UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-2286

SOUTHERN APPALACHIAN COAL COMPANY,

Petitioner,

v.

ALAN L. ADKINS; DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 

PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board. 

(09-0841-BLA)

Argued: December 6, 2011 Decided: March 1, 2012

Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, 

in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Floyd concurred.

ARGUED: David L. Yaussy, ROBINSON & MCELWEE, PLLC, Charleston, 

West Virginia, for Petitioner. Ryan Christopher Gilligan, 

WOLFE, WILLIAMS, RUTHERFORD & REYNOLDS, Norton, Virginia, for 

Respondents. ON BRIEF: Joseph E. Wolfe, WOLFE, WILLIAMS, 

RUTHERFORD & REYNOLDS, Norton, Virginia, for Respondent Adkins.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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WYNN, Circuit Judge:

Southern Appalachian Coal Company challenges the award of 

benefits to Alan L. Adkins, a former coal mine employee, under 

the Black Lung Benefits Act (“Act”). With this appeal, Southern 

Appalachian essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence that was 

before the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and come to a

different conclusion. But this we may not do. Accordingly, we 

affirm the award of benefits to Adkins.

I.

Adkins spent fifteen years employed in coal mining. During 

that employment, Adkins worked underground, including as a roof 

bolt operator and a miner operator, both “dusty” jobs. J.A. 19, 

20. Adkins also smoked cigarettes, from 1975 to 1990, which 

roughly corresponds to his tenure as a miner.

Adkins developed problems with breathing and exhaustion 

upon physical exertion. In June 2007, Adkins filed a claim for 

black lung benefits under the Act. Southern Appalachian 

contested, and a hearing was held. At the hearing, the ALJ had 

before him, among other things, the following medical evidence:
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Dr. Randolph Forehand examined Adkins in August 2007 and 

concluded that Adkins had pneumoconiosis.1 Dr. Forehand stated, 

among other things, that Adkins’s “coal mine dust exposure 

resulted in a significant respiratory impairment . . . which 

would prevent him from going back into the mines. Coal mine 

dust exposure has led to legal coal workers’ pneumoconiosis 

which has permanently and totally disabled him.” J.A. 73.

Dr. D.L. Rasmussen examined Adkins and concluded in May 

2008 that, among other things, Adkins “has evidence to support a 

diagnosis of legal pneumoconiosis. The patient has 

pneumoconiosis, (i.e. COPD/emphysema caused in significant part 

by coal mine dust exposure) which is a material contributing 

cause of his disabling lung disease.” J.A. 77.

Dr. Glen Baker examined Adkins and reported in July 2008 

that, among other things, “the patient does have a chronic lung 

disease caused by his coal mine employment. This is based on 

the presence of both clinical and legal pneumoconiosis.” J.A. 

 1 This Court has previously noted the “broad statutory 

definition of pneumoconiosis as ‘a chronic dust disease of the 

lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary 

impairments, arising out of coal mine employment[,]’” as well as 

the regulatory definition of “legal pneumoconiosis” as “‘a 

disease ‘arising out of coal mine employment’ includ[ing] any

chronic pulmonary disease resulting in respiratory or pulmonary 

impairment significantly related to, or substantially aggravated 

by, dust exposure in coal mine employment.’” Gulf & Western 

Indus. v. Ling, 176 F.3d 226, 231 (4th Cir. 1999) (citations 

omitted).
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88. Dr. Baker indicated that Adkins was only partially, i.e., 

not totally disabled, stating: “He would have a class 2 or a 10 

to 25% impairment of the whole person. . . . This impairment is 

related to his pneumoconiosis and possibly to some extent his 

cigarette smoking history.” Id.

Dr. George Zaldivar examined Adkins’s records in 2008 and 

2009 and reported that Adkins did not have pneumoconiosis; Dr. 

Zaldivar instead theorized that Adkins may have pulmonary 

fibrosis caused by smoking. Dr. Zaldivar stated, “[m]y opinion 

remains that Mr. Adkins does not suffer from coal workers’ 

pneumoconiosis nor coal dust induced lung disease . . . .” J.A. 

112. 

Dr. Kirk Hippensteel examined Adkins and Adkins’s records 

in February 2009 and reviewed records again in May 2009 and 

concluded that Adkins “does not have evidence of legal 

pneumoconiosis . . . .” J.A. 219. Dr. Hippensteel concluded 

that Adkins had bronchitis, allergies, and cardiac disease 

unrelated to working in the mines.

After reviewing this medical evidence, the ALJ determined 

that Adkins had pneumoconiosis caused at least in part by 15 

years’ employment in coal mining, and found that he was totally 

disabled. The ALJ therefore determined that Adkins was entitled 

to benefits under the Act.
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Southern Appalachian appealed to the Benefits Review Board. 

A panel of three administrative appeals judges affirmed the 

ALJ’s decision and order awarding benefits. The Benefits Review 

Board determined that the ALJ’s decision and order “is rational, 

supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with 

applicable law.” J.A. 241. Southern Appalachian now appeals to 

this Court. 

II.

On appeal, Southern Appalachian argues that the ALJ failed 

to: weigh all the evidence and consider certain medical opinions

when concluding that Adkins had pneumoconiosis; accurately 

determine the length of Adkins’s coal mine employment; and 

properly assess the cause of total disability. We address each 

argument in turn. In so doing, “[w]e undertake an independent 

review of the record, as in the place of the Board, to determine 

whether the ALJ’s factual findings are based on substantial 

evidence in the record. We review questions of law de novo.” 

Toler v. E. Associated Coal Co., 43 F.3d 109, 114 (4th Cir. 

1995) (citation omitted).

A.

Southern Appalachian first argues that the ALJ failed to 

weigh all the evidence as to whether Adkins has legal 
6

pneumoconiosis and consider certain medical opinions in

concluding that Adkins has legal pneumoconiosis.

At the outset, we note that “[t]o establish entitlement to 

benefits under the Act, a miner must prove that he has 

pneumoconiosis, that the disease was caused by his coal mine 

employment, and that he is totally disabled due to the disease.” 

Doss v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 53 F.3d 654, 

658 (4th Cir. 1995). On appeal, we do not undertake to re-weigh 

conflicting evidence on these issues, make credibility 

determinations, or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ. 

Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Rather, 

“[w]here conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ 

. . . , the responsibility for that decision falls on the 

Secretary (or the Secretary’s designate, the ALJ). The issue 

before us, therefore, is not whether [the claimant has legal 

pneumoconiosis], but whether the ALJ’s finding . . . is 

supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a 

correct application of the relevant law.” Craig v. Chater, 76 

F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

In this case, the ALJ had several conflicting medical 

reports before him. The one he chose to rely on most 

extensively, that of Dr. Rasmussen, states, among other things, 

that Adkins “has evidence to support a diagnosis of legal 
7

pneumoconiosis. The patient has pneumoconiosis, (i.e. 

COPD/emphysema caused in significant part by coal mine dust 

exposure) which is a material contributing cause of his 

disabling lung disease.” J.A. 77. The ALJ did not err in 

relying on this report, which he found credible because Dr. 

Rasmussen explained that Adkins’s pulmonary disease was caused 

by both coal dust and cigarette smoke exposure and that it was 

impossible to separate the effects of the two.

Further, the main thrust of Dr. Rasmussen’s report, i.e., 

that Adkins had legal pneumoconiosis and that his lung 

impairment was caused at least in significant part due to coal 

dust exposure, was supported by Dr. Baker, who concluded in his 

report that “the patient does have a chronic lung disease caused 

by his coal mine employment. This is based on the presence of 

both clinical and legal pneumoconiosis.” J.A. 88. Similarly,

Dr. Forehand concluded, in his report, that Adkins’s “coal mine 

dust exposure resulted in a significant respiratory impairment . 

. . which would prevent him from going back into the mines. 

Coal mine dust exposure has led to legal coal workers’

pneumoconiosis which has permanently and totally disabled him.” 

J.A. 73.

Southern Appalachian is certainly correct that reports from 

Dr. Zaldivar and Dr. Hippensteel would have supported the 

conclusion that Adkins did not have legal pneumoconiosis. Dr. 
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Zaldivar stated in his report that “Mr. Adkins does not suffer 

from coal workers’ pneumoconiosis nor coal dust induced lung 

disease . . . .” J.A. 112. And Dr. Hippensteel concluded that 

Adkins “does not have evidence of legal pneumoconiosis . . . .” 

J.A. 219.

We cannot agree with Southern Appalachian, however, that 

“the ALJ failed to consider the contrary opinions offered by 

Drs. Hippensteel and Zaldivar . . . .” Appellant’s Br. at 15. 

The ALJ summarized the reports of Drs. Hippensteel and Zaldivar, 

just as he summarized the other doctors’ reports. The ALJ then 

went on to discuss his determination as to the probative value 

of the various reports, ultimately concluding, among other 

things, that Dr. Rasmussen’s opinion was “more clearly explained

than those of Drs. Hippensteel and Zaldivar[]” and was “the most 

rational in this record.” J.A. 232. The ALJ explained at some 

length the basis for these findings. Further, nothing in the 

ALJ’s opinion suggests, as Southern Appalachian claims, that the 

ALJ impermissibly found that certain regulations created a 

presumption that obstructive lung impairments are always due to 

coal dust exposure. And finally, the ALJ did not err in 

crediting Dr. Rasmussen with “extensive experience in pulmonary 

medicine and in the specific area of coal workers’

pneumoconiosis.” Martin v. Ligon Preparation Co., 400 F.3d 302, 

307 (6th Cir. 2005).
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To be sure, the record shows evidence that would have 

supported a contrary conclusion by the ALJ, i.e., that Adkins 

did not suffer from pneumoconiosis and therefore was not 

entitled to benefits. Nevertheless, there is substantial 

support in this record for the conclusion that the ALJ did 

reach. Under these circumstances, we are not free to secondguess the ALJ. Craig, 76 F.3d at 589. We therefore reject 

Southern Appalachian’s arguments regarding the ALJ’s weighing of 

the evidence and failure to (sufficiently) consider the 

conflicting medical reports.

B.

Southern Appalachian next argues that the ALJ did not 

properly establish how long Adkins had worked as a miner, 

despite the ALJ’s stating in his decision and order that he 

“accept[s] the Claimant’s testimony that he has worked fifteen 

years in coal mine employment.” J.A. 226. However, the Joint 

Appendix pages to which Southern Appalachian cites do not

support its contention. Indeed, one of the two cited pages 

establishes via Adkins’s sworn testimony that Adkins worked in 

the coal mines from 1972 to 1987—i.e., fifteen years. 

Despite Southern Appalachian’s contention that the ALJ 

improperly relied on doctors’ reports to determine the length of 

Adkins’s mine employment, the ALJ made clear that he relied not 
10

on them, but rather on Adkins’s sworn testimony. That testimony 

was an appropriate evidentiary source under 20 CFR §

725.101(a)(32)(ii), which states, in pertinent part, that “[t]he 

dates and length of employment may be established by any 

credible evidence including (but not limited to) company 

records, pension records, earnings statements, coworker 

affidavits, and sworn testimony.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Southern Appalachian has provided this Court with no basis to do 

anything other than affirm this aspect of the ALJ’s decision and 

order.

C.

With its last argument, Southern Appalachian contends that 

the ALJ “erred in his assessment of the cause of total 

disability.” J.A. 20. Here, again, Southern Appalachian

essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence before the ALJ. And 

as we have already made clear, we may not do so. Hays, 907 F.2d 

at 1456. It is clear from the ALJ’s decision and order that he 

thoroughly considered all of the medical reports before him and

found in favor of Adkins based on substantial evidence.

Further, to the extent that Southern Appalachian argues 

that the ALJ mistakenly “referred to the cause of disability as 

the claimant’s ‘significant restrictive pulmonary impairment’” 

(Appellant’s Br. at 20), we fail to see the salience of this 
11

mistake, assuming simply for the sake of argument that it is 

one. After all, the ALJ unequivocally determined, based on 

substantial evidence, that Adkins had legal pneumoconiosis,

caused at least in part by his prolonged mining employment, and 

that Adkins was totally disabled as a consequence. See Doss, 53 

F.3d at 658.

III.

In sum, the ALJ’s determination of legal pneumoconiosis and 

length of mining employment were supported by substantial 

evidence, and the ALJ weighed all the evidence and explained his 

reasoning in reaching his determinations. Accordingly, we 

affirm the decision of the Benefits Review Board to uphold the 

ALJ’s determination.

AFFIRMED