alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
III

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. RES. 284

Increasing the efficiency of the deportation process and the removal of

deportable aliens.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 8 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 12), 1994

Mr. DECONCINI (for himself and Mr. SIMPSON) submitted the following

resolution; which was considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

Increasing the efficiency of the deportation process and the

removal of deportable aliens.

1 Resolved, That (a) it is the sense of the Senate that—

2 (1) the Attorney General should consider imple3 menting, through awarding start-up administrative

4 grants to appropriate not-for-profit organizations, a

5 pilot program at processing centers of the Immigra6 tion and Naturalization Service for the purpose of

7 increasing efficiency and cost savings in the process8 ing and removal of aliens held in custody by assur9 ing orientation and representation for such aliens;
2

•SRES 284 ATS

1 (2) these pilot projects should be developed in

2 consultation with the Commissioner of the Immigra3 tion and Naturalization Service, the Executive Office

4 of Immigration Review (EOIR), and appropriate

5 not-for-profit organizations having relevant experi6 ence;

7 (3) one such project currently operating in Ari8 zona at the Florence Service Processing Center is a

9 good model for implementing such a pilot program

10 because of its working relationship with the Immi11 gration and Naturalization Service, the Executive

12 Office of Immigration Review, and a not-for-profit

13 organization; and

14 (4) an evaluation component should be included

15 in any such pilot program to test the efficiency, the

16 cost effectiveness, the services provided, and the

17 replicability in future years to additional processing

18 centers of the Immigration and Naturalization Serv19 ice.

20 (b) It is further the sense of the Senate that nothing

21 in this resolution should be construed as creating a right

22 to be represented at the expense of the Government.

Æ
§ 1.822-12 Dividends to policyholders. ( a ) Dividends to policyholders are used in determining the “underwriting loss” for purposes of the special transitional underwriting loss deduction provided by section 821(f), and the limitation on capital losses under section 822(c)(6); in computing statutory underwriting income or loss under section 823, and the subtractions from the protection against loss account under section 824(d). The term “dividends to policyholders” is defined in section 822(f)(2) as dividends and similar distributions paid or declared to policyholders. It includes amounts returned to policyholders where the amount is not fixed in the insurance contract but depends upon the experience of the company or the discretion of the management. Such amounts are not to be treated as return premiums under section 822(f)(1). Savings credited to the individual accounts of the subscribers of a reciprocal underwriter or interinsurer under section 823(b)(2) are not dividends paid or declared within the meaning of this paragraph. However, distributions in respect of such credits shall be considered as dividends paid. See section 823(b)(2). The term “paid or declared” is to be construed according to the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of the insurance company, and such method shall be consistently followed with respect to all deductions (including dividends and similar distributions to policyholders) and all items of income.
( b ) If the method of accounting so employed is the cash receipts and disbursements method, the deduction is limited to the dividends and similar distributions actually paid to policyholders in the taxable year. If, on the other hand, the method of accounting so employed is the accrual method, the deduction, or a reasonably accurate estimate thereof, for dividends and similar distributions declared to policyholders for any taxable year will, in general, be computed by adding the amount of dividends and similar distributions declared but unpaid at the end of the taxable year to dividends and similar distributions paid during the taxable year and deducting dividends and similar distributions declared but unpaid at the beginning of the taxable year. If an insurance company using the accrual method does not compute the deduction for dividends and similar distributions declared to policyholders in the manner stated, it must submit with its return a full and complete explanation of the manner in which the deduction is computed. For the rule as to when dividends are considered paid, see the regulations under section 561.
[T.D. 6681, 28 FR 11115, Oct. 17, 1963, as amended by T.D. 9849, 84 FR 9236, Mar. 14, 2019]
Wolverine World Wide Exhibit 10.13 to Form 10-K - 02/28/07



EXHIBIT 10.13


          The executive officers listed below have entered into Executive Severance Agreements with the Company in the form filed herewith.  The information listed below is inserted into the blanks for the respective executive officer's Executive Severance Agreement.


	 	
Salary Multiplier

Rate

(Section 4(a)(4))
	


Termination Period

(Section 1(n))
	
Change of Control

Continuation Period

(Section 2)

	 	 	 	 
	
Timothy J. O'Donovan
	
3
	
3 years
	
36 months

	
Stephen L. Gulis, Jr.
	
3
	
3 years
	
36 months

	
Blake W. Krueger
	
3
	
3 years
	
36 months

	
Kenneth A. Grady
	
2
	
2 years
	
24 months

	
Cheryl L. Johnson
	
2
	
2 years
	
24 months

	
Nicholas P. Ottenwess
	
2
	
2 years
	
24 months
CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                          OF CORPORATE GENERAL PARTNER

            PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, James M. Seneff, Jr., the Chief Executive Officer of CNL Realty
Corporation,  the corporate  general  partner of CNL Income Fund VIII, Ltd. (the
"Partnership"),  has executed this  certification  in connection with the filing
with the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission  of the  Partnership's  Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2002 (the "Report"). The
undersigned hereby certifies that:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.



Date: November 7, 2002                     /s/ James M. Seneff, Jr.
      -----------------                    ----------------------------
                                           Name:  James M. Seneff, Jr.
                                           Title:   Chief Executive Officer
IV

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. CON. RES. 145

Concerning the removal of Russian Armed Forces from Moldova.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 1, 1996

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (for himself, Mr. WOLF, Mr. SOLOMON, Mr.

HOYER, and Mr. DURBIN) submitted the following concurrent resolution;

which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Concerning the removal of Russian Armed Forces from

Moldova.

Whereas the United States Government has recognized and

continues to emphasize its commitment to the independence and territorial integrity of the sovereign nation of

Moldova;

Whereas units of the former Soviet 14th Army of the Russian

Federation continue to be deployed on the territory of the

sovereign nation of Moldova against the wishes of the

government and the majority of the people of Moldova;

Whereas the Prime Minister of Russia and the Prime Minister of Moldova signed an agreement on October 21,

1994, according to which Russia would withdraw its military forces from Moldova within three years;
2

•HCON 145 IH

Whereas in the period since the agreement was signed, there

have been negligible force reductions of the Russian

Army in Moldova;

Whereas the Organization on Security and Cooperation in

Europe has been engaged in efforts to resolve differences

between the Government of Moldova and the authorities

of the Transdniestria region where the Russian Army

continues to be deployed, and the Government of Ukraine

has offered to use its good offices to assist in these efforts; and

Whereas the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization on

Security and Cooperation in Europe has passed a resolution calling for the ‘‘most rapid, continuing, unconditional, and full withdrawal’’ of the 14th Army of the Russian Federation: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring), That the Congress—

3 (1) calls upon the Government of the Russian

4 Federation to adhere to the provisions of the troop

5 withdrawal agreement signed on October 21, 1994;

6 (2) welcomes recent statements by the Adminis7 tration supporting Moldova’s territorial integrity,

8 and urges the Secretary of State to use every appro9 priate opportunity and means, including multilateral

10 and bilateral diplomacy, to secure removal of Rus11 sian military forces from Moldova in accordance with

12 the terms of the troop withdrawal agreement;
3

•HCON 145 IH

1 (3) urges all of Moldova’s neighboring countries

2 to recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity

3 of Moldova; and

4 (4) urges the Organization for Security and Co5 operation in Europe to continue its efforts in resolv6 ing differences between the government of Moldova

7 and the authorities of the Transdniestria region, and

8 welcomes the offer by the Government of Ukraine to

9 assist in these efforts.

Æ
# Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali L 281/2020

| | ISSN 1977-074X |
| --- | --- |
| Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali
  tal-Unjoni Ewropea | L 281 |
| | |
| Edizzjoni bil-Malti | Leġiżlazzjoni | Volum 6328 ta' Awwissu 2020 |

ISSN 1977-074X

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali

tal-Unjoni Ewropea

L 281

Edizzjoni bil-Malti

Leġiżlazzjoni

Volum 6328 ta' Awwissu 2020

---

| Werrej | | II   Atti mhux leġiżlattivi | Paġna |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | FTEHIMIET INTERNAZZJONALI |
| | * | Informazzjoni dwar id-dħul fis-seħħ tal-Ftehim għat-Terminazzjoni ta’ Trattati Bilaterali dwar l-Investiment bejn l-Istati Membri tal-Unjoni Ewropea | 1 |

Werrej

II   Atti mhux leġiżlattivi

Paġna

FTEHIMIET INTERNAZZJONALI

*

Informazzjoni dwar id-dħul fis-seħħ tal-Ftehim għat-Terminazzjoni ta’ Trattati Bilaterali dwar l-Investiment bejn l-Istati Membri tal-Unjoni Ewropea

1

| MT | L-Atti li t-titoli tagħhom huma stampati b'tipa ċara huma dawk li għandhom x'jaqsmu mal-maniġment ta' kuljum ta' materji agrikoli, u li ġeneralment huma validi għal perijodu limitat.
  It-titoli ta'l-atti l-oħra kollha huma stampati b'tipa skura u mmarkati b'asterisk quddiemhom. |
| --- | --- |

MT

L-Atti li t-titoli tagħhom huma stampati b'tipa ċara huma dawk li għandhom x'jaqsmu mal-maniġment ta' kuljum ta' materji agrikoli, u li ġeneralment huma validi għal perijodu limitat.

It-titoli ta'l-atti l-oħra kollha huma stampati b'tipa skura u mmarkati b'asterisk quddiemhom.

---

II Atti mhux leġiżlattivi

FTEHIMIET INTERNAZZJONALI

| 28.8.2020 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | L 281/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.8.2020

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

L 281/1

---

Informazzjoni dwar id-dħul fis-seħħ tal-Ftehim għat-Terminazzjoni ta’ Trattati Bilaterali dwar l-Investiment bejn l-Istati Membri tal-Unjoni Ewropea

Il-Ftehim għat-Terminazzjoni ta’ Trattati Bilaterali dwar l-Investiment bejn l-Istati Membri tal-Unjoni Ewropea, iffirmat fi Brussell fil-5 ta’ Mejju 2020
   (1), ser jidħol fis-seħħ fid-29 ta’ Awwissu 2020, f’konformità mal-Artikolu 16(1) tal-Ftehim.

1

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(1)  
  ĠU L 169, 29.5.2020.

1

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##### 



EXHIBIT 99.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Mackenzie Investment Management
Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2002 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Keith J. Carlson, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|(1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                              
|--- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   
|(2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial position and results of operations of the Company.

|                                                                              | 
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | 
|/s/ KEITH J. CARLSONKeith J. Carlson
Chief Executive Officer
November 7, 2002
§ 884.2740 Perinatal monitoring system and accessories. ( a ) *Identification.* A perinatal monitoring system is a device used to show graphically the relationship between maternal labor and the fetal heart rate by means of combining and coordinating uterine contraction and fetal heart monitors with appropriate displays of the well-being of the fetus during pregnancy, labor, and delivery. This generic type of device may include any of the devices subject to §§ 884.2600, 884.2640, 884.2660, 884.2675, 884.2700, and 884.2720. This generic type of device may include the following accessories: Central monitoring system and remote repeaters, signal analysis and display equipment, patient and equipment supports, and component parts.
( b ) *Classification.* Class II (performance standards).
#### Getachew WOLDEAREGAY, Petitioner, v. U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE; John Ashcroft, Attorney General for the United States of America, Respondents.

No. 02-1171.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted June 5, 2002.

Decided June 24, 2002.

*708Richard S. Bromberg, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Mark C. Walters, Assistant Director, Arthur L. Rabin, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondents.

Before WILKINS, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Getachew Woldearegay seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“Board”) decision and order dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s denial of his application for asylum and withholding of deportation. We have reviewed the administrative record and the Board’s decision and find that substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that Woldearegay failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. Accordingly, we deny Woldearegay’s petition for review on the reasoning of the Board. *See Woldearegay v. INS,*No. [ AXX-XXX-XXX ] (B.I.A. Jan. 30, 2002). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED.*
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 00-50267

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOE ALEX ROBERTSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. W-99-CR-80-ALL

--------------------

November 7, 2001

Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Joe Alex Robertson appeals his sentence following his

guilty-plea conviction for bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.

2113(a). 

Robertson first argues that the application of the career

offender enhancement provision found at U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1

unconstitutionally increased his sentence in violation of

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because the facts

supporting the enhancement provision were not proven to a jury

beyond a reasonable doubt. Bank robbery in violation of 18
No. 00-50267

-2-

U.S.C. § 2113(a) is punishable by up to 20 years (240 months) in

prison. As such, bank robbery is a Class C felony, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3559(b), subjecting a defendant to a maximum of three years’

supervised release. Robertson was sentenced to 178 months’

imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. Because

Robertson did not receive a sentence above the statutory maximum

on the bank robbery conviction, Apprendi is inapplicable. United

States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,

121 S. Ct 1163 (2001).

Robertson next argues that the district court erred in

applying the career offender enhancement provision because he did

not have the requisite prior convictions to support the

enhancement. We review the district court’s interpretation or

application of the sentencing guidelines de novo. United States

v. Upton, 91 F.3d 677, 687 (5th Cir. 1996). A defendant is a

career offender if, inter alia, he has at least two prior felony

convictions for either a crime of violence or a controlled

substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. The PSR stated that

Robertson had two prior convictions for driving while

intoxicated, both of which would qualify as felony convictions

under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. 

A PSR generally bears sufficient indicia of reliability to

be considered as evidence by the trial judge in making guideline

determinations, especially when there is no evidence in rebuttal. 

United States v. Alfaro, 919 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1990). 

Because driving while intoxicated is considered a crime of

violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, the district court did
No. 00-50267

-3-

not err in applying the career offender provision when

determining Robertson’s sentence. United States v. DeSantiagoGonzalez, 207 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 2000).

AFFIRMED.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-20032

USDC No. CA-H-95-1279

 

PAUL EARL DORSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JOHN E. STINE; MARSHALL D. HERKLOT;

B. DRIVER; TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF 

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL 

DIVISION,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

- - - - - - - - - -

July 25, 1996

Before DAVIS, PARKER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Paul Earl Dorsey, Texas prisoner #642562, appeals the

district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as

frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). For the first time on

appeal, Dorsey argues that prison officials violated certain

prison regulations concerning access to medical treatment. 

Because Dorsey raised this claim for the first time on appeal, we

review for plain error. Douglass v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n, 79
No. 96-20032

- 2 -

F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc). Dorsey’s allegation

that prison officials violated a prison regulation does not

establish a constitutional violation. See Jackson v. Cain, 864

F.2d 1235, 1251 (5th Cir. 1989). Therefore, there is no error,

plain or otherwise.

Dorsey argues that the punishment imposed in the

disciplinary proceedings, the loss of a substantial amount of

good-time credits, was excessive and disproportionate to the

offenses charged. Because Dorsey’s claim calls into question the

duration of his confinement, he must challenge successfully the

decision denying his good-time credits in a habeas corpus action

before bringing a § 1983 action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.

Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500

(1973); Wilson v. Foti, 832 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1987). 

Dorsey argues that the three disciplinary proceedings

violated his due process rights, that they were not supported by

the evidence, and that he was denied access to the prison

grievance system. We have reviewed the record and the district

court’s opinion and find no abuse of discretion in the dismissal. 

See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1992).

Dorsey has not raised a nonfrivolous issue for appeal. See

Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). 

Accordingly, his motion for IFP is DENIED and his appeal is

DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS. 5th Cir. R. 42.2. Dorsey’s “Application

for Process of Service,” motion for discovery, motion for
No. 96-20032

- 3 -

production of documents, motion for interrogatories, motion for

admission, and motion for continuance are also DENIED.

MOTIONS DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Elliot Lynn YELLOW HAIR, Appellant.

No. 01-3689.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 14, 2002.

Filed June 20, 2002.

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, FAGG, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Elliot Yellow Hair was convicted of assault resulting in serious bodily injury in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(6), 1153 (2000). The district court * found Yellow Hair perjured himself at trial and applied a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice. *See*United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3C1.1 (2000). Yellow Hair appeals his sentence, contending the district court committed clear error when it made the factual findings which support the sentencing enhancement. *See United States v. O’Dell,*204 F.3d 829, 836 (8th Cir.2000) (standard of review).

At Yellow Hair’s trial, several witnesses gave descriptions of Yellow Hair’s assault on the victim. While testifying, Yellow Hair conceded he kicked and stomped on the victim. When the government’s attorney asked Yellow Hair if he caused the physical damage to the victim shown in a photograph taken soon after the assault, however, Yellow Hair replied “No.” (Tr. 418.) The district court highlighted this part of Yellow Hair’s testimony when making its factual findings in support of the obstruction of justice enhancement. (Sent. Tr. 15-16.) The district court stated: “I find that [response] is an outright fabrication on the part of the defendant.” *Id.*The district court noted the jury came to the same conclusion when it convicted Yellow Hair and that a reasonable trier of fact could not have reached a different conclusion.

Based on our review of the parties’ briefs and the relevant parts of the record, we conclude the district court did not commit clear error in finding Yellow Hair perjured himself at trial. Further, we conclude the district court properly assessed the two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice in this situation. Thus, we affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.

*

The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota.
Electronically FiledIntermediate Court of Appeals2939012-NOV-201009:38 AM