COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, McClan ahan and Senior Judge Coleman Argued at Salem, Virginia

MICHAEL LEE FITZGERALD OPINION BY v. Record No. 0572-05-3 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER JUNE 6, 2006 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY Charles J. Strauss, Judge Jesse W. Meadows III for appellant. Eugene Murphy, Seni or Assistant Attorney General (Judith Williams Jagdmann, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Michael Lee Fitzgerald appeal s from his jury trial convicti ons for two counts of indecent liberties with a child in his cu stody and one count of object sexua l penetration. On appeal, he contends the court abused its discretion by allo wing a licensed profession al counselor to give testimony regarding her psychiatric diagnosis of the victim. We hol d the trial court did not err in admitting this testimony. Thus, we affirm appellant’s convictions.
I. BACKGROUND Appellant was indicted for the instant o ffenses involving his st epdaughter, S.L.W., who was twelve years old when the offens es were alleged to have occurred. At trial, after S.L.W. and her mother test ified about the incidents, the Commonwealth called Linda Giles, a licensed professional coun selor who treated S.L.W. after the charged offenses occurred. Giles testified that, after ta king a history from S.L.W., which included a report that appellant “allegedly” “had had an inappropriate sexual penetration with her” on July- 2 - 27, 2004, and “working with [S.L.W.] and he r mom,” Giles determined S.L.W. was “experience[ing] moderately severe symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder [PTSD].” Counsel for appellant objected that Giles was no t “clinically qualified to make that diagnosis” and that such a diagnosis had to be made by a psychiatrist or medical doctor to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Counsel was unable to cite any authority to the court supporting that assertion, and the trial cour t overruled appellant’s objection. At the close of the evidence, the jury convict ed appellant of the charged offenses. After sentencing, appellant noted this appeal.
II. ANALYSIS Appellant contends the tria l court abused its discretion by allowing Giles, a licensed professional counselor, to give a psychiatric diagnosis and that only a psychiatrist or other medical doctor was qualified to make such a di agnosis. We hold Virgin ia’s rules of evidence and statutory scheme support the trial court’s decision to admit Gile s’s opinion testimony, and we affirm the convictions. “In any proper case, an expert witness may be permitted to express his opinion upon matters not within common knowledge or experience.” Cartera v. Commonwealth , 219 Va. 516, 518, 248 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1978). “The record must show that the proffered expert possesses sufficient knowledge, skill, or experience to rende r him competent to testif y as an expert on the subject matter of the inquiry.” King v. Sowers , 252 Va. 71, 78, 471 S.E.2d 481, 485 (1996). Ordinarily, a witness need not have specialized training in a particular field and may gain his expertise solely through work e xperience. Wileman v. Commonwealth , 24 Va. App. 642, 647-48, 484 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1997) (qualifying bank offici al as expert in comparing signatures to determine authenticity). Howe ver, “[w]here a statute designat es express qualifications for an- 3 - expert witness, the witness must satisfy the statutor y criteria in order to te stify as an expert.” Commonwealth v. Allen , 269 Va. 262, 273, 609 S.E.2d 4, 11 (2005). Also, where a statute requires an individual to be licen sed before working in a particul ar field, a witness not licensed in that field may not testify as an expert in that field. See Lee Gardens v. Arlington County Bd. , 250 Va. 534, 539-40, 463 S.E.2d 646, 648-49 (1995) (holding witness not licensed as real estate appraiser could not testify as e xpert on real estate valuation where statute made it unlawful to engage in real estate appraisal without license). In keeping with this pr inciple, “[t]he medical expert is normally an M.D., but need not be. Other medical personnel, e.g. , nurses, technicians, etc., may testify as to matters within their ow n areas of competence.” Charles E. Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 17-17 (6th ed. 2003). “Whether a particular w itness is qualified to testify as an expert is ‘largely a matter in the discretion of the trial court, and its rulings allowing a witness to testify will not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that [the expert] was not qualified.’” Wileman , 24 Va. App. at 647, 484 S.E.2d at 624 (citation omitted). Here, the expert whose opinion testimony was challenged, Linda Gile s, testified she was a licensed professional counselor practicing in Da nville, Virginia. Pursuant to Subtitle III of Title 54.1, which details the professions and o ccupations regulated by boards within the Department of Health Professions, a “profe ssional counselor” is “a person who practices counseling as defined in § 54.1-3500,” Code § 54.1-2400.1, and “a person trained in counseling interventions designed to facilita te an individual’s achievement of human development goals and remediating mental, emotional, or behavioral disorders and associ ated distresses which interfere with mental health and development,” C ode § 54.1-3500 (emphasis added). The general provisions of Chapter 35 of that Subtitle, whic h covers “Professional Counseling,” provide as follows: As used in this chapter, unle ss the context requi res a different meaning:- 4 - * * * * * * *

“ Counseling ” means the therapeutic process of: (i) conducting assessments and diagnoses for the purpose of establishing treatment goals and objectives and (ii) planning, implementing, and evaluating trea tment plans using treatment interventions to facilitate human development and to identify and remediate mental, emotional or beha vioral disorders and associated distresses which interfere with mental health. Code § 54.1-3500 (emphasis added); see 2000 Va. Acts, ch. 473 (noting amendment that changed name of governing board from “Board of Licensed Professional Counselors, Marriage and Family Therapists, and Substance Abuse Prof essionals” to “Board of Counseling”). Thus, Virginia law expressly permits professional coun selors to diagnose--as well as treat--mental, emotional, and behavioral disorders. Compare Code § 54.1-3500 (all owing professional counselors to make diagnoses), with In re Johnson , 58 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Mo. 2001) (in proceeding charging defendant as sexually viol ent predator, holding Missouri statutes permit psychiatrists, psychologists, and licensed clinical social worker s “to make diagnoses of mental disorders” but do not define “professional c ounseling” as including authority to make “diagnoses”). In addition to the diagnostic authority gr anted Giles by the laws of the Commonwealth, the evidence adduced at trial supported a finding that Giles was, in fact, qualified to exercise that diagnostic authority in this case. See Grubb v. Hocker , 229 Va. 172, 176, 326 S.E.2d 698, 700 (1985) (“‘[T]he expressed belief of a w itness that he is an expert does not ipso facto require his qualification. The facts must show that he po ssesses sufficient knowledge, skill or experience to make him competent to testify as an expert on the subject matter of the inquiry.’” (quoting Noll v. Rahal , 219 Va. 795, 800, 250 S.E.2d 741, 744 (1979) (citation omitted))). Giles testified that, in orde r to become a licensed profe ssional counselor, she obtained a Master’s degree in counseling a nd underwent an additional three years of clinical training under- 5 - a licensed psychologist or counselor . Giles’s “initial training was . . . working with children[,] primarily abuse victims, particularly ritualistica lly abused children,” a nd she said she “started doing family work after that.” After completi ng her supervised traini ng, Giles practiced nine years on her own as a licensed profes sional counselor prior to appeari ng in court to testify in this proceeding. Giles testified about the Di agnostic and Statisti cal Manual of Mental Health Disorders (DSM), which she described as “the standard printed by the American Psychiatric Association and used by psychologists, licensed professiona l counselors [and] licen sed clinical social workers” in making psychiatric diagnoses. She said that the DSM “is an effort to organize symptoms and organize thoughts in su ch a way that we can effect a treatment.” She also testified that, based on her training as a licensed prof essional counselor, she was qualified to make psychiatric diagnoses in consulta tion with the DSM. Giles said she studied the particular DSM mental disorder at issue, PTSD, while in her Master’s program and “in much much more detail later in [her] clinical training.” She also gave specific test imony about the sympto ms of PTSD as described in the DSM. In sum, it was uncontested that the nature , symptoms, and possible causes of PTSD, a recognized mental health disord er, were things not within th e common knowledge or experience of the jury, and the evidence supported a finding that Giles was both (1) permitted by state law and (2) qualified by training and experience to te stify about PTSD. Thus, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Giles to testify to her opinion that S.L.W. suffered from
PTSD.- 6 - III. For these reasons, we hold the trial court di d not err in admitting the challenged expert testimony, and we affirm appellant’s convictions. Affirmed.