Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where 

effort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and the commander’s priorities. 

Mission. Provide fully capable special operations forces to defend the 

United States and its interests. Plan and synchronize operations against 

terrorist networks.

Priorities.	 • Deter, disrupt, and defeat terrorist threats.

	 	 • Develop and support our people and their families.

	 	 • Sustain and modernize the force.

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff 

colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction in academic, interagency, and United States military communities.

The JSOU portal is https://jsoupublic.socom.mil. 

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon, U.S. Air Force, Strategic Studies Department Director

William W. Mendel, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Jeffrey W. Nelson, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; 

Kenneth H. Poole, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.; William S. Wildrick, Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret.

Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board

John B. Alexander

Ph.D., Education, The Apollinaire Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret., 

Professor of Strategy, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School and JSOU Associate Fellow

Gilbert E. Doan

Major, U.S. Army, Ret., JSOU 

Institutional Integration Division Chief

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director of the Jebsen Center for 

Counter-Terrorism Studies, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

18th USAF Special Operations School 

Commandant

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Air University and JSOU 

Associate Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director of Homeland Security, Commonwealth 

of Pennsylvania and JSOU Associate Fellow

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, Tufts 

University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Stephen Sloan

Ph.D., Comparative Politics

University of Central Florida

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU Associate Fellow

J. Paul de B. Taillon

Ph.D., International Affairs

Royal Military College of Canada 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Ph.D., History, Courage Services, Inc. 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/

Southeast Asian Studies

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History, Professor of National 

Security Policy, U.S. Army War College 

and JSOU Associate Fellow
On the cover

Top left. Night training mission, two CV-22 Osprey 

aircraft, assigned to the 58th Special Operations 

Wing, at Kirtland AFB. 

Top right. A U.S. Army Special Operations soldier 

scans for insurgents during an engagement in the 

Sangin District area, Helmand Province, Southern 

Afghanistan. 

Bottom left. Marines from the 1st Marine Special 

Operations Battalion discuss their imminent jump 

2,500 feet above Camp Pendleton, California. 

Bottom right. Naval Special Warfare combatantcraft crewmen operate a Rigid Inflatable Boat from 

a forward location. 

USSOCOM

Research Topics

2009
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to Director, 

Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, 

Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. Copies of this publication may be 

obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-1569; FAX 850-884-3917. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written works relevant 

to special operations for potential publication. For more information please contact 

Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, 

james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-26-1
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future Conflict, 

and Implications for SOF, April 2006, John B. Alexander

Civil-Military Operations and Professional Military Education, May 2006, 

James F. Powers, Jr. 

Blogs and Military Information Strategy, June 2006, James Kinniburgh and 

Dorothy Denning

2006 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC Chapter Essays, June 2006

One Valley at a Time, August 2006, Adrian T. Bogart III 

Special Operations Aviation in NATO, September 2006, Richard D. Newton

Beyond Draining the Swamp: Urban Development and Counterterrorism 

in Morocco, October 2006, Stephen R. Dalzell

Filling Special Operations Gaps with Civilian Expertise, December 2006, 

James F. Powers, Jr. 

Educating for Strategic Thinking in the SOF Community, January 2007, 

Harry R. Yarger

The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and Implications for the U.S.,

February 2007, Thomas H. Henriksen

Psychological Operations: Learning Is Not a Defense Science Project,

March 2007, Curtis D. Boyd

2007 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, April 2007

Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist

Operations, June 2007, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Executive Report, JSOU Second Annual Symposium (30 April–3 May 2007)

A Theory of Special Operations, October 2007, Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Block by Block: Civic Action in the Battle of Baghdad, November 2007, 

Adrian T. Bogart III

Private Security Infrastructure Abroad, November 2007, 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Intelligence in Denied Areas, December 2007, Russell D. Howard

Is Leaving the Middle East a Viable Option, January 2008,

Thomas H. Henriksen

Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream, 

February 2008, Jessica Glicken Turnley

Disrupting Threat Finances, April 2008, Wesley J.L. Anderson 

vii

Contents

Foreword ................................................................................................ ix

Preface ................................................................................................... xi

A. Combating Terrorist Networks .......................................................... 1

B. Irregular-Warfare Strategy and Operations .......................................15

C. Interagency (IA) ............................................................................... 27

D. Regional and Cultural Studies ..........................................................33

E. Miscellaneous ....................................................................................39

F. Topics Retained from Previous Years ............................................... 47

ix

Foreword

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 

2009 Research Topics list, produced by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), is intended to guide research projects 

for Professional Military Education (PME) students, our faculty, research 

fellows, and others writing about special operations during this academic 

year. Research is one of the cornerstones of JSOU’s academic mission as 

we strive to produce publications to meet joint Special Operations Forces 

(SOF) operational and planning needs. Each year representatives from 

USSOCOM, the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), SOF 

chairs from the war colleges, and JSOU senior fellows develop a list of 

salient issues confronting SOF in the near term. The list is vetted through 

the components and TSOCs to ensure that research will advance SOF 

missions and support SOF interests. The final recommendations for 

research topics are approved by the USSOCOM commander. 

The topics list is organized into six sections with the first four 

addressing the most pressing needs or issues facing SOF today. The first 

section, unsurprisingly, is focused on research issues related to Combating Terrorist Networks (CbTNs) as this is the critical fight the United 

States and its allies are in today. The following three sections expand on 

issues crucial to understanding CbTNs: irregular warfare, the interagency 

process, and regional and cultural studies. 

The “interagency” is often discussed today, but frequently misunderstood. The interagency is best understood as a community or process 

that links different elements of government. Two key locations where the 

interagency comes together are Washington, DC and at U.S. embassies in 

foreign countries. The overarching focus of interagency research is how 

to best ensure the interagency process meets requirements for successful 

prosecution of the current irregular type of war. Irregular war engenders 

much debate and its concepts are strongly linked to the interagency process. The third key element in the current conflict is the critical concept 

of cultural or regional studies. Defining what are cultural, regional, or 

linguistic requirements for CbTN is itself a major challenge. 

These critical topics, concepts, and processes reflect the challenges 

of winning the current conflicts and meeting the needs for the conflicts 
x

most likely to face us in the foreseeable future. This alone speaks to the 

need for more debate, research, and study. Therefore, I encourage you 

to review the topics and to make use of the research tools found on the 

JSOU Education Gateway at http://jsoupublic.socom.mil. If you have any 

questions about this document, JSOU Press in general, or how JSOU can 

assist you in your academic research, contact Mr. James Anderson, JSOU 

Research manager at (850) 884-1569 (DSN 579) or james.d.anderson@

hurlburt.af.mil. 

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department
xi

Preface

This booklet represents an effort to list and categorize special 

operations-related research topics presented to professional military education (PME) students, JSOU part-time senior fellows, 

and other SOF researchers. The commander of the United States Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM) places high emphasis on Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) students writing on timely, relevant, SOF-related 

topics. This list is simply a guide to stimulate ideas; topics may be narrowed, broadened, or otherwise modified as deemed necessary (e.g., to 

suit school writing requirements or individual experiences). 

Sections A through E contain new topic categories with major ideas/

concepts for 2009 from which topics can be derived, depending on the 

interest/experience of the researcher and the desired level of detail. Some 

are intentionally broad in scope and are designed to provide a start point 

for your topic selection. 

Section F is a list of topics retained from previous years. 

Limited TDY funding will be available from JSOU for researchers (e.g., 

PME students) to support their projects (e.g., to conduct interviews or 

visit USSOCOM or component headquarters). These research “grants” are 

subject to approval by the director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department 

depending on the topic selected and the value added to the project.

For questions and clarification of a given topic or for requesting funding 

to support your research, contact the manager of JSOU Research, Mr. 

James D. Anderson, at james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil, DSN 579-1569 

or (850) 884-1569. Share this reference with fellow researchers, thesis 

advisors, and other colleagues; and feel free to submit additional topics 

for inclusion in updated editions. 

JSOU Press has released several publications; because one may relate to 

your topic of interest, see the complete list at http://jsoupublic.socom.mil. 

1

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

A. Combating Terrorist Networks

Topic Titles

A1. Illicit trade and the financing of transnational terrorism

A2. What are the missions and roles of SOF in the economic domain as 

it applies to narcoterrorism; should SOF do more there?

A3. When is terrorism a tactic and when is it a strategy?

A4. Developing regional counterterrorism strategy—enabling partners

A5. Getting beyond Al Qaeda and looking to the future of counterterrorism policy and operations

A6. Counterterrorism partnerships between SOF and law enforcement 

agencies (LEAs)

A7. Sharing of methods and long-range power projection of various 

types of groups

A8. Disaggregating counterterrorism operations: Al Qaeda is not Hezbollah is not the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

A9. How does cultural awareness contribute to effective activities in 

combating terrorism?

A10. What levels of analysis model should the U.S. military use?

A11. Global reach: clandestine and covert special operations 

counterterrorism

A12. How can special ops better leverage unclassified information technology (IT)?

A13. Intelligence for counterterrorism operations: best practices, future 

requirements, possible synergies among USSOCOM and other U.S. 

agencies—for example, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA)—allies, and other less savory options

A14. Antiterrorism: more than defense—SOF contribution to application 

of national power to prevent terrorism

A15. What are the issues inherent to the rise of civil society and increasing roles of nonstate actors in the international environment for the 

use of U.S. power? What are the implications for U.S. policy and 

strategy in regard to counterinsurgency? 
2

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

A16. Raising the costs—counter value strategies in counterterrorism

A17. Use of surrogates for clandestine counterterrorism

A18. What are the funding relationships between terrorist organizations 

and organized crime?

A19. Is the cyber terrorism threat real? Is it different in kind than a threat 

to any other critical infrastructure or national asset?

A20. Generational terrorism: a strategy for the next 50 years

A21. When counterterrorism is counterproductive: case studies and theories of the misapplication of counterterrorism

A22. Poverty is a pawn: the myth of poverty as genesis of terrorism and 

how poverty is used by terrorist leaders 

A23. Who really gains from the existence of terrorism?

A24. Terrorist “safe havens/sanctuaries/ungoverned areas”

A25. Toxic cultures—long-term strategies for their transformation or 

elimination

A26. Employing private security firms to conduct counterterrorism in 

nonpermissive environments

A27. Information operations and counterterrorism

A28. Can terrorists be deterred?

A29. How to conduct strategic human targeting of a terrorist organization’s senior leadership

A30. What strategy should the U.S. pursue to break the power jihadist terrorist hold over third world population and what is the role of SOF 

in this strategy?

A31. Case study in Saudi Arabia counterterrorism efforts

A32. Engaging the constructive Muslim Ummah to counter violent 

extremist ideology

A33. Fatwas against extremism—engaging the constructive Muslim 

Ummah to counter violent extremist ideology

A34. Synchronizing U.S. public diplomacy efforts and methodologies to 

undermine the ideological foundations of terrorism

A35. Should there be a single DoD campaign plan to address all violent 

extremist organizations, or should there be multiple plans that 

address each organization individually? 

A36. NSPD-41/NSPD-46 transition
3

A. Combating Terrorist Networks

Topic Descriptions

A1. Illicit trade and the financing of transnational terrorism

The Joint Forces Command joint operating environment of the 

future somewhat warns us that the military may be more and more 

exposed to the effects of transnational criminality, as it becomes 

more terrorist and insurgency like. Discuss the needed education to SOF personnel that identifies linkages. What incentives are 

necessary to encourage the cooperation of financial institutions in 

support of the U.S irregular-warfare effort and combating global terrorism? Give analysis of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 

(FARC), arguably one of the most powerful organized criminal 

institutions worldwide.

A2. What are the missions and roles of SOF in the economic domain 

as it applies to narcoterrorism; should SOF do more there?

Discuss how SOF leverages and grows host-nation capacity to deter 

narcoterrorism. Analyze one or both of the two levels to this issue: 

a. The operational/tactical level may deal with the training of law 

enforcement agencies, conducting operations against the drug 

fields/lords, intelligence activities, and coordination of assets 

(information operations, allies, interministerial). Clearly, SOF 

has roles at this level (training, planning, and executing).

b. The strategic/operational level areas of interest deal with strategic relations, crop substitution, justice, drug treatment, money 

laundering, and international legal issues. 

A3. When is terrorism a tactic and when is it a strategy?

Has terror been elevated to a strategic concept in the 21st century? If 

so, how does it work and what are the implications for a counterterrorism strategy? Discuss insurgent violence as terrorism in strategic 

communication/information campaigns. Examine recent history on 

insurgent use of terror and terror for the sake of terror (Red Brigade, 

Oklahoma) versus terror to advance an enemy strategy, policy writing on the use of terror, and counter efforts (which the host nation 

must be able to support with their limited resources) to defeat terrorists. Possible outcomes of this paper could be tools to identify or 

predict the use of terror as a tactic and tools to assist in identification 

of groups using terror as a tactic and then exploit in informationoperation campaigns.
4

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

A4. Developing regional counterterrorism strategy—enabling 

partners

Our partners and allies do not view the war on terrorism as a global 

problem, and often have a problem with preemptive strategies. 

Counterterrorism is often viewed from the perspective of the host 

nation and its relations with its bordering states. Gather, analyze, 

and consolidate best practices in combating-terrorism strategy that 

could be useful at a regional level—similar to a counterterrorism 

Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plan. What are some 

important regional factors and issues with combating terrorism? 

What are some useful policy, strategy, and operational techniques 

for consideration when developing a host nation’s counterterrorism 

IDAD plan? This study should be a regional specialist topic—analyze 

selected partner nation(s) facing common problems to determine 

U.S. priorities and appropriate methods of assistance. 

A5. Getting beyond Al Qaeda and looking to the future of counterterrorism policy and operations

Analyses of groups using terrorist activities have resulted in typologies of different sorts (e.g., groups with political aspirations, ideological/religious motivations, financial/criminal basis; and Rapoport’s 

four historical “waves”). Review these typologies, looking for differences and commonalities. Assess our experience with Al Qaeda 

against them and assess the utility of each. Apply the results of these 

analyses to the current geopolitical climate to discuss possible future 

terrorist activities. This effort may support strategic and perhaps 

operational planning. 

A6. Counterterrorism partnerships between SOF and law enforcement agencies (LEAs)

The focus is how to make LEAs’ work complementary with SOF. At 

least 75 percent of successful counterterrorism operations are as a 

result of law enforcement or other internal security forces (nonmilitary); in combat, much intelligence to run down terrorists can come 

from police access to population. SOF will never achieve effectiveness and strategic utility in combating terrorism if it disregards 

coordination, cooperation, and combined operations with LEAs. 

Ascertain roles for SOF to operate in conjunction with LEAs, both 

international and host nation when operating abroad; identify policy 

and regulatory changes, including budget, needed for SOF to operate in this domain. Recommend unique training and equipping 
5

A. Combating Terrorist Networks

requirements for SOF to perform this function. Illustrate role of 

community policing and international law enforcement in combating terrorism, then explain why SOF is failing to operate in this 

medium, hamstringing our efforts to fully prosecute GWOT plans 

designed by USSOCOM. This project could describe a successful 

indirect strategy for GWOT and one which SOF could perform well.

A7. Sharing of methods and long-range power projection of various 

types of groups

Terrorist groups are accelerating their learning from each other 

and their collaboration. This situation makes counterterrorism 

exponentially more difficult. Identify trends in how terrorist groups 

learn and how they collaborate. Examine case studies of past attacks 

where collaboration existed at the greater or smaller scope of activities. Identify trends and extrapolate. Consider global trends in 

causes of terrorism and anticipate where/to what those trends will 

lead. The product of this research could be a road map of what is 

coming, innovative methods to interdicting this collaboration, and a 

method to keep updating the road map.

A8. Disaggregating counterterrorism operations: Al Qaeda is not 

Hezbollah is not the FARC

Because of the information age and Web use, terrorist networks 

share common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), both 

successful and unsuccessful. Identify links between various organizations, training, and education. The Irish Republican Army 

(IRA) was caught in Colombia, showing a link between IRA and the 

FARC. Repeated activity in propaganda shows support to Middle 

East insurgents from Brazil, which in turns shows a link between 

the two regions. Breaking apart the organizations is one piece, but 

showing how they are interlinked may be useful when looking for 

elusive targets. 

A9. How does cultural awareness contribute to effective activities in 

combating terrorism?

A lack of understanding in how people in a given society see 

things—you cannot influence them, neither with your message nor 

your largesse. Acquaintance with language, culture, and local customs is only the first step in entering into a foreign environment. 

This study would provide analyses of specific terrorist or insurgent 

organizations highlighting how their cultural background has influenced their choices and actions. Show how cultural values determine 
6

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

the correctness or rationality of specific terrorist actions. Objective is 

to raise awareness in this area and lead to additional studies of specific terrorist organizations focused on the culture that shapes their 

operational planning, decisions, actions, and reactions.

A10. What levels of analysis model should the U.S. military use?

We are beginning to understand that adversaries adopt terrorism as a strategy for the simple reason that it works. The literature 

on terrorism has grown exponentially over the past 5 years. One 

useful technique that has grown in popularity is the level of analysis approach. A number of experts have advanced specific models. 

Levels of analysis are useful in allowing the military to understand 

the complexity of the terrorist phenomenon and where and how it 

can be countered. Yet no one has articulated an approach that has 

universal appeal to the military. The articulation and logic for such a 

common military model would improve both the quality of thinking 

and communication about terrorism, its appeal, and why it works. 

It is a contribution that the SOF community can provide because of 

extensive experience and credibility.

A11. Global reach: clandestine and covert special operations 

counterterrorism 

Under what circumstances should SOF conduct low/no visibility 

counterterrorism operations on a global scale? What is the potential 

cost/benefit to such activities? Is this the purview of SOF or CIA or 

both, depending on the situation? Should a more robust partnership between SOF and CIA be built to conduct this type of activity? 

When has this been done historically and what were the results? The 

case study approach may be beneficial if sufficient documentation is 

available. Survey and analyze (e.g., covert operations, assassinations, 

sabotage) to determine what factors lead to these activities, what factors determine the success of the operations (tactical and strategic), 

and potential TTPs. This study will certainly be classified.

A12. How can special operations better leverage unclassified information technology (IT)?

Track historical use and success of using open source intelligence 

and show how it was used as a lever to success. Only a small percentage of useful intelligence is classified. We must develop a way, get 

approval to share both open and closed source intelligence with our 

international partners. Discuss the need to form elements using IT 

experts with the SOF warriors to lever IT. Harness SOF creativity 
7

A. Combating Terrorist Networks

and innovation with IT power. An alternate approach would be an 

operator-focused study on setting up essential elements of information. Most existing lists are either obvious-tactical or a huge hodgepodge of data (not information relevant to the mission). Study would 

analyze one or more classes of SOF threats/targets and demonstrate 

what data (from all sources) provides information relevant to determining enemy intent and action.

A13. Intelligence for counterterror operations: best practices, future 

requirements, possible synergies among USSOCOM and other 

U.S. agencies—for example, Drug Enforcement Administration 

(DEA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA)—allies, and other less savory options

Discuss and analyze the following statements: The intelligence 

community is moving beyond ‘need to know’ to ‘need to share.’ 

Counterterrorism operations need to be in the share business, and 

lessons observed from Iraq show success in this area. Agencies, 

tactical to national, need to share information because target sets 

are illusive and the most current information/intelligence supports 

operations. The counterterrorism mission is global in scale and the 

ability to have the most current intelligence, at all levels, predictive 

in nature (as applicable), is available to planners at any possible time. 

Each day this topic is more relevant. U.S. SOF must acknowledge 

that HUMINT is essential in this business. 

A14. Antiterrorism: more than defense—SOF contribution to application of national power to prevent terrorism

How can SOF contribute to expanded national power (DIMFILE) 

globally to prevent terrorism? Specifically, which interagency partners should SOF be involved with in which activities? How does this 

fit with Ambassadorial Mission Performance Plans? This study can 

result in suggested strategy and could be regionally based.

A15. What are the issues inherent to the rise of civil society and 

increasing roles of nonstate actors in the international environment for the use of U.S. power? What are the implications for 

U.S. policy and strategy in regard to counterinsurgency? 

Discuss the various issues—for example, legitimacy, access to 

resources, flexibility, stability, and ability to address complex tasks. 

How should a state characterize insurgents? Overt statements, legislation, and action (e.g., use of police vs. military for suppression and 

social sanction vs. legal penalties/ detention vs. extra legal action) 
8

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

should be analyzed with a specific context to show effectiveness in 

short-term, tactical, and strategic areas as well as how the effects of a 

single policy may have varying effects on those levels. Result would 

be a text for teaching counterinsurgency interagency strategies.

A16. Raising the costs—counter value strategies in counterterrorism

Most counterterrorism work is counterforce targeting—how to 

find and kill terrorists. The study objective is to examine the terrorist organization at all levels to identify what that enemy values, 

determine vulnerabilities in those areas, and propose strategies to 

attack those vulnerabilities. This approach provides a foundation 

for deterring terrorist actions rather than responding to their initiatives. Study could examine general principles or a specific terrorist 

organization and also focus on one specific area of vulnerability or 

contrast the vulnerabilities of different levels of the terrorist organization (leaders value control, ideology; ideological supporters may 

value their social standing or business interests). Proposed strategies 

could range from information campaigns to economic manipulation 

or various kinetic options.

A17. Use of surrogates for clandestine counterterrorism

How can the U.S. accomplish counterterrorism objectives without 

direct involvement? Should SOF be the basis for external support to 

state or nonstate actors pursuing U.S. counterterrorism strategies or 

counterterrorism strategies complementary to U.S. counterterrorism 

goals? What is the cost-benefit of such an approach? Do historical 

examples or recent situations exist where this approach could have 

been considered? What are some examples where this approach 

would not be viable?

A18. What are the funding relationships between terrorist organizations and organized crime?

Consider one of two approaches:

a. The global operating environment is changing to where transnational criminals and transnational terrorist organizations are 

“cooperating” to replace the state-sponsored system with a new 

system of business enterprise to raise funding. As this threat 

becomes larger, it will work to delegitimize international regulatory control over business and trading. Study this phenomenon 

as it relates to national security interests and threats to the 

U.S.; ascertain what requirements and capabilities SOF needs 

to thwart this threat. Describe current nexus, identify costs to 
9

A. Combating Terrorist Networks

national interests, predict trends, and provide solutions using 

SOF. 

b. Treasury officials in many countries, with a U.S. lead, have been 

successful in interdicting the flow of terrorist and drug networks 

through transnational cooperation, particularly since 9/11. 

Establish a compendium of best practices and lessons learned 

from the most successful of those rooting out terrorist financing. 

A19. Is the cyber terrorism threat real? Is it different in kind than a 

threat to any other critical infrastructure or national asset?

Identify possible targets for cyberterrorist attacks. Who might 

conduct these attacks and for what gain? SOF has the mission of 

counterterrorism, and does a cyberterrorist fall into USSOCOM’s 

mission when attacks are taken against critical and economic 

infrastructure targets? Does LEA/FBI have the lead inside the U.S., 

and USSOCOM/other government agencies have the lead outside 

the U.S.? Where does the Joint Task Force for Global Network 

Operations (JTF-GNO)/JTF-Naval War College (NWC) fit into the 

problems of cyberterrorists and what agreements need to be made 

between USSOCOM, the Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and 

other agencies? Analyze and prepare for possible cyber attacks from 

terrorist organizations against vital U.S./allied interests.

A20. Generational terrorism: a strategy for the next 50 years

No grand strategy exists on the part of U.S. to handle generational 

war from extremists, which may last 50 years or more (like containment in Cold War). Ascertain the weakness of U.S. government to 

develop grand strategy—What does that portend for trying to craft 

a grand strategy of this measure? What would a grand strategy have 

to do for us and what would it look like? What do we need to do in 

a given system to get it adopted? Describe grand strategy, how to 

craft it; show some analogous case studies to explain how it works; 

conduct a strategic assessment of the long war and offer strategic 

tools for crafting a grand strategy; outline detractors inherent to 

getting it adopted, then propose recommendations. NSC-68 defined 

the generations-long strategy that was successful in the Cold War.

A21. When counterterrorism is counterproductive: case studies and 

theories of the misapplication of counterterrorism

Discuss and analyze the current U.S. government strategy for 

counterterrorism through this lens, with recommendations for 

adjustments. The Shining Path in Peru is a great case study for 
10

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

excessive governmental response to terrorism. Another approach is 

to reexamine USSOCOM CONPLAN 7500; using the unclassified 

threat model, campaign framework, and method, determine if the 

strategy is sufficient to achieve U.S. goals and which aspect are necessary to reach U.S. goals? What is missing? What is unnecessary or 

insufficient and why?

A22. Poverty is a pawn: the myth of poverty as genesis of terrorism 

and how poverty is used by terrorist leaders 

Terrorist leaders prey on the poor as a pool for foot soldiers, suicide 

bombers, and both witting and unwitting supporters through various means of exploitation. However, the vast majority of terrorist leaders do not come from poverty, but rather from the middle 

(Zarqawi) and even upper classes (bin Laden). How can governments 

mitigate this exploitation of the poor, knowing that poverty cannot 

be extinguished? Discuss the mix of conditions that serve to create 

fertile territory for developing terrorist actors. Establish a list of conditions (e.g. poverty, religious fervor, education levels, distribution of 

wealth) that when existing concurrently, create an environment for 

growing terrorist actors. Will SOF need to prepare for contingencies 

in Asia, Africa, and Latin America?

A23. Who really gains from the existence of terrorism?

How can state actors and the international community make the use 

of terrorism an impractical strategy? This study would examine who 

really gains from the existence of terrorism? Who does it threaten 

and who does it empower? What are the implications for U.S. policy, 

strategy, and military operations? How does or should this effect 

SOF missions and structure?

A24. Terrorist “safe havens/sanctuaries/ungoverned spaces”

The intelligence apparatus of the U.S. government has fairly precise 

locations for terrorist safe havens throughout the world. Moreover, 

U.S. SOF, coupled with interagency partners, arguably has the 

capability to “terrorize” the terrorist in selected locations such as 

training camps and marshaling areas. Examine needed changes in 

policy, force structure, and legalities for the U.S. government, with 

or without host-nation cooperation/approval, to affect these strikes 

against terrorists in their safe havens—that is, no longer make them 

safe. History is replete with examples of rear-area attacks destroying 

critical nodes of command and control, demoralizing the enemy, 

and degradeing his ability to go on the offensive. Determine which 
11

A. Combating Terrorist Networks

are the most problematic of current and future safe havens—that is, 

which provide most succor and protection to terrorists and fellow 

travelers.

A25. Toxic cultures—long-term strategies for their transformation or 

elimination

While many conditions give rise to terrorism and violence, specific 

cultures and societies seem more prone to lashing out in this way. 

The study would analyze historical campaigns (ancient warfare, 

Mongols vs. sedentary populations, Tamerlane vs. Arabs, U.S. vs. 

plains Indians, Cold War, post-World War II Japanese reconstruction) where specific cultural change or destruction was required to 

achieve victory or peace. Principles derived would be applied to the 

global conflict against terrorists, but would expand to encompass 

actions to change or destroy those cultures that produce transnational terrorists.

A26. Employing private security firms to conduct counterterrorism in 

nonpermissive environments

Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of this idea. Numerous 

issues surround this course of action, very few of them good (e.g., 

disregarding the checkered history of private security firms in Iraq 

and assuming the firms had a clear-cut chain of command, mission 

set). Analyze the value added to employing these elements in the 

battlespace. 

A27. Information operations and counterterrorism

Discrediting our enemies’ extremist ideologies is a major part of 

eroding their support. The Colombian government and use of Plan 

Colombia changed the perceptions of the FARC to the populous 

and to the world. Can the experience and activities taken by the 

Colombian government be applied to activities and actions by U.S./

allied entities in the realm of information operations and strategic 

communications? Several angles to study could be to research the 

history of using terror and where it has been effective in turning the 

population either for or against the government, examine successful counterinsurgencies and their use/work of the media dealing 

with terrorism, review how a government can gain support during 

a period of terrorism, and identify groups by the type of terror tools 

used (e.g., Taliban uses different tools than Al Qaeda) in order to 

point blame. Products of the study could be to develop training 

tools for mobile training teams to present to host nations, develop 
12

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

training tools for use in military education, and to review/update, as 

required, information operations/PSYOP tools.

A28. Can terrorists be deterred?

The limited literature in regard to this question reaches different 

conclusions. A good analysis might look at the fundamental question and conclude who can be deterred and how at both the tactical 

and strategic levels. The latter is particularly critical in regard to 

weapons of mass destruction. For example, such an analysis would 

reveal that a number of Arab countries have been particularly successful; while perhaps we would not want to use their means, they 

have curtailed actions in their homelands. Examine what we think 

we know about terrorism and deterrence and attempt to provide a 

conceptual framework for how we should think about it. It would 

be helpful to policymakers, the state governments, and military and 

SOF communities.

A29. How to conduct strategic human targeting of a terrorist organization’s senior leadership

Does strategic human targeting of senior leadership truly affect the 

organization? Research should look at how many toppled/seized 

leaders have lead to the demise of an organizational whole—Is it 

possible to pull the head from a snake and not have a Hydra? Use 

social network analysis and other organizational analysis techniques 

to characterize a selected terrorist organization. Use computational 

tools, as appropriate, combined with qualitative analyses. Identify 

and justify key targets. Suggest possible organizational reactions 

based on your analysis if the targets are eliminated. The value of this 

study will lie in lessons learned from the combination of a range of 

analytic techniques. It is possible that the most valuable outcomes 

will be identification of what existing analytic approaches cannot tell 

us (either applied singly or in combination) and the identification of 

areas of theoretical or computational development.

A30. What strategy should the U.S. pursue to break the power jihadist 

terrorist hold over third world population and what is the role of 

SOF in this strategy?

Despite all the effort U.S. policy makers and media pundits have 

contributed to talking about the problem, no one has produced a 

satisfactory answer. Because this question has not been properly 

examined and appropriately answered, the U.S. largely plays a game 

of “whack a mole” in a global landscape where the moles look like 
13

A. Combating Terrorist Networks

everyone else. If insights to an answer were developed and successfully advocated, the potential for success in the GWOT would 

increase exponentially. Obviously, such a strategy would involve 

multiple instruments and might even change the classical way in 

which some instruments like to view themselves. What will be the 

SOF role?

A31. Case study in Saudi Arabia counterterrorism efforts

Recent efforts by Saudi Arabia to defeat Wahabi extremism are 

proving to be effective countermeasures against the ideology. For 

example, the government has taken back primary and secondary 

education from Salafi jihadists, instituted rehabilitation and reconciliation programs in prisons to convert extremists to moderates, 

leveraged scholarly Muslim leaders (through coercion, threats, and 

deception) to denounce terrorism, and constrained financial freedom of extremist charitable organizations. A Saudi Special Forces 

officer at National Defense University gave a presentation at the 

Moors Counterterrorism Workshop (held at Naval Postgraduate 

School) that was an outstanding summary of the government 

response to terrorism. This study would analyze the Saudi response 

to pull best practices and lessons learned from their operations. 

A32. Engaging the constructive Muslim Ummah to counter violent 

extremist ideology

Focusing primarily on Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, 

Pakistan, and Europe, what are the barriers to the flow of information among 10–40-year-old Muslims? What can the U.S. government, and others, do to reduce these barriers? Which U.S. policies 

and/or actions should be increased, strengthened, and/or reduced to 

enhance positive engagement of the constructive Muslim Ummah? 

Which instruments of U.S. government “soft power,” as identified 

by Secretary of Defense Gates, should be engaged or enhanced? 

Lastly, since countering violent extremist ideology is not solely a 

U.S. issue, how can we better involve our coalition partners and 

allies in this engagement? Identify avenues and methodologies to 

positively engage the constructive Muslim Ummah (especially in the 

10–40-year-old demographic) to counter violent extremist ideology. 

A33. Fatwas against extremism—engaging the constructive Muslim 

Ummah to counter violent extremist ideology

What fatwas against extemism have been issued, by whom, and from 

what region of the world? What response did the tatwas provoke 
14

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

from violent extremist organizations? Were the fatwas effective, 

dissuading individuals from joining extremist groups or pursuing 

jihad? Among what segments of the populations were the fatwas 

effective, ineffective? How can planners further disseminate the 

messages of the fatwas? Identify avenues and methodologies to positively engage the constructive Muslim Ummah (especially in the 

10–40-year-old demographic) to counter violent extremist ideology. 

A34. Synchronizing U.S. public diplomacy efforts and methodologies 

to undermine the ideological foundations of terrorism

How can U.S. public diplomacy efforts be synchronized to best 

undermine the ideological foundations of terrorism? How can U.S. 

public diplomacy efforts help empower partner nations, the constructive Muslim Ummah, and their leaders to reject violent extremist ideology? It is commonly believed by the majority of Muslims, 

and their religious and government leaders, that terrorism is illegitimate, violates a country’s sovereignty, and carries a high social 

cost—how can U.S. public diplomacy efforts best reinforce those 

beliefs? 

A35. Should there be a single DoD campaign plan to address all violent extremist organizations, or should there be multiple plans 

that address each organization individually? 

There is currently one DoD campaign plan for the Global War on 

Terrorism, broadly addressing all violent extremist organizations. Is 

it appropriate to maintain a single campaign, or are terrorist organizations so different in structure and integration (or non-integration) 

into various cultures and societies that different campaign plans 

need to be developed to address each? In a broader campaign plan, 

is it possible to account for the different organizations by simply 

adding annexes or appendices? For a broad campaign plan, is it 

necessary to provide the level of analysis and detail related to each 

violent extremist organization that might be better expressed in 

separate plans? 

A.36 NSPD-41/NSPD-46 transition

What are the appropriate mechanisms for transition of maritime 

terrorist events between NSPD-41 and NSPD-46 regimes at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels? How well have those mechanisms been institutionalized? How could they be improved? Is there 

a difference between WMD-related events and non-WMD events? 
15

B. Irregular-Warfare Strategy and Operations

B. Irregular-Warfare Strategy 

 and Operations

Topic Titles

B1. Delineating roles of SOF and conventional forces in Security Forces 

Assistance (SFA)

B2. Lessons not learned in irregular warfare to date 

B3. Revolutionaries and criminal groups

B4. Organizing interagency for irregular-warfare campaigns

B5. What is the role of strategic communications for SOF in irregular 

warfare?

B6. Clarifying the nuances between irregular warfare, stability operations, and special operations

B7. What are the theoretical objectives of irregular warfare in the 21st 

century?

B8. Strategic theories on irregular warfare

B9. Recognizing irregular warfare when you see it

B10. Operational art design for irregular-warfare-centric campaigns

B11. How do state or nonstate warriors erode or preserve the others’ 

power, will, and/or influence? 

B12. Understanding police investigation and intelligence operations in 

irregular warfare/GWOT

B13. How is irregular warfare financed and who controls the resources?

B14. Security Forces assistance (anti-insurgency)

B15. Noninstitutionalized lessons—the Phoenix Cycle and irregular war

B16. How have affected host nations been engaged and advised on irregular warfare/counterinsurgency? 

B17. How is irregular war predicted?

B18. How do policy, strategy and planning interrelate in irregular 

warfare?

B19. What is the joint, common operating environment for SOF in 

irregular warfare? 
16

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

B20. Building Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plans for key 

partner nations

B21. Case studies of SOF creating strategic effects in irregular warfare

B22. Using social network analysis (SNA) in incomplete, dynamic nonstate actor networks

B23. How to advise host nations engaged in irregular warfare

B24. SOF aviation in unconventional warfare roles for the 21st century

B25. Strategic decision making for irregular warfare—case studies on 

irregular-warfare success and failure

B26. Various roles for SOF in helping host-nation governments to develop 

the capability for self governance

B27. Building partner capability and capacity—What do our partner 

nations need?

B28. SOF-conventional habitual relationships

B29. Needs analysis for GWOT

B30. What strategic factors are key to success or failure in irregular 

warfare?

B31. Analysis of JTF-510 (Philippines) and reasons for its success

B32. Are Rangers and MARSOC contributors to the irregular-warfare 

fight?

B33. Conventional/SOF cooperation

Topic Descriptions

B1. Delineating roles of SOF and conventional forces in Security 

Forces Assistance (SFA)

This topic deals with a critical concept in the long-war strategy. The 

questions of the roles and responsibilities between the conventional 

forces and SOF need to be discussed and clarified to ensure the 

right force is employed in the right assignment. In short, what is the 

appropriate role for SOF in the long-war strategy?

B2. Lessons not learned in irregular warfare to date 

The GWOT has occurred for 5 years in Iraq and 6 years in 

Afghanistan. Since their respective beginnings, much experience 

has been garnered in both countries. While many lessons have been 

learned, much has yet to be realized. These unlearned lessons need 

to be explored to determine if they are of value for learning and if so, 
17

B. Irregular-Warfare Strategy and Operations

what lessons are we missing or failing to understand? Information 

operations do not seem to be effective, campaign planning continues 

to be conducted in the absence of the host nations, and operations 

are still being run without complete integration. Who needs to learn 

these lessons and why they are important may help in the successful 

desired outcomes to these current conflicts.

B3. Revolutionaries and criminal groups

The lines are blurring between insurgents, revolutionaries, militias, 

and gangsters. The focus of this topic would be on their similarities, 

differences, and why they are natural partners. FARC represents a 

model, but the question is whether they are the model for the future. 

Does the consolidation of these groups necessitate a rethinking of 

key GWOT, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency doctrine?

B4. Organizing interagency for irregular-warfare campaigns

The current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate the struggle 

in interagency coordination, cooperation, and unity of effort. As 

these events blur into the long war, the U.S. needs to review whether 

an organizational structure exists to fight irregular war from an 

interagency design. Who has the lead, when do they lead, and why 

is an agency/organization in the leadership role? What is the process 

used to make the interagency design function properly? How does 

USSOCOM fit into the interagency design?

B5. What is the role of strategic communications for SOF in irregular 

warfare?

The roles and responsibility for strategic communication by SOF 

is still in the maturing process. Much misunderstanding and some 

competition exists between the players. Key to the issue is how to 

effectively synchronize the effort from the national level down to at 

least the operational level. Additionally, how are the disciplines of 

PSYOP, information operations, Public Affairs, and strategic communication linked/coordinated in the current conflict or in irregular 

warfare? 

B6. Clarifying the nuances between irregular warfare, stability operations, and special operations

The lines between these terms and environments have become 

confusing to the general audience. Articulating them ensures their 

proper application. An important element of this issue is to ensure 

SOF is their best use within this environment.
18

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

B7. What are the theoretical objectives of irregular warfare in the 

21st century?

The desired outcome of this study should include the placement of 

the strategic concept into the grand strategy of the U.S. in this century. The idea that irregular warfare will be the common battlefield 

strongly suggests that SOF must understand its role in the concept. 

Additionally, the strategic coordination requirements (interagency 

and services) need identification to avoid or reduce missteps in 

future operations. Some consideration should also be given to the 

integration of other supporting elements—nongovernment offices, 

allies, and information/influence agencies.

B8. Strategic theories on irregular warfare

What approaches can be considered for the study of irregular warfare as a traditional (nationalistic) or nontraditional underdog. Like 

unconventional study, Is there merit in approaching irregular warfare from the position of the insurgent/terrorist? This writing could 

begin with a review of current unconventional-warfare doctrine and 

experience to determine if they need to be revalidated or require 

rethinking. 

B9. Recognizing irregular warfare when you see it

The current conflicts have illustrated a struggle in the proper identification of what is being fought, what phase is occurring and applying the correct solutions to the problems. The objective of this study 

would be the development of indicators, tools, and practices that will 

assist in early understanding of the operational environment. This 

understanding will support developing a strategy, operational campaign and the application of diplomacy, information, military, and 

economic (DIME) elements in a given crisis. 

B10. Operational art design for irregular-warfare-centric campaigns

This study should focus on the development of a format of campaign 

designs for SOF planners specifically and conventional planners generally. The design would be meant to ensure the proper application 

of SOF in the fight. This view is important because little exists to 

help planners, SOF, or otherwise. 

B11. How do state or nonstate warriors erode or preserve the others’ 

power, will, and/or influence? 

The topic suggests a need exists for understanding of “will” and 

how to influence it in irregular warfare to determine the outcome 

of a struggle. Linkage of elements of national power with strategic 
19

B. Irregular-Warfare Strategy and Operations

communications is critical to the successful outcome for the host 

nation/coalition in irregular warfare. Therefore, the study helps to 

answer the question, How effective is the current effort in defeating 

Al Qaeda or the Taliban?

B12. Understanding police investigation and intelligence operations in 

irregular warfare/GWOT

Law enforcement, in all nations, is essential in maintaining stability throughout all levels of irregular warfare. The employment of 

criminals, the illegal drug industry, and insurgency all require law 

enforcement that must be integrated into the campaign plan of any 

country. One of the measures of legitimacy is the public confidence 

in their law enforcement and legal systems. The role of law enforcement, linkage with other security force, and their integration into 

plans require study. 

B13. How is irregular warfare financed and who controls the 

resources?

The topic for study would include the current conflicts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, how are they the same, how are they different, and are 

they models for future nonstate irregular-warfare players? This scope 

includes examination of past irregular war funding and the constraints legitimate governments have in fighting irregular war.

B14. Security Forces assistance (anti-insurgency)

This topic would examine the effectiveness of the shape/deter phases 

in struggling countries. It implies that countries can identify they 

are facing problems, and the U.S. (or other nations) has interests to 

protect. This writing would include review and examination policies 

and programs for the GWOT and drug wars. An historical review 

may also be useful to determine where, when, and how the shape/

deter phases have been effective.

B15. Noninstitutionalized lessons—the Phoenix Cycle and irregular 

war

The vogue term irregular warfare is really not new, but it does reflect 

a reoccurring phenomenon—the Phoenix Cycle. Past experiences 

get forgotten, shelved, or temporarily discarded only to be revived 

later. The war on terrorism has given rise to some old experience 

that should be reexamined. Counterinsurgency is an example of the 

Phoenix Cycle. Has the Petreaus counterinsurgency field manual 

improved our knowledge of counterinsurgency or did it ignore the 

lessons of the past? 
20

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

B16. How have affected host nations been engaged and advised on 

irregular warfare/counterinsurgency? 

This topic deals with combining advising and adapting based on the 

specific country (e.g., culture, history). Is there an art to advising 

and if so, what should be taught to qualify a soldier to be an advisor?

B17. How is irregular war predicted?

Can irregular warfare be predicted? If so, what tools are used to 

make the predictions, who is trained to make them, and can making 

them be taught? This topic may require some historical study to 

evaluate whether sufficient evidence exists to be able to predict the 

event and the possibility of preventing the event.

B18. How do policy, strategy, and planning interrelate in irregular 

warfare?

The topic begs for leadership in linking strategy, policy, and planning into a cohesive process. This study will help clarify the process 

from beginning to end, assist in the tasking of the proper organizations for the correction of missions in the proper sequence, and 

define an end state that is achievable. 

B19. What is the joint, common operating environment for SOF in 

irregular warfare? 

This study will analyze the joint and global environment to understand and ascertain distinct and unique threats, trends, and opportunities for SOF in the next decade. Recommend any force structure 

changes and new capabilities required as a result of this analysis.

B20. Building Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plans for key 

partner nations

This topic is one that is undefined, except for a planning guide in 

Appendix B of Joint Publication 3-07.1 written several years ago. 

A methodology for framing the situation faced by a host nation 

to determine an IDAD strategy is absolutely necessary. The Civil 

Affairs course provides a political-social analysis guide as an initial 

starting point. However, it is not widely known, disseminated, or 

understood by the conventional military. Case studies (such as El 

Salvador, Iraq, and Afghanistan) to highlight success and failure in 

this endeavor are a good study vehicle.

B21. Case studies of SOF creating strategic effects in irregular warfare

This topic could be a basis for strategic special operations theory 

and/or serve as a primer for geographic combatant commander 
21

B. Irregular-Warfare Strategy and Operations

planners. If we do not understand how to create strategic effects, 

SOF becomes less effective. To better understand, identify what is 

the range of strategic effects that might be of use to SOF—that is, 

how SOF produces each of those types of strategic effects, looking at 

case studies with effective and ineffective creation of strategic effects.

B22. Using social network analysis (SNA) in incomplete, dynamic nonstate actor networks

Many agencies—for example, DHS, Department of State, and 

Counterintelligence Field Office (CIFO)—are doing studies using 

SNA methodologies. They believe SNA has “predictive” possibilities. 

Review the studies to see whether some or a combination apply to 

SOF needs. The Jebsen Center completed one for the CIFO on predicting what personality traits might make one want to be a suicide 

bomber. While an interesting exercise, it was not conclusive. An 

understanding of the adversary’s social structure and interconnections can contribute to tactical and strategic planning through the 

identification of high value targets and weak points in organizational 

function, which can be exploited in a wide variety of ways. SNA has 

been increasingly used to map terrorist organizations and, in some 

cases, attempt to predict future activities. Examine such analyses to 

identify what and how they apply to SOF needs. Identify and discuss 

not only strengths but weaknesses of the analyses and the methods. 

If possible, identify additional analytic methods that can be combined with SNA to provide more robust input. As part of SNA, 

technical reliance or intrinsic use of media and types of information 

networks needs to be applied to each specific individual. In performing SNA, not only should a link of individuals exist but also how the 

individuals connect (e.g., face to face, phone, e-mail, runner) and a 

weight of influence between actors.

B23. How to advise host nations engaged in irregular warfare

Advising host-nation counterparts is a slow process (requires time). 

We suffer with time conditions that cause pushing rather than guiding counterparts to a resolution of a problem. A need exists to teach 

the art of advising, much like what was done during the Vietnam 

era, yet no time goes to adequately train advisors. The other condition of time is length of service “in the box” by the respective services. These vary from 4–6 months to a year. Nothing effective can 

be achieved in 4–6 months. Advising/mentoring tours need to be at 

least 18 months, and an effective handoff to the incoming advisor is 
22

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

necessary. Finding and interviewing Vietnam-era advisors would 

greatly benefit this study.

B24. SOF aviation in unconventional warfare roles for the 21st century

Briefly define unconventional warfare (UW) and its significance in 

achieving national security objectives. Examine historical cases of 

airpower supporting UW operations. Determine the distinct capabilities/characteristics that airpower offers in UW operations based 

upon these studies. Also, identify consistent shortfalls/limitations. 

Determine if these capabilities still exist within today’s airpower 

providers (U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps). If they do not 

exist or the capacity is limited, offer several ways to grow/ enhance 

these capabilities. Provide a general framework for using these airpower UW capabilities in supporting future joint/interagency UW 

operations.

B25. Strategic decision making for irregular warfare—case studies on 

irregular-warfare success and failure

Understanding how key decisions are made at the national level 

helps prepare for the next conflict/incident. Who made what recommendations to whom with regard to force structure, size, objectives 

of war in Afghanistan? For example, examine transitions of the 

lead effort from CIA to SOF to conventional force to NATO. How 

did we get approval to use CIA predators to strike terrorist targets in Yemen? Analyze recent case studies of irregular warfare to 

understand the decision-making process, planning mistakes, incorrect assumptions, and mission effectiveness. Operational planners 

will use the case-study analysis to improve the planning process. 

Possible case studies include Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, 

U.S. assistance to Ethiopian forces engaged in Somalia, effectiveness of Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara targeting AQIM, 

JTF-510 and the ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, 

Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT) origins, methods and 

effectiveness. The purpose of this study is to capture lessons learned 

from recent, relevant irregular-warfare activities to better understand national decision-making process, accuracy of planning

assumptions, and effectiveness of operations to improve future 

operations.
23

B. Irregular-Warfare Strategy and Operations

B26. Various roles for SOF in helping host-nation governments to 

develop the capability for self governance

This task may be beyond the means of the DoD, let alone SOF. 

DoD SOF can certainly provide initial support, based on the shortterm Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) objectives developed by 

the Department of State (DoS) Coordinator for Reconstruction 

and Stabilization (S/CRS). However, that support should be based 

on a plan providing for the DoS and the United States Agency for 

International Development (USAID) to assume responsibility for 

the development program as soon as the security situation allows. 

Given this stipulation and the S/CRS PCR objectives, what steps 

can SOF take to ensure that indigenous political structures are on 

track to support U.S. objectives in a country as the security situation 

is resolved? How do SOF liaise with and coordinate for the arrival 

of the DoS and USAID representatives? What are the measures of 

effectiveness to be agreed upon by both DoD/SOF and DoS/USAID 

that will determine when transition of mission responsibility occurs? 

Upon transition of mission responsibility, how much stay-behind 

support do SOF provide?

B27. Building partner capability and capacity—What do our partner 

nations need?

It is difficult to create an effective capacity in much lesser developed 

partner nations if no legal and judicial system is developing. Perhaps 

the best approach would be to train partners as follows:

a. How to interact with other parts of their government to develop 

the lines of communication between military, Intel, social agencies, and the political class

b. How to include partner contingents in foreign operations, where 

they will be free to develop their skills outside their home environment, and where indigenous power relationships hinder their 

operation. 

Discuss the simple differences between capability and capacity, perhaps using the elements of national power as a framework. This writing would be a study of “before and after”—what a given nation had 

in the way of capacity and capability before SOF involvement (e.g., 

foreign internal defense, military training team, and/or joint/combined exchange training) and how the capacity and capability differed after the interaction with U.S. SOF. Examine certain indicators 
24

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

of capacity and capability—for example, strength levels, operations 

conducted, and human-rights issues.

B28. SOF-conventional habitual relationships

In a recent speech, the deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Near 

East Affairs touted great successes/improvements in the interoperability between SOF and conventional forces. Examine the underlying 

reasons for the improved synergies between SOF and conventional 

forces in the battlespace. Discuss factors such as access to intelligence products, technological advances, and changes in command 

climate/emphasis. Discuss the position that conventional U.S. forces 

are becoming more “SOF like” each year. Need to put more emphasis 

on multinational-conventional-force relationships.

B29. Needs analysis for GWOT

What current areas/types of instability (e.g., bandits, insurgents, 

and extremists) have the potential to threaten U.S. territory, U.S. 

citizens, or U.S. interests? Separate treatment of capability and will 

(Tamil Tigers have capability but no interest in attacking external 

to Sri Lanka-Armenians vs. the Turks similar). What U.S. actions 

are needed to deal with these threats? Result of the study would be a 

system/framework of determining strategic priorities for USSOCOM 

action in coordinating GWOT.

B30. What strategic factors are key to success or failure in irregular 

warfare?

In the 21st century environment, irregular warfare is assumed to 

play a significant role. If true, what is really important in regard to 

irregular warfare at the strategic level for the U.S. and its adversaries, friends, and other state and nonstate actors? What is important 

would be the key strategic factors. A generic discussion or model 

that helps strategists and planners to grasp both the need and potential characteristics of such factors would contribute significantly to 

a theory of irregular warfare and help define the roles and capabilities of both SOF and conventional forces. Discussing the “ends” that 

ensure balance with ways and means and adapting as needed, success will generally be realized. Strategic factors would be maintaining will to accomplish the job, maintaining alliances, guaranteeing 

legitimacy of the friendly regime, separating populace from effects 

of adversary, and destroying or neutralizing the enemy’s message, 

leadership, and key organizational structures.
25

B. Irregular-Warfare Strategy and Operations

B31. Analysis of JTF-510 (Philippines) and reasons for its success

The writing is a dissection into the successes of this operation. 

Prepare a focused study with the view of a potential model for future 

operations. Project will provide a case study of JTF-510 operations 

in support of Operation Enduring Freedom-Phillippines, addressing both the global context and specific Philippine perspectives. 

Outcome will provide lessons learned and how those lessons relate 

to the specific details of the Philippine situation.

B32. Are Rangers and MARSOC contributors to the irregular-warfare 

fight?

Research and analyze the role of specialized units conducting longrange, long-duration operations behind enemy lines or in denied 

territory, with particular focus on U.S. Marines and Army Rangers. 

Determine why these roles no longer exist doctrinally within these 

two forces and propose recommendations to doctrine and missions 

for providing more capability to USSOCOM. Historically, Rangers 

have been used both for long-duration raids behind enemy lines and 

for extended reconnaissance patrols. MARSOC’s added capabilities 

to USSOCOM do not include their historical role in raiding behind 

enemy lines. Irregular warfare requires specialized forces to operate 

for long duration behind enemy lines or in denied enemy territory 

(i.e., hunter-killer teams). Neither MARSOC nor the Rangers currently provide this capability. 

B33. Conventional/SOF cooperation

Conventional forces and SOF have coordinated and cooperated to 

an unprecedented degree in Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, 

SOF have developed a reliance on conventional forces for certain 

battlefield operating systems (e.g., maintenance, logistics, and quick 

reaction forces). Discuss the impact of the potential drawdown of 

general purpose forces in theater on this reliance on SOF units in the 

CENTCOM area of responsibility.

27

C. Interagency (IA)

C. Interagency (IA)

Topic Titles

C1. Embassy role in U.S. government irregular-warfare effort

C2. Legislative requirements for effective IA campaigns

C3. Completing the irregular-warfare “spear”

C4. NSC-68 for IA

C5. Beltway strategies to create effective IA action organizations

C6. Integrating IA efforts to build partner capacity

C7. IA and SOF mini-field exercises in irregular-warfare environment

C8. Does irregular warfare suggest major restructuring of the U.S. 

government?

C9. Who are the natural supporters of irregular warfare in the military, 

legislature, executive branch, academia and intellectual communities, business community, and populace at home and abroad?

C10. What diplomatic resources, capabilities, and initiatives need to be 

pursued so that the U.S. can conduct irregular warfare effectively 

and efficiently?

C11. United States Information Agency (USIA)—Do we need to bring it 

back?

C12. How do we create a revolution in the U.S. services’ and government’s 

thinking in support of irregular-warfare strategy?

C13. What are the divisions or types of IA efforts?

C14. Resourcing essential 21st century strategic capacity: deployable civilian departments and agencies

C15. Country team approach

C16. What is USSOCOM’s role in strategic communication?

C17. Evaluation of planning methods of the IA and Department of 

Defense (DoD)
28

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

Topic Descriptions

C1. Embassy role in U.S. government irregular-warfare effort

This topic would explore initiatives for restructuring the DoS—Do 

they go far enough to address the requirements for the long war/persistent conflict of the 21st century? Should more of a regional hierarchy exist to DoS than independent embassies that can report directly 

to the President of the U.S.? How can/should SOF better work with 

embassies in pursuit of U.S. interests in the long war? How can 

IA-SOF synergy at the embassy level better achieve U.S. interests?

C2. Legislative requirements for effective IA campaigns

This topic would review current and pending legislation required to 

establish organizations and authorities to effectively conduct irregular warfare and large-scale foreign internal defense for combating 

terrorism. It could also suggest who should write this IA campaign.

C3. Completing the irregular-warfare “spear”

This topic would be discussion on how to connect the tip of the spear 

(SOF) to the rest of the spear (IA). A new NSC-68 to coordinate IA 

activities may be required to make this happen. Currently, no lead 

exists amongst stakeholders. Concerning IA involvement in irregular warfare, education is needed amongst the players. An effective 

action organization could be developed from existing IA pieces (or 

developing new pieces) to conduct various missions in support of the 

facets of irregular warfare. 

C4. NSC-68 for IA

A study will analyze the history, structure of, and strategies that 

resulted from NSC-68 in the Cold War and apply those lessons to 

designing an analogous document to shape U.S. conduct (strategic IA campaigns) of future indirect conflicts (Iran, terrorists). No 

coordinating agency for the U.S. irregular-warfare policy currently 

exists. The military is viewed as the leader, but what is the role for 

the DoS? Should they be the execute authority as the political arm of 

the government? A rewrite of the National Security Act of 1947 may 

be required—that is, perhaps that is the problem needing research. A 

possible study from a SOF point of view would be to write suggested 

components of the Act from a USSOCOM point of view, which 

perhaps would be heavily committed to a restructured-IA working 

relationship. 
29

C. Interagency (IA)

C5. Beltway strategies to create effective IA action organizations

What actions are needed (legislation, executive order, reorganization) to build organizations capable of taking effective action that 

encompass multiple agencies’ areas of expertise? How can those 

actions be initiated? The study could propose an action plan for HQ 

USSOCOM that includes legislative initiatives, IA reorganization, 

and/or establishment of new organizations to achieve a command 

structure capable of conducting an effective IA-action campaign.

C6. Integrating IA efforts to build partner capacity

This topic could examine what IA partnerships exist today or 

use historical, regional, and nation-specific Internal Defense and 

Development (IDAD) plans to frame the process that integrates IA 

efforts. The foreign internal defense design should be developed to 

force whole-of-government activities around IDAD plans, thereby 

causing actions that meet objectives to help friendly nations protect 

themselves from lawlessness, insurgency, and subversion. 

C7. Interagency and SOF mini-field exercises in irregular-warfare 

environment

This study objective is, How do we “operationalize” foreign internal 

defense? How do we begin shaping the campaign of unconventional 

warfare for long-term, persistent conflict focused on U.S. embassy 

direction? Specific tactical DoD units and other U.S. government 

agencies seldom meet—let alone exercise—together prior to realworld operations in a consistent and meaningful way. Thus both 

sides struggle to overcome different cultural perspectives, organizational structures, and operating procedures to achieve the operational objectives in support of national objectives. 

C8. Does irregular warfare suggest major restructuring of the U.S. 

government?

This topic would determine how we enhance cooperation among 

institutions, particularly U.S. agencies that will create a national 

security “community of interest.” This community would include 

military, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, aid lobbies, and 

other interests.
30

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

C9. Who are the natural supporters of irregular warfare in the military, Congress, executive branch, academia and intellectual 

communities, business community, and populace at home and 

abroad?

This topic begs two questions: Who are the natural supporters and 

the adversaries of irregular warfare and why? This study would provide the SOF community these initial benefits:

a. Basis for understanding the resistance to the concept of irregular warfare

b. Ideas about how to pursue convincing arguments

c. How to build constituencies for gaining the necessary support 

and resources to prepare for such a future.

C10. What diplomatic resources, capabilities, and initiatives need to 

be pursued so that the U.S. can conduct irregular warfare effectively and efficiently?

This study looks at irregular warfare, the relationship of SOF, and 

the diplomatic instrument of power at the regional or country level. 

It seeks to identify those operating concepts, tasks, and models that 

would help both the SOF and DoS communities think about how to 

pursue successful strategies for irregular warfare.

C11. United States Information Agency (USIA)—Do we need to bring 

it back?

Secretary Gates said “Speed, agility, and cultural relevance are 

not terms that come to mind when discussing U.S. Strategic 

Communications” in his Beyond Guns and Steel speech to Kansas 

State University. The USIA was an effective national strategic communications agency because it was not subordinate to DoS or DoD. 

Analyze the success and failures of USIA during the Cold War and 

apply to the shaping lines of operation in the GWOT campaign. 

Address the rationale for disbanding USIA, the effectiveness of the 

disjointed organizations in DoD, and DoS attempting to promote 

American ideas and discrediting extremist-terrorist ideologies. 

Outcome may be the recommendation for new USIA.

C12. How do we create a revolution in the U.S. services’ and government’s thinking in support of irregular-warfare strategy?

The topic of professional education requires change. First, identify 

likely allies across the services, then enlist them to the cause; second, 

identify the decision-makers; research decision-makers’ past decisions to see how best to influence them; develop your options and 
31

C. Interagency (IA)

choose your plan; and develop your core metaphor or idea. The 

study would start with directing services to emphasize educating 

their officers. Increasing the emphasis and scope of the USSOCOM 

IA Partnership Program and SOF Support Teams is another, more 

direct, avenue to change.

C13. What are the divisions or types of IA efforts?

Does it make sense to divide IA efforts into groups: domestic (relationship in the U.S.), international (within a given host nation and 

to include coalition partners), and regional (the host nation and it 

regional partners)? What degree of disconnect exists between IA 

coordination, at least overseas? Give any areas of interest for SOF 

and IA toward understanding the desired end states of developing 

military plans and operations. Where are the regional relationships 

located—that is, those that may be more indirect in their supported 

nation (surrounded by hostile nations vs. friendly nations)?

C14. Resourcing essential 21st century strategic capacity: deployable 

civilian departments and agencies

This study will address measures needed to enable various government departments (e.g., State, Commerce, and Justice) to train and 

equip personnel toward supporting U.S. policy goals and related 

activities in the international environment. U.S. policy goals require 

applying all the elements of power that are represented by the various government agencies, not just the military. Examine what is 

important to SOF because they must interact with various government agencies overseas in accomplishing their mission.

C15. Country team approach

In an era of irregular warfare, SOF may find itself deployed in a 

number of countries and supporting the ambassador’s country 

team. Does SOF need specific representation on the country team 

or is the normal representation sufficient? In either case, how would 

this work? What interaction is appropriate or required? Who is in 

charge of what? How are disputes resolved? How can this support be 

revived, updated, or replaced to ensure that U.S. players in a given 

country are working for common causes?

C16. What is USSOCOM’s role in strategic communication?

An effective strategic communication plan considers behavior and 

presence as well as more traditional messaging techniques. To be 

effective, strategic communication should be executed not as a series 

of discrete events but as a coordinated campaign lasting over time. 
32

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

Because SOF often are the only or the first indication of a U.S. presence in a targeted area, they can have significant impact on the success of such a campaign. What is the appropriate organization to 

lead such a campaign? What would be the SOF role in such a campaign? How should USSOCOM participate? A strong analysis will 

include a discussion of IA interactions as well as an examination of 

the appropriate ways to engage elements of SOF. Discussion of training/education requirements (if any) also would be useful.

C17. Evaluation of planning methods of the IA and DoD 

Determine the seams that may be available to improve methods 

(e.g., planning, cycle, timelines, approaches, and tasking). This study 

would review the current planning methods, compare, contrast, and 

develop an understanding of planning. Who plans, how are plans 

developed, and what is the result of the effort? The study would 

provide a better understanding of how to better plan within our 

national-level government agencies.
33

D. Regional and Cultural Studies

D. Regional and Cultural Studies

Topic Titles

D1. What are the evolving standards for judging legitimacy made by 

various types of state and nonstate actors?

D2. Cultural awareness

D3. Are cultural, religious, and world view factors in motivating irregular warfare?

D4. Special Forces Group regional orientations

D5. Cultural knowledge in irregular-warfare campaign planning

D6. U.S. military engagement with Mexico: past, present, and future

D7. Regional studies

D8. Should SEALs and air commandos be concerned with cultural/

regional awareness? If so, to what extent and how should they be 

educated?

D9. What is the need to effectively integrate language and culture 

training/education?

D10. Assist/enhance deploying soldiers in imparting cultural experiences

D11. Ethics for SOF behavior: What are the first principles that do not 

change?

D12. SOF culture—What is special?

D13. Utilizing “SOF for Life” to rapidly and flexibly increase cultural 

awareness

D14. The realities of human terrain (HT): clarifying what SOF means by 

HT and how that applies to strategy, planning, and operations

D15. SOF and cultural engagement

D16. Culturally attuned engagement

Topic Descriptions

D1. What are the evolving standards for judging legitimacy made by 

various types of state and nonstate actors?

This topic goes to the heart of U.S. foreign policy—that is, who to 

support. Are some terrorist’s groups “legitimate” in the eyes of their 
34

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

fellow citizens (Kosovo)? The evaluation of a potentially supported 

group would implicitly point out what needs to be done to build 

legitimacy. Problems of understanding legitimacy for a given society 

and what is acceptable from our perspective requires further study 

as well. Understanding legitimacy from an economic point of view 

is another challenge to be investigated. One of the little appreciated aspects of globalization is an evolving conceptualization of 

legitimacy. In power relationships, legitimacy is important to “great 

powers” because it defines what must be done to sustain a world 

order favorable to them. The “small powers” and nonstate actors see 

legitimacy as a means to limit the actions of great powers. 

D2. Cultural awareness

Understanding of culture will assist in finding an enemy’s weakness, especially in irregular warfare where the enemy will resort to 

any action to achieve objectives. The need is to understand what is 

acceptable to that enemy, what is not, what his cultural constraints 

are, and what does not constraint his actions. This information will 

permit development of successful courses of action. Population’s 

trust/will is culturally based, and the effective understanding of it 

is critical to a successful outcome. Three areas of potential study 

follow: a) regional specific information for a culture and population, 

b) generic information on awareness, and c) tools to rapidly get specific information on a culture to operators. 

D3. Are cultural, religious, and world view factors in motivating 

irregular warfare?

Cultural education must include orientation on comparative analysis 

of religions of the world. Americans have a secular culture; some 

estimates put 80 percent of the rest of the world as more faith based. 

Many of the conflicts throughout world history have been motivated 

by religious reasons. Warrior culture is the way in which violence is 

valued and managed by the collectivity, and it varies from culture 

to culture. Research how each group handles violence and threats 

against the collectivity; two example questions follow:

a. Is fighting a recognized road to high status? 

b. Are fighters separated from the group in some formal way

—as we do with our military—or are they integrated and 

interspersed?

c. Are there forms of warfare/fighting seen as higher status than 

others? 
35

D. Regional and Cultural Studies

D4. Special Forces Group regional orientations

Examine alternate rotation concepts for Special Forces Groups 

to regain regional focus and preserve quality-of-life issues. What 

impact does the increase in the Special Forces have on the current rotational strategy? To what extent have the past group rotational plans degraded readiness in the non-Central Command 

(CENTCOM) Special Forces units (e.g., language and down-range 

relationships)? Since SOF personnel are high demand, low density 

resources, it is difficult to commit to only one region of the world. 

However, it is critical that all teams have access to orientation education about the region to which they are deploying. This orientation 

must cover the political, military dynamic history that is contributing to current hot topics, demographics, basic economics, local military cultures, and the U.S. national security strategy in the region.

D5. Cultural knowledge in irregular-warfare campaign planning

This lack of cultural understanding also has lead to confusion. 

Because some cultures do not like to be confrontational, their 

acknowledgement is believed to be agreement. In fact, they are only 

agreeing that they understand a position or proposal, not accept it. 

The lack of cultural understanding is a handicap in achieved outcomes by set time schedules. Examine the need to understand the 

actors in the environments that the campaign will be conducted. 

How can this lead to some understanding of the motivations of these 

actors? How can this better prepare planners to tailor the campaign 

plan toward influencing those actors in accordance with the commander’s intent? 

D6. U.S. military engagement with Mexico: past, present, and future

This topic is of interest for the Northern Command J-32 systemic 

operational design. Some of the SOF engagements with Mexico in 

the past are classified, but the need for a concise history of engagements as well as the vision of near-term to far-term—especially in 

terms of counterterrorism and counternarcoterrorism (CNT)—is 

needed for homeland-defense purposes. This challenge can also be 

linked to the cross-border threat of organized crime, its possible 

nexus with terrorism, and illegal immigration. This complex area 

deserves considerable study. Mexico is attempting to reign in drug 

lords that may not be possible. The senior Mexican officials do not 

trust law enforcement agencies in the country; efforts have included 

putting the military in counterdrug operations. 
36

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

D7. Regional studies

Review regional studies to better meet the needs of the combatant 

commanders. Courses that look at the regions from a strategic and 

operational perspective are desired, illustrating the linkage between 

the countries within a given commander’s area of responsibility 

as well as the adjacent countries. Many of the countries currently 

engaged in the conflict were drawn in Europe and do not reflect 

what is occurring in either the country or the region. Ethnic groups 

straddle those borders and they are unrecognized by the people, and 

the numbers of languages further complicate the region. This writing is an opportunity to leverage the revamped discipline of geography, which is now more than maps and physical terrain. Geography 

is now a multidisciplinary study area involving traditional geography as well as aspects of sociology, geology, political science, and 

economics (and some cultural anthropology may also exist).

D8. Should SEALs and air commandos be concerned with cultural/ 

regional awareness? If so, to what extent and how should they be 

educated?

SEALs, Rangers, and air commandos are being asked to operate 

with coalition partners more and more; however, they have never 

developed an overarching training system to develop the necessary cultural understanding capability. What should be the cultural 

knowledge or understanding in order to understand and motivate 

partners so they will work with us?

D9. What is the need to effectively integrate language and culture 

training/education?

This topic would review realistic objectives for language and cultural 

training for SOF personnel. How many SOF personnel are fluent at 

the 3/3/3 levels? What is the standard for cultural training? Should 

new standards be developed for a combined culture and language 

test? Should cultural studies be more integrated into language 

training? 

D10. Assist/enhance deploying soldiers in imparting cultural 

experiences 

This study would address the issue of how cultural understanding 

is transferred by incoming and outgoing personnel. What is really 

important to deploying soldiers/units with respect to cultural awareness? This writing would include (but not be limited to) the do’s and 

don’ts in a country or an ethnic group, religion(s) of the area, the 
37

D. Regional and Cultural Studies

work ethic, the difference between assistance and “feel good,” and 

a clear understanding of how their tour supports the end state of 

the campaign. Assuming the soldiers immersed in a given culture 

can offer much, what are the other pieces to give them when new to 

the environment? History is another topic for the soldiers—that is, 

knowledge of how the locals think about their country.

D11. Ethics for SOF behavior: What are the first principles that do not 

change?

This paper would address behavioral expectations—including cultural accommodation in the field—that may conflict with traditional 

military ethics as taught during formation at the service academies 

and other personnel acquisition programs. What major issues exist, 

and how are they accommodated? How are outcomes affected by 

cultural awareness?

D12. SOF culture—What is special?

Analyze characteristics of SOF personnel and contrast the characteristics that define successful special operators with successful 

conventional forces. Use case study analysis to determine those 

characteristics that lead to success in special operations. Examine 

characteristics of Special Forces, SEAL, and Special Mission Unit 

(SMU) leaders in relation to conventional counterparts. Describe 

SOF culture relative to conventional culture by examining core 

values, personal and professional rewards, risk mitigation and 

acceptance, unique camaraderie, selection, and assessment. Are SOF 

really special, or are they just specifically trained and equipped to do 

special missions, like many conventional leaders believe? Examine 

the pros and cons of establishing a fifth service. What (if any) 

would be the performance advantages gained by establishing such a 

service? 

D13. Utilizing “SOF For Life” to rapidly and flexibly increase cultural 

awareness

The U.S. has countless former SOF warriors in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The topic would be how to capture and share the knowledge, not 

only for the current operations but also as a database. How can they 

be engaged in-country and upon return to the U.S.? There probably 

are many ways to extract the information that they have acquired 

while in-country. That information could be used to better support 

the deploying troops. The result would be a valuable and flexible reservoir of cultural knowledge combined with SOF experience. What 
38

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

are the pros and cons of utilizing this resource? Do legal, experiential, procedural, cultural, or other barriers preclude it?

D14. The realities of human terrain (HT): clarifying what SOF means 

by HT and how that applies to strategy, planning, and operations

This topic can focus on defining HT, how it is applied, and determining its benefits. Examination of its outcomes can also be considered and whether better ways to accomplish this mission exist.

D15. SOF and cultural engagement

The SOF community has cultural challenges; a few examples follow:

a. One “big mother” service relationship with SOF subculture

b. IA cultural issues with SOF as well as the nongovernmental 

organization environment 

c. Cultural concerns for the host nation and its regional role. 

These different cultures all require a different approach/strategy. 

Examine one or more of the cultures, balanced against the SOF warrior culture. These challenges could be approached like engagements 

to ensure that the right applications of resources are used for the 

desired result. 

D16. Culturally attuned engagement 

One of the tenets of the USSOCOM mission is to “emphasize culturally attuned engagement.” Analyze the critical need for cultural 

skills (not just language skills) and discuss specific ways to enhance 

these skills. Give lessons learned from deployments, advantages of 

forward-based SOF elements, and leveraging of educational opportunities (e.g., fellowships and exchange assignments). 
39

E. Miscellaneous

E. Miscellaneous

Topic Titles

E1. Understanding the underworld: black markets, gray markets, and 

how to exploit them to U.S. advantage

E2. How is strategy developed for special operations, and what is the 

framework for such development?

E3. What is the nature of conflict in the 21st century and what is the role 

for SOF?

E4. Why is Phase Zero important and how can SOF support the geographic combatant commander strategy: informing the joint conventional community

E5. Who has doctrinal responsibility for irregular warfare and where is 

it taught?

E6. Civil Affairs as influence maker: theory and practice

E7. The MilGroup and SOF: force multiplier for U.S. embassies

E8. Develop SOF internships with Fortune 500 companies in order to 

develop irregular-warfare skill sets (marketing; influence, investigations, strategic communications)

E9. Can the U.S. ever overcome the propensity for political correctness 

(an essential element for success in irregular warfare)?

E10. Risk acceptance—case studies in how risk-adverse DoD is in times 

of crisis

E11. Is the U.S. transitioning from super power to great power status and 

what does this mean for SOF structure?

E12. NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC)

E13. Irregular-warfare personnel system: rewarding people from the 

conventional military and SOF for actively seeking irregular-warfare 

career paths that do not involve direct action 

E14. Optimizing the USSOCOM mission

E15. Innovative SOF recruiting

E16. Integrating SOF and “big service” requirements/systems

E17. SOF and service convergence 
40

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

E18. What do we know about eliciting emotional responses and cognitive 

change in the virtual world, and how can we best apply it to disrupt 

or impede terrorist recruitment in cyberspace? 

Topic Descriptions

E1. Understanding the underworld: black markets, gray markets, and 

how to exploit them to U.S. advantage

This topic would focus on the study of criminal activities and how 

they are similar to that of insurgent activities. Further, it could 

compare activities of FARC and that of the Taliban/drug lords 

in Afghanistan. Does a transfer of tactics and techniques occur 

between terrorist groups? Does a link exist between crime and terrorism in the early phases or is this aspect a natural progression? 

E2. How is strategy developed for special operations, and what is the 

framework for such development?

This question should consider the operational role of SOF in each 

of the phases (0-V) and assess the effectiveness of their employment 

in those phases. Afghanistan and Iraq could serve as case studies. 

The unconventional warfare operations in Afghanistan are excellent 

examples of pre-phase III operations. They lead into two questions: 

a. How does the U.S. government as well as DoD consider SOF use 

in all campaign phases?

b. What are effective employment techniques in terms of strategy 

and operational art for SOF/IA synchronization to include 

measures of effectiveness?

E3. What is the nature of conflict in the 21st century and what is the 

role for SOF?

This study will consider the viability of technology, impacts of cultural/religion, and other variables. What tools can be developed for 

early detection of an irregular conflict? Will the battlefield be economic rather than terrain oriented? How will SOF be employed in 

an economic conflict?

E4. Why is Phase Zero important and how can SOF support the geographic combatant commander strategy: informing the joint conventional community

Phase Zero can be described in terms of anti-insurgency, in the 

same manner that the Army delineates between antiterrorism and 

counterterrorism. Phase Zero is rapidly becoming an outdated term. 
41

E. Miscellaneous

The Africa Command (AFRICOM) already calls it active security. 

In general, countries are very uncomfortable with Phase Zero; if 

we go active security, what are the resource implications, and is the 

approach even doable?

E5. Who has doctrinal responsibility for irregular warfare and where 

is it taught?

A study that analyzes the “who” should have doctrinal lead and what 

could limit the negative aspects of service competition over that role 

to more rapidly advance the progress of fielding it. Is the DoD or 

Army the lead organization?

E6. Civil Affairs as influence maker: theory and practice 

This study would define how Civil Affairs (CA) operations work in 

“by, with, and through” the foreign people/government to further 

U.S. interests and increase host-nation legitimacy. What is the CA 

role in information operations? What is the strategy that employs 

CA to support U.S. goals and interests in the long war? How can CA 

be incorporated in a theater campaign plan or long-term strategy in 

an age of persistent conflict (the long war)? How is that plan linked 

to the host nation’s campaign plan?

E7. The MilGroup and SOF: force multiplier for U.S. embassies

This topic would review the current and future role of Military 

Groups/Office of Military Cooperation and the U.S. embassy. How 

can the MilGroup concept be revived, reinforced, and/or broadened 

to enable embassies to be efficient headquarters/command posts in 

the long war? What is the role of SOF in the MilGroup? Should a 

MilGroup be commanded by a SOF operator? Is the MilGroup the 

wrong structure for enabling ambassadors to employ the military 

element of national power in pursuit of U.S. interests in the long 

war? 

E8. Develop SOF internships with Fortune 500 companies in order to 

develop irregular-warfare skill sets (marketing; influence, investigations, strategic communications)

This topic would study the value of creating internships for SOF in 

successful companies or organizations to develop a knowledge base 

of nonmilitary functions (e.g., power-economic and diplomatic). 

Strategic communication could be explored from a marketing point 

of view. Strategic thinking at the multinational should also be considered. Computer operation and electronic transfer of funds could 

be examined because are often the terrorist’s means of moving 
42

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

illegal money around the world. Also respond to the question, What 

academic credit should be granted from the internship (M.A. or 

Ph.D.)?

E9. Can the U.S. ever overcome the propensity for political correctness (an essential element for success in irregular warfare)?

This subject should lead to serious review of military culture, military ethics, and morale courage. Senior officials have become adept 

at parroting politically correct policy when moral courage is the 

requirement. How are ethics, values taught? What are their roles 

in modern society? Who wins in the struggle between civil vs. 

military control of the armed forces? Has “political correctness” 

spilled over into the SOF community? What role will they play in 

irregular warfare (unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, 

counterinsurgency)? 

E10. Risk acceptance—case studies in how risk-adverse DoD is in 

times of crisis

This case study would deal with acceptance and avoidance risk. It 

would also deal with the development of a matrix or format that 

would determine acceptable levels of risk compared to the threat to 

national interest. Acceptance of more risk early in the planning of 

the operation may have given the President of the U.S. more options 

or opportunity to prepare the nation once a decision is reached. 

Cost-benefit analysis of risk acceptance through case studies would 

help future operational and strategic planners understand constraints and restraints imposed by senior decision makers.

E11. Is the U.S. transitioning from super-power to great-power status 

and what does this mean for SOF structure?

This topic would examine the status of the U.S. in the world today. 

The post-Cold War made the U.S. a super power, but is that still the 

status today? Has the war on terrorism eroded our international 

standing? What other factors are included in the power-status model 

(e.g., the strength of our dollar, debt to surplus ratio)? 

E12. NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC)

This subject would explore how SOF works within coalition warfare. 

Does “white” and “dark” SOF have the same reporting/coordinating 

requirements? How does U.S. SOF interface with international SOF 

regarding operations and intelligence?
43

E. Miscellaneous

E13. Irregular-warfare personnel system: rewarding people from the 

conventional military and SOF for actively seeking irregularwarfare career paths that do not involve direct action 

Historically, DoD jettisons/ignores the capabilities and talents of 

personnel who excel in irregular warfare after an irregular-warfare 

conflict is complete. Thus experience, knowledge, and investments 

are lost. Furthermore, it discourages other personnel from seeking 

opportunities to develop their irregular-warfare skills/capabilities 

during peacetime or when the focus is only on conventional war. 

In fact, irregular warfare is considered a passing fad that does not 

warrant the investment. Determine the factors that led to DoD’s 

organizational culture—that is, the treatment of irregular warfare 

as a lesser endeavor and how this conduct negatively impacts the 

development of irregular-warfare-focused personnel. Use case studies, interviews, and surveys from Korea, Vietnam, and Operation 

Enduring Freedom to determine the key factors and attitudes. 

Based upon these findings, create recommendations to improve 

the personnel system and PME institutions, thereby encourage 

the enhancement and sustainment of irregular-warfare-capable 

personnel.

E14. Optimizing the USSOCOM mission

Optimizing the synchronization of the Title X functions of 

USSOCOM and/or the standardization of the force(s)? Examine the 

three prongs of the revised USSOCOM mission statement. Pick one 

or more prongs and analyze ways to improve on “performance.” 

For example, for the “develop and support our people and families” 

prong, instances for discussion might be initiatives to improve the 

quality of life, improved training opportunities within USSOCOM 

or a component, and educational program incentives. 

E15. Innovative SOF recruiting

Two successful military recruiting programs in recent history have 

the Filipino Enlistment Act and the Lodge Act. After a discussion of 

these two programs, propose a similar program beneficial to SOF, 

which outlines the recruiting of foreign nationals. Assess the impact 

of such a new program in the context of one facet of the USSOCOM 

mission to “emphasize culturally attuned engagement.” 

E16. Integrating SOF and “big service” requirements/systems

Survey and analyze current U.S. and allied approaches to integrating 

SOF requirements and equipment into “big service” requirements 
44

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

and equipment. Include recommendations and associated impact 

analysis of potential alternative approaches. 

E.17 SOF and service convergence

Investigate the degree to which services have taken and continue to 

take on more SOF roles and become more “SOF-like.” Analyize the 

future of SOF, given trends identified in the investigation as well as 

discuss/recommend “core” SOF missions that should/must be kept 

separate from service activities. 

a. Evaluate the effectiveness of the Buy-Try-Decide approach to 

include the effectiveness of UDAs and JUONs, the quality and 

effectiveness of the final products, and pitfall from the approach 

b. Investigate past commonality efforts, their cost and effectiveness, and any common traits among those efforts that succeeded 

as well as those that failed 

c. Research the value of UID to SOF 

d. Research the value of performance-based logistics to SOF 

e. Evaluate and recommend for better SOF leverage of service and 

DLA systems 

f. Personnel-perspective-related research—how to get long-term 

perspectives from short-term personnel 

g. Investigate the technical limiting factors of “roll-on/roll-off” 

ISR, communications, or weapons systems for commercial or 

common airframes. 

E18. What do we know about eliciting emotional responses and cognitive change in the virtual world, and how can we best apply it to 

disrupt or impede terrorist recruitment in cyberspace? 

The behavioral sciences (including psychology, sociology, and 

anthropology), the intelligence community (through overt and 

covert virtual interactions and lessons learned), and the private 

sector (such as on-line dating and advertising) have compiled a lot of 

information about emotional responses (liking, disliking, love, hate, 

trust, disgust, for example) and cognitive change (thoughts, opinions, perspectives, for example) in virtual interactions. Islamist web 

sites, forums, blogs, chat rooms, and list serves are sometimes sites 

of extremist and terrorist recruitment. There is a need for analyses 

and studies to determine and compile what is reliably known about 

these virtual phenomena. There is a further need to then interpret 

and apply “what is known” to enhance efforts to disrupt, impede, 

or block recruitment into, or supportive affiliation with, estremist 
45

E. Miscellaneous

and terrorist causes and organizations via the these various cyber 

mechanisms. Research that enhances our state of knowledge and 

its application in this domain will be useful in psychological operations, information operations, asset recruitment and handling, and 

intelligence gathering in the Global War on Terrorism.

47

F. Topics Retained from Previous Years

F. Topics Retained from Previous Years

Topic Titles

F1. Counterinsurgency methods

F2. SOF role in current/future Afghanistan

F3. Case studies

F4. SOF stations at embassies

F5. “No borders, no boundaries”

F6. Impact of crossing borders to conduct military operations

F7. How are nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) used to provide 

funding to terrorist groups?

F8. Role of SOF in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear 

environments

F9. Maritime SOF and the war on terrorism

F10. Countering ideological support for terrorism (CIST)

F11. SOF prevention or moderation of the onset of warfare 

F12. The role of SOF in coalition and surrogate warfare in the 21st 

century

F13. SOF and HUMINT/SIGINT/IMINT

F14. Islamic extremism in the Americas

F15. Intelligence indicators to detect emerging insurgency

F16. Roles of SOF and NGOs in complex humanitarian emergencies

F17. Foreign internal defense/counterinsurgency operations in the contemporary operating environment (COE)

F18. Joint SOF training center

F19. Integrating SOF into conventional force training

F20. Medical unconventional warfare: guerilla, resistance medicine, and 

hospitals

F21. Interoperability issues between U.S. SOF and coalition SOF, U.S. 

SOF and coalition conventional forces, and U.S. SOF and U.S. conventional forces

F22. SOF PME considerations

F23. Iraq in 2011
48

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

F24. Islamic and Islamist movements in the Sahel region of Africa, West 

Africa, and Central Africa

F25. SOF and less-than-lethal weapons

F26. What are the appropriate missions and best force structure for Air 

Force SOF in 2020 

F27. Medical enhancements for special operations personnel

F28. Future role of contracting and SOF

F29. War outside of combat zones: joint/IA special operations 

organization

F30. Statecraft vs. kinetic solutions

F31. USSOCOM core activities

F32. “Policy of Reprisal”

F33. Political consequences surrounding the use of SOF

F34. Keys to successful coalitions

F35. SOF/conventional force operations in a coalition environment

F36. Impact of increased Army SOF participation in evolving regional 

security arrangements

F37. Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF)/Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) operations

F38. The casualty care interface between the Air Force Medical Service 

and SOF

F39. Should SOF be given Title 50 responsibilities?

F40. Special operations role in the Proliferation Security Initiative

F41. Streamline PSYOP approval process

F42. Navy and maritime SOF

F43. Effects of IA bypass

F44. War outside of combat zones—an historical perspective

F45. Oral histories of SOF leaders for publication/professional 

development 

F46. SOF/Joint Task Force in counterinsurgency operations

F47. Counterinsurgency strategy—victory vs. management (containment)

F48. Coalition support teams

F49. SOF and Joint Fires

F50. Capabilities of services’ SOF logistical units/elements
49

F. Topics Retained from Previous Years

F51. Adaptive thinking and SOF

F52. Prediction of future Special Forces manning

F53. Filling gaps in critical skills with technical expertise

F54. SOF senior leader competencies for joint warfare—preparing for 

joint SOF combat command

F55. Cross area-of-responsibility operations

F56. Integrated small-unit operations

F57. The relationship between the TSOC and a standing Joint Special 

Operations Task Force (JSOTF) headquarters

F58. U.S. national security initiatives in Africa and the war on terrorism

F59. SOF measures of effectiveness

F60. PSYOP and terrorism effectiveness

F61. Effective PSYOP in a mostly illiterate population

Topic Descriptions

F1. Counterinsurgency methods

Treating this new era of conflict as a form of global insurgency 

implies that counterinsurgency methods are fundamental in combating the new form of transnational terrorism. These methods 

include the following:

a. Focus on protecting and securing the population

b. Politically and physically marginalizing the insurgents, winning 

the support and cooperation of at-risk populations by targeted 

political and development measures, and conducting precise 

intelligence-led special operations to eliminate critical enemy 

elements with minimal collateral damage. 

F2. SOF role in current/future Afghanistan

In the context of the U.S. national interest, examine the SOF impact 

and effects of the war in Afghanistan and recommend strategic 

options based on this 4–5 year assessment. Which elements of U.S. 

national power can/ should be applied there to counter drug production, empower the national government, and continue the progress 

made since 2002?

F3. Case studies

Many students have written timely, thoughtful accounts of recent (or 

historical, with linkages to recent or future operations) operations. If 
50

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

leaning toward this technique, ensure recommendations (e.g., command and control; tactics, techniques, and procedures) are provided 

after the analysis of the operation to add value to the project. 

F4. SOF stations at embassies

Discuss the costs and benefits of creating standing, funded SOF 

elements within selected embassies akin to the current practice of 

CIA stations. Example issues that could be examined are roles and 

missions for these units, command and control, funding, and IA 

coordinations.

F5. “No borders, no boundaries”

This is more of a mindset from the USSOCOM commander than a 

topic. At a March 2006 speech, General Brown challenged special 

operations professionals to develop new ways of thinking and innovative ways of warfighting and training, equipping, and employing the warfighter. To paraphrase, the legal, moral, and ethical 

boundaries are non-negotiable and will not be stretched or broken. 

Everything else is on the table, said General Brown. This type of 

approach to writing has been evident among many special operations authors and should be used in tackling any topic selected in 

pursuit of the writer’s duties.

F6. Impact of crossing borders to conduct military operations

Assess the actual impact of arresting religious leaders and/or entering into mosques/madrassas as a tactic against Islamic extremists. 

The thesis posed via this topic is that when we are oversensitive and 

overstate Middle East sensitivities, we hamstring our efforts. Costs 

and benefits are associated with this type of approach. Can the real 

protagonists of terror be stopped using this method? Consider U.S. 

public opinion, reprisals against the U.S., reaction of coalition partners, and other factors.

F7. How are nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) used to provide 

funding to terrorist groups?

Analyze the efforts of several NGOs, including stated mission, target 

population groups, and impacts on these target groups. Does some 

of the aid rendered to indigenous groups get redirected to terrorist 

organizations? If so, is it intentional or through mismanagement, 

crime, or something else? Discuss how this phenomenon can be prevented by the U.S. government or other agencies.
51

F. Topics Retained from Previous Years

F8. Role of SOF in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear 

environments

Which of the SOF missions can be accomplished in a contaminated 

environment? Discuss the tactical and logistical aspects with a focus 

on what each of the services are doing for conventional mission sets. 

How can the threat be reduced? Mobility concerns, force protection, 

and detection/decontamination equipment could be examined. This 

topic could be broadened or divided to include operating in difficult 

environments.

F9. Maritime SOF and the war on terrorism

Explore and develop a detailed concept of operations for maritime 

SOF involved in the war on terrorism. Evaluate the statement that 

the vast majority of weapons of mass destruction proliferation transport is maritime. Pay particular attention to the force structure, 

basing implications, and logistics support required for Naval Special 

Warfare and U.S. Marine Corps SOF. Other areas that could be 

addressed are joint command and control, relationships with other 

governmental agencies, and interoperability with coalition forces.

F10. Countering ideological support for terrorism (CIST)

The concept of CIST is integral to the U.S. government and military 

strategy for the war on terrorism. Investigate the tenets of CIST and 

provide an awareness of the culture, customs, language, and philosophy of the enemy. Analyze measures to more effectively counter the 

extremist ideology driving terrorists and providing cover for them 

to operate within their society.

F11. SOF prevention or moderation of the onset of warfare 

Examine the ramifications of the following statement: “The key 

application of SOF is to prevent or moderate the onset of warfare by 

skillful application of their capabilities early.” Two facets of this topic 

could be studied—early in the development of a crisis or continuing 

positive relations through a continuous presence in a given country.

F12. The role of SOF in coalition and surrogate warfare in the 21st 

century

Determine the proper mix of forces, skills, and tactics, techniques, 

and procedures to fight and win beside surrogate armies. Analysis 

of historical works and lessons learned could result in a notional 

future employment of SOF and surrogates. Alternatively, a different 

approach could be used to outline experiences with coalition SOF, 

either unilaterally or with conventional forces. A key to this study is 
52

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

to identify which foreign forces can be suitable partners and developing a notional scenario to validate the thesis. 

F13. SOF and HUMINT/SIGINT/IMINT

SOF success is inextricably linked to the quality and quantity of 

intelligence professionals. Examine the current and future capabilities of one of the aspects of intelligence crucial to SOF. A sample of 

the subsets studied under this intentionally broad topic follows: how 

to better share data collected, improved ways to use geospatial products, how a conventional intelligence soldier becomes a SOF intelligence professional, the synchronization of various systems, or new 

SOF intelligence-support structures.

F14. Islamic extremism in the Americas

This topic is an analysis of the threat to the U.S. and to North and 

South America from the “tri-border area.” This region of Argentina, 

Paraguay, and Brazil is home to many Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, neoNazis, FARC, and other terrorists. Smuggling, terrorist fund-raising, 

and law enforcement ineffectiveness make this area a haven for 

criminal organizations. How should SOF and other agencies be 

employed to combat this threat?

F15. Intelligence indicators to detect emerging insurgency

Review existing studies to determine indicators of instability in a 

particular country or region. What is the SOF role in operational 

preparation of the environment (OPE) regarding this intelligence 

requirement? Discuss mechanisms of sharing information and 

intelligence methods and products between SOF units and country 

teams.

F16. Roles of SOF and NGOs in complex humanitarian emergencies

SOF have played an increasingly critical role in the international 

response to complex humanitarian emergencies. The liaison between 

these two elements requires that SOF understand the diversity of 

NGO objectives and organizational cultures. This topic could take 

an approach of the division of labor involved or education of SOF 

(e.g., on NGO capabilities, limitations). Give advantages and disadvantages of “collaborating” with NGOs. Include a discussion of the 

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other international organizations. The relationships between SOF and other 

U.S. contractors could also be explored.
53

F. Topics Retained from Previous Years

F17. Foreign internal defense/counterinsurgency operations in the 

contemporary operating environment (COE)

Research could be based on experiences in a particular region 

and the potential for future operations in that region. Analyze the 

strategic implications of a SOF presence and the resultant benefits. 

Examine SOF interaction with other selected elements of the COE 

(e.g., law enforcement and coalition operations). Include case studies 

of successful operations including pre-existing conditions (DIME) 

in the country and an analysis of what factors will contribute to a 

successful operation today.

F18. Joint SOF training center

Should USSOCOM invest manpower and other resources to design, 

build, and staff an integrated training center for all components 

of SOF? Analyze the worth of current training opportunities at 

the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the other existing 

training centers. Discuss resourcing, logistics, meshing of schedules, 

and IA aspects of this concept with recommendations as to how a 

joint SOF training center could work. Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of a dedicated facility to bring together SOF components 

in a joint training environment.

F19. Integrating SOF into conventional force training

Synergistic opportunities exist throughout the spectrum for SOF 

integration into conventional operations. The best example is occurring now at JRTC; this project could include an assessment of the 

program there and plans to integrate into other areas. Any discussion of this integration should include how this integration will be 

accomplished within the Joint National Training Center (JNTC) 

construct.

F20. Medical unconventional warfare: guerilla, resistance medicine, 

and hospitals

Propose a study to determine relative and pertinent medical unconventional warfare doctrine for the 21st century. The final product 

will determine the importance of integrating medicine to support 

long duration and unconventional warfare operations.

F21. Interoperability issues between U.S. SOF and coalition SOF, U.S. 

SOF and coalition conventional forces, and U.S. SOF and U.S. 

conventional forces

This range of topics would address problems and solutions (nonmateriel) with U.S. SOF conducting operations with forces of differing 
54

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

capabilities. Examine the procedures and techniques for forming 

bonds with dissimilar units, with the purpose of achieving synergistic effects on the battlefield. Collecting and analyzing unclassified 

lessons learned would be a start point if interested in this topic.

F22. SOF PME considerations

Explore educational strategies to enhance the SOF personnel ability 

in handling uncertainty. Explore distance learning, joint aspects of 

education, interface with service PME institutions, and other ways 

to leverage existing programs to achieve the goal. Interesting facets 

of this topic include critical thinking, critical writing, speed reading, 

and the art and skills of negotiating.

F23. Iraq in 2011

The November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq states that 

the United States security objective is “to develop the Iraqis’ capacity 

to secure their country while carrying out a campaign to defeat the 

terrorists and neutralize the insurgency.” (This document is available 

at www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_national_strategy_

20051130.pdf.) In the context of existing SOF doctrine and 

USSOCOM core tasks, analyze this objective with a clear picture 

of SOF presence and activities in Iraq in the year 2011. What conditions must be set in order to create and maintain an effective 

Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) program in Iraq? How 

can SOF manifest the elements of national power to ensure achievement of the above national objective? How can the U.S. achieve 

parallel objectives (political, economic) in concert with the stated 

security objective? Discuss the role of coalition partners in this effort 

and the limitations that will preclude an effective IDAD climate in 

Iraq. 

F24. Islamic and Islamist movements in the Sahel region of Africa, 

West Africa, and Central Africa

According to most experts in this region, this area of Africa is a safe 

haven for terrorists, replete with failed or failing states, and with 

conditions ripe for insurgency. Analyze the Islamic strongholds in 

the region and examine religious conflict and its implications for 

regional stability in Africa. Determine if a U.S. national interest 

exists there. If so, offer suggestions for development of democracy 

and predict the impact of SOF involvement, either in a foreign 

internal defense or Civil Affairs role. Include the evolution of profes-
55

F. Topics Retained from Previous Years

sionalism in African militaries in the region and the future of modernization in African military forces.

F25. SOF and less-than-lethal weapons

Report on the state of nonlethal weapons development and deployment in SOF. Anticipate future developments and legal limitations in 

this arena. Describe the organizational and force structure changes 

required to make best use of these weapons. Discuss required 

changes in law or doctrine to make these weapons effective. Detail 

actions SOF should be taking now to ensure we get the best utility 

from these weapons.

F26. What are the appropriate missions and best force structure for 

Air Force SOF in 2020?

Outline appropriate missions for Air Force SOF and determine force 

structure for these missions. Identify traditional SOF missions that 

may migrate to conventional forces, new missions for which SOF are 

uniquely suited, and the possible impact of these developments—for 

example, on force structure, training, and doctrine. This research 

problem may also be tailored to look specifically at the requirements 

for an “M-X” transport and its potential roles and missions in the 

future operating environment.

F27. Medical enhancements for special operations personnel

Recent advances in medical technology have created opportunities for improving human performance. Examples include LASIK 

surgery to improve/ correct vision and performance-enhancing 

drugs to move faster, longer, and better. Examine impact on recruiting, assessing, and effects on attrition rates among the various 

“pipelines.” This topic is a study of current and future programs, 

including long-term human effects and the potential for future 

developments.

F28. Future role of contracting and SOF

Should USSOCOM expand capacity—for example, in training, 

force protection, and convoy security—through the use of contractor personnel? Analyze issues deemed germane to this concept—for 

example, resourcing, legal ramifications, and physical readiness.

F29. War outside of combat zones: joint/IA special operations 

organization

Develop and propose an organizational construct for a joint or IA 

organization tailored to war on terrorism operations outside of 

combat areas. Analyze the impact of proposed recommendations on 
56

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

existing units and force structure. Discuss command relationships 

for the new organization. Include rough-order-of-magnitude cost 

estimates for all courses of action and identify/propose locations for 

any new commands.

F30. Statecraft vs. kinetic solutions

Interagency partners, particularly the Department of State (DoS), 

offer an approach to combating terrorism for which SOF can benefit. 

Discuss how together, SOF and DoS personnel can reduce conditions favorable to terrorist activity, including enemy leadership 

and safe havens. Recommend ways to complement unconventional 

warfare with statecraft by combining these two elements of national 

power from the local to (and including) the strategic level.

F31. USSOCOM core activities

Are the U.S. SOF direct-action-oriented assets? Should USSOCOM 

review and adjust the stated core tasks? Should USSOCOM 

change their perspective on the stated core tasks in light of the 

current threats? Analyze one or more of the core tasks and offer 

new perspectives based on the threat and emerging capabilities of 

USSOCOM.

F32. “Policy of reprisal”

Examine the effectiveness of a “policy of reprisal” as a deterrent to 

terrorist attacks, in particular directly against the United States. Is 

this a viable counterterrorism policy (i.e., a deterrent future terrorist 

act) or was it done to meet the domestic demand for action? Should 

we fight networked terrorist organizations with networked organizations of our own? To ask the question differently, discuss different 

ways U.S. and coalition counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 

forces could be structured to defeat the terrorist threat.

F33. Political consequences surrounding the use of SOF

SOF are a unique, well-trained, and lethal asset; the use of these 

forces often has strategic consequences. For a number of reasons, 

however, past administrations have been hesitant to use SOF, notably 

in the fight against terrorism prior to September 11, 2001. Examine 

this phenomenon to determine some of these factors, why they influenced senior-level decision making, and why the current administration had little reluctance to put SOF on the battlefield early on 

after 9/11. 
57

F. Topics Retained from Previous Years

F34. Keys to successful coalitions

Three of the SOF attributes (presence and access, regional expertise, 

and influence), as well as historical examples, suggest that SOF personnel are experts at coalition-building and maintaining these alliances at the small-unit level. Examine the potential for these same 

soldiers, sailors, and airmen to affect the same thing at the strategic 

level working with national military leaders. 

F35. SOF/conventional force operations in a coalition environment

The U.S. is seeking to expand or maintain the concept of coalition 

operations as the preferred modus operandi for major undertakings 

overseas. Collect and examine observations and lessons learned. 

Analyze the SOF roles, both internal and external, in establishing 

and maintaining a coalition during complex operations.

F36. Impact of increased Army SOF participation in evolving regional 

security arrangements

Define regional security arrangements and a measure of the projected Army SOF positioned to support these regional arrangements. 

This topic is tied closely to a discussion of appropriate missions for 

SOF versus conventional forces. It is also tied to which “arrangements” are in the national interest, thus raising the OPTEMPO of 

limited assets.

F37. Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF)/Joint CivilMilitary Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) operations

Give lessons learned from duty inside the headquarters element or 

in the field of one of these task forces. Regional obstacles/concerns, 

doctrinal issues, or integration with other SOF elements/conventional forces could be discussed with suggested changes for future 

operations.

F38. The casualty-care interface between the Air Force Medical 

Service and SOF

Give suggested solutions to the problem of the SOF interface. What 

characterizes it, how should it be planned and programmed, and 

how and where will the patient-flow integration/transfer process 

occur?

F39. Should SOF be given Title 50 responsibilities?

This Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) thesis would 

address the topic in enough detail to fully answer the question, 

which would include the following subareas of investigation:
58

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

a. What are the facets of Title 10 responsibility for SOF? 

b. What are the facets of Title 50 for covert agencies? 

c. What are the unique aspects of SOF missions that are conducted 

under Title 10 authority? 

d. What are the unique aspects of missions conducted under 

authority of Title 50 responsibilities? 

e. What authorities would have to change under both Titles 10 and 

50 to allow U.S. SOF to conduct covert-action missions that are 

currently being conducted under Title 50? 

f. If these authorities have to be changed, is the Congress willing?

g. What would be the impacts on force structure, personnel 

requirements, training, and equipment for SOF conducting Title 

50 missions? 

h. What would the impact be on other governmental agencies 

(OGSs) associated with this change of mission? 

The magnitude of the study suggests a group effort (5–7 personnel). 

Each member of the group would be responsible for a portion of the 

research, such as Title 10 responsibilities for SOF, Title 50 responsibilities for other government agencies, SOF missions conducted 

under Title 10 authority, and covert-action missions conducted 

under Title 50 authority.

F40. Special operations role in the Proliferation Security Initiative

The Proliferation Security Initiative reflects the need for a more 

dynamic, active approach to the global proliferation problem. It 

envisions partnerships of states working in concert, employing their 

national capabilities to develop a broad range of tools (e.g., legal, 

diplomatic, economic, military) to interdict threatening shipments 

of weapons of mass destruction and missile-related equipment and 

technologies. Analyze SOF roles in this initiative.

F41. Streamline PSYOP approval process

Current methodology requires staffing of the request through 

the Joint Staff to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for 

approval per CJCSI 3110.05C. This process can hold up the movement of the request to OSD for months by a nonconcur from one 06 

in the JS chop chain. This paper would ideally be staffed at the service chief, combatant command, JCS, and OSD levels.

F42. Navy and maritime SOF

Explore the historical and evolving relationship between Naval 

Special Warfare (NSW) and the Navy, anticipating the future 
59

F. Topics Retained from Previous Years

relationship given the current emphasis on the war on terrorism. The 

SSGN submarine could be added as a focus area. Analyze the needs 

of NSW and the command relations with USSOCOM and the Navy. 

Focus on operational support in both a historical context and in 

future predictions. Include MFP-11 implications.

F43. Effects of IA bypass

What are the pros and cons of DoD bypassing the IA to deploy and/

or employ military forces without ambassador chief-of-mission 

approval and/or knowledge? What are the tactical, operational, and 

strategic factors and implications? Are the tactical, operational, and 

strategic costs/benefits at odds? What possible unintended consequences might be caused by unilateral or uncoordinated operations? 

Will bypassing facilitate or impede U.S. Government unity of action 

in the GWOT? Investigate new instruments of authority under 

consideration for the IA. On a broader scale, does current chief-ofmission policy and protocol provide valuable checks-and-balances, 

factoring diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of 

power (IOPs), or does it cause inappropriate and/or detrimental friction? If so, should the chief-of-mission role and authority be revised? 

F44. War outside of combat zones—an historical perspective

This topic is derived from a larger proposed study by USSOCOM, 

entitled “Conducting the War on Terrorism Outside of Combat 

Zones.” Conduct an historical perspective study of organizations that have had similar objectives. Examples of organizations 

that could be studied are the World War II Office of Strategic 

Services (OSS) and the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), 

operations against the Irish Republican Army both in Ireland and 

internationally, Russian efforts against Chechen rebels, and law 

enforcement efforts against organized crime syndicates, particularly 

narcotraffickers and arms smugglers. Analyze the degree of integration between SOF, law enforcement, and intelligence entities and the 

success of each operation. 

F45. Oral histories of SOF leaders for publication/professional 

development 

Provide a collection of personal SOF accounts throughout recent 

history. While this perspective has been done (e.g., in support of 

briefings and courses), a research-paper-length compendium will 

yield not only lessons learned but aspects of strategy, revolutionary 

thinking, and command-and-control issues for future planners and 
60

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

commanders from interviews with senior SOF leaders. The finished 

product will benefit SOF leaders as a “handbook” on relationships 

with IA and coalition partners and furnish a range of considerations 

for SOF noncommissioned officers and officers. Some travel may be 

involved, or the collection could be gleaned from individuals living 

near the respective PME schools; this topic is ideal for a USACGSC 

or SAMS student because of access to a wide range of distinguished 

SOF senior leaders supporting the SOF elective at Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas.

F46. SOF/Joint Task Force in counterinsurgency operations

What is the value and likelihood of a SOF JTF with conventional 

forces in support of conducting counterinsurgency operations? 

Discuss the advantages to such a construct with a perspective on 

current operations and offer its views in fighting a counterinsurgency in the Western hemisphere. Would a standing JTF built 

around SOF and focused on a host nation’s Internal Defense and 

Development (IDAD) strategy be effective in preventing an insurgency? Case studies and historical examples would be ideal to support the writer’s position.

F47. Counterinsurgency strategy—victory vs. management 

(containment)

There are two distinct courses of action in developing and implementing a counterinsurgency strategy, and both have implications 

for SOF. Determine the preferred method in light of transformation, 

globalization, and grand strategy objectives, using Iraq or another 

potential insurgency as the war on terrorism continues. Historical 

examples of each option can be used to determine what the U.S. 

strategy should be, given the existing variables.

F48. Coalition support teams

Examine the effectiveness of coalition support teams in recent operations. To ensure success in future operations, should the makeup of 

these teams be different? Should these teams expand their mission 

set to enhance the coalition itself? Perspectives on these teams and 

their employment might be a focus of research in this area.

F49. SOF and Joint Fires

Review current thoughts and insights on integration of Joint Fires 

across the spectrum of conflict in special operations, focusing on 

concepts of how Joint Fires support SOF core tasks and small-scale 

counterinsurgency. Discuss the capabilities needed in the future 
61

F. Topics Retained from Previous Years

operating environment to provide timely, accurate, and deconflicted 

Joint Fire support.

F50. Capabilities of services’ SOF logistical units/elements

After examining each of the services’ logistical requirements, analyze the feasibility and costs/benefits of a joint SOF logistics command. Propose a framework for this organization, determine roles 

and missions, interface with existing service logistical units, and so 

forth. 

F51. Adaptive thinking and SOF

Explore how to develop adaptive/critical thinking in future force 

soldiers and leaders. This writing covers how to best select for, train, 

and test for adaptive thinking/leadership in Special Forces. Discuss 

how critical thinking skills can be learned and developed within the 

existing framework of SOF training and education venues. Include 

theories and military writing forwarded by senior leaders.

F52. Prediction of future Special Forces manning

This project could take many forms—for example, personnel entering into Special Forces (e.g., demographics and propensity to enlist), 

organizing for 21st century missions, location of Special Forces 

bases, and new concepts for manning structure. Examine the British 

Special Operations Executive (SOE)/Office of Strategic Services 

(OSS) recruitment as part of the study. Consider also including a 

discussion of the SOF for Life concept.

F53. Filling gaps in critical skills with technical expertise

This topic is an innovative look at leveraging personnel outside of 

SOF, who possess certain SOF-related skills, to alleviate recruiting 

and retention shortages. A possible starting point could be looking 

at the World War II Office of Strategic Services, followed by a discussion of what skill sets are needed based on current and future threats 

(e.g., cultural anthropologist, city manager, banker, and teacher). 

Include practical solutions on how to bring these uniquely skilled 

people in for a short time. Discuss the use of technology to aid in 

locating, assessing, managing, and retaining these augmentees. The 

concept of SOF for Life could be incorporated into this project. 

F54. SOF senior leader competencies for joint warfare—preparing for 

joint SOF combat command

Explore organizing Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs) 

at the O6 level of command and the associated leader competencies required, based on actual experiences of recent commander 
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

Combined JSOTFs. Offer solutions of successful wartime leadership 

techniques for ongoing and near-future senior SOF leaders, anticipating wartime commands during the GWOT. Derive key lessons 

learned from the research for possible incorporation into current 

leader development methodologies.

F55. Cross area-of-responsibility operations

At the operational level, command and control as well as support 

relationships need to be well-defined early on in the operation. 

Examine the supported/supporting relationships between 

USSOCOM and conventional forces belonging to the regional combatant commander and/or Joint Task Force commander. This topic 

could be discussed in the context of tactical operations, then at the 

operational level. 

F56. Integrated small-unit operations

Explore current experiences of SOF units attached, operational control, tactical control, or other relationships. With the advent of transformational concepts in the Army, how should units with differing 

capabilities be organized to maximize effectiveness? Can the services take good ideas in this regard from recent operations? Provide 

detailed analysis of an Army unit of action (UA) and how SOF could 

become a force multiplier when working with a UA.

F57. The relationship between the TSOC and a standing Joint Special 

Operations Task Force (JSOTF) headquarters

Examine the current authorizations against the needed structure 

for a JSOTF. What capabilities are essential to the standing JSOTF 

not embedded in the TSOC? Discuss interaction and relationships 

with combatant commanders. Different areas of responsibility may 

warrant modified recommendations for staffing and fighting this 

organization.

F58. U.S. national security initiatives in Africa and the war on 

terrorism

Address the question of creating an African unified command or 

a U.S. subunified command within Africa in order to protect U.S. 

national interests. Analyze a proposal to establish a political-military 

organization, such as an African regional JTF/Special Operations 

Command within Africa, to promote democratic initiatives and 

influence regional stability. Discuss roles and capabilities for Civil 

Affairs/Civil-Military Operations (CA/CMO) and IA partners, 

framing operational preparation of environment throughout Africa, 
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F. Topics Retained from Previous Years

foreign-internal-defense opportunities in the region, and the rising 

U.S. national interests in Africa.

F59. SOF measures of effectiveness

Examine measures of effectiveness of SOF units. This scope would 

be at least twofold. At the small-unit level, examine how successful 

SOF has been in both combat operations and winning support from 

local population. Employing historical case studies, Is SOF a strategic capability? The broader question is determination of the impact 

of SOF on strategic outcomes. How is the command measuring its 

effectiveness now? How could the system be improved?

F60. PSYOP and terrorism effectiveness

Evaluate the effectiveness of the PSYOP campaign in the war on 

terrorism and how to better use it as a force multiplier in the war. 

Discuss the limitations of PSYOP with respect to radical Islamists 

and the techniques to target specific groups with an aggressive 

PSYOP strategy. A profile of a prominent terrorist group and a proposed PSYOP plan would help to “know the enemy.”

F61. Effective PSYOP in a mostly illiterate population

Determine the effectiveness of a full PSYOP campaign in an area 

where most of the intended audience is illiterate. Using detailed 

analysis, develop possible operations—taking in account the literacy 

and technology of targeted audiences—for future PSYOPs in these 

environments. How do we reach and educate such audiences?