon’s only functioning 

national institutions. We enjoy a strong military-to-military relationship with the 

LAF, and our support has been critical to its success. Our special operations forces 

have conducted extensive joint training exercises and have well-established relationships. The LAF has been a staunch USCENTCOM partner for nearly a decade, receiving almost $1 billion in combined assistance from the U.S. during this period. 

During fiscal year 2015, we provided $84 million in foreign military financing 

(FMF), $80 million in CT assistance, and also trained over 2,000 LAF soldiers in 

the U.S. Our special operations forces have conducted extensive joint training exercises and have well-established relationships. Because of its success against ISIL 

and other VEOs, the LAF enjoys strong support across Lebanese sects. Our continued support of the LAF is critical and will focus on developing much-needed ISR, 

strike, and aerial fires capabilities to ensure sustained success against ISIL and Al 

Nusra Front along the border and to counter-balance LH. 

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan remains one of the United States’ most reliable partners. Like many in the region, Jordan faces economic challenges that are 

exacerbated by the Syrian civil war, the associated refugee flow, and a generally unstable regional security environment. The instability caused by the ‘‘underlying currents,’’ namely the ‘‘youth bulge,’’ makes Jordan’s populace highly susceptible to 

radicalization. The country’s leadership is particularly concerned about the growing 

threat from ISIL and Al Nusra Front emanating from Syria. The Jordan Armed 

Forces (JAF) remain active participants in the Counter-ISIL Campaign. 

Jordan’s partnership and leadership are critical to advancing U.S. regional objectives. Jordan is widely considered the Arab voice of moderation in the region and 

Jordanian leadership continues to play a critical role in countering the extremist 

ideologies that contribute to instability. In return, Jordan requires economic assistance for military cooperation and to stabilize its economy. In fiscal year 2015, Jordan received $385 million in FMF. Congress appropriated $450 million in FMF for 

Jordan in fiscal year 2016. Additionally, Jordan receives $3.8 million annually for 

International Military Education and Training (IMET), and more funding than any 

other partner to date from the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund. The JAF’s ability to procure U.S. weapons and equipment and increase interoperability with U.S. 

Forces depends on this funding, which also provides Jordan with a strong message 

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of assurance that we will help to defend them from extremist threats. Finally, Jordan requires continued international assistance to deal with its sizeable refugee 

population that consists of approximately 600,000 UN-registered Syrian refugees, 

the majority of whom compete with locals for employment and housing, creating the 

potential for increased tensions. In the past 24 months, USCENTCOM invested $5.4 

million for humanitarian affairs projects inside of Jordan. 

Egypt remains an anchor state in the Central Region. It is a key strategic partner 

of the United States in both the counter-ISIL fight and with respect to our many 

shared security interests, including securing peace with Israel, achieving regional 

stability, and enhancing security of the Suez Canal. While daily life is returning to 

normal after four years of political upheaval, including recently conducted parliamentary elections, Egypt still faces a number of internal and external challenges, 

especially in the Sinai Peninsula, which is now home to the ISIL affiliate, ISIL– 

Sinai (ISIL–S) that threatens not only Egyptian stability, but also the Multinational 

Force & Observers (MFO) mission, and is strongly suspected of downing a Russian 

civilian airliner. Egypt is also increasingly concerned about ISIL–Libya’s ability to 

impact its western border. 

The cornerstone of the United States-Egypt relationship is the military-to-military 

partnership with the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF), forged through decades of close 

coordination, exercises, and interdependence. After a downturn in relations in 2013, 

we have seen the relationship enter a gradual recovery period. The Egyptians support our overflight requests and provide our naval forces with Suez Canal transit 

courtesies that provide expedited access to critical waterways. Egypt routinely deploys peacekeeping troops in support of operations around the globe. USG aid and 

support to Egypt, including FMF, remain crucial to Egypt’s fight against ISIL–S as 

we work closely with the EAF to provide both the equipment and the training required to make the transition from a force focused on conventional warfare to one 

that can defeat a terrorist enemy using asymmetrical tactics. We are focused on 

helping Egypt improve the security of their borders in an effort to stop the flow of 

foreign fighters and equipment transiting from Libya and the Sudan through Egypt 

and into the Central Region. 

A sizeable portion of Egypt’s current military leadership is United States-trained 

and has indicated a keen interest in securing additional U.S. support to address 

evolving security threats. It will be imperative to leverage these ties as we look to 

assist the Egyptian military in their ongoing efforts to bring improved stability to 

North Africa, including the Sinai Peninsula. Also, we want to help them to further 

modernize and reform their security forces to better enable them to address relevant 

threats and play a larger role in providing for regional stability. Specifically, we will 

need to focus on updating Egypt’s counter-insurgency/CT doctrine and training programs to better address the unique nature of the terrorist threats facing the region. 

We continue to provide much-needed support to the MFO mission, whose presence 

has been a linchpin for Egyptian-Israeli peace and cooperation since its inception 

over 30 years ago. With the support of the Egyptians, we have taken significant 

measures in recent months to increase the protection of our forces assigned to Task 

Force Sinai and the MFO mission writ large. 

Egypt has not contributed forces in support of the Counter-ISIL Campaign in Iraq 

and Syria. They are supporting the Saudi-led fight in Yemen, and they continue to 

place pressure on ISIL affiliates in both the Sinai and Libya. Additionally, Egypt’s 

regional leadership carries much influence among our Arab partners and can help 

to promote USCENTCOM’s broader regional objectives. We continue to look for 

ways to integrate Egypt into the Counter-ISIL Coalition and in support of our CT 

efforts across the region. 

Central and South Asia 

We view the CASA sub-region, not as a single entity, but as seven individual 

countries, each with its own political and economic trajectory and each sharing a 

unique bilateral relationship with the U.S. While we have many shared interests, 

we are paying especially close attention to the Central Asian States’ (CAS) reaction 

to the planned United States/NATO downsizing in Afghanistan set to begin in late 

2016. Of note, transit access by way of the Northern Distribution Network, used to 

supply our troops in Afghanistan, is provided by Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. 

Our primary goal remains unchanged and that is to prevent the establishment of 

terrorist safe havens in the CASA sub-region, while acknowledging the challenges 

posed by trans-national extremism, narco-trafficking, and the return of foreign fighters. These countries face additional pressures from an increasingly assertive Russia. 

China is seeking to expand its economic influences in the sub-region as well. In light 

of these challenges, leaders in the region actively seek U.S. engagement, while we 

20 

continue to encourage greater multi-lateral cooperation with the goal to promote improved security and stability in the region and to preserve the CAS’ sovereignty. 

We conducted our first CASA Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) Conference in late September. The event was well-attended and highly-productive. Despite their geographic proximity, many of the CHODs had not met nor communicated with one another prior to attending the conference. The conference focused on identifying opportunities for collaboration on issues such as CT, counter-narcotics (CN), border security operations, and the professionalization of their officer and non-commissioned officer corps. It was encouraging to see that, despite their previous reluctance to interact in multi-lateral forums, the CHODs actively participated in the discussions. 

They also expressed interest in convening a follow-on conference, and several of 

them expressed a desire to participate in multi-lateral military exercises going forward. The CASA CHODs also expressed a keen interest in finding ways to share 

intelligence that could further support regional CT operations. On 14–15 March, the 

CASA DMI (Director of Military Intelligence) Conference will be held at 

USCENTCOM Headquarters in Tampa, Florida. Six of the seven CASA States will 

be represented. The United States-Pakistan military-to-military relationship remains stable. Key contributing factors are our security assistance, and the Coalition 

Support Fund. In December 2015, we participated in the Defense Consultative 

Group, a component of the United States-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, which focused on future initiatives that will help to sustain United States-Pakistan bilateral 

defense cooperation on shared security interests. 

We are encouraged by some signs from Kabul and Islamabad that point towards 

a renewed effort at improving Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, and Pakistani support for the reconciliation process in Afghanistan. The Pakistan military continues 

to play a visible role in efforts to reduce safe havens in the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, while at the same time 

actively countering VEOs, including AQ, Tehrik e Taliban—Pakistan, and the 

newly-emerged ISIL–KP. During the most recent fighting season we saw increased 

collaboration among Afghan and Pakistani military leadership. Commanders at the 

corps level have met multiple times and continue their efforts to increase interoperability between the forces. Both countries’ military leaders also are working to secure a bilateral border standard operating procedure. In the meantime, we need 

Pakistan to take decisive actions against the Haqqani Network (HQN). The Pakistanis are uniquely positioned to counter the HQN, which remains the greatest 

threat to our forces and to stability in Afghanistan long-term. 

Progress on the India-Pakistan relationship is hindered by cross-border violence 

and territorial disputes. However, there have been some encouraging signs and lines 

of communication remain open as demonstrated by Indian Prime Minister Narendra 

Modi’s and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s meeting in Pakistan in late 

December 2015 and the subsequent commitment both parties to reinitiate the Comprehensive Dialogue. Dialogue between the two countries is critical, especially given 

that they are both nuclear powers. USCENTCOM will continue to do our part to 

help encourage and strengthen the critical relationship between Pakistan and its 

neighbors. 

Kazakhstan remains the best positioned country in the CASA sub-region with respect to security given its geographic location and strong economic foundation. However, the recent downturn in oil prices and pervasive Russian influence do present 

growing challenges. Despite these obstacles, the United States’ relationship with 

Kazakhstan remains the most well-developed among the Central Asian States. The 

Kazakhs seek United States assistance in modernizing their military forces, and we 

are taking advantage of the opportunity to further strengthen our bilateral relationship. Specifically, we are helping the Kazakhs to professionalize their non-commissioned officer corps, modernize their military education program, and improve training and personnel management. Additionally, we continue to help the Kazakhs to 

build a deployable peace-keeping capability. Kazakhstan remains the largest contributor to Afghanistan’s stability among the CAS, providing technical and financial 

support to the Afghan security forces and educational opportunities for Afghan students to study in Kazakhstan. 

The Kyrgyz Republic faces many of the same security challenges as its neighbors 

in the region, particularly with respect to the threat posed by VEOs and the flow 

of narcotics. While our military-to-military relationship with the Kyrgyz has been 

historically positive, it remains challenged by the absence of a Defense Cooperation 

Agreement (DCA), which guarantees United States servicemembers legal protections 

while in country. The DCA with then-Kyrgyzstan ended on 11 July 2014 with the 

closure of the Transit Center at Manas International Airport. While this has 

strained our military-to-military relationship, we intend to pursue bilateral cooperation on a case-by-case basis. 

21 

Tajikistan has been heavily impacted by Russia’s economic downturn and by increased instability in northern Afghanistan. Moreover, intense pressure from the 

Kremlin, including the presence of Russian military bases inside of Tajikistan, limits our military-to-military cooperation. Nevertheless, Tajikistan still desires a 

strong partnership with the United States to help address external security concerns, maintain internal stability, and safeguard Tajikistan’s sovereignty. Our mutual security interests provide several opportunities for cooperation in the areas of 

CT, CN, border security along the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border, as well as the development of a deployable peacekeeping force. Our military-to-military relationship 

is growing comparatively faster than our other relationships in the CASA sub-region. 

Like other hydrocarbon-exporting countries, Turkmenistan has had to confront 

falling gas prices and remains concerned about perceived instability in northern Afghanistan. Turkmenistan is selective in accepting military cooperation programs, 

declining to participate in most military events, conferences, and exercises. United 

States cooperation with the Turkmen is primarily focused on counter-narcotics, disaster preparedness, and medical service readiness. These three areas provide us 

with engagement opportunities to build those partner capabilities that are acceptable to the Turkmen and also help to sustain and even strengthen our relationship 

going forward. 

A shared border with Afghanistan and a heavy domestic security presence have 

helped to shield Uzbekistan from significant threats. Despite their stated aversion 

to foreign blocs and multi-lateral engagements, our relationship with the Uzbeks 

continues to grow stronger. Bilateral military-to-military opportunities are focused 

on improving border security, CT, CN, and stemming the flow of foreign fighters. 

The Uzbeks, like other CASA nations, remain concerned about the potential return 

of radicalized fighters from Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. Our military-to-military 

relationship with the Uzbeks remains positive. By expanding our collaboration, we 

expect to improve the professionalism and capacity of Uzbekistan’s armed forces, 

which is the largest military force in Central Asia. 

OUR STRATEGIC APPROACH. 

The effective employment of our ‘‘Manage-Prevent-Shape’’ strategic approach 

largely depends upon the capacity and readiness of our forward-deployed military 

forces and Service prepositioned materiel capabilities. Equally important are our efforts aimed at building our regional partners’ capacity and strengthening our bilateral and multilateral relationships. This is achieved principally through key leader 

engagements and our training and joint exercise programs. 

Building Partner Capacity (BPC). A key component of USCENTCOM’s Theater 

Strategy focuses on building the capacity of partner nations to enable them to assume a greater role in providing for the security of their sovereign territories and 

counter common threats. Joint training exercises, key leader engagements, and FMS 

and FMF programs continue to represent the key pillars of our BPC strategy. Also 

critical are relevant authorities and programs noted in the fiscal year 2016 President’s Budget, namely the Global Train and Equip authority and Counter Terrorism 

Partnerships Fund. BPC is a low-cost and high-return investment. Tangible byproducts of our BPC efforts include increased access and influence, enhanced interoperability, and improved security for our forward deployed forces, diplomatic sites, 

and other U.S. interests. The practice of working ‘‘by, with, and through’’ our regional partners serves to enhance the legitimacy and durability of our actions and 

presence in the region. Most importantly, having strong partners enhances our collective capability and interoperability, allows for increased burden sharing, and improves the likelihood of success, particularly in the event of unforeseen contingencies. Over the past year, it has been encouraging to see a number of our regional 

partners take a more active role in addressing threats and protecting their sovereign territories. In particular, the GCC’s role in addressing regional security challenges has grown exponentially. Our Gulf partners are to be commended for their 

leadership and their efforts in a number of areas. The convergence of interests, 

namely the need to counter the threat posed by ISIL and other VEOs, has afforded 

a unique opportunity to strengthen ties among nations while contributing to improving stability and security throughout the region. We should do all that we can to 

support and enable their continued collaboration as we work to enhance our collective capabilities. 

The fact is that contingency operations provide an opportunity to take a hard look 

at ourselves and identify areas where we may need to make improvements. They 

also provide opportunities to strengthen our commitment to our regional partners. 

They will prove increasingly important going forward as we confront the growing 

22 

threat posed by ISIL, AQ and other VEOs, and as we manage the challenges posed 

by Iran and other malign actors in the region. 

The President reiterated our strong commitment to bolstering the defense capabilities of our GCC partners during the U.S.-GCC Summit held at Camp David in 

May 2015. Building on that Summit, GCC members have welcomed enhanced U.S. 

security engagement, but implementation of commitments to follow-up on the Camp 

David Summit has been uneven. In some areas—including arms transfers, ballistic 

missile defense, and CT cooperation—we have had productive initial engagements 

and follow-up efforts are underway. In other areas, most notably special operations 

training and maritime cooperation, the GCC has been slow to act on U.S. offers of 

additional cooperation and assistance. Over the next year, we will continue to build 

on the Camp David Summit, prioritizing implementation of GCC commitments that 

would reaffirm our commitment to Gulf security and also support our two top priorities: defeating ISIL and other extremists, and addressing conflicts that are undermining regional stability. Our security assurance and assistance, and the steps we 

are taking with our GCC partners to strengthen their capacity to deal with asymmetric threats, are designed to put them in a far stronger position so that they can 

engage Iran politically—clear-eyed, without illusions, and from a position of 

strength. We look forward to seeing the initiatives translate into credible, enduring 

capabilities that contribute to improved regional security and stability. 

USCENTCOM Exercise and Training Program. The USCENTCOM Exercise and 

Training Program continues to grow in complexity and relevance with extended participation throughout the AOR during fiscal year 2015 and into the 1st quarter of 

fiscal year 2016. The program affords meaningful opportunities that assist with 

BPC efforts, improve interoperability among partner nations, maintain U.S. readiness, and provide for key leader engagements. 

During fiscal year 2015, the command executed 51 USCENTCOM and/or component command-sponsored bilateral and multi-lateral exercises. These included 

EAGER LION 15, which was hosted by Jordan and included naval, air, and land 

assets from 14 partner nations operating at 14 different locations and totaling over 

8,500 personnel, including some 4,500 U.S. military and civilian support personnel. 

The International Mine Countermeasures Exercise is planned for the spring of 2016, 

taking place in over 8,000 square miles of navigable waterway and uniting more 

than 40 nations, including over 7,000 global military servicemembers and over 40 

naval vessels and numerous other warfighting assets in defense of the region’s maritime commons. Each of the 51 exercises contributes to the readiness of U.S. and 

partner nation forces and the advancement of our national interests. Our exercise 

and training program also serves to demonstrate mutual commitment to regional security and combined command, control, and communications interoperability (C3I). 

Other program impacts include military-to-military engagement, integrated staff 

planning, the execution of joint and combined operations, the development of coalition warfare, and the refinement of complementary warfare capabilities. 

REQUIRED CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES. 

The security environment in the Central Region is likely to remain highly volatile 

for the foreseeable future. We must ensure that we are ready and able to conduct 

steady state operations, deter our adversaries, reassure our regional partners, and 

respond to unforeseen contingencies from a wide range of actors and VEOs. 

In order to effectively protect and promote U.S. and partner nation interests in 

the region, USCENTCOM must maintain a strong forward presence and be adequately resourced with the necessary capabilities and force posture, including forces, 

equipment, and enablers. USCENTCOM’s posture and presence remain the primary 

means for providing the National Command Authority with military options in the 

region. Our required capabilities include: 

Forces and Equipment. Forward-deployed rotational joint forces that are trained, 

equipped, mission-capable, and ready to respond quickly and effectively, including 

fighter and airlift assets, surveillance platforms, BMD assets, naval vessels, ground 

forces, and cyber teams, are essential to the protection of our core interests, and 

supporting and reassuring our regional partners. A capable and well-supported forward presence can help to prevent conflict through deterrence, manage crisis escalation through early intervention, and provides our national-level leadership with a 

broad set of response options. We continue to develop a sustainable, flexible, longterm posture that provides the necessary presence, access, and partnerships to support enduring missions and activities across the USCENTCOM AOR. 

We remain increasingly concerned that our demand for replenishment of critical 

precision munitions continues to put a strain on Service budgets. At the same time, 

industry’s capacity to produce key precision munitions cannot keep pace with the 

23 

demand from USCENTCOM, other geographic combatant commands, as well as our 

Coalition partners looking to purchase munitions through existing security assistance programs in support of USCENTCOM theater-wide operations. We work with 

the Service headquarters to prioritize precision munitions and continue to seek increases in the procurement and AOR allocation of our most sophisticated and precise weapon systems (e.g., TLAMs, JASSM, PAC–3, ATACMs), as well as authorization for construction of munitions storage facilities within the AOR. 

USCENTCOM requires continued regeneration, reset, and modernization of designated Service pre-positioned equipment capability sets. These capability sets and 

associated materiel represent critical enablers essential for effective force employment in support of ongoing operations and unforeseen contingencies. They allow our 

national-level leadership to respond to a diverse set of crisis scenarios, to include 

preventing disruptions to trade and security that could have disastrous impacts on 

the global economy. Pre-positioned equipment reconstitution and regeneration must 

remain a Service priority, recognizing that equipment shortfalls continue to impact 

indirect fire, sustainment, and troop support capabilities. 

Information Operations. Information Operations (IO) remains a top priority for 

USCENTCOM and an important element of the broader ‘whole of government’ effort 

to counter our adversaries and protect our core national interests. Our adversaries, 

including ISIL, use the information battlespace to great effect. We must actively 

counter this asymmetric threat, recognizing that IO will endure well beyond today’s 

major combat and counter-insurgency operations. Of note, Iran and proxy actors actively threaten our interests and the interests of our regional partners and they are 

enabled by robust IO efforts. Our IO capabilities, both offensive and defensive, are 

designed to disrupt and counter these and other threats. They also may be used to 

promote the messages of moderates in order to counter the radical ideologies that 

fuel much of the conflict and instability that plague the Central Region. To date, 

investments in IO have produced a cost-effective, non-lethal tool for disrupting VEO 

activity across the region. We will need to build upon the existing capability and 

improve our effectiveness and that of our partners operating in the information 

battlespace. 

Cyber Operations. USCENTCOM communication networks are the most critical 

enabler for our deployed servicemembers and regional military partners. Our complex joint and coalition command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (C5ISR) systems infrastructure is essential for enabling mission command, precision targeting, intelligence processing and dissemination, CT actions, IAMD, disaster relief missions, cyber, sustainment, and combat operations throughout the AOR. These missions require assured availability, integrity, 

and confidentiality to provide accurate data for precision weapons and navigation 

systems, as well as a robust communications backbone infrastructure that provides 

the required bandwidth for crucial aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) processing, exploitation, and dissemination and distributed mission command. We must also continue to develop and synchronize cyber capabilities with kinetic operations to achieve key security objectives. Congressional support is crucial 

to the continued improvement of cyber security and offensive capabilities necessary 

to provide mission assurance, deterrence and dominance in this critical and highly 

contested domain. A successful cyber defense requires vigilance and continuous investment in order to sustain an advantage over adversaries that are constantly improving their cyber threat capabilities. 

Integrated Air and Missile Defense. A robust IAMD capability remains increasingly important to us and our regional partners as threat technology improves and 

systems become more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate. Today, the 

global demand for BMD capabilities far exceeds supply. In particular, there is a 

need for additional upper- and lower-tier interceptors, surface and space-based surveillance and warning, and ISR platforms to seek and destroy ballistic missiles and 

rockets and unmanned aerial assets. USCENTCOM mitigates some of this risk 

through increased IAMD integration, interoperability, and burden-sharing with our 

partners. However, a gap does still exist that must be addressed. Providing IAMD 

protection to deployed U.S. Forces and in support of critical infrastructure is crucial 

to mission success and provides a visible deterrence to regional aggression. Moreover, it signals U.S. commitment to regional partners, while providing flexibility to 

respond to regional contingencies. Our bases in the USCENTCOM AOR will increasingly be vulnerable to the threat posed by ballistic missiles if we continue along the 

current trajectory. Congress’ support for the Department’s investment in this area 

is essential. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Assets. Intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities remain challenged by supply-versus-demand limitations. The demand for ISR has increased substantially as a result of the CounterVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:21 Jun 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25682.TXT WILDA
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ISIL Campaign, coupled with the enduring need to maintain a persistent eye on 

strategic risks and possible threats to critical U.S. national security interests. Meanwhile, collection in A2/AD environments continues to present a tough challenge. Our 

demand for multi-discipline, low-observable ISR with strike capability that can operate in adverse weather conditions and non-permissive environments is increasing. 

If we do not meet the requirements, we can expect that our information dominance, 

situational awareness, and security posture will diminish accordingly. Although 

overhead systems constitute a crucial component of the intelligence collection enterprise, they lack the ubiquity, persistence, and fidelity to fulfill our ISR gaps by 

themselves. Low observable platforms with improved sensors and endurance are 

critical to a number of USCENTCOM plans, while permissive ISR systems play a 

key role in COIN and CT missions. With respect to Iraq and Syria, there is need 

for a robust ISR capability to develop and maintain situational awareness of the security environment, particularly in denied and ungoverned spaces and in the absence of a larger U.S. ground presence. While we are looking to our coalition partners to help fill some of the ISR demand, shortages do remain that must be addressed. 

REQUIRED AUTHORITIES AND RESOURCES. 

The realities of the current fiscal environment continue to impact USCENTCOM 

HQs, our five component commands, established combined/joint task forces, and 18 

country teams. Provided the right authorities and resources, our world-class Civ-Mil 

team can and will successfully accomplish any mission. With that in mind, we sincerely appreciate Congress’ continued support for key authorities and appropriations 

needed to sustain current and future operations and to respond to unforeseen contingencies. The required authorities and resources listed below will enable 

USCENTCOM to shape positive outcomes for the future. 

Iraq Train & Equip Fund. The Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) includes a 

multi-layered approach to assist the Iraqi military and other associated security 

forces by contributing to the Coalition effort to fill urgent equipment shortfalls and 

training deficiencies. As of mid-December 2015, we trained and/or equipped more 

than 19,000 Iraqi Security Forces, including Counter-terrorism Service (CTS), Iraqi 

Special Operations Forces (ISOF), Peshmerga, and Sunnis through ITEF-related activities. Most graduates of the ISOF Commando Course in Area IV and BPC-trained 

Peshmerga battalions have been involved in combat operations since completing Coalition-led training. These trained forces appear to be performing better than their 

contemporaries who have not undergone Coalition-led training. United States support in fiscal year 2017 is essential to the success of the military campaign in Iraq. 

Syria Train & Equip Fund. The forces we train and equip continue to show resolve and effectiveness in the fight against ISIL inside of Syria. A stand-alone fund 

that provides the flexibility to adapt to the changing battlefield environment while 

permitting the execution of our strategy to train, equip, resupply, and enable forces 

fighting ISIL in Syria is critical to future success. Such a fund would enable streamlined funds flow, transparency, accountability, and responsiveness that positions us 

to reinforce success as it occurs on the battlefield. 

The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). We continue to see tremendous 

achievements made possible by the ASFF as the ANDSF and the Afghanistan Security Institutions (ASI) steadily improve. While our ASFF budget request has decreased by 70 percent since 2011, the capabilities and activities enabled by this appropriation remain critical to continued success in Afghanistan. Furthermore, our 

support reflects U.S. confidence in the ANDSF’s ability to develop and mature into 

a capable, credible, sustainable, and independent force. The fiscal year 2017 ASFF 

budget request for just under $3.5 billion continues to posture the ANDSF for longterm sustainability. The Afghans greatly appreciate United States support, they are 

responsive to our advice, and they understand that funding is neither unconditional 

nor indefinite. 

Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales. Our need for continued 

Congressional funding of FMF programs that support USCENTCOM security cooperation objectives cannot be overstated. The Central Region accounts for nearly 

half of all global FMS. Our partners in the region want U.S. equipment because 

they recognize that it is the best in the world. It also represents a very effective 

means for establishing long-term relationships between the U.S. and our partner 

nations and ensures greater interoperability between our militaries. We appreciate 

Congressional support for interagency initiatives designed to streamline the FMS 

and FMF process. We also need our regional partners to do their part to ensure the 

timely execution of all FMS requests. 

25 

Excess Defense Articles (EDA)/ Foreign Excess Personal Property (FEPP). The 

EDA program represents an integral component of our BPC efforts and has proven 

beneficial in our engagements with our regional partners. We have reaped the benefits of this authority several times in the last year, enabling us to support requirements in Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and other countries located within the 

USCENTCOM AOR or participating in operations with U.S. Forces. Several other 

EDA transfers to the UAE and Egypt are pending. In the same light, the FEPP authorization has allowed us to transfer non-military equipment acquired as part of 

our base closures and reductions to Iraqi and Afghan security forces, and government ministries in Afghanistan, Kuwait, and the Kyrgz Republic. 

Coalition Support. The Coalition is central to the power of our operations and 

has never been stronger or more responsive than it has been over the last 18 

months. The flexible authorities and funding that Congress continues to provide directly enables the size and diversity of the Coalition, which is key to its effectiveness. Together, the Coalition Support Fund, Coalition Readiness Support Program, 

and Lift and Sustain facilitate broad participation in combined military operations, 

thereby reducing the burden on U.S. Forces and enabling activities that would otherwise not be possible. 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). Regardless of the size, 

shape, or mission of U.S. Forces, your continued support for CERP is essential as 

it provides an invaluable tool to commanders. CERP funds are routinely the only 

time-sensitive means to respond to unanticipated events and requirements, implement small-scale efforts that provide immediate and direct benefit to local populations to enhance protection of U.S. Forces, and enable U.S. Forces to make condolence payments for the loss of life or property damage. 

Military Construction (MILCON). We continue to leverage existing infrastructure and host nation funding, as well as maritime posture and reach-back capabilities to meet steady state and surge requirements. In some cases, MILCON is still 

required to expand infrastructure capabilities to facilitate sustainment support for 

U.S. Forces and operations. Given our adversaries’ continued development of A2/AD 

capabilities, it is imperative that we facilitate the dispersion and hardening of key 

infrastructure at our major operating hubs and spokes. 

Long-term C4 Sustainment Plan. USCENTCOM, our Service Components, Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), and our deployed warfighters rely heavily on communications systems to provide critical Joint and Coalition command and control, 

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C5ISR) 

and logistics services across the USCENTCOM AOR. Without a diverse and survivable communications infrastructure and bandwidth delivery, via both satellite communications and terrestrial fiber leases to the current U.S. Force posture locations, 

all current and future Mission Command Operations are at great risk. Continued 

resource support is essential to maintaining the current U.S. Force presence in the 

USCENTCOM AOR, and to enable rapid support for any future contingency operations. 

THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND TEAM. 

The outstanding men and women who make up the USCENTCOM team continue 

to do tremendous work in support of the command’s broad mission encompassing 

a vast and highly volatile geographic area. They shoulder great responsibility and 

their day-to-day actions are of enormous consequence. We have an obligation to ensure that they are resourced appropriately and have the necessary tools and equipment, a responsive support structure, and safe, secure, and respectful environments 

to live and work in. We also take very seriously our obligation to our families; we 

could not do what we do without their support. They are important and valued 

members of our USCENTCOM team. 

The team also benefits from the unique capability provided by our Coalition Coordination Center, which consists of more than 200 foreign military officers from 

nearly 60 partner nations. USCENTCOM is the only geographic combatant command with this unique capability, and it continues to pay enormous dividends in 

terms of information sharing, collaboration, and outreach. 

CONCLUSION. 

Our overarching goal at USCENTCOM is to move the Central Region in the direction of increased stability and security. It is an ambitious task and success will require that all elements of the USG and the international community work together 

in pursuit of this shared objective. We are seeing the power of such collaboration 

in the ongoing fight against ISIL in Iraq and Syria. The enemy’s capability has been 

26 

greatly degraded over the past 18+ months and that reflects the efforts of the indigenous forces supported and enabled by the 66-nation Counter-ISIL 

Coalition. Much work remains, but we do see progress being made across the 

breadth and depth of the battlespace and throughout the USCENTCOM AOR. Going 

forward, we will take direct military action where necessary to counter malign actors and activities that pose a threat to our core national interests and the interests 

of our partner nations. At the same time, we will continue to support the governments and people of the region in their efforts to build needed capacity, enabling 

them to take a more active and pronounced role in providing for the security of their 

sovereign spaces. This will serve to increase burden-sharing among nations, 

strengthen partnerships, and expand cooperation. Ultimately, these various efforts 

will enable us to improve stability and security across the strategically-important 

Central Region. 

Today, more than 84,000 of the very best soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen and civilians assigned to or associated with U.S. Central Command are 

selflessly serving in difficult and dangerous places around the globe. They continue 

to do an exceptional job in support of the USCENTCOM mission and our Nation. 

Our people are our most important assets. We are enormously proud of them and 

their families. They are and will remain our foremost priority. 

USCENTCOM: Ready, Engaged, Vigilant! 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

General Rodriguez? 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID M. RODRIGUEZ, USA, 

COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND 

General RODRIGUEZ. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to update 

you on the efforts of the United States Africa Command. For the 

past three years, I have been honored to command the men and 

women of Africa Command. 

Africa is an enduring interest for the United States, and its importance continues to grow as African economies, population, and 

influence grow. 

Small but wise investments in African security institutions today 

offer disproportionate benefits to Africa, Europe, and the United 

States. African solutions to African problems are, in the long run, 

in the best interest of Africans, Americans, and, indeed, the world. 

Now, in the most troubled spots on the continent, Africans have 

an understandable fear and distrust of the governments and security forces, which are charged with promoting and guarding the 

welfare of the people. Predatory practices, patronage networks, corruption, and political and economic exclusion of portions of the population, as well as inconsistent adherence to the rule of law, combine to crush the hope of a better future. 

These conditions create an environment ripe for the expansion of 

violent extremism and represent a threat not only to Africa but to 

our European allies and the United States. Effectively addressing 

the threat before, during, or after a military crisis requires a comprehensive approach employing diplomacy, development, and defense to address the root causes of extremism and replace fear and 

uncertainty with trust and confidence in African institutions. 

This approach must seek improvements in governance consistent 

with adherence to the rule in a society that offers equal political 

and economic opportunity for all. 

Africa Command’s contributions to this broad solution lie primarily in encouraging and enabling the professionalism of the African security institutions, which will secure national populations, 

27 

cooperate in addressing regional security concerns, and increasingly play a role in sustaining global security. 

Our military strategy articulates a long-term, regionally focused 

approach to enabling our African partners. Our operational approach seeks to disrupt and neutralize transnational threats by 

building African partner defense capability and capacity. 

While we have achieved progress in several areas through close 

cooperation and coordination with our partners, allies, and interagency partners, threats and challenges remain. 

In East Africa, we are helping to set the conditions for the eventual transfer from the African Union Mission in Somalia, or 

AMISOM, to use the Somalia National Army and federal Government of Somalia. 

However, al Shabaab remains a continuing threat and is conducting almost daily lethal asymmetric attacks in Somalia against 

AMISOM troops. 

In North Africa, Libya’s insecurity has negative consequences for 

its people, its neighbors, Europe’s southern flank, and our peace 

and security objectives in Africa and the Middle East. An international coalition to support the Libyans to counter the Islamic 

State of Libya would support a functional Government of National 

Accord [GNA] and reduce the risks of the expansion of ISIL, further instability in North Africa, and the emergence of a direct 

threat to U.S. interests. 

Stability in Libya is a long-term proposition that will require an 

appropriate long-term strategy. Across West Africa, our partners 

and allies are countering terrorist organizations like Boko Haram 

through the Multinational Joint Task Force. With troops from 

Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, the Multinational 

Joint Task Force is a collaborative regional effort to address Boko 

Haram’s conflicts and lethal attacks aimed at destabilizing governments and terrorizing civilians. 

In Central Africa, through the combined efforts of civilian agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and military forces, the Lord’s 

Resistance Army [LRA] no longer threatens regional stability, and 

its capacity to harm civilian populations has diminished greatly. 

Today, we estimate less than 200 LRA fighters remain, and local 

communities are better prepared to protect themselves. 

Now, elections and transition of power remain a source for political instability in many African nations. Despite a decline in violent 

coup terms, challenges to the electoral process and the peaceful 

democratic transfer of power threaten both new and established 

governments. 

Currently, our requirements are increasing faster than our resources. Within the command, we seek innovative ways to mitigate 

capability gaps by refining our priorities and deliberately improving the alignment of our resources to our strategy. Success, however, requires teamwork extended well beyond the command itself. 

Close cooperation with our African partners, allies, the interagency, 

nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations 

will, over time, strengthen democratic institutions, spur economic 

growth, and advance African peace and security to a degree that 

U.S. military efforts alone cannot achieve. 

28 

Together, we can help the people of Africa achieve their potential 

on the global stage. 

I want to thank you all for your continued support of our mission 

and to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, Coast Guard, civilians, contractors, and their families, as we continue to advance our 

Nation’s defense interests in Africa. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Rodriguez follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL DAVID M. RODRIGUEZ

UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND 2016 POSTURE STATEMENT

INTRODUCTION

Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you 

for the opportunity to update you on the efforts of United States Africa Command. 

For the past three years, I have been honored to command the men and women of 

Africa Command. Since its inception in 2007, the command continues to pursue the 

objectives of strengthening democratic institutions, spurring economic growth, trade, 

and investment, advancing peace and security, and promoting opportunity and development throughout Africa. 

Africa is an enduring interest for the United States, and its importance will continue to increase as African economies, population, and influence grow. Relatively 

small but wise investments in African security institutions today offer disproportionate benefits to Africa, Europe, and the United States in the future, creating mutual opportunities and reducing the risks of destabilization, radicalization, and persistent conflict. Our engagement now can assist our African partners in realizing 

their potential and gaining the capability to solve African problems. African solutions to African problems are, in the long run, in the best interest of Africans, Americans, and indeed the world. 

In an effort to produce the greatest impact with the available resources, this year 

we updated the command’s Theater Strategy and Theater Campaign Plan. Our approach employs security force assistance and exercises as decisive efforts to build 

partner capacity. We use military operations to create the conditions for our partners to develop the capacity they need, and we use engagements across the continent as well as our posture, presence, and agreements to sustain our efforts in Africa. These efforts expose our African partners to our values and capabilities, model 

military professionalism and proficiency, and inspire them to pursue excellence in 

their own institutions. 

Our command approach is synchronized and focused, relying upon regional cooperation and close coordination with a host of partners. United States Africa Command, along with our diplomatic, defense, and development partners is helping to 

build African institutions capable of deterring the spread of extremism, protecting 

their populations, enabling economic prosperity, and expanding the rule of law and 

human rights. 

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Africa is complex and dynamic. In 2010, the United Nations estimated Africa’s 

population at 1 billion, predicting a growth to 1.6 billion by 2030 and more than 

2 billion by 2050. This population increase is coupled with urbanization and a youth 

bulge. Africa’s increase in its youth demographic, combined with other historic challenges, has led in some cases to unemployment and wide-spread disenfranchisement 

from already over-taxed governments. With national systems for basic public services, security, and infrastructure under increasing stress, criminal and terrorist networks can exploit fissures between the marginalized masses and the ruling elites, 

taking advantage of ungoverned or under-governed areas. 

Many African populations have an understandable fear and distrust of predatory 

governments or security forces and limited access to democratic participation and 

employment. This creates an environment ripe for the expansion of violent extremism, and require a comprehensive approach employing diplomacy, defense, and development to address the root causes of extremism. Our effectiveness is strengthened by close coordination with interagency partners, including the Department of 

State and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), who possess a strong understanding of African political dynamics, cultural contexts, and 

long-standing strategic partnerships. 

29 

Across Africa, the protection of United States personnel and facilities and the 

operational requirements of the command and the component commands have increased over the past year. In fiscal year 2015, we conducted 75 joint operations, 

12 major joint exercises, and 400 security cooperation activities. In comparison, we 

conducted 68 operations, 11 major joint exercises, and 363 security cooperation activities in fiscal year 2014. With requirements increasing faster than resources, we 

use innovative ways to mitigate capability gaps, including sharing forces with other 

combatant commands and complementing the capabilities of multinational and 

interagency partners. 

EAST AFRICA

The Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa leads the command’s efforts in 

East Africa. They work to complement and build the capability and capacity of our 

East African partners. The International Peace Support Training Center in Kenya 

conducts applied research, training and education for Africans in peace operations. 

The United Nations Signal School in Uganda conducts standardized training for signal units deploying in support of United Nations peacekeeping missions. The United 

Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre in Djibouti serves as a model for regional efforts 

on counter-illicit finance, improve border security, and development of counter-terrorism strategy. 

Security in Somalia has generally improved. Although, African Union Mission in 

Somalia (AMISOM) forces in southern and central Somalia seized significant territories from al Shabaab last year, weakening the group and reducing its ability to 

generate resources, al Shabaab continues to pose a threat to United States and allied interests. Recent AMISOM operations, however, have been limited due to overstretched AMISOM forces and endemic deficiencies within the Somali National 

Army. The Somali National Army remains dependent on foreign forces to conduct 

operations and is challenged by leadership, logistical support, and clan factionalism. 

Al Shabaab remains a continuing threat to U.S. persons and Western interests, 

and is conducting almost daily lethal asymmetric attacks in Somalia against 

AMISOM troops. Under-governed areas outside the reach of the Federal Government of Somalia will continue providing al Shabaab with territory in which it can 

evade security forces and continue targeting East African regional governments and 

security interests as well as European and American interests. Al Shabaab’s efforts 

will be aimed at removing external influence from Somalia and compelling troop 

contributing countries to re-evaluate their involvement in AMISOM. In the future, 

al Shabaab may seek to adapt to financial and territorial losses by broadening its 

terrorist agenda throughout East Africa. 

Political tensions within the Federal Government of Somalia will probably increase leading up to federal elections which have been delayed and are now scheduled for August, 2016.Tensions may be exacerbated if the government falls further 

behind on the key transitional benchmarks of constitutional reform, federal state 

creation, and the establishment of technical commissions to oversee the electoral 

process, or if it tries to exert its authority outside of a federally-styled government. 

Wide-spread deterioration of security situations due to contested elections and 

constitutional referendums in East Africa will continue to challenge the region. As 

seen in Burundi, election protests can lead to politically motivated violence between 

the opposition, security forces, and civilian militias. 

NORTH AFRICA

In North Africa, our priority is to contain Libyan instability and to counter violent 

extremist organizations. The post-Arab Spring transitions have fundamentally altered the regional security landscape. Terrorist groups like the Islamic State-Libya 

(IS–Libya) have exploited this instability and have expanded their training and operations. Furthermore, our European allies are deeply concerned about the migrant 

crisis and view it as their preeminent security issue within the Mediterranean Sea 

and along Europe’s southern flank. 

Libya’s insecurity, combined with porous land and maritime borders, has negative 

consequences for its people, its neighbors, Europe’s southern flank, and our peace 

and security objectives in Africa and the Middle East. Foreign fighters, arms, and 

illegal migrants are flowing through Libya, supplying fighters to the Syrian and 

Iraq conflicts, and threatening our North African partners and Southern European 

allies. The December 2015 agreement to form a Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) is an important step toward stabilizing the country. Even with the support of the international community, the GNA will likely struggle for the foreseeable 

future to establish its authority and secure Libya’s territory, borders, resources, and 

people. The continued absence of central government control will continue to perpetVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:21 Jun 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25682.TXT WILDA
30 

uate violence, instability, and allow the conditions for violent extremist organizations to flourish until the GNA and appropriate security forces are operational within Libya. In the interim, the political situation will complicate national and international efforts within Libya. 

IS–Libya represents a serious and growing threat to U.S. persons and interests 

throughout the region. Since mid-2014, IS–Libya has subsumed existing violent extremist organizations and continues to attract new fighters. Foreign fighters returning from Syria and Iraq reinforce IS–Libya’s ranks with battle-experienced fighters. 

This situation allows for IS–Libya to expand its presence, co-opt existing organizations and militias, and incorporate more tribal and sub-national groups. 

The absence of a functional government in Libya creates a favorable environment 

that threatens to export instability across Africa and threatens our European allies. 

Currently, we are engaged with our European partners in planning and intelligence 

sharing for the Libyan International Assistance Mission (LIAM), an international 

security effort to assist the newly established Government of National Accord. Improving regional security requires a coordinated multinational approach to support 

improvements in governance, security, and development. 

In Mali, security has become more tenuous as terrorist organizations carry out 

deadly attacks in the north against Malian, French, and United Nations forces and 

take advantage of a smaller military presence, the flow of arms from Libya, and the 

inability of the Mali Government to find a political solution to its domestic security 

situation. Increasingly, we are seeing terrorist elements launch attacks in central 

and southern Mali against civilian targets, which will add increased stress to security forces that lack the training and experience with counterterrorism to combat 

the threat effectively. While the situation remains challenging, the international 

community’s coordination in addressing regional security challenges has improved. 

United States Africa Command supports the Department of State in preparing partners with non-lethal training and equipment for deployment to multilateral peacekeeping operations in Mali where eleven African countries are contributing to the 

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stability Mission in Mali mission. We 

continue to provide support to partners and allies operating in Mali and neighboring 

countries, including enabling assistance to French forces in the Sahel, a relationship 

viewed as extremely effective and mutually beneficial. 

United States Africa Command is assisting in broader regional security and stability in numerous ways. We continue to collaborate with the Sahel Multilateral 

Planning Group—United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Italy—to 

synchronize allied activities in the Sahel Maghreb region to strengthen multilateral 

relationships in the fight against violent extremist organizations. In Tunisia, we are 

supporting counterterrorism training and increasing Tunisia’s aerial support capability and focusing on improving Tunisia’s counterterrorism, intelligence, and border 

security capabilities. We are also assisting Tunisia in installing an electronic surveillance system along key portions of the border with Libya to help stem the illegal 

flow of people, arms, and contraband. In Algeria, U.S. Army Africa is providing 

counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and forensic training. This training provides Algerian troops expertise in analyzing post-blast sites to determine types of 

IEDs used and adjust plans and tactics to better counter threats. 

WEST AFRICA

In West Africa, containing and degrading Boko Haram (Islamic State-West Africa 

Province (ISWAP)) remains the top priority as Boko Haram conducts increasingly 

complex and lethal attacks aimed at terrorizing civilians and destabilizing governments. We are watching carefully for signs that the threat posed by Boko Haram 

to U.S. persons is growing as a result of the group’s alignment with ISIL. In 2015, 

the African Union authorized a request from Benin and the Lake Chad Basin Commission nations (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria) to form the Multinational Joint 

Task Force (MNJTF) to counter-Boko Haram. Countering adaptive threat networks, 

like Boko Haram, across a transnational battle-space, requires this type of regional 

approach. The African Union, France, the United Kingdom, the European Union, 

and the United States have all pledged financial support to the MNJTF partner nations to support their counter-Boko Haram efforts. With the assistance of the Department of State, United States peacekeeping operation funds are providing support to the MNJTF Headquarters partners, including a project to link the MNJTF 

headquarters to the African Union’s and regional economic communities’ command 

and control systems, while additional funds will be used to train and equip forces 

and to enable airlift support. 

Last year, Nigerians brought about a largely peaceful transition of executive 

power. Since the election, President Buhari and his administration have focused on 

31 

anti-corruption programs, counter-Boko Haram efforts, and rebuilding Nigeria’s 

socio-political and economic systems. However, after decades corruption at the highest levels of civil and military leadership and a history of human rights abuses by 

security forces, Nigeria will require a comprehensive effort and support from partners such as the United States to reform and fully capitalize on its role as a leader 

on the continent. Nigeria must continue to improve the security services’ behavior 

toward the civilians they are obligated to protect. To assist Nigeria, we are expanding security cooperation engagements and providing counter-IED support; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assessment teams; and advisors to support 

Nigeria’s military at both the tactical and operational levels. We are also working 

with the Department of State to respond to the Nigerian Air Force’s request for 

equipment and aircraft. Information sharing agreements are in place between the 

United States and Nigeria as well. We also facilitated the provision of excess defense article Mine Resistant Armored Personnel carriers to Nigerian forces. 

Also, in support of the counter-Boko Haram effort, the United States provided assistance to the adjoining countries of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. In October 2015, 

the United States began providing security assistance training in Agadez, Niger, 

with 21 United States soldiers and airmen providing training to 250 Nigerien troops 

in support of the counter-violent extremists organization fight. In Chad, we have 

trained approximately 2000 members of the Special Anti-Terrorism Group, and in 

Cameroon we have provided small unit tactics training and assistance to six Battalions from the Rapid Intervention Brigade that are engaged in counter-Boko Haram 

efforts. 

The Gulf of Guinea is rich with resources and significant development potential 

for energy, shipping, transportation, food, and tourism; however, it is also an area 

of insecurity. Piracy, armed robbery, illegal fishing, and kidnaps-for-ransom are pervasive off of Africa’s west coast, and these problems have global implications. Lack 

of a regional coast guard presence to patrol waters allows criminal groups to operate 

and prey on tankers and commercial shipping. Through U.S. Naval Forces Africa, 

we support regional maritime security activities and complement civilian initiatives 

that address the root causes of maritime crime by strengthening governance and 

promoting economic development. Ongoing cooperation efforts between regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States and the Economic Community of Central African States, are yielding results in implementing 

maritime codes of conduct, like the Yaounde ́ Code of Conduct, an information sharing and maritime security agreement to counter illicit trafficking and piracy. For instance, as pirates took the motor tanker Mariam west across the maritime boundaries of Nigeria, Benin, Togo and finally into Ghanaian waters, it was tracked and 

monitored through the increased capabilities of the Maritime Operation Centers we 

helped build. Ultimately, it was interdicted and boarded by Ghanaian naval forces 

resulting in the arrest and prosecution of the pirates. 

This year, Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE, the operation to combat Ebola in 

West Africa, concluded. The USAID-led effort, with the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and U.S. Army Africa supporting, focused on building partner capacity of Liberia and the region. Our efforts 

are guiding partners to lead their own responses to the next outbreak by updating 

regional and national disaster preparedness and management plans based on lessons learned from the Ebola crisis. Recognizing the need to achieve sustainable capacity to preempt and respond to future crises, we initiated the African Partner 

Outbreak Response Alliance. This African-led, USAFRICOM-supported program develops military capabilities to support responses to an infectious disease outbreak. 

Complementary to this is the Disaster Preparedness Program, which provides funding to build national response plans which the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) used as a template for regional response plans. 

CENTRAL AFRICA

In Central Africa, in addition to those states engaged in Gulf of Guinea cooperation, the command’s efforts have focused on working with the African Union Regional Task Force to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army. Uganda, the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan have contributed forces to the African Union Regional Task Force, which has led military efforts 

to reduce the group’s safe havens, capture key leaders, and promote defections. 

While Joseph Kony remains at large, the African Union Regional Task Force, with 

advice and assistance from U.S. forces, has had considerable success reducing the 

threat posed by the LRA. Through the combined efforts of military forces, civilian 

agencies, and non-governmental organizations, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) no 

longer threatens regional stability, and its capacity to harm civilian populations has 

32 

diminished. Today, we estimate less than 200 Lord’s Resistance Army fighters remain, and communities are better prepared to protect themselves. While continuing 

to work to eliminate the threat posed by the LRA, United States Africa Command 

can also now begin to focus on countering illicit activities that support the LRA and 

other destabilization influencers in the region. 

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Southern Africa remains relatively stable. The region fields some of the most professional and capable military forces on the continent. South Africa continues to contribute to regional and continental security, including participation in United Nations peace operations in Darfur, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

Despite its relative stability, the region faces economic and social challenges that 

include poverty, crime, social inequality, and corruption. Future leadership challenges in countries such as Zimbabwe may increase the risk of regional instability. 

STRATEGIC RISKS

Other nations continue to invest in African nations to further their own objectives. 

China is focused on obtaining natural resources and necessary infrastructure to support manufacturing while both China and Russia sell weapon systems and seek to 

establish trade and defense agreements in Africa. As China and Russia expand their 

influence in Africa, both countries are striving to gain ‘‘soft power’’ in Africa to 

strengthen their power in international organizations. 

Non-allied and non-state actors are demonstrating increasing agility and sophistication in the information environment. They exploit vulnerabilities in partner, allied, and U.S. Government networks and invest heavily in internet and social media 

expertise to spread ideology and reach perspective recruits. 

Elections and transitions of power remain both a source of and catalyst for political instability in many African nations. Challenges to the electoral process and to 

peaceful, democratic transfers of power threaten both new and established governments. Protests in response to irregular or unfair voting too easily devolve into violence or violent responses from security forces. 

OPPORTUNITIES

United States Africa Command and our component commands collaborate with 

the African Union, European allies, the European Union, the United Nations, and 

other organizations to further the common objective of a safe, stable, and prosperous 

Africa. We also work in concert with international and interagency partners to build 

defense capabilities, respond to crisis, and deter transnational threats. The ability 

of our African partners to sustain the capacity they gain through security force assistance is dependent upon our collective efforts with allies, international organizations, and the African partners themselves. African nations are working together to 

develop solutions to the threats and challenges confronting them, and our allies and 

partners will continue to support their efforts. 

COMMAND APPROACH

THEATER STRATEGY (5 – 20 YEARS)

Our strategy articulates a long-term, regionally focused approach that seeks to establish, with partners, a strategic environment in which African nations are willing 

and capable of addressing security threats, not solely from a military perspective, 

but from the foundations of governance, security, and development. The 2015 National Security Strategy mandates that we train and equip local partners and provide operational support to confront terrorist groups. It includes developing the ability to direct, manage, sustain, and operate a ready and able organization over time. 

These sustainable defense institutions promote governmental stability, respect for 

the rule of law, democracy, and human rights, and help to sustain broad-based development, all of which address the root causes of violent extremism and mitigate 

the need for costly international intervention. 

THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN (1 – 5 YEARS)

The United States Africa Command operational approach seeks to disrupt and 

neutralize transnational threats by building African partner defense capability and 

capacity, as directed in the 2015 National Security Strategy, in order to promote regional security, stability, and prosperity, while always protecting U.S. personnel and 

facilities and United States’ access on the continent. 

This approach includes five lines of effort: 

33 

• Neutralize al Shabaab and transition the African Union Mission in Somalia to 

the Federal Government of Somalia • Degrade violent extremist organizations in the Sahel Maghreb and contain instability in Libya • Contain and degrade Boko Haram • Interdict illicit activity in the Gulf of Guinea and through central Africa with 

willing and capable African partners • Build African peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response capacity. 

Sustainable security requires effective and enduring institutions, both civilian and 

military, that are guided by the rule of law and a merit-based promotion system. 

We provide direct support to strengthening defense institutions and indirect support 

for governance reform and economic development, primarily led by the Department 

of State and USAID. Diplomatic, defense and development efforts continue to reinforce each other to promote stability in both conflict-affected and steady-state environments to build resilient democratic societies. 

The Theater Campaign Plan, along with the efforts from our component commands, develops a balanced approach that strengthens institutions and conducts 

counterterrorism operations with African regional partners, international allies, 

such as France and the United Kingdom, to disrupt, degrade, and eventually defeat 

terrorists. Recent operations in East Africa removed Abdirahman Sandhere, a senior 

leader of al Qaeda-affiliated al Shabaab, responsible for terrorist activities in Somalia. His removal from the battlefield represents a significant blow to al Shabaab and 

demonstrates that the United States will continue to use all tools at our disposal— 

diplomacy, information, military, and economic—to dismantle al Shabaab and other 

terrorist groups who threaten our partners, our allies, and the United States. In 

North Africa, recent airstrike operations removed Abu Nabil, an Iraqi national who 

was a longtime al Qaeda operative and the senior IS–Libya leader. In West Africa, 

we provide enabling support to the African-led Multinational Joint Task Force in 

their operations against Boko Haram. In the Gulf of Guinea, our cooperation with 

Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo led to enforcement of the Yaounde ́ Code of Conduct and increased their capacity to counter illicit trafficking and piracy. These efforts have achieved an unprecedented level of collaboration, and their operations are 

shaping the campaign plan, which provide time and space to increase partner capacity within defense and government institutions. 

SYNCHRONIZATION WITH PARTNERS

The Africa Strategic Dialogue, an annual meeting of United States Africa Command and our interagency partners facilitated by the Africa Center for Strategic 

Studies, is intended to foster a shared strategic situational understanding and a 

common strategic approach. This collaborative forum fosters a comprehensive approach by including Assistant Secretary-level leaders in the Department of Defense, 

Department of State, and USAID and provides the guidance to improve the alignment of resources to the U.S. strategy and informs our annual budget planning cycles. 

We recognize that defense is only one component of the African security sector, 

and it is equally important to address the law enforcement and judicial systems. 

United States Africa Command and the Department of State are supporting partnerships with Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia to strengthen governance across the security sector with the Security Governance Initiative (SGI). 

SGI is a collective approach to strengthen African partners’ security institutions’ capacity to protect civilians and confront challenges, with integrity and accountability. 

Key to the success of this initiative is the demonstrated willingness and ownership 

of our partners to tackle security sector governance issues. 

The Counter-Terrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) is a mechanism to develop the 

counterterrorism capacity of African partners, as well as nations within the 

USCENTCOM area of responsibility. CTPF proposals, totaling $465 million in fiscal 

year 2015 and $420 million in fiscal year 2016, are designed to strengthen those 

nations’ defense institutions. For fiscal year 2017, the President’s budget requested 

$1 billion for CTPF for AFRICOM and CENTCOM. AFRICOM anticipates using its 

fiscal year 2017 CTPF allocation for crucial airlift, ISR, command and control systems, sustainment training, and force structure development of African partners. 

Programs such as the Security Governance Initiative and the Counter-Terrorism 

Partnership Fund provide an opportunity to further our relationships with African 

partners while improving the security environment and fostering governmental progression toward inclusive democracy. Strong institutions that are fashioned and perform their duties in accordance with the rule of law protect the people and provide 

34 

inclusive opportunities which will sustain our efforts and ultimately determine if 

building partner capacity succeeds. 

Our security cooperation activities are aligned with our Theater Campaign Plan 

objectives and account for what our partner nations can absorb, with the complementary objective of aligning resources to our strategy. For example, Tunisia, our 

newest major non-NATO ally, has developed a three-tiered approach to building 

military intelligence capacity, affirming that Tunisian and U.S. strategic goals for 

counterterrorism and the promotion of democracy are aligned. Through this approach we developed a plan that will provide capabilities such as the Scan Eagle 

unmanned air system, for integration into the Africa Data Sharing Network, and 

build a military intelligence training program at the generating force level which 

complements Tunisian executive direction reforms to create a fusion center between 

the Tunisian Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior. These efforts help to foster security, governance, and economic development and are a model for sustainable 

security force assistance. 

United States Africa Command is working with international partners to synchronize security efforts. The United Kingdom has recently increased its presence 

and commitment in Africa, and we are synchronizing efforts to increase efficiencies 

and provide greater collective effects. In North Africa, the Libyan International Assistance Mission (LIAM), an international security effort to assist the newly established Government of National Accord, is our main planning focus with European 

partners. In West Africa, through an international cooperation and coordination liaison cell, U.S. assistance is synchronized with international partners from France 

and the United Kingdom to build interoperable and sustainable partner defense institutions. With the support of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 

the African Union hosted the African Logistics Forum that brought together thirtyeight nations to discuss African logistical challenges and opportunities. 

THEATER POSTURE

Having an appropriate posture on the continent facilitates building partnership 

capacity, executing joint operations, and protecting U.S. personnel and facilities. We 

maintain 15 enduring locations on the African continent which give the United 

States options in the event of crisis and enable partner capacity building. Additionally, the command designated nine new contingency locations as part of the Theater 

Posture Plan for 2016 focused on access to support partners, counter threats, and 

protect U.S. interests in East, North, and West Africa. These contingency locations 

strive to increase access in crucial areas aligned with the Theater Campaign Plan. 

Flexible and diverse posture facilitates operational needs and the protection of U.S. 

personnel and facilities. 

RESIDUAL RISK

We are helping to set the conditions for the eventual transition from the African 

Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to the Somali National Army and the Federal 

Government of Somalia. If the Somali National Army fails to form the defense institutions required to generate and sustain new forces and equipment, then AMISOM 

troop contributing countries—Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda— 

may reach donor fatigue levels, threatening current troop contributions levels. Recent United Kingdom commitments are encouraging, and we are complementing 

their efforts to neutralize the threat that al Shabaab poses to regional security. 

Strengthening the Somali National Army requires a coordinated international effort. 

We strongly support the formation of an international coalition to counter-IS– 

Libya and to support a functional Government of National Accord; otherwise, we 

risk the expansion of IS–Libya that further degrades stability in North Africa and 

threatens U.S. interests. Stability in Libya is a long-term proposition that will require strategic patience as the GNA forms and develops. Our approach allows time 

for the Libyan Government to develop by providing support to regional partners 

Chad, Niger, and Tunisia, as well as Egypt (in cooperation with United States Central Command); offers support to international partners such as the Italian-led Libyan International Assistance Mission; and directs counter-IS–Libya operations. 

We are mitigating risk to U.S. military and civilian personnel with regard to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements and personnel recovery 

(PR) assets through cooperation with our allies and partners. Most operations in our 

Area of Responsibility occur as advise and assist missions. This requires a serious 

evaluation of vulnerabilities, which can be mitigated by ISR and PR. Integrating 

personnel recovery and surgical stabilization capabilities are a moral obligation and 

essential for the proper care of U.S. servicemembers who risk their lives to protect 

our nation. 

35 

Flexible posture through cooperative security locations and contingency locations, 

complemented by the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response (SPMAGTF–CR) at Moron Air Base, Spain and the East Africa Stand-by 

Force in Djibouti provide the appropriate level of responsiveness during crisis and 

are strategically positioned to enable U.S. and partner operations against terrorist 

threats. Completion of our Cooperative Security Locations, coupled with accurate indications and warnings, will ensure swift crisis response to all fifteen high threat/ 

high risk embassy locations in Africa. 

LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE

The President has stated that Africa—its growing economies, its emerging middle 

class, its rising geo-political influence—is more important than ever to the security 

and prosperity of the international community and to the United States. Modest investments, in the right places, go a long way in Africa. Maximizing our energies 

today with African partners, allies, the interagency, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations will strengthen democratic institutions, spur 

economic growth, boost trade, enhance investment, and advance peace and security. 

These efforts will assist in making African nations strong, stable, and reliable strategic partners in the future, a future in which Africa will play an increasingly 

prominent global role. While the continent offers a challenging and complex strategic environment, the command approach is synchronized and focused, and capitalizes on regional cooperation and close coordination with our African and international partners. 

As the Department of Defense makes difficult decisions about strategic risks and 

associated tradeoffs, United States Africa Command will continue to provide the 

foundation on which to build, shape, and pursue our shared interests across Africa. 

Thank you for your continued support to our mission and to the soldiers, sailors, 

airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, civilians, contractors, and their families as we 

continue to advance our Nation’s defense interests in Africa. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

General Votel? 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA, 

COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

General VOTEL. Good morning, Chairman McCain, Ranking 

Member Reed, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank 

you for the opportunity to appear this morning alongside my teammates, General Lloyd Austin and General Dave Rodriguez, to discuss the current posture of the United States Special Operations 

Command. 

On any given day, nearly 10,000 SOF men and women are deployed or forward-stationed to over 80 countries around the globe. 

They fill combatant command requirements that span the range of 

our congressionally delineated core activities, from behind-thescenes information-gathering and partner-building to high-end dynamic strike operations. Every success they achieve reinforces 

what we already know: Our people are our greatest asset. They are 

adaptive, bold, and innovative. Through persistent presence in 

harm’s way, they allow us to see opportunities early, and they routinely deliver strategic impacts with the smallest of footprints. 

Perhaps nothing makes this point more clearly than the stories 

of two operators you have likely heard about in the past days and 

weeks. 

Navy Seal Senior Chief Petty Officer Ed Byers was awarded the 

Congressional Medal of Honor last week for his courage and heroism above and beyond the call of duty in rescuing an American 

citizen held hostage in Afghanistan in 2012. 

More recently, Army Green Beret Sergeant First Class Matthew 

McClintock provided immediate medical care to a wounded AmerVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:21 Jun 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25682.TXT WILDA
36 

ican teammate before leaving an Afghan element under intense fire 

to secure a landing zone for medical evacuation aircraft. His courageous actions cost him his life but saved the lives of his teammates 

and ultimately turned the tide of the engagement. 

While the stories of these two American heroes are publicly 

known, it is the stories of thousands of SOF operators from all of 

our services, aircrews, acquisition specialists, intelligence analysts, 

communicators, logisticians, and many others that underwrite our 

enduring SOF value to the Nation—quiet professionalism and absolute excellence in accomplishing our most challenging military missions. 

Allow me to emphasize my strongest point this morning: Thank 

you for your devotion to the well-being and resilience for the men 

and women of SOCOM and their families. Their emotional, social, 

psychological, and physical health is in good hands thanks to you, 

and we are very grateful for your enthusiastic support. 

While the command priorities remain unchanged from my testimony last year, USSOCOM continues to learn, evolve, and adapt 

to meet the current operational environment, an environment characterized by rapidly shifting power with competition and conflict 

between both state and nonstate actors, actors who are increasingly ambiguous, transregional, and multidimensional. 

As a result, this past year, we focused on gaining a deeper understanding of today’s gray zone challenges, and we have restructured 

our operational rhythm to focus on the transregional nature of violent extremist organizations. 

Given this complex security environment, the demand for SOF 

skill sets remains understandably high. Therefore, your support for 

SOCOM is more important than ever. 

It is a truth that SOF cannot be mass-produced in times of need. 

Consistent investment in our people and capabilities is very important. 

As good as our men and women in SOCOM are, we remain extraordinarily dependent on service-provided capabilities and capacity to perform our mission. I ask for your strong support for them 

as well. We simply could not perform our mission without serviceprovided capabilities, infrastructure, and institutional programs. 

Alongside our colleagues in the services, we are grateful for the 

budget stability forged out of last year’s agreement and remain 

hopeful for similar stability beyond 2017. 

In closing, I would like to once again thank the committee and 

Congress as a whole for your outstanding support in funding, authorities, and encouragement. Your oversight of our efforts to man, 

train, equip, and employ SOF remains critical as we confront an increasingly complex security environment. 

We look forward to continuing this great relationship, and I 

pledge to you that we will remain transparent, engaged, and responsive. I remain honored and humbled to command the best special operations force in the world. I am extremely proud of each 

and every one of our team members and their families as they continue to serve our great Nation. I look forward to your questions 

today. 

[The prepared statement of General Votel follows:] 

37 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL JOSEPH L. VOTEL

OPENING REMARKS

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to address you today as the 10th Commander of United States Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM). This is my second address on the posture of 

U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF). Since my statement last year, the challenges 

we face in the security environment have continued to evolve and create new conditions to which the military must adjust. USSOCOM is also evolving and tailoring 

our expertise to these challenges, though we remain consistent in our priorities, our 

commitment to excellence, and our dedication to serving the needs of our nation. 

During my remarks, I would like to discuss how we see the security environment 

changing, and how we believe SOF can best contribute to safeguarding the security 

of the American people, both now and in the future. 

TODAY’S U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE

USSOCOM is unique among the Unified Combatant Commands in that it was legislated into existence, and has Service-like responsibilities to organize, train, and 

equip Special Operations Forces. Our mission, as I pointed out last year, is to synchronize the planning of special operations and provide SOF to support persistent, 

networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) operations to 

protect and advance our nation’s interests. 

USSOCOM has approximately 56,000 Active Duty, 7,400 Reserve, and 6,600 civilian men and women serving in a wide variety of roles and functions. Our organizations include Army Special Forces, SEALs (Sea, Air, Land Teams), Air Commandos, 

Rangers, Army Special Operations Aviation, Marine Raiders, civil affairs personnel, 

and psychological operations personnel. Our military personnel include both Active 

Duty as well as Guard and Reserve SOF, which provide us with an essential operational capacity that allows us to surge in support of emerging requirements. We 

also have a variety of enablers that are critical to our success in diverse mission 

sets which include acquisition experts, logisticians, administrators, analysts, planners, communicators, and other specialists who are instrumental in fulfilling our 

mission. 

On any given day, nearly 10,000 SOF are deployed or forward-stationed in more 

than 80 countries worldwide. They are filling GCC requirements that span the 

range of our Congressionally-delineated core activities. Our actions in support of the 

GCCs include such mission sets as: enhancing partner capabilities; coordinating 

counter-terrorism (CT) planning and operations; supporting the capabilities of our 

interagency partners; and developing critical relationships with key influencers. In 

all of these examples, which cover just a segment of our activities, SOF plays a key 

role by working with a range of partners on complex and demanding problem sets. 

Even in those situations where SOF are in the lead for small-footprint, high-risk 

missions, we are fully integrated with, and fully dependent upon, our conventional 

force, international, and interagency partners. 

Given the security environment we now face, the demand for the skill sets that 

our SOF operators possess is understandably very high. Although we will always 

answer these calls, expanding USSOCOM’s role in multiple locations is not without 

risk. The skills, maturity, and agility that we develop in our operators requires significant time, effort, and investment. This is one of our SOF truths: SOF cannot be 

mass-produced. Therefore, the employment of SOF should be based upon where we 

can create the greatest strategic effect to advance our nation’s interests. I believe 

we need a continuing dialogue on how this can be accomplished, as well as how we 

can best prepare to meet the challenges we see developing in the future. 

ENDURING PRIORITIES AND PROGRESS

My priorities remain unchanged from those I discussed with you last year. Focusing on these priorities have helped us continue to develop appropriate capabilities 

and capacities to meet the needs of our nation, as well as the needs of our force. 

I would like to take a moment to review these priorities as well as mention some 

of our ongoing efforts in each. 

First, we are ensuring SOF readiness by developing the right people, skills, and 

capabilities to meet current requirements as well as those that will emerge in the 

future. Although we share responsibility with the Services for developing our special 

operations forces, USSOCOM has the responsibility for ensuring the current combat 

readiness of SOF. To maximize our effectiveness here, our readiness assessment 

process focuses on identifying GCC demands, and assessing our ability to support 

those requirements as well as our ability to surge in support of new demands. This 

38 

approach is helping us identify and rectify any gaps we may have in supporting the 

GCCs. In another important dimension of readiness, we are implementing the Defense Secretary’s decision to fully open all military positions, career fields, and specialties, including special operations specialties and units, to women. We did not request a waiver to this decision because our range of missions require a wide variety 

of skills and perspectives. As I conveyed to the USSOCOM Enterprise through a recorded video, we will not lower, raise or create multiple sets of standards for SOF; 

our priority is to identify and train the very best people for these demanding roles. 

Second, we must help our nation win in today’s challenges and contribute to keeping the nation safe. Our most important effort under this priority has been to organize our processes for dealing with trans-regional threats—those challenges that are 

dispersed not only across the borders of nation-states, but also across our GCC 

boundaries. As a headquarters with global responsibilities, USSOCOM is well-positioned to help the GCCs prioritize and synchronize SOF operations to maximize our 

effectiveness. This trans-regional approach also allows us to better inform DOD decision-making processes on force management and determine where we can act to 

seize opportunities. Our role in Operation Gallant Phoenix, aimed at countering the 

flow of foreign fighters, is prime example of our integrated and innovative approach 

to the challenges we face. This effort has enabled a very limited number of people 

to have a significant impact on these networks. 

Third, we are continuing to build relationships with international and domestic 

partners through sustained security cooperation, expanded communication architectures, and liaison activities. USSOCOM has strengthened the relationships and connections that provide the foundation for this network to enable more regular communication and collaboration. Over the last two years, we have invested heavily in 

integrating our international partners into our headquarters. We now have representation from 17 nations working with us in Tampa, and we are placing our own 

liaisons into 15 partner nations across the globe. Our facility provides our international partners access to their own national classified communication systems 

while placing them in a single collaborative space, side-by-side with their U.S. counterparts. 

We are also continuing to find opportunities to work across the interagency on our 

most pressing national security challenges, and have hosted a number of collaborative sessions to improve our perspectives on these issues. For example, last year 

we hosted a counter-ISIL forum with representatives from the Departments of 

State, Justice, Homeland Security, Treasury, and Defense, as well as the FBI, CIA, 

Office of the Attorney General, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 

USAID, and other departments and agencies. We have also held other such forums 

this past year with the Department of State on messaging, and with 18 of our international partners on coordinating hostage rescue operations. There is still more to 

be done, and I look forward to working with Congress in determining how we can 

best work across the interagency and serve the national security interests of the 

United States. 

Fourth, we are preparing for the future by investing in SOF that are able to win 

in an increasingly complex world. Ultimately, preparing for the future is about ensuring that we match the right people and capabilities with the very best ideas to 

address our most pressing challenges. Improving our ability to perform in the future 

requires us to find innovative ways to invest today in programs that enhance existing capabilities as well as create new advantages for our SOF operators. Programs 

such as the Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit (TALOS) are providing us with the 

ability to collaborate and rapidly prototype with industry, academia and other government organizations to match the latest technologies with the needs of our force. 

Another critical effort is our SOF Information Environment, which supports our 

need for better situational awareness, collaboration, decision-making, and synchronization under complex conditions. While these technologies are important, we believe humans are more important than hardware, and are expanding our investments in the human part of the equation. Our Future Special Operator concept describes appropriate attributes and competencies of the future force and is helping 

us identify and build the right mix of cultural and language expertise. We are also 

investing in education and training that will further enhance our forces’ ability to 

adapt and innovate in rapidly changing conditions. 

Critical to all of our efforts is ensuring we preserve our force and families, providing for their short- and long-term well-being. People—military, civilian, and families—are our most important asset. To the maximum extent possible, we are working with the Services to fulfill the needs of our force in terms of care. Where there 

are gaps in their ability to meet the unique needs of our operators, which is driven 

by a high, sustained operational tempo, the relative maturity of our force, and the 

range of stressors our force and families are placed under, we are building programs 

39 

to fill these gaps. In our efforts to address these needs, we are partnering with academia and governmental agencies, as well as non-governmental agencies. We have 

also begun to integrate discussion of these subjects into our professional military 

educational venues, so that the notion of seeking help and continuously building resilience becomes a habit, rather than an aspiration. 

I believe these are the right priorities—and I also believe we are seeing progress 

toward generating the right capabilities and capacities to deal with the emerging 

security environment. 

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND USSOCOM

Last year, I provided an overview of how we see the strategic environment changing in ways that enhance the ability of connected and empowered populations to reshape security conditions—which are taking place against a backdrop of power 

shifts among both state and non-state actors. Today, I will explain how I see this 

environment influencing the challenges we face—specifically, those that we consider 

‘‘trans-regional.’’ Improving our understanding of the context of these challenges will 

improve our ability to identify appropriate solutions. 

This is clearly an era of rapidly shifting power, which has stimulated increased 

competition and conflicts between states, within states, and across their borders. As 

power shifts, we frequently see competition emerge as empowered actors attempt to 

expand their spheres of influence, while others attempt to preserve the status quo. 

Empowered actors naturally seek to seize new privilege commensurate with their 

elevated power status—this is not new. What is new is that increasingly, populations are becoming connected through modern communications technology and are 

demanding change on a range of governance issues. Grievances can now quickly mobilize a connected population and create opportunities for exploitation by outside 

state or non-state actors. 

Trans-regional challenges are situations in which an actor, such as a violent extremist organization (VEO), operates across the borders of states—and more problematic for us, across our GCC boundaries. When these organizations are able to 

leverage local grievances in multiple locations simultaneously, they create an ‘‘archipelago’’ of local insurgencies. These situations are a combination of internal instability and external exploitation. Importantly, these insurgents are motivated by 

local conditions, though are willing to associate with the trans-regional actors when 

it suits their purposes. What may appear as a vast, trans-regional threat is in many 

cases, a series of local issues that an external actor has taken advantage of by 

leveraging modern communications and culturally-attuned messaging. These associations are opportunistic and based on shared, but often transient, interests. 

When these political conditions exist, aggrieved populations are vulnerable to any 

narrative that is acceptable within the culture and directed at the perceived source 

of grievance. Organizations such as ISIL are using communication tools to recruit 

both regionally and globally—exploiting potential recruits’ receptivity to a jihadist 

message. We must recognize that while the gaps between increased power and lagging privilege are opportunities for our adversaries to exploit, they are also opportunities for us to build stability in strategically important areas, and undermine the 

ability of these VEOs to build inroads. Over time, we can act to sever the linkages 

these groups depend upon for survival. What will remain is denying future opportunities to these groups to exploit local grievances for their own purposes. 

USSOCOM’S VALUE TO THE NATION

Despite this complex security environment, USSOCOM is well-postured to support 

the GCCs in countering these trans-regional challenges by virtue of its global perspective. Our responsibility to synchronize planning against VEOs will help the 

GCCs identify opportunities to influence dynamics in one region by applying pressure in another. Further, we can provide a range of local options, which includes 

building critical influence with key actors, to magnify our strategic effects. 

The range of challenges we deal with in this environment, and the span of their 

reach, prevent a one-dimensional approach from achieving our desired ends. Partners, both international and domestic, are critical to providing us with the range 

of capabilities, resources, and access we require. USSOCOM’s extensive investment 

in building a global network of partners has proven indispensable in developing 

comprehensive approaches against these threats. Although we work with a large 

network of partners, USSOCOM can also provide the capability to act discreetly in 

politically-sensitive situations, where a low-visibility approach is more effective than 

a larger footprint. 

While the challenges we face will not be solved by military capabilities alone, 

there are simply cases in which force will be our only recourse. For these situations, 

40 

USSOCOM has invested a great deal of effort in ensuring we are fully integrated 

with the Services. SOF plays an important enabling role for conventional forces in 

conflict. Simultaneously, we tirelessly work to improve those capabilities that we are 

uniquely structured to provide. Yet even in these cases, most SOF missions require 

non-SOF support; we remain fully dependent upon our Joint Force partners. 

By understanding the complex security environment, building meaningful relationships with our domestic and international partners, and ensuring we are integrated with the Joint Force, SOF can help influence strategic outcomes prior to crisis. Properly posturing SOF will help us identify emerging issues and rapidly adjust 

our approaches to best seize opportunities. All of these characteristics allow us to 

develop long-term and cost-effective options to prevent or mitigate conflict, and create decision-space for policymakers. We also can deter and disrupt the most immediate and important threats to US, partner, and allied interests. 

Therefore, SOF’s value to the nation lies in: our global perspective that spans regional boundaries, coupled with our ability to act and influence locally with a range 

of options; our networked approach that integrates the capabilities of our domestic 

and international partners, paired with our ability to act discreetly against our most 

important threats; and our seamless integration with the Services to support and enhance their effectiveness, while we provide capabilities that SOF is uniquely structured to deliver. All of these are only possible due to our people—adaptive, agile, 

flexible, bold, and innovative—who allow us to seize opportunities early, and have 

strategic impact with a small footprint. 

With the range of capabilities that we can deliver, there are a variety of functions 

we are called upon to fill. These functions can be categorized into three broad bins: 

things we must do, things we are expected to do, and things we should do. Each 

of these bins are important for the security of the United States; our task is to determine the appropriate balance across each of them. To be clear, we are laser-focused on today’s fight, but we remain vigilant in preparing SOF to best meet the 

challenges of the future. 

WHAT WE MUST DO

SOF remains a multi-spectrum, multi-phased force—we provide a full array of capabilities across the range of conflict, and are prepared to support the GCCs when 

conflicts escalate. Yet, USSOCOM provides two no-fail mission sets to safeguard our 

interests. 

First, we must provide the ability to rescue and recover U.S. citizens from hostage 

situations. This is one of the central missions USSOCOM was created to execute. 

Recovery of Americans in crisis situations denies the incentives to attempt to coerce 

U.S. policymakers with the lives of U.S. citizens in the future, while safeguarding 

the lives of those currently in danger to the best of our ability. 

Second, SOF plays a critical role in reducing incentives to obtain and employ 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as deny the effects of current and 

emerging WMD-capable threats. USSOCOM is forging enduring, purposeful relationships with intelligence and law enforcement agencies to fully capitalize on opportunities to achieve national counter-WMD goals. Ideally, we will be able to more 

formally codify these relationships to ensure proper and enduring synchronization 

of efforts. While forums currently exist to bring various government agencies together on these problems, they tend to be more focused in the near-term and in response to crises. The most effective options require a longer-term focus with enduring partnerships. 

These capabilities are unique to SOF and constitute what I perceive as our two 

enduring no-fail responsibilities. However, the utility of SOF in other mission sets 

has led to us taking a lead role in many other challenges we face, some of which 

share connections to these two missions. 

WHAT WE ARE EXPECTED TO DO

Over the past fifteen years, USSOCOM has invested heavily in developing 

counter-terrorism capabilities. The increasing influence of various VEOs has understandably resulted in a call for more capacity to counter them. Our operators undertake demanding, time-sensitive, high-risk mission sets to prevent these groups from 

using terrorist tactics to achieve their ends at the expense of our interests, our partners’ interests, and the lives of innocent civilians. While SOF is not primarily a CT 

force, we recognize that we provide the core CT capabilities for the Department of 

Defense (DOD). 

I believe the use of more kinetically-centric CT operations are best undertaken as 

a narrow set of actions in support of broader activities intended to separate VEOs 

from the populations they are attempting to influence. Certainly, this kinetic aspect 

41 

of CT will play a role in safeguarding our security going forward, though not necessarily the central role. 

Although SOF excel in high-risk, politically sensitive situations, the employment 

of SOF against any problem set is not risk-free. If we restrict our approaches to direct action-centric responses, we can quickly consume our readiness and capacity, 

which can undermine our ability to seize early opportunities to prevent escalation 

in other crises. This is particularly so when we apply a great deal of our force structure and activities against tactical conditions that emerged from unchanging—or 

worsening—strategic trends. A focus on these tactical conditions comes with a hefty 

strategic opportunity cost. We believe the most effective approach to CT is to think 

of it more expansively, and find options to prevent VEOs from building inroads with 

the populations they depend upon for their own strategic success. 

Similar to the complex pathway actors seeking WMD must take, VEOs also have 

pathways they must travel to recruit and train, fund operations, build their networks, develop relationships with relevant populations, organize, and equip. By 

looking at this problem set more broadly, I believe we can begin to undermine these 

groups’ ability to achieve success. This approach would prioritize shaping dynamics 

in the human domain—influencing the ‘‘will to fight’’ of potential recruits as well 

as the decision-making of VEOs. 

WHAT WE SHOULD DO

Earlier, I discussed the necessity of seizing opportunities. Many of the trans-regional actors we encounter are taking an experimental approach to find opportunities they can build upon. We should realize that the tactical actions of our competitors are lagging indicators of where they expect to find—or have found—strategic success. SOF’s role as ‘‘global scouts’’ fits well with our need to also locate and seize 

opportunities, while denying them to our adversaries. USSOCOM is, and must continue to be, a learning organization intensely focused on finding areas of high-leverage opportunities to safeguard and advance our nation’s interests. 

I believe this aspect of our value is where we are currently under-invested, and 

will experience the highest returns on our efforts if we rebalance our activities. This 

rebalance will consist of deepening our understanding of complex regional issues, 

developing important relationships, providing early warning of emerging problems, 

and ultimately cultivating the influence that we can use to undermine the efforts 

of violent organizations. All of this preserves decision-space and expands our windows of opportunity—therefore minimizing our risk. 

We are putting time and effort into developing a family of strategic documents 

intended to guide the development of our ability to do this. Maximizing the strategic 

effectiveness of deployed SOF requires a long time frame, efforts to understand underlying dynamics on the ground, and cultivation of key relationships to maximize 

our influence. The realities of today’s strategic environment simply defy short-term, 

small-force, risk-free solutions that create the desired strategic results. Improving 

our strategic performance will take time, but earlier commitments can help control 

costs overall. 

Throughout the troubled regions of the world in which we operate, actors are increasingly using approaches and methods that avoid conventional military responses 

to territorial encroachments. Sophisticated fusions of information operations and 

targeted tactical actions are helping these actors find areas in which they can 

achieve more enduring strategic success. Russia, for example, is advancing its interests by employing a variety of approaches across their periphery that combine traditional military operations with sophisticated information campaigns aimed at a variety of audiences. The proliferation of, and increasing reliance on, unconventional 

tools in the security environment requires us to invest time and effort in ensuring 

we prepare ourselves with the proper capabilities, capacities, and authorities to 

safeguard our interests. 

Accordingly, we are working hard to determine how we can best leverage the capabilities of our international SOF partners to mutual benefit. Their access to and 

influence in key strategic locations are essential to maximizing the effectiveness of 

our own force, while we possess capabilities that they can benefit from. However, 

we must remember that these arrangements are two-way streets, and built upon 

mutually beneficial relationships. There are a range of areas we are exploring to improve here, such as in communications infrastructure and policies that support information sharing, as well as planning integration. 

Domestically, our interagency partners provide an array of essential capabilities 

to address many of the challenges we face—most of which defy a military-centric 

solution. We continue to look for ways in which we can enhance our ability to work 

with interagency partners. SOF capabilities alone are insufficient to achieve policy 

42 

objectives, but we can create time and space for policymakers, while identifying opportunities to integrate the capabilities of the interagency to advance our interests. 

Although we have made significant progress in working with our domestic partners, 

I believe there is much more to do. 

In short, simply improving upon what we are doing today will not be sufficient 

to meet the challenges of tomorrow. Shifting from a reactive approach to a more 

proactive one will require some time and a sustained effort. I believe this approach 

will be the most effective in controlling the risks we face to our national security 

interests. 

Accordingly, we are working to organize around problem sets and better integrate 

the capabilities of our domestic and international partners. Further, we are working 

to match our operators’ agility with our institutional agility—improving our support 

to those from whom we ask so much. As an organization that routinely deals with 

unique and shifting challenges, we prize our adaptability. This is a characteristic 

we are also leveraging in our programmatic processes to best enable our force. 

ENABLING OUR FORCE

The United States and our allies face an unpredictable and dynamic security environment, while DOD simultaneously faces significant fiscal constraints. To effectively confront challenges we must make timely decisions on tradeoffs between capability, capacity, and in limited cases, readiness. These decisions require analysis and 

oversight. 

USSOCOM’s overall readiness remains stable. However, we expect to see impacts 

on our readiness should significant constraints be put on Service budgets that result 

in cuts to programs and activities that we depend upon. SOF would begin to lose 

its technological superiority or be forced to jeopardize various essential recapitalization and modernization programs, leaving the force with reduced capability and/or 

capacity in critical areas. Further, a significant increase in the demand for SOF 

would prevent us from adequately resetting and retraining for the large variety of 

missions we are expected to execute. 

Programmatically, our priorities have remained consistent. We focus on enhancing 

Service-provided platforms to meet the needs of our force—we are therefore highly 

dependent on investment decisions made by the Services, and greatly impacted by 

budget changes that affect them. Much of our funding is currently dedicated to procurement, modernization and/or modification of aviation and mobility platforms, 

weapons, ordnance, and communications equipment. Our budgetary realignments 

are aimed at better balancing capability, capacity, and readiness as we continue to 

face a great deal of fiscal uncertainty. Critical procurement programs supporting the 

development of our force include: a precision strike package, rotary wing upgrades, 

and the AC/MC–130J in support of SOF aviation; improved wet and dry 

submersibles in support of our shipbuilding programs; and upgraded communications, weapons, protection, and visual augmentation in support of our SOF operators 

on the ground. 

Our own investments in technology are focused on those areas that require relatively small amounts of funding in order to mature them into useful tools that 

uniquely meet the needs of SOF. Often they are centered on the enhancements to 

the platforms that form the backbone of our lethality, mobility, survivability, and 

communicability. We currently have a list of 32 technologies that meet this criteria 

and are investing in them over the next two years. 

USSOCOM continues to build a culture that embraces and supports innovation 

in our research, development, and acquisition programs. Our acquisition team is developing and testing new operating models to help build a marketplace for SOF innovation. For example, we are piloting a venue we call SOFWERX; an unclassified, 

open collaboration facility designed to bring non-traditional partners from industry, 

academia, and the government together to work on our most challenging problems. 

SOFWERX is the central node in USSOCOM’s efforts to push advanced manufacturing, rapid prototyping, and 3D printing technology to our operational units. This 

year we have provided orientation training on these technologies to operators in two 

of our Service components, and are already seeing the benefits of enabling their 

ability to think through a problem and rapidly iterate on potential solutions at all 

levels of our organization. 

We are also breaking down barriers to innovation through industry engagement— 

we are using more non-traditional contractual agreements that provide greater flexibility, including signing more than 120 Cooperative Research and Development 

Agreements, and awarding five non-Federal Acquisition Regulation-base contracts 

called Other Transaction Authorities or OTAs. The TALOS effort, which I mentioned earlier, is one of our key vehicles we are using to improve our innovation caVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:21 Jun 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25682.TXT WILDA
43 

pabilities across a variety of disciplines by better collaboration with industry, which 

we will be applying in other efforts going forward. In the second full year of that 

effort, the TALOS team has grown from long, less frequent prototyping events to 

nearly continuous rapid prototyping in a number of key technologies. 

In another important area of innovation for us, we appreciate the support you 

have provided through the 2016 NDAA to allow our forces to develop creative and 

agile military information support operations concepts, technologies, and strategies. 

USSOCOM is currently carrying out a series of technology demonstrations to assess 

innovative tools designed to detect previously unseen patterns in complex social 

media data, integrate and visualize vast information, and allow warfighters to 

sense, understand, and respond to changes in the information environment in real 

time. The ability to conduct effective messaging, as well as counter-messaging, will 

only grow in importance, given the evolving nature of conflicts. 

USSOCOM’S INTERDEPENDENCE

As I have indicated, a great deal of USSOCOM’s procurement is focused on Special Operations-Peculiar enhancements to Service-managed programs. Being ready 

to support the range of contingencies we prepare for depends upon maintaining a 

robust fleet of air, ground, and maritime platforms that we tailor to our unique 

needs through our MFP–11 funding. Our buying power is highly dependent upon 

the Services’ continued investment in these platforms. Major cuts or reprioritization 

in these programs will require us to reassess our readiness investments. Not only 

do we focus on SOF-specific enhancements to Service-managed programs, but we 

also focus a great deal of our training and equipping efforts on ensuring interoperability with conventional forces and partner nation forces. Major reprioritization on 

the part of the Services will create a significant ‘‘sunk cost’’ for us. 

Therefore, one of USSOCOM’s greatest concerns is the potential impacts of fiscal 

reductions to the Services’ readiness, which directly affect SOF. We have already 

seen reductions which negatively affect us in a variety of ways. Naval Special Warfare Command is seeing training challenges associated with lower fleet asset availability which impacts readiness and interoperability. Marine Forces Special Operations Command is experiencing reductions in access to some important school 

seats. U.S. Army Special Operations Command is experiencing a reduction in the 

Military Training Specific Allotment as well as staffing at heavily-used ranges. Air 

Force Special Operations Command is facing risk in the AC/MC–130J recapitalization program. If further reductions become necessary, we are certain to see more 

examples of adverse impacts on USSOCOM like these. 

We are also dependent upon the capabilities that reside within some of the defense agencies, such as the Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Agency (JIDA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). 

DTRA is uniquely positioned to look at WMD threats from a global perspective and 

provide USSOCOM with planning support, expertise and tools to counter this threat 

from both state and non-state actors. DTRA provides research and development support to USSOCOM by providing warfighter-unique counter-proliferation technologies. These organizations help reduce our analytical load on complex problems, 

while providing us with valuable insight on the threats our operators face today and 

will continue to face in the future. Relatedly, we appreciate the fiscal year 2016 

NDAA (Sec 1533) authorization for training foreign security forces to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which enables a wider effort against this shared 

threat. We request your continued support in sustaining budgetary allotments and 

authorities for these essential enablers. 

Another enduring budgetary concern for us is the future of the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, which we remain heavily reliant upon. Maintaining contingency funds is essential for responding to today’s threats while preserving 

the ability to prepare for the future. The current fiscal environment is forcing us 

to continue to leverage this funding to maintain capabilities that should be programmed into our baseline budget; much of our globally-distributed, enduring operations are currently funded with OCO. We also rely upon programs and activities 

provided by the Services that are funded through OCO—steep reductions will impact SOF operations. In other cases, funding enduring requirements through OCO 

is creating challenges for the Services to adequately match manpower specializations to requirements. For example, our operational tempo has created an increased 

need for Tactical Systems Operators (TSOs), which are airborne intelligence specialists provided by the Services. TSOs operate on aircraft that are not programs of 

record, but are vital to our ability to target enemies on the ground. This creates a 

situation where the Air Force, as well as the other Services, have an increased manpower bill they have not programmed for, while they provide us with essential intelVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:21 Jun 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25682.TXT WILDA
44 

ligence support. For critical and unique enduring capabilities like TSOs, it is essential that we provide sustainable funding that allows the Services to provide sustainable sourcing—migrating funding from OCO to Base preserves our ability to best 

prepare for the future. 

PRESERVING OUR FORCE AND FAMILIES

The demand for SOF across the GCCs as they deal with the complexities of the 

strategic environment will result in an unchanging, or potentially higher, operations 

tempo for our SOF operators. In order to respond to these strategic challenges, 

maintaining a high state of readiness among the entire USSOCOM team— 

servicemembers, families, and our civilian workforce—is paramount. To this end, I 

continue to place the Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) initiatives at 

the forefront of my priorities. 

I am deeply appreciative of the support Congress and the Department have given 

the Command in this area and for the collaboration and support we receive every 

day from the Services. With that assistance, we have built an infrastructure of holistic support services at each of our tactical units. These services include behavioral 

healthcare, family counseling and support services, physical training and rehabilitation, and a cadre of chaplains with skills to guide our community members anytime 

and anywhere. For each SOF member and/or family member requiring care, there 

is an entire team of professionals ready to guide and care for them during their tooshort downtime before the next major training event or deployment. 

USSOCOM’s POTFF is an enduring element of our efforts to design, build, and 

implement a holistic approach to address the pressure on our total force. This program identifies and implements innovative, valuable solutions across the 

USSOCOM Enterprise aimed at improving the short and long-term well-being of our 

SOF members and their families. POTFF addresses significant stressors on SOF 

families to include a lack of predictability, compressed and irregular training cycles, 

and limited post-deployment family reintegration time by leveraging both Service 

and SOF sponsored programs. 

Since implementing the POTFF initiative, USSOCOM has conducted annual surveys to monitor usage and satisfaction and several psychological / health related factors. The program has increased resilience, decreased reported symptoms of depression, increased utilization of behavioral health services, and expanded access to 

timely rehabilitative care. As a result, we are beginning to see the benefits of these 

initiatives. The members of our SOF community are proactively and increasingly 

seeking behavioral healthcare. We are also seeing steady improvement in quickly 

returning our injured personnel to a full-mission capable status. We deeply appreciate Congressional support for these efforts. Resources to support the personnel, facilities, equipment and research necessary to sustain this initiative is a priority for 

USSOCOM. 

Despite this progress, we continue to struggle with the challenge of suicides within our ranks and our community. Any loss of life has a profound impact on the Command. Accordingly, we are working with the American Association of Suicidology to 

review all of our suicides over the past four years to help us understand where we 

may better intervene to prevent these tragic events. We have also redoubled our efforts to ensure that our professional staff and leaders recognize the dynamics that 

lead to suicides and better understand how to intervene. We also continue to work 

with the Defense Suicide Prevention Office to develop a peer-to-peer mentoring program, so that our Service members and their Spouses have access to critical support 

networks during trying times. We are seeing indicators of progress in this area, and 

will continue to stress the value of behavioral health care across the continuum, 

from individual and unit performance enhancement to crisis intervention. 

WORKING WITH CONGRESS

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the posture, perspective, and health of 

our Special Operations Forces. I would also like to extend my thanks for your support on a range of issues that are critical to ensuring USSOCOM is able to provide 

the Secretary of Defense and the GCCs the capabilities that are in such high demand in our current security environment. Given that we expect demand for SOF 

to remain high, it is incumbent upon all of us to do our utmost to ensure those in 

the SOF community and their families are properly cared for. 

Congressional support is critical to ensure we can improve our ability to act early 

and seize opportunities in this complex environment. This improved ability to influence outcomes will come through a combination of tailored authorities and effective 

programs that enhance our capabilities, while ensuring that we adequately care for 

our people. The potential fallout of possible budget reductions in the future remains 

45 

a significant concern for us—the indirect impacts on USSOCOM of cuts to the Services could potentially undermine our ability to field the best possible Special Operations Forces. 

We will continue to earn the high level of trust that our leaders have placed in 

us by maintaining an open dialogue on the challenges we face, providing our best 

military advice, and remaining responsible stewards of U.S. tax dollars. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, General. 

General Austin, General Nicholson, the new commander in Afghanistan, testified before this committee in no uncertain terms 

that the security situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating. Do you 

agree with that? 

General AUSTIN. Sir, as you heard me say in my opening statement, I do think the environment in the country has changed because of a number of—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Actually, he said the situation was deteriorating, General. We really would like just straightforward answers. 

I only have a few minutes here. 

He said that the situation is deteriorating. Do you agree with 

that assessment? 

General AUSTIN. In part, I agree. I think the Taliban has become 

more active and the Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF] have 

been challenged over the last year. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. Would that argue for not having 

further reductions in troop strength there in Afghanistan, would 

you think? 

General AUSTIN. Sir, as I mentioned earlier, you start with a 

plan. The plan is based on facts that you know at that time and 

assumptions that you make in order to continue planning. When 

the situation changes so that those facts are no longer valid, or the 

assumptions that you made are no longer appropriate, then I think 

you have to go back and revisit your plan. I would agree that a review of the plan is in order. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you agree with General Breedlove that 

President Vladimir Putin is ‘‘deliberately weaponizing migration in 

an attempt to overwhelm European structures and break European 

resolve.’’ 

General AUSTIN. I think what we have seen with the use of barrel bombs and the massive number of refugees and displaced personnel I think is absolutely awful. Again, there is no logical reason 

that he would choose to employ this kind of weapon over and over 

again. 

Again, I think the fact that we have a cessation of hostilities on 

the ground right now has enabled us to get some humanitarian assistance to some of the disadvantaged people. That is a good thing. 

What he has done with this barrel-bombing is awful. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, actually, he is not barrel-bombing. 

Bashar Assad is. He is indiscriminately bombing targets without 

regard to precision weapons or precision targets. Is that true? 

General AUSTIN. I misunderstood you. I thought you said Assad. 

Senator MCCAIN. I said General Breedlove said that Putin is deliberately weaponizing migration in an attempt to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve. I am sorry if I did 

make that clear. 

General AUSTIN. I misunderstood you, Chairman. 

46 

Clearly, the approach that the Russians have taken is irresponsible. They are using dumb bombs. They have inflicted extraordinary numbers of civilian casualties, and, again, it is indiscriminate. A really poor approach to warfighting. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, again, General Breedlove said it is an attempt to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve, including breaking up the European Union [EU]. Do you support the sale of fighter aircraft to Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain? 

General AUSTIN. I do, Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you think Putin’s $8 billion in advanced 

arms sales to Iran increased risk to U.S. forces and operations in 

the region? 

General AUSTIN. Certainly, that will enable our adversaries to 

have greater capabilities. I will say at the same time that Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] countries have spent some $10 billion on 

military hardware during the same time period. 

Senator MCCAIN. General Rodriguez, there is a New York Times 

story that says the Pentagon plan to fight ISIS in Libya includes 

a barrage of airstrikes. ‘‘Thirty to 40 targets in four areas of the 

country would aim to deal a crippling blow to the Islamic State’s 

most dangerous affiliate outside of Iraq and Syria.’’ That is a quote 

from story. 

Would you recommend a barrage of airstrikes, such as described 

in the New York Times? 

General RODRIGUEZ. Sir, that answer would be better given in a 

classified setting. I will get that to you and your leadership, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you believe vigorous action should be taken 

in response to the metastasizing of ISIL? 

General RODRIGUEZ. I think the international community has to 

take action to halt the expansion, degrade it, and eventually defeat 

it. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you think we are doing enough now to stop 

this spread, particularly expansion in Libya? 

General RODRIGUEZ. The spread in Libya continues to be a challenge because of the lack of governance as well as the breakup of 

the military and the multiple militias on the ground. We continue 

to develop our situational understanding—— 

Senator MCCAIN. My question was, do you think we need to do 

more? 

General RODRIGUEZ. I think the international community and 

Libyans all—— 

Senator MCCAIN. I am not asking about the international community. I am asking about the United States of America. 

General RODRIGUEZ. Yes, I think we as part of that international 

community have to do more. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General Austin, one of the issues in Iraq is the potential consequences of failure of the Mosul dam. It is not often in headlines, 

but it has potentially serious consequences. Can you give us a status of the situation, and also the planning that has gone into the 

consequences of the failure of the dam? 

General AUSTIN. Yes, sir. We have remained concerned about the 

status of the dam since the conflict started here. As you know, 

47 

when Daesh (another name for ISIL) captured the dam, the employees initially left and the grouting ceased. We have encouraged 

the Iraqi Government, since the dam has been back in the hands 

of the Iraqis, to make sure that they are doing the right things to 

go about repairing the dam to ensure that it does not fail. 

They have most recently hired an Italian company to perform 

maintenance on the dam. It may be several weeks or months before 

that company is up and running, so there is a time period that we 

are concerned about that there will be limited to no maintenance 

being pulled on the dam. 

If the dam fails, it will be catastrophic. There will be thousands 

of people downstream that will either be injured or killed, certainly 

displaced. The damage could extend all the way down to close to 

Baghdad or into Baghdad. 

We have worked with Iraqis to ensure that they are doing the 

right things to warn people about this, and, in the event that it 

does fail, what actions they should take to get to safety. 

We certainly have placed measures in place to ensure that U.S. 

personnel are accounted for and able to be evacuated in case of the 

dam failure. 

Senator REED. Thank you, General. 

General Rodriguez, when I was in Djibouti, we focused a great 

deal of the resurgence of al Shabaab, the ability to concentrate 

forces, and to pick off some of the African allies we have in place. 

I presume you are taking this very seriously and you are beginning 

to try to disrupt their ability to attack, and also to support the 

Ugandan, Kenyan, Djibouti, and Ethiopian forces, and I think the 

Burundi forces are on the ground. Is that fair? 

General RODRIGUEZ. Yes, it is, Senator. 

Senator REED. Is there any indication that our African colleagues, the Ugandans, Kenyans, Djiboutis, Ethiopians, and Burundis, are wavering, or are they committed to the mission? 

General RODRIGUEZ. They are committed to the mission. They 

continue their activities that they have been doing for the last several years. 

Right now, because of the adjusting tactics that al Shabaab have 

taken, they need to start making adjustments, too, and that is 

what we are working with them on. 

Senator REED. Very good. 

I had a question for both the General Votel and General Austin. 

Given the years we have been suggesting, encouraging the Pakistani military forces to take action in the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas [FATA] along the border, they recently have. One of 

the consequences is they have driven a significant number of terrorist elements into Afghanistan, which actually seems to have increased the counterterrorism demands on forces there. 

Is that a fair assumption, in terms the situation on the ground? 

I will start with General Votel, and then General Austin. 

General VOTEL. Senator, I think it is. Certainly, their pushing 

into Afghanistan has not been without some level of coordination 

with our forces. While it has increased the turbulence, it has also 

provided us an opportunity to address that threat as well. 

Senator REED. General Austin, your comments? 

48 

General AUSTIN. It has increased opportunities and demands on 

the Special Operations Forces, Senator. 

Senator REED. A final question, General Austin. This is flipping 

back to Syria. There was, indeed, a train and equip program, and 

it was terminated because it was deemed not to be accomplishing 

objectives. The reality though, and you may dispute this, is that in 

order to hold ground there once we capture it, we need indigenous 

forces, not just Kurds but Arabs, Syrians. 

Are we revising in some way train and equip on a smaller scale 

and prepared to provide that kind of support? 

General AUSTIN. We are, Senator. I have asked for permission to 

restart the effort using a different approach. As you mentioned, we 

were being effective, but we were slow in getting started and generating the numbers that we needed to generate. 

Part of that was because we were trying to take large numbers 

of people out of the fight and keep them out for training for long 

periods of time. We have adjusted our approach. 

As we look to restart our efforts and really focus on smaller numbers of people that we can train on specific skills, and as we reintroduce those people back into the fight, they will be able to enable the larger groups that they are a part of. The training would 

be shorter, but again, I think they would be able to greatly enable 

the forces once they are reintroduced. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte? 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank all of you for your distinguished 

service and leadership to our country. 

General Austin, in your opening testimony, you talked about 

Iran and you said they are having a destabilizing effect on the region. In fact, there is no indication that they are following a different path than they have previously. 

We know in press reports just this week, in fact, Tuesday, that 

Iran, the Revolutionary Guard Corps test-fired several ballistic 

missiles from silos across the country, defying both recent U.S. 

sanctions, and, of course, this follows on after the JCPOA was 

signed, the ballistic missile test that they did in October and November of this year. 

Director of National Intelligence [DNI] James Clapper has testified before this committee that that would be their preferred method for delivering a nuclear weapon. 

Are you concerned about their continuing pursuit of testing ballistic missiles? 

General AUSTIN. I am, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. What are the implications of that? 

General AUSTIN. Well, certainly, we hope that the JCPOA will 

prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon in near- to midterm, and forever, hopefully. This is something we will continue to 

watch. 

Senator AYOTTE. Clearly, the JCPOA is not continuing deterring 

them on the ballistic missile program. Would you agree with me on 

that? 

General AUSTIN. I would agree with that, Senator. What I would 

say is that what we and the people in the region are concerned 

49 

about is that they already have overmatch with numbers of ballistic missiles. The people in the region remain concerned about 

their cyber capability, their ability to mine the straits, and certainly the activity of their Quds Force, which we see malign activity not only throughout the region but around the globe as well. 

There are a number of things that lead me to personally believe 

that their behavior, that they have not changed any course yet. 

This is something we will continue to watch. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, I would argue that, clearly, the sanctions 

the administration did put in place, which I have said from the beginning are pathetic and weak, are having absolutely no impact, 

given that they are now continuing to test ballistic missiles. I 

would hope that we would up our game and impose real, tough 

sanctions on Iran, on their ballistic missile program. 

I wanted to follow up on an important question, both General 

Rodriguez and General Votel. This is something I have actually 

asked both of your predecessors about. 

My concern is if we capture Ayman al Zawahiri or Abu Bakr al 

Baghdadi tomorrow, where will we detain these individuals under 

long-term law of war detention, most importantly to interrogate 

them, so we can find out all that we need to know about Al Qaeda 

and ISIL? 

I asked your predecessor, going back to 2011, I asked General 

Carter Ham, your predecessor in AFRICOM, what would happen if 

we tomorrow captured a member of Al Qaeda in Africa? You know 

what he told me? He said, ‘‘I am going to need some lawyerly help 

on answering that one.’’ 

I also asked the same of Admiral William McRaven, your predecessor, General Votel. He said to me that it would be very helpful 

if there was actually a facility that was designated for long-term 

law of war detention and interrogation. 

I guess my question to both of you is, tomorrow, if we capture 

these individuals, given the phenomenal work that the men and 

women who serve underneath you do every day, where are we 

going to interrogate them? Do you know that? Do you know what 

you would do with them, especially if we want to have a long-term 

interrogation of them? 

General VOTEL: Senator, in my experience, as we look at operations where we are actually going to change someone somebody, 

we have had a plan in place before we actually conducted the operation for how we were going to potentially detain them and what 

their legal disposition would be, whether that was back—— 

Senator AYOTTE. General, we just recently captured someone in 

ISIL. As I understand it, they are being held short term and then 

they are going to be turned back to the Kurds. 

What about long-term detention? You would agree that long-term 

interrogation was quite helpful, for example, in gathering the information we needed to get Osama bin Laden. That is what worries 

me. What do we do in a long-term setting? Do we know? 

General VOTEL. I would agree that there is a requirement for 

long-term detention, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. Do we know where that would be now? 

General VOTEL. I do not know. That is a policy decision that I 

think is being debated. 

50 

Senator AYOTTE. I think it is a policy decision that has basically 

never been made under this administration. It is one that has been 

left up in the air, which means it is left up in the air in a way that 

I think undermines our national security interests. 

I think that you all need to know what would happen tomorrow, 

given the great work of the men and women who serve underneath 

you. We hope they capture these individuals, we interrogate them, 

and we find out what they know, so that we can prevent attacks 

on this country and obviously continue to dismantle these terrorism 

networks. 

Thank you all. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you all for being here this morning and for your service 

to the country. 

General Austin, I want to follow up on some of the questions 

about Afghanistan because I saw reports over the weekend that 

President Ashraf Ghani claimed that ISIL had been defeated in the 

eastern part of the country following a 21-day operation by Afghan 

forces. Do we agree with President Ghani’s analysis of what has 

happened there? 

General AUSTIN. I think we have had some good initial effects, 

Senator, but I think there is more work to be done in that area. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Do we expect the Afghan national forces to 

follow up with ISIL in that area? Are we working with them directly on what is happening there? Can you elaborate a little bit 

on what is going on? 

General AUSTIN. As you know, Senator, we are advising and assisting the Afghan special operation forces on a daily basis. Yes, we 

are helping them to identify these threats and also advising them 

on the best means to go after these threats. 

Senator SHAHEEN. If, in fact, they are performing well with respect to ISIS, what does that mean for the continued fighting 

against the Taliban? I saw recently reports about Helmand Province and what is happening there. 

Having had the opportunity to visit there back in 2010, 2011, we 

visited Lashkar Gah, which is the provincial capital, and saw some 

really amazing work that had been done by International Security 

Assistance Force [ISAF] forces to engage the local population to get 

kids in school, to do very positive things. It is very distressing to 

see what is happening now in Helmand and the fact that provincial 

capital may fall to the Taliban. It is under threat from that. 

Can you talk about whether there are benefits from the effort 

against ISIL that carry over to the fight against the Taliban? I do 

not want to use the word ‘‘propaganda,’’ but is there messaging 

there that is helpful in terms of the Taliban’s recurring activity in 

Afghanistan? 

General AUSTIN. As was mentioned, earlier, Senator, the environment in Afghanistan this last year has been a very challenging environment to work in because of a number of transitions—transition of power for the first time in that young government’s history. 

You had a new government standing up. We reduced our footprint. 

The death of Mullah Omar was announced. That caused the 

51 

Taliban to begin to fracture a bit, but also gave rise to a new leader 

who set out to prove himself with increased activity. 

All of this worked together to prove to be very challenging for the 

Afghan security forces, and there were some setbacks. Those setbacks were due to a number of things—leadership, inappropriate 

techniques. 

General John Campbell and now General Nicholson are working 

with the Afghan security forces to address those setbacks. They put 

measures in place that should improve the performance there. 

The President, Mr. Ghani, has embraced these suggestions, and 

they are making corrections. We expect to see some improved performance. There is more advising and assisting that needs to be 

done going forward. 

One of the key things that has transpired here recently is that, 

because the Afghans in some cases were overextended, they have 

adjusted their footprint to give more flexibility. The smaller footprint allows them to project combat power at will in places that 

they need to project combat power to. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

General Votel, Senator Reed raised the issue of countermessaging in his opening statement. I know that in 2016, the National 

Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] provided resources for technologies to support our information operations and communication 

activities. Can you elaborate on what you are doing in this area to 

improve our countermeasuring efforts, which I think are really critical, both to what is going on with ISIL and to Putin in Russia? 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Senator. I agree with your assessment. I think it is absolutely critical, and it must be an integrated 

aspect of all of our operations, from start to finish. It cannot be 

something we think about afterwards. 

I am very grateful for the support we have gotten in the NDAA. 

Specifically, what we have done at USSOCOM is we have looked 

at publicly available information and how we develop the tools and 

the techniques and the procedures to use that information to help 

us understand the threats that we are dealing with. We are looking 

at how we can experiment in the area, the different things that we 

can do and bring to bear for our forces. 

Publicly available information and being able to work in that environment is an area in which we hope to improve our capabilities 

in the future. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. My time is up, but I would be interested in hearing what we are doing to work with other agencies 

within the Federal Government so that we are coordinating our 

messages across all of our activities. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Rounds? 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your service. 

General Austin, with regard to the challenges surrounding the 

retaking of Mosul and Raqqa by December of this year coming up, 

you currently have I think about 4,000 ground forces available, if 

I am correct. 

Is that enough? Do you have enough right now to assist in your 

plans to be able to retake Mosul and Raqqa? 

52 

General AUSTIN. The approach that we have used and will continue to use, Senator, as you know, is to use the indigenous forces 

to conduct the operations on the ground and enable those forces 

with our aerial fire and other enablers. 

As we look toward Raqqa and Mosul, clearly, there will be things 

that we will want to do to increase the capability of it, to be able 

to increase the pace of operations. That will require some additional capability. We have gone through and done some analysis to 

see what types of things we need to provide, and we have made 

those recommendations. 

Senator ROUNDS. Could you share those recommendations with 

this committee? 

General AUSTIN. No, sir. I would not care to do so because I have 

just provided those to my leadership. 

Senator ROUNDS. You have made the recommendations and you 

are awaiting a response to your recommendations at this time? 

General AUSTIN. Yes, sir. It will work its way up the chain. 

Senator ROUNDS. If you were allowed to have more ground 

troops, what would be the capabilities that you could accomplish, 

or what could you accomplish if you had more individuals on the 

ground there at this time? 

General AUSTIN. We could develop better human intelligence. We 

could perhaps provide more advise and assist teams at various levels. We could increase our assistance in terms of providing help 

with some logistical issues. We could increase some elements of the 

special operations footprint. 

Senator ROUNDS. Assuming we would be successful in retaking 

both of those two towns, what then? It is broken. Clearly, you come 

back in, you need to reestablish civil order and so forth. When we 

take them back, do we have a plan in place? Do we have a plan 

that we want to execute to bring back in a sense of order to those 

communities? What does it look like right now? What part would 

we play? 

General AUSTIN. The short answer is, yes, Senator, first of all, 

the Iraqis will take back Mosul, and we will work with the Syrian 

indigenous forces to take back Raqqa as well. 

As you have seen us do, as they have taken back towns in Iraq 

that include Ramadi, Baiji, Tikrit, Sinjar, and other places, that effort has been to reestablish security in those places and then immediately try to do what is necessary to repair damage and make 

sure that we are taking care of the people, the people are able to 

move back in and resume their lives. 

We build incrementally as we kind of move forward. There is a 

lot of work to be done, Senator. You know from just looking at 

Ramadi, there is a mountain of work to be accomplished to get that 

back to some reasonable state. 

In Mosul, then looking forward to Raqqa, the same types of 

things apply. Establish the security and when that is done, bring 

in the humanitarian assistance, do the reconstruction activities to 

get things back to normal. 

Senator ROUNDS. Do you believe that the current structure in 

Iraq with the government that is there now, do they have the capabilities and competencies to provide that to those communities in 

Iraq? 

53 

General AUSTIN. I think they do, sir. I think that it will require 

a lot of work, and it will require the government to work together 

much more and much better than what we have seen them do up 

to this point. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. [Presiding.] Senator Manchin, on behalf of the 

chairman. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you all for being here, and thank you 

for your service. 

I would ask the first question I think to General Votel. Given 

that we will be considering your nomination to succeed General 

Austin as CENTCOM commander, it would be insightful to get 

your opinion on the current situation in Iraq and Syria. I guess the 

question would simply be, who poses the greater threat to the region and to the United States, ISIL or Iran? 

General VOTEL. Well, I think right now, Senator, my answer 

would be ISIL does because they are inspiring and they are orchestrating external attacks that could impact our people. I think we 

have to take that extraordinarily seriously. 

That said, as we have kind of discussed here already, despite the 

JCPOA and the agreement has been made, we should understand 

that Iran is not ambiguous in their activities and their focus on the 

United States, and certainly on our allies in the region. I think 

they do pose a long-term threat as well. 

Senator MANCHIN. General Austin, do you agree? 

General AUSTIN. Sir, I would say, clearly, the most dangerous 

near-term threat is ISIL or Daesh. We will deal with that threat 

as a part of an international coalition. I would say the greatest 

mid- to long-term threat to stability in the region is clearly Iran. 

We will need to work with our partners in the region to really 

counter the malign activity that we have seen Iran conduct over 

time. 

Senator MANCHIN. The additional revenue that Iran has coming 

now, because their oil is starting to flow and the revenue from that, 

do you see that exacerbating the problem? 

General AUSTIN. It certainly adds a little fuel to the problem, sir. 

They were going to spend money on their military and buy weapons anyway. This gives them some capability to do more. 

Having said that, the GCC is working together, probably in ways 

that they have not done in the past, and they continue to buy a 

healthy dose of our equipment and our weapons as well. They are 

increasing their capability as well. 

Senator MANCHIN. Also, with the change of regime there, I guess 

the last election they just had showed an awful lot of the moderates got elected and some of the extremes got pushed out of office. It is too soon to tell, but do you see that as a promising factor? 

General AUSTIN. I think it is too soon to tell, sir. I think what 

we saw leading up to the elections, we saw a lot of moderates get 

disqualified from the elections. The folks who are now classifying 

themselves as moderates, are they really moderates or just another 

flavor of hardliners? We will see as time passes here. 

Senator MANCHIN. General Rodriguez, regarding the U.S. strike 

in Somalia that occurred Saturday, I read that the fighters that 

54 

were targeted had just completed training for a large-scale attack 

against American forces. The question would be, could you give me 

a sense of the number of camps like that that are still in Somalia 

that you have identified? How big a concern is it that there are 

other camps in this region that we do not even know about? 

General RODRIGUEZ. Sir, the camps are transitory, so they pop 

up and move, and they are at different places throughout Somalia 

at different times. It is a concern because the last three times they 

did something similar to this, they had the ability to conduct a devastating attack on the AMISOM forces. 

Senator MANCHIN. General Votel, I would follow up with you. 

The National Guard State Partnership Program has been successful in building extremely strong relationships between the Guard 

and 70 other countries for over 20 years. In some cases, it has been 

going on longer. 

In your testimony, you indicate one of your major priorities is to 

continue to build relationships with international and domestic 

partners through sustained security cooperation, expand the communication architects, and liaison activities. 

It seems to be something National Guard has been successful 

with in the State Partnership Program. Do you see a role for the 

State Partnership Program in helping advance this priority? 

General VOTEL. Senator, I absolutely do. Of course, as you may 

be aware, West Virginia has played a very key role in sponsoring 

exercises for our Polish SOF partners that was very successful. We 

have already engaged on doing the next version of that. 

I think the State Partnership Program is absolutely essential to 

us. Of course, a number of embassies we have National Guard bilateral officers at the same place where we have some of our special operation liaison officers. I think that provides a great opportunity to increase our interaction and integration on activities. 

I think it is a wonderful program, and we are going to try to leverage it in every way we can. 

Senator MANCHIN. General, I appreciate that, because we think 

it has been very successful, also, and very cost-effective for us, too. 

Thank you for that. 

My time is up. 

Senator REED. On behalf of the chairman, Senator Ernst, please. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you very much. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. I certainly appreciate 

your many, many years of service. 

I would like to start, General Austin and General Votel, just in 

your professional military opinion, you have served a while in our 

armed services. I was going to say over 40 years of service, but we 

will just say many, many years. Again, thank you for that. What 

are the implications of Russia’s actions in Syria and the world’s response or lack of response with Russia in Syria and their international behavior? 

I guess what I am trying to get at is, what lessons do you think 

Putin is taking out of Syria? What concerns should we have about 

what Putin is doing in Syria? We have heard discussion about 

weaponization of migrants. Can you give me a little input on that, 

please? 

General AUSTIN. Thank you, Senator. 

55 

Russia’s entry into this problem set has made a very complicated 

problem even more complicated. You know, when you consider the 

actors that are part of this, the regime, the Russians, the Turks, 

the People’s Protection Units [YPG], the Iranians, Lebanese 

Hezbollah, Daesh, all of these elements interacting with each other 

in a fairly confined battle space, the introduction of Russia has 

made this more complicated, especially because of the fact that, although they said they came to counter terrorism, to counter Daesh, 

what we have seen them do principally is bolster the Assad regime. 

That potentially extends the conflict. 

My personal opinion is that, as Russia entered this, they had no 

designs on being there for a long time. I do not think they can be 

there for a long time, because of the impact that it will have on 

their economy. Clearly, they tried to use this to demonstrate muscle and impress the region. I think they will have an opposite effect. When they came in and aligned themselves with the Syrian 

regime, they also aligned themselves with the Iranians and with 

Lebanese Hezbollah. That will eventually begin to alienate them 

from many of the Sunni Arab states in the region. 

Senator ERNST. Do you think that is his overall goal, the alienation of those groups, and alignment with himself? Has he achieved 

that? 

General AUSTIN. I think what they wanted to do was gain greater—certainly, they wanted access to a port in the Mediterranean. 

They want influence in the region. They want to increase their influence in the region by doing some of the things that they have 

done. I think at the end of the day, it will probably have the opposite effect of what they wanted to do. 

Senator ERNST. Okay. Thank you, sir. 

General Votel? 

General VOTEL. Senator, I agree with everything that General 

Austin just said. I would add one additional point. 

I think the big lesson that we are learning out of this is this ability to operate in the gray area, this area between normal state 

competition that we normally expect and open warfare. I think, in 

my view, this is an area in which Russia is engaging. Syria is another example. Certainly, Eastern Europe is another example. The 

Ukraine is another example. 

Short of open warfare, but they are certainly challenging our interests, challenging our influence, and challenging the interests of 

many of our allies. For those of us in SOCOM, we are paying very 

close attention to this and trying to understand the gray zone and 

how that is going to impact our future operations, and how we contribute in a particular area. 

Senator ERNST. Okay, I appreciate that. 

My time is short, but very quickly, if you could, General Austin, 

talk about the Sunni fighting force in Iraq. Why is it taking so long 

to develop a force, which would keep the region stable? 

General AUSTIN. One of the things I think that must be done, 

Senator, and I think you probably feel the same way, is that the 

Sunnis have to be a part of the solution going forward. We have 

worked with the leadership, with the Prime Minister, to enlist and 

hire and train and pay Sunni tribal elements that can help us. 

56 

They have across-the-board enlisted about 15,000 or so of Sunni 

tribal elements. They have proven that they are very reliable 

troops. 

The reason it has taken a long time is because there are 

hardliners in the environment that do not want to see a large 

Sunni force armed and equipped because of the bad experience 

with Daesh. 

Nonetheless, the Sunnis have to be a part of the solution going 

forward. We see the Prime Minister doing some things to enlist 

their help. We just need some more activity here. 

Senator ERNST. Gentlemen, again, I appreciate it very much. 

Thank you for your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Senator MCCAIN. [Presiding.] Senator Hirono? 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Rodriguez, regarding Libya, you mentioned in your written testimony that the lack of stability and security in Libya 

threatens our peace and security objectives in the Middle East. Of 

course, whatever we do in the Middle East is fraught with all kinds 

of peril and unintended consequences. 

While the Libyan Government of National Accord established by 

agreement in December 2015, as you noted in your testimony, is 

an important step, it will take time to establish its authority. 

Can you talk more about what is supposed to happen under this 

agreement, and what is to be expected to happen in Libya? What 

kind of time frame are we talking about, to establish civility and 

security in Libya? 

General RODRIGUEZ. Thank you, Senator. 

The agreement that the United Nations [U.N.] brokered to build 

of the Government of National Accord was supposed to bring together both the House of Representatives in the east and the General National Congress in the west, and build a central government 

that could then begin to govern Libya. 

This will be a long time coming as they work through this. We 

will continue to press on all the diplomatic fronts that the U.S. and 

international community can to get this thing moving. It has continued to move along slowly. 

As far as the second part of your question, to build stability in 

Libya is going to take a long time because of the lack of institutions that are there, the fractured society, and the multiple competing militias and spoilers from all sides of Libyan society. 

Senator HIRONO. What would you say are maybe the one or two 

most important steps or conditions that must occur for this process 

to proceed in a way that will result in civility in Libya? 

General RODRIGUEZ. I think the Government of National Accord 

has to come together and have enough legitimacy in the eyes of the 

Libyan people that it can function well enough to move forward 

and help to begin building stability. 

Senator HIRONO. Is that happening? 

General RODRIGUEZ. It has not happened yet. 

Senator HIRONO. Beginning to happen? 

General RODRIGUEZ. Yes. 

57 

Senator HIRONO. When you say it is going to be a long time, do 

you have any kind of a sense? Are we talking about 10 years, 15 

years? 

General RODRIGUEZ. For long-term stability, yes, it is going to 

take 10 years or so to build that society up. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

General Votel, North Korea’s nuclear threats are increasing and 

becoming more of a concern by the day. What efforts are SOCOM 

engaging in that we hope will dispel or lower this imminent threat? 

Do you think that a peaceful solution is possible at this point? 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Senator. I do not know if a peaceful 

solution is possible at this particular point. 

What we are doing, of course, is we are retaining our capability 

to deal with those types of weapons in the venues in which we are 

asked to deal with them, which are fairly peculiar. We do maintain 

that capability as one of our kind of no-fail missions. 

That said, the other thing that we have done over the last 18 

months is increase our presence and partnership with our South 

Korean partners. I am pretty proud to say right now, today, there 

are more SOF men and women on the peninsula than we have had 

any time in the past. We are continuing to maintain a robust presence there with all of our capability—air, maritime, and ground 

SOF forces. 

Senator HIRONO. Even as we speak, are we engaging in some exercises with South Korea and our Marines? 

General VOTEL. We are. There are major exercises that occur at 

various times of the year. There is one going on right now. We are 

extraordinarily well-integrated into that, and through our Special 

Operations Command Korea, we are supporting General Curtis 

Scaparrotti in his objectives. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Again, to you, General Votel, regarding our rebalance to the 

Asia-Pacific, which is a key strategic goal, particularly as we see 

what is going on with North Korea and China, with what you can 

say in this unclassified setting, can you comment on the capabilities of SOCOM in the Asia-Pacific region? Do you have a Special 

Operations Forces structure to meet the growing demands of this 

region? Does this year’s budget request provide the resources necessary to meet the demand? 

General VOTEL. Senator, to the last part of your question, we absolutely do have a structure. It is formed around Special Operations Command Pacific that is under the operational control of 

Admiral Harry Harris under my combatant command. We are 

sourcing them. They are a fairly robust headquarters. They have 

the ability to exercise command and control and coordination, integration with Admiral Harris’ staff. 

With regards to the other things that we are doing, I guess I 

would like to say that SOCOM never left the Pacific. We have always been engaged out there. Most of our activities are bilateral. 

We certainly had some success in the Philippines in the past and 

in support of many of Admiral Harris’ objectives out there. 

We are working very closely with a large variety of partners to 

reassure them, to develop their capabilities, and to show that we 

remain very committed to the area. 

58 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you very much. I thank all of our testifiers today. Mahalo. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Graham? 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you all for many years of great service. 

Syria, General Votel, are you responsible for training the Syrian 

Democratic Forces? 

General VOTEL. We are providing forces to General Austin who 

has that mission. 

Senator GRAHAM. What percentage of the Syrian Democratic 

Forces are Kurds? 

General VOTEL. Probably about 80 percent. 

Senator GRAHAM. Is it possible for the current construct for these 

forces to take Raqqa away from ISIL? 

General VOTEL. I do not know. I think that they are capable. As 

we have seen in some of the things that they have done, without—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Is there a plan to take Raqqa back from ISIL 

using these forces? 

General VOTEL. We have a strategy to get to Raqqa—— 

Senator GRAHAM. No. I said, is there a plan? 

General VOTEL. There is currently not a plan. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Is there a plan to hold Raqqa once we 

take it? 

General VOTEL. I would say, no. There is not a plan to hold 

Raqqa. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

General Austin, is it fair to say that when Russia and Iran came 

in to assist Assad, that changed the balance of power on the 

ground militarily in his favor? 

General AUSTIN. It is, Senator. 

If I could make a comment on the question that General Votel 

just answered? 

Senator GRAHAM. Sure. 

General AUSTIN. As you know, Senator, as we continue to work 

with the forces in theater, the indigenous forces. Our goal is to recruit more Arabs and Turkmen and others to—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Will the recruitment require them to fight ISIL 

alone and not go after Assad? 

General AUSTIN. We will recruit, train, and equip forces to focus 

on Daesh, on ISIL. 

Senator GRAHAM. Part of the conditions will be we are not going 

to support you when it comes to Assad. 

General AUSTIN. That is correct, sir. We will only support those 

elements that are—— 

Senator GRAHAM. What happens when Assad bombs the people 

we train? What do we do? 

General AUSTIN. We will defend the folks that we are supporting. 

Senator GRAHAM. Have we defended them against the Russians 

and Assad, the people we have previously trained? 

General AUSTIN. In terms of forces that I have trained, we have 

not had that issue. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, the forces that the Agency has trained 

have been bombed by the Russians and Assad. Is that correct? 

59 

General AUSTIN. Sir, I would not want to address that in this 

forum. 

Senator GRAHAM. I think it is pretty common knowledge that the 

people we trained have been hit by the Russians and Assad. 

Is it fair to say that, going into any negotiations, Assad is in 

pretty good shape because Russia and Iran are behind him militarily and we are not behind the opposition militarily? 

General AUSTIN. I certainly would say, Senator, that Russia’s 

support and Iran’s support of Assad has really emboldened him 

and empowered him to a degree. 

Senator GRAHAM. You have been in Iraq a long time. 

Thank you for your years of service, to all of you. I certainly 

mean that. 

On June 24, 2010, I had an exchange with General Ray Odierno. 

You were there, too. We were changing over from General David 

Petraeus. 

Here is what I said: I think you indicated we are probably on the 

10-yard line when it comes to Iraq. 

This is General Odierno: I did, sir. I think we are on the 10-yard 

line. I think that the next 18 months will determine whether we 

get to the goal line or really give the Iraqis an opportunity to get 

to the goal line by 2011. 

Did you recommend a residual force? 

General AUSTIN. I did, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. If we were on the 10-yard line in June 

24, 2010, using football analogies, where are we at today in Iraq? 

General AUSTIN. Clearly, we are in a completely different game 

with respect to where we were then, sir. Nobody knows this better 

than you because you have spent so much time over there. 

Senator GRAHAM. It is a different game. I think that is a good 

way to say it. 

General AUSTIN. Absolutely, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. What is the strongest ground component in 

Iraq? Is it the Iraqi security forces or the Shiite militia? Who has 

the most capability right now? 

General AUSTIN. The Shiite militia have a lot of numbers, but in 

my opinion, they are not really good fighters. They do not have 

good tradecraft. They do not—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Is it fair to say they cannot be used to liberate 

Mosul? 

General AUSTIN. I would say, if we go down that path, Senator 

Graham, we will make a significant mistake. 

Senator GRAHAM. I could not agree with you more. I am glad you 

said that. We are really relying on the Iraqi security forces and 

Peshmerga. I think that is a long way away. 

Libya, General Rodriguez, thank you for your service. 

What percentage of Libya would you say is under the control, actual or de facto control, of extremist groups like ISIL? 

General RODRIGUEZ. ISIL and Daesh control the area in and 

around Sirte. I could not give you the exact percentage. The other 

places are either contested or have transitory factors. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you consider Libya at this point a failed 

state? 

General RODRIGUEZ. Yes, sir. 

60 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you all very much for your service. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to the witnesses. Also, I echo all the comments about the 

appreciation for your service and the many times you have been before this committee. 

General Rodriguez, I want to ask a couple questions, touching on 

each of your expertise about the training we do with foreign militaries. 

In Africa, I know the U.S. military is a preferred training partner, and many African nations seek our assistance. I kind of would 

like to have you talk about the success of those training efforts over 

the course of your three years in the position and what other nations do significant—not African nations—do significant training of 

African militaries? 

I think this is one of the most cost-effective investments that we 

make, and I would like to hear your thoughts on it. 

General RODRIGUEZ. Yes, Senator. Thank you. 

We are by far the largest contributor to training African peacekeepers in Africa. We have a tremendous amount of successes. 

Just to give you one benchmark now, the U.N. missions in Africa 

are 47 percent provided by African soldiers. That is a significant 

increase over the last several years and almost a 180 degree-turn 

from a decade ago. 

Then we have a great program that is really led by the State Department for training soldiers. All the soldiers that are trained to 

go to Somalia, as an example, all five nations have been trained 

by the State Department, supported by AFRICOM, as well as 11 

nations in Mali. 

We do a tremendous job of training all the U.N. missions who are 

heading out there. They have done extremely well overall. 

There continue to be challenges in certain areas. They have had 

some problems with discipline in some of those units. Overall, it 

has been a huge success story. 

As an example, in Burundi, almost every one of their units has 

been trained and headed to AMISOM and then come back. It has 

increased the professionalism of the forces. 

The U.N. also does some training, as do the United Kingdom 

[UK] and the French. They are the biggest contributors. 

Senator KAINE. The training that we do is not only training 

around dealing with security challenges, but in some of these nations the military has sometimes been the force for civilian repression. There are rule of law and human rights issues. 

I assume that one of the sets of expertise we provide is how to 

do the security job, and at the same time do it in a way that respects rule of law and human rights? 

General RODRIGUEZ. It is, sir. It is all about professionalizing the 

forces in every aspect, not just the tactical operations but also the 

rule of law, the law of armed conflict, and how to support the government in a democratic nation. 

Senator KAINE. General Votel, would you talk about the same 

thing with respect to special operations and special forces, the 

training work we do with other nations? 

61 

Senator King and I traveled to the region, actually to Lebanon 

a few years ago, and we witnessed some training that Lebanese 

Armed Forces [LAF] was incredibly thankful for. 

Just talk a little about the training component of what you do. 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Senator. The example you cited in 

Lebanon is a good example of many of the ways in which we are 

working with some of our international partners, particularly 

through their SOF elements. 

I think one of the very best authorities that Congress has provided to us is the authority that allows us to work very closely with 

some of our partners here to develop capabilities, to assist in our 

counterterrorism efforts. I think that has been a very, very successful program. 

What we try to do is we try to leverage the long-term relationships, the long historical relationships that many of our countries 

and particularly their SOF forces have in the region. 

For example, the French SOF, of course, are great partners in 

North Africa. The British, of course, have inroads in a lot of different places. We try to leverage that as well. 

We are also looking to work with partners to develop capacity to 

export their skills. We look at a country like Poland, for example. 

That is a good example. We worked long term with that country, 

and they have actually been somebody who can deploy, support our 

activities, and, in fact, bring others with them. 

I think the investment that not only we are making in SOF but 

a lot of our partner nations that are making in SOF, I think we 

are leveraging them very well through our relationships and partnerships. 

Senator KAINE. This is budgets, appropriations, and NDAA season, so we are looking at line items, and we are looking at expenditures. My opinion is that one of the best things we do, if you look 

at the Pentagon budget, the amount we spend to train foreign militaries, either in their real estate or bringing leaders over here for 

programs at the National Defense University. It is just a fraction 

of a fraction of a DOD budget, but it might be one of the best investments we make in terms of both building capacity, but also 

building relationships that can be important. I just encourage you 

each in that. 

Again, thank you for your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Fischer? 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service, your many years of service to this country and our people. 

General Rodriguez, last year, you testified that Libya-based 

threats to United States interests are growing and if left unchecked, I believe they have the highest potential among security 

challenges on the continent to increase risk to U.S. and European 

strategic interests in the next two years and beyond. 

What is your assessment of the current situation? Do you see 

these threats continuing to impact not just the United States but 

our allies? 

General RODRIGUEZ. Yes, Senator. It has continued to grow in 

the last year, as I mentioned. Because of the ungoverned space in 

62 

Libya, that is also what contributes to the migration challenges 

that our European partners are facing. I think I agree with all 

those statements I made last year. 

Senator FISCHER. As we look at Libya and really how unstable 

this area of the world has become, and the impact, the negative impact, it is having not just on that area but, as you said, with migration in Europe as well, are we going to see a unity government 

form? Is there any hope that that is going to happen? Or are we 

going to continue to see the threats grow faster than the possibility 

of the formation of a unity government? 

General RODRIGUEZ. I think unity government, as encouraged by 

everybody, has a chance of moving forward. It will be dependent 

upon how they handle the spoilers who are really not in it for the 

future of Libya. That will be the real determining factor. 

The concern right now for the building of the government and 

the ability for Libyans to contribute towards stabilization are the 

resources that have continued to go, their ability to generate the 

resources that continue to dwindle over time, so the instability has 

increased. That is the real risk, ma’am. 

Senator FISCHER. In your best military advice, what are the additional steps that could possibly be taken in order to combat that 

threat that is in Libya against the formation of the unity government? What are the steps that you see that we could take? 

General RODRIGUEZ. The first, of course, is to continue to press 

on all the diplomatic fronts to get some kind of government that 

can function enough, that is legitimate enough in the eyes of the 

people that it can function properly. 

Then on the military side, it is all about working with our partners, first of all, all around Libya, whether it is the European 

Union in the north that has a mission going on to help with the 

migrant situation, or North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 

both have missions in the Mediterranean Sea, as well as shoring 

up all the partners around us. An example is Tunisia, which we 

have done a good job at helping build their capacity to withstand 

the challenges there. 

Then somehow at some point in time the international community is going to have to figure out how to halt the expansion of 

Daesh and then degrade it so that this government has a chance 

to move forward. 

Senator FISCHER. You do believe that the formation of this government, it is going to take outside help in order to stabilize this 

area? 

General RODRIGUEZ. Yes, I do. 

Senator FISCHER. Do you have any idea on who our partners 

would be in that? Besides the European Union, do we have partners outside of them? 

General RODRIGUEZ. NATO, as I mentioned, also has a mission 

in the Mediterranean Sea, and the European Union, as you mentioned. The real critical partners who have continued to work in 

this effort are the U.K., France, Italy, as well as Spain and Germany. 

Senator FISCHER. Do we have a plan moving forward on that? 

General RODRIGUEZ. Yes, we do, ma’am. 

63 

Senator FISCHER. General Votel, are you concerned that the 

threat may outpace that political reconciliation in Libya? 

General VOTEL. I am. I think as General Rodriguez pointed out, 

that is a long-term proposition, so I do think we have to be concerned about that. 

Senator FISCHER. General Austin, have you seen cooperation between Syrian Kurdish groups and Russia? 

General AUSTIN. We have seen some cooperation between the 

YPG element that is in the northwestern part of the country with 

the Russians. 

Senator FISCHER. Is it frequent cooperation? 

General AUSTIN. I would characterize it as infrequent. Again, 

they are going to turn to the folks that they think can provide them 

capability when they need it most. 

Senator FISCHER. Have the Kurdish groups attacked Syrian 

rebels that are supported by us? 

General AUSTIN. There is evidence of that. 

Senator FISCHER. Do you see that growing? 

General AUSTIN. I do not see it growing. I think right now, during the cessation of hostilities, we do not see much activity at all. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal? 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you all for your distinguished service to our Nation. 

General Votel, I noticed in your testimony reference to enhancing 

our relationships with special operators from other countries, the 

interoperability of our activities with theirs. Is that an area that 

you see as a priority? If so, what can we do to support it? 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Senator. It is an area that I see as 

a priority. 

In fact, over the last several years, we have incorporated into our 

headquarters liaison officers from about 17 or 18 different foreign 

SOF forces, who are integrated with us right in our headquarters 

as kind of a demonstration of how important we think that it is. 

I think what you can do is continue to support our efforts in that 

regard. Frankly, I think the biggest challenges that we have working with our international partners really fall into informationsharing arrangements we have with them. I find that that is kind 

of a friction point that we continue to work through. I think anything we can do in those regards would be very, very positive. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Is information-sharing also an issue when 

it comes to other United States agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA], the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]? I 

noticed the reference in your testimony to those agencies as well. 

General VOTEL. In general, Senator, I think that has improved 

a lot. I do not see those as significant obstacles. Most of those agencies you mentioned have representatives in my headquarters, and 

they help smooth any potential conflicts we have. I think our interchange of information-sharing with them is quite good. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Over the years, we have heard testimony, 

both in secure settings and in public settings such as this one, 

about the opportunities and the failings to interdict illicit substances, heroin, opium, which not only undermines our activities in 

64 

some countries abroad—Afghanistan being an example—but also 

threatens our national security at home. 

In fact, we are debating now on the floor of the Senate a measure 

called the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act, which aims 

to prevent as well as treat addiction to illicit substances in our 

country. 

I wonder if you could comment on both the opportunities and the 

potential failings of our Nation in addressing those problems of 

interdicting and stopping the flow of heroin and other substances 

to this country, and the growing of it in other countries. 

General VOTEL. I think, as you know, we have had a long-term 

plan in countries like Colombia that the U.S. Special Operations 

Force and others have supported for a while that has had some 

success to it. We do conduct a number of activities in our southern 

regions here to support some of our partners in those particular efforts. In most cases, we have begun to see some success when we 

do that. 

I think they look for our leadership. They look for our partnership. They look for our expertise in helping them with that. I think 

what we generally see with those countries that we partner with, 

we do see some success. We see better efforts. 

Certainly, the problem is extensive. I think our focus on interdiction routes is extraordinarily important. 

In my view, in my experience, the same routes over which drugs 

travel, humans travel, foreign terrorist fighters could travel. I 

think these are multipurpose threats to us that have to be addressed very, very seriously. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. In some sense, the flow of heroin is along 

the same routes terrorists travel, as other kinds of threats to our 

Nation may come to this country. 

General VOTEL. In my experience, Senator, I think that is true. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you very much. Thank you for your 

excellent testimony today. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Lee? 

Senator LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to all of you for being here and for all you do for the security of our country. 

General Rodriguez, a New York Times report from February 27 

recounted that at the time when intervention in Libya was being 

discussed, then-Secretary Bob Gates stated that Libyan leader 

Muammar Qaddafi ‘‘was not a threat to us anywhere.’’ Then-director of the Defense Intelligence Agency General Michael Flynn commented that Qaddafi was ‘‘a thug in a dangerous neighborhood, but 

he was keeping order.’’ 

General Rodriguez, how has the chaos in Libya, specifically the 

proliferation of weapons from Qadhafi’s stockpile and the infiltration of ISIL and Al Qaeda affiliates, led to the further destabilization of North Africa and the Middle East, and threatened our security interests? 

General RODRIGUEZ. Thank you, Senator. 

The first effect of that destabilization was probably in Mali when 

many of the fighters as well as arms, ammunition, explosives, 

65 

headed that way, which created some of the challenges down there. 

It has destabilized North Africa all the way across to Mali. 

The other challenge are the militias who have grown up in and 

around there, and used many of the ammunition stocks for their 

power and influence not only internal to Libya, but external to its 

neighbors. 

Then the challenges have continued to grow, because of ISIL and 

its brand of terrorism, to threaten places like Tunisia. Then, of 

course, the destabilized and total chaos in the area there has contributed to the migrant problem. 

Senator LEE. Thank you. 

In a long report last week from the New York Times, it was 

made clear that then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the 

White House were persuaded to support Western intervention in 

Libya in 2011 largely due to pressure from European and Arab allies, who seemed to indicate that they would lead the operations, 

allowing the United States to lead from behind, as it was put at 

the time. 

What is your assessment of the involvement of European and 

Arab nations in Libya now, after that intervention has now led to 

chaos and sort of Islamist insurrection? 

General RODRIGUEZ. I think, as the Secretary said many times, 

I think we would all hope that many of the European nations 

would do more in this arena. 

Senator LEE. The United States has been supporting Saudi Arabia’s military initiative in Yemen now for over a year—this one is 

for General Austin—sharing intelligence in providing logistical support. In this time, the Houthis have not been driven out and the 

humanitarian crisis that is there seems to have been exacerbated. 

It certainly has not been alleviated. 

Further, terrorist groups like Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

[AQAP] and ISIL affiliates are able to have safe haven and gain 

strength, finances, and weaponry in the conflict. 

General Austin, what is your overall goal in supporting the 

Saudis in Yemen? Would you assess the Saudis’ intervention in 

Yemen thus far as being successful? 

General AUSTIN. First of all, I assess that the current state of 

play in Yemen is that they are at an operational stalemate, Senator. I think both sides have pushed hard against each other. Because neither one has an overwhelming advantage, neither one 

feels the need to come to the table to negotiate in earnest. 

Having said that, I think even though I would characterize it as 

an operational stalemate right now, I think it is trending toward 

a coalition, a Saudi-led coalition, because of some incremental 

gains that have been made here recently. 

Our goal is to support the coalition in their efforts to reestablish 

the legitimate government in Yemen, and we are hopeful that the 

coalition will be able to bring the Houthis to the table and negotiate a settlement that allows for this government to come back in 

and reestablish itself. If it does that, that will enable us to work 

with that government to do more to counter terrorist networks like 

AQAP. 

66 

We will be able to do more, but that does not mean that we are 

doing nothing right now, Senator. As you know, with all the means 

that we have available, we are pressurizing AQAP on a daily basis. 

Senator LEE. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. [Presiding.] On behalf of the chairman, Senator 

King. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

General Austin, could you give us a quick update on the status 

of the investigation into the allegations of corruption of the intelligence analysis function in CENTCOM? 

General AUSTIN. Yes, sir. The investigation is ongoing. The DOD 

Inspector General [IG] continues his work. As I said from the very 

beginning, the leadership at CENTCOM will do everything within 

its power to support the efforts of the DOD IG. 

Senator KING. Do we have a date? Do we have a projected date? 

It has been sometime since that investigation. 

General AUSTIN. It has been, sir. I would defer to the IG to provide that date. 

Senator KING. Did you stand up any kind of investigation of your 

own of these allegations, being the principal victim of them? 

General AUSTIN. Sir, as you know, it would be inappropriate for 

me to do that while the DOD IG investigation is ongoing. 

Senator KING. You do not have any idea when the IG will be 

completing their work? 

General AUSTIN. I do not, sir. I hope it is soon. I would also tell 

you, as I said before, if the IG or the investigation finds out or determines that there have been inappropriate actions, I will take the 

appropriate measures to address whatever the infractions were. 

It is important to me that my intelligence analysts and all of my 

subordinates provide me unvarnished input on a routine basis. 

Senator KING. I understand that. That is why I characterized you 

as the principal victim. If you are not getting good intelligence, it 

compromises your ability to perform your function. 

Let me change the subject for a moment. Afghanistan, the current schedule is 9,800 to 5,500 on January 1, 2017. The problem 

as I see is to get to 5,500, you cannot just turn a switch on December 31. There is going to be a drawdown of some kind starting 

probably in late summer. 

Are you concerned, given the heightened level of Taliban activity, 

that we would be making a mistake by embarking upon a drawdown of that nature, to get back to the football analogy, if we are 

on the 10-yard line or the 5-yard line? It concerns me that we, 

again, are backed into being calendar-driven rather than conditions-driven. 

General AUSTIN. Yes, sir. The way I view this is, you have to 

have a plan. You build that plan on the facts, and you make assumptions at the time that you build that plan. 

Senator KING. You have testified to a heightened level of Taliban 

activity and greater stress on the Afghan forces. Is it not time to 

reassess that plan now? If we wait until August or September, we 

are already in the midst of a drawdown. 

General AUSTIN. Sir, that is exactly where I was going. As the 

facts change, and as the assumptions are no longer valid, then it 

67 

is appropriate to go back and review that plan and make adjustments, as required. 

Senator KING. Is that happening right now? Is there a reassessment underway? 

General AUSTIN. The new commander is on the ground and he 

is assessing things now, at all levels. We will take a look at this 

and make the appropriate recommendations to the leadership. 

Senator KING. I certainly hope that we do not find ourselves in 

a situation where we are drawing down at a time when, both in 

terms of personnel and authorities, we need more authority to 

maintain the really significant gains that have been achieved. 

General Rodriguez, are al Shabaab and Boko Haram growing? 

Are they adding members? I know they do not hold territory, but 

are they adding areas of influence? 

General RODRIGUEZ. Boko Haram does own some significant territory in northern Nigeria, as does al Shabaab in limited areas of 

Somalia, Senator. 

Right now, in Somalia, there has been a tactical upswing in al 

Shabaab activities. I think that is a tactical change right now. We 

are doing everything we can to support the troop-contributing countries, to ensure that that is just a temporary change. 

Senator KING. Final question. General Austin, the cessation of 

hostilities, would you characterize that as a predecessor to peace 

talks or a locking in of the regime’s position? A cessation of hostilities in an insurgency, it seems to me, always favors the regime. 

How would you characterize where we are now? Is this simply 

a pause? Or is this a predecessor to peace talks? Or is this, as I 

say, locking in the regime? 

General AUSTIN. It is left to be seen what the outcome is going 

to be, Senator. Clearly, the goals of the cessation of hostilities 

would be to allow humanitarian assistance to get to the disadvantaged people. That is happening. That is a really good thing. 

The other thing that we want to happen is for this to lead to 

talks and, eventually, a better outcome. We are hopeful that will 

happen, but that is left to be seen. 

We can expect that there could be some incremental tactical 

gains made by the regime and supported by the Russians. I think, 

long term, the Russians do not own the clock. If we reach a point 

where this drags out for an extremely long period of time, then I 

think it is going to play to their disadvantage. 

Senator KING. The cessation of hostilities is certainly better than 

the all-out war we were seeing before. 

General AUSTIN. Absolutely, sir. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Thank you, General. 

Senator REED. On behalf of the chairman, Senator Cotton? 

Senator COTTON. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony here 

today, and also for your long service to our country, particularly to 

the two who may no longer have the pleasure of appearing before 

our committee anymore. 

General Austin, I want to take stock of Russia’s intervention in 

Syria. Last fall when Russia first intervened, President Obama and 

several senior administration officials used words like ‘‘quagmire’’ 

or ‘‘strategic blunder.’’ 

68 

How would you take stock of Russia’s intervention to this point, 

given their stated objectives? Are they achieving their objectives at 

an acceptable cost to the Putin regime? 

General AUSTIN. Again, I cannot speak exactly to what their specific objectives were, but I would tell you, Senator, that my assumption would be that they wanted to make a substantial difference as fast as they could and transition to something else very, 

very quickly. They have not been able to do that. 

I think what they are finding out is that this could go on for 

some time. 

Senator COTTON. You say, on page 12 of your testimony, ‘‘It is 

apparent through Russia’s actions that their primary objective in 

Syria is to bolster the Assad regime.’’ Skipping down a few lines, 

you say, ‘‘Assad would almost certainly not be in power today were 

it not for the robust support provided to the regime by Iran and 

Russia.’’ 

If that is one of their key objectives, is it fair to say that they 

are meeting that objective of stabilizing the Assad regime? 

General AUSTIN. They have certainly bolstered and empowered 

the Assad regime, yes, sir. 

Senator COTTON. You say further on page 13, ‘‘None of Russia’s 

military actions have helped stabilize Syria or end the suffering of 

the Syrian people.’’ Could you elaborate on that statement? 

General AUSTIN. We still see thousands and thousands of civilians being disadvantaged. Barrel bombs continue. Their intervention has not made things better for the people of Syria. 

Senator COTTON. Can you give a rough estimate, I know it will 

not be exact, but a rough estimate of how much of Russia’s airstrikes are targeting Islamic State positions and personnel versus 

non-Islamic State positions? 

General AUSTIN. I would say a small percentage, sir. I think, as 

you know, what they have said is that they wanted to come in and 

counter terrorism or counter Daesh. What we have witnessed is, in 

almost all cases, they have gone after counter-regime forces. 

Senator COTTON. You further note on page 13 that Russia’s cooperation with Iran appears to be expanding beyond near-term coordination or operations in Syria and is moving toward an emerging strategic partnership. Could you say more about that emerging 

strategic partnership? 

General AUSTIN. It is left to be seen where this will wind up, but 

we have seen a sort of strengthening of that relationship as time 

has passed. 

Russia came in, aligned itself with the regime, obviously, and 

also Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah. What I worry about is if that 

relationship between Syria, Russia, and Iran develops further, then 

it will present a problem for the region. 

Senator COTTON. On page 21, you state something similar there. 

They, Iran, ‘‘also continue to support some Shiite surrogate groups 

in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, Houthis in Yemen, and Lebanese 

Hezbollah, with a combination of money, arms, and training. Iran’s 

emerging relationship with Russia further complicates the security 

environment as they look to expand their cooperation in areas that 

include the sale of high-end weapons.’’ Can you say a little bit more 

about those high-end weapons that worry you? 

69 

General AUSTIN. We have seen recently the sale of high-end air 

defense capability from Russia to Iran, and that is a problem for 

everyone in the region. Also, coastal defense cruise missiles, as that 

type of technology migrates from Russia to Iran, it will eventually 

wind up in the hands of Lebanese Hezbollah. 

Senator COTTON. I am glad you raised coastal defense cruise missiles, because I would like to ask both you and General Rodriguez 

a question. The Levant in the eastern Mediterranean, North Africa, 

all kind of sits at the seam of your Areas of Operation [AOs] as 

well as European Command. 

What are the implications for a long-term, permanent presence 

with the kind of robust modernized weapons that Russia has in 

Syria? What are the implications for our sea control of the Mediterranean, for access to the Suez Canal, for some of our allies in 

the region? 

General AUSTIN. There are potential threats there, Senator. I 

think Russia has had a presence in this region, as you know, for 

some time. I think we would have to do everything we can as part 

of an international community to put pressure on Russia to make 

sure that these weapons, that they do not move around the region 

freely. 

Senator COTTON. General Rodriguez? 

General RODRIGUEZ. I agree, sir. I know General Breedlove does, 

too. We talk about this and it is important for it not to get anywhere. Thank you. 

Senator COTTON. General Rodriguez, if I could shift topics very 

briefly, my final question. 

What can you tell us about the ongoing violence in Burundi, specifically the extent to which old, ethnic rivalries between the Hutu 

and the Tutsi people are driving that conflict, and the impact it 

could have on the Great Lakes region more broadly? 

General RODRIGUEZ. Yes, Senator. Thank you. 

The violence thus far is mainly political violence and has not degenerated to the direct ethnic issues that you talk about that have 

occurred, as you know, in the past. We are watching that every single day to make sure that that does not grow. Most of it has been 

politically motivated, ethnically motivated. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you very much. 

Senator REED. On behalf of the chairman, Senator Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your public service. Thank you, General Austin, for your long, enduring public service. 

We have been proud to have you as a citizen of Tampa, and as 

with General Votel. He will continue to be a citizen of Tampa for 

a while. 

Let me ask you about Libya. Do we have the capability, General 

Rodriguez, to prosecute a war in Libya against ISIL while at the 

same time going after them in other parts of the world, including 

Iraq and Syria? 

General RODRIGUEZ. Senator, I think the answer to that is yes. 

It is a question of how much risk the Nation has to take with the 

readiness of the forces and how much you are going to commit 

versus how much you are going to maintain the readiness, sir. 

70 

Senator NELSON. As I understand it, you all have a recommendation to the White House. Obviously, you cannot share that. That is 

internal conversation. In your status of forces, you feel that you 

have the capability that if the President’s decision is to go after 

ISIL and other extremist elements in Libya, that we have the ability to thwart those elements? 

General RODRIGUEZ. Yes, sir. I do, Senator. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Would any of you want to comment on the efforts around here 

to cut back on your headquarters staff? 

General RODRIGUEZ. We have worked that hard throughout the 

headquarters to figure out the best place to cut back. That continues to move forward. We will support the efforts we are required 

to take. 

General AUSTIN. We clearly want to leverage all of the capabilities that exist in the entire system, Senator. We want to avoid duplication of effort, wherever possible. As you look at U.S. Central 

Command, as you know, sir, as I mentioned earlier, we are involved in four major military operations simultaneously, if you include Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and then this current, ongoing battle against terrorists in the region. 

It takes a fair amount of effort to maintain all of that and also 

do things to promote stability and security throughout the region 

as well. 

The effort to cut back on staff applies to everyone. I fully appreciate I have to do my part. Again, we also need the capability to 

maintain the efforts that we are involved in. 

General VOTEL. Senator Nelson, I would agree with the comments that have already been made on that. Certainly, there are 

opportunities here for us to simplify and streamline and reduce duplication. We should always be looking at that. 

The concern that I would have at SOCOM is we did make some 

decisions in the past year to move people from our headquarters 

out to our theater Special Operations Command, so we have recognized this in the past. We certainly should continue to look at how 

we create more efficiencies and certainly more effectiveness in how 

we are doing our headquarters responsibilities. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. [Presiding.] Senator Sullivan? 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the three of you for your outstanding service to 

our country. 

General Austin, in particular I want to thank you for all you 

have done for the Army and America. I had the opportunity to 

serve with you a decade ago. It was one of the highlights of my 

military career, although I must say I am a little concerned about 

the lack of marines sitting behind you. That was a joke. 

In all seriousness, to the staff, too, I know how much they put 

into these kinds of testimonies. I want to thank all of you, the men 

and women sitting behind you. 

I wanted to follow up on Senator McCain’s and Senator Cotton’s 

comments on the Iranian weapons sales from Russia to Iran, particularly the S–300 missile defense system. There was a recent arVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:21 Jun 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25682.TXT WILDA
71 

ticle that talked about that system, which would be capable of rendering the Iranian skies inaccessible for most U.S. and Israeli jets. 

One thing that has not come up in the testimony: Is that not just 

a blatant violation of the U.N. Security Council conventional weapons ban against sales to the Iranians that is still in existence and 

a violation of the current Iranian nuclear deal that the United 

States and other countries signed? 

General AUSTIN. Senator, I do not know if it is a violation of the 

nuclear deal. I will have to research that a bit. Clearly, it is concerning to everyone. These are things that will increase the amount 

of effort required to do whatever work we need to do. We will certainly find the ways and means to get the job done if required to 

do that. This makes it a little bit more difficult, but not impossible, 

Senator. 

Senator SULLIVAN. The three of you have decades—decades—of 

experience with regard to service in the U.S. Army. Earlier, we 

were talking about a lot of focus on our special operations troops. 

There seems to be less focus in my view on our conventional Army. 

As you know, the Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] in 2014 required the Army to get down to a number of 450,000 Active Duty 

soldiers. I think General Mark Milley and others in the Army are 

looking at that as bringing very high levels of risk, given the new 

security challenges that our Nation faces, not only in CENTCOM 

and AFRICOM Areas of Responsibility [AORs] but really all over 

the world. 

I would like your professional military opinion on that number, 

given the increased threats that you personally see in your different AORs, the transnational terrorists that you are focused on. 

General Votel, do you agree with the statements by General 

Milley and Mr. Eric Fanning that our Army is getting dangerously 

small, given the current threat environment and that the number 

of 450,000 troops in terms of Active Duty Army is too high a risk, 

given our current threats, in your professional military judgment? 

General VOTEL. In my judgment, I do agree with General Milley 

in the comments that he has made in regards to that. 

I would just add, as I mentioned in my comments here, that as 

the Special Operations Commander, we are extraordinarily dependent on the services and the Army, in particular, because of what 

they bring in institutional and infrastructure capability that we are 

absolutely and 100 percent dependent on. 

I am concerned, as these reductions take place, the impact that 

it has on us directly and indirectly. 

Senator SULLIVAN. General, that is a great point. I think there 

is a lot of focus in this committee that, well, we do not need a big 

conventional force, we do not need airborne troops anymore, because we have these great special operators. They are great special 

operators, but they certainly cannot do it all in today’s threat environment. Is that not correct? 

General VOTEL. Senator, I could not agree with you more. I 

would not want to give anyone the impression that Special Operations Command had all the capabilities it needed to do the operations that we do. Literally, everything we do is supported by some 

conventional force, whether it is ISR from the Air Force, close-air 

support from them, basing from the Army, logistics support, at-sea 

72 

capabilities by the Navy. We are extraordinarily dependent on all 

of the services to support our activities. 

Senator SULLIVAN. General Rodriguez, General Austin, can you 

comment, in your professional military judgment, on what you 

think of the number right now, in terms of what a 450,000 Active 

Duty Army does to our Nation’s security? 

General RODRIGUEZ. I absolutely agree with the Chief of Staff of 

the Army that that is high-risk. That is how he characterized that 

because of both the current operations that are going on with 

counterterrorism, as well as the threats from the four major challenges out there between Korea, Iran, China, and Russia. Thank 

you. 

General AUSTIN. As you know, Senator, in a former life, I was 

Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. I was concerned about the direction 

that we were headed then and certainly even more concerned now. 

I do agree with General Milley’s comments. 

Senator SULLIVAN. That 450,000 is too small? 

General AUSTIN. Yes, sir. We are getting dangerously small here. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe? 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is hard for me to believe, General Rodriguez, that it has been 

nine years since AFRICOM. Before that time, of course we all remember, it was part of three different coms, including PACOM. 

I also remember back during the Clinton administration, I was 

opposed to sending troops into Bosnia. The excuse that was being 

used at that time was because of ethnic cleansing, and I recall saying on the Senate floor that for every person who has been ethnically cleansed in Bosnia, there have been 100 in any of the West 

African countries. It was something that was needed. 

It was brought out by Senator—I cannot remember which one it 

was; Senator Cotton, I think it was—about Burundi, that there is 

a problem over there. There are a lot of problems in Africa. They 

do not rise to the top where they can see it, but the President 

there, Pierre Nkurunziza, is one that our State Department opposed. 

It is my understanding, because I know him personally, and I 

have been with him several times—I have been to Burundi. He was 

legitimately put into office, but it was not an election. The reason 

that our State Department was opposed to him running again was 

because the term limits would have set in if that first term had 

been considered a whole term. You follow me there so far. 

Then when the courts came along, the Supreme Court in Burundi, and agreed that he was entitled to run again, then I think 

I will always believe that one of the big political problems that you 

pointed to in answering Senator Cotton’s question was the fact that 

our State Department was very active in that race. Our State Department objected to the fact that he was running again, in spite 

of the fact that their Supreme Court had made that decision. 

Did you have any thoughts on that at the time? Were you involved in that discussion? 

General RODRIGUEZ. I was not involved in that discussion, Senator. My thoughts continue to be focused on the military. 

73 

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate that. I wish the State Department 

sometimes would follow that advice, too. 

There are other problems that have been brought out here. We 

have been talking about Libya, about Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, al Shabaab in Somalia. Other than those, and the discussion 

on Libya, what other areas do you see taking place, really hot 

issues right now, in Africa, other than the three I just mentioned? 

General RODRIGUEZ. Sir, obviously, Al Qaeda and what is happening across northern Mali, and then you already mentioned Burundi, but we have challenges like that in both South Sudan and 

the Central African Republic, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. Maybe in Zimbabwe, too, with some of the problems we have down there. 

South Sudan, that is an interesting situation there, because I remember for years, South Sudan was wanting to get independence 

from Sudan and they finally did it, and then they end up in a civil 

war. What is the status of that civil war right now? 

General RODRIGUEZ. Sir, that civil war continues. Both the leaders are being obstructionist people to limit the ability of that government to get back together again. 

Senator INHOFE. They are supposedly right now in Ethiopia, I 

think it is, trying to have peace talks. Do you see anything really 

productive going on there? 

General RODRIGUEZ. The fact that the regional partners are 

pressing them diplomatically to come to a solution is a very, very 

good sign. I think that, unfortunately, that has happened before 

and we have not seen any progress. We are hoping there will be 

a breakthrough this time. 

Senator INHOFE. One last area that I have been interested in for 

a long time. In 2005, I went up to Gulu, Uganda, and I had two 

Senators with me, Senators John Boozman and Mike Enzi. 

That was the first time that the LRA had really surfaced in the 

minds of people as to how serious that thing was. Joseph Kony, 

while he started there, he ended up going as far south as Congo 

and maybe even western Rwanda and then up to the Central African Republic. 

Just last week, one of his top people—you can probably pronounce it better than I can—was done away with. Over the years, 

we have found others of his top people, Joseph Kony’s, but it seems 

like he continues to go on, even though the level of abduction and 

tragedies has subsided quite a bit. Do you agree with that? 

General RODRIGUEZ. General, we continue to pursue him with all 

means possible with our African Union Regional Task Force, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. That is all I care about. 

General RODRIGUEZ. Thanks. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan had a couple more. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just wanted to follow up on the chairman’s opening statement 

when he talked about the micromanagement of operations. 

As you gentlemen are more than well-aware, looking at the levels 

of warfare—strategic, operational, tactical—and how when you go 

down that level, there is obviously some civilian involvement, but 

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the further down, the conventional wisdom is, the less there should 

be civilian involvement. 

In fact, one of the classic criticisms of the Vietnam War and the 

conduct of that war was how it was micromanaged. Pictures of 

President Johnson at the White House, in the Oval Office, picking 

targets in Vietnam is often seen as a symbol of the mismanagement of that war. 

Yet let me just give you a couple quotes from some articles in the 

paper that talk about what seems to be extreme levels of micromanagement. I know the these are not easy questions, but I would 

like to get your view on it. 

There was a Wall Street Journal headline article last year where 

it said the U.S. military campaign against Islamist militants in 

Syria is being designed to allow President Barack Obama to exert 

a high degree of personal control going so far as to require that the 

military obtain presidential sign-offs for strikes in Syrian territory. 

Similarly, former Secretary Bob Gates recently said, when he 

was talking about the operational micromanagement, he said, ‘‘It 

drove me nuts to have National Security Council [NSC] staffers 

calling senior commanders out in the field, second-guessing these 

commanders. When I was a deputy national security adviser, if I 

would have tried to call a field commander going around the Secretary of Defense or the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, I would have 

had my head handed to me, probably personally by the President.’’ 

Does the White House approve targets in terms of our operations 

in Syria? If so, is it helpful to have 20-somethings with no military 

experience on the NSC staff guessing what our commanders or second-guessing what our commanders are doing in the field? 

Does that happen? In the Wall Street Journal, it says the President was going to approve military targets in Syria. 

Does that help our operational tempo? It seems like it is micromanaging not even in the operational level of warfare but down to 

the tactical, which I think most of us think is a huge mistake. 

Do you care to comment on that? I know it is not an easy question, but to the extent you can be frank about that and how you 

can see the micromanagement, it would be helpful for us, in terms 

of our oversight capabilities. 

General AUSTIN. Actually, Senator, the question as to whether or 

not the White House approves our strikes, picks our targets in 

Syria, that is an easy answer. The answer is no, that does not happen. 

Senator SULLIVAN. They do not approve of strike packages or targets that were focused on in Syria, in terms of what we are bombing or anything like that? 

General AUSTIN. No, Senator. That does not happen. We have a 

process where we generate the intelligence. It goes into our target 

analysis, our target-generation process. Then it is approved by military commanders. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Related to that, when the Iranians took our 

sailors prisoner for that time, was there any involvement? 

How did that happen, General Austin, in terms of our Rules of 

Engagement [ROEs]? We had our sailors out there with 50 caliber 

machine guns that are pretty forceful weapons. Was there any involvement out there from higher political forces that talked about 

75 

ROEs, that, hey, we cannot return fire? How did our sailors get 

captured by Iranian forces? Why did they not return fire when they 

had the Iranians come upon them? 

General AUSTIN. To answer your question as to whether or not 

there was intervention from a higher level of the White House in 

this particular incident, the answer is absolutely not. Things unfolded fairly rapidly with these young sailors. The investigation on 

that has just been completed. It has been forwarded up through 

channels to be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations [CNO]. 

It will take a bit more time for it to be finalized. 

What you know has been reported, in that the sailors veered off 

course, had a mechanical issue that they stopped to address, and 

when they did it, they were detained by Iranians. 

In terms of specifics on what happened between the Iranians and 

sailors, that will come out as a result of the investigation. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. It is interesting in these hearings, General, 

how it matters how the question is asked. I think facts are stubborn things. 

For example, for 16 months, we did not bomb the fuel trucks that 

ISIL was using, generating millions and millions of dollars in oil 

revenues. Now it is a fact that it was a recommendation that we 

hit those oil trucks. It was not turned down; it was never approved. 

This is what is so infuriating to so many of us. For 16 months, 

these fuel trucks went unmolested. God knows how many millions 

of dollars of fuel revenue was generated. 

Sixteen months later, we finally drop some leaflets and told the 

drivers to get out of the trucks. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

AFRICOM

1. Senator INHOFE. How do you assess the effectiveness of AFRICOM and the importance of AFRICOM to the United States and her interests? 

General RODRIGUEZ. USAFRICOM’s effectiveness and importance are measured 

by its ability to fulfill its mission: United States Africa Command, in concert with 

interagency and international partners, builds defense capabilities, responds to crisis, and deters and defeats transnational threats in order to advance U.S. national 

interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity. Fulfilling this mission also meets the requirements directed by the Secretary of Defense in the 2015 

Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) which outlines objectives to achieve 

in the next five years: 1) disrupt al Qaeda Associated Affiliates and other terrorist 

organizations; 2) protect U.S. Personnel and Facilities and secure access to protect 

U.S. interests; and 3) build the capacity of African Partners to counter illicit trafficking, provide defense and security, support peace operations, and provide humanitarian assistance I disaster response. 

USAFRICOM assesses mission effectiveness against our objectives each year in 

the Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA). Our Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) has 

five lines of effort that implement our plan to accomplish our GEF objectives. We 

assess each of our lines of effort and the corresponding intermediate military objectives quarterly, summarizing these assessments annually in the CJA. 

Africa is an enduring interest for the United States, and its importance continues 

to increase as African economies, population, and influence grow. Small but wise investments in African security institutions today offer disproportionate benefits to AfVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:21 Jun 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25682.TXT WILDA
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rica, Europe and the United States. African solutions to African problems are, in 

the long run, in the best interest of Africans, Americans and, indeed, the world. 

In the most troubled spots on the continent, Africans have an understandable fear 

and distrust of the governments and security forces which are charged with promoting and guarding the welfare of the people. Predatory practices, patronage networks, corruption, political and economic exclusion of portions of the population, and 

inconsistent adherence to the rule of law combine to crush the hope of a future. 

These conditions create an environment ripe for the expansion of violent extremism 

and represent a threat not only to Africa, but to our European allies and the United 

States. 

Effectively addressing the threat -before, during, or after a military crisis—requires a comprehensive approach employing diplomacy, development, and defense to 

address the root causes of extremism and replace fear and uncertainty with trust 

and confidence in African institutions. This approach must seek improvements in 

governance, consistent adherence to the rule of law, and a society which offers equal 

political and economic opportunity to all people. Africa Command’s contribution to 

this broad solution lies primarily in encouraging and enabling the professionalism 

of the African security institutions which will secure national populations, cooperate 

in addressing regional security concerns, and increasingly play a role in sustaining 

global stability. 

Our military strategy articulates a long-term, regionally focused approach to enabling our African partners. Our operational approach seeks to disrupt and neutralize transnational threats by building African partner defense capability and capacity. While we have achieved progress in several areas through close coordination 

with our partners, allies, and interagency partners, threats and challenges remain. 

In East Africa, we are helping to set the conditions for the eventual transition 

from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to the Somali National Army 

and the Federal Government of Somalia. However, al Shabaab remains a continuing 

threat and is conducting almost daily lethal asymmetric attacks in Somalia against 

AMISOM troops. 

In North Africa, Libya’s insecurity has negative consequences for its people, its 

neighbors, Europe’s southern flank, and our peace and security objectives in Africa 

and the Middle East. An international coalition to counter the Islamic State-Libya 

(IS–Libya) would support a functional Government of National Accord and reduce 

the risks of the expansion of IS Libya, further instability in North Africa, and the 

emergence of a direct threat to U.S. interests. 

Stability in Libya is a long-term proposition that will require an appropriate longterm strategy. 

Across West Africa, our partners and allies are countering terrorist organizations 

like Boko Haram through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). With troops 

from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, the MNJTF is a collaborative, regional effort to address Boko Haram’s complex and lethal attacks aimed at terrorizing civilians and destabilizing governments. 

In Central Africa, through the combined efforts of civilian agencies, non-governmental organizations and military forces, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) no 

longer threatens regional stability, and its capacity to harm civilian populations has 

diminished greatly. Today, we estimate less than 200 LRA fighters remain and local 

communities are better prepared to protect themselves. 

USAFRICOM, through our ability to build relationships with African partners, is 

able to protect United States interests and prevent local threats from growing into 

trans-regional threats, but this requires both continuous assessment and measured 

long-term resourcing. The return on wise investments, however, is substantial. With 

this, USAFRICOM can keep strategic risk to the United States from Africa as moderate to low and prevent risk from rising to significant levels that threaten African, 

allied, and U.S. interests. 

2. Senator INHOFE. In 2006, General Chuck Wald published an article called ‘‘The 

Phase Zero Campaign’’—why is Phase Zero important and how does it apply to 

AFRICOM? 

General RODRIGUEZ. The goal of Phase Zero activities is to achieve campaign objectives defined for each combatant command in the Guidance for Employment of 

the Force (GEF). Additionally, Phase Zero activities prevent crisis and mitigate the 

need for the execution of contingency plans. For USAFRICOM, Phase Zero activities 

promote stability and peace by building capacity in partner nations that enables 

them to be cooperative, trained, and prepared to help prevent or limit conflicts. 

Phase Zero activities include shaping operations against violent extremists organizations (VEOs) that allow space and time for capacity building efforts to be effective. 

77 

Phase Zero activities place emphasis on interagency support and coordination. In 

many instances, Phase Zero involves execution of a broad national strategy where 

the Department of Defense and its programs play a supporting role in the larger 

U.S. Government effort. Over the long-term, Phase Zero results in an investment 

of fewer resources in a pre-crisis situation while avoiding an exponentially larger 

expenditure later. The central mechanisms for achieving success in Phase Zero operations lie in Security Force Assistance, exercises, engagements, operations, and posture. All are needed to achieve the combined effects that mitigate potential crisis. 

At USAFRICOM, Phase Zero is central to the Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). The 

USAFRICOM TCP defines three types of Phase Zero efforts required to mitigate 

conflict and achieve TCP objectives and end states: Decisive Efforts, Shaping Efforts, and Sustaining Efforts. For USAFRICOM, Decisive Efforts are focused on 

building African partner capacity and strengthening partnerships. Success in the 

Command’s Decisive Efforts ultimately improve the willingness and capacity of our 

African partners. Shaping Efforts provide the necessary time and space for 

USAFRICOM to be successful in its Decisive Efforts over time. Shaping Efforts provide near-term disruption, degradation, and neutralization of VEOs in Africa in 

order to protect U.S. interests and create the conditions that allow for the development of African partner capabilities and capacity. Sustaining Efforts primarily consist of Setting the Force and Setting the Theater for the campaign. Sustaining Efforts are executed through our efforts to acquire posture, presence, agreements, and 

engagements. 

3. Senator INHOFE. Do you see operations in Africa increasing or decreasing over 

the next decade? Does AFRICOM have any resource shortfalls? If yes, what are 

they? 

General RODRIGUEZ. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) assesses that 

non-state actors will continue to exploit global connections to spread violent 

ideologies. Based on this and current trends, we expect the number of U.S. operations in Africa to increase over the next decade. Additionally, we expect to participate in or assist our European partners in their operations in north, west, and east 

Africa. 

We expect African social and democratic challenges will continue to generate crises requiring peacekeeping missions where the United States will be asked to provide enabling military assistance. We also expect Security Force Assistance activities to increase as USAFRICOM steadily builds the capacity of African partners. 

Given current missions, USAFRICOM does not have resource shortfalls. As operations in Africa increase, USAFRICOM will continue to assess the adequacy of 

resourcing efforts. The President’s fiscal year 2017 budget addressed many of the 

African Theater priority programs and requirements. USAFRICOM worked closely 

with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Services to ensure the final 

President’s budget addressed the complex African security environment, most notably, violent extremist organizations’ ability to exploit and exacerbate instability and 

undermine African states’ development. These critical investments included personnel recovery; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; strategic posture; African institution building; intelligence operations; and enabling support. 

4. Senator INHOFE. How do you foresee the African Union Regional Task Force 

and their American Advise and Assist teams eliminating the remainder of the 

Lord’s Resistance Army in the coming year(s)? 

General RODRIGUEZ. The mission against the Lord’s Resistance Army is at a point 

now where intelligence and information sharing are the main drivers of success. 

USAFRICOM has an effective program to spread messages encouraging defection. 

From these defections, USAFRICOM is gaining intelligence on the Lord’s Resistance 

Army. Continuing these defection messages and facilitating information sharing between the affected communities will yield the most promise in weakening what remains of the Lord’s Resistance Army. 

SOCOM

5. Senator INHOFE. How is SOCOM leading DOD’s transregional approach to synchronize actions against terrorist organizations? 

General RODRIGUEZ. USSOCOM is the designated Coordinating Authority responsible for facilitating Trans-Regional Synchronization Forums and producing quarterly assessments that will inform Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and 

Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) prioritization and global resource allocation for 

countering trans-regional threats. This is a collaborative effort including DOD, 

Interagency, Intelligence Community, and coalition partners. USSOCOM has estabVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:21 Jun 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25682.TXT WILDA
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lished a Trans-Regional Synchronization Cell within its Operations Directorate that 

is responsible for aggregating data, developing assessments, and producing feasible, 

acceptable, and suitable strategic recommendations for CJCS and SECDEF consideration. The DOD Campaign Plan to Counter Trans-Regional Terrorist Organizations (CP–CTTO) is in draft form and is expected to be signed by the SECDEF in 

the near future. 

6. Senator INHOFE. Is the Theater Special Operations Command that supports Africa fully manned as the others are? Are the rise in operations across CENTCOM 

and AFRICOM sustainable from a SOCOM perspective? 

General VOTEL. Yes, Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF) is manned at 

a similar rate to other Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs). Headquarters USSOCOM realigned a significant number of authorizations to the TSOCs, 

including SOCAF, beginning in fiscal year 2016. For the fiscal year 2016 growth, 

the vast majority of anticipated inbound personnel will begin arriving in the summer of 2016. 

Yes, current deployment rates remain sustainable while maintaining USSOCOM’s 

readiness levels and its ability to surge forces in response to emergent contingencies 

and major plan execution. Likewise, USSOCOM can continue to meet priority emergent requirements through SECDEF approved reallocation of forces from lower priority missions. 

7. Senator INHOFE. What is the primary fiscal year 2017 cost driver for SOCOM? 

General VOTEL. Maintaining operational readiness continues to be the primary 

2017 cost driver, followed closely by requirements associated with counter-terrorism 

(CT) and other operations including Operation Inherent Resolve and Operation 

Freedom’s Sentinel. Readiness requirements to organize, train, and equip Special 

Operations Forces are contained throughout the entire fiscal year 2017 request in 

all appropriations, both baseline and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). CT 

and other operations are largely addressed in the OCO requests, but baseline funded capabilities also support current operations. 

8. Senator INHOFE. Has support from each of the services to SOCOM been reduced 

because of budgetary constraints or conventional OPTEMPO requirements? If yes, 

what have been the impacts? 

General VOTEL. With respect to budgetary constraints and the impact of service 

support to SOF, the Services have not yet fully identified where they would absorb 

future budget reductions; therefore, impacts on support to SOF cannot be itemized 

or assessed. Historical Service reductions continue to impact USSOCOM’s components as follows: 

a. Army: Reductions to Military Training Specific Allotment (MTSA) curtailed 

mandatory education, which impacts morale, professional development, and career 

advancement of Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel. 

b. Navy: Reductions impacted Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (FSRM) support; fleet asset availability; and rotary wing training support associated with the fiscal year 2016 decommissioning of HSC–84/85. 

c. Air Force: Air Force-funded AC/MC–130 recapitalization restricted Air Force 

Special Operations Command’s planned recapitalization to 79 of 94 aircraft as part 

of a fiscally constrained 30-year Resource Allocation Plan. Budget prioritization 

within the Air Force has also resulted in service reduction in ISR capacity upon 

which SOCOM depends and heavily leverages for operational support. 

d. Marine Corps: Reductions included Marine Corps funded school seats, access 

to USMC ranges, availability of principal end items, and budget support for certain 

contracts. 

Given the historical impacts and lack of the Services’ ability to absorb reductions, 

it is likely that their ability to optimally support SOF will be diminished, further 

straining an already challenged support structure and eventually affecting SOF operations and training in an adverse manner. Services’ OPTEMPO has not been a 

major cause of support issues, although given the extensive Service-provided capabilities SOF relies on, it is possible OPTEMPO has been the reason a particular capability has not been available. It is not a major trend USSOCOM is tracking, and 

we deeply appreciate the Services’ efforts to support SOF when needed. 

9. Senator INHOFE. Given current and planned funding, can SOCOM meet all 

combatant commanders SOF requirements? 

General VOTEL. USSOCOM cannot meet all combatant commanders’ SOF requirements, but through application of the Department’s strategic priorities, we are able 

to allocate SOF to the priority requirements in each theater. Current and planned 

79 

funding remains sufficient to support the sustained deployment of SOF capabilities. 

However, any decrease in either base or Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) 

funding could have a negative impact on our ability to sustain current readiness and 

deployment levels. 

CENTCOM

10. Senator INHOFE. In your professional opinion, what are the implications of 

Russia’s actions in Syria and the world’s response, or lack of response, on Russia’s 

international behavior? 

General AUSTIN. Russia’s deployment of combat aircraft and advisors to Syria last 

September probably prevented the collapse of the Asad regime and has enabled proregime forces to make modest battlefield gains against opposition groups. Russia’s 

bombing campaign was initially focused against opposition forces in northwest 

Syria, further exacerbating the refugee crisis. Following the Cessation of Hostilities 

in late February, Russia has prioritized its counter-ISIL campaign, especially in the 

vicinity of Palmyra. Russia’s recent actions against ISIL and Russia’s March 14th 

partial force withdrawal announcement, which coincided with the restart of the Geneva III talks, was meant to demonstrate Russia’s commitment to a diplomatic solution and garner goodwill from the international community, Syrian opposition, and 

the US-led coalition, with the ultimate goal of securing Russian interests with the 

future government of Syria. While the Russians are still supporting Asad, the withdrawal announcement was likely intended to place pressure on the Asad regime to 

participate more fully in the intra-Syrian talks. Russia has announced they will 

maintain their presence in Syria with naval forces, advanced fighters and air defense equipment. This equipment will hinder the ability of NATO and coalition 

forces to maneuver in the Levant and eastern Mediterranean Sea. Many countries, 

particularly those most affected by the migration crisis, are likely to view the Russian draw down in Syria as a positive step toward ending the conflict and will look 

positively on Russia as a main player in the peace negotiations. However, European 

countries are still striving to treat Russia’s actions in Syria separately from its activities in Ukraine and are unlikely to support easing sanctions without movement 

to begin implementing the Minsk agreement. 

11. Senator INHOFE. What is the impact on CENTCOM’s AOR of Russia’s actions 

as well as proliferation of Russian weapons into your AOR? 

General AUSTIN. Russia wants to be the chief competitor to the U.S. in the Middle 

East, and seeks to diminish and supplant U.S. influence via diplomatic, information, 

military, and economic means. Russia exploited perceived U.S. contraction in the region to gain influence, aggressively seeking energy and security agreements with 

Coalition allies and adversaries under the pretext of promoting regional security 

and stability. Russia shares with Iran the strategic goal of limiting U.S. regional 

influence and is fortifying its military and economic ties to the CENTCOM AOR. 

In September 2015, Moscow initiated military operations in Syria to protect its geopolitical and commercial interests—its greatest commitment of force outside its near 

borders in decades. Russia spearheaded the Russia-Syria-Iraq-Iran Coalition, ostensibly formed for the purpose of defeating ISIL. In reality, such a security agreement 

provides Russia with an open door into the Middle East economic and security environment, and likely increases the prospect of advanced weapons proliferation. 

12. Senator INHOFE. What are you doing to accelerate the timeline to retake 

Mosul and Raqqa? 

General AUSTIN. [Deleted.] 

13. Senator INHOFE. With the typical spring offensive upon us, how prepared are 

the Afghan National Security Forces to stop the flow of fighters moving back and 

forth from Pakistan? 

General AUSTIN. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border region is approximately 1400 

miles long with topography ranging from barren desert to rugged mountain ranges, 

making it virtually impossible to control all cross-border movement. At the official 

crossing points, the Afghan Border Police are postured to monitor both vehicular 

and foot traffic, and with routine inspections, they are able to deter the movement 

of some ‘‘bad-actors’’ into the country. Patrols, border posts, and static checkpoints 

in the rural areas have a similar disruptive effect; however, it would be unrealistic 

to expect the Afghan forces to either prevent or substantially limit the movement 

of insurgent fighters across the porous border. Even at the height of the International Security Assistance Force mission, the coalition struggled with this issue. 

80 

14. Senator INHOFE. Is there a shortage of smart munitions? If yes, what is the 

operational impact and when will the shortage be eliminated? 

General AUSTIN. [Deleted.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL

KUWAIT EQUIPMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

15. Senator MCCASKILL. The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General 

recently put out a report addressing the 401st Army Field Support Brigade and 

Army Field Support Battalion-Kuwait deficiencies in processing wholesale equipment. The audit found the standard operating procedures for processing Army PrePositioned Stock and retrograde equipment were not updated which risked 

misreporting of equipment numbers and the potential for stolen equipment. Additionally, a lack of physical security controls for equipment in one location at Camp 

Arifjan resulted in the theft of two generators, valued at $52,000. The standard operating procedures were due to be updated by March 1st. Has this been completed? 

General AUSTIN. Yes, the standard operating procedures were updated and sent 

to the DODIG lead inspector on 29 February 2016. 

16. Senator MCCASKILL. What actions have been taken to improve security controls at Camp Arifjan? 

General AUSTIN. A security fencing project was initiated; the Statement of Work 

has been finalized and went out for solicitation on 19 March 2016. Following the 

closure of the solicitation on 4 April 2016, a vendor will be identified and construction will begin. 

17. Senator MCCASKILL. What actions are being taken to prevent these deficiencies from happening at other staging locations in the Area of Responsibility? 

General AUSTIN. Other staging areas are secured with guards, fencing or both, 

and standard operating procedures have been reviewed and updated as required. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE DONNELLY

U.S. COMBAT AIR OPERATIONS IN SYRIA

18. Senator MCCASKILL. How do Syrian and Russian air defense systems currently impact our air operations in Syria? 

General AUSTIN. [Deleted.] 

19. Senator MCCASKILL. How would operations be affected if the threat posture 

of those air defense systems were to increase? 

General AUSTIN. [Deleted.] 

20. Senator MCCASKILL. With regard to air operations in Operational Inherent 

Resolve (OIR) and Operation Resolute Support (ORS), are there currently any operational demands that are not being met due to the limited availability of a particular aircraft? 

General AUSTIN. [Deleted.] 

21. Senator MCCASKILL. If the U.S. Air Force had only B–1s, B–52s, F–16s, F– 

15Es, and MQ–1/9s to support the operations you are currently conducting in OIR, 

and did not have A–10s in theater, would your mission be less effective because of 

the lack of A–10 support? 

General AUSTIN. If the overall number of CAS aircraft remained the same, the 

lack of A–10s in OIR would not make the Coalition less effective in our mission because CAS has fundamentally changed due to employment of GPS-guided weapons 

from medium altitude, making all of our fixed wing CAS aircraft equally effective 

in CAS. In fact, there were no A–10s supporting OIR for the first 3.5 months of the 

campaign, and our CAS missions were already very effective before the A–10s arrived. As of October 2017, we will require 10–12 fighter/attack aircraft to meet OIR 

requirements. 

22. Senator MCCASKILL. There are no A–10s performing close air support (CAS) 

in Afghanistan, where the preponderance of CENTCOM ground forces are engaging 

the enemy. How well have the Joint Forces been able to meet the CAS demand 

there? 

General AUSTIN. [Deleted.] 

81 

PRESERVATION OF FORCE AND THE FAMILY

23. Senator MCCASKILL. What are your greatest challenges in supporting the 

mental resilience of our special operations forces and their families? 

General AUSTIN. Our most pressing challenge is suicides among our forces and 

their family members. Although we have seen a steady decline in suicides since implementing the Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF), we will maintain our 

focus on this problem. While difficult to quantify, we believe that our efforts under 

the POTFF program are making a difference. One indicator of this is that the number of Service Members expressing suicidal ideations has dramatically increased. We 

view this as a positive indication that our leadership’s support for seeking help, and 

the resources we have in place to provide that help, are benefiting our forces and 

their families. 

Countering the stigma associated with seeking behavioral health care will continue to be a challenge for the USSOCOM. While the increase in Service Members 

expressing suicidal ideations is a potential indicator that we are reducing stigma, 

there is still much to be done if we are to move our emphasis to prevention. Some 

of the efforts we have undertaken to reduce stigma include adding behavioral health 

content into our professional military education courses and initiating peer mentoring programs. We have also embedded multidisciplinary teams of behavioral 

healthcare providers, human performance specialists, and chaplains who work together to address the needs of our Service Members and their families. Through 

these efforts, we are working with leadership to encourage the use of behavioral 

health resources before there is a problem and establishing a culture in which maintaining psychological health is normal and expected. 

We have developed strong working relationships with the Department of Defense 

and the Services in the areas of behavioral healthcare, family programs, and suicide 

prevention. We have enjoyed phenomenal support across the board and are profoundly grateful for the support of the DOD and Congress. We will be paying particularly close attention to the support we receive from the DOD and Services as 

budgets are trimmed across the DOD and forces are reduced. USSOCOM continues 

to have a high operations tempo and will endeavor to maintain the infrastructure 

of support services that we have built under the POTFF program. 

Another challenge the Command has in terms of supporting the mental resilience 

of our forces and families is in taking care of our families and civilian work force. 

We appreciate the support Congress has given us in this regard with the authority 

to conduct pilot family programs, and while that authority allows us to address 

some of the needs of our families, we are unable to use Major Force Program-11 

funds to hire personnel to coordinate and run family programs. The wellbeing of our 

civilian teammates is also a concern for the command. Many of our civilian employees are themselves veterans, and struggle with the same challenges that our Active 

Duty personnel do, yet we are unable to provide these employees with the counseling support and behavioral healthcare that our Service Members enjoy. 

USSOCOM has engaged with DOD to look for opportunities to provide non-medical 

counseling to our government employees that are DOD beneficiaries, and we will 

continue to explore opportunities to better support these team members. 

24. Senator MCCASKILL. What are your top priorities in the psychological component of the Preservation of the Force and Family program? 

General VOTEL. USSOCOM’s top priority for the Preservation of the Force 

(POTFF) Psychological Performance Program (PPP) is to reduce suicides. To support 

this priority, there are several tasks that the Command has undertaken. The Command has implemented comprehensive reporting and tracking processes, so that we 

may examine the factors and trends associated with suicides. We have also undertaken a comprehensive review of all of our suicides over the past four years, which 

will be used to inform our future suicide prevention efforts. 

A key component of our suicide prevention efforts is our embedded behavioral 

health providers situated at our tactical units. This is a cornerstone of the PPP and 

maintaining this capability is a priority for the command. The proximity of these 

providers to the military members helps to demystify behavioral healthcare and provides unparalleled access to care, which would not be possible otherwise. 

Another priority for our PPP is to collaborate within the DOD, academia, and industry to identify and implement novel approaches to treating some of the most difficult issues faced by our Service Members, such as post-traumatic stress, traumatic 

brain injuries, and chronic pain. For example, this year we will be conducting a 

study in collaboration with the Uniform Service University to test the use of 

transcranial magnetic stimulation to treat post-concussive syndrome. We have also 

engaged in a multi-year study to examine the holistic effects of the POTFF program 

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with Colorado State University. One of the primary goals of these research efforts 

is to ensure that we are developing and using the best evidence-based practices 

available to support our Service Members and their families. 

It is also a priority to ensure that we are addressing the needs of both our families and the community. POTFF cannot be considered holistic if we do not consider 

the social and environmental factors influencing the resiliency of our Service Members. The DOD and Services have been exceptionally supportive of USSOCOM in 

providing resources and programs to our forces and families. The DOD support, coupled with the authority Congress granted USSOCOM to conduct family programs, 

permits us to be responsive to the needs of our families in an exceedingly unpredictable, rapidly changing environment. Maintaining that level of support is also a priority for the command. 

25. Senator MCCASKILL. What are your top lessons learned on supporting the 

mental health of our special operations forces and their families and will you impart 

that knowledge to your potential successor, LTG Thomas? 

General VOTEL. Among the many lessons we have learned in supporting the mental health of our forces is that collaborative relationships with the Defense Health 

Agency (DHA), the Service medical departments, and others within the Department 

of Defense are essential to providing top notch behavioral healthcare. USSOCOM 

enjoys a strong, collaborative relationship with DHA and the Services, which has 

been hugely beneficial to the Command. 

The command has also learned that recruiting and retaining qualified behavioral 

healthcare providers can be difficult. Potential providers are carefully evaluated for 

their qualifications, experience using evidence-based treatments, and how they fit 

with the culture of the unit. A competitive market place, coupled with the high expectations of USSOCOM, has created some challenges to filling contracted and civil 

service positions for behavioral healthcare providers. Therefore, retaining those providers is important. 

We have also learned that dispelling stigma requires a shift in the cultural mores 

of the SOF community and an emphasis from leaders at all levels. To enable this, 

we have begun to introduce our leaders to POTFF capabilities as a part of their professional military education. Currently, we provide content on suicide prevention, 

sleep hygiene, crisis management, and other topics to our senior non-commissioned 

officers and pre-command course attendees. We are on track to expand this content 

to every level of our Service Member’s education over the next two years. 

I will impart all these lessons to my successor to ensure continuity. LTG Thomas, 

now confirmed as the next USSOCOM Commander, is very familiar with challenges 

inherent in preserving our force and families, and the USSOCOM POTFF team is 

prepared to provide the information he will need to be as proactive as possible. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TIM KAINE

AUTHORITIES TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM

26. Senator KAINE. I am keenly interested in our Commander’s ability to encourage inter-governmental response to meet our security challenges, especially countering the rise of violence extremism and radicalization through community-level 

prevention programs. I was told that AFRICOM recently requested approval to 

transfer funding to USAID for community-led violence prevention programs in 

Agadez, Niger but were denied by the DOD Joint Staff legal experts due to a lack 

of authority for such transfer. 

Congress is always attempting to look for ways to help the DOD better incorporate inter-agency approaches to issues, would you support a new transfer authority that allows combatant commanders via the Department of Defense, to transfer 

funds to the Department of State or U.S. Agency for International Development for 

CVE efforts, like community level extremism prevention programs? 

General RODRIGUEZ. USAFRICOM strongly supports the establishment of a mechanism that provides for transferring resources between agencies to support activities 

against threats to security and stability managed by the combatant commanders. 

Development programs that complement Security Force Assistance are essential to 

promote long-term stability in fragile or conflict affected states, to effectively and 

sufficiently counter violent extremism and radicalization. 

For example, USAFRICOM, SOCAFRICA, and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) identified several sources of instability in the Agadez region 

of Niger: youth unemployment, youth disaffection, lack of confidence in the government, elections related violence, and population displacement due to military conVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:21 Jun 08, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\25682.TXT WILDA
83 

struction projects. We collectively identified existing USAID programs which could 

be rapidly expanded to reinforce stability in Agadez, however, USAFRICOM lacked 

the authority to transfer the funds. 

Another example is the transfer of DOD funds to the Department of Homeland 

Security and other agencies to assist with building capacity in willing African partners to improve point of entry security efforts (e.g., airports, seaports, border entry 

etc.) to interdict foreign fighter flow linked to terrorist threats. Additionally, instability across the Sahel coupled with illicit mining and trafficking calls for flexible 

multi-sectoral approaches which can be mobilized quickly. 

USG goals, which include diplomacy, development, and defense objectives, are 

best met when comprehensive solutions are implemented to stabilize regions and 

build resilient communities. Therefore, if efforts are to be successful, the DOD must 

have the flexibility to transfer funds between agencies and collaborate on holistic 

responses to counter current and emerging threats. 

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