1 Although there was no copy of the transcript of t he revocation hearing filed as part of t he record in the instant case, we take judici

al notice of such t

ranscri pt which was fi led in t his Court

as part of

the recor

d on direct appeal.See, Caldwell v. S tate , 917 S.W .2d 662 (Tenn. 1 996); Delbrid ge v. State , 742 S.W.2d 266 (Tenn. 1987). 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON Assigned on Briefs O

ctober 3, 2000 Sessi

on STATE OF TENNESSEE v. SAMUEL K. ROBINSON Post-Conviction Appeal from the Circuit Court for Giles County

No. 9081 Robert L. Jones, Judge

No. M1999-00559-CCA-MR3-PC - Filed July 25, 2001

The appellant appe als fro m the dismissal of his post-conviction petition wherein he attacks the validity of a probation revocation proceeding. After a review of the record we

affirm the decision of the trial court

. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appe al as of Right; Judgme

nt of the Circuit Cour

t is Affirmed. J ERRY S MITH , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D AVID G. H AYES and A LAN E. GLENN JJ, joined. Samuel K. Robinson, pro se . Paul G. Summers, Attorne y Genera l & Reporter; Marvin E. Clements, Jr., Assistant Attorney General; Mike Bottoms, District Attorney General for appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION Factual Backgrou

nd The appellant, Samuel Kimoe Robinson, was convicted of twenty-two criminal offenses including aggravated burglary , burglary, theft and vandalism. He received an e ffective sentence of fifteenyears to be served on probation. On March 13, 1997, after thre e weeks of probation, probation violation warrants issued against the appellant. At his request the appellant was allowed to represent himself at

the revocation hearing held on March 3, 1998. 1 At that hearing the appellant admitted he hadviolated almost all of the conditions of probation alle ged to have bee

n violated in the revocation warrant. He did deny he had committed a burglary in Giles County as alleg ed in the2 The appellant’s complaints concer

ning his wai

ver of counsel r

efer to a lac

k of proper adv

ice from the trial court as to his ri

ght to cou

nsel and/ or self -repres entati

on. Thus, t

he record of

the revoc ation

proceed ing speaks fo r itself in this regard an d this issue cou ld have be en presente d on direc t appeal. -2- revocationwarrant. In mitigation the appellant pleaded that his continued addiction to drugs caused him to commit

the multitude of probation violations alleged against him. Following the hearing the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation and ordered him incarcerated for the balance of h is original sentence. The appel lant f iled a direc t appe al fro m the r evoca tion of his proba tion . In that appeal he did notcontest the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the re vocation of his probation. Rather, he presented to this Court, (1) an

alleged violati

on of his Sixth Amendmen t right to a speedy trial at the revocationproceeding and (2) various alleged due process violations. Significantly, the appellant didnot claim that his

waiver of counsel and pro se representation at the revocation proceeding was constitutionally

invalid. On direc

t appeal this Court a ddressed the substance of the appellant’s claims and found them to be without merit. State v. Samuel Kimoe Robins on , 19 99 WL 173671 Giles County, No. 01C01-9803-CC-00153 (T en n. Crim. App.) (Opinion filed March 31, 1999 at Nashville) permission to appeal denied June 28, 1999. On July 2, 1999, the

appella nt filed th e post-conviction petition which is the

basis of this appeal. In that petition the appellant set forth t he identic al claims he had previously litigated on direct appeal. In addition, the appellant claims his waiver of co unsel at the original revocation proceeding was invalid and that he was therefore denied hi s right to t he effective assistance of counsel at the revocation pr

oceeding in viol

ation of his Sixth Amend

ment rights

found in the United States Constit

ution. Finding, the petition failed to state a colorable claim for relief the trial court summarily

dismissed the petition. See, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206 (f). From that decision the appellant filed th

e instant appeal. Due Process/Speedy Trial It appears that

these issues were fully adjudicated during the appellant’s direct appeal. Such previously

determ ined issues canno t form the basis of p

ost-conviction re

lief and are subj ect to summary dismissal by the trial court. Ten n. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(f),(h). See also , Harvey v. State , 749 S.W.2d 478 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1 987). These issue s were properly

dismissed by the trial court. Waiver of Counsel As noted earlier, the appellant failed to raise on direct appeal the constitutional validity of his waive r of the right t

o counsel at the probation revocation proceeding. We hold that he has waivedthis issue by failing to present it on direct appeal a

s he could have. 2 Thus, this issue cannot form the basis of post-conviction relief. Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 40-30-206(g).-3- Conclusion The appellant’s grounds for post-c onvi ction relief hav e either been wa

ived or previously determined, and the trial court properly dismissed the petition. Accordingly , the judgment

of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

___________________________________ JERRY SMITH, JUDGE