i

The United States Army War College

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CENTER for

STRATEGIC

LEADERSHIP

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service 

at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application 

of Landpower.

The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates 

who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently, 

it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders 

and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage 

in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving 

national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national 

security and strategic research and analysis to influence 

policy debate and bridge the gap between military 

and academia.

The Center for Strategic Leadership contributes 

to the education of world class senior leaders, 

develops expert knowledge, and provides solutions 

to strategic Army issues affecting the national 

security community.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

provides subject matter expertise, technical review, 

and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability 

operations concepts and doctrines.

The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic 

leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom 

grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and 

by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in 

the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional 

expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security, 

resource management, and responsible command.

The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires, 

conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use 

to support the U.S. Army, educate an international 

audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related 

to national security and military strategy with emphasis on 

geostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct 

strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:

• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined 

 employment of military forces;

• Regional strategic appraisals;

• The nature of land warfare;

• Matters affecting the Army’s future;

• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,

• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern 

topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of 

Defense, and the larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics 

of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings 

of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip 

reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.

The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the 

Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army 

participation in national security policy formulation.

iii

v

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

SOCIAL MEDIA—THE VITAL GROUND: 

CAN WE HOLD IT?

Ian Tunnicliffe

Steve Tatham

April 2017

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full 

academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified 

information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent 

official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to 

offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
vi

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 

Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn 

Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010. 

*****

This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War 

College External Research Associates Program. Information on 

this program is available on our website, ssi.armywarcollege.edu,

at the Opportunities tab.

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War 

College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded 

free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of certain 

reports may also be obtained free of charge while supplies last 

by placing an order on the SSI website. Check the website for 

availability. SSI publications may be quoted or reprinted in 

part or in full with permission and appropriate credit given 

to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army 

War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address: 

ssi.armywarcollege.edu.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War 

College Press publishes a quarterly email newsletter to update 

the national security community on the research of our analysts,

recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides 

a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you 

are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on 

the SSI website at the following address: ssi.armywarcollege.edu/

newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-752-9
vii

FOREWORD

In this timely and realistic examination of social 

media, two world-class British experts examine exactly, in the defense context, what social media is and 

what it should and should not be used for in the future. In setting out their arguments, they define social 

media in four distinctly different ways: first, they assess, perhaps self-evidently, that it is a media channel, 

and actually differs little to newspapers and radio in 

anything other than reach and immediacy; second, 

they see it as an interactive medium that might have 

potential for exerting influence, but only when accompanied by robust target audience analysis (TAA); 

third, they see it as a means of establishing a dialogue 

and communications within already well-established 

networks and groups; and, finally, they see it as a realtime sensor network that may possibly provide the 

first indication of globally important events—albeit 

unsubstantiated and raw in its content and reporting. They also make a clear statement; the evidence 

that social media, by itself, as a precursor to mass 

behavior is not present. Social media, in the authors’ 

views, cannot predict behaviors with any reliability or 

consistency.

Having considered each of these in the military 

context, the authors then examine the military implications of social media. Here they address four questions: First, is social media a viable and effective messaging conduit? Second, what are the implications of 

social media for information operations (IO) doctrine, 

personnel, and operational security (OPSEC)? Third, 

the authors ask if the United States has the necessary structures, training, and equipment in place to 

effectively harness social media. Finally, the authors 

ask how well our institutions are placed to train and 
educate military personnel—and specifically the most 

senior personnel—in what social media can and 

cannot achieve.

Social media, the authors write, is a disruptive, yet 

innovative, technology that is poorly understood by 

the military, and it does not sit well in current hierarchical military structures. In headquarters and operations rooms, globally, the Internet terminal is typically 

the preserve of the public affairs officer (PAO). The 

mixing of open source Internet-enabled IT systems 

and classified military and governmental communication systems is fraught with difficulty—bureaucratic 

and technological. If the military is to leverage the full 

capability of social media, there will be many “sacred 

cows” that will have to be slain. However, commanders, the authors conclude, should ignore them at their 

own peril.

Throughout this Letort Paper, the authors draw 

upon their vast IO experience gathered from multiple 

global operations to present a fascinating and useable 

insight into a phenomena that is not yet 15 years old.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

viii
ix

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

IAN TUNNICLIFFE is a Director at Accordance Associates and has led communications, research, and 

training projects across the Middle East, Africa, and 

Asia, including Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, Somalia, 

and Afghanistan. A visiting lecturer in social media 

to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

School in Oberammergau, Germany, his recent work 

has focused on the role of social media in conflict areas, in particular in Syria, Nigeria, and Somalia. He has 

also continued to provide the United Kingdom (UK) 

with exercise support for the Allied Rapid Response 

Corps (ARRC), serving as the Head of Social Media 

in Exercise Trident Jaguar 2015 and Exercise Arrcade 

Fusion 2015. Prior to that, he served for 20 years in the 

British Army, rising to the rank of Colonel, and his last 

few years of service were with the Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations (DTIO) in the UK 

Ministry of Defence (MOD), where he helped develop 

UK cross-government strategic communications plans 

in response to a number of international crises in the 

Balkans, Africa, Asia, and especially the Middle East 

during the Iraq crisis and conflict. His last post in the 

Army was in Baghdad, Iraq, during the period between September 2003 to June 2004, where he worked 

as Director Plans in the Office of Strategic Communications of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 

working for Ambassador Paul Bremer. During his tenure, he was responsible for Iraq-wide Coalition and 

United Nations (UN) media campaigns to inform the 

population of Coalition and UN activities.
STEVE TATHAM is a private consultant specializing 

in Strategic Communication, influence, target audience analysis, and information operations. Dr. Tatham 

resigned from the UK’s Armed Forces in July 2014. On 

leaving, he was the UK’s longest continuously serving officer in information activities. Between 1998 and 

2003, he worked in media operations, covering conflicts in Sierra Leone (2000), Afghanistan (2001), and 

Iraq (2003), where he was a public spokesperson for 

the invasion. Between 2003 and 2013, he worked in 

information operations and psychological operations 

(PSYOPS). Dr. Tatham was the Commanding Officer 

of 15 (UK) PSYOPS Group from 2010 to 2013, during which time he deployed on multiple occasions to 

Afghanistan; was involved at the operational level in 

operations in Libya; and deployed to East Africa in 

an advisory role. His final military appointment was 

as the Special Information Operations Project Officer 

in the UK Ministry of Defence Operations Directorate. In 2007, he advised the then-commander of British 

Forces in Afghanistan on influence operations when 

the strategically vital town of Musa Qala was retaken by British and Afghan forces. The Pentagon later 

described that operation as the: “single best thing to 

come out of Afghanistan.” Dr. Tatham is the author 

of two books: Losing Arab Hearts & Minds: The Coalition, Al-Jazeera and Muslim Public Opinion (Hurst & Co, 

2006); and, Behavioural Conflict: Why Understanding 

People’s Motivations Will Prove Decisive In Future Conflict (Military Studies Press, 2012). Dr. Tatham holds 

an M.Phil. and a Ph.D. in international relations, both 

focusing on ideas of influence and strategic communication in conflict areas. 

x
xi

SUMMARY

This Letort Paper seeks to answer some specific 

questions on how the U.S. Army, and by extension its 

allies, can best leverage social media, particularly on 

operations. Are they a viable and effective messaging 

conduit? Have they changed the information operations (IO) landscape? Does the United States have the 

correct force structure, training, equipment, and technology to leverage social media? Finally, how can we 

train our leaders to better understand and use social 

media?

The impact of social media on the media environment has been widely recognized, as has the ability 

of extremist and adversarial organizations to exploit 

the media to publicize their cause, spread their propaganda, and recruit vulnerable individuals. Supporting 

the growth of social media has been the phenomenal 

global increase in mobile telephone usage, and much 

of this increase is in areas where there are existing 

conflicts or conflicts are highly likely. 

However, the full implications of the mobile and 

social media revolution are not yet fully understood. 

Social media will increasingly have a direct impact on 

virtually all aspects of military operations in the 21st 

century. In doing so, social media will force significant changes to policy, doctrine, force structures, and 

virtually all staff functions within operational units. 

New training requirements and new approaches to 

traditional operational challenges will be required. 

All this will require a wider understanding of social 

media and the realization that it is no longer an area 

simply of concern to public affairs officers (PAO) and 

possibly intelligence (INT). 
Although with new threats come new opportunities, and the interactive nature of social media in 

particular means that it is potentially a very powerful 

medium for IO, that potential needs to be recognized 

before capabilities can be developed to respond to this 

rapidly developing revolution.

There are four distinctly different applications of 

social media; and understanding each, together with 

its impact upon the Army, is critical to addressing the 

various questions posed. 

• Social media can be regarded primarily as a 

media channel, just like radio, newspapers, and 

television. 

• In addition to this, social media can be seen as 

an interactive medium for exerting influence. 

• Importantly, social media is a way of communicating within an already established network 

or networks. 

• Finally, social media is a near real-time sensorto-sensor network.

There is a need for commanders, and in particular 

operations and INT staff, to understand social media 

and all its different functions, not simply its media 

function, in order to understand its potential impact 

on operations, and to incorporate that understanding 

into their planning and operations. 

The key recommendations include:

• A social media capacity needs to be built into 

every level of command. In the real-time information environment created by social media, 

operational commanders at every level will 

need simultaneous and identical situational 

awareness of unfolding events. 

xii
xiii

• Social media is integral to the conduct of operations, not just a PAO or INT function. Thus, the 

U.S. Army needs a custom-made doctrine and 

an educational capacity to inform commanders 

on its intelligent and safe use. 

• In order to integrate social media into operations, each of the staff functions needs continuous access, at their desk, to the Internet.

• Social media must be integral to all exercises. 

This needs the creation of a virtual social media 

environment—i.e., a sandbox or simulation—to 

add the social media space to training environments. This must be a space in which it is “safe 

to fail.” 

• Within headquarters, the responsibility for social media needs to be clearly articulated and 

the posts resourced appropriately. 

• U.S. Army and Department of Defense (DoD) 

policy and doctrine must clarify a host of difficult issues relating to social media usage, in 

particular its use in deception and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS).

1

SOCIAL MEDIA—THE VITAL GROUND: 

CAN WE HOLD IT?

INTRODUCTION

Once upon a time, there existed a world without 

social media. In the ubiquitous information environment in which we now live, it seems incredible that 

such a world was, in fact, no more than 12 years ago. 

Between 2004 and 2014, all 22 of the world’s biggest 

social media networks were developed and launched, 

with the first, Facebook, on February 4, 2004.1 Supporting that growth has been the phenomenal global 

increase in mobile telephone usage. While this was 

initially driven by the consumerism of the global 

“West,” today it would be a challenge to find a society 

where there is no mobile phone usage.2 Much of the 

rapid increase is concentrated in areas where there are 

existing conflicts, or conflicts are highly likely, and as 

a result, we believe that mobile phone usage, particularly when associated with social media, is likely to 

have a significant impact upon the conduct and outcome of those conflicts.3

 However, can we quantify 

that outcome? Much seems to have been written about 

social media: the apparently extraordinary recruiting 

power of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s 

(commonly referred to as ISIS) social media campaign 

(of which we remain to be convinced); the apparent 

“success” of Russia’s trolling (of which we are absolutely less convinced); and the way that social media 

apparently triggered the Arab Spring (of which we are 

absolutely not convinced at all).

It may actually be too late to undertake a nuanced 

assessment of the challenge of social media from the 

perspective of policy—many governments and mili-
2

taries have apparently already decided that the social 

media space is a battlefield and are already spending 

millions on creating social media soldiers or “network 

warriors” to engage in those online battles. Whether 

that is money well spent is debatable, but regardless, 

in this Letort Paper we seek to answer some specific 

questions on how the U.S. Army, and by extension its 

allies, can best leverage social media, particularly on 

operations. Specifically, we will consider if social media is really a viable and effective messaging conduit; 

secondly, we investigate if social media has changed 

the information operations (IO) landscape; thirdly, we 

will consider if the United States has the correct force 

structure, training, equipment, and technology to leverage social media. Finally, we will consider how 

we train and educate our leaders to better understand 

and use social media.

Before addressing each of these areas, we need to 

contextualize our thoughts with our observations of 

what social media is, or can be, in the military context. We find four distinctly different applications of 

social media, and understanding each, together with 

its impact upon the Army, is critical to addressing the 

various questions posed. 

1. Social media, in our view, should be regarded 

primarily as a media channel, just like radio, 

newspapers, and television.

2. In addition to this, social media should be seen 

as an interactive medium for exerting influence.

3. Importantly, social media is a way of communicating within an already established network 

or networks.4

4. Finally, social media is a near real-time sensorto-sensor network.5
3

Each of these observations needs to be explained in a 

little more detail.

The first function, social media as a media channel, is perhaps what people most clearly understand. 

The spread of social media has transformed the speed 

with which incidents are reported, and in many cases, 

events are now being reported through social media 

as they are still unfolding.6 This has undoubtedly 

changed the nature of news reporting and has shortened the response time available to government and 

military leaders after major events. We need to caveat 

this, however, with some historical context. This response time has been reducing throughout history 

with the advent of new communications technologies—with steep changes at the introduction of significant innovations such as the post horse and telegraph networks—so this should not be regarded as 

a new phenomenon. However, social media as a media channel has enabled policymakers to see a wider 

range of viewpoints than ever before, including those 

of the adversary. It has also created a dilemma: most 

conventional news reporting follows certain standards of truth and accuracy. The British Broadcasting 

Corporation (BBC), for example, will only report an 

event as news if it has two independently verifiable 

sources (unless a BBC correspondent is witnessing the 

actual event).7 If it does not, the BBC will clearly state 

that the report has yet to be verified. Such moral exactitude does not exist in social media, so policymakers are gaining a far wider view of an event, but the 

accuracy of that view is highly debatable. While this 

is a major challenge, the nature of the challenge is, in 

general, well understood, especially by public affairs 

professionals.8

Unlike conventional media, though, social media 

allows individuals to interact with others in multiple 
4

different ways and directions. It is this second function that enables social media to be considered as a 

potentially powerful medium for influence. Much recent military and governmental investment in social 

media has been in using it to spread counter-narratives in response to the all too frequently successful 

use by extremist groups. The West has looked at the 

use of social media by organizations such as ISIS and 

concluded that this is a critical area whose importance 

will only increase. We agree that this is an area of 

growing importance; communities currently without 

social media penetration can reasonably be expected 

to, in time, exhibit the same characteristics of communities that already make use of it today. However, 

there is also a very real danger in assuming if social 

media says it is so, it is so. There is also a presumption 

that the volume of social media postings is indicative 

of interest. Again, we urge caution—volume can be 

manufactured very easily.9 Overly focusing on this 

area, while important, risks overlooking the other 

functions of social media that we have identified in 

this Letort Paper previously.

We believe that insufficient attention has been paid 

to the nature of social media as a communications network per se. It is known that terrorist and insurgent 

groups already use applications such as SnapChat and 

WhatsApp for tactical communication, but this is just 

the tip of the iceberg, because they are now increasingly being used by military and civilian groups of all 

descriptions.10 For example, a colleague and European 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officer 

who was deployed to sub-Saharan Africa regularly 

used WhatsApp to communicate with colleagues in 

different European nations, seeking advice on operational issues. The officer explained that the app was 
5

almost instantaneous, that it could reach targeted 

people whose advice was trusted, and was far faster 

than any military information technology (IT) system, 

which would not have been able to reach specialists of 

different nationalities at all, let alone in the time-frame 

that the data was needed. A second example is the 

wave of immigrants making their journey to Europe. 

A number of studies have now shown that WhatsApp, 

in particular, is being used as a tool to improve the 

immigrants’ situational awareness.11

Although messaging apps like these have been 

seen as less secure than government communications 

and, therefore, more open to interception, even this 

may be changing. The recent court case between the 

U.S. Government and Apple over the decryption of an 

iPhone suggests that commercial security protocols 

are becoming at least as strong as many governmental 

ones.12 Whether less secure or not, they are all more 

user-friendly and accessible than conventional classified systems. While the U.S.’s Secret Internet Protocol 

Router Network (SIPR) and Non-classified Internet 

Protocol Router (NIPR) network systems are relatively sophisticated (noting that it is very difficult for nonU.S. nationals to gain access), the United Kingdom’s 

(UK) Defence Information Infrastructure (DII) system, 

for example, is notorious for its slowness, its lack of 

connectivity with others, and its questionable “user 

friendliness.” We should, therefore, not be surprised 

when digitally aware officers use their initiative and 

the technology they are familiar with to address issues quickly and safely. It seems to us that in the future, social media platforms, often the same ones, will 

inevitably be used for operational communication 

by our people, by local civilian populations, and by 

adversarial groups alike. 
6

The final function we would highlight is the ability to use a network of smartphones effectively as a 

sensor network. A population equipped with smartphones and willing to communicate to others about 

the events taking place in their area is able to generate 

a picture of ongoing events in real time across the span 

of that population. Through the use of techniques such 

as crowd sourcing—the practice of obtaining information by soliciting contributions from a large group of 

people on social media—civil society organizations 

(CSOs) are already exploiting this capability in humanitarian crisis situations.13 To date, crowd sourcing 

has been used to generate situational awareness for 

humanitarian organizations in disaster zones, from 

the aftermath of typhoons in the Philippines, to the 

earthquake in Haiti, to major flooding in Australia. 

In each case, an accurate picture of the situation was 

built up virtually and almost entirely through social 

media posts and updates across the area concerned.14

What social media cannot do yet, in our view, is 

predict behavior with any reliability or consistency. 

This latter finding will be the most contentious, not 

least, as many commercial companies are actively 

marketing their media monitoring tools as behavioral 

predictors. Undeniably, while terrorists use the web 

to communicate—particularly applications that do 

not place their data sets in the public domain such as 

WhatsApp—the evidence that social media, by itself, 

is a precursor to mass behavior is simply not present. 

As the U.S. Peace Institute concluded in a major report 

on the Arab Spring: “New media. . . did not appear to 

play a significant role in either in-country collective 

action or regional diffusion during this period [emphasis added].” In any event, the Arab Spring, such 

is the pace of social media development, is already of 

limited relevance for assessing current capabilities.15
7

It would also be useful at this early stage to identify some of the constraints and challenges social media 

poses. For example, social media is a disruptive, yet 

innovative technology that does not sit well in current 

hierarchical military structures. In headquarters and 

operation rooms globally, the Internet terminal is typically the preserve of the public affairs officer (PAO). 

The mixing of open source Internet-enabled IT systems 

and classified military and governmental communication systems is fraught with difficulty—bureaucratic 

and technological. If the military is to leverage the full 

capability of social media, many sacred cows will have 

to be slain. Social media is not just a public affairs or 

strategic communication-messaging tool; it is already 

a major source of intelligence, and will become more 

important still in understanding and planning military operations. Commanders ignore it at their peril. 

HOW DOES THE ARMY LEVERAGE SOCIAL 

MEDIA?

How can the Army leverage social media for strategic messaging? First and foremost, the Army needs to 

understand the changing dynamics and demographics of social media across the world and, in particular, 

the way in which people now access information. The 

world is in the middle of a so-called “mobile revolution,” and increasingly, the principal way to reach 

external audiences worldwide is through social media via their mobile. In the context of the likely audiences in conflict environments, this trend is even more 

pronounced, as these environments are often in less 

developed countries where the population has previously had very limited access to the Internet.
8

The evidence indicates that the acceptance of 

data-enabled smartphones has been even faster than 

previous revolutions in communications such as radio.16 Mobile data traffic has grown 4,000-fold over 

the past 10 years, and the speed of this device acceptance continues to increase; global mobile data traffic 

grew 74 percent in 2015.17 The world is also nearing 

the so-called “peak device” point, as it is estimated 

that more than half of all Internet traffic will originate 

with non-personal computer devices by 2019.18 This 

trend is predicted to continue, and mobile data traffic 

is predicted to grow at a compound annual growth 

rate (CAGR) of 53 percent from 2015 to 2020. By then, 

it is estimated that there will be 11.6 billion mobileconnected devices, exceeding the world’s projected 

population at that time (7.8 billion).19

Social media is already the primary use for the 

data capability of smartphones. In 2015, there were 

3.42 billion Internet users (equaling 46 percent global 

penetration), but not that far behind, there were 2.31 

billion social media users (31 percent global penetration).20 The impact of the mobile revolution is worldwide, but the areas that are most dramatically affected 

by these changes, with the highest rates of smartphone 

and Internet growth, are Africa, the Middle East, and 

Central Asia, including many fragile states and areas 

where conflict is ongoing or where the potential for 

conflict exists.21 While television and radio remain 

important sources of information, the growth of social media has seen it become an increasingly trusted 

source, especially likely to be trusted by the youth 

demographic.22
9

In addition to accessing a range of news sources, 

including both national and international media channels, social media enables access to local sources of 

information such as bloggers and local websites, and 

CSOs working in the local area. The news can cover 

anything: the locations of current fighting, the state of 

repair of power and water lines, the condition of roads 

and the possibility of travel, the names of those killed 

in a recent strike, food prices and locations, international news, and media statements made by politicians, activists, or military leaders. 

Perhaps most importantly, social media enables 

contacts with friends and family, traditionally the 

most trusted sources for information in many societies, particularly in developing countries. In current 

conflict zones such as Syria, communications within 

such networks have been greatly enhanced by the use 

of social media. In his description of the importance of 

Facebook in Syria, blogger Ammar Halabi writes:

Browsing the Facebook feed has therefore [become] a 

primary way to get news and commentary about the 

whereabouts of friends and family, either inside or 

outside of Syria. My connections have mentioned often 

that browsing the ‘green dot’ that indicates that somebody is online on Facebook chat was a way to know 

that they are doing OK [emphasis added].23

While Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter have 

come to dominate across all demographics in many 

countries where social media is in its infancy, the increasing maturity of the communications environment 

in other countries has led to greater audience segmentation, because different social media platforms have 

become more popular with different sections of the 

population. In the UK for example, the average age of 
10

a Facebook user is increasing, and the majority of users are now in the 25 to 34 demographic, while applications such as Snapchat are primarily used by 18-24 

year olds and Kik by an even younger demographic.24

This trend is only likely to continue and will increasingly allow better-targeted communications with specific audience segments. 

With the continuing evolution of social media, 

many countries are developing specific preferences 

for social media applications divided on demographic, political, or even ethnic lines. For example, in Latvia most of the population use the Latvian “Draugiem” social media site, with limited penetration of the 

primarily Russian social networking site VKontakte 

(VK), suggesting a political division of social media 

between those considering themselves to be Latvian 

Latvians and those Latvians of Russian descent.25 Similarly, suspicions that Russia was using data from VK 

to spy on Ukrainians resulted in an increased use of 

Facebook by those opposed to Russian operations in 

Ukraine.26

The differentiation of social media in different 

countries also extends to specific uses. WhatsApp is 

popular across the world, but primarily as a messaging app; it is frequently used as a free substitute for 

texting. In Sudan, however, activists are using it to 

share news and discussion.27 With the repressive government in Sudan monitoring other social media, such 

as Facebook, activists prize WhatsApp for its security 

and encryption, and through the use of messagegroups activists have adapted it to widely distribute 

news.

The mobile revolution and phenomenal rise of social media have affected virtually every country in the 

world, including countries assumed to lack any sig-
11

nificant Internet penetration at all. In Afghanistan, for 

example, the percentage of population with access to 

the Internet has risen to more than 12 percent in a few 

short years, and that percentage continues to rise at a 

rapid pace. It now has over 4 million Internet users, 

of whom 2.6 million are on Facebook.28 Its increasing 

importance was highlighted in December 2015, when 

the deputy governor of the Helmand province sent an 

open letter to the President pleading for more assistance in the province—by means of a Facebook update.29 Paradoxically, President Erdoğan, no lover of 

social media in Turkey, found it unexpectedly useful 

to communicate to his people in the attempted July 

2016 coup.30 In short, in the near future there is no potential conflict area in the world that will not be significantly impacted by the Internet and social media. 

Collectively these trends clearly indicate that careful target audience analysis (TAA) of the social media environment needs to be carried out to determine 

what channels to use. They also suggest that targeted 

messaging to specific demographics is increasingly 

feasible. However, the issue of credibility acts as a major constraint. Recent years have seen a reduction in 

the assessed trustworthiness of government communications, particularly for certain demographics such 

as youth and minority groups.31 It is these groups that 

are frequently key audiences for strategic messaging. 

Where the Army is attempting to communicate, the 

interactive nature of social media can provide better 

ways of engaging audiences, particularly younger audiences, but the emphasis needs to be on creating an 

informal, open, and interactive approach, along with 

utilizing credible non-government voices wherever 

possible.
12

In addressing the question of how the Army leverages social media, the primary lesson is that the Army 

needs to have a better understanding of its audiences, 

and their use of social media, than it does at present. 

Both authors have worked within the UK, U.S., and 

coalition commands and have shared discussions 

with uniformed colleagues of all nationalities. The 

paucity of social media understanding and access has 

been a recurring theme of debate. What this means, 

in practice, is allowing commanders and planners a 

deeper and broader understanding of the specific demographics and usage of social media in their respective regions of interest. This may seem a non sequitur,

but our experience is that many senior, and certainly 

older, people tend not to understand the details of social media, employing instead a “one size fits all” approach. Secondly, the Army needs to understand usage patterns. Again, this is largely a function of TAA; 

it is no good placing all of the output on Facebook if 

the majority of users are on VK. Inherently, this means 

that the Army needs strong linguistic skills in order 

to understand and seamlessly slip into these social 

media outlets. 

Thirdly, the Army needs to have a good understanding of the political and social divisions that characterize social media usage. In Latvia, for example, we 

found that many senior people made the assumption 

that Russian-speaking Latvians accessed only Russian 

organic media. This was simply not the case, and very 

small, but nonetheless influential, organic Latvian 

Russian websites carried a far greater influence than 

originally assumed.32

Finally, social media has become ubiquitous, but 

it is possible to mistake volume for precision. With so 

much data available, it is increasingly important to 
13

find the right media, at the right time, and for the right 

audience, and this requires detailed research. A failure to understand any one of these points will make 

social media exploitation irrelevant and potentially 

misleading.

SOCIAL MEDIA AND INFORMATION 

OPERATIONS (IO)

The second question we wish to address is how 

social media has changed the IO landscape. Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations defines IO:

as the integrated employment, during military operations, of Information Related Capabilities (IRC) in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, 

corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries 

and potential adversaries while protecting our own.33

Given the impact on the information environment and 

therefore IRCs, undoubtedly, the answer to this is yes. 

First and foremost, the ubiquity of social media 

has made it far easier for hostile elements to communicate directly with American audiences. Although 

the effectiveness of ISIS’s online recruiting campaign 

is the subject of some conjecture—with some arguing 

that social media simply serves as a catalyst for other 

deeper behavioral drivers such as marginalization, 

poor life chances, or criminality—it is clear that imagery from the frontline, often of the most gruesome 

and violent nature, is immediately available to a population, which may or may not be directly influenced 

by it. Indeed, many argue that it is primarily through 

social media that extremist groups in the Middle East 

and Africa have been able to radicalize and recruit 

volunteers, in particular, to either conduct attacks in 
14

their own countries, or to travel to conflict areas and 

join the extremist organizations directly. One of the 

earliest exploiters of social media in this way was Al 

Shabbab in Somalia, whose delivery of high-quality 

videos through a range of platforms was at the time 

unprecedented.34 ISIS later adopted and developed Al 

Shabbab’s techniques. 

It is believed that, so far, as many as 30,000 foreign fighters have traveled into Syria to take part in 

the conflict there, from countries all over the world. 

The reasons why they have traveled vary widely, with 

research showing that common motivations include 

excitement and adventure, peer pressure, and a search 

for identity. We argue that social media on its own is 

rarely the root cause; however, it facilitates radicalization and allows users to connect with ISIS recruiters 

as well as other radicalized individuals. Social media 

also allows for the creation of filtered information environments where the group dynamic can be a powerful radicalizing force.35

The use of social media by Russia in its ongoing 

operations in Eastern Ukraine is well known, and 

numerous papers have discussed it in detail.36 While 

Russian operations in Crimea have received many 

internal Russian plaudits, and are the subject of numerous Russian military papers and studies, this is 

not a characteristic of operations in Eastern Ukraine. 

Russia’s efforts there have been far less successful, 

partly due to being less planned and more reactive to 

events on the ground, but also arguably because it is 

significantly less disciplined. This is particularly the 

case in social media where the “firehose of nonsense 

and lies,” a constant stream of trolling and misinformation, has been turned on, but seemingly with little 

effect other than for the West to constantly now ques-
15

tion the veracity of any Russian communication. If 

it has been successful, it has been with the domestic 

Russian audience, which now is completely isolated 

from any competing narrative, giving the lie to the oftstated concept of a global media space.

Russian operations in Donbass have also illustrated that social media usage can increasingly provide critical evidence of the reality of a situation in a 

combat environment. It is the ongoing position of the 

Russian government that Russian troops are not present in Eastern Ukraine. In common with other young 

people, globally, Russian troops are reminded to use 

social media to communicate with their loved ones 

and also with each other. Organizations such as Bellingcat have used this to track individual soldiers and 

the Russian units that command them. This has been 

particularly effective in building the case for Russian 

involvement in the shooting down of a Malaysian 

airliner.37

These are also risks that our own military could 

equally face. In a recent exercise presented at the 

NATO school in Oberammergau, one of this Letort 

Paper’s authors demonstrated how the key personnel 

of a Royal Navy warship, their families, their social 

groups, their personal addresses, and their children’s 

schools could all be easily identified from social media. In one case, the home address of a ship’s Principal 

Warfare Officer was quickly found because he had applied for local authority planning permission, which 

is placed online in the UK, to extend his house. Possessing an unusual surname, he was easy enough to 

locate.38 This type of information is almost impossible 

to protect and yet relatively easy to access using social 

media analysis tools. The Royal Navy ship in question 

may be one of the most powerful warships afloat, but 
16

without its key personnel present and focused on their 

tasks, it would have little operational utility. In a conflict environment, it would be naïve to think that our 

adversaries would not use this information, proactively, to their operational advantage. An integral part of 

Western IO doctrine is operational security (OPSEC); 

as well as regarding social media as an offensive operational tool, the Army needs to think very carefully 

about defensive measures in the social media domain. 

While we may be able to control our soldiers, controlling the use of social media by the soldiers’ families 

will be significantly harder, if not impossible; and yet, 

through those very innocent conduits, it will be possible to directly target military personnel. 

The continuing evolution of social media has 

undoubtedly resulted in areas of opportunity for 

friendly force IO as well. The nature of the Internet 

and social media in particular has effectively removed 

geographic barriers to communication with audiences 

across the world. Social media has none of the range 

or access limitations of radio or television. All that is 

required virtually anywhere in the world is Internet 

access. In addition, little infrastructure or resources 

are required to generate product. In many cases, little 

training has been required or conducted with adversarial groups rapidly learning “on the job.” One unintended consequence of this accessibility of social 

media is that, whereas previous U.S. IO activity using 

conventional media has been able to be specifically 

targeted against adversarial groups or hostile governments, the use of social media in theory allows the 

U.S. home audience to access the same material. U.S. 

legislation states that U.S. forces cannot conduct IO 

against the U.S. population; however, clearly targeted 

material, even if able to be seen by a U.S. audience, 
17

would not violate this condition.39 At the tactical level, 

we have seen how our adversaries have operationalized social media particularly in deceptive operations. 

For example, during the battle for Deir ez-Zour in 

Syria in 2014, between ISIS and al-Nusra, fake videos 

were released onto YouTube purporting to be tribal 

elders switching allegiance to ISIS.40 A small number 

of defection videos were also released—that may have 

been false—causing al-Nusra to make public statements that they were not true, which then confused 

the rather sparse and poorly connected communities 

caught up in the fighting. 

Deception, of course, is not new to the battlefield; 

but its dissemination on social media is, and it brings 

with it difficulties of our own making. Can social media, for example, be used in a tactical deception operation? Imagine simulating the movement of a patrol 

through the generation of social media reports of its 

progress. Under current interpretations of social media, to do so would be classified as “Black Psychological Operations (PSYOPS),” because it would be 

doctrinally categorized as a false report emanating 

from a false source. Both national and NATO Alliance 

doctrine specifically articulate that PSYOPS products 

should be truthful and attributable. Therefore, in our 

consideration of how the Army may leverage social 

media, a further area that needs to be considered is 

both doctrine and rules of engagement. It is perhaps 

worth noting that neither Operation FORTITUDE, 

the Second World War Allies’ successful attempts to 

deceive the Nazis from knowing the location of the 

D-Day landings, nor Operation RHINO, General Norman Schwartzkopf’s deception plan in the 1991 Gulf 

War, would be likely to succeed today given the omnipresence of social media. After all, the world first 
18

learned of the operation to kill Osama Bin Laden, 

while it was being undertaken, by a tweet from Pakistani IT consultant Sohaib Athar, who informed the 

world: “Helicopter hovering above Abbottabad at 

1AM (is a rare event).”41 Today, that might have been 

a live video feed from Periscope.

In fact, the whole issue of doctrine is problematic, because most of the doctrine that currently exists 

was written before the explosion in social media, or it 

only touched upon it very lightly or obliquely. Take 

for example the current official U.S. Army document 

that deals with social media: a handbook that was designed for PAO offices and primarily discusses social 

media in the context of engagement over news issues, 

rather than how it can be used on operations.42

The UK Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), Operations, describes itself as:

the British Army capstone doctrine containing the enduring philosophy and principles for our approach to 

operations reflecting the rapidly involving dynamics 

of the contemporary operating environment.

It contains not one single reference to social media.43

Similarly, the U.S. Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the 

Armed Forces of the United States, describes itself as: 

“the capstone joint doctrine publication . . . for unified action by the Armed Forces of the United States”; 

yet, across some 172-pages, there is but one single 

mention of social media.44 We should not really be 

surprised at this; doctrine, after all, takes a considerable amount of time to draft, be approved, and then 

published—all the more so in large and bureaucratic 

international organizations, such as NATO, where it 

inevitably becomes a reflection of the lowest common 
19

denominator of agreement between multiple member 

states. However, this does highlight the reality that 

the pace of technological and social change with social media is taking place faster than we can articulate 

in our military publications. This is, therefore, a significant challenge for the Army. How far do we wish 

as subordinates to innovate and take risk in a highly 

dynamic information environment? To succeed in future conflicts we may need to ask some very difficult 

questions about rules of engagement, legality, truthfulness, attribution, and a host of subsidiary issues, 

because future conflicts will be played out in a very 

different information environment. 

It would be timely to consider the developments 

made by China in this particular area. In 2003, the 

Chinese Communist Party Central Committee signed 

off on a new concept called Three Warfares. They believed that in the future, nuclear arms would be unusable and that conventional kinetic options would 

be preferred in only a tiny number of possible future 

conflicts, and even then, outcomes would be problematic. Three Warfares is the adoption of a third type of 

warfare, where PSYOPS, media manipulation, and 

legal warfare are the mainstays of Chinese strategy. 

We have seen this played out in key areas of Chinese 

foreign policy in the present-day, for example, with 

the physical creation of new islands in disputed areas 

of the South China Sea that has provided China with 

opportunities to “legally” extend its territorial boundaries. In 2015, China created a strategic support force 

commanded by a four-star general. Within this force, 

China placed both its defensive and offensive cyber 

PSYOPS and media operations commands. 

What we might presume from this is that both 

Russia and China are putting great emphasis on 
20

operationalizing emerging technologies such as social 

media. This does not yet appear to be the case for the 

U.S. Army, and we believe there are a number of key 

areas that need to be investigated. 

Force Structures, Training & Education, 

and Equipment.

Given the nature and pace of social media development, it is clear to us that the U.S. Army must address three distinct issues: Force Structures; Training 

and Education; and Equipment. This Letort Paper and 

its two English authors would not propose to recommend specific force structures, but we could generically recommend that a social media capacity needs to 

be built into every level of command. In the real-time 

information environment created by social media, 

operational commanders at every level will need simultaneous and identical situational awareness of unfolding events. It is preposterous to presume that this 

increasingly vital area should somehow reside only 

with the PAO and Intelligence (INT); it must be central to operations and planning. Today, it is entirely 

normal to have a live unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 

feed into the Force Operations room; in the future, social media feeds should be similarly entirely normal.

Equipment. There is a critical need to integrate the 

Internet into operational headquarters at all levels of 

command, in particular mobile and tactical headquarters.45 Without broad access across the staff functions, 

not just IO, it will not be possible to properly address a 

number of the issues identified earlier. While there are 

technical and security issues with ensuring Internet 

access within headquarters and tactical headquarters 
21

in particular, overall the issue is more about integrating existing technology rather than the challenge of 

developing new technology. 

Analytical software tools. A great deal of emphasis 

has been placed on the development of analytical software for social media analysis. In the context of IO, 

both their importance and their limitations need to be 

properly recognized. There are now large numbers 

of commercial applications that scrape open source 

media and provide all kinds of metrics. Such analysis 

can be very useful, but there is an urgent need to understand the different requirements that different staff 

functions might have. Both INT and PAO functions 

and requirements are relatively well understood, but 

the requirements for others, including both Operations and IO are less clear. 

Social media needs to be considered in terms other 

than simply as a media channel, and as a result operational headquarters at all levels require a monitoring 

function that reflects this. A social media feed, suitably filtered and managed appropriately for the level 

of headquarters, needs to be available to the INT staff 

function and sufficiently integrated with the Operations, IO, and PAO staff functions. This function will 

need to be capable of live monitoring, but depending 

on the level of headquarters may only need limited 

analysis capability, as depth analysis of social media 

can be conducted with reachback capabilities. Responsibilities for the different staff functions need to 

be clarified and manpower changes may be required 

as a result of the need for new social media roles 

within headquarters and supporting IO and PSYOPS 

components. 
22

For example, in the future it is highly likely that if 

deployed troops encounter civil disobedience, including demonstrations and riots, these will be directed 

and coordinated through social media in real time, 

possibly also with multiple sources broadcasting the 

events on live streaming video directly onto the Internet. Under these circumstances, a capability for the 

operations staff to monitor events on social media directly would be required in the same way that a UAV 

feed can be monitored directly when necessary. This 

is not revolutionary, it is evolutionary; and in essence, 

this is no different to the existing practice of monitoring radio communications, already updated in recent 

operational contexts to the real-time provision of tactical information by listening in to Integrated Communications Security (ICOM) chatter. As those involved 

in such civil disobedience would be a key audience for 

IO, there is also both a monitoring implication and an 

IO opportunity for intervention, which implies that IO 

needs a significant deployable social media broadcast 

capability that has a capacity to operate in real time as 

well as a longer-term engagement capacity.

Effective and timely communication in a rising 

number of areas across the world will require engagement via social media as they increasingly come to 

dominate how local audiences communicate and receive information. IO and PSYOPS capabilities will 

need sufficient capability to broadcast using different 

social media platforms. Specific levels of capacity will 

require a more detailed analysis of the likely tasks 

at each level of command, and there is also a need 

to consider different forms of reachback capability. 

Nevertheless, in line with current U.S. doctrine, commanders will need to retain some level of capability at 

different levels of command to be able to utilize IO in 

direct support of their own operations. 
23

Training and Education. We believe there exists a 

requirement for all personnel to be better educated 

in terms of understanding the full range of functions 

that social media can be used for; in particular, dispelling the myth that only PAO or INT need be aware 

of or understand social media. This basic education 

level would also include a clear understanding of the 

OPSEC risk to U.S. forces that social media represents. 

There is a need for commanders, and in particular operations and INT staff, to understand social media and 

its different functions, not simply its media function, 

in order to understand its potential impact on operations and to incorporate that understanding into their 

planning and operations. Commanders do not need 

specialist social media knowledge, but they do need 

sufficient knowledge to understand its importance, 

as well as how the different stakeholders in conflict 

environments are likely to employ it. They also need 

to have an understanding of the analytical techniques 

that can be used on social media data and the capabilities and limitations of that analysis. 

Specialist IO personnel will need to have a greater 

depth of understanding of social media, of its functions, and of the psychology underpinning human 

behavior online. They also need an understanding of 

the different types of analysis that can be conducted 

on social media data and the relative value of that 

analysis. 

IO social media analysts will increasingly be required. The huge increase in social media use presents 

increasing opportunities to mine data-rich information 

in a conflict environment and collect raw intelligence 

on different actors and stakeholders within them. This 

has the potential to generate detailed assessments and 

can offer deep insights into audience motivations, atti-
24

tudes, and behaviors. In addition to requiring specialist analytical skills, these analysts need to be able to 

integrate such information with other target audience 

data and intelligence to best support IO.

In the UK, the use of competency frameworks has 

become increasingly useful in defining who needs to 

know what and to what detail. We would suggest a 

competency framework for social media (see Table 1).

Competency Audience

Awareness

Understand the threats and opportunities, utility and 

constraints of social media.

All

Working Familiarity

Can access social media for analysis purposes and has a 

deeper understanding of its utility and place in intelligence 

collection and operational planning. 

G2-G5

Practitioner

Can access social media for analysis and influence 

purposes and has a deep understanding of its utility and 

intelligence collection and operational planning.

PAO/ INT/ IO

Expert

Takes primary responsibility for all aspects of social media 

usage.

IO

Table 1. Competency Framework for Social Media.

Technology. The technical challenges involved in 

integrating Internet access with classified systems 

center on the security challenges of doing so, rather 

than the development of new technology. In contrast, many of the technologies involved in the area 

of big data analysis are new and emerging, with some 

important areas such as sentiment analysis still in a 

relatively early stage of their development.46 Further 

developments in these areas will only increase the 
25

value and importance of the analysis of social media 

in conflict environments and reinforce the need for 

such analysis to be provided in a timely manner to operational commanders at all levels. Finally, language 

translation technology continues to evolve, and it increasingly will enable operators to utilize social media 

in a multi-language environment.47

CONCLUSION 

The impact of social media on the media environment has been widely recognized; as has the ability 

of extremist and adversarial organizations to exploit 

social media to publicize their cause, spread their 

propaganda, and recruit vulnerable individuals. 

However, the full implications of the mobile and social media revolution are not yet fully understood, 

and they extend far beyond these areas. Social media 

will increasingly have a direct impact on virtually 

all aspects of military operations in the 21st century, 

through all four of the different applications of social 

media we have described. In doing so, social media 

will force significant changes to policy, doctrine, force 

structures, and virtually all staff functions within operational units. Social media will also necessitate new 

training requirements and new approaches to traditional operational challenges. All this will require a 

wider understanding of the full impact of social media 

and the realization that it is no longer an area simply 

of concern to PAO and possibly INT. 

Although, with new threats come new opportunities, and the interactive nature of social media in 

particular means that it is potentially a very powerful 

medium for IO, if that potential is recognized and capabilities can be developed to respond to this rapidly 

developing revolution.
26

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

In addition to the general recommendations above, 

we make the following specific proposals:

1. Social media is integral to the conduct of operations, not just a PAO or INT function. Thus, the 

U.S. Army needs a custom-made doctrine and 

an educational capacity to inform commanders 

on its intelligent and safe use. 

2. In order to integrate social media into operations, each of the staff functions needs continuous access to the Internet at their desk.

3. Social media must be integral to all exercises. 

This needs the creation of a virtual social media 

environment—i.e., a sandbox or simulation—to 

add the social media space to training environments. This must be a space in which it is “safe 

to fail.” 

4. There is a need for commanders, in general, 

and operations and INT staff, in particular, 

to understand social media and its different 

functions, not limited to media use, and how 

to incorporate it into the planning cycle. All 

staff functions need training and education, 

possibly using a competency framework.

5. Within headquarters, the responsibility for social media needs to be clearly articulated and 

the posts resourced appropriately. 

6. U.S. Army and Department of Defense (DoD) 

policy and doctrine must clarify a host of difficult issues relating to social media usage and, 

in particular, its use in deception and PSYOPS.
27

ENDNOTES

1. “Most famous social network sites worldwide as of January 

2017, ranked by number of active users (in millions),” Statista.com,

January 2017, available from www.statista.com/statistics/272014/

globalsocialnetworks-ranked-by-number-of-users/.

2. Jacob Poushter, “Smartphone Ownership and Internet Usage Continues to Climb in Emerging Economies: But advanced 

economies still have higher rates of technology use,” Global Technology Report, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, February 

22, 2016, available from www.pewglobal.org/2016/02/22/smartphone-ownership-and-internet-usage-continues-to-climb-in-emergingeconomies/, accessed February 23, 2016.

3. “Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2015–2020,” White Paper, San Jose, CA: Cisco 

Systems, Incorporated, updated June 1, 2016.

4. Serene Assir, “Facebook, WhatsApp and Viber light way to 

Europe for Syrian refugees,” The Times of Israel, August 19, 2015, 

available from www.timesofisrael.com/facebook-whatsapp-and-viberlight-way-to-europe-for-syrian-refugees/.

5. Annie Shiel, “Conflict Crowdsourcing: Harnessing the 

Power of Crowdsourcing for Organizations Working in Conflict 

and the Potential for a Crowd Sourced Portal for Conflict-Related 

Information,” Undergraduate Honours Thesis, Montréal, Québec, 

CA: McGill University, December 3, 2013.

6. Jenny Hauser, “Speed in Context: Real-time News Reporting and Social Media,” Paper Presented at the European Journalism Training Association Conference held at the Dublin Institute 

of Technology, School of Media, on October 24, 2014.

7. The British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) Editorial 

Guidelines, state that: 

[the BBC will] gather material using first hand sources 

wherever possible, check and cross check facts, validate 

the authenticity of documentary evidence and digital material, corroborate claims and allegations made by contribu-
28

tors wherever possible. In news and current affairs content, 

achieving due accuracy is more important than speed.

British Broadcasting Corporation, Editorial Guidelines, London, 

UK: British Broadcasting Corporation, 2017, available from www.

bbc.co.uk/editorialguidelines/guidelines/accuracy.

8. The main U.S. Army official publication that refers to social media is U.S. Department of the Army, The United States 

Army Social Media Handbook, Washington, DC: U.S. Army, Office 

of the Chief of Public Affairs, Online and Social Media Division, 

April 2016, available from https://www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/

socialmedia/army_social_media_handbook.pdf, which does so in the 

context of public affairs.

9. For example, one has only to look at the volume of information created online by the Internet Research Agency based at 

55 Savushkina Street, St. Petersburg, Russia in support of events 

such as the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17).

10. Associated Press (AP), “Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp 

helping ISIS, U.K. spy alleges,” CBC News, November 4, 2014, 

available from www.cbc.ca/news/world/facebook-twitter-whatsapphelping-isis-u-k-spy-alleges-1.2822890.

11. Megan Specia, “WhatsApp offers lifeline for Syrian 

refugees on journey across Europe,” Mashable, July 3, 2015, 

available from mashable.com/2015/07/03/syrians-europe-whatsapprefugees/#ITbIBHPBFOq8.

12. Alina Selyukh and Camila Domonoske, “The Apple-FBI 

Debate Over Encryption: Apple, The FBI And iPhone Encryption: 

A Look At What’s At Stake,” The Two-Way: Breaking News From 

NPR, National Public Radio (NPR), February 17, 2016, available 

from www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/02/17/467096705/applethe-fbi-and-iphone-encryption-a-look-at-whats-at-stake.

13. Russ Linden, “The Life-Saving Power of Crowdsourcing,” 

Governing: The States and Localities, Management Insights, January 23, 2013, available from www.governing.com/columns/mgmt-insights/col-crowdwourcing-ushahidi-saving-lives-haiti-earthquake.html.
29

14. Ibid.

15. Sean Aday, Henry Farrell, Marc Lynch, John Sides, and 

Deen Freelon, “Blogs and Bullets II: New Media and Conflict After the Arab Spring,” Peaceworks, No. 80, Washington, DC: United 

States Institute of Peace, July 2012, available from www.usip.org/

publications/blogs-and-bullets-ii-new-media-and-conflict-after-thearab-spring.

16. Mark P. Mills, “The Mobile Revolution Has Only Just 

Begun,” Forbes, January 19, 2015, available from www.forbes.com/

sites/markpmills/2015/01/19/the-mobile-revolution-has-only-justbegun/#7e481fd9904c.

17. “Cisco Visual Networking Index.”

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Simon Kemp, “Digital in 2016,” Special Reports, Singapore: We Are Social Limited, January 27, 2016, available from 

wearesocial.com/uk/special-reports/digital-in-2016.

21. Ibid.

22. Damian Radcliffe, “Survey: Arab Youth consume less 

news and trust social media as a news source,” Knowledge Bridge,

June 27, 2013, available from www.kbridge.org/en/arab-youth-areconsuming-less-news-and-increasingly-trust-social-media-as-a-newssource/.

23. Ammar Halabi, “The use of social media in Syria,” Social Informatics Blog, April 24, 2014, available from https://

socialinfoblog.wordpress.com/2014/04/.

24. Mark Hoelzel, “Update: A breakdown of the demographics for each of the different social networks,” Business Insider UK, 

June 29, 2015, available from uk.businessinsider.com/update-a-breakdown-of-the-demographics-for-each-of-the-different-social-networks2015-6?r=US&IR=T; Verto Analytics, “The Demographics of Social Media Properties: Looking Beyond Downloads,” Consumer 

Insights, October 21, 2015, available from www.vertoanalytics.
30

com/2015/10/the-demographics-of-social-media-properties-looking-beyond-downloads/, accessed June 1, 2016.

25. “Draugiem,” crunchbase.com, n.d., available from www.

crunchbase.com/company/draugiem-2, accessed June 1, 2016; “Top 

sites in Latvia,” Alexa.com, n.d., available from www.alexa.com/

topsites/countries/LV, accessed June 1, 2016; A target audience 

analysis (TAA) was undertaken by the London, UK-based company, Strategic Communication Laboratories Limited in 2015.

26. Carol Matlack, “The Kremlin Tried to Use VKontakte—

Russia’s Facebook—to Spy on Ukrainians,” Bloomberg Businessweek, April 17, 2014.

27. Khalid Albaih, “How WhatsApp is fuelling a ‘sharing 

revolution’ in Sudan,” The Guardian, October 15, 2015, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/15/sudan-whatsappsharing-revolution.

28. Internet World Stats website, “Asia: Asia Marketing Research, Internet Usage, Population Statistics and Facebook Information,” Afghanistan, last updated February 16, 2017, available 

from www.internetworldstats.com/asia.htm#af.

29. Mirwais Khan, “Helmand governor takes to Facebook to 

warn Afghan president of Taliban threat,” Independent, December 

20, 2015, available from www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/

helmand-governors-taliban-warning-on-facebook-a6780846.html.

30. Sam Schechner, “Erdogan Embraces Social Media to Repel 

Coup Attempt in U-Turn,” The Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2016, 

available from https://www.wsj.com/articles/erdogan-embraces-socialmedia-to-repel-coup-attempt-in-u-turn-1468760698.

31. Greg Miller, “National Security: Panel casts doubt on U.S. 

propaganda efforts against ISIS,” The Washington Post, December 2, 2015, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/

national-security/panel-casts-doubt-on-us-propaganda-efforts-againstisis/2015/12/02/ab7f9a14-9851-11e5-94f0-9eeaff906ef3_story.html.

32. Target audience analysis (TAA) was undertaken by London, UK-based company, Strategic Communication Laboratories 

Limited in 2015.
31

33. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, Joint 

Publication 3-13, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

November 27, 2012, Incorp. Change 1, November 20, 2014. 

34. Will Oremus, “Twitter of Terror: Somalia’s al-Shabaab 

unveils a new social media strategy for militants,” Slate, December 23, 2011, available from www.slate.com/articles/technology/

technocracy/2011/12/al_shabaab_twitter_a_somali_militant_group_

unveils_a_new_social_media_strategy_for_terrorists_.html. 

35. Research interview conducted by the authors with Hanif 

Qadir, Chief Executive Officer of The Active Change Foundation 

on May 16, 2016. 

36. For example, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) Centre of Excellence Strategic Communications Centre 

of Excellence, Framing of the Ukraine–Russia Conflict in Online and 

Social Media, Riga: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

Centre of Excellence Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, May 2016, available from www.stratcomcoe.org/framingukraine-russia-conflict-online-and-social-media.

37. Daniel Romein, “MH17—Potential Suspects and Witnesses from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade: A Bellingcat Investigation,” Bellingcat.com, February 23, 2016, available from https://

www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2016/02/23/53rd-report-en/.

38. “Using Social Media for Operational Effect,” A lesson 

delivered to the NATO School Oberammergau Senior Officer’s 

Information Operations Course in May 2016.

39. The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act 

of 1948, Public Law 80-402, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, 1948, popularly referred to as the Smith–Mundt 

Act, specifies the terms in which the U.S. Government can engage 

global audiences.

40. Valerie Szybala, “The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham 

and the ‘Cleansing’ of Deir ez-Zour,” Backgrounder, Washington, 

DC: Institute for the Study of War, May 14, 2014, available from 

www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/islamic-state-iraq-and-alsham-and-%E2%80%9Ccleansing%E2%80%9D-deir-ez-zour.
32

41. Sohaib Athar (@ReallyVirtual), “Helicopter hovering above 

Abbottabad at 1AM (is a rare event),” May 1, 2011, 12:58 p.m., 

tweet, available from https://twitter.com/ReallyVirtual?lang=en-gb.

42. U.S. Department of the Army.

43. UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), Operations, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), Shrivenham, UK: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence, November 2010.

44. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of 

the United States, Joint Publication 1, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013, pp. i., I-12.

45. From our joint experience of operational headquarters, 

we know this to be the case; however, one may argue that while 

there is no doctrine that tackles this issue there is no incentive to 

remedy this situation. Our experience suggests that commanders 

will continue to view social media purely as a potential breach of 

operational security (OPSEC) and, therefore, limit its use as much 

as possible.

46. Matthew Mooney, “Facebook Reactions: The Future for 

Sentiment Analysis,” Isitsweet.wordpress.com, November 17, 

2015.

47. Quentin Hardy, “Language Translation Tech Starts to Deliver on Its Promise,” Bits, blog of The New York Times, January 

11, 2015, available from https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/

language-translation-tech-starting-to-deliver-on-its-promise/?_r=0.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Authors

Mr. Ian Tunnicliffe

Dr. Steve Tatham

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Denise J. Kersting

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

This Publication SSI Website USAWC Website