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Filed 11 /19/15 P. v. Holcomb CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Tehama)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. RONALD LOY HOLCOMB,

Defendant and Appellant. C079047 (Super. Ct. No. NCR89904)

Defendant Ronald Loy Holcomb pled guilty to felony possession of ammunition.
D efendant also admitted to having two prior strike convict ions within the meaning of the

t hree s trikes law.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to dismiss one of his prior felon y strike convictions. Defendant argues this
abuse of discretion violat ed his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law and
violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. F ind ing no error in the trial court’ s ruling , we affirm.2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On De cember 29, 2013, Tehama County s heriff ’s deputies saw defendant standing next to the op en door of a recently stolen p ickup truck. The officers stopped defendant when he began to walk away from the truck toward “the back of a nearby apartment building.” After apprehending defendant, the officers determine d he had a warrant for
his arrest. The o fficers subsequently searched defendant and found a single bullet in his
front pocket. Defendant claimed the ammunition c ame from change he received at a store he recently visited.
When officers asked defendant abo ut the stolen vehicle, he initially den ied any knowledge of the truck , insisting he had simply been standing near it. Th is statement
contradi cted information provided by a woman the officers previously saw in the front

seat o f the stolen truck

. The woman t o ld the officers that sh e and a friend asked
defendant for a ride, and he picked the two of them up in the truck , but got out just before
the officers arrived. After the officers confronted defendant with the informa tion gathered from the woman, defendant admitted driving the tr uck for a shor t period of time
to and from a store. Defendant later renounced his admission and again denied any responsibility for the truck

. Subsequently, the o fficers searched the truck and found numerous types of ammunition in the driver’s side door pocket , along with a plastic
rep lica handgun. The o fficers also located a pack of cigarettes that contained less than a tenth of a gram of methamphetamine and found a baggie containing 19.75 grams of marijuana on the center consol e

. Defendant was charge d with unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, possession of ammunition, and possession of a controlled substance. Each of the charges specifically alleged that defendant had been convicted of two prior serious or violent felonies under
the three s trikes law. Defendant pled guilty to possession of ammunition in exchange for dismissal of the two remaining counts. In his plea, defendant admitted the two prior strikes, one of which resulted from a 1990 conviction for attempted second deg ree3

murder and the second of which arose from a 1995 conviction for assault with a deadly
weapon. B efore sentencing, defendant submitted a Romero 1 motion, requesting the court
dismiss his 1995 s trike . The trial court denied defendant’s moti on and sentenced him
under the t hree s trikes law to 25 years to life in prison. Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
The Romero Motion Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to dismiss his 1995 conviction. We disagree. In Romero , our Supreme Court held trial courts have discretion
under Penal Code section 1385 to dismiss a prior strike when a court finds a defendant
f alls outside the spirit of the three s trikes law. (Pen. Code, § 1385; P eople v. Superior
Court ( Romero ) , supra , 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529

- 530.) In deciding whether to exercise this discretion, the court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, char acter, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” ( People v. Williams (1998) 17 C al.4th 148, 161.)
A trial court ’ s “ failure to . . . strike a prior [felony] conviction allegation is subject
to review under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. ” ( People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374.) “ [A] trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony conviction alle gation in limited circumstances.” ( Id

. at p. 378.) “ In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts. First,

1 P eople v. Superior Court ( Romero ) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.4

‘ “ [t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve the legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determinatio n to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on
review. ” ’ [Citations.] Second, a ‘ “ decision will not be reversed merely because

reas onable people might disagree. ‘ An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge. ’ ” ’ [Citation.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with
it. ” ( Id

. at pp. 376

- 377.)
D efendant’s continuous criminal history supports the trial court’s decision not to
dismiss his 1995 conviction. Defendant ’s criminal record includes a 1987 felony conviction for receiving stolen property; a 1990 felony conviction fo r attempted second degree murder , for which he was sentenced to 13 years in prison ; and a 1995 felony
conviction for assault with a deadly weapon , for which he was sentenced to five years in prison, served consecutive to his 13 year sentence. A fter bei ng released from prison in 2003, defendant’s criminal behavior continued , resulting in a 2004 misdemeanor conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol; a 2008 misdemeanor conviction for reckless driving; a 2014 misdemeanor conviction for violating a domestic violence court order; a 2014 felony conviction of possession of a stolen vehicle; a 2014 misdemeanor conviction for disturbing the peace while on college or university grounds; and the present felony offense of possession of ammunition

. While the trial court correctly noted a court cannot solely base its decision to deny a Romero motion on a defendant’s prior record, “e xtraordinary must the circumstance be by which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the sp irit of the very sch eme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation of which the law was meant to attack.” ( People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 338.)5

Defendant asserts the combination of his individualized characteristics and predominantly nonviolent criminal history warranted a dismissal of hi s 1995 strike. Defendant argues his age (49) , history of employment, financial responsibility in pay ing
off a prio r restitution fine and child sup port obligations, and participation in substance abuse treatment and educational programs while in jail awaiting the current charges are individualized considerations that take him outside the spirit of the three s trikes law. I n addition , defendant emphas izes the nonviolent nature of the ch arged offense and the majority of his prior convictions

. Defendant thus argues a dismissal of his previous strike
was warranted and a failure to do so constitute d an abuse of discretion by the trial court. We disagree. The record shows the trial court considered defendant’s criminal history and personal characteristics when deciding defendant’s motion to dismiss. In denying defendant’s Romero motion , the trial court stated defendant’s “background, character and prospects, along with his previous record” kept him within the spirit of the t hree s trikes
law

. T he trial court acknowledged that “even though the current offense [ wa ] s certainly less in the grand scheme of things with regard to the defendant’s prior criminal record” and despite the fact “reasonable people could differ with regard to what the defendant’s
criminal histo ry indicates,” defendant “ha[d] shown a complete disregard

. . . to the law [and] in foll owing the direction that he [had been] given by the Court, Probation, parole,
et cetera.” Although we acknowledge defendant has made some “strides toward leading a normal, productive life,” we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in concluding his continuous “ di sregard

. . . to the law , ” despite his attempts at betterment , warranted a denial of his Romero motion

. G iven t he high level of deference afforded to the trial court and defendant’s demonstrated inability to comply with the rules of society , we conclude t he court’s decision was not “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” ( People v. Carmony , supra , 33 Cal.4th at p. 377

. )6 II
Constitutional Claims Defendant’s constitutional argument amounts to a one

- sentence claim that “[a] determination that the sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing essentially a life term under the Three Strikes law also requires reversal as a violation of [] defendant’s right to due process and the ban on cruel and unu sual punishment.” We disagree , and our rejection of defendant’s contentions is three

- fold. First and foremost, other than the cursory , afore mentioned statement , defendant does not develop an argument for his claims , nor does he cite any relevant authori ty to support his contentions. Because he fails to “elaborate on these separate bases for relief,”

we may decline to address his claims. ( People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 537, fn. 6.) Secondly , “ [ i ] t is elementary that [a] defendant waive[s] [an a rgument based on the U.S. Constitution] by failing to articulate an objection on federal constitutional grounds below.” ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 886.) After the trial court denied defendant’s Romero motion , he failed to bring any Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment objection to the attention of the trial court

. To the contrary , defendant stated “[t]here [wa ] s no legal cause why judgment [could no t] be pronounced .

. . [and he was] prepared to submit on the recommendation contained in the rep ort in light of the Court’s ruling on the Romero motion.” Thus, t he record clear ly shows defendant never raised his

c onstitutional objections in the trial court , and he has therefore forfeited those objections on appeal. Lastly, defendant premis ed his cons titutional argument upon a f inding of abuse of discretion by the tri al court. Defendant states, “[a] determination that the sentencing
court abused its discretion .

. . re quires reversal as a violation of [] defendant’s right to due process and the ba n on cruel and unusual punishment.” Because we conclude the
trial court did not abuse its discretion, defendant’s argument is without merit

.7 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

/s/ Robie, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/ Butz, J.

/s/ Hoch, J.