USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB FL 33621

https://jsou.socom.mil

USSOCOM

Research Topics

2012
Joint Special Operations University 

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The 

JSOU mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international security decision makers, 

both military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department 

where effort centers upon the USSOCOM and United States SOF missions: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM provides fully capable and enabled 

SOF to defend the nation’s interests in an environment characterized by 

irregular warfare. 

USSOF mission. USSOF conducts special operations to prepare the operational environment, prevent crisis, and respond with speed, aggression, 

and lethality to achieve tactical through strategic effect. 

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum 

support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff colleges and 

war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction in academic, 

interagency, and United States military communities.

The JSOU public Web page is located at https://jsou.socom.mil. 

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D., Strategic Studies Department Director

Jeffrey W. Nelson, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Juan Alvarez, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.; 

William C. Jones, GS-15, CIA, Ret.—Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board

James F. Powers, Jr. 

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Richard H. Shultz, Jr. 

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Stephen Sloan 

Ph.D., Comparative Politics 

University of Central Florida 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr. 

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering 

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham 

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Ph.D., History, Courage Services, Inc. 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley 

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/ 

Southeast Asian Studies 

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger 

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow

John B. Alexander 

Ph.D., Education, The Apollinaire Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Roby C. Barrett, Ph.D., Middle 

Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski 

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham 

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

Professor of Strategy, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School and JSOU Senior Fellow

Thomas H. Henriksen 

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Russell D. Howard 

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst 

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

James Kiras 

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Air University and JSOU 

Associate Fellow 

William W. Mendel, 

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro 

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret. 

JSOU Associate Fellow 
On the cover

Top left. Night training mission, two CV-22 Osprey 

aircraft, assigned to the 58th Special Operations 

Wing, at Kirtland AFB. 

Top right. A U.S. Army Special Operations soldier 

scans for insurgents during an engagement in the 

Sangin District area, Helmand Province, Southern 

Afghanistan. 

Bottom left. Marines from the 1st Marine Special 

Operations Battalion discuss their imminent jump 

2,500 feet above Camp Pendleton, California. 

Bottom right. Naval Special Warfare combatantcraft crewmen operate a Rigid Infl atable Boat from 

a forward location. 

USSOCOM

Research Topics

2012
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to Director, 

Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point 

Blvd., MacDill AFB, Florida 33621. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written works relevant 

to special operations for potential publication. For more information or to obtain 

copies of this publication, please contact the JSOU Director of Research at 813-826-

3674, jsou_research@socom.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-59-8
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm in Context , May 2011, Roby C. 

Barrett

Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference 

Manual, Second Edition , April 2011

Report of Proceedings, 6th Sovereign Challenge Conference (7–10 

November 2010)

The Challenge of Nonterritorial and Virtual Conflicts: Rethinking Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism , March 2011, Stephen Sloan 

Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way 

SOF are , March 2011, Jessica Glicken Turnley

Innovate or Die: Innovation and Technology for Special Operations , 

December 2010, Robert G. Spulak, Jr. 

Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking and Joint Special Operational Planning 

Doctrine and Procedures , September 2010, Laure Paquette 

Report of Proceedings, 5th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference 

(8–11 March 2010)

Convergence: Special Operations Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement , 

July 2010, John B. Alexander 

Hezbollah: Social Services as a Source of Power , June 2010, James B. Love

2010 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays , May 2010

Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency, and the Indirect Approach , April 2010, 

Thomas H. Henriksen 

U.S. Military Engagement with Mexico: Uneasy Past and Challenging 

Future , March 2010, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Report of Proceedings, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) and 

Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Society Symposium, Irregular Warfare 

and the OSS Model (2–4 November 2009) 

Hunter-Killer Teams: Attacking Enemy Safe Havens , January 2010 , 

Joseph D. Celeski 

Pakistan’s Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies , 

December 2009, Haider A.H. Mullick

Irregular Warfare: Brazil’s Fight Against Criminal Urban Guerrillas , 

September 2009, Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Manhunting: Counter-Network Operations for Irregular Warfare ,

September 2009, George A. Crawford 

vii

Contents

Foreword ................................................................................................ ix

Preface ................................................................................................... xi

A. Priority Topics ................................................................................... 1

B. Combating Terrorist Networks (CbTNs) ............................................. 9 

C. Irregular Warfare Strategy and Operations ..................................... 17

D. Interagency Operations ................................................................... 23 

E. Regional and Cultural Studies .......................................................... 29

F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues ..................................................... 35 

G. Miscellaneous ................................................................................. 41 

H. Additional Topics and Their Sponsors............................................. 49

I. Topics Retained from Previous Years................................................. 57

ix

Foreword

T he United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 

2012 Research Topics list is intended to guide research projects 

for Professional Military Education (PME) students, JSOU faculty, research fellows, and others writing about special operations during 

this academic year. Research is one of the cornerstones of JSOU’s academic 

mission and focuses on publishing in areas that contribute to understanding policy and strategy issues affecting the operational and planning needs 

of the Special Operations Forces (SOF). Each year, representatives from 

USSOCOM, SOF chairs from the war colleges, and JSOU senior fellows 

participate in a two-day workshop. Participants discuss and develop a comprehensive list of issues and challenges that are of concern to the greater 

SOF community. The list is then reviewed by the Headquarters USSOCOM 

staff, service components, and Theater Special Operations Commands 

(TSOCs) to confirm the suggested research topics best advance SOF missions and support SOF interests. The USSOCOM commander reviews and 

approves the final list, which includes his priority topics. The final Topics 

List is distributed to PME institutions in time for the incoming classes. 

It is also provided to academic researchers to guide their research efforts 

leading to published monographs. The research resulting from these topics 

is made available to the SOF community, members of the larger military 

profession, policymakers and strategists, and other members of the public. 

This research is distributed through JSOU Press publications, the publications produced at the various service schools and colleges, the Defense 

Technical Information Center (DTIC), and other online media. Ultimately, 

the research, study, and debate of these topics will inform decision makers 

and better prepare the profession of arms for our current conflicts and 

future challenges. If you have any questions about this document, JSOU

Press in general, or how JSOU can assist you in your academic research, 

contact the director of research by email at jsou_research@socom.mil. 

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D. 

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department

xi

Preface 

The USSOCOM Research Topics 2012 list represents an effort 

to identify, categorize, and list SOF-related research topics for 

research by PME students, JSOU senior fellows, and other SOF

researchers who desire to make timely and meaningful contributions 

to SOF issues and challenges. The USSOCOM commander places great 

emphasis and value on SOF PME students research and writing on timely, 

relevant, SOF-related topics. Such activity develops the individual’s intellect and provides a professional and practical perspective that broadens and frames the insights of other analysts and researchers in regard to 

these topics. This list and the accompanying topic descriptions are a guide 

to stimulate interest and thinking; topics may be narrowed, broadened, 

or otherwise modified as deemed necessary (e.g., to suit school writing 

requirements or maximize individual interests and experiences).

Sections A through G contain new topic categories with major ideas/concepts for 2012 from which topics can be derived, depending on the interest/experience of the researcher and the desired level of detail. Section 

A (Priority Topics) identifies those topics of particular importance that 

the USSOCOM commander has identified for special emphasis. All of the 

topics seek to expand SOF understanding of specific challenges and issues 

and promote thinking in regard to understanding them and identifying 

doctrine, capabilities, techniques, and procedures to increase SOF efficacy 

in addressing them. At the same time, the research is also intended to 

inform policymakers, the larger military profession, and the public of the 

issues and challenges of concern to the SOF community and what might be 

undertaken in support of them. The topics reflect a consensus of those participating in the topics project—that is, the topics are deemed particularly 

worthwhile in addressing immediate SOF needs and in building future 

capacity for emerging challenges. Topics are unique but share a focus on 

the following: 

a. Terrorist networks and how to counter them

b. Implications of irregular warfare and strategies and operations to 

win
xii

c. SOF in whole-of-government and comprehensive operational 

environments

d. Importance of regional and cultural emphases

e. Future SOF operating environments

f. SOF missions and functions, organization, force structure, and 

professional development and training.

g. Miscellaneous Topics

Section H is a list of topics submitted by PME and other military organizations throughout the year, and Section I is a list of topics retained from 

previous years. 

Limited TDY funding may be available from JSOU for researchers (to 

include PME students) to support their projects (e.g., to conduct interviews, 

visit USSOCOM, or visit component headquarters). These research “grants” 

are subject to approval by the director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department, 

contingent on the topic selected and the value added to the project.

Please share this reference with fellow researchers, thesis advisors, and 

other colleagues. Feel free to submit additional topics for possible inclusion 

in the next USSOCOM Research Topics publication. Also visit the JSOU 

Press online publications library, https://jsou.socom.mil to see whether 

JSOU has a publication that relates to your topic of interest. 

 
1

A. Priority Topics

A. Priority Topics

Topic Titles

A1. Whither terrorism? Where do terrorist adversaries go next and how 

does terrorism end?

A2. Innovation in SOF thinking—irregular strategies in combating terrorism and irregular warfare

A3. Strategic profiling in identifying terrorists and terrorist networks

A4. Leadership and the interagency process

A5. SOF roles in unlit spaces

A6. Return on Investment (ROI) of using SOCOM as the global synchronizer against terrorists and their networks?

A7. Countering the nexus of terrorist and criminal organizations

A8. Prosecuting the counterterrorism mission without alienating the local 

populace

A9. Assessing the Military Accessions Vital to National Interest (MAVNI) 

Program

A10. Role of mass communication strategies and strategic communication 

in combating terrorist group ideology

A11. Preventing and mitigating violent extremism

A12. Hearts and minds: human influence operations in irregular warfare 

Topic Descriptions

A1. Whither terrorism? Where do terrorist adversaries go next and 

how does terrorism end? 

The United States and its partners around the globe have made significant progress in countering terrorism. Yet terrorist adversaries 

have proven exceedingly adaptable and continue to pose a formidable 

security threat. What direction(s) will terrorist adversaries take as we 

and our allies get better? How might terrorism evolve or end? What 

challenges are posed for global security and counterterrorism forces? 

How does the United States and its partners put and end to terrorist 

networks’ adaptability? This study should develop a “Red Team” concept to examine plausible scenarios on how terrorists may continue to 
2

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

adapt, evolve, and develop their tactics and strategies with the implications on our counterterrorism strategy and operations. Implied are 

the questions how does terrorism end, and what happens to the terrorists afterward? Given the range of scenarios, what should SOCOM 

be doing now to stifle terrorist adaptability?

A2. Innovation in SOF thinking—irregular strategies in combating 

terrorism and irregular warfare

The adaptability of terrorists and terrorist networks is widely discussed. However, greater adaptability and flexibility has occurred with 

conventional counterterrorism. While there is much still to be learned 

and improvements in capabilities and capacity to be achieved, the 

significant knowledge gained and changes made suggest that bigger 

steps in innovation are required. Terrorism is only one form of irregular warfare. What is the status of the war on terrorism? What irregular threats loom before us? How do we continue to improve and foster 

innovation, creativity, and agility within SOF? What do we know 

about the strategic nature of our irregular adversaries and where their 

continuous adaptation may take them? 

A3. Strategic profiling in identifying terrorists and terrorist networks

Profiling at the individual level within the United States is often perceived as a civil rights or privacy issue and a politically sensitive issue 

Nonetheless, terrorist groups, terrorist networks, and individual members and potential recruits have characteristics and established patterns 

of operations that are discernible and can help distinguish terrorist 

groups, networks, supporters, and individuals from the normalcy of 

everyday life and activities. This research examines the many ways terrorists have integrated themselves into normal society, such as religion, 

social clubs, charities, business, and finance, and the individual and 

group characteristics. The focus is to answer some broad questions:

a. From a strategic perspective, how should we think about profiling, and what are the implications for policy and operations? 

b. How many ways can the threat be profiled? 

c. What profiling is currently in practice, and where might future 

profiling be appropriate? 

d. What are the issues with profiling? 

e. What are the risks versus gains? 

f. What are the disciplines of study or practice that may apply or 

assist in profiling (for example: criminal justice, economics, and 

anthropology), and how can they be applied?
3

A. Priority Topics

A4. Leadership and the interagency process

The U.S. interagency process has been severely criticized for perceived 

failures in policy decisions and actions regarding the wars in Iraq and 

Afghanistan as well as other domestic and international challenges. 

Congressional interest in how the executive department functions 

has been renewed, and numerous studies and articles have addressed 

the shortcomings. The nature of 21st century challenges has also 

resulted in a much broader involvement of U.S. military in the various levels of the interagency processes and opened the military to its 

share of criticism for the shortcomings. This research seeks a synthesis of the extensive analysis of the interagency and the most viable 

recommendations for improving the interagency process from the 

SOF perspective. What is the role of leadership at the various levels? 

Who should be in charge, and when and where? What are the essential military roles, and how can the military best pursue them? How 

can USSOCOM best engage with our international allies and partners? How can the military make the current or any new process or 

organizational structure more effective? What can SOF do to better 

prepare its leaders for the interagency environment? Does organizational culture play a role in creating barriers to communication and 

coordination?

A5. SOF roles in unlit spaces (fragile and failing states)

Fragile, failing, and failed states are at the root of many of the 21st 

century’s security problems. Their shortcomings trigger local, 

regional, and global instability as governance fails in providing essential human security. Their problems are exported elsewhere through 

migration, disease, humanitarian concerns, crime, and terrorism. 

SOF may be the most competent organization in the U.S. military to 

do the sort of hearts and mind things that prevent a state from collapsing and enable it to restore stability. This research examines SOF’s 

roles in preventing fragile and failing states from becoming failed 

states. What are the characteristics of fragile and failing states? Why 

should the U.S. be concerned? How should the U.S. prioritize interests 

in these states? When and on what levels should the U.S. intervene? 

What capacity does SOF have for dealing with these states and issues? 

What is the value of developing “micro-regional” expertise within 

SOF? What would be the types of roles for SOF in these missions? 

When should SOF become involved? How can SOF improve coordination with other U.S. government elements, local authorities, nongovernmental organizations, and partner states to stabilize a failing state? 
4

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

What are the implications for SOF capabilities, training, education, 

professional development, and deployment?

A6. Return on Investment (ROI) of using SOCOM as the global synchronizer against terrorists and their networks?

In 2003, then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld made SOCOM a warfighting combatant command and effectively made SOCOM the 

global synchronizer for the war on terrorism—a planning and 

coordinating function as opposed to direct command. As a result, 

SOCOM’s responsibilities and influence grew significantly. The headquarters were reorganized and enlarged, new facilities were constructed, liaison activities in Washington, D.C. and elsewhere around 

the globe were expanded, and additional funding was provided for 

programs, activities, and resources that were SOF inspired, if not 

always SOCOM managed and controlled. Equally important, SOF 

field forces took on increasing responsibilities, missions, and taskings 

globally and in the primary theaters of conflict. This research seeks 

to determine the costs, benefits, advantages, and disadvantages of 

having SOCOM as the global synchronizer in an evolving financiallyconstrained environment. The research should consider the basis of 

the decisions and the objectives given the command over time. Both 

qualitative and quantitative analysis can be used. Budget analysis and 

development or discovery of measures of effectiveness are both appropriate and may lead to useful insights. How can a new SOF Force Generation system best match SOF capabilities with existing and evolving 

Service systems? What measures are appropriate to determine if we 

are winning or how efforts should change? What do these measures 

tell us about synchronizing versus other methods of obtaining unity 

of effort (such as “coordinating or directing”)? What have been the 

issues in the relationships between SOCOM and other military and 

civilian organizations and agencies? What have been the gains? What 

has SOCOM learned about the nation’s cost threshold or pain level 

to sustain a protracted campaign to defeat terrorist networks? What 

characterizes SOCOM’s approach (for example: stability operations, 

nation building, punitive warfare, Counterinsurgency (COIN), or 

some hybrid)?

A7. Countering the nexus of terrorist and criminal organizations

A major and growing concern among intelligence agencies and counterterrorism strategists is the growing nexus of terrorist and criminal organizations. While a significant body of literature has evolved 
5

A. Priority Topics

over the last few years that examine the nature and reasons for this 

convergence, little research has been done on how this threat should 

be countered. This study briefly examines the emerging nexus and 

its characteristics, but focuses on how this threat can be averted or 

countered. What are the objectives of the convergence, and how does 

it occur? What are its strengths and weaknesses? How can these be 

mitigated or exploited? What are the potential counter strategies, and 

what best promises success? What are the SOF roles in countering this 

hybrid threat? What types of operations are inherent to the strategy, 

and what changes in organization, doctrine, and training should 

SOCOM consider? Who are the logical SOF partners at home and 

abroad in countering this threat? Discuss SOF interface with, support 

to, and collaboration with other members of the interagency community and suggest ideas to improve the relationship.

A8. Prosecuting the counterterrorism mission without alienating the 

local populace

The United States has made massive investments in winning the 

hearts and minds of local populations, but the populations in these 

regions often continue to be alienated or become re-alienated independent of security progress. David Kilcullen’s The Accidental Guerrilla suggests that much of today’s conflict is a hybrid mixture of 

insurgency, terrorism, criminality, and civil conflict. In the subsequent operational environments, outside military forces represent 

impositions on local population that are increasingly resented as 

security returns. He, like many others, suggests that a key to success for any modern counterterrorism effort lies in avoiding driving 

members of the local population into the passive or active ranks of 

insurgents and terrorists. Can a useful distinction be made between 

winning hearts and minds and the alienation of local populations that 

provides insights into this dynamic? If so, what is the difference and 

what are the implications for counterterrorism operations? How does 

the U.S. best assist the host nation in preparing a Hearts and Minds 

campaign? What is the relationship between kinetic and nonkinetic 

operations? What have we learned or know about the alienation of 

populations and how it can be avoided or mitigated? Are there specific instigators for it? What is the relationship between kinetic and 

nonkinetic operations and alienation and support? Can it be managed 

or shaped in more constructive ways? What policies, doctrine, tools, 

and practices should U.S. military leaders and forces adopt to limit or 

avoid alienation in how we train, deploy, and conduct operations? Are 
6

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

other agency models, such as the Tactical Conflict Assessment and 

Planning Framework (TCAPF) model from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), applicable to SOF operations? What 

policies, doctrine, tools, and practices contribute to encouraging or 

strengthening local population identification with U.S. presence and 

operations? 

A9. Assessing the Military Accessions Vital to National Interest 

(MAVNI) Program

Any objective assessment of the 21st century security environment 

results in a conclusion that instability, particularly caused by issues 

inherent to failing and fragile states, will constitute the highest probability of a security threat to U.S. interests. SOF is a critical instrument of U.S. policy in preempting or mitigating these issues and 

their consequences. However, finding and developing sufficient SOF 

personnel with advanced language and cultural awareness skills to 

recognize potential political or other social threats to failing and 

fragile states is a major impediment to its use. Assess the value of the 

MAVNI Program in identifying and acquiring advance languagequalified and culturally astute personnel as a potential solution to the 

current shortcoming. What is a MAVNI? Should MAVNI recruitment 

efforts be considered the same as a diversity recruitment program? 

How successful has the program been in recruiting qualified personnel into SOF? Discuss what, if any, impediments to success exist in the 

recruitment process. What has been the experience of those personnel who have made it into SOF? How are they being used to advance 

the mission? How can SOF better leverage the program to increase 

the numbers of candidates? What should a SOF utilization program 

for MAVNI-recruited personnel look like, and how would it work (for 

example: acquisition, training, professional development, and deployment)? What are the advantages and disadvantages? Is it a viable longterm solution for SOF? Compare and contrast this effort to previous 

similar efforts such as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in WWII 

to rapidly recruit specialized talent. 

A10. Role of mass communication strategies and strategic communications in combating terrorist group ideology

Some argue the war on terrorism is ultimately a war of ideas, mindsets, and worldview. From this perspective, the way to win the war is 

to challenge the ideas that gain terrorists their active and passive support and influence the hearts and minds of the populations in which 
7

A. Priority Topics

they subsist so that there is no longer any moral or physical support. 

Challenging and changing the ideas of the multiple audiences involves 

mass communication strategies to transform beliefs and attitudes that 

subsequently lead to behavior change. How should SOF advocate for 

and employ communications in the 21st century at the strategic and 

operational levels of war? Who is winning the war of ideas and why? 

How is the initiative gained and retained in this aspect of the struggle? 

Analyze the role of Military Information Support Operations (MISO) 

in combating terrorist networks, and identify its strengths and weaknesses. How have media and the flow of information changed? What 

changes need to be made in friendly practices to adapt to new media? 

How do we best use the rapidly adapting mass communications networks derived from the Internet? How do we improve Information 

Operations (IO)? What long-term change in practices and procedures 

will be necessitated by the new freer flow of information?

A11. Preventing and mitigating violent extremism

In the face of violent extremism and crime rates that threaten the 

stability of the state, USAID and other donors have promoted 

approaches based on prevention and mitigation. These approaches 

rely on development interventions to address the underlying political, social, and economic conditions that leave communities vulnerable to violent extremism. The approaches are generally community 

based, drawing together stakeholders such as at-risk communities and 

populations, especially youth, local and national civil society groups, 

municipal and national governments, security forces, and the private 

sector, who collectively work to identify and address the root causes 

of violent extremism. In some country situations, this prevention 

approach has been utilized as part of civilian-military collaboration to 

mitigate the drivers of instability. An approach based on prevention is 

consistent the National Security Strategy (NSS), which provides: “[W]

e must address the underlying political and economic deficits that 

foster instability, enable radicalization and extremism, and ultimately 

undermine the ability of governments to manage threats within their 

borders.” NSS, at p. 26. This Study will collect and evaluate experiences with countering violent extremism based on a prevention 

approach, taking into consideration factors such as effectiveness of the 

approach relative to law enforcement and institution-building, cost of 

the approach, and sustainability. The Study will focus in particular on 

countries where there has been a close collaboration between civilian and military efforts, and consider how SOF and the development 
8

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

community can work together to achieve the shared goal of preventing violent extremism. 

A12. Hearts and minds: human influence operations in irregular 

warfare 

At the core of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and the indirect 

approach lies the concept of hearts and minds. SOF is deeply engaged 

in both counterinsurgency (COIN) and the indirect approach; therefore, winning the hearts and minds of indigenous populations is 

central to SOF missions. Despite the significance of hearts and minds 

to SOF, the concept is often treated as a buzzword—a phrase that is 

taken at face value with little analysis, historical grounding, or precise 

understanding of what it entails. Its application also differs in recent 

history and in different theaters. This study looks at the concept of 

hearts and minds from a fresh perspective with the goal of deepening 

understanding of the concept and its relevance to the struggle against 

terrorism. Is winning the compliance and cooperation of the population a more relevant understanding of the task? After all, populations 

need to see good reasons to support government efforts, though not 

necessarily to like their government. Has the emphasis on kinetic 

operations produced negative consequences for the hearts-and-minds 

efforts because of friendly fire/collateral damage incidents, or because 

SOF are seen as supporting an unpopular government? How do we 

address religion (hearts and souls) as a component of the heartsand-minds challenge? This research should capture the techniques 

and best practices as we know them from irregular warfare experiences. Are we changing the minds/opinions, or are we simply seeking 

common ground where interests match? What steps do we need to 

take to at least keep the population neutral? Are the hearts-and-minds 

efforts a method or line of operation rather than an objective? 
9

B. Combating Terrorist Networks (CbTNs)

B. Combating Terrorist Networks (CbTNs)

Topic Titles

B1. Working with partner nations in counterterrorism (CT) operations

B2. Defining terrorist networks and understanding the differences

B3. Strategic intelligence and combating terrorism

B4. SOF counterterrorism activities against terrorist networks in developing countries (other than Iraq and Afghanistan)

B5. Nesting of nonkinetic stability operations and kinetic kill/capture 

operations in a shared battle space when combating terrorists and/or 

insurgent networks

B6. Use of SOF airpower in combating terrorist networks

B7. Influencing why individuals and groups resort to terrorism

B8. Scalable strategies for effects against a long-term terrorist threat

B9. Leveraging internal dissent in combating international terrorist 

networks

B10. Deploying a leaner and more lethal force to combat terrorists

B11. Terrorist exploitation of seams in the 21st century global order

B12. National cost threshold when defeating terrorist networks

B13. The specialness of SOF in countering the terrorist network threat

B14. SOF’s role in countering the terrorist network in the cyber realm

B15. Implications of using contractors for Combating Terrorism (CbT) 

missions

Topic Descriptions

B1. Working with partner nations in counterterrorism (CT) 

operations

Over the past decade the United States and its military forces have 

worked with numerous state partners in differing counterterrorism 

operations around the world. All seem to agree that partnerships are a 

good thing, but little actual research has addressed this aspect of 

counterterrorism. Partnerships can be established through bilateral or 

multilateral agreements. Partnership implies mutual benefits for both 

or all partners. Given this decade of experience, what have we learned 
10

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

(or should have learned) about such partnerships? Why, how, and 

when should the United States engage in partnerships in CT operations? What potential advantages are gained and what costs and risks 

may be incurred? Are there tenets of effective partnerships that suggest when a partnership is appropriate and how it should be practiced? 

How can effective partnerships bolster U.S. capacity and capabilities? 

How can the United States bolster the capacity and capabilities of its 

partners? Can these be quantified, qualified, or categorized? What 

pitfalls in partnership must the United States seek to avoid? This study 

should define partnership in regard to CT operations and discuss 

what the U.S. focus should be in acquiring and building effective 

partnerships.

B2. Defining terrorist networks and understanding the differences

Generally, modern terrorism has been addressed in research and 

policy as a single monolithic threat—sometimes referred to as the 

fourth wave (religion). Yet in practice, we recognize that individual 

terrorist groups do not fit conveniently into any broad general category. Partially as a result of counterterrorism successes, greater discrimination is now required to weaken or break the remaining bonds 

of the global network and find methods and techniques that destroy 

the network’s remaining capacity and is acceptable to fatiguing populations. This research reexamines the root causes and motivations 

of individual groups and provides an analysis of the driving factors 

of groups and their attractiveness to individual members. From the 

analysis, groups will be classified into categories and subcategories 

and points or factors of agreement and potential disagreement or friction identified. The latter analysis should lead to recommendations 

for counterterrorism policy and operations that drive wedges between 

various groups in order to defeat them individually. The research 

should include special considerations of hybrid terrorist organizations 

such as Hezbollah and Hamas. It should address the question: What 

specific methods and capabilities does SOF need to adopt to more 

effectively counter or destroy these threats?

B3. Strategic intelligence and combating terrorism

Intelligence and information sharing is a major emerging strategic 

issue. There is an evident pattern within the international community, 

between coalition states, and among the members of the U.S. interagency and military that suggests that existing barriers to sharing 

are affecting success in combating terrorism. Logically, nation states 
11

B. Combating Terrorist Networks (CbTNs)

have legitimate sovereign reasons for limiting some intelligence and 

information. However, the patterns suggest that bureaucratic obstacles, agency rivalry, unwarranted concerns, and changing information paradigms may be the real culprits. How should intelligence and 

information sharing for counterterrorism be designed to deal with 

how terrorists operate and changing information and communications patterns? What are the issues and obstacles? What new concepts 

or principles might apply to intelligence development, collaboration, 

and information sharing? How should SOCOM change its practices? 

What policy changes should SOCOM advocate?

B4. SOF counterterrorism activities against terrorist networks in 

developing countries (other than Iraq and Afghanistan)

As a result of more and more effective counterterrorism collaboration, terrorist organizations have shown a preference for acting in and 

basing from developing states and ungoverned territories/spaces. U.S. 

SOF have vigorously prosecuted the terrorist networks in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, and these wars have dominated our collective attention. However, U.S. and other nations’ SOF have also been conducting counterterrorism operations around the globe in other developing 

states. What are these non-Iraq and non-Afghan experiences telling 

us about counterterrorism and how to conduct it? What are lessons 

learned and insights gained? What do these tell us about doctrine and 

how to operate? What do they tell us about the evolution of terrorism 

and effective countermeasures?

B5. Nesting of nonkinetic stability operations and kinetic kill/capture 

operations in a shared battle space when combating terrorists 

and/or insurgent networks

A consensus has emerged that kinetic kill/capture operations in combating terrorists and insurgent networks is essential but not sufficient. 

In Iraq and Afghanistan, COIN has become dominant; however, 

kinetic operations continue and sometimes conflict with the other 

objectives of stability operations. How should commanders integrate 

nonkinetic stability operations and kinetic kill/capture operations 

in a shared battle space when combating terrorists and/or insurgent 

networks? What have we learned in Iraq and Afghanistan that SOF 

can apply to CT operations in other countries or areas? What have 

others learned elsewhere? Are doctrinal premises or models to help 

our understanding? What is the role of planning and training? What 

guidance must commanders provide?
12

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

B6. Use of SOF airpower in combating terrorist networks

Organic SOF airpower has been built around moving SOF forces (tiltrotor, helicopter, and fixed wing), close air support armed oversight 

(AC-130, MH-60 DAP, AH-6), and more recently, unmanned aerial 

vehicles. Is there a coherent SOF airpower strategy? How does or 

should such a strategy accommodate counterterrorism? Should SOF 

airpower evolve into a multimission force, allowing for all varieties of 

air missions (for example: nonkinetic and kinetic support)? Are SOF 

air assets better able to perform both kinetic and nonkinetic effects 

against CT targets? Are SOCOM and the services fielding/employing 

the right types of aircraft? Is adapting available airframes still sufficient, or do the requirements justify unique designs? How do new 

technologies such as remotely piloted aircraft for combating terrorist 

networks fit into SOF airpower strategy? Will development of needed 

new capabilities in SOF create too much redundancy with conventional forces? What specifically needs to be SOF?

B7. Influencing why individuals and groups use terrorism

Know thy enemy is a premise of successful warfare. Much study has 

been devoted to why individuals join terrorist organizations and how 

these organizations get their members to commit terrorist acts, but 

less has been done to understand why the terrorist network chooses 

and persists in terrorism. Is there root reasoning beyond the clichés 

of “it works” or “the poor man’s weapon” that explain its appeal and 

persistence to the leaders? Is it more than a tactic? If so, what are the 

implications? What do they do different, and how do you counter 

it as opposed to a more Maoist approach where terror is a tactic to 

build strength? How can such appeal and persistence be influenced 

or affected within or across the groups? The United States and other 

nations are heavily engaged in current activities and operations in 

combating terrorism. How do we know that those activities are both 

an effective and efficient use of limited resources? How would a 

focused strategy address the root logic? Discuss root causes of terrorism—that is, What causes some people to resort to acting out their 

apparent frustrations and discontent using terrorist acts while others 

from the same group and exposed to the same irritants do not? How 

do you recognize the signs that someone may be proceeding along the 

path to committing a terrorist act? How can you preempt the terrorism act from being committed? Are there SOF tools available to influence a person or group from carrying out a terrorist act?
13

B. Combating Terrorist Networks (CbTNs)

B8. Scalable strategies for effects against a long-term terrorist threat

Terrorist networks pose short- and long-term threats to the international order and the interests of the United States, the community of 

nations, and other legitimate international and local actors (for example: nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, civic organizations, and businesses). Who or what are the other 

entities that share a potential common interest in the defeat of terrorist organizations and networks? How can these be categorized? What 

are their interests and motivations, and where do they overlap? What 

capacity and capabilities (assets) do they possess, and how can they 

contribute? Given an understanding of the above, how can these be 

integrated to counter both global and specific terrorist threats? Given 

the inherent complexity created by limitations on levels of commitment and available resources of these potential partners and assets, 

how should SOCOM think about creating scalable strategies that deal 

with different terrorist threats that vary in scope, scale, proximity, and 

consequence?

B9. Leveraging and Exploiting Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) 

internal dissent in combating international terrorist networks

The individual terrorist groups, auxiliaries, passive supporters, and 

partners of convenience that make up the terrorist network are not 

a monolithic threat. They may share common or mutually supporting interests and motivations, but interests and motivations vary in 

interpretation and intensity and can be widely dissimilar, competitive, 

and even conflictive. How can we divide our enemies among themselves and from their supporters and allies? What challenges their 

legitimacy and appeal to others? Which interests and motivations can 

be addressed through non-conflict mechanisms, and what are these 

mechanisms? How do we divide and restore stability?

B10. Deploying a leaner and more lethal force to combat terrorists

Nonkinetic operations may provide the resolution to the conditions 

that allow terrorists and terrorist networks to flourish; however, if 

the past is any indicator of the future, SOF will still need a lethal 

capability. How can SOCOM create force packages that can accomplish the diverse missions and meet an increasing demand for a 

smaller footprint? What has our experience taught us to date about 

the deployment of SOF in counterterrorism? What are the types of 

requirements, and how should forces be tailored? What are the constraints on deploying SOF force packages, and how can these forces 
14

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

be tailored to reduce their footprint? How does SOCOM develop host 

nation forces to conduct these operations? How does SOF fit into, 

and support a larger “whole of government” approach? How should 

USSOCOM and SOF support a larger effort lead by a civilian agency?

B11. Terrorist exploitation of seams in the 21st century global order

Multiple studies on modern terrorism argue that the terrorist network 

is better able to take advantage of the changes wrought by globalization. They, along with others, profit by acting through the new seams 

in the international order created by new technology, new means of 

communication and travel, rising expectations of populations, changing economic patterns, and inadequate governance. How can these 

seams be categorized? What are their characteristics? How can they 

be addressed? What counterterrorism policies and strategies best 

address the advantages enjoyed by the terrorist network? What is the 

SOF role in these? 

B12. National cost threshold when defeating terrorist networks

One of the objectives attributable to Al Qaeda is the desire to economically bankrupt the United States. If this is true, it is an objective 

that has not yet been achieved. Nonetheless, the United States and its 

allies have suffered losses of blood and treasure and have made vast 

expenditures in security precautions and counterterrorism activities to defeat the terrorism network. Expenditures have been made by 

both the public and private sectors. Various estimates of a “true cost” 

have been postulated in terms of actual dollar and opportunity costs, 

but single analysis has brought together the qualitative and quantitative metrics to provide a basis for judging a cost threshold of where 

the objective might be realized. Moreover, national will is another cost 

threshold; it is not just about dollars. 

What are the costs currently attributed to the current level of 

efforts in counterterrorism security and operations worldwide? How 

is or should this burden be shared? What does the U.S. spend? Which 

of these costs are sunk costs—that is, would be expended anyway as 

a part of any security paradigm? How much effort and money can 

the United States afford to expend over what timeframe for successful counterterrorism? How are U.S. funds and efforts best used? What 

should the U.S. spend to support partner nations in establishing/

improving their counterterrorism organizations and efforts? 
15

B. Combating Terrorist Networks (CbTNs)

B13. The specialness of SOF in countering the terrorist network threat

Following the attacks on 9/11, the United States has sought to bring 

all of its instruments of power to bear on the threat posed by evolving terrorist networks. SOF has been an integral part of the counterterrorism effort and the war on terrorism. New SOF capabilities and 

missions have evolved and old ones have been adapted and integrated 

into new operational patterns. Conventional military forces, other 

agencies, and local law enforcement have also adapted and evolved. 

Much of the change has been ad hoc, driven by pressing needs. This 

research analyzes what missions and operations SOF is currently 

involved in, categorizes them, and compares them to what others have 

undertaken or are developing. From this understanding, it seeks to 

answer the question what is special about SOF in regard to countering 

the terrorist network threat? What is SOF doing that could be done 

better by others? What is SOF doing that it is uniquely qualified for 

and prepared to undertake? What is inherent to SOF capabilities even 

when others have proficiency? What is SOF not doing that it should be 

doing? What are the implications of the answers to these questions for 

SOF capabilities, organizational structure, and doctrine?

B14. SOF’s role in countering the terrorist network in the cyber realm

Terrorists have been early adapters in regard to the Internet and cyber 

operations. Terrorist networks have capitalized on this talent, and 

expectations are that their activities will increase in this realm across 

a broad spectrum ranging from recruitment to cyber attacks. What 

is the nature of this threat? What role should SOF play in countering 

this threat? What unique capabilities does SOF have that are applicable? What capabilities should SOF develop?

B15. Implications of using contractors for combat terrorism (CbT) 

missions

Contractors have been an integral part of CbT network missions and 

have made significant contributions to national security. However, 

the extensive use of contractors has also created issues at the national 

policy, strategic, operational, and tactical levels. How are contractors 

being used in counterterrorism missions? Can these uses be categorized? In what roles and missions have contractors been particularly 

successful and what are the measures of success? In what roles and 

missions have contractors been problematic and what are the specific 

types of issues caused? What are the implications of using contractors for CbT missions—when and how should they be used and when 
16

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

should they not been considered for use? What is the value-added 

from using civilian contractors in the fight against terrorism? Does 

use of contractors enhance, detract from, or seriously impede SOF 

capabilities in the fight against terrorism? What measures, restrictions, or guidelines (if any) should be put in place to guard against 

potential disaster or misuse of civilians, including contractors, in a 

purely combat role? 
17

C. Irregular Warfare Strategy and Operations

C. Irregular Warfare Strategy and Operations

Topic Titles

C1. “Irregular warfare?”—if so, how and why

C2. SOF and Security Force Assistance (SFA) in the 21st Century

C3. SOCOM as Lead combatant command in fighting Irregular Warfare

C4. Combating Terrorist Networks (CbTNs) vs. the acceptability of punitive warfare

C5. Targeting adversarial irregular forces

C6. Assessment of irregular warfare education/training in U.S. military 

services 

C7. Force structure and missions in an irregular warfare world

C8. Role of civil society in irregular warfare

C9. Using “irregular” resources to achieve irregular war objectives

C10. Partnership in irregular warfare environments

C11. Unconventional Warfare in the 21st Century

C12. IW in the Littorals

Topic Descriptions

C1. “Irregular warfare?”—if so, how and why

Irregular warfare is a term that has been well debated among the 

services in the joint arena. It has utility and has been adopted into the 

military lexicon. Yet, understanding is not yet sufficient and it is not 

universally accepted. There is a need for a good intellectual synthesis 

of knowledge in regard to irregular warfare and its utility as a concept 

relative to spectrum of conflict. What is the definition of irregular 

warfare, and what is its utility as a model or as a concept for understanding types of threats and war? How do our adversaries perceive 

what we call irregular warfare? Is it conventional for them? How do 

our adversaries view their strategy as IW? What gaps exist in our conceptualizations of our adversaries’ thinking? How important is it relative to regular warfare? Is it more or less important in the 21st century 

versus other eras? What is the new norm for “irregular”? What is the 
18

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

relationship and balance between irregular and traditional warfare? 

What are the implications for SOF force structure and missions?

C2. SOF and Security Force Assistance (SFA) in the 21st Century

Security Force Assistance is a security policy instrument, but is often 

problematic in execution, politically sensitive at home and abroad, 

and in the aggregate resource demanding. Using important historical 

engagements (e.g., Vietnam, the Philippines, Colombia, Afghanistan), 

is there evidence that SFA has been effective? Is the usefulness of 

SFA exaggerated? How does SFA fit into our regional strategies? How 

does it work within a given country? Who is in charge? What are the 

most likely demands that might be placed on SOF? Who should be 

in charge, and how should the chain of command work? How should 

funding and accountability work? What capabilities and capacity 

does SOF bring to SFA? What should be SOF’s role in SFA? Is SFA 

an effective tool in strategy, or a tool for force development? Should 

USSOCOM be the executive agent for SFA?

C3. SOCOM as Lead combatant command in fighting Irregular 

Warfare

The Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) are best prepared 

to deal with conflict in their geographic regions. However, the seams 

created by geographic organization and the global or functional 

nature of much irregular warfare are inherently problematic for the 

GCCs. Discuss how difficult it is for a geographic command to deal 

with a global, massive cyber-attack or a global war on terror outside 

their areas of responsibility. U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) 

would be the more logical lead in the former scenario as USSOCOM’s 

integrator role was in the latter. What forms of irregular warfare 

necessitate a SOF lead? Should USSOCOM be a combatant command 

for certain types of irregular warfare? If so, which? If not, what lead 

roles might SOCOM be called upon to play, and how will the command lead (for example, doctrine development, training, education, 

and C2 of operations)? What recommendations in regard to SOCOM 

are justified by the analysis—what roles should SOCOM seek, and 

how should SOCOM prepare itself for such roles? 

C4. Combating terrorist networks (CbTNs) vs. the acceptability of 

punitive warfare

The costs in dollars, lives, opportunity, and time spent in combating terrorist networks through strategies of development and COIN 

are beginning to wear on the American people’s patience. Irregular 
19

C. Irregular Warfare Strategy and Operations

warfare, such as piracy and state-sponsored or tolerated terrorism, 

raises serious questions in their minds about how security is being 

pursued. Military force can be used in differing ways, and military 

operations to impose will or have a punitive effect to deter others 

may well be the way of the future. If the results of actions against the 

United States are preemptive in nature, the use of kinetic military 

force is justified. Such use is consistent with America’s values and history. What is the value of preemptive or punitive strikes in irregular 

warfare? Are they readily usable instruments of policy? What issues 

and problems do they pose? Are they acceptable at home and abroad, 

and do they communicate more meaningfully than winning hearts 

and minds—if so, how and under what conditions? What metrics or 

models are available to help us understand when these methods are 

preferable or more beneficial? How can we better think about the multiple choices available in the use of the military in irregular warfare?

C5. Targeting adversarial irregular forces

Irregular warfare postulates a range of warfare that is distinct from 

traditional warfare. Accepting the joint definition of irregular warfare, what does targeting look like in these environments? What constitutes legitimate targets? Can these be categorized? How might these 

targets be acquired? How might these targets be engaged? Research 

and analyze SOF doctrine, training, and organic or supporting capabilities for determining, identifying, and engaging the range of “irregular targets. What capacity does SOF have now? How should SOF 

invest now for the future—capabilities, training, and doctrine?

C6. Assessment of irregular warfare education/training in U.S. military services 

A primary responsibility for preparation for war is accomplished 

through the training and education programs of the different services. 

Given the complexity of modern warfare and its instruments, significant challenges exist for training/education time and resources. This 

research seeks to assess the state of training and education for irregular warfare within the different services. How should each of the services train and educate in regard to irregular warfare? What do other 

militaries do? Do the U.S. military services provide the right and 

sufficient irregular warfare education/training? What training is conducted, and when does it occur? Is it appropriate and sufficient? What 

is SOCOM’s role, if any? What changes to current practices need to be 
20

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

made? Which institution is responsible to ensure training on irregular 

warfare is conducted and to what standard?

C7. Force structure and missions in an irregular warfare world

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan challenged the U.S. military’s prewar perspectives and capabilities. General Purpose Forces (GPF) have 

adapted by becoming less conventional and more SOF-like, focusing 

on COIN and stability operations. SOF, meanwhile, shifted to a more 

kinetic focus—direct approach. Analysts predict a high probability 

of more irregular warfare in the future, but also the rise of potential 

traditional peer competitors requiring the capacity to deter or defend 

by conventional means. Greater budget restraints also loom in the 

near future. Are the U.S. military force structure and capabilities out 

of balance because SOF has moved too far toward kinetic capabilities 

versus other SOF skill sets? Are the GPF too SOF-like and losing their 

conventional skills or conventional capabilities and expertise? What 

should happen to GPF and SOF force structure and roles when the 

current wars end? Is SOF adequately manned, trained, and equipped 

to counter irregular threats of the future? How might GPF and SOF 

combine efforts during irregular warfare operations? What are the 

roles and responsibilities of each? Will GPF assume some of the more 

routine missions, such as in Foreign Internal Defense (FID), or will 

SOF grow even further to accommodate the continuing increase in 

missions? Does SFA have a role in the development of the force structure deployed overseas?

C8. Role of civil society in irregular warfare

Civil society has always been important within democratic nations, 

but globalism has universally empowered civil society, and its presence and power as a non-state actor has increased exponentially since 

the end of the Cold War. What are the distinctions between international civil societies and domestic civil societies, and why are the 

distinctions important? What are the multiple roles of the different 

civil society actors in irregular warfare? How can they be integrated, 

facilitated, and influenced to take advantage of their positive effects 

or mitigate the negative? Can their concerns be integrated within the 

framework of U.S. objectives/interests? When, if ever, must we modify 

U.S. objectives to counter civil society’s aims? How can they assist or 

hamper the struggle to win the hearts and minds of the population? 

How do they legitimize or disparage our efforts? How should SOF 
21

C. Irregular Warfare Strategy and Operations

“frame” the rise of civil society in strategy, planning, and doctrine? 

How can SOF mobilize or leverage these assets in IW campaigns?

C9. Using “irregular” resources to achieve irregular war objectives

Irregular warfare encompasses a significant part of the spectrum of 

conflict and differs significantly from traditional warfare. Historically, 

its logic is nothing new, but its grammar reemerges from the circumstances of the 21st century. Military audiences often think of irregular 

warfare as “new” and requiring “new” resources. Examine current 

theory and doctrine in regard to irregular warfare. What resources 

are implied? Analyze what is actually “new”? Which of these can 

be garnered from existing military or be provided by nonmilitary 

resources? For example, the presence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international and local, in the battle space is generally 

accepted, but exactly how to deal with this presence in military operations has only recently been addressed in doctrine and is still being 

negotiated at the operational and tactical levels. The strategic relevance as international actors or internal forces has yet to be comprehended. Many NGOs have resources but lack security and planning 

capabilities. Discuss the way forward for resourcing irregular warfare.

C10. Partnership in irregular warfare environments

Historically, the U.S. military has conceptualized “partnerships” as 

political and military alliances, coalitions, and ad hoc military to military arrangements. The strategic and operational environments of the 

21st century challenge by the limitations of these concepts. The challenges are most evident in the modern practice of irregular warfare. 

Consider irregular warfare as it is explained in current doctrine and 

practice. Who should the U.S. military logically seek to “partner” with 

on various levels: strategic, operational, and tactical? Categorize these 

partner relationships and develop the precepts that should guide such 

partnerships. How can we leverage the individual partners’ capabilities while recognizing their limitations or constraints? 

C11. Unconventional Warfare in the 21st Century

Unconventional Warfare (UW) by its traditional definition consists of 

Guerilla Warfare (GW), sabotage, subversion, intelligence activities, 

and escape and evasion (E&E) support. Because of its legacy heritage 

most have interpreted UW through a GW lens, and more importantly that UW is waged against an enemy state or government. This 

requires an analysis and comparison of UW, how it was conducted in 

the past, how it is perceived, and how it is conducted in the present. 
22

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

Refine or define how it should be conducted in the future. How should 

SOF apply, or should SOF re-define the aspects of UW against nonstate actors? Do we need new nomenclature? 

C12. IW in the Littorals

With 70 percent of the earth’s surface covered by water, 80 percent of 

the world’s population living within 100 miles of an ocean, and more 

than 90 percent of the global commerce moving across the world’s 

oceans, the global littorals figure predominantly in national, regional, 

and global security. Key to legitimate trade, the littorals are increasingly exploited by those engaged in irregular activities such as trafficking people, contraband, and a myriad of IW threats. Irregular 

challenges—and how to confront them in the global littorals—is a 

growing concern, particularly as terrorist/insurgent/criminal nexuses 

expand and grow more sophisticated. Compounding the challenge 

of confronting IW in the littorals are that the threat crosses theater 

boundaries, is not viewed as high a DoD priority as more traditional 

threats, and is relegated to law enforcement vice being addressed as a 

whole of government issue. Strategies to develop a better understanding of the problem set, integrate U.S. and partner efforts to confront 

it, and clarify the role and priority of SOF are critical to reducing 

both the breadth and depth of this threat. Specific areas of analysis 

will include determining SOCOM perspectives regarding irregular 

challenges in their respective littorals, both within and across areas 

of operation, with specific emphasis on how irregular threat impacts 

the geopolitical balance (national and regional), economic security, 

and defense of the global commons. Given geopolitical realities, other 

regional influences, and U.S. and partner nation fiscal constraints, 

identify the top two or three countries that influence maritime 

regional security within each theater, the five countries most likely to 

be the source of destabilization, and the impact of littorals on each. 

Make recommendations regarding the integration of the U.S. Navy, 

Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and SOF programs to achieve efficiencies in developing and sustaining joint programs to improve partner 

nation and regional security littorals critical to U.S. national interests. 
23

D. Interagency Operations

D. Interagency Operations 

Topic Titles

D1. Improving interagency-military relationship 

D2. Comprehensive approaches— sharing the security burden globally

D3. Comprehensive approaches— developing better national strategies

D4. Geographic combatant commanders and embassies in security 

assistance

D5. Lessons learned from SOF experience in the interagency

D6. Building a comprehensive host nation perspective of U.S. support – 

Effective Strategic Communications

D7. Reconsideration of the 1997 DoD/DoS MOA on AT/FP issues

D8. Bridging the DoD nongovernmental organization (NGO) divide

D9. Embedding full-time SOCOM LNOs in select embassies

D10. Success factors in Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

Topic Descriptions

D1. Improving interagency-military relationship

Solutions to 21st century U.S. security problems lie in whole of government (interagency) approaches. What is the state of the military 

and SOF’s ability to work with other departments and agencies of 

government? What are the strengths and weaknesses? What are the 

obstacles? At what levels does interagency or whole of government 

coordination occur? Is this sufficient? If not, what other forums are 

required, and what changes need to be made at each level? Should the 

interagency-military relationship be more formalized? Why and how? 

How do we improve interagency information sharing while simultaneously maintaining adequate security/compartmentalization? Does 

whole of government need to be rehearsed? If so, who should conduct 

the exercises and at what levels? What are the implications of a more 

seamless interagency-military relationship for SOF operations? What 

are the implications for SOF professional development? How can the 

relationship leverage each others’ capabilities?
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

D2. Comprehensive approaches—sharing the security burden 

globally

Iraq and Afghanistan, threats of potential conflicts, and increased 

instability exceed the costs of what American taxpayers can reasonably be expected to support. Contributions of friends and allies in 

Afghanistan in a comprehensive approach have helped. Nonetheless, 

United States security capacity is strained by increasing commitments. Is a new global security paradigm possible based on a comprehensive approach? What is a comprehensive approach, and what 

are the scenarios it may support? For example, from a U.S. perspective, can we delegate more of the counterterrorism, nation building/peacekeeping/FID operations to others? Can the North Atlantic 

treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations take more of the 

security burden in various regions/states? If so, what are the plausible 

scenario implications for SOF? What are the measures of capability on 

the host nation to assume the responsibility? 

D3. Comprehensive Approaches—developing better national 

strategies

Many countries struggle in the development of their national strategies. Yet, legitimate state actors that have evolved good processes for 

strategic appraisals and strategy formulation invariably pursue strategies that complement U.S. interests rather that oppose them. How can 

the SOF community help other nations understand strategy formulation better and gain a better appreciation for whole of government and 

comprehensive approaches to local, regional, and global security and 

stability issues? Do SOF warriors understand national strategy and 

strategy development? Do SOF warriors know and understand the 

concepts of Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)? Where does 

SOF teach our Captains how to appreciate and develop strategy? Does 

the interagency and military leadership (not just SOF) understand 

IDAD? Should there be a national executive agent for IDAD? Where 

does SOF fit best as a tool to support IDAD? 

D4. Geographic combatant commanders and embassies in security 

assistance

Security Force Assistance (SFA) is a complex and challenging instrument of national policy and security. It will become increasingly 

important as the United States seeks more and more to deal with 

regional instability through regional actors. Not surprising, U.S. 

ambassadors and geographic combatant commanders (GCC) 
25

D. Interagency Operations

sometimes differ on Security Assistance (SA) priorities and issues. 

How are SA policy and requirements identified, developed, prioritized, 

and disseminated among the various levels: ambassadors, GCCs, DoS, 

DoD, the National Security Council (NSC), and presidential level? 

What is the big picture? Are the relationships and collaboration processes among the GCCs and various U.S. embassy staffs clearly established and defined? How do they differ among the regions? Do some 

more successfully identify, prioritize, and implement security assistance requirements and support? Why? What drives prioritization? 

How are differences in DoD and DoS perspectives resolved? Are GCC 

concerns appropriately represented in the country team model? How 

can SFA identification, development, prioritization, and implementation be improved? How does SOF fit into this process? Should SOF 

have a permanent presence in an embassy security cooperation role? 

What are the differences between SFA and SA?

D5. Lessons learned in SOF experience in the interagency

The interagency is composed of differing organizational cultures, 

members with diverse educational and experiential backgrounds, and 

often conflicting interests and priorities. SOF culture is specifically 

developed to appreciate these types of differences in foreign populations. In addition, SOF has developed a near continuous relationship 

with much of the interagency over the past decade. How can USSOCOM’s past experiences in supporting interagency efforts be used 

to improve overall whole of government efforts in engagement with 

other nations? What insights does the SOF perspective and experience 

offer in regard to interagency relationships and processes? What lessons have been learned? What are the implications for development of 

training, education, professional development, and exercises and duty 

for SOF, the military, and the whole of government?

D6. Building comprehensive host nation perspective of U.S. support—Effective Strategic Communications

The United States provides significant support through various agencies and activities to multiple countries and peoples. Yet, we need to 

look no further than Iraq or Afghanistan for evidence that this support is falling short of building the kind of relationship with the host 

nation and its citizens that U.S. policy seeks. There are numerous 

reasons. Some have described it simply as losing the strategic communication battle. Others point to the disjointed and competitive 

agency programs and messages and express a growing concern that 
26

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

these populations perceive these efforts in a piecemeal fashion. There 

is a perspective that, individuals, contractors, and separate agencies 

become competitors for what we really want—legitimacy of our intervention and legitimacy for the government we are supporting. What 

are the distinct reasons U.S. contributions have not resulted in more 

favorable indigenous support and legitimacy for U.S. policy goals? 

Which can be addressed? Which cannot? How does the U.S. government employ strategic communications to get indigenous populations 

to see individual U.S. agency assistance as a whole of U.S. contribution 

and favorable U.S. policy at work? How do we effectively integrate and 

coordinate strategic communications between agencies in order to 

affect indigenous populations favorably? How do strategic communications and MISO operations improve population attitudes in regard 

to what whole of government efforts are achieving within the battle 

space—transition from the perspective of the hand that feeds them to 

an understanding of good governance?

D7. Reconsideration of the 1997 DoD/DoS MOA on AT/FP issues

The DoD/DoS 1997 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) regarding Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) issues for DoD elements addresses the issue of whether military units come under the 

authority/responsibility of the Chief of Mission or Combatant Command when operating in a foreign country. The conflicts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan as well as incidents involving SOF units in Pakistan 

have caused the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), the security and 

law enforcement arm of DoS, to revisit this MOA for possible revision. Examine the major provisions of the current MOA and the 

issues associated with it. Discuss its strengths and shortfalls. Is the 

MOA appropriate for today’s environment, and is the major issue one 

of education and adherence? Are the issues substantial and require 

a revised or new MOA? What new provisions are needed to support 

evolving circumstances and requirements? How should resources 

and funding be controlled and accounted for? Are unique provisions 

needed in regard to SOF?

D8. Bridging the DoD-nongovernmental organization (NGO) divide

There is an existing history of NGO aversion to cooperation and 

identification with U.S. military forces. Yet, military professionals 

and NGO professionals share much in common in regard to values 

and commitment. And, increasingly they share the same operational 

space. More recently, some members of the NGO community have 
27

D. Interagency Operations

begun to question their aversion, and the military has developed 

a new appreciation for what NGOs can do to help in fragile states. 

Should we further bridge the DoD–NGO divide, and if so, how? What 

are the reasons for the divide? What are the advantages and disadvantages of greater cooperation? Where does it make sense, and where 

is it not appropriate? Are there ways to facilitate shared operational 

space issues? Are there doctrinal precepts? What are they? What are 

the mechanisms of bridging—for example, doctrine, education, and 

structural? Are there unique SOCOM roles and responsibilities in 

regard to NGOs? What are possibilities and the pros and cons of SOF 

working with NGOs?

D9. Embedding full-time SOCOM Liaison Officers in select embassies

SOCOM is developing Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLO) for 

assignment with partner nation SOF headquarters overseas. Should 

SOCOM have full-time SOLOs embedded in the country teams at 

U.S. embassies in countries with critical SOF operations? What would 

be the purpose and role of such SOLOs? What role justifies placement of a full-time SOLO at an embassy as opposed to what military 

attaches or security cooperation officers (SCOs) do currently? What 

would be the specific duties of a SOLO, and how would they differ 

from other U.S. military personnel assigned to an embassy? What are 

the diplomatic, legal, and bureaucratic requirements? Are there professional development implications? Should SOF heavily participate in 

respective Service Foreign Area Officer (FAO) programs or develop a 

parallel SOF-specific career track? Should there be language, country 

experience, and rank requirements? Do we have the resources/manpower to execute this idea?

D10. Success factors in Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

PRTs are an innovative solution to applying interagency capabilities 

to the battle space. While generally accepted as a successful innovation, approaches and performance have varied widely among PRTs. 

What are the measures of success for a PRT? How do the link to the 

host nations’ national plans? What roles should PRTs play? What are 

the attributes of a successful PRT? What promotes success or contributes to failure? What are the issues related to and confronted by PRTs? 

What best prepares PRT personnel? What should be SOCOM’s position in regard to PRTs? Are PRTs appropriate assignments for SOF 

personnel? What other relationships with PRTs should SOF cultivate 

or avoid?

29

E. Regional and Cultural Studies

E. Regional and Cultural Studies 

Topic Titles

E1. Importance of sociocultural understanding in the war on terror

E2. 21st century SOF warrior regional and cultural proficiency

E3. Requirements for language and cultural immersion training

E4. Acquiring population awareness

E5. Regional specialization and focus...value and limitations 

E6. Aligning assignments and individual cultural affinity

E7. Influencing public attitudes in different cultures and societies

E8. Preempting and preventing insurgencies

E9. Seeing the differences in Arab states

E10. SOF roles and missions in an unstable Middle East

Topic Descriptions

E1. Importance of sociocultural understanding in the war on terror

Understanding culture has been an area of training and tactical 

emphasis for SOF warrior-diplomats since the beginning of Special 

Forces. Improvements in cultural understanding at the tactical and 

interpersonal level have been useful, but insufficient. Success requires 

an understanding of both culture and society and how they interrelate. Individual cultures, tribes, civil and religious structure and 

organizations, economic structure and activities, and governance 

structure and practices are all part of the tapestry of a nation. How do 

we need to think holistically and strategically about societies and 

cultures? What disciplines are available to aid SOF in thinking about 

cultures and societies, and how can they inform us? What paradigms 

are available to help us understand the complexity and nature of 

intercultural interactions? What are the implications of what is known 

and what is not known at this time? How can SOF use this knowledge 

or improve on it? How does enhanced cultural awareness impact SOF 

operations? What is the linkage between the U.S. and Host Nation 

End State and cultural understanding?
30

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

E2. 21st century SOF warrior regional and cultural proficiency

The SOF Warrior ethos values intellectual agility, cultural astuteness, 

and situational awareness. A large number of SOF members have been 

committed to deployment cycles that have taken them away from 

their traditional areas of expertise. Most have been focused on specific 

combat environments. National, regional, and global interactions are 

changing at an exponential pace. What does the 21st century SOF 

warrior need from his education and training experiences to regain or 

sustain his regional proficiency, cultural awareness, and mental 

preparedness to operate in an ever changing world environment? 

What is the nature and level of the content required to maintain 

proficiency? How can this be accomplished—teaching and learning 

methodologies, structures, and education resources? What are the 

obstacles that must be overcome? What changes or improvements, if 

any, are required to better facilitate the learning process?

E3. Requirements for language and cultural immersion training

Deployment commitments and other expedient decisions have distracted SOF professional development priorities away from language 

and cultural immersion. At the same time, the importance of language and cultural awareness has been reinforced by the facts on the 

ground of combat operations. How should SOF approach this problem? What is the current status of qualification of the force? What are 

the metrics used to determine proficiency? Are they adequate? How 

does training need to be changed? Are there roles for others, such as 

anthropologists, as well as linguists? Should language and cultural 

immersion training (for example: at least 90 days in a given country) 

be mandatory for SOF? What is the role of technology? Are changes to 

incentives required? What should an effective program look like, and 

how much would it cost? 

E4. Acquiring population awareness

Winning hearts and minds requires an understanding of differing 

populations to support the end state or U.S. political objective. Culture, social context, knowledge, and individual and collective interests all matter. The way a person and his social equals understand the 

world influences the way they act in it. For example, a rural Afghan 

and his fellows living in an isolated village may not understand the 

geopolitical justifications of the presence of a SOF-led VSO in his 

village. However, those in Kabul may grasp it readily. SOF operatives with extensive field experience in a region appear to intuitively 
31

E. Regional and Cultural Studies

practice nuanced population awareness. How do we prepare the SOF 

as a whole to interface appropriately and more rapidly with differing 

populations? Can what is known about culture and social dynamics 

be merged with an assessment of particular segments of populations 

to enhance SOF interaction with them? Is there education, training, 

or models that would enable a quicker bridging of the experience gap? 

This research brings together what is known about this topic and recommends potential ways forward.

E5. Regional specialization and focus...value and limitations 

The value of regional experience and knowledge is recognized by all 

the services. Individuals, assignment managers, and gaining commands tend to support multiple assignments to the same region for 

reasons ranging from convenience to readiness. Many SOF operations 

are dependent on in-depth study and knowledge of a region, others 

less so. Yet, regional specialization and focus remain ill-defined and 

misunderstood. Define regional specialization and focus in terms of 

individuals, units, and missions. What are the values and advantages 

gained from regional specialization and focus for individuals, services, and Combatant Commands (COCOM)? Categorize these. What 

are the disadvantages and costs of such practices? Analyze the data 

and draw conclusions about comparative advantages? Who should 

specialize and focus in terms of individuals and units? For example, is 

it feasible for everyone within a SOF unit to have a regional specialty 

or a “micro-regional” specialty? In what ways? Does an AC-130 or 

MH-47 crew need the same level as an A-team? Should units within 

each of the services be regionally focused like the Special Forces (SF) 

Groups? Should Corps/divisions/Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) learn 

the language and culture of a specific region? This research provides 

better understanding of the purpose and relative value of regional 

specialization and focus.

E6. Aligning assignments and individual cultural affinity

The military services recruit tens of thousands of individuals every 

year. Many of these recruits have innate or acquired linguistic and 

culture knowledge or other affinities for non-American cultures. Yet, 

much of this capacity goes unrecognized or mal-utilized because of 

the inability of our personnel systems to recognize the potential or 

overcome the administrative barriers to better align assignments (e.g., 

contracts, fairness policies, and lack of incentives). Is it possible to 

better identify cultural affinities and linguistic skills and potential in 
32

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

the recruitment process or early in service careers for personnel with 

such skills? Can they be tracked or developed more effectively? How 

might this be done? Given such potential capacity exists, what are the 

obstacles to its more effective use? How might these obstacles be overcome (for example: can it be incentivized, can inter-service transfers 

be simplified, and assignment policies wavered)? Does the potential 

derived merit the efforts involved?

E7. Influencing public attitudes in different cultures and societies

The U.S. military effort to assist earthquake victims in Pakistan 

changed public attitudes in regard to the United States favorably, if 

only briefly. How foreign public attitudes shift and change is poorly 

understood or responded to by United States agencies. What research 

has been done in regard to foreign public attitudes and how they are 

shaped and changed? What are the dynamics of these shifts, and why 

does the U.S. fail to anticipate, avoid, or gain advantage from them? 

What insights can SOF gain from this research? Does it confirm or 

conflict with what SOF now believes or acts on?

E8. Preempting and preventing insurgencies

The Iraq and Afghanistan experience reinforces the old adage that an 

ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Explore the possibility that through strategic assessment, U.S. assets could identify where 

insurgencies might occur and take preemptive actions or preventive 

measures to preclude them or mitigate their consequences. What are 

the metrics for an assessment and the decision to act? What types of 

missions might be used? What are the metrics for success? What risks 

are involved? Considering all this, how would SOF assets be used in 

these circumstances? How do you convince the host nation it has a 

problem, and then how does the Embassy/SOF team approach the 

problem?

E9. Seeing the differences in Arab states

The Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa are increasingly unstable, and vital U.S. interests are threatened by this instability. Within the U.S. military there is a tendency to think of all Arabs 

as one homogeneous society. While Arabs largely share a common 

culture and religion, the societies in the various states differ greatly. 

What are these differences, and how will they shape the consequences 

of any government failure? For example, what is the significance of 

citizens who share or aspire to a national identity as opposed to a 

tribal one? What difference does education and other modern social 
33

E. Regional and Cultural Studies

attributes, including the use of online social networking, make? How 

do resources affect the nature of change in these states? What are the 

implications of the uniqueness of each society for U.S. policy options 

and potential operations?

E10. SOF roles and missions in an unstable Middle East

Recent instability in numerous Islamic countries presents challenges 

and opportunities to the U.S. in the global order. However, these 

opportunities do not promise to be easy, and failure will create more 

challenges to the world community. U.S. interests are best served if 

modernity occurs and arrives in the least painful way for the populations involved. Where on the spectrum of conflict might these transitions occur? How can they be moved closer to stability? What are 

the likely SOF roles and missions as this process unfolds. How can 

SOF contribute to the reshaping of these societies in ways that are 

not contrary to the interests of the United States and the indigenous 

populations? How does Special Operation Forces collaborate with its 

European allies to have a positive impact on Islamic Nations? What 

risks are involved? Who leads the effort?

35

F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues

F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues 

Topic Titles

F1. SOCOM and SOF organization in a changing environment

F2. SOCOM’s role as provider of “Special Operations” Forces

F3. Effects of an end to the extraordinary demand for SOF in 

counterterrorism

F4. Adequacy of SOCOM Title 10 authorities

F5. Training and education in a SOCOM Training and Doctrine 

Command

F6. SOF and the questions of risk

F7. Strengthening the human dimension through SOF relationships

F8. Collaboration initiatives in R&D, operational planning/execution, and 

information sharing

F9. Defining future air capability for transport

F10. GPF PME on SOF strategy, operational concepts, capacity, and utility

F11. Identifying potential unnecessary redundancy, misalignments, and 

mission creep in SOCOM

F12. Emerging 21st century strategic insights and a theory of SOF

F13. Required SOF warriors attributes for the Future (15+ years)

F14. SOF professional development and advancement

F15. The need for SOF strategists

F16. 21st century SOF warrior as a weapon system

F17. Cyber as a SOF enabler

Topic Descriptions

F1. SOCOM and SOF organization in a changing environment

SOCOM and component SOF organizations undertake periodic 

reviews in order to ensure the structure is appropriate for the changes 

and challenges of the strategic environment. What changes and challenges are anticipated in the strategic environment in the mid- and 

long-term? What are the basic organizational structures, mission 

and functions of SOCOM and SOF organizations? What were they 
36

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

maximized to do? Are they appropriate for the changes and challenges that are anticipated? What are SOCOM’s Title 10 roles, and 

do the SOF Core Activities support Title 10 authorities? Which are 

appropriate and necessary? What staff activities are duplicative of 

GCCs or the larger Services? How have SOCOM and SOF organized 

in the past to execute the irregular warfare mission? What might 

be applicable for the future? What changes can be made to the current USSOCOM headquarters in order to gain efficacy? Are the 

various components—AFSOC, USASOC, NAVSPECWARCOM, 

MARSOC—best organized to support current or future USSOCOM 

and GCC missions? Discuss the justification—pros and cons—for 

TSOCs to fall under SOCOM. Should operational units be organized 

based on capabilities or missions, or both? How so? This research is 

designed to provoke innovative thinking and challenge current precepts in regard to SOCOM and SOF organization.

F2. SOCOM’s role as provider of “Special Operations” Forces

SOCOM’s primary role is to provide “special operations” 

forces—trained and equipped to accomplish missions General Purpose Forces (GPFs) are not structured for or capable of accomplishing 

with efficacy. Defining the future of the SOF Warrior is essential to 

SOCOM successfully fulfilling this role. Missions and requirements 

will evolve and devolve requiring SOF to do the same. What are the 

evolving demands for capabilities in the 21st century? How will they 

affect SOF? What functions, missions, and capabilities will require 

specialized training, levels of performance, technology/equipment, 

and a military culture that cannot be incorporated into the GPF with 

efficacy? How will SOCOM meet the challenge of providing these 

special operations forces? Where and how must SOCOM compete for 

resources? Discuss the apparent conflict in mission caused by GPF 

taking on more SOF-like missions.

F3. Effects of an End to the extraordinary demand for SOF in 

counterterrorism

The war on terror has created extraordinary demands for SOF in a CT 

role. This demand has been met by reprioritizing SOF missions, training, deployment, development, and increases in recruitment. What 

happens in SOF when “terrorism” as a threat is institutionalized in the 

state’s bureaucracy, or when terrorism as a strategic threat ends? What 

has been left undone that should now be undertaken—for example, 

missions, training, professional development, and doctrine? How will 
37

F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues

SOF requirements be reprioritized? What opportunities for change for 

the future are presented? Discuss future roles and missions for SOF 

as/if CT missions lessen. What has SOF forgotten or has reduced visibility on to meet the demands of CT?

F4. Adequacy of SOCOM Title 10 authorities

SOCOM’s experience as a force provider in the war on terror provides 

a unique opportunity to examine the adequacy of the Title 10 Servicelike responsibilities and authorities of the command. What issues and 

problems have emerged? What has worked well? Where have responsibilities and authorities not been adequate for the demands placed on 

the forces? What additional “Service-like” authorities should be given 

to USSOCOM? Should SO become a separate service with responsibilities and authority for assignment of personnel, promotion, all training and education, special pay entitlements, etc.? Why or why not? 

Should SOCOM become a fifth Service?

F5. Training and education in a SOCOM Training and Doctrine 

Command

Special operations are inherently joint and are unique from GPF 

operations. As a result of SOCOM’s unique missions, should SOCOM 

seek establishment of a Training and Doctrine Command to provide 

central SOF training, educational, and doctrine distinct from the 

Services? What are the requirements, costs, advantages, and disadvantages of such a SOF command? What would such an organization 

look like, and what would be its missions and functions? Should the 

U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School 

(USAJFKSWCS) and the Naval Special Warfare Center (NAVSPECWARCEN) be brought under this command? How would role of 

JSOU change under such a command structure?

F6. SOF and the questions of risk

Part of SOF’s uniqueness is the SOF warrior’s relationship with risk. 

SOF accept extraordinary risk as inherent to the nature of its missions, but recognition of mission risk transmutes to extraordinary 

preparation, precision performance, and emphasis on adaptability. 

Risk is also both incurred and mitigated in the acceptance and use of 

advanced and special training and technology. Is the SOF relationship with risk taking changing? What is the relationship, and how 

has it historically manifested itself? Does the success of cutting-edge 

technology against asymmetric foes invite an attitude of risk aversion among SOF? Has the force become too reliant on technology? For 
38

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

example, if a unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) cannot be dedicated to 

an operation, the operation may be cancelled. Can the technological 

advantages actually become a handicap? In a war of beliefs and ideas, 

is atrophy of nontechnical competencies creating unnecessary risks? 

What is the place of risk in SOF operations and how should the SOF 

warrior culture consider it?

F7. Strengthening the human dimension through SOF relationships

Engaging and building relationships with and among peoples, governments, militaries, interest groups, and individuals is a core SOF 

capability. It is founded in understanding of cultures and the role of 

human potential to influence outcomes. What relationships should 

the SOF community seek to sustain or develop abroad for a changing strategic environment and the resulting national priorities? Can 

SOCOM strategically frame and prioritize these relationships? What 

measures of effectiveness should be applied or what other models can 

be used to determine an outcome? What existing programs should 

SOCOM retain, adapt, or eliminate? What new programs should be 

undertaken? Why?

F8. Collaboration initiatives in Research and Development (R&D), 

operational planning/execution, and information sharing

How does the whole of the U.S. government and our allies operate 

or coordinate with DoD/SOF and COIN They also conduct research 

and development, regional and country analysis, and operational 

missions. In what ways can SOCOM and SOF collaborate with, combine, or piggyback off of these like activities to gain advantages (for 

example: innovation, save costs, and gain easier access to areas in 

which others already have a presence) and greater effectiveness and 

efficiency? How should SOF think about this? Are there precepts to 

guide it? What are the advantages and disadvantages? What risks are 

involved, and how will such risk be managed or mitigated?

F9. Defining future air capability for transport

SOF operates in and supports operations by others in environments 

that lack infrastructure or deny use of roads and airfields. SOF will 

require an air transport capability suited to its unique mission 

requirements to move supplies to troops in hostile environments that 

are not favorable for road convoys or lack suitable airfields. What are 

the requirements for SOF mission air transport? Are remotely piloted 

vehicles (RPVs) an option? What missions cannot be met with 
39

F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues

existing U.S. military airframes? What is available commercially or 

from other friendly militaries and agencies? What is the need and 

advantages of R&D of a specific airframe? What is the recommended 

way forward?

F10. GPF PME on SOF strategy, operational concepts, capacity, and 

utility

Iraq and Afghanistan operations have brought more visibility of SOF 

and SOF operations to the GPF. However, in large part, SOF strategies, operational concepts, capacity, and utility remain a mystery to 

far too many future GPF leaders who one day may need to employ or 

contribute to decisions in regard to SOF. What is the requirement for 

GPF PME for SOF-oriented education to develop both the military 

professional and SOCOM’s institutional needs? What is being done 

now? What are the gaps? How should this education be accomplished, 

and what should it consist of? What is the way forward? Discuss 

JSOU’s role in providing such education.

F11. Identifying potential unnecessary redundancy, misalignments, 

and mission creep in SOCOM.

The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) recently directed all of DoD to 

look at where efficiencies can be made and savings gained. Future 

budget reductions are in the wind. This research seeks to augment and 

challenge SOCOM internal thinking about how SOCOM and SOF 

can best deal with these reductions. For example, what are the various SOCOM staff activities doing that is either redundant with what 

others are doing, should be done by the theater commands or national 

agencies, does not need to be done, or can be consolidated within 

SOCOM? What are the efficiencies that can be gained across the SOF 

community? Any such look would also identify anything that surfaces 

that is needed but is not being done. What changes are recommended, 

and what issues or risks, if any, are associated with the changes?

F12. Emerging 21st century strategic insights and a theory of SOF

The SOF experience in the first decade of the 21st century—what 

has been done and what has been recognized as needed, but not 

resourced—provides good insights into what the new century portends for SOF. What are the SOF strategic insights gained over the last 

decade by U.S. and foreign SOF? How do they inform SOF thinking? 

What strategic framework helps explain the role of SOF in the new 

century? What is an appropriate theory for SOF power and doctrine 
40

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

in the 21st century? How is it founded in other theories, and what are 

its specific premises? What are the implications of these premises for 

SOCOM and special operations? 

F13. Required SOF warriors attributes for the Future (15+ years)

Adaptation and change are inherent to the SOF warrior ethos, and we 

know the future consists of continuities and change. What are SOF 

attributes now and how do they compare to past organizations such as 

the OSS? What attributes will define SOF warriors in 15+ years? Are 

there identifiable “Enduring Attributes” that can be adopted similar 

to the “SOF Truths”? What continuities and changes are required? 

This research should focus on what will constitute a SOF warrior in 

15+ years, and what attributes and commonalities bind these warriors 

together as SOF. Such research would also address any appropriate 

distinctions.

F14. SOF professional development and advancement

SOF professional development and advancement continue to be areas 

of general concern. Is this a problem supported by facts or merely 

perceptions? Discuss commonalities and differences within SOF components that affect individual professional development. Are they on 

par with their non-SOF contemporaries? How do SOF careers compare with other low density specialties versus GPF specialties? Discuss ways to level SOF career progression throughout the Command 

to ensure advancement on par with other services. Are there differences among the services? Are changes needed? This research should 

include a statistical analysis to distinguish perception from realities 

and to discern the extent and nature of substantiated concerns. Subjective analysis proceeds from this concrete data. Research should 

address career development (education) and career advancement at 

the Officer, Warrant Officer and NCO levels. Consider the current 

OPTEMPO and operational demands in your review of operational 

and staff development issues.

F15. The need for SOF strategists

There is a general consensus that SOF will play an increased and often 

lead role in 21st century security policy. What are the justifications 

for creating SOF strategists? What are the arguments against endorsing SOF strategists? How should SOCOM select, educate, professionally develop, and nurture SOF strategists? How does SOF create the 

environment to promote strategic thinking? How do we identify SOF 
41

F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues

thinkers early on in their careers? How does SOF encourage a culture 

of operators and change some into a cultural of strategic thinkers?

F16. 21st century SOF warrior as a weapon system

The SOF warrior of the 21st century should be treated as a weapon 

system. This topic will define each variant of the SOF warrior as a 

system. The researcher will define interfaces, architectures and interactions to include use cases for programs and developers to build to. 

Hardware and software developed for SOF are managed by various 

programs, and currently there is no integrated and synchronized 

approach for development of hardware and software. The assumption 

is that defining the operator and use cases will assist with improving how programs focus on specific needs of individual SOF units or 

the greater SOF community. The use case and solution analysis and 

output should describe the 21st century SOF warrior system. If material solutions are available, the study will be able to identify them 

as well. A collateral goal of a weapon system approach is to reduce 

training time. How can this be accomplished—teaching and learning methodologies, structures, and education resources? What are the 

obstacles? What changes or improvements to material solutions are 

required to improve operations? 

F17. Cyber as a SOF enabler

There is a predominant global approach to cyber-related activities. 

It is important to investigate the requirements and capabilities that 

USSOCOM has and will need within the cyber domain. Assuming cyber capability is an important SOF enabler, what are the cyber 

forces and support required across the spectrum of conflict? What 

is the impact of SOF utilizing cyber as a force multiplier? What are 

the effects that cyber enables in SOF-specific mission sets? Is there a 

requirement for organic cyber capability or cyber support to SOF? Is 

there a reason to have Special Operations cyber forces? How does SOF 

bridge the gap between its operators being digital natives versus digital immigrants?

43

F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues G. Miscellaneous

G. Miscellaneous

Topic Titles

G1. SOF roles and responsibilities in domestic events

G2. SOF and countering gangs and narcotics trafficking

G3. Relationship between USSOCOM and NORTHCOM Special Operations Directorate (SOD)

G4. Role of “preemption” and “prevention” in SOF thinking in the 21st 

century

G5. SOF roles and missions in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

G6. Weakening the terrorist factories (i.e., Islamic schools, mosques, 

Internet)

G7. SOF employment of police/investigative techniques 

G8. Nature of SOCOM/SOF relationship with the CIA

G9. Effects of near term mission expediency on core SOF activities 

G10. Need for more than one SOC in the Pacific Theater

G11. Role of the National Guard and Reserve in SOF activities

G12. SOF knowledge management imperatives

G13. Evaluating a COIN synthesis

G14. Levels and distinctions in legitimacy

G15. Optimal Prioritization of USSOCOM MILCON Projects

Topic Descriptions

G1. SOF roles and responsibilities in domestic events

The nature and extent of challenges and threats confronting the 

United States domestically has raised questions about posse comitatus, 

the defining law in regard to domestic use of military force. What are 

the implications for the SOF community if posse comitatus is revoked 

or changed? What are the potential roles, responsibilities, and missions SOCOM and SOF may incur if changes are made to the law? 

What changes in authorities, organizations, and doctrine and training 

will be required?
44

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

G2. SOF and countering gangs and narcotics trafficking

SOF capabilities have wide application to traditional police security 

concerns. How far should SOF allow itself to be drawn into police 

work against gangs and narcotics trafficking? What potential contributions can SOF make in countering these threats at home and 

abroad? What should SOF’s role be? What are the second and third 

order effects of greater SOF involvement? What are the political consequences? If greater involvement is directed, how should this involvement be prioritized in relation to specific threats and locations? How 

would such mission demands “fit” with SOF’s core activities? Does it 

become a core activity of the 21st century? What new capabilities and 

training should be considered? How does this fit into regional strategy 

and a whole of government approach?

G3. Relationship between USSOCOM and NORTHCOM Special 

Operations Directorate (SOD)

SOD is not a TSOC. SOD has no operational control (OPCON) 

of SOF forces. SOF are not likely to be used “operationally” in the 

NORTHCOM AOR, except for possibly Mexico. In the case of the 

latter, NORTHCOM SOD is likely to grow in importance. In addition, 

as SOCJFCOM is being eliminated, some missions and tasks may 

migrate to the SOD, or a SOCNORTHCOM may be established. What 

is the range of scenarios involving NORTHCOM SOD? What are the 

implications for the relationship between USSOCOM and NORTHCOM SOD or its successor? This research should also consider the 

histories of TSOC and SOD creation and the reasons the current relationships exist.

G4. Role of “preemption” and “prevention” in SOF thinking in the 

21st century

The Bush Administration discovered in articulating its national 

security strategy that words have meaning when they appeared to get 

confused over prevention of war and preemptive war. What should 

prevention and preemption in SOF thinking for the 21st century be? 

Do we need to rethink it in strategic terms? Preventive and preemptive actions properly executed are much cheaper and faster than a long 

war. This research is intended to add clarity to SOF thinking about 

and articulation of preemptive and preventive actions in war and 

peace. Compare and contrast prevention and preemption and other 

applicable “titled” concepts as different terms with specific meanings. 

What should be the SOF understanding of preventive and preemptive 
45

F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues G. Miscellaneous

war? What are the differing implications of war and other actions for 

SOF? For example, why is SFA not war? What is the spectrum of SOF 

preventive and preemptive actions in the 21st century? 

G5. SOF roles and missions in humanitarian assistance (HA) and 

disaster relief (DR)

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations are a growing 

reality of the 21st century. USSOCOM and SOF interagency experiences in providing support in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Haiti constitute a remarkable, if not well told, history in 

these missions. How does SOF participation in HA/DR operations in 

other countries potentially advance national objectives in potential 

hotspots or “areas of interest” around the world? What should be the 

SOF role and mission in HA/DR operations? Are there transferable 

tactics, techniques, processes, and procedures (TTP) from previous 

experiences that can enable the U.S. military and SOF to better plan, 

execute, and support HA/DR operations? Examine SOF’s role in the 

opening hours and days of the Haiti earthquake disaster and discuss 

other HA/DR operations in which SOF have been used. How can we 

better integrate SOF capabilities to support HA/DR with those of 

general purpose forces? What does the de jure primacy of other government agencies (OGA) mean for SOF operations, specifically Office 

of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), in any foreign HA/DR 

effort? Would rehearsals or participation in interagency or international exercises improve SOF capacity for these missions? What are 

the implications for training and capabilities?

G6. Weakening the terrorist factories (i.e., Islamic schools, mosques, 

Internet)

Terrorist organizations have created virtual terrorist factories through 

their appropriation and use of school houses, mosques, and the Internet. Continued indoctrination through the means of education, 

religion, and Internet communications provide a ready supply of new 

recruits. How do we degrade the effect of or eliminate these terrorist 

virtual factories? This research topic seeks effective ways to degrade 

“terrorist factories” with methods that do not create negative secondary effects. What are the key strategic factors to be considered in any 

strategy? What are the objectives, concepts, and resources required 

for a successful strategy? What are the political and reactionary risks 

of engaging in such a campaign, one that seems to target religions, 

education, and free speech? How can this be mitigated? Specifically, 
46

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

discuss the impact such a campaign would have on U.S. efforts to win 

over hearts and minds and change the attitudes and beliefs of those 

inclined to support terrorism.

G7. SOF employment of police/investigative techniques 

SOF units in the field have increasingly encountered mission circumstances where the lines between military tactics and police skills and 

techniques are blurred. Do SOF units need to be trained in police/

forensic investigative techniques (such as cyber-crime, financial fraud, 

documentation and fabrication) to work with the interagency, particularly law enforcement community and achieve mission success? 

What is the juxtaposing of conflict and criminality, and is this a form 

of hybrid warfare? What are the issues it poses for nation-state security, and how might states and the international community deal with 

them? For example, in the event that a SOF unit encounters a location 

that is involved in illegal activity, will the expectation be that evidence, suspect interviews, witness statements, and so forth, are collected and forwarded to U.S. law enforcement attaches for evaluation 

and possibly further investigation? What are the advantages and disadvantages of SOF employment in law enforcement-type missions as 

compared to agencies established and trained for counter-crime missions? Debate whether SOF units are more or less capable to perform 

this mission, and discuss why SOF should or should not take on this 

mission. Are there ways in which SOF can better leverage those U.S. 

agencies that have the expertise to create a more Whole of Government approach in operations of this nature? Discuss any advantages of 

participating in joint training or deploying interagency elements with 

SOF teams. Consider also any advantages of using SF National Guard 

groups with significant law enforcement backgrounds, some of which 

may already be performing some of these functions.

G8. Nature of SOCOM/SOF relationship with the Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA)

There is a history of SOF and CIA working collaboratively in the 

Vietnam War and more recently cooperation in Iraq, in the intervention phase into Afghanistan, and the successful hunt for Osama Bin 

Laden. Some aspects of close collaboration with the CIA significantly 

contribute to SOF success, but others were problematic. The security issues of the 21st century portend an increasing nexus between 

SOF and CIA missions. How should SOF think about this nexus? 

What does an analysis of past experience and the future environment 
47

F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues G. Miscellaneous

future reveal in regard to potential future advantages and disadvantages—what are the synergies, pitfalls, and risks of increased collaboration? Should SOCOM establish an extraordinary and enduring 

relationship with the CIA? At what levels? How would these differ 

from other interagency coordination? What would be the effect on 

the favorable reputation SOF enjoys with the American people and 

Congress? How would a closer affiliation affect success in other SOF 

endeavors? How would it affect the SOF ethos? Would it create impediments to joint and combined operational cooperation in the future? 

Should SOCOM seek additional authorities to enhance its ability to 

collaborate with CIA?

G9. Effects of near-term mission expediency on core SOF activities 

SOF always fully supports the mission assigned. It is inherent to the 

SOF ethos. However, in the current conflicts, SOF has been both an 

essential and expedient Direct Action solution to a lot of problems, 

often at the expense of future proficiency in other core activities. How 

can SOF refocus more on core activities in order to avoid the prospect 

of becoming a “jack of all trades and a master of none?” What are the 

current core activities of SOF? How to they relate to current mission 

requirements?” How are resources being consumed? What are the 

implications of any mismatch? Are the core activities correct for the 

21st century environment confronting SOF? Discuss the tradeoffs 

in the “need to be relevant today” and the opportunity costs to the 

future. What can SOF do to close the gaps? 

G10. Need for more than one Special Operations Command in the 

Pacific Theater

The Pacific Theater is large and culturally diverse, potential threats 

and conflict are numerous and widespread, and opportunities for 

employment of SOF assets are extensive. Korea as a divided and 

conflict-prone nation poses a special challenge. However, this theater 

only has one TSOC. Will SOCKOR be given the resources/priority of 

effort in sufficient time for any conflict on the Korean Peninsula? Is 

there adequate SOF command and control capacity and forces to meet 

Korean missions and effectively engage the rest of the vast region? 

What would be the relationship between the current TSOC of today 

and one that would be added in the future—for example, functions 

and responsibilities, missions and activities, command and control, 

areas of responsibility, and resourcing? Explain your rationale for how 

this might change over time. With a majority of SOF forces deployed 
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

currently in the CENTCOM AOR, how would you adjust priorities 

to reapportion resources for the two SOCs caused by an uptick in 

Korean issues?

G11. Role of the National Guard and Reserve in SOF activities

Active duty SOF capacity is limited by a number of different factors. 

In spite of a number of initiatives to mitigate these factors, National 

Guard and Reserve forces will remain important to SOF activities. 

Examine the roles, missions, and functions of National Guard and 

Reserve forces in relation to current and future SOF activities. What 

are the multiple relationships and interactions—formal and informal, 

existing and potential—between active and Reserve component SOF 

(for example, the need and ability to retain experienced, well trained, 

and battle-tested SOF personnel through transitioning to the Reserve 

force)? How can these relationships be better exploited to build greater 

SOF capacity and efficacy?

G12. SOF knowledge management imperatives

SOF has a historical appreciation of the value of information, but 

today we live in a world of information overload. A significant strategic advantage goes to the actor who can better manage and use 

knowledge derived from this information stream. The purpose of 

this research is to examine how SOF might gain advantage through 

knowledge management. What is knowledge management in terms 

meaningful to SOF? Is there a current knowledge management plan? 

How have others—for example, different professions, different societies, and other militaries—been able to gain advantages from knowledge management? What impediments and opportunities exist? How 

can SOF best manage knowledge—for example, in what areas or 

categories of missions, and functions? What should be the objectives 

of knowledge management, and how can these objectives be achieved? 

What resources are required? How should SOF move forward? 

G13. Evaluating a COIN synthesis

COIN manuals are proliferating and reflect different culture, social, 

and professional perspectives. There are contemporary U.S., French, 

British, and other COIN manuals available. Other potential or unpublished manuals exist in various educational and training institutions 

around the world, such as the COIN Academy Afghanistan’s curriculum content. What are the existing superior COIN “manuals?” 

How are they alike and where do they differ? Create a synthesis of 

the better precepts and ideas. Is there a real understanding of COIN? 
49

F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues G. Miscellaneous

What is similar and different between the countries with COIN 

Doctrine?

G14. Levels and distinctions in legitimacy

In the struggle among states, insurgents, and international supporters, authorities such as David Galula and Timothy Lomperis, suggest 

there are levels of “legitimacy,” and these levels matter. Sovereignty 

and legitimacy are being redefined in the 21st century and differing 

disciplines are still exploring these changes and their implications. 

Legitimacy has been “codified” in SOF doctrine and is being “operationalized” without fully comprehending what it is and its relationship to sovereignty. What is legitimacy? Who defines legitimacy? 

What is sovereignty and how is it changing? Using a multi-disciplinary approach, synthesize what is known about the dynamics of sovereignty and legitimacy for the 21st century, and develop insights for 

how governments should or must act when challenged by insurgents, 

terrorists, or other non-state actors.

G15. Optimal Prioritization of USSOCOM MILCON Projects

The SOCOM J8 is responsible for building a Program Objective 

Memorandum that provides the best mix of Joint SOF capability. 

Inherent in this process is balancing readiness, force structure, and 

infrastructure (MILCON). To ensure that the resources allocated to 

MILCON are used in the most efficient manner possible, the SOCOM 

J-8 employs a MILCON prioritization model to prioritize all MFP-11 

MILCON projects. The current model, which will be revised for use in 

POM 14, used the resource sponsor’s prioritization and the SOCOM 

Capability Based Program List in the weighted product model to 

produce an initial prioritization list. This priority list is then subject to revision based on the senior military judgment of a panel of 

the component deputy commanders chaired by the SOCOM Deputy 

Commander. Review the revised model proposed for use in POM 14 

for potential analytical improvement for possible implementation in 

POM 15 (fall of CY12). How can the proposed model better distinguish between resource sponsor projects with similar priorities while 

normalizing project priority between resource sponsors with differing numbers of projects? How can it better determine urgency of need 

for a project and maintain a capability linkage to the prioritization 

process? 

51

H. Additional Topics and Their Sponsoring Organizations F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues

H. Additional Topics and Their Sponsoring Organizations

CJOTF-Afghanistan submitted the following research questions related to 

counterinsurgency (COIN) and Village Stability Operations (VSO).

H1. What makes for successful COIN and how can it be applied to 

Afghanistan? 

H2. What should Combined/Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) do now to prepare for the withdrawal of General 

Purpose Forces?

H3. What key tasks should SOF teams execute to maintain a balance 

between security, development, and governance when conducting 

VSO?

H4. What is the most efficient task organization of a Village Stability Platform (VSP) that provides the maximum capability with the minimum 

physical and logistical footprint?

H5. Are VSPs that embed into local villages more successful than VSPs 

that operate from Combat Outposts or traditional bases?

H6. What objective metrics define successful VSO?

H7. What is an ideal model of stability in Afghanistan? 

H8. How can coalition forces identify and empower true traditional leaders (as opposed to nefarious power brokers) in Afghanistan? 

H09. What roles do Pashtunwali, Islam, and other regional customs play in 

VSO in Afghanistan? 

H10. What traditional and modern local defense mechanisms exist in 

Afghanistan and how do they compare to the Afghan Local Police 

(ALP) program?

H11. Given that the ALP program is intended to last for 3–5 years, what are 

some viable options for demobilizing ALP members?

H12. What must Afghanistan’s Ministry of the Interior (MoI) do to expand 

and sustain the ALP program? 

H13. What conditions must be set for Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) to disengage 

from the ALP program? Discuss the requirement for a capable Afghan 

National Army (ANA) to support an Afghan Campaign Plan.
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

H14. How can SOF and GPF illuminate not only the dark, but also the 

light and gray networks to mitigate the inadvertent empowerment of 

malign actors?

H15. How can malign actors be marginalized when they cannot be 

removed?

H16. What is the most efficient use of Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program (CERP) funds to support VSO and mitigate the empowerment of criminal patronage networks? 

H17. How can SOF and GPF better integrate to conduct COIN and VSO in 

Afghanistan? 

H18. What special training and task organization is required for GPF and 

Coalition Forces to conduct VSO?

H19. What conditions must be set and what resources are required for SOF 

Teams (U.S. Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA), 

Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Platoons, and Marine Special Operations Teams (MSOT) to conduct split-team VSO in Afghanistan? 

Consider integration of SOF and GPF enablers, Military Information 

Support to Operations (e.g., MISO, Civil Affairs (CA), and Female 

Treatment Teams Cultural Support Teams), ALP and Afghan National 

Army Special Forces (ANASF), which is part of Afghan National 

Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC).

H20. What is the most effective manner to employ SOF organic UAVs in 

Afghanistan?

H21. What are objective metrics to identify effective Information Operations (IO) at the tactical and operational levels of war?

H22. In light of the recent wave of popular revolts in the Middle East, 

what is the viability of a grass-roots social movement in Afghanistan 

that counters Islamists and builds sustainable governing structures 

(Afghan Enlightenment or Third Way)? 

H23. How can GPF be integrated into SOF elements to conduct VSO?

H24. How can CJSOTF-A improve CA, IO, and MISO effectiveness? 

H25. Evaluate the effectiveness of SOF Command and Control in Afghanistan and make recommendations for improvement.

H26. Is the Advanced Special Operations Management System (ASOMS) 

effective and what are possible alternative solutions? 

H27. What role do the Baluchis play in countering Al-Qaida, the Taliban, 

and Iranian aggression? 
53

H. Additional Topics and Their Sponsoring Organizations F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues

H28. Evaluate the current Personnel Recovery (PR) architecture of the 

SF Groups and CJSOTFs. Are those elements properly manned and 

trained to meet PR requirements? Address SOF, GPF, Nonconventional Assisted Recovery (NAR), and Unconventional Assisted Recovery Mechanisms (UARM).

H29. What role do the Sayyed play in Afghanistan and traditional 

governance?

H30. What mechanisms can improve information sharing between Afghan 

National Police, Afghan National Army, and the National Directorate 

of Security?

NATO SOF Headquarters submitted the following topics:

H31. NSHQ (NATO SOF HQ) is striving for maximum interoperability 

between partner nations. How interoperable should international or 

NATO SOF forces be? This research question is intended to identify 

the limit of interoperability and seek to understand when sharing 

among nations becomes a security risk (if it even does).

H32. How much emphasis should PME place on political, economic, social, 

information, and infrastructure areas of competence? If so, how 

could the SOF PME curriculum be updated to reflect these changes to 

develop more rounded and competent mid-, senior-, and executivelevel leadership?

H33. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is the current NATO system 

that pools together military forces from NATO Troop Contributing 

Nations (TCN) in order to meet immediate military contingencies. 

The current NRF system receives criticism for being slow and cumbersome. How can the NRF model be updated to reflect a system that 

is truly responsive? Note: This problem set is a real problem/puzzle at 

the strategic level, and extremely complicated due to the legal framework that binds much of what NATO does.

H34. NATO SOF Air assets. NSHQ would like to, in the future, purchase 

and maintain its own fleet of air assets to be a responsive SOF unit 

within NATO. If that were to actually happen, what would this SOF 

Wing look like? How many rotary wing (RW) assets would exist, what 

would be the cost, where would the pilots come from, and why would 

this be a good (or bad) thing? This topic should be done in a similar 

fashion to the current SOCC Core thesis, with the exception that once 

NSHQ gets a green light to get RW assets they would already have a 

model showing them “how to.” 
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

H35. Given the assumption that authorities for Special Forces will not 

change in the future, how could SF Groups best engage and maintain 

engagement with key countries in their respective AORs? What would 

this look like?

H36. What are the long-term strategic engagement countries that SOF 

should be interested in? This thesis would be AOR-dependent and 

look at AOR threats 10–15 years into the future.

H37. How can current and future SOF capabilities enable cyber warfare, 

and how can SOF capabilities evolve to enable U.S. cyber forces to 

meet the growing cyber threat? For example, how can SOF provide 

access for U.S. Cyber forces to adversaries’ denied/closed networks? 

What does this mean with respect to ODA composition, pipeline 

training, and associated organic enablers within the SF Group? 

H38. NSHQ is seen by NATO countries located in Europe as a prime 

facilitator for SOF training and proponency in their home countries. 

This has occurred via the training that NSHQ conducts through their 

NATO SOF Education Program (NSTEP) within Belgium and the 

strategic engagement campaign. However, NSHQ is predominately 

regionally oriented to NATO countries within Europe. What other 

opportunities exist within other geographic regions that would enable 

the same kind of collaboration among SOF that currently exists 

within NATO?

Naval Postgraduate School, NATO COIN Course and Common 

Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab FY11 generated the following research questions and thesis ideas: 

H39. How have leaders effectively synchronized units during COIN campaigns in the past? (3-24, Academies, Portuguese, Malaysia, Vietnam)

H40. Evaluate the organizational design of Village Stability Coordination 

Centers (VSCC) in Afghanistan?

H41. From an organizational design perspective, evaluate how to connect 

VSO to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

(GIRoA).

H42. What are the consequences, methods, and options for confronting the 

Afghan poppy trade during VSO?

H43. Is there a way to subvert the poppy network in Afghanistan? Have 

other counterinsurgents successfully harness illicit economies?
55

H. Additional Topics and Their Sponsoring Organizations F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues

H44. How can ground operators understand and employ the cultural idiosyncrasies of Pashtunwali to separate insurgents from the population?

H45. What opportunities exist to transition from poppy to high-price 

crops? (Rose Oil, Black Cumin)

H46. What are the tenets of a collective society concept and how do 

counterinsurgents manage the population in such a society?

H47. How is defensive targeting used in conjunction with VSO to ensure 

survivability and create the time/space gap needed to succeed in VSO?

H48. How are national level strike assets effectively nested into a COIN 

strategy? 

H49. What are the considerations for reconciliation in Afghanistan?

H50. What is the value of differentiating and independently analyzing networks: friendly, opposition, illicit economy, and the population?

H51. Conduct an Organizational Design Analysis of the joint service 

SOTFs in Afghanistan (SOTF-W and SOTF-SE 2011).

H52. What are the effects and derived decision criteria for raids by a local 

or higher echelon security force?

H53. What are the historical best practices and primary considerations for 

remote area and denied area resupply in IW?

H54. Beginning in April 2011 an INF BN has been TACON to CJSOTF 

to support VSO. What are the organization design and cultural 

challenges?

H55. What are the critical metrics in VSO and ALP: for site selection, embedding, for ALP certification, and transition to ANSF 

responsibility?

H56. What are the VSO/ALP security considerations and quick reaction 

force (QRF) requirements by phase in the operation?

H57. What are the best practices for split team operations?

H58. What are the critical functions and capabilities of District Support 

Teams?

H59. What are the best practices for CERP approval that ensure value 

is added to the community, maximize utility of funds, avoid fraud 

and waste, and avoid increased rivalry throughout the society while 

enhancing the legitimacy of GIRoA? 

H60. Assess the NATO COIN Field Manual (FM), AJP 3-44. (Available on 

request)
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

H61. Does Area Structures Capabilities Organizations People and Events 

(ASCOPE) or Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, 

Information, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT) best support understanding and analysis of the COIN environment?

H62. Evaluate the COIN model that the forms the theoretical basis of 

instruction at the COIN Academy in Afghanistan (“war amongst the 

people?”)

H63. Evaluate the manual used by the COIN Academy in Afghanistan 

(Cutting the Gordian Knot).

H64. What is the value/effect of putting all brigade/battalion commanders/

staff through a COIN Academy upon arrival in Afghanistan?

H65. What are the historical best practices of small unit Clear, Hold, Build 

operations? (Question from Denmark Army Special Operations 

Forces (ARSOF)) 

H66. What are the differences and techniques for effectively participating 

or influencing a Jirga versus a Shura meeting? (Question posed by 

Italy and Belgium)

H67. Assess COIN “Principles” taught by COIN Academy-A.

H68. Assess elements of insurgency taught by COIN Academy-A.

H69. Assess the new French COIN FM. (available upon request)

H70. Assess the new British COIN FM. (available upon request)

H71. COIN Academy Afghanistan asks students to evaluate insurgent strategy. Among the possible types of insurgent strategies is “Subversive 

Strategy.” Is the concept of a Subversive Strategy valid? Rather than a 

strategy, is subversion a tactic or line of operation within the context 

of an insurgency?

H72. Authorities such as Galula and Lomperis suggest levels of legitimacy. 

What are the levels and how is a population moved from one level to 

the next?

H73. Denmark ARSOF was created to conduct UW and COIN. In the 

1980-90s, it switched mission focus to DA. Now, the unit is transitioning back to a UW/COIN focus and is attempting to join U.S. Special 

Forces in VSO. What challenges will the force face as it transitions? 

What are the advantages and obstacles of NATO countries specializing in particular SOF missions? How does their transition reflect 

tendencies/challenges and the future of U.S. Special Forces indecision 

concerning mission specialization?
57

H. Additional Topics and Their Sponsoring Organizations F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues

H74. Are there momentum (or growth) cycles in insurgency conflicts (both 

for the insurgents and COIN forces)? What are the variables and how 

are they influenced by phase?

H75. COIN Academy Afghanistan identifies three prerequisites for insurgency: weak government, vulnerability tied to basic need conditions, 

and leadership. Assess these prerequisites and propose additional 

conditions if applicable.

H76. Population Resource Control (PRC) is frequently viewed as levels. Can 

PRC techniques be broken down and defined as a menu of options 

from which a force can select the right technique to achieve affect 

with minimal disturbance of the population? Or, can PRC techniques 

be used to regain initiative and maneuver insurgents into poor physical or information positions?

H77. COIN Academy–A has linked McCormick’s Diamond directly to D3A 

targeting; serious flaws existed in there linkage. Is it possible to link 

McCormick’s Diamond to targeting? How?

H78. What techniques are available for leaders to war-game 2nd and 3rd 

order effects across the entire spectrum of operations?

For more information on topics in this section: please send an email to 

the JSOU Director of Research at jsou_research@socom.mil. You will be 

provided with additional information and a topic point of contact.

59

I. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues

I. Topics Retained from Previous Years 

Topic Titles

I1. What initiatives are necessary to improve SOF capabilities to understand local, global, and regional terrorist networks?

I2. Operationalizing combating terrorism: Direct and indirect 

approaches 

I3. Countering radicalization: How do we identify and recruit the appropriate indigenous persons and leverage them to improve SOF understanding and effectiveness at the local level?

I4. How to build capabilities to conduct local, regional, and global assessments of counterterrorist network effectiveness

I5. How to expand capabilities to identify, locate, target, and disrupt key 

components of terrorist networks

I6. SOF contributions to a new intelligence architecture for 

counterterrorism

I7. Phase 0, SOFt Power: Role for SOF in political warfare, coercive diplomacy, and active security campaigns

I8. Integrating General Purpose Forces (GPF) and SOF operations in 

irregular warfare

I9. Building an irregular warfare force for the future

I10. Retooling Special Forces for the 21st century counterterrorism effort

I11. What capabilities can and should be developed to provide support to 

the interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental counterterrorist 

network?

I12. Turning the hot war cold: Suggestions for the increased emphasis on 

the indirect lines of operation to combat terrorist networks

I13. Engaging the constructive, credible Muslim Ummah to counter violent extremist ideology

I14. Capability to synchronize DoD/DoS networks to counter terrorist 

networks

I15. How can Islamic religious tenets be employed to counter terrorist 

activities and slow the recruitment of new extremists?
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

I16. What are the appropriate metrics for DoD to assess irregular warfare 

operations?

I17. Refining the indirect approach, irregular warfare strategy and 

operations

I18. Game theory and the warrior diplomat: Understanding competitive 

and cooperative decision making and their applications to interagency 

interaction

I19. Impact of organizational (agency) cultures on effective interagency 

interaction

I20. Analyze interagency C2, planning, and operational mechanisms 

employed during contingency operations where the interagency community leads

I21. What steps can the DoD take to encourage the engagement of the 

whole of government in the counterterrorism effort, thus maximizing best practices while reducing redundancy and costly overlap with 

other U.S. Government agencies, partner and cooperative countries, 

and multinational organizations? 

I22. Interagency community turf battles

I23. Best practices of providing cultural education in preparation for SOF 

operations 

I24. Supporting U.S. southwest border stability in a crisis period: Potential 

SOF assistance to struggling Mexican security institutions and U.S. 

CONUS defense

I25. Leveraging academic support for special operations 

I26. Strategic culture analysis: Predictive capacity for current and future 

threats

I27. Natural resources battlefield

I28. SOF intellectual capital

I29. Law and legal institutions 

I30. U.S. SOF training of foreign military/security forces “to enhance their 

capacity” in counterterrorism, COIN, and FID is a major strategy of 

the U.S. and USSOCOM overseas contingency operations, but have 

those efforts generated the desired results? 

I31. Diplomatic agreements to support rapid SOF support for other 

nations

I32. Security Force Assistance (SFA) 
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I. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues

I33. SOF interaction with host-nation Ministry of Interior (MoI) resources

I34. Influence and relationship between USSOCOM and the military 

services 

I35. Training systems for USSOCOM and its components 

I36. SOF aviation: Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs)

I37. Use of Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UHV) systems

I38. Use of Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) and Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) systems 

I39. Planning for Joint special operations for the indirect approach

I40. Developing regional counterterrorism strategy—enabling partners

I41. Getting beyond Al Qaeda and looking to the future of counterterrorism policy and operations

I42. Counterterrorism partnerships between SOF and law enforcement 

agencies (LEAs)

I43. How does cultural awareness contribute to effective activities in combating terrorism?

I44. Intelligence for counterterrorism operations: Best practices, future 

requirements, possible synergies among USSOCOM and other U.S. 

agencies—for example, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA)—allies, and other less savory options

I45. What are the funding relationships between terrorist organizations 

and organized crime?

I46. When counterterrorism is counterproductive: Case studies and theories of the misapplication of counterterrorism

I47. Poverty is a pawn: The myth of poverty as genesis of terrorism and 

how poverty is used by terrorist leaders 

I48. Terrorist safe havens/sanctuaries/ungoverned areas

I49. What strategy should the U.S. pursue to break the power jihadist terrorist hold over third world population and what is the role of SOF in 

this strategy?

I50. Lessons not learned in irregular warfare to date

I51. Organizing interagency community for irregular warfare campaigns

I52. Strategic theories on irregular warfare

I53. Operational art design for irregular warfare-centric campaigns
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

I54. Building Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plans for key 

partner nations

I55. Case studies of SOF creating strategic effects in irregular warfare

I56. How to advise host nations engaged in irregular warfare

I57. Conventional/SOF cooperation

I58. Embassy role in U.S. Government irregular warfare effort

I59. Legislative requirements for effective interagency campaigns

I60. Country team approach

I61. Cultural awareness

I62. Are culture, religion, and worldview factors in motivating irregular 

warfare?

I63. Cultural knowledge in irregular warfare campaign planning

I64. Regional studies

I65. How is strategy developed for special operations and what is the 

framework for such development?

I66. Why is Phase 0 important and how can SOF support the geographic 

combatant commander strategy: Informing the joint conventional 

community

I67. Develop SOF internships with Fortune 500 companies in order to 

develop irregular warfare skill sets (marketing; influence, investigations, strategic communications)

I68. Impact of crossing borders to conduct military operations

I69. Roles of SOF and NGOs in complex humanitarian emergencies

I70. Oral histories of SOF leaders for publication/professional development

I71. SOF senior leader competencies for joint warfare: Preparing for joint 

SOF combat command 

I72. Cross area-of-responsibility operations

I73. U.S. national security initiatives in Africa and the counterterrorism 

effort 

I74. Effective PSYOP in a mostly illiterate population
63

I. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues

Topic Descriptions

I1. What initiatives are necessary to improve SOF capabilities to 

understand local, global, and regional terrorist networks? 

For SOF to be successful in defeating and deterring terrorist networks, 

we must first understand our operational environment, whether 

physical or virtual. To do this, we need the cognitive skill sets to 

provide SOF with local, global, and regional understandings of those 

environments. What cognitive skill sets? Historical context is essential 

for understanding current conditions and to avoid becoming trapped 

in a Western mindset. What is a “network”? What hindrances do we 

bring to the fight? What outcomes against terrorist networks are truly 

possible and acceptable? This study examines current SOF capabilities 

to learn about and share awareness of terrorist network structures, 

strengths, and vulnerabilities. It then moves forward to propose steps 

to improve current capabilities while seeking initiatives to fill existing 

gaps.

I2. Operationalizing combating terrorism: Direct and indirect 

approaches 

Experience teaches that fighting and winning within the counterterrorism effort are separate, though complementary, endeavors. Fighting requires direct action to kill or capture terrorists and destroy 

their support networks. However, is reliance on such quick, decisive, 

and measurable missions reflective of a winning strategy? How does 

such a mindset hinder or help win a war when the ultimate effects of 

such operations may not be apparent for months or even years? Thus, 

is the reliance on Direct Action missions to attrit terrorists effective 

beyond force protection or the defense of strategic interests within the 

broader war on terror? Winning must ultimately be about indirect 

actions intended to eliminate the environment that enables terrorists 

to flourish and operate. Winning is also about eliminating sanctuaries, an effort inevitably requiring a mix of direct and indirect actions. 

This study proposes a “right mix” of direct and indirect actions to 

assure the achievement of U.S. strategic objectives. What is the correct 

force structure to win and win decisively? What does “operationalizing intelligence” mean to collectors, analysts, planners, and operators? How does the process of operationalizing look when successfully 

implemented? Defining the relationship between direct and indirect 

action helps define the required balance between them to achieve the 

End State.
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I3. Countering radicalization: How do we identify and recruit the 

appropriate indigenous persons and leverage them to improve 

SOF understanding and effectiveness at the local level?

One of the lessons of the counterterrorism effort is that “radical” 

Islamic thought and practice represent a very complex and diverse 

mix of groups and agendas. However, by simply labeling terrorists 

and their networks as “Al Qaeda” or some other shorthand reference 

without a more detailed understanding of their nature runs the risk 

of missing important characteristics that are essential to the successful engagement of these networks. SOF needs to become far more 

sophisticated in their understanding of Islam in general and in categorization of Islam’s radical elements. This study surveys the relevant 

Islamic groups, their belief structures, and their agendas. For example, what are the differences between an Iraqi Jaysh al-Mahdi follower 

who adheres to Wilayat al-Fiqh as a political philosophy and an Iranian who espouses similar beliefs? Once the differences are identified 

and understood, what can be done to leverage them to achieve success 

in the counterterrorism effort? How do we counter radicalization in 

the areas of identifying motivations, recruiting methodologies, and 

working with indigenous assets who have special emphasis on parents 

and relatives? 

I4. How to build SOCOM capabilities to conduct local, regional, and 

global assessments of counterterrorist network effectiveness 

Credible assessments of counterterrorist network effectiveness are 

essential to sustained and successful counterterrorism operations. 

This study explores the purpose of such assessments, USSOCOM’s 

authorities to conduct assessments, the assumptions and components that drive the assumption process, and the complex interactions 

required with other combatant commands and the wider interagency 

community to ensure the most complete assessment products. Assessments allow the joint force to determine the effects associated with 

counterterrorist network operations: the impact upon the terrorist 

network, the effect upon the targeted populace and other actors, the 

effect upon other elements within the operational environment, and 

the requirements for future joint force contributions to counterterrorist network operations. This study also includes an overview of 

planning assumptions to include the understanding of the terrorist 

network, emerging effects, and the changing conditions within the 

operational environment to determine the accuracy of understanding, 
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I. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues

effectiveness of operations, and the course corrections required for 

future operations.

I5. How to expand SOF capabilities to identify, locate, target, and 

disrupt key components of terrorist networks 

Central to any counterterrorism effort is the capability to engage the 

full spectrum of a terrorist network and to render the network unable 

or unwilling to continue to function. This study examines techniques 

by which parallel organizations can be established to compete with 

and neutralize components of existing terrorist networks. Engagement of such networks can be either led or enabled by the DoD 

functioning by, with, and through interagency, multinational, and/

or nongovernmental partners. Activities may involve direct actions 

focused on specific nodes or links of interest; they may also employ 

indirect methods addressing some aspect of the operating environment and thus rendering ineffective the node or link of interest.

I6. SOF contributions to a new intelligence architecture for 

counterterrorism 

In the late summer of 2008, the Defense Science Board (DSB) identified key security issues that, if not addressed, could lead to future 

military failure. One of these was a lack of deep penetration capabilities needed for developing actionable intelligence against individual 

terrorists and terrorist groups. More broadly, the DSB underscored 

the need for a new architecture that no longer focused on mainly fixed 

installations, but on people and activities “hiding in plain sight” and 

collection that would be “close-in, intrusive, and must achieve deep 

penetration.” The DSB pointed to SOF as one of the “enduring pockets 

of innovation, agility, and prudent risk-taking” within DoD. Using the 

DSB findings as a point of departure, this study will address specific 

steps that SOF can take to enhance new counterterrorism intelligence 

collection efforts in appropriate and feasible ways. Overview reading: 

Defense Imperatives for the New Administration, Defense Science 

Board, August 2008.

I7. Phases 0-II, SOFt Power: Role for SOF in political warfare, coercive diplomacy, and active security campaigns 

There is a need to assist the DoD and the interagency community to 

understand and integrate Phases 0-II operations into the preparation of the environment in support of irregular warfare. This study 

explores the strategic utility of SOF to achieve U.S. policy objectives 

in non-war and preventive-war scenarios. It is relevant to theater and 
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SOF strategists, campaign planners, the irregular warfare community, and the interagency community. The discussion should include 

the achievement of strategic effects in periods of political warfare (for 

example: secret warfare, ideological warfare, and flexible deterrent 

options)—also known as “Grey” SOF—during coercive diplomacy 

and as part of COCOM persistent and adaptive Phase 0 theater campaigns. The research should explore the ways and means by which 

SOF achieve high levels of strategic performance in pursuit of national 

political goals; identify the optimal cooperation and team arrangements among SOF, DoD, and the wider U.S. Government interagency 

environment to achieve both military and political objectives; identify 

the best war-prevention measures SOF can perform; and recommend 

any necessary changes to the current security assistance environment 

to develop strategically sound, long-term, adaptable campaign lines of 

operation.

I8. Integrating General Purpose Forces (GPF) and SOF operations in 

irregular warfare 

The integration of GPF and SOF operations in irregular warfare environments raises many familiar questions. This study identifies the 

most persistent of these integration problems and proposes answers 

that seek to formalize the relationship between the complementary 

efforts. What lines of authority delineate SOF and GPF-controlled 

portions of an area of operation? When is one component the supported and the other the supporting within a specific operation? What 

are the mechanisms for the de-confliction of GPF and SOF rules of 

engagement? What are the mechanisms for ensuring the resolution of 

other interoperability issues that may arise? How does SOF gain equitable access to GPF-controlled sustainment and mission enablers such 

as transportation, communication, intelligence resources, and UAV 

support?

I9. Building an irregular warfare force for the future 

Emerging thought contends that SOF may not be adequately prepared 

to interact with indigenous populations in the variety of operational 

environments in which the irregular warfare counterterrorism effort 

will be fought and won. Do such shortcomings exist? If so, how can 

SOF better prepare itself for its global missions by addressing these 

shortcomings through employment of proxies, irregulars, or surrogates? Propose procedures to identify those with particular aptitudes 

for cultural awareness, intercultural communication, and language 
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proficiency. What indicators in secondary school curricula can assist 

in alerting recruiters to individuals with appropriate skill sets? 

Increasing numbers of school systems offer and sometimes require 

Spanish language proficiency. Are similar mandates available for 

Arabic, Chinese, Farsi, Russian, and so on? What is cultural awareness? How should proficiency levels in cultural awareness be introduced and managed? Should training be focused on individual 

soldiers, units, or force-wide capabilities? How should cultural awareness training be tailored for different Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs), duty positions, and grades? Is cultural awareness 

sufficient for SOF to meet mission requirements? Should standards for 

specific cross-cultural capabilities be introduced to expand individual 

and unit SOF proficiencies across multiple geographical areas? 

I10. Retooling Special Forces for the 21st century counterterrorism 

effort 

This research topic focuses on U.S. Army Special Forces and potential 

changes in how they operate to address the counterterrorism effort 

and related threats. How practical is it to have U.S. Army Special 

Forces prepare themselves primarily for unconventional warfare and 

FID missions while retaining the capabilities for support of remaining core SOF missions? With a narrower lane to travel, how can the 

training of language and cultural skills be upgraded to address the 

specific requirements of unconventional warfare and FID? What 

initiatives are available to establish and sustain stronger and more 

credible relationships with host-nation personnel? Is there utility in 

forward deploying Special Forces units to draw on improved infrastructures and opportunities for immersion in local and regional cultures? Consider historical examples and outline potential benefits and 

drawbacks to these approaches. Shifting to the future, how might such 

initiatives better prepare Special Forces units to identify, understand, 

prepare for, and confront emerging threats? Conduct assessments of 

the ODAs, ODBs, and Groups with an eye toward suggesting changes 

in their structures and skill sets. Is a 12-man ODA too large, too small 

or just right? Are its skill sets in need of a fresh assessment? Might the 

communication sergeant become the “Computer Surveillance/Attack 

Sergeant?” Is the Special Forces education and training system outdated? Are we getting the maximum benefit from the “brainpower” 

of ODA members? What specific steps are necessary to field the most 

efficient and effective Special Forces capability for the future?
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I11. What capabilities can and should be developed to provide support to the interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental 

counterterrorist network? 

Joint Forces possess a variety of direct and indirect services, products, and resources to enable counterterrorist network disruption 

operations as well as programs to encourage local development, 

governance, and security. This study identifies possible Joint Force 

contributions that are both appropriate and acceptable to partners 

in the interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental counterterrorist network. The resulting program may include training, security 

assistance, education, command and control, logistics, ISR, funding, 

support to civil authority, information operations, and direct action 

missions.

I12. Turning the hot war cold: Suggestions for the increased emphasis 

on the indirect lines of operation to combat terrorist networks 

It is commonly accepted that indirect action and lines of operation are 

central to the efforts to defeat terrorists and their networks. Even so, 

it would appear that direct action missions are the preferred choice. 

This study surveys historical examples, lessons learned, and best 

practices to provide a comprehensive overview of the strategic, longterm nature of the indirect process. Examples such as the Marshall 

Plan and case studies from the Cold War serve as support for indirect 

thinking. What do SOF operators and leaders need to relearn about 

indirect planning and operations? Suggestions to improve the quality of indirect efforts should focus on preparing the irregular-warfare 

operational environment through the use of information operations, 

population influence, strategic communication, and civil-military 

operations.

I13. Engaging the constructive, credible Muslim Ummah to counter 

violent extremist ideology 

This topic continues to be one of growing interest among members of 

the Intelligence community who are seeking strategies for countering 

radicalization or changing the attitudes of those who are already 

extremists. Focusing primarily on Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, 

Algeria, Pakistan, and Europe, what can the U.S. Government do to 

reduce information barriers among 10–40 year-old Muslims? Which 

U.S. policies should be either increased or reduced to enhance positive 

engagement of the constructive Muslim Ummah organization? Also, 

how does the U.S. support or encourage credible Muslim voices 
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without discrediting them through our endorsement or support? 

Identify avenues and methodologies to positively engage the constructive Muslim Ummah to counter violent extremist ideology. Further, 

look to other nations such as India (home to more Muslims than 

Pakistan), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Nigeria, Senegal, and 

Mali as venues for similar initiatives. For instance, are the techniques 

that are appropriate in Egypt also appropriate in Indonesia or 

elsewhere?

I14. Capability to synchronize DoD/DoS networks to counter terrorist 

networks 

The complexities of terrorist networks require the establishment and 

synchronization of counterterrorism networks that field the necessary 

capabilities from the DoD, DoS, and throughout the wider U.S. Government interagency community. Such arrangements remain elusive 

as stovepipe relationships and legislation prohibiting collaboration 

among various agencies limit network functioning. This study looks 

at how terrorist groups form their social networks and the areas of 

interest in which they operate. As we consider the emerging concept 

of “communities of interest” built around social networking, is a network the best way to conceptualize both terrorist and counterterrorist structures? What specific steps are necessary to synchronize DoD/

DoS counterterrorist structures so they more efficiently bridge organizational boundaries? How do we construct counterterrorist structures that mirror those of our adversaries? How do we ensure that the 

emerging counterterrorism structures reach down to the operational 

level and are not blocked by the temptation to over-classify the flow of 

essential information?

I15. How can Islamic religious tenets be employed to counter terrorist activities and slow the recruitment of new extremists? 

Islamic extremists justify their behavior by invoking religious principles and elements of faith. This study turns the tables by challenging 

these claims and suggesting alternative Islamic interpretations that 

discredit terrorist behavior. Survey re-education programs such as in 

Singapore and other countries that use religious teachers to meet with 

captured extremists or terrorists to challenge their interpretation of 

Islamic teachings, discredit their justifications for violent conduct, 

and reframe Islamic teachings as condemning violent acts rather than 

endorsing them. Instead of relying on imprecise terminology and 

labels, what Islamic words and verses exist that reject the violence 
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committed and “justified” by religion? For instance, the often-used 

terms such as jihadist and mujahedeen are, in fact, positive terms 

that bolster the prestige and morale of the Islamic extremist. What 

Islamic words convey negative judgment on a terrorist or evil doer? 

How can we carefully use Islamic beliefs against the extremists? What 

is the true meaning of fatwas and their role in Islamic culture? Propose approaches that originate with credible Islamic voices, not with 

non-Islamic, non-cleric, nonreligious scholars. What primary source 

secular materials exist that highlight the hypocrisy and internal contradictions contained in the writings and actions of Al Qaeda and 

other terrorist groups? Pointing out that such groups are opportunistic as much as they are ideological or religious can serve as an effective 

way to undermine their propaganda and presumed righteousness. 

I16. What are the appropriate metrics for DoD to assess irregular 

warfare operations? 

The measurement of success in irregular warfare operations is 

extremely difficult because of the absence of “cookie-cutter” solutions to address any given situation and the need to develop specific 

metrics on a case-by-case basis. This study tackles the challenge 

of determining how irregular warfare operations can be viewed as 

effects-based when existing measurements of success are so rudimentary. Active engagement with academia and the application of assessment and analysis tools already used by social scientists can greatly 

assist in irregular warfare evaluation efforts. Contrast the need for 

an “inside out” assessment model that considers people, adversaries, 

and environmental perspectives with the traditional U.S. “outside in” 

approach. How do we arrive at data baselines against which to measure effectiveness? How do we measure the impact of irregular warfare activities (beyond killing the terrorists) in achieving geographic 

combatant command, DoD, and national strategic goals? What is the 

measurement of effect(s) for FID in terms of partner preparedness vs. 

SOF relationship building? What are the lines of operation for other 

SOF activities, and how can those measurements be captured? How 

do we define success, and how do we measure it? How do we measure “good enough?” How do we assess when no action is better than 

action that, though successful, may result in huge strategic costs? 

What are the time horizons across which we should measure?
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I17. Refining the indirect approach, irregular warfare strategy and 

operations 

The proper coordination and application of effort in the areas of 

governance, development, security, economics, and social structures 

can result in the unbalancing of our adversaries and/or the alteration of environmental conditions. Such indirect approaches normally 

require a long-term commitment and challenge the patience of politicians and publics. Based on lessons learned, this study reviews the 

essential issues of indirect action with an idea of refining the paradigm to account for inevitable long-duration involvement. Attention 

must be paid to the various leverage points so as to gain maximum 

effect. These include goals/desired end states, levels of operational risk, 

access of U.S. forces and resources, U.S. “anti-bodies,” pre-conflict 

vs. conflict roles, security vs. non-security threats, regional players 

(such as EU, AU, ASEAN, OAS), and independent players (such as 

UN, ICRC, business/industry). What are the indirect action lessons 

learned? How do we prioritize various indirect approaches? How do 

we prepare domestic, partner, and host-nation publics to understand 

and accept the long-term nature of indirect action? The study recognizes the theoretical influence of rhetorical studies and strategic communication theory such as inoculation theory, cultivation theory, and 

the two-step communication process.

I18. Game theory and the warrior diplomat: Understanding competitive and cooperative decision making and their applications to 

interagency interaction 

When conducting interagency collaboration or negotiations, most 

participants are trained to approach the bargaining table as if they 

are engaged in a zero-sum game—that is, if another agency wins, 

my agency loses. This approach reflects classic competitive decision 

making. How can the introduction of game theory shift the negotiation paradigm from competitive to cooperative decision making? 

Drawing on the assumption that it is in the best interests of each 

participant to cooperate with the others, what techniques are available to teach that all participants benefit from cooperative decision 

making models? How might game theory assist in developing lasting 

interagency decision models that can also be further applied to stateto-state negotiations?
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I19. Impact of organizational (agency) cultures on effective interagency interaction 

Understanding different organizational cultures is essential in seeking 

to reconcile different approaches for dealing with interagency issues. 

The goal is to achieve a unity of action by identifying complementary 

approaches in framing and addressing a specific challenge. Unique 

organizational cultures determine such things as decision-making 

models, communication styles, goal expectations, operational structures, and resource flows. This study explores these dimensions within 

the DoD, DoS, and other key participants in the interagency process. 

How do these differences affect both positive and negative interagency 

interaction? How might best practices in different agencies be documented and adapted throughout the interagency community? Part 

of the design of the interagency community, especially the respective 

Intelligence nodes within the Intelligence community, was to foster 

competition. The organizational culture within the DoS is very different from that within the DoD or CIA, leading in part to differing 

Intelligence estimates. This competition was intended to ensure that 

decision makers had different opinions to weigh against one another. 

Does the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) run 

the risk of undermining this competition in favor of consensus assessments? What procedures can be developed to ensure that decision 

makers in all functional areas have different opinions to weigh against 

one another? 

I20. Analyze interagency C2, planning, and operational mechanisms 

employed during contingency operations where the interagency 

community leads 

The interagency community has successfully led contingency-based 

operations, many with irregular warfare parameters. Around the 

globe, the interagency community leads on a daily basis the U.S. 

Government efforts in combating terrorism, counter-finance, countercriminal business enterprise, counter-drug, and other security missions. During the secret war in Laos (Vietnam War era), the covert 

and paramilitary efforts of the U.S. Government, in conjunction with 

SOF, were led by the U.S. ambassador and his country team with 

operational control over both U.S. military and civil assets. Successful COIN cases exist where DoS-led efforts, enabled by U.S. SOF and 

other military forces, advanced U.S. interests and achieved strategic 

political objectives (for example: El Salvador, Operation Enduring 

Freedom, Philippines, and security assistance to Greece after World 
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I. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues

War II). Efforts to win the drug war and assist Plan Columbia are 

interagency community-led, specifically by the U.S. ambassador and 

his military group (MILHRP). However, important differences in 

approach persist. This study analyzes the various methods that different agencies employ. For example, the military uses a very structured 

planning process (MDMP), but the DoS utilize a different method. 

How does each department’s planning processes differ, and what we 

can do to fill the gaps resulting from these differences? Should we 

plan on using similar processes, and if not, how do we bridge gaps 

that might result? Study and analyze interagency community-led 

contingency-size task force operations to identify and synthesize best 

practices in strategic and operational planning, C2, and implementation. Identify the vital role SOF can play in these indirect applications 

of military power. Identify best uses of GPF to facilitate these operations. Recommend a 21st century task organization for the country 

team. This would include the MILHRP, which would optimize contingency operations when led by the interagency community. What 

are the risks? What challenges and strategic opportunities will dictate 

the use of interagency task forces? Consider the use of an interagency 

task force to accomplish soft-power campaigns over extended periods. 

What are the implications of having non-DoD departments (such as 

DoS/DoJ/DoE) in charge of DoD elements? Is the DoD prepared to 

place DoD assets under the control of OHA commanders?

I21. What steps can the DoD take to encourage the engagement of 

the whole of government in the counterterrorism effort, thus 

maximizing best practices while reducing redundancy and costly 

overlap with other U.S. Government agencies, partner and cooperative countries, and multinational organizations? 

The skill sets and resources necessary for the successful prosecution of 

the counterterrorism effort reside throughout the U.S. Government. 

One of the weaknesses of the interagency process is the absence of a 

clear mandate for who is authorized to contribute to the requirements 

generated by the counterterrorism effort. What specific steps are necessary to identify and engage the full range of U.S. Government capabilities? One of the recurring problems is that of information sharing. 

What can be done within the interagency community to break down 

stovepipes and flatten the dynamic process of information exchange? 

How can DoD improve its capabilities to share information with the 

U.S. Government interagency community, partner and cooperative 

countries, and multinational organizations?
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I22. Interagency community turf battles.

As experiences in Afghanistan and elsewhere have taught, the military frequently finds itself in the position of performing tasks normally performed by DoS or other U.S. government agencies because 

the magnitude of the work precluded those normally responsible from 

doing it. This reality raises important political/social theory questions about the tension among organizations that have been given 

formal mandates/charters to perform while resources have been given 

to another organization, and capabilities perhaps reside with yet a 

third. What examples of both success and failure exist in such complex situations? How can objective after-action reports prepared by 

external reviewers (and not intended merely to assess blame) assist in 

identifying best practices in interagency relationships? What are the 

underlying obstacles to creating a synchronized interagency process 

to execute the counterterrorism effort and other theater missions and 

objectives? How can we convince others within the U.S. Government 

to muster resources towards a common goal when no individual and 

independent agency is subordinate to another? How do interagency 

players overcome the restrictions of their legal responsibilities, capabilities, and capacities and yet provide the fullest support to a wholeof-government effort? Do we need an interagency commission with 

representatives from the DoS, DoD, DNI, DoJ, and other agencies to 

run the counterterrorism effort? Does such management-by-consensus stifle real leadership? Examine various options or approaches, 

taking into account the human factors involved, with recommendations of how to better run the whole-of-government machinery 

without creating another cumbersome layer of bureaucracy. How do 

we manage/resolve conflicting agency missions to achieve true interagency solutions? How do we develop practical nonhierarchal C-2 

structures to enable SOF, GPF, and other government agencies to 

work together on the battlefield?

I23. Best practices of providing cultural education in preparation for 

SOF operations 

SOF traditionally place a heavy reliance on operating within unfamiliar cultures. Cultural awareness and language proficiency are the 

building blocks of cultural education. How do different SOF components prepare their personnel to conduct operations with indigenous populations? Do specific education methods work better for 

certain missions? How does language proficiency assist with cultural 

education? Which elements of culture are essential to prepare SOF 
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for down-range experiences? Do NGOs, international governmental organizations, and other international players conduct education 

programs that may be helpful in assessing and improving SOF cultural education? How might cultural immersion programs assist SOF 

preparations? Identify standards for determining how much education is sufficient in a given situation.

I24. Supporting U.S. southwest border stability in a crisis period: 

Potential SOF assistance to struggling Mexican security institutions and U.S. CONUS defense 

The U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) recent articulation of the 

U.S. Joint Operational Environment (JOE) highlights a real potential 

for Mexico becoming a failed state. Sustained pressures from organized crime- and gang-fed violence increasingly point to weakening 

Mexican military and security institutions, while at the same time 

entrenched government corruption undermines the most serious 

reform efforts. JFCOM—in a judgment that may have been characterized as excessive just a few years ago—highlights Mexico’s weakening institutions as a threat to Western Hemispheric security generally, 

and especially as a U.S. Homeland Security problem of “immense 

proportions.” Visible increases in Mexican cross-border violence 

immediately following the JFCOM report’s release were underscored 

by Phoenix, Arizona being named the top U.S. kidnapping center and 

the second highest in the world as a consequence of Mexican gang 

and paramilitary violence. Individual U.S. states, in response, have 

begun to formulate their own plans for border crisis. The possibility 

of a sudden catastrophic collapse with ensuing mass border crossings, 

humanitarian crises all point to the broadest U.S. support requirements being implemented, and anticipatory planning or actions 

undertaken ahead of time. The U.S. State Department’s FY 2009 Strategic Mission Plan: U.S. Mission to Mexico has declared four major 

policy goals. These potentially benefit from the direct or indirect support of U.S. SOF to appropriate Mexican institutions and to CONUS 

military, law enforcement, and interagency organizations: enhancing common border security, increasing security of a shared North 

American homeland, strengthening Mexican law enforcement and 

judicial capabilities, and helping Mexico consolidate and strengthen 

its governmental institutions and the rule of law. Research under this 

topic examines the ways in which U.S. special operations components—and especially the roles of U.S. NORTHCOM and the interagency community—can effectively support such U.S. policy goals in 
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today’s operational environment that blurs distinctions between U.S. 

and Mexican requirements.

I25. Leveraging academic support for special operations 

The SOF community, in the form of Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 

was an innovator in the recruiting and use of academic specialists—for example, anthropologists, political scientists, historians, and 

linguists—to advance irregular warfare initiatives. Support in the 

early days was typically enthusiastic. While productive relationships 

have continued to some extent, recent years have seen far less enthusiasm in academia for defense and security interaction. Sometimes the 

response is outright rejection and hostility. In a 2008 effort to reinvigorate what decades earlier had been productive relationships, U.S. 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates oversaw the development of what 

was called the Minerva Consortia. This initiative included academic 

outreach and a number of programs that included the creation and 

deployment of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), document exploitation for key areas of interest to both scholars and military planners, 

religious and ideological studies, and other applications of history, 

anthropology, sociology, and evolutionary psychology expertise residing in U.S. universities. Some of these programs, however, particularly the HTTs under U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC) management, have proven controversial in academia and 

in reviews of implementation and effectiveness. While SOF has its 

own priorities and approaches, concepts for leveraging academic support for special operations should be considered in light of such controversies and problem areas. This study addresses how SOF can most 

productively use expertise found in U.S. universities and academic 

research centers to advance SOF knowledge, skills, initiatives, and 

operations. It will consider concepts, approaches, specific activities 

and programs, and the overall nature, appropriateness, and potential 

of academic/university relationships. 

Overview readings are Speech to the Association of American 

Universities (Washington, D.C.) as delivered by Secretary of Defense 

Robert M. Gates, Washington, D.C., 14 April 2008 and Robin Winks, 

Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961 (Yale University Press, 1996).
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I26. Strategic culture analysis: Predictive capacity for current and 

future threats 

Many feel that strategic culture analysis holds significant promise for 

interpreting and understanding how different states approach matters of war, peace, strategy, and the use of military force. Strategic 

culture analysis emerged from Cold War requirements to understand 

and possibly predict Soviet nuclear behavior. Strategic culture fell out 

of favor as a concept after the fall of the Soviet Union. More sophisticated than its Cold War construct, strategic culture now explores 

belief systems, values, climate, resources, geography, classical text, 

defense concepts, military doctrine, economic resources, and a country’s technological base. Given their structures and purposes, are 

Al Qaeda and other transnational, non-state terrorist, and criminal 

groups appropriate candidates for strategic cultural analysis? Consider 

state-like attributes such as military forces, an international economic 

base, a sophisticated communication network, a system of social services, and clearly articulated international security objectives. Can 

strategic culture analysis of transnational, non-state actors identify 

strategic personalities, define strategic perspectives, and ultimately 

predict strategic behavior? Is strategic culture analysis a viable tool for 

understanding current and predicting future terrorist threats?

I27. Natural resources battlefield 

Competition for natural resources such as oil, water, food, and wood 

has led to conflict throughout history. Research is necessary to identify contemporary vulnerabilities, security measures, and the location of any seams. Second-order effects on population, land use, 

and economic activity are also of immediate concern. More specifically, the study identifies potential natural resource battlefields and 

their roles in future acts of terrorism and wider aspects of irregular 

warfare. Examples include oil and natural gas reserves sited amidst 

Iran, Russia, and China. What are the implications of U.S. petroleum security commitments to the Gulf states? Discuss the use of oil 

(controlling supply/artificial price manipulation) by oil-producing 

nations to blackmail/damage western economic systems. Analyze 

historical trends from the creation of the OPEC cartel to the present to determine if there is precedent to attempt long-term damage 

through cartel policies. What roles might SOF play in such security 

scenarios? Examine the current structure of indigenous internal 

security and military forces as they relate to petroleum infrastructure 
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security (oil refineries, wells, pipelines, and offshore facilities). What 

are some emerging security threats to natural resources? What integrated security operational concepts will be required? How would 

those concepts integrate local MoD, MoI, and commercial resources 

into a comprehensive security infrastructure for petroleum and other 

natural resources? How can SOF integrate with local Special Security 

Forces (SSF), typically under the direction of the MoI? How do proposed security concepts enhance coordination among MoIs, MoDs 

and SOF?

I28. SOF intellectual capital 

Develop a framework for selection and assessment for the next generation of SOF leaders based on understanding of the strategic level 

of security policy. Discuss how to build a requisite academic body of 

knowledge to support this framework and explain how it might be 

integrated into the existing military education system as pertains to 

SOF leaders.

I29. Law and legal institutions 

Analyze perspectives from senior lawyers coming out of Iraq and 

Afghanistan on developing rule of law and legal institutions. Discuss 

obstacles to this development, akin to a lessons-learned analysis. Collect and examine viewpoints of Staff Judge Advocate personnel who 

have served on Joint Special Operations Task Forces, capturing unique 

issues in providing legal and rules of engagement advice to SOF.

I30. U.S. SOF training of foreign military/security forces “to enhance 

their capacity” in counterterrorism, COIN, and FID is a major 

strategy of the U.S. and USSOCOM overseas contingency operations, but have those efforts generated the desired results? 

For more than 50 years, SOF has taken the lead role in DoD for training indigenous forces in counterterrorism, FID and COIN skills. 

Because of the capacity-building requirements of the effort, this strategy has become a major component of DoD’s efforts in North Africa, 

the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. After 

all these years, is there sufficient evidence that the U.S. commitment 

of personnel and material resources been successful in developing 

the intended capacity in local security forces? Furthermore, does the 

development of capacity even matter if the host-nation government 

is not willing to employ those forces as we intended, or at all? This 

study looks at the track record of SOF training and answers the question, “How do we know if it is working?” What are specific cases of 
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both success and failure? Why do the outcomes vary? Is the mission 

truly to “build capacity,” or is it merely to establish a sustained presence on the ground? SOF has operated in places like the Philippines 

and Colombia for many decades. Should we keep doing it, or should 

we dramatically change how we do it? What are the standards for 

success? What steps should be in place to increase the likely hood of 

success? To what level and extent should host-nation forces be trained 

and what technologies/resources should the U.S. provide them? 

I31. Diplomatic agreements to support rapid SOF support for other 

nations 

U.S. SOF possess training, equipment, and mobility capabilities that 

far surpass those of many nations’ police and military forces. In the 

event of a crisis, particularly those involving U.S. persons and interests, the employment of U.S. SOF could be the most effective and 

credible response. Recent and ongoing concerns over weapons of mass 

destruction, piracy, and transnational terrorists are relevant examples. 

However, most sovereign governments are adverse to the employment of another nation’s military forces within their state boundaries. 

Despite many cases of extensive training and coordination between 

U.S. and host nation militaries, the host-nation government still may 

not be well informed about the shortcomings of their own forces and 

the capabilities of US SOF to respond to an immediate threat. Should 

the U.S. establish diplomatic agreements with other countries prior 

to a crisis to formalize U.S. response options and streamline diplomatic decisions in the event of a time-sensitive crisis? Understanding 

that decisions in crisis situations are of a political nature, who should 

participate in the discussions leading to such agreements? What 

provisions should such agreements contain? To what extent should 

such agreements commit the U.S. to supporting a particular government against internal threats? What can be done to minimize friction 

between the ambassador/country team and the SOF deployed to the 

area? What provisions with the host nation are necessary for testing 

the response system?

I32. Security Force Assistance (SFA) 

This study examines the nature of SFA missions within the context 

of complementary operations and multiple participants. How do we 

determine if a SFA mission set is a SOF or General Purpose Force 

requirement? How do we clearly define SFA? How can USSOCOM 

best organize itself to accomplish the mission of SFA proponency? 
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How can the U.S. Government seamlessly integrate DoS, DoD, and 

other members of the interagency community into SFA programs? 

How can IGOs and NGOs make contributions consistent with their 

capabilities and agendas? What needs to be done to gain IGO and 

NGO investment in the process? Examine the issues, similarities, 

and differences between SFA and FID missions. What makes them 

similar? What makes them different? Are those differences merely 

semantic? FID is supposed to be a noncombat operation. When threat 

conditions introduce the need for combat, FID is more rightly categorized as COIN or support to COIN. Should SFA be categorized as 

combat or noncombat? Could it be both? If SFA is a noncombat activity, what approaches become appropriate in combat?

I33. SOF interaction with host-nation Ministry of Interior (MoI) 

resources 

In the Middle East and other regions, MoIs normally have internal 

security forces that resemble special operations organizations in their 

structure and functions. They may be called Special Security Forces or 

Paramilitary Forces, but they operate as an arm of the police. Frequently they are larger than the special operations components of the 

host-nation military assisted by U.S. SOF. This study examines the 

structure and functioning of such organizations. How are they used 

to protect the ruling government and provide stability both within the 

country and the region? How can U.S. SOF interface with these units 

to improve internal security conditions and build counterterrorism 

capacity? If necessary, how can SOF counterbalance these MoI units 

within the internal security context?

I34. Influence and relationship between USSOCOM and the military 

services 

The USSOCOM commander is tasked with conducting SOF core 

activities across a spectrum of missions. To do so, USSOCOM relies 

on the military services for the recruitment, training, development, 

retention, and assignment of SOF personnel. This relationship is 

central to USSOCOM’s abilities to accomplish the assigned missions. 

This study surveys the current relationships and influences between 

USSOCOM and the military services, with particular emphasis on 

issues concerning SOF personnel. Determine whether and where 

there are gaps in these relationships. What can be done to close these 

gaps? What influence does the USSOCOM commander require over 

military service management of SOF personnel, their incentives 
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and retention, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) development, 

assignments, and promotion/career management opportunities to 

effectively accomplish the USSOCOM mission? What steps can be 

taken to improve the required coordination and cooperation between 

USSOCOM and the military services?

I35. Training systems for USSOCOM and its components 

The rapid procurement and fielding of new equipment and evolving technologies present a variety of training challenges. At the same 

time, the standardized training of common tasks remains a familiar 

requirement. This study takes a comprehensive look at ways to provide 

timely and effective training on new equipment and other systems as 

fresh initiatives come on line and become forward deployed. Who is 

responsible for developing training programs and ensuring that they 

remain current and relevant? Identify the best ways to train the end 

users in such fast-moving environments. Which media are most effective in providing that training? How useful is a simulation system that 

is networked for all receiving components and organizations to access 

and/or download, especially when deployed? What roles can Webbased applications play? Survey ongoing and future innovations to 

address training program development, delivery, assessment, and sustainability. Are the Joint Training System (JTS) and the Joint Training 

Information Management System (JTIMS) useful tools to users in the 

field? Is feeding the system more resource intensive than originally 

envisioned? If it needs improvement, how can we make it better? Consider also efficiencies to be gained for current training approaches. 

For instance, resources, throughput capacity, and practicality have 

driven USSOCOM components to establish multiple training venues 

for the same skill set (e.g., military free-fall, combat dive, and snipers). What is the best process for USSOCOM to establish a baseline 

SOF standard for a particular skill set? How should those baselines be 

evaluated and sustained at required proficiency levels? What potential advantages accrue to the establishment of a SOF Training Center 

of Excellence (SOFTCOE) for the standardization and consolidation 

of SOF common skills training? Might a USSOCOM “Training and 

Education Command” represent a more comprehensive approach to 

training, standardization, and innovation? Review the Joint Special 

Operations Task Force (JSOTF) mission set and make a recommendation on the best training a unit can do to prepare for the JSOTF 

mission. Should USSOCOM certify units for the JSOTF mission? 
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If so, what are the standards and procedures for awarding such a 

certification?

I36. SOF aviation: Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) 

UASs have provided enhanced capabilities to address a variety of 

operational requirements. The purpose of this study is to explore the 

utility of employing UAS assets to support irregular warfare operations. How can multi-mission UASs assist in nontraditional environments? What specific capabilities can UASs bring to irregular warfare 

activities? Which irregular warfare strategies and tasks are appropriate for UASs? Identify specific employment profiles for using UASs in 

irregular warfare situations. Consider such missions as humanitarian relief operations, civil affairs, disaster response and the resulting hybrid threats they may impose on COIN and irregular warfare 

operations. 

I37. Use of Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) systems

Unmanned Ground Systems (UGS) have provided enhanced capabilities to address a variety of operational requirements. The purpose of 

this study is to explore the utility of employing UGV assets to support 

irregular warfare operations. How can UGVs assist in nontraditional 

environments? What specific capabilities can UGVs bring to irregular warfare activities? Which irregular warfare strategies and tasks 

are appropriate for UGVs? Identify specific employment profiles for 

using UGVs in irregular warfare situations. Consider such missions 

as humanitarian relief operations, civil affairs, disaster response, and 

the resulting hybrid threats they may impose on COIN and irregular 

warfare operations.

I38. Use of Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) and Unmanned 

Surface Vehicle (USV) systems 

Maritime unmanned systems have provided enhanced capabilities 

to address a variety of operational requirements. The purpose of this 

study is to explore the utility of employing UUV and USV assets to 

support irregular warfare operations. How can UUV/USVs assist in 

nontraditional environments? What specific capabilities can UUV/

USVs bring to irregular warfare activities? Which irregular warfare 

strategies and tasks are appropriate for UUV/USVs? Identify specific 

employment profiles for using UUV/USVs in irregular warfare situations. Consider such missions as humanitarian relief operations, civil 

affairs, disaster response, and the resulting hybrid threats they may 

impose on COIN and irregular warfare operations.
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I39. Planning for joint special operations for the indirect approach 

This study focuses on planning approaches for JSOTF strategic and 

operational missions in current and future environments. It would 

particularly focus on SOF core activities that typically involve indirect 

approaches to achieving strategic objectives, such as unconventional 

warfare, SFA, and FID. The study should identify classic campaign 

planning constructs and investigate how SOF joint headquarters 

(TSOC, JSOTF) conduct campaign planning in the current environment. Consideration should include planning for future SOF organizations such as expeditionary task forces that incorporate service 

combat multipliers as inherent parts of the force. Conclusions and recommendations should be provided that confirm or advance changes 

to SOF planning procedures.

I40. Developing regional counterterrorism strategy: Enabling partners 

Our partners and allies do not view the counterterrorism effort as a 

global problem and often have a problem with preemptive strategies. 

Counterterrorism is often viewed from the perspective of the host 

nation and its relations with its bordering states. Gather, analyze, and 

consolidate best practices in combating-terrorism strategy that could 

be useful at a regional level—similar to a counterterrorism Internal 

Defense and Development (IDAD) plan. What are some important 

regional factors and issues with combating terrorism? What are some 

useful policy, strategy, and operational techniques for consideration 

when developing a host-nation’s counterterrorism IDAD plan? This 

study should be a regional specialist topic—analyze selected partner 

nation(s) facing common problems to determine U.S. priorities and 

appropriate methods of assistance. 

I41. Getting beyond Al Qaeda and looking to the future of counterterrorism policy and operations 

Analyses of groups using terrorist activities have resulted in typologies of different sorts (e.g., groups with political aspirations, ideological/religious motivations, financial/criminal basis; and Rapoport’s 

four historical “waves”). Review these typologies, looking for differences and commonalities. Assess our experience with Al Qaeda 

against them and assess the utility of each. Apply the results of these 

analyses to the current geopolitical climate to discuss possible future 

terrorist activities. This effort may support strategic and perhaps 

operational planning.
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I42. Counterterrorism partnerships between SOF and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 

The focus is how to make LEAs work complementary with SOF. At 

least 75 percent of successful counterterrorism operations are as a 

result of law enforcement or other internal security forces (nonmilitary); in combat, much intelligence to run down terrorists can come 

from police access to population. SOF will never achieve effectiveness 

and strategic utility in combating terrorism if it disregards coordination, cooperation, and combined operations with LEAs. Ascertain 

roles for SOF to operate in conjunction with LEAs, both international 

and host nation when operating abroad; identify policy and regulatory changes, including budget, needed for SOF to operate in this 

domain. Recommend unique training and equipping requirements for 

SOF to perform this function. Illustrate the role of community policing and international law enforcement in combating terrorism, then 

explain why SOF is failing to operate in this medium, hamstringing our efforts to fully prosecute counterterrorism plans designed by 

USSOCOM. This project could describe a successful indirect strategy 

for overseas contingency operations and one which SOF could perform well.

I43. How does cultural awareness contribute to effective activities in 

combating terrorism? 

Acquaintance with language, culture, and local customs is only the 

first step in entering into a foreign environment. This study would 

provide analyses of specific terrorist or insurgent organizations highlighting how their cultural background has influenced their choices 

and actions. Show how cultural values determine the correctness or 

rationality of specific terrorist actions. Objective is to raise awareness 

in this area and lead to additional studies of specific terrorist organizations focused on the culture that shapes their operational planning, 

decisions, actions, and reactions.

I44. Intelligence for counterterrorism operations: Best practices, 

future requirements, possible synergies among USSOCOM and 

other U.S. agencies—for example, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—allies, and other less savory 

options 

Discuss and analyze the following statements: The intelligence 

community is moving beyond need to know to need to share. 
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Counterterrorism operations need to be in the share business, and lessons observed from Iraq show success in this area. Agencies, tactical 

to national, need to share information because target sets are illusive; 

and the most current information/intelligence supports operations. 

The counterterrorism mission is global in scale, and the ability to 

have the most current intelligence, at all levels, predictive in nature (as 

applicable), is available to planners at any possible time. Each day this 

topic is more relevant. U.S. SOF must acknowledge that HUMINT is 

essential in this business.

I45. What are the funding relationships between terrorist organizations and organized crime? 

Consider one of two approaches:

a. The global operating environment is changing to where transnational criminals and transnational terrorist organizations are 

“cooperating” to replace the state-sponsored system with a new 

system of business enterprise to raise funding. As this threat 

becomes larger, it will work to delegitimize international regulatory control over business and trading. Study this phenomenon 

as it relates to national security interests and threats to the U.S.; 

ascertain what requirements and capabilities SOF needs to thwart 

this threat. Describe current nexus, identify costs to national 

interests, predict trends, and provide solutions using SOF. 

b. Treasury officials in many countries, with a U.S. lead, have been 

successful in interdicting the flow of terrorist and drug networks 

through transnational cooperation, particularly since 9/11. Establish a compendium of best practices and lessons learned from the 

most successful of those rooting out terrorist financing.

I46. When counterterrorism is counterproductive: Case studies and 

theories of the misapplication of counterterrorism 

Discuss and analyze the current U.S. Government strategy for counterterrorism through this lens, with recommendations for adjustments. The Shining Path in Peru is a great case study for excessive 

governmental response to terrorism. Another approach is to reexamine USSOCOM CONPLAN 7500; using the unclassified threat model, 

campaign framework, and method, determine if the strategy is sufficient to achieve U.S. goals and which aspect are necessary to reach 

U.S. goals. What is missing? What is unnecessary or insufficient, and 

why?
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I47. Poverty is a pawn: The myth of poverty as genesis of terrorism 

and how poverty is used by terrorist leaders 

Terrorist leaders prey on the poor as a pool for foot soldiers, suicide 

bombers, and both witting and unwitting supporters through various 

means of exploitation. However, the vast majority of terrorist leaders 

do not come from poverty, but rather from the middle (Zarqawi) and 

even upper classes (as did bin Laden). How can governments mitigate 

this exploitation of the poor, knowing that poverty cannot be extinguished? Discuss the mix of conditions that serve to create fertile 

territory for developing terrorist actors. Establish a list of conditions 

(for example: poverty, religious fervor, education levels, distribution 

of wealth) that when existing concurrently, create an environment for 

growing terrorist actors. Will SOF need to prepare for contingencies 

in Asia, Africa, and Latin America?

I48. Terrorist safe havens/sanctuaries/ungoverned spaces 

The intelligence apparatus of the U.S. Government has fairly precise 

locations for terrorist safe havens throughout the world. Moreover, 

U.S. SOF, coupled with interagency partners, arguably has the capability to terrorize the terrorist in selected locations such as training 

camps and marshaling areas. Examine needed changes in policy, force 

structure, and legalities for the U.S. Government, with or without 

host-nation cooperation/approval, to affect these strikes against terrorists in their safe havens—that is, no longer make them safe. History is replete with examples of rear-area attacks destroying critical 

nodes of command and control, demoralizing the enemy, and degrading his ability to go on the offensive. Determine which are the most 

problematic of current and future safe havens—that is, which provide 

most succor and protection to terrorists and fellow travelers.

I49. What strategy should the U.S. pursue to break the power jihadist 

terrorist hold over third world population and what is the role of 

SOF in this strategy? 

Despite all the effort U.S. policy makers and media pundits have contributed to talking about the problem, no one has produced a satisfactory answer. Because this question has not been properly examined 

and appropriately answered, the U.S. largely plays a game of “whack a 

mole” in a global landscape where the moles look like everyone else. 

If insights to an answer were developed and successfully advocated, 

the potential for success in the counterterrorism effort would increase 

exponentially. Obviously, such a strategy would involve multiple 
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instruments and might even change the classical way in which some 

instruments like to view themselves. What will be SOF’s role?

I50. Lessons not learned in irregular warfare to date 

The counterterrorism effort has occurred for 5 years in Iraq and 6 

years in Afghanistan. Since their respective beginnings, much experience has been garnered in both countries. While many lessons have 

been learned, much has yet to be realized. These unlearned lessons 

need to be explored to determine if they are of value for learning and 

if so, what lessons are we missing or failing to understand? Information operations do not seem to be effective, campaign planning 

continues to be conducted in the absence of the host nations, and 

operations are still being run without complete integration. Who 

needs to learn these lessons and why they are important may help in 

the successful desired outcomes to these current conflicts.

I51. Organizing interagency community for irregular warfare 

campaigns 

The current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate the struggle in 

interagency coordination, cooperation, and unity of effort. As these 

events blur into the long war, the U.S. needs to review whether an 

organizational structure exists to fight irregular warfare from an 

interagency design. Who has the lead, when do they lead, and why 

is an agency/organization in the leadership role? What is the process 

used to make the interagency design function properly? How does 

USSOCOM fit into the interagency design?

I52. Strategic theories on irregular warfare 

What approaches can be considered for the study of irregular warfare as a traditional (nationalistic) or nontraditional underdog. Like 

unconventional study, Is there merit in approaching irregular warfare 

from the position of the insurgent/terrorist? This writing could begin 

with a review of current unconventional-warfare doctrine and experience to determine if they need to be revalidated or require rethinking. 

I53. Operational art design for irregular warfare-centric campaigns 

This study should focus on the development of a format of campaign 

designs for SOF planners specifically and conventional planners generally. The design would be meant to ensure the proper application of 

SOF in the fight. This view is important because little exists to help 

planners, SOF, or otherwise.
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I54. Building Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plans for key 

partner nations 

This topic is one that is undefined, except for a planning guide in 

Appendix B of Joint Publication 3-07.1 written several years ago. 

A methodology for framing the situation faced by a host nation to 

determine an IDAD strategy is absolutely necessary. The Civil Affairs 

course provides a political-social analysis guide as an initial starting 

point. However, it is not widely known, disseminated, or understood 

by the conventional military. Case studies (such as El Salvador, Iraq, 

and Afghanistan) to highlight success and failure in this endeavor are 

a good study vehicle.

I55. Case studies of SOF creating strategic effects in irregular warfare 

This topic could be a basis for strategic special operations theory and/

or serve as a primer for geographic combatant command planners. If 

we do not understand how to create strategic effects, SOF becomes less 

effective. To better understand, identify what is the range of strategic 

effects that might be of use to SOF—that is, how SOF produces each 

of those types of strategic effects, looking at case studies with effective 

and ineffective creation of strategic effects.

I56. How to advise host nations engaged in irregular warfare 

Advising host-nation counterparts is a slow process (requires time). 

We suffer with time conditions that cause pushing rather than guiding counterparts to a resolution of a problem. A need exists to teach 

the art of advising, much like what was done during the Vietnam era, 

yet no time goes to adequately train advisors. The other condition of 

time is length of service “in the box” by the respective services. These 

vary from 4 to 6 months to a year. Nothing effective can be achieved 

in 4 to 6 months. Advising/mentoring tours need to be at least 18 

months, and an effective handoff to the incoming advisor is necessary. Finding and interviewing Vietnam-era advisors would greatly 

benefit this study. Examine conventional SOF cooperation to include 

the impact on both U.S. SOF and NATO/partner SOF. As conventional forces drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan the general assumption is that the SOF role will increase. What impact will this increased 

requirement have on U.S. SOF? If NATO SOF support dwindles or 

ceases, what impact will that have on the future U.S. SOF requirement in Afghanistan? What should their focus be? What impact will 

this long-term requirement have on U.S. SOF (individual, collective, 

global)? 
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I57. Conventional/SOF cooperation 

Conventional forces and SOF have coordinated and cooperated to an 

unprecedented degree in Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, SOF 

have developed a reliance on conventional forces for certain battlefield operating systems (e.g., maintenance, logistics, and quick reaction forces). Discuss the impact of the potential drawdown of GPF 

in theater on this reliance on SOF units in the CENTCOM area of 

responsibility.

I58. Embassy role in U.S. Government irregular warfare effort 

This topic would explore initiatives for restructuring the DoS—Do 

they go far enough to address the requirements for the long war/persistent conflict of the 21st century? Should more of a regional hierarchy exist to DoS than independent embassies that can report directly 

to the President of the U.S.? How can/should SOF better work with 

embassies in pursuit of U.S. interests in the long war? How can interagency-SOF synergy at the embassy level better achieve U.S. interests?

I59. Legislative requirements for effective interagency campaigns 

This topic would review current and pending legislation required to 

establish organizations and authorities to effectively conduct irregular warfare and large-scale FID for combating terrorism. It could also 

suggest who should write this interagency campaign.

I60. Country team approach 

In an era of irregular warfare, SOF may find itself deployed in a 

number of countries and supporting the ambassador’s country team. 

Does SOF need specific representation on the country team or is the 

normal representation sufficient? In either case, how would this work? 

What interaction is appropriate or required? Who is in charge of 

what? How are disputes resolved? How can this support be revived, 

updated, or replaced to ensure that U.S. players in a given country are 

working for common causes?

I61. Cultural awareness 

Understanding of culture will assist in finding an enemy’s weakness, 

especially in irregular warfare where the enemy will resort to any 

action to achieve objectives. The need is to understand what is acceptable to that enemy, what is not, what his cultural constraints are, and 

what does not constraint his actions. This information will permit 

development of successful courses of action. Population’s trust/will is 

culturally based, and the effective understanding of it is critical to a 

successful outcome. Three areas of potential study follow: a) regional 
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specific information for a culture and population, b) generic information on awareness, and c) tools to rapidly get specific information on a 

culture to operators. 

I62. Are culture, religion, and worldview factors in motivating irregular warfare? 

Cultural education must include orientation on comparative analysis of religions of the world. Americans have a secular culture; some 

estimates put 80 percent of the rest of the world as more faith based. 

Many of the conflicts throughout world history have been motivated 

by religion. Warrior culture is the way in which violence is valued 

and managed by the collectivity, and it varies from culture to culture. 

Research how each group handles violence and threats against the 

collectivity; three example questions follow:

a. Is fighting a recognized road to high status? 

b. Are fighters separated from the group in some formal way—as we 

do with our military—or are they integrated and interspersed?

c. Are there forms of warfare/fighting seen as higher status than 

others? 

I63. Cultural knowledge in irregular warfare campaign planning 

This lack of cultural understanding also has led to confusion. Because 

some cultures do not like to be confrontational, their acknowledgement is believed to be agreement. The fact, however, is they are only 

agreeing that they understand a position or proposal vs. accept it. The 

lack of cultural understanding is a handicap in achieved outcomes by 

set time schedules. Examine the need to understand the actors in the 

environments that the campaign will be conducted. How can this lead 

to some understanding of the motivations of these actors? How can 

this better prepare planners to tailor the campaign plan toward influencing those actors in accordance with the commander’s intent? 

I64. Regional studies 

Review regional studies to better meet the needs of the combatant 

commanders. Courses that look at the regions from a strategic and 

operational perspective are desired, illustrating the linkage between 

the countries within a given commander’s area of responsibility 

as well as the adjacent countries. Many of the countries currently 

engaged in the conflict were drawn in Europe and do not reflect 

what is occurring in either the country or the region. Ethnic groups 

straddle those borders and are unrecognized by the people, and the 

numbers of languages further complicate the region. This writing 
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is an opportunity to leverage the revamped discipline of geography, 

which is now more than maps and physical terrain. Geography is now 

a multidisciplinary study area involving traditional geography as well 

as aspects of sociology, geology, political science, and economics (and 

some cultural anthropology may also exist).

I65. How is strategy developed for special operations and what is the 

framework for such development? 

This question should consider the operational role of SOF in each 

of the phases (0-V) and assess the effectiveness of their employment 

in those phases. Afghanistan and Iraq could serve as case studies. 

The unconventional warfare operations in Afghanistan are excellent 

examples of pre-phase III operations. They lead into two questions: 

a. How does the U.S. Government as well as DoD consider SOF use 

in all campaign phases?

b. What are effective employment techniques in terms of strategy and operational art for SOF/interagency synchronization to 

include measures of effectiveness?

I66. Why is Phase 0 important and how can SOF support the geographic combatant commander strategy: Informing the joint conventional community 

Phase 0 can be described in terms of anti-insurgency, in the same 

manner that the Army delineates between antiterrorism and counterterrorism. Phase 0 is rapidly becoming an outdated term.

I67. Develop SOF internships with Fortune 500 companies in order to 

develop irregular warfare skill sets (marketing; influence, investigations, strategic communications) 

This topic would study the value of creating internships for SOF in 

successful companies or organizations to develop a knowledge base of 

nonmilitary functions (e.g., power-economic and diplomatic). Strategic communication could be explored from a marketing point of view. 

Strategic thinking at the multinational should also be considered. 

Computer operation and electronic transfer of funds could be examined because are often the terrorist’s means of moving illegal money 

around the world. Also respond to the question, what academic credit 

should be granted from the internship (M.A. or Ph.D.)?

I68. Impact of crossing borders to conduct military operations 

Assess the actual impact of arresting religious leaders and/or entering into mosques/madrassas as a tactic against Islamic extremists. 

The thesis posed via this topic is that when we are oversensitive and 
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overstate Middle East sensitivities, we hamstring our efforts. Costs 

and benefits are associated with this type of approach. Can the real 

protagonists of terror be stopped using this method? Consider U.S. 

public opinion, reprisals against the U.S., reaction of coalition partners, and other factors.

I69. Roles of SOF and NGOs in complex humanitarian emergencies 

SOF has played an increasingly critical role in the international 

response to complex humanitarian emergencies. The liaison between 

these two elements requires that SOF understand the diversity of 

nongovernmental organization (NGO) objectives and organizational 

cultures. This topic could take an approach of the division of labor 

involved or education of SOF (e.g., on NGO capabilities, limitations). 

Hive advantages and disadvantages of “collaborating” with NGOs. 

Include a discussion of the International Committee of the Red Cross 

(ICRC) and other international organizations. The relationships 

between SOF and other U.S. contractors could also be explored.

I70. Oral histories of SOF leaders for publication/professional 

development 

Provide a collection of personal SOF accounts throughout recent history. While this perspective has been done (e.g., in support of briefings and courses), a research-paper-length compendium will yield not 

only lessons learned but aspects of strategy, revolutionary thinking, 

and command-and-control issues for future planners and commanders from interviews with senior SOF leaders. The finished product will 

benefit SOF leaders as a handbook on relationships with interagency 

community and coalition partners and furnish a range of considerations for SOF noncommissioned officers and officers. Some travel 

may be involved, or the collection could be gleaned from individuals 

living near the respective PME schools; this topic is ideal for a U.S. 

Army Command and General Staff College (USACHSC) or School 

of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) student because of access to a 

wide range of distinguished SOF senior leaders supporting the SOF 

elective at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

I71. SOF senior leader competencies for joint warfare: Preparing for 

joint SOF combat command 

Explore organizing Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs) 

at the O6 level of command and the associated leader competencies required, based on actual experiences of recent commanders of 

combined JSOTFs. Offer solutions of successful wartime leadership 
93

I. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues

techniques for ongoing and near-future senior SOF leaders, anticipating wartime commands during counterterrorism efforts. Derive key 

lessons learned from the research for possible incorporation into current leader development methodologies.

I72. Cross area-of-responsibility operations 

At the operational level, command and control as well as support 

relationships need to be well-defined early on in the operation. Examine the supported/supporting relationships between USSOCOM and 

conventional forces belonging to the regional combatant commander 

and/or Joint Task Force commander. This topic could be discussed in 

the context of tactical operations, then at the operational level. 

I73. U.S. national security initiatives in Africa and the counterterrorism effort 

Address the question of creating an African unified command or 

a U.S. subunified command within Africa in order to protect U.S. 

national interests. Analyze a proposal to establish a political-military 

organization, such as an African regional Joint Task Force/Special 

Operations Command within Africa, to promote democratic initiatives and influence regional stability. Discuss roles and capabilities for 

Civil Affairs/Civil-Military Operations (CA/CMO) and interagency 

partners, framing operational preparation of environment throughout 

Africa, FID opportunities in the region, and the rising U.S. national 

interests in Africa.

I74. Effective MISO in a mostly illiterate population 

Determine the effectiveness of a full Military Information Support 

Operations (MISO) campaign in an area where most of the intended 

audience is illiterate. Using a detailed analysis, develop possible operations—taking in account the literacy and technology of targeted audiences—for future MISOs in these environments. How do we reach 

and educate such audiences?