· CMH Pub 10-1-3 

N I G H T 

COMBAT 

-'I'hls publlcatlon replaces DA l'flm 20-236, JUlie 1953. 
Fncsimile Edition, 1982, 1986 

(;entel' of Military History 

United States Army 

\Vnshington, D.C. 
FOREWORD 

The mnwl'inl fol' this study was prepllred fOl' t.he H istol'ical 

Division, EUCOU, by a group of fornu!I' Gcnnnn gCllcl'l1is and 

gcncl'al staff ofliccl's. The IH'incipnl author, forllHll' Brig. Gen. 

Alfred Toppe, and most of h is nssocilltcs scrved fol' extended pcdods 

on the Russinn Front during '''orld "Val' IT. M OI'CM CI', most of them 

held assignments involving troop tl'aining. 

The render is reminded that publicntions in the GERMAN 

REPORT SERIES were written by GCl'mnns f('Om the Gerlllan point 

of view, find that the procedurcs, tnblcs of organization and equip· 

lIIent, CQmlmL docLrine, find staff methods of the German Army 

differed widely from dlOSC of the U.S. Army. It is intcresting to note, 

howe\'er, that, in con formity with the GCl'lnnlll'CCOlllmcndatiolls Illll.de 

in t.his st.udy, our own progrnms are placing increasing emphasis on 

night. combat trnining. 

Final editing of this study was done in the Fore ign Studies Brnnch, 

Special Studies Division, Office of the Chief of Military History. The 

draft. translation of the original German text was first reviS<'d and 

then reorganized in the interest of brevity, clarit.y, and pertinence. In 

this process every effort was made to reta in the point of view, the 

expressions, and even the prejudices of the authors. 

A. C. SMITH 

Majol' General, USA 

Chief, Military History 

CONTENTS 

,.,. 

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .........•....••.....•••..•.••. ................. ..••...•••.....••....•.. I 

2. PRINCIPLES OF NIGHT COMBAT 

I. General............................................................... ............................ 4 

11. Physical and Psychological Factors.............................................. 4 

Ill. Exercise of Command................................................................... 5 

IV. Orientation..................................................................................... 6 

V. Reconnaissance............................. ................................................. 6 

VI. Security ............. ............................................................................. 7 

VII. Movements..................................................................................... 7 

VIII. ASIlembly........................................................................................ 8 

IX. Attack............................................................................................ 9 

X. Pursuit..................................................................................... ...... 12 

XI. Octense ............................................................. ............................. 13 

XII. Retrograde Movements................................................................. 15 

XIII. Position Warfare............................................................................ 16 

CHAPTER J . RUSSIAN NIGHT COMBAT METHODS 

I. 

II. 

Ill. 

IV. 

Characteristics snd Training of the Russian Soldier................... 19 

Movements..................................................................................... 20 

Reconnaissance ............................................................................. . 

Infiltration ..................................................................................... . 

V. Offensive Operations ................................................................... .. 

VI. Defensive Operations .................................................................... . 

VII. 

V11I. 

Retrograde Movements ............................................................... .. 

Partisan Warfare .......................................................................... . 

CHAPTER.4. GERMAN NIGHT COMBAT METHODS 

21 

22 

27 

29 

30 

30 

I. Movements..................................................................................... 32 

11. Reconnaissance.............................................................................. 33 

/11. Offensive Operations ..................................................................... 33 

IV. Ocfensive Operations........................... ......................................... 37 

V. Retrograde Movements.................. ............................................. 38 

CHAPTER 5. TRAINING 

I. General........................................................................................... 42 

II. Individual Training ........................................................................ 43 

Ill. Weapons Training ............................. ............................... .............. 44 

IV. Unit Training.............................................................. ................... 44 

APPENDICES I_VII . Training Sehedules ........................................................................ 46 
MAPS 

No. Pofl" 

1. General Rerercnee Map .......................................................................................... vi 

2. The Region around Shala.. .......... ........ ........ ............... ............................ ................. 23 

3. Russian Infiltration by Night (17-21 August 1943) ............................................... 25 

4. Gennan Preparations for a Night Attack (30 September-2 October 1941) .......... 35 

5. Gcnnan Surprise Attack by Night (21 January 1944) ........................................... 36 

6. Gennan Night Withdrawal (2.5-27 September 1943) .............................................. 40 
GENERAL REFERENCE MAP 

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CHAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTION 

The reader of the prewar German Army operations manual, 

upon reaching the chapter heading "Night Combat," found that 

the subject was covered very succinctly and somewhat superficially. The contents failed to reveal the tremendous importance 

that night combat and night movements were to assume in modem warfare. 

During two world wars, night and other periods of poor visibility. such as fog and snowstorms or rainstorms, gradually came 

to be considered the ideal time for action. Interference from the 

air reduced fighting and paralyzed movements in daylight hours, 

with the result that the space between the front and the most 

remote corner of the rear areas was often empty and deserted. 

During the hours of darkness combat and movements resumed 

with new intensity. After a while the German soldier considered 

this mole-like existence as normal, but the conclusions that 

should have been drawn from these undeniable facts in setting 

up training schedules were completely inadequate. 

In Russia more and more actions occurred at night. Once this 

was widely recognized during the later years of the war, much 

of the individual and unit training took place during darkness 

and other periods of poor visibility. 

The farther the recruit is r emoved from nature, the more night 

training he must get. Once a soldier has learned how to move 

and fight at night, he will be all the more effective in daytime 

when good visibility facilitates his tasks. 

The purpose of movements in darkness or obscurity is to 

conceal preparations and thereby achieve maximum surprise and 

effect. Another important consideration is that night combat 

keeps the casualty rate at a minimum. Both elements apply to 

any operation from the time of assembly until its conclusion. 

whether it is a small unit action or a strategic envelopment. 

Movement and combat at night are inexpedient when a certain minimum amount of orientation is impossible because terrain 

conditions and the enemy situation are too uncertain, or when the 

moon or enemy action create conditions resembling daylight. 

-This publication replaces DA Pam 20-23t\ June 1968. 
2 GERMAN REPORT SfRIES 

Bright nights make it easier to conduct night operations, but 

they give the enemy more opportunity to observe and interfere. 

To overcome these difficulties, units accustomed to night fighting learned to apply certain practical lessons. Night movement 

and night combat require the most exacting preparation by offi~ 

cera and men, including detailed map and terrain study. Even 

for well-trained troops, poor visibility will cause delays that may 

result in a lowering of the over-all march performance or may 

involve loss of initiative and freedom of action. The larger the 

units. the greater the difficulties that will inevitably arise. 

Careless night movement along roads and on the battlefield 

enables the enemy to take effective countermeasures. Depending on the enemy's potential and the ability of his leaders. the 

advantages friendly forces derive from operating in darkness 

may not only be cancelled out. the execution of the entire operation plan may be jeopardized by a complete stoppage of every 

movement, by a disruption of the chain of command. and by panic. 

Before any night operation the responsible commanders must 

familiarize themselves with the theater of operations, become 

thoroughly acquainted with the enemy's materiel and his methods 

of employing them, and observe carefully his tactics in different 

situations. Possessing this knowledge. a field commander will be 

able to decide whether the principles of night combat should be 

applied rigidly or whether there may be some relaxation. 

Under conditions as they exist in central and eastern Europe. 

troops must be capable of carrying out night marches in such a 

manner that their performance will not be greatly affected by 

observation and interference from the air. Once under way, movements in the combat zone must be completed according to schedule. 

even in the face of surprise enemy action. This may be achieved 

by breaking down units into small components, by camouflaging 

them, and by applying other protective measures. 

The intended operations must achieve surprise, so that the 

enemy is not prepared for counteraction. However, it must be 

assumed that during large-scale operations only the preparations 

and the initial engagements will take place under cover of darkness. To bring the fighting to a successful conclusion will require 

efficient interunit communication, a clear view of the situation 

and the terrain. and the exercise of firm leadership-demands 

that can be met only in daylight. 

Night operations require the closest contact among ground 

units and among all components of services operating in a given 

theater.. 

Bombing and strafing missions against movements behind the 

enemy front may save lives and decide battles; the same thing is 
NIGHT COMBAT 3 

true of day and night attacks on enemy aircraft and airfields, 

which facilitate movements behind one's own front and, in some 

instances, constitute a prerequisite for the execution of such 

movements without severe casualties. 

Night marches and night combat make greater demands on 

the troops than similar daytime operations. The responsible com M 

manders must bear this in mind if reverses are to be avoided. 

Therefore, there must be some nights during which the troops 

may rest, because even relatively quiet sleep in daytime cannot 

replace rest at night. Through the use of excellent staff work 

and troop discipline the number of full night rests can be reduced 

to a minimum, but they cannot be eliminated. entirely. 
I. General 

CHAPTER 2 

PRINCIPLES OF NIGHT COMBAT 

Night operations call for discipUned. cool. self-reliant troops. 

The mental strain involved in night combat is severe; it is easier 

to endure in periods of activity than during long spells of inactivity. This is why at nigbt---even more 80 than by day-he 

who takes the initiative has the advantage. However, since orientation and co-ordination will beeome increasingly difficult, this 

initial advantage diminishes as the attack progresses. 

DarkDess is helpful in achieving surprise, and the attacker will 

derive additional advantages from the defenders inability to 

aim his fire effectively. To maintain control and intraunit contact 

and communication is difficult during the hours of darkness. and 

unit commanders must therefore prepare every detail of the operation plan with metieulous care. Any contingency, however farfetched. must be taken into consideration. Success of a night 

attack also depends on the resourcefulness and initiative of 

subordinate leaders and their ability to make independent decisions in line with the over~all plan. Furthermore, since frequent 

and accurate reporting is of great importance ~ the existence of 

a smoothly operating communication system is essential. 

Every possible method of deception, camouflage, and conceal~ 

ment must be employed in night operations. 

11. Physical and Psychological Factors 

The effect of events taking place at night increases or decreases 

in proportion to the degree of darkness. Operations taking place 

during moonlight and starlit nights, especially across snow~cov~ 

ered terrain, may approximate daytime conditions. Very hazy, 

rainy, foggy, or overcast weather calls for reliance on the auditory rather than on the visuar sense and makes increased demands 

upon physical stamina and mental balance .. 

The reaction pattern to night operations is not uniform. In 

general, men originating from rural areas adjust quickly and 

easily, whereas former city dwellers take a long time and en~ 

counter many difficulties in getting used to the pecularities of 

night conditions. Darkness acts as a strong stimulus to the 

imagination and thus burd'ens the nervous system; a feeling 

of insecurity, which might eventually lead to panic, may be the 
NIGHT COMIAT 5 

outcome. The sensitivity of eyes and ears differs between night 

and day. with the result that in darkness objects seem bigger 

and distances greater. The ears exaggerate sounds that would 

hardly be perceptible during the day. 

Nights are normally used for resting, and for this :reason 

fatigue and symptoms of exhaustion afflict those who have to 

stay awake. Unit commanders must bear in mind that uninterrupted night duty is more strenuous than similar daytime activities. Young men are not necessarily better equipped to overcome 

night fatigue than men belonging to older age groups. To a 

certain degree, however, everyone can readjust his senses and 

habits through continuous practice. 

III. Exercise of Command 

In a situation in which a daytime operation promises success, 

a resolute and bold commander will continue the action into the 

night. Determined pursuit of a weakened enemy may result in 

a major victory. Although mobile units are generally most suitable for launching a pursuit:. foot infantry may be employed to 

great advantage, especially when the terrain and weather conditions reduce the mobility of motorized forces. A well-planned 

airborne operation, either independent pf or in conjunction with 

ground operations, may be particularly effective in such a situation. 

A commander whose air and armored power is manifestly 

inferior to the enemy's may score at night if his infantry is 

tough and has sufficient elan. In general, tactical movements in 

the proximity of enemy lines can be undertaken only under cover 

of darkness. In some instances it may be advisible to engage 

the enemy only at night:. if daytime fighting would lead to heavy 

casualties. 

Success of night operations depends primarily on careful 

planning, detailed preparation, simplicity of the operation order 

and tactical procedure, achievement of surprise, and the leaders' 

calmness and circumspection. Every officer who is to participate in a night operation must be initiated into the plan. The 

more thorough the daytime preparations. the more certain the 

success. Tactical maneuvers and the mechanical handling and 

servicing of weapons and equipment are slowed down and complicated by darkness. Proper condition and meticulous care of 

weapons and equipment are essential. 

At night the example of leaders exercises a strong influence 

on the troops. It is imperative that the leaders share danger 

with their men and inspire them by their own courage and 
6 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

determination. A reverse or defeat suffered at night has a more 

lasting effect on the troops' morale than one suffered during the 

day. 

IV. Orientation 

Night orientation is based on careful daytime reconnaissance, 

thorough study of maps- including captured ones- and the knowledge of prominent landmarks and celestial bodies. To facilitate 

orientation one may use the prismatic compass, radio beam apparatus, line-oi-site fire by mortars. illumination of enemy terrain by artillery fire on inflammable targets, fires lighted behind 

one's own MLR, Very lights, parachute flares, searchlights. machine gu n tracer fire, mortar salvos at prearranged orienting 

points, and specifi c night fire orientation tables. 

V. Reconnaissance 

Reconnaissance must be an uninterrupted effort; frequently 

the most useful information is gathered through night reco ~ 

naissance. During the hours of darkness friendly patrols ar e able 

to penetrate deep into enemy territory to points from which they 

can observe enemy movements during daytime. 

In darkness reconnaissance patrols can usually determine only 

whether or not a specific area is occupied by the enemy. To gather 

more detailed information about the strength, composition, and 

weapons of the enemy forces, reconnaissance in force must be 

carried out by patrols that should return with prisoners of war. 

As in daytime, patrols advance by bounds. During very dark 

nights, when the enemy is within close proximity of the friendly 

lines, reconnaissance and security activities may coincide. 

Every effort should be made to carry out reconnaissance during 

daytime in order to obtain essential information for launching 

a night attack. The r econnaissance elements will then be able to 

guide the attack forces across the intermediate terrain at night. 

Motorized patrols are general1y unsuitable for battlefield recon~ 

naissance because of the noise they make. If, however, motorized 

elements must be employed, they should be sufficiently strong 

to be capable of fighting their way back to friendly lines. Engineer 

detachments should accompany them on such missions. 

Collecting information for use by the artillery at night is especially important and is the responsibility of the observation battalion. Evaluation of the elements of information should be per~ 

formed at an evaluation center located near the artillery com~ 

mand post. When operations progress at a rapid pace, it will 
NIGHT COM. .... T 7 

rarely be possible to employ the entire observation battalion in 

properly surveyed positions. 

Short-range communication intelligence operations performed by 

radio intercept and direction finding teams may be effective, p&r~ 

ticularly in a defensive situation or during a retrograde movement. 

The closer the co-operation between al1 ground and air reeon ~ 

naissance elements, the more accurate will be the commanders' 

estimate of the enemy situation. 

VI. Security 

At night, when troops are at rest, in combat, or on the move, 

security is closely related to reconnaissance. Precautions must 

be taken against surprise ground and air attacks, and against 

observation by the enemy. All units, even those in rear areas, 

must be highly security conscious. 

A strong infantry point, marching 300 to 400 yards ahead 

of a reinforced combined arms battalion, will usually provide 

adequate security for a night movement. The distance between 

this advance guard and the main body depends primarily upon 

the degree of darkness and should in general not exceed 1,000 

yards. Flank security elements should remain close to the moving 

column; their strength depends on the nature of the terrain. 

Motorized units should be preceded by advance detachments or 

picked advance guard units to which engineers should always 

be attached. 

In a defensive situation the security elements should be as 

close to the enemy as possible so that approaching enemy forces 

can be detected at an early moment and appropriate measures 

to intercept them can be taken. The security detachments should 

be alert and observe the roads as well as the intermediate 

terrain. They must carry ample signal equipment. Patrols should 

be sent out to maintain contact between the security elements 

if the terrain is close and the enemy situation obscure. Securing 

communication centers and traffic arteries in rear areas is par~ 

ticularly important if there is danger of infiltration by enemy 

ground forces, paratroops, or partisans. 

VII. Movements 

In darkness, movements can be far better concealed from 

enemy ground and air observation than in daylight. The smooth 

execution of a movement depends upon careful road eco nnai ~ 

sance, easily identifiable road markings, efficient traffic regu~ 

lation, and proper employment of engineer units. 
8 GERMAN REPORT SEa.IES 

If a movement that should be concealed from the enemy 

cannot possibly be completed during the hours of darkness. the 

responsible commander must dedde whether it should start before 

dark and end before daybreak or begin after dusk and terminate 

in daylight. The decision will depend primarily upon the over-aU 

plan. 

During the night the average unit can march one and a quarter 

to two and a half miles an hour. Under favorable conditions 

infantry forces can cover greater distances at night than during 

the day, but night marches and movements are more strenuous. 

Marches along a wide front with full utilization of the entire 

road net are often more advantageous than marches in great 

depth along only a few roads. The best results are obta ined if 

march schedules are rigidly adhered to and phase lines reached 

at the designated time. Since night movements require particularly careful supervision, light aircraft may be used for this 

purpose. Even in rear areas strict march discipline should be 

enforced. Headlights should either be removed or given a coating 

of blue paint. 

If the road net and time permit, night movements should be 

carried out in dispersed formation in depth so that only a few 

march elements can be di ~cov red and identified if the terrain 

is illuminated by enemy night reconnaissance planes. 

During the approach to the enemy lines strict Round discipJine 

must be observed. Phase lines must be designated for motorir.ed 

vehicles, beyond which they are not allowed to proceed until 

ordered to do so. Harassing and interdictory fire from artillery, 

antiaircraft, and infantry weaponR, as well as low-fiying aircraft, 

can be employed to conceal the noise of motorized vehicles and 

thus deceive the enemy. 

In the immediate proximity of the enemy till movements will 

have to be carried out in complete silence. Order:; must be transmitted in a whisper; no (Ither talking should he permitted. 

Weapons and equipment must he ca rried in such a way that 

they do not clatter. Wherever necessa ry, manpower will re place 

motor traction. The striking of matches, smoking, or Hny other 

use of light must be avoided .. ff contact with the enemy is 

expected, exposed partli of the soldier's body Hhould be hlnckened. 

During the winter a white outer garment shou ld lie wOl'n ove r 

the uniform. 

VIII. Assembly 

Proper assembly preparations must be made lIefol'e launching 

a night attack aga inst well-established enemy positions. If a major 
NIGHT COM'AT 9 

offen8ive operation is planned, several nights will generally be 

needed for the approach, assembly, and execution of the attack, 

especially during summer when nights are short. 

Assembly areas must be protected. If the attack is to be launched 

by fresh troops, unit8 manning the MLR will be responsible for 

security during the assembly period. Tactical air support units, 

in pnrticular fighter forces operating in conjunction with ground 

troops, will have to clear and secure the air over the approach 

routes and assembly areas. Antiaircraft defense must be organized before the start of night movements and before the ground 

troops arrive in the assembly areas. 

In order not to reveal one's intentions prematurely, it is best 

to wait until the night immediately preceding the attack before 

moving the assault forces, the artillery, and the armored and 

motorized elements to their jumJH)ff positions. Headquarters 

staffs, reconnaissance teams of the individual arms, and battery 

details should be moved up ahead of the main body of troops so 

that they can obtain in advance the data needed for the planning 

and execution of the attack. 

The movement of large numbers of troops into an assembly 

area during a single night requires meticulous timing and rigid 

traffic regulation. It is advisable to control these movements by 

a special staff having the authority to regulate the traffic and 

sufficient traffic control personnel at its disposa1. 

A dense communications network, including fully operational 

control points, should be established along the approach routes 

to guarantee the smooth flow of movement8. Approach routes 

should be marked with luminous signs. Delays caused by broken 

down vehicles will be avoided if POL dumps and recovery elements are placed along the approach routes and if detour routes 

are designated in advance. Units that are not included in the 

first attack wave should be held in rear areas to prevent traffic 

congestion. 

Assembly at night is inherently difficult and is not worth 

undertaking unless every means of camouflage and deception is 

used to prevent detection by enemy reconnaissance. 

IX. Attack 

Attempts to exploit a daytime success often lead to continuation of an attack at night. Surprise is especially effective 

in conducting limited-objective attacks in darkness. During a 

night attack the individual soldier's moral stamina is of particular 

importance. In many instances he will be engaged in hand-to-hand 

fighting. 
10 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

The success of a night operation will depend upon meticulous 

and detailed preparations, including proper evaluation of reconnaissance reports; study of maps, including capturcrl onc!\; terrain reconnaissance; familiarizing all officerf\ and the maximum 

number of NCO's with terrain features in daytime lmd during 

the night-j reconnoitering and marking roads; carrying out road 

repairs and improvements with the assistance of engineer troops; 

preparing a fire plan for all flupporti ng weapons; prepnring a 

plan of maneuver; and establishing a communication network. 

Surprise can be achieved by unexpected intervention of friendly 

forces at a point where there has been no previous cont.'l.ct, or 

by a variation in the direction and timing of the night nttnck 

if contact with t he enemy hns previously been egt."1blishetl. In .10 

effort to produce surprise the enemy should be lulled into a false 

sense of security by staging concentrations, by conducting deceptive movements behind the front accompanied by the noise of 

motor vehicles, etc. Other means of confusing the enemy before 

the start of an attack include unexpected variations in combat 

methods, deceptive and diversionary maneuvers, radio deception, 

and sudden concentrations fired by all weapons. 

The timing of an attack depends on the over-all plan, strength 

and disposition of the attack forces, delays t hat may be encountered while assembling them and preparing all weapons for action, 

the strength of the enemy forces and their alertness. and, finally, 

visibility and weather conditions. 

If the intent is to break through a well-established defense 

system in order to gain freedom of action, the attack should be 

timed to start a few hours before dawn. Against a well-prepared 

enemy such an atack will have a chance of success only if a 

complete penetration is achieved before daybreak, so that it can 

be exploited during the early morning hours. On the other hand, 

since limited-objective attacks launched at night ought to be 

concluded by daybreak, it is best to start them during the early 

hours of the night. In general, night attacks directed against 

enemy flanks are particularly effective. 

The assault columns should be developed early in the attack, 

but deployed as late as possible. They should be echeloned in 

depth along a narrow zone of action. By keeping closed up, the 

columns will be able to maintain contact. Infantry heavy weapons 

should be placed in the center of the march columns until the 

battalions arrive at the jump-off positions. It may be advisable 

to assign a few guns to the lead battalions; artillery observers 

should always accompany the forward elements. Self-propelled 

guns, assault guns, and tanks are more mobile, but make more 

noise than horse-drawn guns. 
HIGHT COMMT 11 

Unit commanders should be well forward j reserves and engineer 

elements ought to be within their reach. Radio silence should be 

imposed until the start of the attack; if this is not feasible, the 

8ssault forces, which must be amply provided with radio sets, 

must impose strict radio discipline. 

There will be no need for artillery preparation if it is expected 

that the night attack will achieve complete surprise and that 

the enemy forces will disintegrate after the initial ass8ult. Every 

effort must be made to move the assault forces as close to the 

objective as possible without firing a shot, even though this may 

lead to premature detection of the plan by the enemy. Absolute 

silence must be maintained during the approach. The preparatory 

fire will commence upon request by telephone or radio. Light 

signals ~tray the presence of troops and may lead to confusion 

among the friendly for::!Cs. 

Protected by the preparatory fire, the assault forces will make 

their way to the jumP-Off positions. Then, while the artillery 

shifts to counterbattery fire or to adjacent enemy sectors, the 

assault forc:es will advance, supported by their own heavy weapons 

and guns firing from the line of departure. Forming small attack 

groups the assault forces will tight their way into the enemy 

lines, using bayonets and other close-combat weapons. The simultaneous appearance of tanks and assault guns, as well as the use 

of flame throwers, may have a great psychological impact on 

the enemy. 

Depending on the situation and the scope of their mission, 

the assault forces must regroup for the continuation of the 

attack or prepare themselves for defense against counterthrusts 

immediately after reaching their designated objective. Uninterrupted communication with the heavy weapons and artillery is 

essential. The direct-support guns attached to the assault forces 

should remain under the same jurisdiction until daybreak. 

The attack should be broken off without any hestit.'ltion if it 

bogs down within the enemy's defense system and if there is 

no prospect of concluding it successfully by additional fire support, 

a change in maneuvers, or other means. In that event it may be 

necessnry to move the assault forces back to their jump-off position.s. If lhifl Hhould not be feasible, the attack forces will have 

to organize themselves for defense in the terrain they have 

seized. To repent the att .... ck during the s .... me night at the same 

point is nol ndvhmble. 

In the event that the :ll'ls,'tllit force is composed exclusively of 

armored lInitH, then the t:mk~, l.lrmored engineers, nnd .... rmored 

in!nnlry mUflt operate aH a team and stay close together to lend 

mutual MlIpport. If the armored force is sufficiently strong, it is 
12 GEllMAN REPORT SfllES 

advisable to divide it into two waves. The first one should consist 

of tanks to lead the attack in line formation, their hatches closed. 

their lights off, and their guns firing; the second should be composed of the main body of armored personnel carriers and antitank weapons, and should be echeloned in depth to facilitate the 

shifting of forces and the protection of the flanks. The armored 

engineers should stay close to the assault force commander 80 

that they can remove mine fields and other obstacles in an emergency. By refueling at the last possible moment and assuring 

the replenishment of ammunition, the forces should be fortified against the moment of weakness that occurs immediately 

after the initial objective has been seized. 

As soon as the assault forces have penetrated the enemy's 

defense system, strong formations that possess maximum mobility 

and have been held in readiness in the rear area must advance 

through the gap without delay. A local penetration achieved at 

night may easily transform a static situation into a fluid one 

during which motorized formations can obtain freedom of maneuver. The annihilation of hostile elements capable of offering 

continued resistance must be left to the reserves backing up the 

initial assault wave. 

If visibility is good, tactical air formations can lend effective 

support to the ground forces by attacking hostile artillery positions, units on the move, and troop concentrations in rear areas. 

Since detailed planning and close co-ordination with the ground 

forces are essential, air liaison detachments equipped with adequate means of communication should be made available for 

this purpose. 

The carefully planned commitment of parachute units in conjunction with ground operations may lead to decisive results by 

paralyzing the enemy's will to resist. To find suitable drop zones 

and establish intra unit contact after landing are the principal 

difficulties connected with the employment of airborne troops by 

night. On the other hand, darkness handicaps the defender in 

determining the scope of landings and in distinguishing between 

actual airdrops and deceptive measures, such as the dropping 

of dummies. 

X. Pursuit 

Night pursuit may lead to the complete rout of defeated enemy 

forces because the pursuing troops have a decisive psychological 

advantage over the badly shaken enemy. When pursuing defeated 

hostile forces at night, the attacker must not lose contact with 
NIGHT COMIAT 13 

them or permit them to catch their breath. Silence is no longer 

of any importance. 

The pursuing elements may be composed of all arms. Armored 

units with self-propelled guns and mounted infantry, as well 

as foot troops with a few artillery batteries or pieces and antitank 

and assault guns, may be employed for this purpose. Engineers 

should always accompany the pursuit units to remove obstacles 

and clear mines without delay. 

Night pur~uit through unfamiliar terrain will usually confine 

the attack forces to roads. The speediest and surest way to 

overcome strong enemy resistance is to turn off the road and 

envelop the hostile forces. Enveloping maneuvers should be attempted, but the pursuing forces must not be diverted from 

their far-reaching objective by their efforts to envelop or encircle 

the enemy elements they have overtaken. 

The air force can be of great assistance on the condition that 

close air-ground co-operation is maintained. Bold, continuous 

bombing and strafing attacks against retreating hostile forces 

have a decidedly demoralizing effect on the enemy command and 

troops. The conduct of night pursuit can be greatly facilitated 

by illuminating the enemy's route of withdrawal and by indicating 

by radio the position of the pursuing spearheads. 

XI. Defense 

The strength of the defender's forces usually determines the 

defensive system he will adopt. Against an enemy who is capable 

of infiltrating the defender's MLR, a continuous front provides 

better protection than a system of strong points that save manpower but leave the security of the intermediate terrain to patrols. 

The main batt!e position should be fortified as far back as the 

division command POBts. Headquarters and service troops should 

be integrated into the defensive system. 

The fire plan that governs the co-ordination of artillery with 

infantry heavy weapons and small arms must be established in 

conformance with existing fortifications. The plan for artillery 

fire by night will provide for interdiction fire, delivered automatically upon request of the outpost elements, on the strip of no man's 

land immediately in front of the forward trenches. The co-ordinates of certain areas within the main battle position must be 

determined in advance so that interdiction fire can be laid down 

immediately in the event that enemy forces succeed in penetrating 

the position. An weapons should deliver interdiction fire, and for 

this purpose the infantry heavy weapons must be integrated into 

the plan of artillery fire. 
,. GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

The fire plan will also include concentrations that will be firE:d 

by several batteries on specific terrain features which the enemy 

will bave to occupy on his approach to the friendly lines. Moreover, the plan will provide for counterbattery fire based on air 

reconnaissance and ground observation, surprise fire pinpointed 

on command posts, approach routes, and localities in the rear 

areas, as well as harassing fire. 

At night, patrol activities must be increased and the troops at 

the outposts and in the MLR should be reinforced if s ufficient 

manpower is available. The no man's land should be lit by ftares 

and searchlights placed in flanking positions. The meaning of 

each type of light signal must be c1early established and explained 

to all concerned. 

In an attempt to prevent the enemy from making use of ground 

and air reconnaissance information obtained during the day. daytime troop dispositions should be changed after dusk. Such pre~ 

ventive measures will also protect friendly forces against hostile 

artillery preparations preceding a night attack and will prevent 

the capture of the forward elements by enemy combat patrols and 

r aids. At night a defensive position must present a completely 

different picture from that shown during daytime. The enemy 

forces attacking by night will thus be faced by an unexpected 

situation. 

Whenever possible, counterthrusts against enemy penetrations 

should be carried out during the hours of darkness so that friendly 

forces can capitalize on familiarity with the positions they formerly occupied. A counterthrust against the enemy's vulnerable 

flank is usually preferable to a frontal attack. 

In the event that local reserves are incapable of immediately 

restoring the situation by a counterthrust or if no forces are 

readily available for this purpose, it is preferable not to get too 

involved in fighting but rather to wait until the situation has been 

clarified and sizable reserves have been moved up. Then, after 

systematic preparation, the counterattack can be launched at 

dawn or even later. Too much haste may lead to failure. 

Close~combat antitank detachments. positioned at advantageous 

points, can often inflict severe losses on enemy tanks that have 

broken through the MLR. Assault g uns and tanks. held in readiness by the defender, add impetus to a counterattack by giving 

mobile support to the foot soldiers. The destruction of enemy 

tanks that have managed to break through the main battle position 

will usually have to be delayed until daybreak. when they can be 

taken care of by antitank and artillery pieces. 

Whenever the defender recognizes the imminence of a major 

enemy offensive, he should adopt a'ppropriate countermeasures for 
NIGHT COMIIAT 15 

the hours of darkness. The outpost area should be evacuated to 

prevent excessive casualties from preparatory fire. However 

much terrain the defender decides to abandon, he must not forget 

that his objective is possession of the MLR by the time the engagement ~ over. 

XII. Retrograde Movements 

The best time to withdraw from action is after a successful 

defense. Darkness facilitates disengagement and may conceal a 

withdrawal from enemy observation and reconnaissance for a 

relatively long period. 

Once a withdrawal is under way, the retiring forces must make 

every effort to put between themselves and the enemy the maximum distance in the shortest possible time. The hours of darkness must be used not only for the movement proper but also for 

occupying another position farther to the rear. All measures 

taken by the superior commander in charge of the withdrawal 

must facilitate smooth and rapid execution of the night movement. 

To conceal the disengagement, a covering force should remain 

in contact with the enemy until the main body is already well on 

its way to the rear. The covering force is left in position with the 

mission of simulating normal night activity of the full garrison. 

An infantry division would leave a covering force composed of 

one or two rifle companies with heavy weapons support in each 

regimental sector. If possible, one roving gun should be left in 

each battery position. Normal radio traffic should be maintained 

so long as the covering force remains in contact with the enemy. 

Radio intelligence produces particularly valuable results during 

this phase of the fighting. 

The covering force within each division sector should be placed 

under one commander who will also be responsible for the demolition of bridges after the last elements have crossed them. 

When large bodies of troops are being withdrawn over long distances, it is advisable to leave only mobile troops in contact with 

the enemy. Their strength will be in proportion to the supplies 

available for their use. Ample provision of ammunition and fuel 

is essential. If tanks are to be included in the covering force, it 

must be remembered that any minor breakdown caused by mechanica1 failure may 1ead to the total loss of the vehic1e. Adequate 

recovery equipment and sufficient engineer troops must be assigned to the covering force. 

The fonowing preparations should be made to guarantee the 

smooth withdrawal of the main body of troops: 
16 GERMAN REPORT SERIU 

a.. All elements that can be spared. c!\peciaUy the service units, 

should be evacuated as early as possible. The ammunition and 

fuel supplies required for continued operations and for the march 

movement should be stor ed along the routes of withdrawal. 

b. The withdrawing elements should be grouped into independent combat forces capable of fighting their way to the reaT, if 

forced to do so. 

c. Nonessential signal equipment should be dism ..... ntled and 

transferred to the new position in the rear. In any event, a reserve 

of signal equipment must be set al\ide before the st.."lrt of the 

withdrawal. 

d. A number of measures must be taken to avoid delays during 

the course of the withdrawal; these include traffic regulation, establishment of a recovery service. reconnoitering, and marking 

roads and detours. All signs must be removed by the last unit 

passing through the area. 

Antiaircraft units must protect the march columns against enemy air attacks. Combat aviation may assist the withdrawing 

ground forces by attacking the pursuing enemy troops. thus delaying their advance. 

Intermediate covering positions should be established in suitable terrain to protect the withdrawing units against unexpected 

enemy attacks. By defending those positions the covering forces 

will permit the main body of troops to continue its withdrawal 

without interference. The covering detachments should be composed of infantry, artillery, antitank, and engineer troops. In 

some instances antiaircraft batteries may be attached to the covering detachments. Flank protection is essential if the enemy 

attempts to envelop the withdrawing forces from adjacent sectors 

or by using side roads, or if he tries to block the route of withdrawal. Reserves should be set aside to cover the flanks. 

The superior commander must move to the rear as soon as the 

withdrawal from action has taken place without major incident. 

Aside from controlling the retrograde movement of troops and 

taking precautionary measures to protect the flanks, his principal 

preoccupation must be to organize the defense of the new position 

or to regroup his forces for a different assignment. 

Any measure that might betray one's intention to withdraw, 

such as the burning of supplies and stored equipment. premature 

demolitions in rear areas, or increased vehicular traffic must be 

avoided. 

XIII. Position Warfare 

a. Reconnaissance. In position warfare the reconnaissance ele-
NIGHT COM8AT 17 

ments have the following missions: 

(1) To capture prisoners by sending out combat patrols or 

intercepting enemy patrols; 

(2) To obtain information on the intentions of the enemy 

forces by determining at which points they have cleared 

mines and cut gaps into the barbed wire obstacles: and 

(3) To ascertain the strength and disposition of the enemy 

forces in the outpost area and their movements behind 

the lines-this information is needed for launching an 

attack on the enemy positions. 

A reconnaissance in force will constitute the most effective 

means of clarifying an uncertain situation and obtaining information OD the enemy's strength, the disposition of his artillery pieces, 

and the Dumber of infantry heavy weapons at his disposal. This 

information will permit the superior commander to draw valid 

conclusions as to the enemy's intentions. In many instances the 

same purpose can be achieved by deceptive measures designed to 

draw enemy fire, such as firing a concentration of all weapons on 

the enemy positions for only a few minutes. 

Air reconnaissance over the enemy positions. battery emplacements, and over localities in the proximity of the front will provide information on changes in the enemy situation. Regular 

flights should be scheduled before dark and shortly after dawn for 

the purpose of photographing these areas. The aerial photo1{raphs, together with their evaluation, should be made available 

to the front-line commanders as soon as possible, since the latter 

can obtain a clear picture of the enemy situation only by collating 

air and ground reconnaissance information. 

b. SecU'rity. During the night, outposts beyond the MLR should 

not be maintatined at the same points as during daytime; frequent 

changes will prevent the ir becoming an easy prey for enemy patrols. Any kind of routine schedule in posting sentries at night 

should be avoided. 

c. T"001J DisPQsition. Only sentries and patrols equipped with 

small arms and a few light machine guns should occupy the outpost area. The bulk of the defense forces should be in the battle 

position. If an impending enemy attack is recognized in time, the 

outposts should be reinforced unless zone defense tactics are applied. In the event that the enemy makes a surprise attack, he 

ought to · be stopped at the MLR; contact with adjacent sectors 

should be I'e-established and a counterthrust initiated. The reserves are to be assembled near the company CP so that the company commander can lcnd the counterthrust, which should preferably be cond ucted against the flank of the enemy penetration. 
18 GalMAN REPORT SERIES 

d. Measures to Prevent Infiltration. Trip wires should be strung 

along the wire obstacles and at otber points of the outpost area. 

These wires should be connected to an alarm system, including 

floodlights. Midget radar devices are superior to all others in uncovering infiltration attempts. Patrols must constantly cross the 

outpost area, and a dense communication network, extending to 

the outpost area, should be set up. 

No listening posts should be positioned beyond the outpost area 

at night. Double sentries should be stationed at the outposts, and 

these should be in contact with ODe another. Machine guns and 

mortars emplaced in the outpost area should be firmly anchored to 

prevent the enemy from carrying them off. 

e. Combat Patrols. Patrol activity serves the purpose of reconnoitering, capturing prisoners, and seizing strong points. These 

operations may be carried out in strength with intensive artillery 

preparation to eliminate resistance in the enemy outpost area or 

they may be staged without such preparation by weak forces that 

can be assembled without attracting the enemy's attention. While 

the combat patrol attempts to penetrate t he enemy outpost area, 

the artillery should deliver counterbattery and interdiction fires, 

the latter to seal off from the rear that section of the enemy position under attack, thus preventing the arrival of reinforcements 

or the launching of a counterattack. Once the patrol has crossed 

the zone of hostile interdiction fire, the enemy artillery will usually 

have little effect because of its lack of flexibility in darkness. 

The members of the patrol must be well acqu<1.inted with terrain 

conditions and with every detail of their mission. The use of deception and diversionary measures may be indicated. Because of 

their greater effectiveness in close combat, the men should be 

equipped with light individual weapons and flame throwers rather 

than heavy weapons. 

Patrols should adhere to a fixed timetable. Improper ~e of 

light signals usually leads to confusion that might jeopardi:-:e the 

success of the operation. 
CHAPTER 3 

RUSSIAN NIGHT COMBAT METHODS 

I. Characteristics a nd Training of the Russia n Soldier 

In World War II, as in preceding wars, the Russian soldier 

demonstrated that he wa~ closer to nature than his west European 

counterpart. This was hardly surprising since most of the Russian !>oldicrs were born and raised far from big cities. The civilian 

occupation of the typicnl Russian soldier was that of a farmer, 

lumberjack, or huntsman. From ea rly childhood he had been used 

to covering long distances across difficult terrain, orienting himself by conspicuous features on the ground, by the stars, and often 

:-l imply by following his nalu ral instincts. The manifold dangers 

that were ever present in the wide-open Russian countryside were 

bound to sharpen his senses, particularly his sight and hearing. 

Even the city uwellers, most of whom had only recently been 

transplanted to the densely populated cities as part of the industrialization of the Soviet Union and the resulting concentration of 

Jabor masses, remained relatively dose to nature. Being attuned 

to t he vast open spaces and desolate steppes with which a large 

part of his country is covered, t he Russian did not know the depressing loneliness and forlornness that often overwhelmed the 

German soldier. The Russian was accustomed to getting along 

with a minimum of comfort and equipment under climatic conditions that imposed severe hardship on the invader. 

The Russian was able to move without a sound and orient himself in the darkness. On a night patrol he instinctively behaved 

like a huntsman who is careful to avoid making the slightest noise. 

During long night vigils the German sentries, on the other hand, 

often saw no harm in conversing or lighting a cigarette or pipe 

just to lessen their drowsiness. When reporting to a superior who 

was checking their post, they spoke in a loud voice without realizing that they often permitted the intently listening Russian who 

was hiding in the immediate vicinity to gather valuable informat.iou. 'Vhen their not-tao-keen ca rs picked tip It sllspieiolls soulld, 

Gennnn scntl'ics often fired Very pistols, thus giving awn y the il' 

position to t.he ('nem),. Since t.he Gel'mnns were in the habit. of 

posting scntries at the same pla(~e night after night. o\-el' periods 

of sc\'eral weeks or (well months, Russinn ngents who were wntching the scntl·jes perform their routine duties wem able to infiltrat(' 

the Germnn lines without danger to themsch-cs. ]n eontl'llst to 

the stereotype way in which the Germans posted their guards at 
20 G£ItMAN REPORT SERIES 

night, the Russians changed the location of their posts constantly_ 

The Russian soldier performed particularly weB 8S a night observer. Stem discipline and self-constraint enabled him to lie 

motionless for hours and observe the German troops at close range 

without being detected. He waited patiently for the most favorable opportunity to carry out his mi88ion. 

Russian junior officers were accustomed to act in accordance 

with rigid orders. Upon encountering unexpected resistance they 

were easily confused and. in the event of a surprise counterattack 

against the flank of their unit, often helpless. 

In general, Russian night combat training was adapted t o the 

terrain conditions and the characteristics of the average soldier. 

The exigencies of war led to an intensification of the training with 

emphasis on trickery, cunning, and deception rather than orthodox tactical doctrine and independent imaginative thinking. 

II. Movements 

Russian night movements were in many ways similar to those 

of the Germans, and the organization and composition of Russian 

march columns resembled the German pattern. Along wide roads 

two columns would move abreast. The Russian troops' familiarity 

with terrain conditions and the support they r eceived from the civilian populace enabled them to undertake cross-country marches 

in terrain that was frequently considered impassable by their opponents. Both in the planning and the execution of night movements the Russian commanders were ruthless. The welfare 

and care of troops were of secondary importance, and whoever 

dropped out was left behind. This was particularly true during 

the Russian retrograde movements in 1941 and 1942. 

Concentrations preparatory to major offensive operations always took place at night. Truck columns would haul the attack 

formations over long distances; the detrucking points were usually outside inhabited localities. The troops then marched on foot 

to the assembly areas-also at night-and immediately began to 

dig in. Armored and motorized infantry formations were brought 

up from the rear at the close of the assembly phase. In 1944, 

when the German power of resistance was deteriorating at a rapid 

pace, the Russians. apparently conscious of their numerical and 

material superiority, made little effort to conceal their night movements and permitted their motor vehicles to drive without dimmmg their Jights. 

In winter the Russians often used tanks to break roads through 

the snow. As soon as these roads froze solid they formed an excellent communications net behind the front. The following inci-
NIGHT COMaAT 21 

dent illustrates the Russian adeptness in moving over ice by night. 

During the winter of 1941--42 the southern wing of the German 

front was anchored on the north shore of the Sea of Azov at 

Taganrog. The south shore was still in Russian hands. By January the water had frozen so solid that troops could move across 

the ice. At night Russian units up to and even above battalion 

strength crossed the ice; they spent the day a few miles off shore 

lying motionless on the ice. As soon as darkness set in they proceeded to the shore and raided German billets and rear installations, then withdrew before daybreak. Even though the Russians 

suffered many casualties from frostbite, they continued their 

night raids as long as the water remained frozen. 

III. Reconnaissance 

When the Russian soldier was sent out on a reconnaissance mission, he was not confronted by any unusual problems. His natural 

cunning as well as his typically Slavic astuteness and cleverness 

stood him in good stead. That he was moving across his own territory and found ready support from the local populace were undoubtedly important but not decisive factors in helping him to 

achieve success. 

The Russian command often combined ground reconnaissance 

missions with reconnaissance in force and occasionally with fullfledged night operations. The remarkable feature was the strength 

of the units that were always employed for night reconnaissance 

in force. At times units up to regimental strength carried out 

such missions, despite very heavy losses incurred by m3ssing so 

many troops. The Russian field commanders continued to apply 

the same methods up to the end of the war, undoubtedly because 

the presence of such strong bodies of troops complicated the task 

of the considerably weaker German reconnaissance elements. Occasionally, the Russians added tanks to reconnaissance units, thus 

giving the infantry patrols support and protection. Along some 

sectors of the front horse cavalry was employed on night reconnaissance. 

In some instances individual Russian reconnaissance patrols, 

led by capable and energetic officers, managed to slip through gaps 

or weakly held positions in the German front under cover of darkness. They either restricted their activities to obtaining information or expanded the scope of their mission by disrupting wire 

communications, laying mines, and carrying out commando-type 

raids on CP's. 

In general the Russian reconnaissance methods were efficient 

and adapted to the conditions prevailing during the hours of dark-
22 GERMAN E~RT SERIES 

Dess. During fighting on the Kerch Peninsula in the winter of 

1942 the Germans captured Russian soldiers who had spent two 

nights and one day in the immediate vicinity of the German positions and who had been able to obtain a wealth of information 

during that time. In another instance that occurred during the 

autumn of 1941, the advance guard of a German infantry division 

was attacked during the night in a large village where the rein ~ 

forced battalion had stopped on the way to Kharkov. After the 

Russian attack had been beaten off. the German battalion commander found that a Russian rifle platoon had been left behind 

in the village after all other troops had withdrawn and that the 

men had concealed themselves in groups of two or three in the 

dunghills near the farm buildings. Their mission was to observe 

the Germans after their entry into the village and to communicate the information to their parent unit, which was hiding in a 

near-by woods with the intention of launching a surprise attack. 

IV. Infiltration 

Infiltration by small detachments, as we1l as by Jarger units up 

to an entire division, was probably the most effective Russian 

method of night combat. It was effective at all times because the 

Russians were able to penetrate seemingly impassable terrain in 

an: kind of weather, all the more so when it was as poorly defended, as during the latter part of the campaign. Once the shortage of manpower had forced the German Army to resort to a system of defensive strong points rather than continuous lines. the 

Russians could employ their favorite night tactics to their greatest 

advantage. Time and again their troops sJipped through a lightly 

held sector during the night and were securely established behind 

the German front by the next morning. 

A good illustration of infiltration by night and its serious consequences was provided by a Russian infantry battalion in February 1942. The action occurred in the ar ea north of Shala, about 

fifty miles southeast of Leningrad, and began during a snowstorm. Personnel of the Russian battalion moved on skis, pulling 

light and heavy infantry weapons on sleds. (Map 2) 

In single file the troops traversed the Kovrigino swamp, just 

north of Konduya, during darkness and passed silently between 

two strong points of the 269th Infantry Division. Once established in the rear of the division, the Russians lay low during the 

day, but came to life night after night. They sowed mines along 

the routes of communication, attacked columns bringing up rations and ammunition, and assaulted command posts and heavy 

weapons positions. Every German detachment had to be on the 
NIGHT COMBAT 23 

Map 2 

THE REGION AROUND SHALA 

• o • .0 

MIL.ES 

alert throughout the night, and every morning mine-elearing 

squads had to remove the mines planted during the previous night. 

It was not too difficult to detect the activities of the Russians 

because their tracks were clearly visible in the snow. But the 

German troops were not equipped with skis and were, therefore, unable to pursue the Russians who disappeared in the vast, 

wooded, and uninhabited · region in the daytime. At night the 

enemy force received ammunition, weapons, and rations by air-
GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

drop and continued its destructive activities on such a scale that 

counteraction became imperative. By an intensive German effort, 

the Russian battalion was gradually ferreted out and annihilated 

after a series of costly engagements. 

For some weeks the communications of an entire division had 

been threatened and every night the Germans suffered casualties 

and losses of materiel. With men trained in night combat on skis, 

the division wolud have been able to eliminate the threat promptly. 

During the following month the 269th Infantry Division was 

again subjected to extensive Russian infiltration. The division 

was still engaged in heavy defensive fighting in the Konduya area. 

The situation grew so critical that the regimental command posts 

had to be set up in the MLR and the division CP, only some 1,000 

yards to the rear, in a dense forest. 

One morning at daybreak Markayevskaya, a village located 

about two miles behind the front along the only communication 

route, was suddenly attacked by approximately 600 Russians coming from the rear. The division trains and some elements of the 

signal battalion engaged the Russians in hand-to-hand fighting 

and, though the German forces suffered heavy casualties, they 

were able to restore the situation and thereby avert a complete 

disaster. 

The presence of the Russian force had not been observed by any 

component of the German division, but it was assumed that the 

4!nemy battalion had effected a night crossing of the Markayevskaya swamp, considered impassable at the time. Thus there was 

a combination of elements, such as the cover of darkness, infiltration tactics, and difficult terrain, which the Russians exploited 

time and again. 

By 1943 most sectors of the German front were easily penetrated by the Russians during the hours of darkness. Numerical 

weakness forced the German commanders to group their men in 

a system of strong points, while small detachments made periodic 

night patrols across the intermed iate terrain. This German weakness was quickly noted by the alert opponents. At night they 

silently slipped through the gaps in the German defense system 

and quickly established themselves unless the Germans launched 

an immediate counterattack. A number of such penetrations generally resulted in the loss of the German position, since the understrength units were unable to defend themselves on both sides. 

In August 1943 the XXXIX Panzer Corps, composed of the 18th 

Panzer Grenadier and 337th Infantry Divisions, was withdrawing according to plan from the area north of Dorogohuzh toward 

Smolensk. Some sixteen miles east of the confluence of the Dnepr 

and Vop Rivers, the corps had established a delaying position 
NIGHT COMBAT 25 

against which the pursuing Russians exerted strong pressure. 

(Map 3) 

..u..._ .......... , ___ ~ ...... .. ... . .' ' . ,~ .... ~',. . . ,. , ,..r' .. ,".' 

.,'. , f) .:;t" 

~ .. ".". i' ~l?C·\; ~I. ~ "'. ,'" ·· .. 0. :: ., ,. ............ 

_S",~I'. , .. 

,,-~-

.... '. " " 

~.~~ ..... -----.-.. -.-~ ... ~ ... 

\ j RUSSIAN 

(17-2. 

INFlLT~::N Av~v.t 1943) BY NIGHT r ' 

"i""", GUIOU"Ut , Ihlll,uT"It\IU' 

• . , 

" " , 

'" -, 

On 17 August the corps commander had to commit the last availM 

able reserves to hold off superior Russian forces. The 337th Division pulled out every last squad from those sectors that were not 

under attack and moved these troops to the Dorogobuzh-Smolensk 

road to prevent an enemy break-through. Along a swampy area 

situated some five miles south of the road, the division commander 

left only weak security detachments. Nothing unusual was observed during the night of 17- 18 August. 

On the morning of 18 August the Russian attacks against the 

337th Division front slackened noticeably. However, at about 

1200 an ammunition column that was setting up a dump approxiM 

mately four miles behind the front was fired on from a wooded 

area neal' by. During the early afternoon German reconnaissance 

elements reported that the western and northern edge of this woods 

was held by enemy forces of unknown strength. Since these RusM 

sian forces would be able to interfere with traffic along the Dorogobuzh-Smolensk road, the corps engineer battalion was given the 

mission of clearing the woods the next morning. In addition, the 

corps commander reinforced the troops guarding the Dnepr and 

Vop bridges south of Yartsevo. 
26 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

During the night of 18-19 August the engineer battalion moved 

to the wooded area and assembled for an attack that was launched 

early the next morning. Upon entering the woods the battalion 

encountered no Russian troops. Obviously, the Russians h<H1 withdrawn. 

On the morning of 20 August the German troops guarding the 

eastern approaches to the Vor bridge, about eight miles south of 

YnrtsevQ, reported that they were being attacked by superior 

enemy forces. The Russ ~ were repelled with lhe assistance of 

service troops and personnel from corps headquarters. At the 

time it WtlS assumed that the attack had been made by strong parti~a n forces who had previously been active in this area. Since 

the lines of communiclltions between the Vop bridge and the 18th 

Panzer Grenndier Division had to be kept open, the corps assigned 

two engineer battalions and one infantry battalion the mission of 

clenning out the intermediate wooded a rea. During the night of 

20- 21 August these units assembled for an attack aga inst the 

"partisans." While the prepnrations were under way, it was 

learned that shortly after nightfall the troops guarding the Dnepr 

bridge had been attacked by enemy forces. estimated at one to 

two compnnies and equipped with mortars and infantry heavy 

weapons. The raiders were repulsed by the strengthened guard. 

On the morning of 21 August the three batt.-tlions began to comb 

the forest northeast of the Vop bridge. By good fortune they ran 

almost immediately against a Russian regimental headquarters, 

which they overpowered. Enemy resistance thereupon slackened 

and about 150 prisoners were c.'lptured, all belonging to a regiment 

that had infiltrated the German MLR four nights earlier. 

Prisoner interrogation revealed that the entire regiment had 

infiltrated the German MLR south of the Smolcnsk road by night 

and had assembled in the woods four miles behind the 337th Di~ 

vision's lines. 'fhe mission of the Russian regiment was to cut the 

German lines of communications by capturing the Dnepr and Vop 

bridges and to support by an attack from the rear the frontal 

assa ult on the German lines that was scheduled for 22 August. 

On 18 August, when the regimental commander realized that the 

presence of his unit in the woods had been discovered by the Ger~ 

mans, he waited until darknes::I li nd led his regiment northward 

across the Dorogobuzh-Smolensk road. Upon reaching the south 

bank of the Dnepr he divided his force, leaving one battalion in 

the forest south of the river and ('rossing with the other on impro~ 

vised floats. He spent the next day hiding in the forest northeast 

of the Vop bridge and let the supply trucks of the 18th Panzer 

Grenadier Division pass through without interference in order to 

escape detection by the Germans. During the night he assembled 
NIGHT COMaAT 27 

his forces for the attack on the Vop bridge and, after its failure. 

he moved to the battalion on the south bank of the river and led 

it in the night attack on the Dnepr bridge. 

Despite their failure to reach the designated objectives, the 

Russian forces demonstrated remarkable skill in infiltrating the 

German Jines by night without being observed and in reassembling in the woods south of the highway. During the subsequent 

days the Russians moved quietly and withstood the temptation of 

making daylight attacks on near-by objectives, with the result 

that they escaped notice several nights in a row. Another notable 

feat was the night crossing of the Dnepr without the use of any 

bridging equipment. 

Here. as in many other instances. most of the infiltrated Russians were annihilated. but not until they had caused much damage and confusion. and had tied down considerable German manpower. Along all sectors of the Russian front German units were 

plagued by constant infiltrations at night, which meant that troops 

at the front and in rear areas had to be especially alert during 

darkness. 

V. Offensive Operations 

Russian doctrine on the conduct of night attacks. underwent 

many changes during World War II. both with regard to the objective that was to be attained and the methods of execution. The 

performance of the Russian unit leaders improved gradually. 

Whereas at the beginning of the campaign Russian commanders 

often demonstrated a lack of initi ative and resoluteness. they executed many very daring maneuvers toward the end of the war. 

During t he initial phase of the campaign they often failed to exploit an opening, but their conduct of operations gradually improved so much that eventually they were able to &Core major 

victories. especially since German resistance was diminishing and 

the defense usually lacked depth. 

In 1941. after the German offensive had ground to a bait, the 

Russians reorganized their units by the integration of thousands 

of insuflkiently trained infantry replacements. The night attacks 

executed by these units often were not properly co-ordinat ed. 

Massed infantry. insufficiently supported by artillery. was hurled 

against the German lines. its sole objective being the seizure of 

the outpost area. At this time the Russian command followed the 

World War I pattern of massed night attacks that nearly always 

miscarried. 

By 1942 the Russian. night combat methods had been improved 

on the basis of the lessons learned from experience. Tanks that 
28 GERMAN REPORT SERtES 

had been concealed during daytime suddenly made an appearance 

at dusk or in darkness. The probable reason for the employment 

of armor at night was that poor visibility protected the Russian 

tanks from the otherwise too accurate German antitank fire. In 

general, night attacks launched during this phase had only limited 

objectives. During the preparatory stage of such attacks. the Russians proved very skilled and courageous in clearing German 

mines by hand. Even in deep snow and extreme cold they spent 

long nights searching for mines. When they found them, they 

often merely detached the fuses and then covered the mines with 

a layer of dirt or snow. 

Russian commanders had no scruples about casualties when a 

mine field had to be cleared in a hurry. On 28 December 1942 on 

the Kerch Peninsula, for instance, a Russian penal battalion was 

driven across a particularly dense German mine field during the 

hours of darkness which preceded the attack. The casualties were 

very high, but several lanes were cleared for the follow-up units. 

In another instance, occurring on the night of 1-2 December 

1942 in the sector of the German Army Group Center, the Russian 

II Cavalry Corps with three horse cavalry divisions attempted to 

exploit a three-mile daytime advance achieved by armored units 

twenty miles south of Rzhev. Making full use of the cover of darkness, the cavalry units sped across the snow in open formation, 

disregarding the losses inflicted by a few remaining German machine gunners and riflemen, and a weak artillery barrage. The 

Russians penetrated the German lines and, without exploiting 

their success, r eturned to their starting positions during the same 

night. Their objective was never known. 

A few months later, in mid-August 1943, in the southern sector 

of the German front the Russians attacked with overwhelming 

forces and in the course of the day overran a weak, battle-weary 

German division. By nightfall the Russian infantry and armor 

stood about four miles behind the forme r German MLR within 

reach of a stream which, according to a map captured by the Germans, was their immediate objective. Contra ry to their previous 

practice the Russians did not halt but immediately went on to 

exploit their succes!'l. During the same night, after crossing the 

river, they broke through the haRtily organized German position, 

and by dawn Russian tanks stood far to the rear of the German 

lines. The Russian break-through could not be offRct by countermeasures and led to decisive developments in this area. Tn this 

instance a bold Russian night attack could not be contained by the 

weak German defense. 

By 1944 the Russians often continued durin ~ the hours of darkness a major offensive operation they had started in the early 
HIGHT COMBAT 

morning hours. Armor always led the way. Even when carried 

out on a wide front. these attacks usually bogged down in the German battle position. although they occasionally penetrated up to 

the artillery emplacements. The slow progress of the attackers 

usually left the German commander sufficient time to move up 

reserves. which were able to restore the situation by the next 

morning. In the summer of that year the Russians introduced a 

new procedure. Before major offensivefl they would use deceptive 

and diversionary measures on a wide front. At the point of main 

effort they would commit infantry units supported by tanks in a 

night attack with limited objective. Evidently the intention was 

.to soften up the German defense at night and to open gaps for the 

follow-up unit.<J. Heavy artillery preparations usually preceded 

the infantry assault. At the crack of dawn armored formations. 

held in reserve for the break-through. went into action. 

VI. Defensive Operations 

The Russians were always prepared to defend themselves, even 

during the short lulls that occur during any offensive operation. 

Wherever they stopped, they dug in and vanished from sight. As 

a r ule Russian defensive positions were organized in great depth 

and held by strong infantry forces. Cover and concealment were 

excellent. Dense wire entanglements and wen-laid mine fields in 

conjunction with ceaseless night reconnaissance provided a high 

degree of security. A multitude of heavy weapons, multiple rocket 

projectors. flame throwers. and artillery pieces gave the defensive 

system a firm backbone. However, the Russians did have difficulty 

at night in effectively co-ordinating artillery fire and in neutralizing the German artil1ery by counterbattery fire. Apparently, they 

either lacked well-trained observation battalions and flash and 

sound-ranging batteries, or else they did not employ them effectively. Their flat-trajectory night fire on roads, crossroads, and 

prominent landmarks was often very accurate, probably as a 

result of highly developed meteorological observation and an accurate knowledge of climatic factors. 

Counterattacks, most of them supported by tanks, were well prepared and executed with great assurance. At points where the 

Russians expected German armored thrusts they often set up antitank fronts interspersed with individual tanks. 

On the whole, Russian defensive tactics lacked flexibility during 

the early stage of the campaign. The German experience of the 

last year of the war indicated. however, that the Russian command 

and troops had adopted the principal features of the more mobile 

and fl exible German tactics. 
30 GE.IlMAN REPORT SfRIES 

An order, issued by Marshal Semyon Timoshcnko in 1941 and 

captured by the Germans during their advance townrd Moscow, 

encouraged the Russian troops to m~\ke more u!;c of night lighting, 

close combat, and fighting in the extensive fOfCf'ltf'l. TheRe three 

types of combat, he stated, were the forte of the RUf'lsiuns and the 

weakness of the Germans. who placed too much reliance on their 

machines. At night and in the forests, he continued, mechanical 

equipment loses some of its effectiveness, and hand-to-hand fighting, for which the Russians have a traditional aptit ude, comes 

into its own. 

VII. Retrograde Movements 

The only Russian strategic withdrawal occurred at the very 

beginning of the German campaign. During the initial phase of 

the retrograde movement the Russians executed consecutive night 

marches with two columns often marching abreast. After the 

initial shock of the German attack had worn off, the Russians 

began to fight a series of delaying actions. During the battles of 

encirclement that took place during this phase, the Russians in 

the pockets would abandon their heavy weapons, equipment, and 

supplies and, taking advantage of the hours of darkness, would 

attempt to break through the German ring. Masses of infantry 

would hurl themselves against the German lines at what seemed 

to the Germans the most unfavorable points, that is to say, in open 

terrain, far away from any road or highway. 

In carrying out retrograde movements at night Russian field 

commanders had no qualms about sacrificing rear guard units, 

which were often ordered to fight to the last man. In such emergencies the civilian populace was put to work digging antitank: 

ditches, delaying positions, dummy fortifications, etc. The importance of mines in night combat operations was fully realized by 

the Russians from the very beginning of the campaign. Whereas 

the Russians employed armor during every phase of this retrograde movement, their air force intervened only rarely. 

VIII. Partisan Warfare 

Shortly after the start of the Russian campaign partisans began 

to harass the GermaI'l. rear areas, especially in the central and 

southern regions of Russia . Time and again German logistical 

plans were threatened by nightly partisan forays on supply installations, rail lines, and other important military objectives. Destruction in the rear areas was often as costly as losses at the 

front. 
NIGHT COMBAT 31 

The effectiveness of night attacks by partisans was demonstrated by the experience of the 98th Infantry Division after its 

withdrawal across the Kerch Straits late in 1943. Behind the division front there was an extensive system of underground quarries near Adzhim-Ushkay, two miles northeast of Kerch. which 

were interconnected by long subterranean galleries. The partisans 

hidden in these quarries were well equipped, and they undoubtedly 

maintained contact with the Russian units across the straits. 

Starting at dusk, partisans equipped with infantry heavy weapOilS emerged from their inaccessible hideouts to cut German supply 

lines, destroy signal installations. and attack weak German service 

units. At daybreak they disappeared without giving the German 

troops an opportunity to come to grips with them. 

In this primitive country, with its many inaccessible hiding 

places, the Germans were at a loss to combat the partisans effectively because the latter were able to attack in small groups during 

the hours of darkness and then vanish. In view of his limited 

manpower the local commander was unable to cope with this persistent menace. 

In the spring of 1944 the German V Corps was engaged in heavy 

defensive battles near the city of Kerch. At that time the corps' 

line of communications was subjected to frequent night attacks 

at points some sixty miles west of the front line. Partisan forces 

numbering 400 to 1,000 men made frequent night attacks on vehicles moving along the supply route Simferopol-KarasubazarFeodosiya, as well as on villages in the same area. The partisans 

were hiding in the inaccessible Yaila Mountains of the Southern 

Crimea, where they were supplied by nightly airdrops. As a countermeasure, the corps furnished armed escorts for vehicles moving 

in convoy, but this meant a considerable diversion of manpower 

for the hard-pressed corps. No matter how vigorously German 

units combatted these and other-partisan groups, there was no end 

to partisan night attacks behind the front and especially against 

rear installations. Darkness was the protector of the partisan, 

particularly in difficult terrain that the numerically weak German 

troops were often unable to comb. 
CHAPTER 4 

GERMAN NIGHT COMBAT METHODS 

I. Movements 

In the course of the Russian campaign night movements became 

increasingly important in planning and executing operations, 

since the German field commanders realil':ed that marching unita 

needed the protection of darkness if excessive losses were to be 

avoided. However, night marches were often hampered by the 

dearth of good roads and by Budden changes in the weather, 

which often made the existing roads impassable in the midst of 

a movement. 

Careful preparation of a ll night marches was imperative. This 

included detailed advance road reconnaissance, establishment of 

traffic control posts, employment of engineers to repair defective 

portions of the roads, availability of recovery and evacuation 

crews, use of luminous road markers, and good. camouflage of the 

marching units. In composing his march serial each commander 

had to anticipate possible interference by enemy air and ground 

forces, including partisans. 

During a night motor march each serial was assigned phase 

lines, which facilitated proper movement control. Headlights 

were removed or painted blue, while blackout lights were carried 

in the rear. Traffic control personnel and unit commanders down 

to the squad leaders were equipped with red and blue flashlights. 

Radio silence was observed during the march ; however, stations 

in the various nets were standing by. Field switchboards tied in 

with existing lines were used in rear areas. During bright nights _ 

liaison planes were employed to good advantage for traffic control. 

When motorized elements marched toward the front, they had a 

tendency to delay dismounting as they approached the enemy. 

This was particularly true during the early part of the campaign. 

An effective countermeasure was the setting up of phase lines, 

where the men were ordered to detruck. When motorized or armored units moved to assembly areas close to the front, it was 

found expedient to cover the noise of their motors by firing artillery and heavy weapons in their vicinity. During these movements in close proximity to the front, it was .desirable to bypass 

road junctions and villages, as they were the favorite targets of 

Russian artillery. It should be noted, however, that an extensive 

movement control organization was required to effect such bypassing during darkness. 
NIOHT COMIAT 33 

II. Reconnaissance 

The German troops needed various aids to perform their duties 

during darkness; most soldiers had to be conditioned to being 

outdoors at night beeause their senses had been dulled by city life. 

It was particularly difficult for them to find their way in the generally monotonous Russian countryside, which contained very few 

good reference points. 

Among the expedients used by reconnaissance units were the 

firing of tracer ammunition and of star shells, dropping of flares 

from planes, and the intermittent employment of searchlights in 

pairs behind the front. There was little motorized or armored 

night reconnaissance because vehicles are heard a long way off 

and attract attention. However, in situations where night reconnaissance elements had to cover long distances, motorized reconnaissance forces were sent out. As they approached the enemy, 

they dismounted and continued on foot. 

Artillery night reconnaissance was mainly a function of the 

sound and flash ranging sections of the corps artillery observation 

battalions. Firing data were computed with the aid of the meteorological section whenever immediate fire was to be delivered. 

During completely dark nights German observation battalions 

tried to use captive balloons for detailed reconnaissance over wide 

areas, but this procedure was applied successfully only on a few 

occasions. 

III. Offensive Operations 

German units carried out night attacks to exploit successes 

achieved in daytime, as a prelude to major offensive operations, to 

restore the situation where the enemy had achieved a local success, 

and to camouflage the execution of other operations, such as a 

retrograde movement. 

The starting time for night attacks was set with due regard 

for the inherent difficulties of fighting in the dark. Action at 

night was always time consuming; yet, it was usually desirable 

to conclude any operation before daybreak. The unit commander 

had to consider these two factors and evaluate his own and the 

enemy situation before he decided to launch a night attack. 

The terrain in Russia was rarely ideal for night attack. In 

many instances there was good cover for the approach. but the 

enemy.held territory usually did not afford good visibility, so that 

the opponent's preparations for defense could not be observed. 

Whenever there was danger of encountering strong, well·prepared 

enemy force~, night attacks had to be launched in a direction from 

which they were not expected. 
34 GEllMAN REPORT SERIES 

The success of a night attack depended on careful preparation, 

proper timing, and selection of favorable terrain. Detailed evaluation of information gathered by air and ground reconnaissance, 

thorough analysis of captured maps, study of the terrain by the 

maximum number of officers, road reconnaissance and marking, 

and provisions for adequate supplies were some of the preparatory 

measures. Before issuing the operation order the commander discussed his plan in detail and answered questions requiring clarification, so that every officer knew exactly what was expected of 

him and his men. 

These careful preparations applied also to major attacks started 

before dawn and continued during daylight. Before such operations many nights were required to ready a large body of troops. 

Attack~ scheduled to last but a single night were generally confined to a limited objective not too distant from the starting position. Even these relatively minor operations required thorough 

preparations to avoid enemy traps or other disagreeable surprises. 

The following example shows how carefully LVI Panzer Corps 

prepared an attack during darkness in the area west of the Dnepr 

River in September 1941. The objective of the operation was 

Vyazma, about sixty miles to the east. The situation in the area 

had been static for several weeks with the 290th Infantry Division 

holding the front. (Map 4) 

For the attack, which started on 2 October, three additional 

divisions were brought up from other areas-the 6th and 7th 

Panzer Divisions, and one armored infantry division. Improvement of the poor road net was begun as early as 20 September. Other preparations included the reinforcement of numerous 

bridges, aerial photography of enemy-held terrain, nuisance raids 

by a few planes to obscure the noise of traffic on the ground, and 

maintenance of traffic along the main north-south road to simulate normal supply activity. 

On the night of D minut'! 3 the forward echelons of the two 

panzer divisions were moved to their 3f1sembly areas ncar the 

front, so that they could familiarize themselves with local conditions. This also gave the artillery units two days to determine 

their firing position and data, and to establish observation posts. 

The next night the motorized infantry elements of the two 

panzer divisions were brought up to the area west of the major 

north-south road, where they detrucked. The vehicles were parkcd 

farther to the rear. 

During the last night before the attack all assault troo p!'! were 

moved to the jump-off positions, where the forward echelons of 

their respective units awaited thcm. The 290th Infantry Division 

regrouped its forces for the impendinJr :'Ittack, while the armored 
NIGHT COMBAT 35 

Map 4 

GERMAN PREPARATIONS 

FOR A NIGHT ATTACK 

(30 September-2 October 1941) 

o 

, , 

, MILES 

10 

infantry division was held back as corps reserve. At the same 

time the tanks and empty trucks of the two panzer divisions were 

moved up to the north-south road. 

The operation itself started an hour after dawn and was successfully completed at H plus 30 hours when a bridgehead was 

firmly established east of the Dnepr near Cholm. No doubt the 

carefully camouflaged night preparations of the corps during the 

preceding weeks were a major factor. for the Russian troops apparently had not anticipated an attack by an entire corps. 
36 GERMAN E~1T SUlf! 

In another im'l tance the Germans launched a night attack on a 

smaller scale in t he sector southeast of Mogilev in January 1944. 

(Map 5) Defensive positions were held by t he German 56ih Infantry Division, whose front had been pushed back along a 1,000-

yard stretch to a maximum depth of approximately 500 yards. 

In the middle of this salient the Russians had cstnulishcd a strong 

point that afforded good observation of the German front and 

rear area. 

GERMAN SURPRISE ATTACK 

BY NIGHT 

(ZIJonuary 1944) 

Map S 

'L-________ .~"~--------~'~' - 'AROS 

On 10 January the German commander decided to launch a 

counterattack to wipe out the Russian salient. Reconnaissance 

had established that the Russian strong point contained at least 

one hundred men, equipped with six to eight heavy ll).achine guns, 

several heavy mortars, and an antitank gun. In addition, it was 

known that the Russian position was heavily mined, so that it 

had to be attacked from the rear, where it was linked to the MLR 

by a communication trench. It was also realized that the German 
NIGHT COMBAT 37 

force had to launch a surprise attack, since the Russian artillery, 

consisting of at least six batteries, would otherwise break up the 

attack. The best time for achieving surprises was during the 

hours of darkness. 

The German night attack was to be ca rried out by an assault 

detachment composed of one officer and thirty-five men, and 

equipped with submachine guns and two flame throwers. A covering detachment of similar size was to follow the assault troops, 

cut the communication trench midway between the strong point 

and the Russian MLR, and protect the assault detachment against 

interference from the south. Reinforced infantry companies were 

to move to both shoulders of the Russian salient, ready to occupy 

the former German positions after the Russians evacuated. These 

two companies were to break up the expected Russian counterattack by flanking thrusts. Finally, as a deceptive measure the 

reinforced German artillery was to deliver intermittent fire on the 

strong point and on other parts of the Russian front for eight 

nights prior to the operation. 

At 0230, 21 January, the assault detachment !:lo tarted to infiltrate 

from the flank of the sali ent, followed by the covcl'ing deta\.'hment. 

At 0320 a short artillery ('oncentration W8!:lo delivered on the strong 

point, followed by a feint from the west ten minutes later. At 

0335 the as~ault detachment entered the strong point. Simultane-

, the entire Germnn artillery shifted its lire to the 80uthern 

part of the communication trench. FinnUy, at 0340 there was an 

air attack on the Rm~:'lian div n <.'ommand po&ot. 

The opel'ation W ;IR ~o succe.g~f lll that the a8:'lault deta<.'hment 

suffered only onc c1I8ualty; heavier logscs WE're sustained by the 

covt~ rin g rict:il'hmpnt. The :-; IH..'l'l':-;8 mny be ct'('riitt'd to the careful 

preparat:ion (If the a:-;t':llI lt 0 11 the Rllt'\::1 ian :-; tl'On ~ point. A relatively !-;m:lll :md Iight.1y ;\I'med fol'cc reached itg objective and overwhclm(l(1 numerically UI ll'rio r elcmentR because it achieved surpri ~e by night, The RUf;Rian counterattack. bunched about an 

hour nfter the los. ... of the position. wn$ repulsed by the two Germ.1n comp:mies' lhru$L ... int.ll the f1 mk~ llf the Rus:-;ian attack force. 

IV, Defensive Operations 

Thc Gcrm;ms applit'd tht' :-;;\me fundament,,1 dm'trines to defcn:-;ive oper:ltion:-; by tI:l,\' llI' night. Additi(lnal precautions taken 

during the houl'~ of tiarkne:-;:-I incilui('d strengthening outposts, a ll 

of which were positioned:l8 fOIl' forwnrd;\8 possible; moving local 

rc~crves close to the MLR; int'l'C'asillg reconnai ~.gance activities to 

uncover enemy prepal'lltions fOI':1n attnck; and employing search-
3. GERMAN REPORT SEll!! 

lights and flares to light the terrain over which the attacking 

enemy had to advance. 

Artillery and infantry heavy weapons played an important role 

on the defensive. Careful preparations for night fires had to be 

made in daytime, so that concentrations or counterbattery fire 

could be ordered during the night as soon as a worth·while target 

was detected. When sufficient ammunition was available, wellaimed artillery fire often forced the enemy to delay or cancel his 

planned attack, or at least to change its direction. Interrogation 

of prisoners revealed that accurate night fire had a particularly 

demoralizing effect on the Russians. 

By massing overwhelming strength for night attacks the Russians frequently penetrated the German front positions, but the 

impetus of their attacks was usually lost as soon as they ran into 

infantry reserves that had been promptly moved up. The Germans therefore found it advisable to construct several positions in 

depth. In general the second line was 70 to 100 yards behind the 

MLR and was formed by a continuous trench with mortar and 

machine gun emplacements. About 700 yards to the rear were 

the heavy weapons, the company CPt and the company reserves. 

Barbed wire and mine fields protected the positions, and communication trenches connected the entire system. This disposition 

enabled the reserves to move up quickly to aid the forward elements or to seal off Russian penetrations. Mine fields were laid 

in front of the first and second lines, and a dense wire net connected the various positions with the CPo 

When German manpower became depleted, continuous positions 

could no longer be maintained. The German forces relied instead 

on a system of widely separated strong points; however, Russian 

infiltration tactics were so effective that the Germans considered 

this defensive system merely an emergency improvisation, to be 

applied only when a continuous line could not be manned. 

V. Retrograde Movements 

Whenever possible German units were to take advantage of the 

hours of darkness to execute retrograde movements. Special pre.-

cautions against enveloping maneuvers and parallel pursuit were 

mandatory because the Rus~ians with their uncanny ability to 

traverse seemingly impassable terrain usually pursued the withdrawing Germans relentlessly. One of the precautionary measures 

applied by the Germans wa!:! to occupy in advance all critical points 

behind the front line such as defiles, dominant hills, bridges, and 

road centers. Another measure Was to organize all troops who 

could be spared at the front into independent combat forces that 
NIGHT COMIAT 39 

could fight their way back if it became necessary. No more troops 

were to be left in contact with the enemy than could be adequately 

supplied: "Rather fewer men, and plenty of ammunition and 

gasoline" was the accepted maxim for organizing an effective 

covering force. 

During large~scale retrograde movements, the Germans pre~ 

ferred to leave mobile units in contact with the enemy. Since 

minor technical defects were liable to lead to total loss, only tanks 

in perfect condition were to be employed to screen a withdrawal. 

The Germans also found it expedient to include in the covering 

force many maintenance and recovery crews as well as strong 

engineer units equipped to carry out extensive demolitions. Addi~ 

tiona I covering forces had to occupy the rear positions before the 

retrograde movement was initiated. 

Having made preparations, a unit commander could evacuate 

the bulk of his troops to the rear under cover of darkness, while 

the covering force simulated normal activity at the front in order 

to conceal the withdrawal from the attacking Russians. 

In the autumn of 1943, the 337th Infantry Division conducted a 

successful withdrawal in accordance with these principles. The 

operation started in the area north of Dorogobuzh and was to end 

with the occupation of the Panther position, which was under con~ 

struction in the Dnepr bend east of Oraha. By the middle of Sep~ 

tember the 337th Division reached a point aome twelve miles 

southwest of Smolensk, where for several days it repulsed attacks 

by superior enemy forces. 

On the morning of 25 September the division received orders to 

break contact with the enemy, beginning at 2000 the following 

day, and to reach the Panther position by the morning of 28 Sep~ 

tember. Thus two nights and one day were available for a retrograde movement of about thirty-five miles. The following account 

covers only the first part of the withdrawal, from the morning of 

25 September until the morning of 27 September, when an intermediate position was reached. (Map 6) 

As soon as he received orders for the withdrawal, the division 

commander initiated the essential preparations. Reconnaissance 

detachments formed by division headquarters, the two infantry 

regiments, and the artillery battalion were given the mission of 

assigning sectors of the Panther position to each individual unit 

and of finding suitable terrain for an intermediate position where 

the pursuing Russian forces might be delayed west of Krasny. 

Advance detachments accompanying these elements were made 

responsible for marking the routes of withdrawal and for controlling the movement of the different columns to their destinations. 
GERMAN NIGHT WITHORAWAL 

(2$'27 SlpU .. b.r "4)1 

+ ____ .,,,o., ....... '_ .. n _ G ..... cO~.". 'M.~ ... 

GERMAN AfPORT SERIfS 

• • • 

.~. 

During the night of 25-26 September most of the service elements of the division were moved behind the Panther position. 

Along the routes of withdrawal they established fuel and ammunition dumps to meet the requirements of the combat elements. 

Most of the signal communication equipment was also moved behind the Panther position; only essential wire lines were left at 

the front, while reserve equipment was placed in the vicinity of 

Krasny. The reconnaissance battalion was moved to the same area. 

To assure a smooth flowing movement, traffic was strictly regulated and towing vehicles were placed at crucial points. The use 

of alternate routes was explored. A number of footbridges were 

constructed across a brook three miles behind the front. Simultaneously, preparations were made to blow up these footbridges 

and the two road bridges east and northeast of Krasny after the 

last German troops had crossed. The local inhabitants were moved 

to wooded areas away from the indicated routes of withdrawal to 

prevent their interfering with the troop movements. Past experience had shown that many civilians would attempt to elude the 

onrushing Soviet Army by joining the German units. Finally, to 

protect the operation against interference from the air, the division requested the assistance of an antiaircraft unit, and one flak 

battalion with five batteries was made available on 26 September. 

The withdrawal began after dusk on 26 September, but did not 
NIGHT COMIAT 

take place entirely in accordance with the division's schedule. At 

H minus 30 minutes the commander waa informed that the enemy 

had struck hard in the adjacent sector on the right. Accordingly, 

the reconnaissance battalion, reinforced by an 8S-mm. battery, 

made a night march from Krasny southeastward to a bridge across 

the brook in the neighboring sector. The move was made to pre~ 

vent a Rusaian flank thrust from the south. As an additional pre.-

caution reconnaissance detachments, composed of men from the 

division headquarters company and the division's military police 

detachment, were sent from Krasny to where the division boundary crossed roads leading south and southeaat from there. 

Starting at 2000 the main infantry and artillery components 

rapidly withdrew westward. Near the front only isolated Russian 

reconnaissance detachments were observed. Therefore, the division commander ordered his rear guard to withdraw ahead of 

schedule, at 2400. 

The expected flanking thrusts from the south materialized at 

2800, but, thanks to the timely measures taken, the Russians were 

held off at all points. Without interruption the division continued 

its movement and by 1000, 27 September, reached the intermediate 

position. 

This example illustrates not only lessons learned by the German 

Army but also several peculiarities of Russian night combat. The 

Russians were hesitant in launching frontal pursuit. In general 

they preferred to envelop or thrust into the flanks. Therefore, a 

Russian penetration usually implied a threat to the adjacent unit, 

rather than to the one originally under attack. Russian night attacks were generally carried out by infantry and armor without 

artillery support. Toward the end of the war the Russians made 

increasing use of their air force, whose bombing attacks were directed agai nst vulnerable fllsed targets. 

Withdrawing German troops adapted themselves to these peculiarities by certain countermeasures. Once a night withdrawal 

was under way, it had to be completed without delay so that the 

troops would be ready to offer renewed resistance in the next position. The command echelon of a mnjor unit hnd to move to the 

rear position at an early time so thnt the unit commander could 

make appropriate dispositions to counter any possible threat to 

hift flanks. Strong flak units had to be attached to the withdrawing 

troops to protect them against air attack. 
CHAPTER 5 

TRAINING 

I. General 

Since training is a prerequisite for success in battle, training 

programs must simultaneously utilize lessons from past experience and anticipate future developments, particularly in the field 

of technology. No matter how fundamental the changes in tactics 

and techniques. it will always be up to the individual soldier to 

do the actual fighting. For this purpose he must be trained and 

indoctrinated. The longer and more thorough the training, the 

more effective it will be. Training and educational programs must 

be so devised that they stimulate the soldier's initiative. Only on 

that basis will military planners be able to shape a powerful and 

flexible instrument that will be capable of withstanding the vicissitudes of war. 

In night combat he who is conditioned to darkness will be at 

an advantage, and training must therefore strive to restore the 

soldier's native sensitivity, which has been dulled by city life. 

Against a potential opponent who has the innate characteristics 

of a tough, ruthless, and cunning night fighter, proper training 

is indispensable. 

German field commanders with many years of practical experience advocate that up to 50 percent of all training be conducted 

at night, starting from the very first day of basic training. In 

their opinion it is unnecessary to devise a specific night training 

program. They advocate that the most important features on the 

weekly training schedule take place at night and that the lessons 

learned in daytime be repeated and driven horne during the hours 

of darkness. By shifting part of the regular sched ule from day to 

night, one may achieve the dual purpose of toughening the soldier 

and making him a night fighter. 

The better a soldier knows the mechanics of his profession, the 

more self-confident he will be. The morning after a night problem 

should not necessarily be a re t period since trainees must get accustomed to hardship at an early stage. For instance, to simulate 

combat conditions a trainee returning from a night exercise should 

be given a short break, followed by field training until noon. 

Moreover, to toughen the trainee, field sports should be included 

in the schedule. 
NIGHT COMBAT 

II. Individual Training 

Individual training should begin by familiarizing the trainee 

with the pecuJiarities of the night. His eyes and ears must be conditioned to a variety of unaccustomed impressions. Since this 

conditioning process is gradual, it may be practical to start with 

lectures and demonstrations. Competitive exercises should be initiated as early as possible since they arouse the trainee's interest 

in night combat. The recruit must learn that at best he can perceive only the outline of an object without any detail. Since he 

can observe better from below than from above, he must get down 

on the ground. Distances are difficult to estimate in the dark and 

the position of a distant light can, therefore, be easily misjudged. 

By lighting a flashlight, a match, or smoking a cigarette the soldier might betray his presence even to a rather distant fQe. 

Sounds are transmitted most clearly at night, and the trainee 

must learn to differentiate between ordinary noises and those that 

should arouse suspicion. By putting his ear to the ground he will 

often be able to hear noises that are otherwise inaudible. To 

familiarize the trainee with nighttime conditions, preliminary 

marksmanship and range firing exercises should be shifted to the 

hours of darkness at an early stage in the training. Cross-country 

night marches may occasionally be combined with practice alerts. 

Since a sudden drop in temperature during the night or unexpected ground fog during the early morning hours may affect the 

trainee's health, he must be taught to take appropriate precautions. 

During the next stage of individual training the recruit should 

learn to orient himself by the stars, by prismatic compass, by 

tracer and various other types of signals, and by terrain features 

briefly observed during daylight. He must know how to move 

silently, both erect and prone, at first across familiar, then across 

unfamiliar terrain, taking every precaution not to attract the 

enemy's attention by the clatter of weapons or equipment. During 

daytime he must prepare heavy weapons positions for fire against 

potential night targets. In addition, his training should include 

practice in patrolling and close combat at night, use of pyrotechnic 

signals, performance of sentry duty, attacks on enemy outposts, 

employment of intrenching tools without attracting attention, 

messenger duty, etc. 

In peacetime, individual training is followed by unit training 

beginning at squad level. In the wartime training of replacements. 

one may discard this systematic program and use a mixed schedule 

if the need for additional manpower is urgent and if experienced, 

outstanding instructors are available. Such a mixed program consists of alternating individual with unit training by scheduling, 
... GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

for instance, two days of individual training, followed by one day 

of squad and one day of platoon training, and reverting to one 

day of individual training, etc. The objective in setting up such a 

schedule is to obtain effective teamwork at the earliest possible 

moment. The attached tentative training charts, based on the 

practical experience of a German training instructor for armored 

units, contain suggestions along these Jines. (Appendices I-VII) 

The disadvantage inherent in this type of program is that both the 

instructor and the trainee may be overtaxed by such a crowded 

schedule. Careful supervision of the training activities is therefore indicated. 

III. Weapons Tra ining 

A soldier's familiarity with his weapons'may be a decisive factor in night combat. To achieve complete mastery in the manipulation of weapons and equipment. the trainee must practice all postures-first while in camp. then under simulated combat conditions. and finally in the dark and blindfolded. The last type of 

individual training can be given only in the field, and its objective 

is to perfect the trainee's skill until he qualifies for unit training. 

Each arm of the service will proceed according to established 

procedures. 

IV. Unit Training 

Squad training should emphasize firing practice at dusk. in the 

dark, by moonlight, and in artificial light. Firing practice should 

frequently be combined with an extended exercise, such as a 

strenuous march or reconnaissance problem, during which the 

unit should switch to extended formation after dusk. Only thus 

will the trainee get accustomed to the idea that he must be able 

to fight even after great physical exertion. Special importance 

should be attached to firing practice as part of defense in twilight 

and moonlight in order to condition the trainee to enemy attacks 

and give him confidence in his unit's ability to defend itself during 

the various stages of darkness. Additional subjects of instruction 

are night patrolling and reconnaissance, combat patrol missions, 

t eamwork in firing heavy weapons, execution of technical missions 

normally assigned to engineers, close combat against tanks from 

foxholes, first aid in darkness, protection against frostbite, etc. 

Advanced unit training embraces all types of combat, with emphasis on combined arms operations. Starting at platoon level 

this training phase culminates in large-scale combined arms maneuvers. The lessons learned by the individual will now find their 
NIGHT COMBAT 

practical application in the field. Passing through the execution 

of different phases of night operations, the training of the unit 

progresscs to unintcrrupted day and night exercises which emphasize various types of combat in darkness. 

The combined arms maneuvers should feature co-operation between armored, tactical air, and airborne unit8. The training for 

g raduate officers of advanced staff schools should stress planning 

of combined arms operations and exercise of command by night. 

The ideal night fi ghter is a self-reliant, fully integrated soldier 

commanded by a cool, resourceful, and thoughtful leader who inspires confidence and determination. Only if training can produce 

such men will an army have a chance of success against an adversary who not only is unhampered by darkness but even seems to 

thrive on it.