[Cite as State v. Benton, 2012-Ohio-4080.]

 

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MIAMI COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO : 

: Appellate Case No. 2010-CA-27 

Plaintiff-Appellee : 

: Trial Court Case No. 2010-CR-94 

v. :

 

: 

TIMOTHY BENTON : (Criminal Appeal 

from 

: (Common Pleas Court) 

Defendant-Appellant : 

: 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

O P I N I O N

Rendered on the 7th day of September, 2012. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

ROBERT E. LONG, III, Atty. Reg. #0066796, Miami County Prosecutor’s Office, 201 West 

Main Street, Safety Building, Troy, Ohio 45373 

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

JOHN C. MEEHLING, Atty. Reg. #0077630, Holfaster, Cecil, McNight & Mues, 1105 

Wilmington Avenue, Dayton, Ohio 45420 

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 

HALL, J. 

{¶ 1} Timothy Benton appeals the trial court’s judgment convicting him of gross 
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sexual imposition and classifying him as a Tier II sex offender. We affirm the conviction, but 

we reverse the sex-offender classification because Benton committed the offense before S.B. 10 

was enacted. 

{¶ 2} In 2010 Benton was indicted on one count of gross sexual imposition for having 

had sexual contact with his then 12-year-old step daughter. Benton waived his right to a jury 

trial, and the charge was tried to the court. At the trial, the victim (Benton’s step daughter) 

testified about two instances of sexual contact that occurred between 1995 and 1997. In the first, 

Benton was sitting naked on the living-room floor, watching pornography on television, and 

masturbating. He called the victim into the room and, when she came, took her hand and put it 

on his penis. In the second instance, the victim was on the couch watching television when 

Benton came into the room naked. He turned on a pornographic movie and sat down on the 

couch beside the victim. Benton then reached over and, sliding his hand underneath her shorts, 

rubbed her vaginal area through her underwear. Testifying in his own defense, Benton denied 

that he watched television naked or masturbated in front of the victim. He further denied ever 

touching her sexually. 

{¶ 3} Saying that it believed the victim, the trial court found Benton guilty. The court 

sentenced him to 5 years in prison and classified him as a Tier II sex offender. 

{¶ 4} Benton appealed. 

A. The Conviction

{¶ 5} Of the three assignments of error presented, the first and second allege that the 

trial court erred by convicting Benton of gross sexual imposition. The first assignment of error 

contends that the conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. The second 

assignment of error contends that the statute of limitations for the offense had expired before the 
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state indicted Benton. 

1. Manifest weight of the evidence 

{¶ 6} Benton was charged with violating R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), which provides that 

“[n]o person shall have sexual contact with another * * * [or] cause another * * * to have sexual 

contact with the offender” when the other person is younger than 13 years of age. R.C. 

2907.05(A)(4). “Sexual contact” in this case “means any touching of an erogenous zone of 

another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or * * * a breast, 

for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.” R.C. 2907.01(B). The victim’s 

testimony supports a finding that Benton engaged in sexual contact with her and made her 

engage in sexual contact with him. She also testified about other things that Benton did, like 

walking around the house naked, watching television naked, and masturbating in front of her. 

Benton took the stand and denied all these allegations. In support of his argument that his 

conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, Benton contends that the trial court 

should not have believed the victim’s testimony over his because, he says, her testimony is not 

accurate nor is she credible. 

{¶ 7} In a manifest-weight challenge, the appellate court, “‘reviewing the entire 

record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses 

and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [factfinder] clearly lost its 

way.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting 

State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). “[T]he credibility of 

the witnesses [is] primarily for the trier of the facts.” State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St. 2d 230, 227 

N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. “[T]he trier of fact is free to believe all, part 

or none of the testimony of each witness appearing before it.” State v. Green, 117 Ohio App. 3d 
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644, 654, 691 N.E.2d 316 (1st Dist.1996), citing State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 197 N.E.2d 548 

(1964). The trier of fact does not lose its way if its resolution of conflicting testimony is 

reasonable. See State v. Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 476684, *4-5 

(Aug. 22, 1997). 

{¶ 8} Here, in announcing its verdict, the trial court made explicit credibility 

determinations: “Based upon the evidence presented I find the Defendant guilty based upon the 

credibility of the victim and the lack of credibility in the Defendant’s testimony.” (Tr. 85). 

Reviewing the evidence, we see no reason to think that the trial court lost its way. None of the 

grounds on which the court could have rejected the victim’s testimony, identified by Benton, 

compelled the court to do so. The trial court reasonably chose to believe the victim over Benton. 

{¶ 9} The first assignment of error is overruled. 

2. Statute of limitations

{¶ 10} Benton next contends that he should not have been convicted because the 

statute of limitations for gross sexual imposition had expired before the state indicted him. The 

indictment alleges that Benton committed the offense between 1995 and 1997. At that time, the 

statute of limitations for gross sexual imposition was 6 years, see former R.C. 2901.13(A)(1), 

meaning in this case that it would expire, at the earliest, in 2001. But as the state points out, in 

1999 the Legislature amended the statute and extended the limitations period for gross sexual 

imposition to the current 20 years, see R.C. 2901.13(A)(3)(a). See State v. Warren, 168 Ohio 

App.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-4104, 859 N.E.2d 998, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing Am.H.B. No. 49, 1998 

Ohio Laws 188. 

{¶ 11} In the bill that amended the statute of limitations, the Legislature specifically 

stated that the amended statute of limitations “‘applies to an offense committed prior to the 
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effective date of this act if prosecution for that offense was not barred under section 2901.13 of 

the Revised Code as it existed on the day prior to the effective date of this act.’” Id., quoting 

Am.H.B. No. 49, Section 3, 1998 Ohio Laws 188. In other words, as long as the limitations 

period for an offense had not yet expired when the amendment took effect, the new limitations 

period applies. Courts do not consider a statute-of-limitations extension to be an 

unconstitutional ex post facto law. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 15 (“[T]he extension of an unexpired statute 

of limitations is not an invalid ex post facto law.”); State v. Swint, 5th Dist. Stark No. 

2003CA00165, 2004-Ohio-614, ¶ 28 (same). The reason is that “the extension of the statute of 

limitations [is] procedural, not substantive.” Swint at ¶ 28. 

{¶ 12} Benton does not address the amendment issue. 

{¶ 13} In this case, when the statute of limitations was extended in 1999, the then 

6-year limitations period for prosecuting Benton for gross sexual imposition had not yet 

expired. For the reasons given by the courts cited above, we agree that the 20-year expanded 

limitations period applies in this case, meaning that the statute of limitations did not expire, at 

the earliest, until 2015. 

{¶ 14} The second assignment of error is overruled. 

B. The Classification

{¶ 15} Benton contends, in the third assignment of error, that the trial court erred by 

classifying him as a sexual predator. He says that the record does not contain sufficient evidence 

to make this classification, that the trial court failed to consider the statutory factors relevant to 

the determination, and that the court failed to make a finding about his status as a habitual sex 

offender. As the state points out, though, the trial court did not classify Benton as a sexual 

predator but as a Tier II sex offender. 
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{¶ 16} Tier classification for sex offenders replaced the previous “sexually oriented 

offender” designations in 2008 when S.B. 10 was enacted. In March 2011, after the defendant’s 

sentencing but while this appeal was pending, the Ohio Supreme Court held that S.B. 10 may 

not be applied to a sex offender who committed an offense before the bill’s enactment because 

doing so violates the constitutional prohibition on retroactive laws. See State v. Williams, 129 

Ohio St. 3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 22. Benton committed his offense well 

before S.B. 10 was enacted, and the state concedes that the trial court’s designation of him as a 

Tier II offender under S.B. 10 is error. We agree. 

{¶ 17} The remedy here, as we said in a previous decision in this case, is “‘remand for 

classification under the law in effect at the time the offense was committed.’” Decision and 

Entry (Nov. 29, 2011), quoting State v. Smith, 196 Ohio App. 3d 431, 2011-Ohio-3786, 964 

N.E.2d 3, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.), citing Williams at ¶ 22. 

{¶ 18} The third assignment of error is sustained. 

{¶ 19} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Benton’s 

conviction is affirmed, but his classification as a Tier II sex offender is reversed. This case is 

remanded for the limited purpose of reclassification, consistent with this opinion. 

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

GRADY, P.J., and DONOVAN, J., concur. 

Copies mailed to: 

Robert E. Long, III 

John C. Meehling 

Hon. Christopher Gee