Department of Homeland Security
 

FEMA’s Initial Response to Hurricane Isaac in 


Louisiana Was Effective and Efficient 


OIG-13-84 April 2013
 
OFFICE o.F INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland StlCl11;ly 

," in "" , oc 2M 28 i ""'''' oig <h ..,,' 

APR 3 0 2013 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Elizabeth Zimmerman 

Ac ing Associate Administra Response and Recovery 

Fe eral E nt Agency 

FROM: 

Assis <lnt Inspector eneral 

Office of Emergen Management Over~ight 

SUBJECT: FEMA'siniti(l1 Response to Hurricane Isaac in Louisiana 

Was Effective and Efficient 

FEMA Disaster Number 4080-DR-LA 

Audit Report Number OIG-13-84 

Attached for your information is our final letter report, FEMA '5 Initial Response to 

Hurricane Isaac in Louisiana Was Effective and Efficient 

Our office audited the Federal Emergency Management Agency'~ (FEMA) initial 

response to Hurricane Isaac in Louisiana from early September to mid-October 2012. 

We discussed the results ofthis audit with FEMA officials during the audit. We al~o 

provided a discussion draft report to FEMA Joint Field Office officials on February 4, 2013, 

and to FEMA headquarters on February 12, 2013, and discussed it at e~it conferences 

held on February 7 and 12, 2013, respectively. The report does not contain any 

recommendations; therefore, you do not need to provide our office with a written 

response. 

Consistent with our respon~ibility under the Inspector General Act, we are providing 

copies of our report to appropriate congressional committee~ with oversight and 

appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post 

the report on our website for public dissemination. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact john Kelly, Deputy Assistant 

Inspector General, Office of Emergency Management Oversight, at (202) 254·4100, 

Attachment 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

BACKGROUND 

Hurricane Isaac struck southeast Louisiana on August 28, 2012, causing widespread 

flooding in the low-lying areas impacting Ascension, Assumption, Jefferson, Lafourche, 

Livingston, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, St. John the Baptist, 

St. Tammany, Terrebonne, Tangipahoa, and Washington parishes (15 parishes). As the 

hurricane moved inland and downgraded to a tropical storm and later to a tropical 

depression, it continued to move slowly and took several days to exit the state. 

FEMA cannot provide disaster assistance under the RobertfT.fStaffordfDisasterfRelieffandf

EmergencyfAssistancefAct, Public Law 93-288, as amended, until the President declares 

a “major disaster” or an “emergency.”1

 When an incident occurs or threatens to occur 

that would not qualify under the definition of a major disaster, the Governor of a State 

may request that the President declare an emergency. Based on the Governor’s request 

and all available information, FEMA forwards the Governor’s request to the President 

with a recommendation for or against an emergency declaration. 

In the case of Hurricane Isaac, FEMA recommended and the President declared an 

emergency for the 15 affected parishes on August 27, 2012. Later, on August 29, 2012, 

the President declared a major disaster for Individual Assistance and Public Assistance in 

55 of Louisiana’s 64 parishes. FEMA is providing 75 percent Federal funding for this 

disaster. 

RESULTS OF AUDIT 

FEMA’s initial response to Hurricane Isaac was overall effective and efficient. In 

evaluating FEMA’s initial response to this disaster, we focused on answering the 

following questions: 

1. What activities did FEMA perform before the major disaster declaration? 

2. What were the most pressing challenges that FEMA faced in this disaster? 

3. What were the most significant resource shortfalls? 

4. How did FEMA make disaster sourcing decisions? 

5. How well did FEMA coordinate its activities? 

 

 1

 42 U.S.C. §5121, et seq., as amended. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

1. FEMA Proactively Prepared for Hurricane Isaac 

FEMA effectively coordinated activities in Louisiana before the President’s major 

disaster declaration. On August 25, 2012, FEMA Region VI began coordinating 

predeployment activities with the State. After the Emergency Declaration, FEMA moved 

quickly to mobilize an Incident Management Assistance Team, set up the Initial 

Operating Facility, and respond to requests for initial assistance and needed supplies 

using internal resources and mission assignments. 

Incident Management Assistance Team: For Hurricane Isaac, FEMA’s Federal 

Coordinating Officer and the FEMA Region VI Acting Regional Administrator deployed to 

Baton Rouge to coordinate with the Incident Management Assistance Team 2 days 

before the hurricane made landfall.2 Incident Management Assistance Teams are fulltime, rapid-response teams with dedicated staff, able to deploy within 2 hours and 

arrive at an incident within 12 hours to support the local incident commander. The 

teams support the initial establishment of a unified command and provide situational

awareness for Federal and State decision-makers crucial to determining the level and 

type of immediate Federal support required. The Incident Management Assistance Team

initially deployed 11 people to Baton Rouge to establish the Initial Operating Facility. 

Initial Operating Facility: FEMA operated the Initial Operating Facility from several 

trailers connected together. The Initial Operating Facility trailers came ready to use 

with computer connections and equipment that allowed FEMA personnel to set up their 

computers and start working immediately. Set-up time for operations usually takes 

several days, but this “plug-‘n’-play” setup enhanced readiness. 

Initial Assistance and Needed Supplies: FEMA used the logistics process and 

prenegotiated plans for supplies it previously set up in the event of disasters in 

Louisiana. Shortly before this hurricane, FEMA began ordering commodities and 25 fully 

equipped mobile housing units from Selma, Alabama, to the Initial Operating Facility 

location in anticipation of housing requests. FEMA also tasked other Federal agencies to 

support the Federal response through the use of mission assignments. FEMA used 

mission assignments to mobilize Federal personnel to the FEMA Regional Response 

Coordination Center in Denton, Texas, and to other operational facilities within the 

State before the hurricane’s landfall. 

2

 The role of Federal Coordinating Officers in disaster operations is to manage Federal resources during a 

disaster. They help FEMA accomplish its core missions of saving lives, preventing suffering, protecting 

property, and conducting recovery operations. Their primary mission is to coordinate the timely delivery 

of Federal assistance to State and local governments, individual victims, and the private sector.

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

2. FEMA Successfully Overcame Staffing, Operational, and Funding Challenges 

FEMA performed well at managing the challenges that Hurricane Isaac presented. 

During the first 30 days, the most pressing challenges that faced FEMA included moving 

staff from the Initial Operating Facility to the Joint Field Office, obtaining experienced

disaster staff, and expediting operational and funding requests.3

Initial Operating Facility Move to Joint Field Office: As the response and recovery effort 

developed, FEMA needed more office space. This required relocating staff from the 

Initial Operating Facility to the Joint Field Office, a four-story leased building in downtown 

Baton Rouge, 9 miles away. FEMA’s Safety Officer identified several safety and security 

issues with the Joint Field Office facility that needed attention before the move. After 

resolving these issues, FEMA quickly accomplished the move on September 12, 2012. 

Experienced Staff: FEMA’s Operations Section experienced some difficulty obtaining 

experienced staff early in the disaster. FEMA staff said that they can no longer request 

staff by name through the Automated Deployment Database system, which precludes 

their ability to request individuals that they know are qualified. However, FEMA is 

implementing a FEMA Qualification System to capture staff skill sets, which will enable 

FEMA to identify and deploy qualified staff to disasters more quickly in the future. 

Operational and Funding Requests: Logistics personnel voiced concerns about the need 

to speed up the process time for operational/action requests. To resolve this issue, 

FEMA is moving toward a new web-based emergency operations center called WebEOC® 

to track and approve action requests. This system speeds the process by reducing the 

number of people involved in approving the requests. FEMA tested WebEOC® in recent 

Texas disasters and found it very effective. 

Finance personnel were concerned about the length of time it took to analyze funding 

requests and submit them to FEMA Headquarters for approval. However, they said 

that, although the many steps and the manual aspects of collecting information to 

complete the analyses were challenging, the increased interaction with the program 

areas led to better overall information, communication, and coordination. 

3

 The Joint Field Office is a temporary Federal facility that provides a central location for the coordination 

of Federal, State, tribal, and local governments and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations 

with primary responsibility for response and recovery. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

3. FEMA Overcame Staffing and Equipment Issues 

FEMA successfully obtained and managed resources needed for this disaster. FEMA 

officials said that their most significant resource shortfalls included (1) obtaining 

qualified, experienced people to support the needs of the disaster and (2) quickly 

providing ready-to-use equipment to deployed staff. 

Qualified Staff: FEMA officials were concerned about obtaining qualified, experienced 

staff to support the timely delivery of disaster services using the current staff 

deployment system. However, most FEMA officials said that they were fortunate to 

obtain the experienced staff they needed for this disaster, and most staff started 

working immediately. As stated previously, FEMA is working on initiatives, such as the 

FEMA Qualification System, to broaden its capability to ensure that staff members hold 

the correct skill sets to draw upon during a disaster. 

Equipment: The initial surge of staff during the first week of this disaster overwhelmed 

the limited Information Technology (IT) staff and created servicing problems. However, 

FEMA increased the number of IT staff and resolved these problems quickly. Further, 

FEMA is eliminating the transportation and distribution backlog of equipment by directly

assigning equipment to FEMA reservists to keep in their possession to bring to their next 

disaster assignment. This new process will expedite the time for reservists to start 

working. 

4. FEMA Relied on a Variety of Mechanisms for Disaster Sourcing Decisions

FEMA effectively made disaster sourcing decisions for this disaster. The primary 

sourcing mechanisms for Hurricane Isaac included mission assignments; requisitions for 

supplies, equipment, services, and personnel; and acquisitions. FEMA also discussed

with the State whether to use Emergency Management Assistance Compact. 

Mission Assignments: The Federal Coordinating Officer in this disaster identified three 

individuals to sign and approve mission assignment requests. The FEMA Operations 

Section Chief located at the State Emergency Operations Center determined the 

eligibility of mission assignment requests. If the State could not fulfill a request, the 

State sent it to FEMA for review, approval, and action. This process appears to have 

worked very well. 

Requisitions for Supplies, Equipment, Services, and Personnel: Finance staff members 

reviewed all requisitions for supplies, equipment, services, and personnel for proper 

justification and need. This step verified the need for these resources before funding 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

and reduced the likelihood of duplication by ensuring that FEMA did not use mission

assignments to obtain the same resources. 

Acquisitions: FEMA’s Finance and Acquisitions staff used advance General Services 

Administration, FEMA, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) contracts for 

purchases. In addition, Acquisitions personnel made every effort to award contracts to 

local companies. At the time of our fieldwork, Acquisitions had awarded 15 contracts, 

12 of which were to local companies. In addition, working under the umbrella of FEMA 

Region VI, the Disaster Acquisition Response Team provided contract support to the 

Joint Field Office. The team assisted in completing the contract for disaster housing in 

only 23 days. This process normally takes 45 days or more. 

Emergency Management Assistance Compact: FEMA considers Emergency Management 

Assistance Compacts to be a relatively inexpensive option that enables one state to help 

another when the disaster exceeds the state’s ability to recover. For this disaster, FEMA 

and State officials discussed the option of using an Emergency Management Assistance 

Compact, and the State decided not to request this type of assistance. 

5. FEMA Effectively Coordinated Its Activities

FEMA effectively coordinated major activities during its response to Hurricane Isaac. 

These activities included (1) establishing and supplying staging and mobilization sites, 

(2) responding to temporary housing needs, (3) tracking and monitoring mission 

assignments, and (4) obtaining appropriate staffing. 

Staging and Mobilization Sites: Before the storm made landfall, FEMA activated the 

Federal Staging Area at Camp Beauregard, a Federal facility located north of Alexandria, 

Louisiana, and deployed a staging team there. As needs changed, FEMA moved staging 

and mobilization sites to various locations. When needed, General Services 

Administration staff assisted FEMA with moving trucks in and out of the various 

locations. 

Temporary Housing Needs: The Louisiana Housing Authority managed the response for 

temporary housing needs. A Direct Housing Specialist at FEMA Region VI worked closely 

with the State and helped obtain assistance from various key Federal agencies. The 

coordination between both State and Federal agencies enabled the Temporary Housing 

Program for this disaster to run smoothly. 

Mission Assignments: The close coordination of mission assignment requests among 

FEMA, State, and local officials was very effective. FEMA’s Request Action Tracking 

System helped staff to monitor and coordinate mission assignments issued at different 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

locations to avoid duplication and ensure delivery of requested items. The Request 

Action Tracking System is a fully functional, web-based tool that tracks Action Request 

Forms from initiation/acceptance through completion. Users can download reports or 

email them to provide updates for easy sharing with State or other Federal agencies. 

Staffing: FEMA and the State worked together to ensure the availability of experienced 

staff. FEMA’s Office of Chief Counsel deployed seven attorneys authorized to make 

decisions about the disaster to work at the Initial Operating Facility, Joint Field Office, 

and branch locations. This group of attorneys enabled FEMA and the State to overcome 

several potential problem areas. In addition, staff experienced in environmental and

historic preservation and hazard mitigation addressed potential problems in those 

areas. Environmental Specialists provide guidance on compliance with environmental 

and historic preservation laws and analyze potential problem areas including analyzing 

mixed debris and disposing of animal remains. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on our observations, FEMA performed very well in its response to Hurricane 

Isaac. Normally, FEMA needs several days to deploy and position staff to the areas 

needed to respond to a disaster. In this case, FEMA was fortunate to have facilities and 

staff already operating in Louisiana when Hurricane Isaac made landfall. The ability to 

draw upon these resources allowed FEMA to respond faster and more effectively than 

usual. FEMA prepared well for this disaster, faced challenges with innovative solutions, 

quickly resolved resource shortfalls, made efficient disaster sourcing decisions, and 

coordinated its activities effectively with State and local officials. All disasters generate 

unexpected issues, but the FEMA disaster team was able to adjust and adapt quickly to 

fulfill its mission. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

The objective of this audit was to determine whether FEMA’s initial response to 

Hurricane Isaac was effective and efficient, and to evaluate FEMA’s actions, resources, 

and authorities according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines in effect at the 

time of our fieldwork. 

We interviewed FEMA officials, FEMA Incident Management Assistance Team members, 

FEMA Disaster Assistance Employees, and Louisiana Governor’s Office of Homeland 

Security and Emergency Preparedness officials; observed operations at FEMA’s Initial 

Operating Facility and Joint Field Office in Baton Rouge, Louisiana; and performed other 

procedures considered necessary to accomplish our objective. We did not assess the 

adequacy of the agency’s internal controls applicable to disaster response because it 

was not necessary to accomplish our audit objective. 

We also observed operations at the following sites in the State of Louisiana: 

• State Emergency Operating Center (EOC) in Baton Rouge. 

• Parish EOCs in East Baton Rouge Parish and St. John the Baptist Parish. 

• Disaster Recovery Centers in Livingston, Plaquemines, and St. James parishes. 

• FEMA/State Applicant Briefings in Gretna, Baton Rouge, and Laplace.

• Damage sites in Ascension, Livingston, and St. John the Baptist parishes. 

• Debris operations at the Killona Landfill in St. Charles Parish. 

We conducted this performance audit between September and October 2012, pursuant 

to the InspectorfGeneralfActfoff1978, as amended, and according to generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our

findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objectives. 

 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix B 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Tonda Hadley, Director 

Judy Martinez, Supervisory Program Analyst 

Mary Monachello, Auditor 

Arthur Jones, Program Analyst 

Chiquita Washington, Auditor 

Susan Stipe, Senior Auditor 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C 

Report Distribution

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary 

Chief Financial Officer 

Under Secretary for Management 

Acting Chief Privacy Officer 

Audit Liaison 

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Administrator 

Chief Counsel

Chief of Staff 

Chief Financial Officer 

Acting Associate Administrator, Response and Recovery

Director, Risk Management and Compliance 

Federal Coordinating Officer, FEMA Disaster Number 4080-DR-LA 

Regional Administrator, FEMA Region VI 

Interim Director, FEMA Louisiana Recovery Office 

Audit Liaison, FEMA (Job Code G-13-006)

Audit Liaison, FEMA Region VI 

Audit Liaison, FEMA Louisiana Recovery Office 

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch

DHS OIG Budget Examiner

Congress

Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

House Committee on Homeland Security 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

www.oig.dhs.gov 10 OIG-13-84
 
 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this document, please call us at (202) 254-4100, fax your 

request to (202) 254-4305, or e-mail your request to our Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) Office of Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

For additional information, visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov, or follow us on Twitter 

at: @dhsoig. 

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