U.S.-CHINA COMPETITION:

ASIA-PACIFIC LAND FORCE 

IMPLICATIONS

A U.S. Army War College Integrated Research Project in 

Support of U.S. Army Pacific Command and Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, Directorate of Strategy and Policy 

(HQDA G-35)

William G. Braun III

David Lai

Project Directors

COL Frederick J. Gellert

COL James “Buddy” Frick

COL Rory Crooks

Faculty Mentors

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

UNITED STATES 

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS

Jose A. Arana Sang K. Lee

Tom Asbery Danielle Ngo

Jason P. Conroy Hung Nguyen

Lance R. Eldred Alberto Rodriguez-Cruz

Mark Illg Galbadrakh Togoo

Contributing Researchers

i

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v

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

U.S.-China Competition:

Asia-Pacific Land Force Implications

A U.S. Army War College Integrated Research Project in Support of 

U.S. Army Pacific Command and Headquarters, Department of the 

Army, Directorate of Strategy and Policy (HQDA G-35)

William G. Braun III

David Lai

Project Directors

Jose A. Arana Sang K. Lee

Tom Asbery Danielle Ngo

Jason P. Conroy Hung Nguyen

Lance R. Eldred Alberto Rodriguez-Cruz

Mark Illg Galbadrakh Togoo

Contributing Researchers

Rory Crooks

James A. Frick

Frederick J. Gellert

Writing Mentors

November 2016

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ISBN 1-58487-739-1
vii

CONTENTS

Foreword.......................................................................ix

Executive Summary.....................................................xi 

Foundational Understanding......................................1 

I. Introduction ...........................................................3 

II. Theory and Scope.................................................7 

III. Security Environment Context........................15 

Recommendations.......................................................29 

IV. Rebalanced Mindset and Lexicon...................31 

V. Access and Readiness through Partnership 

 and Presence.......................................................39 

VI. Land-Based Cross-Domain Control...............65 

VII. Assured Land Force Maneuver.....................85 

Summary and Implementation 

of Recommendations ..................................................93

VIII. Summary and Implementation....................95 

IX. Rebalanced Mindset and Lexicon ..................99 

X. Access and Readiness through 

 Partnerships and Presence..............................101 
XI. Land-Based Cross-Domain Control.............111 

XII. Assured Land Force Maneuver...................119 

Conclusion.................................................................121

XIII. Concluding Analysis ..................................123

XIV. Validity Assessment....................................127

XV. Future Research.............................................129 

About the Contributors............................................131 

XVI. About the Project Directors ........................133 

XVII. About the Researchers ...............................134 

XVIII. About the Writing Mentors .....................139 

Endnotes.....................................................................141 

viii
ix

FOREWORD

This report is the product of the U.S. Army War 

College’s (USAWC) inaugural Integrated Research 

Project (IRP) on “U.S.-China Competition: AsiaPacific Land Force Implications.” It addresses a 

Chief of Staff, Army priority research topic and was 

sponsored by the U.S. Army Pacific and the Headquarters, Department of the Army, Directorate of Strategy 

and Policy (HQDA G-35).

The report resulted from a whole-of-War-College 

effort. Core curriculum and regional elective studies 

augmented student research and facilitated analysis. 

The Center for Strategic Leadership hosted an implementation workshop to solicit subject matter expertise 

on recommendations and implementation plans. Faculty from across the USAWC supported the analytical 

debate, mentored student participants, and reviewed 

the written contributions. Additionally, the USAWC 

team engaged in extensive dialogue with senior military leaders, both in theater and at Carlisle Barracks, 

to explore issues and develop recommendations. 

This research project drew on insights from a 

power transition theory, using the Chinese game of 

“go” as an analog. Additionally, it considered the concept of “gray zone” competition, while taking into account the vital role regional allies and partners play 

in achieving U.S. strategic outcomes. The key findings 

of the research project are: (1) counter-intuitively, the 

Asia-Pacific is a land force centric maritime theater; 

(2) the U.S.-China relationship continues to emerge 

as the central “determinant dynamic” for the future 

of Asia-Pacific international relations; (3) a range of 

economic, diplomatic, and security relationships impact gray zone competition in the theater; and, (4) the 
x

U.S. Army requires a change in mindset to compete 

successfully in the gray zone, and senior defense and 

Joint Force leaders must understand the nature of this 

space to create a force capable of competing.

This report presents nine recommendations and an 

implementation plan. The full report benefited from a 

number of engagements with military staff and academia. The U.S. Army War College archived selected 

portions of these engagements via multiple media formats. We offer this report to enable better understanding of U.S. security challenges in the Asia-Pacific.

 

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
xi

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This research project is a Chief of Staff of the Army 

(CSA)-directed study, conducted by the Army War 

College and co-sponsored by the Commander, U.S. 

Army Pacific Command (USARPAC) and the Headquarters, Department of the Army, Directorate of 

Strategy and Policy (HQDA G-35). The report presents findings and recommendations derived from an 

8-month, quick-turn, student-led research and analysis effort. The central theme of the research effort is 

U.S.-China competition and the development of relevant land force recommendations to compete effectively in the gray zone between peace and war. 

THEORY AND ANALOGY

The report employs Power Transition Theory and 

a “go game” analogy to underpin and explain the 

various assumptions and perspectives taken by the 

researchers regarding the state of U.S.-China relations 

and gray zone competition, respectively.

KEY FINDINGS

Findings include: (1) counter-intuitively, the AsiaPacific is a land force centric, maritime theater; (2) the 

U.S.-China relationship emerges as the central “determinant dynamic” for the future of Asia-Pacific international relations; (3) a range of economic, diplomatic, 

and security relationships impact gray zone competition in the theater; and, (4) the U.S. Army requires a 

change in mindset to compete successfully in the gray 

zone, and senior defense and Joint Force leaders must 

understand the nature of this space to create a force 

capable of competing.
xii

RECOMMENDATIONS 

The report offers nine specific recommendations 

and a two-tier implementation plan to integrate those 

recommendations into defense management processes. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1. Report Logic Map with Quick 

Read Highlights.

The first category facilitates changes in both the 

mindset and the way the U.S. approaches winning 

in gray zone competition. This first recommendation 

calls for an integrated campaigning concept to provide a new lexicon, new campaign design, and new 

principles to guide the conduct of cooperative and coercive theater campaigns. 

The second recommendation category addresses 

access and readiness through partners and presence. 
xiii

The following four specific recommendations populate this category: 

• Adjust Pacific Pathways to encourage direct 

engagement with China and promote regional 

partner leadership in cooperative defense; 

• Expand the State Partnership Program to all 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN) stakeholders, to develop long-term 

and reliable trust networks, military-to-military, and military-to-civilian relationships; 

• Synchronize civic action activities to rationalize resource expenditures and improve linkages to combatant command prioritized initiatives and objectives; and, 

• Establish cooperative security locations (CSL) 

in South China Sea periphery states. 

These CSLs should be constructed and maintained 

through negotiated logistics cost sharing (LCS) agreements to establish ports, infrastructure, exercise sites, 

and “warm basing” facilities. Host nations would own 

these CSLs; U.S. forces would position logistics, engineering, medical, communications, intelligence, and 

other activity sets in these CSLs. The U.S. Joint Force 

and regional partner militaries would rotate forces 

into these CSLs to exercise and mature Joint Force 

reception, operations, and political interoperability 

procedures. 

The third recommendation category proposes the 

development of a robust and mobile land-based crossdomain control capacity for collective regional defense. The following three specific recommendations 

populate this category: 

• Air control; 

• Sea control; and, 

• Cyber and space control. 
xiv

The purpose of this collective set of recommendations 

is to impose costs on challengers, and to discourage 

escalation from gray zone competition to war. Additionally, the collection of recommendations would 

expand the political space to conduct coercive military 

options in support of U.S. interests to enforce international order short of war. This recommendation 

addresses a regional capability gap. Therefore, it requires more than a U.S.-centric equipping solution. 

The long-term strategic options for filling this capability gap require long-term U.S. force development 

decisions and actions to facilitate U.S. force development, U.S.-facilitated foreign military sales (FMS), and 

partner-fielded capability options. 

In all cases, the U.S. Joint Force must lead in the 

development of land-based cross-domain control concepts, and pursue doctrine and Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD) to re-mission existing 

capabilities, or incentivize partners and allies to pursue these gray zone competition-centric capabilities. 

The final ninth recommendation category—the creation of a land-force assured shallow-water maneuver 

capability—fills a tactical and operational need, which 

is critical to land forces operations in the Asia-Pacific. 

The capability involves performing mobile tactical 

tasks (including offensive operations such as a raids 

and interdiction; or enabling operations such as reconnaissance, security, or support to civil authorities) 

by land forces in a maritime environment. It requires 

fielding land forces meant to interdict transnational 

criminal organization supply chains, pirates at sea 

and supporting land bases, commercial fishing fleets 

presenting illegal incursions into disputed waters, 

and similar maritime-borne disorder activities. During coercive operations, this recommendation pro-
xv

vides land force commanders “division cavalry-like” 

capabilities in a maritime environment. Cavalry-like 

operations include screening, reconnaissance, armed 

patrols, raids (on land bases), interdiction (land bases 

and sea platforms), envelopment or bypass maneuver, 

and route reconnaissance for freedom of navigation 

operations. 

IMPLEMENTATION

The primary implementation objective is a rebalance of defense management processes and resource 

prioritization, from an exclusive combat readiness 

focus to an appreciation of the interrelationship between war fighting and winning the gray zone competition. The implementation plan recommendations 

embrace a two-tier (near-term, longer-term) approach. 

Near-term, “first-steps” include concept and doctrine 

development to allow for “functional area analysis” 

and “functional needs analysis” assessments to establish feasible requirements.

Long-term force management options include capabilities developed exclusively for use by U.S. forces, 

U.S.-developed capabilities for FMS, and regional 

partner-generated capabilities. Unless the threat profile in the region shifts significantly, U.S.-centric development of the full spectrum of recommended solutions may not be feasible. Therefore, it is imperative 

that the United States collaborate with regional partners to develop concepts and conduct JCTDs that will 

facilitate strategic force management options. No matter who fields this capability, the United States must 

provide leadership in the near-term to incentivize and 

mature the concept and capabilities. Regardless of the 

U.S. economy, defense budgets, or threat profile fac-
xvi

ing the United States in the next 20 years, the report 

recommends immediate action on “near-term” recommendations to make a future decision between strategic force development options possible. 

CONCLUSION

Academic institutions and security policy analysts 

from various research institutions have independently 

arrived at recommendations similar to those proffered 

in this report, supporting the soundness and validity 

of this quick-turn research and analysis.

Future Research.

This report did not consider the extensive ChinaU.S. competition space associated with Indian Ocean 

periphery states, the Americas, Russia, or Africa. Each 

of these regions deserves a focused consideration. The 

report’s Asia-Pacific analysis is intertwined with Indian Ocean security issues; however, time constraints 

prevented the synthesis of these Indian Ocean and 

Asia-Pacific issues. Considering the U.S.-China relationship through the lens of security issues involving 

India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia, and Thailand are critical to understanding the 

interdependent nature of the USARPAC’s Indo-AsiaPacific challenge.

Finally, the context of the Asia-Pacific rivalry has 

evolved over the last 5 or 6 decades. The regional 

stakeholders’ political, economic, military, and cultural histories have also evolved. This suggests an 

urgent need to re-examine war plans for the region, 

starting with first-principle assumptions and creative 

assessments of potential strategies employed by rivals 

to advance their national interests.
1

FOUNDATIONAL 

UNDERSTANDING

3

I. INTRODUCTION

It is hard to overestimate the centrality and influence of the U.S.-China relationship in shaping the security environment and regional state behaviors in the 

Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. According to Chinese President Xi Jinping, “China and the U.S. account for onethird of the world economy, one-fourth of the global 

population, and one-fifth of global trade.”1 The region 

is also home to half the world’s population, eight of 

the world’s ten largest armies, and five of the seven 

U.S. mutual defense treaties. Further, the U.S. Army 

has influenced regional stability and security by maintaining a continuous regional presence since the late 

19th century.2 Since the late 1970s, the U.S. relationship with China and the region has been characterized by strong elements of cooperation and economic 

growth.3 More recently, concerns over territorial dispute resolution, response to a bellicose nuclear threat 

emanating from North Korea, and an unease among 

regional allies and partners over China’s increasingly 

assertive foreign policy and outward looking military 

strategy have further complicated policy calculations 

in the region.4 As rightly noted by Dr. David Lai, “for 

better or for worse, the U.S.-China relationship is becoming a defining factor in the relations among AsiaPacific nations.”5

U.S. President Barack Obama emphasized the importance of Asia-Pacific security and stability to U.S. 

interests by announcing a rebalancing of U.S. foreign 

policy toward the Asia-Pacific in his 2012 strategic 

guidance document.6 The 2015 National Security Strategy of the United States re-emphasized the administration’s commitment to that policy choice.7

 Since then, 

the U.S. Joint Force has responded to the rebalance in 
4

several ways. Units deployed to the wars in Iraq and 

Afghanistan have been returning to the Asia-Pacific 

theater as the United States withdraws from those 

conflicts. The U.S. Marines are on their fourth rotation to Darwin, Australia, where they are gradually 

increasing their rotational presence to 2,500 marines 

by 2017.8 Finally, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 

General Martin E. Dempsey, issued the Joint Operational Access Concept to direct “how the Joint Force will 

operate in response to emerging anti-access and areadenial [A2AD] security challenges” in the region.9

These military responses to the rebalance guidance—incorporating not only military but also diplomatic, economic, and other elements of national power—have improved U.S. security posture, presence, 

and readiness to respond to combat contingencies in 

the region. However, the most persistent challenges 

facing the U.S. have emerged in the contested security 

space between war and peace, commonly called the 

gray zone.10

Military practitioners must better understand the 

nature of these gray zone competitions and the forces 

of regional disorder that inhibit a united response to 

those challenges. Land force practitioners must develop or adapt capabilities to compete successfully 

in this contested security space. The purpose of this 

report is to identify the land force capabilities and initiatives necessary to advance U.S. national interests 

and achieve national strategic objectives in the face of 

gray zone competition and disorder activities in the 

Asia-Pacific region. 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC) students wrote 

this report for land force military practitioners. The 

value of this student-led research project is to provide 

quick-turn insights, unconstrained by the realities of 
5

staff filters and organizational culture limitations, to 

address gray zone competition and disorder activities. 

These preliminary insights, inspired by what is new 

or changing in the environment, are intended to feed 

formal command planning and defense management 

systems for further consideration. The research team 

offers actionable implementation first steps for each 

recommendation proffered. The research team aspires 

to provide recommendations to enhance land forces 

relevance in shaping U.S. relations with China through 

relationships with regional allies and partners. Each 

recommendation provides some improvement to the 

U.S. Joint Force’s warfighting capability by enhancing multi-domain joint warfighting, providing deterrence and escalation mitigation options, or enhancing 

host government legitimacy and counter-corruption 

by leveraging partner capacity building activities.11

The Report Logic Map (see Figure 2) depicts the logic 

flow leading to the report’s conclusion: land forces relevance in the Asia-Pacific hinges on providing options 

to manage gray zone (between war and peace) competition, and providing cooperative to coercive means to 

enforce compliance with favorable international order 

norms through presence.
6

Figure 2. Report Logic Map.

The report logic map begins with a discussion of 

power transition theory and a Chinese “go game”

analogy to rationalize the report’s central focus on the 

U.S.-China relationship, explain the nature of gray 

zone competition in the Asia-Pacific, and highlight the 

vital role that U.S. engagement of regional allies and 

partners plays in achieving strategic outcomes. 

The report briefly covers both U.S. and Chinese 

key interests and the security environment, followed 

by a description of the most significant challenges and 

opportunities affecting U.S. interests in the region. 

This discussion leads to the identification of six broad 

land forces capability gaps and recommendations to 

address them. Finally, the report proffers implementation first steps to embed the recommendations into 

formal defense management processes for further 

development. The report concludes with a self-assessment of the report’s validity and suggestions for 

future research.
7

II. THEORY AND SCOPE

POWER TRANSITION

Power transition refers to a struggle among “big” 

and “powerful” nations (“big” primarily in terms of 

territory, demographics, and level of development; 

and “powerful” with respect to their consequential influence on world affairs). The stakes of power transition competition involve the modification of an existing international system. 

The rise of a previously underdeveloped and frustrated big nation sets in motion a power transition. 

The upstart nation’s frustration stems from a dissatisfaction with the existing international system and the 

dominant system leader nation. 

As its national power . . . [begins to increase, this rising 

nation experiences] . . . the impulse to make changes, 

intentionally or compulsively, to the rules of the [international] system that purportedly works against its 

interests. Changes of this kind challenge the existing 

international order. If the challenger and the statusquo powers cannot come to terms with the changes 

. . . they often [tragically] settle their differences on 

battlefields.12

China’s economic and military advancement and 

expanding influence around the world has precipitated a process of power transition competition between the United States and China. Unlike rivalries 

and competitive exchanges between other states, the 

U.S.-China competition has a revisionist nature. The 

countries engage in power transition competition not 

over temporal wins regarding specific issues, but over 

the future structure of the international system and 
8

the norms that shape state behavior. The competition’s 

myriad variables prevent prediction of an inevitable 

transfer of international system leadership from the 

United States to China, or the continued dominance of 

the United States. Rather, engaging in the process of 

competition results in a change of rules by which all 

nations interact within the international order.13

Though scholars may debate the viability of power 

transition theory or its application to U.S.-China relations, evidence of power transition appears nonetheless. Its first stage arguably began in 1978 when China 

launched its modernization mission and concluded in 

2008 when China reached many of its developmental 

milestones. Now in a second stage, expected to continue through 2050, China continues to grow in ways 

that make compromise more difficult, as China becomes more assertive on matters involving its extant 

and expanding national interests.14 This stage marks 

a dangerous period in power transition. Neither Chinese nor U.S. interests can afford for competition to 

escalate to war; but the potential for miscalculation 

remains significant. China may push for change in 

the international system too quickly, using economic 

and military force to impose its will on the system. 

Likewise, the United States may succumb to the historic precedent of a system leader “concerned with, 

and uneasy about, the changing power balance” being 

tempted to “launch a preemptive strike to derail the 

rising power.”15

Three critical insights derived from U.S.-China 

power transition analysis to inform the scope and 

focus of the report. First, the U.S.-China relationship 

emerges as the centerpiece and focus of the report. 

The nature of the U.S.-China relationship and competition for influence over international system structure 
9

and norms fundamentally underpin U.S. engagement 

with regional partners and the land forces recommendations presented. 

Second, U.S.-China power transition analysis provides context for understanding the behavior of China, the United States, and other regional state actors. 

Third, this analysis of China-U.S. power transition provides a rationale and incentive for the United 

States to manage and influence the restructuring of 

international order in the gray zone competitive space 

between peace and war. The United States fails to 

protect its interests if it retreats from the competition, 

or escalates to war. If the United States retreats from 

direct competition, one of two outcomes seem likely. 

In the first, the United States avoids a confrontation 

with China until the competitive disadvantage compels the political leadership to employ the military 

instrument of power, thereby going to war to reverse 

unfavorable international order trends. In the second, 

the United States concedes to international system adjustments that no longer assure the advancement of 

U.S. interests. No doubt, other options exist that iteratively oscillate between these two extremes. Neither 

U.S. retrenchment nor bellicose behavior (nor oscillating between them) seems prudent. Rather, this report 

adopts the position that U.S. political leadership will 

aspire to a strategic vision that includes nuanced win 

adjustments to the international order (shared power, 

no victory-defeat), a nuanced foreign policy that operates on several levels to affect those adjustments, and 

the resourcing of a military capable of contributing to 

the advancement of foreign policy objectives in the 

gray zone. 
10

GO GAME ANALOGY

Leaders must understand the nature of the gray 

zone competitive space to pursue a vision of the future 

that includes international order changed through 

China-U.S. competition, short of war. The Chinese 

board game of go offers a special insight into Chinese 

strategic thinking and operational art.16 The go game–

chess comparison provides a useful analogy to understanding the difference between Western and Chinese 

perspectives of strategy and competition, especially in 

the gray zone.

Only a brief description of the go game is necessary to glean the key points of comparison between 

the Chinese and U.S. strategic approaches to the gray 

zone.17 Go is an ancient Chinese board game played on 

a 19x19 matrix with black and white stones. Like many 

other board games, the go game is a game of war; its 

object is to exercise control of territories, one of the 

most basic objectives of war. The go game is played 

between two players who alternately place black and 

white stones on the intersections of the grid matrix 

board—one piece at a time. Stones hold equal value 

and remain on the board unless captured (encircled) 

and removed by the opposing player. By encircling 

an intersection with the same colored stones, a player 

controls territory. The game begins with an empty 

board and ends when both players see no advantage 

in continuing (two passes, one by each player, ends 

the game).

Contrasting the strategies and play between the go

game and chess offers at least five insights relevant 

to U.S. versus Chinese competition perspectives in the 

gray zone. First, the go game is designed to employ a 

win-without-fighting strategy. In chess, players attack 
11

opponent pieces—removing them from play, simplifying the game as it continues. Competitors remove 

stones in the go game, but not through direct attack. 

They gradually out-position (encircle) the opponent’s 

position and exercise control over the terrain—a hallmark of Chinese strategy. Further, in the go game, all 

the stones are of equal value and they do not move 

around the board. There is no “advantage of technology,” with some pieces having greater mobility than 

others do—a hallmark of both chess and U.S. strategy. 

Second, the go game features a multi-nodal initiative. Opposing players take the initiative across multiple regions of the board through successive turns. 

Players exploit opportunity and abandon failed initiatives in different regions as play progresses. There are 

always multiple sub-competitions occurring across a 

go game board. In chess, a player often pursues a single strategy across the board. Opportunity is usually 

limited to exploiting an opponent’s mistake. Amongst 

skilled players, these rarely occur. The multi-nodal 

initiative nature of the go game represents the simultaneous regional and functional competition present in 

the natural environment. The United States and China 

pursue competition in multiple regions and across 

multiple functions (diplomatic, economic, security, 

and narrative) simultaneously. In some, the competition takes the form of cooperation; in others, it takes 

the form of coercion or confrontation. Yet the competition occurs simultaneously.

Third, go game strategy takes the long-view, as 

play continues and the game becomes more complex. 

The go game presents 361 possible opening moves, 

whereby chess offers only 20. Likewise, as the go game 

progresses, players add more stones on the board, increasingly complicating strategies and power dynam-
12

ics. In chess, the number of pieces on the board attrite 

as the game progresses, simplifying the options available. Both dynamics align with the U.S. preference to 

isolate issues and deal with them sequentially, often 

adopting binary language to describe competitors 

in different contexts. China is often characterized as 

a partner when discussed in international trade and 

commerce circles, but a rival (or threat) when discussed in security and territorial dispute circles.

Fourth, go game players often pursue a periphery 

to center strategy. Especially during early stages of the 

game, go game players seek to dominate the periphery 

and corners of the board before consolidating their advantage in the center. This demonstrates the Chinese 

willingness to tackle quick-win engagements in order 

to establish precedence and momentum before engaging in center of board competition. In chess, players 

adhere to the fundamental tenet of dominating the 

center. This is indicative of a Western fascination with 

engaging centers of gravity or the reduction to decisive points.

Finally, the go game results in nuanced outcomes. 

A typical go game produces a subtle “imperial” win 

between skilled players, often decided over as few as 

two or three spaces of territory. Most chess matches 

end with decisive victory, the defeat of the opponent’s 

king.18 Binary language—for example, quick win and 

decisive victory or defeat and surrender, and mission 

accomplishment or failure—reflects Western military 

tradition and culture. The Chinese aspire to a perspective that incorporates long-term strategic success, resourcing trends that incrementally advance their interests, exploiting opportunities even when they were 

not the original objectives. These five game dynamics 

can shed light on the differing ways China and the 
13

United States view both competition and the strategies pursued in the gray zone.

The go game fundamentally embodies a game of 

positioning, not a game of annihilation or attrition. 

The U.S. chess perspective values the preparation 

for war by developing competitive edge technology, 

overwhelming and ready combat capability and capacity, and strategies to defeat adversary A2AD capabilities. A go game perspective conforms to the ancient 

Chinese strategist Sun Tzu’s dictum that the greatest 

victory is winning without fighting. The game relies 

on strategy and power dynamics (positioning), not 

technology or overwhelming force (analogous to the 

unequal power of various chess pieces). A central feature of the go game strategy involves creating multinodal and dynamic conditions for success. Initiative 

in a go game is derived from an inexhaustible variation of moves that create conditions requiring an opponent to react and thereby allowing the potential to 

achieve territorial advantage (or political objectives in 

security strategy parlance). Along these same lines, 

the go game becomes more complicated as play continues from the periphery to the center and the number 

of stones (stakeholders affected by the competition) 

increases. Very importantly, play proceeds in a measured and balanced manner. Strategic success at times 

involves reciprocal concessions resembling “nuanced 

win” conditions in a go game. This is not typical of 

adversarial engagements leading to decisive victory, 

as in chess. At the end of a go game, equally talented 

players nearly share overall territory distribution and 

power. 

The go game perspective encourages a win-without-fighting strategic approach, nuanced win solutions 

to disputes, and the inclusion of regional stakehold-
14

ers—starting with less contentious peripheral issues 

and moving to the more central disputes as initiative 

and power accrues. Finally, the go game reminds us 

that strategic success is characterized by sustainable 

and favorable political outcomes, not military victory 

over an opponent. 

National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski 

observed that U.S. leaders think in terms of chess.19

The United States arguably expects other nations (or 

its opponents) to respond on chess terms. However, 

the aspirational perspective of the United States does 

not always prevail. This is particularly true in cases 

where the other player proves capable of envisioning 

an alternative game and strategy. The go game mindset ostensibly motivates China’s behavior. This presents a problem for the United States, as it must manage 

a competitive and resurgent China in the gray zone 

competition between war and peace. The chess game, 

where pieces attrite from play and decisive victory 

over a king determines the outcome, does not reflect 

the contemporary competitive security environment. 

In fact, at the point that the game turns to chess (war), 

both sides stand to lose a great deal. Instead, the current competitive security environment looks more like 

a go game, and the United States needs to recognize 

the game it is engaged in.

The purpose of the Chinese go game analogy involves identifying and avoiding U.S. strategic cultural 

biases and an exclusive warfighting mind-set when 

competing with China. This may avert the probability of the United States losing a go game by accident, 

while preparing for a game of chess. 
15

III. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT CONTEXT

U.S. INTERESTS 

The Quadrennial Defense Review 2014,

20 the 2015 

National Security Strategy,

21 and the President’s budget22 (among other documents) establish U.S. security 

interests and the means to pursue them. Subordinate 

federal departments and institutions provide documentation of the ways to achieve specific objectives 

nested under these national documents. For the U.S. 

military, these documents include The National Military Strategy23 and combatant commander’s regional 

strategies.24

The three principle U.S. interests proffered by each 

of these documents include security, international order, and prosperity. Each of these broad interests has 

a global and regional component. Admiral Samuel J. 

Locklear III, the former Commander of U.S. Pacific 

Command (USPACOM), sums up the macro-level relevance of the Asia-Pacific to U.S. security and prosperity interests when he says:

The region is a vital driver of the global economy and 

includes the world’s busiest international sea-lanes 

and nine of the ten largest ports. By any meaningful 

measure, the Asia-Pacific is also the most militarized 

region in the world, with seven of the world’s ten largest standing militaries and five of the world’s declared 

nuclear nations.25

U.S. security interests specific to the Asia-Pacific 

start with protection of the homeland. Currently, no 

direct threat to the continental United States emanates 

from the Asia-Pacific. However, the Asia-Pacific theater includes a number of U.S. states and territories, 
16

including Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, 

and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 

Islands. In addition, the United States is a signatory 

to several security alliances and collective defense arrangements in the theater. “This homeland area, coupled with our [U.S.] treaty alliances with Australia, 

Japan, [the] Republic of Korea, [the] Philippines, and 

Thailand are the cornerstone of U.S. engagement in 

the region.”26 The commitment to rebalance U.S. foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific strikes as a consistent 

theme across all national security documents. Renewed commitment to assure our allies, and a pledge 

to pursue deeper ties with a more diverse set of regional security partners, form the foundation to build 

the rebalance. 

Deepening and diversifying regional security partnerships is not purely altruistic. The objectives of these 

security relationships are twofold: (1) to build partner capacity, increasing regional collective defense 

burden sharing; and, (2) to assure access and multilateral readiness if competition escalates to conflict. 

“The U.S. military . . . routinely provide[s] presence 

and conduct[s] training, exercises, and other forms of 

military-to-military activities—to build security globally in support of our national security interests.”27 Of 

the dozen priority joint missions listed in The National 

Military Strategy (2015), six involve gray zone competition and presence.28 The recommendations offered in 

this report directly address all six gray zone relevant 

missions, and incorporate the concrete methods recommended in the Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 to 

conduct the missions. 

Eight of the nine recommendations provide a stabilizing presence that concurrently improves crisis 

and contingency response capability. This stability 
17

includes enhancing essential capabilities of missile 

defense, cybersecurity, maritime security, and disaster 

relief.29 Four of the recommendations focus on military 

engagement missions involving security cooperation, 

stability operations, and support to civil authorities. 

These recommendations adopt tailored packaging of 

capabilities, regional alignment of forces, optimization of multilateral training facilities, and the pursuit of access agreements to increase interoperability 

with our allies and partners. Combined, they provide 

strategic and operational flexibility to respond to a crisis.30 Finally, three recommendations have a distinct 

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief component, as this mission provides the greatest opportunity for direct U.S. Army-Chinese People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) multi-lateral operations.

The report recommendations fully embrace the 

Quadrennial Defense Review 2014’s aspiration to increase Asia-Pacific collective defense burden sharing 

and leadership. One recommendation in particular 

specifically calls for one of the traditional anchors of 

regional security (Australia, Japan, or the Republic of 

Korea31) to take on the additional leadership role of 

running a multi-site, multinational training exercise 

supported by U.S. logistics and transportation assets.32

U.S. military engagement with regional allies and 

partners provides opportunities to advance other national interests not directly related to the security mission. The U.S. military “underpins the international 

order and provides opportunities to engage with 

other countries while positioning forces to respond 

to crises.”33 U.S. economic strength relies on a stable 

international order, underwritten by the U.S. military’s role and that of our allies and partners to ensure freedom of access and the free flow of commerce 
18

globally.34 The U.S. military can promote international 

order and universal values by facilitating dispute resolution through regional institutions that respect civil 

liberties and the rule of law. This can be done directly, 

by teaming with host nations to bring transnational 

criminals, pirates, and other violators of international 

order to the courts. Further, rebalancing land forces 

to the Asia-Pacific will directly contribute to stronger 

alliances and partnerships, as well as a diverse security posture. Indirectly, land force activities have the 

potential to create positive opportunities for increased 

diplomacy, expanded trade, and foreign military sales 

(FMS). 

On a local level, land force activities can promote 

and empower civil society by strengthening statesociety relationships. Implementation of the recommendations offered in this report would facilitate the 

secondary benefits of extending host nation central 

government legitimacy to the periphery of their control. Land force presence activities have the potential 

to stimulate local economies, help reduce poverty, 

and mitigate conditions that lead to corruption and 

illegal shadow economy practices. Oversight of land 

force related contracting, construction, and workforce employment can directly confront corruption by 

advancing the standards of accountability and transparency as well as promoting universal values. The 

2017 President’s budget specifically addressed the advancement of U.S. interests by engaging democratic 

governments working toward reform by managing 

U.S. activities through local institutions, investing 

in infrastructure, and confronting corruption and financial mismanagement.35 These land force activities 

contribute to building strong democratic institutions 

and programs that foster good governance, promote 

justice, and strengthen civil society.36
19

Despite the balance between combat and gray zone 

competition mission sets found in U.S. security strategy documents, Joint Forces and Army concepts and 

doctrine lean heavily toward combat missions. U.S. 

strategy clearly requires the nation to maintain land 

forces prepared to fight and win in the Asia-Pacific. 

Additionally, it clearly requires land forces capable of 

developing regional allies and partners, contributing 

to stability through partner relationships, and advancing U.S. interests beyond the requirements of security. 

To advance U.S. national interests and achieve national strategic objectives, U.S. land forces should be 

prepared to fight and win, and commensurately be 

prepared to manage the peace in the competitive security environment known as gray zone competition.37

CHINA’S INTERESTS38

China’s national interests fall into three categories: 

(1) preservation of the Communist Party of China’s 

control of China; (2) safeguarding Chinese sovereignty 

and territorial integrity; and, (3) sustainable economic 

and social development, which is dependent on retaining economic and market influence as well as access 

to/and security of resources, especially energy and 

minerals.39

Currently, China places emphasis on the territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. Several important factors have forced China’s attention 

to this area. First, China’s turn to assertive diplomacy 

has much to do with its intensified focus on the two 

seas. Second, China holds that the U.S. rebalance is all 

about China and presents China’s assertive acts as a 

kind of reaction to the U.S. strategic rebalance toward 

the Asia-Pacific. China blames the U.S. for sending 
20

“wrong” signals to China’s neighbors, especially those 

who “dare” to challenge Chinese territorial assertions 

in the South and East China Seas. Third, China’s quest 

for maritime power complicates the situation. The 

previous 30 years of economic reform and development transformed China from a land-based agrarian 

society into a global-reaching powerhouse. Much of 

China’s resource supply and trade rely on seaborne 

transportation. These factors have compelled China to 

develop its sea power so that it can protect its expanding interests. Confident of security on the mainland, 

China has correspondingly increased efforts to settle 

maritime area disputes in its favor. As the Chinese put 

it, China wants to become a full-fledged global power; 

however, without unification with Taiwan and achieving what China perceives as territorial integrity in the 

East and South China Seas, China cannot pursue its 

broader goals at will. 

China’s assertive behavior in pursuing its interests 

in the Western Pacific have put pressure on the U.S.-

China relationship, as both countries address power 

transition realities. 

CHALLENGES

This report offers land forces relevant recommendations to respond to the four most pressing security 

challenges facing the United States in the Asia-Pacific: 

revisionists, state-based disorder, nonstate disorder, 

and natural disorder. The first challenge to regional 

stability emanates from China, a revisionist nation 

seeking to alter the nature of current international 

order to reclaim a central historic role in the Asia-Pacific.40 China’s military modernization investment—to 

include a nascent naval power projection capability—
21

combined with a more assertive foreign policy stance 

pose the most direct challenge. This assertive foreign 

policy manifests itself in military posturing to extend 

China’s active defense periphery and in exercising 

physical claim to disputed territories.41 Within the 

South China Sea, examples of this pattern of Chinese 

assertive behavior include the establishment of air defense and anti-ship missile systems on Woody Island, 

in the Paracel Islands.42 Perhaps more disturbing is the 

use of commercial fishing fleets and artificial island 

construction to directly challenge China’s neighbors 

by physically advancing Chinese claims to disputed 

territories distant from China’s coast. China is not the 

only country advancing its territorial claims by developing features in the South China Sea; however, 

China’s island construction activities—to include a 

3,000-meter runway on Fiery Cross Reef, and the potential construction of a similar airfield on Subi Reef in 

the Spratly Islands—are among the most ambitious.43

Even more distant from China’s shores, Chinese commercial fishing fleets (backed up by the PLA’s Navy 

[PLAN]) have challenged the Philippines’ claims to 

the Scarborough Shoals and Malaysia’s claims to the 

fisheries off Borneo.44

The second category of challenges involves statebased disorder challengers that lack the capacity China has to revise the international order. While not a 

gray zone competitor per se, North Korea represents 

the most troubling of this kind of state-based disorder 

force in the region. Following a decades-old tradition 

of bellicose behavior, North Korean leader Kim Jongun ordered the separate testing of a nuclear warhead 

and a ballistic rocket in March 2016. Further, within the 

next several months, he intends to test the capability 

to launch a ballistic missile from a mobile platform—a 
22

missile capable of reaching Guam and Alaska.45 The 

most troubling aspects of this challenge are North Korea’s steadfast foreign policy antagonism and unpredictability, combined with their advances in nuclear 

warhead and mobile ballistic rocket technology; these 

aspects render an increasingly real and present threat 

to the U.S. Pacific Northwest.

As a rule, regional states with weak central government legitimacy, limited security force capacity, 

and an internally focused security apparatus make-up 

the remainder of the state-based disorder category. 

Particularly endemic among nations forming the peripheral boundary of the South China Sea, these weak 

states pose no direct threat to the United States, but 

instead prevent regional ally and partner central governments from effectively focusing externally on the 

challenges posed by China. Additionally, the central 

government’s inability to provide order and prosperity at the periphery of their control present conditions 

that are fertile for nonstate disorder forces to proliferate. The Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia count 

among the nations whose weaknesses at the periphery 

could exacerbate challenges. 

Nonstate disorder forces—the third challenges category—include transnational criminal organizations, 

pirates, and domestic criminal elements who establish shadow economies and power authorities. These 

nonstate disorder forces disrupt international order, 

present challenges to regional security, and consume 

partner nations’ security force capacity. These disorder forces typically operate at the periphery of legitimate central government control. Parts of the southern islands of Mindanao and Sulu are at the periphery 

of the Luzon-based Philippine government’s control. 

Parts of Sulawesi and the other islands bordering the 
23

Celebes Sea are at the northeastern periphery of Indonesia’s Java-based government control. Malaysia’s 

two provinces in Borneo, Sabah and Sarawak, are 600 

nautical miles across the South China Sea from the 

capital of Kuala Lumpur. Parts of each of these areas 

are hubs for human trafficking, drugs and gunrunning, piracy, and local shadow economies.

The final category of disruptive force in the AsiaPacific involves those dealt by nature. East and Southeast Asia rank among the most prone to natural disasters and devastation as anywhere in the world.46

Typhoon-prone tracks of territory traverse expanses 

of the Western Pacific that include subduction zones 

prone to seismic activity. Dense human presence and 

vulnerable infrastructure often compound the magnitude of disasters, as witnessed during the 2011 tsunami and Fukushima nuclear accident. Pandemics, a 

few simple mutations away from rapid transmissibility, remain a perpetual risk.

Combined, these four categories of regional disorder forces underpin several capability gaps and 

influence the nature and location of the United Nations University’s World Risk Report 2014 recommendations.47 The report outlines those activities likely to 

improve stability and reinforce several U.S. interests 

beyond the realm of security (e.g. support for democracies; prosperity enhancement; and poverty mitigation, rule-of-law, and human rights proliferation).

OPPORTUNITIES 

The Asia-Pacific offers its share of opportunities. 

Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea are among 

the most stable U.S. allies, possessing robust military 

forces, legitimate governments, and stable economies. 
24

In addition, “Australia and Japan are two of the most 

capable maritime powers in the Asia Pacific and serve 

as the longstanding southern and northern anchors 

of regional stability.”48 Japan’s recent reinterpretation 

of its constitution has opened the possibility of an expanded role in regional collective defense. Australia 

has already contributed to the U.S. capacity to provide 

land forces to regional collective defense by agreeing 

to base U.S. Marines at Darwin. 

For very different reasons, Singapore and Vietnam 

both represent useful models for regional partners.49

Singapore offers political stability, economic growth, 

and adherence to rule-of-law standards. Transparency 

International, a watchdog organization based in Berlin, has consistently rated Singapore among the leastcorrupt countries in Asia.50 Vietnam, with a strong and 

relatively effective central government, boasts a record 

of accomplishment in protecting its interests vis-à-vis 

China. Vietnam defended itself against a direct invasion by China during the last Sino-Vietnamese war 

in 1979.51 China then fought a protracted war against 

Vietnam for 12 years, some directly but most through 

a proxy government in Cambodia. “The Chengdu 

summit denoted the end of China’s twelve years of 

hostility toward Vietnam.”52 The agreement included 

a Vietnamese concession to a Chinese request that the 

Khmer Rouge participate in post war governance of 

Cambodia. In part to avoid repeating the devastation 

caused by the war, Vietnam and China negotiated a 

delimitation of the territorial seas and a joint fishery 

agreement, dividing the Tonkin Gulf (known as Beibu 

Gulf or Bac Bo Gulf in the official document) between 

Vietnam and China on Christmas Day, 2000.53 This 

negotiation was significant for two reasons. It demonstrated China’s willingness to negotiate on territorial 
25

claims, if sufficiently compelled to do so. Moreover, 

though weaker in nearly every metric when compared 

to China, the negotiated settlement arguably favored 

Vietnam. 

Mongolia, at the other end of the Asia-Pacific geography from the South China Sea, offers another opportunity for partnership. Mongolia has a long-standing 

relationship with both China and North Korea. Mongolia has been a constitutionally based democracy 

and market economy since 1992. Mongolia was the 

site of the third exercise of a Pacific Pathways rotation 

in 2015. The Mongolians have offered to host a military exercise on humanitarian assistance and disaster 

relief, with both China and the United States participating. This offer represents a potential opportunity 

for expanding direct China-United States military-tomilitary engagement.

The final opportunities presented in the region 

are the various cooperative organizations and forums 

available to engage with; resolve disputes; and gain 

understanding. The Association of Southeast Asian 

Nations (ASEAN) is a long-standing and credible organization within the region. Periodic changes in its 

leadership offer rich opportunities for expanding its 

role. Upcoming changes in ASEAN leadership will 

also offer opportunities for new perspectives and new 

roles.

U.S. CAPABILITY GAPS54

The U.S. whole-of-government approach falls 

short of effectively countering China’s assertiveness 

in the gray zone and of influencing security environment disorder in the Asia-Pacific theater. Six capability gaps contribute to this shortfall. First, the U.S. Joint 
26

Forces lack sufficient language and frameworks to 

describe or design campaigns for gray zone competition. Second, legislative and Department of Defense 

(DoD) oversight, in the form of authorities and timely 

permissions, limit U.S. land force military-to-military 

relations with China. These relationships are critical, 

regardless of political tensions and immediate state 

behavior. Especially during times of tense political 

disagreement and assertive behavior, U.S.-China trust 

relationships mitigate miscalculation, improve mutual understanding, and offer venues for unofficial dialogue. Third, relationships capable of assuring access 

and readiness among partners in the periphery states 

of the South China Sea remain embryonic. Fourth, 

several South China Sea periphery partners lack externally focused security forces, limiting their effective 

contribution to regional collective defense.55 Fifth, U.S. 

land forces lack sufficient land-based cross-domain 

control capabilities. For air defense systems, capacity 

shortfall poses the greatest challenge. For sea control, 

lack of existing doctrine or capability to conduct antiship operations are the greatest challenge. In the cyber and space domain, the shortfall in training and in 

sufficiently transparent interoperability with partners 

complicates achieving cross-domain synergy. Finally, 

U.S. land forces lack an assured shallow-water maneuver capability. Cumulatively, these gaps amount 

to a serious multilateral and Joint Force shortfall for a 

land force centric, maritime theater.

In summary, the above sections comprise the rationale behind the recommendation screening criteria 

developed and used by the research project team. The 

centrality of the U.S.-China relationship in shaping 

the security environment and outcomes in the AsiaPacific led to the first criteria. All recommendations 
27

must address the improvement of U.S.-China relations or the advancement of U.S. interests in the gray 

zone competition with China.56 While acknowledging the primary role of a military force to fight and 

win the nation’s wars, recommendations must focus 

on identifying land forces capabilities and activities 

that provide decision makers options for effectively 

competing in the gray zone—options for effecting a 

“winning without fighting” or “managing the peace” 

foreign policy and security strategy. 

The project deliberately scoped recommendations 

to address emerging changes in the Asia-Pacific security environment. Distilled, four categories of new 

or unique regional security attributes appear. The 

first includes China’s recent boldness in addressing territorial disputes and use of non-military and 

maritime law enforcement assets to advance that assertiveness. The second involves a growing desire for 

regional cooperative defense. Japan’s reinterpretation 

of its constitution, allowing for an expanded role in 

regional cooperative defense, provides an important 

case-in-point. Third, there is a growing importance 

for partner/ally legitimacy, and an externally focused 

security apparatus. These factors increase a partner 

state’s ability to resolve disputes through the rule-oflaw, and toward maturing international system norms 

that are nuanced wins for U.S.-China relations (and 

therefore for the region). Finally, leadership changes 

within ASEAN offer opportunities for expanded roles 

and new perspectives.

The final screening criteria for recommendations 

stipulated that they must be “dual-purpose” relevant. 

Recommendations must advance land forces options 

and effectiveness in gray zone competition; but they 

must also contribute to combat readiness of the Joint 
28

Forces. No matter how useful a recommendation is to 

a combatant commander competing in the gray zone, 

preserving combat readiness within the constraints of 

austere budgets dominates resource prioritization and 

funding choices in Washington.
29

RECOMMENDATIONS

31

IV. REBALANCED MINDSET AND LEXICON

Several civilian and military leaders have praised 

the U.S. Joint Forces for being the best in the world. 

These accolades generally refer to the Joint Force’s 

demonstrated ability to deploy force to fight the nation’s wars. Over the last 2 decades, U.S. land forces 

have been called on disproportionally to project power and use violence to dominate the nation’s enemies. 

For several decades, the U.S. Joint Force has been peerless in prosecuting wars characterized by nation-state 

armies clashing in armed conflict over a sustained 

period. 

Perhaps because of the U.S. dominance in decisive 

warfare, rivals challenge the United States in other 

dimensions of coercive competition. Persistent competition between the United States and both state and 

nonstate actors in the gray zone characterize the current security environment. When this coercive competition involves capable competitors (China, Russia, 

maybe Iran), the terms of success include permanent 

changes to the norms of world order. Nations do not 

employ strategies that are dependent on land force 

victory to determine outcomes in gray zone competition. To maintain the contest below a level that would 

trigger a sustained military response, rivals introduce 

ambiguity by making use of proxies, cyber and socialmedia narratives, and other activities short of a direct 

and overt use of the armed forces.

Unlike wars fought by nation-state armies clashing 

over sustained periods, the United States is not currently competing well below the threshold of major 

combat operations and campaigns.57 China’s artificial 

island construction operations in the South China Sea 

and positioning of military capabilities on those fabri-
32

cated features are an example of gray zone competition 

for which the United States does not appear to have an 

effective response. Despite diplomatic challenges to 

Chinese claims and several recent freedom of navigation challenges by the U.S. Navy, China remains undeterred. In response to U.S. Navy cruisers exercising 

freedom of navigation rights within 12 nautical miles 

of Chinese occupied disputed territories, China dispatched advanced air-defense systems to Woody Island in the Paracel Islands.58 In response to diplomatic 

sparing over China’s sovereignty claims, General Fan 

Changlong (a senior commander in the PLA) made a 

symbolically significant visit to the Spratly Islands in 

April 2016, and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied the U.S.S. John C. Stennis a port call in 

Hong Kong in May 2016.59

Lieutenant General (Ret) Daniel Bolger makes an 

argument that the U.S. military does not compete well 

outside major combat operations because the force is 

designed for rapid, decisive, conventional war.60 Others consider military involvement in coercive conflict 

short of war troubling at best and folly at worst.61

Notwithstanding the policy choice argument and in 

recognition of Lieutenant General Bolger’s argument, 

the U.S. military must be prepared to provide options 

to civilian political leaders who direct military action 

to advance U.S. interests and collective defense treaty 

obligations. As noted historian Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria points out, gray zone competition is nothing new, 

but “Chinese coercion . . . highlighted weaknesses in 

the U.S. military’s conceptual framework for planning 

campaigns in support of strategies.”62 The U.S. military must correct these conceptual shortfalls as a first 

step in addressing the gray zone challenge presented 

by China.
33

RECOMMENDATION 1: SUSTAINED 

COMPETITION FRAMEWORK

The Joint Staff publish a joint concept establishing a conceptual framework for conducting sustained 

competition operations that includes language and 

frameworks compatible with gray zone competition. 

The conceptual framework should account for partner 

cooperation through coercive enforcement of international order norms. Such enforcement may include 

episodes of lethal coercive force, without provoking 

a threshold for war escalation. The gray zone competition dialogue that would accompany the process of 

developing that concept would be worth the effort, 

even if a definitive framework proves elusive. 

The first element to establishing a sustained competition conceptual framework requires challenging 

a few assumptions under which the Joint Forces, and 

the nation, operates. The first assumption to challenge 

is the myth of the war-peace binary narrative. This 

narrative views the nation, and therefore the military, 

as being in a state of war or peace. Historically during periods of peace, the nation cycles though defense 

budget austerity and invests in hedging strategies for 

developing future warfare technology. This binary 

narrative proves incompatible with the nature of gray 

zone competition or the realities of military commitment during periods of relative peace. It does, however, drive resource priority choices within the Pentagon.63 The reality of the actual security environment 

involves continuous competition in the space between 

peace and war where no definitive end-state or objective drives a competition termination decision. Instead, it involves a success (“band-of-stability”) measured in terms of maintaining favorable international 
34

order, achieving sustainable political outcomes, and 

managing a security environment within the capability and capacity of local security forces to preserve the 

peace. 

The second element for a sustained competition 

conceptual framework requires the development 

and codification of a new lexicon to effectively discuss military actions and outcomes. The new lexicon 

must transcend echelons of command as well as be 

accessible and palatable within the communities of 

international and interagency partners that operate in 

the competitive gray zone environment. The recommendation intent includes creating a rich language 

to facilitate the understanding of various interagency 

methods, to describe various conditions and outcomes 

that contribute to gaining partner cooperation, and to 

achieve synergy of effort. The current joint lexicon of 

destroy, disrupt, neutralize, divert, delay, and others 

lend themselves to combat operations. In most cases, 

they prove alien or even offensive to interagency and 

multinational partners managing the peace in the 

gray zone competitive environment.64 It would be presumptuous to offer a definitive lexicon or definitions 

in this preliminary report. However, concept writers 

might consider starting with the categories of actions 

referred to earlier in the report, including: coordinate, 

cooperate, collaborate, coerce, challenge, confront, 

and compel to describe the competition. Each of these 

categories have dimensions that concept writers must 

explore to translate them into operational definition 

language. That exercise, done with our interagency 

and multinational partners, will facilitate precision of 

idea exchange between stakeholders. Potential outcome terms might include advance, maintain, change, 

counter, create, and restore. None of these words is 
35

intended to be prescriptive. They represent exemplars 

to guide an initial conversation about neutral language that can inform communication regarding gray 

zone competitive actions and outcomes.

The third element of the sustained competition 

conceptual framework involves a design paradigm 

that accounts for robust interagency solutions and the 

nature of the gray zone competition environment. Dr. 

Echevarria suggests that a:

paradigm, of some sort is necessary because the exercise of non-kinetic (and eventually kinetic) power in 

economic, diplomatic, informational, and military dimensions requires a great deal of coordination. Moreover, not only must the United States coordinate its 

own efforts, it must synchronize them with those of its 

allies and strategic partners.65

Military notions of unity of command may not be 

feasible or desirable to synchronize loosely harmonized activities across interagency partner activities. 

Concept writers must augment traditional elements of 

design66 with new elements of design that are interagency friendly, relevant across national instruments 

of power,67 and easily applied in the gray zone competitive environment.68 The elements of design must 

also uncover the various authority, process, and forum 

relationships necessary to coordinate and synchronize 

activities. Plans resulting from new design elements 

must provide geographic combatant commanders 

with timely access to authorities, permissions, and 

resources required to compete continuously. This requires the national agility to approve periodic relief 

from peacetime restraints based on rapidly changing 

competition conditions. To be successful, Congress 

and the DoD must resource geographic combatant 
36

commanders for sustained competition operations 

and manage-the-peace initiatives. A deep and realistic 

understanding of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational stakeholders’ capabilities and 

capacity, culture for engagement, and commitment to 

pursue mutually agreed upon outcomes prove essential to applying any new elements of design. 

The fourth element of the sustained competition 

conceptual framework that will improve military effectiveness in the gray zone includes the notion of 

“strategic mindedness.” Strategic mindedness involves the ability to think of military activities in an 

appropriate political context, to take a long-term view 

of success, and to consider military options in terms of 

their contribution to achieving favorable international 

order, sustainable political outcomes, and the ability 

of local security forces to manage the peace. This component of a conceptual framework remains closely 

tied to the development of real and relevant military 

options (versus courses of action, sharing similar outcomes and similar ways).69

The final element of a sustained competition conceptual framework entails a recognition of the dualpurpose nature of military capability and capacity. 

This report has highlighted the value of land forces 

non-warfighting capabilities and relationship-building activities to combat operations. Equally important 

to a shift in military mind-set is the dual-purpose value 

of combat capability. The deterrent effect of a combat 

capability, combined with the national will to use it, is 

widely acknowledged—and as widely underappreciated. The ability to impose coercive combat capabilities into an opponent’s behavior calculus expands the 

gray zone competitive space. The potential to apply 

force using a robust and present coercive force is the 
37

most effective way to expand the competitive space. 

When the United States and regional partners can 

increase the potential cost on gray zone competitors 

who escalate to war, the available U.S. options—from 

cooperation through confrontation—to influence outcomes short of war grow exponentially. 

39

V. ACCESS AND READINESS THROUGH 

PARTNERSHIP AND PRESENCE

Two recommendations in this category (2 and 3) 

are quick wins. They extend activities already in progress. Recommendation 4, civic action activity synchronization, appears easy; but in practice, it is difficult, 

requiring coordination and cooperation beyond the 

boundaries of military organizational authority. Recommendation 5, cooperative security locations, is the 

stretch goal. Many components of this recommendation are already underway. However, the synergistic 

affect achieved by full implementation of the recommendation will require a shared perspective regarding its value between the combatant command, service 

leaders, policy makers, Congress, and select regional 

partner governments.

RECOMMENDATION 2: NEW PACIFIC 

PATHWAYS INITIATIVES

Direct Engagement with China Through 

Mongolian Hosted Exercises.

The United States appreciates China’s increasing 

contribution to solutions associated with global security challenges. China’s recent economic growth and 

overall development makes their contributions to security solutions possible.70 Additionally, the United 

States welcomes the peaceful rise of China. There are 

many security interests that the two countries share, 

such as countering terrorism and piracy, promoting 

international peacekeeping, and developing regional 

humanitarian assistance and a disaster relief capacity. These shared interests present opportunities for 
40

military-to-military cooperation with China, which 

would help advance the bilateral relationship.71 In 

general, the United States endeavors to engage China, 

collaborate on shared interests, and better understand 

respective differences. 

In order to engage with China in constructive ways, 

the United States should seek opportunities to leverage the relationship. Specifically, the United States 

should cooperate with other willing nations to foster 

U.S. cooperation with China. Mongolia represents a 

potential candidate for furthering U.S. engagement 

with China as well as North Korea. 

In terms of opportunities, Mongolia offers U.S. 

land forces a rich opportunity to engage China (and 

tangentially North Korea). There are two attributes 

that render Mongolia a fertile partner to advance U.S.-

China (or at least U.S. land force and PLA) relations. 

First, Mongolia maintains friendly relations with all 

nations in the region, including North Korea. Second, 

Mongolia has demonstrated the political willingness 

to take part in all activities that promote peace and 

security in the region.72

Mongolia and the USPACOM have been successful in advancing military-to-military cooperation with 

the PLA in recent years. The PLA sent a platoon to participate in the Khaan Quest peacekeeping exercise in 

2015, marking the first time ever that the PLA actively 

participated in this exercise. Mongolia and China conducted joint anti-terrorism exercises in each other’s 

territories. Thus, opportunities exist to explore, and 

Mongolia could help advance U.S. efforts to engage 

China positively.

Mongolia has a special and long-lasting relation 

with North Korea. Mongolia was the second country to 

recognize the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s 
41

(DPRK) independence in 1948, after the Soviet Union. 

At the time, both countries shared a socialist ideology, 

although Mongolia converted to a liberal-democratic 

political system in 1990. North Korea sees Mongolia as 

the only “non-threatening” nation in Northeast Asia.73

Mongolia, however, has always expressed its desire 

to see North Korea behave in line with international 

norms and standards. Mongolia acknowledges current international attitudes toward North Korea and 

recognizes that it will be difficult for the international 

community to push North Korea toward an agenda 

change. Thus, Mongolia rightfully assumed that the 

best way to go forward in bringing sustainable and 

lasting stability to the region was by building confidence among the concerned states through open 

dialogue, collaboration, and engagement. Mongolian 

President Elbegdorj Tsakhia officially announced the 

“Ulaanbaatar Dialogue” initiative at the VII Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracies in 

March 2013.74 The initiative recommends dialogues on 

common issues facing the region, for example: regional stability, social-economic cooperation, and environmental reform. The initiative is not a substitute for 

the Six-Party Talks. Rather, it provides an instrument 

to encourage dialogue among regional countries, the 

most important factor in paving the road for resolving 

security challenges. 

Within the context of the initiative, Mongolia 

hosted an international conference, the “Ulaanbaatar 

Dialogue” in 2014, at which more than 100 scholars 

and researchers attended from China, Russia, South 

Korea, North Korea, the United States, Singapore, 

and Mongolia.75 The main agenda was the Northeast 

Asian security situation. Experts in security studies 

exchanged their views and potential prospects for 
42

the region. Although the initiative was only recently 

started, the results seem quite promising. Especially 

significant is the participation of all members of the 

region, including North Korean scholars, who are to 

inform their countries’ respective decision makers. 

Overall, Mongolia’s efforts to resolve regional issues 

through dialogue could be useful for the United States 

in promoting peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. 

Another avenue of cooperation Mongolia could offer is increasing military-to-military engagement with 

the PLA through multinational military exercises and 

training. Mongolia has co-hosted a multinational exercise, Khaan Quest, annually since 2003.76 China has 

sent observers to participate in the exercise since 2013, 

and sent a platoon to participate in a field training exercise in 2015 for the first time ever. It seems likely 

that China will continue participation in the years to 

come.77 This clearly demonstrates the possibility of 

reaching out to the PLA and establishing a network of 

trust relationships through military cooperation. The 

United States and Mongolia should encourage China 

to increase its participation in all aspects of the exercise; 

including command post exercises (CPX), engineering 

civic action program (ENCAP) projects, as well as cooperative health engagement (CHE).78 In short, direct 

military-to-military engagement initiatives brokered 

by Mongolia would build more cooperative relations 

between U.S. land forces and the PLA. 

The U.S. Department of State (DoS)-sponsored 

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) enabled 

Mongolia to conduct several peace support operations 

training courses within Mongolia. In future iterations, 

Mongolia could invite Chinese peacekeepers to participate based on rising Chinese participation in peace 

support operations.79 In addition, Mongolia worked 
43

closely with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) on improving its peace support operations 

training center capacity, and the center joined the 

NATO network of education and training centers in 

2014. The Mongolian peace support operations training center is also a member of the Association of AsiaPacific Peace Operations Training Centers (AAPTC), 

in which the United States has an administrative 

role.80 Based on Mongolian willingness to cooperate 

with the United States and other regional countries in 

developing peace support operations capacities, the 

United States could cooperate with both the NATO 

and the AAPTC to enhance military relations with 

the PLA—particularly in humanitarian assistance, disaster response, peacekeeping, and protracted stabilization operation (collapsed state with civil war and 

possibly nuclear weapons) training and education. In 

general, Mongolia offers a venue for further military 

engagement with the PLA through which all regional 

nations would benefit. 

In addition, Mongolia and China have held joint 

anti-terrorism exercises, the Hunting Eagle series, in 

each other’s territories bilaterally since 2009.81 In the 

summer of 2015, both the United States and China participated in the exercise.82 A People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) defense white paper 2015 acknowledged 

that China faces a serious challenge of “maintaining 

the political security and social stability,” pointing to 

difficulties created by violent extremist organizations 

such as the “East Turkistan Separatist Forces.”83 Given 

the United States’ hard-earned experience from the 

Global War on Terror (GWOT), counterinsurgency 

operations (COIN), and small wars, the United States 

could be a potential candidate with whom China 

could cooperate. Within the scope authorized by U.S. 
44

law and military combat skill transfer sensibilities, the 

United States can help the PLA to enhance its ability to 

counter terrorist activities through the exercise, while 

other interested countries like Japan and the Republic 

of Korea could assist the PLA to broaden conceptual 

understanding of anti-terrorism operations. Overall, 

anti-terrorism operations training and exercise could 

be one of the more productive engagements among 

the Asia-Pacific nations. 

Even though Mongolia and the United States continue to work at increasing military cooperation with 

the PLA, official policy currently prevents the two nations’ efforts from bearing full fruit. Joint Forces are 

limited in their ability to engage with the PLA by the 

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2000. 

The NDAA 2000 provides sufficient authorities and 

venues to gain additional authorities to USPACOM; 

but congressional and DoD oversight do not provide 

sufficient permissions to use professional military 

judgment to exercise those authorities. This limitation, 

in practice, stifles initiative and limits the ability of regional military staffs to explore engagement and planning opportunities. Enforcement and oversight of the 

act has a stifling impact regarding inviting the PLA to 

participate in more activities. The NDAA 2000 explicitly prohibits military exchanges that expose the PLA 

to various kinds of activities. It permits only search, 

rescue, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations exchanges.84 It appears that without 

change in philosophy and new approaches to the application of U.S. policy, U.S. land forces will not broaden their military relations with the PLA, even though 

nations like Mongolia offer promising avenues and 

opportunities. 
45

U.S. policy makers and military commanders are 

justifiably reluctant to improve the PLA’s warfighting 

military capabilities. After all, in a study conducted by 

Allison Graham of Harvard University, 11 of 15 cases 

of power transition resulted in the competitors going 

to war.85 Following this same line of thinking, some regional military experts believe cooperative exchanges 

and military engagements should be held out to the 

Chinese as carrots to reward good behavior; and withheld as a punishment for bad behavior.86

Military-to-military engagement between U.S. 

land forces and the PLA will inevitably contribute to 

their effectiveness. At no point does the project team 

suggest improving or contributing to China’s material or technological warfighting capability directly. 

The objectives of the recommendation are expanded 

trust relationship networks and improved mutual understanding to advance acceptable military behavior 

norms and prevent misunderstanding. Even professional military education exchanges, counter-terrorism 

exercises, protracted stability operations dialogues (to 

control nuclear weapons in failed states), and humanitarian/disaster relief exercises will improve the effectiveness of the PLA. However, the potential benefits of 

those engagements appear to outweigh the potential 

disadvantages of the military lessons learned though 

those exercises. 

Avoiding direct military-to-military engagement 

with the PLA appears shortsighted. Using engagement as a carrot or stick is counter-productive. Routinizing engagement, so that it is not stifled by either 

nation’s behavior or political climate, may prove to be 

a valuable tool for communicating intent and offering 

de-escalation opportunities should formal channels 

gridlock.
46

President Obama said there are many things the 

United States can do to lead the world, however, there 

are few that it can do alone.87 In general, Mongolia offers invaluable avenues to enhance U.S.-China military-to-military cooperation as well as broader regional security and stability. Mongolia can be a valuable 

partner in advancing common interests and regional 

security, especially through dialogue, cooperation, 

and exchanges with both North Korea and China. 

Reverse Pathways.

The United States remains arguably the most important nation with regard to Asia-Pacific security, 

given its commitments and volume of effort in the 

region. However, few mechanisms have emerged for 

regional collective defense in the world’s most populous, most diverse, and economically important region 

since the short-lived Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (1954-1977).88 Consequently, only bilateral defense agreements exist among certain nations, primarily between the United States and Australia, Japan, the 

Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand. In 

addition, Australia maintains a long-standing defense 

agreement with New Zealand, and China maintains 

an alliance of sorts with North Korea. 

Routine, non-U.S. led, multinational military exercises in the Asia-Pacific are limited. These include the 

Australia-led Kakadu 2014, a multinational maritime 

exercise; and the India-led Force 18, a multinational 

military exercise with the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ 

Meeting Plus nations.89 The United States leads or cosponsors a much higher number of exercises in the 

region, whose scope reaches far wider. Exercises can 

enhance interoperability, build mutual trust, strength-
47

en partnership, and improve multinational communication—contributing to the avoidance of miscalculation and miscommunication. The U.S. Army Pacific 

Command’s (USARPAC) Pacific Pathways exercise 

exemplifies one such initiative. 

Pacific Pathways involves 3-4 nations conducting a 

series of tailored Joint Force exercises throughout the 

region. Typically, the leadership, planning, logistics 

support, and theater transport for these exercises is 

U.S.-centric. These Pathway exercises improve multinational interoperability and facilitate the development of trust networks and understanding. They also 

improve U.S. Joint Force readiness and deployability 

more efficiently than individual or bilateral exercises.90

In essence, the recommendation advocates that the 

United States cooperate with partners to conduct the 

Pacific Pathways in a reverse manner. Australia, Japan, 

and the Republic of Korea are potential candidates to 

lead such an effort as their capability and interoperability are relatively healthier compared to other partners in the region. This “Reverse Pathways” should 

differ in concept from the original initiative in the following ways. Any of the above-mentioned countries 

would lead the operation with two or three regional 

partner countries’ military participating. The Reverse 

Pathways exercise would incorporate a series of military exercises in the Asia-Pacific region with the final 

destination in the U.S. Pacific Northwest or the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. Since 

this Pathways version will involve a large number of 

participants, potentially surpassing the transportation 

capacity of the regional lead nation, the United States 

might have to support the leading country with these 

assets. This variation of the original concept expands 

upon the existing initiative’s outcomes (building rela-
48

tions, capacity building, and enhancing readiness) by 

increasing partners’ leadership in regional common 

defense. Moreover, this initiative offers a unique opportunity for the participating nations to deepen cooperation and relationships among themselves.

The cost associated with U.S. support of the Reverse Pathways initiative must be a consideration, as 

the United States may need to provide logistics and 

transport depending on the scale and duration of the 

deployments. Nevertheless, the security benefit of the 

initiative could outweigh the cost, as regional partners 

share collective defense burdens and build multinational military leadership capacity. Overall, Reverse 

Pathways would offer an invaluable opportunity to 

increase regional military involvement and leadership 

among Asia-Pacific partners, providing regionally led 

security, stability, and cooperative defense. 

RECOMMENDATION 3: EXPANDED STATE 

PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM (SPP)

The 10 countries that form the ASEAN are situated at the confluence of the most perplexing jurisdictional and maritime management problems in the 

world. While regional tensions over the South China 

Sea tend to attract international attention, there are, at 

the same time, less visible threats that put pressure on 

the ASEAN nations and prevent at least some of them 

from achieving their full potential as security partners 

for the United States. For example, modern maritime 

piracy, which cycles through transitions of intensity 

and geography,91 remains a serious problem in Southeast Asia. Transnational criminal organizations and 

violent extremist and insurgent groups continue to 

afflict some ASEAN nations. The most prominent ter-
49

rorist and transnational criminal organizations that 

operate in Southeast Asia are located in Indonesia, 

Malaysia, and the Philippines. These organizations include Jemaah Islamiya (JI); Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 

with known ties to al-Qaeda; Bangsamoro Islamic 

Freedom Fighters (BIFF); and Moro Islamic Liberation 

Front (MILF). After the November 2015 Paris terrorist 

attacks, both ASG and BIFF pledged their allegiance to 

the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). These known 

terrorist organizations create a destabilizing effect on 

legitimate governments. They fund future destabilizing activities while actively recruiting and training 

new members. 

The Philippines’ Assistant Secretary for Strategic Assessment Raymund Jose Quilop remarked on 

“How 90 percent of their defense efforts focused on 

dealing with [these] internal terrorist and insurgent 

threats,”92 which prevent the government from “focusing on external maritime domain awareness, in 

order to counter China.”93 This is not only true for the 

Philippines. Several ASEAN nations currently lack the 

full governmental and military capacities they need to 

address simultaneously the internal and external challenges they face.

Adding complications to the mix are recurring 

natural disasters in Southeast Asia, which can create 

widespread regional instability resulting in human 

suffering, loss of life, and infrastructure destruction, 

in some cases with far greater disruptive effect than 

man-made disorder. Examples include the November 2013 Typhoon Haiyan, known as Super Typhoon 

Yolanda in the Philippines. Natural and man-made disasters regularly affect the stability of the Asia-Pacific 

region because of unstable geological fault lines, annual tropical depressions, and over-burdened coastal 
50

environments.94 Southeast Asia remains prone to frequent and severe natural disasters. Volcanic eruptions, 

tsunamis, earthquakes, monsoon rains, and cyclones 

hammer the region every year. These natural disasters 

present environmental, disease, displaced population, 

group grievance, and poverty challenges, testing the 

local government’s ability to provide public services. 

In this context, the ASEAN nations, the U.S. DoS, 

and USPACOM elements seek cooperation to improve 

security partnerships in order to counter man-made 

and natural threats. They seek to adapt or improve 

the effectiveness of regional theater security cooperation (TSC) activities. The 2014 signing of the Enhanced 

Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the 

United States and the Philippines laid the groundwork 

for the U.S. military access that is needed to position 

troops and equipment, and to conduct Joint and multilateral training exercises on a rotational basis at five 

locations throughout the Philippines. This increased 

access demonstrates partner commitment and produces tangible evidence of the military aspect of the 

U.S. rebalance to the Pacific.95

Another key resource in strengthening security cooperation between the United States and ASEAN partners is the State Partnership Program (SPP), “an innovative, low-cost, small-footprint, high-impact program 

that can help keep our alliances fit, strengthen existing 

partnerships, and develop new ones.”96 The SPP dates 

back to 1993, originally established to build the partner capacity of new democracies emerging out of the 

former Soviet Union. This proven program has grown 

to 76 partnerships engaged with 54 National Guard 

units. “The State Partnership Program is a joint Department of Defense program that is managed and administered by the [National Guard Bureau (NGB)].”97
51

The true success of this DoD program is the “mutually 

beneficial relationship that is developed between the 

U.S. state and the partner nation.”98 Presently, USPACOM has only eight partnerships. This is in stark contrast to the United States European Command’s (EUCOM) 22 partnerships. In fiscal year 2015, the DoD and 

USPACOM spent only $1.6 million to conduct 68 partnership activities involving more than 2,200 foreign 

participants.99

The unique dual-trained (civilian-military) nature 

of the soldier conducting the SPP provides invaluable 

experience to prospective partner nations in shaping their security. The Title 32 responsibility that the 

National Guard provides to its state allows National 

Guard members to serve as expert advisors in disaster risk preparedness, emergency response, and defense support to civil authorities as partner nations 

seek to improve their internal and external security 

against man-made and natural disorder activities and 

threats.100

To help improve the security architecture of Southeast Asia and avoid potential gaps in military-to-military engagements, the DoD should extend the SPP to 

cover all ten countries of ASEAN. Currently, the SPP 

accommodates five of the ASEAN nations: Cambodia 

paired with Idaho, Indonesia with Hawaii, the Philippines with Guam and Hawaii, Thailand with Washington, and Vietnam with Oregon. This report recommends that the SPP add the five remaining ASEAN 

countries (Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Singapore). Singapore already cooperates with the Texas 

Army National Guard (ARNG) on helicopter aviation. 

Some of the other not-yet-partnered ASEAN countries 

have expressed interest in moving forward to identify 

U.S. state partners.101
52

Expanding the SPP to cover all 10 ASEAN nations 

could help support the ASEAN community’s aspirations to develop its political-security pillar alongside 

its economic and socio-cultural pillars. By including 

all ASEAN nations for the first time, it would break 

important new ground in U.S.-ASEAN military-tomilitary cooperation. While the recommendation’s 

focus is specifically on ASEAN, it complements a 

broader recommendation from the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) that, as part of the 

rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, the United States should 

increase the number of state partnerships in the AsiaPacific.102

The DoD and U.S. ARNG should give new partnership priority to those nations that will have the 

greatest ability to advance U.S. security interests and 

security cooperation objectives, including control of 

access to the maritime commons. The nations of ASEAN surround the “most important maritime choke 

point in the world.”103 Security of and access to the 

global commons of the South China Sea is a key factor to be considered when selecting future program 

participants.

Analogous to the go game, each new partnership 

and lasting relationship formed is like placing another stone to enhance stability on the regional game 

board. The SPP will help shape the security environment and accomplish security cooperation objectives 

by enabling partnered states to engage regionally and 

sustain long-term relationships, allowing soldiers to 

apply their unique civilian-military and military-military expertise across multiple instruments of national 

power.104

Since the inception of the SPP in 1993, there have 

been multiple examples of how the program contrib-
53

utes to the partner nation’s government legitimacy. 

Thailand entered the SPP in 2002 with the Washington National Guard. Both the partner nation and the 

United States share similar drug and human trafficking challenges due to their large and vulnerable shipping industries. “Both partners collaborated on better 

methods to enhance their respective [maritime] security” which benefited both the Port of Seattle and the 

Thai Port of Laem Chabang.105 The outcome of these 

engagements included building trust between the military and governmental organizations while improving global security.

The trust networks developed over time embody 

the most invaluable success of the program. Unlike 

partnered active duty units that travel to countries for 

training and exercises, National Guard unit’s leaders 

do not frequently change, providing for deep and sustained relationships. Typically, relationships formed 

between junior leaders deepen as those leaders are 

promoted and serve in positions of greater responsibility. 

Some challenges the SPP encounters include the 

limited number of training days that a reservist has to 

engage in partnership activities. Typical SPP engagements occur twice a year. States must pursue innovative strategies to increase the number of engagements, 

especially if resourcing levels remain constrained. In 

October 2014, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General 

Milley, announced his intent at the Association of the 

United States Army (AUSA) conference in Washington, D.C. to increase the total number of training days 

for reservists and national guardsman.106 It would be a 

missed opportunity if the additional training days did 

not go towards building the capacity of our partners 

and allies through the SPP. 
54

Because the current SPP advances TSC goals and 

objectives, the U.S. Army should consider expanding the program. All U.S. states and territories that 

are involved in the SPP have at least one nation, and 

in some cases two nations, with whom they partner. 

USPACOM’s TSC goals and objectives compete with 

other geographic combatant commands. DoD limits 

the funding of the SPP to $10 million annually; this 

funding level supports 76 partnerships. Worldwide, 

one or two partnerships are added each year, and 

there is no provision for “graduation” from the program. This creates a difficult resourcing decision for 

the NGB as they forecast partner activities or explore 

the feasibility of adding new programs. To facilitate 

the expansion of the SPP, in terms of both the number 

of partnerships and engagement activities, the program will require an increased funding level.107

RECOMMENDATION 4: CIVIC ACTION 

ACTIVITIES SYNCHRONIZATION

This recommendation encompasses two mutually 

supporting concepts. First, the alignment of activity 

sets and Joint Force engagements in locations that 

benefit local residual prosperity and extend host nation legitimacy at the periphery of their control. The 

second is the consolidation of planning and synchronization of all Joint Force civic action activities under 

a single executive agent. The agent responsibilities 

would include rationalizing linkages to theater campaign plan objectives and nesting activities under the 

greater whole-of-government effort. This synchronization has the potential to improve the overall synergy and effectiveness of military civic action activity. 

In addition, it provides the combatant commander 
55

with a single agent to integrate planning, organize coordination forums, and provide liaison to external interagency forums. Because USPACOM conducts civic 

action activities in the land domain, the project team 

recommends USPACOM task USARPAC with this 

synchronization effort, and provide executive agent 

authorities to ensure military unit compliance. 

Civic action activities contribute to setting the theater. These activities establish favorable conditions 

for conducting a range of military actions. Specific 

operation plans and other requirements established in 

the geographic combatant commander’s theater campaign plan determine what tailored civic action activities are conducted by the Joint Forces. For civic action 

activities to achieve desirable outcomes, the executive 

agent must ensure the activities are closely linked to 

theater campaign objectives, synchronized with other 

Joint Force activities, and nested within the larger U.S. 

whole-of-government effort in the region. Shaping the 

security environment, setting the theater, and projecting national power are a few of the strategic advantages civic action activities afford the Joint Forces. 

Additionally, this recommendation offers U.S. land 

forces and the host nation the opportunity to mitigate 

the impact of organized crime (piracy, human/drug/

arms trafficking, gang violence, etc.), local terrorists, 

shadow governments and economies, and corrupt 

and disruptive activities. 

Civic action activity synchronization provides a 

decisive advantage in shaping the strategic environment by providing assurance of U.S. development 

and security commitment to the region. The enduring 

security interests of the United States and the understanding of allies and partners is dependent on building strong relationships and maintaining a rotational 
56

forward presence. As a result, the United States can 

leverage its forward presence in key locations to pursue bilateral and multilateral activities that enhance 

situational awareness, response capacity, trust, and 

responsible use of shared domains.108

A cross-domain, interagency, and Joint Force synergy is necessary to engage allies and partners, enabling quick response to contingencies and helping 

to convey resolve. Additionally, linking civic action 

activities to the overarching national security and foreign policy strategies is critical to synchronization. 

Geographical combatant commanders (GCC) execute their campaign plans continuously through 

numerous security and military cooperation activities. The lack of a common assessment framework 

might result in unsynchronized activity and divergent 

goals at the country level. This lack of synchronization can seriously dilute the overall effectiveness of 

the U.S. Government effort.109 Developing an assessment framework goes beyond the scope of this report. 

However, the report’s recommendation to assign responsibilities and create forums to facilitate holistic 

(joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational) civic action synchronization will facilitate their 

development.

For the purpose of projecting power and demonstrating U.S. commitment, co-locating civic action 

activity with pre-positioned equipment activity sets 

would provide for a non-escalatory U.S. military presence. Pre-positioned equipment could be maintained 

using local contractor service or by the host nation 

military, boosting the local economy or building host 

nation military capability respectively. Though not its 

primary purpose, units falling in on pre-positioned 

equipment would provide the United States with a 

credible rational to gain access during contingencies. 
57

Synergy between civic action activities and equipment activity sets helps enable military-to-military 

engagement, exercises, and assure the sustained commitment of the United States to our partners and allies in the region. This effort contributes to land force 

training and readiness, promotes multinational interoperability with allies and partners, and improves 

access to Southeast Asia, without permanent basing. 

The ability to coordinate and train together gives additional flexibility to the United States government for 

crisis or disaster response. The proposed locations for 

emplacing equipment activity sets are aligned with 

the U.S. Army’s Pacific plan (dated Oct 2015): Vietnam (FY16-18), Cambodia (FY 17-19), and Malaysia 

(FY 18-20). 

Although each service is conducting civic action activities in support of the GCC’s theater campaign plan 

in coordination with each Country’s Development 

Cooperation Strategy, the military needs to synchronize these activities to optimize the desired effects. It 

is critical for a single executive agent to control land 

operations to help shape the security environment, 

deter conflict, and consolidate gains. 

Civic action activities provide: a favorable U.S. 

military presence; transfer technical skills to local residents; and collaborate with the host nation in basic 

infrastructure development. Integral to this process 

are the four execution elements: (1) the community 

construction program; (2) the apprentice-training 

program; (3) the medical civic action program; and,

(4) the community relations program. These programs 

provide a wide range of services to the host nation, 

such as construction support, assistance and training for the local population in general engineering 

skills, an in-camp clinic, outreach to outlying areas 
58

and health education programs for local residents, 

and a positive U.S. presence. With this in mind, the 

equipment activity set should include logistics support (mobility and distribution), movement control, 

water production and purification, theater and port 

opening capabilities, medical support, and engineering support. Medical support could be as limited as 

unit medics providing sanitation education, up to a 

combat surgical hospital with United Nations Level II 

capability. Engineering support should include vertical and horizontal construction, de-mining, and debris 

clearing. Each activity set should complement a civic 

action activity execution plan.

Civic action activities support the full range of military operations, from military engagement and security cooperation, to crisis response and security force 

assistance. In addition, readiness, access, and relationships will improve multinational effectiveness when 

conducting major combat operations. Civic action activities build the host nation’s capacity for combating 

the spread of infectious disease and responding to natural disasters. Civic action activities help strengthen 

relationships through engagement. They also offer a 

rich opportunity for direct U.S.-China military-to-military engagement, especially in support of humanitarian and disaster relief operations. Personnel rotations 

and equipment set placement supporting civic action 

activities also provide for a non-escalatory U.S. peacetime presence in the region. 

International development is not a military mission; however, it is key to maintaining national security. According to the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID), the current Southeast Asia 

regional growth model relies on an unsustainable 

use of resources that creates growing inequalities and 
59

undermines future economic growth. The USAID 

goals stated in its Regional Development Cooperation 

Strategy for Asia’s 5-year strategy (2014-2018) aspired 

to “A More Sustainable, Inclusive, and Prosperous 

Asia, with Particular Emphasis on Southeast Asia.” 

Civic action activities assist USAID by increasing 

partner nation abilities and by countering the effects 

of domestic and natural disturbance disruptors. Civic 

action activities strengthen the individual national 

government’s ability to project power, and Joint Force 

example and oversight can contribute to the mitigation of public health threats, corruption, and human 

rights violations.110 The presence of activity sets and 

rotational units have the potential of improving local 

economic prosperity by infusing funds and providing 

jobs to support those activities. These efforts are essential to maintaining regional peace and building capabilities to provide for security and disaster relief.111

The Joint Force operates across multiple domains 

and executes its mission through joint combined arms 

operations to achieve decisive action. Although civic 

action activities are not perceived as value added for 

conducting decisive action, military leaders should 

consider the value that stabilizing social trends and 

access through relationships can bring to the Army’s 

role in preventing war by managing the peace. Civic 

action activity synchronization contributes to positive 

relations and conflict prevention in the gray zone competitive security environment. Military-to-military 

engagements during civic action activity promotes a 

safe and secure environment, rule of law norms, social 

well-being, stable governance, and sustainable economies.112 These partnership engagements will continue 

to strengthen U.S. relationships with host nations, 

promote unity of effort, and contribute to setting the 

theater in the event a military contingency emerges.
60

RECOMMENDATION 5: COOPERATIVE 

SECURITY LOCATIONS

Cooperative security locations are not new to the 

Asia-Pacific theater. This recommendation extends 

the current notion of cooperative security locations to 

incorporate the notion of host nation managed warm 

basing and the establishment of a multinational exercise site that accommodates the rehearsal of military, interagency, and non-governmental organization missions. Infrastructure development, to include 

transportation networks, storage facilities, reception 

infrastructure, and base billeting and ablutions could 

be funded through bilateral cost sharing agreements, 

reaffirming United States and host nation commitment to common interests.

The DoS has the lead on setting country-specific 

security cooperation goals. The DoD country teams 

within the embassy facilitate the linkage of military 

operations to DoS goals through various coordination 

forums involving the Joint Forces and other U.S. government agencies. 

Cooperative security locations could provide a 

fiscally responsible platform to launch whole-of-government activities to confront security challenges and 

overcome the tyranny of distance inherent in interagency operations in the theater. 

General Brooks, former Commander of the U.S. 

Army Pacific (USARPAC), stated that one of his greatest challenges was to provide “more faces in more 

places with fewer bases.”113 While cooperative security locations do not completely address the challenge, 

the concept does mitigate the tyranny of distance and 

facilitate the employment of faces with fewer bases. 
61

A string of cooperative security locations deliberately 

placed to provide access to areas of importance to the 

United States would significantly reduce the deployment and sustainment challenges faced by U.S. forces 

operating in Southeast Asia. The recommended cooperative security locations should be facilities with 

little or no permanent U.S. presence.114 If properly 

coordinated, the host nation could share the costs associated with running the facilities and maintaining 

pre-positioned equipment. 

DoD Directive 3000.10115 establishes policy guidance for establishing basing outside the United States 

for contingency operations. Cooperative security locations could satisfy the basing needs associated with 

gray zone competition and power projection short of 

contingency operations. The primary functions of the 

cooperative security locations for the U.S. Joint Forces 

would be the establishment of a location to position 

and maintain equipment activity sets, rotate and temporarily house military units (primarily in support of 

SPP and the Civic Action Team activities), and facilitate 

the conduct of multinational and interagency training 

exercises. In the event of a military contingency, established cooperative security locations could serve as 

initial “warm” forward operating bases (FOBs) until 

the DoD coordinates alternative contingency basing 

outside the continental United States.116

The synergy between civic action activities, the 

SPP, and prepositioned equipment activity sets enables military-to-military engagements, exercises, 

and assures U.S. sustained commitment to our partners and allies in the region. Additionally, this effort 

contributes to Army training and readiness, promotes 

multinational interoperability with allies and partners, 

improves access in Southeast Asia without permanent 
62

basing, and gives additional flexibility to the United 

States government for crisis or disaster response. 

Initial recommendations for cooperative security 

locations mirror the proposed civic action activity and 

equipment activity set locations (Vietnam FY16-18, 

Cambodia FY 17-19, and Malaysia FY 18-20). Future 

locations could be established to support host government legitimacy at the periphery of their control and 

in areas where cooperative security locations can boost 

local economies—mitigating the conditions that allow 

nonstate disruptors to flourish. Malaysia’s Borneo 

states (Sarawak and Sabah), the Philippines’ Southern 

islands (Mindanao, Palawan) and Indonesia’s Eastern islands—bordering the Celebes Sea (Sulawesi, 

Kalimantan-Borneo)—present great opportunites for 

extending central government legitimacy, improving 

local prosperity, and providing a base of operations 

to counter transnational criminal organizations, shadow economies, and competing governance/power 

structures. 

Cooperative security locations provide a decisive 

advantage in shaping the strategic environment by 

providing assurance of U.S. development and security 

commitment to the region. Strong relationships, maintained by a routinized rotational forward presence, 

advance the enduring security interests of the United 

States and Joint Force leader understanding of allies 

and partners. Similarly, by leveraging equipment activity sets present in key locations, the United States 

can pursue bilateral and multilateral military activities 

that further strengthen response capacity, trust, and 

promote responsible use of shared domains.117 Routine 

multinational and interagency exercises staged out of 

these cooperative security locations provide access 

to critical regions with little risk of escalation, should 
63

intelligence indicators suggest a potential contingency 

requirement.

Cooperative security locations support the full 

range of military operations: from military engagement, security cooperation, and crisis response, to major operations and campaigns. Prepositioned equipment activity sets in cooperative security locations 

support military-to-military engagements, militaryto-civilian engagements, enhance emergency preparedness, facilitate global infectious disease prevention, and build host nation capacity for humanitarian 

assistance and disaster relief operations. They provide 

for a peacetime U.S. presence, contribute to flexible 

crisis response options, counter-terrorism operations 

options, and allow transnational criminal organization interdiction. Finally, robust cooperative security 

locations can transition to contingency locations if the 

need arises. 

65

VI. LAND-BASED CROSS-DOMAIN CONTROL

In the Pacific theater, the limited capability and 

capacity of friendly force land-based cross-domain 

control systems represents a critical capability gap. 

The revisionist and disruptive challenger capability to 

exercise cross-domain control are increasing military 

risk in the Asia-Pacific region, creating an urgency to 

fill this gap expeditiously.118 This recommendation is 

principally about providing cross-domain control capabilities to expand the range of operations the United 

States and its partners can conduct in the gray zone 

to combat challengers without triggering a sustained 

combat operation. It is about imposing a cost on a 

competitor willing to escalate to war. The Joint Operational Access Concept119 and Joint Concept for Entry Operations120 provide guidance to prioritize the required 

capabilities needed to ensure access to the global commons while protecting our forces, partners, and allies. 

This recommendation proposes developing a friendly 

force land-based cross-domain control capability and 

capacity to impose an A2AD planning concern on U.S. 

rivals.

As a defensive capability, land-based cross-domain 

control provides a deterrent capability that is especially relevant to the security environment of Northeast 

Asia (Japan, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea). In 

Southeast Asia, USPACOM could use this capability 

offensively or as a deterrent to Chinese military assertiveness in resolving territorial disputes.

Allies are already exploring this capability. For 

example, “Tokyo is responding by stringing a line of 

anti-ship, anti-aircraft missile batteries along 200 islands in the East China Sea stretching 1,400 kilometers 

from the country’s mainland toward Taiwan.”121 The 
66

United States and its regional partners would mutually benefit from a combined exploration and testing 

of available and emerging land-based cross-domain 

control systems. The United States should pursue future force development and partner capacity-building 

options, including both sales and purchases through 

FMS. 

The Pacific Ocean is a geographic challenge for 

the commander of USPACOM. Due to the reduction 

of bases and troops in foreign countries throughout 

the region, the tyranny of distance to get U.S. combat formations in the theater to the critical point of 

contention remains a problematic issue. However, 

regionally deployed land-based cross-domain control formations could mitigate this challenge by providing mobile and deployable A2AD packages that 

include anti-ship, anti-air, anti-missile, and counter-cyber and space capabilities. These land-based 

A2AD “lily pad” formations would present rivals 

considering the possibility of becoming adversaries a multitude of planning challenges and risk 

considerations.

USPACOM should employ a land-based “lily pad” 

concept of tailorable packages consisting of anti-ship, 

anti-missile, anti-air, cyber, and electronic warfare 

(EW) capabilities to support theater security and contingency plans. The idea of using operational outposts 

is not new; during the Vietnam War, American units 

conducted operations from combat outposts called 

firebases. From these firebases, the United States was 

able to effectively engage the enemy with supporting 

fire elements, while also protecting these elements 

with ground maneuver units.

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, coalition 

forces dispersed units in FOBs and patrol bases, plac-
67

ing them closer to combat areas. More recently, the 

Pentagon announced that the United States would use 

land-based “lily pads” to employ U.S. troops closer 

to areas of combat, while taking advantage of their 

mobility for force protection. Currently, a land-based 

“lily pad” doctrine does not exist; however, USPACOM and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) can adapt many of the firebase and 

FOB tactics, techniques, and procedures used in Vietnam War firebases and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

to employ land-based cross-domain control “lily pad” 

formations across the Asia-Pacific.

The Pacific theater is larger in scale and scope then 

Vietnam or Iraq; however, tailorable “lily pads” with 

land-based cross-domain control assets throughout 

the region could accommodate many of the USPACOM commander’s needs, while posing an unpredictable challenge to adversaries. The concept is to 

forward base A2AD assets in cooperative security locations, forward operating sites or the main operating 

base. However, if these locations are unavailable, the 

USARPAC commander could use Pacific Pathways 

as a temporary means of placing these formations in 

theater. 

“Lily pad” formations could facilitate gaining U.S. 

entry into allied or partner countries. However, concerns over sovereignty and antagonizing China might 

prevent partners from allowing the United States to 

employ these assets, short of clear intelligence of an 

imminent threat. Therefore, making these capabilities available to partners though FMS or facilitating 

partner nation domestic development may be a more 

feasible multinational force development option. 

Getting started on these capabilities is critical, as 

technology development and competitor military 
68

modernization are advancing at a rapid rate. With the 

availability of high volume, low-production cost, and 

ubiquitous access to three-dimensional (3D) printing 

technology, it will not be long before near-peer competitors could mass airborne and seaborne unmanned 

vehicles using swarm tactics. Perhaps more concerning, North Korea continues to develop its nuclear capability while testing the missile and rocket technology necessary to deliver it. In the maritime domain, 

China’s expanded blue water navy and coastal antiship missile capabilities could challenge the future of 

U.S. regional dominance. Land-based cross-domain 

control capabilities can be a component of the U.S. 

response to all of these future threats.

Most importantly, land-based cross-domain control assets provide the USPACOM commander with 

a relatively cheap capacity for collective regional defense, which imposes costs on challengers who would 

escalate gray zone competition to war. Fielding the 

land-based cross-domain capability expands the political space available to conduct coercive military operations in support of U.S. interests to enforce international order short of war. 

Secondarily, and outside the scope of this gray 

zone competition focused report, these land-based 

cross-domain control capabilities provide obvious 

benefits during combat operations. Land-based crossdomain control improves the Joint Force entry operations capability. In the event of a sustained combat 

contingency, this capability would improve force 

protection for Air Force assets operating within range 

of the mainland. Those Air Force assets could strike 

mainland and maritime targets, reducing the threat 

to U.S. Navy forces operating inside the first island 

chain. Viewed from this major combat operation per-
69

spective, the land-based cross-domain control “lily 

pad” formations become the first leg of a Joint Force’s 

three-legged approach to countering an adversaries 

A2AD capability. While this argument is irrelevant to 

the gray zone competition context, it does provide a 

useful narrative to attract funding in the warfighting 

centric resource prioritization culture of the Pentagon.

This land-based cross-domain capability represents 

a regional gap in military capability and capacity, not 

a U.S.-centric gap. The long-term strategic options for 

filling this capability gap require long-term U.S. force 

development and fielding options. These options 

range from U.S. development and fielding to partner 

development and fielding options. They all originate 

with a U.S. Joint Force-led effort to development landbased cross-domain control concepts, capabilities, and 

doctrine—in concert with our regional partners. As a 

first step, Joint Concept Technology Demonstrations 

(JCTD) for the re-missioning of existing capabilities 

might incentivize partners and allies to pursue these 

gray zone competition-centric capabilities and expedite their fielding. The full potential of this recommendation cannot be realized without systems being 

fully interoperable across the Joint Forces—as well as 

between regional partners. It is essential that, from 

concept development through JCTD testing and fielding, the United States actively engage our partners in 

the process.

RECOMMENDATION 6: AIR CONTROL

The current air defense gap in the Asia-Pacific is 

one of capacity and interoperability more than capability. The primary purpose of anti-air assets in 

the tailored mission specific “lily pads” is to prevent 
70

competitors from gaining and maintaining air space 

control and dominance. To successfully control the air 

domain, the United States or its allies must employ 

an integrated anti-air system. An integrated system 

would include sensors, ground-based weapons, and 

interoperable command and control.

There are a myriad of anti-air weapons and systems available today, and currently emerging, from 

which to choose. However, in the short term, the United States should field preexisting systems and better 

integrate with partner nations to advance interoperability through exercises, training, and standardization of tactics, techniques, and procedures. Examples 

of current land-based short- and long-range air defense and missile systems that could be used for air 

control against aircraft, missiles, rockets, and drones 

are: counter rocket, artillery, mortar (C-RAM); Patriot; 

and Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD).

In the mid and long term, the U.S. Joint Forces 

must lead the development of concepts, and pursue 

doctrine and JCTDs for the re-missioning of existing 

capabilities. Additionally, in the long term, strategic 

options for filling this capability gap require longterm U.S. force development decisions and actions to 

facilitate U.S. force development, U.S. facilitated FMS, 

or partner fielded capability options.

RECOMMENDATION 7: SEA CONTROL

The primary purpose of anti-ship assets in the 

tailored mission specific land-based “lily pads” is to 

prevent competitors from gaining an advantage in 

the maritime environment and the littorals. Additionally, the systems must impose a much higher cost on 

competitors to discourage escalatory behavior dur-
71

ing gray zone competition. To control the maritime 

domain, land-based “lily pad” assets must maneuver 

along coasts, the littorals, and in brown water regions. 

To minimize cost and expedite fielding, the United 

States should improve systems that could serve dualpurposes. The Joint Forces could modify preexisting 

land-based artillery and missile systems, increasing 

their range and providing ordinance suitable to the 

anti-ship mission. 

As with anti-air systems, employing land-based 

systems that are currently on-hand and interoperable 

with partner nations seems a logical first step. Hypervelocity projectiles (HVP) and precision guided munitions (PGM) are examples of current land-based 

weapons systems that the Joint Forces could adapt 

to anti-ship systems. The military’s M777 155mm 

Howitzer can fire the Excalibur, a PGM. Blackhawk 

helicopters and small ships can move the M777s, 

which greatly increase their mobility and versatility. In response to Chinese militarization of disputed 

territories, the United States could emplace anti-ship 

capable M777s on features owned by U.S. partners 

throughout the South China Sea, and exercise them as 

part of Pacific Pathways. Employing a limited number 

of anti-ship capable systems in the region could compel competitors to modify their behavior in light of the 

increased risk.122 Even though the range and mobility 

of these dual-purpose land-based systems are limited 

compared to U.S. Navy assets, they are a relatively 

low-cost anti-ship alternatives. The United States and 

partner nations could employ these systems without 

the risk of maneuvering limited and vulnerable naval 

assets to confront a challenge. 

Land-based maritime control primarily supports 

two land forces mission frameworks: combat capabil-
72

ity and peacetime presence. In the first framework—

combat capability—land-based maritime control 

focuses on potential confrontation and conflict. One 

method to overcome A2AD challenges is through 

extended deterrence in the Asia-Pacific region.

One counter-argument to land-based maritime 

control is that the United States, its allies, and its partners are reluctant to stage offensive combat capabilities forward. For example, in March 2016 during an 

interview, Admiral Tomohisa Takei, Chief of Staff of 

the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), 

admitted that although a land-based ballistic missile 

defense system is one of Japan’s challenges, “at this 

moment the JMSDF is going to concentrate on increasing the number of Aegis destroyers.”123 This underscores one of the Japanese government’s biggest challenges; whereas the government and Prime Minister 

Shinzo Abe want to expand cooperative security with 

the United States and other countries, there is significant resistance within the Japanese population to increase it. Admiral Takei stated, “The Japanese government supports the U.S. Navy’s freedom of navigation 

operations but Japan has no plan to participate.”124

Because of Japan’s and other Asian-Pacific nations’ 

reluctance to appear more offensive, one option is to 

use mobile, tailorable packages for defensive, multilateral exercises. That capability could also be used 

offensively in the future should the need arise. 

Another counter-argument is that land-based 

A2AD is an expansion of the Army’s traditional roles 

and missions in a fiscally constrained environment. 

However, one can argue that it extends the U.S. presence without a larger footprint—and the costs associated with larger formations deployed forward. In addition, the U.S. can mitigate the expense of land-based 
73

systems and technologies through possible cost sharing with other Asia-Pacific nations with similar security concerns, or repurposing old technologies such 

as short and long-range missiles onto existing A2AD 

platforms.

RECOMMENDATION 8: CYBER AND SPACE 

CONTROL

U.S. national security relies on the ability to preserve freedom of action in the Asia-Pacific at the time 

and place of our choosing. Today, the United States 

Army Pacific (USARPAC) faces a variety of challenges 

from fiscal austerity measures, political pressure, and 

military threats. These threats also affect USARPAC 

facilities, military forces deployed overseas, and partner nations. Regionally, Chinese interests in the South 

China Sea and a desire for regional influence exacerbate these issues. In light of increasing threats to national space and cyber capabilities, the commander 

of USARPAC must effectively protect, defend, and 

respond to destabilizing efforts or aggressive acts in 

the space and cyber domain. As such, the commander 

must have a dedicated team of cross-functional experts in space and cyber to train, advise, and assist 

U.S. international partners. Engaging the theater and 

working alongside partners and allies is not only the 

first line of effort, but it is critical to achieving the USPACOM commander’s theater campaign plan objectives.125

The DoD has three primary missions in cyber and 

space: (1) the DoD must defend its own networks, systems, and information; (2) the DoD must be prepared 

to defend the United States and its interests against 

cyber and space attacks of significant consequence; 
74

and, (3) if directed by the President or the Secretary of 

Defense, the DoD must be able to provide integrated 

capabilities to support military operations and contingency plans.126 Additionally, the DoD has five interrelated strategic approaches to meet national security 

space objectives: (1) promote the responsible, peaceful, 

and safe use of space; (2) provide improved U.S. space 

capabilities; (3) partner with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial firms; (4) 

prevent and deter aggression against space infrastructure that supports U.S. national security; and, (5) prepare to defeat attacks and to operate in a degraded 

environment.127

Space and cyber capabilities are strategic capabilities and critical enablers to U.S. national security and 

activities within the gray zone. Together they enable 

the United States, our partners, and allies to maintain 

a significant advantage over our adversaries and enhance our national security.128 They have been proven 

to enhance all aspects of military operations by providing global communications; positioning-navigationtiming (PNT) services; environmental monitoring; 

space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); links and networks; and warning services 

to combatant commanders, services, and agencies.129

For decades, the United States has enjoyed a dominant 

military advantage in space and cyberspace. However, China’s emerging space power and counter space 

activities are testing the U.S. space dominance enjoyed 

since the end of the Cold War.130

Today USPACOM and USARPAC are at a defining moment concerning the PRC’s development and 

modernization of counter-space, offensive cyber, and 

EW capabilities.131 The current territorial and maritime 

jurisdiction disputes in the South China Sea and East 

China Sea could provide the incentive and situation 
75

for the use of a counter-space or offensive cyberattack as a strategic instrument. In 2014, the Director of 

National Intelligence stated that the number one strategic threat to the United States was cyberthreats (displacing terrorism).132 Additionally, he reported to the 

Senate Intelligence Committee that the United States 

would face increased threats to its national security 

space assets, specifically mentioning that “Chinese 

military leaders understand the unique information 

advantages afforded by [the] space system and are 

developing capabilities to disrupt United States use of 

space in conflict.”133 The PRC is pursuing long-term, 

comprehensive military modernization with an emphasis on counter-space, offensive cyber operations, 

and EW capabilities.134 China views this modernization effort as an essential capability to reduce core U.S. 

and allied military technological advantages, and they 

support China’s status as a great power and regional 

hegemon.135

While the United States recognizes and understands China’s desire to develop military capabilities 

commensurate with its strategic interests within the 

region, the United States remains committed to preserving regional peace and security and guaranteeing 

free access to the sea, air, and space domains.136 The 

increased attacks in the space and cyberspace domain 

reflect a dangerous trend in international relations. 

Vulnerable space capabilities and data systems present 

state and nonstate actors within the USPACOM area 

of operation with an enticing opportunity to strike the 

United States and its allies.137 A disruptive, manipulative, or destructive space or cyberattack could present 

a significant risk to U.S. national interests. Therefore, 

USARPAC should engage in a broad array of activities to help U.S. allies and partners to understand the 

space and cyberthreats they face, and to build the 
76

capacity and collective defense necessary to defend 

their networks, data, and space capabilities.138

Given the high demand and low density of space 

and cyber capabilities, USARPAC must focus its space 

and cyber partnership initiatives and leverage existing 

personnel and infrastructure. One approach to build 

partner nation space and cyber capacity and security 

is to establish an Integrated Cyber and Space Security 

Cooperation Center of Excellence (ICS2C-COE) within 

the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. The AsiaPacific Center for Security Studies is an existing facility 

designed to support USPACOM’s security strategy of 

developing and sustaining professional relationships 

with partner nations in the Asia-Pacific region.139 The 

development of an ICS2C-COE within the Asia-Pacific 

Center could provide professional space and cybersecurity education and training to eligible military, law 

enforcement, and civilian personnel of key partner 

nations of the Asia-Pacific region within the context 

of USPACOM’s TSC plan and activities.140 The ICS2CCOE concept would develop extensive partner nation 

networks and relationships amongst a community of 

mid- and senior-career space and cybersecurity practitioners. The center could be used as the primary location where United States and partner nations could 

gather to advise, assist, train, and exchange ideas on 

space and cybersecurity. The center and instruction 

would provide an opportunity to achieve a greater 

understanding of the challenges and security environment of the Asia-Pacific region.141

Under the ICS2C-COE concept, USARPAC would 

establish a mobile space and cyber training team concept at the Asia-Pacific Center and offer quarterly 

training to partner nations in order to build their capability and capacity. Assigned personnel from the US-
77

PACOM Joint Cyber Center (JCC) Pacific and Cyber 

Protection Teams would provide trainers and conduct 

the cybersecurity partnership program. The Cyber 

Protection Teams could serve to engage partners and 

build credibility, confidence, and trust through cybersecurity training and activities at the ICS2C-COE. Influence and rapport is an intangible element built on 

interactions and personal relationships, and the Army’s Cyber Teams offer a nascent capability to form 

new relationships and create a vital “network of influence” that USARPAC can use to set the conditions to 

respond and win in cyberspace contingencies. 

The Army Space Support Teams (ARSSTs) from 

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/

Army Forces Strategic Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT) could also provide trainers and conduct the 

space security partnership program at the ICS2CCOE. The ARSSTs could provide collaborative space 

training, education, and exercise support in order to 

build partner nation capacity and promote interoperability in the space mission areas of space situation 

awareness and space force enhancement. The space 

capabilities listed in Figure 3 represent a framework 

around which the U.S. Joint Forces could develop an 

initial curriculum.

The goal of the training and exercises would be 

for partner nations to increase their ability to identify 

key space issues and trends. To assist in the training, the ARSSTs would provide the partner nation 

with access to Army, Joint, and national space capabilities for their military headquarters. The teams 

would also provide satellite imagery, support satellite communications, and provide PNT data to support precision maneuver and fires. The technical and 

operational space expertise the ARSST provides to
78

Figure 3. Space Capabilities.

partner nations will develop an enduring capability 

to establish and maintain space security and deter the 

PRC activities in the Asia-Pacific region. 

The space and cyber military training and advisory assistance teams could provide technical and 

operational expertise through a scaled-to-need concept at the ICS2C-COE and as mobile training teams. 

The ARSSTs and Cyber Teams could deploy to partner nations in order to enhance information sharing, 

as appropriate, and extend U.S. reach into environments where nefarious actors are currently operating 

undetected across the space domain. The teams could 
79

provide vulnerability assessments on space and cyberthreats, and advise host nations on counter space and 

offensive cyber operations. During the mobile training, the teams and partner nation personnel would 

learn to identify key space and cyber issues and trends 

affecting the United States and partner nations within 

the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. 

Advising, assisting, and training partner nations in 

space and cyber mission areas will help to build collective defense relationships that promote specific U.S. 

security interests, as well as provide USARPAC with 

peacetime and contingency access to partner nations. 

USARPAC’s engagement and partnership program is a crucial element of the Army Campaign Plan 

and the USPACOM theater campaign plan.142 Comprehensive partnerships provide access to forward 

operating locations that are necessary to deter Chinese aggression within the region. They also create 

an environment where sustaining operational effects 

are possible, while also increasing support nodes to 

foreign territories that are necessary to sustain U.S. 

military activities. The partnership program must not 

stop at the traditional air, land, and sea capabilities, 

but extend into the domains of space and cyberspace. 

Evolving posture changes and host nation support in 

the region require a strategic approach to sustain a 

resilient, survivable force in an A2AD environment. 

The ICS2C-COE and mobile training teams concept 

has the capability to build U.S. and partner space and 

cyber capacity during peacetime, which can be used 

during conflict.

Space and cyber capabilities underwrite U.S. Army 

land dominance and must be preserved, expanded, 

and enhanced to support the rebalance to Asia.In light 

of increasing threats to our national space and cyber 
80

enterprise by the PRC, USARPAC must work together 

with our partners and allies to effectively protect and 

respond to destabilizing efforts or aggressive acts in 

the space and cyber domain. As such, the ICS2C-COE 

and mobile training teams concept offers USARPAC 

a dedicated team of cross-functional space and cyber 

experts to deploy and train, advise, and assist our 

partner nations within the Asia-Pacific during peacetime and during conflict. 

SECTION SUMMARY

As described in numerous defense strategic documents, overcoming A2AD challenges in the Asia-Pacific region is a stated strategic challenge. Within that 

context, land-based A2AD is a large capability gap 

that currently exists in the Asia-Pacific region. The 

2012 strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense;143 the Quadrennial Defense Review 2014;144 the 2015 National Security 

Strategy;145 and the 2015 The National Military Strategy146 all highlight the projection of power, despite 

A2AD challenges to maintain freedom of navigation 

in the global commons. They point towards the desire 

for protection and assured access to shared spaces. 

In the past, the United States was able to take advantage of time and distance standoff capabilities to 

frustrate enemies. Today, with the ranges of ballistic 

missiles, loss of technological overmatch, cyber and 

space innovations, nuclear proliferation, and blurred 

lines on what constitutes an enemy, the United States 

faces a far more complex security environment than 

it had in the past. To bridge the strategic guidance to 

operational capabilities gap, the DoD developed joint 

concepts intended to guide the organization, training, 
81

resourcing, and employment for gaining and maintaining assured access. 

The Joint Operational Access Concept,

147 and Joint 

Concept for Entry Operations,

148 provides guidance for 

the prioritization of capabilities needed to ensure access to the global commons while protecting Joint 

Forces, partners, and allies. As adversary and competitor technologies and weapon systems advance, 

and they extend the range of their systems, it will be 

more difficult to operate in an increasingly contested 

environment. Without sufficient land-based A2AD 

protecting the United States and its allies, the United 

States will find it more difficult to project forces into 

the area to accomplish its missions.

Admiral Harry Harris, Commander USPACOM, 

expressed concern during Senate testimony on China’s recent increased militarization of the South China 

Sea, including the stationing of HQ-9 missile batteries 

on Woody Island in the Paracels.149 This escalation of 

tensions increases the challenge of ensuring freedom 

of navigation and assured access in the region. Furthermore, the lack of forward deployed forces due to 

the downsizing of the military, the erosion of technological overmatch, and uncertainty about defense 

budget heightens this challenge. U.S. capabilities and 

technological overmatch in this region will continue 

to degrade without current and future investment. 

Land-based A2AD is one investment option under 

discussion to gain an advantage in the region. Without sufficient land-based A2AD protecting the United 

States and its allies, the United States will find it more 

difficult to project forces into the area. Without quick 

solutions, USPACOM may not be able to complete its 

assured access mission if challenged in the near term. 

The United States must therefore balance the desired 
82

ends (freedom of navigation within the global commons) with effective ways (land-based A2AD), and 

within limited means (defense resources). The main 

issue is how to build this capability in a resource-constrained environment.

One method of building this capability is through 

extended deterrence. For example, after the passage 

of its new security bills in September, Japan started 

developing plans to craft its own A2AD strategy by 

“stringing a line of anti-ship, anti-aircraft missile batteries along 200 islands in the East China Sea stretching 1,400 km (870 miles) from the country’s mainland 

toward Taiwan. . . .”150 Other new manifestations of Japan’s interests include: entering into agreements with 

the Philippines and Vietnam on classified defense information, with possible sales of training aircraft and 

other military equipment; a bid for submarine sales to 

Australia; a deal to transfer defense technology to Indonesia; and the purchase of a Hawkeye aircraft from 

the United States. Additionally, Japan is selling amphibious aircraft to India and adopting an agreement 

to share classified intelligence and export nuclear 

power production technology to India. 

This is the first time Japan reached a deal with a 

non-signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, stating that they are “united by democratic values, large 

market economies, regional heft, and global aspirations.”151 Japan is also adopting its own rebalancing 

strategy with “rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, 

calling on all parties to avoid unilateral actions in the 

South China Sea and implementing a code of conduct 

for activities there.”152 These and other initiatives, and 

planned future joint exercises, demonstrate Japan’s 

recent moves to align their interests with regional 

action.
83

Another form of extended deterrence that the 

United States can leverage is through FMS and foreign military financing (FMF). Some countries in the 

Pacific, such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, or Taiwan, may be willing to base systems within their territory, which are either sold to them through the U.S. 

defense or industry base. These systems, if interoperable with U.S. military systems, can increase security 

coverage to our allies and partners without having 

more troops in the region. The United States could 

also pre-position activity sets in the region that it or its 

allies can access when the need arises. These activity 

sets can range from medical to combat sets, depending 

on the willingness of the host nation to support their 

placement.

The second framework, peacetime presence, focuses on competition and coercion. Land-based maritime 

control also supports this framework with the concept 

of access through presence. The United States can increase its “coercive force” activities in the gray zone 

if rivals fear an escalation to war. Since the United 

States must consider budget constraints, the downsizing of the military, and future resource competition 

with other theaters of operation, an increase in the 

forward basing of troops is unlikely without an imminent threat. The land-based “lily pad” concept offers 

a method which does not permanently forward base 

additional troops, but instead provides the capability 

of surging presence and sustainment forward when 

needed. 

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VII. ASSURED LAND FORCE MANEUVER

RECOMMENDATION 9: LAND FORCE ASSURED 

SHALLOW-WATER MANEUVER

It is incumbent on the United States to find the right 

balance when dealing with China in this gray zone, 

where the risk of inaction is as great as the risk of action. China’s aggressive military modernization, land 

reclamation, and militarization of the South China Sea 

have the potential to create instability in the region. 

While the United States and China are competing in 

many areas across all instruments of national power, 

the territorial disputes are among the few areas of 

competition that put the two countries’ militaries in 

direct confrontation. It is critical that the United States 

continue to work through diplomatic channels to dissuade China from militarizing the South China Sea. 

However, it is equally critical that the United States 

prepare for the worst-case scenario, which leads to 

the discussion of the current U.S. land forces gap—

assured maneuver in a shallow-water environment. 

Before addressing the gap, some background on China’s recent assertiveness and disorder activities in the 

South China Sea is appropriate to help highlight the 

significance of the gap and the potential threat associated with the gap.

First, China entered the land reclamation business 

in December 2013, and since then has established over 

2,900 acres of islands in the Spratly Archipelago. This 

is more development than all other countries combined have produced over the last 4 decades.153 While 

it is true that five of the six countries with competing 

claims in the region have established military fortifications throughout the area,154 China’s infrastructure 
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is much larger, more modern, and more robust when 

viewed in terms of potential military capabilities. For 

instance, in late 2015, China completed construction 

on a 3,000-meter runway on Fiery Cross reef in the 

Spratly’s. A 3,000-meter runway is capable of landing 

the entire inventory of Chinese military aircraft (from 

fighters to strategic bombers), enhancing China’s ability to project power deeper in the South China Sea. 

Additionally, China installed advanced radar systems, surface-to-air capability, and anti-ship cruise 

missiles on Woody Island in the Paracels, extending 

the potential for A2AD. China’s most recent reclamation endeavor is taking place on Scarborough shoal, 

150 miles west of Subic Bay in the Philippines. The 

Philippine government has contested China’s claims 

to the Shoal at the international court for arbitration at 

The Hague; but China does not recognize the court’s 

jurisdiction. Furthermore, China’s refusal to participate in any multi-lateral negotiations is causing growing concern among other countries of South East Asia. 

Second, not only are China’s revisionist activities 

causing concern for smaller countries in the region, 

but also the growing threat of criminal organization 

and their disorder activities are contributing to a less 

stable international order in the South China Sea. 

Even with the 2010 rebalance to the Pacific, questions 

about actual U.S. commitment to the region arise, 

driving some regional partners to start hedging on 

who will be the dominant power in the future. During 

a Pentagon news conference in August of 2015, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Security 

Affairs (ASD [APSA]) David Shear sought to reassure our allies and partners by stating that the United 

States will “maintain the necessary military presence 

and capabilities to protect U.S. interests and those of 
87

allies and partners against potential threats in maritime Asia.”155 So, are U.S. land forces prepared and 

capable to defend U.S. interests and those of our allies 

in the Asia-Pacific?

As former ASD (APSA) Shear stated, the AsiaPacific is a maritime environment. U.S. land forces 

currently do not have the capability to maneuver in 

a shallow-water environment to provide wide-area 

security or maneuver, creating a significant capability 

gap considering the environment. An example of the 

environment is the Philippine island chain, which is 

comprised of over 3,200 km of navigable waterways 

that are limited to watercraft with less than 1.5-meter 

drafts. Many of the Philippine islands are only accessible via watercraft. These shallow-water environments 

present multiple challenges in the region, such as accessibility during natural disasters to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief services to affected 

areas. Transnational criminal organizations and other 

nefarious actors who exploit host nation limitations in 

shallow-water capacity conduct illicit activities such 

as drug trafficking, piracy, human trafficking, and terrorism in these isolated areas.

These disorder activities are counter to U.S. interests on multiple levels. First, they continue to act as 

fund raising activities and potential safe-havens for 

terrorists. Second, they tend to drive the countries to 

have an inward look when it comes to defense, which 

does not allow them to cooperate and help alleviate 

some of the burden the United States faces in its ongoing efforts to have nations be defense exporters 

vice consumers. Lastly, these nefarious actors start to 

develop shadow governance by threatening the local populace, which in term discredits the legitimate 

government. Developing a shallow-water capability 
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for the Army could have an impact across all of these 

threats. Based on China’s (revisionist) and other bad 

actor (disruptor) activities, and the potentially destabilizing effects they may bring to the region, it is 

incumbent on the United States to address the current 

gap in assured shallow-water maneuver now. 

U.S., allied, and partner land forces must develop 

a means to assure combat maneuver, security, and 

reconnaissance in the shallow-water maritime environment common to this region. The Asia-Pacific theater’s key terrain is replete with shallow-water island 

and shoals, coastal littorals, and navigable rivers.

Although the Asia-Pacific environment is predominantly a maritime one, most of the regional militaries 

are land force centric. Why is this important? Because 

culture matters. While the United States is already 

facing challenges in the region dealing with different 

historical cultures, it could limit the amount of friction it encounters when dealing with organizational 

culture by leveraging land force engagement, making 

it a more predominant actor in the Asia-Pacific. The 

United States has a Joint Force ethos, but each service 

has unique language and sub-cultures. Making a land 

force the executive agent for shallow-water maneuver 

in the region allows for more commonality amongst 

the United States and host nation forces.

Land forces rely on equipment for combined arms 

maneuver. During the most recent operations in the 

Middle East, the Army relied on Stryker Brigade 

Combat Teams (SBCT) to balance lethality, mobility, 

and survivability against the requirements for rapid 

strategic deployability. The Army does not have a 

“Stryker” for shallow-water maneuver. Thus, in order 

to support joint TSC goals and objectives, the Joint 

Forces will require additional water-borne systems 
89

capable of maneuvering land forces throughout shallow-water environments. At first glance, this seems 

like a Navy/Marine function, and perhaps it is; but 

current force structure within those services does not 

support the anticipated demand for shallow-water 

maneuver in the theater. 

The U.S. Army is addressing part of the material 

solution. The Army is developing a request for proposal for a Maneuver Support Vessel (Light), as part 

of its Army Watercraft System (AWS), to replace its 

Vietnam-era mechanized landing craft (LCM-8 “Mike 

Boats”). This is a perfect opportunity for land forces 

to address the full maritime maneuver and movement 

gap holistically. 

This recommendation offers great flexibility for 

operations in the gray zone. The recommendation 

also has direct relevance to land force decisive operations (maneuver and wide area security) in a littoral 

maritime environment. In the gray zone, assured maneuver in shallow-water provides the land force with 

a means to interdict an assertive revisionist China. 

It provides a low-escalatory means to interdict commercial fishing fleets and commercial shipping used 

to construct man-made islands from reef features. A 

shallow-water maneuver capability also provides the 

land forces commander with a means of interdicting 

disruptive challengers, like transnational organized 

criminals and local “shadow power” economies—both 

of which use the shallow coastal littorals as a maritime 

highway to transport their goods and influence.

Land force shallow-water maneuver is also essential should gray zone competition advance to confrontation—or worse, sustained combat. This capability is 

applicable across the full range of military operations. 

For example, a combat patrol boat equipped land force 
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could maneuver in a maritime environment to conduct 

an ambush, bypass a coastal obstacle, encircle a shore 

bound force, raid a trafficking supply hub, or provide 

covering fires to a ground unit maneuvering along a 

waterway. A combat patrol boat equipped land force 

could also provide traditional security and reconnaissance missions along coastal roads and maritime avenues of advance, providing early warning forward of 

coastal defensive positions and build-up lodgments.

Surveillance and reconnaissance are vital to any 

maneuver or security operation. In the expansive shallow-water environments of the Asia-Pacific, the land 

forces commander must retain an organic capability 

that assures situational awareness, early warning, and 

physical communication between flank elements separated by bodies of water. Fitted with enhanced technology autonomous and semi-autonomous systems, 

the shallow-water maneuver platform could provide 

extended range and duration surveillance and reconnaissance both above the sea and under the sea. The 

early warning, targeting, and route clearance advantages these capabilities could bring to the ground force 

commander are substantial.

Other missions that would greatly enhance land 

forces commander options, presenting multiple planning (and actual) dilemmas to an adversary, include 

interdiction patrols, seaborne supply line and landing 

raids, and stealthy infiltration and resupply of small 

units. 

During gray zone competition, a shallow-water 

capable boat could further enhance partner nation 

building during peacetime activities. For instance, according to an analysis conducted by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 

the Pacific (UNESCAP), “Asia and the Pacific is the 
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most disaster-prone region in the world.”156 According to the data, the Philippines rank number three in 

the world for most exposed to natural disasters; Japan 

is number four, Brunei is number six, and Cambodia 

is number 15. Considering the susceptibility of this 

region to maritime related disasters, having an easily 

transported shallow-water capability, capable of accessing areas that may be cut-off to ground transportation, would enhance humanitarian assistance and 

disaster relief efforts.

The Navy and Marine Corps have developed limited capability in this area. The sheer size of the AsiaPacific, however, will require far more capacity than 

what is currently resident between these two services. 

This is a Joint Forces capability gap. It is unlikely that 

the Navy-Marine team will field sufficient capacity to 

accommodate the range of missions and expansive 

geography of the Asia-Pacific theater. Therefore, the 

Army should actively engage in concept and doctrine 

development and the joint operational testing, training, and equipment fielding associated with the force 

development of this capability. 

The Army has long employed watercraft to support land force operations. Nevertheless, regardless of 

who fills this gap, someone has to develop and field 

the “Stryker” of the Pacific to support land forces 

conducting combined arms maneuver and wide area 

security missions in shallow-water environments.

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SUMMARY AND 

IMPLEMENTATION OF 

RECOMMENDATIONS

95

VIII. SUMMARY AND IMPLEMENTATION

The capability gaps and solution recommendations 

identified in this report address new capabilities, new 

employment strategies, and the expansion of existing 

capabilities to meet current and projected gray zone 

competition needs in the Asia-Pacific.

This report presents the implementation activities 

as a two-tier construct. The tier-one implementation 

activity is a discussion of first-step actions that the U.S. 

Joint Forces can take to move the recommendations 

forward. The objective of the near-term first-step is to 

identify a responsible-agent, and to offer that agent 

strategies to expand resourcing for existing initiatives 

or strategies to move recommendations toward inclusion in a formal defense management decision process. The tier-two implementation activity addresses 

longer-term options for implementing the recommendation within formal defense management processes, 

or alternative options to develop and deliver future 

capabilities. In the current fiscally constrained environment, there is limited institutional appetite for 

investing in new, opportunity-oriented capabilities. 

Therefore, when appropriate, the tier-two recommendation offers options that are not dependent on the 

U.S. defense establishment to bear the full burden of 

required capability development.

Near-term actions generally require a responsible 

agent (proponent) to secure funding for an existing 

program by demonstrating a regional requirement, 

then arguing for resource prioritization among competing requirements from around the globe. For new 

initiatives, the near-term action involves developing a 

white paper to socialize a new concept or requirement. 

The white paper should address: the aspects of the 
96

operating environment that create the capability gap 

or opportunity; a clear military problem or challenge; 

a central idea animating the proposed solutions; and 

a description of the key aspects of the recommended 

solution.157 Responsible agents produce concept proposals from socialized white papers. The Joint Staff 

J7 manages the development of those proposals into 

concept documents. Approved Concepts provide the 

basis for detailed capability based assessments, which 

establish the need for new capability requirements 

documents.158 For each of the “new idea” recommendations proffered, the report narrative provides the 

basis for a white paper to begin this process.

In some cases, existing national strategy and guidance, DoD/service roles and missions, or the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations must be refined to 

justify the development of needed subordinate Joint 

Operating Concepts/Supporting Joint Concepts. This 

refinement requires a national level dialogue to generate the motivation for fundamental change in the 

national perception of security challenges or the ways 

to address them. National security dialogue advocating fundamental change typically occurs outside the 

formal defense management processes. Mechanisms 

to influence the change dialogue include reports like 

this one, congressional testimony, academic and think 

tank papers, professional journal articles, and discussions among security and military professionals.

Unless the regional threat profile or the strength of 

the U.S. economy shift significantly, U.S.-centric development of the full pallet of recommended solutions 

offered in this report may not be feasible. Therefore, 

the report offers long-term force management options 

that include U.S. developed and fielded capabilities, 

U.S. developed capabilities for FMS, and U.S. devel-
97

oped concepts to encourage regional partner development and fielding of capabilities. 

Both the security and economic environments will 

inevitably change during the time it takes to develop 

the exploratory concept, requirement, JCTD, and doctrine initiatives. However, these initial steps remain 

sound regardless of a future environment informed 

optimal force development fielding decision. It is imperative that the documentation development take 

place to establish a baseline for capability development. Collaborating with regional partners to develop 

concepts and conduct JCTDs will facilitate force management option flexibility. Regardless of who fields 

the capabilities suggested in this report, U.S. leadership is necessary to stimulate idea development, concept development, and multinational participation in 

JCTDs to re-mission existing capabilities, as well as to 

incentivize partners and allies to pursue needed gray 

zone competition-centric capabilities. Despite fluctuations in the U.S. economy, defense budgets, or security 

estimates over the next 20 years, U.S. near-term action 

to ensure that future strategic force development options are imperative. 

Four categories of actionable recommendations 

advance the ideas generated by the project’s analysis. 

These categories include: mind-set changes through 

the development of concepts that facilitate effective 

gray zone competition; access and readiness through 

partnerships and presence; land-based cross-domain 

control; and land forces assured shallow-water maneuver. Each of these recommendation categories 

requires near-term, first-step action. Some recommendations will require a future force development 

choice between U.S.-centric and partner development 

options. The last two recommendations expand the 
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coercive options available to impose compliance with 

international order while reducing the risk of escalation to war. 

The foundational implementation objective is to 

influence the national security dialogue, drawing attention to gray zone competition and the need to rebalance defense management processes and resource 

prioritization. The U.S. military mind-set requires a 

re-balance from war fighting to effectively competing in the gray zone. Warfighting is fundamental to 

the military’s core competency. However, the nation 

could lose a competition with our rivals without ever 

triggering major combat operations. The U.S. military 

must provide options short of war to protect and advance U.S. interests when rivals challenge them using 

coercive force short of war. Investing in dual-purpose 

(war and gray zone) capabilities is required to compete in this fiscally constrained environment.

Several report recommendations expand existing 

program capacity, or re-enforce ongoing initiatives. 

This report does not provide detailed implementation 

steps for these recommendations. Implementation is 

dependent on senior military leader awareness and 

resource prioritization of these initiatives. 
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IX. REBALANCED MINDSET AND LEXICON

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES FOR 

RECOMMENDATION 1

Sustained Competition Framework.

The Joint Staff J7 is currently developing a Joint 

Concept for Integrated Campaigning. This concept 

captures many of the ideas offered in Recommendation 1: to establish a sustained competition framework 

for competing in contested security space, from gray 

zone competition to major combat operations. The 

concept framework encompasses more than gray zone 

competition. It employs an alternative joint campaigning construct to align instruments of power across a 

security environment, representing competition from 

cooperation through sustained combat. The joint 

concept work group is composed of representatives 

from across the land forces services, the U.S. Army, 

U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command. The initial drafts of the Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning posted the v0.3 “Draft for Red 

Team” review milestone in March 2016.159 The joint 

concept work group expects to have the complete 

draft through the service operations deputies’ (OpsDep) review, and ready for signature, early in the next 

fiscal year. The most important land force near-term 

action required to advance this effort is active involvement with the joint concept work group core writing team, to ensure the concept accurately captures 

needed reform and endorsement of the Joint Concept 

for Integrated Campaigning during general officer 

staffing later this summer. The U.S. Army lead agent 

coordinating this near-term activity is the TRADOC’s 
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Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC). As the 

document drafts move through various general officer 

and OpsDep reviews, ARCIC will need to fully engage 

Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) (G3/5/7) and U.S. Army Pacific (among others) to prepare the concept for final signature.
101

X. ACCESS AND READINESS THROUGH 

PARTNERSHIPS AND PRESENCE

Success in gray zone competition is dependent on 

people-centric activities. Land force roles and missions in the gray zone may not fully align with traditional land force “warfighting” missions; however, 

land forces are perhaps the best suited and most value 

added instrument of national power to set the conditions in coercive gray zone environments. Operating 

in harmony with joint, interagency, and multinational 

partners, land forces can provide the skills, capacities, 

and relationships to succeed in the gray zone. As a dual-purpose (gray zone/major combat) capability, access and readiness through partner relationships and 

physical presence in the gray zone provide land forces 

access and improved warfighting skills if competition 

escalates to war. Gray zone competition is an opportunity to improve regional partnerships and access at 

the national level. The land forces are the right instrument of power to facilitate this; but success requires 

forward presence and new approaches to gray zone 

competition for land forces to be effective. 

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES FOR 

RECOMMENDATION 2

Pacific Pathways Modification.

This recommendation offers two approaches to address the greatest partner-building needs in the region. 

The first is developing a direct military-to-military relationship between the United States and China. China 

is not an enemy, nor must they be a rival. The United 

States and China cannot avoid being competitors, and 
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may wish to be rivals from time-to-time when they 

perceive their core national interests are at stake. The 

single greatest challenge facing both nations is the risk 

of miscalculation due to misunderstanding, which 

could lead to war. While it is the most common pattern, war is not the inevitable outcome when a rising 

power and an established power vie for hegemony.160

The land forces, through a robust network of personal 

and organizational military relationships, can advance 

understanding and reduce the risk of miscalculation 

between the two nations. Below the Chinese Communist Party, the PLA is the most influential institution 

in China. Beyond commercial economic interests, the 

U.S. military is among the ubiquitous U.S. presence in 

the region. It makes sense that these two institutions, 

symbols of national power and intent, share in a direct, productive, and assuring relationship that strives 

for reflection and mutual understanding.

There are several methods for the United States to 

pursue the development of a closer and more robust 

U.S. land force-PLA relationship. The one proffered 

by this report suggests pursuing the natural advancement of the relationship through the mutually respected regional partner, Mongolia. The PLA relationship 

with Mongolia is already quite strong. PLA leaders 

regularly conduct training exercises with Mongolia, 

and PLA officers attend Mongolia’s mid-career general staff college. Likewise, U.S. land forces have a 

close relationship with Mongolia. The U.S. Army conducts exercises in the region with Mongolian Army 

participation, and one of the researchers of this report 

is a Mongolian Army officer attending the USAWC in 

Carlisle, PA. All three countries (China, Mongolia, and 

the United States) seem receptive to developing stronger relationships through more routinized interaction. 
103

Beginning those relations slowly, through educational 

exchanges and military exercises focused on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations, will establish a precedent that the three armies 

can expand on over time.

The United States and China have already worked 

side-by-side on HA/DR exchanges and academic discussions in China.161 A first step to expand these into 

multi-lateral military exercises requires USPACOM 

and USARPAC to work with the DoD and the U.S. 

Congress to lift bureaucratic and legislative barriers 

to allow more robust and diverse exchanges. Regardless of the political situation associated with the China-U.S. relationship, military-to-military engagement 

provides a real power based moderating venue for 

idea exchange and understanding. These moderating 

relationships, based on mutual respect and a desire 

for understanding, are perhaps most important when 

the two nations have divergent political perspectives 

on regional issues. 

The second recommendation addresses the need to 

develop regional partners into leaders that orchestrate 

regional collective defense operations. The United 

States has been, and will continue to be, a strong influence in regional collective defense initiatives. This 

leadership role occasionally precipitates two negative 

narratives: (1) China sees the U.S. role in solidifying 

collective defense relationships as stirring up trouble, 

and as a direct challenge to China’s historic interests 

in the region;162 and, (2) Critics in the United States 

complain that our regional partners should take a 

more active burden-sharing role in regional collective 

defense.163 The reverse pathways initiative encourages 

a regional partner (perhaps Australia, Japan, or the 

Republic of Korea) to coordinate and execute a Pacific 

Pathways-like military exercise. This exercise would 
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involve 3-4 countries participating in a series of collective training exercises, culminating with a visit to the 

U.S. National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA, or a 

Pacific Northwest training area near Fort Lewis, WA. 

Leadership for the coordination and planning of 

the operation would fall on the lead-country regional 

partner. The United States would support the exercise 

with strategic mobility and operational logistics. The 

effort would build confidence among regional partners, and develop systems and forums to facilitate 

collective defense cooperation and military planning. 

Implementation of this recommendation is a logical extension of the U.S. Army’s initial efforts, which 

brought Singapore, Canada, and Japan to the United 

States to participate in exercises Tiger Balm (HI), Arctic 

Anvil (AK), and Rising Thunder (WA), respectively.164

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES FOR 

RECOMMENDATION 3

Expand the State Partnership Program (SPP) 

to all Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN) Members. 

The SPP, resourced through the NGB, has significantly contributed to the GCC ability to execute theater 

campaign plans and TSC requirements. The continued 

requirements of the six geographic combatant commands and expanded interest in the program by AsiaPacific countries indicate an increased demand for SPP 

activities. 

Therefore, the implementation plan for this recommendation encourages defense policy guidance to direct an increase in SPP activities to meet the demand. 

The relative cost of increasing the SPP in the AsiaPacific, versus redistributing programs aligned with 
105

Europe, seems both a prudent and cost-effective way 

to assure allies while improving access and readiness 

for U.S. forces. The host (requesting) country provides 

the demand signal to expand the SPP by making a 

request through the U.S. Embassy. The U.S. Embassy 

country team processes the host country’s request 

through the commander, USPACOM. The USARPAC, 

through USPACOM, facilitates the formal request to 

increase National Guard unit availability. USARPAC 

facilitates the request through formal coordination 

with the NGB, the Joint Staff, and HQDA. The commander, USPACOM, could use the Integrated Priority 

List to encourage funding prioritization for the program expansion. The NGB and the Adjutants General 

Association of the United States have mechanisms to 

encourage expanded program funding as well, both at 

the congressional and Army levels. 

The NGB and ARNG can further improve the SPP 

by standardizing oversight, and by petitioning the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to develop a 

strategy to amend Title 32 authorities with Congress. 

These authorities could provide participating National Guard units a habitual increase in mobilization, 

available training days, and funding to improve the 

availability of units and effectiveness of this important program. 

As an existing program, the NGB-J35 has proactive mechanisms in place to assess the compatibility 

of state offerings with countries that have requested 

to participate in the SPP. The NGB shares their prioritization analysis with the DoD and the GCCs during annual program and budget development. Since 

the introduction of the SPP in 1990, the budget prioritization process has routinely expanded the program.165 In 2012, the Government Accounting Office 

(GAO) conducted a thorough audit of the SPP. The 
106

study found that both participating units and host 

countries derived great benefit from the program. The 

GAO encouraged greater program oversight by the 

NGB, particularly with respect to standardizing and 

tracking program activities, objectives, outcomes, and 

funding.166

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES FOR 

RECOMMENDATION 4

Civic Action Activities Synchronization.

The final two recommendations in this category will take longer to coordinate than the first two 

programs within the Joint Forces, interagency, and 

regional partners. The implementation process to 

synchronize and coordinate civic action activities is 

dependent on the designation of a central synchronizing and coordinating agent. Many stakeholders are 

involved in the prioritization of civic action activity 

planning and execution. There has been no national 

or regional authority designated to coordinate those 

activities, though the embassies and USPACOM have 

the most interest in activities affecting regional security objectives. Further compounding the challenge, 

military units and federal agency elements operating 

in the region engage in unplanned civic action opportunities.

The logical first step to synchronize civic action activities is for USPACOM, the only regional authority 

with the capacity to manage the full range of activities, to designate an executive agent to synchronize all 

Joint Force activities. Since civic action activities are 

by nature population-centric and conducted on land, 

USARPAC stands out as the logical subordinate headquarters to take on this management responsibility. 
107

Once assigned executive agency, USARPAC needs 

to establish coordination and planning forums comprised of regional embassy country teams, USPACOM subordinate Joint Force commands, and rotational military elements anticipated in theater. Prior 

to convening these planning forums, USPACOM staff 

would need to develop a list of embassy coordinated 

country-specific objectives for the civic action activities. USPACOM currently includes these State Department prioritized objectives in a theater campaign 

plan and refines them on a regular basis to accommodate changes in the security environment or political 

priorities. 

USARPAC should develop and refine this embassy 

objective determination alongside military planning 

and synchronization efforts with an intent to expand 

stakeholder participation beyond the Joint Forces. 

This will require careful attention to the locations, 

battle rhythms (timing), and language used when 

convening forums or producing execution documents 

respectively. Once the participants extend beyond the 

U.S. military, the language and nature of execution 

documents must convey the collaborative and cooperative nature of the enterprise.

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES FOR 

RECOMMENDATION 5

Cooperative Security Locations.

An equally long-term recommendation is the establishment of host nation run and supported cooperative security locations. The first-step near-term 

activity associated with implementing this recommendation is the co-location of activity sets with 
108

rotational units and multinational exercises. In the 

near-term, the report recommends the permanent 

storage of activity sets in the region, and the routinization of multinational exercises to employ the sets. 

A parallel element of the first-step is an interagency coordinated selection of the cooperative security 

location sites. Over time, the activities associated with 

these cooperative security locations will contribute 

to local prosperity by energizing the local economy 

with funds derived from military exercise, facilities 

and infrastructure construction, and continuing maintenance. Further, well-selected sites will extend host 

nation central government legitimacy to the periphery 

of their current influence. U.S. land forces operating 

in a cooperative setting with host country security, 

police, and commercial interests could also improve 

host nation legitimacy by gradually transferring best 

practices of individual rights, corruption controls, and 

transparent power relationships. 

Cooperative security locations should be located 

in areas that have the greatest potential to contribute 

to host nation stability and legitimacy. Among the locations recommended for prioritization are Vietnam, 

Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Vietnam 

is a natural and successful ally in balancing Chinese 

assertiveness. In addition, a Cooperative Security Location in Vietnam offers U.S. land forces access to an 

operating base from which HA/DR in the islands and 

littorals could be effective, and proximity to China 

might support cooperative training opportunities. 

Malaysia’s Borneo states (Sarawak and Sabah), the 

Philippines’ Southern islands (Mindanao, Palawan), 

and Indonesia’s Eastern islands—bordering the Celebes Sea (Sulawesi, Kalimantan-Borneo) present 

great opportunities for extending central government 
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legitimacy, improving local prosperity, and providing 

a base of operations to counter transnational criminal organizations, shadow economies, and competing governance/power structures in these partner 

nations. 

A central element of this recommendation is the 

host nation development and maintenance of infrastructure (ports, roads, barracks, and “soft basing” 

facilities), training areas, and storage facilities to accommodate routinized multinational HA/DR, and 

later cooperative defense military exercises, from 

these locations. This will likely require some U.S. 

funding support in the form of Logistic Cost Sharing 

agreements, which can be used as leverage to gain 

favorable “status of forces-like” agreements with the 

host nation.

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XI. LAND-BASED CROSS-DOMAIN CONTROL

The very first step is the need to develop a U.S. policy perspective that acknowledges the appropriate use 

of coercive military force to advance U.S. interests in 

the region by confronting Chinese assertive and coercive behavior. China is a competitor whom the United 

States desires as a partner, especially in the economic 

arenas of finance, trade, and commerce. This aspiration is not in conflict with a realist view that China’s 

use of coercive force as an extension of state power—

even during periods of relative peace—threatens regional security and international norms which the 

United States wishes to protect. Left unchecked or 

unchallenged, the United States and regional partners 

have no leverage to limit China’s use of coercive behavior to advance a “manifest destiny” march across 

the Asia-Pacific and beyond. Therefore, the first step 

in opening up the space for the United States or partners to use coercive force to blunt aggressive behavior 

is recognition that a legitimate deterrent capability is 

necessary to pursue those operations without escalating to war.

This recommendation requires a fundamental 

change, or possibly acknowledgement, that the United States must incorporate a real-power anti-access 

component to our national and military strategies to 

encourage a productive China-U.S. relationship. Current U.S. concepts address gaining access to regions 

protected by adversary A2AD capabilities once war 

breaks out. That IS NOT the recommendation proffered in this report. This report recommends building 

a regional capability to impose friendly force, landbased A2AD costs on a rival, to increase the operating 

space within which the United States and its partners 
112

can conduct coercive gray zone competitive activities 

while minimizing the probability of escalation to war.

These land-based cross-domain control capabilities 

adopt the dual-purpose nature of all the report recommendations, but from the opposite direction. During 

conflict, this capability would allow the United States 

and its partners to fight for access inside the first island 

chain from relatively secure land-bases. By denying 

the enemy operating space from the land, friendly air 

forces could more easily deploy assets within striking 

range of areas controlling the first island chain. Combining land-based and Air Force assets, force protection of naval assets inside the first island chain will 

improve their survivability and freedom of maneuver. 

Despite the applicability of this recommendation to 

support the Joint Operational Access Concept167 or the 

emerging Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the 

Global Commons (JAM-GC), the warfighting value of 

the capability is not the focus of the recommendation.

The purpose of the land-based cross-domain control is to impose a cost on rivals willing to escalate 

gray zone coercive competition to war. It is a deterrent 

capability that expands the range of coercive military 

options available to the United States and its partners 

to blunt assertive rival behavior (bordering on aggressive behavior or direct challenges to international 

norms), while reducing the likelihood that confrontation will escalate to war. To advance the national policy and strategy debate, the Joint Staff should develop 

a white paper capturing the need for this capability; 

and the pursuit of a white paper will help coalesce senior level thoughts and discussion on this topic, while 

providing a vehicle to engage in a national policy and 

strategy dialogue. 
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IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES FOR

RECOMMENDATION 6

Air Control.

The second near-term first-step to advance this 

recommendation is the recognition that each element 

of the land-based cross-domain control recommendation, and its associated land-based “lily pad” employment strategy, requires a different approach to 

operationalize the ideas offered. Land-based control 

of the air domain is a capacity and interoperability 

issue. The greatest threat to U.S. and partner forces 

from the air are ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, airbreathing aircraft, semi-autonomous robots (drones), 

and the potential of a swarming attack by a combination of each. The United States and its allies possess 

land-based systems capable of defeating each of these 

threats. However, current U.S. resource prioritization 

and partner nation interoperability does not accommodate sufficient capacity in theater to counter these 

projected threats.168

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES FOR 

RECOMMENDATION 7

Sea Control.

Neither the United States nor regional partners 

willing to share their technology possess a sufficient 

land-based anti-ship (maritime control) capability to 

counter anticipated future threats. Japan is the only 

regional partner known to be adequately pursuing 

this capability.169 Without U.S. leadership to develop 

a land-based anti-ship concept, and probably the tech-
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nology to operationalize it, it is unlikely that regional 

partner armies will develop the capability.

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES FOR 

RECOMMENDATION 8

Cyber and Space Control.

Cyber and space domain control is largely a function of sharing technology, software, and techniques to 

counter attacks by rivals. The extent that partner nations rely on cyber and space technologies determines 

their exposure and vulnerability to attack. Defense 

systems interoperability and partner asset vulnerability are important aspects of Joint Force vulnerability 

to attack. Vulnerability awareness through education, 

shared defensive tools (software, techniques, and 

procedures), and transparency regarding attacks—to 

increase awareness and attribution—are critical firststeps in this domain.

In light of increasing threats to U.S. national space 

and cyberspace capabilities, the commander of USARPAC must effectively protect, defend, and respond to 

destabilizing efforts or aggressive acts in the space and 

cyber domain. As such, the commander must have a 

dedicated team of cross-functional expertise in space 

and cyber to train, advise, and assist U.S. international 

partners. Engaging partners and allies is not only the 

first line of effort; it is critical to achieving the USPACOM commander’s theater campaign plan objectives. 

Space and cyber capabilities are strategic capabilities and critical enablers to U.S. national security and 

activities within the gray zone. They enable the United 

States and its partners to maintain a significant advantage over rivals. The rate of change in the systems and 
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resources that rivals commit to intrusion is expanding 

at an alarming rate. The USPACOM commander does 

not have sufficient systems to build the capacity and 

collective defense among partners and allies necessary 

to defend their networks, data, and space capabilities. 

To remedy this capability gap, the report recommends 

fielding three capabilities to the theater: increase Cyber Protection Teams, increase ARSSTs, and establish 

an ICS2C-COE.

It is important to note that the Cyber Protection 

teams and ARSST exist. Increasing or redistributing 

manpower to create additional teams requires USARPAC to submit a concept plan to HQDA (Deputy 

Chief of Staff, G-35 [DAMO-FMZ]). All requests for 

additional manpower requirements must be workload-based, and concept plans must include a manpower bill-payer strategy. Once approved, the HQDA-approved requirements in the concept plan form 

the basis for requesting additional resources, or for 

realigning proponent resources. Commands must be 

prepared to resource concept plans from within the 

command’s available authorizations and total obligation authority.170 The Total Army Analysis and Program Objective Memorandum processes facilitate 

the allocation of resources against approved requirements.

THE LONG VIEW

Force Development Options for Recommendations 

6, 7, and 8.

The final near-term first-step is to begin the process of advancing this recommendation into formal 

defense management processes once the national level 

strategy and policy perspective will support it. There 
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are several elements to this step, but they all begin 

with a white paper that leads to a joint concept proposal, and finally to a multinational collaboration on 

a joint concept for land-based cross-domain control. 

The concept provides the basis for a capability based 

assessment and capability requirement document 

generation. In collaboration with willing regional 

partners, a JCTD could test the land-based “lily pad” 

employment strategy, and identify existing anti-ship 

and air defense systems and technologies. This testing should incorporate partner-developed systems for 

cross-domain control in the demonstration. 

At a minimum, the United States must lead the 

development of this capability set through these nearterm steps. This effort will take several years, likely 

extending beyond the current programming years (FY 

22). At that time, the DoD and HQDA would need to 

assess the security environment and make a strategic 

decision regarding the fielding of this capability. Unless the security environment changes significantly, 

the DoD will select a force development choice favoring U.S. developed capability for FMS, or a collaborative U.S.-regional partner developed capability 

for partner fielding. These two options recognize the 

two most significant obstacles to fielding a U.S. landbased cross-domain control capability in the region. 

First, the current threat and fiscal environment would 

not support prioritization of this capability in sufficient capacity to meet the military requirements of the 

Asia-Pacific theater. Second, partner nations would 

be reluctant to allow the United States to station this 

capability within their sovereign territory, for fear of 

offending China. That concern would not prevent regional partners or allies from developing their own 

capability to provide capacity to a regional collective 

defense strategy. 
117

The three critical points associated with implementing this recommendation are: First, to socialize 

the need for the capability despite the U.S. aspiration 

to collaborate with China in other spheres. Second, 

to pursue a U.S.-led, multinational effort to develop 

a concept and capability to operationalize it. Finally, 

to pursue defense management activities that provide 

senior civilian security decision makers strategic force 

development fielding options in what are now the 

“out-years.” 

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XII. ASSURED LAND FORCE MANEUVER

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES FOR 

RECOMMENDATION 9

Land Force Assured Shallow-Water Maneuver.

This capability is critical to land forces operations 

in the Asia-Pacific. Land force assured shallow-water 

maneuver requires the fielding of a land forces means 

to interdict: maritime transnational criminal organization supply chains, pirates at sea and supporting land 

bases, commercial fishing fleets presenting illegal incursions into disputed waters, and similar maritimeborne disorder activities. During coercive operations, 

this capability must provide land forces commanders 

“division cavalry-like” capabilities in a maritime environment. These include reconnaissance and security 

operations (screen and early warning) in support of 

land forces operating on narrow coastal plains, armed 

maritime patrolling, and maritime route reconnaissance to ensure shallow-water freedom of navigation. 

This recommendation represents the rejuvenation of an old way of fighting, and the development 

of for-purpose capabilities, to improve the effectiveness of assured land force shallow-water maneuver. 

At various times in U.S. history, the Navy, Marines, 

and Army possessed systems and doctrine to provide 

a similar shallow-water maneuver capability. When 

relative peace removed the immediate combat requirement, each service abandoned this ad-hoc land 

force required capability. In the land forces-centric 

maritime environment of the Asia-Pacific, an assured 

land forces shallow-water maneuver capability is 

critical. Without it, any organized group in johnboats 
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can outmaneuver the best-equipped and trained land 

forces tied to the beach. 

Similar to the land forces cross-domain control 

recommendation, this recommendation will require 

the development of a joint concept in collaboration 

with our regional partners. Only the Filipino Army 

currently possesses this capability within an Army 

formation. During the development of this report, USAWC International Fellows from the region expressed 

interest in the capability; but all expressed reservations regarding their country’s willingness to pursue 

the development of the capability short of U.S. leadership in socializing a concept for its employment. 

The first-step in pursuing the joint concept is for 

the Joint Staff J7 to assign lead-agency to one of the 

land force elements of the Joint Forces. The U.S. Army 

should volunteer for this responsibility, but the U.S. 

Marine Corps would also be a logical choice. Each of 

the Joint Force land forces elements and the U.S. Navy 

have existing systems that could be adapted to this 

purpose. If a proponent develops an equipment solution prototype through a JCTD, the DoD could fast 

track procurement and fielding to 1-3 years.

All three strategic force development options are 

viable for fielding this capability. A Joint Force roles 

and missions discussion during the development of 

the joint concept would establish responsibility for 

funding the development and fielding of a capability 

within the Joint Forces. Once a concept and combat 

patrol boat system are developed, the strategic force 

management option to facilitate fielding through FMS 

is attractive. Since the principle use of the platform in 

the gray zone is closely tied to law enforcement and 

interdiction to blunt coercive violations of international norms, partners fielding the system may be the 

best option for filling this theater specific land forces 

capability gap.
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CONCLUSION

XIII. CONCLUDING ANALYSIS

The Asia-Pacific is a land forces-centric theater 

when viewed through the lens of China and U.S. regional partners. It is also a maritime theater, requiring land forces to develop capabilities to control space 

and maneuver in littoral, shallow-water, and interior 

riverine environments. 

Competition describes the China-U.S. relationship 

across several domains of national power. That competition is healthy and natural for both nations. The 

United States seeks friendly competition in economic 

arenas of commerce, trade, and international finance; 

diplomatic arenas of international law and norms; and 

security arenas of international stability and conflict 

avoidance. Yet, the United States must acknowledge 

that China-U.S. security competition in the gray zone 

is the central “determinant dynamic” for the future of 

Asia-Pacific international relations. Outcomes of the 

gray zone competition are setting precedent that will 

shape international norms for decades, if not centuries. Currently, the United States is not competing 

well with China or countering disorder activities in 

the gray zone competitive space effectively. This report has offered nine specific recommendations to improve land forces capabilities that could help reverse 

this trend.

The leadership of the U.S. security establishment 

must undertake a deliberate change in mindset to 

compete successfully in the gray zone. Senior civilian 

leaders must accept that there is coercive competition 

occurring below the threshold of sustained combat, 

and that U.S. land forces have a role to play in defending U.S. interests in that competitive space. Senior 

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defense and Joint Force leaders must understand the 

nature of gray zone competition to create a force capable of competing. Contesting effectively in the gray 

zone underpins every report recommendation. 

The nine recommendations proffered in this report 

represent the type of change required for land forces 

to compete effectively in the gray zone. They are not 

an exhaustive list. However, the four categories of recommendations do highlight the most important arenas of change required. Intentionally, the first arena 

of change is a change of mind-set. The first mind-set 

change required is an appreciation of the nature of 

gray zone competition, and a recognition that if a rival can “win-without-fighting,” then the United States 

can lose without competing. The second set of recommendations acknowledge the people-centric nature of 

gray zone competition; and the criticality of partner relationships based on mutual understanding and trust 

to achieve any meaningful success. Through partnerships and presence, U.S. land forces can contribute to 

successful outcomes in gray zone competition. Additionally, through partnerships and presence, U.S. land 

forces can improve warfighting readiness and access 

should coercive competition escalate to sustained 

combat. The last two categories of recommendations 

acknowledge the maritime environment within which 

gray zone competition is joined. 

The land-based cross-domain control category 

aspires to expand the range of options available to 

compete in the gray zone by exposing a rival to unacceptable costs if they chose to escalate coercive competition to war. The final category highlights the military 

imperative to conduct maneuver operations with land 

forces in shallow-water “no-go” dominated terrain.
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Bottom line: The nation should view gray zone 

competition as an opportunity to advance national 

interests; land forces are the right instrument of military power to engage that competition, but success requires both forward presence and new thinking about 

land forces to be effective. Land force relevance in the 

Asia-Pacific hinges on providing options to manage 

gray zone (between war and peace) competition, and 

providing cooperative to coercive means to enforce 

compliance with favorable international order norms 

through presence.

XIV. VALIDITY ASSESSMENT

The Asia-Pacific Integrated Research Project (AP 

IRP) team arrived at the regional assessments and recommendations presented in this report independently. 

Each of the recommendations are consistent with the 

theory and scoping screening criteria underpinning 

the research design, and are appropriate remedies to 

capability gaps identified during the environmental 

scan. Perhaps the most significant confirmation of the 

report’s analysis and recommendations validity is the 

similarity of conclusions reached by other prominent 

scholars, security experts, and practitioners familiar 

with the region and China-U.S. relations.171

The go game analogy facilitated the AP IRP team’s 

assessment of the Asia-Pacific security environment. 

The report relies on the reader’s knowledge of current 

events to draw conclusions. This is a weakness of the 

quick turn, student-led report. Future studies should 

confirm the linkage between the analogies and the environment using more rigorous regional case study. 

Having acknowledged this shortcoming, the insights 

presented in the report are consistent with foundational theory, the go game analogy, and current events.

The report benefited from three levels of vetting. 

The AP IRP team presented initial report assessment 

of the Asia-Pacific security environment, initial insights, and initial recommendations to a group of International Fellows (students) attending the USAWC. 

The group generally accepted the security environment assessment. A discussion of insights and recommendation feasibility contributed to the refinement of 

both in the final report. The USAWC Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) ran a 2-day workshop with more 

than 20 defense management subject matter experts, 

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128

from the Pentagon to “Red Team” report recommendations and implementation plans. The final report 

reflects the insights gained from this review. Due to 

report length considerations, the AP IRP team did 

not include detailed process documentation or implementation path options in the final report. The depth 

of discussion during this implementation workshop, 

however, greatly improved the quality of the recommendations and the feasibility of the implementation 

strategies suggested. A select group of faculty from 

the USAWC, and staff from HQDA, USARPAC, and 

USPACOM provided a peer review of the coordinating draft of the report. Incorporation of several recommendations improved the readability and clarity 

of the report’s logic argument. 
129

XV. FUTURE RESEARCH

This report did not consider the extensive ChinaU.S. competition space associated with Indian Ocean 

periphery states, the Americas, Russia, or Africa. Each 

of these regions deserves a focused consideration. 

Indian Ocean security issues are intertwined with 

the Asia-Pacific analysis associated with this report. 

Constraints of time prevented the synthesis of Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific issues. Considering the 

China-U.S. relationship through the lens of security 

issues involving India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia, and Thailand are critical to 

understanding the interdependent nature of the USPACOM’s Indo-Asia-Pacific challenge.

Finally, the context of the Asia-Pacific rivalry has 

evolved over the last 5 or 6 decades. The regional 

stakeholders’ political, economic, military, and cultural histories have also evolved. This suggests an 

urgent need to re-examine war plans for the region, 

starting with first-principle assumptions and creative 

assessments of potential strategies employed by rival 

stakeholders to advance their national interests.

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ABOUT THE 

CONTRIBUTORS

133

XVI. ABOUT THE PROJECT DIRECTORS

WILLIAM G. BRAUN III Professor “Trey” Braun is a 

Professor of Practice with the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College (USAWC). Professor Braun’s research agenda includes national strategy 

and policy analysis, land forces employment, military 

leadership, and civil-military relations. He last deployed as the Director, CJ-7 (Force Integration, Training, and Education Directorate), Combined Security 

Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). His 30-

year Army career included multiple tactical aviation 

and planner assignments at Division and Corps, and 

multiple force management assignments on the Army 

staff, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC), and the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. 

Professor Braun holds a bachelor of arts degree from 

Alfred University and master’s degrees from the 

USAWC, School of Advanced Military Science, 

(SAMS), and Webster University.

DAVID LAI Dr. Lai is a Research Professor of Asian 

Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC). Before joining SSI, 

Dr. Lai was on the faculty of the U.S. Air War College. Born and raised in China, Dr. Lai’s research and 

teaching cover U.S.-China and U.S.-Asian security relations. He has also made special contributions to the 

study of Chinese strategic thinking and operational 

art. Dr. Lai’s academic studies began in China. He later pursued his post-graduate studies at the University 

of Colorado, where he earned his master’s and doctoral degrees in political science specializing in international relations.
134

XVII. ABOUT THE RESEARCHERS

JOSE A. ARANA Commander (CDR) Arana most 

recently served as Operations Officer, National Joint 

Operations and Intelligence Center, National Military 

Command Center, Directorate for Operations, J-3, 

Joint Staff, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. CDR Arana 

was responsible for the development and transmission of messages directing the execution of several 

numbered operations plans, to include combatant 

command nuclear plans. Prior to being assigned to 

the Joint Staff, CDR Arana deployed onboard every 

platform from which the MH-60S is employed, to include the maiden deployment of the USS George H.W. 

Bush (CVN 77) where he earned his Command Duty 

Officer (CDO) Underway qualification. He has been 

stationed on both coasts (San Diego, CA, and Norfolk, 

VA), and has flown missions in support of Operations 

IRAQI FREEDOM, ENDURING FREEDOM and NEW 

DAWN. He was recently selected to take command 

of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron Twelve based 

out of Atsugi, Japan. CDR Arana graduated from the 

University of Florida in 1997. 

TOM ASBERY Colonel (COL) Asbery was commissioned in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in May 

1994. He holds a bachelor of science degree in landscape architecture from West Virginia University and 

a master of science in architecture from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. COL Asbery 

most recently served as the Deputy Division Commander of the Pacific Ocean Division and Commander of the Honolulu District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Shafter, Hawaii. He has served in a variety 

of command and staff assignments in the continental 
135

United States, Hawaii, and Europe. His next assignment will be as the Transatlantic Division-Forward 

Officer-in-Charge, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at 

Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.

JASON P. CONROY Colonel (COL) Conroy was commissioned in 1995 as an armor officer from the U.S. 

Officer Candidate School. He has served in a variety 

of command and staff assignments, both in the continental United States and overseas. Most recently, he 

served as the Liaison Officer for U.S. Strategic Command Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD) and U.S. Army 

Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces 

Strategic Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT) to U.S. 

Central Command (USCENTCOM), located in Tampa, 

FL. His previous assignments include: Deputy Chief, 

Strategy Division for Joint Forces Component Command Space (JFCC SPACE) and Chief of Operational 

Assessment for JFCC SPACE, Vandenberg Air Force 

Base (AFB), CA. COL Conroy holds a bachelor of science degree from Austin Peay State University, and a 

master‘s degree in military art and science from the 

United States Air University. 

LANCE R. ELDRED Colonel (COL) Eldred is a U.S. 

Army Logistics officer whose 24-year career includes 

four deployments from Bosnia to Iraq. His most recent 

assignments include a tour on the Joint Staff as Director, Special Access Programs, Squadron Commander, 

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and as an ObserverController/Trainer at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels Germany. COL Eldred has held various command and staff positions 

in the European and Southwest Asian theaters. COL 
136

Eldred’s next assignment is the 8th Army G4 in Yongsan, Korea, while also performing as Support Operations Officer for 8th Theater Support Command, 

Hawaii. COL Eldred holds a bachelor’s degree in history from Western Illinois University and a master’s 

degree from the U.S. Naval War College.

MARK ILLG Mr. Illg has over 30-years of experience 

as a proven strategic leader with extensive management and hands-on experience in public sector operations. He has held positions at all levels of command 

to include Department of Army and combatant command level jobs. He has deployed to Afghanistan as a 

Department of Defense (DoD) Civilian twice, working 

reconstruction, and senior level bilateral agreement 

management. Mr. Illg holds a master of science degree in business organizational management from La 

Verne University and a bachelor of science degree in 

logistics management from Weber State University. 

SANG K. LEE Colonel (COL) “Sonny” Lee was commissioned as a field artillery officer from the United 

States Military Academy with a degree in systems 

engineering. His previous assignment was as the 

Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team Chief for the 

Headquarters, United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) located at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. His next assignment is 3rd Army (Army Central) Headquarters at 

Shaw AFB, SC, as the electronic warfare (EW) director. 

He holds master’s degrees in business administration 

from Webster University, and public administration 

from Farleigh Dickinson University. 
137

DANIELLE NGO Colonel (COL) Ngo was a prior 

enlisted soldier before being commissioned as a U.S. 

Army engineer officer with deployments to Bosnia, 

Iraq, and Afghanistan. Her previous assignment was 

as a military assistant for a 4-star Danish General, 

Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, at Brussels, Belgium. Her next assignment is as the 130th 

Engineer Brigade Commander at Schofield Barracks, 

Hawaii. She also holds a master’s degree in military 

arts and sciences in theater studies from the Command and General Staff College and a master’s degree 

in public policy from Georgetown University. 

HUNG NGUYEN Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Nguyen 

is Vietnam’s International Fellow at the USAWC. He 

is the second Vietnamese officer who has studied at 

the USAWC. LTC Nguyen started his military career 

in 1993 as an enlisted soldier in the Vietnam People’s 

Air Force. He later shifted to study at the Vietnam People’s Army Infantry Officers School and the Vietnamese Military Science Academy to become an Army officer. His last assignment was at the Vietnam People’s 

Army Newspaper. He holds a master of arts degree 

in journalism from Griffith University, Australia.

ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ-CRUZ Lieutenant Colonel 

(LTC) Rodriguez-Cruz is a logistics officer with a 

functional area in simulation operations whose 20-

year career includes three deployments to Kosovo and 

Iraq. He holds a master of arts degree in public administration from Bowie State University, Maryland. His 

previous assignment was as a Deputy, Operation Officer for the 8th Theater Sustainment Command, Fort 

Shafter, Hawaii. His next assignment is to the U.S. 

Army Pacific Command (USARPAC), Fort Shafter, 

Hawaii.
138

GALBADRAKH TOGOO Colonel (COL) Togoo is 

Mongolia’s International Fellow at the USAWC. He 

previously taught National Security Studies as a Senior Instructor at the Mongolian Defense Leadership 

Academy, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. Previously, he 

served with Joint Multinational Peacekeeping forces 

and earned special qualifications as a joint planner, logistician, and military parachutist. He received a master’s degree in military art and science from King’s 

College, London, and attended the United Kingdom’s 

Joint Service Command and Staff College.
139

XVIII. ABOUT THE WRITING MENTORS

RORY CROOKS Colonel (COL) Crooks is a field artillery officer. His most recent assignment was Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Strategic Communications and Outreach at the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence, Fort 

Sill, OK. He has held previous tactical assignments 

with 1st Special Forces Group, 2d Infantry Division 

(Fort Lewis and Korea), XVIII Airborne Corps (Iraq), 

75th Ranger Regiment, and 501st Infantry Regiment 

(Alaska). He has also served as an operations officer 

for the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, observer controller at Hohenfels, Germany, 

and small group instructor for the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course. He holds a bachelor of science 

degree in civil engineering from Washington State 

University and a master’s degree in military arts and 

science from the U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College. His next assignment is the Director of 

International Fellows and G9 at the USAWC.

JAMES A. FRICK Colonel (COL) “Buddy” Frick is the 

Director of the Defense Planners Course at the USAWC. As a field artillery officer, he has served at every 

level from battery to division deep affects coordinator 

and fires planner. After graduating from the School 

of Advanced Military Science at Fort Leavenworth in 

2009, COL Frick served as the Army’s Chief of Contingency Plans and later as Chief of Strategy and Policy 

in USARPAC. He holds master’s degrees in military 

art and science from the Air University and the School 

of Advanced Military Science and in strategic studies 

from the USAWC.
140

FREDERICK J. GELLERT is a Professor of Practice of 

Resource Management in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the USAWC. 

His 30-year Army career included force management 

assignments at Department of the Army, U.S. Army 

Pacific (USARPAC), and deployment with NATO in 

Afghanistan. Professor Gellert holds a bachelor of science degree from Wayne State University, a master’s 

degree in astrophysics from Rensselaer Polytechnic 

Institute, and a master’s degree in strategic studies 

from the USAWC.
141

ENDNOTES

1. Anonymous, “Full Transcript: Interview with Chinese 

President Xi Jinping; China’s president offers written answers to 

questions from The Wall Street Journal,” The Wall Street Journal, 

September 22, 2015, available from www.wsj.com/articles/full-transcript-interview-with-chinese-president-xi-jinping-1442894700:

In approaching China-U.S. relations, one should see the 

larger picture and not just focus on differences, just as a Chinese saying tells us, “When important things are addressed 

first, secondary issues will not be difficult to settle.”. . . If 

two big countries like ours do not cooperate with each other, 

just imagine what will happen to the world.

In the Asia-Pacific, both China and the United States should 

vigorously implement the principles of mutual respect and 

win-win cooperation.

2. U.S. Department of the Army, “U.S. Army in Asia Pacific: 

Ensuring Stability and Security,” Washington, DC: U.S. Army 

Quadrennial Defense Review Office (G8), November 2013. Note: 

Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, III is using seven of the world’s ten 

largest standing militaries. The difference involves the distinction 

between armies and militaries. 

3. President Nixon visited the People’s Republic of China 

(PRC) in 1972, which led to a Chinese agreement to settle the political status of Taiwan peacefully. This led to the United States 

normalizing relations with the PRC. By 1979, the United States 

established full diplomatic relations with the PRC. For a more detailed description of the four periods that categorize China’s modern history, see David Lai, The United States and China in Power 

Transition, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, 2011, ch. 3, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.

army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1093.

4. David M. Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy,” in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, The People’s 

Liberation Army in the Information Age, Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 1999, available from www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/
142

pubs/conf_proceedings/CF145/CF145.chap7.pdf. For a more recent assessment of Chinese military capability and their emerging ability 

to project power at greater distances, see Eric Heginbotham et al., 

The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996-2017, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, available from www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html. 

5. David Lai, Asia-Pacific: A Strategic Assessment, Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 28, 2013, 

p. ix, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/

display.cfm?pubID=1155.

6. Barack Obama, Leon E. Panetta, and the U.S. Department 

of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 

2012, available from archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_

Guidance.pdf. 

7. Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, Washington, 

DC: The White House, February 2015, available from https://

www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_

strategy.pdf. 

8. Steven Schubert and James Purtill, “US Marines begin arriving in Darwin in fourth rotation as part of US ‘pivot’ to the 

Asia-Pacific,” ABC News, May 18, 2015, available from www.abc.

net.au/news/2015-04-13/us-marines-arrive-darwin-us-pivot-amid-concern-tensions-china/6387444.

9. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operational Access Concept

(JOAC), v. 1.0, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 2012, available from www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/

pubs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf.

10. This defense review is perhaps the first use of this term; 

see, U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense 

Review 2014, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 4, 

2014, available from archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_

Defense_Review.pdf. For a brief article that answers the question 

“So what is gray zone conflict,” see Hal Brands, “Paradoxes of 

the Gray Zone,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 2016, 

available from www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/.
143

For a more in-depth exploration of the current national security 

dialogue associated with gray zone competition, see Michael J. 

Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of 

Conflict, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, December 2015, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1303. 

11. Thomas D. Waldhauser, “Memorandum for Military Education Coordination Council, Subject: 2016 Joint Professional Military Education Special Areas of Emphasis List,” Washington, DC: 

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, not dated, received April 12, 2016.

12. David Lai, “The US-China Power Transition: Stage II,” The 

Diplomat, June 30, 2016, available from thediplomat.com/2016/07/

the-us-china-power-transition-stage-ii/.

13. Lai, The United States and China in Power Transition.

14. Ibid., p. xi.

15. David Lai, “China’s Strategic Moves and Counter-Moves,” 

Parameters, Vol. 44, No. 4, Winter 2014-2015, p. 19, available from 

www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/Issues/Winter_2014-15/5_LaiDavid_ChinasStrategicMovesCounter-Moves.pdf.

16. For a full development of this analogy, see David Lai, 

Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept, Shi, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, May 2004, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=378; and Lai, “China’s Strategic Moves and Counter-Moves.”

17. Also known as weiqi (wei Ch’i) in China, Igo in Japan, 

and Baduk in Korea, the United States calls the game go. For a 

more detailed discussion of the game, see the U.S. Go Association’s webpage, available from www.usgo.org. 

18. British Go Association webpage available from www.britgo.org/learners/chessgo.html; and Lai, Learning from the Stones.

19. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York: Basic Books, 1997.
144

20. U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense 

Review 2014.

21. Obama, National Security Strategy, February 2015.

22. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. 

Government: Fiscal Year 2017, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, 2016, available from https://www.whitehouse.gov/

sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2017/assets/budget.pdf. 

23. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of 

the United States of America 2015: The United States Military’s Contribution to National Security, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, June 2015, available from www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/

Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf.

24. Samuel J. Locklear, III, “USPACOM Strategy,” quoted on 

U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) Strategy webpage, available 

from www.pacom.mil/AboutUSPACOM/USPACOMStrategy.aspx, 

accessed on April 28, 2016.

25. Ibid., “Introduction.”

26.Ibid., “Alliances”; “U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements,” U.S. Department of State’s (DoS) Diplomacy in Action 

webpage, available from www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/, 

accessed on April 29, 2016.

27. U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense 

Review 2014, p. 16.

28. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of 

the United States of America 2015, p.11. The six missions most relevant to gray zone competition are: (1) Provide a global, stabilizing 

presence; (2) Respond to crisis and conduct limited contingency 

operations; (3) Conduct military engagement and security cooperation; (4) Conduct stability operations; (5) Provide support to 

civil authorities; and, (6) Conduct humanitarian assistance and 

disaster response.

29. Ibid.
145

30. U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense 

Review 2014, pp. 23-24.

31. Anthony H. Cordesman and Steven Colley, “Chinese 

Strategy and Military Modernization in 2015: A comparative analysis,” Final Review Draft, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, updated October 10, 2015, p. 15, available from https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/

files/publication/150901_Chinese_Mil_Bal.pdf. The analysis identified Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) as traditional anchors and emerging leaders of regional security.

32. U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense 

Review 2014, p. 4. Describes Australia, Japan, and the Republic of 

Korea as traditional anchors of regional security, and encourages 

their increased role in leading cooperative defense exercises.

33. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of 

the United States of America 2015, p. 9.

34. U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense 

Review 2014, p. 9.

35. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. 

Government: Fiscal Year 2017, p. 82.

36. Ibid., p. 84.

37. Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, and Mark Cancian, et al., 

Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships: 

An Independent Review of U.S. Defense Strategy in the Asia-Pacific, 

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2016, available from csis.org/files/publication/160119_

Green_AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf: 

Four lines of effort are highlighted: (1) Washington needs 

to continue aligning Asia strategy within the U.S. government and with allies and partners; (2) U.S. leaders should 

accelerate efforts to strengthen ally and partner capability, capacity, resilience, and interoperability; (3) the United 

States should sustain and expand U.S. military presence in 

the Asia-Pacific region; and, (4) the United States should 

accelerate development of innovative capabilities and concepts for U.S. forces.
146

38. H.E. Xi Jinping, “Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-win Cooperation and Create a Community of 

Shared Future for Mankind,” Statement by H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China at the General Debate of 

the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, September 28, 2015, available from qz.com/512886/read-the-full-text-ofxi-jinpings-first-un-address/:

Major countries should follow the principles of no conflict, 

no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation 

in handling their relations.

We should advance international cooperation in both economic and social fields and take a holistic approach to addressing traditional and non-traditional security threats, so 

as to prevent conflicts from breaking out in the first place.

Also see, Anonymous, “Full Transcript: Interview with Chinese 

President Xi Jinping,” President H.E. Xi Jinping’s words to explain “Dream China’s” historic roots; and his views on South 

China Sea territorial disputes. Note references to “history and reality.” China is trying to change the reality of the South China Sea. 

They will argue for their territorial rights, not on an international 

law and norms basis, but on history and a changed reality: 

The Chinese dream is fundamentally about making life 

better for the Chinese people, and I think one should approach this concept from two angles: history and reality. 

Starting from the Opium War in 1840, the Chinese nation 

went through a century of social turbulence, foreign aggression and the sufferings of war. Yet throughout all this 

trying time, our people stood on their feet and struggled 

tenaciously for a better future. They never gave up the longing for their cherished dream. To understand today’s China, 

one needs to fully appreciate the Chinese nation’s deep suffering since modern times and the profound impact of such 

suffering on the Chinese minds. That is why we regard the 

Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation as its greatest dream since modern times. The Chinese 

dream is as much the dream of every Chinese as it is the 

dream of the whole nation. It is not an illusion, nor is it an 

empty slogan. The Chinese dream is deeply rooted in the 

hearts of the Chinese people.
147

39. For more on China’s foreign policy driver, see Christopher K. Johnson, President Xi Jinping’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative: A 

Practical Assessment of the Chinese Communist Party’s Roadmap for 

China’s Global Resurgence, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, March 2016.

President Xi views OBOR as the signature foreign policy 

theme of his leadership tenure and the practical embodiment of his ‘China Dream’ for promoting national rejuvenation and cementing the country’s place as a leading world 

power. (p. V)

Washington has been slow to recognize the intricate lattice 

the Silk Road projects are forming in conjunction with initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 

(AIIB) and the BRICS’s (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 

Africa) New Development Bank (NDB) that are shaping the 

economic landscape in Eurasia with important consequences for global business. (p. VI) 

40. For a description of China in the context of global revisionist states (China, Russia, Iran), see Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess 

Mitchell, The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and 

the Crisis of American Power, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 2016; For comparative U.S.-China military capabilities, 

trends, and vulnerabilities, see Heginbotham et al., “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard.” 

41.For the unclassified letter disputing Chinese “limited militarization” of reclamation of disputed holdings in the South China Sea, see James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, 

Memorandum to Sen. John McCain, February 23, 2016, available 

from https://news.usni.org/2016/03/08/document-dni-assessment-ofchinese-militarization-reclamation-in-south-china-sea.

42. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “Imagery suggests China has deployed YJ-62 anti-ship missiles to Woody Island,” Jane’s Defence 

Weekly, March 23, 2016, available from https://janes-ihs-com.usawc.

idm.oclc.org/DefenceWeekly/Display/1765554; Richard D. Fisher, Jr., 

“China deploys HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles to Woody Island,” 

Jane's Defence Weekly, February 17, 2016, available from https://

janes-ihs-com.usawc.idm.oclc.org/DefenceWeekly/Display/1763200. 
148

43. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Airpower in the 

South China Sea,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

available from amti.csis.org/airstrips-scs/. 

44. See Simon Denyer, “How China’s fishermen are fighting a 

covert war in the South China Sea,” The Washington Post Asia and 

Pacific, April 12, 2016; Manuel Mogato, “Philippines says Chinese 

ship rammed fishing boats in Scarborough Shoal,” Reuters World 

News, February 4, 2015, available from www.reuters.com/article/usphilippines-china-idUSKBN0L81IM20150204; Shannon Teoh, “China fishing boats dispute: KL summons envoy,” The Straits Times, 

April 1, 2016. For a detailed description of the Philippine claim at 

the Permanent Court of Arbitration, see FPRI, “Shame Power: the 

Philippine Case against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration,” Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, available from www.fpri.org/fpri_programs/asia-program/.

45. Barbara Starr, “U.S. sources: Signs of North Korea mobile 

ballistic missile launch,” CNN Politics, April 13, 2016, available 

from www.cnn.com/2016/04/12/politics/north-korea-mobile-ballisticmissile-launch/index.html?eref=rss_latest; Jack Kim and David 

Brunnstrom, “Declassified: Secretive North Korea lifts veil on arms 

program,” Reuters, U.S. Edition, April 12, 2016, available from 

www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-idUSKCN0X91LD.

46. Jörn Birkmann, Matthias Garschagen, Peter Mucke, et al., 

World Risk Report 2014, Berlin, Germany: Bündnis Entwicklung 

Hilft and United Nations University, Institute for Environment 

and Human Security, 2014, p. 49 (World Risk Index), available 

from i.unu.edu/media/ehs.unu.edu/news/4070/11895.pdf.

47. Ibid., pp. 5-75.

48. Andrew Shearer, Australia-Japan-U.S. Maritime Cooperation: Creating Federated Capabilities for the Asia Pacific, Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2016, p. 

v, available from https://www.csis.org/analysis/australia-japan-usmaritime-cooperation.

49. Robert D. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and 

the End of a Stable Pacific, New York: Random House, 2015, pp. xv, 

ch. 3, ch. 5, ch. 6, epilogue.
149

50. Singapore is rated 8 of 168 nations world-wide on Transparency International’s 2015 “Corruption Perceptions Index,” 

Transparency International webpage, available from www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview.

51. David Stout, “The Last Time China Got Into a Fight With 

Vietnam, It Was a Disaster,” Time, World Section, May 15, 2014, 

available from time.com/100417/china-vietnam-sino-vietnamese-warsouth-china-sea/. 

52. Xiaoming Zhang, Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The military 

conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979-1991, Chapel Hill, NC: 

University of North Carolina Press, 2015, p. 205.

53. “Treaties and international agreements registered or filed 

and recorded with the Secretariat of the United Nations,” United 

Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 2336, No. I-41860, 2005, pp. 194-199, 

available from https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202336/v2336.pdf.

54. A review of U.S. security strategy documents, challenges 

and opportunities presented by the Asia-Pacific security environment, tacit knowledge of U.S. Joint Force concepts and doctrine, 

and various briefings on USPACOM and U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) initiatives in the theater informs this section’s summary 

analysis.

55. Victor A. Manhit and Angelica Mangahas, “EDCA Refocus: Eyes on the AFP’s Modernization Program,” Asia Maritime 

Transparency Initiative, February 5, 2016, available from amti.csis.

org/edca-refocus-eyes-on-the-afps-modernization-program/. 

56. Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone”; Antulio J. Echevarria II, “How Should We Think About ‘Gray-zone’ Wars?” Infinity Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, Fall 2015, available from https://www.

infinityjournal.com/article/158/How_Should_We_Think_about_GrayZone_Wars/; For a discussion of the range of military “modes of 

war,” to include gray zone/hybrid modes of war, see Frank G. 

Hoffman, “The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, 

Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War,” Essay written for the 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength, Washington, DC: 

Heritage Foundation, pp. 25-36, available from index.heritage.org/

military/2016/essays/contemporary-spectrum-of-conflict/.
150

57. Although, historically, the United States has done very 

well in this gray zone competition.

58. Dan De Luce and Keith Johnson, “Crunch Time for Washington and Beijing in the South China Sea,” Foreign Policy, February 17, 2016, available from foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/17/crunchtime-for-washington-and-beijing-in-the-south-china-sea/.

59. Chris Buckley, “Chinese General Visits Disputed Spratly 

Islands in South China Sea,” The New York Times, April 15, 2016, 

available from www.nytimes.com/2016/04/16/world/asia/china-southchina-sea-spratly-islands.html?_r=0; Bloomberg News, “China denies U.S. carrier Hong Kong visit,” BusinessMirror, May 2, 2016, 

available from www.businessmirror.com.ph/china-denies-us-carrierhong-kong-visit/. 

60. Daniel Bolger, Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account 

of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, New York: Houghton Mifflin 

Harcourt, 2014. 

61. Rachel Maddow, Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power, New York: Crown Publishers, 2012; and Doug Bandow, “The U.S. Should Stay Out of Asia’s Island Disputes,” News 

Week Opinion page, May 29, 2015, available from www.newsweek.

com/us-should-stay-out-asias-island-disputes-337165. 

62. Antulio J. Echevarria, II, Operating in the Gray Zone: An 

Alternative Paradigm for U.S. Military Strategy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 4, 2016, p. 4, 

available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.

cfm?pubID=1318.

63. Of course, current operations are prioritized across the 

military establishment. After that, however, the focus on future 

warfighting capability is emphasized to the exclusion of managethe-peace capabilities and operations. Each of these leader’s positions have become more nuanced and refined (less blunt) over 

time, but the central theme of needing to resource and prepare 

for a future war is unwavering. Several examples of this include: 

A summary of several key points made in a speech by Deputy 

Secretary of Defense Robert Work: Recover readiness and keep 

pace with emerging threats; Research & Development and long-
151

term modernization to stay ahead of competitors, informed by 

the Third Off-set strategy. See Robert O. Work, “Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech: McAleese/Credit Suisse Defense Programs Conference,” Washington, DC, March 17, 2015, available 

from www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606653. 

“Army’s No. 1 current priority is readiness [for ground combat], 

said Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Mark A. Milley,” quoted in 

David Vergun, “Milley names top 3 readiness focal points,” Army 

News Service, April 7, 2016, available from https://www.army.mil/

article/165671; General Joseph Dunlap, Commandant U.S. Marine 

Corps, “fight and win,” quoted in The Washington Post, “Marine 

Corps’ General outlines priorities, vision,” TribLive Blog, January 24, 2015, available from triblive.com/usworld/nation/7633478-74/

marine-dunford-corps. The prioritization of current combat and security operations followed by preparing for future warfare is unremarkable. These Joint Force priorities are widely held. What is 

remarkable is the near absence of any language that acknowledges the requirement to resource forces and capabilities to conduct 

the “manage the peace” and engagement missions the military is 

called on to perform every day.

64. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 

11, 2011, available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf. 

JP 3-0 offers numerous joint operations and establishes language 

that defines the effects intended by those operations. Examples 

include—Offensive counter air: destroy, disrupt, neutralize; Interdiction: divert, disrupt, delay or destroy; Force protection: 

degrade, neutralize and destroy; Strike: damage or destroy; and 

WMD: secure, inventory, destroy, neutralize, dispose. Some operations, like Stability Operations: assess, train, advise, and assist, 

are more palatable to interagency and multinational partners, but 

don’t really provide a language that helps a Joint Force leader 

convey exactly what is being done or what outcomes are expected. The document uses the word “cooperate” twice, in both cases 

referring to international governmental organizations. The word 

“compete” is never used.

65. Echevarria, II, Operating in the Gray Zone, p. xii.
152

66. Among the least useful of the current 13 elements of design 

in the gray zone are termination, end-state, center-of-gravity, and 

decisive points. Notions of center-of-gravity and decisive points 

lend themselves to rigid pursuit of mission objectives. Flexibility 

and seizing opportunity are more desirable attributes of sustained 

competition. For a discussion of end-state and termination see Eliot A. Cohen, “Defense in a Disordered World,” The American Interest, October 28, 2015, available from www.the-american-interest.

com/2015/10/28/defense-in-a-disordered-world/; Eliot A. Cohen, “Colloquium Closing,” Presentation at the U.S. Army War College’s 

(USAWC) Annual Strategy Conference, “Defense Choices for the 

Next Administration,” April 27-28, 2016, video available from 

https://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/conf/2016bliss.cfm.

67. While several acronyms try to distill national instruments 

of power, the DIME acronym (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic) is widely used and accepted.

68. The go game analogy described earlier in the report offers 

a start point for these environment relevant aspects of design. The 

go game perspective encourages a win without fighting strategic 

approach, win-win solutions to disputes, multi-nodal spheres of 

initiative (geographic and instrument of power employed), and 

approaching challenges from less contentious peripheral issues 

first, then moving to the more central disputes as initiative and 

power accrue. Finally, the go game reminds us that strategic success is characterized by sustainable and favorable political outcomes, not military victory and the defeat of an opponent.

69. The term “Strategic Mindedness” and this aspect of a 

conceptual framework were developed by MG William E. Rapp, 

Commandant USAWC in his article: William E. Rapp, “CivilMilitary Relations: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy Making,” Parameters, Vol. 45, No. 3, Autumn 2015, pp. 13-26, available 

from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/issues/

Autumn_2015/Parameters%20Autumn%202015%20Vol45%20No3_

ONLINE.pdf, accessed July 25, 2016.

70. The White House, “Remarks by President Obama and 

President Xi of the People’s Republic of China in Joint Press Conference,” September 25, 2015, available from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/remarks-president-obama-andpresident-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint, accessed February 29, 2016. 
153

71. USPACOM Strategy webpage.

72. David L. Caprara, Katharine H.S. Moon, and Paul Park, 

“Mongolia: Potential Mediator between the Koreas and Proponent of Peace in Northeast Asia,” Brookings East Asia Commentary, No. 84, January 2015, available from www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-mongolia-north-korea-caprara-moon-park, 

accessed July 25, 2016.

73. Stephen Noerper, “Mongolia Matters,” Brookings East 

Asia Commentary, No. 12, available from www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2007/10/mongolia, accessed July 25, 2016.

74. Alicia J. Campi, “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security,” Jamestown, July 11, 2014, available from 

www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_

news%5D=42618&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=756&no_cache=1#.

VwE0FP72bIU. 

75. Ibid. 

76. Mendee Jargalsaikhany, “Mongolian Defense Diplomacy,” Jamestown, October 9, 2013, available from www.jamestown.

org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41467&no_cache=1#.Vkd3Pf6FPIU.

77. Ankit Panda, “A First: China Sends Troops to US-Mongolia-Led Khaan Quest Exercise,” The Diplomat, June 23, 2015, available from thediplomat.com/2015/06/a-first-china-sends-troops-to-usmongolia-led-khaan-quest-exercise/. 

78. For an example of USMC & Mongolian exercises, see Ben 

Eberle, “Multinational peacekeeping exercise begins in Mongolia,” U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific News Articles, August 

4, 2013, available from www.marforpac.marines.mil/News/NewsArticle-Display/Article/530644/multinationalpeacekeeping-exercisebegins-in-mongolia/.

79. “Chinese peacekeepers to exceed 3000 by year end,” China Military Online, April 8, 2015, english.chinamil.com.cn/newschannels/china-military-news/2015-04/08/content_6434515.htm. 
154

80. Forum Staff, “Maj. Gen. Byambasuren Bayarmagnai, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces, reveals keys to the successful resurgence of his nation’s military,” 

Indo-Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, February 27, 2015, available 

from apdf-magazine.com/maj-gen-byambasuren-bayarmagnai/. 

81. B. Amarsaikhan, “Two countries’ servicemen join in military exercises against terrorism,” Montsame Mongolian News 

Agency, October 12, 2015, available from en.montsame.mn/politics/

two-countries-servicemen-join-military-exercises-against-terrorism. 

82. Alicia J. Campi, “Mongolian military trains with US troops 

while preparing for exercises with Russia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 

Vol. 12, Iss. 133, July 16, 2015, available from www.jamestown.org/

single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=44169&no_cache=1#.V3xuh3r2WJE.

83. China’s State Council Information Office, “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” April 2013, available 

from eng.mod.gov Gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2012.htm. 

84. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of Fiscal 

Year 2000, Public Law 106-65, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess., October 5, 

1999, p. 270. 

85. Graham Allison, “Avoiding Thucydides’s Trap,” Financial 

Times (London), August 22, 2012, available from belfercenter.ksg.

harvard.edu/publication/22265/avoiding_thucydidess_trap.html. 

86. This was a common, though not universal, theme expressed by military and civilian planners on the USPACOM and 

USARPAC staff during the team’s visits to theater. 

87. Obama, National Security Strategy, 2015, p. 2.

88. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), U.S. 

Alliances and Emerging Partnerships in Southeast Asia: Out of the 

Shadows: A Report of the CSIS Southeast Asia Initiative, Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009, available from csis.org/files/publication/090710_southeast_asia_alliances_

partnerships.pdf, accessed May 3, 2016.
155

89. The Australian Navy KAKADU 2014 webpage, available 

from www.navy.gov.au/operations-and-exercises/kakadu-2014, accessed May 3, 2016; also see, Prashanth Parameswaran, “India 

Concludes ‘Watershed’ Military Exercise with ASEAN-Plus Nations,” The Diplomat, March 11, 2016, available from thediplomat.

com/2016/03/india-concludes-watershed-military-exercise-with-aseanplus-nations/.

90. For more details and articles describing Pacific Pathways, 

the 2016 scheduled exercises, and the USARPAC list of benefits, 

see USARPAC, “Pacific Pathways 2016,” Tri-fold brochure 

available from https://www.usarpac.army.mil/pdfs/Pacific%20Path

ways%2016%20Tri-fold.pdf; Brig. Gen. Kurt J. Ryan, “Pacific 

Pathways: Overcoming the tyranny of distance,” Army Sustainment, March-April 2016, available from https://www.army.mil/

article/162425/Pacific_Pathways__Overcoming_the_tyranny_of_

distance/; and Gary Sheftick, “Soldiers shifting to Pacific via new 

‘pathway’,” Army News Service, October 14, 2014, available from 

https://www.army.mil/article/136129/Soldiers_shifting_to_Pacific_

via_new__pathway_/.

91. Donna J. Nincic, “Trends in Modern Piracy: Cycles, Geographical Shifts, and Predicting the Next ‘Hot Spots’,” The SAIS 

Review of International Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 2, Summer, 2013, p. 105, 

available from search.proquest.com/docview/1465556433?accountid=

4444. 

92. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, p. 129.

93. Ibid.

94. USPACOM Strategy webpage.

95. Prashanth Parameswaran, “A Big Deal? U.S., Philippines 

Agree First ‘Bases’ Under New Defense Pact, A look at the significance of the initial locations agreed for EDCA’s implementation,” The Diplomat, March 19, 2016, available from thediplomat.

com/2016/03/a-big-deal-us-philippines-agree-first-bases-under-newdefense-pact/.

96. William B. Boehm, The National Guard State Partnership 

Program: Forging and Maintaining Effective Security Cooperation 
156

Partnerships for the 21st Century, Arlington, VA: Office of Public Affairs, National Guard Bureau, Historical Services Branch, 

2014, p. vi.

97. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “State Partnership Program Nomination Process,” Fact Sheet, November 17, 2015.

98. Ibid.

99. Eric Oh and Darryl Taguacta, “State Partnership Program 

Overview Brief,” briefing slides, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army 

War College, February 24, 2016.

100. Ibid.

101. Conversation by the researchers with Mike Hubner of 

the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) of the U.S. State Department. Mr. Hubner manages the State Partnership Program 

(SPP); also see, Pennsylvania Army National Guard (ARNG) Major Lutz, Presentation held at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA, June 15, 2016.

102. Zach Cooper and John Schaus, Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025 

Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships: An Independent Review of 

U.S. Defense Strategy in the Asia-Pacific, Washington DC: Center 

for Strategic and International Studies, January 2016, pp. 18, 205.

103. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, p. 94.

104. Ibid., p. 17.

105. Boehm, p. 38.

106. Michelle Tan, “Milley: Readiness for ground combat is 

no. 1 priority,” Army Times, August 28, 2015, available from www.

armytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/08/28/milley-readinessground-combat-no-1-priority/71284206/.

107. Notes from a telephone interview of LTC Terry Duran, 

National Guard Bureau (NGB), SPP Office, conducted by this 

report’s researchers, January 11, 2016.
157

108. USPACOM Strategy webpage.

109. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International 

Development, and the U.S. Department of Defense, “3D Planning 

Guide Diplomacy, Development, Defense,” Pre-Decisional Working Draft, Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 

31, 2012, available from https://archive.org/details/3D-PlanningGuide-Diplomacy-Development-Defense-31-July-2012.

110. U.S. Agency for International Development, “Country 

Development Cooperation Strategy,” available from https://www.

usaid.gov/asia-regional/cdcs.

111. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of 

the United States of America 2015, p. 9.

112. Enumeration of benefits is identified in Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, Stability Operations, Field Manual (FM) 

3-07, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2008, 

pp. 1-16.

113. Comment made during a meeting with General Brooks, 

former Commander of USARPAC with this report’s project team 

in the U.S. Army War College’s Command Conference Room, October 15, 2015.

114. This requirement is addressed in the Overseas Basing 

Commission report to the President of the United States; see Al 

Cornella et al., Report to the President and Congress, Arlington, VA: 

The Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, August 15, 2005, p. 25, available from 

www.coherentbabble.com/Congress/OBC-FinalReport.pdf.

115. U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3000.10, “Contingency Basing Outside the United States,” January 10, 2013, available from dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300010p.pdf.

116. By way of contrast, critics negatively discuss how the 

United States requires these developing nations to pay for U.S. 

presence in their countries. Nevertheless, the potential cost-benefit assessment by several host nations seems to indicate the benefits outweigh the costs. Cooperative security locations, especially 
158

those focused on logistics, medical, and engineering capabilities 

that can be used to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster 

relief, provide a host nation with positive U.S. and partner commitments without unduly provoking an escalatory response from 

China.

117. USPACOM Strategy webpage.

118. J. Randy Forbes, “The U.S. Army Should Pursue a Counter-A2/AD Mission,” The National Interest, October 16, 2014, available from nationalinterest.org/feature/the-us-army-should-pursuecounter-a2-ad-mission-11486.

119. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operational Access Concept

(JOAC), v. 1.0.

120. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Entry Operations

(JCEO), Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2014, 

available from dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/jceo.pdf. 

121. Tim Kelly and Nobuhiro Kubo, “Exclusive: Japan’s farflung island defense plan seeks to turn tables on China,” Reuters 

World News, December 18, 2015, available from www.reuters.com/

article/us-japan-military-china-exclusive-idUSKBN0U107220151218.

122. Critics will argue this militarization runs counter to the 

norms to which we ask China to adhere. Others will point out the 

risk of an escalatory arms race in the South China Sea. However, 

used with discretion and as a response to Chinese assertiveness 

and militarization of these land features, the anti-ship enabled 

“lily pad” formation would offer a much greater deterrent to China’s behavior than the recent naval freedom of navigation operations seem to be providing. 

123. Christopher P. Cavas, “Interview: Adm. Tomohisa Takei, 

Chief of Staff, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force,” Defense 

News, March 30, 2016, available from www.defensenews.com/story/

defense/show-daily/singapore-air-show/2016/03/30/admiral-tomohisatakei-japanese-maritime-self-defense-force-jmsdf/81858684/.

124. Ibid.
159

125. USPACOM Area of Responsibility webpage, available 

from www.pacom.mil/AboutUSPACOM/USPACOMAreaofResponsibility.aspx, accessed 17 Feb 2016.

126. U.S. Department of Defense, The Department of Defense 

Cyber Strategy, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 

April 2015, p. 5. 

127. U.S. Department of Defense, National Security Space Strategy, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2011, p. 5.

128. Madelyn R. Creedon, Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(ASD) for Global Strategic Affairs, “Space and Cyber: Shared 

Challenges, Shared Opportunities,” Remarks to the USSTRATCOM Cyber and Space Symposium, November 2011, p. 1, available from: www.afcea.org/events/stratcom/11/documents/ASDsymposiumspeechFINAL_000.PDF.

129. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Space Operations, JP 3-14, Washington, DC: U.S. Joints Chiefs of Staff, May 2013, p. I-1.

130. Erik Seedhouse, The New Space Race: China vs. the United 

States, Chichester, UK: Praxis Publishing Limited, 2010, p. 108.

131. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to 

Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department 

of Defense, April 2015, p. i.

132. U.S. Department of Defense, Mission Analysis for Cyber Operations of Department of Defense, August 2014, available 

from https://publicintelligence.net/dod-cyber-mission-analysis/. 

133. Mike Gruss, “U.S. Space Assets Face Growing Threat 

From Adversaries, Stratcom Chief Warns,” Space News, February 2014, available from spacenews.com/39669us-space-assets-facegrowing-threat-from-adversaries-stratcom-chief/. 

134. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to 

Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 

People’s Republic of China 2015,” p. i.
160

135. Ibid., p. i.

136. Admiral Samuel Locklear, III, “PACOM House Armed 

Services Committee Posture Statement,” March 2014, available 

from www.pacom.mil/Media/SpeechesTestimony/tabid/6706/Article/

565153/pacom-house-armed-services-committee-posture-statement.

aspx. 

137. U.S. Department of Defense, The Department of Defense 

Cyber Strategy, p. 5. 

138. Ibid, p. 5.

139. Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies homepage, available from apcss.org.

140. Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, 

“Mission Statement,” available from www.benning.army.mil/tenant/WHINSEC/mission.html. 

141. Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies homepage, available from apcss.org.

142. USPACOM Area of Responsibility webpage.

143. Obama, Panetta, and the U.S. Department of Defense,

Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership.

144. U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014.

145. Obama, National Security Strategy, 2015.

146. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of 

the United States of America 2015.

147. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operational Access Concept

(JOAC), v. 1.0.

148. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Entry Operations

(JCEO).
149. Admiral Harry Harris, Statement Of Admiral Harry B. 

Harris Jr., U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Before The 

Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, 

Posture Statement presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington DC: U.S. Central Command, February 23, 

2016, available from www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/

doc/16-15_02-23-16.pdf.

150. Kelly and Kubo, “Exclusive: Japan’s far-flung island defense plan seeks to turn tables on China.”

151. Richard Fontaine, “Where is America in Japan and India’s Plans for Asia?” The National Interest, December 28, 2015, 

available from nationalinterest.org/feature/where-america-japan-indias-plans-asia-14741.

152. Ankit Panda, “G7 Leaders call for ‘Rules-Based’ maritime order, condemn North Korea,” The Diplomat, June 9, 2015, 

available from thediplomat.com/2015/06/g7-leaders-call-for-rulesbased-maritime-order-condemn-north-korea/.

153. David Alexander, Michael Martina, Dean Yates, “China’s 

land reclamation in South China Sea grows: Pentagon report,” Reuters, World Section, August 21, 2015, available from www.reuters.

com/article/2015/08/21/us-southchinasea-china-pentagon-idUSKCN0QQ0S920150821penta Gon-idusKCN0QQ0S920150821#uxovDtY

oeRWSeYgR.97.

154. Michael Martina, “China Says Has Shown ‘Great Restraint’ in South China Sea,” Reuters, Business Section, November 

17, 2015, available from http://www.reuters.com/article/southchina

sea-china-idUSL3N13C1MW20151117.

155. “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Assistant 

Secretary Shear in The Pentagon Press Briefing Room,” August 

21, 2015, News Transcript available from www.defense.gov/News/

News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/614509/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-assistant-secretary-shear-in-the-pentag.

156. Information and Communications Technology and Disaster Risk Reduction Division (IDD) of United Nations Economic 

and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), “Over161
162

view of Natural Disasters and Their Impacts in Asia and the Pacific, 1970 -2014,” Working Paper Series, March 2015, available from 

www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Technical%20paper-Overview%20

of%20natural%20hazards%20and%20their%20impacts_final.pdf, accessed April 1, 2016.

157. David L. Goldfein, (Lt Gen, USAF), Guidance for Development and Implementation of Joint Concepts, Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3010.02D, Joint Staff (J7), November 22, 2013, available from www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/

unlimit/3010_02.pdf; and David L. Goldfein, (Lt Gen, USAF), Joint 

Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01I, Joint Staff 

(J8), January 23, 2015, available from www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/

cdata/unlimit/3170_01a.pdf. 

158. Goldfein, (Lt Gen, USAF), Joint Capabilities Integration and 

Development System (JCIDS).

159. The “Red Team report” is in the possession of the Joint 

Concept on Integrated Campaigning writing team lead, located at 

the Army Capabilities and Integration Center. At the time of this 

writing, the writing lead is COL Charles E. Hornick, Jr.

160. Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and 

China Headed for War?” The Atlantic, September 24, 2015, available from belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/25783/thucydides_

trap.html. 

161. Angela E. Kershner, “Disaster Management Exchange 

2015 concludes in China,” U.S. Army News, January 26, 2015, 

available from https://www.army.mil/article/141698/Disaster_Management_Exchange_2015_concludes_in_China/. 

162. Justin McCurry, “China accuses Japan of threatening Pacific peace with military law,” The Guardian, March 29, 2016, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/29/china-accusesjapan-of-threatening-peace-in-pacific-with-new-law. 

163. See Carl Baker and Brad Glosserman, eds., “Doing More 

and Expecting Less: The Future of US Alliances in the Asia Pacific,” Issues and Insights, Vol. 13, No. 1, CSIS Pacific Forum, Janu-
ary, 2013, available from csis.org/files/publication/IssuesInsights_

vol13no1.pdf; also Patrick Cronin, “Security challenges in the 

Asia-Pacific: a US perspective,” The Strategist website, Australian 

Strategic Policy Institute, April 3, 2013, available from www.aspistrategist.org.au/security-challenges-in-the-asia-pacific-region-a-usperspective/; for a deeper historic view focused on the 1960s-1990s, 

see Tomohiko Satake, “Japan, Australia and International Security Burden-Sharing with the United States” in William T. Tow 

and Rikki Kersten, eds., Bilateral Perspectives on Regional Security: 

Australia, Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region, London, UK: Palgrave 

Macmillan, June 15, 2012, pp. 183-199.

164. C. Todd Lopez, “I Corps Pacific Pathways brings partner 

nations stateside to enhance readiness,” U.S. Army News, April 

19, 2016, available from https://www.army.mil/article/166345/I_

Corps_Pacific_Pathways_brings_partner_nations_stateside_to_enhance_readiness/. 

165. See Major Galen “Mac” McAllister, “Capturing Effectiveness of SPP at the State Level,” National Guard Bureau J5 International Affairs Newsletter, Vol. 2, Iss. 2, Summer, 2014; and LTC 

Brian Botkin, “Proactive Partnering Process: Getting SPP Ahead 

of the Curve,” National Guard Bureau J5 International Affairs Newsletter, Vol. 2, Iss. 2, Summer, 2014.

166. For procedures for request processing, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, “State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training Needed for National 

Guard’s Efforts with Foreign Partners,” Report to Congressional 

Committees, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability 

Office, May 2012, pp. 7-8.

167. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operational Access Concept

(JOAC), v. 1.0.

168. James Hackett, “Pacific Dragon and Asia-Pacific missile defense: more progress or familiar impediments?” IISS: Military Balance Blog, June 17, 2016, available from www.iiss.org/en/

militarybalanceblog/blogsections/2016-629e/june-8109/james-hackettmissile-defence-aabb; Thomas Karako, “What North Korea’s Latest 

Missile Test Means for the US and Its Allies,” Defense One, February 8, 2016, available from www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/02/north163
164

koreas-missile-test-implications-us-and-its-allies/125792/?oref=d-channelriver.

169. Terrence K. Kelly, Anthony Atler, Todd Nichols, and 

Lloyd Thrall, Employing Land-Based Anti-Ship Missiles in the Western Pacific, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013, available 

from www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1321.html.

170. For details of the process, see U.S. Department of the 

Army, Force Development and Documentation, Army Regulation 

(AR) 71-32, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, July 

1, 2013, ch. 8, pp. 50-56, available from https://acc.dau.mil/adl/

en-US/719817/file/79519/USA%20-%20Regulation,%20AR%2071-

32,%20Force%20Dev%20_%20Doc,%201%20Jul%202013.pdf.

171. Recommendation 1: See writings associated with the Strategic Landpower Task Force and the Joint Concept for Integrated 

Campaigning core writing team. Recommendations 2-5: See USPACOM and USARPAC theater campaign plan initiatives, Pacific 

Pathways exercises, activity set positioning and SPP activities. 

Recommendations offered in this report are natural extensions 

of these programs and activities. In several cases, the USARPAC 

staff is already examining the feasibility of implementing aspects 

of these report recommendations; also see, Green, Hicks, Cancian, 

et al., Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025, The report emphasizes the importance of the region, forward posture of forces during peacetime, 

and the value of seeking partnerships and military-to-military 

relationships in the region. It further acknowledges the insufficiency of current U.S. efforts to blunt China and secure U.S. interests in the region. Recommendation 6: Multiple reports confirm 

China’s growing capability and capacity across the “air domain” 

spectrum. For their ballistic missile capability, see Jeremy Bender, 

“This is the only chart you need to see about China’s increasingly global ballistic missile capability,” Business Insider, Military 

& Defense Section, May 12, 2016, available from www.business

insider.com/chinas-ballistic-missile-capabilities-chart-2016-5. For their 

cruise missile capability, see Dennis Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, “China’s Cruise Missiles: Flying Fast Under the Public’s Radar,” The National Interest, May 12, 2014, available from nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-cruisemissiles-flying-fast-under-the-public%E2%80%99s-radar-10446; 

For their Semi-autonomous Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, see 
165

“Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” SinoDefence, May 15, 2016, available from https://sinodefence.com/chinese-military-aircraft/unmannedaerial-vehicles/. Recommendation 7: See Kelly, Atler, Nichols, and 

Thrall, Employing Land-based Anti-ship missiles in the Western Pacific. Recommendation 8: For China’s offensive cyber and space 

capabilities, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2015.” Recommendation 9: Gabrielle Joyner, “CTF-75 Receives New Riverine Command Boats,” 

PACOM News, December 1, 2014, available from www.pacom.

mil/Media/News/NewsArticleView/tabid/11348/Article/564878/ctf-75-

receives-new-riverine-command-boats.aspx.

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