Opinion issued November 21, 2017

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-16-00505-CR

———————————

DONALD D. BECKETT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 263rd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1462320

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted appellant, Donald Beckett, of murder and the trial court 

assessed his punishment at 50 years’ confinement. In three related issues, appellant 
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contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his 

conviction. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On March 3, 2015, the complainant, Isaac Tandoh, was waiting to get his hair 

cut at the Chop Shop barbershop when a fight broke out in the parking lot. Tandoh’s 

barber, Shannon Miller, went outside to break up the situation. Miller, a member of 

the Black Disciples gang, knew both of the men involved in the altercation. Leon 

Dupre Whiting, who was holding a gun, was a long-time friend of Miller, and Hasan 

Matthews was a fellow Black Disciples gang member. Miller stood in front of 

Matthews in an effort to diffuse the situation.

As a result of Miller’s intervention, Whiting began apologizing and Matthews 

left the scene. Miller then returned to the barbershop and resumed cutting Tandoh’s 

hair. Whiting continued walking around the barbershop and apologizing to Miller.

While Miller was cutting Tahdoh’s hair, a man entered the barbershop and began 

shooting and then left the premises when his weapon would not fire anymore. As a 

result of the shooting, Miller was shot in the ankle, Whiting was shot in the abdomen, 

and Tandoh lay dead on the floor.

When first questioned by police, Miller denied knowing the shooter. Several 

days later, however, he gave a photograph of appellant to police and identified 
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appellant, a man he knew from his gang as “Hitman,” as the shooter. He later 

identified appellant from a photograph line-up also. Appellant was soon arrested.

During the investigation, the police learned that appellant’s wife, Tanesha 

O’Neal, owned a red Suburban. Photographs of the crime scene showed a red 

Suburban that matched the vehicle owned by appellant’s wife. Miller also testified 

that appellant was known to drive a red Suburban.

Police also linked appellant to the crime scene by showing that the phone that 

he used on the night of the murder was accessing a cell tower that serviced the scene 

of the crime. The same cell phone tower would not have been used to service calls 

from appellant’s phone if he had been at his sister’s apartment, as he claimed in his 

alibi.1 Records of the cell phone appellant used also showed that he received a call 

from Matthews, the fellow Black Disciples gang member involved in the parking lot 

altercation, at around 7:00 p.m., before the murder, and that appellant made a call to 

Matthews at about 7:40 p.m., after the murder. Phone records also showed that he 

and his wife spoke on the phone, even though they testified that they were together 

at his sister’s birthday party the entire time.

 

1 Appellant testified that he was not at the barbershop that night, but was at a birthday 

party for his sister at her apartment. His wife, sister, and her husband supported his 

alibi. Although he told police, when questioned, that he drove the red Suburban to 

the birthday party, at trial he testified that he rode with his mother.
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At trial, Miller, the barber, testified that he decided to tell the police about 

appellant’s involvement in the shooting because he and Tandoh, an innocent 

bystander, had been shot. He admitted that had Whiting been the only victim, he 

probably would not have said anything to police. He explained that Whiting had 

disrespected the Black Disciples by confronting Matthews in the parking lot with a 

gun. Essentially, the State’s theory of the case was that someone in the Black 

Disciples—likely Matthews—had called the gang’s “Hitman” to take retribution on 

Whiting for disrespecting Matthews, and that, in exacting that retribution, appellant 

shot not only Whiting, but also Miller and Tandoh.

At trial, the State also presented recordings of jailhouse telephone calls that 

appellant made. During one call, someone told appellant that “this wouldn’t have 

happened if people wouldn’t have called you up there.” The caller further stated, 

“[T]hey just told Hitman to do this and he threw away his life.” Appellant stopped 

the caller from further comments with an admonition that the calls were being 

recorded. In another phone call from the jail, appellant apologized to another of the 

barbers, although he claimed that the apology was related to money that he owed the 

barber, not the shooting.
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SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

identify him as the perpetrator, arguing that “there was at best a mere modicum of 

evidence to support a conclusion that Appellant was the shooter.”

Standard of Review

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal 

conviction, a court of appeals determines whether, after viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict, the trier of fact was rationally justified in finding 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 

895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We measure the evidence “by the elements of the 

offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v. 

State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). As the exclusive judge of the 

facts, the jury may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony. 

Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We presume that 

the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we 

defer to that resolution. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793. On appeal, 

we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the record evidence and thereby 

substitute our own judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 

742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We review factual-sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
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challenges under the same appellate standard of review as that for legal sufficiency 

challenges. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912–13, 917–18, 922–24, 926–28.

Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Review

The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the 

person who committed the charged offense. Johnson v. State, 673 S.W.2d 190, 196 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 

154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Identity may be proved by direct or circumstantial 

evidence. Earls v. State, 707 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). 

Here, the State presented both direct and circumstantial evidence of 

appellant’s guilt. First, Miller identified appellant, a man he knew, as the shooter. 

He also identified appellant from a photographic line-up. Miller’s identification is 

sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for murder. Aguilar v. State, 468 S.W.2d 

75, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (holding testimony of one eyewitness is sufficient to 

support a jury’s verdict); Walker v. State, 180 S.W.3d 829, 832–33 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (holding same).

However, there was also circumstantial evidence of appellant’s identity as the 

shooter. Appellant was known to drive a red Suburban; his wife owned a red 

Suburban. A red Suburban matching that owned by O’Neal was photographed in the 

parking lot the night of the murder.
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Appellant claimed to be at his sister’s apartment for a birthday party the night 

of the murder. Phone records showed that if he were at his sister’s apartment, as he 

claimed, the cell phone tower that serviced the calls he received and made that night 

would not have been involved. Also, cell phone records showed that, just before the 

murder, appellant received a phone call from the fellow gang member, Matthews, 

who had been involved in the earlier parking lot altercation. Shortly after the 

murder, appellant made a phone call to Matthews. And, in the jailhouse conversation 

appellant had indicated that the caller believed that “[the shooting] wouldn’t have 

happened if people wouldn’t have called you up there.”

From this direct evidence—Miller’s identification—and circumstantial 

evidence regarding the cell phone records, red Suburban, and jailhouse phone calls,

the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was the 

person who shot Tandoh. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789. 

Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s first issue.

Factual Sufficiency

In issues two and three, appellant contends that:

This Court has the authority under the Texas Constitution to conduct a 

factual sufficiency review by weighing the evidence in a neutral light, 

and Appellant has a Constitutional right to such review[; and]

[t]he state appellate courts deny meaningful review in criminal appeals 

by misapplication of Jackson v. Virginia to factual sufficiency review.
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Because both issues request that we conduct a factual sufficiency review, we 

address them together.

Appellant acknowledges Brooks v. State, in which the Court of Criminal 

Appeals discontinued factual sufficiency review, holding that the standard of review 

established in Jackson v. Virginia applied to all sufficiency challenges. See Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 318–19, 99 S. Ct. at 2788–89; Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2014); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) 

(plurality opinion). Appellant argues that Brooks was wrongly decided, citing a 

provision of the Texas Constitution stating that the decisions of the courts of appeals 

are “conclusive” on all questions of fact. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6(a). He argues

applying the Jackson standard to his factual sufficiency challenge denies him the 

due process guaranteed to him by the federal constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. 

XIV, § 1.

This Court considered and rejected appellant’s arguments in Kiffe v. State, in 

361 S.W.3d 104, 109–10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); see also 

Cozart v. State, Nos. 01-15-01007-CR and 01-15-01008-CR, 2017 WL 3910696 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 7, 2017, no pet) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication), Tan v. State, No. 01-15-00511-CR, 2016 WL 3542255, at *3, (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 28, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication). In Kiffe, this Court explained that, while the intermediate appellate 
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courts have final jurisdiction over all questions of fact, the applicable standard of 

review is a question of law that is determined by Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 

precedent. Id. Therefore, we apply the Jackson standard to factual insufficiency 

claims. See Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 730 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Brooks, 

323 S.W.3d at 912; Kiffe, 361 S.W.3d at 109–10.

Having determined that there is sufficient evidence under the Jackson

standard of review, and declining to conduct a separate factual sufficiency review, 

we overrule issues two and three.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Sherry Radack

Chief Justice 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Bland.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).