IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON

Appellant,

v.

OLAJIDE ADEL FLETCHER,

Respondent.

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No. 37661-3-III

PUBLISHED OPINION

STAAB, J. — This case raises several issues of first impression pertaining to the 

collateral attack of a sentence. Olajide Fletcher pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of 

second degree assault with a firearm and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. 

Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State recommended an exceptional sentence of 120 

months (the statutory maximum). The sentencing judge followed the recommendation. 

Shortly after sentencing Mr. Fletcher filed a motion to modify the judgment and sentence 

pursuant to CrR 7.8. Three years later, on July 15, 2019, Mr. Fletcher filed a second CrR 

7.8 motion, contending that the court miscalculated his offender score and standard range 

sentence before imposing the exceptional sentence. Following a series of hearings, the 

superior court granted Mr. Fletcher’s motion, holding that it was timely, good cause was 

shown for failing to bring the offender score issue in his first motion, and the 

FILED

OCTOBER 28, 2021 

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 37661-3-III

State v. Fletcher

2

miscalculated offender score prejudiced Mr. Fletcher. At the resentencing hearing, the 

court imposed a high-end standard range sentence of 77 months.

The State filed this direct appeal and we reverse the trial court’s decision. We 

hold that a judgment and sentence is facially invalid when it contains a miscalculated 

standard range even when the defendant receives the agreed-upon exceptional sentence. 

While Mr. Fletcher’s motion was not untimely, we conclude that it was successive 

because Mr. Fletcher did not establish good cause for failing to raise the issue in his first 

motion. Ordinarily, when the court of appeals determines that a collateral attack is timely 

but successive, we transfer the case to the Supreme Court. In this case, however, since 

the superior court addressed the motion on the merits, and we are reviewing the case in 

our appellate capacity and not as original jurisdiction, the transfer provisions of RAP 

16.5(c) do not apply and we retain appellate jurisdiction to decide the case. Because Mr. 

Fletcher’s motion was successive without good cause, we reverse the superior court’s 

order granting Mr. Fletcher’s motion and reinstate the original sentence. 

FACTS

In November 2015, the State charged Olajide Adel Fletcher with one count of first 

degree assault with a firearm or deadly weapon. The charge alleged that Mr. Fletcher 

shot Alex Tauveve five times in the legs. According to Mr. Fletcher, Mr. Tauveve took 

Mr. Fletcher’s televisions and when Mr. Fletcher tried to recover the televisions, Mr. 

Tauveve pulled a gun on him. Mr. Fletcher overpowered Mr. Tauveve, taking the gun 
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State v. Fletcher

3

and shooting him. Mr. Fletcher and his girlfriend fled to Montana, where U.S. Marshalls 

took them into custody.

The State agreed to reduce the first degree assault charge to second degree assault, 

and refrain from filing charges against Mr. Fletcher’s girlfriend if Mr. Fletcher would 

stipulate to an exceptional sentence of 120 months, the statutory maximum. The 

statement on plea of guilty identified Mr. Fletcher’s offender score as “8” on the second 

degree assault count, with a standard range of 53-70 months and a firearm enhancement 

of 36 months, and an offender score of “5” on the unlawful possession count, with a 

standard range of 41-54 months. The statement did not include Mr. Fletcher’s criminal 

history, although it indicated that it was attached as a separate document. The parties 

agreed that the prosecutor would recommend “an exceptional sentence/incarceration of 

84 months on Count 1 (with a three yr deadly weapon enhancement), 41 months on 

Count 2 to run concurrent, for a total of 10 years.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 14. Mr. 

Fletcher “agree[d] there are substantial and compelling reasons for an exceptional 

sentence in this case.” CP at 19. 

Mr. Fletcher was sentenced on February 23, 2016. His offender scores for the two 

charges were calculated as “8” and “5”, based on his criminal history of one adult 

conviction for first degree theft, a juvenile conviction for second degree assault, and 

juvenile convictions for two counts of attempted second degree assault. The parties also 

agreed that Mr. Fletcher had a prior third degree assault conviction that washed out. 
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Based on the offender score, the parties calculated the standard range sentence as 89 to

106 months. The sentencing court followed the recommendation and imposed an 

exceptional sentence of 120 months.1 

On March 18, 2016, Mr. Fletcher filed a motion to modify the judgment and 

sentence pursuant to CrR 7.8, seeking a standard range sentence of 106 months in 

confinement. The superior court transferred the motion to this court for consideration as 

a personal restraint petition. This court dismissed the petition as frivolous, noting that 

Mr. Fletcher stipulated to the exceptional sentence. Therefore he could not challenge the 

exceptional sentence he agreed to without challenging the entire plea agreement, which 

he did not do. See In re Pers. Restraint of Fletcher, No. 34430-4-III (Wn. Ct. App. Mar. 

3, 2017).

Three years later Mr. Fletcher filed a second CrR 7.8 motion, arguing that the 

sentencing court incorrectly calculated his offender score, thus rendering his sentence 

unlawful. Specifically, he asserted that the court incorrectly included his two juvenile 

second degree attempted assaults from May 2006 in his offender score when those crimes 

should have washed out pursuant to RCW 9.94A.525(4) and State v. Moeurn, 170 Wn.2d 

169, 240 P.3d 1158 (2010). Mr. Fletcher argues that his correct offender score on the 

 

1

 Grant County Superior Court Judge David Estudillo accepted Mr. Fletcher’s

guilty plea and followed the recommended 120-month exceptional sentence. The motion

at issue in this appeal, and the subsequent resentencing, were heard by Judge John

Antosz.
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5

second degree assault charge was 4, rather than 8, and the score for the unlawful 

possession of the firearm was 3 rather than 5.

In response, the State argued that the motion was untimely, barred as successive 

under RCW 10.73.140, and failed to establish prejudice because the State and Mr. 

Fetcher negotiated the exceptional sentence as part of the plea agreement, with no 

reference to the offender score or standard range.

Mr. Fletcher then responded by filing a declaration certifying that his previous 

petition did not present similar grounds and arguing that he had good cause for not 

raising the offender score in his previous petition because he did not have access to his 

judgment and sentence. Mr. Fletcher argued that the lack of access was “an external 

objective impediment” that prevented him from raising the issue. According to Mr. 

Fletcher, he requested a copy of his judgment and sentence from defense counsel, who 

told Mr. Fletcher he could not have the judgment in his personal possession when he was 

transferred to prison but that he would receive a copy when he arrived at the corrections 

center. Mr. Fletcher did not receive the judgment when he arrived at the corrections 

center, and when he requested his legal documents from the law librarian, he only 

received his statement on plea of guilty. Mr. Fletcher claims the plea statement listed his 

offender scores but did not contain any information regarding his criminal history, such 

as the dates of the crimes and the sentences. Mr. Fletcher asserted that he did not receive 

a copy of his judgment and sentence, containing his criminal history, until the State filed 
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State v. Fletcher

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a response to his first personal restraint petition in July 2016. At that time, his motion 

was already filed and before this court for consideration. 

Ultimately, the superior court held that Mr. Fletcher’s judgment was facially 

invalid, and thus his motion was timely. The court also found good cause for not 

including the issue in his first motion. Finally, the court found prejudice, concluding that 

if the sentencing court had known the parties relied on an erroneous offender score and 

standard range when they negotiated the agreement, the sentencing court likely would 

have departed from the agreement and imposed a lower sentence. Accordingly, the court 

held that Mr. Fletcher was entitled to re-sentencing with the proper offender score and 

proper standard range. The court held that Mr. Fletcher’s stipulation to the firearm 

enhancement and the stipulation to the exceptional sentence remained in place and could 

not be withdrawn, but that Mr. Fletcher could argue for a sentence shorter than 120 

months. At resentencing, the court ordered a high-end standard range sentence of 77 

months. 

The State filed this timely appeal. 

ANALYSIS

A. WAS THE CRR 7.8 MOTION TIMELY?

We are asked to decide whether the miscalculation of a petitioner’s offender score 

renders a judgment and sentence facially invalid when the trial court does not impose a 

standard range sentence but instead imposes the exceptional sentence recommended by 
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the parties. We hold that when the miscalculation of an offender score and standard 

range sentence can be determined from the judgment,

2

it renders the judgment facially 

invalid even when the court imposes the recommended exceptional sentence. 

Mr. Fletcher filed his collateral attack in superior court as a motion for relief from 

judgment under CrR 7.8(b). The procedures for filing such a motion are governed by 

chapter 10.73 RCW. CrR 7.8(b). Similar to other collateral challenges, a motion under 

CrR 7.8(b) may not be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final “if the 

judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent 

jurisdiction.” RCW 10.73.090(1).

“Generally, a judgment and sentence is facially invalid ‘if it exceeds the duration 

allowed by statute and the alleged defect is evident on the face of the document without 

further elaboration.’” State v. Chambers, 176 Wn.2d 573, 583-84, 293 P.3d 1185 (2013)

 

2 The State concedes that the offender score was miscalculated and does not argue 

that calculating the offender score requires us to go beyond the face of the judgment and 

plea documents. The parties are correct that an incorrectly calculated offender score may 

render a judgment invalid on its face. See In re Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861, 867, 50 P.3d 

618 (2002) and In re LaChapelle, 153 Wn.2d 1, 6, 100 P.3d 805 (2004) (“A sentence, 

which was improperly calculated using previously washed out juvenile offenses, is 

invalid on its face.”). In both of these cases, however, it appears that the washout could 

be determined from the information provided in the judgment and plea paperwork. This 

distinction was noted in In re Pers. Restraint of Rowland, 149 Wn. App. 496, 504, 204 

P.3d 953 (2009), which held that “[u]nlike in Goodwin, here there is nothing on the face 

of Rowland’s judgment and sentence to make it apparent that his offender score should 

have been two rather than three.” See also, In re Pers. Restraint of Banks, 149 Wn. App. 

513, 515, 204 P.3d 260 (2009) (Judgement was not facially invalid where calculation of 

offender score required court to consider documents beyond the judgment). 
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(quoting In re Pers. Restraint of West, 154 Wn.2d 204, 211, 110 P.3d 1122 (2005)). A

judgment is facially “invalid” if the trial court exercised power that it did not have, most 

typically by exceeding its substantive or statutory authority, as opposed to its procedural 

authority. In re Pers. Restraint of Flippo, 187 Wn.2d 106, 110, 385 P.3d 128 (2016); In 

re Pers. Restraint of Snively, 180 Wn.2d 28, 32, 320 P.3d 1107 (2014); In re Pers. 

Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 136, 267 P.3d 324 (2011). 

Because this is a collateral attack, it is not enough to point out an error that may be 

obvious on the face of the judgment. In Coats, the court rejected the petitioner’s 

argument that any error of law, such as an error concerning the maximum possible 

sentence renders the judgment and sentence facially invalid. Id. at 135. Instead, the 

court held that a judgment is invalid “only where a court has in fact exceeded its statutory 

authority in entering the judgment or sentence.” Id. While the sentencing court misstated 

the maximum possible sentence for one of the convictions, it nevertheless handed down a 

sentence within the standard range for that charge. Therefore, while Coats could point to 

error, the sentencing court did not exceed its statutory authority, and the judgment was 

facially valid. Id. at 143. 

Examples of facially invalid judgments include cases where the sentence exceeded 

the duration allowed by statute. In re Pers. Restraint of McWilliams, 182 Wn.2d 213, 

215 n.2, 340 P.3d 223 (2014); In re Pers. Restraint of Tobin, 165 Wn.2d 172, 176, 196 

P.3d 670 (2008). A judge’s notation on the judgment that the defendant waived early 
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release was beyond the court’s authority and rendered the judgment facially invalid. 

West, 154 Wn.2d at 211-12. A conviction for a then-nonexistent crime is also facially 

invalid. In re Pers. Restraint of Hinton, 152 Wn.2d 853, 857, 100 P.3d 801 (2004); In re 

Pers. Restraint of Knight, 4 Wn. App. 2d 248, 252-53, 421 P.3d 514 (2018).3

On the other hand, errors that do not affect the petitioner’s rights or sentence do 

not render a judgment and sentence facially invalid. In Toledo-Sotelo, the trial court 

miscalculated the petitioner’s offender score but ultimately imposed a sentence within the 

correct standard range. In re Pers. Restraint of Toledo-Sotelo, 176 Wn.2d 759, 767, 297 

P.3d 51 (2013). “For a judgment to exceed the court’s statutory authority, we require 

more than an error that ‘invite[s] the court to exceed its authority’; the sentencing court 

must actually pass down a sentence not authorized under the [Sentencing Reform Act]

SRA.” Id. at 767 (quoting Coats, 173 Wn.2d at 136). Because the court reached the 

correct result required by the SRA, the procedural error of miscalculating the offender 

score did not render the judgment facially invalid. Id. at 768. 

More recently, our Supreme Court has clarified the distinction between 

substantive authority and procedural requirements. In Flippo, the court held that failing 

 

3

In Finstad, the State stipulated that lack of findings to support an exceptional 

sentence rendered the judgment facially invalid. In re Pers. Restraint of Finstad, 177 

Wn.2d 501, 505-06, 301 P.3d 450 (2013). The court accepted the stipulation, noting 

that the parties were not meaningfully adverse in the issue. Id. Given the lack of 

opposition, it is hard to say that Finstad stands for the proposition that the lack of 

findings renders a judgment invalid. 
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to conduct an individualized inquiry into a criminal defendant’s ability to pay legal 

financial obligations (LFOs) does not render the imposition of legal fees facially invalid. 

187 Wn.2d at 110. “The specific grant of authority to impose discretionary LFOs and the 

duty to engage in an individualized financial inquiry regarding a defendant’s present and 

future likely ability to pay are distinct components of the discretionary LFO statute, and 

only the former has any bearing on the question of facial validity.” Id. at 110. 

Collectively, these cases hold that a court exceeds its authority when it 

miscalculates the standard range, resulting in a sentence outside the correct standard 

range, or when the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for a crime. Mr. Fletcher’s 

case falls in the middle. The parties miscalculated his standard range but stipulated to 

facts sufficient to impose an exceptional sentence. Since the exceptional sentence was 

not “based on” the miscalculated standard range, we must decide whether the exceptional 

sentence nevertheless exceeded the court’s authority, rendering the judgment facially 

invalid. In other words, is the miscalculation of a standard range before imposing an 

exceptional sentence a procedural error or a substantive error? 

To answer this question, we turn to the court’s authority under the SRA. A court 

may impose an exceptional sentence above the standard range “if it finds, considering the 

purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an 

exceptional sentence.” RCW 9.94A.535 (emphasis added). In State v. Parker, the 

Supreme Court held that the SRA’s “purpose” included proportionality, which 
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11

necessarily requires consideration of the presumptive sentence or standard range. 132 

Wn.2d 182, 187 n.6, 937 P.2d 575 (1997). Consequently, a sentencing court must 

correctly determine the standard range or presumptive sentence before imposing an 

exceptional sentence. Id. at 188. In this case, the superior court relied on the holding in 

Parker to find the judgment in Mr. Fletcher’s case facially invalid. 

As the State points out, however, Parker was a direct appeal and only considered 

whether the failure to correctly calculate the standard range was legal error. Parker did 

not determine whether a court exceeds its authority by imposing an exceptional sentence 

after incorrectly calculating the standard range. In Parker, the court held that the findings 

necessary to impose an exceptional sentence must include a correctly calculated standard 

range. The State argues that Parker establishes a procedural rule, not a substantive rule 

because calculating the standard range is simply a step toward imposing an exceptional 

sentence that is not based on the standard range. As the State points out, while Parker

held it was error to miscalculate the standard range before imposing an exceptional 

sentence, it did not hold that a court exceeds its authority when it fails to take this step.

While the State’s characterization of Parker is correct, several other Supreme 

Court decisions strongly suggest that a court does exceed its statutory authority when its 

findings do not support an exceptional sentence. In Goodwin, the court found a judgment 

to be facially invalid when the sentence imposed was based on an offender score that 

incorrectly included washed-out juvenile offenses. In re Pers. Restraint of Goodwin, 146 
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Wn.2d 861, 865-67, 50 P.3d 618 (2002). The court reasoned that because Goodwin’s 

offender score was miscalculated, his standard range was miscalculated, and the sentence 

imposed by the trial court exceeded the standard range. 

While Goodwin is similar to this case, as the State points out, it is not controlling 

because the sentencing court in Goodwin was attempting to impose a standard range 

sentence. Id. at 864. Significantly, however, the sentence actually imposed in Goodwin

was above the (correctly calculated) standard range. In other words, it was an 

exceptional sentence. Implicit in Goodwin’s holding is the conclusion that a sentence 

above the (correct) standard range, without the necessary findings, exceeds the court’s 

authority and is facially invalid. See Toledo-Sotelo, 176 Wn.2d at 768 (In Goodwin, 146 

Wn.2d at 877-78, “[t]his court held that the sentence exceeded the court’s statutory 

authority because it was ‘based upon a miscalculated offender score (miscalculated 

upward).’”).

The Supreme Court has similarly found that a court exceeds its authority when the 

jury’s verdict did not support the sentence enhancement imposed by the court. In Scott, 

the Supreme Court considered whether the petitioner’s sentence, based on a firearm

enhancement, was facially invalid when the jury’s verdict only found a deadly weapon 

enhancement. In re Pers. Restraint of Scott, 173 Wn.2d 911, 271 P.3d 218 (2012). In 

other words, the finding (by the jury) was insufficient to support the sentence

enhancement actually imposed. Ultimately, the court found that since the verdict did not 
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support the application of the enhancement, the judgment was facially invalid. Id. at 917-

18.

Finally, in Chambers, the Supreme Court found a judgment to be facially invalid 

when the defendant received an exceptional sentence and there were no written findings 

of fact and conclusions of law setting forth the reasons for the exceptional sentence as 

required by the SRA. Chambers, 176 Wn.2d at 584. 

The collective holdings of Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861, Parker, 132 Wn.2d 182,

Scott, 173 Wn.2d 911, and Chambers, 176 Wn.2d 573, suggest that a sentencing court 

exceeds its authority when it imposes an exceptional sentence that is not supported by 

necessary findings. The findings necessary to impose an exceptional sentence include a 

correctly calculated standard range. Since the standard range in this case was incorrectly 

calculated, the sentencing court exceeded its authority by imposing an exceptional 

sentence. Because the court exceeded its authority, the judgment is facially invalid and 

Mr. Fletcher’s motion under CrR 7.8(b) is timely. 

B. DOES MR. FLETCHER DEMONSTRATE GOOD CAUSE FOR FAILING TO INCLUDE THE 

OFFENDER SCORE ISSUE IN HIS FIRST MOTION?

Having determined that the one-year time bar does not apply to Mr. Fletcher’s 

collateral attack, we must next decide whether he is exempt from the bar on successive 

petitions. After he was sentenced, Mr. Fletcher filed a motion to modify the judgment 

and sentence pursuant to CrR 7.8, seeking a standard range sentence of 106 months. The 
No. 37661-3-III

State v. Fletcher

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Superior court transferred the motion to this court for consideration as a personal restraint 

petition. This court dismissed the petition as frivolous, noting that Mr. Fletcher stipulated 

to the exceptional sentence. 

Mr. Fletcher filed the current action in superior court as a motion for relief from 

judgment under CrR 7.8(b).

4

 Motions under this rule are considered a form of collateral 

attack and are subject to the provisions against successive petitions under RCW 

10.73.140. In re Pers. Restraint of Becker, 143 Wn.2d 491, 496, 20 P.3d 409 (2001). 

Under RCW 10.73.140, a second or subsequent collateral attack will not be considered 

unless the petitioner certifies, “that he or she has not filed a previous petition on similar 

grounds, and shows good cause why the petitioner did not raise the new grounds in the 

previous petition.” In this second motion, the parties agree that Mr. Fletcher’s offender 

score issue is new and was not raised in his first petition. The parties disagree, however, 

on whether he has demonstrated good cause for failing to raise this issue in his first 

motion for relief from judgment. 

The term “good cause” is not defined in the statute. Instead, our courts have 

adopted a definition of “good cause” as that term has been used in other settings. For 

example, one way to show good cause is to demonstrate that there has been a significant 

 

4 CrR 7.8(b): “The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons 

(1) and (2) not more than 1 year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 

taken, and is further subject to RCW 10.73.090, .100, .130, and .140.”
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intervening change in the law. In re Pers. Restraint of Johnson, 131 Wn.2d 558, 567, 

933 P.2d 1019 (1997). 

“Good cause” has also been defined to include an “external objective 

impediment,” as opposed to a “self-created hardship.” State v. Crumpton, 90 Wn. App. 

297, 302, 952 P.2d 1100 (1998) (quoting State v. Dearbone, 125 Wn.2d 173, 180-81, 883 

P.2d 303 (1994)). In Crumpton, the petitioner filed a motion for a new trial alleging 

newly discovered evidence in the form of hearsay statements from witnesses. After this 

motion was denied, the petitioner filed another motion for a new trial or relief from 

judgment, this time submitting first-hand declarations from witnesses and alleging newly 

discovered evidence. The petitioner alleged he had good cause for not including the firsthand declarations in his first motion in that he was incarcerated, indigent, and could not 

locate the witnesses. After adopting a definition of “good cause” from RCW 10.95.040, 

the notice of intention to seek a death penalty statute, the court found that Crumpton’s 

reasons were self-created hardships not otherwise caused by external objective 

impediments. Id. at 302. Thus, Crumpton’s second petition was successive and properly 

dismissed. 

Since Crumpton was decided in 1998, there have not been any published cases 

further defining good cause as used in RCW 10.73.140. In this case, Mr. Fletcher does 

not allege that a material intervening change in the law provided good cause. Instead, he 

contends that his failure to raise the offender score issue in his first petition was due to an 
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external objective impediment. Specifically, he contends that he was not given a copy of 

his judgment at sentencing and did not have a copy when he filed his first petition. The 

Superior Court accepted Mr. Fletcher’s reason as good cause. The court distinguished 

Crumpton by noting that Crumpton dealt with a similar issue raised in successive 

motions, whereas Fletcher was raising a new issue.

We disagree with the Superior Court’s analysis of the law and application to the 

facts. The statute requires a second petition to raise new issues and show good cause for 

not raising them in the first petition. RCW 10.73.140. The superior court’s analysis 

seems to conflate the two factors. While the successive motions in Crumpton addressed a 

similar issue, the case is relevant for its legal analysis on good cause. The court defined 

good cause and then applied that definition to the facts of the case. The similarities 

between the two motions were relevant in the application, not the holding. 

Applying the definition of good cause in this case, we find that Mr. Fletcher’s 

reasons for not including his offender score issue in his first petition are not convincing 

and are self-created. Mr. Fletcher’s argument was legally and factually available to him 

when he filed his first petition. His plea statement identified his offender score as 8 and 

5, and also indicated that a copy of his criminal history was attached. Significantly, Mr. 

Fletcher received a copy of his judgment in July or August 2016 as part of the State’s 

response to his first petition. If access to the judgment was the issue, Mr. Fletcher could 

have amended his first petition after obtaining a copy. RAP 16.8(e); In re Pers. Restraint
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of Meredith, 191 Wn.2d 300, 422 P.3d 458 (2018). Instead, he waited almost three years 

after receiving a copy of the judgment before filing a second motion for relief. While we 

decline at this time to incorporate a requirement of due diligence into the definition of 

good cause, we agree that the considerable lapse in time discredits Mr. Fletcher’s 

purported reason.

Since we find that Mr. Fletcher has failed to show good cause for not including the 

offender score issue in his first motion, we conclude that his second motion is successive 

and barred by the requirements of RCW 10.73.140 as applied through CrR 7.8(b). 

C. REMEDY.

Having decided that Mr. Fletcher’s motion is timely but successive, we must 

decide the remedy. Both the State and Mr. Fletcher suggest that since the successive 

petition bar under RCW 10.73.140 only applies to the Court of Appeals, we should 

transfer this case to the Supreme Court. See RAP 16.3 (Supreme Court and Court of 

Appeals have original concurrent jurisdiction over personal restrain petitions not 

involving the death penalty). 

This recommendation misconstrues the status of this case. Mr. Fletcher’s motion 

was filed in superior court and decided on the merits. It comes to us on direct appeal, not 

as a transfer. The jurisdictional limitations of RCW 10.73.140 apply to personal restraint 

petitions filed as an original action in the court of appeals. Because we review this case 

in our appellate capacity, not as an original action, the transfer provisions of RAP 16.5(c) 
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do not apply. While there are no published cases recognizing this procedural process, in 

an unpublished decision we followed this course after direction from the Supreme Court. 

See State v. Yates, No. 33703-1-III, slip op. at 1 (Wash. Ct. App. Jul. 11, 2017)

(unpublished), http://courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/337031_unp.pdf (citing Order, State v. 

Yates, No. 93772-9 (Wash. Jan. 5, 2017)).

We grant the State’s appeal, reverse the superior court’s decision granting Mr. 

Fletcher’s CrR 7.8 motion, and direct the superior court to reinstate the original judgment 

and sentence.

_________________________________

Staab, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________________

Pennell, C.J.

_________________________________

Siddoway, J.