IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 80065-5-I

)

Respondent, )

)

v. )

)

HELEN M. DAHLL, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION

)

Appellant. ) 

)

VERELLEN, J. — Helen Dahll assigns error to her convictions for first 

degree theft and attempted first degree theft. She contends the court erred by 

excluding evidence, the State prejudiced her right to a fair trial by mismanaging 

discovery, and the State failed to disprove her good faith claim of title defense

to the money she was charged with stealing from her elderly father, John Dahll.1 

Helen fails to show the court abused its discretion by concluding her 

father’s will was irrelevant to her right to his money before his death and by 

concluding the probative value of the foreclosure of her home after the charging 

period did not outweigh its emotional impact.

 

1 Because they have the same last name, we refer to John and Helen 

Dahll by their first names.
No. 80065-5-I/2

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She also fails to prove actual prejudice from discovery mismanagement 

by the State because evidence timely disclosed revealed the same information 

and would have let her attorney pose the same theory she now argues was 

unavailable to her.

And she fails to demonstrate the State presented insufficient evidence to 

disprove her defense of an open and avowed taking of her father’s money 

under a good faith claim of title. 

Therefore, we affirm.

FACTS

In April of 2012, Helen became a caregiver for her elderly father John 

and, after a power of attorney he had signed years earlier took effect, became 

his attorney-in-fact. John was in the early stages of dementia and suffered from 

heart disease, congestive heart failure, and arthritis in his knees, among other 

health problems. Helen hired a home healthcare provider, and John began 

receiving 24-hour care in his house. 

In the spring of 2014, John moved in with Helen, and she rented out his 

house. She reduced his caretaking hours to only four per day. By this time, he 

was unable to toilet himself, prepare meals, manage his medications, or get 

around independently. Helen’s neighbors began noticing she often went out for 

hours and left John alone. Helen would leave the front door unlocked when she 

went out, so her neighbors would check on John. More than once, a neighbor 

found John lying on the floor and calling out for Helen, unaware she had left him 
No. 80065-5-I/3

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alone. As more neighbors became concerned for John’s welfare, they 

submitted reports to Adult Protective Services (APS).

On October 8, 2015, an APS investigator visited John. She noticed his 

limited cognitive abilities, such as not knowing the date or time, not knowing 

who was visiting him, not knowing how long Helen left him alone, and being 

unaware he was unable to care for himself. She returned again on November 4 

after a home healthcare worker arrived to find John cold, shivering, and 

precariously positioned in his bed. 

On November 14, the APS investigator returned to check on John, and 

Helen refused to let her in, relenting only after the police arrived. The 

investigator found John lying in his own waste and wearing clothes stained with 

urine and blood. He had a bright red sore on his tailbone and a bloody wound 

on his buttocks. Helen said she knew he needed 24-hour care but could not 

afford it because John had only $15,000 in certificates of deposit and no 

savings. She said his only income was from his Boeing pension and from 

renting out his house. Helen had not worked in over 10 years due to her own 

medical issues, and John had financially supported her.

John was moved into an adult family home in November of 2015. On 

February 3, 2016, an independent guardian was appointed, over Helen’s 

objection, for John’s person and estate. The appointment ended Helen’s role 

as John’s attorney-in-fact. The guardian reviewed John’s finances and 

discovered at least $200,000 missing from his checking and savings accounts, 
No. 80065-5-I/4

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all of which were at BECU. The guardian called the police. John died on 

September 15, 2016, and the guardian became personal representative of his 

estate.

Helen was charged with committing first degree theft between April 1, 

2014 and February 22, 2016, attempted first degree theft between March 22 

and 23, 2016, and third degree criminal mistreatment between June 1, 2015 

and November 16, 2015. The State’s theory was that Helen took John’s money 

through many unauthorized automated teller machine (ATM) withdrawals. 

Helen’s pretrial theory was that she spent the missing money both on John’s 

care and to support herself, which he had intended for her to do by making her 

a joint accountholder. The court excluded evidence that John had made Helen 

the primary beneficiary of his estate and that Helen’s home was in foreclosure 

at the time of trial.

In the middle of trial, the records officer for BECU provided documents to 

the State that had not been disclosed previously. Account documents showed 

several accounts identified as Helen’s alone were actually joint accounts held 

by Helen and John. Helen moved to dismiss under CrR 8.3(b), arguing the late 

disclosures were prejudicial discovery violations caused by governmental 

misconduct. The court denied her motion. The jury found Helen guilty of all 

charges.

Helen appeals, assigning error to only the theft and attempted theft 

convictions.
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ANALYSIS

I. Evidentiary Rulings

Helen contends her right to present a defense was violated by the court 

excluding two pieces of evidence. We review a court’s evidentiary decisions for 

abuse of discretion and review de novo whether the defendant’s right to present 

a defense was violated.2

She argues the court erred when it excluded relevant evidence from 

John’s 1992 will designating her as the primary beneficiary of his estate.

“‘To be relevant . . . evidence must (1) tend to prove or disprove the 

existence of a fact, and (2) that fact must be of consequence to the outcome of 

the case.’”

3

 The threshold for relevancy is very low, and even minimally 

relevant evidence is admissible.4 Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.5 A 

defendant has no right to introduce inadmissible evidence.6

In 1992, John signed a will designating Helen the personal

representative and primary beneficiary of his estate if his wife Mary 

 

2 State v. Bedada, 13 Wn. App. 2d 185, 194, 463 P.3d 125 (2020) (citing 

State v. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d 784, 797-98, 453 P.3d 696 (2019); State v. Clark, 

187 Wn.2d 641, 648-56, 389 P.3d 462 (2017)).

3 State v. Weaville, 162 Wn. App. 801, 818, 256 P.3d 426 (2011)

(alteration in original) (quoting Davidson v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 43 

Wn. App. 569, 573, 719 P.2d 569 (1986)).

4 State v. Briejer, 172 Wn. App. 209, 225, 289 P.3d 698 (2012) (quoting 

State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d 612, 621, 41 P.3d 1189 (2002)).

5 ER 402.

6 Bedada, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 193 (citing State v. Blair, 3 Wn. App. 2d 

343, 349, 415 P.3d 1232 (2018)).
No. 80065-5-I/6

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predeceased him. The court allowed evidence John designated Helen as his 

personal representative but excluded his decision to make Helen his primary 

beneficiary. She argues the court erred because her status as primary 

beneficiary was probative of her defense that John let Helen use his money on 

herself during his lifetime.

An heir cannot have an interest in another’s estate until that person’s 

death.7 “Prior to that event there is no ‘heir’ because no one can be the heir of 

a living person.”8 This is true for both realty and personalty in an estate.9 Helen 

provides no authority that a will evidences a living person’s intent to make inter 

vivos gifts.10

Helen was accused of taking John’s money without his authorization. 

John’s will had no effect on Helen’s legal interest in his money before his death. 

Because John’s decision to make Helen his primary beneficiary was not 

probative of her legal right to his money nor of John’s intent to make gifts to her 

 

7 See Matter of Estate of Baird, 131 Wn.2d 514, 520, 933 P.2d 1031 

(1997) (“An intestate interest is created only upon the death of the creator of the 

interest, i.e., the death of the intestate.”) (citing In re Wiltermood’s Estate, 78 

Wn.2d 238, 240, 472 P.2d 536 (1970).

8 Wiltermood, 78 Wn.2d at 240.

9

In re Verchot’s Estate, 4 Wn.2d 574, 582, 104 P.2d 490 (1940).

10 John’s will is not part of the appellate record, and Helen does not 

argue it contained language attempting to make or acknowledging any inter 

vivos gift.
No. 80065-5-I/7

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while alive, the evidence was not relevant. Helen fails to show the court erred 

or infringed upon her right to present a defense.11

Helen also argues the court erred when it excluded evidence her home 

entered foreclosure after the charging period. Helen sought to introduce 

evidence of the foreclosure to argue it made it less likely she stole thousands of 

dollars from her father only to stop paying her mortgage. The court concluded 

the evidence was minimally probative, and ER 403 barred the evidence as 

unduly prejudicial in Helen’s favor.

Relevant evidence can be excluded when “its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”12 “‘Evidence likely 

to provoke an emotional response rather than a rational decision is unfairly 

prejudicial.’”

13

 A court considers the whole case when weighing the risk of 

unfair prejudice, including:

“the importance of the fact of consequence for which the evidence 

is offered in the context of the litigation, the strength and length of 

the chain of inferences necessary to establish the fact of 

consequence, the availability of alternative means of proof, 

whether the fact of consequence for which the evidence is offered 

 

11 See Bedada, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 193 (no right to present inadmissible 

evidence).

12 ER 403.

13 State v. Nguyen, 10 Wn. App. 2d 797, 820, 450 P.3d 630 (2020) 

(quoting State v. Johnson, 90 Wn. App. 54, 61, 950 P.2d 981 (1998)), review 

denied sub nom. State v. Thanh Pham Nguyen, 195 Wn.2d 1012, 460 P.3d 178 

(2020).
No. 80065-5-I/8

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is being disputed, and, where appropriate, the potential 

effectiveness of a limiting instruction.”

[14]

 

When the evidence is of high probative value, “it appears no state interest can 

be compelling enough to preclude its introduction” without violating the state 

and federal constitutions.15

Helen analogizes to State v. Jones, where our Supreme Court held 

retrial was required after a defendant being tried for rape was prohibited from 

testifying the sex was consensual or from cross-examining the victim about 

having consented.16 Only a police officer and the victim testified, and the State 

did not call other witnesses to the alleged rape.17 Under those circumstances, 

evidence of consensual sex was the defendant’s “entire defense” and had 

“extremely high probative value.”18 Excluding it violated the defendant’s right to 

present a defense, requiring retrial.19

Helen sought to introduce evidence of the foreclosure to illustrate she 

could not afford her mortgage and therefore could not have stolen hundreds of 

thousands of dollars years earlier. Unlike Jones, evidence of the foreclosure is 

minimally probative of the crimes charged. It occurred outside the charging 

 

14 Bedada, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 193-94 (quoting State v. Kendrick, 47 Wn. 

App. 620, 628, 736 P.2d 1079 (1987)).

15 State v. Jones, 168 Wn.2d 713, 720, 230 P.3d 576 (2010) (quoting 

State v. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d 1, 16, 659 P.2d 514 (1983)).

16 168 Wn.2d 73, 717-18, 721, 230 P.3d 576 (2010).

17 Id. at 718.

18 Id. at 721.

19 Id. at 721, 725.
No. 80065-5-I/9

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period and after Helen lost access to John’s accounts. Only by layering 

inferences does it suggest Helen’s innocence. Again, unlike Jones, other 

evidence allowed the same argument. Helen introduced evidence she had not 

paid her homeowner’s association dues since John died and elicited other 

testimony she should “write a book on how to survive with no cash for two or 

three years.”20 She also introduced evidence that John had supported her 

financially “for some time.”21 The evidence of foreclosure had little probative 

value because it could not directly establish Helen’s innocence, and she 

introduced other evidence allowing the same arguments. Helen fails to show 

the court abused its discretion by concluding the foreclosure’s minimal 

probative value was outweighed by its emotional impact.

II. CrR 8.3(b) Motion to Dismiss

Helen contends the State prejudiced her by mismanaging discovery 

when it failed to timely obtain and provide documents showing she and John 

held many joint bank accounts, which prevented her attorney from adequately 

preparing and from pursuing the theory that someone stole John’s identity to 

make the ATM withdrawals.

 

20 Report of Proceedings (RP) (Jan. 29, 2019) at 1284.

21 RP (Jan. 10, 2019) at 469.
No. 80065-5-I/10

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We review a court’s decision on a CrR 8.3(b) motion to dismiss for abuse 

of discretion.22 A court abuses its discretion where its decision rests on 

untenable grounds or was made for untenable reasons.23 

A court can dismiss a charge against a defendant under CrR 8.3(b) when 

the defendant shows arbitrary action or misconduct by the government 

prejudiced her right to a fair trial. The movant has the burden of proving both 

misconduct and resulting prejudice.24 “[G]overnmental misconduct need not be 

of an evil or dishonest nature; simple mismanagement is sufficient.”25 Where 

misconduct is proven, dismissal is an “extraordinary remedy” to be granted 

“only as a last resort”

26 upon a showing “of not merely speculative prejudice but 

actual prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”27

Assuming the State mismanaged discovery by failing to thoroughly 

investigate and timely disclose the ownership of Helen’s various accounts at 

BECU, she fails to prove actual prejudice. In August 2017, the State timely 

disclosed evidence during discovery, including three documents showing Helen 

and John’s history of joint accounts: BECU member account signature cards 

 

22 State v. Brooks, 149 Wn. App. 373, 384, 203 P.3d 397 (2009) (citing

State v. Blackwell, 120 Wn.2d 822, 830, 845 P.2d 1017 (1993)).

23 Id. (citing Blackwell, 120 Wn.2d at 830).

24 State v. Salgado-Mendoza, 189 Wn.2d 420, 427, 403 P.3d 45 (2017).

25 Blackwell, 120 Wn.2d at 831 (citing State v. Dailey, 93 Wn.2d 454, 

457, 610 P.2d 357 (1980)).

26 Brooks, 149 Wn. App. at 384 (citing Wilson, 149 Wn.2d at 12).

27 State v. Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647, 649, 71 P.3d 638 (2003).
No. 80065-5-I/11

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from 1985 and 1987 creating joint accounts for John, Mary, and Helen, and a 

2000 BECU Master Enrollment and Member Agreement identifying John, Mary, 

and Helen as joint account owners. Pretrial, defense counsel argued Helen had 

a legal right to John’s money because “[Helen] was listed as a joint 

accountholder, and she has been for decades on both of her parents’ accounts. 

Not all of them, but on many of their accounts, [Helen] was listed as a joint 

accountholder.”28 Thus, pretrial, defense counsel knew Helen and John held 

joint accounts and used that information to articulate an exculpatory theory. 

These circumstances are similar to State v. Woods29 and State v. 

Salgado-Mendoza.

30

 In Woods, the state crime laboratory failed to diligently 

analyze a defendant’s DNA,31 causing a multi-month delay.32 The court 

concluded the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudicial misconduct because 

the delay did not “cause the interjection of new information into the case,”33

especially when the defendant had always known the State intended to use his 

DNA to prove his guilt.34 In Salgado-Mendoza, a defendant driver charged with 

driving under the influence did not suffer actual prejudice when the State 

 

28 RP (Jan. 7, 2019) at 73.

29 143 Wn.2d 561, 23 P.3d 1046 (2001).

30 189 Wn.2d 420, 403 P.3d 45 (2017).

31 Deoxyribonucleic acid.

32 Woods, 143 Wn.2d at 583.

33 Id. at 584.

34 Id. at 584-85.
No. 80065-5-I/12

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mismanaged its case by failing to disclose the identity of its expert toxicologist 

before the morning of trial.35 Five months before trial, the State had provided 

the names of nine potential toxicologists from the state crime laboratory, all of 

whom were available for interviews and whose resumes and professional 

backgrounds were also available online.36 Regardless of which toxicologist 

testified, defense counsel could have expected each to testify about the same 

set of topics about blood alcohol testing.37 The driver articulated a risk of 

prejudice but failed to prove actual prejudice.38

On this record, Helen had sufficient evidence of joint account ownership 

to articulate a defense theory and prepare for trial on it, and she fails to show 

the belated discovery and disclosure prevented her from preparing an alternate 

exculpatory theory also based upon joint account ownership. As in Woods and 

Salgado-Mendoza, the State’s mismanagement of discovery did not prevent 

defense counsel from preparing for trial or force counsel to proceed 

unprepared. Because Helen fails to prove actual prejudice, the court did not 

abuse its discretion by denying her CrR 8.3(b) motion to dismiss.

III. Substantial Evidence Challenge

Helen contends the State failed to produce substantial evidence 

disproving her statutory “good faith claim of title” defense to theft. Substantial 

 

35 Salgado-Mendoza, 189 Wn.2d at 435.

36 Id. at 438.

37 Id. at 438-39.

38 Id. at 435-36. 
No. 80065-5-I/13

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evidence supports a jury’s finding when, “‘after viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

39

 A challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence admits the truth of the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences from it.40

A person is guilty of first degree theft when, with the intent to deprive, 

she wrongfully obtains or exerts unauthorized control over at least $5,000 of 

another’s property.41 It is a complete defense to any charge of theft that the

allegedly stolen property was “‘appropriated openly and avowedly under a claim 

of title made in good faith, even though the claim be untenable.’”

42

 The defense 

has two elements: “(1) an open and avowed taking of property and (2) a good 

faith claim of title to the property.”43 The State did not dispute the evidence 

supported giving this instruction, and it had to disprove the defense beyond a 

reasonable doubt.44 

The core of Helen’s argument is that the evidence showed she could 

have had a reasonable, good faith belief in her right to use John’s money for 

 

39 State v. Davis, 182 Wn.2d 222, 227, 340 P.3d 820 (2014) (quoting 

State v. Hosier, 157 Wn.2d 1, 8, 133 P.3d 936 (2006)).

40 State v. Miller, 14 Wn. App. 2d 469, 481, 471 P.3d 927 (2020) (quoting 

State v. Condon, 182 Wn.2d 307, 314, 343 P.3d 357 (2015)).

41 RCW 9A.56.020(1)(a); RCW 9A.56.030(1)(a).

42 State v. Mora, 110 Wn. App. 850, 855, 43 P.3d 38 (2002) (quoting 

RCW 9A.56.020(2)).

43 State v. Ager, 128 Wn.2d 85, 95, 904 P.2d 715 (1995).

44 State v. Hicks, 102 Wn.2d 182, 186-87, 683 P.2d 186 (1984).
No. 80065-5-I/14

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her own benefit. But we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

State after assuming its truth and defer to the jury about witness credibility, 

conflicting testimony, and persuasiveness of evidence.45 Thus, the question is 

not whether a juror could have found for Helen but whether a reasonable juror 

could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Helen did not have a 

good faith claim of title to at least $5,000 of John’s money.46 

Helen relies upon a BECU Master Enrollment and Member Agreement 

governing her and John’s joint accounts to argue she had a good faith belief in 

her right to John’s money.47 The agreement provides “that any joint accountholders (with respect to deposits) . . . will have as much right to withdraw funds 

from deposit or loan accounts as the primary member does.”48 

But the right to withdraw funds from an account does not change 

ownership of the funds.49 RCW 30A.22.090(2) provides that funds held in a 

 

45 Miller, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 481 (citing Condon, 182 Wn.2d at 314; State 

v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874-75, 83 P.3d 970 (2004), aff’d, 166 Wn.2d 380, 

208 P.3d 1107 (2009)).

46 Davis, 182 Wn.2d at 227; RCW 9A.56.020(2)(a); 

RCW 9A.56.030(1)(a).

47 Helen also relies upon language from a depository account signature 

card from 1987 to support her argument. Because the Master Enrollment 

Agreement is from 2000, was signed by Helen, John, and Mary, and expressly 

“contains the terms and conditions governing membership in BECU and its 

deposit products,” exhibit 51, at 2, it necessarily superseded any prior 

agreement governing depository accounts.

48 Ex. 51, at 2.

49 See Mora, 110 Wn. App. at 856 (“A joint tenant may have the right to 

withdraw funds, but this does not mean he or she owns the funds.”) (citing In re 

Estate of Tosh, 83 Wn. App. 158, 166, 920 P.2d 1230 (1996)).
No. 80065-5-I/15

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joint account “belong to the depositors in proportion to the net funds owned by 

each depositor on deposit in the account, unless the contract of deposit 

provides otherwise.” Unchallenged jury instruction 13 echoed these rules. The 

Master Enrollment agreement speaks only to the right to withdraw; it is silent 

about ownership. Thus, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, a 

reasonable juror could have concluded Helen did not have a good faith belief in 

her ownership over John’s monies in their joint accounts.

Other evidence supports this conclusion. Helen told the APS 

investigator she used $18,400 of John’s money to buy a car, and she planned 

on repaying him. No evidence showed repayment. Beginning on July 15, 

2014, and continuing for years, Helen accepted a $1,200 monthly rent payment 

for John’s house, despite identifying it as one of his assets and explaining she 

rented it out to help manage his money. Helen wrote the lease and required 

that the rent be paid to her. Especially when combined with the Master 

Enrollment Agreement, a reasonable juror could conclude Helen did not have a 

good faith claim of title over at least 5,000 of the dollars she took from John.

A reasonable juror could also conclude that Helen’s conduct around 

taking John’s money was not open and avowed. Helen defied a court order and 

refused to provide an accounting of John’s finances to the guardian. Helen lied 

to the APS investigator about John’s income, claiming he received the rent from 

his house when John’s accounts showed no record of rent payments. She lied 

to the investigator again in October of 2015, saying that John had no savings 
No. 80065-5-I/16

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and only $15,000 invested in certificates of deposit, when he actually had at 

least $100,000 in cash and Helen had already withdrawn over $100,000 from 

his accounts that year alone. Helen also lied about John’s financial status in 

January 2015 when she told a nurse John could only afford four hours of daily 

home care, despite his net worth of $525,000 and Helen having recently 

withdrawn $79,608 in cash from his accounts. And Helen lied about her 

financial status to her neighbors. For example, one neighbor testified Helen 

described herself as “independently wealthy.”50 From this evidence, a 

reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Helen was not 

taking John’s money openly and avowedly.

To the extent Helen contends the State failed to disprove the “good faith 

claim of title defense” for the attempted theft charge, substantial evidence 

supports the jury’s conclusion. Helen’s power of attorney was revoked on 

February 3, 2016, when an independent guardian was appointed for John’s 

person and estate. Helen’s attorney signed the order appointing the guardian. 

On March 22, within hours of the guardian reminding Helen her power of 

attorney had been revoked, Helen took John into the bank and used $8,800 

from his individual investment account to open a new joint bank account. She 

then withdrew several hundred dollars from the account. From this, a 

reasonable juror could conclude Helen did not have a good faith claim of title 

 

50 RP (Jan. 10, 2019) at 452.
No. 80065-5-I/17

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when opening the joint account with John’s investments and withdrawing 

money.

Because the State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate beyond 

a reasonable doubt that Helen took and attempted to take more than $5,000 of 

John’s money and did not do so under a good faith claim of title or openly and 

avowedly, substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdicts.

Therefore, we affirm. 

WE CONCUR: