Marine Corps History

Issues of Marine Corps History can be found on the History Division 

website at https://www.history.usmc.mil under Publications.

Covers Marine Corps History Vol. 1 No. 2 Winter 2016.indd 1 
e History Division is moving!

History Division will be moving to the Simmons Marine Corps History Center, part of the Marine Corps University. e new state-of-the-art wing will bring together all of the Marine Corps University schools into one 

unit. e structure will oer many new features and amenities for the student body, faculty, and sta at Marine 

Corps Base Quantico. 

e Greene Papers:

General Wallace M. Greene Jr.

and the Escalation of the Vietnam War,

January 1964–March 1965

Nicholas J. Schlosser, 2015. Cloth. 418 pp.

The Greene Papers: General Wallace M. Greene Jr. and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, January 1964–March 1965 contains 

more than 100 documents from the personal papers of the 23d 

Commandant of the Marine Corps and is the rst edited volume 

of personal papers to be published by the Marine Corps History 

Division as a monograph. Produced by a member of the Joint 

Chiefs of Sta, General Greene’s notes provide a rsthand account from one of the main participants in the decision-making 

process that led to the commitment of a large-scale American 

expeditionary force in Southeast Asia.

is volume begins in January 1964 and ends just before 

the landing of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Da 

Nang on 8 March 1965, a pivotal moment that marked the 

ocial transition from the United States’ advisory mission to a more active combat mission. In doing so, it traces 

Greene’s growing frustration with Secretary of Defense 

Robert S. McNamara’s and President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 

equivocation and uncertainty about Southeast Asia. Along with a 

series of commemorative pamphlets, this book is part of the Marine 

Corps History Division’s eort to mark the ieth anniversary of the 

Vietnam War.

Covers Marine Corps History Vol. 1 No. 2 Winter 2016.indd 2 
PRESIDENT

of Marine Corps University

Brigadier General H. G. Pratt

...

DIRECTOR

of History Division

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Paul J. Weber

CHIEF HISTORIAN 

Vacant

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

Cassandra Bennett

...

HISTORIES BRANCH

Vacant (Branch Head); J. Michael Miller; 

Douglas Nash; Paul W. Westermeyer; 

Dr. Brianne Robertson 

...

HISTORICAL INQUIRIES AND

RESEARCH BRANCH

Annette D. Amerman (Branch Head); 

Beth L. Crumley; Kara R. Newcomer; 

Shelia Phillips

...

ORAL HISTORY

and VIDEO SECTION

Dr. Fred Allison and Dr. Tom Baughn

...

EDITING AND DESIGN BRANCH

Angela J. Anderson (Branch Head); Jennifer Clampet; Nora Ellis; W. Stephen 

Hill; Dr. Alexandra Kendall; Robert A. 

Kocher; Gregory A. Macheak; Vincent 

J. Martinez; Christianna Sanders; Shawn 

H. Vreeland

...

MARINE CORPS

HISTORY DIVISION

3078 Upshur Avenue

Quantico, Virginia 22134

Telephone (703) 432-4877

http://www.history.usmc.mil

history.division@usmc.mil

...

COMMANDANT OF THE

MARINE CORPS

Department of the Navy

Headquarters United States

Marine Corps

3000 Marine Corps Pentagon 

Room 2B253

Washington, DC 20530-3000

OFFICIAL BUSINESS 

PCN 10600011300

ISSN 2381-375X

Director’s Foreword

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

e Tiger of Seibo: 

Charles F. Merkel, George C. orpe,

and the Dark Side of Marine Corps History

Mark R. Folse

e U.S. Marines in World War I

Part I: e U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

Comes to the Fore

Colonel Walter G. Ford, USMC (Ret)

Development of Medical Doctrine 

for Amphibious Warfare by the U.S. Navy and 

Marine Corps, 1929–39

Part I

Captain Steven L. Oreck, USN (Ret)

e Importance of Professionalism:

An Analysis of the 1st Marine Division Planning

Process for the Amphibious Assault on Inchon

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Bonura, USA; 

Major Michael Padilla, USAF; 

Major Kwan Seop Lee, Republic of Korea Army

National Museum of the Marine Corps:

Moving Forward to Tell the Story of Today’s Warrior

Book Reviews

Shooting the Pacic War:

 Marine Corps Combat Photography in WWII

Reviewed by Charles Grow

War’s Nomads: A Mobile Radar Unit in Pursuit

 of Rommel during the Western Desert Campaign, 1942–3

Reviewed by Douglas E. Nash

Marine Corps Tank Battles in the Middle East

Reviewed by Paul Westermeyer

Hirohito’s War: e Pacic War, 1941–1945

Reviewed by Grant W. Jones

D-Day in the Pacic: e Battle of Saipan

Reviewed by Mark R. Folse

A Call to Arms: Mobilizing America for World War II

Reviewed by Bradford A. Wineman

WWII: A Chronicle of Soldiering

Reviewed by Chris Blaker

3

4

19

43

58

70

71

74

76

78

80

83

85

 Volume 1, Number 2 Winter 2016

Cover Art:

Cpl John Henry Pruitt, USMC

Medal of Honor, Blanc Mont Ridge 

Acrylic on canvas.

Gift of the Artist, Col Charles H. Waterhouse, 

USMCR (Ret).

The History Division will 

be moving into the new 

Brigadier General Edwin 

Simmons Historical Center this spring. e rst two oors 

of the center will be dedicated to 

historical archives, personal papers, 

and oral/video history. By doing so, 

we hope to create a “one stop shop” 

for all historical research related to 

the Marine Corps. e rest of the 

division, to include the Historical 

Inquiries and Research Branch, will be located on 

the third oor of the center. 

is particular edition of Marine Corps History is 

again full of interesting material on the history of our 

Corps. In keeping with our “telling it like it is” policy, we have included an intriguing article by former 

History Division intern and PhD candidate Mark 

Folse on the controversial campaign conducted by 

the Marine Corps in Santo Domingo, 1917–18. Colonel Walt Ford, retired editor of Leatherneck magazine, contributed a pathbreaking piece on the U.S. 

Marine Corps Reserve during the First World War. 

Dr. Steven Oreck wrote a very interesting article on 

doctrine developed for U.S. Navy medical activities 

during the interwar years, 1920–39. Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Bonura, USA, wrote a very 

timely essay on the planning process of the 1st Marine Division on the eve of their historic 15 September 1950 amphibious assault at Inchon, South Korea. 

is essay is especially germane due to the renewed 

attention given amphibious warfare doctrine and the 

Asia-Pacic region. As usual, the magazine contains 

a number of book reviews on the latest scholarship 

in military history. 

e Marine Corps History Division is looking 

forward to the publication of the second volume of 

Marine Corps History. As director, I am proud of 

what we have been able to accomplish this past year 

and hope to build upon our record of excellence into 

the future. s1775s

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

Director, History Division

Marine Corps University

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer: the director is responsible for the collection, production, publication, 

and dissemination of Marine Corps history and 

manages the functioning of a wide variety of Marine Corps historical programs. 

FOREWORD

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps

Belleau Wood by SSgt Kristopher J. Battles, USMCR. Oil 

on canvas, 2013.

DIRECTOR’S

3
e Tiger of Seibo: 

Mark R. Folse 

History Department

University of Alabama

I

n the summer of 1918, the U.S. Marine Corps 

waged war on insurgents in the eastern provinces of the Dominican Republic. On 24 

August, the 52d Company, 1st Battalion, 3d 

Marine Regiment, entered Hayto Mayor, Dominican 

Republic, rounded up the residents, and questioned 

them about bandit activity. Frightened and confused, 

the residents stood nervously as Captain Charles 

F. Merkel shouted and red his pistol in the air to 

intimidate them. en, Merkel approached a man 

standing outside of his home. Aer a brief conversation, Merkel drew his pistol and shot the man in the 

head while the crowd watched.1

 Captain Merkel became known as the “Tiger of Seibo,” named aer the 

eastern province of Seibo, which he terrorized.2

 His 

alleged atrocities of murder and torture are some of 

the least understood blots on Marine Corps history. 

Merkel’s story appears in vignette form in the 

works of many Marine Corps and Latin American 

historians but none delve into Captain Merkel’s past, 

his motivations, his career as an ocer, or his impact 

on the United States’ intervention in the Dominican 

CHARLES F. MERKEL, GEORGE C. THORPE, AND THE 

DARK SIDE OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY

Republic.3 Marine historians oen interpret Merkel 

as a rogue and not a reection of general Marine 

misconduct during the occupation. Latin American 

historians typically use Merkel as an extreme example of the Marine brutality that triggered the 1918 

insurgency in the Dominican Republic. Although 

fair, these interpretations of Merkel’s actions are incomplete and fail to consider the complicity of other 

Marine Corps ocers in the crimes. is article argues that Merkel’s alleged crimes are important and 

were potentially disastrous for the Marine Corps’ 

reputation at the time.

e following pages explore Merkel’s possible motivations and the command climate that contributed 

to his actions. Arguably, his behavior in the Dominican Republic was part of a larger problem aecting 

Marines, such as misunderstanding the nature and 

motivations of insurgents, eliciting violence toward 

indigenous people, losing experienced Marines to 

the war in Europe, and dealing with a preponderance of ocers who wanted to ght in World War I 

not on the island of Hispaniola. 

While Merkel allegedly committed or ordered 

atrocious acts against the Dominican people, the 

circumstances in which the infractions occurred 

1 Luis Bautista, Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo (statement, Hearings Before the Select Committee on 

Haiti and Santo Domingo: Pursuant to S. Res. 112, vol. 1, 67th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 14 December 1921), 1132. 2 Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in the Caribbean, 1898–1934 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 

146. 

3 Robert D. Heinl Jr. and Clyde H. Metcalf focus on Merkel’s combat record, not his criminal acts, and use Merkel’s experience in-country as an 

example of how hard Marines fought against Dominican insurgents. See Robert Debs Heinl Jr., Soldiers of the Sea: United States Marine Corps, 

1775–1962 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1962), 248; Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1939), 359; Lester Langley uses Merkel as an example of an officer who “grew increasingly resentful of occupation duty” as a result 

of being left out of the Great War. See Langley, Banana Wars, 147. Allan R. Millett and other historians blame Merkel for inflaming the insurgency 

and sending peaceful Dominicans into the bandit ranks; Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: 

Macmillan Publishing, 1980), 200; Bruce J. Calder, The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the U.S. Occupation of 1916–1924

(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 131; and Alan McPherson, The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended U.S. 

Occupations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 93, 97. Stephen M. Fuller and Graham A. Cosmas cite Merkel’s misconduct as a result 

of “life in isolated outposts, where they [Marines] often exercised wide authority under minimal supervision from superiors, offered temptations 

of corruption and misuse of power to which a few Marines fell victim.” See Stephen M. Fuller and Graham A. Cosmas, Marines in the Dominican 

Republic, 1916–1924 (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1974). Ivan Musicant argues that Merkel’s actions 

constituted “one of the most serious atrocities committed” by a Marine against the Dominican people. See Ivan Musicant, The Banana Wars: A 

History of United States Military Intervention in Latin America from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama (New York: Macmillan, 

1990), 281.

4
Winter 2016 5

4 Charles F. Merkel letter to Russell W. Duck, 2 October 1918, Charles Merkel personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis, MO.

5 Steeve Coupeau, The History of Haiti (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008), 68. 6 Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic: A National History (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1998), 314–15; and Ian Bell, The Dominican Republic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 62–64. 7 Butler letter to his parents, 6 October 1917, Smedley D. Butler Papers, Marine Corps History Division Archives Branch, Gray Research Center 

(GRC), Quantico, VA, hereafter Butler letter to his parents. 

8 Ibid. 

9 Ibid. Emphasis in original.

also implicate other ocers. Most notably, Lieutenant Colonel George C. orpe, Merkel’s immediate 

superior and battalion commander, who was also 

responsible for several Marine ocers accused of 

committing atrocities. orpe played a signicant 

part in allowing Merkel’s misconduct and deserves 

to share in the blame for the violent 1918 Dominican insurgency. Merkel believed he was following 

orpe’s orders, which involved killing “a whole 

lot of people.”4

 orpe denied any culpability and 

allowed Merkel to be tried for the crimes of murder and torture. However, letters orpe penned to 

his superior ocer strongly connect orpe to the 

atrocities. Ultimately, Merkel and his alleged crimes 

would have been a public relations disaster for the 

Marine Corps were it not for his suicide. His death 

precluded a court-martial, keeping the story out of 

U.S. newspapers. 

An oen overlooked element, however, is the impact of the Great War on the attitudes and behaviors 

of Marines serving in both Haiti and the Dominican 

Republic. Marines landed on Haitian shores in 1915 

to quell a civil war, which began with the assassination of the Haitian president and a takeover of the 

government by armed rebels.5

 President Woodrow 

Wilson deemed the actions a threat to American 

lives and interests on Hispaniola and ordered Rear 

Admiral William B. Caperton on the USS Washington (ACR 11) to land Marines near Port-au-Prince, 

Haiti. A Marine brigade landed in Santo Domingo, 

Dominican Republic, in 1916 when the Americanbacked Juan Isidro Jimenes lost control of the government. Rival political factions rebelled against 

Jimenes because of his pro-American policies.6

 In 

both countries, Marines fought insurgents, formed 

constabularies, and established as much military and 

political control over the fractious region as possible. 

More than a year before the United States entered 

World War I, the Marines entered a smaller war in 

Hispaniola, a war historians characterize as a counterinsurgency.

Once the U.S. Congress declared war on Germany 

in April 1917, the situation in Hispaniola changed 

because many Marines wanted to ght the Great 

War but not all could. President Wilson and Congress authorized the Marine Corps to expand to an 

unprecedented size, to send men to France, and to 

maintain expeditions in Hispaniola and elsewhere. 

us many Marines remained stationed in Hispaniola, and newly assembled units oen headed to the 

Caribbean instead of across the Atlantic.

Marine eld grade ocers, including Smedley D. 

Butler, focused on the war in Europe and awaited 

orders to France. Butler was an experienced ocer 

who had served in the Spanish-American War, the 

Philippines, China, and Mexico. Butler believed that 

his service in Haiti as the commander of Marine and 

Haitian gendarmerie forces was noble and important 

until the United States entered the Great War. “is 

work here would be more interesting and worthwhile,” he wrote his parents in October 1917, “but 

under the circumstances it is unbearable . . . is 

thing of being le out of the show is really more than 

I can stand, and I tell you both very truthfully that I 

shall never show my face in West Chester again if I 

am not allowed to go to France.”7

In letters to family, Butler implied profound depression regarding his role in the war and questioned his long service with the Marine Corps. “Had 

I remained in civil life,” he lamented, “I could have 

gone to France at least as a lieutenant, and saved my 

face, while now . . . I must sit here under a foreign 

ag, while my country goes to war.”8

 He claimed to 

be willing to do anything to go to France, including reduction in rank: “It isn’t as if I asked to be sent 

as a general or even a colonel or even a lieutenant 

colonel. I would welcome any position from private 

on down.”9

 Even the thought of his extended family 

serving in France caused mental anguish: 

Bunny has 14 near male relations in the [U.S.] 

Army, from privates up to lieutenants and all 

my able bodied kinfolk have gone—all males on 
6 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

both sides but me the one professional soldier 

. . . they can readily see why I could never associate with anyone aer the war. Some day my 

grandchildren will be subjected to the remark 

“where was your grandfather during the big 

war?” And they will have to lurch their heads in 

shame and either lie or say “he was a policeman 

in the service of a foreign and black Republic.”10

Due partly to his father’s political connections, 

Butler nally shipped out to France in 1918, but 

many ocers who also requested transfers to France 

stayed put in Hispaniola.11

Marine ocers in the Dominican Republic expressed similar sentiments as Butler. Lieutenant 

Colonel orpe wanted to go to France and believed 

he had a chance if he could prove himself competent: 

“If I do a good job of clearing these two provinces 

of insurgents,” he reasoned, “maybe I go to a more 

active eld of endeavor too . . . I’d be a good German killer.”12 Unable to ght the Germans in France, 

many Marines made do with ghting Germans on 

the island instead. 

Once the United States entered the Great War, 

Marines equated the ghting in Hispaniola with the 

war against Germany. Since the turn of the century, 

Americans considered Germany to be an economic 

and strategic rival in the Caribbean.13 For the rst 

two decades of the twentieth century, German of-

cials and businessmen traveled throughout the 

Caribbean to conduct commercial ventures.14 By the 

time the Marines arrived, hundreds of Germans had 

established themselves in the social and economic milieus of Haiti and the Dominican Republic.15

American policy makers believed that Germans intended to establish a colony at the doorstep of the 

United States—a blatant violation of the Monroe 

Doctrine and threat to the security of the Panama 

Canal.16 erefore, when Marines landed in Haiti in 

1915 and the Dominican Republic in 1916, their attitudes toward resident Germans hardened aer the 

United States entered the war. Marines in Haiti for example took a secret census of all Germans in-country 

and later conscated the property of and imprisoned 

those suspected of subversive activities.17

e driving force behind Marine hostility toward 

Germans was the belief that they were directing insurgent activity—thus connecting the small war in 

Hispaniola to the bigger war in France. In the Dominican Republic, Lieutenant Colonel orpe claimed 

that a recent spike in insurgent activity “shows the 

handiwork of the German as certain as can be, there 

is no doubt in my mind that a German is commanding the enemy’s campaign.”18 Another Marine ocer 

in Santo Domingo claimed that “the pro-German element is at work stirring up the minds of the people 

. . . I believe that if the Germans had some big win in 

Europe we would have here a general insurrection.”19

According to contemporary reports, insurgent activity increased in the spring and summer of 1918. e 

cause for the spike was controversial, but Marines 

believed the Germans masterminded it.20 Joseph 

Henry Pendleton wrote that Marines in the summer of 1918 “were campaigning against Germany, 

German inuence, German money, and Germaninspired revolt.”21

ese beliefs led to a blatant misunderstanding 

10 Ibid. 

11 Hans Schmidt, Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History (Lexington: University Press of 

Kentucky, 1987), 1.

12 George C. Thorpe letter to Joseph Pendleton, 21 August 1918, Joseph Pendleton Papers, Marine Corps History Division Archives Branch, GRC, 

Quantico, VA. 

13 Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 22; and Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 

University Press, 1971), 34–35.

14 Mary A. Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915–1940 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 

Press, 2001), 51; Schmidt, United States Occupation of Haiti, 91; and Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 68–69. 15 Schmidt places the number of Germans in Haiti around the time of intervention at 210. See Schmidt, United States Occupation of Haiti, 91. 16 American foreign policy from 1823 focused on three ideas: separate spheres of influence for the Americas and Europe, no further colonization 

in the Americas, and no intervention in Western matters.

17 Schmidt, United States Occupation of Haiti, 95; and “Reports Relating to Operations in Haiti and Santo Domingo, 1915–21,” Records of U.S. 

Marines in Haiti, RG 127, box 2, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC. 18 Col George C. Thorpe to Joseph Pendleton from San Pedro de Macorís, Dominican Republic, 18 August 1918, Pendleton Papers, Marine 

Corps History Division Archives Branch, GRC, Quantico, VA.

19 L. Nogart to Joseph Pendleton, 16 April 1918, Pendleton Papers, Marine Corps History Division Archives Branch, GRC, Quantico, VA. 20 Col George C. Thorpe to Joseph Pendleton, 18 August, 1918.

21 BGen Joseph Pendleton to the secretary of the U.S. Navy, 24 July 1919, Pendleton Papers, Marine Corps History Division Archives Branch, 

GRC, Quantico, VA. 
Winter 2016 7

of the situations in both countries. Historian Hans 

Schmidt argues that in Haiti, “All the investigations 

of rumors, surveillance of German rms, censoring 

of letters, and other counterespionage work failed 

to turn up much concrete evidence of German intrigue.”22 Much of the resistance Marines experienced in Haiti stemmed from the notorious corvee 

work system—employed Haitians who could not 

pay the road tax provided labor instead. e system 

had been used before in Haiti, and Marines assumed 

that it would work. However, many Haitians saw the 

work system as slave labor and resisted.23

Bruce J. Calder argues that the Dominican Republic’s spike in insurgent activity in 1918 stemmed 

from a misunderstanding of, or disrespect for, local 

politics in the eastern provinces. Caudillos—local 

men who had charisma, military skills, economic 

resources, and important family ties—controlled 

much of eastern Dominican Republic and had for 

generations. e caudillo system was embedded 

deeply into Dominican political culture, but Marines “either failed to understand it or completely 

misjudged the strength of the caudillo system,” argues Calder.24 World War I also seriously hindered 

the country’s export trade, which negatively aected 

many Dominicans’ economic prospects.25 So what 

the Marines, especially orpe, saw as a Germaninspired revolt, led by bandit leaders, was actually 

a grassroots resistance with Dominicans ghting 

against foreign intrusion and economic exploitation 

and being led by trusted local political and military leaders. orpe’s and Merkel’s actions occurred 

within this broader context. 

Marines framed the wars in Hispaniola within the 

context of the larger war against Germany, in part, 

to demonstrate the need for experienced units to remain in-country. Once the war began, the Marine 

Corps pulled most its experienced companies out of 

Hispaniola, which irritated brigade commanders. In 

April 1917, a brigade commander in Haiti reported 

“the reduction of the number of Marines in Haiti by 

two companies is, in my opinion, a serious mistake 

. . . It is necessary in my mind that we increase our 

inuence in this island and not weaken it . . . to withdraw troops just at this time . . . cannot but have a 

very unfortunate eect.”26 For the Marines, undermanned brigades equated to longer and more dangerous patrols, shortages in manpower for security 

posts, and sagging morale.27

erefore, when Captain Merkel arrived in the 

Dominican Republic in the spring of 1918, he encountered a command climate that misunderstood 

insurgent motivations and suered from an overwhelming desire to play a bigger part in the Great 

War. In the Dominican Republic, a revival of bandit 

activity in 1918 challenged the 2d Marine Brigade, 

which had been stripped of much needed manpower, materiel, and leadership.28 “To face this situation 

what do we have?” wrote one Marine ocer. “Men 

of experience . . . have gone, other men . . . are on the 

limit of their two-year period and probably on the 

eve of their departure.”29 Establishing and maintaining control over the countryside became more dif-

cult, and as will be explored below, Merkel joined a 

command that oen used harsh tactics to maintain 

order. 

Lieutenant Colonel orpe, Merkel’s original recruiting ocer, who now served as Merkel’s battalion 

commander in the Dominican Republic, believed 

strongly that Germans funded and led the local insurgency. orpe wrote many of the documents that 

describe Marine eorts to suppress the insurgency 

of late spring and summer of 1918. erefore, much 

of what is known about Merkel’s actions and the 

Marines’ attempts to restore peace by waging war in 

Seibo Province originated from orpe. 

Marine ocers under orpe’s command began 

killing indigenous people in early 1918 in retaliation 

22 Schmidt, United States Occupation of Haiti, 92. 23 Capt John H. Craig, Development of the Republic of Haiti, general correspondence, Operations and Training Division, intelligence section, 

1915–1934, H-134, Haiti box 14, entry 38, National Archives, Washington, DC. 

24 Bruce J. Calder, “Caudillos and Gavilleros versus the United States Marines: Guerilla Insurgency during the Dominican Intervention, 1916–

1924,” Hispanic American Historical Review 58, no. 4 (November 1978): 656. 25 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 196. 26 BGen George Barnett, Report on Affairs in the Republic of Haiti, June 1915 to June 30, 1920 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 

1920), 50. 

27 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 196. 28 Ibid., 196. 

29 L. Nogart to Joseph Pendleton.
8 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

for the murder of Captain William R. Knox, who 

served temporarily as a captain in the Guardia Nacional (the Dominican Republic’s national guard). 

Merkel arrived in-country in March 1918. Captains 

ad T. Taylor, Harry Seipel, and Knox led an expedition that captured a prominent bandit and caudillo 

named Ramon Hatera and a dozen of his associates. 

While being transported to San Pedro de Macorís, 

Hatera and some of his men escaped. Hatera allegedly 

wanted revenge for his capture, and in January 1918, 

Dominican insurgents murdered Captain Knox. 

Knox was well liked, well respected, and known as 

“a champion of civic improvement in his district.”30

According to orpe, First Lieutenant Hatton, who 

replaced Knox, in retaliation allegedly executed 11 

men suspected of being involved in Knox’s murder.31

Aer Knox’s death, Taylor believed “that all circumstances called for a campaign of frightfulness,” so he 

“arrested indiscriminately upon suspicion and then 

people rotted in jail pending investigation or search 

for evidence.”32 “Just as Captain Knox used discretion and accomplished a great deal of governmental 

progress in Seibo, Captain Taylor used no discretion 

and created unrest and dissatisfaction and anarchy,” 

orpe wrote in a 1918 condential report.33

e murder of Captain Knox served as a turning 

point for Marines in the eastern provinces of Seibo 

and San Pedro de Macorís. His death led to violence against the indigenous people, which in turn 

sent Dominicans into the ranks of insurgent groups. 

Since they believed “the permitted escape of Hatera 

was really the cause for all the recent trouble in Seibo 

as well as for the loss of that valuable ocer, Knox,” 

Marines attempted to guarantee that captured bandits remained in custody.34 Unfortunately, Marines 

including Captain Taylor used the fear of attempted 

escapes to abuse and even execute suspected bandits. ese acts terrorized local Dominicans. orpe 

Leatherneck, May 1937, 57 

Only known photograph of Charles Merkel (front row, second from left) seated among a group of officers and 

NCO’s of the Marine detachment onboard the USS New York, February 1916.

30 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 200. 31 LtCol George C Thorpe, “Confidential Report upon Conditions in Seibo and Macorís Provinces,” hereafter “Confidential Report,” 30 May 1918, 

Joseph Pendleton Papers, Marine Corps History Division Archives Branch, GRC, Quantico, VA. 1stLt Hatton’s full name is mystery, at the moment. 

According to 1st Battalion, 3d Regiment, muster rolls for 1918, copies of which are held at Marine Corps History Division, Quantico VA, Hatton 

does not exist. “Hatton” might be a misspelling of “Patten,” however. If that is the case, then this Marine was probably Lt Gerald R. Patten of the 

115th Company. 

32 Thorpe, “Confidential Report.” 

33 Ibid. 

34 Ibid. 
Winter 2016 9

noted that Dominicans were “deadly fearful of being arrested because of the uncertainty of getting a 

hearing,” and as a result “a number of unsteady ones 

joined the Cabilleros.”35

orpe also believed that Taylor’s actions corrupted the methods of many ocers around him. “Captain Taylor had a very bad eect upon other ocers, 

who acquired the idea that lawlessness and utter disregard of civilians’ rights was proper and admirable 

conduct for military forces,” orpe wrote.36 On 14 

April 1918, Taylor and a group of Marines captured a 

Syrian national living in Hayto Mayor. Known locally as Agapito José, the Syrian was suspected of being 

involved in the Knox murder.37 Aer Marines shot 

and killed Agapito in the street, Taylor then allegedly “took a dagger and driving it in his [Agapito’s] 

throat slashed down to the abdomen.”38 Taylor’s accomplices were Captain Russell W. Duck and newly 

arrived Captain Charles F. Merkel. All the ocers 

present at the incident claimed that Agapito was shot 

and killed as he tried to escape.39 By April 1918, three 

of orpe’s company commanders allegedly participated in controversial killings, none of which were 

seriously investigated. 

orpe cited Merkel’s German ancestry in an 

evaluation of the Agapito incident. “Captain Merkel, 

during operations around Hayto Mayor, conducted 

himself as a German might be expected without regard for feelings of natives, with no attempt at courtesy, and with a good deal of arbitrariness,” orpe 

wrote.40 But orpe also argued that Merkel “had a 

great amount of energy and ability to endure hardships and is thorough; he is an excellent ocer with 

the exceptions noted.”41

By this time, Merkel had acquired a notorious, but 

not violent, reputation among his superior ocers 

for being forceful and harsh, which came up oen 

in his tness reports. Major H. G. Snyder’s report 

claimed “Merkel is a capable ocer; an indefatigable 

worker; but he is super sensitive; and at times bull 

headed and peevish, requiring tactful handling.”42

In a tness report dated March 1918, Merkel’s general temperament was described as “calm and even 

tempered,” although Merkel was also “very active . . . 

forceful . . . and thorough.”43 Despite these cautionary 

words, the reviews are bere of any real indication 

that Merkel would one day turn malicious or murderous. Under orpe’s command, however, Merkel 

transformed his sensitive and forceful nature into 

violent and cruel conduct. 

e subsequent capture and torture of Pedro Hernandez Rivera of Hayto Mayor shortly aer Agapito’s 

death illuminated what orpe and others described 

as “thorough” and “forceful.” Merkel reportedly tied 

Rivera to a horse by his neck and hands. Marines 

trotted the horse for several kilometers to reach a secluded area. Merkel then reportedly tortured Rivera, 

who testied that “I was placed on my back, with 

my face to the sun, and was kept there for about two 

hours while water was poured through a funnel at 

intervals, and when I refused to open my mouth they 

forced it open with a stick.”44 e simulated drowning reportedly continued for two minutes at a time 

or until Rivera lost consciousness. Merkel repeated 

the process for four or ve days before realizing he 

had captured the wrong man. ese actions did not 

endear the Marines to the Dominicans.

In June 1918, Captain Merkel enacted his operational methodology on the people of Pedro Santana 

when they failed to answer his questions about the 

whereabouts of local bandits. He ordered 25 men, 

women, and children to be tied together, “threatening 

35 Ibid.; Millett, Semper Fidelis, 200; cabilleros is Thorpe’s spelling for the Spanish word gavilleros, which in the Dominican Republic meant “rural 

bandit.” According to Bruce Calder, some Dominican insurgents resented being called gavilleros and preferred the title revolutionary; Calder, 

“Caudillos and Gavilleros,” 660. 

36 Thorpe, “Confidential Report.” 

37 Major General Commandant letter to the judge advocate general of the Navy, 9 November 1925, RG 80 general correspondence, National 

Archives, Washington, DC, hereafter Major General Commandant letter to the judge advocate general. Agapito was also known as Azepto José, 

who was a store owner in the Dominican Republic. His real name was Habib Koziah. 

38 Hearings into the Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, Before the Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, 67th 

Cong. 1136 (14 December 1921) (statement of Jesus M. Vasquez).

39 Major General Commandant letter to the judge advocate general. 

40 Thorpe, “Confidential Report.”

41 Ibid.

42 Report on the fitness of officers of the U.S. Marine Corps, Charles F. Merkel, 10 November 1917 (Merkel personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis, MO) 4. 

43 Report on the fitness of officers of the U.S. Marine Corps, March 1918 (Merkel personnel file, NPRC), 2. 

44 Hearings into the Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, Before the Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, 67th 

Cong. 1122 (13 December 1921) (statement of Pedro Hernandez Rivera). 
10 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

them with death if they did not state where they [the 

bandits] were to be found.”45 Merkel then forced them 

to march blindfolded toward San Lorenzo, where he 

stopped the column just outside of town and spent 

four days interrogating and torturing the prisoners. 

ose awaiting interrogation were tied to a tree.46 He 

eventually released the prisoners but then captured 

another group of people and repeated the process.47

By the summer of 1918, the 2d Brigade, 3d Marine 

Regiment, faced an intense counterinsurgency camCaptain Charles F. Merkel: Early Marine Career

The life Merkel had before serving in the Dominican Republic is worth recounting because his nationality, connection to orpe, 

and behavior all became relevant to the alleged 

atrocities. Merkel was born on 26 June 1889 in 

Mannheim, Germany. At an unknown date, he immigrated to the United States. According to records, 

he enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps on 15 September 1908 at age 19. Interestingly, Major George C. 

orpe, then serving as a recruiting ocer in Newark, New Jersey, enlisted Merkel.1

 orpe was likely 

one of the rst Marines that Merkel ever knew. 

Merkel served as a guard at the Portsmouth Naval Prison in Maine, and he requested transfers to 

the Philippines and Panama in 1909 but was denied 

due to a lack of vacancies at both places. Merkel’s 

duty stations included the Navy yards in New York, 

Portsmouth, and Norfolk, Virginia, and the Marine 

Barracks in Annapolis, Maryland, and Charleston, South Carolina. In 1912, as a sergeant and temporary 

gunnery sergeant, Merkel became warden of the naval prison onboard the USS Hancock (AP 3). He 

deployed to Veracruz, Mexico, in 1914 and later served with the Marine detachment on the USS New 

York (BB 34).2

 Except for a few instances of insubordination during his rst year in the Marine Corps, 

superior ocers gave Merkel excellent prociency and conduct marks on his tness reports throughout 

his rst two enlistments.3

Merkel’s rapid promotions indicate a successful and competent Marine. By 1916, Merkel attained the 

rank of rst sergeant. In July 1917, he received a commission as a temporary second lieutenant followed 

quickly by rst lieutenant. By 17 December, he was promoted to captain.4

 Aer serving several months 

at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, South Carolina, Merkel arrived in the Dominican Republic 

in March 1918 and assumed command of the 52d Company, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, operating out of 

San Pedro de Macorís.5

 Merkel’s Marine Corps records prior to the Dominican Republic did not indicate 

violent behavior.

1

 Charles F. Merkel personnel file, National Personnel Records Center (NPRC), St. Louis, MO, hereafter Merkel personnel file.

2 Application for examination as Marine gunner, 8 September 1916, Merkel personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis, MO. 

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. 

5 Ibid. 

Marine’s Magazine, September 1917, 5

LtCol George C. Thorpe with Vicentico Evangelista, a 

captured insurgent.

45 Ibid., 1142. 

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid. 
Winter 2016 11

paign, caused by local reactions to either cultural 

misunderstandings or Marine misconduct.48 Since 

the Marines’ arrival two years prior, counterinsurgency in the Dominican Republic had been a signi-

cant challenge, and by most accounts, the experience 

was very frustrating for the American forces present. 

One Marine lieutenant claimed that on most patrols 

when enemy contact was made, the bandits would 

re a few shots then ee.49 Oen the local population would not identify the insurgents. In June 1917, 

a Marine ocer complained that the Dominican 

people “hate us so that they will not give us information of any value . . . in practically all of Seibo 

Province the people have a deep dislike of us.”50 e 

insurgency strained the Marines’ patience and endurance. Brigade Commander, Brigadier General 

Pendleton, dispatched companies into the interior 

of the country to track and eliminate roving bands 

of Dominicans reportedly looking to commit raids, 

the, and murder. “Detachments are oen out several days,” orpe reported. “at’s the only way to 

catch the enemy—to get on the trail and stay on it.”51

Marine companies patrolled for days at a time in the 

Dominican hills and jungles. “ose who have really 

been doing good work are hollow-cheeked and thin 

as crows,” claimed orpe.52

Merkel and his Marines endured some of the worst 

of the insurgency. On 15 July, bandits ambushed his 

patrol in the hills outside of San Pedro de Macorís. 

e opening shot of the ambush passed Merkel’s face 

and knocked o the hat of another Marine.53 In the 

ght that ensued, Merkel’s company suered three 

casualties but claimed to have killed eight of the 

enemy and wounded two. e bandits ed into the 

countryside, however, leaving Merkel and his men 

empty handed. is engagement was covered in the 

U.S. newspapers and in Clyde Metcalf ’s A History of 

the United States Marine Corps.

54 e newspapers 

and Metcalf used Merkel’s skirmish as an example 

of the tough job that Marines were doing in the Dominican Republic. Metcalf, who published his book 

in 1939, mentions nothing further about Merkel. 

Another engagement with insurgents undoubtedly added to Merkel’s frustration. While leading a patrol of about 30 Marines and guardia troops, Merkel 

stumbled across a group of suspected bandits crossing a ooded area. Merkel ordered his men to open 

re. orpe reported that “the whole Marine detachment had that bunch under re in the open at about 

300 yards or less for a long time and didn’t hit one 

of them.”55 Merkel and his Marines could do nothing but continue to track the elusive enemy through 

tough terrain and unfriendly indigenous communities during the hot Dominican summer. To persevere under these conditions required patience and 

determination. But the situation in Seibo Province 

also required restraint, something that Merkel—already known among his peers for being forceful and 

peevish—used sparingly. 

A crucial turning point in Merkel’s behavior came 

in August 1918 when orpe instituted a campaign 

known by the locals as reconcentraciones. e campaign gathered Dominicans from the countryside 

into camps located in the larger urban centers.56 By 

placing populations of Dominicans under surveillance and control, the plan was to allow the Marines 

to separate the good Dominicans from the bad.57

During this campaign, Merkel committed his most 

48 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 200; Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 131; and McPherson, The Invaded, 93, 97. 49 LtGen Edward A. Craig, intvw by Maj L. E. Tatem, 1968, transcript, Marine Corps Oral History Collection, Marine Corps History Division Archives 

Branch, Quantico, VA. 

50 Henry C. Davis to regimental commander, “Report of Field Operations,” 34th Provisional Regt, 1 June 1917, Campaign Files, Dominican Republic, Marine Corps History Division Archives Branch, Quantico, VA. 1. 

51 George C. Thorpe to Joseph Pendleton, 19 September 1918. 

52 Ibid. 

53 Capt Charles F. Merkel to battalion commander, “Operations, field, from 15 July 1918 to 16 August 1918,” geographic files, Dominican Republic 1917–1919, Marine Corps History Division Archives Branch, Quantico, VA. 

54 “U.S. Marines Kill Domingo Bandits,” Washington Post, 30 July 1918; and Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps (New 

York: G. P. Putnam, 1939), 359. 

55 Thorpe to Pendleton, 19 September 1918.

56 Campaign Order No. 1, Headquarters Battalion, 3d Provisional Regt, San Pedro de Macoris, DR, 20 August 1918, Pendleton Papers, Marine 

Corps History Division Archives Branch, GRC, Quantico, VA, hereafter Campaign Order No. 1.

57 Langley, Banana Wars, 146; and Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 149. Dr. Alejandro Coradin of Hayto Mayor witnessed the concentration 

efforts firsthand, however, and noted that the “concentration of the wretched inhabitants of the commune of Hayto Mayor who had been locked 

up like pigs in stockades under the pretext of investigating whether or not they were bad persons, a procedure which we can call puerile.” Dr. 

Alejandro Coradin, Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo (statement, Hearings Before the Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo: Pursuant to S. Res. 112, vol. 1, 67th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 13 December 1921), 1119.
12 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

notorious crimes. Prior to August, Merkel had been 

abusive toward indigenous people but had not committed murder. at changed when the intensive 

campaign began.

Merkel’s actions outside of the concentrated areas 

indicate that he treated every Dominican like a bandit. Technically, this behavior followed the 20 August campaign orders signed by orpe that stated 

explicitly 

All good Dominicans are then supposed to be 

in the cities, leaving the country clear for operations . . . Armed Dominicans that ee will be shot

[emphasis author’s]. Other persons suspected 

of being enemies or aiding the enemy will be 

arrested and sent to nearest base under guard. 

Hunt out the bandits in all the hills and barrios 

in the designated zones.58

Merkel also received classied orders titled “Instructions for Troops in Fight Against Bandits” that 

mandated that “a court-martial must be ordered for 

every case of prisoner escape if [a] soldier is properly present.”59 e latter order likely stemmed from 

Captain Knox’s murder the previous January, where 

the alleged perpetrators were insurgents who had 

escaped from Marine custody. erefore, Merkel 

not only had a mandate to use deadly force on eeing prisoners, but he could potentially face a courtmartial if they escaped. Dominicans died under this 

pretext, the exact number is unknown. 

According to eyewitness testimony gathered before the U.S. Senate Committee on Haiti and Santo 

Domingo in 1920–21, Merkel terrorized the countryside around Hayto Mayor and San Pedro de Macorís in September 1918. Four years aer the alleged 

atrocities, witnesses gave their accounts of events, 

which oen included conicting dates.60 But all who 

testied agreed that Merkel had murdered Dominicans aer the beginning of orpe’s campaign in late 

August and early September. 

Merkel led a detachment of Marines and guardia 

from San Pedro de Macorís toward Dos Rios. During that trek, according to Emilio Suarez—Merkel’s 

guide and interpreter—Merkel ordered the towns of 

Matapolacio and El Salto burned. Merkel’s men then 

captured a wounded man named Armado Mejia 

outside of El Salto near a riverbank. Believing that 

Mejia was a bandit, Merkel told Mejia that he “ought 

to state where his companions were.”61 Mejia replied 

that he did not know. Merkel then beat him, cut o 

one of his ears, and carved crosses into his chest.62

Marines then tightly secured Mejia, who was bloodied, bruised, and in excruciating pain, to a horse and 

took him to Dos Rios. 

What happened next is known as the “pickax incident” and represents one of Merkel’s most malevolent acts. Upon arriving in Dos Rios, Merkel ordered 

the capture of two men suspected of banditry, one 

of them suered from a virulent skin disease known 

as yaws.63 Merkel suspected the men were bandits 

because they deed orpe’s orders to stay in the 

town. Both men claimed “they were suering with 

that bad disease, and [were afraid] they might infect 

people of the city,” and so they stayed out of town.64

at evening, Merkel ordered Suarez and a few Marines to use their knives to kill the diseased man. 

Suarez said he refused “because the man had not 

oended us, and he (Merkel) had many ries and 

machine guns and could use them on him.”65 Merkel 

then tasked a sergeant with shooting the man, and 

the sergeant did. “He [the man] fell on the ground 

alive,” Suarez testied. “en, the enlisted man drove 

a pickax through his head from one side to the other.”66 Merkel ordered the body to be buried, but Suarez and the sergeant feared that they would contract 

the disease if they touched the body. So the two used 

58 Campaign Order No. 1. 

59 George C. Thorpe, “Instructions for Troops in Fight against Bandits,” 20 August 1918, Pendleton Papers, Marine Corps History Division Archives 

Branch, GRC, Quantico, VA. 

60 Emilio Suarez, Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo (statement, Hearings Before the Select Committee 

on Haiti and Santo Domingo: Pursuant to S. Res. 112, vol. 1, 67th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., December 14, 1921), hereafter Emilio Suarez statement, 1144. 

61 Ibid., 1142. 

62 Ibid.

63 Yaws is a chronic bacterial infection that typically affects skin, bones, and joints.

64 Emilio Suarez statement, 1144. 

65 Ibid. 

66 Ibid. 
Winter 2016 13

a rope to drag the corpse out of town and disposed 

of it in the hills. en, irritated that Suarez had disobeyed an order, Merkel allegedly threatened to kill 

Suarez on the spot.67

A short time later, Marines brought three Dominicans accused of the before Merkel, who decided to make an example of them “in order that no 

more robberies might be committed in Dos Rios.”68

Merkel brought all ve prisoners—Mejia who had 

been tortured, the companion of the man with yaws, 

and the three suspected thieves—back to Hayto 

Mayor with the Marine company. Just o a road in a 

eld near Mata Lambre, Merkel reportedly executed 

four of the prisoners under the guise of attempted 

escape.69 “en he ordered Armado Mejia, whose 

ear had been cut o, to tell him [Merkel] where his 

companions were, saying that if he [Mejia] did not 

tell him, he [Merkel] was going to shoot him,” Suarez 

claimed.70 Mejia reportedly could not state where his 

companions were. According to Suarez, Merkel then 

set Mejia’s pants on re attempting to persuade Mejia to talk, but he reportedly had nothing to tell. 

Merkel then ordered his Marines to throw oranges at Mejia and beat him. Suarez testied that 

Mejia “asked them [the Marines] to kill him and 

not torture him so much,” to which Merkel reportedly replied coldly “that he [Mejia] was a bandit and 

should die little by little; that bandits should neither 

eat, drink, nor sleep . . . and that he would not give 

him anything else to eat until he died of hunger and 

thirst.”71 But, aer about a week of torture, Mejia’s ordeal ended once Merkel and his detachment arrived 

in Hayto Mayor. Mejia’s savior was Lieutenant Colonel orpe. Upon seeing Mejia’s condition, orpe 

took Mejia out of Merkel’s custody and assigned a 

physician to see him. Merkel likely met with orpe 

at this time, but no records document such a meeting or, if a meeting occurred, what was said. Mejia 

survived the torture, and his horrifying experience 

ultimately led to Merkel’s arrest.

By late September 1918, news of Merkel’s atrocities reached his regiment and brigade commanders, probably from multiple sources. According to 

Calder, the Roman Catholic archbishop of Santo 

Domingo notied Marine authorities of Merkel’s actions aer hearing about them from terried locals.72

Suarez testied that he never reported Merkel to the 

authorities because he feared for his life. According 

to Suarez, Merkel “had several men who used to go 

around with him [Merkel] in the country . . . and 

more than one was killed by Captain Merkel himself, because they [the men] had been eyewitnesses 

to these acts.”73 Ultimately, a fellow Marine reported 

Merkel to the authorities, which eventually put a 

stop to the violence. 

Aer Merkel’s return to Hayto Mayor, Marines of 

the 52d Company openly talked about what they had 

done in the interior, sharing their stories with Marines of other companies. A Warrant Ocer, Gunner 

David H. Johns, was appalled by what he heard. On 

26 September, Johns reported Merkel to the chain of 

command. Major R. S. Kingsbury served as the investigating ocer and found that

On or about 13 September, on the road between Hayto Mayor and Dos Rios, that the said 

Merkel did cut of[f] an ear of a native prisoner, 

name unknown [Mejia], and that he did beat 

said prisoner with a stick; that the said Merkel 

did maliciously cause the said prisoner to be 

cut across the breast and salt to be put in his 

wounds . . . that this prisoner was by Captain 

Merkel’s order kept without food or water for 

a period of at least three days . . . Further, that 

Captain Merkel did on or about 13 September 

1918, unjustiably cause four native prisoners, 

names unknown, to be shot down by machine 

gun and rie range [sic] . . . And further unlawfully and unjustiably [b]urned down . . . many 

houses in Seibo Province, this in direct disobedience of the said Merkel’s orders, received 

from his commanding officer.74

Aer reading this report, orpe ordered Merkel 

67 Ibid. 

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid. 

70 Ibid. 

71 Ibid.

72 Calder, “Caudillos and Gavilleros,” 672–73. 73 Emilio Suarez statement, 1145.

74 Arrest of Capt Charles F. Merkel, 18 October 1918, geographic files, Dominican Republic 1917–1919, Marine Corps History Division Archives 

Branch, GRC, Quantico, VA. 
14 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

to San Pedro de Macorís. On his way there from 

Hayto Mayor, Merkel went on a nal rampage, taking and executing two prisoners near El Higuamo 

and ring upon laborers who ed from his patrol. 

On 1 October, orpe placed Merkel under arrest.75

orpe, who had brought Merkel into the Marine 

Corps and supported and praised his tough and 

thorough nature, placed Merkel in a cell to await 

court-martial. orpe had worked hard to associate 

the war in Hispaniola with the greater war in Europe. 

His method of ghting that war, the recontraciones 

campaign, led to Merkel’s downfall.

e next morning around 0930, Private Howard 

L. Sampson, who served as the sentry over Merkel, 

heard a pistol shot. Sampson rushed to Merkel’s 

cell and found that Merkel had shot himself in the 

head.76 Merkel had acquired a .380 Savage automatic 

pistol though no one knew where or when he got it. 

In a report to Commandant Major General George 

Barnett, Brigadier General Pendleton claimed that 

Merkel hid the revolver on his person.77 Marine 

Corps historians Stephen Fuller and Graham Cosmas take Pendleton at his word.78 Historians Lester 

Langley and Ivan Musicant, however, suggest that 

two Marine ocers visited Merkel in his cell the 

night before and le him the pistol with one round.79

However, no evidence exists that this occurred. No 

Marine on guard that day had any knowledge of 

where the pistol came from. As the ranking ocer, 

Captain Russell Duck, who participated in the killing of Agipito the previous April with Merkel and 

Taylor, responded to the scene. When Duck arrived, 

the corporal of the guard handed him Merkel’s pistol 

and a handwritten letter. 

Merkel’s suicide letter—addressed to his friend, 

Captain Duck—revealed Merkel as a man who felt 

betrayed, who believed he had carried out his superior’s orders, and who wanted to save the Marine 

Corps from disgrace. Merkel wrote

I can’t bear to think that I shall go to prison 

aer carrying out my CO’s [commanding of-

cer’s] orders, which were as follows: aer the 

people are concentrated in the various towns 

designated, everyone found out in the hills 

will be a bandit unless they have a proper pass. 

e only way we can settle this revolution is by 

drastic measures and that is to kill a whole lot of 

people.

80 [emphasis author’s] 

In the suicide letter, Merkel also claimed that, 

in a meeting held just before his arrest, he begged 

orpe to admit to ordering Merkel to kill people, 

but orpe refused. Merkel then claimed that “the 

conversation about killing a lot of people took place 

at his [orpe’s] oce on the evening of August 19” 

and that several ocers were present.81 “I am doing 

this in order to save disgracing the M. Corps and 

myself,” Merkel wrote, “but I sincerely hope that god 

will punish orpe some day for he is not t to have 

command of anything and his sole object is to get 

people into trouble.”82

orpe acted quickly to defend himself and used 

the fact that Merkel was German to explain his behavior. In the suicide letter, Merkel identied Captain Robert S. Hunter, Lieutenant C. C. Simmons, 

and Lieutenant Carroll F. Byrd as being present at 

the meeting when orpe gave the order to “kill 

a whole lot of people.” Captain Duck forwarded 

Merkel’s suicide note to orpe who then rounded 

up the ocers Merkel mentioned. All the mentioned 

ocers signed documents swearing that orpe 

gave no such order.83 orpe denied all of Merkel’s 

allegations but also tried to explain himself. “As for 

his [Merkel’s] statement that my sole object ‘is to get 

people into trouble,’ I presume he [Merkel] refers to 

numerous prosecutions that I have initiated against 

Germans . . . I was particularly considerate of the 

late Captain Merkel and tried to make him a loyal 

subordinate,” orpe wrote.84 Ultimately, everyone 

75 Emilio Suarez statement, 1146. 

76 Charles Merkel files, RG 80 Stack Area IIW3, E-19, General Correspondence, National Archives, Washington, DC. 

77 Joseph H. Pendleton to George Barnett, “Arrest of Captain Charles F. Merkel,” 18 October 1918, Charles Merkel personnel files, NPRC, St. 

Louis, MO. 

78 Fuller and Cosmas, Marines in the Dominican Republic, 33. 

79 Langley, Banana Wars, 147; and Musicant, Banana Wars, 281. 80 Charles F. Merkel letter to Russell W. Duck, 2 October 1918, Charles Merkel personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis, MO. 

81 Ibid. 

82 Ibid. 

83 George C. Thorpe letter to regimental commander, letter from late Captain Charles F. Merkel, MC, to Captain Russell W. Duck, M. C., 10 October 1918, Charles Merkel personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis, MO.

84 Ibid. 
Winter 2016 15

distanced themselves from Merkel and claimed his 

actions directly disobeyed orders. 

However, orpe’s behavior calls his innocence 

and integrity into question. orpe’s racism, like 

many Marines stationed in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, tainted his opinions of the population. 

Regarding Agapito—the Syrian killed by Taylor, 

Merkel, and Duck in April 1918—orpe claimed 

Agapito and all Syrians in-country “will do anything 

for money and have no bowels; they are a very low 

order of humanity.”85 Believing that Dominicans 

could not possibly conduct their own campaigns, 

orpe wrote to Pendleton that “the general opinion 

here is that whoever is running this revolution . . . 

is getting a lot out of the n——s.”86 On 14 August, 

orpe praised Merkel claiming “I believe that Captain Merkel and Lieutenant Simmons (commander 

of 114th Company) are working hard and doing well 

. . . sympathize with our hard task and be patient 

with us for we certainly are trying to bring home the 

black bacon.”87

e exact details of what orpe said to Merkel 

and the other ocers during the 19 August meeting 

is unknown. However, Merkel’s claim that orpe 

mentioned the need to “kill a lot” is supported by 

documents. orpe wrote those exact words to his 

own superior on 21 August, two days aer the meeting where Merkel claimed orpe gave the orders 

“to kill.”88 In a letter to Brigadier General Pendleton, 

orpe indicated that he stood to benet from the 

deaths of many Dominicans. “If I do a good job of 

clearing these two provinces of insurgents and kill a 

lot [emphasis author’s] maybe I go to a more active 

eld of endeavor too . . . I ought to show that I’d be a 

good German killer,” orpe wrote.89 He, like many 

ocers, wanted to ght the Germans in France, not 

wage a frustrating counterinsurgency campaign in 

what they considered a backwater arena. 

Evidence suggests that orpe bears at least partial 

responsibility for the crimes committed under his 

command. Other ocers under orpe’s command, 

such as Taylor and Hatton, also committed atrocities 

against indigenous people. orpe’s concentration of 

Dominicans in urban centers and campaign orders, 

dated 20 August 1918, gave ocers the latitude to 

abuse Dominicans found outside the designated areas. What is impossible to know is whether or not 

orpe ordered his company commanders to explicitly kill “a lot of people.” On 20 August, he did order 

his company commanders to “kill the enemy,” but 

orpe also ordered his Marines to “be courteous to 

everyone. It costs nothing, and it pays well.”90 orpe’s letter to Pendleton, however, strongly suggests 

that orpe believed killing Dominicans would lead 

to positive results, at least for himself. Also, Merkel’s 

murderous and torturous acts against the Dominicans did not occur until aer the concentration campaign began and only a few days aer orpe’s letter 

to Pendleton. 

Because of orpe, the Marine Corps allowed 

Merkel to take the blame. Perpetrators of cruelty, of 

which Merkel serves as a heinous example, inamed 

the insurgency and therefore damaged the Marines’ 

ability to accomplish its mission in the Dominican 

Republic. orpe placed the onus for that on Merkel 

and attributed Merkel’s crimes to his German heritage claiming

All insurgents that continued in that state 

during the past two months have done so because they felt they could not do otherwise as 

they feared being killed if they surrendered, 

since they are the criminal class and could expect nothing better than capital punishment if 

brought to trial; furthermore, they have a fear 

of being summarily executed . . . is last mentioned belief is founded upon the fact that the 

late Captain C. F. Merkel, MC, a German, tortured and murdered some prisoners.91

At no point did orpe take responsibility for actions of the ocers under his command—not Taylor, not Hatton, and especially not Merkel. Nor did 

85 Thorpe, “Confidential Report.”

86 George C. Thorpe to Joseph Pendleton, 18 August 1918. 

87 George C. Thorpe to Joseph Pendleton, 14 August 1918.. 

88 George C. Thorpe to Joseph Pendleton, 21 August 1918.

89 Ibid. 90 George C. Thorpe, “Instructions for Troops in Field against Bandits.” 

91 George C. Thorpe memo to commanding officer, 2d Provisional Brigade, “Observations re Seibo and Maceria Province,” 1918, RG 127, box 

8, National Archives, Washington, DC. 
16 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

orpe appear to see the link between his explicit 

orders to shoot Dominicans attempting to escape 

and the Dominicans “fear of being summarily executed.”92

e Marine Corps was fortunate that the press 

attributed American victories in France against the 

German army to Marines, and Merkel’s suicide obviated a court-martial. e cancelled court-martial 

delayed the promulgation of the atrocities, which 

proved benecial to the Corps’ public image and reputation. Had Merkel decided to face a court-martial, 

he may have defended himself against orpe, referring to the facts mentioned in his letter. 

A year later, courts-martial of Marines in Haiti for similar crimes brought down a restorm of 

negative attention on the 1st Provisional Brigade. 

In September 1919, Major General Barnett ordered 

an investigation of Marines in Haiti aer he heard 

of the court-martial of two Marines who killed an 

indigenous prisoner. Barnett noted that “practically 

indiscriminate killing of the natives has gone on now 

for some time.”93 Newspapers published Barnett’s 

remarks, which precipitated a barrage of bad press 

coverage for the Marine Corps. Shortly thereaer, 

ocials opened up investigations of Marine actions 

in the Dominican Republic. 

As a result, in late 1919 and through 1921, U.S. 

newspapers ran the stories of military misconduct, 

which caused the publicity nightmare that Marine 

ocials had hoped to avoid. “e military record 

in Haiti is a blot on the (Woodrow Wilson) administration and a stain on the honor of the American 

people,” wrote one columnist for the New York Evening Post. News of Marines killing Haitian indigenous people indiscriminately “is a shock to those 

who have cherished the conviction that American 

military rule did not imitate the coercive methods of 

some experienced and more callous governments,” 

claimed the author (the implication being Germany). e Philadelphia Public Ledger reported that 

“while we [the United States] were ‘making the world 

safe for democracy’ in France . . . we were ruthlessly 

practicing machine-gun imperialism.”94 And regarding the Dominican Republic, the Cleveland Gazette 

ran a story with the headline “Outrage Aer Outrage 

Perpetrated in the Little Mulatto Republic, As in 

Haiti, So in Santo Domingo.”95 e Gazette reporter 

accused Marines in the Dominican Republic of using “Belgium Congo or Prussian-Belgian methods of 

eliciting information” such as burning and torturing 

indigenous people.96 “I did not meet a single Dominican who did not want the Americans out, band and 

baggage.”97

And in all likelihood, Merkel’s and orpe’s 

actions also fueled resistance to the military government’s political programs in the Dominican 

Republic. By 1921, indigenous organizations, such 

as the Antielection League of the Santo Domingo 

Province, opposed all elections sanctioned by the 

military government. e league called the Marine 

occupation of the Dominican Republic “a pirate 

expedition” that controlled the country “merely by 

the virtue of their [the Marines’] machine guns and 

bayonets.”98 e league accused Marines of hurting, 

not helping, the Dominican people: “ey [the Marines] commit murder, burn, and concentrate the 

poor peasants of entire regions, depriving them of 

their lands and water for the benet of despicable 

Yankee Corporations.”99 e description of Marine 

brutality reected memories of not only the Tiger 

of Seibo, Charles Merkel, but also the concentration 

campaigns of George orpe. 

e handling of Merkel’s burial indicates the 

lengths to which the Marine Corps restricted acknowledgement of Merkel’s actions, even among 

Marines. e Corps shipped Merkel’s body to New 

92 Ibid.

93 George Barnett confidential letter to John H. Russell, 2 October 1919, George Barnett Papers, Marine Corps History Division Archives Branch, 

GRC, Quantico, VA. 

94 “What Other Papers Say: Puts Nation in Bad Light” Washington Post, 16 October, 1920, 6. The paper reported that “Gen. Barnett’s Revelations 

as to Haiti Held Not an Understatement. Blot on the Administration. Haitian Record Also Seen as Stain on honor of American People. Will Shock 

Humane Americans. Was Secretary Daniels Deceived? American Cannot afford Oppression. Lodge’s Devotion to Monroe,” Washington Post, 16 

October 1920, 6.

95 Cleveland Gazette, 25 June 1921, 6. 96 Ibid.

97 Ibid. 

98 Anonymous, Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo (statement, Hearings Before the Select Committee 

on Haiti and Santo Domingo: Pursuant to S. Res. 112, vol. 1, 67th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., December 13, 1921), 1121. 99 Ibid. 
Winter 2016 17

Jersey without a military escort, where he was buried in Hamilton Cemetery, Monmouth County. Hilda Merkel, Charles’s sister and closest relative in the 

United States, was hurt by the perceived slight to her 

brother and her family’s honor.100 In a letter written 

to Hilda Merkel, dated 1 November 1918, Brigadier 

General Charles G. Long expressed regret that Captain Merkel did not receive the honors due to him 

but noted the Marine Corps’ perceived slight was not 

intentional. “I am very sorry that a misunderstanding arose which led to such a bitter experience for 

you [Hilda],” he wrote, claiming that the misunderstanding “might have been avoided had your request 

been directed to these headquarters, in which case 

an eort would have been made to comply with your 

wishes.”101 Regarding Hilda’s continued inquest into 

the events leading to her brother’s suicide, Long expressed surprise noting, “I am at a loss to suggest any 

circumstance which should have prompted the act 

which resulted in his [Merkel’s] death.”102

In mid-November, aer learning of the charges 

against Merkel, Long wrote to Joseph C. Waller, who 

continued to inquire about Charles Merkel on behalf 

of his sister. “Your own discretion will dictate what 

portion of the facts you should communicate to his 

sister,” advised Long.103 Whether Hilda ever learned 

of her brother’s actions in the Dominican Republic 

is unknown. 

e Marine Corps contacted Hilda at least three 

more times aer 1918 regarding her brother. Apparently, Charles Merkel owed a driver named Melchor 

Bernol $75 in transportation fees for several trips 

made in the summer of 1918 between Hayto Mayor 

and San Pedro de Macorís. Bernol went to orpe 

for payment; orpe paid the man $50 and had the 

balance forwarded to Hilda because orpe believed 

the rest should come from Merkel’s estate.104 In 1921 

and 1923, respectively, Hilda received her brother’s 

Victory Medal and Mexican Service Badge “to cherish its possession in precious memory of your dear 

brother, who died while in the service of his country.”105 Merkel’s ambiguous legacy, which has troubled historians since his death, may have begun with 

those very words. 

Merkel’s story, like the Marine interventions in 

Hispaniola, is fraught with ambiguity. In Hispaniola, 

the Marine Corps gained experience in counterinsurgency warfare, experience that some historians 

say proved valuable in later small-war conicts.106

Some experts argue that Marines accomplished their 

mission in the country by halting the Dominican 

Civil War, suppressing organized banditry, protecting American commercial interests, and establishing 

an indigenous peacekeeping constabulary, the Guardia Nacional Dominicana. But these successes came 

at a cost; many Marines engaged in brutal misconduct of the indigenous population, particularly in 

the summer of 1918. One historian notes that “it was 

the style of Marine rule, not its accomplishments, 

that was remembered,” among the Dominicans and 

among members of the American press.107

No Marine encompasses this legacy more than 

Merkel, whose actions during one summer in the 

Dominican Republic eclipsed 20 years of honorable 

service. His superiors oen extolled him as an excellent ocer. Some of his skirmishes with bandits 

made positive headlines in U.S. newspapers. However, Merkel is also the Marine Corps’ most infamous 

case of illicit, lurid, and murderous conduct during 

that occupation. Historians selectively choose parts 

of Merkel’s story when answering questions about 

the incident. Marines will do the same when guring out what lessons can be learned from his actions. 

However, it is important to remember that Merkel 

did not act alone. orpe, Merkel’s superior, had a 

hand in the misconduct, and the Marines’ actions 

were symptoms of institutional problems the Corps 

faced during World War I. 

Merkel and orpe represent a dark time in Marine Corps history. Both were responsible for some 

100 Hilda Merkel letter to 2d Provisional Regt Headquarters, 30 October 1918, Charles Merkel personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis, MO. 101 BGen Charles G. Long letter to Hilda Merkel, 1 November 1918, Charles Merkel personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis, MO. 102 Ibid. 103 BGen Charles G. Long letter to Joseph C. Waller, 13 November 1918, Charles Merkel personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis, MO. 104 George Thorpe to regimental commander, 28 October 1918, Charles Merkel personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis, MO. 105 LtCol H. Lay letter to Hilda Merkel, 27 January 1921, Charles Merkel personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis, MO; and LtCol Macker Babb letter to Hilda 

Merkel, 2 August 1923, Charles Merkel personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis, MO. 

106 James A. Warren, American Spartans: The U.S. Marines: A Combat History from Iwo Jima to Iraq (New York: Free Press, 2005), 32. 107 Langley, Banana Wars, 158. 
18 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

of the worst atrocities committed by Marines in the 

Dominican Republic, and historians have failed to 

illuminate the signicance of Merkel’s and orpe’s 

actions. From 1918 until the present, Marine Corps 

historians have argued that Marines like Merkel represent isolated cases of Marine misconduct in the 

Dominican Republic. To an extent, this contention 

is true since most Marines did not commit atroci108 Small Wars Manual: U.S. Marine Corps, 1940 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940), 32. 

ties while in-country. Atrocities, isolated or not, 

have a greater impact on the Marines’ mission and 

legacy than the countless number of Marines who 

served honorably. Merkel’s story elucidates the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual, which notes “mistakes may have the most far-reaching eect and it 

may require a long period to reestablish condence, 

respect, and order.”108 s1775s
Colonel Walter G. Ford, USMC (Ret)

America’s Citizen Marines—State Militias,

a Tradition of National Service

To address more than a century of evolving 

national requirements, the United States 

Marine Corps added the crisis response 

capabilities of the Marine Corps Reserve 

(Reserve); its origins can be traced to the inadequacies of the states’ naval militias for the defense of 

democracy and protecting the country’s interests 

abroad. e 1916 legislation authorizing a Reserve 

provided a source of trained manpower and, not 

surprisingly, was the result of a coordinated NavyMarine team approach.1

 is rst part of a twopart story discusses how the Reserve in World War 

I depended greatly on the development of Marine 

branches inside state naval militias, the initiatives 

authorizing the Reserve and its mobilization, and 

nally the contributions of the Marine Reserve during the war.

e founding fathers recognized the need for a 

strong military reserve, but not as it has come to exist. e authors of the Articles of Confederation and 

later the U.S. Constitution were concerned about 

possible excesses of a large standing army and its 

expense on a edgling nation. Retaining the citizensoldier character of the military aer the American 

Revolutionary War was fundamental to the survival 

of the new nation. A small standing army, backed 

by well-armed and -trained militias provided by the 

states, oered support for national emergencies.

e U.S. Marines

in World War I

PART I: THE U.S. MARINE CORPS RESERVE COMES

TO THE FORE

e U.S. Constitution, which took eect in 1789, 

addressed the use of state militias with Article I, Section 8, Clause 15, dening the grounds for Congress 

to call up militias “to execute the laws of the Union, 

suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.”2

 en 

on 2 May 1792, Congress passed the Uniform Militia Act (1 Stat. 264) requiring enrollment in the 

states militia, specifying exceptions to enrollment 

and providing guidance on organization and arming of the state militias.3

e War of 1812 was the rst great test of the militia system. However, when many of the militiamen 

refused to leave their home states, the militia proved 

to be of little national value. Militia deployments 

were not authorized for the Mexican-American War 

because the conict did not meet the criteria for employment of state militias as dened in the Constitution, that is to enforce laws, repel invasions, and 

suppress insurrection. Use of state militias in the 

American Civil War was more eective—the militias 

could be used to end insurrections but members were 

limited to no more than three months active duty.4

Secretary of the U.S. Navy Benjamin F. Tracy 

(1889–93) stressed the importance of a trained militia for the Navy and called for funding arms and 

equipment for naval militia in various seacoast 

states. As a result of his eorts with Congress, in his 

annual report for 1892, Tracy noted the naval appropriation act, approved 19 July 1892, provided 

$25,000 for naval militias. In that annual report, 

he also conrmed qualifying instructions for states 

seeking a portion of the funds. Seven states formed 

and mustered in naval militias by the time Tracy 

1 Reserve officers of Public Affairs Unit 4-1, The Marine Corps Reserve: A History (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1966), 1. 2 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. U.S. Constitution Online, http://www.usconstitution.net/xconst_A1Sec8.html.

3 Uniform Militia Act of 1792, Pub. L. No. 2-1-28, 1 Stat. 264 (1792).

4 Rollin F. Van Cantfort, “Call Out the Reserves,” Marine Corps Gazette 37, no. 10 (October 1953): 16.

19
20 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

submitted his annual report on 10 December 1892. 

One additional state mustered in a naval militia unit 

before the end of the year.5

In spite of various congressional actions to improve the state militia system, the Constitutional 

restrictions on employment of militia remained 

unchanged, and by the end of the 1898 SpanishAmerican War, the militia system, which relied on 

militiamen provided by states, was shown to be inadequate in responding to national emergencies.6

Calls for a National

Naval Reserve

e oce of the state adjutant general monitored 

the state militias, including the naval militias. A 

review of annual adjutant general reports reveals a 

consensus that improvements were needed in the 

militia systems. 

Of particular note are the diculties encountered 

in New York state. In the Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State of New York for the Year 1898, 

C. Whitney Tillinghast II emphasized a major lesson 

from the Spanish-American War: the states’ abilities 

to provide forces to support the national call were hindered by the U.S. Constitution’s restrictions on the use 

of militias. Since that war did not meet Constitutional 

requirements, Tillinghast noted the state of New York 

was forced to ask its militia for volunteers. While volunteers did come forward, the administrative nightmares associated with reporting the New York militia 

volunteers “mustering in,” or swearing in for federal 

duty to the satisfaction of the U.S. War Department, 

were extremely challenging and frustrating, particularly federal payment to the volunteers. 

In an exchange of telegrams from May through 

July 1898, the War Department and the New York 

adjutant general attempted to sort through the administrative issues associated with the expenses of 

food and shelter, transportation, and pay for the volunteers for federal service.7

Additionally, included in the New York adjutant 

general’s 1898 report was the report of the head of 

the New York Naval Militia, Captain J. W. Miller. 

Miller wrote on the war with Spain, “e personnel 

of the Naval Militia is well tted to defend the immediate coast of the State. If it be desired to perfect 

the ocers and men for deep-sea duty, the general 

government must provide suitable tools, in the way 

of modern ships. is has been recommended by me 

in many annual reports.”8

Miller added “If the general government provided 

these ships, it would naturally expect a high standard of excellence both in ocers and men. is 

standard can be obtained by the enactment of a National Naval Reserve Law.” He also recommended 

the National Naval Reserve have its own ranks and 

ratings and be distinct from the U.S. Navy and that 

the federal government publish the “scope of examinations for entrance to the Naval Reserve . . . and a 

certain proportion of the Naval Militiamen of each 

State should have passed it before any aid was supplied by Congress.”9

Under President William McKinley’s direction, 

the secretary of the War Department was to procure soldiers from the states’ National Guard (NG) 

units.10 New York’s challenges in responding to federal requests for more manpower were typical of the 

other states of the Union. More improvements in 

growing a crisis response capability were needed.

On 1 November 1900, Lieutenant Commander 

William H. H. Southerland (USN), ocer in charge 

of the Navy Department’s Naval Militia Oce and 

future commander of the Navy and Marine force in 

Nicaragua in August 1912,11 wrote to the secretary of 

5 U.S. Department of the Navy, Report of the Secretary of the Navy: Being Part of the Message and Documents Communicated to the Two Houses 

of Congress at the Beginning of the Second Session of the Fifty-Second Congress (Washington, DC: GPO, 1892), 44–46. 6 Van Cantfort, “Call Out the Reserves,” 16.

7 New York’s call for volunteers, the very positive response, frustration with the administrative issues, and the exchange of messages between 

the War Department and New York’s state paymaster-general reflects ever increasing annoyance at the federal and state levels and suggests 

the absence of clearly defined procedures for bringing a militiaman into federal service. See the Adjutant General’s Office, State of New York, 

Annual Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of New York for the Year 1898 (Albany, NY: Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co., 1899), 36–43. 8 Adjutant General’s Office, State of New York, Annual Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of New York for the Year 1898 (Albany, NY: 

Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co., 1899), 245–46.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., 13; and Maj Michael S. Warren, The National Guard in the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection, 1898–1899 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2012), 12. 

11 George B. Clark, The United States Military in Latin America: A History of Interventions through 1934 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2014), 

117.
Winter 2016 21

the Navy about the inadequacies of the naval militia 

system:

I call your attention to these facts to show the 

absolute necessity for the creation, in addition 

to the naval militia organizations, of a Government or national reserve force, which should be 

organized entirely under . . . the control of the 

Navy Department.12

Little progress was made in authorizing a reserve 

for the Navy and Marine Corps until Secretary of the 

Navy George V. L. Meyer (6 March 1909–4 March 

1913) recognized the inadequacies of the militia system as a source of trained ocers and men for the 

Navy and Marine Corps. Meyer twice called for legislation to move toward a viable solution.13 In December 1911, under his leadership, the Department of 

the Navy proposed legislation to the 61st Congress 

(1909–11) to create a “reserve of personnel for the 

U.S. Navy and Marine Corps and for its enrollment.”14

Need for a Marine Corps Reserve

While the need for a national Navy and Marine 

Corps reserve force had been building over the 

years, the operational tempo of the sea services had 

increased. In particular, the Marine Corps’ operational tempo in Central America, Mexico, and the 

Caribbean had been expanding since the SpanishAmerican War. Protecting American interests in 

Haiti, Veracruz, Nicaragua, and Santo Domingo 

kept Marines deployed, while manpower had grown 

only marginally.15 ese demands, plus ships’ detachments, legation guards, and other requirements, 

strained the Corps’ resources and armed the need 

for a Marine Corps Reserve ready to meet emergent 

force requirements. 

Marine Militia and National

Naval Volunteers

e U.S. Marine Corps Reserve obtained much of 

its initial core of trained manpower from Marine 

units in the state naval militias. Finding records of 

Marines in state naval militias in the early days of 

America remains problematic, thus conrming the 

existence of the rst Marine Corps unit in a state 

militia, aer the Naval Appropriations Act of 1892, 

presents a challenge. 

According to available records, the 1st Marine 

Corps Reserve Company, New York State Naval Militia, was activated in 1893.16 On 25 January 1994, 

New York Senator Alfonse M. D’Amato asked for 

and was granted permission to read into the congressional record part one of a two-part Naval 

Reserve Association News magazine article by two 

U.S. Navy Reserve/New York Naval Militia ocers, 

Commanders Walter J. Johanson and William A. 

Murphy, on the history and importance of the naval 

reserve. It read, in part, as follows:

e Naval Militia, in addition to developing as 

a reserve for the Navy, was an incipient reserve 

for the Marine Corps as well. Starting in 1893, 

the New York Naval Militia included the 1st 

Marine Corps Reserve Company. Massachusetts and Louisiana also included units of Marines in their Naval Militia organizations.17

At the national level, the assistant secretary of war 

was charged with oversight of the state naval militias 

from 1891 to 1909. In December 1909, that responsibility was moved to the Personnel Division, Department of the Navy; and in 1911, the Oce of Naval 

Militia was established and assumed oversight and 

support functions. en in 1912, the U.S. Naval Militia functions were moved to the Navy’s Bureau of 

Navigation.18

Key references for identifying Marine units in state 

naval militias include the annual reports of the states 

adjutants general, which incorporate both national 

guard and naval militia information. In the annual 

adjutant general reports of the three states named in 

the above mentioned article—New York, Massachusetts, and Louisiana—the earliest mentioned Marine 

unit is in the Annual Report of the Adjutant General 

12 Marine Corps Reserve, 2. 13 Ibid.

14 U.S. Department of the Navy, Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1911 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1912), 56, 63. 15 Col Jon T. Hoffman, USMC: A Complete History (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 2002), 162–63. 16 Marine Corps Reserve, 3. 17 140 Cong. Rec. S (The Naval Militia) (25 January 1994). 18 “Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel: Records of the Division of Naval Militia Affairs,” U.S. National Archives Guide to Federal Records, 

www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/024.html?vm=r#24.6.2.
22 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

of the State of Louisiana for the Year Ending 1902. 

e report lists a Marine guard of 31 men in the 1st 

Naval Battalion, Louisiana Naval Militia (LNM), 

serving onboard the USS Stranger.

19 e next year, 

that Marine guard increased to 49 militiamen and 

reported as Division G, 1st Naval Battalion, Naval 

Brigade, LNM. e militia continued to increase in 

number and in 1906, LNM added a second division, 

Division H, 1st Naval Battalion, Naval Brigade.20 In a 

reorganization of the Naval Brigade, Division H was 

disbanded on 5 September 1912, and the Marine militiamen consolidated into Division G.21

In a report ending 31 December 1912, the adjutant general of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 

noted the authorization of a Marine guard as part of 

a new naval militia battalion.22 In his report the following year, the adjutant general wrote, “For the rst 

time in the history of the Naval Brigade, a Marine 

guard consisting of 1 commissioned ocer and 25 

enlisted” was formed.23

A a charter member of Marine Company, Massachusetts Naval Militia, William A. Worton served 

more than 30 years on active duty aer World War 

I and retired as a major general in June 1949. His 

detailed record keeping, personal papers collection, 

and oral history maintained in the Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections Section of the Marine 

Corps University provide insight into the organization, arms, equipment, uniforms, and strength of the 

Marine units in the naval militia prior to and during the war. He mentions the formation of a Marine 

unit in the Massachusetts Naval Militia in May 1913 

with Walter A. Powers, Assistant Attorney General 

for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, appointed 

as a rst lieutenant and named as the Marine Company’s rst commander.24 A 1909 Harvard graduate, Powers’s credentials mirror those of many who 

joined the naval militia: well-educated and upwardly 

mobile. His militia records indicate he was mustered 

into the Massachusetts Naval Militia on 11 March 

1911 and commissioned rst lieutenant 27 March 

1913.25

Beginning in 1892, the annual reports of the adjutant general of the state of New York included reports 

from the commander of the naval militia. However, 

the state’s report does not mention a Marine unit 

in the state naval militia until the annual report for 

1916. at report cites an amendment to the federal 

law on naval militias approved 15 May 1916, addressing the composition, strength, and command 

19 Louisiana Adjutant General’s Office, Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Louisiana for the Year Ending 1902 (Baton Rouge, 

LA: Ramires-Jones Printing Co., 1903), 77–78, filed in The National Guard Memorial Library, Washington, DC.

20 Louisiana Adjutant General’s Office, Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Louisiana for the Year Ending 1906 (Baton Rouge, 

LA: Ramires-Jones Printing Co., 1907),132–33.

21 Louisiana Adjutant General’s Office, Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Louisiana for the Year Ending 1912 (Baton Rouge, 

LA: Ramires-Jones Printing Co., 1913), 26, 72, 104, 134.

22 Massachusetts Adjutant General’s Office, Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the Year Ending 

December 31, 1912 (Boston, MA: Wright & Potter Printing Co., 1913), 11.

23 Ibid., 33–34.

24 William A. Worton, Personal Papers, Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA.

25 Massachusetts Adjutant General’s Office, Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the Year Ending 

December 31, 1913 (Boston, MA: Wright & Potter Printing Co., 1914), 24.

Marine Corps History Division

1stLt William A. Worton, Marine Branch, Massachusetts 

Naval Militia, in 1916 at age 16. 
Winter 2016 23

of the state naval militias. In New York, the 1st Battalion, Naval Brigade, now included nine divisions 

and an aeronautic section; the 2d Battalion included 

seven divisions, one Marine company, and one aeronautic section; and the 3d Battalion included eight 

divisions. According to the 1916 annual report, the 

naval militia mustered from the Marine Company 

into the 2d Battalion on 1 May 1916. e company’s 

rst commander was Lieutenant J. F. Rorke.26

e annual Register of the Commissioned and Warrant Ocers of the Naval Militia of the United States

does not list a Marine unit in any state naval militia 

until the 1 January 1914 edition, which reported on 

units that were active in 1913.27 e sole Marine unit 

listed in 1914 was Marine Company, Massachusetts 

Naval Militia, Boston, with 1 ocer and 31 enlisted 

men. A note in the 1914 edition indicates the state of 

Louisiana did not submit a report for 1913.28

Uniforms of the Marines 

in the Naval Militia

In a 25 January 1915 letter to U.S. Navy Captain 

Frederic B. Bassett Jr., chief of the Navy’s Division of 

Naval Militia Aairs, Charles H. Power29 of 1st Battalion, Naval Militia, New York, asked for clarication on the uniforms, equipment, and ordnance for 

the state’s Marines. His question arose aer learning 

in Washington that “Marines are to be allowed for 

the Naval Militia, and being about ready to muster in a detachment of one ocer and twenty-four 

men.”30

Bassett forwarded the letter to Major General 

Commandant George Barnett on 30 January and 

stated in his endorsement that appropriations to 

support the Naval Militia Act would be used to purchase uniforms, equipment, and ordnance for enlisted men, but “no uniforms will be issued to ocers, 

as this is contrary to precedent and there is not suf-

cient money available.” Bassett requested that Barnett dene the uniform items and insignia for the 

Marines in the naval militias.31

In a response dated 3 February 1915, Barnett 

conrmed the enlisted uniform items to be supplied: “khaki, undress blue, campaign hat, undress 

cap, leggings, annel shirt, and noncommissioned 

ocers’ chevrons, and the regulation tan shoes.”32

He recommended that Marine ocers in the naval 

LtCol Richard L. Cody (Ret)

Uniforms of Marines in the Naval Militia.

26 New York Adjutant General’s Office, Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State of New York for the Year 1916 (Albany, NY: J. B. Lyon 

Co., 1917), 45, 50, 118, 124. The Department of the Navy issued General Order No. 153 implementing the new federal law, and as the states 

complied with the directive, the composition of their naval brigades adhered to a three-battalion organizational construct. Secretary of the U.S. 

Navy, U.S. Department of the Navy, General Orders of the Navy Department: Series of 1913 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1918). 27 U.S. Department of the Navy, Register of the Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Naval Militia of the United States (Washington, DC: 

GPO, 1914).

28 Ibid., 28.

29 Of note, when war was declared, Power left the naval militia and joined the New York National Guard (NG) in May 1917 and was assigned to 

the 102d Sanitation Train, 27th Division, NG. He deployed for World War I in June 1918 and returned to Brooklyn, New York, in March 1919 to 

be discharged. New York State Adjutant General’s Office, Abstracts of National Guard Service in World War I, 1917–1919, Series 13721, New York 

State Archives, http://nysa32.nysed.gov/a/digital/images/about/about_military_wwi.shtml. 30 Charles H. Power to Capt F. B. Bassett, USN, letter, 25 January 1915, Reserve subject file, Historical Inquiries and Research Branch (HIRB), Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

31 Capt Bassett forwarding Power’s letter to MajGen Commandant George Barnett, Reserve subject file, HIRB, Marine Corps History Division, 

Quantico, VA.

32 Letter from MajGen George Barnett, 3 February 1915, Reserve subject file, HIRB, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
24 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

militias “be required to equip themselves with khaki 

and blue, including cap, sword, belt, gloves, leather 

puttees, campaign hat, etc.” He continued with the 

following:

It is recommended that Marine ocers and enlisted men of the Naval Militia wear the same 

rank devices and chevrons as in the regular service, and that they wear the Marine Corps insignia, with the same distinguishing mark that 

may be adopted for the Naval Militia.33

Calls for a United States

Marine Corps Reserve

Although more federal funding and equipment were 

provided to the militia aer the Spanish-American 

War, the militia remained an ineective solution to a 

presidential call for forces in time of war. While the 

inadequacies of the militia system were becoming 

more apparent at this point, incremental improvements continued.34 e states’ naval militia organizational eorts progressed signicantly with the 16 

February passing of the Naval Militia Act of 1914.35

e act placed the Naval Militia under the supervision of the Department of the Navy, authorizing annual inspections, assigning active-duty naval ocers 

as inspector-instructors for the units, establishing a 

board to standardize qualications for all naval militia ocers and enlisted men, and elevating the Oce 

of Naval Militia within the Department of the Navy 

to the larger Division of Naval Militia Aairs under 

the Bureau of Navigation.36

Despite the 1914 Naval Militia Act, the state militia was not seen as the panacea for the ills associated 

with mobilizing a force in response to a presidential 

call. Major General Barnett took the oath of oce as 

the 12th Commandant of the Marine Corps on 25 

February 1914,37 just days aer passage of the Militia Naval Act. Barnett and Secretary of the Navy 

Josephus Daniels began a series of meetings from 

which emerged a coordinated plan to increase the 

size of the Marine Corps and create a Marine Corps 

Reserve to meet the country’s ever-expanding expeditionary commitments and to provide a source for 

a manpower surge in the time of war.38

A demanding and decisive man of action with 

a natural bent for seeking eciencies,39 Secretary 

Daniels issued a succinct implementation order for 

the 1914 Naval Militia Act two months aer the legislation passed. In Department of the Navy General 

Order No. 93 of 12 April 1914, the secretary elevated 

the importance of the U.S. Naval Militia by enlarging 

the Oce of Naval Militia and renaming it the Division of Naval Militia Aairs.40 In that order, he also 

decreed that communications between the states, 

territories, District of Columbia, and Department of 

the Navy would be through the new division. at 

division would be responsible for all business pertaining to the Naval Militia including “armaments, 

Library of U.S. Congress, Harris & Ewing Collection

Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, 1913–21.

33 Ibid.

34 War College Division, General Staff Corps, The Militia as Organized Under the Constitution and Its Value to the Nation as a Military Asset, War 

Department Document No. 516 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1916), 19.

35 Naval Militia Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-57, 38 Stat. 283.

36 Division of Naval Militia Affairs, Navy Department, Naval Militia Annual Report for the Year 1914 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1915), 3, 4, 72. 37 LtCol Merrill L. Bartlett, “George Barnett,” in Commandants of the Marine Corps, ed. Allan R. Millett and Jack Shulimson (Annapolis, MD: U.S. 

Naval Institute Press, 2004), 176.

38 Marine Corps Reserve, 4. 39 Bartlett, “George Barnett,” 181–82.

40 General Orders of Navy Department.
Winter 2016 25

equipment, discipline, training, education, and organization of the Naval Militia.”41

Secretary Daniels further interpreted the Naval 

Militia Act of 1914 in his expansive Navy Department General Order No. 153, wherein he more clearly dened the scope of Marine units in the Marine 

Corps Branch, Naval Militia, and specied that federal funding was contingent on naval militia units 

complying with the order’s provisions by 16 February 

1917. In General Order 153, dated 10 July 1915, Daniels prescribed a “unit of organization” for the Marine 

element in the naval militias as a company with 3 of-

cers and 48 enlisted, but noted the companies may 

be greater or lesser in strength, depending on availability of men. In the 103-page order, he also speci-

ed qualication requirements and prerequisites for 

the dierent ranks and billets, provided guidance on 

professional examinations for advancement, and authorized the formation of Marine battalions and brigades, if men were available. e order allowed for 

honorably discharged Marine veterans to join naval 

militias without a professional examination.42

e secretary moved forward in organizing the 

naval militias and improving the professional skills 

of the militia members “in order that they will be 

eligible to be mustered into the service of the United 

States without further professional examination on 

the call of the president.”43 Barnett continued to press 

Congress for a ready reserve, noting that manpower 

was a paramount need and a standing reserve force 

would be of signicant assistance. In his annual report for scal year 1915, submitted 1 December, Barnett stated that “e Marine Corps has no reserve. 

During the last session of Congress a naval reserve, 

consisting of men who have seen service in the Navy, 

was created. e adoption of a similar proviso for the 

Marine Corps is recommended.”44

In addition to formal testimonies promoting increased manpower and the creation of a Reserve, efforts moved forward on other fronts with Congress. 

In his memoir e Reminiscences of a Marine, Major 

General John A. Lejeune, 13th Commandant of the 

Marine Corps, tells of becoming the Assistant to the 

Commandant in January 1915 while a colonel and 

working to ease the Marine Corps’ manpower de-

ciencies.45 General Lejeune noted that “probably 

the most important” undertaking while he was Assistant to the Commandant was his participation, 

along with Colonel Charles H. Lauchheimer, on the 

Navy and Marine Corps Personnel Board. e board 

worked with the House of Representatives for three 

months in the summer of 1915 to hammer out the 

manpower sections of the critically important Naval 

Appropriations Bill, which later became law.46

On 29 February 1916, Barnett, accompanied by 

Colonel Charles L. McCawley, quartermaster; Colonel George Richards, paymaster; and then-Colonel 

Lejeune, Assistant to the Commandant, testied before the House Committee on Naval Aairs. In his 

statement, Barnett once again strongly promoted the 

need for a Marine Corps Reserve.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer to the 

matter of a Marine Corps reserve. e Marine 

Corps has no reserve. is is a very important 

matter, and it is urgently recommended that 

legislation similar to that enacted for the Navy 

be also enacted for the Marine Corps. During 

the last session of Congress the headquarters 

oce of the Marine Corps urgently recommended the incorporation in the naval appropriation bill of a proviso for a Marine Corps 

reserve, and in the annual report of the Major 

General Commandant this recommendation 

was renewed.47

Congress Creates

a Marine Corps Reserve

e clarion call by Daniels and Barnett for a formal 

Reserve was nally heard. On 29 August 1916, the 

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., 3, 4, 9..

43 Ibid., 2.

44 Navy Department, Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1915 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1916) 761. 45 The billet title “Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps” was first used in October 1946, but in reading Gen Lejeune’s memoir, Lejeune’s 

duties as Assistant to the Commandant were similar to those of the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. “Marine Corps Assistant Commandants,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division, www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision/pages/frequently_requested/Assistant_Commandant.aspx.

46 MajGen John A. Lejeune, The Reminiscences of a Marine (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, 1930), 219, 227. 47 Hearings Before the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, 64th Cong. (29 February 1916) (statement of USMC MajGen Commandant George Barnett), 2143.
26 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

Sixty-Fourth Congress, in its rst session, authorized 

a Reserve in H.R. 15947. Specically, on the creation 

of the Reserve, the legislation set forth the following:

A United States Marine Corps Reserve, to be 

a constituent part of the Marine Corps and in 

addition to the authorized strength thereof, is 

hereby established under the same provisions 

in all respects (except as may be necessary to 

adapt the said provisions to the Marine Corps) 

as those providing for the Naval Reserve Force 

in this Act: Provided, at the Marine Corps 

Reserve may consist of not more than ve 

classes, corresponding, as near as may be, to the 

Fleet Naval Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Naval Coast Defense Reserve, the Volunteer Naval 

Reserve, and the Naval Reserve Flying Corps, 

respectively.48

e legislation addressed the manpower needs of 

the Navy and Marine Corps and ultimately gave the 

president more authority to mobilize the U.S. Naval 

Militia. e congressional work to nally improve 

the president’s access to the Naval Militia also created a new organization, the National Naval Volunteers, into which the president could order members 

of the Naval Militia and then federalize, or bring 

onto active service, those trained militiamen for war 

or other needs. Regarding the National Naval Volunteers, the legislation announced

that to provide a force for use in any emergency, 

including that of actual or imminent war, requiring the use of naval forces in addition to those of 

the regular Navy, of which emergency the president shall be, for the purposes of this Act, the 

sole judge, there is hereby created a force, to be 

known as the “National Naval Volunteers,” into 

which the President alone is authorized, under 

such regulations as he may prescribe, to at any 

time enroll, by commission, warrant, and enlistment, respectively, and without examination, 

such number as he may decide to enroll from 

among those of the Naval Militia . . .49

e secretary of the Navy moved quickly to publish the legislation through Navy Department channels. General Order No. 231, dated 31 August 1916, 

reprinted the legislation for the “information and 

guidance of all persons belonging to the Navy.”50

While the legislation creating the Marine Corps 

Reserve directed that it consist of not more than ve 

classes, similar to the Naval Reserve Force, the MaPhoto courtesy of Leatherneck magazine

As a senior colonel and then brigadier general, John 

A. Lejeune served in the billet of Assistant to the Commandant for MajGen Commandant George Barnett before taking command of Marine Barracks Quantico in 

September 1917.

48 U.S. Congress and Secretary of State, The Statutes at Large of the United States of America from December, 1915, to March, 1917: Concurrent 

Resolutions of the Two Houses of Congress and Recent Treaties, Conventions, and Executive Proclamations, vol. 39, part 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 

1917), 593.

49 Ibid., 595.

50 General Orders of the Navy Department.
Winter 2016 27

Classes of Marine Corps Reserve 

On 29 August 1916, congressional legislation created the Marine Corps Reserve. Subsequently, Marine 

Corps Order No. 13, dated 21 March 1917, laid out the implementation of that legislation, creating ve 

classes of Marine reservists for males. Legislation and the Marine Corps order did not address women 

in the Marine Corps Reserve because Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels did not grant the Marine Corps 

permission to enroll women in the Reserve until 12 August 1918.

Class 1: Fleet Marine Corps Reserve (FMCR)

1a. Ocers honorably discharged. 

1b. Men entitled to an honorable discharge aer at least one four-year enlistment. 

1c. Enlisted men who completed 16 years of honorable service and were transferred to the FMCR at the 

expiration of enlistment. 

1d. Enlisted men who completed 20 years of honorable service.

Class 2: Marine Corps Reserve A

All enrollments were restricted to U.S. citizens, and the commitment was for four years. 

2a. Ocers, provisional: must not be less than 20 or more than 40 years of age; not less than two years’ 

experience as an ocer in a military organization or military school or college; and pass a physical and professional examination. 

2b. Ocers, conrmation: aer three months active service, must pass another professional examination 

by a board of ocers and a physical examination to retain the provisional rank granted at enrollment.

2c. Enlisted men, provisional: must not be less than 18 or more than 35 years of age and of good character 

and show evidence of abilities.

2d. Enlisted men, conrmation: aer three months active service, could be conrmed in provisional rank 

by an appointed Marine Corps ocer.

Class 4: Marine Corps Reserve 

is class was for citizens with useful skills and had no age limit. ose enrolled could subsequently transfer to 

Class 2, if eligible. Oen underage or overage men took advantage of this category. 

4a. Ocers, provisional: must show proof of special skills needed in naval and reserve districts and pass 

a professional and physical examination.

4b. Ocers, conrmation: same as Class 2, 2b.

4c. Enlisted men, provisional: must provide evidence of character and citizenship and proof of needed 

special skills and pass a medical examination. e provisional rank given was based on skills of the applicant and 

the requirements of the district.

4d. Enlisted men, conrmation: same as Class 2, 2d.

Class 5: Marine Corps Reserve Flying Corps

Former ocers and men of the Marine Corps who were members of the Naval Flying Corps, surplus graduates of 

the aeronautic school, civilians skilled in ying, building or designing aircra, and other current members of the 

Marine Corps Reserve with aviation skills could enter this Marine Corps Reserve class. 

5a. Ocers, provisional: must provide proof of character and citizenship, qualify through a professional 

examination, and pass a medical examination.

5b. Ocers, conrmation: honorably discharged former ocers of the Naval Flying Corps and surplus 

graduates of the aeronautical school could be designated in this class without a prior provisional appointment. 

Marines appointed with a provisional rank must serve three months’ active duty service and be conrmed to that 

provisional rank through a professional examination and a medical examination.
28 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

rine Corps took time to evaluate the next step and 

did not clarify or dene those classes until months 

later. Marine Corps Order No. 13 (series 1917), dated 

21 March 1917, laid out the Marine Corps’ expected 

implementation of that legislation and dened the 

ve classes in the Reserve for men.51

e earlier eorts of the members of the Navy and 

Marine Corps Personnel Board also paid o as an 

increase in manpower was authorized in the August 

1916 legislation. e Marine Corps was granted an 

immediate increase in ocers from 344 to 597, and 

in enlisted men from 9,921 to 14,981. e legislation 

also authorized the president to further increase the 

number of ocers to 693 and enlisted men to 17,400 

in an emergency.52

Transfer of Personnel

of the National Naval Volunteers, 

Marine Corps Branch,

to Marine Corps Reserve

While the intent of the 1916 legislation was to create 

the Marine Corps Reserve and provide the president 

access to a trained militia in time of an emergency, 

the creation of the National Naval Volunteers caused 

confusion since both it and the Naval Militia had 

Marine Corps branches. Congress addressed the issue with an amendment to an appropriations bill for 

naval services on 1 July 1918, authorizing the president to transfer all personnel of the National Naval 

Volunteers as a class to the Naval Reserve Force, or 

the Marine Corps Reserve.53

On 10 July 1918, Barnett issued Marine Corps 

Order No. 34 (series 1918), stating that “from and 

including July 1, 1918, the personnel of the National 

Naval Volunteers, Marine Corps Branch, is transferred from that organization to Class 2, Marine 

Corps Reserve . . .” e order also conrmed that, 

in accordance with the congressional action, individuals transferred to the Reserve would retain their 

ranks on a provisional basis. Also, the Reserve would 

not conduct medical examinations or tests to gauge 

the professional competence of those brought in via 

transfer.54

Barnett then sent letters to the adjutants general 

of those states with National Naval Volunteers or 

Marine branches in their naval militias, informing 

them of his actions. ose letters, dated 11 July 1918, 

51 Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Revision of U.S. Marine Corps Orders, May, 1918 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1918), hereafter Revision of U.S. 

Marine Corps Orders, 104–20. Among other Marine Corps orders, the reference contains Marine Corps Order No. 13 (series 1917). 52 Maj Edwin N. McClellan, The United States Marine Corps in the World War (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters 

Marine Corps, 1968), 71. 

53 S. Doc. No. 7983, at 452 (1918).

54 Commandant of the Marine Corps, U.S. Marine Corps General Order No. 34, 10 July 1918, Reserve subject file, HIRB, Marine Corps History 

Division, Quantico, VA.

5c. Enlisted men, provisional: must provide proof of character, ability and citizenship and qualify through 

a professional examination for a provisional rank and pass a medical examination. is class had no age limit.

5d. Enlisted men, conrmation: honorably discharged men of the Naval Flying Corps aer at least one 

four-year enlistment in the Navy and those who were discharged aer a term of enlistment. Aer three months’ 

active duty service, a member could be conrmed in his provisional rank by qualifying before a designated Marine Corps ocer.

5e. Any enlisted Marine with 16 years’ service could transfer, with the authority of the Major General 

Commandant, at the end of his current enlistment contract to the Marine Corps Reserve Flying Corps if all other 

Class 5 requirements were met.

5f. Any enlisted Marine with 20 or more years enlisted service could transfer, with authority of the Major 

General Commandant, to the Marine Corps Reserve Flying Corps.

Class 6: Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve 

is class was comprised of men who met the qualications for the above classes and committed themselves but 

waived their retainer fee and uniform gratuity in time of peace. When called to active duty service in wartime, 

their pay was the same as the corresponding rank in the Marine Corps.

5c. Enlisted men, provisional: must provide proof of character, ability and citizenship and qualify through 

a professional examination for a provisional rank and pass a medical examination. is class had no age limit.

5d. Enlisted men, conrmation: honorably discharged men of the Naval Flying Corps aer at least one 

four-year enlistment in the Navy and those who were discharged aer a term of enlistment. Aer three months’ 

active duty service, a member could be conrmed in his provisional rank by qualifying before a designated Marine Corps ocer.

5e. Any enlisted Marine with 16 years’ service could transfer, with the authority of the Major General 

Commandant, at the end of his current enlistment contract to the Marine Corps Reserve Flying Corps if all other 

Class 5 requirements were met.

5f. Any enlisted Marine with 20 or more years enlisted service could transfer, with authority of the Major 

General Commandant, to the Marine Corps Reserve Flying Corps.

Class 6: Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve 

is class was comprised of men who met the qualications for the above classes and committed themselves but 

waived their retainer fee and uniform gratuity in time of peace. When called to active duty service in wartime, 

their pay was the same as the corresponding rank in the Marine Corps.
Winter 2016 29

went to the nine states with Marine units: California, 

Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, 

Oregon, Rhode Island, and Texas. e letters noted 

that should the Marine reservists who entered from 

state organizations be discharged from the Reserve, 

the adjutants general would be informed. Barnett 

then signed a letter that same day to the chief of the 

Division of Naval Militia Aairs, Bureau of Navigation, Department of the Navy, informing him of the 

actions to bring the militiamen and National Naval 

Volunteers into the Reserve.55

e Philadelphia Military

Training Corps

Recruiting for the Reserve was slow to begin, hampered by the fact that guidance on the dierent classes of reserves was not published by the Marine Corps 

until March 1917. When war was declared on 6 April 

1917, the Reserve had just 3 commissioned ocers 

and 36 enlisted men to call for active duty. e Marine Corps Branch of the National Naval Volunteers 

had 24 ocers and 928 enlisted men, also subject to 

the call for active duty.56

However, eorts not associated with the naval militia programs became a valuable source of trained 

manpower. Civilian military training programs, 

particularly the Philadelphia Military Training 

Corps—established with the resources of wealthy, 

conservative Philadelphian Anthony J. Drexel Biddle—garnered positive Marine Corps exposure and 

enlistments in the Reserve. 

Biddle was among a group of inuential individuals who foresaw America’s eventual involvement in 

World War I. In October 1915, with the consent of 

Barnett, Biddle created a training camp at Lansdowne, 

Pennsylvania, conducted by Marine noncommissioned ocers from Marine Barracks Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania. Aer the close of the camp, Marines 

from the Philadelphia barracks led periodic drills 

throughout the winter. ose trained in the camp became known as the “Drexel Biddle Citizens’ Army,” 

and by April 1916, more than 3,000 men had completed training. At that point, U.S. Representative 

omas S. Butler of Pennsylvania introduced a bill, 

which was approved, to provide $31,000 for the Marine Corps to train citizen soldiers.57

Also in April 1916, Biddle invited Barnett to speak 

at a Philadelphia Preparedness Campaign Committee dinner focused on raising money for a citizens’ 

army. e dinner aorded another opportunity for 

the Commandant to promote a citizens’ army, reinforcing his quest to pressure Congress into creating a 

Marine Corps Reserve. Pledging his support for the 

preparedness campaign, Barnett ordered Captain 

Logan Feland from Marine Barracks Philadelphia 

55 MajGen Barnett letter to chief of the Division of Naval Militia Affairs, Bureau of Navigation, Department of the Navy, 11 July 1918, Reserve subject file, HIRB, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA. In spite of the legislation and Barnett’s order, some Marines continued to be listed 

as National Naval Volunteers on unit muster rolls through World War I and during demobilization.

56 McClellan, United States Marine Corps in the World War, 11, 76. 57 Philadelphia War History Committee, Philadelphia in the World War, 1914–1919 (New York: Wynkoop, Hollenbeck, Crawford Co., 1922), 81.

Marine Corps History Division

MajGen Commandant George Barnett (1914–20) oversaw the largest expansion in Marine Corps manpower 

up to that time in the history of the Corps.
30 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

to command training during the summer of 1916 at 

Lansdowne.58

On 23 July, thousands of civilians attended the 

camp’s opening ceremony, and Barnett conducted 

a formal inspection. At the end of training on 28 

August, the Commandant returned to review the 

graduation parade. During the closing ceremony, 

Captain Feland called on the graduates to join the 

Reserve, and 74 percent of the men volunteered.59

At age 43, Biddle enrolled as a captain in the Reserve, Class 4, on 31 March 1917, not long before war 

was declared.60 By that time, the millionaire sportsman and philanthropist had signicantly rened his 

combat skills and inuenced many of Philadelphia’s 

nest to join the Reserve. One report stated that 

Biddle’s Philadelphia Military Training Corps recruited 40,000 men for the military, including 8,900 

for the Marine Corps.61 Biddle, initially assigned as 

a bayonet instructor at the new training site, Marine 

Barracks Paris Island, [sic] South Carolina,62 (name 

changed to Parris Island in 1919), became an instructor at the Marine ocer training camp at Marine Barracks Quantico, Virginia, by the fall of 1917. 

While there, he was sent as an observer to study both 

the French and British close combat training.63

Upon his return from Europe in the spring of 

58 David J. Bettez, Kentucky Marine: Major General Logan Feland and the Making of the Modern USMC (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 

2014), 76–77.

59 Ibid., 78.

60 U.S. Department of the Navy, Register of the Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the United States Navy, U.S. Naval Reserve Force and the 

Marine Corps, January 1, 1919 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1919), 870. 61 Robert B. Asprey, “The King of Kill,” Marine Corps Gazette 51, no. 5 (May 1967): 33. 62 The current Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island was Marine Barracks, Paris Island, SC, in 1917. The spelling changed to Parris Island in 

May 1919. Revision of U.S. Marine Corps Orders, MCO No. 27 (Series 1917), 129; and Elmore A. Champie, Brief History of Marine Corps Recruit 

Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1962), 4. 63 Asprey, “The King of Kill,” 33.

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck magazine

Logan Feland, as a captain in 1916, was instrumental in 

successfully recruiting men into the Marine Corps Reserve from the Philadelphia Military Training Corps.

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck magazine

Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, a millionaire philanthropist 

who helped form the Philadelphia Military Training 

Corps prior to WWI, enrolled as a captain in the Marine 

Corps Reserve in 1917 and taught personal combat 

techniques until released from active duty in 1919.
Winter 2016 31

1918, Biddle was assigned as an instructor in the Infantry Ocers’ School at Marine Barracks Quantico, 

teaching bayonet, knife ghting, and hand-to-hand 

combat. He continued to prepare ocers for war 

through the Armistice, transferring from Quantico 

to Marine Barracks Philadelphia on 1 January 1919, 

where he served as the athletics ocer until being 

released from active duty in July 1919.64

Biddle’s initiatives promoting civilian readiness 

indirectly helped to push legislation that created the 

Reserve and greatly assisted in providing trained 

manpower for America’s war eort. For the next three 

decades, Biddle continued to serve as a Marine Corps 

reservist. Biddle returned to active duty briey in 

World War II as a colonel, still spry and eective as an 

instructor in bayonet ghting, boxing, and jujitsu.65

Mobilization in the Naval Militia,

National Naval Volunteers, and

Marine Corps Reserve

As America moved toward war, recruitment numbers for the Marine Corps Branch of the Naval Militia 

topped out at 1,046 men on 1 April 1917. Recruitment for the militia had stopped while recruiting 

eorts for the Reserve picked up.66 Just as America 

declared war on 6 April 1917, the Reserve and Naval 

Militia mobilized that same day. Nearly all members 

LtCol Richard L. Cody (Ret)

Nine U.S. states included Marine Corps units in their naval militias at the beginning of WWI. They were mobilized as 

National Naval Volunteers (Marines).

64 “Anthony J. Drexel Biddle,” in “Headquarters Detachment, Officers Training Camp, Marine Barracks Quantico, VA, muster roll (MRoll), April–December 1918,” “Barracks Detachment, Marine Barracks Philadelphia Navy Yard, PA, MRoll, January 1919,” and “Third Reserve District MRoll, July 

1919,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

65 David J. Bettez, “The Marine Corps Prepares for War: The Philadelphia Military Training Camp,” Leatherneck 92, no.10 (October 2009), 51. 66 McClellan, United States Marine Corps in the World War, 76.
32 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

of the Naval Militia volunteered for enrollment in 

the National Naval Volunteers.67 e recruiting environment signicantly changed as patriotic fervor 

spread; three Marine Reserve companies, designated 

1st, 2d and 3d Reserve Companies, 68 were immediately recruited in Philadelphia, many most probably 

sourced from Drexel Biddle Citizens’ Army, and began training at the Philadelphia Navy Yard.

Militia and National 

Naval Volunteers

Aer members of the state militias and National Naval Volunteers were mustered into federal service, 

members of the Marine units were ordered to rendezvous sites and then dispatched to various naval 

stations. Upon arriving at these naval stations, the 

Marine Corps disbanded the units and men were 

brought into the Marine Corps and sent to Marine 

installations to join units based on the needs of the 

Marine Corps. Some ocers in the Marine Corps 

Reserve and National Naval Volunteers applied 

for temporary appointments in the regular Marine 

Corps with the goal of becoming regular active duty 

ocers. Noncommissioned ocers were tested and 

evaluated to conrm their ranks and determine their 

occupational ratings.69

Uniforms 

As the Marine Corps grew in numbers with the in-

ux of Marines from the National Naval Volunteers 

and Reserve, Barnett extended the uniform guidance given to Marines in the state naval militias to 

Marines serving in the National Naval Volunteers 

and Reserve. 

Marine Corps Order No. 17 (series 1917), signed 14 

April 1917, directed that ocers and enlisted men of 

the National Naval Volunteers and the Reserve wear 

the same uniforms as ocers and enlisted men of the 

regular Marine Corps but with a distinguishing device. Ocers in the National Naval Volunteers wore 

a metal “V” on their coat collars, overcoat shoulder 

straps, and eld hats. Enlisted men of the National 

Naval Volunteers wore a metal “V” on the eld hat. 

Reserve ocers wore a metal “R” on the collars of 

“undress, white, and eld coats and on the shoulder 

straps of the overcoat.” Reserve ocers also wore the 

metal “R” on “the eld hat with the bottom of the letter resting on the top of the hatband” and centered 

underneath the “eyelet for the corps device.”70

Training

With a small Reserve at the beginning of World War 

I, the multitude of young men who volunteered at 

the onset of the war overwhelmed the Marine recruit depots. e two Marine Corps recruit training 

sites for enlisted men—Paris Island [sic] and Mare 

Island—were initially unprepared for the growth in 

the number of recruits. While the facilities were being expanded, a temporary recruit depot with capacity for 2,500 recruits was established at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. Another temporary recruit training 

facility with a capacity for 500 opened at the Norfolk 

Navy Yard. By the end of the war, the Marine Corps 

had signicantly enlarged both primary recruit 

67 U.S. Department of the Navy, Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1917 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1918), 25. 68 “United States Reserve, 1914–1940,” a summary paper, Reserve subject file, HIRB, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

69 “Marine Corps Militia,” Marine Magazine, July 1917, 4. 70 Revision of U.S. Marine Corps Orders, 125. 

Marine Corps History Division

After being called to federal service in 1917, 2dLt 

Newton Best, California Naval Militia (Marines), was assigned as the post athletics officer for Marine Barracks 

Mare Island.
Winter 2016 33

Table 1. Marine Corps Reserve Units Activated for the First World War

71 Department of the Navy, Register of the Naval Militia of the States, Territories, and of the District of Columbia, January 1, 1917 (Washington, 

DC: GPO, 1917), 228, and “National Naval Volunteers (MC), 36th Company, Marine Barracks Mare Island, CA MRoll, 6 April-30 April 1917,” and 

“98th Company, Marine Barracks Mare Island MRoll, 1 September-30 September 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division.

72 “Louisiana Company, National Naval Volunteers (MOB) MRoll, 6 April-30 April 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division.

73 LtCol Eben Putnam, A. of U.S., ed., Report of the Commission on Massachusetts’ Part in the World War: History, vol.1 (Boston, MA: The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1931), 28; and “1st Marine Company (Mass.), National Naval Volunteers MRoll, 7 April-30 April 1917,” HIRB, Marine 

Corps History Division.

74 Ibid., 155-56; and James R. Walsh, Officers’ Data Card, Archives-Museum Branch, The Adjutant General’s Office, Concord, MA.

75 “New York Company, National Naval Volunteers MRoll, 6 April-11 April 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division.

76 “Eastern Recruiting Division MRoll, 1November-30 November, 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA; and New York Adjutant General, Annual Report of the Adjutant General of The State of New York, 1917 (Albany, NY: J.B. Lyon Co., 1920), 20. 77 “1st Marine Company, 3d Battalion, National Naval Volunteers, Tonawanda, NY MRoll, 7 April-7 May 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division.

78 “2d Marine Company, 3d Battalion, National Naval Volunteers, Rochester, NY MRoll, 6 April-6 May 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division.

79 “Ohio Company, National Naval Volunteers, Marine Barracks New York MRoll, 7 April-30 April 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division. 

80 Oregon Secretary of State, Oregon Blue Book, 1917-1918, compiled by Ben W. Olcott, Secretary of State (Salem, OR: State Printing Department, 1918), 114; and “Marine Corps Militia,” Marine Magazine, July, 1917, 4. 81 “Company A, Texas National Naval Volunteers MRoll, 12 April-30 April 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division.

82 “Company B, Texas National Naval Volunteers MRolls 7 April-30 April 1917 and 1May-4 May 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division. 

83 “Company C, Texas National Naval Volunteers MRoll 6 April-30 April 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division.

84 “Company D, Texas Naval Militia (Marine Corps Branch) MRoll 6 April-30 April 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division.

85 “1st Marine Company, (R.I.), National Naval Volunteers MRoll 7 April-30 April 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division.

86 “Marine Company, National Naval Volunteers, 1st Regiment, Marine Barracks Navy Yard Philadelphia MRoll 9 April-30 April 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division.

Unit Activated Commander Location

Marine Company, 7th Division, 2d 

Battalion, California Naval Militia 

became 36th Company

6 April 1917 Capt Newton Best Exposition Park, Los Angeles moved to Marine Barracks 

Mare Island, California71

Marine Company, 1st Battalion, 

Louisiana Naval Militia, New 

Orleans

6 April 1917 Capt Sidney S. Simpson Marine Barracks Naval Station New Orleans72

1st Marine Company, Massachusetts Naval Militia, Boston27 March 1917 Capt George H. Manks Charlestown (Boston) Navy Yard73

2d Marine Company, Massachusetts Naval Militia, Leominster, 

Massachusetts

9 May 1917 1stLt James R. Walsh

(discharged 18 June 1917)

Charlestown (Boston) Navy Yard74

Marine Company, 2d Battalion, 

New York Naval Militia, Brooklyn

6 April 1917 1stLt James F. Rorke Northport, New York, power station75

1st Marine Company, 1st Battalion, New York Naval Militia, New 

York City

26 April 1917 1stLt Stanford W. Hoffman Marine Barracks Brooklyn Navy Yard, New York76

1st Marine Company, 3d Battalion, 

New York Naval Militia, Tonawanda

7 April 1917 1stLt Alan V. Parker Marine Barracks Brooklyn Navy Yard77

2d Marine Company, 3d Battalion, 

New York Naval Militia, Rochester

7 May 1917 2dLt Clarence Ball Marine Barracks Brooklyn Navy Yard78

Marine Company, 2d Battalion, 

Ohio Naval Militia, Cleveland

7 April 1917 1stLt Jonas H. Platt Marine Barracks Brooklyn Navy Yard79

Marine Company, Oregon Naval 

Militia, Portland

6 April 1917 2dLt Richard I. Heller Marine Barracks Puget Sound Navy Yard, Washington80

Company A, Texas Naval Militia 6 April 1917 Capt Thomas R. Shearer Marine Barracks Pensacola, Florida81

Company B, Texas Naval Militia 6 April 1917 Capt Percy D. Cornell Marine Barracks Pensacola, Florida82

Company C, Texas Naval Militia 6 April 1917 Capt William N. Pearson Marine Barracks Charleston Navy Yard, South Carolina83

Company D, Texas Naval Militia 6 April 1917 Capt Angus A. Acree Marine Barracks Norfolk Navy Yard, Virginia84

1st Marine Company, Rhode 

Island Naval Militia, Providence

6 April 1917 Capt John H. Sadler Marine Barracks Boston Navy Yard85

Marine Company, Illinois Naval 

Militia, Chicago

6 April 1917 Capt Franklin T. Steele Marine Barracks Philadelphia Navy Yard86
34 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

Clarence Ball

Clarence Ball, a member of the Sons of the American Revolution, Empire State Society1

, enlisted 

in the New York Naval Militia in Rochester in 1892 and served as a petty ocer in the U. S. Navy 

during the Spanish-American War, was promoted to rst lieutenant in the Marine Corps Branch, 

New York Naval Militia in August 1917 and ordered to the ocers training camp in Quantico, Virginia. 

He joined the 5th Regiment in France in June 1918 in time for the beginning of the battle of Belleau Wood 

on 6 June. Ball fought at Soissons, the Saint-Mihiel salient, and the Champagne sector. During the battle 

of Blanc Mont Ridge, he assumed command of Company M, 5th Regiment, aer the commanding ocer 

was wounded and evacuated. Hospitalized for wounds received during his time in the Champagne sector, 

Ball yielded command in early November 1918 and was evacuated back to the United States.1

Ball was cited for gallantry in action while serving with the 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, 

American Expeditionary Forces, at Château-ierry, France, 6–10 July 1918 and authorized to wear a 

silver star “on the ribbon of the Victory Medals awarded him.”2

 Ball was honorably discharged from the 

Marine Corps Reserve on 6 October 1919 as a captain.3

1 Edward R. Foreman, ed., World War Service Record of Rochester and Monroe County New York, vol. 2, Those Who Went Forth to Serve 

(Rochester, NY: City of Rochester, 1928), 58.

2 “Clarence Ball,” Hall of Valor, http://valor.militarytimes.com/recipient.php?recipientid=75048,1910.

3 “Barracks Detachment, Marine Barracks Quantico, VA, MRoll, 1 October–31 October 1919,” roll 0181, ancestry.com.

training facilities and set the duration of training at 

eight weeks.87

e Marine Corps pursued ocers dierently. Before legislation authorized the formation of a Reserve 

in August 1916, Commandant Barnett brought 18 of 

the best Marine noncommissioned ocers to Washington, DC, for ocer testing. On 7 August, 12 enlisted Marines passed the exam. Aer legislation for the 

Reserve was approved, the Commandant sent a letter 

to colleges with military training curriculums oering 

graduates the opportunity to take an examination on 

18 September 1916 to become a Reserve ocer. Only 

24 candidates passed the exam, so the Commandant 

oered a second examination (military training was 

not necessary) in November 1916 for any civilian.88

Ocers appointed directly from civilian life went 

to the Marine barracks at Mare Island and San Diego, 

California; the Marine Corps Rie Range Winthrop, 

Maryland; and Paris Island89 [sic] until the Ocers 

Camp of Instruction could be opened at Marine Barracks Quantico. e rst contingent of 345 untried, 

new lieutenants arrived at Quantico in July 1917.90

Marine Corps History Division

Capt Jonas H. Platt resigned from the National Naval 

Volunteers to accept a regular commission in the Marine Corps in September 1917. He earned a Navy Cross 

and a Purple Heart in the battle of Bois de Belleau on 6 

June 1918. 

87 McClellan, United States Marine Corps in the World War, 25. 88 Bernard C. Nalty and LtCol Ralph F. Moody, A Brief History of U.S. Marine Corps Officer Procurement, 1775–1969 (Washington, DC: Historical 

Division, HQMC, 1958, rev. ed. 1970), 4..

89 McClellan, United States Marine Corps in the World War, 22. 90 LtCol Charles A. Fleming, Capt Robin L. Austin, and Capt Charles A. Braley III, Quantico: Crossroads of the Marine Corps (Washington, DC: 

History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1978), 26.
Winter 2016 35

In June 1917, aer success in these early eorts, 

the Commandant issued Marine Corps Order No. 

25 (series 1917), discontinuing the enrollment of 

civilians because he believed this source for ocers 

was no longer required. Instead, the Marine Corps 

would appoint graduates of the U.S. Naval Academy 

and enlisted men who distinguished themselves in 

active service.91

In April 1917 at the beginning of U.S. involvement 

in World War I, more than 50 percent of active duty 

U.S. Marines (13,725) were serving outside the continental United States, either onboard U.S. Navy ships 

(2,236) or ashore (4,733).92 With the adopted slogan 

of “First to Fight,” the Marine Corps quickly carved 

out the 7th, 8th, and 9th Regiments for the continuing commitments of the Advanced Base Force, with 

all remaining regiments intended for the American 

Expeditionary Forces (AEF).93

At that time, Marine Corps manpower was 

stretched. However, with the assistance of the emerging Reserve and National Naval Volunteers, the Marine Corps lled a request from Secretary of War 

Marine Corps History Division

John W. Thomason Jr. enlisted as a private in the Texas Naval Militia, mobilized as a gunnery sergeant with 

Company A, Texas Naval Militia, then commissioned in 

Company C. He gained fame as an author and illustrator and passed away in 1944 as a Marine colonel.

Marine Corps History Division

Capt Franklin T. Steele, Naval Militia Illinois, accepted 

a regular commission in the Marine Corps and served 

in the Heavy Artillery Force, Marine Barracks Quantico 

during WWI.

91 Revision of U.S. Marine Corps Orders, 128; and Nalty and Moody, A Brief History of U.S. Marine Corps Officer Procurement, 76. 92 McClellan, United States Marine Corps in the World War, 9, 11. 93 Col Robert Debs Heinl Jr., Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775–1962 (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1962), 193.
36 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

Newton D. Baker Jr. for a regiment of Marines to be 

part of the AEF in France. Within weeks, the Marine 

Corps’ 5th Regiment sailed from Philadelphia.94

e regiment ocially organized at the Philadelphia Navy Yard on 7 June 1917, just one week prior 

to departing for France on 14 June.95 Commanded by 

Colonel Charles A. Doyen, the regiment consisted of 

70 ocers and 2,689 enlisted men96 drawn from ship 

detachments, naval stations, and barracks plus newly enlisted men from the Reserve and National Naval 

Volunteers.97 e Reserve was of critical importance 

when the Marine Corps was called to war quickly; 

for example, 75 of the 123 Marines of the regiment’s 

Supply Company were reservists. Most of these men 

came from 1st and 2d Marine Reserve Companies 

in training in Philadelphia.98 e June muster rolls 

for 5th Regiment units included 16 Reserve ocers, 

1 ocer in the National Naval Volunteers, Marine 

Branch, 88 Reserve enlisted men, 74 enlisted men in 

the National Naval Volunteers, and 2 enlisted men 

in the U.S. Naval Militia, Marine Branch, who had 

not yet been brought into the National Naval Volunteers.99

Many reservists and National Naval Volunteers 

in the AEF ground forces in France were in units of 

the 4th Brigade, 2d Division.100 e brigade earned 

honors from actions taken in the Aisne defensive 

and the battles at Hill 142, Bouresches, and Belleau 

Wood—which garnered international recognition 

for U.S. Marines—and at Soissons, Saint-Mihiel, 

Library of Congress, Harris & Ewing Collection

MajGen Commandant George Barnett inspects the sights and action of a Lewis machine gun at the Marine Corps 

Rifle Range Winthrop, MD, in 1917.

94 George B. Clark, Devil Dogs: Fighting Marines of World War I (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, Inc., 1999), 2–3. 95 Ibid., 2.

96 McClellan, United States Marine Corps in the World War, 9. 97 Clark, Devil Dogs, 2. 98 “Supply Company, 5th Regiment, onboard USS Hancock, MRoll, 12 June–30 June 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA. 99 “5th Regiment Field and Staff MRoll, 8 June–30 June 1917” and the muster rolls of “Headquarters Company, 5th Regiment; Supply Company, 

5th Regiment” and the companies of “1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, 2d Battalion, 5th Regiment and 3d Battalion, 5th Regiment, June 1917,” HIRB, 

Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

100 "2d Division General Recapitulation MRoll, 1 November–30 November 1918,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
Winter 2016 37

Blanc Mont, the crossing of the Meuse River, and 

during the occupation of Germany, all of which motivated U.S. Marines and instilled the Marine Corps 

in the hearts of Americans. 

e Marine Corps Reserve during 

the War but Not “Over ere”

While most of the mobilized Marine Corps Reserve, 

U.S. Naval Militia, and National Naval Volunteers 

were deployed with units in France, many remained 

in the United States at bases and stations, some were 

in U.S. Navy ships’ detachments and others were 

with Marine units scattered around the globe. 

As America’s involvement in World War I became 

unavoidable, bands of rebels created unrest and disturbed sugar production in Cuba. As early as March 

1917, Marines deployed from Haiti to Cuba to ensure the continued safety of the Allied sugar supply. 

With continued disruption of sugar-producing efforts and an outcry from American sugar producers, 

the Marine Corps activated the 7th Regiment, one of 

the Advanced Base Force regiments, in Philadelphia 

on 14 August 1917 under Lieutenant Colonel Melville J. Shaw.101 e regiment arrived in Guantanamo 

Bay, Cuba, on 27 August 1917.102

With signicant eorts to assemble a ghting 

force for Europe, lling out the 7th Regiment for 

Cuba required Reserve participation, specically 

for the headquarters company. Marine regiments, 

at this time, were not organized in battalions but 

were formed for expeditionary service with a headquarters and a varying number of companies based 

on the need.103 e 7th Regiment included a headquarters company and eight infantry companies. Of 

the 120 men in Headquarters Company, 7th Regiment, 42 were reservists and all transferred in from 

the 1st Marine Reserve Company, Marine Barracks 

Philadelphia.104 e eight companies in the regiment—37th, 59th, 71st, 72d, 86th, 90th, 93d, and 

94th—were less dependent on the Reserve for men. 

However, two of the three ocers in each company 

were reservists except in 59th Company, which had 

one Marine Corps Regular, one Reserve, and one of-

cer from the National Naval Volunteers.105

Oil was another resource critical to the Allied war 

eort. e U.S. Navy and Allies were dependent on 

the Mexican oil elds, but deteriorating relations and 

continued turmoil in Mexico in 1917 caused concern 

about undisrupted oil supply. e infamous “Zimmermann Telegram” prompted action.106 To ensure 

the ow of oil from Mexico and to promote stability 

Library of Congress, Charles Buckles Falls, 

World War I Posters Collection

Premiers au feu means “First to Fight” in English, and 

the Marines meant to live up to that reputation by getting to France with the American Expeditionary Forces 

in June 1917.

101 James S. Santelli, A Brief History of the 7th Marines (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1980), 1. 102 J. Robert Moskin, The U.S. Marine Corps Story, 3d rev. ed. (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), 156; and “Headquarters, 7th Marine 

Regiment MRoll, 14 August–31 August 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

103 James S. Santelli, A Brief History of the 8th Marines (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1976), 1–2. 104 “Headquarters, 7th Marine Regiment MRoll, 14 August–31 August 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division. 105 “37th, 59th, 71st, 72d, 86th, 90th, 93d, and 94th Companies, 7th Marine Regiment, USMC, MRoll, 1–31 August 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps 

History Division, Quantico, VA.

106 Communiqué from the German foreign secretary, Arthur Zimmermann, to the German ambassador to Mexico that promised significant financial support to Mexico if it allied with Germany against the United States. BGen Edwin Howard Simmons and Col Joseph H. Alexander, Through 

the Wheat: The U.S. Marines in World War I (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2008), 2.
38 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

in relations with Mexico, once again the president 

turned to the Marine Corps for a ready reserve force, 

and the Corps responded with the 8th Regiment. 

e 8th Regiment of the Advanced Base Force was 

activated at Marine Barracks Quantico on 9 October 

1917 under the command of Major Ellis B. Miller. 

e 8th Regiment became an infantry regiment with 

a headquarters and three companies—105th, 106th, 

and 107th. Within the month, it added 103d, 104th, 

108th, 109th, and 110th Companies from Marine 

Barracks Mare Island, and two additional companies were organized from men at Marine Barracks 

Quantico—111th and 112th Companies.107 Once 

again, the Reserve helped the Corps quickly eld the 

new regiment. e regiment’s Headquarters Company stood up on 9 October with 39 men on its muster 

roll, 20 of whom were reservists.108 Each of the companies, except the 109th and 111th, included Marine 

Corps reservists and National Naval Volunteers.109

On 2 November 1917, Colonel Laurence H. Moses 

arrived at Quantico from Marine Barracks New York 

and assumed command of the regiment the next day. 

en, exactly one month aer being activated, the 

8th Regiment boarded USS Hancock (AP 3) and, on 

10 November 1917, sailed for Fort Crockett, Texas, 

on Galveston Island and arrived on 18 November.110

e regiment’s mission was to prepare to move swi-

ly to land on the Mexican coast and seize the major 

oil elds near Tampico, Mexico. e 8th Regiment, 

joined by 9th Regiment in August 1918, remained at 

Fort Crockett under the command of 3d Provisional 

Brigade until early 1919.111

e third regiment intended for the Advanced 

Base Force—the 9th Regiment—was formed at Marine Barracks Quantico on 20 November 1917 with 

a headquarters, one machine gun company, the 14th 

Library of Congress, United States Army Signal Corps

Marines in France dig trenches during training for battle.

107 Santelli, A Brief History of the 8th Marines, 1. 108 “Headquarters Company, 8th Marine Regiment MRoll, 9–31 October 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA. 109 “103d, 104th, 105th, 106th, 107th, 108th, 109th, 110th, 111th, and 112th Companies, 8th Marine Regiment, USMC MRoll, 1–31 October 

1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

110 “Headquarters Company, 8th Marine Regiment MRoll, 1–30 November 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA. 111 Santelli, A Brief History of the 8th Marines, 2.
Winter 2016 39

Company, and eight rie companies—36th, 100th, 

121st, 122d, 123d, 124th, 125th, and 126th.112 Again, 

the Reserve and the National Naval Volunteers played 

a key role. e headquarters of the newly formed 

9th Regiment had 22 men on its muster roll on the 

day the regiment was activated, and 19 were Marine 

Corps reservists.113 On 20 November, the 36th Company, 9th Regiment, had 4 Marine Corps reservists 

and 41 National Naval Volunteers to a total strength 

of 117 men.114 While the 100th Company reported 

only 1 Marine Corps reservist and 7 National Naval 

Volunteers to a strength of 111 men,115 the remaining ve companies, 121st through 126th, reported 

no Marine Corps reservists or National Naval Volunteers on their muster rolls.116

Numbers Reect Wartime

Signicance of the Reserve

An examination of the “General Recapitulation” 

of the Marine Corps’ November 1918 muster rolls 

for the 4th Brigade, 2d Division, AEF, reveals that 

28.9 percent (86 of 212) of the ocers and 11 percent (1,040 of 8,372) of the enlisted men in the brigade were Marine Corps reservists.117 In that month, 

November 1918, the Reserve attained its highest 

strength: 6,773.118

Certainly the Reserve suered its share of casualties in a war where the Marine Corps endured more 

casualties in eight months than during its entire 142 

years of existence.119 In February 1919, Barnett reLibrary of Congress, Harris & Ewing Collection

Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels visits Marines during training at the newly activated Marine Barracks Quantico in 1918.

112 Truman R. Strobridge, A Brief History of the 9th Marines (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1967), 1. 113 “Headquarters, 9th Marine Regiment MRoll, 20 November–30 November 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division. 114 “36th Company, 9th Marine Regiment MRoll, 20 November–30 November 1917, HIRB, Marine Corps History Division. 115 “100th Company, 9th Marine Regiment MRoll, 1 November–30 November 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division. 116 “121st, 122d, 123d, 124th, 125th, and 126th Companies, 9th Marine Regiment MRoll, 1 November– 30 November 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps 

History Division.

117 “2d Division General Recapitulation MRoll, 1 November–30 November 1918,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division. 118 McClellan, United States Marine Corps in the World War, 76. 119 Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, 219. 
40 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

ported that 7 Marine Reserve ocers and 156 enlisted men were killed in action, and 8 Reserve of-

cers and 61 enlisted men died of other causes. e 

6,435 Marines reported wounded were not separated 

by component, Regular or Reserve, so a denite look 

at this measure of sacrice for the Reserve is not possible.120

e deaths reect the sacrice and commitment 

of Marine Corps reservists. e decorations awarded 

to reservists punctuate the signicance of the contributions the Reserve made to the war eort. One 

Marine reservist, Second Lieutenant Ralph Talbot, 

earned the Medal of Honor. Forty Marine reservists 

or Marines enrolled via the Naval Militia or National 

Naval Volunteers were awarded the Navy Cross with 

many also earning a Distinguished Service Cross for 

the same actions.121 Captain Percy D. Cornell, who 

entered the Marine Corps via the Texas Naval Militia, Marine Branch, was awarded the Navy Cross 

twice for separate actions.122

Private Roy H. Simpson, who joined the Reserve 

in Philadelphia assigned to 1st Reserve Company, 

Marine Barracks Philadelphia,123 was awarded a 

Navy Cross for heroic actions while serving with the 

47th Company, 5th Regiment, during the attack on 

Belleau Wood. On 12 June 1918, Simpson was carrying a message from battalion headquarters to his 

company when he was apparently shot. Initially reported as killed in action and posthumously awarded 

the Navy Cross,124 Simpson was actually a prisoner 

of war being held at Rastatt, Baden, Germany. He 

was released on 6 December 1918 and returned to 

his unit in France on 19 January 1919.125

Several Marine reservists were awarded Navy Distinguished Service medals in addition to the Navy 

Cross, but only one Marine reservist was recognized 

solely with the Navy Distinguished Service medal. 

Second Lieutenant Frank Nelms Jr. earned the medal “for extraordinary heroism as a pilot in the First 

Marine Aviation Force” during several air raids and 

for his participation in the airdrop of supplies to an 

isolated French army unit in October 1918. Nelms 

ew in at an altitude of 100 feet and dropped food 

under intense rie and machine-gun re, not once, 

but three times.126 Nelms was commissioned in the 

Reserve, Class 5, and was among those former U.S. 

Naval Reserve Force pilots discharged to enter the 

Reserve to meet the need for pilots in the Day Wing, 

Northern Bombing Group.127

Two reservists earned the Distinguished Service 

Cross (DSC): Private Sydney G. Gest128 and Second 

Lieutenant Fred omas. For two separate actions, 

omas earned two DSCs and a Navy Distinguished 

Service medal. Always in the thick of the action, 

omas also earned four Silver Star citations.129

When war was declared in April 1917, the U.S. 

Marine Corps had less than 14,000 men in activeduty ranks, with another 1,091 Reserve and National 

Naval Volunteers available for active duty. By mid 

November 1918, the Marine Corps had more than 

75,000 men and women on active duty, and 7,256 

were members of the Reserve. While the Reserve 

represented not quite 10 percent of the Marine Corps 

at the end of the war, its growth in approximately 17 

months was phenomenal.130

Demobilization

Immediately aer the Armistice of 11 November 

1918 went into eect, demobilization began. e 1st 

Marine Aviation Force, which returned to the United States in December 1918,131 disbanded in February 1919, and Marine Flying Field Miami, Florida, 

120 The Marine Corps Reserve, 10. 121 Crosschecked search results of Reserve awards using C. Douglas Sterner, ed., Marine Corps Heroes, Medal of Honor, vol.1 and Marine Corps 

Heroes, Navy Cross 1915-WWII, vol. 2, (Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace, 2015); “Preserving the History of Recipients of the Medal of Honor,” homeofheroes.com; and Jane Blakeney, Heroes: U.S. Marine Corps, 1861–1955, Armed Forces Awards Flags (Washington, DC: Guthrie Lithograph 

Co. 1957).

122 Sterner, Marine Corps Heroes, vol. 2, 27. 123 “1st Marine Company, Marine Barracks Philadelphia Navy Yard MRoll, 3 April–30 April 1917,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division. 124 Sterner, Marine Corps Heroes, vol. 2, 84. 125 “47th Company, 5th Marine Regiment MRoll, 1 June–30 June 1917” and “rewritten 10 November 1931,” HIRB, Marine Corps History Division 126 To read the award citation, see “Frank Nelms, Jr.,” Hall of Valor, http://valor.militarytimes.com/recipient.php?recipientid=16730. 127 Reginald Wright Arthur, Contact! Naval Aviators Careers (Washington, DC: Naval Aviator Register, 1967), 229. 128 Blakeney, Heroes: U.S. Marine Corps, 1861-1955, 86. 129 Ibid.,153. 130 McClellan, United States Marine Corps in the World War, 9, 11, 76. 131 Ibid., 75.
Winter 2016 41

closed in September 1919.132 With the end of the war, 

the number of Reserve aviators quickly dropped. On 

9 September 1918, the Reserve Flying Corps had 11 

rst lieutenants and 118 second lieutenants. A Marine aviator list published 13 March 1919 reected 

just 13 rst lieutenants and 60 second lieutenants. 133

e number continued to drop as men transitioned 

to inactive status or became members of the regular 

component.

Marines in the brigades were released on a different basis, with individual requests for release 

processed as they were received until the new scal 

year began on 1 July 1919. e Naval Appropriations 

Act approved on 11 July 1919 provided the Marine 

Corps with funds for an average strength of 27,400 

enlisted men plus ocers. e pace of demobilization for the brigades then signicantly increased. 

e Marine Corps completed demobilization of the 

brigades on 13 August. e transfer of reservists on 

active duty to inactive status was completed on 25 

August 1919.134

While the World War I Marine reservists returned 

U.S. Army Signal Corps photograph courtesy of Leatherneck magazine

Marines go into the attack in the Meuse-Argonne area, 1918.

132 LtCol Edward C. Johnson, Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years, 1912–1940, ed., Graham A. Cosmas (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1991), 17.

133 Headquarters Marine Corps, “A list of Officers of the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Reserve on Active Duty Arranged According to Rank,” booklet, 9 September 1918; and “A list of Officers of the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Reserve on Active Duty Arranged According to Rank,” booklet, 

13 March 1919, Francis T. Evans, Personal Papers Collection, U.S. Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections, Marine Corps University, Gray 

Research Center, Quantico, VA.

134 LtCol Frank E. Evans, “Demobilizing the Brigades,” Marine Corps Gazette 4, no. 4 (December 1919): 303–4.
42 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

to their homes, just as militiamen had done for more 

than a century, a new and vital source of military capability emerged through the Reserve. Evolutionary 

changes in American interests, a more international 

bent, proved the need for a military that could be 

called upon to do more than “execute the laws of the 

Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.” 

e citizen-soldier construct, so important to the 

founders of the Republic, was maintained. Although 

an embryonic force in World War I, the Reserve 

contributions were signicant. It was born at just the 

right time. 

e second, and concluding part, of the special 

feature on the Reserve in World War I focuses on the 

birth, growth, and contributions of the Reserve Flying Corps and the Reserve (Female). s1775s
Captain Steven L. Oreck, USN (Ret)

Introduction

The period between the First and Second 

World Wars saw the development of warfare concepts not previously seen and 

other concepts that were, at most, still in 

their infancy at the end of World War I. e notion 

of amphibious warfare was not new but certainly 

had not been advanced as a modern technique. e 

United States Marine Corps led the development of 

amphibious warfare doctrine and equipment. One 

piece of the overall doctrine that needed to be established and rened was medical support for amphibious warfare, which was the responsibility of 

Navy medical sta assigned to support the Marines. 

As such, a relatively small group of physicians networked to create workable medical support doctrine 

for amphibious warfare and contributed to the ability of U.S. forces to undertake amphibious operations 

when America entered World War II.

Medicine and warfare have been bound together for millennia, almost as long as there have been 

organized militaries and individuals identied as 

doctors. Hippocrates advised the aspiring iatros

(physicians/surgeons) that, if they wanted to be 

surgeons, they should follow the army.1

 e ImpeDevelopment of Medical Doctrine 

for Amphibious Warfare by the U.S.

Navy and Marine Corps, 1920–39

PART I

rial Roman Army had a well organized and ecient 

medical service that set standards not exceeded 

until relatively modern times.2

 While the general 

principles of military medical care and the organization of a military medical service have remained 

constant, in many ways, the details of this care must 

adapt to the circumstances of each campaign. e 

physical environment, the weapons employed, and 

the technology of transport are as important as the 

advances in medical care. As such, amphibious warfare requires that medical doctrine be tailored to t 

the unique environment, weapons, and transport vehicles used in this mode of warfare. 

Once the Marines had identied a role for which 

they were particularly suited, and one for which the 

Army wanted no part, the Corps had to develop the 

appropriate doctrine.3

 Military doctrine provides a 

road map for planning and carrying out a set of operations to achieve a given objective. At a minimum, 

doctrine provides a list of tasks, both planning and 

operational, that must be accomplished and usually 

denes who is responsible for those actions. Doctrine gives all of the participants a common starting 

point and vocabulary, thereby allowing for coordinated planning and execution.

Although amphibious operations have taken 

place as far back in history as the Persian invasions 

of Greece, there are no large-scale, successful recent 

1 For more on Hippocrates, see “Who’s Who in Greek Medicine: Hippocrates,” GreekMedicine, http://www.greekmedicine.net/whos_who/Hippocrates.html.

2 See “The Military Medicine of Ancient Rome,” World History in Context, 2001, http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/whic/ReferenceDetailsPage/Referen

ceDetailsWindow?zid=7a6408a0d3ad1dc47110c6f113b7595b&action=2&catId=&documentId=GALE%7CCV2643450064&source=Bookmar

k&u=lith7757&jsid=49995908fcd7eeb08c8c7eaa958435ef.

3 Kenneth J. Clifford, Amphibious Warfare: Development in Britain and America from 1920–1940 (Laurens, NY: Edgewood Inc., 1983), 153. In 

William O. Odom’s After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918–1939, which examines in detail U.S. Army doctrinal development in the interwar period, the Army had no discussion or consideration of amphibious warfare until the late 1930s. Joint Action of the Army 

and the Navy, JB-350 (Washington, DC: Joint Army-Navy Board, 1927), 13. Beginning in 1927, the Joint Board that assigned roles and missions 

for the Services consistently assigned the amphibious assault mission to the Marine Corps.

43
44 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

amphibious assaults to use as a model. e only major amphibious assaults in modern warfare can be 

seen in the British and French eorts at Gallipoli in 

1915 and the smaller German assaults on three Baltic islands in 1917. e latter eort, against an illprepared and poorly led force, was successful, while 

the former against a prepared and well-led force was 

a disaster.

e primary model for the Marines came from 

Gallipoli, which was studied extensively as a lesson 

in what not to do.4e German assault on the Baltic 

Islands in 1917 could also be considered; however, 

the scale and special circumstances of that campaign, where Russian defenders were, along with the 

rest of the Russian military, in a partial state of collapse following the revolution, meant the Baltic assault held few lessons for the Marines. A great deal 

has been written about the development of Marine 

Corps doctrine for amphibious assaults during the 

interwar period, and also for the development of key 

equipment for amphibious warfare, such as the Higgins boat and amphibious tractor (AMTRAC/Alligator).5 A considerable amount of this development 

and procurement occurred in spite of, rather than 

because of, ocial channels. Warfare is not only 

about those who pull triggers, the Marines charging across the beach, the big ships providing gunre 

support, or the aircra strang troops and isolating 

the beachhead. Take, for example, a well-worn military aphorism that says “amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics.”

4 LtCol Kenneth J. Clifford, USMCR, Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States Marine Corps, 1900–1970 (Washington, 

DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1973), 25; Leo J. Daugherty III, Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945: 

Profiles of Fourteen American Military Strategists (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2009), 204; Tom Fitzpatrick, A Character that Inspired: Major 

General Charles D. Barrett, USMC, Amphibious Pioneer (self-published, 2003), 315; and Gen Holland M. Smith, USMC (Ret), The Development of 

Amphibious Tactics in the U.S. Navy (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1992), 18. 5 LtCol Merrill L. Bartlett, ed., Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985); Clifford, 

Progress and Purpose; Clifford, Amphibious Warfare; Daugherty, Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare; Jeter A. Isley and Philip A. Crowl, U.S. Marines 

and Amphibious War: Its Theory and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951); Henry I. Shaw Jr., Opening Moves: 

Marines Gear Up for War (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1991); Gen Holland M. Smith, USMC 

(Ret), The Development of Amphibious Tactics in the U.S. Navy (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 

1992); Carolyn A Tyson, A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps, 1935–1946, Vol II (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, 

Headquarters Marine Corps, 1965) all discuss at length the development of amphibious doctrine by the Marines, and the concomitant search 

for appropriate equipment, such as landing craft, to carry out its mission. The minutes of the Marine Corps Equipment Board in the late 1930s 

focus extensively on equipment issues for amphibious warfare both large and small, but only rarely discuss medical equipment. Both the Higgins boat and the amphibious tractor were originally created for civilian use, and were noticed by enterprising Marine officers. The inventors of 

these craft modified them and made them available at their own expense to the Navy and Marine Corps for evaluation, which resulted in both 

craft being adopted by the U.S. military.

6 The distinction between “line” and “staff” (and other nonline officers) varies from Service to Service. In general, staff officers are technical experts such as medical personnel, lawyers, and others. Staff officers are restricted by regulations as to where and how they can exercise authority, 

as opposed to line officers who are not so restricted. This distinction is important, as staff officers such as doctors advise line officers on medical 

matters and outside of very technical medical issues, implementation of medical plans and enforcement of medical regulations falls under the 

purview of line officers.

One general category of logistics includes medical 

support, which consists of two main areas: treatment 

of the wounded and sick; and measures taken to prevent the force from becoming sick (i.e., preventative 

medicine). Just as other aspects of a military operation must be tailored to the specic circumstances, 

so too must medical support. Medical support has 

the same requirement for doctrine as any other aspect of a military operation, and therefore as the 

Marines developed doctrine for amphibious assault, 

there was a need for a concomitant medical doctrine 

for amphibious assault, or more generally all aspects 

of amphibious warfare, to be developed.

On many levels, line ocers tend to give thought 

to medical support only when it is absent. It was 

(and oen still is) expected that “the docs” would 

be present when and where needed with the equipment and personnel to provide for the medical requirements of the force.6

 In the case of the Marine 

Corps, this area of potential miscommunication was 

exacerbated by the fact that the medical personnel 

who took care of Marines were all Navy personnel, 

and they were under the administrative control of 

the Navy through the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) and the Bureau of Naval Personnel 

(BUPERS). is could, and frequently did, lend credence to the concept that receiving adequate medical support where and when needed was “the Navy’s 

problem.” is was certainly the case with the development of amphibious doctrine by the Marines and 

Navy. 
Winter 2016 45

During the 1920s and the early 1930s, Marines 

were not researching the issue of medical support, 

nor was medical support for amphibious warfare being analyzed by BUMED or the Navy line.7e Navy 

emphasized instead building and modernizing the 

eet during times of nancial stringency and strong 

pacistic and isolationist sentiments. At the same 

time, BUMED worked continually to meet the needs 

of naval hospitals and ships in the face of personnel 

shortages. e Marines’ needs ranked lower on the 

priority list, and issues of medical support for potential amphibious operations lower still.

When outlining the basics of amphibious operations and amphibious assaults, medical support in 

this environment is neither simple nor intuitive. Yet 

by the time the Corps made its rst amphibious assault in August 1942 on Guadalcanal, medical planners had written doctrine for medical support, which 

the Navy and Marine Corps implemented and which 

worked. A few months later, when the Army landed 

in North Africa, they, in conjunction with the Navy, 

used the same doctrine to support those landings.

Just as with other aspects of amphibious doctrine, 

that for medical support came as the result of analysis, 

experimenting, and testing. In fact, a small number 

of Navy doctors closely associated with the Marines, 

more or less without direction or sometimes without 

much support, made it their mission to develop the 

necessary doctrine. What these doctors did, in fact, 

had very little to do with direct medical care; their 

actions were less about better surgical techniques or 

new medications, and more about devising a system 

of care adapted to the particular circumstances of 

amphibious operations. is system encompassed 

organization, personnel, equipment, and a doctrinal 

template for planning and implementation that is still 

the basis for current Marine Corps medical planning. 

Doctors with clinical skills and experience were 

needed to dene the parameters of what care, whether preventative or reparative, would be provided to 

the amphibious task force and assault force. Naval 

ocers with experience in Marine Corps operations 

were needed to dene the parameters of what could 

be done: in particular, how best to provide the physical and human infrastructure to produce the desired 

care within the limits imposed by the realities of an 

amphibious assault. e process relied on input from 

specialists; in the end, however, a small group of individuals with disparate skills and knowledge made 

the hard decisions about overall doctrine and what 

and who to include on the tables of equipment and 

personnel.

As a result of their work, appropriate medical doctrine and support was “there” when it was needed; 

therefore, the military analysts and historians of amphibious warfare who have examined many other 

aspects of doctrinal development during the interwar period have ignored medical doctrinal developments.8

is article represents the rst in a three-part series that will explore how the U.S. Navy and Marine 

Corps established medical doctrine for amphibious 

warfare during the period between World War I and 

World War II. In many ways, doctrinal development 

follows the standard military planning process for 

any operation: (1) dene the mission, (2) produce 

alternate plans, (3) test these plans (by experimentation or wargaming), (4) repeat these steps until a 

nal plan is promulgated, and (5) nally analyze the 

plan’s success or failure to support the development 

of future plans. Unlike establishing doctrine and the 

processes for the development of equipment, creating medical doctrine became almost an informal 

process. Navy doctors who combined the requisite 

skills and operated with the Marines saw the need 

to create this doctrine, and established a casual network of like-minded ocers working on the issue. 

e use of counterfactuals in history, such as “what 

if ” General Robert E. Lee had won at Gettysburg or 

the Navy carriers had been docked at Pearl Harbor, 

are not usually a useful tool. In this case, however, it 

was valuable to ask the “what if ” of amphibious medical doctrine having been thrown together at the last 

minute. e Gallipoli example answers the “what-if ” 

for our purposes. e section on Gallipoli in the Of-

cial History of the Australian Army Medical Services 

1914–1918 (1930) describes in painful detail how the 

lack of proper planning caused vast amounts of un7 Daugherty, Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare, 300–1. 8 Many of the texts listed have either no reference to medical doctrine development or little mention of medical support for amphibious operations. BUMED histories of World War II discuss medical support for the Marines as it was provided, but essentially nothing about the development of the doctrine/equipment for that support.
46 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

necessary suering. is analysis should also serve 

as a reminder to those who write military history 

and to those who study it that military operations 

work much like an arch, whereby the keystone may 

be the most important and visible piece but, absent 

all of the supporting pieces, the arch will collapse no 

matter how solid the keystone.

Concepts of Amphibious Warfare

Perhaps no other class of military operations illustrates Clausewitz’ maxim that “everything is very 

simple in war, but the simplest thing is dicult” better than amphibious warfare.9 Initially, processes appear straightforward and analogous to conventional 

land warfare, such as loading troops and equipment 

on transports (in this case ships not trains, wagons, 

or trucks), deliver them to the point of assault, and 

once an adequate bridgehead has been secured, the 

campaign transitions to “normal” land warfare. is 

supercial analysis, while not inaccurate, is woefully 

incomplete. Many military analysts would agree that 

no military operation is as complex as an amphibious assault, no other where attention to detail is as 

critical, and none more likely to produce large numbers of casualties so quickly.10

A basic understanding of the major issues in 

amphibious warfare is necessary to grasp both the 

overall process of amphibious warfare doctrine by 

the Navy and Marine Corps and the corollary issues 

regarding the development of medical doctrine for 

amphibious warfare. While the overarching amphibious doctrine and plan provides guidance for the 

creation of subsections or subplans, medical planners must provide accurate and appropriate input up 

the chain of command to ensure that their needs are 

integrated into the overall plan.11

An attack that achieves maximum surprise and 

avoids a direct assault has a higher chance of success, and is much more likely to result in fewer casualties. Unfortunately, amphibious assaults rarely 

achieve these conditions. ese oensives almost 

always come from a direct frontal assault, with the 

force completely exposed during transport to the 

beach and upon the beach, thus creating the greatest 

potential for a large numbers of casualties in a short 

period of time. Unlike a land battle, transporting 

the wounded to treatment facilities becomes much 

more dicult. All wounded, even those who could 

normally walk to an aid station, must be transported 

back to a ship for the medical care provided on a 

beach remains limited until it is relatively free from 

the enemy or incoming fusillades. Once the beach is 

adequately safe, medical units have to be landed and 

made operational; such units should be as compact 

as practicable to conserve weight and space and their 

resources need to be packed in waterproof containers to prevent spoilage due to spray or submersion.

Ship loading the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) 

presents a major planning issue in amphibious warfare. Equipment and supplies need to be packed with 

the requisite units, and placed in storage in the reverse order of use, with equipment needed rst on 

the top. Also, the assault force cannot transport the 

entirety of one type of equipment (or one class of personnel) in one ship, because if that ship sinks then all 

is lost. Failure to understand the concepts of combat 

and spread loading bedeviled American landings at 

Daiquiri, Cuba, during the Spanish-American War, 

and the British and Commonwealth troops at Gallipoli. In the former case, vital medical supplies were 

still onboard ships weeks aer the landing due to 

lack of planning during the loading process. At Gallipoli, medical equipment and supplies were oen 

on dierent ships than those carrying the medical 

units, which then landed with only minimal ability to perform their duties. Medical planners must 

understand what equipment (and personnel) will 

be needed, when it will be needed, and where it will 

be needed. Otherwise, appropriate medical care will 

not be available in a timely fashion.

9 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport (London: Penguin Books, 1982), 164. 10 Amphibious assaults are almost always direct frontal assaults, the type of attack that generates many casualties in a short period of time. Any 

medical system (military or civilian) is highly stressed when a large number of casualties arrive in a short period of time potentially overwhelming the system. When the system is limited in personnel and equipment, as in an amphibious assault, and transportation of the wounded is 

complicated by the need for shore to ship movement, the need for efficient organization including triage, appropriate emergency treatment, 

and medical regulation is even more important than in other circumstances.

11 See Combat Service Support in Amphibious Operations, MCI 7643 (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Institute, 1988). Medical support is a component of combat service support. See also, Amphibious Embarkation, FMFM 4-2 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Development and Education 

Command, 1980) and Medical and Dental Support, FMFM 4-5 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1968).
Winter 2016 47

Until the campaign transitions from an amphibious assault to a traditional land campaign, or an island 

is secured, transporting wounded involves signicant 

shore-to-ship movement. is is not merely an issue 

of having adequate landing cra designated for the 

movement, but also ensuring that the wounded are 

transported to the appropriate ship with both the 

facilities and the personnel to receive the wounded 

but also available space for the wounded. Failure to 

put such a system (medical regulating) in place was 

one of many tragedies in the early part of the Gallipoli operation, when barges of wounded dried from 

ship to ship trying to nd treatment. Even when they 

found a vessel to o-load the wounded, the receiving 

ship was frequently inappropriate, lacking appropriate medical spaces, personnel, and equipment.12

Some of the equipment issues particular to amphibious operations have been mentioned previously. Simplicity and minimizing the weight and 

volume of the equipment is important, even more so 

with amphibious operations than in traditional land 

campaigns. Equipment must be thoroughly waterproofed or packed in waterproof containers and be 

protected not just from moisture, but also from highly corrosive salt water. Just as the transports must be 

combat ready and spread loaded, equal thought and 

preparation must go to the equipment for a medical 

unit as this equipment is as liable for loss during the 

landing as any other.

e many factors specic to amphibious operations illustrate the need for meticulous planning, 

and for the medical sta to have a concept of operations and doctrine that meshes with that of the 

command and the operation. e Australian report 

on Gallipoli, and the results of Army investigations 

of medical failures from the Spanish-American War, 

demonstrate the impact of a massive failure of proper medical planning. While medical doctrine for traditional land warfare and assaults can be used as a 

starting point, the demands of an amphibious assault 

require a special and specic doctrine.

e 1920s

e 1920s represent a decade of challenge for the 

U.S. military, and the Marine Corps was not an exception. Although the United States had become a 

major force on the world stage and was more than 

20 years into being an imperial power, America was 

turning inward. e Senate acceptance of the Versailles Treaty with the provisions for the League of 

Nations was defeated for a variety of reasons, both 

political and philosophical. e military forces that 

had been built up for the Great War were rapidly reduced, as Congress and the public saw no need for 

a permanently expanded force much above prewar 

levels. Huge stockpiles of everything from uniforms 

to ammunition sat in warehouses, with the surplus 

to be used before a parsimonious Congress would 

consider anything new. In fact, U.S. forces would be 

eating World War I rations and using all manner of 

World War I equipment when they went into action 

aer Pearl Harbor.

With massive reductions in funding, carrying out 

anything more than the most necessary operations 

was dicult. Money for exercises was slim, and military pay during the 1920s was not competitive with 

the booming civilian economy. As a result, recruiting was dicult and the Marines were not able to 

ll even the reduced number of positions they had 

been allotted. e Navy had personnel shortages as 

well, which aected the Corps in terms of assigning 

medical ocers and corpsmen to ll full time, as opposed to temporary or exercise only, billets. Operating on even more of a shoestring budget than usual 

had an eect on plans to revamp Marines as an amphibious assault force. In one respect, the Marines 

were fortunate. Commandant Lejeune had made 

the decision about the direction the Corps was going to take, stating formally in 1922: “e primary 

war mission of the Marine Corps is to supply a mobile force to accompany the Fleet for operations on 

shore in support of the Fleet. is force should be of 

such size, organization, armament, and equipment 

as may be required by the plan of naval operations.”13

Early versions of War Plan Orange (war with Japan) 

recognized the need to seize island advance bases. 

Since the Army wanted nothing to do with amphibious warfare, with the amphibious mission formally 

allotted to the Marines by the Joint Board, the Marines had a well-dened mission to provide a future 

for an independent Marine Corps even in an era of 

retrenchment and isolationism. As long as the Ma12 A. G. Butler, Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914–1918 (Melbourne: Australian War Memorial, 1938), 115–17. 13 Clifford, Progress and Purpose, 30.
48 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

rines could operate within tight scal and personnel 

constraints, developing the amphibious force and its 

doctrine had been given a green light to proceed.

As noted, Lejeune had taken the Advanced Base 

Force concept and used it as the springboard for a 

Marine Corps built around the model of amphibious 

warfare even before he ascended to the commandancy. Immediately following the end of World War I, 

Lejeune assigned Major Earl “Pete” Ellis to evaluate 

potential Marine Corps operations against Japan in 

the context of an “Orange” war. Following WWI, the 

chances of a conict between Great Britain and the 

United States faded into improbability, and Germany had been eliminated as a threat for the immediate 

future. e Atlantic Ocean was, so it seemed, secure. 

However, the Pacic Ocean and Asia still presented 

the potential for conict between the United States 

and Japan. Military planners looked on a U.S.-Japan 

conict as the most probable outcome. Civilian and 

general readership books, such as Walter B. Pitkin’s 

Must We Fight Japan? (1921) and Hector C. Bywater’s 

Sea-Power in the Pacic: A Study of the AmericanJapanese Naval Problem (1921), highlighted the fact 

that conicting American and Japanese interests 

would lead to war.

Because the German Pacic islands north of the 

equator had been ceded to Japan under a League of 

Nations mandate,14 the sea lanes between Hawaii and 

the Philippines could be readily interdicted by the 

Japanese as the U.S. possessions along this route—

Midway, Guam, and Wake islands—were isolated 

and far from any support. It was clear that any attempts by the United States to relieve or recapture 

the Philippines would require seizing advance bases 

on islands currently occupied by Japan. In addition, 

these bases would be needed to support the eet as it 

advanced west in anticipation of the Mahanian (Alfred ayer Mahan: Inuential U.S. Navy admiral, 

historian, and geostrategist in the late 19th century) 

clash of battle eets to take place near Japan. Hence, 

the study by Major Ellis was presented in 1921. e 

provisions of the treaty from the Washington Naval 

Conference in 1922 where the United States and Japan agreed to forgo fortifying almost all Pacic island bases meant that, in case of conict, most if not 

all U.S. possessions west of Hawaii would be overrun, thus increasing the need for a plan to seize new 

or to retrieve old bases.

Ellis’ Advance Base Operations in Micronesia

(FMFM 12-46), as detailed and prescient as it was, 

made no mention of casualties or medical treatment of casualties.15 He would not be the rst Marine Corps planner to ignore this issue; most Marine 

ocers saw the issue of medical care as “the Navy’s 

problem” and, furthermore, felt out of their depth 

when considering medical issues. is is not to say 

that the issue of casualties was completely ignored in 

the war planning process. Captain D. N. Carpenter, 

Medical Corps, USN, who was a medical planner, 

outlined the needs for hospital beds in an Orange 

(Japan) war scenario to Captain H. R. Stanford Civil 

Engineering Corps, USN, who was a civil engineering ocer. Hospital bed needs were estimated at 

19,262, however, Carpenter noted that hospitalization (initially) for the Advanced Base Force would be 

on class A hospital ships, but no estimate was given 

for the number of ships required.16

Fortunately, there were Navy and Marine ocers 

who were aware of the gap between the doctrine of 

the new Marine Corps and the medical establishment 

and the doctrine that would support it. Between July 

1922 and January 1923, Major S. N. Raynor, USMC, 

published a six-part series in the United States Naval 

Medical Bulletin entitled “e Functions and Organization of Medical Corps Units Serving with the 

Marine Corps in the Field.”17 e editors explained 

the rationale behind this series of articles in the introduction to the rst part:

e writer has undertaken to prepare for the 

UNITED STATES NAVAL MEDICAL BULLE14 Includes the Carolines, Marshalls, and Marianas islands. See George H. Blakeslee, “Japan’s New Island Possessions in the Pacific: History and 

Present Status,” Journal of International Relations 12, no. 2 (1921): 173–91. 15 Maj E. H. Ellis, Advance Base Operations in Micronesia, FMFM 12-46 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1921). 16 Capt D. N. Carpenter, USN, “Memorandum to Captain H. R. Stanford, CEC, USN: estimate of total number of beds required by the medical 

department for an orange war [SECRET],” 14 November 1924, Record Group 52, National Archives, Washington, DC. Class A hospital ships were 

fully equipped as floating hospitals and a full medical complement, as opposed to class B ships, which were for transport of the wounded, but 

had limited treatment facilities. This estimate would include only those beds needed for the treatment of Navy and Marine Corps casualties. 

Unfortunately, this early estimate of hospitalization needs for these two Services was a gross underestimation.

17 Maj S. N. Raynor, USMC, “The Functions and Organization of Medical Corps Units Serving with the Marine Corps in the Field,” United States 

Naval Medical Bulletin 17, no. 7 (1922): 220–30.
Winter 2016 49

TIN a series of articles dealing with the functions and suggested organization of Medical 

Corps units serving with the Marine Corps in 

the eld. Up to the present time there has been 

no special organization for that service. If the 

necessity for such special organization can be 

demonstrated, the quo animo of this series 

shall have been attained.18

Furthermore, the editors informed the readers that Major Raynor had created an appropriate 

correspondence course through the Marine Corps 

schools at Quantico, Virginia, and the surgeon general was “desirous” that all medical ocers available 

for service with the Marines take this course.19 Since 

a brief article had appeared in this same journal at 

the beginning of 1922 announcing this course and 

explaining the rationale behind it, the emphasis 

and strong endorsement implies that the number of 

medical ocers taking the course must have been 

below expectations and goals.20

At the beginning of part two of this series, the editors elaborated further upon the reasoning behind 

the series. ey detailed how service ashore with the 

Marines created a dierent environment with dierent challenges than working aboard ship or in a hospital and that, to properly function in this setting, 

the medical ocer had to be appropriately trained 

and educated. is training and education had to include not only the specics of the duties as a medical 

ocer, but also how to function personally and as a 

sta ocer within the military (as opposed to naval) 

milieu.21

In the article, Major Raynor set forth the notional 

organization of a Marine brigade with its components, both medical and line.22 is organization was 

essentially a copy of an Army unit. Likewise, the notional table of equipment (T/E) that Major Raynor 

described was also a copy of the Army T/E. Outlines 

of the requirements of the administrative order (operations order or “OPORD” in today’s vernacular) 

and examples of how and with whom to interface on 

the sta to accomplish tasks were also detailed in the 

article. Overall, this relatively short article—a distillation of the correspondence course—still represented a giant leap forward when compared to the Navy’s 

Landing-Force Manual.

23 e latter is extremely limited when discussing medical issues, and seems suitable only for addressing the conduct of operations 

with a relatively small number of sailors detached 

from a ship to form a landing party.

Although Major Raynor and the Navy medical 

establishment had made a necessary start to developing doctrine for Navy medical support of the 

Marines, a critical and glaring hole in this doctrine 

became obvious: there was no mention of amphibious operations. e concepts of the duties of a senior 

medical sta ocer presented in the article, and development of the medical annex to the overall plan 

and how to prepare it, were applicable to any operation. However, the very specic issues of amphibious 

assault were completely ignored. And just as operating with the Marines is very dierent from operating 

on a ship, so too is the medical task of an amphibious 

assault dierent from that of a “standard” land campaign, which had not yet been articulated.

Almost simultaneously with Major Raynor’s article, the United States Navy Medical Bulletin published an article by Lieutenant Commander William 

L. Mann Jr., Medical Corps, USN. A highly detailed 

article dealing primarily with the preventive medicine issues of Marine forces ashore, this piece was intended to serve as a “how-to” guide, rather than as a 

conceptual leap.24 As with Major Raynor, Lieutenant 

Commander Mann was dealing with an established 

18 Ibid., 59.

19 Ibid.

20 “On a Correspondence Course for Naval Medical Officers,” United States Naval Medical Bulletin 16, no. 1 (January 1922): 44–46. It is worth 

noting that, in the comments of part one of the article, the maps needed for the correspondence course are described as being free from a 

government source. However, in the comments of part two, those who wanted to take the course are told where to get (and pay for) the maps. 

No doubt the decision to make participants purchase their own maps was made in line with the general parsimony concerning military expenditures in the 1920s.

21 Raynor, “The Functions and Organization of Medical Corps Units Serving with the Marine Corps in the Field,” 220.

22 At this time, the brigade was the largest unit in the Marine Corps, and is a subset of a division. As described by Raynor, the brigade consisted 

of the headquarters elements and two infantry regiments (with attachments) of roughly 3,100 men each. Thus a brigade included approximately 

6,500 men.

23 Landing-Force Manual, U.S. Navy (Washington, DC: Navy Department, 1920). 24 LCdr William L. Mann, USN, “Some of the Functions of the Naval Personnel Serving in the Field, with Special Reference to Field Sanitary Measures,” United States Naval Medical Bulletin 19, no. 6 (December 1923): 735–813.
50 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

land campaign, and issues concerning amphibious 

assault were not mentioned at all. Similarly, Mann 

based his organization and planning on Army models. It would not be until 1927 that the Navy would 

collect and expand upon the articles and publish 

this compendium as a textbook. Even if many of the 

concepts and diagrams were essentially copied from 

Army manuals, his illustrations as well as his text 

provide the most useful practical guide for a medical 

ocer assigned to the Marines produced to date (see 

gures 1–4).

ese attempts to dene medical support for the 

Marines in the early 1920s should be read in the 

context of the overall movement to transform the 

Marines and develop amphibious capability. Study 

of the British and Commonwealth assault on Gallipoli was considered essential to devising a workable 

doctrine for amphibious assault. Brigadier General 

Robert H. Dunlap, later Commandant of the Marine 

Corps, noted in his study of Gallipoli published in 

1921, that pretty much everything had gone wrong.25

One of the ve major areas that Brigadier General 

Dunlap highlighted as a failure was evacuation of 

the wounded, which had been a complete disaster. 

He noted specically “evacuation of the wounded, 

requiring close cooperation between the Army and 

the Navy” was not performed properly.26

e Navy was also giving some consideration to 

the concepts of amphibious warfare, however, most 

of the Navy assumed that the Army would be involved in these operations, not the Marines. In a 

series of articles published in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings in 1924 and 1925 on Joint Army 

and Navy operations, Captain William S. Pye, USN, 

Adapted from LCdr William L. Mann, USN, Medical Tactics in Naval Warfare

Medical plan for Marine infantry regiment

25 Fitzpatrick, A Character that Inspired, 315. 26 Daugherty, Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare, 206.
Winter 2016 51

considered a wide range of issues. While the articles 

contained a great deal of detail on such subjects as 

properly tting out of troop transports and conversion from standard merchant shipping, certain 

broad ideas applicable to development of a workable amphibious warfare doctrine were highlighted. 

ese applied not only to overall conduct of amphibious operations, but also applied in terms of medical 

doctrine as well. Like General Dunlap, Captain Pye 

drew freely on the experience from Gallipoli and, in 

the rst of his articles, he came out strongly in favor 

of prewar planning and practice between the Navy 

and the land component stating: “e British Army 

and Navy have been conducting joint operations for 

Adapted from LCdr William L. Mann, USN, Medical Tactics in Naval Warfare 
52 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

centuries yet the history of the Dardanelles Campaign, their latest large joint operation, indicates that 

almost every known error was committed at some 

time during the campaign.”27

Another lesson from Gallipoli that Pye highlighted was the need for unity of command, and he 

cited many examples (mostly from British experience) where the lack thereof led to disaster.28 Unity 

of command was not present in the medical aspects 

of the Gallipoli operation as well, where lack of a formal cooperative command structure resulted in major problems in both planning for and execution of 

medical treatment and casualty evacuation. In terms 

of the actual amphibious landing or assault, Captain 

Pye came to the conclusion that the process of landing troops still needed to be worked out.29

In an attempt to understand the workings of an 

amphibious assault, the Navy and Marines staged 

several landing exercises in 1922, 1923, and 1924 

around the Caribbean at Culebra, Puerto Rico, and 

the Panama Canal Zone. e 1923 exercise was the 

rst to include a medical component, although it 

27 Capt W. S. Pye, USN, “Joint Army and Navy Operations–Part I,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 50, no. 12 (December 1924): 1964. 28 Capt W. S. Pye, USN, “Joint Army and Navy Operations–Part II,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 51, No. 1 (January 1925): 1–14. 29 Capt W. S. Pye, USN, “Joint Army and Navy Operations–Part V,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 51, No. 4 (April 1925): 594.

Adapted from LCdr William L. Mann, USN, Medical Tactics in Naval Warfare
Winter 2016 53

was small. An aid station (of sorts) was established 

during the exercise, but it did not include casualty 

treatment. A more ambitious exercise was held by 

the Services in Hawaii in 1925.30 Not surprisingly, 

these exercises highlighted many shortcomings. e 

landing force was transported by the Navy on various warships from battleships to destroyers, which 

made shipboard conditions dicult for the Marines 

and created signicant issues connecting troops with 

appropriate materiel. While the actual process of 

getting the Marines ashore improved from the complete shambles it was in 1922, all parties agreed that 

the use of standard cras to land troops and supplies 

and to evacuate wounded from the beach was inadequate at best. Command and control of all sections 

represented another area of diculty.

Unfortunately, the exercises in Hawaii in 1925 

were to be the last of the 1920s. Commitments 

around the Caribbean and in China placed severe 

scal and personnel constraints on the Marines 

and on the medical personnel assigned to support 

them. ere were neither the personnel nor the 

dollars available to devote to practicing amphibious landings or to individuals spending a great deal 

of “ocial” time working on solutions to the many 

problems highlighted during these exercises.

Adapted from Cdr William L. Mann, USN, Medical Tactics in Naval Warfare

Brigade medical supply system 

30 Daugherty, Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare, 186; Clifford, Progress and Purpose, 24–26; and Isley and Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, 31–32.
54 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

e Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, although 

very focused on the medical care of sailors ashore 

and aboard ship and various Navy operational issues, 

had not completely ignored the issues and needs of 

the Marines. e annual surgeon general’s reports to 

the secretary of the Navy for scal years 1924 and 

1925 specically mentioned, albeit briey, medical operations with the Marines. In 1924, a report 

by Lieutenant Commander W. Chambers, Medical 

Corps, USN, on new equipment for use with the Marines was cited; and in 1925, the report stated “Considerable attention has been given to eld service,” 

and the composition (personnel and equipment) of 

the medical battalion is described in detail, as were 

the courses of instruction at the schools at Quantico 

and the naval medical school for eld service.31

While concentrated eorts in developing doctrine 

and techniques for amphibious operations were on a 

hiatus during the second half of the 1920s, some important developments took place. In 1927, the Joint 

Board of the Army and Navy formally gave the amphibious warfare mission to the Marines.32 e Joint 

Board served many of the same functions as the current 

Joint Chiefs of Sta does, one of which was to specify 

the roles and missions of each Service. e 1927 report 

dened the function of the Marines as follows:

10 (g) to establish and defend advanced naval bases.

11 (a): For land operations in support of the 

eet for the initial seizure and defense of advanced bases and for such auxiliary land operations as are essential to the prosecution of the 

naval campaign.

VI 8 (b): Marine Forces: Marines organized 

as landing forces perform the same functions as 

above stated for the Army, and because of the 

constant association with naval units will be given special training in the conduct of landing.33

is Joint Board decision gave the Marines the 

U.S. Navy photo 

Medical personnel set up an aid tent on San Clemente Island, California, during casualty movement training in the 

winter of 1937.

31 Annual Report of the Surgeon General, U.S. Navy Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery to the Secretary of the Navy for the Fiscal Year 

1924 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1924), 29; and Annual Report of the Surgeon General, U.S. Navy Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery to the Secretary of the Navy for the Fiscal Year 1926 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1926), 8. 32 Craig C. Felker, Testing American Sea Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercises, 1923–1940 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2013), 

101.

33 Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1927, FTP-155 (Historical Amphibious File, General Alfred M. Gray Archive, Marine Corps University, 

Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA), 3, 13.
Winter 2016 55

green light to recast themselves as they had hoped to, 

including tasks they were to pursue vigorously once 

personnel and money became available.

Also in 1927, the Navy published Medical Tactics 

in Naval Warfare.

34 is publication greatly expanded on the series of articles that Commander Mann 

had published the year prior in the United States 

Naval Medical Bulletin. e sections pertaining to 

medical support of amphibious operations and the 

Marines ashore represented the state-of-the-art concepts not only for U.S. forces but also for amphibious 

medicine around the world. While Mann’s article 

was as complete as anything in 1927, he recognized 

the limitations of the doctrine as it existed.

e rst book on the tactics of landing operations has yet to be written . . . medical tactics 

connected with this type of military activity 

must conform and harmonize with the ideas 

of combatant branches . . . we have been compelled to follow closely, in the preparation of 

this study, the views outlined to us in informal 

conversations and discussions with the ocers 

of the Army and Navy who have devoted considerable thought to landing tactics.35

Commander Mann had explained the need for 

Marine specic doctrine, training, and equipment, 

as distinct from the Army techniques, as follows:

e Naval Medical Department serving with 

the United States Marine Corps can pattern 

aer and approach the Army medical organization and system of supplies, but unless the 

mission of the United States Marine Corps becomes identical with the mission of the United 

States Army, a dierence in their two medical 

services must exist.36

In these two statements, Mann summarized the 

essence of the problems that faced naval medical of-

cers in the coming years. First, that the organization and system (doctrine) for medical support of 

the Marine Corps must t precisely with its mission, 

and secondly that, as of yet, the details of landing 

operation missions had not yet been dened. us, 

while lessons of the past could be studied to avoid 

making the same mistakes, and theoretical work 

could outline the “what” of medical amphibious 

doctrine, without well-developed tactics the medical 

department could make little progress in the “how” 

of medical doctrine.

Commander Mann then proceeded to present 

many of the issues that medical planners needed to 

tackle. He dened four types of Marine Corps operations that required medical support: naval landing 

parties, organized modern warfare, expeditionary 

service against semiorganized resistance, and occupation duty against semiorganized resistance.37 He 

outlined the dierent types of medical support for 

each type of operation, and the specics of supply for 

each type of unit.38

Mann stressed the need for proper planning for 

medical aspects of an amphibious operation, particularly for the medical sta to constantly interface 

with line sta so as to be informed of important 

tactical considerations and casualty estimates. Like 

many other Navy and Marine Corps thinkers and 

planners Commander Mann used Gallipoli and the 

failures of coordinated planning there to illustrate 

his point. He also used a quote from Clausewitz’ On 

War that is almost a holy writ among planners: “In 

war everything must be simple, but the simple is usually dicult.” It is the natural tendency of the physician to concentrate on the sick or wounded patient 

in front of them, but the military medical planner 

has to raise their gaze beyond the individual patient. 

Because even the most junior doctor assigned to a 

Marine unit, the battalion surgeon, is by necessity a 

medical planner, Mann advised that “. . . in the eld 

the distribution of medical supplies, prompt evacuation, skilled rst aid, shelter, food, and restoratives 

available early for every fallen combatant are of in-

nitely more importance than highly technical relief 

to dicult cases.”39

Although unable to get into details for reasons already discussed, Mann did make important points 

with respect to concepts that had been disastrous 

34 Cdr William L. Mann, USN, Medical Tactics in Naval Warfare (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1927). 35 Ibid., section IIIb, 6.

36 Ibid., section IIIa, 104. 37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., section IIIa, 105, 114–45. 39 Ibid., section IIIa, 102. The importance of this statement of medical priorities cannot be overemphasized.
56 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

at Gallipoli and problematic during the eet landing exercises of the early 1920s, including medical 

regulation and loading supplies. He stressed that 

the medical team required adequate communications to keep track of the wounded and ensure that 

wounded would be sent to the appropriate locations.40 Anticipating the conclusions of the Marines 

who would deal with logistic and supply issues in the 

next decade, Commander Mann advocated collocating supplies for the medical unit on the same ship 

that carried medical personnel and ensuring that the 

most urgent medical supplies were loaded on top so 

they could be unloaded early in the assault. 

Concepts such as combat loading and a proper 

system of medical regulation, as well as interfacing 

medical planners with line planners, might seem 

obvious in hindsight, but as Gallipoli and some of 

the diculties in the eet exercises of the 1920s illustrate, they were certainly not obvious, at least to 

those making decisions at the time. Although the 

successful German assault on the Baltic islands of 

Ösel, Moon, and Dagö was not studied until the early 

1930s by American military analysts, it is worth noting that even with the lessons of Gallipoli to guide 

them, the Germans did not land any medical troops 

until 48 hours into the assault due to the low priority given them in loading and unloading. Because of 

the demoralized and disorganized conditions in the 

Russian Army on those islands and the rapid disintegration of most resistance, the German forces had 

very few casualties and thus avoided a disaster that 

might have been caused by poor medical planning.41

In addition to the more limited forces involved in 

direct Marine support, Commander Mann also discussed more capable but forward facilities. During 

the early part of a campaign, the plan was that hospital ships provided the most capable facilities (class A 

hospital ships). As the campaign advanced and a signicant secure area acquired, tent-based “base hospitals” of 500 beds, expandable to 1,000 beds, were 

to be established.42 Other sections of Mann’s book 

dealt with specic shipboard issues, and sanitation 

and other measures that would fall under the general 

heading of preventative medicine.

40 Ibid., section IIIb, 14. During the amphibious assault phase of the Gallipoli operation, there was no system of medical regulation and boats 

and barges of wounded were loaded haphazardly. There was an inadequate number of hospital ships and, if they were not available due to 

location or being at capacity, the wounded were literally brought from ship to ship until one would accept them. This resulted in many wounded 

being brought onboard ships that had inadequate or even no facilities or personnel to treat them. Preventing this situation is one of the main 

purposes of a system of medical regulation.

41 Fred M. Green and C. T. Lanham, “The Invasion and Capture of the Baltic Islands,” Infantry Journal, vol. 43 (September–October 1936): 429. 42 Mann, Medical Tactics in Naval Warfare, section II, 3, 23, and section II, 82.

U.S. Navy photo

During casualty movement training (1937), stokes litters are shown transporting casualties.
Winter 2016 57

As the 1920s drew to a close, much had been accomplished by amphibious planners, but much was 

yet to be done. Not only had the Marines decided to 

transform and become centered around amphibious 

operations, but the 1927 Joint Board decision had 

ratied that decision and awarded the Marines that 

niche within the U.S. military establishment. From 

the medical side, such pioneers as Commander Mann 

had already begun serious analysis of the diculties 

of medical support for amphibious operations, and 

had outlined many of the major concerns and had 

begun to take steps to nd solutions. However, absent an overall doctrine for amphibious operations, 

as well as technical solutions to such problems as adequate landing cra, medical planners could only go 

so far in their doctrinal designs. Navy and Marine 

Corps resources were stretched too thin by operational commitments to continue the eet landing 

exercises into the second half of the 1920s, robbing 

the forces of the opportunity to experiment and gain 

experience. 

Most importantly, a small group of naval medical ocers led by Commander Mann and Lieutenant 

Commander W. A. Vogelsang had made an important start. ey had properly identied that medical 

support for amphibious operations was not the same 

as medical support for a more “normal” land campaign. Having identied that there was a problem, 

and a huge gap in doctrine, they had begun to de-

ne the individual elements that made up the whole. 

In fact, the base laid down in the 1920s for dening the outlines of medical doctrine for amphibious 

operations proved remarkably prescient. Fortunately 

for Marines, Commander Mann, Lieutenant Commander Vogelsang, Captain Chambers, and others continued to be involved in the development of 

medical doctrine for amphibious operations.

e close of the decade would usher in both challenges and opportunities for the Marine Corps and 

the Navy physicians who supported them. e Great 

Depression would only add to the nancial stringencies that all of the armed Services struggled with. 

At the same time, the marked reduction in overseas 

commitments of the Marines in the Caribbean and 

Central America would free up resources for other 

purposes. As you will see in part two of this discussion, the early 1930s would see an emphasis on the 

development of Marine Corps doctrine for amphibious warfare, the search for adequate landing cra, and 

the realization by a small group of Navy physicians of 

the need for the development of a scheme of medical 

support to complement this doctrine. s1775s
Lieutenant Colonel Michael Bonura, U.S. Army;

Major Michael Padilla, U.S. Air Force;

Major Kwan Seop Lee, Republic of Korea Army

On 15 September 1950, the commander in chief of U.S. Far East Command 

(CinCFE), Army General Douglas MacArthur, ordered an amphibious assault 

at Inchon, which turned the tide of the Korean War. 

MacArthur envisioned using an amphibious landing 

to strategically envelope the North Korean advance 

in the rst weeks of the war. Based on his experience 

commanding amphibious assaults in the Pacic eater of World War II, he knew the strategic maneuver would require the experience and capabilities of 

a U.S. Marine Corps division.1

 However, at that time, 

the only Marine division available was the partially 

mobilized 1st Marine Division under Major General Oliver P. Smith.2

 Because of the requirements 

of the mobilization, the entire planning eort for 

the landing forces fell on a small portion of the 1st 

Marine Division sta that at the time was forward 

deployed to Japan ahead of the rest of the division. 

ese hard-pressed sta ocers planned the dicult 

amphibious assault in less than two weeks, issuing to 

the dispersed units of the division a detailed operations and administrative order that set the stage for 

the successful landing. 

e 1st Marine Division sta ocers who planned 

e Importance

of Professionalism:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION PLANNING

PROCESS FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT ON INCHON

the Inchon landing were as competent as MacArthur knew they would be, but the assault planning 

took more than competence to complete. e sta 

ocers coordinated the eorts of supporting U.S. 

Army and Navy headquarters into a single team that 

increased their eectiveness and provided the extra 

eort needed to plan the Inchon landing. Joint Publication 1 states that competence and teamwork are 

considered elements of professionalism.3

 e actions 

of individual sta ocers, and the 1st Marine Division Sta as a whole, demonstrated a commitment to 

these elements of professionalism. is professionalism played a key role in distributing a detailed plan 

to the 1st Marine Division in time for the Inchon 

landing. For the 1st Marine Division Sta, professionalism was a vitally important component of the 

planning process. 

Undertaking e Inchon Landing 

on a Short Timeline

Almost from the beginning of the Korean War, Mac

Arthur envisioned using an amphibious assault to 

envelop the North Korean advance and cut their 

lines of communication thus relieving pressure on 

the Pusan perimeter. In the rst week of July 1950, 

MacArthur created the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group led by General Edwin K. Wright to 

plan a landing in the Seoul area named Operation 

1 William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880–1964 (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 277–375. 2 Gail B. Shisler, For Country and Corps: The Life of General Oliver P. Smith (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009); and Clifton LA Bree, The 

Gentle Warrior: General Oliver Prince Smith, USMC (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2001). 3 Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, JP-1 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

2013), B-1, B-3.

58
Winter 2016 59

Bluehearts.4

 As part of the initial planning for Operation Bluehearts, MacArthur tasked the Amphibious 

Group I (PhibGruOne) sta to undertake a study of 

Inchon as a potential landing site. Led by the experienced amphibious assault commander Navy Rear 

Admiral James H. Doyle, PhibGruOne consisted of 

the amphibious command ship USS Mount McKinley (AGC 7), an attack transport ship, and an attack 

cargo ship. Doyle’s group arrived in Japan just before 

the start of the Korean War to conduct amphibious 

exercises, and the sta was immediately available to 

begin the amphibious planning eort.5

 e arrival of 

Doyle and his task force was one of the most fortuitous coincidences of the war for MacArthur and his 

dream for a strategic envelopment.

James Doyle was one of the most experienced amphibious assault commanders of the Second World 

War. Aer distinguishing himself as the commander 

of a destroyer in the North Atlantic, Doyle was transferred to the Pacic where he served on the Amphibious Force sta. While on the sta, he earned the 

Legion of Merit for meritorious service during the 

Soloman Islands Campaign. In particular, he played 

especially important roles in the landing and occupation of Guadalcanal and Tulagi. It was during the 

Soloman Islands Campaign that Doyle earned his 

reputation for amphibious warfare. In 1948, he took 

command of the Navy’s Amphibious Training Command, Pacic Fleet, and for two years was responsible for the training of all amphibious groups in the 

Pacic. With experience in command of amphibious 

operations, on the sta of amphibious operations for 

the Pacic Fleet, and then as the commander of all 

amphibious training for the Pacic Fleet, the Navy 

made Doyle the commander of Amphibious Group 

One for the Pacic Fleet in January 1950.6

 is was 

the command that Doyle led to Japan in the weeks 

before the Korean War.

e PhibGruOne study looked at all the beaches 

in the Seoul area that could support a landing. e 

study became the basis for all subsequent planning 

for the Inchon landing. However, when MacArthur deployed the divisions allocated for Operation 

Bluehearts to the Pusan perimeter, he cancelled the 

planning for Bluehearts. us by the end of June, 

the strategic envelopment by amphibious landing 

was nothing more than an idea. On 10 July during 

a conference at Far East Command (FECom) headquarters, Marine Corps ocers assured MacArthur 

that the 1st Marine Division could be mobilized and 

ready for amphibious operations by September.7

at same day, MacArthur sent an ocial request to 

the Joint Chiefs of Sta for the use of the 1st Marine 

Division for an amphibious assault. Subsequently, on 

13 July, during an update on the war eort, MacArthur briefed Army Chief of Sta General J. Lawton 

Collins on the amphibious plans.8

 Collins took Mac

Arthur’s preliminary plans to the Joint Chiefs for review. MacArthur required approval from the Joint 

Chiefs of Sta for an amphibious landing and getting 

that approval delayed the planning process.

Planning for the amphibious envelopment was 

abbreviated at every echelon of the process. MacArthur ordered his sta to develop three plans, focused on three dierent landing areas that threatened 

Seoul, for what would become Operation Chromite. 

However, even then, MacArthur favored Inchon as 

the landing site. e FECom sta issued these plans 

as CinCFE Operations Plans 100-B, 100-C, and 100-

D on 12August. It took several high-level meetings 

of the Joint Chiefs of Sta to come to a consensus 

and approve an amphibious landing. MacArthur received authorization on 23 August to proceed with 

the Inchon landing as outlined in Plan 100-B.9

 Due 

to the complex nature of the tides and the shallow 

approaches to the Inchon harbor, the landing would 

only be feasible a few days each month.10 With a 

renewed North Korean oensive under way, Mac

4 Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, CMH Pub. 20-2-1 (Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1961), 

488–89.

5 James A. Field Jr., History of United States Naval Operations: Korea (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), 1962), 46, 53, 

171.

6 U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command, “James Henry Doyle, 29 August 1897–9 February 1981,” http://www.history.navy.mil/research

/histories/biographies-list/bios-d/doyle-james-h.html. 

7 Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona, U.S Marines in Korea 1950–1953: The Inchon-Seoul Operation, vol. 2 (Washington DC: GPO, 1955), 

10–11.

8 James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992), 140–41. 9 Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Military Operations Historical Collection (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997), II-5. 10 1st Marine Division, FMF, Special Action Report Inchon-Seoul 15 September–7 October 1950 (Washington, DC: Marine Corps History Division, 

1951), hereafter 1st Marine Division, Special Action Report, 12, http://www.koreanwar2.org/kwp2/usmc/001/M001_CD01_1950_09_52.pdf.
60 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

Arthur ordered Operation Chromite to begin on 15

September 1950.11

Army doctrine, during the Korean War, required 

160 days from conception to execution for an amphibious landing.12 From the FECom sta ’s initial 

planning date on 10 July to the landing date of 15 

September, U.S. forces had only 68 days to execute 

the plan. FECom used 34 of those days to issue the 

operations plan that, aer 11 days of deliberation, 

le the 1st Marine Division with only 23 days for 

planning and preparation for the Inchon landing. 

At the tactical level, a published operations order culminates a military planning eort. During 

the Korean War, Marine doctrine divided the orders process into two parts: an operations order that 

contained all of the planning devoted to the actual 

assault and an administrative order that covered all 

of the logistical requirements to support the operation. On 4 September 1950, the 1st Marine Division 

issued Operations Order 2-50 and Administrative 

Order 2-50. Operations Order 2-50 was two pages 

long and included a succinct description of the missions for each of the units that made up the landing 

force.13 e details of the plan were distributed in 

84 pages of annexes that included the task organization, an intelligence analysis, an operations overlay, 

and a landing plan. Operations Order 2-50 also referenced Administrative Order 2-50 for the logistics 

details of the amphibious landing. Administrative 

Order 2-50 was nine pages and laid out a complete 

logistical support plan for the operation.14 Following the base order, 52 pages of annexes detailed the 

plans for personnel administration, shore party, 

medical, engineering, baggage, and beach and port 

development for the exploitation of Inchon by other 

American forces. Issuing the order on 4 September 

provided ample time for distributing the orders to 

the scattered division elements before sailing to Inchon on 8 September. However, the delay reduced 

the planning time for the Inchon landing to twelve 

days.

Twelve days presented a signicant challenge for 

the 1st Marine Division sta because the mobilization and embarkation of the division limited the sta 

ocers available to plan the landing. At the beginning 

of the war, 33 sta ocers from 1st Marine Division 

deployed to Korea with the 1st Provisional Marine 

Brigade to bring the brigade sta to full strength. Additionally, the division had pulled Marines from a 

mixture of existing formations, security detachments, 

and recalled reservists to fully man the 1st Marine 

Division.15 is mobilization included Reserve units 

from California and Arizona and Marines from Hawaii, Guam, and units aoat. For example, the Marine 

Corps activated the 7th Marine Regiment on 17 August 1950, with Marines from the 3d Battalion, 6th 

Marine Regiment, aoat in the Mediterranean Sea, 

and Marines from the 1st Marine Division rear echelon and Camp Pendleton, California.16 Fiy-one sta 

ocers and noncommissioned ocers organized and 

transported the division to Japan. e remaining 23 

sta ocers became the division’s initial planning 

sta, which arrived in Tokyo, Japan, by air on 19 and 

22 August.17 e short planning timeline for the Inchon landing forced 1st Marine Division sta to focus 

only on the most critical planning elements required 

to produce a detailed operations and administrative 

order. is presents an opportunity to identify the 

most signicant factors that contributed to the Marine’s successful planning eort.

Analyzing the 1st Marine

Division Planning Process

It is important to analyze the planning process of the 

1st Marine Division sta based on the sta sections 

used to divide the planning eort for Operation 

Chromite as opposed to using the sta sections currently being used by the United States Marine Corps. 

11 Appleman, South to the Naktong, 488–95. 12 Headquarters X Corps: War Diary Summary for Operation Chromite, 15 August–30 September 1950 (Washington, DC: Department of the 

Army, 1950), 3, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll11/id/831.

13 Operation Order 2-50: 1st MarDiv [Rein] (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 4 September 1950), http://www.recordsofwar.com

/korea/USMC/Box%202-4.pdf.

14 All of the annexes were attached to Administrative Order 2-50. Administrative Order 2-50: 1st MarDiv [Rein] (Washington, DC, 4 September 

1950), 1–9, http://www.recordsofwar.com/korea/USMC/Box%202-5.pdf.

15 Montross and Canzona, U.S Marines in Korea 1950–1953, 17–24, 30–33, 55–56. 16 7th Marine Regiment: Historical Diary, August 1950–January 1951 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1951), http://www.koreanwar2.org/kwp2/usmc/083/M083_CD22_1950_08_2281.pdf.

17 1st Marine Division, Special Action Report, 9.
Winter 2016 61

e 1st Marine Division sta that served throughout 

the Korean War had nearly the same organization 

as the Marine divisions that served during World 

War II. e organization included 26 sta sections, 

consisting of the adjutant, chaplain, chemical warfare and radiological defense, operations, legal, ordinance, supply, and civil aairs to name a few.18 Many 

sections were unrepresented in the small planning 

sta sent to Tokyo for the Inchon landing. erefore, 

to understand the 1st Marine Division planning process, this article will analyze only the command and 

control relationships created for the Inchon landing 

and the sta sections of personnel (G-1), intelligence 

(G-2), operations (G-3), and logistics (G-4). e 1st 

Marine Division sta produced a special action report detailing the planning, preparation, and execution of Operation Chromite with annexes written by 

the G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 sta sections. Historians 

oen overlook the more mundane and administrative eorts of sta ocers, and instead concentrate 

on the more exciting and interesting actions of combat leaders and troops. e special action report, 

written by division sta sections and ocers, provides a detailed look into the planning process for 

Operation Chromite that includes not only the challenges the sta faced, but also recommendations for 

future operations. e report provides a signicant 

amount of information on the division’s planning effort from which this analysis is largely drawn. 

e Command Structure

for Operation Chromite

e abbreviated planning time line for Operation 

Chromite created a nondoctrinal and, at times, convoluted command structure for the 1st Marine Division. e command relationships for Operation 

Chromite followed two dierent phases: gure 1 

represents the initial planning relationships and gure 2 represents the relationships during the landing 

operation. e gures are reprints from the 1st Marine Division special report and represent the division’s understanding of its chain of command. 

18 1st Marine Division, Special Action Report, 7.

1st Marine Division, Special Action Report, 9

Figure 1. This is the diagram of the initial command relationships for the Inchon landing as understood by the 1st 

Marine Division staff. Note: ComPhibGru One was the designation of the commander, Amphibious Group One or 

RAdm Doyle. 

 Planning

 Command

CinCFE

CTF 90

CJTF 7

COMNAVFE

CG X CORPS

COMPHIBGRU ONE CG 7th Inf Div CG 1stMarDiv
62 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

On paper, the command relationships outlined in 

gures 1 and 2 appear straightforward and in line 

with the amphibious assault doctrine of both the 

Army and the Navy going into the Korean War. e 

Navy’s amphibious landing doctrine remained unchanged since World War II. e 1943 document, 

Landing Operations Doctrine, established the attack 

force, which consisted of the naval task group and 

the landing force. is attack force usually included 

the senior naval commander of the naval task group, 

while the landing force consisted of the Marine or 

Army units comprising the troops landing on the 

beach. e landing force commander was usually the 

senior commander of the service, whether Army or 

Marine, that contributed the largest number of troops 

to the landing.19 e landing doctrine outlined the 

specic duties and responsibilities of the attack and 

landing forces in an amphibious operation. While 

the command relationships seem straightforward, in 

practice, a great deal of friction existed between the 

commands in relation to the 1st Marine Division.

e friction was due largely to the piecemeal creation of the headquarters charged with exercising 

command and control over the entire operation. e 

headquarters that began the initial planning for Operation Chromite was the PhibGruOne sta, which 

conducted the initial study of the Inchon harbor. is 

allowed the PhibGruOne sta to begin planning for 

the Inchon landing before any other headquarters. 

However, they were not the headquarters in charge 

of the entire Inchon landing. e senior naval commander over both PhibGruOne (as the naval task 

force) and the 1st Marine Division (as the landing 

force) was the Seventh U.S. Fleet commander, Navy 

Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble.20 In CinCFE Operation Plan 100-B, MacArthur designated the Seventh 

Fleet as Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) and 

made Struble the attack force commander.21 CJTF-7 

was in charge of the entire Inchon landing operation, 

but not in the way described in Landing Operations 

Doctrine. Doctrinally, Admiral Doyle should have 

been the attack force commander as the senior o-

cer of the naval task force, but MacArthur personally 

gave command of the CJTF-7 to Admiral Struble. 

is led to misunderstandings for the 1st Marine Division sta when they received guidance and verbal 

orders from Admiral Struble.22 e confusing chain 

of command was exacerbated by the fact that Admiral Struble arrived in Tokyo on 25 August while the 

CJTF-7 sta, onboard the USS Rochester (CA 124), 

 Planning

 Command

CinCFE

COMNAVFE CG X CORPS

COMPHIBGRU ONE CG 1stMarDiv

1st Marine Division, Special Action Report, 10

Figure 2. This is a diagram of the command relationships during the Inchon landing as understood by the 1st Marine Division staff.

19 Office of U.S. Naval Operations, Division of Fleet Training, Landing Operations Doctrine, F. T. P. 167 (Washington DC: GPO, 1943), 29–33. 20 U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command, “Arthur Dewey Struble, 28 June 1894–1 May 1983,” http://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories

/biographies-list/bios-s/struble-arthur-dewey.html.

21 CinCFE Operations Plan 100-B, LtGen Edward M. Almond Papers, RG 38, Box 5, Folder 1, MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, 

VA. 

22 1st Marine Division, Special Action Report, 11.
Winter 2016 63

was still steaming toward Japan. erefore, while 

Admiral Struble gave guidance for the planning process, the CJTF-7 sta did not issue an order before 

the PhibGruOne and 1st Marine Division stas began planning their portions of the operation. is 

led to conicting guidance from the commanders 

of CJTF-7 and the naval task force that adversely 

aected the 1st Marine Division’s parallel planning 

process.

While CJTF-7 was responsible for the entire approach and landing at Inchon, MacArthur wanted a 

corps headquarters to command the ground attack 

from Inchon to Seoul, in accordance with the joint 

operations doctrine between the Army and the Navy 

from before World War II. e document, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, states that the military 

Service with paramount interest will be identied 

for each phase of a joint operation and that the command relationships will be dened for each phase.23

erefore, the designation of an Army corps to command the 1st Marine Division ashore complied with 

the existing doctrine for the execution of joint operations. On 15 August, MacArthur created the U.S. 

Army X Corps, under the command of Major General Edward M. Almond, to exercise command and 

control over both the 1st Marine Division and the 

Army’s 7th Infantry Division. MacArthur created 

the X Corps sta out of the special planning group 

of the FECom general sta that planned Operation 

Chromite.24 is small group of planners led the effort to produce the CinCFE Operations Plans 100-B, 

100-C, and 100-D, and beneted from the fact that 

Almond was also MacArthur’s chief of sta. Due 

to operational security concerns, the headquarters 

was not activated as X Corps until 26 August when 

it began issuing directives and orders for Operation 

Chromite.25 e activation posed no threat to the 

unity of command needed to plan a dicult operation on an extremely shortened time line. 

e Army entered the Korean War using landing 

doctrine that closely mirrored Landing Operations 

Doctrine. Although Army ocers continued discussing amphibious operations in the years aer 

World War II and compared the way Army and Marine units conducted such landings, no new doctrine 

for Army amphibious operations existed in 1950.26

e Army published Landing Operations on Hostile 

Shores in 1941 based on the Navy’s existing landing doctrine.27 e Army went to war in 1950 with 

essentially the same landing doctrine as the Navy, 

doctrine that was familiar to the ocers of the 1st 

Marine Division. erefore, the 1st Marine Division sta had no reason to believe that the orders 

and directives of X Corps prior to the landing would 

contain unexpected guidance or attempt to direct 

actions outside the purview of the commander of the 

operation aer the successful landing. However, the 

1st Marine Division sta did receive confusing and 

oen conicting guidance from the X Corps sta.28

Consequently, the division sta had no clear expectations of what guidance and control to expect from 

CJTF-7 or X Corps. For example, X Corps Operations 

Order No. 1, issued on 28 August 1950, identied 

the 1st Marine Division as the landing force for 

Operation Chromite and established the task organization for the landing.29 e task organization was 

reected in Annex A of 1st Marine Division Operations Order 2-50.30 e guidance, however, should 

have come from the attack force commander, not 

the commander of the ground operations following 

the landing. One recommendation from 1st Marine 

Division sta, included in the Special Action Report,

was to use command relationships established in the 

applicable doctrinal publications along with their 

doctrinal titles to clearly delineate the status and 

authority aorded to each echelon of the chain of 

command.31 From the perspective of the 1st Marine 

Division sta, the higher headquarters MacArthur 

23 The Joint Board, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, F. T. P. 155 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1936), 1. 24 Headquarters X Corps, 2–3. 25 Commanding general Operation Chromite, General Order No. 1, 26 August 1950, LtGen Edward M. Almond Papers, RG 38, Box 5, Folder 1, 

MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA.

26 Donald W. Boose Jr., Over the Beach: U.S. Army Amphibious Operations in the Korean War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute 

Press, 2008), 65–81.

27 U.S. Army chief of staff, Landing Operations on Hostile Shores, FM 31-5 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1941). 28 1st Marine Division, Special Action Report, 11. 29 X Corps Operations Order No. 1 as cited in Montross and Canzona, U.S Marines in Korea 1950–1953, 306. 30 Operation Order 2-50. 31 1st Marine Division, Special Action Report, 27.
64 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

established for the Inchon landing did not contribute to the success of the operation or to the planning 

eort for the landing force.

One command relationship vital to 1st Marine 

Division’s success during Operation Chromite was 

the relationship with the PhibGruOne sta. Aer arriving in Japan, the division sta colocated with the 

PhibGruOne sta on the Mount McKinley.

32 Conditions onboard the McKinley were barely adequate to 

meet the needs of one operations sta, much less two 

stas simultaneously. ere was a shortage of desk 

and work space, reproduction facilities, and even 

typewriters aboard the Mount McKinley.

33 Additionally, 1st Marine Division sta requested signicant 

support from the PhibGruOne sta to cover personnel gaps, including reproduction assistance and 

clerks.34 e crew of the McKinley supported every 

request from the 1st Marine Division sta in addition to supporting PhibGruOne. Both stas had 

knowledge of and consented to the others planning 

activities and operational decisions. No rivalries 

existed between the organizations. And the limited 

planning resources and short time line served to 

synergize the eorts of both stas. Without direction 

from their respective commanders, the 1st Marine 

Division and PhibGruOne stas came together to 

form a single joint planning team. 

In addition to the teamwork that grew between 

the PhibGruOne sta and the 1st Marine Division 

planning sta in Tokyo, the doctrinal nature of the 

stas’ relationship facilitated their cooperative efforts. Landing Operations Doctrine detailed the responsibilities and duties of both the attack force and 

the landing force during amphibious operations. 

From the start, the 1st Marine Division sta considered Admiral Doyle to be the attack force commander and the PhibGruOne sta to be the attack force 

sta.35 us, the Marines expected PhibGruOne to 

organize the naval task force according to doctrine, 

to be responsible for ship-to-shore communications, 

and to organize the transportation group to land 

forces and supplies on the shore. Similarly, the Marines were responsible for organizing the embarkation groups and landing groups, which corresponded to the transportation division organization of the 

naval task force.36 Because both stas understood 

their doctrinal responsibilities, their planning eorts 

were ecient as each sta understood exactly how 

their eorts t into planning for the other force. is 

relationship enabled the Marines to issue Operation 

Order 2-50 for the Inchon landing in only 12 days, 

which le enough time to distribute the order before 

the initial movement to Inchon on 8 September.

G-1 Personnel Planning Process

e division’s prewar operations as well as additional 

planning sta requirements placed on the G-1 section created several issues for personnel planning. 

Before the Korean War, the 1st Marine Division had 

only 30 percent of its authorized strength present 

for duty.37 In the undermanned division, personnel 

operations were primarily administrative in nature, 

and members of the G-1 section did not participate 

in eld training exercises. is led to a lack of preparedness in the G-1 section for understanding sta 

requirements for combat. Additionally, personnel 

operations training was nonexistent at the Marine 

Corps professional military educational courses, 

so units had few trained Marines to fulll normal 

personnel functions. ese included administrative 

responsibilities such as the processing of pay, promotion, awards, and leave actions and the creation 

of travel orders to name only a few. us, Marines 

in the G-1 section became involved in the personnel 

actions of subordinate units, which further reduced 

the section’s combat focus.38 e division ocers’ 

lack of training and knowledge of personnel operations prevented the G-1 section from devoting its 

full attention to the planning process. G-1 Colonel 

Harvey S. Walseth, Assistant G-1 Lieutenant Colonel 

Bryghte D. Godbold, and Administrative Chief Master Sergeant Leslie W. Sherman ew to Japan with the 

division’s initial planning sta. However, no elements 

from the division adjutant section were on the ini32 Ibid., 9.

33 Montross and Canzona, U.S. Marines in Korea 1950–1953, 56. 34 1st Marine Division, Special Action Report, 11. 35 Ibid., 9.

36 Landing Operations Doctrine, 30–31. 37 Montross and Canzona, U.S. Marines in Korea 1950–1953, 18. 38 1st Marine Division, Special Action Report, 24.
Winter 2016 65

tial planning sta.39 For the entirety of the planning 

process, the G-1 section performed tasks usually 

executed by the division adjutant because the adjutant section did not embark on the McKinley until 

11 September 1950.40 e two most dicult adjutant 

tasks during the preliminary planning were the tasking to prevent all 17-year-old Marines from entering 

combat and the assembling, logging, and mailing of 

the division sta ’s top-secret and secret operation 

and administrative orders.41 e understaed G-1 

section had diculty executing the additional tasks 

while also fullling its regular requirements and contributing to Operation Chromite planning. 

With limited time, sta, and resources, the G-1 

section used preliminary planning and the support 

of the PhibGruOne sta to produce the personnel 

annex in time for the distribution of Administrative 

Order 2-50. When the division mobilization began 

with a notication from the Commander of Fleet 

Marine Forces Pacic General Lemuel Sheppard on 

14 July 1950, Colonel Walseth, the G-1, realized that 

no standard operating procedures (SOPs) existed for 

combat personnel operations such as requisitioning replacements, processing casualties, and burials. 

During the two weeks between the initial deployment order and the departure of the division’s initial 

planning sta to Japan, the G-1 section produced 

SOPs covering all combat personnel operations for 

the division. ese included instructions and a format for personnel daily summaries to be lled out 

by subordinate units, a format for a unit report that 

included explanations for each subsection, a casualty 

reporting procedure that referenced chapter 13 of 

the Marine Corps Manual and included a format for 

a report of casualties processed, a format for an embarkation roster to be used during the amphibious 

assault, a set of war crimes procedures that included 

forms for reporting and investigating war crimes, a 

set of burial and graves registration procedures, and 

a section outlining the process for awards recommendations. Colonel Walseth initiated this eort on 

his own authority, and Marines of the G-1 section 

produced the documents based on their own experience and competence with personnel operations.42

When the G-1 section began the planning process 

for the Inchon landings, the section incorporated 

the SOPs into the personnel annex as general appendices.43 e SOPs were critical to produce a complete personnel annex to Administrative Order 2-50 

in only 12 days and to demonstrate the importance 

of competence in an abbreviated planning process. 

e division’s G-1 section also used the people 

and resources of the PhibGruOne sta to perform 

the planning duties of the division adjutant. e primary role of the division adjutant in the planning 

process is the production and distribution of orders. 

To accomplish this, the G-1 section required the use 

of the reproduction facilities onboard the McKinley. e PhibGruOne sta made these available to 

the 1st Marine Division sta without any prioritization issues or parochial reservations. Despite the G-1 

section’s planning requirements, the section successfully carried out all of the administrative tasks of 

the division adjutant as well as reproduced and distributed Operation Order 2-50 and Administrative 

Order 2-50 on time.44 e individual competence 

of members of the G-1 section, combined with the 

productive relationship with the PhibGruOne sta, 

was critical to the timely completion of the personnel planning in support of the Inchon landing. 

G-2 Intelligence Planning

e short time line and initial lack of intelligence 

collection assets such as aerial reconnaissance or 

scouts in the Inchon-Seoul area produced signi-

cant problems for the undermanned division G-2 

section. Only G-2 Colonel B. T. Holcomb and Assistant G-2 Major J. G. Babashanian ew out to Tokyo 

with the initial planning sta on 19 August. At that 

time, the division had an almost total lack of intelligence information for the landing beaches. Even 

though U.S. forces had operated out of Inchon since 

the end of World War II, military forces had very 

little detailed technical information about the har39 See ANNEX A G-1 Report, in ibid., 3. 40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., 4–5.

42 Ibid., 3.

43 The G-1 SOPs became appendices 1–7 of Annex Able attached to Administrative Order 2-50. Administrative Order 2-50: 1st MarDiv [Rein]

(Washington, DC, 4 September 1950), http://www.recordsofwar.com/korea/USMC/Box%202-5.pdf.

44 Ibid., 5.
66 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

bor to include maps, tidal information, geology, and 

harbor infrastructure specications. Due to the uid 

combat situation and distance to Inchon from the 

Allied front lines, very limited intelligence existed 

on enemy defensive tactics or units in the InchonSeoul area in July 1950.45 Additionally, the G-2 section was critically undermanned for the analysis of 

even the limited intelligence available at the beginning of the planning process. Operation Chromite’s 

short planning time line, limited initial intelligence, 

and a personnel shortage in the G-2 section created 

signicant planning challenges.

To eectively analyze the battleeld situation of 

the Inchon-Seoul area, the G-2 section leveraged 

outside capabilities. e PhibGruOne G-2 section 

briefed the 1st Marine Division G-2 section immediately on arrival in Tokyo, and the two sections 

collaborated to conduct a more detailed analysis of 

existing information. ey pored over Joint ArmyNavy Intelligence Service publications, strategic 

engineering studies, and naval attaché reports to 

construct a detailed understanding of the physical 

problems associated with the beaches. ey identied abnormally high and low tides that exposed 

extensive mud ats for the landing area, thereby narrowing the landing window to a three to four-hour 

time frame two days in each month.46 rough their 

own analysis, they also uncovered important information on the enemy’s position at Inchon and the 

surrounding areas. ey were able to analyze information from photographic interpretation reports, 

which allowed the G-2 sections to identify only a 

scattering of unoccupied defense installations.47

ese photographs indicated very little activity 

around these installations. e teamwork between 

the G-2 sections of PhibGruOne and 1st Marine Division sta was vital in gathering and analyzing the 

limited intelligence data available.

To ensure the 1st Marine Division G-2 was capable 

of the dicult planning tasks required by the Inchon 

landing, the section was augmented with signicant 

joint assets. Early in the planning process, FECom 

allocated both Army and Republic of Korea assets 

to support the G-2 section. e assets included the 

U.S. Army’s 163d Military Intelligence Service Detachment and the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps. 

e highly specialized competence of the units in 

conjunction with the amphibious expertise of the 1st 

Marine Division G-2 section produced a powerful 

joint intelligence team. Due to the increased capabilities from the additional assets, the G-2 section was 

able to direct the ongoing prisoner of war interrogations of the U.S. Eighth Army, which was engaged 

in combat operations hundreds of miles away.48 is 

enabled the G-2 section to write an enemy estimate 

that proved to be surprisingly accurate about the enemy situation in the Inchon-Seoul area. e estimate 

ensured the detail and completion of the intelligence 

annex and paragraphs contained in Operation Order 2-50. Incorporating the competence of outside 

intelligence organizations through close teamwork 

allowed the G-2 section to complete its intelligence 

estimate on time. 

G-3 Operations Planning

For the G-3 section, the planning phase commenced 

on 19 August aer G-3 Colonel A. L. Bowser Jr. and 

Assistant G-3 Lieutenant Colonel F. R. Moore arrived in Tokyo with the initial planning sta. ese 

two ocers were responsible for the majority of the 

tactical planning for Operation Order 2-50. However, creating a detailed plan for the Inchon landing 

was impossible without additional support. e G-3 

section produced the base plan for Operation Order 

2-50 by incorporating ocers from across the division and by relying on other division sta directorates and PhibGruOne sta. With only the G-3 and 

assistant G-3 ocers acting as the operations planning section, division Chief of Sta Colonel G. A. 

Williams augmented the G-3 section with the division’s antitank ocer and two tactical observers.49

He attached the ocers to the G-3 section as assistant operations ocers in addition to 11 enlisted 

Marines who provided administrative support during the orders production process. e section functioned well with the augmentees, because although 

45 See ANNEX B G-2 Report, in ibid., 2, 8. 46 Ibid., 2–3.

47 Ibid., 3.

48 Ibid.

49 ANNEX C G-3 Report, in ibid., 2–3.
Winter 2016 67

they had little training or experience in planning, 

they had a great deal of experience in amphibious 

operations. ese augmentee ocers reected the 

overall experience of the 1st Marine Division Sta, 

the majority of which served in WWII.50 e of-

cers enabled the G-3 to supervise the planning 

process, make eld visits, and attend conferences 

with higher and subordinate units. is freedom 

of movement was key to the functioning of the G-3 

section and increased the quality of planning for all 

operations. 

As a landing beach, Inchon and the surrounding 

area presented a tactical problem that required the 

G-3 to use the entire division sta ’s competence in 

conducting amphibious operations. e G-3 section planned the landing with an initial attack on 

Wolmi-Do Island 11 hours before the main landing. 

e planners realized they needed to address the island rst because of the physical advantage it gave 

the enemy in defending the beaches. e G-3 section 

based this assessment on the G-2 analysis of both 

the geographical complexity of the Inchon area and 

the enemy situation. During the planning process, 

the G-2 analysts identied extremely steep seawalls 

that protected the rear of the city. With this information, the G-3 was able to identify the need for scaling 

ladders in time for their procurement prior to the 

landing. is teamwork amongst the sta sections allowed the G-3 to plan an envelopment of Inchon and 

contributed to its successful execution. e analysis 

of the Inchon sea conditions was another critical element of the landing plan. With the G-2 assessment 

of the tides and the G-3 section’s amphibious experience, the G-3 section determined that the landing 

had to begin at 1730 to have enough daylight to reach 

all initial objectives.51 Even with a compressed time 

line, the G-3 section created an extremely detailed 

Operation Order 2-50 that synchronized the actions 

of several dierent maneuver elements for a successful landing. Teamwork allowed the G-3 section to 

collect all necessary information to plan the landing. 

e section’s competence in amphibious operations 

allowed for fast turnover, completing the operations 

order in only 12 days.

G-4 Logistics Planning

Along with a short planning time line for Operation 

Chromite, the lack of available shipping and the unpredictable nature of trans-Pacic operations challenged the 1st Marine Division’s logistics planning. 

Knowing only that the division would be participating in an amphibious operation, the G-4 section 

used available shipping assets to load and transport 

the division’s equipment and personnel.52 e transportation available at such short notice fell well below the assets required for the combat deployment 

of a Marine division. e lack of transportation assets prevented all of the division’s units from being 

loaded in a combat conguration which allows those 

units to drive their equipment o of the transport 

ships and directly into combat. Some units were organizationally loaded, which meant they were unable 

to roll their equipment o of the ships and into combat but instead were reloaded prior to combat. In addition to the deployment time line, several shipping 

events occurred that limited the exibility of the division’s logistics operations. ese events included a 

typhoon that hit the Port of Kobe, Japan—which was 

the division’s main assembly area in FECom prior to 

the operation—and the loss of one of the division’s 

cargo ships to a re.53 ese challenges made the logistics planning and execution for the Inchon landing as dicult as the tactical problems.

e lack of adequate shipping required the G-4 

section to decide which units to combat load and 

which units to organizationally load based on their 

experiences conducting amphibious operations. 

With very little detailed knowledge of future operations, the G-4 section decided to combat load two 

battalions while organizationally loading the rest of 

the division.54 e section intended to combat load 

the remainder of the units once they arrived in theater. However, Typhoon Jane struck Kobe on 3 September 1950 and stopped logistics operations for a 

critical 36-hour period, which prevented the reloading of any of the division’s units. erefore, the units 

combat loaded in Camp Pendleton, California, were 

the only combat units available for the operation 

50 1st Marine Division, Special Action Report, 11. 51 Ibid., 3.

52 ANNEX D G-4 Report, in ibid., 4. 53 Ibid., 7.

54 Ibid., 6–7.
68 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

and became the rst wave of the Inchon landing. 

If the G-4 had decided to organizationally load the 

entire division to get it into theater faster, the division would not have made the 15 September landing 

date. ese decisions, based on the knowledge and 

experience of the G-4 section, represented a high 

level of competence. 

Like the rest of the sta, only a small G-4 section 

ew out to Tokyo on 22 August as part of the division’s initial planning sta. e section included G-4 

Colonel F. M. McAlister and Assistant G-4 Lieutenant Colonel C. T. Hodges. e remainder of the G-4 

section stayed at Camp Pendleton as the division 

completed its mobilization, embarkation, and departure for Korea. Part of the planning for Operation Chromite required the G-4 section to stage and 

supply the units in theater. As the main assembly 

area in Kobe did not have sucient space, the division spread out over a large area. When the SS Noonday caught re with a hold full of combat uniforms 

and other equipment, the G-4 section operating between Kobe and Tokyo had to repair the equipment 

on-site. e section coordinated with the Salvage 

Agency of Kobe Base Command to repair, clean, dry, 

and repack the equipment essential to the division’s 

sustained combat operations. Marines in the section 

used personal contacts with Army salvage personnel, who were themselves operating away from their 

higher headquarters. Salvaging the equipment and 

avoiding any delay in the deployment schedule was 

a testament to the G-4 section’s ability to work with 

their Army counterparts as a team. In this instance 

as with the entire operation, the division sta attributed the logistical success of Operation Chromite 

to the “ingenuity and good judgment” of the stas 

and units from the division.55 During the operation, 

no division element ran short of mission essential 

equipment or supplies. e competence and teamwork of the G-4 section allowed the 1st Marine Division’s logistics operations for the Inchon landing to 

be a success. 

Conclusion

For the 23 sta ocers on the 1st Marine Division’s 

initial planning sta, preparing for the Inchon landing—which involved nearly 30,000 Marines and 

soldiers in only 23 days—was an impossible task. e 

geographical and maritime conditions of the Inchon 

harbor were among the most dicult of any port in 

the world, and sta could not blindly apply doctrinal 

templates to the tactical problems. e 1st Marine 

Division sta ocers relied heavily on their collective 

amphibious experiences, their competence as sta 

ocers, and a close working relationship with the 

PhibGruOne sta; thus, the division sta produced an 

operation and administrative order in only 12 days to 

ensure enough time for distribution of that order to 

the division’s dispersed units prior to the movement 

to Inchon. is close working relationship developed 

without direction from FECom, CJTF-7, or X Corps, 

as the rapidly changing situation in theater prevented 

close coordination or synchronization of the headquarters activities.56 Several interconnected factors 

led to such a productive working relationship under 

very dicult circumstances. 

Military professionals and historians alike believe 

that military ocers do not read their own doctrine. 

If they do read it, they do not follow the doctrine, but 

instead rely on pragmatic decision making based on 

changing circumstances. e ocers of the 1st Marine Division across all sections of the sta were well 

versed in their amphibious assault doctrine without 

requiring refresher training or additional sta exercises before departing California for Japan. Division 

sta understood the process for producing a complete 

order and what to expect in working with their naval 

peers. But also, the sta ’s knowledge of the amphibious assault doctrine was essential for integrating with 

the PhibGruOne sta so eortlessly and producing a 

complete order in such a short amount of time.

e division sta worked with the PhibGruOne 

sta across all joint functions of command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, and sustainment. However, the importance of the teamwork 

between dierent stas, operating in a joint operation, cannot be overlooked. Oen stas in the same 

chain of command have adversarial relationships 

due to strong personalities and the command climate established by commanders. Additionally, the 

potential exists for commanders and stas to remain 

55 Ibid., 6.

56 John R. Ballard, “Operation Chromite: Counterattack at Inchon,” Joint Forces Quarterly 28 (2001): 33.
Winter 2016 69

committed to parochial pursuits to the detriment of 

the joint endeavor, especially when one of the stas 

is a joint organization and the other a service component headquarters sta (Currently, each Geographic 

Combatant Command has a headquarters from the 

Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Marine Corps that 

are designated as service component headquarters). 

For example, in 2011, the stas of the Joint Task 

Force Odyssey Dawn (a joint command of ocers 

and noncommissioned ocers from all Services) 

and Joint Force Maritime Component (comprised 

primarily of naval ocers) were colocated onboard 

the USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20), the “U.S. contribution to a multilateral military eort to enforce a 

no-y zone and protect civilians in Libya.”57 While 

the commands experienced mutual cooperation, 

both stas worked concurrently on their own functional eorts. e additional eorts overworked the 

sta ocers and blurred lines of communication and 

authority between the stas, which led to coordination issues from near instantaneous communication 

across the joint task force to disregarding the organizational chain of command.58 Doctrine for the Armed 

Forces of the United States states that adherence to 

the principles of professionalism is every joint of-

cer’s responsibility.59 However, an equally strong 

requirement for commanders, chiefs of sta, and 

sta directorate leads is to actively encourage and 

inculcate a climate of professionalism in their stas. 

Without this command reinforcement, the collective 

eorts of stas, such as those with 1st Marine Division in Inchon, cannot leverage the competence of 

their members while simultaneously creating a joint 

team with other sta organizations operating in the 

same area of responsibility. Oen thought to be the 

purview of only commanders, the planning eort of 

the 1st Marine Division Sta for the Inchon landing 

demonstrates that professionalism is a requirement 

for sta ocers as much as it is for commanders in 

combat operations. s1775s

57 Jeremiah Gertler, Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya): Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

2011), 1.

58 Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), Libya: Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD): A Case Study in Command and Control (Suffolk, VA: 

JCOA, 2011), 6–7.

59 Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, B-1,B-3.
More than a year ago, the National Museum of the Marine Corps (NMMC), 

in cooperation with the Marine Corps 

Heritage Foundation, broke ground to 

fulll a nine-year-old commitment to be the home 

for all Marine Corps history. When the work is nished on this 126,000-square-foot Final Phase (the 

name coined for this project), NMMC will have 

more than doubled in size, and the circle, as well as 

the Corps’ story, will be complete. 

Included in the new spaces will be not only historical galleries covering the Corps’ history from 

1776 to the present, but also a giant-screen theater, 

an expanded education suite and children’s gallery, 

a combat art gallery and studio, a Hall of Valor, and 

a Marine Corps Sports gallery, as well as a changing 

exhibits gallery. 

Much has happened since the groundbreaking, 

both on the building and with dening the design 

and content of the new spaces. As construction crews 

have been taking down existing walls and building 

new ones, the Final Phase team has been nalizing 

plans for how to tell the story in the most compelling way. e museum’s exhibit design team has been 

shaping the visual story, while a team of writers from 

NMMC and historians from Marine Corps History 

Division has been craing the written storyline. Design development is complete. 

“It’s imperative that we get these galleries right because the memories of recent wars are so very fresh. 

e sense of pride and of loss is still raw, especially 

for visitors who have recently lost loved ones in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. is is the most important thing 

we’ve done yet; these galleries will honor warriors in 

uniform today,” Lin Ezell, NMMC director, said. 

To get the story right, the museum put together 

National Museum

of the Marine Corps: 

MOVING FORWARD TO TELL THE STORY 

OF TODAY’S WARRIOR

a diverse group of senior advisors to guide the process and to ensure that the whole story is told. e 

new historical galleries will tell of Marines in both 

combat and humanitarian eorts, as well as on the 

home front. ese galleries will communicate every 

Marine’s story because, while not every one of them 

served in combat, they are each important to the mission. e senior advisors told the team that if they 

do not tell the Marine family story they “will have 

missed the mark.” e team took that to heart and 

has not only included an exhibit on the Marine family, but has also woven it into the overall exhibition. 

At current count, 575 artifacts have been chosen to 

illustrate Marine Corps history in the new galleries. 

ese include everything from a McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet to a set of blood-crusted ribbons. 

“When telling the story of ‘no better friend, no 

worse enemy,’ there’s no museum better positioned 

to do this than the National Museum of the Marine 

Corps,” Ezell said. s1775s

For more information about the National Museum of the Marine 

Corps, please call 703-784-6107 or visit the museum’s website at 

www.usmcmuseum.org.

70

Photo courtesy of the National Museum of the Marine Corps

An artist rendering of the Desert Storm/Desert Shield 

exhibit for the final phase of the National Museum of 

the Marine Corps.
BOOK REVIEW

Shooting the Pacic War:

Marine Corps Combat

Photography in WWII Photography in WWII

Review by Charles Grow

Deputy Director 

National Museum of the Marine Corps

Shooting the Pacic War: Marine Corps Combat Photography in WWII. By ayer Soule. (Lexington: 

University Press of Kentucky, 1999. Pp. 272. $40.00 

cloth and e-book.)

Thayer Soule’s memoir, Shooting the Pacic War, discusses the genesis of a formal Marine Corps combat photography 

program and records the author’s experiences in establishing a photographic eort from 

scratch, through its proof of concept at Guadalcanal 

and battle testing at Iwo Jima. Soule’s story resonates 

with authenticity and humility. Although a veteran 

of both Guadalcanal and Iwo Jima, the author comes 

across as accessible and relatable because of his selfdeprecation and humor. His reliance on a personal 

journal and historical references help Soule accurately tell a little-known story. 

As America entered World War II, all of the Services faced the daunting challenge of exponential 

expansion, recruiting and training huge numbers of 

young Americans. Each Service used still and motion photography for recruitment and training. To 

achieve their goals, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine 

Corps vigorously recruited professional photographers to establish, 

equip, and train new 

photographic units. 

Collectively, these 

military cameramen 

provided the country with a previously 

unprecedented collection of images 

that shaped America’s understanding 

of war and the challenges faced by its 

warriors. Both the 

Army and the Navy 

developed fairly robust photographic 

programs. e Navy’s vaunted Aviation Photographic Unit, led by Commander Edward J. Steichen, produced a body of work that is well documented in 

Mark D. Faram’s Faces of War: e Untold Story of 

Edward Steichen’s WWII Photographers (2009). e 

Army’s Signal Corps had signal photo units spread 

throughout the European and Pacic theaters; much 

of their work is stored at the National Archives and 

Records Administration. Ralph Buttereld, an Army 

photographer during World War II, edited Patton’s GI 

Photographers (1992), which suggests that the Army’s 

use of photography was also better planned and resourced than the Marine Corps’ program.

Karl ayer Soule Jr. was a Harvard-educated 

American lm documentarian in Holland before 

Adolf Hitler’s advance forced him to return to the 

United States. Hoping to put his talent and skills to 

work in support of the American war eort, ayer 

71

Charles Grow, captain, USMC (Ret), serves as deputy director of the National Museum of the Marine 

Corps, Quantico, Virginia. He deployed to the Gulf 

War, Somalia, Haiti, Cuba, Afghanistan, and Pakistan as a combat artist and photographer. Grow 

served as the 1st Marine Division combat camera 

officer from 1995 to 1998.
72 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

contacted the Army to join the Signal Corps and 

become a combat camera ocer. However, an old 

friend got Soule an interview with Brigadier General Robert L. Denig at Headquarters Marine Corps. 

Within days, Soule was directly commissioned a second lieutenant. Soule felt at a loss for not experiencing Ocer Candidates School or e Basic School, 

but he made the most of this new opportunity. Smart 

enough to listen and admit when he did not know 

something, Soule was a quick study and soon proved 

to be a capable leader, excellently prepared to help 

establish and develop the Marine Corps’ edgling 

combat camera program.

Stationed at Quantico, Virginia, in building 2009, 

which continues to house U.S. Marine Corps Combat 

Camera today, Second Lieutenant Soule learned the 

ropes of being a Marine ocer and leader. He helped 

to establish equipment requirements and rigorous 

eld training and to develop the tactics, techniques, 

and procedures for the combat photographers he 

would soon lead at Guadalcanal. Resourceful and 

driven, the new lieutenant worked hard to get atypical equipment and supplies from a quartermaster 

system better suited to buying helmets and ries. 

at reality continues to be a challenge to combat 

camera Marines today. 

Soule and his Marines were ready by the time they 

deployed to Guadalcanal. ey tested their theories 

and made adjustments where needed. Soule was in 

the 1st Marine Division’s G-2 (intelligence) section, 

where he championed the value of photography 

for intelligence, training, operations, and historical 

documentation. His commander, Colonel Frank B. 

Goettge, asked him, “Now you can clear up a mystery for me. What the hell is a photographic o-

cer?” (p. 27). Like most new lieutenants, Soule also 

inherited additional duties. He was responsible for 

making, printing, and distributing tactical maps as 

well as producing a steady volume of aerial reconnaissance photographs. Slowly, the senior ocers 

warmed to the new technology and the value it added to the warghting eort. By the end of the Guadalcanal campaign, the 1st Marine Division combat 

camera crew was battle tested and ready for rest and 

ret. However, their photographic work was largely 

unimpressive, according to Peter Maslowski, professor of history and author of Armed with Cameras: 

e American Military Photographers of World War 

II (1993). According to Maslowski, Soule said, “We 

just plain and simple didn’t have the equipment, 

didn’t have the lm, didn’t have the people.” Soule 

le the Pacic and returned to Quantico to train another group of greenhorns.

Captain Soule spent just more than a year at 

Quantico, incorporating lessons learned from Guadalcanal into the classes and tactics taught to new 

photographers. He worked hard to prepare the men 

for combat because some of them were headed to 

3d Marine Division with Soule, where they would 

participate in the Iwo Jima campaign. is tour was 

dierent; Soule joined the 3d Marine Division aer 

the unit had fought through Bougainville Island and 

Guam. He checked into the division headquarters, 

where he found a slipshod combat camera section 

that had not had an ocer for months. Major General Graves B. Erskine grilled the young ocer, looking 

for an executable plan that would net good results 

for the division. Soule’s thoughtful and detailed plan 

impressed Erskine and may have kept Soule from 

becoming the mess ocer. With little time to prepare and a signicant portion of the team overdue 

for stateside rotation, Soule’s rigorous training and 

eective leadership had the men ready just in time 

for the Battle of Iwo Jima, for which he and some of 

his men were decorated for their service. His section 

suered casualties, and Soule struggled to deal with 

the wounded and dead. Before the battle ended, he 

was dispatched to Quantico on urgent business. 

By 1945, the United States was on its seventh bond 

drive, which featured a painting of Joseph J. Rosenthal’s photograph of the ag rising at Iwo Jima. e 

Japanese code of Bushidō, whereby duty supersedes 

everything, continued to demand a high cost in lives 

and limbs as Americans moved toward the emperor’s 

homeland. Soule’s urgent business at Quantico had 

involved a team putting a lm together about Iwo 

Jima; their eorts received positive public reviews and 

earned an Oscar nomination. He also worked on procuring new camera equipment before proceeding to 

Headquarters Fleet Marine Force, Pacic, located in 

Hawaii. While there, he trained another new crop of 

combat photographers for the pending invasion of Japan. However, two atom bombs eliminated the need 

for a full-scale invasion of Japan; Soule and his men 

went back to civilian life where several of them enjoyed long and productive careers in the lm business.
Winter 2016 73

Soule’s book is an interesting and balanced read, 

written by an intelligent and unassuming young o-

cer who saw the rapidly growing wartime Corps from 

a fresh perspective. e book documents Soule’s 

transformation from a direct commissioned second 

lieutenant to a combat veteran of one of America’s 

seminal battles. e work stands as a good companion to Charles Jones’s War Shots: Norm Hatch and 

the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Cameramen of World 

War II (2011), and Joe O’Donnell’s Japan 1945: A 

U.S. Marine’s Photographs from Ground Zero (2005).

s1775s
BOOK REVIEW

War’s Nomads:

A Mobile Radar Unit in Pursuit 

of Rommel during the 

Western Desert Campaign, 1942–3

Reviewed by Douglas E. Nash

Historian, History Division

Marine Corps University

War’s Nomads: A Mobile Radar Unit in Pursuit 

of Rommel during the Western Desert Campaign, 

1942–3. By Frederick Grice. Edited by Colin and 

Gillian Clarke. (Oxford: Casemate Publishers, 2015. 

Pp. 240. $34.95 cloth.)

Radar technicians are seldom the subjects 

of serious historical study, particularly 

when comparing their mundane specialty to more glamorous occupations, such 

as paratrooper or ghter pilot. But similar to other 

military specialties, radar technicians do their part 

to defend against or strike back at the enemy. War’s 

Nomads: A Mobile Radar Unit in Pursuit of Rommel 

during the Western Desert Campaign, 1942–3 is the 

story of one man’s experiences in Unit 606, a Royal Air 

Force (RAF) improvisation created to rapidly eld 

deployable light Type 6 radar sets, specically designed to provide early warning to forward airelds. 

ough such obscure units gained little attention 

during the war and were forgotten quickly aerward, Fred Grice’s 

account (more of 

a travelogue than 

a memoir) lls a 

gap in the historical record, shining a 

light on what everyday life was like for 

those operating at 

the margins of “the 

big war” in North 

Africa. 

Grice had been 

a public school 

teacher and amateur historian until 

draed in 1941 at 

the age of 31. He rst served as an enlisted aircrasman (“Erks” in RAF slang) in North Africa and 

later as a ight ocer in East Africa until the end 

of the war. War’s Nomads, edited by Grice’s daughter 

and son-in-law, is based on three wartime accounts 

that Grice wrote but never published. He provides 

a fascinatingly detailed look at life in an exotic unit 

during a critical period in the campaign—that of the 

immediate aermath of German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s defeat at the rst battle of El Alamein 

in August 1942 until the beginning of the Allied assault into Tunisia in March 1943. During his seven 

months of active service with British Army Field 

Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery’s Eighth Army, 

Grice and his team of Erks—usually fewer than 10 

men—operated in an austere environment at the 

far end of the British logistical system. Grice’s team 

scrounged for such basic necessities as food, water, 

74

Douglas E. Nash, colonel, USA (Ret), works as a writer/researcher at History Division, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia. He is the author of Hell’s 

Gate: The Battle of the Cherkassy Pocket, January 

to February 1944 (2002) and Victory Was Beyond 

Their Grasp: With the 272nd Volks-Grenadier

Division from the Hürtgen Forest to the Heart of 

the Reich (2008). Nash is currently researching 

Marine Corps amphibious warfare for an upcoming USMC History Division anthology.
Winter 2016 75

clothing, and repair parts for their ancient Crossley 

truck, which carried the team’s radar set. 

e book is divided into two sections. e rst, 

“On Dra,” is his monograph focusing on his entry 

into the RAF, specialty training, and voyage on a troop 

ship around the Cape of Good Hope of South Africa 

to Egypt. e second section, “Erk in the Desert,” 

is a companion piece that describes his experiences 

in Egypt and the Libyan Desert until his transfer to 

East Africa. e works stand on their own, but when 

brought together and reinforced by entries from an 

unauthorized daily journal (Grice’s “black book”), the 

reader gets a broader, more comprehensive account 

of everyday life experienced by the enlisted men who 

served in the British armed forces during this crucial 

period of the war. 

Readers of Richard Tregaskis’s Guadalcanal Diary

(1943) will recognize some of the aspects of the long 

voyage onboard a troopship, which Grice recounts in 

“On Dra.” While Tregaskis’s weeklong voyage from 

Australia to Guadalcanal onboard the decrepit liner 

USS American Legion (AP 35) was no picnic, Grice’s 

two-month voyage around the southern tip of Africa 

and up through the Suez Canal was a grueling aair. 

e food onboard the cramped British troopship 

HMS Highland Monarch was bad, accommodations 

were poor, and worse still was the chasm between 

living conditions experienced by the “other ranks” 

(as British enlisted men were known) and ocers, 

whose trip was nothing less than a pleasure cruise, 

enjoying the privileges of rank bestowed upon them 

by a system nearly unchanged in 400 years. Grice and 

250 of his fellow RAF aircrasmen were elated when 

they reached Alexandria, Egypt, in August 1942 and 

disembarked for dry land. But that marked only the 

beginning of the author’s hegira.

Grice’s next adventure, as recounted in “Erk in 

the Desert,” was his journey from Egypt across the 

Western Desert to the gates of Tunisia, where Rommel’s desert army was nally brought to bay aer its 

crushing defeat at the second battle of El Alamein 

in October 1942. Closely following the British spearhead, Grice and his team set up and operated radar 

equipment that enabled RAF ghter aircra to operate close to the front lines without fear of an Axis 

surprise attack by the dreaded Messerschmitt and 

Stuka German aircra. Living in the open desert 

with few of the amenities enjoyed by today’s soldiers, 

Grice and his comrades eked out a bare existence, 

making do with little and scrounging as much as 

they could. His meals usually consisted of tea, biscuits (hard crackers), some occasional marmalade, 

and the dreaded M&V (meat and vegetable) canned 

ration. Oen living in a log-covered hole scooped 

out of the desert oor, Grice treasured his privacy at 

night, using his precious free time between his duties 

onboard the Crossley gharry (truck) to write in his 

journal, compose poetry, and weave vivid descriptions of desert sights and sounds. 

Living a nomad existence for nearly seven months, 

Grice was recalled to East Africa on 19 March 1943, 

the same day the Eighth Army launched its counteroensive into southern Tunisia. Surprised by the 

suddenness of his posting, he was relieved yet simultaneously saddened to leave his tight-knit group 

with little time to say farewell. Aer the war, Grice 

reunited with his family and resumed his career as 

an educator and administrator. He devoted increasing amounts of his free time toward historical research and professional writing, nding a measure 

of success in publishing children’s stories and local 

English histories before his death in 1983. Grice’s 

contribution to military history, though limited to 

this one posthumous work, is signicant in that it 

highlights a little-known chapter of the war in North 

Africa. Its only shortcoming is that the author never 

wrote about Unit 606’s actual mission—operating as 

a rapidly deployable radar warning station. ough 

no doubt constrained by operational security considerations of the time, an actual description of how 

the equipment functioned and was employed would 

have shed additional light on the military specialty, 

but this hardly detracts from Grice’s account.

s1775s
BOOK REVIEW

Marine Corps Tank Battles

in the Middle East

Reviewed by Paul Westermeyer 

Historian, History Division

Marine Corps University

Marine Corps Tank Battles in the Middle East. By Oscar E. Gilbert. (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2015. Pp. 312. $34.95 cloth.)

The U.S. Marine Corps is renowned as an 

infantry force and not usually associated 

with armored ghting vehicles or main 

battle tanks. e Corps, however, is a modern combined-arms force, and Marine tankers existed long before Marine divisions. Oscar E. Gilbert has 

written a series of books describing Marine tanks in 

action. Marine Corps Tank Battles in the Middle East

is the latest entry in this series, which includes Marine Tank Battles in the Pacic (2001), Marine Corps 

Tank Battles in Korea (2003), and Marine Corps Tank 

Battles in Vietnam (2007). Gilbert’s new work covers 

Marine tank engagements from the 1990–91 Gulf 

War to recent operations in Afghanistan.

Oen Marine tanks supported Marine infantry operations. Marine tanks engaged enemy tanks in World 

War II and the Korean War; but during the Gulf War, 

the Corps operated mechanized forces against enemy armored divisions on a scale not previously seen. 

Both the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions operated with 

two tank battalions, and the 2d Marine Division—

with the U.S. Army’s 1st (Tiger) Brigade, 2d Armored 

Division, under its 

operational command—formed a de 

facto armored division with more than 

250 tanks and 350 

armored ghting vehicles. Marine tanks 

plowed through the 

xed Iraqi defenses 

on the rst day of 

the campaign and 

destroyed an Iraqi 

armored counterattack on the morning 

of the second day. 

I Marine Expeditionary Force then swept north to 

liberate Kuwait City. Gilbert devotes two chapters to 

this seminal event in Marine Corps armored history. 

He provides a short chapter on the background 

of the Taliban, the 9/11 attacks, and light armored 

vehicle (LAV) operations supporting Task Force 58 

during initial operations in Afghanistan. Four chapters are devoted to the role of armor in the 1st Marine Division’s mechanized column during the 2003 

invasion of Iraq, including the fratricide-plagued 

battle of an-Nasiriyah. is ghting was in some 

ways more intense and costly than the larger tankon-tank engagements of the Gulf War. Several tankon-tank engagements occurred during the march on 

Baghdad, primarily against Iraqi Army T-55 main 

battle tanks, which the Marine M1A1 Abrams main 

battle tanks destroyed somewhat easily. 

Gilbert also describes the use of armor in the counterinsurgency operations that dominated events after the initial invasion in 2003, including the Second 

76

Paul Westermeyer is a historian at the U.S. Marine 

Corps History Division, Quantico, Virginia. He is the 

author of U.S. Marines in the Gulf War, 1990–1991: 

Liberating Kuwait (2014) and U.S. Marines in Battle: Al-Khafji, 28 January–1 February 1991 (2008).
Winter 2016 77

Battle of Fallujah where Marine tanks were forced to 

support the infantry in brutal house-to-house ghting. e book concludes with a chapter on the more 

limited role armor played in the wind-swept mountains of Afghanistan where the Marine presence was 

beefed up in 2010. 

Two threads run throughout the book. One is the 

1st Tank Battalion, which played a key role in Marine 

operations during the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, 

helped seize Baghdad in 2003, and helped clear Fallujah in 2004. e second thread is the emergence of 

Marine LAVs during this period. e vehicles were 

wheeled and armed with 25mm chain guns; 81mm 

mortars; tube-launched, optically tracked, wireguided (TOW) antitank missiles; and infantry re 

teams. e LAVs provided the Marines with a lighter 

armored option and increased the exibility of the 

Marine air-ground task force compared with those 

used in the early 1990s. 

Gilbert’s writing is clear and concise and immerses the reader in the immediacy of the action. 

His book contains numerous footnotes with primary 

and secondary sources; however, he favors memoirs 

and oral history interviews and misses key secondary sources on the topic. His citations are at times 

sloppy; he continuously misnames the reviewer 

when citing the book on al-Khai, for example. e 

focus on rst-person accounts adds to Gilbert’s interesting prose but reduces the coverage of his work. 

e book cannot be considered a comprehensive 

historical account of Marine armor operations in 

the Middle East, but the work covers the topic suf-

ciently nonetheless.

Prior to Gilbert’s book series, Marine armor operations was oen an ignored topic covered solely by 

fringe publications and aimed at hobbyists and model builders more than at military readers. He treats 

the subject with historical gravitas and shows that 

Marine armor includes more than just amphibious 

attack vehicles. e book’s quality, however, suggests 

a rushed publication, which explains the missing 

sources, but the book remains a key work for Marine 

armor in support of Marine infantry operations.

s1775s
Hirohito’s War: e Pacic War, 1941–1945. By Francis Pike. (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015. Pp. 

1152. $45.00 cloth; $45.99 e-book.)

Hirohito’s War by Francis Pike oers a 

comprehensive history of the East Asia/

Pacic war between Japan and the Allied 

powers. e title is somewhat misleading on two counts. e author devotes much of the 

book to the war on the Asian mainland both before 

and aer 1941. e rst 150 pages of the work explain 

the causes and events leading up to the conict in 

the Pacic theater. e author’s narrative successfully 

strikes a balance among the four main areas of con-

ict: the Central Pacic, the South Pacic, China, and 

Southeast Asia. By doing so, Pike illustrates the interconnections in Allied and Japanese strategy and logistics. While Emperor Hirohito is an important gure 

in the narrative, he is not the book’s central focus. Pike 

does view the emperor as being involved in both the 

decision to go to war and the wartime strategy. However, the author does not consider Hirohito a leader 

with total power. e emperor had to accommodate 

many powerful, independent interest groups in Japan, 

including the military. Pike does not see Hirohito as 

the war’s “arch villain” as Hitler was in Europe. But, 

Hirohito was also 

not a passive nonentity “invented by 

the elaborate postwar propaganda” (p. 

xxxiii).

Pike maneuvers 

between theaters and

continents with out 

losing the reader. 

e book has seven 

parts, each one devoted to a specic 

time leading up to 

or occurring during 

the war. e chapters in each part discuss the relevant events in every major theater. e result is a seamless narrative, 

though with some overlap and avoidable repetition.

e book treats the Asian mainland as a vital 

theater of the conict that merits sucient coverage. Pike provides some conclusions that contradict current historical mainstream conclusions, and 

his views on U.S. Army General Joseph W. Stilwell 

should be given serious consideration. Barbara W. 

Tuchman’s positive portrayal of the general in Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–

1945 (1971) still dominates the historiography of the 

war with Japan on this issue. Pike correctly judges 

that Stilwell’s tenure as senior American commander 

in East Asia had a detrimental eect on the war effort and American interests in the region. Pike views 

Stilwell as “in large part responsible for the ICHIGO debacle” and one who “took comfort from the 

defeats of the Chinese Army” (p. 726). Pike creates 

an unpleasant picture of a petty man way out of his 

depth and a man who actually undercut the Allied 

Hirohito’s War:

e Pacic War, 1941–1945

BOOK REVIEW

Grant W. Jones 

Instructor of American and Military History

Southern New Hampshire University and Ashford 

University

78

Grant W. Jones is an instructor of American and 

military history for Southern New Hampshire 

University and Ashford University, San Diego, California. He has been published in War & Society

and is working on an article about the China Air 

Task Force. 
Winter 2016 79

war eort to further his personal agenda. Other 

recent works, such as e Battle for China: Essays 

on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 

1937–1945 (2011), indicate that a major reevaluation 

on this topic is required.

ere are two signicant shortcomings in this 

edition that could be rectied in future printings. 

e book’s citations, maps, and several important 

appendices (on submarine warfare, economics and 

production, and the kamikazes) are made available 

online but are not in the print edition. is practice 

is inconvenient, particularly with the citations and 

maps. Hopefully, other scholarly presses will not follow this publishing model that disconnects the reader from important content. e other problem for 

this reader was the sheer number of errors that made 

it through the editing process. For example, in the 

book’s opening chapter on the causes of World War 

I, “Ultimately it was Germany’s invasion of neutral 

Belgium, required by the von Schlieen Plan’s attempt 

to outank France’s defensive Maginot Line. . . .”

(p. 17, italics in original). e publisher should x 

such glaring mistakes, along with the random use of 

italics, for the next edition. Such corrections would 

improve the value of this comprehensive and useful 

work. s1775s
D-Day in the Pacic:

e Battle of Saipan

BOOK REVIEW

Reviewed by Mark R. Folse 

University of Alabama History Department,

Tuscaloosa Alabama

D-Day in the Pacic: e Battle of Saipan. By Harold J. Goldberg. (Bloomington: Indiana University 

Press, 2007. Pp. 296. $29.95 cloth; $23.99 e-book.)

Harold Goldberg’s D-Day in the Pacic is a 

narrative account of the June 1944 Battle 

of Saipan between naval and military 

forces of the United States and Japan. 

Using e-mails and personal interviews from surviving veterans as well as a myriad of published memoirs and secondary sources, Goldberg reconstructs 

the terrible carnage on the island of Saipan to illuminate several important aspects of the battle. First, 

he argues that the Japanese hastened their own defeat 

during the battle by conducting costly and foolhardy 

frontal assaults on U.S. positions that wasted manpower. Goldberg also sheds light on the inter-Service 

rivalry between the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps 

during the battle. He contends that Marine Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith caused unnecessary 

tension between the two services by wrongfully questioning the bravery of the 27th Infantry Division and 

by removing its commander, Army Major General 

Ralph C. Smith, from command. Ultimately, Goldberg argues that Saipan was a strategically crucial and 

decisive battle “that has been largely forgotten” as a 

result of other events, such as Iwo Jima and the Allied 

landings at Normandy (p. 6). ese represent familiar interpretations to World War II scholars; however, 

Goldberg succeeds 

admirably in bringing contemporary 

readers’ attention to 

this terrible battle.

Goldberg demonstrates to readers 

throughout the book 

how Japanese banzai

tactics (mass attacks) 

wasted critical manpower and negated 

the island’s natural 

defenses. He argues 

that the Japanese 

“emerged from their 

caves and protective strongholds to pursue an oense 

battle plan that allowed the marines and soldiers to destroy the Japanese soldiers, tanks, and equipment” (p. 

2). Leaving their concealed and fortied positions in 

the jungles and hills of Saipan to assault American positions headlong, the Japanese were exposed to terric 

Navy, Marine, and Army repower and committed a 

major “strategic and tactical error” (p. 2). However, 

Goldberg recounts how one of these counterattacks, or 

gyokusai (to die with honor), nearly overran elements 

of the 27th Infantry Division on 6–7 July. Believing 

that the Japanese were spent, U.S. forces were shocked 

when more than 4,000 Japanese soldiers nearly broke 

through the extreme le of the American line. e 

ghting was horric: the 105th Infantry Regiment 

killed more than 2,000 Japanese during the attack but 

suered a casualty rate of 80 percent (p. 182). Goldberg suggests the Japanese could have caused more 

U.S. casualties and held out longer if the Japanese had 

adopted more defensive tactics such as those that came 

later at Iwo Jima. 

While some historians have pointed to the dierMark R. Folse is a PhD candidate at the University of Alabama History Department, Tuscaloosa Alabama.

80
Winter 2016 81

ences in tactics employed by Marines and the Army, 

Goldberg blames Holland “Howlin’ Mad” Smith for 

the acrimony between the Army and the Marine 

Corps that developed during, and continued aer, 

the battle. Holland Smith ordered Ralph Smith to 

advance with two battalions of the 105th Infantry 

Regiment on 23 June to “mop up” the Japanese defenders on the Nafutan Peninsula. Holland Smith relieved Ralph Smith aer the latter ordered his troops 

to hold the line until they could organize for the offensive (pp. 150–51). Holland Smith took this as an 

act of disobedience and a lack of aggressive spirit. 

Goldberg, however, accuses Holland Smith of being 

inexible and not considering the challenges that 

the 27th Infantry Division encountered. e author 

notes that Ralph Smith’s soldiers faced thousands 

of well-prepared Japanese soldiers, not a few hundred that Holland Smith believed present. Goldberg 

argues that Holland Smith should have trusted the 

subordinate Smith’s judgment and allowed for adjustments in tactics according to the situation. Goldberg goes on rightly to criticize Holland Smith for 

making the Battle of Saipan sound as though it were 

exclusively a Marine aair, withholding due encomium for Ralph Smith’s soldiers (p. 152). 

Goldberg claims that Saipan was a crucial battle in 

support of American victory in the Pacic because it 

ended all prospects of a Japanese success. “Just as the 

Normandy invasion destroyed Germany’s chances 

for victory in Europe,” he argues, “the Battle of Saipan 

ended Japan’s prospects for victory in the Pacic” (p. 

214). e Japanese considered Saipan to be crucial 

to their defense zone. e U.S. invasion of the island 

prompted the Japanese Navy to seek a decisive battle 

with the American Fih Fleet that guarded U.S. amphibious operations on Saipan. e rst battle of the 

Philippine Sea, also known as the “Great Marianas 

Turkey Shoot” on 19 June 1944, was a terrible defeat 

for Japan, which lost hundreds of planes, pilots, and 

three aircra carriers (p. 101). e battle set the U.S. 

Navy up for a victory in the Battle of Leyte Gulf in 

October 1944. Goldberg argues that “it had been the 

reduction in Japan’s air strength at the First Battle of 

the Philippine Sea that paved the way for the destruction of Japan’s surface ships at Leyte Gulf ” (p. 102). 

is great naval victory, however, was tainted by 

the squabbling of U.S. Navy Vice Admiral Marc A. 

Mitscher and Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, commander of the Fih Fleet. e two men diered on 

attack plans against the Japanese eet. Mitscher, aggressive and impatient, wanted to give chase and 

sink the remaining Japanese eet. Spruance, on the 

other hand, the more cautious, deliberate, and in 

overall command of the Saipan operation, decided 

that pursuing the Japanese eet would leave ground 

troops on Saipan dangerously exposed. Spruance 

decided to let the Japanese steam away. Despite the 

bickering that occurred aerward, Goldberg praises 

both commanders: “Spruance’s defensive plan led to 

a decisive American victory, while Mitscher’s launch 

schedule decimated Japanese resources” (p. 211). 

D-Day in the Pacic does a ne job of supporting 

the above contentions, but it excels in capturing the 

horror of what the Marines and U.S. Army soldiers 

on Saipan experienced during the battle. From the 

amphibious assault on 15 June to the gyokusai on 6–7 

July, troops on both sides struggled with sleep deprivation, fear, hunger, and exhaustion amongst the 

lth, death, and heat. Goldberg’s rsthand accounts 

from veterans allowed him to paint a lurid and lucid picture of the terrifying battle from the infantryman’s perspective. e book is full of grim moments: 

Marines forced to watch violent deaths of friends 

and to see bloated and maggot-infested corpses, and 

Japanese sneaking into aid stations to bayonet and 

slit the throats of wounded troops. Of all the narratives, the mass civilian suicide at Marpi Point (the 

incident Saipan is infamous for) was exceptionally 

tragic. Japanese soldiers convinced Saipan civilians 

that they would suer a fate worse than death if 

captured by American forces. erefore, hundreds 

of men, women, and children plummeted from the 

clis to their deaths needlessly. “e scene was grisly 

even for battle veterans, and many marines and soldiers were haunted by the memories” (p. 202).

D-Day in the Pacic is highly commendable for 

what it accomplishes. Goldberg argues persuasively 

the eects of Japanese tactics, the root cause of Marine and Army tension during the battle, and the importance of the battle in bringing the war to a close. 

ough the book focuses on the Corps’ history, it is 

unsupported by any material from the Marine Corps 

Archives and Special Collections in Quantico, Virginia, and provides infrequent references from the 

National Archives in Washington, DC. Goldberg’s 

interpretations, especially regarding the strategic 
82 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

importance of Saipan, are not new. Jeter A. Isely 

and Philip A. Crowl attached similar importance to 

the battle in e U.S. Marines and Amphibious War 

(1951). George W. Garand and Truman R. Strobridge, authors of Western Pacic Operations: History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II

(1971), also argued the signicance of Saipan. More 

archival sources may have inuenced Goldberg’s already well-considered conclusions and might have 

led him to new interpretations. Nevertheless, Goldberg’s work will be useful to World War II military 

and naval historians, both professional and amateur. 

is book is tough to read, but a good book on a terrible battle should be. s1775s
A Call to Arms:

Mobilizing America for World War II

BOOK REVIEW

Reviewed by Bradford A. Wineman

Associate professor of military history 

Marine Corps University Command and Staff College

A Call to Arms: Mobilizing America for World War II. 

By Maury Klein. (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015. Pp. 912. $40.00 cloth; $25.00 paperback; 

$16.99 e-book.)

Maury Klein’s A Call to Arms escorts the 

reader through the experience of the 

American home front during World 

War II, focusing on three key misconceptions about the mobilization process and its success. e rst is forgetting the nation’s late entry into 

the war—the war began almost two years before the 

attack on Pearl Harbor. While the American people 

launched themselves into supporting the military 

eort aer 7 December 1941, President Franklin D. 

Roosevelt (FDR) had been laying the groundwork 

for the nation’s transition to a war footing by gradually reacting to the events of the growing conict in 

Europe and preparing at home. By late 1941, FDR 

had sent a myriad of supplies to England, shut o resources to Japan, stockpiled crucial war materiel domestically, and instituted the rst peacetime dra in 

American history. In sum, the nation already had a 

running start upon entering the conict. 

e second misconception relates to the rst in 

how the experiences of World War I, mostly negative, aected America’s entrance into World War II 

and the country’s 

subsequent mobilization. Business owners shuddered at the 

prospect of having 

to forfeit production 

controls to the government, and citizens bitterly recalled 

the rampant war 

proteering of indus

try captains whom 

they labeled “merchants of death” 

during the interwar 

period (p. 14). For 

many Americans, 

the memory of the Great War was characterized as 

much by corruption and coercion as by patriotism 

and unity. 

e last and most damaging misconception is 

that of the “Greatest Generation.” According to 

Klein, the civilian home front was not as unied, 

hard working, and seless as Tom Brokaw would 

have his readers believe. Klein chronicles cases of 

citizens circumventing the rationing requirements, 

shirking their work at industrial jobs, and halting 

production with labor strikes. According to Klein’s 

persuasive narrative, rampant self-interest and 

greed from both individuals and institutions perennially marred the war eort. 

Klein is a celebrated economic historian and professor emeritus at the University of Rhode Island. 

His research into the methodology and process of 

American industrial production is nothing short 

of extraordinary. He describes the step-by-step 

construction of bombers, liberty ships, and other 

machines of war. e technical explanations of 

Bradford A. Wineman, PhD, is an associate professor of military history at Marine Corps University’s 

Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA. He is 

the author of “‘We Will Fight Them . . .’: The Experience of British Civilians during the ‘Blitz’,” in Personal Perspectives: World War II, edited Timothy 

C. Dowling (2005). 

83
84 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

the war assembly-line procedures alone would be 

stultifying to the reader if not for Klein’s numerous 

and well-placed anecdotes of the American workers and managers that humanize the cold, unfeeling machinations of the war’s production activities. 

ese anecdotes also allow the author’s economic 

analysis to illuminate discussions on the social and 

cultural consequences of the drastic changes social 

and economic changes taking place, both positive 

(increased economic opportunities for women 

and minorities) and negative (missed opportunity 

to address institutionalized racism), in the United 

States. 

 Although Klein examines the roles of institutions, businesses, and broader economic trends, he 

habitually steers his explanation to the role of leadership, specically that of FDR, as the true key to 

American home front success. As mentioned previously, FDR had the foresight to prepare the nation 

for the war despite substantial isolationist and paci-

st opposition. Once America entered the conict, 

FDR discovered that some of his greatest enemies 

were at home: isolationists, reluctant corporate executives, and even stalwart New Dealers in his own 

party. roughout the war, FDR adeptly balanced 

the delicate variables of manpower, prices, resources, and government power to maintain success on 

the battleeld and harmony at home. While it took 

millions of citizens to create and operate the “arsenal of democracy,” (pp. 128–29) Klein posits that 

FDR put all the various pieces together and willed 

the United States population to victory through his 

organization, doggedness, and charisma. 

e book’s only major shortcoming is the ending. 

Aer nearly 800 pages of painstakingly researched 

narrative tracing the United States’ journey through 

the war, Klein oers only a pithy two pages on 

America aer the dropping of the atomic bombs. He 

asks ambiguous rhetorical questions about “What 

did it all mean?” but never attempts to give answers. 

With so much rich explanation about the mobilization process, the book leaves the reader wanting for 

a concluding analysis, tying together all of the facts 

and elucidating on the broader long-term impact on 

U.S. economics, society, government, and culture. 

Regardless, this volume stands out as the gold standard for scholarship on the World War II American 

home front. s1775s
WWII:

A Chronicle of Soldiering

BOOK REVIEW

Reviewed by Chris Blaker 

Oakland University in Rochester, Michigan

WWII: A Chronicle of Soldiering. By James Jones. 

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975, 2014 

rev. ed. Pp. 216. $17.00 paper and e-book.)

I

n the revised edition of WWII: A Chronicle of 

Soldiering, James Jones examines the evolution, 

and later de-evolution, of the civilian-soldier 

during the war from 1941 to 1946. e book

presents a collection of Jones’s essays originally written to complement war art for a 1975 World War II 

picture book.

Best known for his World War II trilogy—From 

Here to Eternity (1951), e in Red Line (1962), and 

Whistle (1978)—Jones uses personal experiences as 

a mud-slogging infantryman in the Pacic and pens 

vivid accounts of the war. Jones’s work jumps from 

his own memories at Pearl Harbor and Guadalcanal 

to the contributions of war correspondents and painters, including accounts of how politicians and highlevel military ocers planned and executed incredible operations against the Axis Powers. e author 

attempts to create a historical cocktail, a blending of 

personal and social but also historical and ctional 

perspectives. WWII: A Chronicle of Soldiering is an 

all-encompassing compilation of wartime experiences. e anthological structure moves the book freely 

from topic to topic but requires the reader to follow 

along carefully as essays and commentaries oen 

interrupt the more 

traditional telling of 

military histories. 

Some of Jones’s 

essays discuss the 

evolution of war art 

in both theaters of 

the war—the Pacic 

and Europe. e war 

art selections included in this volume 

complement Jones’s 

writing style. He describes how early art 

in Yank magazine 

cheered on enlisted 

soldiers; its humor 

addressed their everyday problems in a way that even 

they could laugh at. Later cartoons, such as those 

drawn by Bill Mauldin, and more serious publications, such as Life and Time magazines, continued to 

promote war art. American Servicemen even contributed to the phenomenon themselves: infantrymen 

reproduced the popular doodle of “Kilroy” across 

the battleelds and pilots painted nose art on their 

planes. e strength of war art, as proven by both its 

creators and consumers, comes from its honesty and 

nonpolitical means of describing the war experiences 

of those directly involved. Whether the work was light 

or serious in nature, soldiers appreciated the truth.

e evolution and de-evolution of the American soldier, however, remains Jones’s focal point. 

He notes that, while the United States went to great 

lengths to train and prepare its civilian-soldiers for 

war, the country did far less to assimilate them into 

peacetime society upon their return home. e author also presents a downside to America’s indomitable wartime industry. He argues that the rapidly 

Chris Blaker previously worked at the U.S. Marine 

Corps History Division, Quantico, Virginia. He is 

pursuing a master’s degree in American history 

at Oakland University in Rochester, Michigan, and 

is writing his thesis on Marine Corps organization 

during the Vietnam War.

85
86 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

expanding size of military forces and a dependence 

on machines threatened to overshadow the infantryman, condemning him to become simply a cog in an 

industrial machine rather than a distinct element of 

American military might. Jones’s writing reects this 

transition as well, whether intentional or not. e author concentrates on the soldier, squad, and company 

on Guadalcanal and in North Africa. But by the time 

Operation Overlord and Okinawa occur, the corpsand army-size campaigns overshadow the book’s thesis: the individual soldier.

Ultimately, Jones’s work oers a unique view of the 

war presented as a collection of military histories, 

political and social commentaries, psychological hypotheses, and cultural developments. His work views 

the war from many angles and, by doing so, creates 

a wide lens through which to assess the conict. e 

author’s observations on varied topics draws suspicion to his defense of a single thesis, but Jones masterfully presents the war to his readers exactly as it 

appeared to the very servicemen he seeks to remember. s1775s
Winter 2016 87

Marine Corps History Division is actively searching for contributors to Marine Corps History (MCH). MCH is a scholarly, 

military history periodical published twice a year (Summer and 

Winter). Our focus is on all aspects of the Corps’ history, culture, 

and doctrine. Articles should be no less than 4,000 words and footnoted according to Chicago Manual of Style. For more information 

about submitting an article or writing a book review, please email 

history.division@usmc.mil with the subject line of “Marine Corps 

History Submission.”

Submissions

New History Division Publication!

U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare

Training and Education, 2000–2010

Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser

U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare

covers a period of considerable intellectual activity for the U.S. Marine 

Corps. e initial ghting during the 

Iraq and Afghanistan Wars convinced 

many Marine leaders that it needed to strengthen and enhance how 

it trained and educated Marines in 

counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. is book recounts the work 

of Marines and educators in the eld 

and at home at Marine Corps Base 

Quantico, Virginia, and at Marine 

Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 

Twentynine Palms, California.

New History Division Publication!

U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare

U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare

covers a period of considerable intellectual activity for the U.S. Marine 

Corps. e initial ghting during the 

Iraq and Afghanistan Wars convinced 

many Marine leaders that it needed to strengthen and enhance how 

it trained and educated Marines in 

counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. is book recounts the work 

of Marines and educators in the eld 

and at home at Marine Corps Base 

Quantico, Virginia, and at Marine 
88 MCH Vol. 1, No. 2

U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001–2009

Anthology and

Annotated Bibliography

Major David W. Kummer

This anthology and bibliography presents a collection of 37 articles, interviews, and speeches describing many 

aspects of the U.S. Marine Corps participation in Operation Enduring Freedom 

from 2001 to 2009. is History Division 

publication is intended to serve as a general overview and provisional reference 

to inform both Marines and the general 

public until monographs dealing with 

major Marine Corps operations during 

the campaign can be completed. e accompanying annotated bibliography provides a detailed look at selected sources 

that currently exist until new scholarship 

and archival materials become available.

his anthology and bibliography presents a collection of 37 articles, interviews, and speeches describing many 

aspects of the U.S. Marine Corps participation in Operation Enduring Freedom 

from 2001 to 2009. is History Division 

publication is intended to serve as a general overview and provisional reference 

to inform both Marines and the general 

public until monographs dealing with 

major Marine Corps operations during 

the campaign can be completed. e accompanying annotated bibliography provides a detailed look at selected sources 

that currently exist until new scholarship 

and archival materials become available.

terviews, and speeches describing many 

from 2001 to 2009. is History Division 

public until monographs dealing with 

vides a detailed look at selected sources 

that currently exist until new scholarship 

Story to tell?

Marine Corps History is currently

accepting article and book review

submissions for 2016–17.

For more information about submission guidelines 

or history books available for review, please contact 

the senior editor at angela.anderson@usmcu.edu.

Story to tell?
e History Division is moving!

History Division will be moving to the Simmons Marine Corps History Center, part of the Marine Corps University. e new state-of-the-art wing will bring together all of the Marine Corps University schools into one 

unit. e structure will oer many new features and amenities for the student body, faculty, and sta at Marine 

Corps Base Quantico. 

e Greene Papers:

General Wallace M. Greene Jr.

and the Escalation of the Vietnam War,

January 1964–March 1965

Nicholas J. Schlosser, 2015. Cloth. 418 pp.

The Greene Papers: General Wallace M. Greene Jr. and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, January 1964–March 1965 contains 

more than 100 documents from the personal papers of the 23d 

Commandant of the Marine Corps and is the rst edited volume 

of personal papers to be published by the Marine Corps History 

Division as a monograph. Produced by a member of the Joint 

Chiefs of Sta, General Greene’s notes provide a rsthand account from one of the main participants in the decision-making 

process that led to the commitment of a large-scale American 

expeditionary force in Southeast Asia.

is volume begins in January 1964 and ends just before 

the landing of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Da 

Nang on 8 March 1965, a pivotal moment that marked the 

ocial transition from the United States’ advisory mission to a more active combat mission. In doing so, it traces 

Greene’s growing frustration with Secretary of Defense 

Robert S. McNamara’s and President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 

equivocation and uncertainty about Southeast Asia. Along with a 

series of commemorative pamphlets, this book is part of the Marine 

Corps History Division’s eort to mark the ieth anniversary of the 

Vietnam War.

Covers Marine Corps History Vol. 1 No. 2 Winter 2016.indd 2 
Marine Corps History

Issues of Marine Corps History can be found on the History Division 

website at https://www.history.usmc.mil under Publications.

Covers Marine Corps History Vol. 1 No. 2 Winter 2016.indd 1