Marine Corps History

Issues of Marine Corps History can be found on the History Division 

website at https://www.usmcu.edu/historydivision under Publications.
PRESIDENT

of Marine Corps University

Brigadier General Thomas A. Gorry

...

DIRECTOR

of History Division

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Paul J. Weber

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

Cassandra Bennett

...

HISTORIES BRANCH

Douglas Nash; Paul W. Westermeyer; 

Dr. Breanne Robertson 

...

HISTORICAL REFERENCE BRANCH

Annette D. Amerman (Branch Head)

Kara R. Newcomer; Ryan Musselman

...

ORAL HISTORY

and VIDEO SECTION

Dr. Fred Allison and Dr. Tom Baughn

...

EDITING AND DESIGN BRANCH

Angela J. Anderson (Branch Head); 

W. Stephen Hill; Dr. Alexandra Kendall; 

Robert A. Kocher; Gregory A. Macheak; 

Stephani L Miller

...

MARINE CORPS

HISTORY DIVISION

111 South Street

Quantico, Virginia 22134

Telephone (703) 432-4877

http://www.usmcu.edu/historydivision

...

COMMANDANT OF THE

MARINE CORPS

Department of the Navy

Headquarters United States

Marine Corps

3000 Marine Corps Pentagon 

Room 2B253

Washington, DC 20530-3000

OFFICIAL BUSINESS 

PCN 10600011300

ISSN 2381-375X

Director’s Foreword

Charles P. Neimeyer, PhD

The U.S. Marines in World War I

Part III: The U.S. Marine Corps Reserve Comes to the Fore

Colonel Walter G. Ford, USMC (Ret)

With “Spartan Courage and Marine Grit”

4th Brigade Occupation of the German Rhineland, 1918–19

Chief Warrant Officer Alexander F. Barnes (Ret)

Development of Medical Doctrine for Amphibious Warfare

by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1936–39

Part III

Captain Steven L. Oreck, USN (Ret)

The Aftermath of Hell

Graves Registration Policy and U.S. Marine Corps Losses in the

Solomon Islands during World War II

Christopher J. Martin

Managing a U.S. Marine Corps Unit’s

Command Chronology

Major Michael Kappelmann

Book Reviews

Gallipoli: The Dardanelles Disaster in Soldiers’ Words and

Photographs

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Winston A. Gould, USAF

The Somme

Reviewed by John Grady

German Propaganda and U.S. Neutrality in World War I

Reviewed by Staff Sergeant Matthew E. Paisie

Kleinkrieg: The German Experience with Guerrilla Warfare,

from Clausewitz to Hitler

Reviewed by Douglas E. Nash

The Choice of the Jews under Vichy: Between Submission and 

Resistance

Reviewed by Lieuteanant Colonel Don Thieme

Light It Up: The Marine Eye for Battle in the War for Iraq

Reviewed by Jeremy Maxwell

3

5

15

40

56

65

87

89

92

94

98

101

 Volume 2, Number 2 Winter 2016

Cover Art: First in France, by John A. 

Coughlin, Oil on canvas, ca. 1917.

Used as a recruiting poster in WWI. 
Did you know . . .

All History Division publications—books and this magazine—can be sent free of charge. Shop our full 

catalog of titles at https://www.usmcu.edu/historydivision and click on the publications button. Email 

your requests to history.division@usmcu.edu.

Now Availiable. . .

Next in the Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Hill of Angels

U.S. Marines and the Battle for Con Thien 

1967 to 1968

Colonel Joseph C. Long, USMCR (Ret)

Hill of Angels examines Marine Corps and North Vietnamese actions throughout the region that became known as “Leatherneck 

Square.” More than a dozen Marine operations occured during 

the Battle of Con Thien. This account covers those from mid–

1967 to early 1968.

Submissions

Marine Corps History Division is actively searching 

for contributors to Marine Corps History (MCH). 

MCH is a scholarly, military history periodical published 

twice a year (summer and winter). Our focus is on all 

aspects of the Corps’ history, culture, and doctrine. Articles should be no less than 4,000 words and footnoted 

according to Chicago Manual of Style. For more information about submitting an article or writing a book review, 

please email history.division@usmcu.edu with the subject line of “Marine Corps History Submission.”
S

ince September 2016, the History Division has been happily ensconced in the new 

Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons Marine Corps History Center. This long awaited 

relocation places the division in its final home at 

Quantico, Virginia. Our new facility enables the 

division to create some synergy by having the Historical Reference Branch and Archives together in a 

single location creating a “one stop shop” for Marine 

Corps historical research. In addition, the bookstore 

makes complimentary copies of all History Division 

and MCU Press titles available on the first deck. The 

public is encouraged to visit. If you are coming to 

conduct research, please make an appointment in 

advance so the reference historians can anticipate 

your needs. 

This issue of Marine Corps History is again full 

of interesting articles on the history of our Corps. 

The lead article by former Leatherneck editor, Colonel Walt Ford, USMC (Ret), is a continuation of his 

work from the last issue. Colonel Ford’s knowledge 

and expertise on the Marine Corps in World War 

I is especially appreciated as we begin to close on 

the centennial anniversary of the end of the “Great 

War.” Next, retired Chief Warrant Officer Alexander 

F. Barnes writes about a heretofore largely ignored 

period of Marine Corps World War I history—the 

occupation duty in the German Rhineland that followed the signing of the Armistice on 11 November 

1918. After the occupation story is the third and final 

installment by Captain Steven L. Oreck, USN (Ret), 

on medical doctrine for the Marine Corps during the 

interwar years, 1936–39. We are grateful to Captain 

Oreck for his expertise on military medicine and his 

analysis about how the Marine Corps envisioned its 

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

Director, History Division

Marine Corps University

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer: the director is responsible for the collection, production, publication, 

and dissemination of Marine Corps history and 

manages the functioning of a wide variety of Marine Corps historical programs. 

FOREWORD

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps

Sergeant Louis Cukela, USMC — Medal of Honor, near 

Viller-Cottertes, France, by Col Charles H. Waterhouse, 

USMCR (Ret). Acrylic on canvas, ca. 2000–10.

DIRECTOR’S

3
4 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

application during amphibious operations. Following 

the military medicine article, Christopher J. Martin 

writes an investigative history about the graves registration policy during World War II. This is a timely 

article in light of a number of forgotten World War 

II graves (including the grave of posthumous Medal 

of Honor recipient, First Lieutenant Alexander Bonnyman Jr., USMC), which have been recently discovered in places such as Tarawa. Finally, active duty 

Major Michael Kappelmann explains the importance of writing a good command chronology. This 

is a long neglected subject, and one that is important for the future writing of Marine Corps history. 

As usual, the magazine contains a number of 

excellent book reviews on the latest scholarship in 

military history. The majority of the books focus 

on World War I history. The Marine Corps History 

Division is looking forward to the publication of its 

fourth issue of Marine Corps History—our shift to 

a scholarly magazine continues to be a resounding 

success. With the centennial anniversary of American involvement in World War I fast approaching, 

I strongly encourage outside authors to submit articles on this particular subject. s1775s
by Colonel Walter G. Ford, USMC (Ret)*

The Marine Corps Reserve

(Female)

As with the advent of the Marine Corps 

Reserve, the U.S. Navy led the way for 

women in the Marine Corps Reserve. 

The Navy’s significant expansion, resulting from the Naval Appropriations Act of 1916, demanded more manpower quickly. While volunteers 

and the draft brought about growth in personnel, 

the Navy needed more men in the fleet, and while 

the act did not specifically mention women in the 

Reserve, it did not preclude their service. So, with 

a secretary of the Navy interpretation and decision, 

that same act opened the doors for women to volunteer and serve. The Navy began recruiting female 

yeomen in March 1917.1

Seeing the Navy’s success, the Marine Corps quickly realized the benefit of opening its rolls to women in 

clerical positions at its stateside headquarters, recruiting stations and supply depots, freeing men for the 

frontlines in Europe and other expeditionary efforts 

in support of national defense commitments. The demand for trained clerical staff was particularly great, 

and civilian women with those skills were seen as a 

capable source. Just four months after the Navy acted 

to bring in women on 2 August 1918, Major General 

Commandant George Barnett wrote the secretary of 

the Navy seeking authority to enlist women in the 

Marine Corps Reserve, specifically for clerical duty. 

The secretary, in concurring wrote:

5

The U.S. Marines

in World War I

PART III: THE U.S. MARINE CORPS RESERVE

COMES TO THE FORE

* This article, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the First World War, is published for the education and training of Marines by the History 

Division, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, as part of the Marine Corps’ observance of the centennial anniversary of that war. Editorial costs 

have been defrayed in part by contributions from members of the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation.

1 Nathaniel Patch, “The Story of Female Yeomen during the First World War,” Prologue Magazine 38, no. 3 (Fall 2006).

National Archives, Record Group 127G, photo 515829 

Pvt Opha May Johnson, the Marine Corps’ first enlisted woman and first female noncommissioned officer, 

enrolled on 13 August 1918, the day after Secretary of 

the Navy Josephus Daniels authorized the enlistment 

of women in the Marine Corps Reserve.
6 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Washington

August 12, 1918 

To: The Major General Commandant 

Subject: Enrollment of women in the Marine 

Corps Reserve for clerical duty.

Reference: Letter of Major General Commandant, August 2, 1918.

1. Referring to letter of the Major General 

Commandant as per above reference and in 

particular to the statement contained in the 

second paragraph thereof, that it is thought 

that about 40 per cent of the work at the Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, can be performed 

as well by women as men: authority is granted 

to enroll women in the Marine Corps Reserve 

for clerical duty at Headquarters, U. S. Marine 

Corps, Washington, D. C., and at other Marine 

Corps offices in the United States where their 

services may be utilized to replace men who 

may be qualified for active field service with the 

understanding that such enrollment shall be 

gradual.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS, 

Secretary of the Navy2

Anticipating the secretary’s approval, the Marines 

enlisted the first female, Opha May Johnson, who 

was working as a civil service employee at Headquarters Marine Corps, into the Marine Corps Reserve on 13 August 1918. Johnson was assigned as a 

clerk in the office of the Quartermaster.3

 Later in August 1918, Marine recruiting offices received the following guidance on enrolling females in the Reserve:

1. Women to be enrolled as privates in the 

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4, for a period of 

four (4) years, and the requirements to be the 

same as for men, except as modified by the 

“Circular Relating to the Physical Examination 

of Women” prepared by the Bureau of Medicine 

and Surgery, Navy Department. 

2. To be between the ages of 18 and 40, but 

an applicant slightly under 18 years of age, who 

is in every respect very desirable, to be enrolled 

with the consent of her parents, after authority 

from the Major General Commandant.

3. Women to be enrolled to be competent 

stenographers, expert bookkeepers, accountants, or typists.

4. No enrollments to be made without specific authority of the Major General Commandant.

5. All applicants to be informed that they will 

be subject to the rules and regulations that apply to enlisted men and that if their services or 

behavior are unsatisfactory they will be summarily disenrolled.

6. Pay and allowances while detailed as clerks 

to be the same as privates in the Marine Corps 

Reserve ($110.00), in addition to which articles 

of uniform clothing are issued gratuitously.

7. Women enrolled to be entitled to the same 

privileges as enlisted men in the regular service 

regarding family allotments and insurance.

8. Opportunity for promotion to noncommissioned rank, with corresponding increase 

in pay, open to those who prove capable and 

industrious.4

The uniforms for Reserve female Marines were designed by the Marine Corps Quartermaster’s Office 

and tailored for each woman from material similar 

to the men’s uniforms. The issued items, described 

in the May 1936 article by former Corporal Lillian 

C. O’Malley, included “a specially designed skirt and 

coat, overcoat, chambray shirt, regulation tie, overseas cap, and campaign hat. The overseas cap, both 

in winter field and khaki, was the preferred head gear 

and the one usually worn by all women in uniform.”5

Initially, each female reservist was issued one green 

wool jacket and skirt for the coming winter. The standard issue later became two winter and three summer khaki uniforms. The uniform issue consisted of 

jackets and skirts, six shirts, one overcoat, two neckties, and a pair of brown high-topped shoes for winter wear and low-cut oxfords for the summer khaki 

uniform. There was no dress uniform, and raincoats, 

gloves, and purses were not issued. The Marine Corps 

2 Lillian C. O’Malley, “Marine Corps Reserve (F),” Marine Corps Gazette 20, no. 2 (May 1936): 30. 3 Capt Linda L. Hewitt, USMCR, Women Marines in World War I (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, 1974), 4. 4 O’Malley, “Marine Corps Reserve (F),” 30, 31.

5 Ibid., 31.
Winter 2016 7

emblem and appropriate chevrons were also issued. 

The female Marines were noted to be “very impressive with their ‘trim and snappy appearance’.”6

There was no boot camp or recruit training for 

these new female Marines, who were called “Marinettes” in both civilian and War Department news 

releases and in photograph captions. However, officials at Headquarters Marine Corps disapproved of 

the nickname, as did many of the female reservists 

who preferred to be called simply “Marine.”7

 Training for the female reservists consisted of clerical 

work and close order drill. The drill, conducted by 

experienced male Marine noncommissioned officers 

(NCOs), took place in Potomac Park on the White 

House Ellipse. The new Marines, under the tutelage 

of the demanding male NCOs, became sufficiently 

proficient to be included in numerous parades and 

ceremonies in Washington, DC.8

 The Major General 

Commandant reviewed them on parade at the Ellipse on 3 February 1919, and the “entire unit was 

included in the guard of honor, facing the Presidential Reviewing Stand at the White House, for a parade of troops just returned from the front,” in early 

summer 1919.9

Women Reservists

by the Numbers

Thousands of women stepped forward to be screened 

for enlistment in the Marine Corps Reserve in those 

first weeks after its authorization. In New York City, 

2,000 women lined up at the recruiting office to be 

screened. After dictation and typing tests winnowed 

the line somewhat, interviews were conducted and 

only five were chosen.10

Faced with the challenge of all the enlisted women 

entering at the rank of private, some more mature 

women received early appointment to a higher rank. 

The September muster roll for Headquarters Marine 

Corps indicates that, on 11 September 1918, with 

just less than one month on active duty, Opha M. 

Johnson was appointed to sergeant, making her not 

only the first female reservist but the Corps’ first female NCO.11

Florence Gertler, one of the five applicants from 

New York City, was enrolled as a private on 3 September 1918 and assigned to Headquarters Marine 

Corps. She rose in rank quickly: promoted to private first class in November, corporal in February 

1919, and sergeant in April 1919.12 Also promoted to 

sergeant in April 1919 were Violet Van Wagner and 

Florence M. Weidinger (enlisted 17 August 1918), 

Helen M. Mull (enlisted 29 August 1918), and Margaret L. Powers (enlisted 19 September 1918).13

Another female enrollee, Sophia J. Lammers, enNational Archives, Record Group 127G, photo 528855

Marine Corps artist Morgan Dennis depicts a female 

Marine replacing a Marine clerk for duty in the operating forces. 

6 Hewitt, Women Marines in World War I, 29. 7 Ibid., 16.

8 O’Malley, “Marine Corps Reserve (F),” 31.

9 Hewitt, Women Marines in World War I, 33; and O’Malley, “Marine Corps Reserve (F),” 31. 10 Hewitt, Women Marines in World War I, 7. 11 Headquarters Marine Corps, Muster Roll (MRoll), September 1918, Roll 0149, Ancestry.com.

12 Headquarters Marine Corps, MRolls, September and November 1918, and February and April 1919, Rolls 0149, 0154, 0161, and 0167, 

Ancestry.com.

13 Headquarters Marine Corps, MRolls, August 1918, September 1918, and April 1919, Rolls 0147, 0149, and 0167, Ancestry.com.
8 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

listed on 4 November 1918 and reported for active 

duty at Headquarters on 9 November 1918.14 She 

had the distinction of being immediately appointed 

to sergeant due to her qualifications: a 1911 University of Nebraska graduate, former reference librarian for the university, and a reference librarian at 

the Library of Congress when in the Marine Corps 

Reserve (F), listing source materials for a history of 

the Marine Corps. As such, this previous education, 

training, and work experience made her highly qualified to research and assist in writing Marine Corps 

history.15

Another female accepted for enlistment was 

Martha L. Wilchinski. In August 1918, the Marine 

Corps Recruiting Publicity Bureau in New York City 

enrolled Wilchinski as a private.16 With a degree in 

journalism from New York University, she was well 

prepared for service in the Publicity Bureau. During 

her active duty, several of her articles about service 

in the Corps were published in various newspapers 

and magazines, and she frequently appeared in publicity photographs. Wilchinski went on to become 

the editor of Variety magazine.17

Wilchinski rose to the rank of sergeant by July 

1919 and was transferred to the Assistant Adjutant 

and Inspector Office, San Francisco, California, that 

month.18 There, Wilchinski was discharged from active duty, but remained as an Inactive Reserve until 

her enlistment obligation was completed in August 

1922.19

National Archives, War Department photo 165-WW-598A-12 

Women applicants surged into the New York recruiting office when the announcement was made that the Marine 

Corps was enrolling qualified women for clerical work as members of the Marine Corps Reserve. 

14 Headquarters Marine Corps, MRoll, December 1918, Roll 0156, Ancestry.com.

15 Marine Recruiting Station Washington, DC, MRoll, October–December 1918, Roll 0157, Ancestry.com; and Nebraska Alumni Association, 

“Alumni Directory: Classes 1873–1914,” University Journal, January 1919, 8. 16 Marine Corps Recruiting Publicity Bureau, MRoll, August 1918, Roll 0147, Ancestry.com.

17 Hewitt, Women Marines in World War I, 27. 18 Office of the Assistant Adjutant and Inspector, San Francisco, MRoll, July 1919, Roll 0174, Ancestry.com.

19 Marine Corps Reserve Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, MRoll, July 1922–September 1922, Roll 0216, Ancestry.com.
Winter 2016 9

movie business prior to active duty, proved very useful for the Marines. Among her credits as a Marine is 

one of the first training films, “All in a Day’s Work.”24

While with the Publicity Bureau, Leibrand’s articles provided insight into life as a female reservist at Headquarters. Her article, “The Girl Marines,” 

tells of the Navy Department taking over the Vendome Hotel in downtown Washington to house the 

women away from the men. She describes drill, beginning early in the morning on the Ellipse behind 

the White House, with each female company having 

a Marine NCO in charge. She recorded the names 

of these early drill instructors for the female leathernecks: Sergeant Arthur G. Hamilton, Corporal 

Edward E. Lockout, Corporal Guy C. Williams, and 

Private Herbert S. Fitzgerald.25

Leibrand returned to the film industry after the 

war, first working at Fox Studios in New York City, 

but eventually making a name for herself and promoting her daughter’s career. Although married 

more than once, she was well known by the last 

name: Rogers. Her daughter, Ginger Rogers, gained 

fame in the movie and entertainment industry.26

With assignments restricted to clerical-type duties, even with the expanding need for manpower, 

the numbers of Marine female reservists were small. 

By 1 September 1918, there were 31 women enlisted; 

as of 1 October there were 145; and by 1 November, 

there were 240 female reservists. In July 1919, when 

disenrollment from active duty began, there were 

226 reservists.27 At its greatest strength, the Marine 

Corps Reserve (F) numbered only 305.28

While the numbers were few, the impact was significant. As early as mid-September 1918, the Major General Commandant was able to authorize the 

transfer of men “at Marine Corps Headquarters in 

staff offices, and in recruiting offices, employed on 

clerical or other routine duty and who were classified under selective service regulations, provided, of 

course, their service could be spared without detAnother impressive female enlistee who attained 

the rank of sergeant outside of Headquarters was 

Lela E. Leibrand. She enlisted on 31 October 1918 

at the recruiting station in New York City and began 

her service as a clerk in the Adjutant and Inspector 

Office on 8 November.20 Muster rolls show her on 

“Special Temporary Duty” with the Publicity Bureau 

in New York City, during 11–17 March 1919 and 

again in 17–21 May 1919.21 She then transferred to 

the Central Recruiting District, Kansas City, Missouri, on 25 May 1919.22 Leibrand continued on the 

inactive Reserve list until discharged at the rank of 

sergeant in December 1922.23

While assigned to the Marine Corps Publicity Bureau, Leibrand did routine office work but also produced articles published in the Recruiters’ Bulletin, 

Leatherneck newspaper (it later became Leatherneck 

magazine) and The Marines Magazine. She had been 

a Hollywood scriptwriter in 1916 prior to entering the 

Marine Corps. Her talents, honed in the burgeoning 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 518891 

Cpl Martha L. Wilchinski, assigned to the Recruiting 

Publicity Bureau in New York City, marches alongside 

USS Arizona (BB 39) seagoing Marines when the ship 

was anchored in the North River (south end of the Hudson River) in late 1918.

20 Headquarters Marine Corps, MRoll, November 1918.

21 Headquarters Marine Corps, MRolls, March and May 1919, Rolls 0165 and 0171, Ancestry.com.

22 Central Recruiting District, MRolls, May and July 1919, Rolls 0170 and 0174, Ancestry.com.

23 Marine Corps Reserve Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, MRoll, December 1922, Ancestry.com.

24 Hewitt, Women Marines in World War I, 27. 25 Ibid., 76.

26 Sabrina Messenger, “Lela Leibrand Rogers,” Women Marines Association, 26 July 2013.

27 Maj Edwin N. McClellan, The United States Marine Corps in the World War (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1920), 77. 28 O’Malley, “Marine Corps Reserve (F),” 18.
10 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

riment to the government service and the women 

clerks available were competent to fill their places.”29

With the majority of the female Reserve billets at 

Headquarters by January 1919, there were 88 female 

reservists assigned to the Adjutant and Inspector’s 

Office, 53 in the Quartermaster’s Office, and another 

28 in the Paymaster’s Office.30

Release From Active Duty

On 11 November 1918, when the Armistice began, 

there were 277 women in the Marine Corps Reserve 

(F).31 With the war over, Sergeant Opha M. Johnson, 

the first female to enlist in the Marine Corps Reserve 

(F) and the Corps’ first female NCO, was discharged 

on 28 February 1919.32 She had etched her name solidly into Marine Corps history. However, the need 

for additional administrative support was not over. 

The clerical demands of bringing the Marines home, 

ensuring the accuracy of pay records, and accounting for the supplies while drawing down the force required the skills of the women reservists for several 

additional months. The Naval Appropriations Act 

for the fiscal year beginning 1 July 1919 called for 

“placing on inactive duty within 30 days of all female 

members of the Marine Corps Reserve, but also provided for the retention of such that were necessary 

and whose service was satisfactory, in the capacity 

of temporary civil service appointments, and about 

75 percent were retained under this arrangement.”33

By July 1919, the urgent need for experienced 

Courtesy of former Capt Linda L. Hewitt Seagraves, USMCR

Marines participate in a 1919 parade in Philadelphia commemorating Marine Corps expeditionary service.

29 Ibid.

30 Hewitt, Women Marines in World War I, 27. 31 McClellan, United States Marine Corps in the World War, 76. 32 Headquarters Marine Corps, MRoll, February 1919, Roll 0160, Ancestry.com.

33 Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1919 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1920), 126.
Winter 2016 11

clerical staff had diminished, in spite of the fact that 

most of the Marine ground forces would not return 

until August 1919.34 So, in July, to comply with the 

congressional direction, the Major General Commandant ordered “all reservists on clerical duty at 

Headquarters . . . to inactive status prior to 11 August 1919.”35

As is traditional in the Marine Corps, a farewell 

ceremony, including speeches from the Major General Commandant and secretary of the Navy, was 

conducted in honor of the female reservists departing active duty. The grand event, recognizing the service of the women Marine Reserves in time of great 

need, was held on the White House lawn. Both the 

Major General Commandant and the secretary applauded their commitment and performance.36

Based on their service, the female reservists earned 

several lifelong benefits. In addition to the option of 

burial in a national cemetery, these included:

1. Eligibility for government insurance. 

2. $60 bonus on discharge and World War 

Adjusted Compensation at the rate of $1.00 a 

day for home service performed during the period from April 5, 1917, to July 1, 1919. Some 

states also provided a bonus for legal residents. 

3. Medical treatment and hospitalization under the regulations of the Veterans Administration for service connected disability.

4. Five per cent added to earned rating in 

examinations for entrance to classified service 

under Civil Service Regulations.37

The women who remained in the Reserves in an 

inactive status, serving out their enlistment, received 

a $1 monthly retainer pay until discharged at the end 

of their four-year enlistment. In addition, they were 

awarded a Good Conduct Medal and World War I 

Victory Medal when they were discharged from the 

Inactive Reserves.38

Once a Marine

The saying “Once a Marine, Always a Marine” was 

certainly ascribed to by female reservists. Although 

no longer a part of the uniformed Marine Corps, 

some women remained in government service 

working for the Marine Corps. One was Jennie F. 

Van Edsinga. Van Edsinga joined in September 1918 

and was released from active duty to complete her 

enlistment as a corporal in the Inactive Reserve on 

31 July 1919.39 Corporal Van Edsinga changed her 

name to Jane F. Blakeney in 1921 after marrying Arthur Blakeney, a fellow Marine, while she was still in 

the Inactive Reserve.40 Before retiring from civil service, Jane Blakeney rose to head the Marine Corps’ 

Decorations and Medals Branch at Headquarters 

Marine Corps.41

Blakeney’s reference book, Heroes, first published 

in 1957 and dedicated to her late husband Major Arthur Blakeney, remains a significant source of information on Marines earning medals for valor from 

the Civil War era to 1955 and includes histories and 

facts about the highest military medals awarded by 

our country.42 With this book, her contributions to 

Marines, their families, and historians, which began 

in 1918, continue through today.

Another of the original female reservists who remained with the Marine Corps was Private Alma 

Swope. She worked in the Supply Department for 

more than 44 years. She was the last female reservist 

from World War I who worked in the civil service 

to retire. When she retired in 1963, General David 

M. Shoup, Commandant of the Marine Corps, personally congratulated Swope on her service to Corps 

and country.43

Two of the World War I female reservists, Lillian 

O’Malley Daly and Martrese Thek Ferguson, came 

back into the Corps for World War II.44 One of these 

two, Martrese Thek Ferguson, ordered to the Divi34 McClellan, United States Marine Corps in the World War, 78. 35 Hewitt, Women Marines in World War I, 40. 36 Ibid., 40, 41.

37 O’Malley, “Marine Corps Reserve (F)," 45, 46.

38 Hewitt, Women Marines in World War I, 43. 39 Reserve District No. 2, New York, MRoll, July–September 1918, Roll 0149, Ancestry.com; and Headquarters Marine Corps, MRoll, July 1919, 

Roll 0174, Ancestry.com.

40 Headquarters, Eastern Reserve District, Philadelphia, MRoll, July–September 1921, Roll 0204, Ancestry.com.

41 Hewitt, Women Marines in World War I, 43 42 Jane Blakeney, Heroes: U.S. Marine Corps, 1861–1955; Armed Forces Awards, Flags (Washington, DC: Guthrie Lithograph, 1957). 43 Hewitt, Women Marines in World War I, 43. 44 Ibid., 43, 44.
12 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

sion of Reserve, Headquarters Marine Corps, in 

April 1952 for training, extended her active service 

into the Korean War era.45

Lillian O’Malley Daly, then Lillian C. O’Malley, 

enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve (F) in November 1918, moved to an Inactive Reserve status as a 

corporal on 31 July 1919, and remained in the Inactive Reserve until her four-year enlistment period 

was complete. She was discharged on 8 November 

1922.46 Later married, she came back into the Marine Corps as a reservist with a direct commission 

to captain, one of only eight women who entered the 

recently authorized Marine Corps Women’s Reserve 

(MCWR) as an officer in early 1943, straight from 

life as a civilian. Daly was assigned as the West Coast 

liaison officer for the MCWR.47

As the West Coast liaison officer, Daly represented 

the Marines at various civilian functions.48 By January 1944, she was the adjutant for the Women Reserve Battalion, Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, 

San Diego area.49 She transferred to the East Coast 

as a major in January 1945, assigned to the Women’s Reserve Battalion at Marine Corps Base Camp 

Lejeune, North Carolina.50 The end of World War II 

found her assigned to 3d Reserve District, Marine 

Barracks, Navy Yard, New York.51 Daly was listed in 

the Officers Volunteer Reserve, 4th Marine Corps 

Reserve District, as a major in 1952, promoted to 

lieutenant colonel on the Inactive Status Personnel 

list in October 1952, and last noted on the October 1957 roll “Inactive Status List, Officer Volunteer 

Reserve, 4th Marine Corps Reserve and Recruiting 

District, Philadelphia,” while a lieutenant colonel.52

45 Company C, Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters Marine Corps, Division of Reserve, Unit Diary (UD), 7 April 1952, Roll 0251, Ancestry.com.

46 Headquarters Marine Corps, MRoll, November 1918 and July 1919; and Marine Corps Reserve Division, HQMC, MRoll, October–December 

1919, Rolls 0154, 0174, and 0219, Ancestry.com.

47 Hewitt, Women Marines in World War I, 45. 48 “Detachments: San Diego,” Leatherneck, September 1943, 68. 49 Headquarters Company, Marine Corps Women’s Reserve Battalion, MRoll, January 1944, Roll 0717, Ancestry.com.

50 4th Marine Corps Reserve District (MCRD), Philadelphia, Roll 2040, Ancestry.com; 4th MCRD, Philadelphia, Inactive Status Personnel UD, 26 

October 1952, Roll 2041, Ancestry.com; and 4th Marine Corps Reserve and Recruiting District, Philadelphia, Inactive Status Personnel UD, 31 

October 1957, Roll 3725, Ancestry.com.

51 General Service Unit, 3d Reserve District, Marine Barracks New York, MRoll, July 1945, Roll 1003, Ancestry.com.

52 4th MCRD, Philadelphia, Roll 2040; 4th MCRD, Philadelphia, Inactive Status Personnel UD, 26 October 1952; and 4th MCRD, Philadelphia, 

Inactive Status Personnel UD, 31 October 1957.

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 521222 

Marine Corps Reserve (Female) and U.S. Navy Reserve 

(Yeomen) march in one of the numerous wartime parades in Washington, DC, in 1918–19.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo A412893

LtCol Martrese Thek Ferguson served on active duty 

in the Marine Corps Reserve during three wars: WWI, 

WWII, and on active duty for training at Headquarters 

Marine Corps during the Korean War.
Winter 2016 13

There was no indication she served in an active-duty 

status during the Korean War-era, although she was 

carried on the Reserve rolls in an inactive status.

Martrese Thek enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve (F) on 7 September 1918 in New York City 

and was assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps.53

When released from active duty, she returned to civilian life, married, and as Martrese Thek Ferguson, 

reentered the Corps as a cadet in the newly formed 

MCWR in April 1943.54 That same month, she graduated first in the initial women officers’ course conducted at Mount Holyoke College, Massachusetts.55

By the end of the war, she was a major and commanding 2d Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters 

Marine Corps, Henderson Hall, Virginia.56 In March 

1952, Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson was again on the 

Marine Corps’ muster rolls, now called the Unit Diary (UD), as a reservist in Company C, Headquarters 

Battalion, Headquarters Marine Corps, Henderson 

Hall, Virginia, in the Office of the Division of Reserve.57 She was transferred to the “Inactive Status 

List” in 1956.58

Making Their Mark

While the active duty for those women who labored 

so intently to serve the Marine Corps and the nation 

in time of war was limited to not quite one year, it 

was impactful. In his annual report to the secretary 

of the Navy, prepared for Congress in 1919, the Major General Commandant noted, “The termination 

of hostilities on Nov. 11, 1918, precluded the practical working out of the principal idea in enrolling 

women in the Marine Corps Reserve for clerical 

duty, namely, that of releasing for active service in 

National Archives, Record Group 127G, photo 530164A

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, fourth from the left, with the Secretary of the Navy Josephus 

Daniels standing to his left, join USMCR(F) Marines and Navy Yeomen (F) at their final review in Washington, DC 

on 30 July 1919.

53 Headquarters Marine Corps, MRoll, September 1918.

54 Marine Detachment Naval Reserve Midshipmen’s School, MRoll, April 1943, Roll 0600, Ancestry.com.

55 Hewitt, Women Marines in World War I, 44. 56 Headquarters Company, 2d Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters Marine Corps, MRoll, April 1945, Roll 0955, Ancestry.com.

57 Company C, Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters Marine Corps, UD, 7 April 1952.

58 1st Marine Corps Reserve and Recruiting District (MCRRD), Boston, Inactive Status List of Officers Volunteer Reserve, UD No. 11-56, 30 April 

1956, Roll 3394, Ancestry.com.
14 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

the field practically all the enlisted men who had 

been and were being utilized in the performance of 

such duties. However, the majority of the women so 

enrolled rendered capable and efficient service, and 

about 75 per cent of them have elected to remain on 

in a temporary civil status as provided by the Act of 

July 11, 1919, so that the working efficiency of those 

headquarters and the staff and recruiting offices outside of headquarters at which women were stationed 

has not been interfered with by the sudden demobilization of the female reserve.”59

It would be 24 years and another great world war 

before the Marine Corps once again turned to women to meet wartime manpower needs.s1775s

59 “Annual Report of the Major General Commandant to the Secretary of the Navy for the Fiscal Year Ended 30 June 1919,” in Annual Reports 

of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1919, 2637, 2638.
by Chief Warrant Officer Alexander F. Barnes (Ret)**

One of the more unusual missions in Marine Corps history took place from November 1918 to August 1919. The idea 

of Marines performing as police and 

civil administrators was certainly nothing new. This 

time, however, it was not taking place in Haiti, the 

Dominican Republic, or Nicaragua but in the heart 

of Europe, specifically the German Rhineland. Also 

unique to this situation was the size of the Marine 

contingent—specifically, a fully equipped brigade 

that counted among its members five future Marine 

Corps Commandants as well as a number of other 

Marines who later became legends of the Corps. In 

spite of the size of the force, the importance of the 

mission, and the celebrity status of some of the participants, the Marine brigade’s service in the occupation of Germany is unknown by many and virtually 

unappreciated.

The 4th Brigade’s service, as part of the U.S. Army’s 2d Division in the American Expeditionary 

Forces (AEF), has been well covered elsewhere so 

this epoch begins where those histories end—on 11 

November 1918. Just days previously, on the night of 

30–31 October 1918, the 4th Brigade moved into the 

front lines south of Landres-et-Saint Georges. The 

brigade had enjoyed a short respite from battle, but 

now was joining the rest of the AEF in the massive 

Meuse-Argonne Campaign. The American offensive began on 26 September 1918, and many of the 

original attacking divisions were roughly handled by 

the Germans. With a good number of them now requiring rest and refit, other divisions, such as the 2d 

Division, received the call to join the fight. Early on 

the morning of 1 November, the brigade began its 

final combat operation of the war. By 1100 on the 

morning of 11 November 1918, the Marines had advanced 30 kilometers and, after conducting attacks 

across the Meuse River, were set in positions on the 

opposing bank.

The Armistice

As the guns fired their last shots that November 

morning, the western front went silent for the first 

With “Spartan Courage

and Marine Grit”

4TH BRIGADE OCCUPATION

OF THE GERMAN RHINELAND, 1918–19*

*

 This article, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the First World War, is published for the education and training of Marines by the History 

Division, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, as part of the Marine Corps’ observance of the centennial anniversary of that war.

** Alexander Barnes was born in Niagara Falls, NY, and grew up in an Air Force family. He enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1974 and then joined 

the Army National Guard in 1977, retiring as a Virginia Army National Guard chief warrant officer in 2004. He retired from U.S. Army Combined 

Arms Support Command (CASCOM) at Fort Lee in July 2015 after 30 years of service as an Army civilian. He has a master’s degree in anthropology and authored In a Strange Land: The American Occupation of Germany 1918–1923; Let’s Go! The History of 29th Infantry Division; and the 

two-volume set To Hell with the Kaiser: America Prepares for War 1916–1918. He is currently serving as the command historian for the Virginia 

National Guard.

(Left) Program from 2d Division. Courtesy of the Peck 

family. (Right) Occupation of Germany Medal. Courtesy 

of Alison Hutton.

15
16 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

time in more than four years. The German Army 

was unable to continue fighting due to the collapse of its government, the strength of the Allied 

offensive, and the revolution flaring up all over the 

fatherland. The hastily selected German representatives to the Armistice negotiations had little choice 

but to accept the Allied peace terms, which included 

two bitter pills: occupation of the Rhineland and a 

war reparations program. The Armistice document, 

signed in a railcar near Compiègne, France, put into 

effect a tentative peace and led the Americans and 

their allies into the unusual circumstance of occupying large portions of Germany. While much of the 

world celebrated the end of the war, the staffs of the 

American, British, French, and Belgian armies were 

hurriedly trying to figure out how they would administer the peace. The AEF found itself transitioning from a combatant force into an administrative 

organization now responsible for the governmental 

and economic control of 2,500 square miles of the 

German homeland, which included a potentially 

hostile population.

General John J. Pershing’s directions to the Third 

Army were deceptively simple in wording, yet high 

in complexity: cease current combat operations, assemble the Army, move it from the combat zone in 

France through Luxembourg and into Germany, establish an occupation in conjunction with the armies 

of three other nations, accept war reparations from 

the defeated enemy, and be prepared to resume combat operations at any time. Any one of these operations would be significantly difficult; together they 

were a real challenge. Keeping in mind that the Armistice of 11 November was not the actual end of 

World War I, but merely a truce to allow peace negotiations to take place, the mission of the occupying 

forces was quite complex and challenging.

Pershing addressed the soldiers and Marines of 

the Third Army:

There remains now a harder task which will 

test your soldierly qualities to the utmost. Succeed in this and little note will be taken and few 

praises will be sung; fail, and the light of your 

glorious achievements of the past will sadly be 

dimmed. . . . Every natural tendency may urge 

towards relaxation in discipline, in conduct, in 

appearance, in everything that marks the soldier. Yet you will remember that each officer 

and each soldier is the representative in Europe 

of his people. . . . Whether you stand on hostile territory or on the friendly soil of France, 

you will so bear yourself in discipline, in appearance and respect for all civil rights that 

you will confirm for all time the pride and love 

which every American feels for your uniform 

and for you.1

Karte von Rheinland und Westfalen und den angrezenden Ländern, 

c. 1920, author’s collection 

This period map shows the four Allied occupation 

zones starting in the north with “B” for Belgian, “E” for 

English (Great Britain), “A” for United States, and “F” for 

French. The three semicircle bridgeheads across the 

Rhine River are clearly visible as is the neutral zone (in 

green). 

1 United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919: American Occupation of Germany, vol. II (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 

1948), 326.
Winter 2016 17

One of the key objectives of the American force 

was the seizure and control of all access to the Rhine 

River bridges within its sector. These included a pontoon bridge and a railroad bridge at Coblenz, as well 

as the railroad bridges at Engers and Remagen in 

Germany. To the north, the British Army and troops 

from their empire were similarly assigned to control 

the five bridges in the Cologne and Bonn area. The 

French Army would do likewise for the crossings in 

the area around Wiesbaden and Mainz. These same 

bridges were the starting points for the German invasion of Belgium and France in 1914, so the Allies 

recognized the need to secure them. As was proven in World War II, the Rhine serves as the natural western barrier in and out of Germany. Only an 

army in control of bridges across the river can easily 

traverse this barrier. Should the Paris peace negotiations break down, the Allies could use their strongly 

defended bridgeheads across the Rhine to swiftly deploy additional forces into the heart of Germany. The 

occupation zones also were designed to serve as the 

administrative areas for the acceptance of war materiels required by the Armistice to be turned over to 

the Allies by the German Army.

The American Zone

Under terms of the Armistice, an area of western 

Germany with a million inhabitants was assigned 

to the United States for occupation duty. The Third 

Army set up its positions in a sector running from 

the Luxembourg border to a semicircular section on 

the east side of the Rhine River, soon known simply 

as the Coblenz Bridgehead. The area of Germany the 

Americans occupied was predominantly conservative in politics and Roman Catholic in religion. There 

were only two large towns in the American zone: 

Trèves with a population of 45,000 and Coblenz with 

65,000.2

 The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg also fell 

under American control for a short period.

Originally, only the French and Belgian governments insisted on the occupation of an area of Germany as a key provision of the Armistice. Following 

much debate and discussion, the Americans and British finally agreed and directed their military staffs to 

participate in the planning. Meanwhile, after intense 

negotiation among the Allied representatives, the 

terms of the Armistice, which now included the occupation of the Rhineland by the victorious forces, 

were finally agreed upon. Paragraph V of the 11 November 1918 Armistice agreement stated that “the 

[portion of Germany on] the left bank of the Rhine 

shall be administered by the local authorities under 

the control of the Allied and United States armies 

of occupation.”3

 Historically, the United States’ colonial experiences in the Philippines, Mexico, and the 

Caribbean had shown that the supervision of a civil 

government by an occupying force may be either 

strict or loose, depending on the level of compliance 

or hostility of the local population. In the case of the 

German Rhineland, the original intent was to follow 

a loose style of supervision because of America’s earnest desire to not interfere with German customs or 

institutions. However, as with the leaders of the other 

occupying armies, the security and safety of American troops was just as important as their administrative duties in the zones. If mistakes were made, the 

Allies were determined to err on the side of safety to 

protect their troops.

Strict rules against fraternization were published 

and enforced by the military police. Due to the very 

nature of military and civil administration of the occupied areas, the Third Army soon found it impossible to avoid interference in local matters that were 

not strictly within the realm of “security.”4 What was 

not clear or precise in the Armistice was the definition of “local authorities.” Equally unclear was the 

meaning of “under control.” These ambiguities led to 

complications of many kinds and, at times, almost 

set the two sides back at war with each other. Making 

a bad situation even worse, each Allied nation had 

its own national agenda, and therefore, a differing 

approach on exactly how to conduct an occupation.

After some 19 months of war, the German and 

American people had reached some conclusions 

2 Trèves is the French name for Trier, Germany. Ralph Loren Erickson, “The Historic Role of Military Preventive Medicine and Public Health in U.S. 

Armies of Occupation and Military Government,” in Military Preventive Medicine: Mobilization and Deployment, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Office 

of the Surgeon General, 2003), 813.

3 United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919: Reports of the Commander-in-Chief, Staff Sections, and Services, vol. 12 (Washington, DC: 

Department of the Army, 1948), 53.

4 American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918–1920: Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American 

Forces in Germany (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1943), 268.
18 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

about each other; now they were going to meet, not 

separated as before by the barbed wire of no-man’sland, but face to face in the very heart of Germany’s 

historic Rhineland. As a Third Army civil affairs 

officer noted simply: “The average soldier looked 

forward with curiosity to seeing Germany.”5 First, 

however, they had to get there.

Organization of Third Army

When the AEF commander, General Pershing, received notification of the occupation requirement, he 

selected his occupying force from among the 29 intact 

combat divisions in the AEF.6

 Realizing the potential 

for danger and the inherent complexity of the operation, he chose the best units, specifically, four Regular 

Army divisions: the 1st, the 2d with its Marine brigade, the 3d, and 4th. From the National Guard divisions, he selected the 42d Division (Rainbow Division) 

and the 32d Division from Michigan and Wisconsin, 

whose members became known as the “Gemütlichkeit boys” because so many of them spoke German.7

From the National Army divisions, he added the 89th 

Division, originally formed with men from Missouri, 

Kansas, and Colorado, and the 90th Division, whose 

men were drawn primarily from Texas and Oklahoma. These eight divisions now comprised the Third 

Army, commanded by Major General Joseph T. Dickman.8

 Their distinctive patch, designed for the Third 

Army, was a capital letter “A” inside the letter “O,” 

symbolizing the “Army of Occupation.” 

5 Ibid., 18.

6 On paper, Pershing had 42 divisions in France of which 13 had been converted to depot divisions to provide support or had been skeletonized 

to provide replacements for the frontline units.

7 Translates literally to coziness or good times.

8 American Armies and Battlefields in Europe: A History, Guide, and Reference Book (Washington, DC: American Battle Monuments Commission,1938), 488–93; and Joseph T. Dickman, The Great Crusade: A Narrative of the World War (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1927), 

198–99.

Marine Corps Historical Reference Branch (HRB), Marine Corps University

Cpl Edward J. Donnelly of the Marine Rhine River Patrol, seen here on 11 January 1919, pilots the SS Mosel. While 

most of the 4th Brigade Marines wore a version of the 2d Division patch, the members of the Marine patrol wore 

the Third Army’s “Army of Occupation” shoulder patch. The banner displayed here shows clearly the “A” inside the 

“O,” symbolizing the Army of Occupation.
Winter 2016 19

Receiving notification of their new mission as part 

of the Third Army almost immediately after the end 

of the fighting on 11 November, the selected divisions had only a few days to prepare for the move. 

Some of the units, those farthest from the intended 

occupation zone, would have to travel some 300 kilometers. Other units had shorter distances to cover, but for all participants, it was going to be a long 

march. Following on the heels of the retreating German Army, Third Army units began their advance 

toward Germany on 17 November 1918 and crossed 

the borders of Belgium and Luxembourg. Soon the 

roads between France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and 

Coblenz were filled with 250,000 American doughboys and all of their equipment. To the north, elements of the British Army marched toward Cologne, 

and the Belgian Army advanced toward Aachen. To 

the south of the Third Army, the French forces headed toward their sector, which was centered on the 

cities of Wiesbaden and Mainz. Under the guiding 

provisions of the Armistice, the victorious armies 

moved in stages, conscious at all times of the potential for renewed warfare. The Armistice did not permit crossing the German border until 1 December, 

and this allowed the units to take organized pauses 

to rest their animals, care for their sick soldiers, and 

refurbish some of their equipment.9

To the Rhine

As the Third Army crossed into Luxembourg, AEF 

headquarters announced a policy of noninterference 

in the affairs of the Grand Duchy. Shortly thereafter, a French general in Luxembourg City was placed 

in charge of all troops in the Grand Duchy by the 

Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies, Marshal 

Ferdinand Foch. Pershing issued instructions that 

9 American Armies and Battlefields in Europe, 488; United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919: American Occupation of Germany; and Final 

Report of Gen John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1920), 56. 

“When I was in Germany” cartoon pamphlet, c. 1919, author’s collection 

American doughboy humor reflects the hardships of the hike from France through Belgium and Luxembourg into 

Germany. As tired as they were from the march, many of the doughboys found the local versions of the U.S. flag 

entertaining.
20 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

this order did not apply to his U.S. troops, and they 

would not be subject to French control. Maintaining 

American independence of command in the Grand 

Duchy was extremely important because, not only 

would the Third Army’s route of march and logistical support pipeline run through Luxembourg, some 

U.S. forces—the 5th and the 33d Divisions—were to 

remain within its borders protecting that pipeline. 

Marshal Foch, in response to the action by Pershing, 

resolved the issue by placing the entire Grand Duchy 

in the American zone.10 

Meanwhile, the march continued, and the daily 

reports from the Third Army back to AEF headquarters in Chaumont highlighted the problems advancing forces were having. Being unable to accurately fix 

the location of the German forces and the confusion 

caused by the revolution that was sweeping throughout Germany made it difficult to provide a clear picture of the movement. The 18 November 1918 U.S. 

Army report noted:

The march of the Third Army to the Rhine has 

been resumed one day in advance of the prearranged schedule owing to the lack of established authority in the region being evacuated 

by the enemy. The latter is having difficulty in 

complying with the terms of the armistice because of the limited number of roads available 

for his withdrawal across the MOSELLE and 

SURE [SÛre or Sauer] Rivers.11

In addition to the German Army having problems 

moving its units out of the occupation zones, some 

Germans also went out of their way to make it more 

difficult for the advancing Americans by cutting 

telegraph lines and shooting holes in water tanks.

As the various units of the American force passed 

slowly through France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, 

the doughboys were pleasantly surprised by the 

warm welcome they received. The areas previously 

occupied by the Germans were particularly festive. 

Once across the German border, however, the march 

took a different tone altogether. Victory flags and 

pretty girls waving from the windows of the liberated towns of France and Luxembourg gave way to 

shuttered windows and deserted streets.

By 26 November, most of the Third Army’s advance units reached the German border and stopped. 

The Allied troops previously decided to cross the 

German border on 1 December simultaneously. The 

pause was welcomed by the soldiers and Marines as 

it gave the supply sections a chance to bring up badly 

needed cold weather clothing and rations. It also allowed medical personnel to treat some of their sick 

rather than evacuate them to hospitals. 

The Indian magazine, author’s collection

Written by a 23d Infantry Regiment soldier and printed 

in The Indian, this poem reflects the difficulties of the 

hike into Germany for the soldiers and Marines of the 

2d Division.

10 United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919: Reports, 48. 11 United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919: American Occupation of Germany, 19.
Winter 2016 21

At 0700 on 1 December 1918, with the 5th Regiment commanded by Colonel Logan Feland in the 

lead, the Marines of the 4th Brigade crossed the 

Sauer River near the town of Neidersgegen into Germany. Now fully aware that they were on enemy soil, 

the previously cased regimental colors and guidons 

were unfurled to allow the Germans to see who was 

marching through their country.12 For the most part, 

the advancing Third Army passed through seemingly deserted small towns and villages as most of the 

Germans chose to remain inside, perhaps fearful of 

drawing attention after the 

rumors spread by defeated 

German soldiers. Some of 

the disorganized German 

units retreating earlier along 

these same roads had “taken 

a considerable quantity of 

foodstuffs without paying 

for it, excusing their actions 

by saying: ‘The Americans, 

who are the biggest robbers 

in the world, will take it 

anyway when they come’.”13

With both Americans 

and Germans appearing to 

be on their best behavior, 

the march continued on 

a wide front through the 

Moselle Valley west of the 

Rhine. One Marine of the 

6th Regiment wrote home: 

“I don’t know just where 

[we are] but can guess close 

enough. Ten of us are staying tonight in an old lady’s 

house. We had nice feather 

beds with clean sheets and 

everything . . . she set out 

a huge bowl of beef soup, a 

large platter of fried spuds, 

liverwurst about a yard 

long, good old rye bread 

[and] coffee. We sure did eat.”14 In spite of the good 

conditions, the Marines remained aware of the fact 

that they were in enemy country. The Marine ended 

his letter by saying he had to close because he had to 

go on guard duty for the night.

Once past Trèves, the terrain became more difficult, and the combination of frozen roads and heavy 

loads took their toll on the troops. Usually marching 

for 10 hours a day, with hourly 10-minute breaks, the 

Marines of the 4th Brigade managed to keep the required separation zone between the German forces 

Official U.S. Army photo. 

This illustration shows the location of the American divisions (in circles) in the U.S. 

occupation zone. The first division to redeploy to the states was the 32d Division, 

which was located on the east side of the Rhine. With that departure, the 1st and 

2d Divisions expanded their areas to cover the entire sector on the east side of the 

Rhine. 

12 Lt George C. Strott, USN, The Medical Department of the United States Navy with the Army and Marine Corps in France in World War I: Its 

Functions and Employment (Washington DC: Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, U.S. Navy Department, 1947). 13 Candid Comment on the American Soldier of 1917–1918 and Kindred Topics by the Germans (Chaumont, France: American Expeditionary 

Forces, General Staff, General Headquarters, 1919), 19.

14 Pvt Clinton Vann Peck to Mrs. William H. Peck, 5 December 1918, private collection.
22 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

and themselves. By the time the Americans were 80 

kilometers inside Germany, the troops in the lead 

divisions were feeling the strain of hiking through 

rain and snow on frozen roads. Adding to the distance was the fact that there were few straight roads 

due to the Moselle Valley geography. Instead, curving, switchback roads were the norm, and the troops 

marched much farther than the straight-line distance 

on a map would indicate. Later reports commented 

negatively on what appeared to be a straggling problem in the Marine brigade. Approximately 1,000 

replacements intended for the 4th Brigade joined 

their units during the march. Unfortunately, many 

of these men had arrived recently in France and were 

not prepared for the arduous journey to Germany. 

An observing officer noted at the time that “more 

men fell out on this hike than on any other. Most of 

these men were new replacements who had joined 

the brigade in and near Arlons, Belgium.”15 Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Matthews, assigned to the 2d 

Division staff, later wrote that the replacements had 

made a daylong march just to catch up to the Brigade 

and that the 

replacements had no equipment other than the 

personal equipment of the soldier and their reserve rations . . . after a conference at Division 

Headquarters, it was decided on account of 

the foot-sore condition of the replacements, to 

send back machine gun trucks and ambulances 

to bring up the replacements so that they might 

join their organizations and be ready to resume 

when the march was again taken up. . . . During 

the 19th a number of machine gun trucks from 

the Fourth Machine Gun Battalion and ambulances from the Sanitary Train were utilized to 

bring up the Marine replacements, repeated 

trips being necessary to effect this. By the evening of the 19th all the replacements had been 

turned over to the Fourth Brigade and resumed 

the march . . . the morning of the 20th.16

Another Marine officer, Major Franklin B. Garrett, the 2d Division staff officer in charge of the 

mission to pick up the replacements and take them 

to the brigade, gave a more detailed version. After 

receiving his orders, Garrett quickly found out that 

even the brigade headquarters did not know “which 

of the many roads the replacements had taken.” Finally getting in contact with the lead element of the 

replacements, he found the detachment “strung out 

all along the line for many miles back.” After gathering the replacements in a central location, Garrett made an assessment of their condition. Many 

of the men were so exhausted or had such bad foot 

problems that they were unable to continue the 

march. Contacting the 4th Brigade Headquarters, 

he reported to Brigadier General Wendell C. Neville, the brigade commander, “of the condition the 

men were in and suggested that transportation be 

furnished as [he] did not think these men would 

ever catch up by hiking.” A short while later, the 

trucks from the 6th Machine Gun Battalion and the 

ambulances from the sanitary train arrived to carry 

the men forward. 

Garrett later reported that “the spirit of these men 

was wonderful. Their one desire seemed to be to 

join up with the [4th Brigade] column. For green replacements they had covered a remarkable distance. 

. . . Many of them had continued hiking with feet 

so badly bruised that only Spartan courage and Marine grit could have brought them as far as they had 

come.”17

Significantly, another Marine officer mentioned 

having to find accommodations for the replacements prior to them joining up with their assigned 

units in the 4th Brigade. He stated that he “finally 

made arrangements with a local priest to put 800 of 

the men in a convent” and the remainder in a local 

school. Due to the massive movement of U.S. forces 

through the area during this period, the officer further explained that billets were so difficult to obtain 

that he, himself, “was unable to get a billet and slept 

on a table in a café.”18

Still the Third Army continued, making staggered 

stops and starts, but always pushing eastward with 

the 1st, 2d, and 32d Divisions leading the way. These 

15 Strott, Medical Department of the United States Navy, 135. 16 LtCol Hugh L. Matthews and Maj Bennet Puryear Jr. to MajGen John A. Lejeune, 9 February 1923, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA. 

Matthew’s quote references the trucks of the “4th Machine Gun Battalion” but should have said “6th Machine Gun Battalion.”

17 Maj F. B. Garrett to MajGen John A. Lejeune, 15 February 1923, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

18 Unidentified U.S. Marine Corps officer to Maj Bennet Puryear Jr., 13 February 1923, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
Winter 2016 23

three divisions, under control of III Corps, were the 

lead elements and had the 

farthest distance to travel. 

Ultimately, their trek led 

them over the Rhine to sectors on the far side of the 

river. As the 2d Division 

moved eastward, the 5th 

and 6th Regiments alternated serving as flank guard 

and advance guard. Early in 

the march, the left flank was 

covered by French Army 

units, but they soon moved 

southward and headed for 

their occupation sector near 

Mainz. Their place was taken by British soldiers, who 

maintained liaison with the 

Americans the rest of the 

way to the Rhine.

The 330 kilometers from the Argonne that some 

of the units travelled was a struggle for the doughboys in the second echelon also. Following the lead 

divisions, they were able to occupy previously used 

billets, but found the roads even more torn up by the 

passage of the leading units. Army Sergeant Bert A. 

Fidler, an experienced combat veteran from the 39th 

Infantry Regiment, wrote his father that “I will not 

mention the fourteen days hike from the Argonne 

woods to Coblenz, making anywhere from twenty to 

fifty-four kilometers a day with full field equipment. I 

couldn’t begin to express my feelings.”19 Others in the 

4th Division were not so reticent, referring to what 

they called the “Hobnail Express,” where “everyone 

agrees that it was a corker from any point it might 

be considered.”20 Ironically, Marine Private Clinton 

Vann Peck, one of Sergeant Fidler’s best friends from 

Syracuse, New York, was making the same hike as 

part of the 6th Regiment. In a hurriedly written letter 

to his mother, Peck wrote: “I suppose you read much 

now days about the Victorious march to the Rhine. It 

is much nicer to read about than to do as we are now 

doing. It is sure tough hiking. We march all day and 

then stop overnight in barns and houses.”21

As noted, one requirement of the Armistice was 

to keep 25 kilometers between the advancing Allied 

forces and the retreating German Army. Maintaining this interval was a struggle for the Americans 

because they seldom knew the exact location of the 

German Army to their front. As German forces withdrew from the western front, they were required to 

pass certain delineated, numbered geographic lines 

on definite dates. These “phase” lines and the dates 

for reaching them were written into the Armistice 

documentation and had been determined by staff officers in the comfort of warm and dry headquarters 

buildings. However, with road conditions deteriorating quickly due to the weather and heavy traffic, 

meeting the published march schedule proved to be 

a difficult task for both sides.

As the American Army crossed the German border, some of the second and third echelon units 

dropped out of the march and set up in their assigned 

sectors. The other units continued on through the 

rain and mud toward the Rhine. 

Photo courtesy of the Peck family 

In this unique view, Pvt Clinton Vann Peck, 97th Company, 6th Regiment, cleans 

his rifle in preparation for a unit inspection. This photo was likely taken at the rifle 

range established in the 2d Division sector near Leutesdorf, Germany.

19 Sgt Bert Fidler to his father, 8 June 1919, private collection.

20 “AEF Shop Talk,” Stars and Stripes, 14 February 1919. 21 Pvt Peck to Mrs. Peck, 5 December 1918.
24 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

The Watch on the Rhine

On 11 December 1918, all of the Allied forces 

reached the Rhine. After another short reorganization period, they crossed the river in large numbers 

on 13 December to establish positions on its eastern 

shore.22 The Marine brigade, still serving as the extreme left flank of the Third Army, crossed the Rhine 

led by the 5th Regiment via the Ludendorff Railroad 

Bridge at Remagen, a site that assumed even greater significance in the next world war. On their left 

flank, the Marines made contact with the Canadian 

Corps, which represented the extreme right flank of 

the British zone.

When the main U.S. force arrived, the headquarters of the Third Army was established in Coblenz in 

a large German government building complex located on the waterfront on the west bank of the Rhine. 

Crossing to the east side of the Rhine, the U.S. III 

Corps, comprised of the 1st, 2d, and 32d Divisions, 

took up positions within a large semicircle, 30 kilometers (18.6 miles) in radius, guarding the Rhine 

River bridges they had crossed.

To keep the Allied armies and the German Army 

apart, a 10-kilometer (6.2 miles) strip was established. It ran from the Netherlands to the border of 

Switzerland and served as the demilitarized zone 

between the Allied zones and unoccupied Germany. This region was designated as the neutral zone. 

Germany was allowed to keep civil police forces in 

the towns of the neutral zone: however, they were 

not allowed to make any infrastructure changes or 

improvements. This meant the Germans were not 

allowed to fix roads, upgrade railroads, or run telephone lines without permission from the French, 

who were the nominal overseers of the entire neutral 

zone. The German Army was allowed to enter the 

zone in small numbers, if necessary, to assist local 

police with riot control. No recruiting for the German Army was allowed in either the neutral zone or 

in any of the Allied occupation areas.23 In addition 

to these restrictions, hunting and fireworks also were 

forbidden. Obviously, the Allies feared the danger of 

sneak attacks coming out of the zone and so the Armistice terms included these restrictions to ensure 

they did not happen.

One potential problem for the Allied armies during the occupation was the presence of a very large, 

unoccupied Germany just to the east on the other 

side of the neutral zone. There were still many proud 

and angry Germans who believed the war should not 

have ended as or when it did. Therefore, aggravating 

or provoking the Allies and their occupation armies 

served as a viable and valid means to continue the 

conflict. Maintaining oversight of their portion of 

the neutral zone to keep potential troublemakers out 

of the American zone soon became an important 

part of the Marine brigade’s mission.

West of the Rhine

Remaining on the west bank of the Rhine was IV 

Corps with the 3d, 4th, and 42d Divisions. The U.S. 

VII Corps, made up of the 89th and 90th Divisions, 

occupied the Moselle Valley from Trèves west to the 

Luxembourg border.24 As expected, the arrival of the 

U.S. Third Army was a cause for uncertainty in the 

local population because the attitude of the Americans toward the Germans was unknown. General 

Pershing attempted to alleviate the local citizens’ 

fears by proclaiming, “The American Army has not 

HRB, Marine Corps University 

Among the primary duties of the 4th Brigade was maintaining control of the neutral zone, the 10-kilometerwide barrier between unoccupied Germany and the 

Allied zones. BGen Wendell C. Neville poses on the 

edge of the neutral zone with two enlisted Marines and 

another officer.

22 Alexander Barnes, In A Strange Land: The American Occupation of Germany, 1918–1923 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 2011), 70–74. 23 Ironically, the French brought in recruiters from the French Foreign Legion into their own zone to sign up unemployed German veterans.

24 Barnes, In A Strange Land, 488–89; and Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, 3 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, 1988, reprint), 1:265, 289, 333, 335, 2:87–89, 201–3. 
Winter 2016 25

come to make war on the civilian population. All 

persons, who with honest submission act peaceably 

and obey the rules laid down by the military authorities, will be protected in their persons, their homes, 

their religion and their property. All others will be 

brought within the rule with firmness, promptness 

and vigor.”25

Along that same line, just before the arrival of 

the first American forces, Coblenz’s Burgomaster 

(Mayor) and Police Director Bernhard Clostermann 

announced to the German population: “We are informed by the American Commission that the civil 

life will not be disturbed. Under the condition, however, that not the slightest disturbance to public order and security occurs.”26 Despite these assurances 

from the U.S. Army, American forces soon issued 

regulations for their occupation zone that banned 

public gatherings, severely restricted long-distance 

telephone communications and outdoor photography, censored the press, and even required detailed 

reports from the owners of carrier pigeons. With 

these edicts, General Dickman and his staff regulated a broad range of social and economic aspects 

of life for the occupiers and the occupied in the 

American zone. The Americans were determined to 

let everyone know who was in charge in the Coblenz 

Bridgehead. 

Although preliminary planning had been quite 

limited, the AEF had wisely decided that officers 

designated for civil affairs duty would accompany 

and assist the commanders of combat units into 

their designated zones of occupation. This freed the 

unit commanders to focus their attention on the disposition of their units and to make preparations for 

combat operations should that be necessary. Operating in the towns and local regions of the American zone, the officers in charge of civil affairs had 

responsibilities that far outstripped any training they 

received. Their administrative duties eventually included supervision of the German police and local 

jails, liaison with the local government officials, the 

conduct of provost marshal courts, control of the 

movement of all civilians in their area, and responding to complaints by local civilians against the military. Other duties included the surveillance of local 

food and fuel supplies, supervision of public utilities, 

and oversight of the local political scene.27

For their part, the soldiers and Marines of the 2d 

Division were kept in a constant state of vigilance 

and training in which “outpost positions and patrols 

were established, and a strict guard maintained.”28

Photo courtesy of the Mark Sanders collection

The Marines of the 4th Brigade carried out many duties, one of which was to furnish mail detachments and 

guards. Here, one group from 6th Marine Post Office 

Detachment (APO 710) poses with their U.S. mail sacks.

Photo courtesy of NARA (Ref #127-N-520522)

Marines of 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment, on winter maneuvers in the hills around Segendorf, Germany.

25 Report of the Military Commander, Coblenz, Germany: From December 8, 1918 to May 22, 1919 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: General Service 

Schools Press, 1921), 79.

26 Proclamation by Oberbürgermeister Bernhard Clostermann, 7 December 1918, in Report of the Military Commander, Coblenz, 75; and Rules 

and Regulations, 9 December 1918, in Report of the Military Commander, Coblenz, 81–83.

27 Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, 86. 28 Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year, 1919 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1920), 119.
26 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

Almost immediately after arrival in their designated 

sector, the Marines of the 4th Brigade conducted a 

series of training exercises to maintain their hardwon combat skills, while integrating the new Marines into their units. Construction of a rifle range 

also was high on the list of priority projects and was 

quickly completed. Another group of Marines was 

assigned to mail duty and served in the 2d Division’s 

APO 710 Mail Detachment on the east side of the 

Rhine.29

The Rhine River Patrol

During this period, the Marines also drew a mission 

that was greatly to their liking. Known as the Marine Detachment, Rhine River Patrol, Third Army 

Water Transportation Service, they were assigned 

to work for the Inter-Allied Waterway Commission. 

An original agreement between the Allied Armies 

had called for the British and French to maintain the 

river patrol for all of the occupied zones. Subsequent 

discussion led to the agreement being rescinded and 

the Americans were assigned to patrol a portion of 

the river. Thus, the Marines drew the assignment.30

Estimates of German commercially operated boats 

on the river ranged at more than 12,000 vessels, including a number of sailing ships and barges. At any 

given time, there were almost 35,000 sailors working 

on these boats. Some ocean-going cargo ships were 

able to navigate the Rhine as far south as Remagen 

before the river became too shallow for them to operate. Obviously a workforce this large, operating 

vessels that could sail from Rotterdam in the north 

all the way through the Allied occupied zones to 

Mannheim in the south, would require strict monitoring and military oversight.

One of the clauses of the Armistice forbade German policemen in the four occupied zones from carrying weapons. The need to maintain the blockade 

of Germany, the threat of river pirates and armed 

smugglers, as well as fear of Bolsheviks using the 

river to transport weapons, meant that an armed 

force would be required. The obvious solution was 

to establish the river patrol by using armed Marines 

in confiscated German patrol boats. Marines from 

the 5th and 6th Regiments and the 6th Machine Gun 

Battalion were assigned as boat crewmen manning 

the deck cannons and machine guns. Using these 

boats, they regulated river traffic, performed courier 

and escort duty, and arrested smugglers on the 30-

mile stretch of river from Rolandseck in the north 

down to the Horchheim railway bridge, which was 

just south of Coblenz. The French Rhine River Patrol 

was responsible for the section of river from Horchheim down to the southernmost part of their sector near Mainz. However, the section of river from 

Map courtesy of 1st Division Museum at Wheaton, IL.

Overlay graphics by author 

The patrol zone for the Marine Rhine River Patrol extended from Remagen, Germany, in the north down 

to Bingen in the south. The Marine patrol boats regulated river traffic and enforced the terms of the Armistice. The Marine patrol headquarters at Andernach is 

shown with a red star and the Third Army headquarters 

at Coblenz is shown with a blue star.

29 Military Post Office (MPO) refers to all post offices operated by the U.S. military departments. Army/Air Force Post Office (APO) and Fleet Post 

Office (FPO) is used when addressing mail. 

30 Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, 52.
Winter 2016 27

Horchheim to Bingen was under the nominal command of American forces, although the French ships 

patrolled it. Therefore, French patrol boats were a 

common site in Coblenz.

The American Rhine River Patrol fleet consisted 

of 14 boats, manned by 8 officers and 190 enlisted 

Marines (table 1). From 18 December 1918 to 1 

March 1919, Captain Robert H. Shiel commanded 

it. He was succeeded by First Lieutenant (later Captain) Lloyd A. Houchin, who led the detachment until 8 July 1919. Perhaps the most unique member of 

the American river patrol was not a Marine, but a 

16-year-old American named Joseph Frengar. Originally from Lincoln, Nebraska, Frengar had been 

trapped in Germany during a visit with German relatives at the outbreak of the war. He eventually encountered the American Army near Trèves as they 

marched into Germany in 1918. At first a mascot of 

HRB, Marine Corps University 

The Mosel, under the command of Capt Gaines Moseley, was a real workhorse for the Marine river patrol. It featured several mounted machine guns, and its crew included several Marines from the 6th Machine Gun Battalion. 

HRB, Marine Corps University

The bridge of the Mosel with Capt Moseley on the left, 

Capt A. G. Chase in the center, and 2dLt Vernon Bourdette on the right. On the deck below them stand two 

enlisted members of the crew: Pvt J. F. Hoffman and 

Pvt H. S. Yarbrough.
28 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

a military police unit, he ended up in Coblenz after their redeployment to the United States. The Red 

Cross representative in Coblenz introduced him to 

the executive officer of the Rhine River Patrol, Lieutenant Houchin, who added him to the crew of the 

SS Rheingold.

31

The largest of all the boats was the SS Preussen, 

formerly the official vessel of the Rhineland uberpräsident, the Rhineland’s equivalent of governor. The 

Preussen was used by Major General Dickman on his 

inspection tours of the bridgehead.32 The Pruessen

had a working crew of 29 Marines and six Germans 

and was heavily armed with two 37mm cannons and 

six machine guns. In addition, the Preussen was noted for having “graceful lines and [an] elaborately laid 

out and beautifully paneled saloon, cabins and dining room.” Among the first things the Marine crew 

did, after cleaning her “filthy spaces” was to repaint 

her to “battleship gray.” 

The SS Mosel (Moselle) was the second largest of 

the vessels and was the first boat of the Marine patrol to fly the American flag on the Rhine River. Its 

trial run was conducted on 20 December 1918 and 

performed well enough to be accepted by the Third 

Army for use on the river.33 Also armed with machine guns, the Mosel carried “a sufficiently strong 

body of men to cope with any disturbances ashore.” 

It was primarily used as a supply boat for carrying 

provisions for the patrol stations and troops stationed along the river. The SS Mainz (1904) was 

used by the members of the Inter-Allied Waterway 

Commission in the performance of their regulation 

of commercial river traffic. There was a houseboat, 

usually stationed at Andernach, which served as the 

brig or guardhouse for lawbreakers brought in by the 

river patrol. The city of Andernach also served as the 

central headquarters for the Marine patrol; it shared 

a building with the 3d Division’s post office a short 

distance from the river. At the time, Andernach had 

one of the best-equipped river port complexes with 

31 Originally known as the International Committee of the Red Cross, what is now known as the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red 

Crescent Societies was created after World War I. “River Patrol Has American Lad as Official Mascot,” AMAROC News, 8 June 1919. 32 “Marines Afloat Once More, Man Fleet on Rhine,” Stars and Stripes, 31 January 1919. The uberpräsident of the Rhineland was the U.S. equivalent of a state governor with a great deal of administrative power in his region. 

33 This information came from an unsigned, typed single-page history of the Rhine River Patrol provided in March 2016 to the Marine Corps 

History Division by the granddaughter of Capt Gaines Moseley. While the original author of this document is unknown, they appeared to be 

intimately involved with the patrol, and the information contained deemed credible.

Ship/station Commander

SS Mosel (1872) Captain Gaines Moseley 

SS Preussen (1902) First Lieutenant William L. Harding Jr.

SS Rhein (1899) First Lieutenant Harold W. Whitney

SS Borussia (1912) Second Lieutenant Guy D. Atmore

SS Elsa (1904) Second Lieutenant Morris C. Richardson

SS Rheingold Second Lieutenant Morris C. Richardson

SS Albertus Magnus Second Lieutenant George R. Rowan

SS Frauenlob (1902) Second Lieutenant James E. Stanners

Stadt Düsseldorf Station Second Lieutenant Elmer L. Sutherland

Andernach Station Second Lieutenant Louis Cukela (18 December 1918 to 22 March 1919)

Second Lieutenant John T. Thornton

Remagen Station Second Lieutenant Vernon B. Bourdette

Table 1. U.S. Rhine River Patrol ships and stations

Note: The command of some of the river patrol boats changed fairly regularly—the Elsa, Frauenlob, Borussia, Rheingold and Albertus Magnus in particular changed hands several times.

Source: Edwin N. McClellan, “Fourth Brigade of Marines,” Marine Corps Gazette, December 1919, 363. 
Winter 2016 29

its series of warehouses and five cranes for loading 

and unloading cargo.

In addition to the eight vessels named above, six 

other vessels were used, though unnamed, known 

simply by their hull numbers. Two of them had steam 

engines while the others were gasoline driven. Using 

these vessels, the Marines monitored most aspects of 

river traffic, including their most controversial arrest 

in January 1919. 

Author’s collection 

The headquarters for the Marine patrol was located in 

this building in Andernach on the west side of the river. 

The first commander of the headquarters detachment 

was 2dLt Louis Cukela, a Medal of Honor recipient and 

legendary figure in Marine Corps history.

34 The ₰ (pfennig), or German mark, is a former coin or note used as the official currency from the ninth century until 2002 when the euro was 

introduced.

HRB, Marine Corps University

Four Marines assigned to the Marine patrol enjoy some time off away from their boats. The varied clothing would 

suggest that this photo was taken early in the occupation before the supply pipeline ensured uniformity. Here, 

they are wearing Third Army patches, the standard insignia for Rhine River Patrol Marines.

It all started simply enough; two German citizens, 

Mathias Scheid and Jacob Ring, attempted to smuggle 700 cases of contraband cognac worth ₰1 million 

by boat from Oppenheim am-Rhein into Coblenz.34

The two men hid their illegal cargo under what appeared to be a full shipment of rocks and gravel. Unfortunately for the two, the Marines regulating traffic 

on the river that day grew suspicious. Very quickly, 

the Marines removed the layer of camouflage and 

found the bottles of cognac, as this alcohol was forbidden in the U.S. zone. After being arrested, the two 

pleaded not guilty to a number of smuggling and 

fraudulent documentation charges. They were found 

guilty after four days of hearings and were sentenced 

to hard labor for a year and a fine of ₰250,000. The 

punishment was later reduced by the Third Army 

commander, Major General Dickman, to six months 

hard labor and a ₰100,000 fine. Their trial was such 

a major event that it even received coverage in the 

23 May 1919 Stars and Stripes published in Paris.

Scheid and Ring were two of the wealthiest citizens in the American bridgehead area, and their arrest and subsequent trial were meant to show that 

the law was being applied equally to rich and poor. 

Viewed from a German perspective, it was seen as 
30 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

just another example of the harshness of American 

justice. One German wrote that “the American is 

very fond of large fines. I saw copies of the ‘Coblenzer 

Zeitung’ in which the lists of fines covered columns. 

No fines were less than 100 marks, and many of 

them mounted into the thousands. Two respectable 

merchants were given two years imprisonment and 

200,000 marks fine for smuggling cognac and this 

sentence was ‘mercifully’ commuted to six months 

imprisonment and 100,000 marks fine.”35 Obviously, 

the nationality of the observer tended to color the 

spin put on the story. Nonetheless, the commander 

of the Third Army had decreed that no cognac would 

be sold in his zone, and the two smugglers received a 

six-month sentence in jail to let that message sink in.

One of the more notable events took place in 

February when all of the Marine patrol vessels were 

assembled for the first time for a review by General Dickman. Joining Dickman on the Andernach 

reviewing stand was Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 

assistant secretary of the Navy. To maximize the effectiveness of the review, all the ships were filled with 

doughboys in Coblenz on R&R, providing them with 

a Rhine cruise and a chance to see their commanding 

general at the same time. Adding to the excitement, a 

squadron of aircraft from the nearby Weißenthurm 

airfield performed aerial maneuvers over the fleet. 

Among the aircraft were two German Etrich Taube 

(pigeon) planes, flown by U.S. Army pilots, providing for many of the doughboys their first view of enemy aircraft since the Meuse-Argonne Campaign.36

In spite of the continually inclement Rhineland 

weather, the Marines spent a great deal of time 

outdoors, securing the neutral zone and practicing 

to repel any attacks from unoccupied Germany. A 

member of the 4th Brigade commented on his living conditions by saying that “we, four of us, have a 

good billet now. The [German] people here are very 

good to us. . . . The old man here has a fine collection 

of [animal] horns. In our room there [are] 15 pairs 

and in the front parlor there are about 20 or more 

all sizes, also [stuffed] hawks, ducks, cranes, woodpeckers and a fawn . . .”37 By April, life in the Marine 

sector was good. The German Army had completed 

its demobilization and much of the postwar tension 

had dissipated; although, it would prove to be only 

a short reprieve. Soon, the 2d Division would find 

itself again preparing for war.

The Treaty of Versailles

The period of lessened tension lasted only until late 

May 1919 when reports from the Paris peace negotiations indicated that the German government 

seemed to be dragging its feet about signing the final 

surrender documents. By this time, almost half of 

the original American occupation force had departed, leaving only the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Divisions in 

Germany and the 5th Division in Luxembourg. The 

problem was quite simple: many German government officials considered the surrender documents 

and the peace treaty being negotiated in Versailles 

to be a second capitulation to the Allies. Fearing for 

their reputations and in an increasingly angry and 

violent postwar Germany, their lives, they were understandably hesitant to sign the documents. They 

Photo courtesy of the Peck family 

The house in which Pvt Peck was billeted in Rockenfeld, Germany. The owner of the house was a noted 

huntsman in the area, and Peck wrote home that the 

house was filled with antlers, horns, and “stuffed 

hawks, ducks, cranes, woodpeckers, and a fawn.”

35 “Jail Coblenz Smugglers,” New York Times, 3 March 1919; Candid Comment on the American Soldier of 1917–1918 and Kindred Topics by the 

Germans, 50; and Report of the Military Commander, Coblenz, 99. 36 “Army General Reviews Own Fleet,” Stars and Stripes, 14 February 1919. Gen Dickman later wrote in The Great Crusade (242) that the order 

of the procession was “Preussen (flagship), Borussia, Frauenlob, Stadt Dusseldorf, Albertus Magnus, Mosel, and six smaller vessels.” Dickman’s 

memory was in error as Stadt Dusseldorf was not the name of any of the vessels; most likely, he meant the Elsa or the Rheingold. 37 Pvt Clinton Vann Peck to Mr. William H. Peck, 3 July 1919.
Winter 2016 31

chose instead to try to drag out the negotiations in 

hopes of obtaining less harsh terms.

This strategy became apparent to the Allies in May 

1919. Just the opposite of Germany, they needed to 

settle these issues quickly so they could demobilize 

their armies which were consuming many of the 

resources necessary to restore their war-weakened 

economies. The Allies also needed to focus and redirect their energies to reshaping Europe’s map as the 

dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the 

Imperial Russian Empire had created a number of 

violent border disputes in Central Europe. Hungary, 

Romania, Yugoslavia, and the newly merged country of Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Poland, just to 

name a few, all sought more land and population at 

the expense of their neighbors. Several of these flareups required the deployment of Allied troops to 

separate the warring factions. Equally draining were 

the Allied expeditionary forces that had been sent 

to Siberia and northern Russia to confront the Bolsheviks. Clearly then, to the Allies, something had to 

be done quickly before their own military strength 

melted away completely. Most of the 2 million U.S. 

soldiers of the AEF had already returned to camps in 

the United States for demobilization. Many of Britain’s soldiers had demobilized as well.

Due to German foot dragging, on 20 May 1919, 

Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the overall military commander for the Allied armies, directed the staffs of 

the French, British, Belgian, and United States armies 

to prepare operational plans that would move their 

forces out of their occupation zones and into unoccupied Germany.38 General Pershing’s headquarters 

instructed Third Army headquarters in Coblenz to 

begin the planning phase, and on 22 May, each of 

the five American divisions still on occupation duty 

received instructions that included the wording:

Should the enemy refuse or decline to sign 

the Treaty of Peace presented to him, the Allied and Associated Powers will renounce the 

present Armistice and resume the march of 

their armies into the enemy’s territory. . . . The 

purpose of this advance would be: to separate 

northern and southern GERMANY by the occupation of the valley of the MAIN; to reduce 

the enemy’s resources by the seizure of the 

RUHR industrial district; and to threaten his 

seats of government—WEIMAR and BERLIN. 

. . . All arrangements will be made to begin the 

advance by crossing the present outer limits of 

the bridgehead on or after May 30.39

The basic operational plan for the Americans was 

simple in design. Since the 1st and 2d Divisions were 

already occupying the bridgehead on the eastern 

bank of the Rhine, they would lead the American 

forces through the neutral zone into unoccupied 

Germany. The 3d Division, centered near Andernach 

on the west side of the Rhine, would move by foot, 

vehicle, and rail over the Rhine. One reinforced brigade (consisting of the 30th and 38th Infantry Regiments with associated engineers and machine gun 

battalions) of the 3d Division was detached from divisional command and placed directly under Third 

Army control. This brigade would move strictly by 

train and once across the Rhine would be used as 

a mobile force to support the advance. The 4th Division would remain on the left bank of the Rhine 

to maintain security of the river crossings. A French 

cavalry division would pass through the American 

zone and cross the Rhine to act as the link between 

the British Army and the American forces.

Soon after the plan was drawn up, Third Army 

also provided direction to III Corps and the leading 

divisions: 

The corps will advance with its leading division 

transported on trucks in two main columns to 

reach the line FRANKENBERG-KIRCHHAIN 

on the first day of the advance. These columns 

will advance in combat formation well covered 

and connected by armored cars and motor patrols armed with rifles and machine guns. This 

division will seize and leave guards over all principal railway stations and junctions, important 

telephone and telegraph centrals, and all other 

sensitive points on the lines of communication 

38 Message from Marshal Foch, General Headquarters, Allied Armies, to General Pershing and the commanders of the British, French, and Belgian occupation armies, 20 May 1919, DGCRA Order No. 8618, original copy in author’s personal file.

39 This information was forwarded to the units of the Third Army via G-3, GHQ, AEF (Germany, Third Army HQ), Folder no. 278 with the title, 

Preparation for Advance into Germany, 22 May 1919, in American Occupation of Germany, 117. At the time of receipt, the 2d Division was assigned to the U.S. III Corps along with the 1st Division and the French 2d Cavalry Division.
32 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

east of the RHINE River. These guards will be 

as small as is consistent with safety so that the 

greatest possible strength of the division will be 

with the advance available for combat. The civil 

population of country passed over, especially 

those engaged in operating public utilities, will 

be required to remain in place and continue 

their functions.40

Thoughts of a renewed war were put on temporary hold in the Marines’ sector during the first 

week of June, when there was an unusual and deadly 

episode involving two Marines from 17th Company 

(commanded by First Lieutenant Augustus Paris), 

5th Regiment. Privates Albert D. Dupree and Lauren 

W. Collier, two Marines with somewhat checkered 

pasts, became fed up with occupation duty and decided to see what was on the other side of the neutral 

zone. They loaded up their packs with field gear and 

a supply of soap and cigarettes. Avoiding the guard 

post, the two slipped through the demilitarized zone 

and then rode a train eastward until the first stop. 

After spending the night in a German hotel, they encountered three Germans who wanted to purchase 

some of their blankets. During the course of negotiations, one of the Germans asked the Marines if they 

had a pass allowing them to be outside of the American sector. The two privates responded by tapping 

their holsters, saying, “This is our pass.” One of the 

Germans then grabbed Private Dupree and wrestled 

with him as he attempted to take his .45 automatic 

pistol out of its holster. After a short struggle, the two 

men fell down a flight of stairs to the ground floor 

of the hotel. Collier followed the two men down the 

stairs and fired into the air to scare away any other 

onlookers. Unfortunately, the German managed to 

get control of Dupree’s pistol and shot him. Hit twice, 

Dupree fell into the hotel kitchen and died. The German then turned the pistol on Collier and shot him 

in the arm. German authorities arrived quickly on 

the scene, and after a telephone call between them 

and the American authorities, the wounded Marine 

and his deceased friend were transported back to 

the American sector. The Germans later reported 

that “the men complained of army life and said they 

were through with it all and were going to Berlin for 

a good time.”41

On 9 June 1919, the Third Army received another 

message from AEF headquarters, which again indicated the rising tension between the Allies and the 

Germans:

The enemy has refused to sign the Treaty of 

Peace presented to him. The Armistice has 

been renounced by the Allied and Associated 

Powers, effective at H [hour] of D day. The 

enemy occupies with one corps of approximately 10,000 second class troops, the territory through which this army will advance. 

His forces are scattered and are not prepared to 

offer an organized resistance. Resistance from 

stubborn detachments of a battalion or less may 

be expected. No troops have been reported as 

moving from the east to reinforce this corps. 

The attitude of the enemy civil population will 

probably be passive. The British Army of the 

RHINE on the left, and the French Tenth Army 

on the right, advance abreast of our army.42

To the soldiers and Marines of Third Army who 

had fought their way through the Argonne against 

German soldiers, the statement from higher headquarters that they would only be facing 10,000 

second-class troops was probably greeted with some 

skepticism. They had learned the hard way what a 

few German soldiers behind a Maschinengewehr 

(MG08) machine gun, nicknamed the “devil’s paintbrush,” could do to advancing American troops. The 

MG08 was so respected by the Americans of the 

Third Army that they had equipped the Marine patrol boats with MG08s instead of their own organic 

weapons. As tensions between the governments increased, the previously friendly relationship between 

the Americans and the Germans took a sudden 

downturn. Arguments and street fights increased, 

and there were several violent incidents leading to 

injuries and fatalities on both sides. As German hesitation continued to deadlock the peace treaty signing, Marshal Foch finally decided on a date for the 

operation to commence—20 June 1919 would be 

D-Day.43 Prior to this, the Allied forces had been 

40 Chief of Staff, Third Army, to Commanding Generals, III Corps and 3d Division (Germany, Third Army HQ), 22 May 1919.

41 “German Slays Marine, AWOL on Way to Berlin; American’s Comrade Wounded in Scuffle,” AMAROC News, 6 June 1919, 1. 42 Plans in Case Germany Refuses to Sign Peace Treaty, Field Orders 193-32.1, No. 9 (France: Third Army, AEF, 17 June 1919). 43 LtGen Liggett, Plan of Communication, Supply and Evacuation, Annex No. 3 (France: Third Army, AEF, 19 June 1919). 
Winter 2016 33

told that the day, three days before the actual operation, would be known as J-Day. Once J-Day was announced, all participants would know that they were 

now in the three-day window prior to the operation 

and to proceed with their initial troop movements. 

This planning information was so important in ensuring the transportation requirements for the attack were met that French Lieutenant Colonel Jean 

Marcel Guitry, the president and senior member of 

the Inter-Allied Railway Commission, personally 

telephoned Major Gornusy Courtillet, the French 

liaison officer in the Third Army Coblenz office, on 

16 June to ensure that he and his American counterpart were aware of the impending announcement. At 

this point, however, H-Hour had not yet been determined, and while the subsequent J-Day (17 June) 

Third Army message provided further movement 

instructions for the American units, the exact time 

for the attack remained a mystery.44

As is so common in military operations, the 

very next day, 18 June 1919, Third Army received a 

change: D-Day was now set for 23 June 1919. Along 

with the date change, there was more information on 

the enemy situation and follow-on maneuvers: 

As no great resistance to our forward movement is expected, we may, by a rapid movement of our advance troops, seize important 

centers and lines of supply and communication 

far to the east of the present limit of the bridgehead, thus providing for an extensive forward 

movement upon further orders from the Allied 

Commander-in-Chief.45

Simultaneously, as this message was sent, the 

roads in the American zone on the east side of the 

Rhine were filled with trucks and horses as the soldiers and Marines of the 1st and 2d Divisions moved 

to their jumping off points near the neutral zone. By 

19 June, even the artillery regiments were in place 

and ready to support the advance with either fire or 

further maneuver. The Third Army reported that 

44 Maj Gornusy Courtillet to Maj George Knight, 16 June 1919, author’s personal file.

45 June 14 to 18 [Extract] Estimate of the Situation, Operations Report 193-33.1, Folder no. 46 (France: Third Army, AEF, 18 June 1919).

Photo courtesy of the Peck family 

The town of Herschbach in late June on the edge of the 

neutral zone. While preparing to restart hostilities because of the German unwillingness to sign the Treaty 

of Versailles, Peck wrote on the back: “This was our advance position waiting for the Heinies to sign. In case 

they refused, Bango Alles Kaput.”

Photo courtesy of LtCol Peter T. Underwood (Ret)

The Herschbach town church as it appears today. 

The town sits on high ground, and from its strategic 

heights, most of the surrounding area of the neutral 

zone was visible. Fortunately, the Germans signed the 

treaty, and the impending battles never took place.
34 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

“concentration of our troops having been completed 

this date, the American Third Army is prepared to 

advance eastward.” Third Army also informed the 

1st and 2d Divisions in their jump-off positions that 

H-Hour was now set for 1900 on 23 June.46

The Americans received word that the British 

forces to the north were ready and in place as were 

the French to the south. A clear indication of the 

French influence on the language of the American 

Army is evident in the 20 June report that stated 

“camions [trucks] for the forward movement of the 

1st Division have been assigned to all units and have 

reported at designated entrucking points.” With this 

notification, all eyes turned to the clock. The Third 

Army logisticians continued to refine their plans. 

They received the welcome news that they would be 

provided 25 trucks with drivers to move the InterAllied Railway Commission on D-Day because it 

had been decided that the commission staff would 

accompany the frontline troops to take immediate 

control of key railheads. Rations, gasoline, and forage for the animals in the combat units were scheduled to be delivered to designated forward railheads. 

Ammunition was to be resupplied from stockage 

maintained at the ammo depot in Neuwied. Evacuation hospitals were loaded on trains and staged at 

the Coblenz railhead, awaiting movement orders. 

Resumption of the Great War was now less than 36 

hours away.

Tension increased almost to the breaking point on 

21 June, when news arrived that the German fleet’s 

warship crews, who were interned at Scapa Flow 

in the Orkney Islands since the Armistice, scuttled 

their own ships rather than have them taken over 

by the Allies. Before they could be stopped, 74 warships were sitting on the bottom of the harbor. Some 

nearby British warships fired on them in an unsuccessful attempt to stop the destruction, killing eight 

German sailors.47 The next day in Versailles, France, 

the German delegation indicated they might be willing to sign the treaty, except for the clauses that held 

Germany responsible for starting the war, and asked 

for an extension to the signing deadline. Still angry 

at the report of the German warships being scuttled, 

the Allies rejected this request and informed the 

Germans that the deadline remained 23 June 1919.

At 1800 on 22 June, Third Army reported that 

“the American Third Army is awaiting orders for 

forward movement.”48 War was now only 25 hours 

away, and the Marines of the 6th Regiment were 

hunkered down in the area around Herschbach 

awaiting the word to advance. Likewise, the soldiers 

of the 28th Infantry Regiment, 1st Division, were 

at Mähren watching the clock. With the possibility of renewed combat looming, events outside the 

occupation zones now took a sudden turn in rapid 

succession. In Berlin, the German cabinet and its 

leader, Reichs Chancellor Phillip Scheidemann, who 

had taken a strong stand against signing the peace 

terms, resigned from office. They were almost immediately replaced by a new coalition government 

formed under the new chancellor, Gustav A. Bauer, a 

former trade union leader. When the senior German 

Army leaders were summoned by this new government and asked if they could defend their homeland 

from an Allied attack, their only reply was that the 

situation was “hopeless.” In light of this revelation, 

the German government notified the attendees at 

the Paris Peace Conference (1919–20) of their intention to sign the peace treaty as written. As a result, 

at 1000 on 23 June, the Third Army sent a message 

to its units.

From: Chief of Staff, Third Army

To: Commanding General, III Corps

1. The preliminary operations directed by 

letter June 19, to begin at 19 h., June 23, are suspended until further orders.49

War was averted with just nine hours to spare. 

Soon after, another message was sent from Allied 

Headquarters.

The German Government having indicated its 

intention of signing the Treaty of Peace, the 

units of the Allied Armies, while maintaining 

the alert, are being so disposed as to increase 

46 June 14 to 18 [Extract] Estimate of the Situation, Operations Report 193-33.1, Folder no. 47 (France: Third Army, AEF, 19 June 1919). 47 Dan Van der Vat, The Grand Scuttle: The Sinking of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow in 1919 (Edinburgh, UK: Birlinn Ltd., 1997). 48 June 14 to 18 [Extract] Estimate of the Situation, Operations Report 193-33.1, Folder no. 50 (France: Third Army, AEF, 22 June 1919). The closer 

the operation came to being put into action, the shorter the messages became, which is a significant difference between then and today’s operational environment where guidance and last-minute instructions are sometimes overwhelming.

49 Third Army to CO III Corps, June 1919, Folder no. 27923 (Germany, Third Army HQ).
Winter 2016 35

the comfort of men and animals; the divisional areas being extended and certain units 

withdrawing somewhat from the advance line 

pending the actual signing.50

On the date the treaty was signed, the 5th Regiment, with headquarters at Hatenfels, occupied the 

most advanced position ever occupied by Marines 

in Germany. During the course of the next few days, 

the Marines of the 4th Brigade made the hike back to 

their regular duty stations near Leutesdorf, Boppard, 

and Hönningen. With the crisis over, the members 

of the brigade and the entire Third Army could begin preparations for what was going to be a memorable Fourth of July celebration in the American occupation zone.

The Fourth of July

and the Composite Regiment

In April 1919, the Regular Army divisions in the 

Third Army received orders to establish a company-size element in each of their infantry brigades, 

which would represent their division in the postwar 

celebrations. They would also serve as the U.S. representative to the many ceremonies that would take 

place. The Composite Regiment was composed of a 

headquarters detachment with a band and 12 infantry companies as follows:

• 1st Battalion: Company A, 1st Division; 

Company B, 1st Division; Company C, 3d Division; and Company D, 3d Division.

• 2d Battalion: Company E, 4th Brigade 

(USMC); 2d Division, Company F; 3d Brigade, 

2d Division; Company G, 5th Division; and 

Company H, 5th Division.

• 3d Battalion: Company I, 4th Division; Company K, 4th Division; Company L, 6th Division; and Company M, 6th Division.

One aspect of 2d Division culture had to be 

changed to accommodate uniformity requirements 

of the Composite Regiment: the shoulder patch. The 

2d Division had previously chosen an Indianhead 

imposed on different shapes and with varying colors 

to represent the individual units. For the Composite 

Regiment, the background design was replaced by 

a star, thereby presenting a uniform appearance for 

the Army and Marine representatives in the regiment.

Unlike many military directives that often provided a unit the opportunity to remove malcontents or troubled soldiers, the composite units were 

formed from among the very best and most combatexperienced men. After selection, the companies 

from all the divisions reported to Third Army headquarters at Coblenz, where they were formed into 

50 June 14 to 18 [Extract] Estimate of the Situation, Operations Report 193-33.1, Folder no. 54 (France: Third Army, AEF, 26 June 1919). The actual 

signing ceremony for the Treaty of Versailles took place on 28 June 1919. Ironically enough, while all the other main participants accepted and 

signed (except Russia), President Woodrow Wilson was unable to convince the U.S. Congress to ratify the treaty due to political infighting and a 

growing ”isolationist” movement in the country. As a result, the United States would remain, technically, at war with Germany until the Treaty of 

Berlin was signed by both countries in August 1921.

HRB, Marine Corps University

The sign for the 96th Company office of Capt Clifton B. 

Cates. Cates served with distinction during the fighting 

at Belleau Wood and was an excellent choice to lead 

the Marine component of the Composite Regiment. 

He would later serve as the nineteenth Commandant 

of the Marine Corps.
36 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

the three battalions of the Third Army’s Composite 

Regiment. The Marine officers chosen to lead the 

4th Brigade were well known figures among Marine 

Corps lore. The commander of the 4th Brigade contingent (now Company E, 2d Battalion, Composite 

Regiment) was Captain Clifton B. Cates. His secondin-command and executive officer was First Lieutenant Merwin H. Silverthorn. Both would go on to 

illustrious Marine Corps careers.51 Cates would later 

recall in an oral history interview how the Marines 

for the unit were chosen: “We had I think about 12 

or 14 lieutenants and about 400 enlisted men that 

were already handpicked. The first requirement was 

they had to be 5 feet 10 inches tall, and they had to 

have been in combat operations, and they had to be 

in good shape physically.”52

Now assembled with the finest soldiers from the 

other Regular Army divisions, the Marines and 

doughboys from the 2d Division drilled with a vengeance. In late May and June, while the rest of the 

Third Army’s infantrymen were cleaning weapons 

and preparing to go back to fighting, the members 

of the Composite Regiment continued drilling. 

Their first official appearance outside the American zone had to be postponed because of the German delay in signing the Treaty of Versailles. They 

were scheduled to accompany General Pershing to 

London for a victory parade, but Pershing decided 

to cancel his appearance and instead stayed at his 

headquarters in the event hostilities began. As a result, the regiment remained encamped on Carnival 

Island near Coblenz.53 To keep their skills sharp, 

51 Barnes, In A Strange Land, 282–301. 52 Gen Clifton B. Cates intvw with Benis Frank (Oral History Collection, History Division, Quantico, VA), x, 38.

53 Carnival Island near Coblenz along the Rhine River was one of the most developed areas created by AEF, which included an athletic field and 

track for Third Army competitions.

HRB, Marine Corps University

A group of officers from the 5th Regiment pause for a sandwich. This photograph was likely taken during one of 

many drill sessions in preparation for service in the Composite Regiment. Although the units of the 2d Division 

wore different versions of the Indianhead patch, before they joined the rest of the Composite Regiment, all would 

switch to the same patch with the white star background and their helmets painted accordingly.
Winter 2016 37

the regiment paraded every other day through the 

streets of the city. On 24 May 1919, American Army 

of Occupation (AMAROC) News reported that the 

marching soldiers and Marines were “picked for 

size and appearance, with every man in new clothing and equipment, they look [like] soldiers [to] the 

last man . . . marching in line of half companies, two 

platoons abreast, with the 3rd Division band in the 

lead.”54

As the treaty crisis was being resolved, the Composite Regiment departed Coblenz for Paris via 

train. Known now as “Pershing’s Own,” the Composite Regiment made its first public appearance at 

the Inter-Allied Games being held in Pershing Stadium. During the opening ceremonies on 22 June, 

the regiment was reviewed by General Pershing and 

French Premier Georges B. Clémenceau. The unit 

performed guard and escort duties during the athletic competitions. This was followed by Independence Day ceremonies on 4 July, and 10 days later, 

the French Bastille Day ceremony. These were proud 

moments for Cates and 100 of his Marines as they 

marched in the parades. Although the regiment was 

at reduced strength on these occasions, the order of 

march was the same. The Marines fell in just behind 

the massed colors and standards of the regiments of 

the Third Army as they passed through the Arc de 

Triomphe de l’Étoile and down the Champs-Élysées 

to the Place de la Concorde.

After the victory parade in Paris, Cates’ Company 

E accompanied General Pershing to London. Enjoying a few days in Britain, which included an inspection by the Prince of Wales in Hyde Park, they 

marched in the Empire Day victory parade.55 The 

Marines then crossed the English Channel again to 

embark on the USS Leviathan (1913) and returned 

home with Pershing. On 19 September 1919, Company E was detached and transferred to the Marine 

Barracks Washington, and on the 20th, Cates paid 

his men and discharged those who had decided not 

to remain in the Corps.

While the Composite Regiment was drilling and 

marching, the rest of the Third Army back in the 

occupation zone prepared for the Fourth of July 

celebration. Starting early in the day, concerts were 

held by all of the units’ bands and at noon there was 

a 48-gun salute in honor of the 48 states. One of the 

culminating events was a baseball game between 

the 3d Division and the 2d Division. Most of the 

other units followed suit, and the American zone 

turned quickly into a hotbed of athletic competition.

Following the full day of concerts, sporting events, 

pie-eating contests, and boxing matches, all the inhabitants of the zone eagerly awaited the arrival of 

darkness. Shortly after 2100, two signal guns were 

fired from on top of Ehrenbreitstein Fortress, and 

the grand finale began. The 17th Field Artillery, stationed in the fortress, shot off the 10,000 captured 

German signal rockets and flares it had in storage. 

As the sky lit up with multicolored streamers from 

the flares, the 4th Division to the north of Coblenz 

pitched in, launching their own supply of captured 

pyrotechnics. The show continued until midnight, 

when the massive stockpiles were finally exhausted.56 The New York Times reported the next day that 

“the Americans have just finished a Fourth of July 

celebration the memory of which will live long in 

the Rhineland, and it will not soon be forgotten by 

the hundred thousand soldiers who staged it. In the 

doughboys’ slang, it was a ‘beaucoups show’.”57 The 

timing of the celebration was particularly appropriate because the Third Army was quickly shrinking; 

on some days, up to 8,000 soldiers left the occupation zone for the United States. After it was over, all 

who witnessed it agreed that they had successfully 

brought the excitement of the American holiday to 

the German Rhineland.

Homeward Bound

With the departure of the Composite Regiment 

from the Coblenz area en route to their full schedule 

of appearances in London and Paris and the conclusion of the Fourth of July celebration, the high54 "Composites Are a Fine Marching Organization,” AMAROC News, 24 May 1919. 55 Honoring Great Britain’s expansive empire, the impetus behind Empire Day began as early as 1895, though the first official celebration occurred after Queen Victoria’s death and fell on her birthday, 24 May 1902.

56 Edwin L. James, “Biggest July 4 the Rhine Ever Saw,” New York Times, 5 July 1919. Fittingly, to this day, the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein is depicted on the distinctive unit crest for the 17th Field Artillery.

57 James, “Biggest July 4 the Rhine Ever Saw.”
38 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

water mark of the Third Army had been reached. 

Very shortly thereafter, the Third Army was renamed the American Forces in Germany and a new 

commander, Major General Henry T. Allen, took 

over. The 4th Division departed the American zone 

on 12 July and the 2d Division began to leave a short 

while later on 21 July. The 3d and 1st Divisions left 

on 11 and 12 August, respectively.

In the 4th Brigade, the Marines were well aware 

of this movement; Vann Peck wrote his mother on 3 

July that “I expect to walk to Leutesdorf tomorrow 

and then go up to Neuwied or Coblenz for it may be 

the last chance I get. . . . The way things look we will 

sail this month.”58

The westward journey was a marked change 

from the original march to the Rhine. Instead of 

hiking, the now well-fed and well-dressed soldiers 

and Marines of the 2d Division were divided into 

train-size contingents and dispatched to the transit 

camps outside the port of Brest in mid-July. General Lejeune, his staff, the 4th Brigade headquarters, the 5th Regiment, and the 2d Battalion of the 

6th Regiment sailed on the USS George Washington

(ID 3018) and arrived in the United States on 3 August. The 6th Machine Gun Battalion sailed on the 

USS Santa Paula (ID 1590) and arrived on 5 August, while the remainder of the 6th Regiment sailed 

shortly thereafter on the USS Rijndam (ID 2505) 

and the USS Wilhelmina (ID 2168). The Marine 

contingent of the Composite Regiment arrived on 

8 September, still serving as the escort for General 

Pershing. While the ocean voyage was more pleasant than their previous trip, the 2d Division still had 

one more mission before they could demobilize—

a parade in New York City on 8 August and then 

a review by the president in Washington, DC, just 

HRB, Marine Corps University

A key part of each victory parade was the marching of the AEF units. Here, the 6th Regiment receive a warm welcome as they march down 5th Avenue in New York City on 8 August 1919.

58 Pvt Peck to Mrs. Peck.
Winter 2016 39

four days later to celebrate their well-deserved victory. With the parade and review completed, the 

Marines of the 4th Brigade returned to Quantico, 

Virginia, on 12 August. Their final duties consisted 

of being fitted for and issued new green uniforms as 

Author’s collection Photo courtesy of the Matthew Fidler collection

59 Pvt Clinton Vann Peck to Fred H. Peck, 10 August 1919, courtesy of the Peck family. During this short period, some 6,677 enlisted men were 

discharged from the Marine Corps or transferred to inactive status as reported in Maj Edwin N. McClellan, The United States Marine Corps in 

the World War (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps History Division, 2015, reprint), 139.

well as drawing their closeout pay and a train ticket 

home.59 The 4th Brigade, brought to life to serve in 

the AEF’s 2d Division on 24 October 1917 at Bourmont, Haute-Marne, France, was deactivated on 13 

August 1919, its mission complete.s1775s
Development of Medical Doctrine

for Amphibious Warfare by the

U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1936–39

Captain Steven L. Oreck, USN (Ret)

F

or the U.S. Marines, 1936 started with a 

controversy that could have derailed all of 

the plans and effort of the Corps to transform in line with a new mission. In 1935, 

the Joint Action of the Army and Navy had removed 

the language inserted in 1927 that had made amphibious warfare the main Marine Corps mission.1

The U.S. Army was focused elsewhere and was not 

interested in becoming involved with amphibious 

assault. In 1928, Army Colonel William L. Mitchell 

had predicted that air forces would devastate any 

amphibious assault fleet before a landing, and in 

the early 1930s, General Douglas MacArthur, then 

chief of staff, had indicated the Army had “extreme 

reluctance” to undertake amphibious operations.2

The Navy and Marine Corps mounted a vigorous 

response to this change, with the acting Secretary 

of the Navy, William H. Standley, sending a letter to 

the Joint Board urging in the strongest way that this 

action be reversed: “In the seizure and temporary 

defense of advanced bases, the Marine Corps can, it 

is believed, make its most valuable contribution to 

a naval campaign. The Marine Corps considers this 

functions [sic] its primary mission . . .”3

The amphibious mission was promptly reassigned 

to the Marines, and they would remain the lead Service in this area. It is worth noting that, when the amphibious mission was taken from the Marine Corps 

in 1935, it was not given to anyone else. Though it has 

been suggested that the change represented a “Parthian Shot” from General MacArthur as he left his 

position. MacArthur, like many senior Army officers 

who had been in France during World War I, harbored resentment against the Marines for the publicity they had garnered during that conflict.4

Although 

this episodemay have increased inter-Service resentment, its prompt resolution prevented any significant 

change in Navy and Marine transformation efforts.

In the early winter of 1936, Fleet Landing Exercise 

(FLEX) 2 was held in and around Culebra, Puerto 

Rico. The 1st Brigade surgeon, Lieutenant Commander John B. O’Neill, USN, submitted a detailed 

report on the exercise, and Colonel G. I. McKinney, 

an Army medical observer, also made a report. Lieutenant Commander O’Neill had significant experience as a junior medical officer (lieutenant) with the 

Marines during the Second Nicaragua Campaign, 

and had been awarded the Navy Cross twice for valor 

for his actions in that campaign.5

 Additionally, the 

overall report from the commanding general of the 

Fleet Marine Force (FMF) contained a section analyzing medical aspects of the FLEX. 

PART III

1 Joint Board, “Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1927,” Chapter 1, Section VII, Historical Amphibious File, Gen Alfred M. Gray Research Center 

(GRC), Marine Corps University (MCU), Quantico, VA.

2 William Felix Atwater, “United States Army and Navy Development of Joint Landing Operations, 1898–1942” (PhD thesis, Duke University, 

1986), 38–39.

3 W. H. Standley to Joint Board, 18 May 1936, Historical Amphibious File, GRC, MCU, Quantico, VA.

4 Atwater, “United States Army and Navy Development of Joint Landing Operations,” 85. During WWI, Gen Pershing had a policy that individual 

units were not to be identified in press releases so that credit could be attributed to the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) as a whole. It was 

initially thought that a well-known reporter, Floyd Gibbons, had been killed covering the Belleau Wood action, and his fellow reporters identified the Marines and the action as a tribute to him. In actuality, the reporter was wounded but survived. Pershing was furious about this episode, 

and Army officers attributed the violation to deliberate Marine publicity seeking. Harry S. Truman, who had been an Army artillery officer in 

France, as president complained about the Marines' “publicity machine.”

5 “Navy Cross Recipients: Second Nicaragua Campaign, 1926–1933,” ValorDefense.gov, updated 29 March 2013.

40
Winter 2016 41

The report of the brigade surgeon followed the 

pattern established in FLEX 1, which was to become basically a template for future reports. The 

actual medical care delivered to achieve the overall health of the force was good. However, when it 

came to the purpose of the exercise—simulated assaults—the shortcomings were obvious. Lieutenant 

Commander O’Neill distilled the biggest problem 

down to a single comment: “The operations ashore 

demonstrated the outstanding fault of the medical 

service—lack of personnel. A secondary fault was 

inadequacy of training.”6

The table of organization (T/O) for medical personnel attached to units participating in the exercise 

was inadequate, even for peacetime needs. The T/O 

was not filled for the exercise, with shortages particularly of corpsmen. Furthermore, approximately 

50 percent of the corpsmen reported with little or no 

experience or training in field operations, and there 

was insufficient time between when they reported 

and when they departed for the exercise to remedy 

this fault. Equipment was also deficient. What equipment they had was too bulky, and while Lieutenant 

Commander O’Neill wanted changes, he urged more 

experimentation and trials before any new equipment was procured.

The report of the Army observer, Colonel McKinney, echoed the analysis of Lieutenant Commander 

O’Neill. Colonel McKinney noted that the overall 

number of medical personnel assigned to the brigade was inadequate and that there was no collecting company. Those medical personnel who were 

present were neither adequately trained nor integrated into the units they supported or the medical 

detachments.7

 Colonel McKinney recommended a 

publication by Navy Captain William L. Mann Jr. on 

joint operations—the division of responsibility between Navy and land components for medical care 

was the same for both Army and Marine landings. 

That is, the Navy and the attack force surgeon were 

responsible for the casualty collection stations on the 

beach or beach evacuation stations, and transport of 

the wounded to the appropriate ships and care once 

they were on board. The land component and its senior medical officer were responsible for all medical 

issues forward of the beach.

The overall Marine Corps after action report on 

FLEX 2 contained a section on medical aspects. 

Again, a major issue presented was the lack of sufficient medical personnel and the fact that many of 

those assigned arrived late and had no training prior 

to the exercise.8

 Recommendations were made to 

increase the number of enlisted medical personnel 

in the brigade to 76, to establish permanent brigade 

medical staff (officer and enlisted), and to send some 

personnel to the Army field medical school as soon 

as possible.9

 Arriving with the signature of the commanding general of the 1st Marine Brigade, this report carried a great deal of weight.

In July 1936, Commander Joel T. Boone, USN, arrived in San Diego to assume the position of FMF 

surgeon. Commander Boone was experienced, well 

known, and well connected. He joined the Navy in 

1914 and served in Haiti prior to service with the 

Marines in France during World War I, where he 

was awarded the Medal of Honor. Subsequent to the 

war, he was the physician assigned to the presidential 

yacht, and following that assignment, attended an advanced course at the naval medical school in the early 1930s.10 Dedicated, a man of action, and unafraid 

to use his influence for a good cause, Commander 

Boone was just the sort of Navy doctor to organize 

and develop medical support for the FMF. When he 

arrived, he found no job description, no files, and for 

6 LCdr John B. O’Neill, USN, “Medical Activities of First Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, report of [FLEX 2] (CONFIDENTIAL),” 13 March 1936, 

Record Group (RG) 127, National Archives, Washington, DC. 

7 Col G. I. McKinney, USA, “Extract from a Report on Fleet Landing Exercise No. 2 (CONFIDENTIAL),” 1 September 1936, RG 127, National Archives, Washington, DC.

8 To approximate the T/O for Marine support, medical personnel (officer and enlisted) would be detached from their normal duty stations, clinics, or hospitals for temporary duty during an exercise. Typically, they were detached from their parent unit as late as possible; and if they had 

never served with the Marines before, they had no training in medical care in the field or with a specific type of field medical unit. Thus, while 

these personnel might be well qualified medically, they were totally unqualified for field duty, absent at least minimal training. When they came 

at the last minute, time that should have been spent doing the exercise was needed to train them to a minimal standard simply to be safe in the 

field environment.

9 “Report on U.S. Fleet Landing Exercise Number Two (CONFIDENTIAL),” 30 March 1936, RG 127, National Archives, Washington, DC.

10 “Biographical Information Sheet (NavPers): VAdm Joel T. Boone, MC, USN,” 19 November 1973, Biographical Files, Navy Historical Center, 

Operational Archives, Washington Navy Yard.
42 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

Throughout the fall of 1936, Commander Boone 

worked closely with Captain Cottle to get the medical service of the FMF on a sound basis. One of the 

junior medical officers in the FMF, Lieutenant Commander J. L. Manion, (MC) USN, had produced the 

most detailed plan for the medical service of the FMF 

to date. Twenty-two pages long with 68 attached 

tables, this analysis set out the T/O and proposed 

table of equipment (T/E) for the brigade medical 

organization and defined the roles and responsibilities of the various levels of medical staff (battalion, 

regimental, and brigade surgeons). A sample medical annex to the field order was included in the plan, 

as well as a discussion of the actions of the various 

medical units from embarkation through the assault 

until there was a hiatus in combat.15 Commander 

Boone forwarded a summary of this to Captain Cottle and strongly urged the adoption of the concept 

of four smaller, 66-bed field hospitals for the FMF 

rather than one larger one, citing the ease of combat 

loading, lighter weight of each unit, and the added 

flexibility with this scheme.16 Commander Boone 

used Cottle as another advocate to get the Bureau of 

Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) and the Navy line 

command to make the changes that those medical 

officers working with the Marines saw as necessary 

and urgent. He was able to do this and remain cognizant of the chain of command because of the change 

made several years prior that designated Marine 

expeditionary forces as the Fleet Marine Force. By 

adding another direction to the line of attack, Boone 

was attempting to overcome inertia and disinterest 

in Washington.

As 1936 drew to a close, all indications showed 

that the letters and reports forwarded to Washington by Commander Boone and others had some 

effect. In December 1936, Boone received a letter 

from Captain G. E. Thomas, (MC) USN, at BUMED, 

which was very supportive of his efforts. Captain 

Thomas agreed with the concept that medical officers with the FMF should be there for a full cruise 

better or worse, was confronted with a tabula rasa, 

or blank slate.11 One of Commander Boone’s first actions was to study the reports on Gallipoli. 

Boone wasted no time in beginning to cover the 

blank slate with writing. In August 1936, he sent a 

letter to Rear Admiral Percival S. Rossiter, the surgeon general of the Navy, on the subject of FMF 

medical organization. Unsurprisingly, he requested 

an increase in the strength of the assigned personnel and urged that the appropriate officers and enlisted men be assigned as quickly as possible to allow 

for unit integrity.12 Also in August, Boone received 

a letter from Captain George F. Cottle, (MC) USN, 

the Pacific fleet surgeon and an old friend.13 Besides 

welcoming Commander Boone to San Diego and his 

new job, Captain Cottle pointed out the new landing 

manual and suggested that Commander Boone review it and make recommendations to improve the 

medical section. Cottle also mentioned that Boone 

should review the lectures on field medicine by Captain Mann. This communication illustrates the relatively small circle of Navy medical officers dealing 

with the issue of amphibious warfare, and the prominent position of Mann in the center of that circle.

One of the issues that the Marines had to deal with 

during the 1930s was a lack of interest by most of the 

Navy line in amphibious warfare. The struggles of 

the Marines to get the Navy to support amphibious 

shipping in both the right quantity and the right design, and the uphill struggle to acquire proper landing craft, has been well presented by such authors 

as Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, Allan R. Millett, and others. In conjunction with Captain Cottle, 

Commander Boone presented lectures to the Navy 

line staff of the Pacific Fleet on amphibious operations and the medical aspects thereof. One might 

expect a lecture by a Medal of Honor recipient on 

any subject to be attractive to a military audience, 

however, the line staff was described as “bored” at 

the first lecture, although showing somewhat more 

interest at the second.14

11 VAdm Joel T. Boone, USN (Ret), “Memoirs” (unpublished manuscript, 1963), Joel T. Boone Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 

XXV-6.

12 Cdr Joel T Boone, (MC) USN, to Admiral P. S. Rossiter, 17 August, 1936, Joel T. Boone Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

13 Capt George F. Cottle, (MC) USN, to Cdr Joel T. Boone, (MC) USN, 24 August 1936, Joel T. Boone Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

14 Boone, “Memoirs,” XXV-7.

15 LCdr J. L. Manion, (MC) USN, “Organization Brigade Medical Service Fleet Marine Force 1936,” September 1936, RG 52, National Archives, 

Washington, DC.

16 Cdr Joel T. Boone, (MC) USN, to Capt George F. Cottle, (MC) USN, 11 December 1937, RG 52, National Archives, Washington, DC.
Winter 2016 43

(i.e., a regular tour of duty) and not temporarily assigned. He also supported the development of an 

FMF/Marine Corps field medical course for corpsmen, who would attend a two-week course following graduation from the Hospital Corps School in 

San Diego, California. Captain Thomas urged Commander Boone to develop and submit a curriculum 

for this course to BUMED.17 The support of BUMED 

was encouraging and also illustrated that higher authorities in the Navy and Marine Corps, whether 

medical or line, basically had given the medical officers with the Marines, like Commander Boone and 

his compatriots, free rein to devise solutions. It was 

also clear that Washington was not supplying much 

if any guidance, and that the efforts to devise doctrines and solutions for medical support of Marine 

Corps amphibious operations would have to be done 

on an informal and ad hoc basis, in stark contrast 

to the way the Marines had gone about devising the 

Tentative Manual for Landing Operations (1934).18

Early in 1937, the Navy and Marines conducted 

FLEX 3 in the waters of the Pacific Ocean, with 

the landings taking place on San Clemente Island, 

California. For the Marines, and the exercise as a 

whole, the rougher surf of the Pacific compared with 

the Caribbean and the less friendly beaches of San 

Clemente highlighted the inadequacies of standard 

ships’ boats for landing. For the medical personnel, 

difficulties moving personnel and equipment onto 

the beach only indicated how challenging moving 

stretcher cases off the beach would be using the current boats.

Lieutenant Commander O’Neill, as brigade surgeon, once again submitted a detailed after action report. He described routine medical care as adequate, 

and that care had been stressed by the explosion of a 

gun on the USS Wyoming (BB 32), resulting in several deaths and serious injuries. O’Neill noted that 

only the proximity of the exercise to onshore medical facilities had allowed the most seriously wounded to be transported to facilities that could provide 

needed care in time. Many of the organizational and 

equipment-related themes highlighted in FLEXs 1 

and 2 were again stressed by Lieutenant Commander O’Neill. Stretcher-bearers needed to be assigned 

and trained prior to the exercise. A medical detachment needed to be ashore with the beach detachment early on to relieve the battalion medical staff of 

having to care for wounded awaiting evacuation—a 

task that impaired their ability to do their primary 

mission. Once again, equipment packs needed to be 

lightened, modularized, and waterproofed. Finally, 

Lieutenant Commander O’Neill urged that a type C 

field hospital be included in the next exercise to test 

the ability to land it, set it up, and provide care in the 

field.19

Lieutenant (junior grade) Robert S. Snyder, (DC) 

USN, submitted a report on the dental activities during FLEX 3. This was the only dental report found in 

the archives, and it is notable for two observations. 

The dental field equipment was not landed during 

the exercise as had been scheduled because it was too 

bulky and difficult to transport, and Lieutenant Snyder also requested that an enlisted dental technician 

be assigned to the dental officer to provide needed 

assistance. The equipment and personnel issues of 

the medical officers were very much the same for the 

dentists. In a prescient analysis, Snyder described his 

view of how the dental officer would function during 

the assault phase.

Considering these landing operations carried 

out against an actual enemy in position, the 

dental surgeon would take over the duties of a 

battalion medical officer or assist the regimental medical officer until the desirable enemy positions had been secured. After these positions 

have been secured the dental officer could then 

revert back to the duties of the dental officer 

and place the dental field equipment in position 

and perform his prescribed duties.20

In two sentences, this junior dental officer had 

defined the role of dental officers during the early 

phases of an amphibious assault, and this doctrine 

persists to the present day.

Commander Boone performed the most com17 Capt G. E. Thomas, (MC) USN, to Cdr Joel T. Boone, USN, 29 December 1936, Joel T. Boone Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

18 Tentative Manual for Landing Operations (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Schools, 1934). 19 At this point in time, all field hospitals were tent based; LCdr John B. O’Neill, (MC) USN, “Medical Department Activities of First Marine Brigade, 

Fleet Marine Force, Report of [FLEX 3],” 26 February 1937, RG 127, National Archives, Washington, DC.

20 Lt R. S. Snyder, USN, “Dental Activities, Report of Fleet Landing Exercise No. 3 (CONFIDENTIAL),” 23 February 1937, RG 127, National Archives, 

Washington, DC.
44 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

plete analysis of FLEX 3. In his memoirs, Commander Boone described his feelings as he prepared 

to supervise medical aspects of this exercise: “Amphibious operations were understood but rather 

nebulously. There was much to learn how they 

should be executed.”21 In his 13-page report, Commander Boone supported and expanded upon the 

comments made by Lieutenant Commander O’Neill, 

reiterating the recurrent personnel issues. The T/O 

was inadequate, and enough personnel were not 

assigned to even fill the inadequate T/O. The issue 

of stretcher-bearers had yet to be solved, and Commander Boone was very clear that stretcher-bearers 

could not be corpsmen because using highly trained 

medical personnel in that role was a misuse of scarce 

resources. The medical officers assigned to the beach 

party were both inadequate in number and training. A more pointed set of comments highlighted 

what Commander Boone felt was a lack of interest 

and commitment on the part of the Navy to this exercise. He emphasized that the fleet medical officer 

did not attend the exercise, the designated attack 

force medical officer cancelled his appearance due 

to other commitments, and no other medical officer had been assigned to the staff of the transport 

group commander even though it had been mandated by the landing manual.22 Commander Boone 

went on to state that the Navy needed to understand 

that the wounded were not disposable but repairable 

and that conservation of the trained personnel, who 

would need to be replaced from bases far away during amphibious operations, was an important task. 

He lamented, “There is reasonable apprehension that 

too little thought is being given by our naval officials 

to the greatest of military assets—manpower conservation.”23

Commander Boone enumerated the need for a 

permanent FMF medical staff, as had others. This 

staff needed to be included in all aspects of the planning for an exercise or an actual assault. In typically 

strong language, Boone described the shortage of 

personnel, especially the enlisted corpsmen: “In the 

event of hostilities, a marked expansion of medical 

enlisted requirements would be urgently necessary. 

The present corpsman quotas barely meet actual 

[peacetime] need.”24

Commander Boone also echoed the comments of 

Lieutenant Commander O’Neill concerning equipment. Medical equipment for the FMF needed to 

be man portable as much as possible, put together 

in smaller containers, and properly waterproofed. 

Lightweight collapsible stretchers needed to be provided for the assault phase. There was a need for 

a lightweight field hospital that could be landed 

through the surf, as opposed to being only capable of 

landing ashore once more formal docking facilities 

could be seized by the landing force. Another note 

was the need for experimentation, the need to try out 

any new equipment before buying it. The Marines 

were not immune from criticism; they were faulted 

for failing to provide a complete field uniform issue 

to the assigned Navy personnel, which not surprisingly caused difficulties and dissatisfaction. This last 

point, although seemingly minor, was yet another 

example of the problems that were caused by the 

medical personnel assigned to the Marines existing 

in two worlds, but not fully part of either.

Commander Boone did not simply identify failings without offering constructive suggestions. He 

recommended that medical personnel not be sent 

ashore in their own boats but be dispersed among 

the troops they were to care for. Proposals were laid 

out for improving the entire evacuation chain from 

the point of injury to the hospital ships, which he felt 

should be present for the exercise. Once again, Commander Boone emphasized the need for training and 

practice: “Unless thorough, complete and long training is provided, care of casualties and their evacuation will be woefully deficient.”25 While the overall 

state of medical support for amphibious operations 

and the level of expertise actually demonstrated at 

FLEX 3 was not encouraging, the Navy medical officers assigned to the Marines were developing a 

good idea of what was workable, where the major 

21 Boone, “Memoirs,” XXV-69.

22 Cdr Joel T. Boone, (MC) USN, “Report of Medical Officer on U.S. Fleet Landing Exercise No. 3,” HQ FMF MCB San Diego, CA, 12 March 1937, 

Historical Amphibious File, GRC, MCU, Quantico, VA.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.
Winter 2016 45

problems were, and an outline of how to solve those 

problems. Looking back in his memoirs then-Vice 

Admiral Boone commented:

I had learned during World War I overseas that 

medical contingents serving with the Marines 

must be an integral part of them. Without those 

discouraging and tragic days, as they seemed 

then, on San Clemente, it would be most depressing to contemplate what would have happened when World War II came upon us.26

The state of the medical support might be best 

visualized through photographs taken during those 

exercises.

Following FLEX 3, the task was to incorporate the 

lessons learned into the doctrine and move forward. 

Commander Boone used the network of like-minded 

doctors and corresponded with Captain Mann on the 

East Coast, where he was still post surgeon at Quantico. Captain Mann agreed with Commander Boone 

concerning equipment issues and again stressed the 

need to lighten and modularize equipment; he also 

was convinced that the issue of medical evacuation, 

especially the shore-to-ship and ship-to-ship movements, was an unsolved problem. Captain Mann illustrated the utility of using the network of Marine 

and amphibious-oriented medical officers when he 

said: “I am very glad to see the interest you are taking 

in such matters, and it is best for the service that we 

interchange ideas as much as practicable so all can 

pull towards a common objective.”27

The month following this exchange with Captain 

Mann, Commander Boone wrote an article for the 

BUMED medical newsletter that is distributed to all 

Navy medical officers. He intended this article to not 

only inform other medical officers about field medicine and amphibious operations but also to inform all 

fleet medical officers about their connection to this 

special area and their obligation to get involved. Boone 

attempted to not only interest “non-Marine” medical 

officers in amphibious warfare but also to solicit their 

ideas. He described field medicine as a specialization 

within military medicine and emphasized that, no 

matter what billet they held, naval medical officers 

needed to be aware of the greater military aspects 

of their situation. He listed several sources of information, including the Tentative Manual for Landing 

Operations and the Official History of the Australian 

Army Medical Services, 1914–18, which detailed the 

medical errors and overall failure at Gallipoli.28 Commander Boone had loaned his copy of the Australian 

Army medical history to Captain Mann for his use in 

researching medical care for amphibious operations.

Captain Mann was coauthor with Lieutenant Col26 Boone, “Memoirs,” XXV-71.

27 Cdr Joel T. Boone, (MC) USN to Capt W. L. Mann, (MC) USN, 29 March 1937, Joel T. Boone Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

28 Cdr Joel T. Boone, (MC) USN, 12 April 1937, Joel T. Boone Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; and A. G. Butler et al., Official History 

of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914–18, vol. 1 (Canberra, Australia: Australian War Memorial, 1930). 

Official U.S. Navy photo 

Medical personnel set up an aid tent on San Clemente Island, CA, during casualty movement training in the winter 

of 1937.
46 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

regulation of moving casualties off the beach and 

between ships. The authors also stressed the need 

for proper loading and unloading plans for medical 

equipment and field hospitals, as well as ensuring 

medical troops were dispersed among the boats with 

the forces they were supposed to support.29

The bibliography of this work gives insight into 

the scholarly approach taken by the authors. The 

earliest article the authors cite comes from Benjamin Rush about military medical organization and 

duties in 1777. All other works, however, are from 

the twentieth century, with the bulk being post1918. Most of the titles focus on the British experience at Gallipoli, though the book by General Erich 

von Tschischwitz on combined German operations 

in the Baltic Islands is also cited—Gallipoli and the 

Baltic Islands being the two modern amphibious 

campaigns.30 Gallipoli was repeatedly studied by the 

medical officers devising Navy/Marine amphibious 

doctrine because it was used by their line counterparts as a comprehensive guide on what not to do 

and mistakes to avoid.

In the fall of 1937, the Navy embarked upon a 

review of the medical equipment for Marine Corps 

support with special emphasis on the aid stations. 

Captain Mann was president of this board, and shortly thereafter, probably at his request, Commander 

onel Edgar E. Hume, (MC) USA, on a work published 

by the naval medical school entitled “Medical Tactics of Combined Operations of the Army and Navy,” 

which was released in 1937. While this publication 

was partly applicable for amphibious operations, it 

did not deal exclusively with them or specifically 

with amphibious assault. The publication was about 

35 pages long and included a historical review of 

many joint operations carried out from Sir Francis 

Drake in 1588 through World War I, specifically 

Gallipoli and to a small extent the German Baltic 

assault. While the work concerned primarily Army/

Navy operations, most of the overarching principles 

were the same for Navy/Marine operations.

The authors emphasized the need for a predefined 

and unified scheme of command and distinct responsibilities as well as joint planning to prevent 

a repeat of the medical fiasco at Gallipoli. Several 

single-spaced typed pages were devoted to extensive 

quotations from the Australian experience at Gallipoli. The essence of the command structure was 

that the Navy was in charge from the gangway at the 

port of embarkation to the landing beach; inland 

from the beach, the Army (land component) was in 

charge. This put the control of evacuation from the 

beach and triage at the beach stations in the hands 

of the Navy, which was responsible for the medical 

Official U.S. Navy photo

During casualty movement training in the winter of 1937, stokes litters transport casualties.

29 Capt W. L. Mann, (MC) USN, and LtCol Edgar Erskine Hume, (MC) USA, “Medical Tactics of Combined Operations of the Army and Navy,” Naval 

Medical School, 1937, Historical Amphibious File, GRC, MCU, Quantico, VA.

30 The book by von Tschischwitz was written in 1931 and translated in 1933 by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, see Michael B. 

Barrett, Operation Albion: The German Conquest of the Baltic Islands (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 233.
Winter 2016 47

of parsimony died hard among the bean counters. 

Commander Boone argued strongly, and eventually 

successfully, for Captain Mann to receive funding to 

attend FLEX 4 in light of both his acknowledged expertise and his position as president of the board reviewing medical equipment for Marine Corps use.33

That it took this level of effort to get the minimal 

funding necessary for Captain Mann to attend the 

FLEX, while not surprising, is indicative of the lack 

of any sort of urgency or priority given to the issue of 

medical support for the Marines.

In preparation for FLEX 4 to take place in the Caribbean, Lieutenant Commander O’Neill had been 

corresponding with Commander Boone to develop 

plans for the exercise. Commander Boone as FMF 

surgeon was in charge of the medical arrangements 

and planning. Commander Boone was impressed 

with Lieutenant Commander O’Neill’s ideas and 

considered them very good. In his memoirs, Boone 

described Lieutenant Commander O’Neill as “[a] 

very experienced medical officer serving with the 

Marines,” and adding, “The Marines thought he was 

really one of them.”34

Prior the 1938 winter fleet exercise, FLEX 4, Commander Boone prepared the medical Annex G to 

the operations order for the exercise. This set out 

the general parameters for the exercise but did not 

go into great detail.35 This exercise was to see three 

significant figures involved: Captain Mann was the 

attack force surgeon, Commander Boone was the 

FMF surgeon, and Lieutenant Commander O’Neill 

was the 1st Brigade surgeon. Their time together was 

cut short as Commander Boone became very ill with 

a case of food poisoning, which led to his evacuation back to the United States. The illness was quite 

serious and required a long convalescence, and fortunately, Commander Boone’s relief as FMF surgeon 

was Captain Mann, continuing a long and close association with the Marines and putting the Navy’s 

foremost expert in the area of field medicine in just 

the right spot at just the right time.

Boone was also appointed to the review board.31 At 

about the same time, Lieutenant Commander O’Neill 

was appointed to the Marine Corps Equipment Board 

to provide input on items that impacted the medical 

service. These officers and other doctors attached to 

the Marines hoped that these actions would result in 

much needed changes being made. Rearmament, in 

particular naval rearmament, was beginning to pick 

up steam, and there were expectations that funding 

to solve these long-standing equipment issues might 

be secured by the Navy and Marines.

The action on the part of the BUMED to conduct 

a thorough review of field-related equipment may 

have been helped along by Commander Boone’s 

willingness to light fires in sensitive places. He 

worked with Brigadier General Louis M. Little, the 

FMF commanding general, to write a memo that the 

Commandant, Major General Thomas Holcomb, 

eventually endorsed. In this memo addressed to 

Rear Admiral Rossiter, the surgeon general, the Marines complained that supply and evacuation were 

not being adequately stressed by the Navy medical 

command and that requests for changes and increases in both supply and assigned personnel had gotten 

nowhere. These deficiencies, the Marines averred, 

had caused the readiness of the medical elements of 

the FMF to lag.32

In December 1937, in anticipation of FLEX 4, 

Commander Boone wrote yet another strongly 

worded letter to BUMED. He requested eight medical officers and 48 enlisted corpsmen to cover the 

landings as well as a “skeletonized” type C field hospital, which they would staff and use to treat both 

real and simulated casualties. In his own words and 

quoting Captain Mann, Commander Boone reemphasized the need for realistic training to expose 

shortcomings in doctrine and equipment. He stated 

his understanding of and sympathy for the shortage of doctors and corpsmen, but claimed that the 

FLEX was a vital exercise. In spite of increasing budgets and the beginnings of rearmament, the habits 

31 Boone, “Memoirs,” XXV-205-06.

32 Ibid., XXV-196-97.

33 Cdr Joel T. Boone, (MC) USN, to BUMED, 11 December 1937, RG 52, National Archives, Washington, DC.

34 Boone, “Memoirs,” XXV-218. The Marines have always regarded highly the Navy medical personnel assigned to support them, because for 

the Marines to consider a medical officer or corpsman “one of them” is considered a high compliment by both the Marines and the “adopted” 

Navy individual.

35 Cdr Joel T. Boone, (MC) USN, “Annex ‘G’ to FMF Operation Plan 1-38,” 10 March 1938, Joel T. Boone Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, 

DC.
48 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

This unfortunate illness put an end to Commander 

Boone’s service with the Marines, although he would 

stay in the Navy and rise to great heights. An entry 

in his memoirs from late 1938, however, illustrates 

once again the web that bound this group of Navy 

physicians together. Boone mentions the graduation 

of Commander Walter A. Vogelsang from the Naval 

War College and his assignment as battle force surgeon and refers to him as a friend.36 Commander Vogelsang had a long experience with the Marines and 

was another member of this small group of medical 

officers considered experts in field medicine.

Due to his illness and premature departure, Commander Boone did not submit an after action report, although both Captain Mann and Lieutenant 

Commander O’Neill did so. FLEX 4 made less use of 

constructive units then the previous exercises, and 

there was some actual casualty evacuation training 

involving shore-to-ship movement. Certain specialized transport equipment and hoisting devices for 

the wounded were tried for the first time.37 Unfortunately, from a medical standpoint, the exercise 

was another example of trying to decide if the glass 

was half empty or half full. Both Captain Mann and 

Lieutenant Commander O’Neill highlighted problems that had been identified with proposed solutions in the previous exercises. One can almost see 

Lieutenant Commander O’Neill biting his tongue 

to restrain himself as he wrote his report. The same 

personnel problems occurred: the total number of 

personal was inadequate and most of the personnel 

reported too late to receive any training before they 

needed to board ship. While the type C field hospital 

was added to the exercise as requested by Lieutenant Commander O’Neill and Commander Boone, 

the lack of adequate numbers of medical personnel 

meant that the personnel from the field hospital became a pool for assignment to other areas, such as 

line units.38 Naturally, robbing Peter to pay Paul had 

the predictable result of reducing the ability of the 

field hospital to perform its duties and to participate 

fully in the exercise as a unit.39

Convening the equipment review board of the 

Navy and assigning Lieutenant Commander O’Neill 

to the Marine Corps equipment board had not yet 

produced any results. Equipment issues persisted, 

and as Lieutenant Commander O’Neill’s comments 

make clear, the issues had not changed appreciably.

As has been reported previously, this equipment is excellent for certain types of medical 

work, but many of the units are quite unfit for 

use in landing operations as they are too heavy, 

too bulky, not waterproofed, contain many superfluous or obsolete items, and lack a unit designed for care of chemical casualties.40

When Lieutenant Commander O’Neill was on 

the Marine Corps equipment board, the minutes for 

1938–40 have only one mention of a piece of equipment for medical use.41

Two important tactical errors were described by 

O’Neill as well; both concerned medical activity on 

the beach while the beach was still under heavy fire. 

First, wounded were evacuated by forward units to 

the beach before the beach was relatively secure, and 

medical stations were established by the Marines 

on the beach when and where they were subject to 

heavy fire. While complete freedom from enemy 

fire on the beach was not a requirement for establishing collection points or medical stations, doing 

so too soon needlessly exposed medical personnel 

and their equipment to destruction, without a corresponding benefit to the wounded. Second, medical 

facilities were needed ashore early but not too early. 

This sort of timing was something that needed to be 

learned and internalized with experience.

Captain Mann submitted a detailed report, and 

many of his points coincided with Lieutenant Commander O’Neill’s. The tone of Captain Mann’s comments was more on the level of concepts than the 

36 Boone, “Memoirs,” XXV-216. 

37 Gen Holland M. Smith, USMC (Ret), The Development of Amphibious Tactics in the U.S. Navy (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 

History and Museums Division, 1992), 28.

38 LCdr John B. O’Neill, USN, “Report of the Medical Activities of the First Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, during the U.S. Fleet Landing 

Exercise Four,” 28 February 1938, RG 127, National Archives, Washington, DC.

39 The T/O for a type C field hospital at this time was six commissioned officers (five doctors, one dentist), one warrant officer (pharmacist), 40 

USN enlisted, and 14 USMC enlisted.

40 O’Neill, “Report of the Medical Activities of the First Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, during the U.S. Fleet Landing Exercise Four.”

41 “Minutes, Marine Corps Equipment Board, 1938, 1939, 1940,” Marine Corps Equipment Board Meetings and Reports, Box 1, GRC, MCU, 

Quantico, VA. 
Winter 2016 49

specific of the brigade surgeon’s. Coordination and 

command and control had worked well, and he 

stressed this function as an absolute necessity, including quotes from the Australian Gallipoli experience.42 He created numerous enclosures, including 

detailed recommendations for equipment, manning 

levels for various units, proper preparation for gas 

casualties, and improved dental care.43

In May 1939, shortly after Captain Mann had 

taken over as FMF surgeon, the Navy board began 

studying the proposed equipment the Marines promulgated in its report. This highly detailed report 

went through the Navy equipment tables for medications and equipment and made numerous recommendations for change. The set for the battalion aid 

station (BAS) was defined in the report and specified to be highly portable. The Navy’s own history of 

the medical department acknowledged the lack of 

proper equipment for Marine Corps support as war 

approached. This equipment was more than 15 years 

old, was bulky and improperly packaged, and had 

proven to be inadequate during the FLEXs. As a result of this board, new equipment sets were designed 

by the BUMED and a budget allocated for them; 

however, these new sets were not issued to units until 1941.44 The board also made a recommendation 

to increase the number of corpsmen in an infantry 

battalion—between 16 and 20—not the first time 

this increase in the T/O had been recommended.45

Captain Mann continued his dialogue with 

BUMED about FMF reorganization. In September 

1938, he forwarded further suggestions for changes 

in the T/O and T/E. The proposed medical staff for 

a regiment of 2,258 men was to be 8 medical officers and 57 enlisted corpsmen.46 It appears that Captain Mann felt his voice and the voice of the Marine Corps medical needs was finally being heard at 

BUMED, and changes were afoot as he said in the 

same letter:

Your letter was most receptive after four years 

of useless discussion and little progress. Believe 

we will get somewhere now. Field medical service is one of the most important subdivisions 

of naval medicine since it must be maintained 

in a state of IMMEDIATE READINESS at all 

times.47

This is a key point: the medical service, supporting the Marines, must be ready in all respects at all 

times. The deployment of the Marines cannot depend on taking time to make up significant medical 

deficiencies, and absent adequate medical support, 

deploying the Marines absent adequate medical support is not acceptable.

In August 1938, the Navy promulgated Fleet 

Training Publication 167 (FTP-167), Landing Operations Doctrine. The Navy and Marines derived 

FTP-167 from the Tentative Manual for Landing 

Operations, and the tentative manual was ordered 

withdrawn by the Marines from circulation in November 1938.48 This foundational publication, with 

relatively minor changes, was the controlling document for amphibious planning at the beginning of 

World War II and the basic source for planning for 

the invasion of Guadalcanal (Operation Watchtower) in August 1942. FTP-167 was modified slightly by 

the Army to fit its terminology and units and was issued as the Army’s operational guide for amphibious 

operations in 1940. Consequently, this document 

was what Army planners used for their components 

of the invasion of North Africa in the fall of 1942 

(Operation Torch).

In replacing the tentative landing manual, FTP167 was, at least in theory, the product of combined 

42 The text on the history of the Australian Army Medical Corps in WWI has the most detailed discussion of any war history regarding the medical 

aspects of Gallipoli from planning to evacuation of wounded to distant hospitals. The loan of this book shows the close cooperation between 

Cdr Boone and Capt Mann. Capt Mann used it for several of his publications and reports. In 2009, no copy of this book was available in any U.S. 

library, and it had to be obtained from Australia. Cdr Boone’s copy may have been the only one in the United States in 1937–38.

43 Capt W. L. Mann, (MC) USN, and Cdr M. J. Aston, (MC) USN, “Final Report on Medical Activities during Landing Exercises Number Four (Restricted),” March 1938, RG 127, National Archives, Washington, DC.

44 U.S. Navy Medical Department Administrative History, 1941–1945: Volume II, Organizational History Chapters I-IX, (Washington, DC: Bureau of 

Medicine and Surgery Navy Department, 1946), 205–6.

45 Capt W. L. Mann, (MC) USN, “Preliminary Report of Board (for Study of Medical Expeditionary Equipment and Revision of the Field Supply 

Table, Medical Department, U.S. Navy),” 27 May 1938, RG 52, National Archives, Washington, DC.

46 Currently the medical T/O for a Marine regiment (infantry) of approximately 2,700 men is 7 medical officers and 180 enlisted personnel.

47 Capt W. L. Mann, (MC) USN, to BUMED, 13 September 1938, RG 52, National Archives, Washington, DC.

48 MGen Thomas Holcomb, “Destruction of the Tentative Landing Operations Manual 1935,” 28 November 1938, Historical Amphibious File, 

GRC, MCU, Quantico, VA.
50 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

Navy and Marine Corps thinking and represented a 

doctrine accepted and understood by both Services. 

Some sections of the document were highly detailed, 

and others, such as medical, less so but even less detailed areas were not glossed over.

In spite of what might be considered rather 

skimpy coverage, several important doctrinal points 

were established in FTP-167.49 The very beginning of 

the section, paragraph 955 (Medical Plans), lays out 

the issues that must be determined in advance of the 

operation—at least on the Navy side. The responsibilities of the attack force surgeon (in paragraph 

956) are clearly laid out in the document: moving the 

wounded from the beach evacuation station (BES) 

seaward including the actual evacuation, assigning 

the wounded to appropriate ships for treatment, recommending placement of casualty receiving ships, 

and more.50 Unfortunately, the duties of the senior 

medical officer of the landing force (landing force 

surgeon) are not defined. The verbiage implies that 

everything forward of the BES is his responsibility, 

but not defining this properly represents a potentially significant oversight. The writers of FTP-167 

possibly felt that it is incumbent upon the Marines 

to define the scope of authority of the landing force 

surgeon who would be serving on a Marine general 

staff; however, this is a joint document, and the landing force surgeon’s duties should have been as well 

defined as the attack force surgeon. In fact, the landing force surgeon is never specifically mentioned in 

the medical section of FTP-167.

Although the duties of the landing force surgeon 

are not defined, the responsibilities of the BAS, regimental aid station, and collecting station, all of which 

are part of the landing force, are defined. Additionally, the distribution and function of corpsmen within 

the battalion are defined.51 The organization schema, duties, and casualty flow, proposed for a landing, closely follow the work and recommendations 

of Mann, Boone, O’Neill, and others. One potential 

issue was that FTP-167 assigns company corpsmen 

just prior to the assault, whereas as noted previously, 

most of the medical officers who had discussed this 

issue emphasized the need for corpsmen to be wellintegrated into their assigned line unit. Fortunately, 

this particular issue was solved by the medical officers in the unit, well before any assault, by making 

these assignments early on, thus assuring unit integrity.

FTP-167 contains extensive discussion about supply issues, but none regarding control and movement 

of medical supplies. Supplies for the corpsmen and 

initial issue for units such as the BAS is mentioned, 

but the entire issue of medical replenishment or replacement for lost or damaged supplies and equipment is absent from FTP-167. This was a significant 

oversight for it points to the issues of how to determine how much resupply might be needed, who is 

responsible for procuring such supplies and equally 

important allocating space on transports for those 

supplies, and who controls them both afloat and 

ashore. If something is not assigned as somebody’s 

responsibility, then it is likely to end up as nobody’s 

responsibility with negative consequences.

Another area of potential friction concerns base 

hospitals. These facilities are larger medical units of 

more robust capability that are scheduled to be landed and set up as the campaign progresses. Paragraph 

967(b) defines these units, and is clear that “the 

medical personnel of the Fleet Marine Force is not 

adequate to establish or operate a base hospital.”52

Left unanswered are several questions: who decides 

how many of these units are needed, who decides 

where they are to be located (especially if they are in 

the combat zone), and who has operational control 

of these units? Even as recently as Operations Desert 

Storm and Iraqi Freedom, there was significant contention over the answers to these questions.

In spite of the shortcomings of FTP-167 in some 

areas of medical doctrine and tactics, overall, it represented a tremendous leap forward. It codified and 

made official the experiences and work of more than 

15 years by naval medical officers who made amphibious warfare an area of interest and study. Although in war nothing is certain, by following the 

doctrine set forth in FTP-167, the amphibious force 

49 Medical support in FTP-167 is in chapter 9 (Logistics), the last chapter of the publication, and medical is the last section of that chapter and 

consists of 8 pages (of the 238 total pages) of which 3 were illustrations.

50 Landing Operations Doctrine, FTP-167 (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, 1938). 51 Ibid. 

52 Ibid.
Winter 2016 51

could avoid the sort of medical catastrophe typified 

by the Gallipoli landing. The weaknesses identified 

in FTP-167, if recognized during the planning stage, 

could be overcome by some extra staff work. The fact 

that the current doctrine and planning for amphibious (and expeditionary) assault follows along the 

same basic lines as FTP-167 testifies to its intellectual and doctrinal solidity, and the changes wrought by 

experience and technology have not made the basic 

concepts of FTP-167 obsolete.

In the winter of 1939, FLEX 5 was the last when 

the world was at peace. The Navy decided to conduct these exercises in the Caribbean, in spite of the 

fact that the FMF and most of its units were in California, because of a concern that the Pacific Coast 

would be more exposed to Japanese espionage activities. In several minor exercises, the Army became involved but still depended on the Marines to provide 

training. Lieutenant Commander W. T. Brown was 

now 1st Brigade surgeon, and his report indicated 

that many of the problems reported from past exercises had not yet been solved. He recommended an 

increase in the number of corpsmen in an infantry 

battalion (once again) to a minimum of 24 from the 

current 16 (Army infantry battalions had 20 medics), doubling the number of collecting companies 

and associated personnel and adding a medical officer to the collecting company, and increasing the 

size of the medical company. Equipment portability 

remained an issue.53

By the time the war began in September 1939, 

the foundation and most of the structure that would 

constitute medical doctrine for amphibious warfare 

was well established. More practice was needed in 

the two years that America had before the conflict 

finally engulfed the entire world. Like the Higgins 

Boat and the Alligator, medical equipment suitable 

for the needs of the Marines was slowly being developed and procured by BUMED. Medical manpower still presented a severe bottleneck, and civilians, 

even physicians, could only be turned into trained 

field medical personnel so quickly. In 1940, the Navy 

published Medical Service in Joint Oversea Operations, which was basically a refinement of the 1937 

publication by Captain Mann and Lieutenant Colonel Hume. As noted, the first tests of amphibious assault came in 1942 at Guadalcanal by the Marines 

and in North Africa by the Army. Learning, refining, 

and improving continued throughout the war, but 

the work of a small group of naval physicians had 

created the doctrine that sustained these and future 

assaults. That these physicians “labored in the wilderness” and that their efforts seemed to have been 

officially forgotten is best illustrated by this statement from the official Navy history of the medical 

department during World War II:

It should be mentioned here that planning for 

amphibious warfare became a real necessity, 

and it was at an early point in 1942 that the 

Medical Department of the Navy, in conjunction with the Marines and certain Navy components, began thorough training in this peculiar 

form of warfare.54

Only when BUMED, following the shock of Pearl 

Harbor, realized that medical readiness for amphibious warfare was an urgent necessity, did the official 

history of medical doctrine for amphibious warfare 

begin. All of the work done by the small group of 

physicians prior to 1942 to develop doctrine, techniques, and equipment for medical support of amphibious operations seems to have been completely 

omitted in the official history.

Conclusion

Military doctrine has to be appropriate to the circumstances that surround a potential conflict. Many 

factors define the total picture of the circumstances. 

These factors include the resources available for the 

military, the geographic position of your country and 

of any potential enemies, the internal politics of your 

country, and the presence or absence of religious or 

ethnic factors that could cause internal disunity. 

Doctrine also has to adapt to the terrain of combat: 

mountains, deserts, sea, or sky. Similarly, every subset of the overarching doctrine has to be appropriate 

for the circumstances. Medical doctrine is no exception; it must be appropriate to the circumstances 

where it will be employed. Amphibious warfare, and 

in particular amphibious assault, represents a very 

53 LCdr W. T. Brown, (MC) USN, “Medical Activities, Report No. 17 (Restricted),” 5 March 1939, RG 127, National Archives, Washington, DC.

54 U.S. Navy Medical Department Administrative History, 1941–1945, 4.
52 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

special military environment that requires an equally specialized medical doctrine.

As we have seen over the three parts to this article, 

there is no better example of the consequences to inadequate medical doctrine for amphibious warfare 

than Gallipoli. Certainly, doctrinal failure was complete in almost every respect, but concentrating on 

the failures of medical doctrine is highly illustrative 

for our purposes. Failure to understand the need for 

proper doctrine, and then the planning and training 

such doctrine would have mandated, led to immense 

preventable suffering and increased morbidity and 

mortality amongst the wounded, especially in the assault phases of the operation. The Navy physicians 

who worked in the interwar period to create medical 

doctrine for amphibious warfare were determined 

not to repeat these errors.

While the Marines, and at least certain elements 

of the Navy, realized the need for a systematic approach to developing doctrine and to dealing with 

issues related to amphibious warfare, this systematic 

approach did not quite extend to medical concerns. 

Naval line officers attached to the Marines for the 

development of doctrine and equipment for amphibious assault were no more attuned to the need 

for development of medical doctrine than were their 

Marine counterparts. The general tendency of the 

line officers to ignore medical issues until they became a problem was not unique to the interwar Navy 

and Marine Corps. Both Union and Confederate 

forces put medical issues to the side at the beginning 

of the Civil War and only began to address them 

when they became overloaded and dysfunctional. 

Even U.S. involvements in the last 20 years have seen 

medical issues much more of a last-minute fix than 

it should have been.

The role of medicine in the military and in wartime has always been somewhat ambiguous. How 

does one find a military role for a profession dedicated to saving life and alleviating suffering in the 

midst of an organization that is, at its core, dedicated 

to generating death and destruction? However, to say 

that this role is to only alleviate suffering and prevent 

death is incomplete; it ignores the military role of the 

medical officer. The military physician, on the other 

hand, must be two people with a dual “personality.” 

He (or she) must be skilled in both the healing and 

the military arts, and know when to call on which 

personality. These naval medical officers who developed this amphibious medical doctrine understood 

this truth and knew when to call on which side of 

their inner selves.

All of the key physicians in the development of 

medical doctrine had distinguished records and experience with the Marines, serving in the field and in 

combat. Joel Boone and John O’Neill received high 

decorations for valor in the field at the risk of their 

own lives while providing care to the Marines. All 

of these physicians made the decision to accept further duty with the Corps. Continuing assignments 

with the Marines or assignment to senior leadership posts, such as brigade surgeon, post surgeon at 

Quantico, or FMF surgeon, happened because the 

officers that requested these assignments had demonstrated abilities for such roles. Compared with 

most peacetime jobs in Navy medicine, these posts 

represented extra work and hardship, and the fact 

that these individuals sought them out testifies to 

their dedication. The reports from exercises and the 

end product of amphibious medical doctrine speak 

to their intellectual qualities.

As much as these officers worked separately, they 

also worked together. The naval medical community 

of the interwar period was not large, and the subset 

of those who spent a significant proportion of their 

careers with the Marines was smaller still. Doctors 

like Mann, Boone, Vogelsang, O’Neill, and others 

were not strangers. At a minimum, they knew each 

other by reputation, and more often than not called 

each other friend. The surviving correspondence illustrates how they consulted each other, bounced 

ideas back and forth, and shared resources all in aid 

of the same goal—to develop a doctrine for medical 

support of amphibious warfare that would be effective. Washington, DC, Quantico, and later San Diego 

encompassed the geography where these men would 

work. The headquarters, medical facilities, quarters, 

and officers’ clubs enclosed these doctors in a relatively small world where interaction was inevitable. 

Thus, the environment these naval officers worked 

in was conducive to the formation of networks and 

their shared desire to produce the solutions for medical care in an amphibious Marine Corps resulted in 

a system that worked for more than 20 years.

Unlike the Marines who worked within a formal 

structure and command directive to produce the 
Winter 2016 53

overall military doctrines for amphibious warfare, 

these doctors worked without the benefit of a tasking order. When such an order is given, it also carries 

with it the unspoken promise that there will be some 

sort of guidance, which will hopefully be of benefit, 

and also funds and other assistance to ease the task. 

For the development of medical doctrine, no such 

tasking order was given by the Marines or BUMED, 

no funding or administrative support flowed to 

those who created this doctrine, and for better or 

worse, there was little if any guidance from above.

It was not that the Navy, or BUMED in particular, 

was totally unsympathetic to the needs of the Marines. Some, perhaps many, of the medical officers 

at BUMED had served with the Marines or personally knew the medical officers who were submitting 

the reports and suggestions. Unfortunately, until the 

very end of the interwar period, resources of both 

men and materiel were severely constrained. Medical supplies and equipment in a warehouse ready to 

be deployed in support of potential operations represent a cost without a clearly obvious benefit, unlike 

a ship steaming away to show the flag or a Marine 

carrying a rifle. Similarly, medical personnel, always 

a limited quantity and expensive in a classroom or in 

the field learning the craft of field medicine, represented an opportunity cost. To provide the care that 

they could have been providing were they not in the 

classroom or field training requires the expense of 

either having more personnel to cover these absences or contracting this care to an outside source and 

incurring more expense.

In tension against the personnel and financial 

costs of medical readiness was the reality quoted by 

Captain Mann as FMF surgeon: medical support 

needs to be ready at all times. During the SpanishAmerican War, the shortcomings of military medicine in sanitary and preventive aspects as well as care 

during combat were so scandalous that Congress set 

up a special committee to investigate the problem. In 

World War I, there was time, before U.S. involvement 

to consider plans and a period after the declaration of 

war in April 1917 when U.S. forces were being created and few forces were engaged in actual combat, that 

allowed the creation of an expanded military medical establishment. In World War II, American forces were significantly engaged immediately after the 

Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and other American 

military entities. Yet, even though the United States 

had two years to anticipate and prepare for war, the 

official history shows that medical doctrine and preparedness for amphibious warfare was not a hot button item at BUMED until early 1942.

The network of doctors did not have to work against 

the Marine command structure either. Although, in 

most cases, the doctors were not included in major 

planning meetings, the Marines were comfortable 

with them and trusted their collective judgment. 

When medical issues came up, the Marines generally deferred to and supported the recommendations 

made by these officers. The Marines recognized that 

the “docs” had expertise in a field about which they 

knew next to nothing, the particular doctors proposing these ideas had a proven track record with the 

Marines, and the solutions made sense and did not 

make unreasonable demands on the system.55 Since 

the medical doctrine developed during the interwar 

period was only partially tested in exercises, it is not 

surprising that the doctrine needed to adapt and 

evolve during World War II. Fortunately, the first 

two amphibious assaults at Guadalcanal and North 

Africa were not strongly resisted on the beaches and 

did not produce large numbers of casualties immediately to stress the system. Given the problems at 

Guadalcanal with inappropriately loaded transports, 

the failure to unload all supplies before the transports had to leave due to threats from the Imperial 

Japanese Navy, and the medical struggles during the 

“land” campaign, there was significant potential for 

complete or at least partial failure from a medical 

standpoint had the Japanese resistance been similar 

to what was seen later in the Pacific campaign.

Had medical doctrine not been developed in parallel with the overall amphibious doctrine, it seems 

55 One of the more difficult concepts for a physician, newly assigned to a field command, is the system of priorities and command. Within a clinic 

or hospital, solutions that optimize medical efficiency and outcomes are the goal, and the appropriate members of the medical staff make the 

decisions about what is required to achieve these goals, allocate personnel and resources, etc. When attached to the Marines, a doctor must 

understand (and completely internalize) the reality that the optimal solution from a medical standpoint will take second place to mission accomplishment, and the unit commander will make that call, not the doctor. The experienced medical staff officer will jump ahead and present 

the commander with options that he (or she) knows will fit within the margins of mission accomplishment first.
54 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

clear that there would have been a high price to pay. 

The record is clear that the bulk of Army doctrine for 

amphibious warfare was taken almost word for word 

from FTP-167, and similarly, the medical doctrine 

for naval amphibious warfare also was taken from 

the above Navy/Marine document. In fact, as the 

joint operations publications made clear, a significant portion of the medical doctrine and care for an 

amphibious assault was a Navy responsibility—the 

BESs, shore to ship evacuation, and care afloat. There 

is no evidence to suggest that Army medical personnel spent any significant amount of time working on 

amphibious medicine until 1939–40 at the earliest.

We can conclude that, at least for the first two years 

of World War II, there would have been a very steep 

learning curve for amphibious medical doctrine had 

these Navy doctors not developed the basics of such 

doctrine during the interwar period of 1920–39. The 

result of such a steep learning curve would have certainly increased suffering, morbidity, and mortality 

among the sick and wounded of any amphibious operation. The effect of raising the human cost of the 

early operations is hard to determine. At a minimum, 

it would have made planners more cautious in the use 

of amphibious operations, and in cases where there 

was no alternative, the expectation of a high casualty 

cost would necessitate the gathering of more troops 

(and the ships to carry them) for any operation, thus 

slowing the overall pace of the Allied advance during 

the war. Exactly how much slower and what effect 

that might have had on the outcome of the war is 

impossible to know. In this example, if D-Day had 

been delayed three months, even if we assume the 

post invasion scenario proceeded at the same pace, 

that could have produced significant changes in the 

postwar picture, though the eventual defeat of Germany probably would not have been affected. 

A truism of military medicine is that surgeons 

have to relearn the principles of combat surgery, 

which differs significantly from even civilian trauma 

surgery, with every war. For our purposes, the same 

holds true for medical support in general. In 1959, 

a course module prepared by the Marine Corps 

Schools was entitled “Medical Service in Modern 

Amphibious Operations” and stated: “Unfortunately, however, precepts of landing force medical service have not been clearly established as such and, 

therefore, are not generally well recognized and understood; consequently, planning for medical support in the FMF often lacks the positive direction 

of military tactical planning.”56 Coming after all the 

experiences of World War II and the Inchon landing in Korea, one wonders how this statement found 

its way into an instruction syllabus. Other doctrinal 

and Navy medical publications of the same period 

show that the efforts of the interwar period and the 

lessons of World War II had not been lost.

Doctrine does not stand still. Use of the helicopter for both assault and medical evacuation and the 

possibility of the use of nuclear weapons against an 

amphibious force were factors in 1959, but not present in 1939. The basic concepts of medical support 

for amphibious warfare were established by the physicians during the interwar period, and these principles, if not in every specific detail, were validated in 

every theater of operations during the World War II.

Military history is no longer just about the great 

generals, the tactical details of a given battle or campaign, or the technology of warfare. Not that these 

facts and understanding them is unimportant, but 

rather that what might be considered nontraditional 

factors are recognized as being important within the 

field of military history. Logistics, from the tactical 

details of getting beans to the troops to the understanding of how economic capacity of a nation can 

determine the outcome of a conflict, is one area. 

Social and political issues, questions of gender, and 

underlying cultural norms are other examples of 

nontraditional factors now being examined for their 

effect on military history. While some interest has 

always been present over the years in the history of 

military medicine, it has been primarily an interest 

of doctors (usually with military experience) and 

usually focused on strictly medical issues. Medical 

doctrine, the blending of the military and medical 

halves of the military physicians mind, has been 

much less examined.

Military medical services and medical doctrine 

will not win a battle or a war, although it can contribute to victory. However, failure to have adequate and 

appropriate medical doctrine can cause defeat at any 

level from the tactical to the strategic. Medical doc56 “Medical Service in Modern Amphibious Operations,” 1959, Historical Amphibious File, GRC, MCU, Quantico, VA.
Winter 2016 55

trine is not just about managing the wounded from 

the battlefield but also recognizing the risks presented by the environment of the campaign and mitigating those effects to preserve the force. As Joel Boone 

noted, the commanders must recognize the value of 

the soldiers, and then the doctors must use this support to preserve those soldiers. Military historians 

should understand and analyze medical doctrine and 

its effects on battle as they would any other factor.

Almost immediately following World War II, Walter Vogelsang and William Mann retired from the 

Navy, Vogelsang as a captain and Mann as a rear admiral. Joel Boone retired as a vice admiral for medical 

reasons in 1950, and subsequently served for several 

years as director of medical services for the Veterans 

Administration. John O’Neill was the youngest of the 

group developing medical doctrine and the only one 

to serve with the Marines during World War II; Captain O’Neill spent all of that war with the Marines in 

one capacity or another. As a captain, he became the 

corps surgeon for the V Amphibious Corps and the 

senior medical officer for the invasions of Saipan and 

Tinian. There, he displayed the intellectual flexibility 

demonstrated during the 1930s when he established 

the largest air evacuation system to date when rough 

seas prevented the evacuation of the wounded from 

Tinian to Saipan.57 Following these actions, he continued with the V Amphibious Corps and was the 

senior medical officer for the invasion of Iwo Jima for 

which he received the Legion of Merit with combat 

“V.”58 He retired as a rear admiral in 1947.

The Navy medical officers who worked between 

1920 and 1939 to create a viable medical doctrine for 

amphibious warfare had a very large stone to push 

uphill. The only guide they had—Gallipoli—was a 

treasure trove of information on what not to do but 

did nothing to suggest what to do. They had moral 

support from the Marines and to some extent from 

BUMED but little if any financial or administrative support, lacking even a tasking order creating a 

board or study group. What they did have was a realization that there was a need for medical doctrine 

to suit the new amphibious warfare doctrine and the 

intellectual curiosity to research the subject. They 

established a network that operated not so much 

against or outside the existing system but in parallel with it. This network functioned in wardrooms 

on board transports, in letters that passed from one 

base or command to another, and probably in informal conversations at one “O” club or another.

The basic concepts of medical amphibious doctrine—definition of command relationships for 

medicine, control of medical evacuation, general 

capabilities of various Marine medical units, and 

more—remain in place today. Even with the modifications in the past 70 years due to advances in medicine and changes in technology, these naval doctors 

would recognize their handiwork in current operational manuals. By minimizing the human cost of 

amphibious warfare, these officers contributed to 

victory, and many of those who participated in amphibious operations during World War II and their 

descendants since then owe a great deal to these men.

s1775s

57 Maj Carl W. Hoffman, The Seizure of Tinian (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1951). 58 RAdm John B. O’Neill, USN, “Biographical Information Sheet,” 24 March 1955, Biographical Files, Navy Operational Archives, Washington 

Navy Yard, Washington, DC.
The Aftermath of Hell

GRAVES REGISTRATION POLICY AND U.S. MARINE CORPS 

LOSSES IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS DURING WORLD WAR II

Christopher J. Martin*

On the morning of 7 August 1942, personnel from the 1st Marine Division scrambled onto their landing craft and began 

the invasion of Guadalcanal, the first 

step by Allies to retake the Solomon Islands from 

forces of the Japanese empire.1

 Mountains of material have been written on these legendary battles, from 

books by historians such as Richard B. Frank and 

Eric M. Hammel to memoirs from individual Marines who took part in the conflicts on Bougainville, 

Guadalcanal, and New Georgia. However, none of 

these works discuss what happened to the remains of 

those Marines who did not survive these encounters 

with the Japanese or determine how many Marines 

may still lie in unmarked graves on the Solomon Islands or remain unidentified in American cemeteries and why many of these Marines were not able to 

be properly identified after the end of World War II. 

The Marines killed in the Solomon Islands who remain unrecovered or unidentified remain so because 

a lack of trained graves registration personnel and a 

policy decision to inter their remains on the battlefield either rendered their burial site lost to history 

or their remains too decomposed for identification. 

How Many Marines

Remain Unidentified?

After the conclusion of World War II, the Memorial 

Division of the Office of the Quartermaster General 

(OQMG) created the “Rosters of Military Personnel 

Whose Remains Were Not Recovered, 1951–1954.”2

“The Rosters” is an electronic list created by the Department of the Army in 1954 of military personnel 

whose remains were not recovered or identified during or after World War II. The list is arranged alphabetically by surname of the decedent and lists rank, 

branch of Service, date of death, and the geographical 

area in which the servicemember died. “The Rosters” 

used a system of “geographic codes” to detail not only 

the theater in which an individual was lost—the “area 

code”—but, in cases of Service personnel from the 

U.S. Marine Corps and Navy, the individual country 

using a “pinpoint code.” Unfortunately, the original 

key to these codes does not accompany the copy of 

“The Rosters” held by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), and it is not known 

which organizations originally assigned the area and 

pinpoint codes. The NARA data file of World War II 

prisoners of war (POWs) provided initial information on the codes associated with individual theaters 

* Christopher Martin received both his bachelors in communication (2000) and his masters in history (2005) from George Mason University. He 

served as an Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Technology archival research fellow at the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency from 2005 to 

2008, and now works as a historian for the federal government in Washington, DC. The research for this article was supported, in part, by an appointment to the Postgraduate Research Participation Program at the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), administered 

by the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education through an interagency agreement between the U.S. Department of Energy and DPMO. 

The author would like to thank the archivists of the Modern Military Section at NARA and historians Dr. Mark Russell, Dr. Christine Cohn, and Julia 

Hickey for offering thoughtful comments and suggestions.

1 Richard B. Frank, Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle (New York: Penguin, 1990), 59. 2 “Rosters of Military Personnel Whose Remains Were Not Recovered, 1951–1954,” hereafter “The Rosters,” RG 92, Records of the Office of the 

Quartermaster General (ROQG), 1774–1985, NARA, College Park, MD.

56
Winter 2016 57

personnel lost in the sinking of U.S. Navy ships. Per 

these two lists, 48 Marines were buried at sea and 

71 were killed when their ship sank during one of 

the many battles between the United States and the 

Imperial Japanese Navies in the Solomon Islands. 

Lastly, because of an error in coding, the individual 

deceased personnel file of 15 Marines include area 

and pinpoint codes that indicate they were lost in 

the Solomon Islands when in fact they were lost elsewhere in the Pacific theater. Removing those Marines 

buried at sea, lost in the sinking of Navy ships, and 

mistakenly included in the overall number of Marines unrecovered from the Solomon Islands leaves 

approximately 663 Marine Corps personnel still deserving of a proper burial. 

The Military Establishes a Graves

Registration Service and Learns

from World War I

After the United States’ entry into World War I in 

August 1917, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker 

Jr. issued War Department General Orders No. 

104, which authorized the creation of a graves registration services.6

 By the end of the war, 19 graves 

registration companies were created by the Quartermaster General and sent to Europe.7

 During the war, 

one of the most important duties of the GRS was, 

“the deployment of units and groups along the entire 

line of battle, so that they might begin their work of 

identification of bodies and marking of graves immediately upon the beginning of hostilities in any 

given sector.”8

 The policy of deploying graves registration units as quickly as possible, sometimes even 

while hostilities were ongoing, resulted in successful 

identification of 96.5 percent of the 79,129 U.S. military deaths in World War I.9

 According to OQMG 

historian Edward Steere, the experience of World 

and countries.3 Historians at the Defense Prisoner of 

War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), renamed 

the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA) 

in 2015, analyzed a sample of individual deceased 

personnel files (IDPFs) created for each U.S. servicemember lost during World War II.4

 Through the 

use of IDPFs and other documents held by NARA, 

the historians were able to determine that 08 is the 

primary area code, and 3H is the primary pinpoint 

code used in “The Rosters” to indicate Marine Corps 

losses in the Solomon Islands.5

In 2007, DPAA released the “Service Personnel 

Not Recovered Following World War II” list of more 

than 78,000 U.S. Service personnel whose remains 

were not recovered or identified from that conflict. 

Using this data revealed that 798 Marines were not 

recovered or identified whose geographic codes 

place their area of loss in the Solomon Islands. The 

names of each of those Marines were compared with 

individuals on lists of personnel buried at sea and 

3 Matthew J. Richardson, “Geographic Code Project Summary” (unpublished manuscript, DPMO, 1 November 2004). 

4 For more information about the history of these agencies, see “Our Transformation,” Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency.

5 Area codes 0E, 015, 03A, 02, 03, 08, and pinpoint codes 3H, 3A, 3G, and 57 are also associated with U.S. Service personnel losses in the Solomon Islands. A review of individual deceased personnel files for Marines unrecovered from the Solomon Islands later revealed the instance of 

two Marines unrecovered or unidentified from the Solomon Islands recorded with the pinpoint code 3G and three with the area code 08 but 

without a pinpoint code.

6 Edward Steere, The Graves Registration Service in World War II, Q. M. C. Historical Studies No. 21 (Washington, DC: Historical Section, Office 

of the Quartermaster General, 1951), 12. 

7 Ibid. 

8 Ibid., 13; and J. Dell, “Historical Notes Prepared on Graves Registration Service,” RG 92, NARA, College Park, MD, 3. 

9 Steere, Graves Registration Service in World War II, and Dell, “Historical Notes Prepared on Graves Registration Service.” 

National Archives 

A graves registration worker points out the outlines of 

a body to his crew.
58 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

War I resulted in the emergence of a “theater graves 

registration service, with its operating units in close 

support to combat.”10

During the 1920s, many of the policies established 

during World War I were codified in Army regulations. In February 1924, the War Department published the AR-30 series of Army regulations (AR) that 

governed graves registration responsibilities during 

the first half of World War II, until their replacement 

by a new set of AR-30 regulations in 1943. One of 

these regulations, known as AR-30-1810, established 

strict procedures for the registration of unmarked 

graves, the care and disposition of unburied remains, 

and the identification of individual remains.11 According to AR-30-1810, burials of military personnel 

during wartime were to be conducted and supervised 

by “detailed burial officers and commanding officers 

under the general supervision of the graves registration officer of the command.”12 These regulations 

also heavily discouraged the use of isolated burials, 

which were defined as a group of less than 12 graves 

because, as AR-30-1810 noted, “Every isolated burial 

renders liable the loss of a soldier’s body.”13

Graves Registration

on Guadalcanal

Prior to World War II, the AR-30 regulations anticipated that, upon a declaration of war, four graves 

registration companies would be activated, which 

would have “served as a nucleus for expansion” of the 

graves registration service.14 However, the surprise 

Japanese attack against the American base at Pearl 

Harbor, Hawaii, on 7 December 1941 gave the U.S. 

military no such opportunity for slow expansion, 

and with it adequate training. According to Steere, 

“under the accelerated training program of wartime 

there was no unit training.”15 Only seven complete 

graves registration companies were active in August 

1942 at the beginning of the invasion of Guadalcanal, and none of them were fully trained.16 The Army 

estimated that each graves registration unit needed 

three months of training to adequately perform its 

function in the field.17 It was not to be until early 1943 

that an adequate training program was available for 

graves registration units.18 The 604th Quartermaster 

Graves Registration Company, which later served on 

Guadalcanal in postwar search-and-recovery operations, became the first graves registration company 

to complete a training course at Vancouver Barracks 

Unit Training Center in Washington State.19

The lack of fully trained graves registration personnel heavily influenced the graves registration 

policy pursued by the Marine Corps during operations in the Solomon Islands. The Marines modeled 

their graves registration doctrine using a recent example of an operation conducted without the benefit 

of graves registration personnel—the U.S. Army’s 

long retreat down the Bataan Peninsula on the island 

of Luzon, Philippine Islands, in 1941. During the retreat, Army troops were forced to develop their own 

graves registration service using untrained personnel and to perform burials wherever possible instead 

of waiting to inter their fallen comrades at a central 

cemetery. Facing the same lack of trained personnel 

in mid-1942, the Marines simply copied the Army’s 

policy used on Bataan and improvised a graves registration service staffed by combat personnel under 

the direction of the Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and 

Surgery.20

Burial policy prior to the invasion held that, “a 

necessary concession to conditions of combat” 

would have to be made, and initially, Marines killed 

on Guadalcanal would be buried on the battlefield 

and not taken to a central collection point for proper 

10 Steere, Graves Registration Service in World War II, 13. 11 Ibid., 16. 

12 Quartermaster Corps Burials on Field of Battle, AR-30-1810 (Washington, DC: War Department, 1924); and Army Regulations (1920–1947), 

30-1675 (October 1925) to 30-2215 (December 1946), Box Files, Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2.

13 Ibid. 

14 Steere, Graves Registration Service in World War II, 19. 15 Ibid. 

16 Ibid., 43. 

17 BGen R. G. Moses to Quartermaster General, 18 August 1942, Box 167, RG 92, ROQG, 1774–1985, NARA, College Park, MD.

18 Ibid., 19. 

19 Ibid. 

20 Steere, Graves Registration Service in World War II, 43–44.
Winter 2016 59

the battered condition under which these bodies were interred and the rapidity with which 

decomposition takes place in the tropical climates, and these bodies must wait for a considerable time before they can be exhumed and 

reburied in proper cemeterial plots.23

According to Steere, “Lacking trained personnel and motor transport, essential to the operation 

of a collecting point system, any persistent effort at 

evacuating bodies to a centrally located burial place 

only tended to defeat the utilitarian purpose sought 

in first removing the dead.”24 Records of the OQMG 

indicate that burial of the dead by graves registration 

personnel in the combined U.S. Army, Navy, and 

Marine Corps cemetery on Guadalcanal occurred 

as early as January 1943.25 However, none of the 

Marines buried in the cemetery during that month 

had been disinterred from a battlefield grave and 

reburied in the cemetery; all of the burials were of 

Marines killed in late 1942 and early 1943. Unfortunately, the location of the consolidated cemetery on 

Guadalcanal does not appear on any map created by 

either the Marines or Army troops from the OQMG. 

The second and third pages of the burial plot chart 

for the cemetery in the holdings of NARA states “See 

Page 1” for its location; however, page one of this plot 

chart is missing. The likely location of this cemetery 

was near Henderson Field. According to Marine 

Corps Chaplain W. Wyeth Willard, the cemetery was 

“out past Henderson Field.”26 When Willard and the 

3d Battalion, 1st Marine Division, departed Guadalcanal on 15 December 1942, the cemetery consisted 

of 650 graves.27 This number of graves is sufficient 

for less than half of the 1,769 Marines and Army soldiers killed on Guadalcanal.28

Battlefield Burials on Guadalcanal 

Burial information for Service personnel killed during World War II was recorded on OQMG Form 

identification and burial.21 The Marine Corps directed a platoon of combat personnel selected for graves 

registration duties to follow the main combat invasion force ashore.22 A postwar critique of this unit 

stated that it “confined its activities almost entirely 

to emergency burial on the battlefield.” Plans for the 

invasion of Guadalcanal stated that, once the main 

combat objectives were accomplished, it would then 

be feasible to establish a cemetery on the island. It 

was not until the arrival of the U.S. Army’s Americal 

(23d Infantry) and 25th Infantry Divisions in November and December 1942 that a provisional island 

graves registration service was established. Plucked 

out of the artillery and transferred to the Quartermaster Corps because he worked as a mortician prior to the outbreak of the war, Warrant Officer (later 

First Lieutenant) Chester E. Goodwin headed this 

new effort to improve graves registration operations 

on Guadalcanal. Under Goodwin’s leadership, GRS 

personnel immediately began to bring the haphazard layout of the cemetery on Guadalcanal into conformity with specifications approved by the OQMG. 

On 18 February 1943, the 1st Platoon, 45th Graves 

Registration Company, became the first graves registration unit in the Solomon Islands. However, they 

were not given motor transport or enough labor 

personnel to enable Goodwin to initiate a program 

to disinter and collect the remains of the Marines 

buried on the battlefields around the island. Goodwin’s unit only consisted of six enlisted personnel 

and native laborers. U.S. Army Colonel Joseph H. 

Burgheim of the Quartermaster Service Command, 

New Caledonia, wrote to Army Major General (later 

Lieutenant General) Edmund B. Gregory, Quartermaster General, shortly after the activation of the 

1st Platoon, 45th Graves Registration Company, and 

stated that

No attempt has been made to date, to move 

battlefield casualties to the cemetery owing to 

21 Ibid., 44; and interviews and statements of officers of the 1st Marine Division of the Guadalcanal operations, compiled by Col B. Q. Jones, 5 

December 1942–19 January 43. Document is cited and quoted by Steere; however, the document has not been located at NARA.

22 Steere, Graves Registration Service in World War II, 44. 23 Ibid., 44–45; and Col J. B. Burgheim to MGen Edmund B. Gregory, 24 February 1943. Document is cited and quoted by Steere; however, the 

document has not been located at NARA.

24 Steere, Graves Registration Service in World War II, 46. 25 Headquarters Graves Registration Service, Quartermaster Corps, “Weekly Report of Burials Recorded,” 10–16 January 1943, Box 180, RG 92, 

ROQG, 1774–1985, NARA, College Park, MD. 

26 Martin Russ, Line of Departure: Tarawa (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1975), 170. 27 William H. Whyte, A Time of War: Remembering Guadalcanal, A Battle without Maps (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 86. 28 Ibid. There were 241 Marines lost in ground actions on Guadalcanal who remain unrecovered or unidentified. 
60 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

371, “Data on Remains Not Yet Recovered or Identified,” which was completed for each servicemember’s 

IDPF. The exact coordinates where burial occurred 

on the battlefield were recorded for 82 of the 137 

Marines who were killed on Guadalcanal. These coordinates were determined using a Marine Corps 

map known as “Map 104, North Coast of Guadalcanal, Lunga Area,” which used an arbitrary 1,000-

yard system to divide the map into grid sections.29

It is unknown which Marine organization drew the 

original map, but the creation of a map fitting its description is discussed by Navy Captain William H. 

Whyte in his memoir, A Time of War. According 

to Whyte, “[Lieutenant Colonel William McKelvy] 

instructed [Corporal] Wilke to draw up a battalion 

map. It was a handsome affair. The lettering was especially impressive, ‘North Coast of Guadalcanal–

Lunga Area’.”30 These deaths and the burial locations 

generally follow the course of the lengthy battle for 

Guadalcanal.31

In addition to the Marines known to have been 

buried on the battlefield, 86 Marine airmen were lost 

on or around Guadalcanal. These losses encompass 

at least 48 different loss incidents; 19 of the losses 

occurred in a variant of the Douglas SBD Dauntless 

dive bomber (the SBD-3, SBD-4, or SBD-5) and another 18 occurred in a variant of the Grumman F4F 

Wildcat aircraft (the F4F-1 or F4F-4). Identifying the 

location of air losses is a tricky one, however, because 

only the last known location of the aircraft can be 

identified. In some cases, the last known sighting of 

the aircraft occurred when it took off from Henderson Field. Therefore, the actual location of the crash 

can be anywhere between Henderson Field and the 

intended target location—either on Guadalcanal, at 

sea, or another island.

Adherence to Established Prewar

Policy Leads to Fewer

Unidentified Marines

Elsewhere in the Solomon Islands, the policy of 

battlefield burials without relatively quick disinterment and reinterment in the local cemetery does not 

Official U.S. Marine Corps map 

Map of Guadalcanal.

29 “Map 104, North Coast of Guadalcanal, Lunga Area,” RG 77, Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, 1789–1996, Cartographic and 

Architectural Unit, NARA, College Park, MD. 

30 Whyte, A Time of War, 53. 31 Plotting each burial on this map reveals that the Marines appear to have created ad hoc cemeteries on Guadalcanal where they buried remains near each other. Near Point Cruz on the north coast of Guadalcanal, there are 28 burials recorded in one grid square, including 20 in the 

same exact location. In the adjacent grid square, there were an additional seven burials. In a third grid square to the southwest of Point Cruz 

and to the west of the Matanikau River, the Marines buried another 21 individuals, 9 at the same coordinates. The burials in each of these grid 

squares also occurred largely around the same time during the fighting on Guadalcanal. Six of the seven burials near Point Cruz occurred in October 1942. Beginning on 6 October, the Marines crossed the Matanikau River to mount an attack against the Japanese forces massed beyond 

the river. During this three-day engagement, the 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division, buried five Marines in this grid square. Nineteen of the burials 

in the adjacent grid square, all from the 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division, occurred on 1 November 1942 after the opening day of a Marine offensive designed to push the Japanese back from Henderson Field. Of the 19 Marines buried that day, 12 are from C Company. Another seven 

Marines also were buried in the same grid square during 21–25 November 1942. Marines killed in the grid square southwest of Point Cruz and 

west of the Matanikau River also were buried largely on or around the same day. Two were buried on 10 October and another 16 during 21–24 

November, including 10 on 22 November. 
Winter 2016 61

appear to be a widely accepted practice. Just prior 

to the invasion of New Georgia, the 43d Infantry 

Division ordered that burials were to be confined 

to those at sea or in shore cemeteries.32 Because the 

New Georgia invasion did not begin until 20 June 

1943, Goodwin also was afforded the time to train 

provisional graves registration units.33 According 

to Steere, “Bodies were removed from the battlefield and, whenever possible, carried to task force 

or island cemeteries.”34 These provisional units were 

reinforced by the 109th Quartermaster Graves Registration Platoon, which arrived on 3 August 1943.35

In addition to recovery and identification operations, the 109th began building the permanent cemetery on New Georgia in September 1943.36 There is 

evidence that graves registration troops from New 

Zealand assisted in the effort to recover casualties 

from the battlefield.37 According to Steere and fellow Quartermaster historian Thayer M. Boardman, 

“New Georgia Island underwent a rather thorough 

search during the wartime American occupation, 

but construction work either covered or wiped out 

many graves.”38

 In total, 33 Marines are still not recovered or 

identified from action on New Georgia. The vast 

majority of these Marines are airmen lost in attacks 

against the Japanese airfield at Munda on 1–2 February 1943. Unfortunately, not all of these aircraft 

are potentially recoverable. According to the IDPFs 

of their occupants, four of these aircraft are known 

to have crashed into the ocean. Overall, 17 Marine 

airmen, whose area of loss is New Georgia, are currently not recovered or identified; these 17 losses 

occurred in nine separate loss incidents. Eleven of 

the 17 airmen currently not recovered or identified 

were lost while flying a Grumman TBF-1 Avenger 

torpedo bomber, another 3 in an F4F-4 Wildcat, and 

3 in an SBD-4 Dauntless dive bomber. Out of nine 

separate loss incidents, five TBF-1 Avengers, three 

F4F-4s, and one SBD-4 crashed on and around New 

Georgia. Of the 15 Marines known to have been lost 

on the ground in New Georgia but have not yet been 

recovered or identified, only 5 are known to have 

been buried on the battlefield. The majority of the 

Marines not recovered or identified, including the 

only Marine buried on the battlefield with exact 

burial coordinates recorded in his IDPF, were lost on 

the same day, 20 July 1943, during a Marine attack 

on Japanese positions at Bairoko Harbor.39

The ground loss statistics for Bougainville, Papua 

New Guinea, are similar to those on New Georgia. 

However, as with the invasion of Guadalcanal, the 

invasion of Bougainville illustrates the impact the absence of trained graves registration personnel in the 

invasion force had on the number of unrecovered or 

unidentified Marines. Even though the Marines had 

been bombing and harassing the Japanese garrison 

and airfield on Bougainville since the arrival of airplanes to Henderson Field on Guadalcanal in 1942, 

the actual land invasion of Bougainville did not begin until 1 November 1943. Unfortunately, trained 

graves registration personnel from the 1st Platoon, 

49th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company, 

did not arrive on Bougainville until 8 November 

1943.40 Of the 39 Marines lost in ground action on 

Bougainville and still not yet recovered or identified, 

10 were lost on 1 November 1943 and another 4 on 

7 November, before the arrival of graves registration 

personnel. However, evidence exists that the 1st Platoon, 49th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company, did conduct wartime search-and-recovery 

operations. Per the unit history, Sergeant Jakob O. 

Christofferson received the Bronze Star for recovery 

of the remains of U.S. Service personnel killed in an 

32 “Annex 4 to F.O. No. 1,” Headquarters New Georgia Occupation Force, 16 June 1943, Box 1004, RG 407, Records of the Adjutant General’s 

Office (RAGO), 1917–[sic], NARA, College Park, MD. 33 Ibid. 

34 Steere, Graves Registration Service in World War II, 48. 35 “Unit History of the 109th Graves Registration Platoon,” September 1945, Box 22959, RG 407, RAGO, 1917–[sic], NARA, College Park, MD. 36 Ibid. 

37 “Operations of the 25th Infantry Division in the Central Solomons,” 22 July–29 October 1943, Box 6932, RG 407, RAGO, 1917–[sic], NARA, 

College Park, MD. 

38 Edward Steere and Thayer M. Boardman, Final Disposition of World War II Dead, 1945–51, Q. M. C. Historical Studies Series II, No. 4 (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, Office of the Quartermaster General, 1957), 446. 

39 Entry for 20 July 1943, “Action Report-Daily Summary Narrative,” 1st Marine Raider Regiment, Box 241, RG 127, Records Relating to United 

States Marine Corps Operations in World War II (Geographic Files), NARA, College Park, MD. 

40 Headquarters, 1st Platoon, 49th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company, to the Adjutant General, “Unit History 1 April to 30 June 1944,” 

30 June 1944, Box 22526, RG 407, RAGO, 1917–[sic], NARA, College Park, MD. 
62 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

aircraft crash beyond American lines.41 Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Zisk also received a commendation 

for outstanding service for directing the removal of 

remains from temporary burial plots and their reinternment into the cemetery on Bougainville.42

By far, the largest number of Marine airmen not 

recovered or identified have Bougainville as their 

area of loss; for example, 65 Marine airmen are not 

recovered or identified from action over or around 

the island. As with the action elsewhere in the Solomon Islands, some of these losses undoubtedly occurred over deep water and the exact location of the 

aircraft crash may never be known. 

Postwar Graves Registration

in the Solomon Islands

After the end of World War II, in addition to providing burial and identification services on the battlefield, the American GRS (AGRS), under the direction 

of the OQMG, identified and repatriated the remains 

of U.S. servicemembers killed during the war in the 

Pacific. The responsibility and authority for these operations was assigned to the commanding general 

of American forces in the western Pacific.43 Three 

subordinate sector commands were also established: 

MIDPAC (mid-Pacific) sector, WESPAC (western 

Pacific) sector, and JAP-KOR (Japan-Korea) sector. 

The Solomon Islands, because of the geographical 

broadness of the area, were assigned to both MIDPAC and WESPAC sectors, with the northern Solomon Islands assigned to WESPAC and the southern 

Solomon Islands assigned to MIDPAC.44

There apparently were operations undertaken in 

the southern Solomon Islands to search and recover 

remains of U.S. military personnel immediately following the surrender of Japan and then again in July 

1946.45 Unfortunately, the organizations that conducted these operations and their results remain a 

mystery. Operational plans were laid out for a third 

search-and-recovery operation of isolated burials in 

the Solomon Islands to begin on 15 May 1947 and 

conclude three months later.46 Prior to the beginning 

of this third recovery operation, an estimated 277 

U.S. personnel potentially were recoverable from 

isolated burials in the southern Solomon Islands, 

including 268 on Guadalcanal.47 As we have seen, 

the AGRS woefully underestimated the number of 

potentially recoverable Marines on Guadalcanal. 

However, the AGRS did their best to recover the low 

number of Marines they estimated were yet to be recovered. 

On 15 July 1947, the 1st Platoon, 604th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company (QM GRC), 

left Hawaii on board USS LST 711 en route to the 

South Pacific to conduct search-and-recovery operations. A detail of 33 men and 5 officers were to 

search Guadalcanal while the rest of the company 

continued operations elsewhere because, “A number 

of men lost during the heavy fighting in the fall of 

1942 and early spring of 1943, had never been recovered and in view of time elapsed [of] four years, 

rapid growth of jungle covering the area where these 

men fell would entail a great amount of work in 

searching.” After LST 711 arrived back at Guadalcanal on 18 October 1947, the 604th QM GRC began 

an intensive area search of Guadalcanal during 19–

24 October. According to the unit history, “As most 

of all the fighting on Guadalcanal covered an area 

starting at Henderson Field and extending west for 

approximately six miles and to an average of three 

miles inland, this area was concentrated on.” In addition to trained graves registration troops, the 604th 

QM GRC also enlisted the aid of natives on Guadalcanal in the area search. The specific details of any 

recoveries made by the company on Guadalcanal 

are unknown. However, the 604th QM GRC did re41 Headquarters, 1st Platoon, 49th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company, to the Adjutant General, “Unit History 1 July to 30 September 

1944,” 30 September 1944, Box 22526, RG 407, RAGO, 1917–[sic], NARA, College Park, MD. 42 Ibid. 

43 “History of the American Graves Registration Service, Pacific Zone Activities during the Period 1 January 1946–31 December 1949,” U.S. Army 

Military History Institute, 1. 

44 “Search and Recovery Activities, AFWESPAC Sector,” 20 November 1946, Box 3, RG 92, ROQG, 1774–1962, NARA, College Park, MD. 

45 “History of the American Graves Registration Service,” 20. See also “Status of Searching and Recovery,” undated, Box 3, RG 92, ROQG, 1774–

1962, NARA, College Park, MD. 

46 “Operational Plan for Search and Recovery of Isolated Burials within AGFPAC Area,” undated, Box 3, RG 92, ROQG, 1774–1962, NARA, College Park, MD. 

47 Ibid. 
Winter 2016 63

cover certain remains and also knowingly left others 

unrecovered, possibly because these remains were 

in locations that made them simply impossible to 

recover. For example, on 1 November, a team from 

the 604th ascended Mauru Peak on Guadalcanal to 

recover remains from the crash of a Douglas C-47 

Skytrain, which caused the loss of 12 U.S. Service 

personnel, including the Marine pilot and crew. The 

team only recovered the remains of eight individuals, “leaving four unrecoverable.” On 6 November, 

the 604th QM GRC investigated losses on the west 

bank of the Matanikau River without success. According to Chief Warrant Officer John R. McBee, the 

area to the west of the river, which he had fought 

through during World War II, had changed significantly, and he recognized very little.48

The 604th QM GRC also investigated losses elsewhere in the Solomon Islands, not just on Guadalcanal. On 26 November and 1 December 1947, the 

company investigated losses on New Georgia, specifically those which occurred at Munda Point. Specific 

details of this investigation are unknown; however, 

the unit history specifically states that this investigation did not result in any recovered remains. Natives 

reported that remains had been removed previously 

from New Georgia and that they did not know of 

any other aircraft crashes or isolated burials. During 

12–19 December, the 604th extensively investigated 

losses that occurred on the island of Bougainville. 

Little detail is known about the identity of individual 

remains the 604th QM GRC attempted to recover 

during these investigations. Per the unit history, 

the company recovered two sets of remains from 

Bougainville and that the cases of several other U.S. 

Service personnel lost on Bougainville were sent for 

further investigation by an unknown higher authority.49

Consolidation of cemeteries in the southern Solomon Islands (as well as from Espíritu Santo, Efate, 

New Hebrides) to the Army, Navy, and Marine 

Corps cemetery on Guadalcanal occurred in September 1945.50 From November to December 1947, 

the 9105th Technical Services Unit (TSU) operated 

a mausoleum on Guadalcanal and was charged with 

identifying the dead consolidated into the cemetery 

and preparing their remains for shipment.51 The majority of more than 3,000 remains processed by the 

9105th TSU were skeletal and not casketed.52 Therefore, the possibility exists that a large number of 

these remains were unable to be identified and were 

later buried as unknown remains. The USAT Cardinal O’Connell transported all the remains from Guadalcanal to Hawaii in January 1948.53

Remains from cemeteries on Rendova and Bougainville Islands were consolidated in the cemetery 

on New Georgia and then removed to Finschhafen, 

New Guinea; though, little is known about the con48 Headquarters, 604th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company to Commanding Officer, 604th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company, “Summary of Cruise,” undated, Box 22592, RG 407, RAGO, 1917–[sic], NARA, College Park, MD. 49 Ibid. 

50 Steere and Boardman, Final Disposition of World War II Dead, 398. 51 F. O. S. No. 5, 9105th Technical Services Unit to Commanding Officer, 9105th TSU, AGRS, PAC, “End of Operations Historical Report, 22 December 1947,” Box 22876, RG 407, RAGO, 1917–[sic], NARA, College Park, MD. 52 Ibid. For the number of remains processed by the 9105th TSU, see Steere and Boardman, Final Disposition of World War II Dead, 537. 53 The Cardinal O’Connell has taken on several iterations in its history, including SS Cardinal O’Connell in 1945 and USNS Cardinal O’Connell in 

1950 after it was acquired by the U.S. Navy. For our discussion in 1948, it was part of USAT or Army Transportation Service. Steere and Boardman, 

Final Disposition of World War II Dead, 538. 

National Archives 

The grave of an unknown American on Guadalcanal, 

ca. 1942–43.
64 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

solidation of cemeteries from the northern Solomon Islands.54 However, the dates these operations 

were undertaken and the organizations involved 

is unknown. In May 1947, operations began to remove remains from cemeteries in Finschhafen to 

their ultimate burial destination, the Manila American Cemetery and Memorial in the Philippines.55

The removal of all remains from Finschhafen was 

completed and the temporary cemetery closed 22 

54 Ibid., 369. 

55 Ibid., 413. 

56 Ibid., 414. 

March 1948, thus ending the journey to a final resting place for U.S. Service personnel recovered from 

the Solomon Islands.56 While the recovery effort by 

the graves registration personnel involved was noble 

and herculean in task, if the military had followed its 

own established procedures following World War I, 

and been better prepared for war, those ships could 

have carried more identified Marines out of the Solomon Islands. s1775s
65

Managing a U.S. Marine Corps

Unit’s Command Chronology

Major Michael Kappelmann*

Foreign Security Force Advisor, Information Operations, Operation Resolute Support

I

n late March and September each year, the leadership of many Marine Corps units scrambles 

to complete command chronologies in time for 

the end of a reporting period.1

 Despite the efforts of even the best staff historians, many of the entries received are late, poorly written, and filled with 

irrelevant data and unsubstantiated opinion. Any deliverable collated by staff historians from these entries 

is consequently ineffective, resulting in a product that 

provides little historical value and serves the organization as not much more than a paperwork drill.

This trend is nothing new. In 1969, historian Jack 

Shulimson characterized some of the command 

chronologies coming out of Vietnam as “not worth 

the price of scrap paper.”2

 As recently as 2012, Annette Amerman of the Marine Corps History Division more tactfully expressed that well-written and 

effective chronologies are the exception rather than 

the rule.3

This does not have to remain the case. The previous works of Colonel Frank C. Caldwell and Ms. 

Amerman describe the purpose of command chronologies and their value as primary historical documents.4

 Indeed, a well-researched and well-written 

chronology has significant potential as a single 

source for factual data that organizational members 

may use for writing investigations, unit and personal 

awards, fitness reports, veteran’s benefits, and other 

deliverables requiring research. Additionally, command chronologies are often a unit’s only enduring 

record of its activities during a given period from 

which historians may later write insightful works, 

such as those in Marine Corps History. However, like 

any product, a command chronology is only as good 

as the staff process that generates it. 

This article is intended to build on the works of 

Caldwell and Amerman to provide not only a greater 

understanding of this program’s value but also some 

specific prescriptive measures for staff historians 

and operations professionals. First, an historical case 

study illustrates a chronology that failed to meet its 

potential. Second, the article provides 12 recommendations for improving a unit’s process at the local level. Third, three additional measures focus on 

maintaining the process once in place. Finally, the 

article addresses two arguments often heard that attempt to justify inaction but serve only as obstacles 

to effectiveness. The end state desired is an effective, 

simple, and sustainable process for unit command 

chronologies that not only meets the demands of the 

Marine Corps order but also contributes meaningfully to their organizations.5

* The author is a Bell UH-1Y Venom (Super Huey) pilot, historian, and Lean Six Sigma (LSS) black belt. The best practices discussed in this 

article resulted from an LSS project conducted at Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 267 (HMLA-267) from July 2013 to January 2015.

1 A command chronology is a documented report to the Commandant of the Marine Corps covering the significant events of designated 

Marine Corps organizations. It is retained on the Commandant’s behalf in the Archives Branch, History Division, Marine Corps University, 

Quantico, VA. For more information on the Marine Corps’ command chronology program, see “Command Chronology Program Overview,” 

Library of the Marine Corps Research Portal, http://guides.grc.usmcu.edu/5750.

2 Jack Shulimson, “Vietnam Historical Data Base,” Marine Corps Gazette 53, no. 2 (February 1969): 44. 3 Annette Amerman, “Every Marine an Historian: The Sequel,” Marine Corps Gazette 96, no. 3 (March 2012): 78. 4 Frank C. Caldwell, “Every Marine an Historian,” Marine Corps Gazette 50, no. 3 (March 1966): 34–35; and Amerman, “Every Marine an Historian: 

The Sequel,” 77–78. 

5 Manual for the Marine Corps Historical Program, Marine Corps Order 5750.1H (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 13 February 

2009).
66 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

Case Study: Los Angeles Riots

While a good chronology can improve planning or 

orientation of personnel, a poor chronology may 

represent lost opportunities for the same. For example, in the wake of the 1992 Los Angeles riots, the 

Marine Corps formed Special Purpose Marine AirGround Task Force-Los Angeles (SPMAGTFLA) to 

support the exhausted civil authorities in restoring 

order.6

 In July 2013, the author was researching utility helicopter support for this operation and found 

that Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 

(HMLA-169) provided a detachment to support civil efforts. What follows is that squadron’s entire command chronology entry on the subject:

On 1 May, rampant civil unrest erupted in Los 

Angeles. For a period of 11 days, HMLA-169 

UH-1N’s [sic] provided the command and control platforms for [SPMAGTFLA], commanded 

by BGen Marvin T. Hopgood. Viper aircrews 

provided around the clock support for the Marine contingency force, ensuring success during this crisis. HMLA-169 distinguished itself 

by providing the only naval aircraft employed 

during the joint services operation.7

A full analysis of this entry, in terms of what information it provides, or fails to provide, could fill 

an article alone. First, careless errors about the facts 

are present. Contrary to what the passage states, civil 

unrest had erupted in Los Angeles on 29 April, not 

on 1 May (elements of SPMAGTFLA arrived in the 

greater Los Angeles area on 1 May). Also, HMLA169 did not provide the only naval aircraft for the 

operation; a Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 

also participated with a detachment of Boeing Vertol 

CH-46E Sea Knights. 

Second, unsupportable opinions are used throughout, such as this detachment’s “ensuring success.” 

Several Marine Corps infantry battalions were involved in securing property and augmenting the 

police, and as such, stating that a small detachment 

of helicopters involved in command and control was 

the decisive element would be difficult to prove at 

best.

Third and most importantly, almost nothing in 

this passage would aid in planning a similar mission 

in the present day. It does not speak to what facilities 

the detachment used in or near Los Angeles or what 

logistical arrangements the squadron made to sustain its aircraft, aircrew, and support personnel. The 

passage does not speak to mission specifics, challenges encountered, or lessons learned with respect 

to such unusual activities as tactical flight in heavily 

urban terrain or coordination with civil authorities. 

It does not name the detachment officer in charge, 

who could possibly still provide an interview, and it 

does not give the reader amplifying information on 

the existence of an after action report or any other 

supporting documentation, which might likewise 

have more details. The paragraph does not even provide information as basic as how many aircraft and 

personnel were part of the detachment.8

In short, support of SPMAGTFLA was unique 

and arguably the most important activity in which 

this unit was involved during the reporting period in 

question, yet this command chronology states very 

little about the operation that might be useful to future readers.

Improving the Process

Building an effective staff process involves three concepts already familiar to Marines: leadership, planning, and setting standards. That said, what follows 

are 12 simple prescriptive measures that should get 

an organization on track to an effective process. 

1. Build your team early. Identify and designate the staff historian and representatives of each 

subordinate element and functional area at the 

beginning of a given reporting period. All too often, individuals receive word of this responsibility 

the week their entries are due, and the quality of 

their work reflects the late notification. Further, 

many of the below recommendations proceed 

from an assumption that the command chronol6 For a timeline of this event, see “Los Angeles Riots Fast Facts,” CNN Library, 8 April 2016. 

7 HMLA-169, Command Chronology (ComdC), 1 January–30 June 1992, Marine Corps University (MCU), History Division Archives Branch (HD), 

Quantico, VA, 7.

8 Section III of this command chronology later indicates that the detachment consisted of two Bell UH-1N Twin Hueys, but provides no additional 

information on personnel. See ibid., 9.
Winter 2016 67

ogy team is involved in the process for the full period. Maximizing the staff process means leveling 

the workload over the entire six months. Staying 

on top of research, recording, and writing is not 

particularly onerous—usually no more than a few 

minutes per week—but it is continuous. 

2. Take advantage of local talent. Unused or 

underused human resources constitute waste that 

keeps any staff process from meeting its full potential.9

 Another common practice in respect to 

command chronologies is for unit leadership to 

assign writing duties to the most junior members 

present, without any regard to their background 

or ability. Many officers have earned bachelor’s degrees in history and other liberal arts disciplines; 

consequently, they often have more experience 

writing at an undergraduate level. Use these assets. The better the initial entries are, the less time 

staff historians will spend editing and collating 

with a deadline closing in. Also, infantry battalions are notorious for assigning staff historian 

duties to one of the air officers. While aviators 

on temporary orders make convenient targets for 

collateral duties, a permanently assigned member 

of that unit is likely to be more invested as a stakeholder in the organizational history, particularly if 

infantry is their occupational specialty.

3. Generate buy-in and enthusiasm. This step 

is where a little leadership can have a disproportionate effect—positive or negative. If an operations officer acts as if the command chronology is 

a meaningless requirement, then so will everyone 

else involved in the process. The results inevitably 

will be late, rife with errors, and add nothing insightful to the unit’s shared history. To secure the 

commitment of team members, not merely their 

compliance, organizational leadership must take 

the time to stand in front of its team and express 

the purpose, essential tasks, and end state desired. 

A key element of this activity is explaining the 

team’s personal stake in the outcome. One day, 

every member of a team will likely have a project 

involving organizational research, such as writing 

a unit citation, and they will personally benefit 

from a single source of factual information that 

is accurate, relevant, and well written. Leadership must also clear up any misconceptions of the 

commander’s role in this process. Team members 

must understand that the commander is not the 

customer for this product but rather the author 

of it. Capturing this fact will mitigate some of the 

other common errors discussed below. 

4. Establish a local unit template. Many of the 

guidelines present in the Marine Corps order are 

intentionally broad and vague.10 This grants units 

maximum flexibility to build chronologies that reflect a myriad of missions and cultures. Consistent 

with the unique aspects of each unit, establish a 

template for how the command chronology is organized in Section II. This includes the order of 

individual subsections, how information is presented within each subsection, and the minimal 

required information of each subordinate element 

or functional area. One best practice is to provide 

a detailed narrative for the entire organization 

(written by the staff historian) at the beginning 

of Section II, then have each subordinate element 

and functional area subsection provide amplifying information for the facts already presented. 

As a rule, the more specific guidelines representatives have, the better and more consistent with 

each other their entries will be. A solid template is 

also an essential element of sustaining the process 

once the desired standard is achieved. 

5. Quantify accomplishments. The organization as a whole and each individual functional 

area should have numeric data by which they 

measure effectiveness and performance. For an 

aviation unit, that might include flight hours 

completed and ordnance expended. An S-1 (manpower or personnel) may calculate the number of 

travel vouchers processed. An S-4 (logistics) may 

measure the metric tons embarked.11 In combat, 

numeric data could represent the number of patrols conducted, kinetic strikes, and enemy casualties confirmed. The team needs to define these 

9 “Muda’s Eight Forms of Waste,” Six Sigma Online, accessed 7 August 2014.

10 Manual for the Marine Corps Historical Program, chapter 5, 4–6. 11 Staff functions within the Marine Corps typically fall within either G or S prefixes. G denotes a general staff section within headquarters commanded by a general officer with a chief of staff to coordinate actions; an S denotes executive staff sections within headquarters commanded 

by a field grade officer.
68 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

metrics up front, continuously track them, and 

record them in their entries. 

6. Reduce redundancy and unnecessary variation. Once again, the commander is effectively the 

author of the chronology, and though composed 

by multiple writers, the final product must read 

as if from the commander’s point of view.12 This 

means that the staff historian must eliminate repetitive information prior to the final draft. For 

example, if the main narrative already states that 

the unit “supported Integrated Training Exercise 

(ITX) 2-17 at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat 

Center (MCAGCC) Twentynine Palms, California, from 10 January to 20 February,” then the S-4 

subsection can omit information already stated 

and focus on the specific logistical support that 

the department provided for this exercise. The 

staff historian must also ensure that, once the entries are collated into a single document, it reads 

as if written by a single person. Another best practice is to direct team representatives to write their 

entries exclusively in the third person, past tense, 

active voice (as opposed to passive), and in a formal tone (as opposed to a casual tone more appropriate for a unit newsletter to family members).

7. Express only relevant facts and (when necessary) unpleasant facts. Another common error 

(as illustrated in the case study) can be seen in 

entries replete with flowery and opinionated language. As previously discussed, this usually corresponds to a misunderstanding of the role of the 

commander. If representatives perceive their commander as the customer, then they may be inclined 

to present their entries as if writing an award or 

fitness report for their particular functional area. 

For example, a team member may write that his or 

her department performed a certain function in 

an “outstanding manner.” The better practice is to 

state in crisp, professional language exactly what 

the department accomplished (quantifiable data), 

and let these facts speak for how effective and efficient the work was. While a command chronology may (and should) serve as a primary source 

for awards, fitness reports, or investigations, a 

command chronology is not itself intended for 

that purpose. Further, keeping future readers in 

mind, the writers should restrict the expression 

of facts to those most relevant. For example, the 

S-4 should not focus on the precise number of toilet paper rolls consumed in a given period; a unit 

member would neither find such data pertinent to 

writing an award nor would a future historian doing research for a book or journal article. Finally, 

the writers should not omit negative facts simply 

because they may be embarrassing. One of the 

specific stated purposes of the command chronology is to identify problems, especially recurring 

problems, to mitigate their future repetition.13

8. Be specific. This measure highlights a point 

already made by Amerman.14 To the extent possible, a command chronology should be precise 

with dates, names, locations, and (as previously 

stated) metrics. For example, it is not enough 

to write that the unit “supported Exercise Dawn 

Blitz in August”; instead, state specifically “from 

12 to 18 August.” The entries should also identify 

key personnel, such as lead planners or officers 

in charge, by their rank and full name (including 

middle initials).15 This information could assist a 

future researcher in tracking down key personnel 

for an interview if necessary. Furthermore, at first 

mention, locations should be identified by their 

full formal name and the country or state in which 

they are located, such as “Fort Leavenworth, Kansas” or “Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan.” When 

producing these chronologies, keep future readers 

in mind. Most members of the organization in the 

present day may already understand who Captain 

Smith is and where El Centro is, but a researcher 

20 years from now may not.

9. Eliminate jargon. Just as organizations must 

be mindful of future readers, they also should 

not assume that the reader was ever part of that 

organization or one similar to base a frame of 

reference. A future historian may have had a different occupational specialty, been part of a different Service, or have never been in the military 

at all. The Marine Corps consists of a variety of 

12 Manual for the Marine Corps Historical Program, chapter 5, 5. 13 Ibid., chapter 5, 4–5.

14 Amerman, “Every Marine an Historian: The Sequel,” 79.

15 Manual for the Marine Corps Historical Program, chapter 5, 4.
Winter 2016 69

units, operating in different locales, with unique 

operational histories and cultures. Consequently, 

there are many examples of slang and technical terminology that might be difficult to understand outside of the military, a certain Service, 

or even the unit in question. That being the case, 

writers should use plain language to the extent 

possible when describing personnel and events. 

For example, you should refer to Marines in accordance with their specialties, such as “machine 

gunner,” “technician,” “mechanic,” “clerk,” or “analyst,” in contrast to such slang as “trigger puller” 

or “wrench turner.” Also, unit members should 

avoid using nicknames, such as “Viper aircrew” 

in the above case study. To the uninformed, “Viper” could mean a number of things, while writing “squadron aircrew” is unambiguous. Finally, 

an undefined acronym is just another form of jargon. Those in common use today may have disappeared in a few years, so always define them with 

the first use. 

10.Exercise a logical order within subsections. 

A strict chronological order is not necessarily the 

most effective means of conveying information. 

Instead, consider (as part of the previously mentioned template) a logical order, meaning to organize paragraphs by related topics instead of listing 

dissimilar events in the order that they occurred. 

For example, an S-4 subsection may be organized 

first with a paragraph that describes changes in 

leadership (the department head, chief, battalion 

surgeon, etc.), followed by a paragraph about embarkation data, then a paragraph covering medical information, and so on. One particularly poor 

(but common) practice is a month-to-month narrative in which subsection paragraphs begin with 

“in January,” “in February,” “in March,” and so on. 

This style of narrative is problematic not only because it fences the writer into a strict chronological 

order but also because it generates a natural tendency to be vague with dates. For instance, a writer who began a paragraph with “in July” may be 

reluctant to write that a certain exercise occurred 

“from 10 to 18 July” to avoid sounding repetitive. 

Additionally, some activities, such as an ITX, cross 

over two or more months. Furthermore, writers 

who exercise a month-to-month narrative tend to 

include vague or irrelevant information just to put 

something down for a given period during which 

no significant events occurred. 

11.Set intermediate deadlines. Much of the 

command chronology can be completed well 

in advance of the reporting period’s end. A 90-

percent solution going into the last two weeks can 

significantly reduce the staff historian’s final workload and increase the quality of the end product. 

To level out the research, documentation, and 

writing over the full period, leadership should assign intermediate deadlines where representatives 

submit entries that are current up to that date. In 

addition to increasing the staff historian’s ability to 

generate a first-pass deliverable on time, intermediate entries grant leadership an early opportunity 

to assess and adjust if necessary. If representatives 

are falling behind in their duties, the staff historian can take immediate corrective action, instead 

of hours before the commander expects to see 

the final draft. When leadership should set these 

deadlines may vary, depending on the unit’s mission. Recommendations include a week following 

the completion of a major exercise or operation 

(while data and lessons learned are still fresh) or 

the first week of the final month of a reporting period. 

12.Use supporting documentation. This measure echoes another important recommendation 

from Amerman.16 Section IV of command chronologies should contain a list of all supporting 

documents, such as after-action reports, letters of 

instruction, or higher headquarters fragmentary 

orders.17 Despite the fact that these documents 

can provide additional clarity and completeness, 

and preclude lengthy or redundant writing, staff 

historians often fail to take advantage of this option. Supporting documents can further build understanding in future readers by connecting them 

to additional primary sources. If such a document 

is already properly archived at the Marine Corps 

Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), then note 

that in Section IV next to the document in ques16 Amerman, “Every Marine an Historian: The Sequel,” 79.

17 Manual for the Marine Corps Historical Program, chapter 5, 5.
70 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

tion. If not, then units should provide digital copies along with their submissions. Finally, if a source 

of information is classified, such as the results of 

operational testing, then specify the document’s 

classification level and which agency is responsible for securing it. If necessary, future readers can 

search for it themselves, provided they possess the 

appropriate clearance and have a need to know. 

Sustaining the Process

Once a command chronology meets the Marine 

Corps’ and the individual unit’s goals, work is not 

done. Arguably, the bigger challenge lies ahead: the 

battle against entropy.18 Naturally, operations officers, staff historians, and subsection writers will 

not hold their present duties forever, and soon, an 

entirely new team will be in place. Like any process 

improvement, if an organization desires to make 

its gains permanent, then certain control measures 

are necessary to keep future members on the same 

track. This article offers three additional prescriptive 

measures for sustaining improvements to your unit’s 

command chronology.

1. Host working groups. Periodically set up 

team meetings to discuss current progress and the 

way ahead. This is also the staff historian’s opportunity to explain the results of the previous deliverable; pass down guidance, such as directing the 

S-6 (communications or IT) representative to capture a certain software upgrade in that subsection; 

and assign the intermediate deadlines discussed 

above. These meetings do not have to take place 

more frequently than every two months, depending on the unit’s mission, and do not need to last 

more than 30 minutes. The staff historian should 

also compile and publish meeting minutes, which 

at a minimum list the topics discussed and any 

specific assignments. This published record serves 

as a key enabler to ensure team members are accountable for their responsibilities. 

2. Make a comprehensive checklist. An execution checklist is an outstanding tool for codifying the specific standards on effectiveness and 

performance. This checklist should include general items that apply to all team members, such 

as “The text spells out all acronyms for their first 

use” or “The text correctly spells out named exercises and operations in all capital letters, such as 

Exercise COBRA GOLD or Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.”19 Also, each subsection should 

have its own specific checklist items. For example, 

the S-1 would include “describe all major challenges . . . confronted, including but not limited 

to tracking travel vouchers and government travel charge card payments and any measures taken 

to achieve or attempt to achieve those goals.”20

While the S-4’s list might say, “include information regarding funds received and spent if it exceeds the standard amount allotted from [higher 

headquarters] each quarter.”21 With a comprehensive checklist, team members begin the reporting 

period with an understanding of what is expected 

of their entries, and then they have a means of reviewing their own work for compliance once they 

have finished their initial drafts.

3. Write a unit directive. In the Marine Corps, 

best practices are simply good ideas until the commander makes them part of a formal order. Once 

the unit has an acceptable and sustainable process, 

consider drafting a directive that, while nested 

within the Marine Corps order and any guidance 

from higher headquarters, specifies how the unit 

executes this tasking consistent with its unique 

mission and culture. Include any procedures 

for conducting working groups and execution 

checklists (as an enclosure). Another important 

element of such an order is a description of the 

staff historian’s authority. All too often, the staff 

historian is junior to many of the representatives 

tasked with providing entries. The order should 

specify that the staff historian has the delegated 

authority of the commander to call meetings, set 

deadlines, and return entries for revision. Otherwise, operations officers will be more involved 

18 Thomas Pyzdek and Paul A. Keller, The Six Sigma Handbook: A Complete Guide for Green Belts, Black Belts, and Managers at All Levels, 3d ed. 

(New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2010), chapter 12.

19 Command Chronology Management Program, Squadron Order 5750.1H (Camp Pendleton, CA: HMLA-267, 5 January 2015), enclosure 2, 1–2,

SharePoint site.

20 Ibid., enclosure 2, 3.

21 Ibid., enclosure 2, 5.
Winter 2016 71

than necessary when team members fail to meet 

their requirements. 

Eliminating the Excuse Matrix

The command chronology is every Marine Corps 

unit’s direct contribution to the historical record. 

The governing order characterizes these documents 

as the single most important body of historical records created, collected, and archived by the Marine 

Corps.22 Nevertheless, in many cases, units submit 

products deficient in terms of their utility and authority as historical primary sources. Part of this deficiency likely results from a failure to understand 

the program’s importance, as previously discussed. 

Another issue that acts as an obstacle to effectiveness is a pervasive attitude that nothing important 

happens during normal, peacetime operations, and 

therefore, cost-benefit analysis does not support a 

great deal of effort on the command chronology. 

Amerman characterized this as a “mistaken belief 

that the report is a frustrating and burdensome requirement that is less important in the big picture.”23

Colonel Caldwell’s essay directly addressed the importance of peacetime recordkeeping. Before the establishment of the command chronology requirement 

in July 1965, the Marine Corps’ historical program 

had been concerned almost exclusively with combat 

operations.24 As a result, the Marine Corps has large 

gaps in its historical record prior to the Vietnam War. 

If Caldwell’s words are not sufficiently persuasive, 

this section offers two additional explanations for 

why a sound process matters, even when units are 

not in combat conditions. First, information that 

seems of low importance today may prove insightful in the coming years, including testing new tactics, techniques, and procedures, even if the results 

are not particularly striking at the time. A historical example can be seen in much of the doctrinal 

writing and experimentation the Marine Corps 

conducted with amphibious operations between the 

world wars.25 Those within the Service understand 

this subject at a high level because of the hard efforts 

of the historians who put it together. Their work may 

have been less arduous and more comprehensive had 

a command chronology program been in place during the 1920s and 1930s.

Second, units must also build habits during peacetime that they expect to carry into war. The Marine 

Corps recognizes that combat naturally generates 

more activities and events of significance as well as a 

greater need to record them. This is why units must 

submit a chronology once a month, instead of every six, while serving under combat, contingency, or 

other special conditions.26 For the same reason that 

commanders require their Marines to wear full armor during training, even when safety is not a legitimate factor, staffs must likewise exercise the same 

detailed processes. A unit will not magically develop 

the ability to generate a command chronology as 

soon as it is in harm’s way.

A second obstacle to effectiveness is a belief that 

units should adopt a wait-and-see approach before 

implementing any improvements, because many of 

the rules governing submission of command chronologies are about to change. Indeed, the Marine 

Corps Electronic Command Chronology Reporting 

System (ECCRS) will soon be fully functional across 

the operational forces.27 This system is designed to 

streamline the submission process between reporting units and History Division, which archives all 

command chronologies as well as provides a more 

efficient means to hold units accountable for making required submissions. Some units already have 

received direction to submit via ECCRS, and many 

others continue to use the traditional method, pending the program’s full implementation. However, 

most of the prescriptive techniques discussed in this 

article will assist units in improving and sustaining 

their command chronology processes regardless of 

the submission method. That being the case, there 

22 Manual for the Marine Corps Historical Program, chapter 4, 1. 23 Amerman, “Every Marine an Historian: The Sequel,” 78.

24 Caldwell, “Every Marine an Historian,” 34.

25 Allan R. Millett, “Assault from the Sea: The Development of Amphibious Warfare between the Wars: The American, British, and Japanese 

Experiences” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, ed. Williamson R. Murray and Allan R. Millett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 

1996), chapter 2.

26 Manual for the Marine Corps Historical Program, chapter 5, 7. 27 BGen Thomas D. Weidley, “Library of the Marine Corps Electronic Command Chronology Reporting System Test,” Marine Administrative Message (MARADMIN) 509/14, 7 October 2014.
72 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

is nothing for units to gain in waiting until ECCRS 

is functional before making positive changes to the 

way they conduct business. 

Conclusion

The words of Colonel Caldwell and Ms. Amerman 

deserve our attention and reflection as much today 

as when they were written. The command chronology can be an outstanding tool for future planning 

and orientation of personnel, or it can be a worthless 

document that wastes the time of all involved. The 

difference relies strictly on leadership. If staff historians and operations professionals make the effort to 

implement some of the suggestions above, their processes will improve, and more effective and betterwritten chronologies will certainly follow. s1775s

 SqdnO 5750.1H

 S-3

 5 Jan 15

SQUADRON ORDER 5750.1H

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA)

To: All Hands

Subj: COMMAND CHRONOLOGY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM28

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.1H

Encl: (1) Command Chronology Standardization Project Paper

(2) Command Chronology Checklist

(3) Command Chronology Submission Example (Jul-Dec 14)

1. Situation. Between July 2013 and January 2015, HMLA executed a project to improve, standardize, and 

control the process by which it generates its command chronology. This Order implements the recommendations of encl (1) and provides policy and procedural guidance for authoring the Squadron command chronology in accordance with ref (a). 

2. Mission. In accordance with the reference, sets specific policy and guidance for constructing the Squadron 

command chronology in order to standardize and control the means by which the Squadron records and 

archives its history. 

3. Execution

a. Commander’s Intent and Concept of Operations

(1) Commander’s Intent

(a) Purpose. To maintain a single, streamlined, and uniform process for the preparation, approval, 

28 Minor revisions were made to this document to account for issues with consistency and style.
Winter 2016 73

and archiving of the Squadron command chronology. An ancillary benefit of improving this process will be 

the development of the professional writing and communications skills for those personnel who participate 

in the process.

(b) Essential Tasks 

1. Publish Squadron guidelines for authoring the command chronology consistent with the provisions of 

ref (a).

2. Educate Squadron leadership and Historical Program functional area representatives on the contents 

of this Order.

3. Establish and maintain control methods for sustaining improvements to the process. 

4. Establish and maintain a digital database for Squadron command chronologies, signature pages, and 

supporting documentation. 

(c) End State Desired. Squadron command chronologies are complete, informative, legible, and representative of the professionalism and precision that have traditionally characterized [insert unit label] in 

accordance with ref (a).

(2) Concept of Operations. The execution of this Order shall occur along four lines of effort (LOEs):

(a) LOE 1 – Effectiveness. A measure of effectiveness (MOE) is a criterion used to assess changes in 

system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end 

state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. In other words, effectiveness is a function of conducting the correct set of actions. In terms of this Order, an effective command chronology is a complete, 

informative, and useful product that fully documents the Squadron’s history during a given reporting period. 

The MOEs for a Squadron command chronology are as follows:

1. Does not deviate from the established template except through consultation with the Staff Historian 

or by direction of the Commanding Officer.

2. Written with future readers in mind and does not assume the reader has context for ongoing events or 

an understanding of HMLA operations.

3. Exercises plain-language descriptions versus jargon or slang; a future reader with little or no military 

experience would understand exactly what the text means.

4. Specific as possible in terms of dates, places, personnel, nomenclature of equipment, and quantifies 

wherever appropriate.

5. Expresses only facts; the only opinions present are direct quotations, such as from a general officer or 

member of Congress, which would lend weight to the historic importance of a fact in question.

6. The facts listed have potential relevance and could possibly aid a future reader with planning, orientation, or the authoring of awards, fitness reports, investigations, and journal articles.

7. Does not omit facts of a negative nature.
74 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

8. Spells out all acronyms for their first use.

9. Uses full names, including rank and middle initial, of individuals for their first mention (e.g., Capt 

John E. Snow) for the first use; the text uses last name and rank (Capt Snow) in follow-on references.

10. Uses full location names, including city and state or country, for their first mention (e.g., Marine 

Corps Air Ground Combat Center [MCAGCC] Twentynine Palms, California; Marine Corps Air Station 

[MCAS] Futenma, Okinawa Prefecture, Japan). 

11. Where applicable, references and includes supporting documentation that may clarify or provide amplifying information to the text; examples of such documentation include after-action reports, awards, and 

journal articles.

12. Includes no specific facts of a classified nature but references where a reader with an appropriate 

clearance may acquire such details if necessary.

13. The text follows a logical order, broken down by functions or programs within departments, versus a 

strict chronological order; at no time does the text follow a month-to-month narrative.

(b) LOE 2 – Performance. A measure of performance (MOP) is a criterion used to assess Squadron 

actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. In other words, performance is a function of conducting a given set of tasks correctly. In terms of this Order, performance refers to a Squadron command chronology that is professionally written. The MOPs for a Squadron command chronology are as follows:

1. Exercises proper grammar, including appropriate punctuation, subject-verb agreement, etc.

2. Exercises crisp, professional language appropriate for a historical document, as opposed to warm, informal language more consistent with an award or newsletter.

3. Exercises an active voice only, emphasizing the subject of a given sentence (for example, “The Squadron 

conducted a mishap drill” instead of “A mishap drill was conducted”).

4. Reads in a past tense, third-person voice as if written entirely from the perspective of the commander.

5. Uses apostrophes to demonstrate possession, not as an incorrect means to indicate plurality (Incorrect: 

11 UH-1Y’s; Correct: 11 UH-1Ys).

6. Spells out numbers one through nine and uses digits for numbers 10 or higher (with understood exceptions, such as Twentynine Palms, VX-9, or UH-1Y).

7. Hyphenates compound modifiers, such as “on-station time” or “six-barreled weapon.”

8. Properly abbreviates units (such as 3d MAW for 3d Marine Aircraft Wing) and ranks, dependent on 

the service of the individual (such as Capt [USMC/USAF], CPT [U.S. Army], and CAPT [USN]).

9. Spells out named exercises and operations in all capital letters, such as Exercise COBRA GOLD or 

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. 

10. Uses a dating convention of day, abbreviated month, two-digit year (e.g., 25 Dec 14); no zero is present 

for the first nine days of the month (e.g., 1 Jan, not 01 Jan); the year is not present if already implied.
Winter 2016 75

(c) LOE 3 – Standardization. Standardization is the minimization of unnecessary and unpredictable 

variation between like products. In terms of this Order, standardization refers to Squadron command chronologies that are as uniform as possible with respect to construction, format, and language.

(d) LOE 4 – Control. Control refers to those means and ways for developing and implementing a plan 

to institutionalize a new process or design in order to sustain improvements. This LOE employs three methods of control:

1. Directive. This Order serves as published guidance to codify the procedures for generating the Squadron command chronology within the scope of ref (a) and based on the findings of encl (1).

2. Checklist. Encl (2) provides a comprehensive checklist for the Staff Historian and Historical Program 

functional area representatives to confirm that their entries meet Squadron standards and do not omit reportable facts.

3. Working Group. This order gives instructions for constituting a process-control working group for the 

purpose of leveling out research, documentation, and writing over the course of a reporting period as well as 

providing a forum for further improving the process.

b. Subordinate Tasks

(1) Staff Historian

(a) Perform specified duties in accordance with ref (a), ch. 5.

(b) Plan and lead a working group to take place at least once every two months for the purpose of 

passing research, documentation, and writing guidance to the functional area representatives; following the 

meeting, author minutes that specify any conclusions and tasking, and distribute these to the Operations Officer and all functional area representatives.

(c) Write the main narrative and S-3 (Operations) narrative for the command chronologies in accordance with the specific requirements listed in encl (2).

(d) Coordinate with the Tactics Officer and Ground Training Officer to receive inputs related to Tactics and Ground Training accomplishments.

1. Tactics Officer. Provide the Staff Historian with factual information related to Tactics initiatives and 

accomplishments during the reporting period.

2. Ground Training Officer. Provide the Staff Historian with factual information related to Ground 

Training accomplishments during the reporting period.

(e) Edit and collate the entries of the Squadron functional area representatives into a comprehensive 

document that reads as if written entirely from the perspective of the Commanding Officer.

(f) Assign internal Squadron deadlines and standards in accordance with this Order, higher headquarters guidance, and ref (a).

(g) Return entries for corrections to the functional area representatives when the entries are not in 

compliance with Squadron standards.
76 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

(h) Comply with higher headquarters deadlines.

(i) Archive approved command chronologies, signature pages, and supporting documentation in a 

designated area of the Squadron SharePoint.

(2) S-1 (Manpower or Personnel)

(a) Assign a functional area representative to attend command chronology working groups and write 

S-1 entries.

(b) Comply with S-1 specifics in accordance with encl (2).

(c) Coordinate with the Adjutant and Legal Officer to receive inputs related to awards and legal activities.

1. Adjutant. Provide the S-1 representative with factual awards information in accordance with the template present in encl (3).

2. Legal Officer. Provide the S-1 representative with factual legal information in accordance with the 

template present in encl (3).

(3) S-2 (Intelligence and Security)

(a) Assign a functional area representative to attend command chronology working groups and author S-2 entries.

(b) Comply with S-2 specifics in accordance with encl (2).

(4) S-4 (Logistics)

(a) Assign a functional area representative to attend command chronology working groups and write 

S-4 entries.

(b) Comply with S-4 specifics in accordance with encl (2).

(c) Coordinate with the Squadron Flight Surgeon to receive inputs related to the Medical subfunction.

(5) Squadron Flight Surgeon 

(a) Provide the S-4 representative with factual information related to Squadron medical readiness 

and accomplishments during the reporting period.

(b) Review portions of the S-4 entry related to the Medical subfunction prior to its submission to the 

Staff Historian. 

(6) S-5 (Human Affairs)

(a) Assign a functional area representative to attend command chronology working groups and write 

S-5 and Family Readiness entries.
Winter 2016 77

(b) Comply with S-5 specifics in accordance with encl (2).

(c) Coordinate with the Family Readiness Officer to receive inputs related to Family Readiness.

(7) Family Readiness Officer

(a) Provide the S-5 representative with factual information related to Squadron Family Readiness accomplishments during the reporting period.

(b) Review the Family Readiness entry for accuracy and comprehensiveness prior to its submission 

to the Staff Historian.

(8) S-6 (Communications or IT)

(a) Attend command chronology working groups and write S-6 entries.

(b) Comply with S-6 specifics in accordance with encl (2).

(9) Department of Safety & Standardization (DOSS)

(a) Assign a functional area representative to attend command chronology working groups and write 

DOSS entries.

(b) Comply with DOSS specifics in accordance with encl (2).

(10) Maintenance

(a) Assign a functional area representative to attend command chronology working groups and write 

Maintenance entries.

(b) Comply with Maintenance specifics in accordance with encl (2).

(11) Operations Officer

(a) Oversee the execution of this Order, including the compliance of functional area representatives 

with Staff Historian requirements.

(b) Serve as the initial and primary level of review and quality assurance for the command chronology with respect to effectiveness, performance, and standardization in accordance with this Order.

(12) Executive Officer. Serve as the final level of review and quality assurance for all Squadron directives 

with respect to effectiveness, performance, and standardization in accordance with this Order.

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Research and Documentation 

(a) Research and documentation of functional area accomplishments shall be continuous throughout 

the reporting period.
78 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

(b) Functional area representatives shall keep detailed notes over the course of the reporting period 

in the event they have to turn over their duties prior to submitting entries.

(2) Formatting and Template 

(a) Use Courier New typeface, 10-point font.

(b) Organize into four sections in accordance with ref (a).

(c) Organize Section II by Squadron functional areas in accordance with the example provided in 

encl (3).

(d) Each functional area entry in Section II follows the below general template in accordance with 

encl (3):

1. Mission Statement

2. Enduring Tasks

3. Numeric Data (bullet form)

4. Department Narrative

(e) Functional area representatives shall not amend or omit approved portions of the mission statement, enduring tasks, or numeric data bullets without the prior approval of the Staff Historian.

(f) The Staff Historian shall return any functional area entries that are not in compliance with Squadron 

standards, and the functional area representatives shall make the required corrections prior to resubmission. 

(2) Working Group

(a) Functional area representatives shall attend a command chronology working group, hosted by the 

Staff Historian, to take place at a minimum once every two months.

(b) This working group shall serve as a forum to pass guidance, discuss lessons learned, and build 

consensus on what information should be present in the next command chronology.

(c) An additional purpose of this working group will be to level out the efforts of research, documentation, and writing over the full course of a given reporting period versus doing so during the final weeks 

before a submission is due to higher headquarters.

(3) Department Head Review. Department Heads should review the inputs of their representatives 

for accuracy and comprehensiveness prior to their submission to the Staff Historian.

4. Administration and Logistics. Squadron personnel desiring to make recommendations concerning the 

contents of this Order may do so by forwarding a request to the Commanding Officer via the chain of command.

5. Command and Signal 

a. Command 
Winter 2016 79

(1) This Order is applicable to all Squadron personnel.

(2) Higher headquarters (Marine Aircraft Group 39 when the Squadron is based at Marine Corps Air 

Station Camp Pendleton, California) sets the external submission deadline and is the sole authority for approving an extension.

(3) The Commanding Officer is effectively the author of the command chronology and is the final approval authority prior to submitting to higher headquarters.

(4) In accordance with ref (a), only the Commanding Officer is authorized to sign the Squadron command chronology.

(5) The Operations Officer is the Portfolio Manager for all S-3 programs, including the Squadron Historical Program.

(6) The Staff Historian is the Squadron Historical Program Manager.

b. Signal. This Order is effective the date signed.

 I. M. COMMANDER
80 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

SqdnO

5 Jan 15

Command Chronology Checklist29

1. Effectiveness (All Entries)

• The narrative portions do not deviate from the established template except through consultation with 

the Staff Historian or by direction of the Commanding Officer.

• The text is written with future readers in mind and does not assume the reader has context for ongoing 

events or an understanding of HMLA operations.

• The text exercises plain-language descriptions versus jargon or slang; a future reader with little or no 

military experience would understand exactly what the text means.

• The text is as specific as possible in terms of dates, places, personnel, nomenclature of equipment, and 

quantifies wherever appropriate.

• The text expresses only facts; the only opinions present in the text are direct quotations, such as from 

a general officer or member of Congress, which would lend weight to the historic importance of a fact 

in question.

• The facts listed have potential relevance and could possibly aid a future reader with planning, orientation, or the authoring of awards, fitness reports, investigations, etc.

• The text does not omit facts of a negative nature.

• The text spells out all acronyms for their first use.

• The text uses the full name, including rank and middle initial, of individuals (i.e., Capt John E. Snow) 

for the first use in Section II; the text uses last name and rank (Capt Snow) in follow-on references.

• The text uses the full location name, including city and state or country, for its first mention (i.e., Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center [MCAGCC] Twentynine Palms, California; Marine Corps Air 

Station [MCAS] Futenma, Okinawa Prefecture, Japan). 

• Where applicable, the text references and includes supporting documentation that may clarify or provide amplifying information to the text; examples of such documentation include after-action reports, 

awards, and journal articles.

• The text includes no specific facts of a classified nature, but references where a reader with an appropriate clearance may acquire such details if necessary.

• The text follows a logical order, broken down by functions or programs within departments, versus a 

strict chronological order; at no time, does the text follow a month-to-month narrative.

29 This checklist comes from Squadron Order 5750.1H as revised 5 January 2015.
Winter 2016 81

2. Performance (All Entries)

• The text exercises proper grammar, including appropriate punctuation, subject-verb agreement, etc.

• The text exercises crisp, professional language appropriate for an historical document, as opposed to 

warm, informal language more suitable for an award or newsletter.

• The text exercises the active voice only, emphasizing the subject of a given sentence (e.g., “The Squadron conducted a mishap drill” instead of “A mishap drill was conducted”).

• The text reads entirely in a past tense, third-person voice and as if written entirely from the perspective 

of the commander.

• The text uses apostrophes to demonstrate possession, not as an incorrect means to indicate plurality 

(Incorrect: 10 UH-1Y’s; Correct: 10 UH-1Ys).

• The text spells out numbers one through nine and uses digits for numbers 10 or higher (with understood exceptions, such as Twentynine Palms, VX-9, or UH-1Y).

• The text properly hyphenates compound modifiers, such as “on-station time” or “six-barreled weapon.”

• The text properly abbreviates units (such as 3d MAW for 3d Marine Aircraft Wing) and ranks, dependent on the Service of the individual (e.g., Capt [USMC/USAF], CPT [U.S. Army], and CAPT [USN]).

• The text correctly spells out named exercises and operations in all capital letters, such as Exercise COBRA GOLD or Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. 

• The text uses a dating convention of day, abbreviated month, two-digit year (e.g., 25 Dec 14); no zero is 

present for the first nine days of the month (e.g., 1 Jan, not 01 Jan); the year is not present if already implied.

3. Main Narrative

• The first paragraph of the main narrative following the introduction paragraph describes major turnovers in Squadron leadership, specifically the CO, XO, and Sergeant Major; in such cases, the text describes the names of the individuals involved, from what billet or unit they came, to what billet or unit 

they are going, and any end-of-tour awards they may have received.

• The main narrative describes all major Squadron activities, including but not limited to deployments 

for training (DFTs), named operations or exercises supported, and changes in facilities; as appropriate, 

the text also names the leadership involved and lists quantitative data associated with this support, including flight hours, sorties, training and readiness syllabus events completed, etc.

• The main narrative describes any nonroutine support the Squadron provided during the reporting period, such as Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).

• The main narrative describes any Squadron contributions to development of HMLA doctrine, including advances in tactics, techniques, or procedures (TTPs).

• The main narrative names all individuals who have earned the AMOS (additional military occupation 

specialty) of Weapons and Tactics Instructor (7577) or Forward Air Controller (7502), including their 

date of designation and (in the case of FACs) their follow-on assignment. 

• The main narrative describes any major Squadron awards or accomplishments, including but not lim-
82 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

ited to unit citations, Marine Corps Aviation Association recognition, placement in official team competitions, etc.

• The main narrative describes any major initiatives, programs, or policy decisions taken by the Command that are intended to have an effect on the whole Squadron (not merely one specific functional 

area) and may serve as lessons learned or best practices to other units.

4. Administration (S-1) Narrative

• The first paragraph of the S-1 narrative, following the introduction paragraph and numeric data, describes turnovers in S-1 leadership: the S-1 Officer in Charge, S-1A, Chief, Legal Officer, and Adjutant; 

in such cases, the text describes the names of the individuals involved, from what billet or unit they 

came, to what billet or unit they are going, and any end-of-tour awards they received. This paragraph 

also describes the successful completion of the Legal Officer Course, including location and dates, and 

any individual augment (IA) billets by department personnel begun or completed during the reporting 

period.

• The following paragraph(s) describes S-1 support to the major Squadron activities listed in the main 

narrative, such as total funding for a given exercise.

• The S-1 narrative describes all major challenges that the S-1 confronted, including but not limited to 

tracking travel vouchers and government travel charge cards payments and any measures taken to 

achieve or attempt to achieve those goals. The text also names the leadership involved in the instigation 

of these plans and measures.

• The S-1 narrative describes CGI results and any initiatives to improve CGI programs under S-1 supervision.

5. Intelligence (S-2) Narrative

• The first paragraph of the S-2 narrative, following the introduction paragraph and numeric data, describes turnovers in S-2 leadership: the S-2 OIC and Chief; in such cases, the text describes the names 

of the individuals involved, from what billet or unit they came, to what billet or unit they are going, and 

any end-of-tour awards they may have received. This paragraph also describes any IAs by department 

personnel begun or completed during the reporting period.

• The following paragraph(s) describes S-2 support to the major Squadron activities listed in the main 

narrative, such as flight briefs, post-mission debriefs, and video exploitation support. 

• The S-2 narrative describes any intelligence training that S-2 personnel attended as well as describes 

any intelligence specific exercises, conferences, or working groups that occurred during the reporting 

period. 

• The S-2 narrative describes CGI results and any initiatives to improve CGI programs under S-2 supervision.

6. Operations (S-3) Narrative

• The first paragraph of the S-3 narrative, following the introduction paragraph and numeric data, describes major turnovers in operations leadership, specifically the Operations Officer, Assistant Operations Officer, and Operations Chief; in such cases, the text describes the names of the individuals 

involved, from what billet or unit they came, to what billet or unit they are going, and any end-of-tour 

awards they received. This paragraph also describes the successful completion of any key schools, including locations and dates:
Winter 2016 83

• Anti-Terrorism & Force Protection (AT/FP) Course

• Reconnaissance, Surveillance, & Decontamination (RSD) Course 

• Additionally, this paragraph describes any IAs by department personnel begun or completed during 

the reporting period.

• The S-3 narrative describes all major challenges that the Operations Department confronted, including 

but not limited to aircraft availability challenges, flight hour assignments, tactical training requirements, ground training objectives, and the measures taken to achieve these. The text also names the 

leadership involved in the instigation of these plans and measures.

• The S-3 narrative contains a Tactics summary, describing any initiatives from the Tactics office, including but not limited to training plans, Stinger University, operational plans (OPLANs), academic classes, 

and linked simulator initiatives.

• The S-3 narrative lists significant improvements to the ready room by the Ready Room Officer that 

aided in efficiency or accountability.

• The S-3 narrative names all individuals who have earned flight qualifications that are Attack or Utility 

Helicopter Commander (AHC or UHC) and above. 

• The S-3 narrative names all individuals who have earned Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) 

Black Belts or instructor qualifications and who their instructor was in obtaining those qualifications. 

• The S-3 narrative describes CGI results as well as any initiatives to improve CGI programs under its 

supervision.

7. Logistics (S-4) Narrative

• The first paragraph of the S-4 narrative, following the introduction paragraph and numeric data, describes major turnovers in S-4 leadership: the S-4 OIC, S-4A, and Chief; in such cases, the text describes the names of the individuals involved, from what billet or unit they came, to what billet or unit 

they are going, and any end-of-tour awards they may have received. This paragraph also describes any 

IAs by department personnel begun or completed during the reporting period.

• The following paragraph(s) describes all major embarkation operations that the shop conducted in 

support of Squadron events. This includes but is not limited to deployments, DFTs, Family Day Events, 

and any aircraft recovery operations. Each event shall include number of personnel supported, number, type, and source of vehicles required, amount of pounds transported, as well as any challenges or 

deficiencies encountered in the process.

• The S-4 narrative includes information regarding funds received and spent if it exceeds the standard 

amount allotted from MAG-39 each quarter.

• The S-4 narrative contains a Medical summary, including any turnover of the Squadron Flight Doctor, 

any initiatives and data regarding Squadron Medical Readiness, and any challenges encountered. This 

paragraph includes the percentage of Squadron Overall Medical Readiness at the beginning and end of 

reporting period with reasons for substantial increase or decrease.

• The S-4 narrative includes a summary of any initiatives to improve the Squadron spaces, including 

objectives, costs involved, and lessons learned.
84 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

• The S-4 narrative describes CGI results and any initiatives to improve CGI programs under S-2 supervision.

8. Human Affairs (S-5) and Family Readiness Narratives

• The first paragraph of the S-5 and Family Readiness narratives, following the introduction paragraphs 

and numeric data, describe any turnover of the S-5 OIC and Family Readiness Officer (FRO); in such 

cases, the text describes the names of the individuals involved, from what billet or unit they came, 

to what billet or unit they are going, and any end-of-tour awards they may have received. This paragraph (in the S-5 narrative) also describes the successful completion of the following courses, including 

names, dates, and locations:

• Equal Opportunity Representative (EOR) Course

• Substance Abuse Control Officer (SACO) Course

• Education Officer Training

• Family Advocacy Officer Training

• Family Readiness Officer Training

• Additionally, this paragraph describes any IAs by department personnel begun or completed during 

the reporting period.

• The following paragraph(s) describes S-5 or Family Readiness support to the major Squadron activities 

listed in the main narrative, such as expeditionary food sales, cookouts, and Squadron social events in 

support of DFTs. 

• The S-5 narrative describes Squadron social events, such as the Birthday Ball, Mess Nights, and Hail & 

Farewells, including amplifying information about dates, locations, funds expended, and approximate 

number of attendees.

• The S-5 and Family Readiness narratives describe major challenges confronted, including but not limited to lack of funds, logistical support for major events, command support for family personnel and 

welfare, and the measures taken to achieve or attempt to achieve those goals. 

• The S-5 narrative describes any non-routine activities or support the departments provided during the 

reporting period, such as the MAG-39 “Octoberstache Officer Social.”

• The S-5 and Family Readiness narratives describe CGI results and any initiatives to improve CGI programs under respective department supervision.

9. Communications (S-6) Narrative

• The first paragraph of the S-6 narrative, following the introduction paragraph and numeric data, describes turnovers in S-2 leadership: the S-6 OIC and Chief; in such cases, the text describes the names 

of the individuals involved, from what billet or unit they came, to what billet or unit they are going, and 

any end-of-tour awards they may have received. This paragraph also describes the successful completion of the following courses, including names, dates, and locations:

• SharePoint Course, Levels I, II, and III

• OOMA Data Administration
Winter 2016 85

• Additionally, this paragraph describes any IAs by department personnel begun or completed during 

the reporting period.

• The following paragraph(s) describes S-6 support to the major Squadron activities listed in the main 

narrative, such as deployment of computers and any efforts to maintain connectivity while deployed 

for training. 

• The S-6 narrative describes any new updates to software or hardware that affect Squadron operations, 

measures taken to implement the changes, and any associated challenges with the process.

• The S-6 narrative describes all major challenges confronted, including insufficient hardware or software requirements, external support, updates to policies and the measures taken to achieve or attempt 

to achieve those goals. The text also names the leadership involved in the instigation of these plans and 

measures.

• The S-6 narrative describes commanding general’s inspection (CGI) results and any initiatives to improve CGI programs under S-6 supervision.

10. Department of Safety & Standardization (DOSS) Narrative

• The first paragraph of the DOSS narrative, following the introduction paragraph and numeric data, 

describes major turnovers in DOSS leadership: the Director, Aviation Safety Officer (ASO), Ground 

Safety Officer (GSO), and Standardization Officer; in such cases, the text describes the names of the 

individuals involved, from what billet or unit they came, to what billet or unit they are going, and any 

end-of-tour awards they may have received. This paragraph also describes the successful completion of 

the following courses, including names, dates, and locations:

• ASO Course

• GSO Course

• Additionally, this paragraph describes any individual augment billets (IAs) begun or completed by 

department personnel begun or completed during the reporting period.

• The following paragraph(s) describes initiatives that the shop conducted in support of the Squadron, 

such as nonroutine periods of instruction and mishap drills.

• The DOSS narrative includes a summary of any Hazard Reports submitted, changes to Squadron standard operating procedures (SOP), and Read & Initials.

• The DOSS narrative includes a mishap summary, describing all aviation and ground mishaps that 

occurred during this period. This paragraph includes dates, locations, and a description of involved 

personnel by department but does not include the affected individual’s name if the event was strictly 

within the realm of safety (and did not involve criminal activity, for instance).

• The DOSS narrative describes CGI results and any initiatives to improve CGI programs under DOSS 

supervision.

11. Maintenance Narrative

• The first paragraph of the Maintenance narrative, following the introduction paragraph and numeric 

data, describes major turnovers in Maintenance leadership: the Aviation Maintenance Officer, Assis-
86 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

tant Aviation Maintenance Officer, and Maintenance Chief; in such cases, the text describes the names 

of the individuals involved, from what billet or unit they came, to what billet or unit they are going, and 

any end-of-tour awards they may have received. This paragraph also describes the successful completion of the Aviation Maintenance Officer Course, including location and dates, and any IAs by department personnel begun or completed during the reporting period.

• The following paragraph(s) describes all Maintenance support to major Squadron events. This includes 

but is not limited to Deployments, Deployments for Training (DFTs), Family Day Events, and any aircraft recovery operations. Each event includes number and type of aircraft involved.

• The Maintenance narrative includes a summary of all aircraft and transferred or received, to include 

type/model/series (T/M/S), Bureau Number (BUNO), date of transfer, the unit transferred to or received from, and the reason for the transfer. This summary also describes significant equipment received or transferred and any new or updated equipment or software changes.

• The Maintenance narrative describes Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF) Inspection results and 

any initiatives to improve CNAF programs.
BOOK REVIEW

Gallipoli:

The Dardanelles Campaign

in Soldiers’ Words and Photographs

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Winston A. Gould,

U.S. Air Force

Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Marine Corps University

Gallipoli: The Dardanelles Campaign in Soldiers’ 

Words and Photographs. By Richard van Emden and 

Stephen Chambers. (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015. Pp. 352. $40.00 cloth)

Richard van Emden interviewed more than 

270 Great War veterans in the course of 

writing 16 books pertaining to World War 

I. Stephen Chambers has written five Great 

War books, including four battlefield guides on Gallipoli. Both gentlemen are passionate about World 

War I with a keen interest in Gallipoli in particular. 

In Gallipoli: The Dardanelles Campaign in Soldiers’ 

Words and Photographs, van Emden and Chambers 

provide a refreshing, personal look at the campaign. 

The title is interesting because one could argue that 

the casualties on both sides were horrendous, and 

therefore, the Dardanelles Campaign was a disaster 

for both the Allied forces and the Turks.

“By combining harrowing, moving and sometimes darkly humorous personal accounts written by soldiers on both sides, with more than 130 

photographs taken by servicemen themselves, most 

previously unpublished, the Gallipoli campaign 

is made real to us in a 

way that has not been 

achieved before” (dust 

jacket). As advertised, 

van Emden and Chambers provide a realistic, 

personal look at the Dardanelles Campaign. The 

book is divided into six 

chapters, each based on 

a significant part of the 

campaign. From “Forcing the Straits of Dardanelles,” the opening Allied moves, to the “Defeat” 

and subsequent withdrawal from the peninsula, the 

book provides adequate background material and 

context for those not familiar with the Dardanelles 

Campaign. This framework allows the personal recollections to make sense with regard to the events 

unfolding at sea and on the beachheads.

Gallipoli is unique in that it provides personal recollections from both Allied and Turkish personnel, 

from junior privates to the most senior leaders. A 

sampling of personnel includes Sapper Geoffrey Robin, 1st Field Company, Australian Engineers; General Sir Ian Hamilton, Headquarters, Mediterranean 

Expeditionary Force (MEF); Lieutenant Mehmed 

Fasih, 47th Regiment, 16th Ottoman Division; and 

General Askir Arkayan, Ottoman Howitzer Battery. 

Diary entries from Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal, Headquarters, 19th Ottoman Division, are also 

included. After the war, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) 

would eventually become the president of Turkey.

The book reiterates one theme of the Dardanelles 

Campaign—that it was a second-rate expedition 

doomed to failure. The western front was the primary theater during World War I. The Dardanelles 

87

LtCol Winston A. Gould, USAF, is a military faculty 

advisor assigned to Command and Staff College, 

Quantico, VA. He is a career intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) officer with 168 ICBM alerts and 

1,900 hours as a battle staff crewmember on the 

Boeing E-6B Mercury. His primary areas of interest are World War I, World War II, military airpower, 

and nuclear operations/deterrence theory.
88 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

Campaign was undertaken to knock Turkey out of 

the war and open a second front. “If ever a campaign was doomed from the start, then the year-long 

slog in the Dardanelles was the case in point. Anyone who believed otherwise was blinded by overoptimism and had never stood on the region’s baked 

and arid ground or been privy to more than could be 

discerned from a stretch of trench” (p. 2). Time and 

again, the reader travels though the campaign and 

sees the impact on the average soldier and sailor partaking in the operation, as well as junior, midlevel, 

and senior leaders.

Van Emden and Chambers’ sources include published memoirs, unpublished diaries, letters and 

memoirs from private collections, other books, and 

Gallipoli Association journals. Allied and Turkish 

archives were also consulted. This variety of sources 

no doubt enabled the authors to write such a richly 

diverse account of the events that occurred on the 

Gallipoli peninsula. Each account is credited to the 

particular individual by annotations in the margin. 

This innovative method allows for a highly readable 

account that meets the mark. The reader would gain 

from reading one or more of the excellent operational histories of the Dardanelles Campaign listed 

in the “Other Books” section, which would provide 

more context to the personal accounts provided by 

Van Emden and Chambers.

Gallipoli should be mandatory reading for any 

World War I historian and those interested in personal accounts of the Great War, especially the Dardanelles Campaign. The reader is drawn into gritty, 

first-hand accounts from both sides of the campaign, 

which personalizes the battle while providing an operational context to the successes and failures of the 

Allied and Turkish forces.s1775s
BOOK REVIEW

The Somme

Reviewed by John Grady

Military writer

The Somme. By Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson. 

(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016. Pp. 

384. $25.00 paperback.)

Although only a little more than a decade 

old and reissued for the centennial of this 

months-long battle where so many British lives were lost, especially for so little 

gain by either side, Robin Prior’s and Trevor Wilson’s 

The Somme is a classic, weaving together the political, the military, and the personal threads of this epic 

struggle. These Australian historians, both originally 

at the University of Adelaide, have made careers out 

of mining the records and archives for a series of histories about World War I—a war that to most Americans is distant in time and eclipsed in memory by the 

even deadlier war that followed a generation later.

What the British high command, including Field 

Marshals  Sir John D. P. French and Douglas Haig, 

and other leaders in the British government led by 

Prime Minister H. H. Asquith and almost all members of the Parliament’s War Committee, did not 

grasp or chose to ignore was that on the western 

front, “modern weaponry was bestowing on defence 

a marked superiority 

over offence” (p. 6). 

In hindsight, with 

hundreds of thousands of British casualties in the fighting 

that spanned July to 

November 1916, this 

deadlock could not 

be broken by highexplosive shells—even 

if they existed in sufficient numbers—and 

piecemeal attacks, 

even division-size, 

against line after deeper line of trenches that were 

interconnected to provide multiple exits if overrun 

and were fronted by barbed wire and machine guns.

What had originally been intended as a French offensive with British support on land changed even 

before the stalemate at Verdun, when the German 

attack, launched in February, was finally blunted by 

the French in July. Even so, fighting from shell hole 

to shell hole in a grinding counterattack at Verdun 

continued into December.

The War Committee clearly realized before the 

impasse at Verdun that “Britain’s allies were going to lose the war on land unless Britain agreed to 

contribute mightily in that sphere also.” The Royal 

Navy’s blockade of Germany lasted through the war. 

From the unfolding of the Gallipoli fiasco against 

the Ottoman Empire, to the pressure the Russians 

were feeling along their fronts, to the Italians bracing for an Austrian offensive, the situation was looking dire (p. 9).

Prior and Wilson do a magnificent job of following the divided War Committee through its twists 

89

John Grady served as managing editor of Navy 

Times and retired as communications director of 

the Association of the United States Army. He is 

the author of Matthew Fontaine Maury, Father of 

Oceanography: A Biography, 1806–1873 (2015). 

He has been a contributor to the New York Times’ 

Disunion (blog) series and also its collection of essays on the Civil War, naval history, and the Front 

Line (blog) on the Civil War Monitor. He also reviews books for the Naval Historical Foundation.
90 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

and turns with decisions that are not carried out and 

ideas that are translated into military action because 

no one holding office stomped their feet, jumped 

from their chair, and shouted, “No!” Particularly illuminating is the role David Lloyd George, who succeeded Asquith as prime minister, played in “causing 

their offensive to happen” (p. 31).

The committee was clearly not alone in this line of 

thinking, as Prior and Wilson make clear. “Britain by 

the end of 1915 possessed a mass army undergoing 

extensive military training and an industrial and financial base in the process of being converted to the 

generation of unprecedented (if not necessarily sufficient) volumes of weaponry and ammunition” (p. 10). 

General Henry S. Rawlinson, commanding the 

army for this Somme offensive, would fight “in a region of gently undulating hills with green fields and 

woods still in evidence behind the [original set of] 

trench lines. There were no precipitate rises . . . It had 

no industrial wilderness such as the British had encountered at Loos. Nor had it yet suffered the effects 

of continuous fighting” (p. 37).

From the start of the planning, Prior and Wilson 

create a sense of foreboding without signaling they 

know how events will play out. A 3 April plan sent 

to Haig, who could be blindly single-minded, called 

for an attack on a front of 20,000 yards that would 

“kill as many Germans as possible with the least loss 

to ourselves.” This was a sure-fire prescription for a 

battle of attrition (p. 41).

As he would do throughout the Somme Campaign, Haig all but ripped Rawlinson’s plan to shreds 

because it “made no attempt to achieve surprise; it 

was too cautious; it paid no attention to the need to 

assist the French; and there was no role for the cavalry.” Assuming command of the British Expeditionary Force in late 1915, Haig called for, among other 

things, bombardment on a much longer front that 

reduced the amount of shells falling on the area to 

be assaulted. Although this bombardment plan was 

worked out, Haig never stopped “thinking in Napoleonic terms” when it came to fighting a battle, carrying out a campaign, and waging a war. He “wished 

away” realities of the war he was in. The battle he was 

fighting was the Somme, not Jena (pp. 43, 44, 51). 

Even more astounding from the first day of infantry combat, and a deadly fact that was repeated 

later on: “For many [British] soldiers the ‘race to the 

parapet’ was actually a race to their own parapet, and 

it was a race that they lost.” The German artillery and 

machine gun emplacements were not taken out by 

the early bombardment. The Tommies in X Corps 

never made it to “No Man’s Land” (p. 89).

That first day, the British suffered approximately 

60,000 casualties to gain three square miles of territory. Through mid-September, they suffered 126,000 

casualties to gain six square miles. “The Germans 

counter-attacked on no fewer than 90 occasions” 

even if the ground they fought over was without 

“any tactical value.” Rawlinson’s battle of attrition 

was grinding on relentlessly (pp. 188, 190).

Only Winston Churchill, forced to leave the admiralty after Gallipoli and now holding a minor post, 

seemed to have a handle on the truth of the fighting 

early on. “We have not conquered in a month’s fighting as much ground as were expected to gain in the 

first two hours.” Worse yet for the British and Allies, 

“the Germans had still not been deprived of strategic 

initiative on all fronts” (p. 196).

Not even the British introduction of tanks to the 

Somme changed the equation. Haig might have favored their introduction and a plan of how to use 

them, but Rawlinson had never seen one. The Mark 

I also had major drawbacks. In addition to being 

prone to breakdowns and vulnerable to artillery fire, 

“its maximum speed over average . . . was just 2 miles 

per hour, which made it slower than a walking infantryman.” Should they go before the infantry or after? 

Among the British, “The arrival of the tank in this 

instance was causing confusion where none had existed before.” The arrival of the tanks did not cause 

German morale to collapse (pp. 216, 219, 224).

Now into the fall with only casualties to show, 

the War Committee did not step back and order the 

military to work with the French to find another way 

to disrupt German operations in this campaign, all 

across the western front and against Russia. “We 

must keep going,” were the words of Sir Edward Grey, 

the foreign minister, because to their collective mind 

there really was “nothing else to be done” (p. 280).

This reviewer agrees with the authors’ assessment 

that all the criticism of the soldiers in Haig’s armies 

“can be largely discounted,” and they were anything 

but an “unthinking Tommy plodding to his doom on 

1 July” (pp. 303, 307).

Topping that assessment was the combat perfor-
Winter 2016 91

mance of the British New Army, largely draftees, and 

soldiers from the Dominions: They “were quite capable of outfighting the German defenders” in “grim, 

intense, close-quarter fighting” (p. 259).

The deficiencies of the Somme campaign lies with 

Haig and the other commanders led by Rawlinson for 

their “inadequate planning for the impossible objectives set for the infantry” and then their self-serving 

cover for their own fatal errors. In Haig’s case, he did 

not lack imagination as some of the others did. “He 

had too much. He could envisage cavalry sweeps and 

decisive battles in keeping with Napoleonic conception than with industrial war” (pp. 303, 307).

“The final arbiter of the British fortunes at the 

Somme was the civilian War Committee. It is melancholy to report that this group of generally intelligent men carried out their tasks with no more 

understanding of the imperatives which face them 

than did Haig” (p. 307).

The authors correctly added the lesson that must 

be drawn: The soldiers who were wounded and 

killed “in their hundreds of thousands fought well in 

a good cause. But they deserved a plan and competent leadership as well as a cause” (p. 309).

This reviewer was stunned years ago to see on one 

of the seven volumes of the “Roll of Honour” the illustrated list of names of men and women who died 

in World War I, open for inspection at St. Patrick’s 

Cathedral in Dublin, Ireland. For the first time, it 

brought home the cost of that war to the British, the 

French, and the Germans. 

For that alone, The Somme is a remarkable work 

of history.

At the cathedral this year, a newly unveiled 

18-foot-high steel “Tree of Remembrance” with 16 

bare branches surrounded by faux barbed wire sits 

in the north transept where the roll is displayed. The 

tree marks the battle’s centennial as part of its Lives 

Remembered Project. Closer to home, the National 

World War I Museum and Memorial in Kansas City, 

Missouri, will commemorate in its main exhibit hall 

the battles of the Somme and Verdun as highlights 

of “They Shall Not Pass: 1916” that will run through 

2017.s1775s
BOOK REVIEW

German Propaganda and

U.S. Neutrality in World War I

Reviewed by Staff Sergeant Matthew E. Paisie

German Propaganda and U.S. Neutrality in World 

War I. By Chad R. Fulwider. (Columbia: University 

of Missouri Press, 2016. Pp. 296. $60.00 cloth and 

e-book.)

When discussing the American role 

in the First World War, battles such 

as Belleau Wood and the Argonne 

Forest typically take pride of place. 

Chad Fulwider argues, however, that the most important campaign was fought on American soil and 

was far less bloody than the engagements in Europe—the competing propaganda struggle waged by 

the Germans and the British for influence over the 

United States. This was a war of words and public 

statements, propaganda pictures, and political clout. 

As may be presumed from the title of the book, Dr. 

Fulwider has chosen to focus on the German efforts 

to alter the course of American politics with regard 

to the war in Europe, arms shipments, and related 

military or economic issues.

Rather than a strict chronological list of events 

with associated names, the book’s narrative shifts 

from one group or policy concept to another, such as 

“German Professors Defend Germany” (p. 75) and 

“Legislative Opinions and Public Awareness Campaigns” (p. 105). Times and dates are noted frequently, but Fulwider is more concerned with discussing 

relevant ethnic, social, political, economic, and cultural issues than an extensive temporal ordering of 

places and personalities. This enables him 

to discuss said issues 

in-depth and to make 

his points about each 

as discrete items, but 

also creates a sense 

that the narrative is 

moving forward and 

backward in time. Incidentally, the reader 

would be well-advised 

to learn the basics 

about the sinking of 

the RMS Lusitania

and the Zimmermann Telegram as the author alludes to both without going into much detail about 

either, which may confuse readers unaware of their 

importance. Despite any mild confusion about these 

events or the narrative’s timeline, the material covered makes fascinating reading.

The Lusitania’s sinking may be the most famous 

event related to America’s entry into the war, but Fulwider argues that the United States had already given up its neutral position by the time the ship sank. 

“Pro-German interests had suffered a severe setback 

on 21 August 1915, when [President T. Woodrow] 

Wilson reversed his position on large loans to allow the Allies to continue to purchase munitions. 

In theory, the Germans could also have applied for 

loans, but they were already unable to ship the materials previously purchased” (p. 109). It seems unlikely that Americans never noticed the Royal Navy’s 

dominance of the Atlantic, and there was no forceful American action to ensure that Germany, as well 

as its Austro-Hungarian ally, received any sort of 

equal treatment concerning trade or shipping. This 

is just one of numerous incidents outlined in the 

92

SSgt Matthew E. Paisie, USMC, is currently an Arabic linguist at Fort Gordon in Augusta, GA. He is 

currently researching the role of the Marine Corps 

in the American occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 

1934.
Winter 2016 93

book wherein the United States chose to pursue an 

economic policy that benefited the Allies over the 

Central powers, well before American troops were 

committed to European battlefields.

The author makes eminently clear, however, that 

these pro-British policies did not originate out of 

thin air. In his assessment of the British and German 

campaigns to influence American opinion, he assigns plenty of justly deserved blame to the Germans 

and German-Americans for self-defeating practices 

and counterproductive decisions. “The Germanlanguage propaganda effort in the U.S., however, 

was hampered by linguistic barriers from reaching 

those outside the German-American community, 

especially those unused to reading the Germanic 

script of most newspapers during this era. . . . Furthermore, one can argue that the German-language 

newspapers went to the wrong people—they were 

effectively preaching to the choir, while the rest of 

the country slept through a sermon they neither understood nor cared to hear” (p. 34). The Germans 

routinely focused on the German-American community, operating under the completely misguided 

impression that they constituted a single monolithic block and that there was no need to try to reach 

Americans who were not of German descent.

Additionally, the German government displayed 

little, if any, understanding of the importance of 

public opinion in the United States, choosing instead to “fully place their faith in reason and logic, 

believing that Americans would respect the ‘truth’ 

as preached by professionals and academics over the 

‘yellow journalism’ of the American newspapers” (p. 

60). The British did not make this mistake and ensured that their propaganda campaign was aimed at 

as many Americans as they could target. This book 

includes 19 pictorial reproductions of war-related 

material during this era, two of which are Germanlanguage propaganda pieces that consist of dry facts 

and figures. These German propagandistic materials 

were likely ineffective in the United States compared 

to the lurid British and American depictions of vicious monsters, ravaged women, war crimes, and 

warnings against lurking spies and saboteurs.

A theme that runs through this book, and which 

is highlighted in both the conclusion and the appendix, is the position of the German-American community and how the rest of America acted toward 

it. Internally divided by a variety of issues and fundamentally misunderstood by the Kaiser’s government, many German-Americans chose loyalty to the 

United States over Germany and worked harder to 

assimilate, in some cases changing their names, even 

as cities and states were banning German language 

instruction in public schools. Dr. Fulwider does not 

claim that World War I totally and singlehandedly 

destroyed the German-American community, demonstrating that assimilation had already been occurring ever since immigrants arrived in America, but 

he assigns it a vital role in accelerating and finishing 

the process for most of the German-American community.s1775s
Kleinkrieg:

The German Experience with Guerrilla

Warfare, from Clausewitz to Hitler

BOOK REVIEW

Reviewed by Douglas E. Nash

Historian, History Division

Marine Corps University

Kleinkrieg: The German Experience with Guerrilla 

Warfare, from Clausewitz to Hitler. Edited by Charles 

D. Melson. (Oxford: Casemate Publishers, 2016. Pp. 

216. £19.99 cloth.)

When one examines Germany’s historical record of counterinsurgency 

warfare, especially through the lens 

of Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich, one 

would expect to encounter little beyond the rigid application of ancient Roman “scorched-earth” methods—best summarized by Galgacus’ [Caledonian 

chief who fought against the Romans in North Britain, AD 83–85] phrase, “They make a solitude and 

call it peace.” Indeed, Germany’s record of combating guerrillas, partisans, and franc tireurs [civilian or 

guerrilla fighters] from the mid-nineteenth century 

until 1945 reveals a history of brutality and legal 

single-mindedness, rivaled only by that practiced by 

the Caesars, who sought at all costs to protect their 

vast empire against uprisings by various Germanic 

tribes, Jewish zealots, Caledonians, and other tribes. 

Few practitioners of counterinsurgency today, then, 

would expect to learn anything useful from Ger94

Col Douglas E. Nash, USA (Ret), works as a historian at the Marine Corps University, History Division, Quantico, VA. He is the author of Hell’s Gate: 

The Battle of the Cherkassy Pocket, January 1944

(2002) and Victory Was beyond Their Grasp: With 

the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division from the Hürtgen Forest to the Heart of the Reich (2008) and 

is currently researching Marine Corps amphibious 

warfare for an upcoming HD anthology.

many’s record, at least 

according to modern 

conventional wisdom.

Long buried in U.S. 

government archives 

and only recently declassified, two previously translated German 

theoretical and doctrinal works dealing with 

the subject of counterinsurgency have been 

rediscovered and combined into one volume 

and edited by Charles 

D. Melson, the former chief historian of the Marine 

Corps History Division and a retired Marine Corps 

major. The two primary works—Arthur Ehrhardt’s 

Kleinkrieg (Guerrilla Warfare), published in 1935, and 

Bandenbekämpfungen (Fighting the Guerrilla Bands), 

published by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht 

(German Armed Forces High Command) as Directive 69/2 on 6 May 1944—display a surprising amount 

of insight and ingenuity in understanding and addressing counterinsurgency. In fact, the latter document, according to one source from the U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, was the foundation for the 

Army’s first doctrinal counterinsurgency publication, 

Operations against Guerrilla Forces (Field Manual 

31-20). Published in 1951, this manual became the 

standard text for the Army’s fledgling Special Forces 

organization for a decade. Indeed, some portions of it 

appear to consist entirely of translated passages from 

the German original. 

A review of these two publications, each preceded 

by a section by the editor that provides historical 

context as well as examples of German counterinsurgency operations during World War II, illustrates 
Winter 2016 95

ing a nascent insurgency and soon found themselves 

poorly equipped doctrinally to understand and respond to this growing threat. Harsh methods of 

reprisal were instituted, including the execution of 

innocent civilians and the destruction of entire villages. Though these methods had proven effective in 

the nineteenth century, they now tended to reinforce 

the Soviet-sponsored partisan movement’s call to the 

civilian population to help them wage all-out war 

against the German occupiers. 

As a partial remedy to this situation, Kleinkrieg

was republished in 1942 and again in 1944. Though 

primarily a theoretical work, Ehrhardt’s book, ignored in the 1930s, now served as a touchstone for 

German counterinsurgency practitioners who understood that other ways were needed than mere 

brute force to effectively pacify Nazi Germany’s vast 

European empire. Still, theory was not enough—

more was needed to translate Ehrhardt’s theories 

into practice. Existing doctrine and tactical directives were insufficient to address the need, though 

field commanders immersed in fighting partisan or 

guerrilla “bands” rapidly began to accrue a store of 

hard-won lessons learned.

Ehrhardt, who was reactivated in 1939 to serve 

as a captain in Germany’s counterespionage service, 

the Abwehr, was transferred to Heinrich Himmler’s 

dreaded SS in early 1944 to become that organization’s premier counterinsurgency expert with the 

rank of SS major. In an organization dedicated to 

genocide and harsh repressive measures toward occupied populations, Ehrhardt sought to moderate 

these tendencies, which he saw as counterproductive, by drafting guidelines for the SS and Wehrmacht 

counterinsurgency leaders to effectively fight the 

partisan bands. These guerrilla groups had became 

a thorn in Germany’s side from 1942 onward, and 

by mid-1944 had become large and growing movements that tied down hundreds of thousands of German troops in occupied Russia, Poland, Yugoslavia, 

Italy, and elsewhere. 

Meanwhile, by mid-1943, Germany’s scorchedearth tactics had depopulated vast reaches of Belarus and Russia, killed millions of Soviet citizens, and 

brought about economic ruin to the very areas that 

Hitler’s armies had depended upon for food and fodder. Ehrhardt and others saw these tactics as counterproductive; they sought alternate ways to achieve 

how the Wehrmacht, Schutzstaffel (SS), and police 

units put theory and doctrine into practice, often 

successfully. The first section of the book consists of 

Arthur Ehrhardt’s 1935 classic, Kleinkrieg. Though 

directly translated as “small wars,” Ehrhardt makes it 

clear that he is writing about counterguerrilla warfare 

and not the kind of small wars fought by the Marine 

Corps in the 1920s and 1930s, though there are parallels between the two different types of conflict. A 

highly decorated veteran of World War I’s Kaiserheer

(Imperial Army), Ehrhardt was a retired German officer who, during the early 1930s, chronicled Germany’s history of fighting against indigenous guerrilla 

or insurgent forces. He also accurately predicted the 

role that this kind of volkskrieg or “people’s war” (as 

theorized by the great German military thinker Carl 

von Clausewitz) would play in future conventional 

wars between two modern industrial powers. 

For example, Ehrhardt foresaw how modern guerrilla movements might capitalize on radio communications, aircraft, and motor vehicles to effectively 

strike targets in an occupying army’s rear area. He 

also gave some thought as to how modern media 

might be mobilized to rally the population to provide popular support to guerrilla armies. Conversely, 

Ehrhardt discussed a variety of ways and means to be 

employed by an occupying power (e.g., Germany) to 

effectively counter and destroy an insurgent or guerrilla movement. However, despite his well-argued 

assertion that Germany needed to prepare to fight 

such a war in the immediate future or even to wage 

its own guerrilla campaign should its territory be occupied, his entreaties were ignored by his contemporaries as well as by younger officers of the newly 

formed Wehrmacht. In the late 1930s, Hitler’s legions 

were preparing to fight a modern mechanized war, 

and its leaders had little time to consider something 

that many considered as being beneath them; guerrilla warfare was something “ungentlemanly,” a dirty 

kind of war fought by criminals or brigands.

When Germany began the invasion of the Soviet 

Union in June 1941, it soon found itself having to 

administer thousands of square miles of occupied 

territory, which sheltered large numbers of bypassed 

Soviet troops who began waging guerrilla war 

against the Germans as early as the summer of 1941. 

Hitler’s occupation forces in the rear areas were soon 

called upon to support the SS and police in combat-
96 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

the same goal without leaving a wasteland. After 

much thought and review of recent experiences, the 

German Armed Forces High Command published 

Bandenbekämpfungen in May 1944 to replace a previous, less encompassing directive published two 

years earlier. Its authors, though unknown but most 

including Ehrhardt, sought to strike a balance between theory and practice by encapsulating the accumulated knowledge of lessons learned, backed up 

by explanations of why certain practices produced 

greater success than other methods. This publication 

arrived in the field at an opportune time when the 

fortunes of war began to turn decidedly against Germany and when counterguerrilla operations began 

to assume greater prominence.

This salient document, picking up where Ehrhardt 

had left off in 1935, reads like a commonsense guide 

that not only examines the guerrilla phenomenon in 

detail, but also describes a number of various tactics, 

techniques, and procedures that could be applied to 

combat these movements. For example, sections are 

dedicated toward patrolling, local security, population and resource control, and cooperation with the 

air force. More impressive is a portion of the document that focuses on the importance of treating the 

local population fairly and devising measures to gain 

their trust with the aim of securing their cooperation 

in fighting the insurgents—ideas that are still valid 

today; see, for example, the current Marine Corps 

Interim Publication 3-33.01, Small Unit Leader’s 

Guide to Counterinsurgency, which is analogous to 

Bandenbekämpfungen, while Ehrhardt’s Kleinkrieg

has more in common with Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency. 

Bandenbekämpfungen directive was widely circulated throughout the Wehrmacht and SS during the 

last years of the war. It was considered by German 

practitioners of counterguerrilla warfare as an excellent primary source for guidance on how to conduct 

these types of operations. According to one general 

officer, counterinsurgency was a type of combat for 

which conventionally trained officers had little or 

no experience, a gap that led to German excesses in 

the field, which in turn were quickly followed up by 

guerrilla reprisals. Special schools were established 

during 1944 to train Wehrmacht and SS leaders in 

counterguerrilla techniques and procedures, and 

specialized SS units, the so-called jagdverbände

(hunter-killer groups) were organized to track, locate, identify, and eliminate partisan bands. Though 

these units became highly proficient at their task, it 

was a classic example of too little, too late. 

By late 1944, Nazi Germany had managed to alienate if not turn entire subjugated populations against 

them, and the crimes and incompetency of Nazi officials in the occupied areas during the first several 

years of the war could never be made good. Though 

recognized by the U.S. Army after the war as being 

an extremely useful doctrinal work, Bandenbekämpfungen by its very essence illustrated the conflict between practitioners who sought to effectively wage 

counterguerrilla war, and a cruel, ideologically driven totalitarian government that seemingly did everything possible to give rise to guerrilla movements. 

These diametrically opposing goals could never be 

reconciled, and most of Ehrhardt’s initiatives resulted 

in failure, though he never stopped trying.

The end of the war found Ehrhardt employed in 

establishing and organizing the stay-behind SS Werwolf resistance organization that was supposed to 

carry on guerrilla warfare against the occupying Allies after May 1945. That movement never really took 

off, though not due to a lack of effort on Ehrhardt’s 

part. Imprisoned briefly after the war with those who 

had served in the SS, Ehrhardt resumed his writing 

career after the war. He became involved in various Pan-European movements that sought to influence politics in postwar West Germany and was the 

founder of a major right-wing publishing firm, Nation Europa. He died in 1971 at the age of 75. Ironically, Kleinkrieg received very little recognition at the 

time outside of Germany, but his thoughts about how 

modern industrial nations could fight a counterguerrilla war were picked up by a small circle of counterinsurgency theoreticians, such as Walter Laqueur, 

who were concerned with addressing the challenge 

posed by contemporary Communist-influenced 

guerrilla movements then metastasizing throughout 

Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. 

This new edition of these two classic works seeks 

to redress the lack of German sources on counterinsurgency theory and doctrine. It is an accessible, 

easy-to-read resource that practitioners or students of counterinsurgency warfare can reference 

as they study the various insurgent groups operating throughout the world today. Replete with dia-
Winter 2016 97

grams and illustrations from the original versions, 

the text has been meticulously edited and, in parts, 

footnoted to provide additional context. Of note, 

the editor has provided a closing chapter that sums 

up both works and uses them as a filter to analyze 

modern Germany’s current counterinsurgency doctrine, which surprisingly uses much of the same 

World War II terminology, such as bandenkampf, 

partisan, and kleinkrieg, in describing the methods 

to be used by today’s Bundeswehr (German Federal 

Armed Forces) to address reoccurrences of this phenomenon they might face, as they have in Afghanistan. Though the study of counterinsurgency in its 

various modern forms may not be in vogue at the 

moment, as the various U.S. Armed Services seek to 

regain traditional warfighting competency, this book 

deserves to be on the bookshelf of anyone interested 

in the subject or for those who must devise methods 

to effectively combat future insurgencies, whatever 

form they may take.s1775s
The Choice of the Jews under Vichy:

Between Submission and Resistance

BOOK REVIEW

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Don Thieme

Professor of writing

U.S. Naval War College

The Choice of the Jews under Vichy: Between Submission and Resistance. By Adam Rayski. (Notre Dame, 

IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005. Pp. 408. 

$35.00 cloth; $25.00 paperback.)

“In order to understand historical reality it is sometimes necessary not to know its outcome.”

~Pierre Vidal-Naquet

This is a story of humans facing a great 

challenge: that of the population of France 

and the French Jews during World War II. 

Rayski’s book was first published in 1992 

as Le choix des Juifs sous Vichy: Entre sousmission et

résistance, and the English version of this authoritative and poignant chronicle was published in 2005. 

Adam Rayski (1913–2008), a Jew from Białystok, 

Poland, immigrated to France after World War I. He 

survived the Nazi and Vichy regimes in France, and 

spent his life after the war thinking deeply about the 

lessons of war, morality, and the frailty of the human 

condition. 

Frequently, books 

written by direct participants lack a broadspectrum perspective, 

as well as the multinodal detailed analysis to 

reconstruct a more accurate version of what 

happened, much less 

the ability to discern 

the drivers of human 

choice and actions, 

These weaknesses in 

investigatory writing 

are usually made worse 

by the passage of time and the fading of memory. Such 

is not the case with this book. Rather, based on newly accessible records, and with a zealous passion for 

precision, Rayski carefully constructs a detailed and 

nuanced view of the agonizing dilemmas the French 

faced as citoyens [citizens] and in the subdivisions of 

Gentile and Jew. 

The Choice of the Jews under Vichy appears partly 

as a response to the seminal publication by Michael 

R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France and 

the Jews (1981). Rayski traces the timeline of events 

in much the same way, but whereas Marrus and Paxton focus on a more chronological narrative, Rayski 

returns time and again to the human element as reflected in the title: choice. He does not spare Pierre 

Laval, Marshal Pétain, and other French leaders. 

Instead, he focuses on the divisions in the French 

Jewish population between those who considered 

themselves as French (i.e., as in the France of 1789) 

and those who were interlopers or recently arrived 

foreign Jews. Rayski highlights the ability of the Nazis 

and their French puppets to divide the French from 

Don Thieme earned his first MA in Central and 

East European studies from the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland, where he studied under 

Dr. Jonathan Webber. He has written and lectured 

extensively on the Holocaust and genocide, and 

helped write the Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook (2010). Recently retired from the U.S. Marine Corps, Thieme 

is completing his PhD with a focus on global ethics 

and human security while serving as professor of 

writing at the U.S. Naval War College.

98
Winter 2016 99

the Jews and then “native” Jews from “foreign” Jews. 

In this complex milieu, three social groups had to 

make choices, and Rayski pays close attention to the 

details of these nuances. First were the French and 

their choice—whether to collaborate, accommodate, 

tolerate, or resist. Many French were willing to sacrifice, at least to some degree, their own ideals of liberté, égalité, fraternité to preserve a sense of greater 

France. Rayski considers the difficulty of this choice 

even as he condemns the apparent ease with which at 

least some sectors of French leadership enabled Nazi 

policies. The second group was “native” French Jews. 

Their choice was narrower: flee, go underground, 

actively resist, or partially collaborate in hopes that 

“foreign” Jews would fulfill the victim role. The final 

group, “foreign” Jews like Rayski himself, faced even 

starker choices: flee, go underground, or resist. 

In navigating the moral and ethical choices of the 

protagonists, perpetrators, bystanders, and victims, 

Rayski carefully delineates the Byzantine structure of 

Nazi occupying forces, French organizations in occupied France, Vichy French organizations, and the 

many Jewish organizations. While the book would 

benefit from a set of charts to visually portray these 

bureaucratic relationships, the point that Rayski 

makes is plain: it was maddeningly difficult for any 

French citizen—Jew or Gentile—to even know where 

to look for information, guidance, or assistance.

Furthermore, the relationships between occupation administration, Nazi Germany, occupied France, 

and Vichy France were in constant flux. At the same 

time, the Holocaust continued to evolve, especially in 

1942, as Nazi policies toward Jews took an exterminationist turn, roundups and deportations increased 

in the “Greater Paris” region, and the Nazis occupied 

the whole of France in November 1942. 

Despite the confusion, chaos, and complexity of it 

all, Rayski shows that “if the Jews were victims they 

were by no means passive ones” (p. 3). He spares neither Chief Rabbi of France Isaïe Schwartz nor Jacques 

Helbronner (president of the Israelite Central Consistory of France, 1940–43). He makes it clear that 

the decision makers of 1942 could not know the consequences of three years of war by 1944: their decision making must be viewed in light of the facts as 

they were known at the time. The collaborationists 

in Paris thought that the Vichy administration was 

too soft on the implementation of the anti-Semitic 

policies of the Nazis; those in the Vichy administration thought that the Parisians were too compliant 

with those same policies. In the middle of this were 

the Jews—as well as those who wished to aid them—

who had to make theological, pragmatic decisions in 

the face of significant obfuscation and chaos. 

The physical movement of Jews was nearly as 

convoluted as Nazi-Vichy policy making. Drancy 

initially served as a “reassembly center” during a period of policy drift and improvisation. In the end, 

roughly 67,000 of the 75,000 Jews deported to Auschwitz had departed from Drancy. The intermittent 

stop at the Vélodrome d’Hiver was only another part 

of the complex maze that all French (Jew and Gentile) navigated under increasingly challenging conditions, especially after November 1942. 

In addition to the more than 200 camps that 

“blemished the French countryside” (p. 102), Rayski 

focuses on the human element of the nearly fouryear occupation. The Judenrat (Jewish council) was 

charged with the horrific task of “screening” registered Jews to “try to retain those whom we judge 

indispensable and to abandon those whom we expect to die shortly . . . it’s awful” (p. 112). The effects 

of social actions—relentless Nazi efforts to uncover 

and expose underground movements and hiding 

schemes, recruit collaborators, and foment societal 

distrust—were deeply divisive and destructive to 

French civil society. Even as the Henri Pétain-Pierre 

Laval government turned over nearly 25,000 Jews, 

others resisted in positions great and small. Rayski 

lays out the efforts to move and hide Jews in Italy, a 

scheme that worked as long as the Nazis did not fully 

occupy Italy.

Rayski’s analysis of the “People of the Shadows” 

is the greatest strength of this book. Using information from archives not previously investigated, and 

carefully moderating his own perspective and memories, Rayski observes that: “until now, this human 

experience, this unique reality in history, has passed 

largely unstudied by historians and sociologists” (p. 

163). Noting the positive, he stresses that “the humanitarian tradition made many French immune to 

antisemitism and racism” (p. 167) and that “nothing 

can diminish the gallantry of the population of the 

plateau” of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon (p. 184).

The author addresses the resistance of the Jews, 

quoting Marek Edelman that “our only morality: to 
100 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

kill him who is killing us” (p. 221). Rayski outlines 

the actions Jews took to defend themselves against a 

tyranny unique in the history of Europe; this is another great strength of the work. The fight against the 

Milice (French paramilitary organization) as well as 

the struggle against other French organizations that 

were complicit in various degrees with carrying out 

the Endziel (ultimate goal) of the Nazis in France was 

a centerpiece of Jewish action during the long night 

of German occupation. As in other parts of occupied 

Europe, the Jewish scouting movement answered the 

call with organization, diligence, courage, and resilience. He tackles the complex arguments of Yehuda 

Bauer and others, noting that the value of resistance 

was, sui generis, the resistance itself. 

Rayski concludes with a powerful testimony of the 

power of resistance, struggle, and survival. Writing 

near the end of a long, vibrant life (he died shortly after the English version was published), he stated that 

his purpose was to look back, reflect, and remember 

that time and address “the poorly known phenomenon of clandestinity, ‘people going underground’ ” 

(p. 314). Carefully considering the complex tapestry 

of the horrific choices of the Jews—and other French 

citoyens—during the occupation, Rayski concludes 

that if France was the country that, alongside Germany, most persecuted the Jews, “it was at the same 

time a country where nearly three-fourths of the 

Jews survived” (p. 315) with “pride, courage, and 

moral strength” (p. 320). s1775s
Light It Up:

The Marine Eye for Battle

in the War for Iraq

BOOK REVIEW

Reviewed by Jeremy Maxwell

Military Historian

Park University, Missouri

Light It Up: The Marine Eye for Battle in the War for 

Iraq. By John Pettegrew. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 2015. Pp. 240. $34.95 cloth and ebook.)

What makes a Marine? Are there any 

enduring qualities that make a Marine different from any other enemy 

on the battlefield? How does the Marine perceive combat? These are some of the questions that John Pettegrew endeavors to answer in 

Light It Up: The Marine Eye for Battle in the War for 

Iraq. More specifically, Pettegrew argues that U.S. 

military force in the Iraq War was projected through 

the lens of the Marine on the battlefield, or what he 

terms the optics of combat. Comparing the technology available during the Gulf War and the war in Iraq 

in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, he underscores the increasing accuracy and availability of 

visual-based guidance systems and combat gear that 

make killing the enemy a simpler task. In this era of 

supertechnology, the optics of combat is quite literally the blending of ability to see everywhere with the 

Marine belief that “if a target can be seen, it can be 

killed.” The phrase light it up then, describes the dual 

meaning of being able to illuminate any target and 

the subsequent use of force that destroys the enemy.

As the phrase optics of combat suggests, heavy emphasis is placed on how 

the enemy is perceived. 

Pettegrew offers a thorough analysis of how 

the Marine perception 

has been enhanced by 

digital technologies, 

effectively separating 

the shooter from the 

target. He discusses 

key issues, such as how 

risk of bodily harm is 

eliminated for the remote warrior, while 

discussing how the 

achievement of reality-based combat video games 

blur the line between simulated play and fighting. 

Such games are so effective that the Marine Corps 

and the Department of Defense spend vast sums of 

money to fund the development of gaming software 

that provide Marines with real-time training in urban 

warfare based upon veteran experiences. The theory 

behind the technology is, of course, that if Marines 

are exposed to the situations they will be facing prior 

to deployment, they will be far more effective when 

in-country.

Pettegrew’s analysis of Marines in Iraq is comprehensive, encompassing discussions about shockand-awe airpower, war porn and pleasure killing, 

ludology and the “first to fight” mentality in Fallujah, 

counterinsurgency and the ability to “turn off the killing switch,” and the idea of posthuman warfighting. 

The discussion of a vast array of subjects is incredibly effective in portraying not only the differences 

between the Marines in Iraq and the enemy they 

faced, but also the shifts in mission goals that forced 

Marines to adapt from their historic identity as an 

amphibious force in readiness. The development of 

Jeremy Maxwell currently teaches military history 

as an adjunct for Park University, MO. He is completing his PhD at Queen’s University, Belfast, and 

is currently researching integration in the U.S. military.

101
102 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

counterinsurgency doctrine and force projection are 

key components in conveying that message, as the 

manner in which Marines were deployed in Iraq was 

atypical of the purpose they were previously tasked 

to serve. 

Once their invasionary mission had been fulfilled, 

Marines had to turn off what Pettegrew so poignantly terms the killing switch. Using the oral testimonies 

of veterans of the war in Iraq, Pettegrew discusses 

the changes in rules of engagement that took place 

and the hardships that combat Marines encountered 

while transitioning to an occupying force. Counterinsurgency was a complete reversal of conventional 

warfare, where Marines had to adapt from the shockand-awe show of force to a humanitarian-based approach. Destruction was no longer the methodology 

employed. Rather, the new modus operandi was 

winning the support of the inhabitants of the villages 

they secured or occupied, and thus, hoping that the 

villagers would provide actionable intelligence.

The development of new technology, doctrine, 

and force projection, coupled with the experiences 

of Marines in combat, provided a more complete 

picture of the nature of the Iraq War. The experiences of Marine veterans were extremely valuable in 

portraying the feelings that arose as a result of combat. Equally valuable was Pettegrew’s use of material 

gleaned from interviews with retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, who had seen combat and been 

involved with the development of Marine Corps 

doctrine since the Vietnam War. As a former commander in chief of the United States Central Command, Zinni also was involved with the discussion 

and planning of much of the Marine Corps’ mission 

in Iraq. By incorporating these testimonies into the 

discussion and defining the role of Marines in the 

Iraqi conflict, Pettegrew presented one of the most 

comprehensive analyses of what it means to be a Marine in modern warfare.

John Pettegrew is an associate professor of history and director of the American Studies Program at 

Lehigh University who teaches and writes about the 

modern United States, specializing in the history of 

thought, culture, war, and visual culture. He has authored a number of significant works including Brutes 

in Suits: Male Sensibility in America, 1890–1920 (2007), 

an examination of the putatively male instinct of aggressiveness as constructed in modern U.S. social science, law, literature, and sports and military cultures. 

Given his background with such topics, Pettegrew 

is highly qualified to address the issues presented in 

Light It Up, a fact that is evident in his superior analysis of the hyper-masculine attitudes exemplified by 

Marines in Iraqi combat. While his analysis might 

be beyond the comprehension of the average reader, 

Light It Up definitely belongs on the shelf of military 

history enthusiasts, particularly those interested in 

the more recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, Pettegrew’s analysis would prove very useful for 

military academies and command and staff colleges 

as a tool of introspection and means of conveying the 

modern trends in force projection and adapting to 

new mission objectives.s1775s
Winter 2016 103

Marine Corps History Division is actively searching 

for contributors to Marine Corps History (MCH). 

MCH is a scholarly, military history periodical published 

twice a year (summer and winter). Our focus is on all 

aspects of the Corps’ history, culture, and doctrine. Articles should be no less than 4,000 words and footnoted 

according to Chicago Manual of Style. For more information about submitting an article or writing a book review, 

please email history.division@usmcu.edu with the subject line of “Marine Corps History Submission.”

Submissions

U.S. Marines and 

Irregular Warfare

Training and Education, 2000–2010

Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser

U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare

covers a period of considerable intellectual activity for the U.S. Marine 

Corps. The initial fighting during the 

Iraq and Afghanistan Wars convinced 

many Marine leaders that it needed 

to strengthen and enhance how it 

trained and educated Marines in 

counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This book recounts the work 

of Marines and educators in the field 

and at home at Marine Corps Base 

Quantico, Virginia, and at Marine 

Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California.
104 MCH Vol. 2, No. 2

U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001–2009

Anthology and

Annotated Bibliography

Major David W. Kummer

This anthology and bibliography presents 

a collection of 37 articles, interviews, 

and speeches describing many aspects of the 

U.S. Marine Corps participation in Operation Enduring Freedom from 2001 to 2009. 

This History Division publication is intended to serve as a general overview and provisional reference to inform both Marines 

and the general public until monographs 

dealing with major Marine Corps operations during the campaign can be completed. 

The accompanying annotated bibliography 

provides a detailed look at selected sources 

that currently exist until new scholarship 

and archival materials become available.