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MOVING THE LINE OF SCRIMMAGE: REEXAMINING 

THE DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH STRATEGY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

BORDER AND 

MARITIME SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2016 

Serial No. 114–85 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 


Congress.#13
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY 

MARTHA MCSALLY, ARIZONA, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

PAUL L. ANSTINE, Subcommittee Staff Director 

KRIS CARLSON, Subcommittee Clerk 

ALISON NORTHROP, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Arizona, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Filemon Vela, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 

Security ................................................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Mr. Mark A. Morgan, Chief, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10 

PANEL II 

Mr. Gary P. Brasher, Private Citizen: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 30 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 32 

Ms. Peggy Davis, Private Citizen: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 38 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 40 

Dr. Elyse Golob, Executive Director, National Center for Border Security 

and Immigration, University of Arizona: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 50 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 52 

Mr. Christian Ramı ́rez, Director, Southern Border Communities Coalition: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 59 

Joint Prepared Statement of Christian Ramı ́rez, Director, Southern Border 

Communities Coalition; Jennifer Johnson, Border Policy Advisor, Southern Border Communities Coalition; Karin Johanson, Director, ACLU 

Washington Legislative Office; Christopher Rickerd, Policy Counsel, 

ACLU Washington Legislative Office; Vicki B. Gaubeca, Director, ACLU 

of New Mexico, Regional Center for Border Rights; and Brian Erickson, 

Border Policy Strategist, ACLU of New Mexico, Regional Center for Border Rights .......................................................................................................... 61 

Page

IV 

FOR THE RECORD 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas: 

Statement From PHP, Arizona ........................................................................... 80 

(1) 

MOVING THE LINE OF SCRIMMAGE: REEXAMINING THE DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH STRATEGY 

Tuesday, September 13, 2016 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Martha McSally [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Duncan, Hurd, McSally, Vela, Jackson 

Lee, and Torres. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee On Border and Maritime Security will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the U.S. Border Patrol’s defense-in-depth strategy and its effect on local communities. 

I recognize myself now for an opening statement. 

First, I would like to thank Chief Mark Morgan, who is testifying 

now before Congress for the first time as the new chief of Border 

Patrol. Like your predecessors, I am sure you will be spending frequent visits to our subcommittee as we discuss very important 

questions related to border security, things like what does a secure 

border look like, what are the right tools and strategies to achieve 

a secure border, and how do we measure success or failure? 

Today, I want to focus on the second question, an aspect of the 

current Border Patrol strategy known as defense-in-depth, specifically the unintended consequences this strategy imposes on border 

communities and residents that live along the border, including 

many of my constituents. 

In the early 1990’s, the Border Patrol and U.S. Customs Service 

were outmatched in all aspects of illegal activity, both between and 

at the ports of entry. Yet despite having a smaller Border Patrol 

at the time, agents apprehended millions of people. Border Patrol’s 

response to this activity in El Paso and San Diego led to Operations Hold the Line and Gatekeeper, that surged resources to the 

border in those major urban areas. 

In the short term, it stemmed the tide of illicit activity. However, 

it had the unintended effect of pushing the illicit activity away 

from urban areas and into the remote rural areas of the border. By 

design, the shifting cartel activity in the more rugged terrain gave 

the Border Patrol the advantage of time to interdict people and target the contraband of smuggling. 

Border Patrol leadership routinely has articulated the strategy’s 

effectiveness by explaining that in urban areas they had mere secVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:04 Jun 23, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\114THCONGRESS\16BM0913\16BM0913.TXT HEATH
2 

onds to minutes to intercept the illegal activity; in suburban areas, 

minutes to hours; and in rural areas, they had anywhere from 

hours to days to interdict the illegal activity. 

Ceding territory for time has had profound ramifications, however, for populated rural areas along the border, like my district in 

Arizona. On a routine basis, our fellow residents are exposed to 

this illicit activity that crosses the border, trespasses on their land, 

destroys their property, and puts their lives at risk. Small businesses and tourism suffer from the illegal activity that has pushed 

deep into the interior of the country by a strategy that I believe 

now needs to be reexamined. 

To be clear, I am not asking agents to link arms across the border, 2,000 miles of south, shoulder-to-shoulder. What I am asking 

for is we focus our resources and manpower more at the line of 

scrimmage, not 5, 10, 100 miles inland. Our enforcement posture 

should be arranged with the intent of anticipating, deterring, and 

stopping most illicit activity before it enters our communities, using 

the overwhelming majority of agents and technology as close to the 

line as terrain access and agent safety will allow. 

I have spent countless hours at the border with ranchers, border 

residents, and the Border Patrol. In many instances, I have observed miles-long stretches of the border with little to no agent activity actually patrolling the road near the fence. I have also witnessed whole sections of fence cut out, allowing untold number of 

vehicles to come across the border before being detected. 

Presence on the border matters, serving as both a deterrent to 

illegal activity and as a rapid response to inevitable breaches. I am 

mindful that geography has an effect on where we apprehend individuals and interdict narcotics, but we cannot cede 10 to 100 miles 

or more of U.S. territory waiting for these nefarious actors to be 

caught at the time and place of our choosing. Instead, we have to 

take the fight to them at the earliest point of the incursion. 

In Tucson, 48 percent of the total number of apprehensions took 

place more than 5 miles from the physical border. Compare that 

with Yuma or Rio Grande Valley in Texas where more than 84 percent of illicit crossings are apprehended in the first 5 miles. But 

let’s be clear, for citizens who live along the border, 5 miles is like 

an eternity. 

Interior checkpoints are part of the layered approach to border 

security that have created challenges for the men and women that 

I was sent here to represent. The Border Patrol uses a mix of permanent and tactical checkpoints along major routes in and out of 

the border. Consistent with its defense-in-depth strategy, checkpoints are designed to push the illicit traffic around the checkpoints into areas where the Border Patrol has a better chance of 

interdiction. 

But what checkpoints have really done is to introduce inconvenience, hassle, and the threat as a way of life for law-abiding American citizens who live near these checkpoints. The Border Patrol 

has little to show for their use. Very few apprehensions take place 

at an interior checkpoint. To add insult to injury, the checkpoints 

are closed when it rains to prevent a traffic accident. All the cartels 

have to do is wait for the weather to change to bypass this layer 

of defense. 

3 

In 2014, the University of Arizona’s National Center for Border 

Security and Immigration conducted an in-depth study concerning 

the effectiveness of checkpoints and the impact on local communities. The report makes a series of recommendations to develop 

measures of effectiveness and to closely track the impacts of checkpoints on communities. To date, I don’t think the Border Patrol has 

followed or implemented the recommendations, but I look forward 

to talking about that today. We do have a University of Arizona 

representative on the second panel. 

Defense-in-depth and the layered approach to border security 

sounds good in theory, but there are real-world negative impacts 

for the American citizens who live at or near the border. I look forward to hearing from the chief and the witnesses on the second 

panel to discuss looking at a better approach. 

[The statement of Chairman McSally follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MARTHA MCSALLY

SEPTEMBER 13, 2016 

First, I would like to thank Chief Mark Morgan, who is testifying before Congress 

for the first time as the new chief of the Border Patrol. 

Like your predecessors, I’m sure you will be a frequent visitor before this subcommittee as we discuss what arguably are the three most important border security questions: What does a secure border look like? What are the right tools and 

strategies to achieve a secure border? How do you measure success or failure? 

Today, I want to focus on the second question—an aspect of the current Border 

Patrol strategy known as defense-in-depth. Specifically, the unintended consequences this strategy imposes on border communities and residents that live along 

the border, including many of my constituents. 

In the early 1990s, the Border Patrol and U.S. Customs Service were outmatched 

in all aspects of illegal activity both between and at the ports of entry. Yet despite 

having a smaller Border Patrol at the time, agents apprehended millions of people. 

Border Patrol’s response to this activity in El Paso and San Diego led to Operations Hold the Line and Gatekeeper that surged resources to the border in those 

major urban areas. In the short term, it stemmed the tide of the illicit activity. 

However, it had the intended effect of pushing illicit activity away from urban areas 

and into the remote rural areas of the border. 

By design, shifting cartel activity into more rugged terrain gave the Border Patrol 

the advantage of time to interdict people and target contraband smuggling. Border 

Patrol leadership routinely articulated the strategy’s effectiveness by explaining 

that in urban areas, they had mere seconds to minutes to interdict illegal activity; 

whereas in suburban areas they had minutes to hours, and in rural areas, they had 

anywhere from hours to possibly days to interdict illegal activity. 

Ceding territory for time has had profound ramifications for populated rural areas 

along the border, like my district in Arizona. On a routine basis, our fellow residents 

are exposed to illicit activity that crosses the border, trespasses on their land, destroys their property and puts their lives at risk. Small businesses and tourism suffer from the illegal activity that is pushed deep into the interior of the country by 

a strategy that I believe needs to be reexamined. 

To be clear, I am not asking agents to link arms across all 2,000 miles of the border. What I am asking is that we focus our resources and manpower at the line of 

scrimmage, not 5, 10, or 100 miles inland. Our enforcement posture should be arranged with the intent of anticipating, deterring, and stopping most illicit activity 

before it enters our communities, using the overwhelming majority of agents and 

technology as close to the line as terrain, access, and agent safety will allow. 

I have spent countless hours at the border with ranchers, border residents, and 

the Border Patrol. In many instances, I’ve observed miles-long stretches of the border with little to no agents actually patrolling the road near the fence. 

I’ve also witnessed whole sections of fence cut out of the fence, allowing an untold 

number of vehicles to come across the border before being detected. Presence on the 

border matters—serving as both a deterrent to illegal activity and as a rapid response to inevitable breaches. 

4 

I am mindful that geography has an effect on where we apprehend individuals 

and interdict narcotics, but we cannot cede 10 to 100 miles of U.S. territory waiting 

for these nefarious actors to be caught at the time and place of our choosing. Instead 

we have to take the fight to them at the earliest point of incursion. 

In Tucson, 48% of the total number of apprehensions took place more than 5 miles 

from the physical border. Compare that with Yuma, or Rio Grande Valley in Texas 

where more than 84% of illicit crossings are apprehended in the first 5 miles. For 

citizens who live along the border 5 miles is an eternity. 

Interior checkpoints are part of the layered approach to border security that has 

created challenges for the men and women I was sent here to represent. The Border 

Patrol uses a mix of permanent and tactical checkpoint along major routes in and 

out of the border. Consistent with its defense-in-depth strategy, checkpoints are designed to push illicit traffic around the checkpoints into areas where the Border Patrol has a better chance of interdiction. 

But what checkpoints have really done is to introduce inconvenience and hassle 

as a way of life for law-abiding American citizens who live near these checkpoints. 

The Border Patrol has little to show for their use. Very few apprehensions take 

place at an interior checkpoint, and to add insult to injury the checkpoints are 

closed when it rains—to prevent a traffic accident. All the cartels have to do is wait 

for the weather to change to bypass this layer of defense. 

In 2014, the University of Arizona’s National Center for Border Security and Immigration conducted an in-depth study concerning the effectiveness of checkpoints 

and their impact on local border communities. The report makes a series of recommendations to develop measures of effectiveness and to closely track the impacts 

checkpoints have on local communities. 

To date, I do not believe that the Border Patrol has followed or implemented any 

of the recommendations. 

Defense-in-Depth and the layered approach to border security sounds good in theory, but there are real-world negative impacts for the American citizens who live 

at and near the border. I look forward to hearing from the chief and the witnesses 

on the second panel to discuss a better approach. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of 

the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Vela, for any 

statement he may have. 

Mr. VELA. Thank you, Congresswoman McSally. 

I don’t have a whole lot more to add. I want to welcome you, 

Chief Morgan, to this hearing today and congratulate you on your 

appointment. My perspective on your agency and these checkpoints 

comes from having crossed the Sarita and Falfurrias checkpoint 

virtually all of my life. 

When I was a young lawyer, I traveled between Brownsville and 

Corpus Christi almost weekly, and I used to get really frustrated 

having to go through the checkpoint, because to me it didn’t make 

sense that I, as an American citizen born in Brownsville, would 

have to be asked whether or not I was a citizen 2 hours north. 

However, my father was a Federal judge with jurisdiction over the 

Sarita checkpoint. When I would often voice my frustration, he 

would remind me of the volume of apprehensions that he would 

witness. So over time, I kind-of softened my reaction. 

But your agency is very much a part of life across the entire 

U.S.-Mexico border, and definitely for those of us in south Texas. 

Over the course of the last year, I can tell you, I talk to your agents 

on an official basis sometimes, but more often on an unofficial 

basis, because they live all around us. They are part of our social 

fabric. I can tell you that you have some challenges ahead, because 

over the course of the last year, there is hardly an agent that I 

have run into, many who have been part of the agency for many, 

many years, who have expressed a level of dissatisfaction and just 

feeling a lot of low morale with many of the people that work for 

the agency. 

5 

So I look forward to working with you as we move forward with 

the rest of the committee to see what we can do about improving 

morale, you know, for the agents on the ground and doing what we 

can to make your agency as effective as possible. 

But I yield the balance of my time. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. The gentleman yields. 

Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statements of Ranking Member Thompson and Honorable 

Jackson Lee follow:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

SEPTEMBER 13, 2016 

Having served as both Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on 

Homeland Security, I have had the opportunity to visit many communities along the 

Southern Border, hear from community members directly, and watch the men and 

women of the Border Patrol carrying out their duties on behalf of our Nation. 

I have seen the triple fence near San Diego, ridden along the border with ranchers in Arizona, and observed Border Patrol Agents processing unaccompanied children in South Texas. 

I know that each area of the border is different, the challenges facing each area 

are different, and therefore the appropriate way to address these challenges is often 

different as well. 

After visiting southern Arizona at the request of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords and others and meeting with constituents there, I have first-hand knowledge 

of residents’ concerns and a better appreciation for the challenges confronting Border Patrol in the region. 

Our 2012 Government Accountability Office report helped quantify how Border 

Patrol utilizes its resources in each of its Southern Border sectors, including the 

Tucson Sector. 

So while today’s hearing title implies that Border Patrol has moved its personnel 

and resources away from the border entirely, that is simply not the case. 

There is tactical infrastructure and technology in use and agents patrolling even 

in remote areas of the border, though not to the extent that residents in these areas 

would like. 

I look forward to hearing from the new chief of the Border Patrol, Mark Morgan, 

about how he is deploying Border Patrol personnel and resources to meet these challenges. 

As the first chief in the history of the Border Patrol to come from outside its 

ranks, Chief Morgan is uniquely positioned to guide the Patrol going forward. 

Also, given his background as assistant commissioner for internal affairs at CBP, 

I hope to hear today how he plans to ensure the Border Patrol adheres to appropriate Use of Force protocols, addresses possible misconduct, and ensures the utmost professionalism among all Border Patrol Agents. 

On the second panel, we have a group of border stakeholders to lend their expertise to the discussion today. 

I am especially interested to hear their opinion about Border Patrol’s interior 

checkpoints, including whether they contribute to border security and how they affect law-abiding Americans in and around border communities. 

I know Border Patrol considers checkpoints an integral part of its defense-indepth strategy. However, I also understand residents in the region are concerned 

about being stopped as they go to work or school, visit friends and family, and go 

about their daily lives. 

I, too, am concerned about the potential for civil liberties violations and potential 

racial profiling at such checkpoints. There are many who would prefer to see these 

resources utilized at the border instead and understandably so. 

If Border Patrol is going to operate checkpoints away from the border, it must 

have protocols in place to protect the rights of U.S. citizens and maintain metrics 

that prove their effectiveness. 

6 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE

Chairman MeSally and Ranking Member Vela thank you for this opportunity to 

hear testimony on the topic of ‘‘Moving the Line of Scrimmage: Re-examining the 

Defense-in-Depth Strategy.’’ 

As a senior Member of the Homeland Security Committee, I served as Ranking 

Member of the Border and Maritime Subcommittee during the last Congress and 

believe that the Northern and Southern Borders deserve our attention and concern 

regarding security. 

I welcome today’s witnesses: 

• Peggy Davis, Private Citizen; • Gary Brasher, Private Citizen; 

• Dr. Elyse Golob, Executive Director, National Center for Border Security and 

Immigration, The University of Arizona; and 

• Christian Ramı ́rez, Director, of the Southern Border Communities Coalition 

(Democratic witness) 

I will never forget September 11, 2001 when 2,977 men, women, and children 

were murdered by 19 hijackers who took commercial aircraft and used them as missiles. 

I stood on the East Front steps of the Capitol on September 11, 2001, along with 

150 members of the House of Representatives and sang ‘‘God Bless America.’’ 

This annual reminder of the cost of our freedom and way of life exacted by 19 

terrorists in a single day, we are reminded of the importance of the work of the men 

and women of the Department of Homeland Security. 

Today’s hearing will allow us to examine the U.S. Border Patrol’s ‘‘defense-indepth’’ strategy and the effectiveness of interior checkpoints as a border security 

tool. 

There are tensions between where resources should be placed to best protect the 

borders of the United States. 

Some would have us construct a wall as a means of controlling the Southern Border, while completely ignoring our Nation’s Northern Border, which is the longest 

border of two nations in the world. 

There are some who want to deploy thousands of border agents to station them 

at intervals along the Southern Border 24 hours a day to monitor the territory that 

comprises our Nation’s borders. 

A more prudent approach would be to do comprehensive immigration reform, 

which would include a border security component. 

As the Ranking Member and Chair of the Committee’s Subcommittee on Border 

and Maritime Security the Jackson Lee and Candice Miller bill, H.R. 1417, the Border Results Act of 2013, was a bipartisan comprehensive border security bill that 

should have gone before the House for a vote as part of a comprehensive immigration reform measure. 

The Border Security Results Act of 2013, which was adopted unanimously by all 

members of the House Homeland Security Committee and for which many Democratic Senators have expressed support, offers a realistic, practical, measured, and 

cost-effective approach to achieving the border security that all Americans desire. 

The bill would have achieved this objective in the following ways: 

• First, the legislation directs the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to develop, and report to Congress for approval, a National strategy to gain 

and maintain operational control of the Nation’s borders. 

• Second, it defines the standard that must be met to constitute operation control, 

which is the apprehension of 90% of illegal border crossers in high-traffic areas 

within 2 years and the entire Southwest Border in 5 years. 

H.R. 1417 directed the use of advanced technology to achieve visibility of the entire border by incorporating existing taxpayer-owned Department of Defense technology being brought back from Iraq and Afghanistan. 

This approach provided a level situational awareness of the border that physical 

surveillance would not have achieved and would have empowered the Border Patrol 

to target problem areas and deploy resources where they are most needed, when 

they are most needed, and to do so in a fiscally responsible way. 

The bill ensured that the border security strategy would yield good results and 

not just good intentions, the legislation mandated the development of metrics to 

measure progress at and between the Nation’s ports of entry, as well as in the maritime environment and requires these metrics to be developed in consultation with 

a panel of Governors from border States and a National Lab which will provide an 

additional layer of scrutiny and expertise. 

Finally, in addition to requiring the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to report to Congress every step of the way, H.R. 1417 required GAO, the 

7 

independent investigative arm of Congress, to verify the viability of the Department’s strategy, implementation plan, metrics, and results. 

During the 10 terms I have been in Congress, serving on both the House Committees on Judiciary and Homeland Security, dozens of immigration reform proposals 

have been offered but no major changes have been enacted since 1996 when Congress passed the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 

1996 as part of the Newt Gingrich-inspired Contract With America. 

DHS as a consequence of not having comprehensive immigration reform has 

adapted and crafted the defense-in-depth strategy. 

This defense-in-depth strategy generally refers to Border Patrol’s three-tiered border enforcement strategy, which consists of ‘‘line watch’’ at the border, roving patrols near the border, and checkpoints located away from the border but within Border Patrol’s 100-mile zone of authority. 

The Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) protects our Nation’s borders and ports of entry from terrorist threats and 

prevents illegal entry of people and dangerous materials in the United States. 

I appreciate the focus on Arizona, but we should be looking at the border in totality. 

Border Patrol Agents at checkpoints have legal authority that agents do not have 

when patrolling areas away from the border. 

In 1994, the Border Patrol developed its first formal National border control strategy, the National Strategic Plan, which was informed by efforts in EI Paso and San 

Diego, known as Operation Hold the Line and Operation Gatekeeper, to place additional Border Patrol Agents and resources at the border itself. 

Today, the Border Patrol continues to use prevention through deterrence as part 

of a three-tiered border enforcement strategy, consisting of ‘‘line watch,’’ roving patrols, and checkpoints. 

The majority of Border Patrol Agents are assigned to line watch operations at the 

border, where they maintain a high profile and are responsible for deterring, turning back, or apprehending anyone they encounter attempting to illegally cross the 

border. 

The United States Supreme Court ruled that Border Patrol Agents may stop a 

vehicle at fixed checkpoints for brief questioning of its occupants even if there is no 

reason to believe that the particular vehicle contains illegal aliens. 

Roving patrol operations consist of smaller contingents of Agents deployed behind 

the line watch to detect and apprehend those making it past the first layer of defense in areas away from the immediate border. 

Traffic checkpoints are located on major U.S. highways and secondary roads, usually 25 to 100 miles from the border. 

Border Patrol operates two types of checkpoints—permanent and tactical—that 

differ in terms of size, infrastructure, and location. 

While both types of checkpoints are generally operated at fixed locations, permanent checkpoints are characterized by their brick-and-mortar structure, that may include off-highway covered lanes for vehicle inspection, and several buildings including those for administration, detention of persons suspected of smuggling or other 

illegal activity, and kennels for canines used in the inspection process. 

The Supreme Court has held that Border Patrol Agents on roving patrol may stop 

a vehicle only if they have reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains aliens who 

may be illegally in the United States. 

In 2009, GAO released a report examining the effectiveness of such checkpoints, 

concluding that such operations have contributed to furthering the Border Patrol’s 

mission to protect the border, and have also contributed to protection efforts of other 

Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencIes. 

Most recently, in 2014, the University of Arizona released a report reviewing the 

GAO’s conclusions, at the request of the Border Patrol. 

In addition to the question of efficient and effective application of resources and 

tactics, the issue of ‘‘reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains aliens,’’ does 

raise questions on how Border Patrol practices may impact the rights of American 

citizens. 

We have seen actions taken by local law enforcement in a few border areas based 

on laws that attempt to enforce immigration laws using local resources. 

The larger issue for some people who may reside on the Southern Border especially for those Americans of Mexican ancestry that have resided within the United 

States for generations is how are their civil liberties impacted by border security 

practices. 

We must assure that our Customs and Border Patrol professionals have the resources to do their jobs well. 

8 

Part of making the border safer is the collaboration and cooperation of all of our 

citizens to reside on the border. 

I look forward to the testimony of today’s witnesses. 

Thank you. 

Ms. MCSALLY. We are pleased to be joined today by two panels 

of distinguished witnesses to discuss the important topic today. The 

sole witness of our first panel is Mr. Mark Morgan. Mr. Morgan is 

the chief of the United States Border Patrol, a position he assumed 

earlier this year. Before entering the U.S. Border Patrol, Mr. Morgan served in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Los Angeles 

Police Department, and the U.S. Marines. While at the FBI, Chief 

Morgan served as a special agent in charge of El Paso Division and 

as a deputy assistant director for the Inspection Division. Chief 

Morgan’s full written statement will appear in the record. 

The Chair now recognizes the chief for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MARK A. MORGAN, CHIEF, U.S. BORDER 

PATROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Chief MORGAN. Good morning. Chairman McSally, Ranking 

Member Vela, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for holding this important hearing today. This is a proud 

moment for me. This is the first appearance at a Congressional 

hearing representing the dedicated and talented men and women 

of the United States Border Patrol. 

During my first 2 months here as chief, I have had the privilege 

to meet thousands of agents, staff, and trainees along the Northern, Southern, Coastal Borders, United States Border Patrol Academy, and the headquarters here in Washington. I can’t think of a 

better way for me to have started my tenure than to get out in the 

field to listen, learn, and observe. It has exceeded my expectations. 

In all these interactions, two critical facts have been crystal clear 

to me: No. 1, I still have a heck of a lot to learn; and No. 2, the 

men and women of the United States Border Patrol have one of the 

toughest jobs in Federal law enforcement. The complex challenges 

we face in 21st Century law enforcement are more difficult than I 

have seen in my 30 years of my career. The threat environment is 

constantly evolving, and this demands that we do the same. 

This was never more evident than my assignment as the FBI 

special agent in charge of the El Paso Division in Texas. The 

unique environment facing law enforcement and the intelligence 

community along the Southwest Border are unparalleled. It was 

there that I first learned about the vast and challenging Border Patrol mission and just how critical it is to our Nation’s security. I 

was astonished at the magnitude of the Border Patrol mission, and 

I was equally impressed with the men and women serving honorably every day to carry out that complex, constantly-evolving and 

never-ending mission. 

I can tell you from my personal experience, they are hard-working, dedicated to this mission and their country, and they have and 

continue to make personal sacrifices to protect the citizens of this 

great Nation. So I sit before you today honored and privileged to 

be part of the United States Border Patrol team. 

You know, the numbers we often hear associated with the United 

States Border Patrol are the numbers of annual apprehensions of 

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those attempting to illegally enter the country every year. It is 

hundreds of thousands. I would like to take a few minutes to also 

share some other numbers that we don’t often talk about. 

I have learned that the United States Border Patrol Agents are 

among the most assaulted law enforcement personnel in the country. There have been 7,542 assaults against Agents since 2006, and 

30 agents have died in the line of duty since 2003. The recent passing of Border Patrol Agent Manuel Alvarez serves as a vivid reminder of the dangerous, challenging, and unique environment 

Border Patrol Agents are asked to experience. 

Another number which often gets little mention is how often Border Patrol Agents put themselves in harm’s way to provide emergency medical care and assistance to those in need, to include those 

that are trying to illegally enter the United States. Every year, the 

United States Border Patrol is involved in the rescue of thousands 

of victims of human smuggling and individuals attempting to illegally cross the United States, more than 3,700 this fiscal year 

alone. 

In July, the Laredo sector Border Patrol Agent risked his own 

life as he jumped into the Rio Grande to save 4 victims that were 

surely to drown. Also, this past July, Tucson sector Border Patrol 

Agents risked their own lives to rescue 15 individuals that were attempting to illegally enter the United States when they found 

themselves trapped in an open pit mine in Green Valley, Arizona. 

Just a few weeks ago, the Buffalo sector Border Patrol marine 

units made landfall on the Canadian shore in the middle of the 

night after observing a house was on fire. They made landfall and 

they alerted the resident’s family and escorted them to safety as 

the home became engulfed in flames. 

Today’s hearing is to discuss Border Patrol Agents and the Border Patrol strategic use of checkpoints. I think that it does acknowledge that illegal and dangerous cross-border activity can 

occur away from the immediate border. The Border Patrol’s posture 

includes a threat-based, intelligence-driven, multi-faceted approach, such as checkpoints and Forward Operating Bases that are 

strategically located on known routes from the border in an effort 

to maximize our resources and prevent a single point of failure. 

For example, just a few weeks ago, a driver attempted to flee the 

Sarita checkpoint in the Rio Grande Valley when a Border Patrol 

Agent canine had alerted to his vehicle. The driver was apprehended and 7 people, illegal immigrants, were discovered locked in 

the vehicle trunk with no means of escape. Along with sophisticated technology, enhanced infrastructure, a dedicated and skilled 

law enforcement personnel and partnerships, the use of checkpoint 

operations are a current component of the Border Patrol’s layered 

strategy to protect this country’s National security and ensure the 

safety of the public we are here to serve. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to 

your questions and having dialog concerning where, as an agency, 

we can get better at what we do. 

[The prepared statement of Chief Morgan follows:] 

10 

1 2012–2016 U.S. Border Patrol Strategic Plan. https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/alongus-borders/strategic-plan. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK A. MORGAN

SEPTEMBER 13, 2016 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Vela and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today on behalf of the U.S. Border 

Patrol (USBP) to discuss our layered security strategy and the role of checkpoints 

in securing the U.S. border between our Nation’s ports of entry (POEs). 

As America’s unified border agency, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

protects the United States against terrorist threats and prevents the illegal entry 

of people and dangerous materials into the United States, while facilitating lawful 

travel and trade. USBP works with our CBP, interagency, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and international partners to patrol the more than 6,000 miles of land border 

between the POEs that we share with Mexico and Canada and 2,000 miles of coastal waters surrounding the Florida Peninsula and the island of Puerto Rico. 

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. Government facilitated an unprecedented 

deployment of personnel, technology, and infrastructure to secure our Nation’s borders. The resource base built over the past 2 decades has enabled USBP to develop 

and implement a Strategic Plan1 and enforcement posture tailored to meet the challenges of securing a 21st Century border against a variety of different threats and 

adversaries. Today, our Strategic Plan is based on risk: Identifying high-risk areas 

and flows and targeting our response to meet those threats. Through enhanced technology and situational awareness and the introduction and expansion of sophisticated and layered tactics, capabilities, and operations, USBP’s strategy focuses on 

Information, Integration and Rapid Response applied in the most targeted, effective, 

and efficient manner to achieve multiple objectives, including: 

• Prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States between the POEs through improved and focused intelligence-driven operations, 

as well as operational integration, planning, and execution with law enforcement partners; 

• Disrupt and degrade Transnational Criminal Organizations by targeting enforcement efforts against the highest priority threats and expanding programs 

that reduce smuggling and crimes associated with smuggling; and 

• Manage risk through the introduction and expansion of sophisticated tactics, 

techniques, and procedures. These include methods of detecting illegal entries 

such as using ‘‘change detection’’ techniques, increased mobile-response capabilities, and expanded use of specially-trained personnel with ‘‘force multiplying’’ 

skills and abilities. 

Information gathered from reconnaissance, community engagement, sign-cutting, 

and mobile and fixed technology together provide situational awareness and intelligence and helps us to best understand and assess the threats we face along our 

borders. The use of technology in the border environment is an invaluable force multiplier to increase situational awareness, direct a response team to the best interdiction location, and warn the team of any additional danger otherwise unknown along 

the way. Information and intelligence will empower USBP leadership and front-line 

agents to get ahead of the threat, be predictive and proactive. 

Integration denotes CBP corporate planning and execution of border security operations, while leveraging partnerships with other Federal, State, local, Tribal, and 

international organizations. Integration of effort with these organizations will ensure we bring all available capabilities and tools to bear in addressing threats. 

Lastly, through Rapid Response, we will deploy capabilities efficiently and effectively to meet and mitigate the risks we confront. Put simply, rapid response means 

USBP and its partners can quickly and appropriately respond to changing threats. 

A key element of the USBP’s Nation-wide Strategic Plan for securing the border 

is the USBP’s layered enforcement posture, which has been referred to as ‘‘defensein-depth’’. This layered posture includes advanced detection technology, tactical infrastructure, traditional patrol activities, and other tactical enforcement operations. 

The Strategic Plan recognizes that the security of the border cannot be achieved by 

only enforcement activities located at the physical border, such as routine patrols 

deployed from 135 Border Patrol stations, and 6 substations on the Northern and 

Southern Borders. For that reason, some of USBP’s enforcement operations take 

place away from the physical border, at interior checkpoints, and in ancillary areas. 

This approach makes full use of available enforcement opportunities to produce a 

11 

layered deployment of capabilities to improve our comprehensive understanding of 

the threat environment, to increase our ability to rapidly respond to threats, and 

to strengthen enforcement. 

USBP’s 15 Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) give USBP a tactical advantage by 

providing close support in areas that are remote or otherwise difficult to patrol; reducing the amount of time and fuel required to drive to and from the border area; 

and providing a sustained enforcement presence and deterrence posture in the border area. FOBs are a critical part of the USBP Strategic Plan in that they provide 

greater operational capability in areas where gaps exist in deployment density and 

infrastructure. 

Immigration checkpoints are also a critical element of USBP’s layered approach 

to combat illegal cross-border activity and are the primary focus of my testimony. 

Border Patrol checkpoints are strategically located on routes of egress from the border and thereby additionally deters an attempted illegal entry. The purpose of 

checkpoint operations is to apprehend recent entrants who are undocumented and 

smugglers who were not apprehended at the border and are attempting to travel 

to interior locations. 

As part of the USBP’s layered security strategy, checkpoints greatly enhance our 

ability to carry out the mission of securing the Nation’s borders against terrorists 

and smugglers of weapons, contraband, and unauthorized entrants. Checkpoint operations are critical security measures that ensure that the border is not our only 

line of defense, but rather one of many. 

CHECKPOINT OPERATIONS

Given the ratio of agents to miles of border, checkpoints establish funnel points 

to more effectively use resources for immigration enforcement purposes. All checkpoint sites are determined by Border Patrol managers in advance of establishment, 

and are positioned far enough from the border to avoid interfering with traffic in 

populated areas near the border; at sites where the surrounding terrain should restrict vehicle passage around the checkpoint; and located on a stretch of highway 

compatible with safe operation. Permanent USBP checkpoints are operated at the 

same location every time; however, tactical checkpoints are mobile. 

All checkpoint locations and operations are implemented in accordance with established CBP checkpoint policy, to ensure consistent and appropriate physical setup, illumination, and signage for the safety of vehicle traffic and agents. Also, all 

checkpoints comply with all State departments of transportation requirements and 

Federal traffic control guidelines using the latest version of the U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Federal Highway Administration’s Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices. 

In the operation of checkpoints, USBP also ensures that appropriate equipment 

including, vehicles, barricades, cones, rumble strips, and other traffic control equipment is in place to safely and effectively funnel and stop traffic to perform both primary and secondary inspection operations. The safe operation of traffic checkpoints 

is of the utmost importance. The site selection and the physical arrangement of immigration checkpoints are designed to minimize the risk of an accident or an injury 

to any agent or member of the public. At times when traffic can be funneled into 

one lane and during the hours of darkness, the physical setup is changed to enhance 

the safety of Border Patrol Agents. 

In additional to ensuring the safety of the traveling public and Border Patrol 

Agents, USBP establishes checkpoints in strategic locations to maximize enforcement resources as well as to minimize interference with the flow of legitimate personal and business traffic. USBP makes every effort to only operate checkpoints 

when traffic volume allows the operation to be conducted safely and efficiently. 

Although the purpose of an immigration checkpoint is to identify undocumented 

persons who recently entered and human smugglers, agents often encounter violators of other Federal and State laws, such as the Federal Controlled Substances Act 

and the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act. During primary or secondary 

inspection at an immigration checkpoint, Border Patrol Agents briefly question the 

vehicle occupants’ citizenship and immigration status. During the inspection, Border 

Patrol Agents may make plain view observations regarding the vehicle and its occupants and may request consent to search. When agents obtain consent, they may 

search the area consented to, without a warrant and without probable cause. 

Generally, Border Patrol Agents employ two means to stop vehicles driven by 

smugglers using side roads to circumvent a checkpoint: Additional checkpoints and 

roving patrols. USBP may establish and coordinate tactical checkpoints on circumvention routes, so as to ensure the effectiveness of checkpoints on main thoroughfares. USBP may also conduct roving patrols, an acceptable and effective means 

12 

2 ‘‘Rio Grande Valley Agents Rescue Immigrants, Smuggler Flees Checkpoint.’’ August 23, 

2016. https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2016-08-23-000000/rio-grandew-valley-agents-rescue-immigrants-smuggler. 

to stop vehicles driven by smugglers using side roads to circumvent an immigration 

checkpoint. Border Patrol Agents on roving patrol may stop a vehicle only if they 

have reasonable suspicion, based upon specific articulable facts and rational inferences from those facts, that the vehicle contains individuals who may have illegally 

entered the United States. 

When Border Patrol Agents make a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of a 

vehicle at an immigration checkpoint, they are authorized to make certain 

warrantless searches incident to the arrest, including the person arrested, personal 

effects in the arrestee’s possession. Vehicles and personal articles that are impounded, detained for safekeeping or as evidence may be subject to an inventory 

search. 

USBP also uses canine teams to detect undocumented individuals and illegal 

drugs by conducting a quick exterior canine sniff at an immigration checkpoint 

while the roadblock inspection is on-going. An alert by a Border Patrol canine constitutes probable cause to search. USBP canine teams are specially trained to detect 

the odors of controlled substances and concealed humans at checkpoints and other 

Border Patrol operations. As part of CBP’s layered enforcement strategy, canine 

teams provide an unmatched level of security and detection capability. 

When there is probable cause or consent, Border Patrol Agents may also use detection technology such as non-intrusive inspection (NII) systems and X-ray equipment to view the interior of a vehicle. However, if Agents have probable cause to 

believe that people are hidden inside a vehicle, agents will proceed with a physical 

search to minimize the risk of radiological exposure to humans. 

The purpose of a Border Patrol checkpoint is to apprehend recent undocumented 

entrants and smugglers; however, as noted, in the performance of these operations, 

Border Patrol Agents may develop suspicion of a range of criminal activity. Agents 

may be exposed to dangerous materials. To ensure the rapid detection of radiological 

materials, CBP policy mandates that all personnel assigned to primary inspection 

at Border Patrol checkpoints be issued a personal radiation pager and must ensure 

it is activated while on duty. A radiation pager is a portable gamma-ray radiation 

detector for use by law enforcement officials in the interdiction and location of nuclear materials. 

EFFECTIVENESS, PERFORMANCE, AND METRICS

While there is still work to be done, the Nation’s long-term investment in border 

security between the POEs has produced significant and positive results. In fiscal 

year 2015, USBP apprehensions—an indicator of illegal migration—declined to 

337,117 Nation-wide compared to 486,651 in fiscal year 2014. CBP also has a critical counter-narcotics role; in fiscal year 2015, CBP seized or disrupted the movement of more than 3.3 million pounds of narcotics and more than $129 million in 

unreported currency at and in between the POEs. These positive trends lend themselves to our Nation’s whole-of-Government approach to border security efforts, 

which emphasize the importance of joint planning and intelligence sharing. 

The presence of USBP Agents along strategic routes reduces the ability of criminals and potential terrorists to easily travel away from the border. Given that fewer 

resources (law enforcement personnel, equipment, and technology) are required to 

operate a checkpoint, checkpoint operations are an efficient and effective security 

mechanism used to interdict criminal activity and restrict the ability of criminal organizations to exploit roadways and routes of egress away from the border. In fiscal 

year 2015, at checkpoints alone, USBP apprehended 8,503 individuals and seized 

over 75,000 pounds of drugs, while intercepting thousands of dangerous attempts 

at human and drug smuggling. Many of the drugs seizures at checkpoints are a reflection of the effectiveness of USBP’s multi-layered strategy. The shipments seized 

at checkpoints are often referred to as ‘‘consolidation loads,’’ meaning that they are 

not shipments being moved directly from the border into the interior, but rather 

they are a combination of several small cross-border shipments that had previously 

entered the United States, and are now being moved to major distribution points 

in the interior of the country. 

For example, just a few weeks ago, agents from the Rio Grande Valley Sector 

working the Sarita Checkpoint, arrested a driver who had been attempting to smuggle immigrants in his vehicle. When a USBP canine alerted to his vehicle, the driver 

attempted to flee; however, after a brief pursuit, the driver was apprehended. Seven 

migrants were discovered in the trunk with no means of escape.2 Also this past 

13 

3 ‘‘Significant Seizure Caught at Border Patrol Checkpoint.’’ June 17, 2016. https:// 

www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2016-06-17-000000/significant-seizure-caught-border-patrol-checkpoint. 4 Southwest Border Deaths, By Fiscal Year. https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/ 

documents/BP%20Southwest%20Border%20Sector%20Deaths%20FY1998%20-%20FY2015.pdf. 5 Migrant Testimonial Series (produced by the DHS Joint Task Force—West). https:// 

www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/2016-05-31-000000/cbp-launches-series-spanish-language-central. 

June, Border Patrol agents from the Laredo Sector assigned to the Interstate Highway 35 Checkpoint encountered a Kenworth tractor towing a cargo tank at the primary inspection lane.3 While the driver was being questioned, a service canine 

alerted to possible concealed humans or narcotics within the vehicle. After the driver was referred to secondary, the agents performed an X-ray scan of the trailer and 

discovered several anomalies within the cargo tank area. A total of 216 bundles, of 

what was later determined to be marijuana, were removed from the tank with a 

total weight of 5,734.3 pounds and a street value of $4,578,440.00. 

In August 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report, Border Patrol Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol’s Mission but More Consistent 

Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness, (GAO– 

09–824) and made recommendations to improve checkpoint governance. To effectively manage and account for checkpoint performance measures, USBP created a 

Checkpoint Program Management Office (CPMO). The duties of the CPMO include 

reviewing checkpoint activity reviewing staffing and checkpoint resources; working 

policy and legal issues with divisions and departments at Headquarters; coordinating external reviews; coordinating with facilities maintenance and engineering 

on facility updates; and conducting liaison with sectors on checkpoint issues. The 

CPMO also collects and maintains statistical information, including traffic counts 

and arrest statistics per location to demonstrate that a particular checkpoint is effective in interdicting undocumented individuals and to justify the intrusion on the 

traveling public. 

Through strategic placement and operation, Border Patrol checkpoints are not 

only effective for enforcing immigration laws and detecting smuggled contraband, 

but they are also extremely beneficial in thwarting human smugglers. Smugglers 

often conceal immigrants in unsafe and even life-threatening conditions in an attempt to circumvent detection. The USBP works closely with our interagency, State, 

Tribal, territorial, and local partners to urge immigrants not to put their safety at 

risk by attempting to illegally enter the United States or circumventing a checkpoint. 

THE BORDER SAFETY INITIATIVE

Border Patrol Agents work around the clock to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit 

cross-border activity in all types of terrain and environmental conditions in support 

of our law enforcement mission; however, an inherent and essential component of 

our security mission is the responsibility to protect the safety of the public. Every 

year, USBP is involved in the rescue of thousands of people—more than 3,200 this 

fiscal year alone—who are victims of human smuggling and other undocumented 

immigrants who find themselves in dangerous or distressing situations while attempting to cross into the United States from Mexico between the ports of entry. 

Historically, the summer months are the deadliest. Nearly 4,000 migrants have 

tragically lost their lives in the last 10 years from exposure to the unforgiving elements, suffering heat stroke, dehydration, hyperthermia, and drowning in canals, 

ditches, and the Rio Grande River.4

CBP’s deployment of specialized personnel, area-specific technology, and public 

awareness campaigns are all key elements in the effort to prevent the unfortunate 

loss of life. USBP currently has more than 4,150 first responders, 730 Emergency 

Medical Technicians and 70 paramedics, all of whom are Border Patrol Agents who 

also have the capability to treat any individual with immediate medical needs in 

the field. 

CBP recently released the first in a series of 60-second Spanish language video 

testimonials5 of Central American immigrants who voluntarily share their horrifying 1,600-mile journey north in the hands of human smugglers. The immigrant 

testimonials are a continuation of Spanish language messaging campaigns CBP has 

launched in recent years in Central America, Mexico, and in key Central American 

communities in the United States. Through these efforts, CBP hopes to prevent the 

loss of human lives and to raise awareness of the real dangers and hazards Mexican 

14 

and Central American immigrants and their families face in the hands of unscrupulous human smugglers. 

In conjunction with the launching of the testimonials series, CBP announced the 

expansion of Border Safety Initiative (BSI) messaging outreach to key Central 

American communities in California, Texas, Florida, New York, and Washington, 

DC metropolitan areas regarding the dangers of attempting to illegally cross the 

Southwest Border. The BSI focuses on the deployment of life-saving technology, 

emergency response personnel, as well as binational information campaigns aimed 

at reducing the numbers of immigrant deaths. BSI also strives to rescue immigrants 

who fall prey to unscrupulous human smugglers who have no regard for their life 

and safety. 

Partnerships and collaborative efforts such as the BSI enhance our Nation’s overarching capability to address the threat of human and drug smuggling, increase 

front-line intelligence and enforcement operations, and enhance the safety and security of the public we serve. 

CONCLUSION

The function of checkpoints is to conduct immigration enforcement operations in 

strategic locations on routes leading away from the border. However, checkpoint operations are also a critical enforcement tool for interdicting dangerous materials, 

narcotics, and human smugglers. Checkpoint operations, paired with FOBs, effective 

Border Patrol canine teams, and sophisticated technology continue to deter the activities of human smugglers and disrupt the flow of illicit contraband from entering 

our communities. 

The border environment is dynamic and requires adaptation to respond to emerging threats and changing conditions. I appreciate the partnership and support 

USBP has received from this subcommittee, whose commitment to the security of 

the American people has enabled the continued deployment of resources and capabilities USBP needs to secure the border. 

The continued focus on unity of effort, in conjunction with checkpoint and other 

strategic and layered enforcement operations, better enables USBP to enhance its 

ability to detect and respond to threats in our Nation’s border regions. CBP will continue to strategically deploy resources, technology, and front-line personnel in order 

to keep our borders secure, and the communities along it, safe. 

Chairman McSally and Ranking Member Vela, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify today. I look forward to your questions. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks, Chief Morgan. 

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. 

So as the relatively new chief of the Border Patrol and one that 

wasn’t an agent first, you mentioned in your opening statement 

that you have taken time and toured the different sectors and just 

taking a fresh look as to the mission that they have, the challenges 

that they have. 

So based on that and the topic of this hearing, which checkpoints 

is one element of it, but really, we are looking at the full defensein-depth strategy, can you share, what did you learn about the defense-in-depth strategy, and do you agree that this should continue 

to be the approach that we take, especially in rural communities? 

Chief MORGAN. Yes, ma’am. So I think I first learned that I am 

probably going to stop referring to it as defense-in-depth strategy. 

I think there has been a perception, that means we are actually 

ceding, intentionally ceding ground and territory. I don’t think that 

is what I am seeing. I think what I am seeing—and after 2 months, 

you are right, I still have a lot to learn. I am still taking a hard 

look at this and I am asking a lot of questions. I think what I am 

observing is the strategy really is, as I said in my statement, is trying to come up with a comprehensive, multifaceted, layered strategy that prevents us from having a single point of failure. That 

really is my concern. Now, there are lots of different ways that 

maybe that can be achieved, and we need to take a look at that 

and continue to grow. 

15 

I think the Border Patrol is going in the right direction, being 

that threat-based, intelligence-driven, operationally-focused organization that is supported with infrastructure, technology, and personnel. But also that I think part of that strategy—we know that 

regardless of, as we continue to grow on that threat-based, intelligence-driven, operationally-focused approach, supported by infrastructure, technology, and people, things are still getting across. 

That is what I saw too and that is what I am learning. We are getting better. We are not where we need to be yet, but we are getting 

better. But things are getting across. 

So as I am looking at that, what do we do to prevent the things 

that do get across and do get by us? How do we have a strategy 

that gives us a second look at that, gives us a second chance at 

that, to eliminate that single point of failure? I think that is what 

I am seeing with respect to the strategy. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So thanks, Chief. You know, during your time and 

your discussion and your visits, I mean, were you able to see or do 

you agree that, again, if you see the vast majority in the Tucson 

sector, anyway, of apprehensions that are taking place north of 5 

miles from the border, that the illicit activity does have some serious repercussions to border communities and residents? 

Chief MORGAN. Yes, ma’am, I absolutely agree. I have been to 

Del Rio. I have been to RGV. I have sat with the ranchers. One 

night I had dinner with the local ranchers there. It was a great 

barbecue. They—I sat and I talked with them. The elements that 

you mentioned in your opening comments are exactly what they 

are saying as well. I think they are absolutely, unequivocally legitimate in everything that they say. 

If I was a rancher and I hear that they talk about the things that 

they do, from what others may see as small, a gate left open, it is 

not small to a rancher. Cattle can get out. Right. That can have 

devastating impacts. They have seen people that have passed on 

their property. Their property is getting broken into. Things are 

being stolen. 

Yes, ma’am. So it is absolutely a serious issue. I can say, my tour 

and being out in the field, especially along the Southwest Border, 

I have not met a Border Patrol Agent yet that doesn’t understand 

that and take that equally as serious. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. As part of your assessment, do you 

think we have enough Agents to secure the border? My understanding is we are now below 20,000 Agents Nation-wide. 

Then I guess the other question, again, related to the strategy 

is, of the agents that you have, are you taking a look at where they 

are assigned? We hear a lot from the Agents themselves about 

those that are being detailed away and not enough are mustering 

actually to be out patrolling on a daily basis. Those percentages, as 

we have done some, you know, just different visits and talking to 

people, seem to be a little bit lopsided as far as those that are out 

in the field versus those that are in other assignments. So are you 

taking a look at that, and what have you learned from the number 

of agents and where they are actually assigned? 

Chief MORGAN. Yes, ma’am. So I think all elements you just said 

absolutely, unequivocally I am taking a look at that across the 

board. There are a couple of things. 

16 

So first, to answer your question: Do we have enough? My first 

immediate answer is, I don’t know yet when it comes to the personnel, because I think we have to do, also what you said, is take 

a look at the resource allocation and where are they at. I think also 

it is a layered approach. I think to answer that question honestly, 

it is a little premature, I think, for me to be able to do that and 

to have that confidence before I give you those numbers. Because, 

again, part of that is increasing our ability to identify and understand the threat and have a situational awareness to be able to 

continue to grow, being intelligence-driven, and then focusing our 

operations toward that threat. It is also a combination of infrastructure and technology. Through the use of infrastructure and 

technology, it could impact the need for the number of Agents. So 

I am taking a look at that. 

I think you hit the other element right on the head, is that, basically, are the Agents where they need to be? I don’t know. I don’t 

know. I am taking a look at that. I am asking those questions. 

If you look at the history, as you mentioned as well, you know, 

Hold the Line, Gatekeeper, if you look at the history of the Border 

Patrol, you know, resources had to be shifted as the threat shifted. 

I think that is hard for an organization that is static in nature, 

meaning people have to move and buy homes and et cetera, but 

also being agile and mobile enough to be constant, having that constant ability to be able to go where the evolving threat is. We are 

taking a look at that. We have mobile response teams. 

So, you know, some sectors may see some Agents leave. I don’t 

know. You know, may see agents leave the Tucson sector, for example, but they may be going to RGV, which they are just getting 

hammered right now with the inflow and influx of folks crossing. 

So we have to take a look at that, I think, in a holistic approach. 

But absolutely, we are taking a hard look at that. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK, thanks. One more quick question on the 

checkpoints and then we will get another round, because I want to 

go deeper into it. So we have got these permanent checkpoints on 

most roads in Arizona and I know across the rest of the border. I 

mean, look, if you are a hardened cartel operative and you drive 

through a known Border Patrol checkpoint, you should get the Darwin award. OK? So, I mean, as I have talked to Agents and I have 

talked to your predecessor, you are picking up the low-level criminals who maybe don’t know any better or don’t have good intel 

themselves, think somehow they are going to be getting through, 

but not the serious cartels. 

The understanding, the way it has been described, is you intend 

that the serious cartels, the transnational criminal organizations 

are going to go around the checkpoints, and that pushes them into 

our communities. We will hear from the second panel about some 

of the impacts of that. So we won’t be able to have that sort of dialog so I want to make sure we get this discussion out in this first 

panel. 

So—and then we talked to Agents who say they don’t have 

enough manning to actually go out and patrol the walkaround. So 

this is impacting, if Agents are at the checkpoints, but they are not 

out there fanning out for those that are going around it, then you 

17 

are still not intercepting them, yet they are being a public safety 

threat to the communities that are around the checkpoints. 

So can you just talk a little bit about that checkpoint strategy, 

the fact that they are fixed versus roaming, they close down when 

the rain comes? So, you know, the bad guys just line up during 

monsoon season. They know exactly when to go around them. Just 

like, you know, what your assessment is of how we can improve or 

take a fresh look at the use of these checkpoints. 

Chief MORGAN. Yes, ma’am. First of all, I want to say absolutely 

we should take a look at this, 100 percent. I am and we are absolutely looking for every opportunity we can improve. I think that 

is how great organizations get better. I think the Border Patrol is 

a great organization, but I think the way we get better is to continue to challenge ourselves and to ask ourselves, is what we are 

doing working, is it effective, and can we get better? So absolutely, 

I will be asking those questions. 

Now, more specific, I will have to do a little bit more work to be 

able to provide you a solid answer whether, you know, specific cartels are using the checkpoints. I can tell you from my experiences 

20 years in the FBI as well as what I have seen thus far in the 

Border Patrol, is that serious drug cartels do use lower-level mules 

to do transportation. I think last year alone the checkpoints, I 

think it was around 75,000 tons of drug seized. This year, we are 

about on track to do that via the checkpoints. So they are getting 

serious amounts of drugs. 

Now, the change of TTPs, sometimes the loads are smaller, but 

that doesn’t mean necessarily it is not coming from a serious drug 

trafficking organization. They are just changing their TTPs. 

The other part with respect to pushing around the community, 

I think I am seeing there is some truth to that. What I am seeing 

Border Patrol’s part of the strategy is they do have roving patrols 

around those checkpoints for that and they base that on intelligence and the traffic flow. They also can set up intermediate or 

temporary checkpoints as well to try to stop the flow of people 

going around. So I think they do have a strategy to try and address 

that. Holistically, how effective is that? I still need to get some 

more data on that to be able to provide you a good answer. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. I will come back during Round 2, but I will 

tell you that at some checkpoints in Arizona, they don’t have the 

manning to do the roving patrols. So these are all hand-in-hand. 

Where is the Border Patrol manning going and, you know, do you 

have the manning to be able to address those issues? Then the impact again on the private property and the local communities when 

the bad guys are going around. 

So I am going to go ahead and yield to my Ranking Member 

here, Mr. Vela, for his opening questions. 

Mr. VELA. So are you making a distinction between the effectiveness of the checkpoints in terms of catching people versus catching 

loads of narcotics? 

Chief MORGAN. I am not sure, sir, what you mean by making a 

difference. 

Mr. VELA. Well, I guess what I am curious about is we see statistics when we cross these checkpoints in terms of, you know, pounds 

of cocaine, you know, that has been detected and, you know, so 

18 

much marijuana. I am just trying to get an assessment as to what 

your sense of how effective the checkpoints are with respect to apprehension of narcotics versus apprehension of people. 

Chief MORGAN. I think at this point I am seeing the checkpoints 

that are an effective part right now of the strategy to prevent us 

from having a single point of failure. I am seeing that. I am not 

saying that there are not alternatives that we should look at or we 

could look at, again, as part of the strategy to prevent us from having a single point of failure. But currently, as the structure right 

now, the statistics are showing that they are effective at the immigration enforcement of which their primary purpose is. Last year, 

the checkpoints across Southwest Border I think was about 8,000. 

This year, I think we are on track for that same number as well. 

So on its face, they appear to be effective as that part of the strategy to prevent us from having a single point of failure. 

Now, ancillary, in addition to that, yes, they have been, I would 

categorize it as very successful with respect to drug seizures. I 

think they have also been somewhat successful in catching people, 

criminals, that have outstanding warrants, State/Federal/local warrants for some pretty violent, heinous crimes, as well as those that 

have been convicted of violent crimes in the past. That is also happening at the checkpoints as well. 

Mr. VELA. Yes. I didn’t mean the question to be critical. I was 

just trying to get your assessment of the effectiveness of the checkpoints with respect to those different tasks that the agency has at 

the checkpoints. 

Chief MORGAN. Yes, sir. So I think right now, I would say they 

appear to be effective, especially with the resources that are actually dedicated to the checkpoints. It is actually a very small 

amount of the Border Patrol resources that are dedicated to checkpoints overall. I would say that the statistics that are being produced by those checkpoints, I would say at this point, knowing 

what I know now, I would categorize them as being successful. 

Mr. VELA. So back on the issue of morale, just to give you an 

idea of how entrenched the Border Patrol has been in south Texas 

and in my life there, your agency served as pallbearers at my father’s funeral. 

So when I talk to Agents—it happened last weekend at a golf 

tournament. I had, by coincidence, ran into two Agents that came 

up to me, and they had the same story, and it was, you know, how 

deeply things had changed from their perspective in the Border Patrol, and not for the good, right, not from a morale standpoint. 

What I have found—and this is not just a statement on the Border 

Patrol or Department of Homeland Security but with respect to 

Federal agencies in general and the disconnect between the offices 

up here in Washington, DC, and what is going on on the ground. 

You know, I guess what I am—I know you just started and I 

know that these assessments that you have made are your initial 

assessments, but what can you tell us about where you are headed 

with respect to improving morale? For that matter, these conclusions that I have come to aren’t based on statistics that I have read 

and these notebooks that we are handed or what staff has told me. 

These are real-life conversations that I have, you know, with the 

19 

people that work for you, right. So I am just kind of curious. Are 

you getting the same sense I am or is it different? 

Chief MORGAN. Yes, sir. Well, first, I would absolutely love to 

maybe do an off-line and get more in depth of what you are actually hearing from the line agents, because I think, as the chief of 

Border Patrol, that is exactly what I need to hear, if I am going 

to take a look at issues and be able to really make the impact that 

I need. 

I go out there and my stump speech, part of what I tell them is 

part of one of my key roles as the chief is to be their relentless advocate. I think part of being their relentless advocate is understanding what they are feeling each and every day. That is really 

one of the main reasons why on Day 3 I decided that I was going 

to go out to the field and I am going to visit every single sector, 

all 20 sectors, and I am not going to stop until I complete it. Since 

I have been out there, I have stood in front of musters of 300, and 

I have talked to two mechanics in the garage and I have listened 

to them. 

So I am hearing issues about morale. Morale is not where it 

needs to be, but there are a lot of reasons for that and it is very 

complicated. I can say—so the FEVS survey, the Federal Employee 

Viewpoint Survey that went out is that it really kind of told us and 

identified that there are some morale issues and there are some 

challenges, but that is only one point of context. 

So what the Border Patrol did is they actually commissioned an 

outside entity to come in and take a look at the basic information 

from the FEVS survey. They went out, they went out to 13 sectors, 

talked to over 900 personnel from the Border Patrol chief of the 

sector all the way down to the mechanic, and from that they came 

up with these basic 8 core areas. Then we brought back additional 

people to do a deeper dive to really get to the core root of the 

issues. Then the plan is—my plan is to really do some targeted 

teams on those issues to really try to address those issues to improve morale. 

Those are specific things, but I think there is also some bigger 

things that we need to take a look at too. I think we have mentioned some of those as well. That is the second thing that I tell 

them as part of my job that I think will impact morale is, as the 

chief, to get them the resources, the training, the tools, and the 

technology to do their job effectively and safely. I think this goes 

to the heart of the hearing, as a matter of fact, is is our strategy 

right? Are the things that we are using correct? We need to take 

a look at that. We do. Everything. 

Sitting as a new chief, I can tell you I am not accepting anything 

that I see as it is the right thing. I am not doing that. I am asking 

questions and I am asking for explanations. Why are we doing 

this? Is this the right thing? Are there alternatives to prevent us 

from having a single point of failure, or is checkpoints the only 

thing that we can do? I think that is important going forward. 

Mr. VELA. Well, look, I look forward to working with you on that 

issue and many others. What I can tell you is that I am sure the 

surveys are real nice and everything, but between Mr. Hurd and 

Congressman McSally and, you know, Mr. Higgins, who represents 

the Northern Border, and those of us who interact with your agenVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:04 Jun 23, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\114THCONGRESS\16BM0913\16BM0913.TXT HEATH
20 

cies every day, not to mention the people that we have working for 

us back in our offices—I mean, I was at my office back in the district 2 weeks ago and, you know, Agents were coming in. 

So our offices have a significant degree of interaction with the 

people that work for your agency and, you know, use us as a tool, 

because I think that we can help bridge some of these gaps, given 

our interaction with your agency, you know, with your agents on 

the ground day-to-day. But thank you for being here. 

Chief MORGAN. Yes, sir. I would absolutely like to take advantage of that. Absolutely. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Duncan from South Carolina for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thanks for this 

hearing as well. 

Chief, thanks for being here. Congratulations. I enjoyed working 

with your predecessor, Chief Fisher, when I was a little more engaged with the Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency. 

I have been on this committee for 6 years and this topic never 

seems to go away. You have got quite a challenge ahead of you because of the bureaucracy that you work for. I am glad you are asking the questions and I hope we can make those changes as you 

seek answers, and I look forward to working with you. 

I think you will find a willing Congress, at least a willing committee, to help you. It is not just the border States and their delegations that are interested. Immigration issues affect everyone, 

drug issues affect everyone, National security issues affect everyone, even in South Carolina. 

So coming on the heels of 9/11 15 years later, a lot of reflection 

over what happened, mistakes made and all that, I have done a lot 

of radio interviews and I have told folks that I don’t know that we 

are any safer today by combining all these agencies under DHS, 

and our border is still insecure. 

I say that in that we still have illegals and contraband and drugs 

and illicit activity happening that is coming across our border. That 

is no fault of yours and that is no fault of your personnel. I applaud 

you and I support you and I want to keep working with you. But 

the facts are the facts, that we have illegals coming in this country. 

We have another element coming into this country illegally, walking across our border, and that is a DHS term of OTMs, other than 

Mexicans. These are personnel that aren’t just the Hispanic origin 

folks that are coming to take the jobs in agriculture, horticulture, 

hospitality, you name it. These are people who we really don’t 

know their intent because the apprehension rates of folks that have 

crossed our border are speculative. I say that in that Jeh Johnson 

has said, well, we take the number that we catch and then we kind 

of extrapolate that and figure out how many we are not catching. 

That is alarming when you really think about that. 

So do you know the percentages of OTMs that are apprehended 

on the border? These are people from Africa, the Middle East, you 

know, Asia. What is that percentage, based on your knowledge? 

Chief MORGAN. Yes, sir. I don’t know that exact percentage of 

OTMs. 

21 

Mr. DUNCAN. OK. There’s no problem. America just needs to 

know—— 

Chief MORGAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUNCAN [continuing]. That there are people crossing our border that aren’t just from Latino, Latin descent, and Mexico or Guatemala or whatnot, coming to take jobs, coming to bring their unaccompanied children here or whatnot; that they are folks that have 

traveled great distances, oftentimes using false or fake passports 

and a lot of money, traveling through the tri-border region of South 

America, transiting up through Latin America and coming into this 

country. Some may have goals of providing for their family, I don’t 

discount that. But I believe some may have nefarious goals, and on 

the heels of 9/11 I am going to be very, very cognizant of that. 

So Congress in 2006 passed the Secure Fence Act. I wasn’t here. 

I applauded it as a State legislator in South Carolina, but then 

Congress failed to appropriate the dollars to complete the job. I 

don’t know how many miles have been completed now. I believe in 

more fencing. I believe it works because I believe there are areas— 

I know there are areas you can’t fence. Nogales sector, the mountains are high. But what it does is it puts the bad element, I guess, 

into corridors that makes your personnel more effective. So I see 

it as a force multiplier. 

But we all know that a taller fence just means a higher ladder 

or a higher fence means a taller ladder and elements are going to 

cross over that fence. That is where electronic surveillance, that is 

where other force multipliers actually come in. I appreciate that. 

But if you go and look and you go to my Facebook page, Jeff 

Duncan, I put it up there last week, 2 weeks ago, there is a video 

in San Diego. San Diego News, which isn’t the most conservative 

news source, but they were talking about the fact that people were 

coming into this country, they were apprehended by you guys and 

let go, because they are claiming asylum. It also says that this isn’t 

a policy that is bottom-up, this is from the very top guy sitting 

down here on 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue saying, let them go. 

I will tell you, in South Carolina, we are not very happy about 

that, about folks that have crossed our border, broken our laws, 

violated American sovereignty—we are a sovereign Nation—and 

they are let go. So—and I don’t blame you for that. These are problems we have got to work on together. I am acknowledging that. 

I am offering help to work on it together as Congress. 

We have been told in the 6 years I have been here by folks that 

work within DHS, that we have operational control of the border. 

I can’t get a good definition of what that operational control 

means, Madam Chairman, but I would ask the chief, in your opinion, what does operational control mean and have we achieved 

operational control of our Southern Border? The Northern Border 

is for another topic, another day. The Southern Border is where I 

am focused. 

Chief MORGAN. Yes, sir. So I will start with the latter, operational control. Two months in, I am taking a look. I am not sure— 

again, I caveat that with 2 months in. I am not sure operational 

control is the right way to look at this. I am questioning that term, 

to be able to provide everyone that should with that definition. 

22 

I think I go back to the strategy of being threat-based, intelligence-driven, operationally-focused, supported by infrastructure, 

technology, and personnel. With that as the framework, I think the 

goal is, is that we are striving to have confidence levels through 

our situational awareness. So I am asking folks, what are your confidence levels from zone to zone within a station, within a sector, 

throughout an entire 6,000-plus land border miles and 2,000 coastal we are responsible for. I pulled a little bit of that from my FBI 

experience as we went through in the aftermath of 9/11, we are trying to figure out and ask ourselves the same question. 

So I want to be able to get to a sector chief, to him or her, and 

say, what are your confidence levels with respect to the situational 

awareness that you have in your sector? Tell me about that. Talk 

to me about that. How did you get that? Talk to me about your 

threats. Talk to me about the intelligence process. Talk to me 

about your partnerships. Talk to me about the use of infrastructure, technology, and personnel that you used to get to that. We 

need to have a defined set of matrix and factors that we all go in 

that goes into a sector chief being able to determine their confidence level. Then, based on that, that is how we allocate those resources. I think that is the direction that we need to go, but I am 

asking those questions. 

So, again, I would say I am not sure operational control. One of 

the reasons why I am not sure operational control is a right frame 

is because the TTPs change too quickly. Again, as you mentioned, 

ma’am, in your opening comments about Gatekeeper and Hold the 

Line, those are great examples of how we did all this, and the stuff 

shifted. So at one moment we could say we have operational control 

in the area and the next minute it will change. But if we have that 

process that I described, having situational awareness, I think that 

is going to position us better to be able to do what we need to do. 

I would like to talk a little bit and respond to what you mentioned about people are coming here and they are being allowed to 

then come into the United States. I think that is also something 

that we need to talk about and take a look at. Because when we 

talk about resources, specifically manpower, what I see that we are 

being asked to do—and please don’t get me wrong, we are going to 

do whatever we are going to be asked to do. The political decisions 

or the policies of the U.S. Government, that is not our role to get 

involved in. Whatever you decide, we are going to do. 

What we are being asked to do right now, I think you could 

phrase it a little bit as a humanitarian mission. For example, some 

of what you referred to, sir, is the unaccompanied children that are 

coming across. I stood in the Rio Grande Valley on one of the cut 

roads where a smuggler had told some children, once they made 

landfall, to go on the cut road until you came in contact with a 

United States Border Patrol Agent. I was there and I watched that. 

I watched the little 6-year-old girl holding the hands of her 11- 

year-old brother, and they made the trek all the way from Honduras. 

Now, personally, I wanted to take that little girl home with me, 

I did. That is something that will probably stick with me my entire 

life. But as the chief of the United States Border Patrol, which I 

think we have a National security interest in this country, we have 

23 

a law enforcement threat in this country, I think when I look at 

that 6-year-old, she is not a National security threat or a law enforcement threat, with respect to what I see my job as the chief of 

the Border Patrol. But I am taking a lot of resources, a lot of resources dedicated to what I would say is a humanitarian role, and 

I am taking them off the line. 

So I think there needs to be discussion and I am asking questions, what are some alternatives we could do instead of taking 

Agents that have been trained that have a National security mission, should be on the front line, I am taking them off that front 

line a lot to process a 6-year-old and an 11-year-old as part of the 

humanitarian mission. So I think that is a challenge. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me just finish up by saying I appreciate your 

position on the children. That pulls at our heartstrings and it is the 

right thing for America to do to try to figure out this. But the issue 

is exacerbated, Madam Chairman, by all the other things we have 

talked about. 

When you think 49 percent of all illegals in this country didn’t 

come across that Southern Border or Northern Border, they came 

with a permission slip. America gave them permission to come to 

this country. We trusted them, and they have violated that trust 

by overstaying that visa and remaining in this country. That is 

low-hanging fruit for enforcement. That is a different division, I get 

that. 

But going back to the point, that exacerbates the problem of 

being able to deal with her. So visa overstays, border enforcement, 

dealing with the criminal element within this country, then dealing 

with the other illegals that happen to be in this country and what 

we do if they are gainfully employed and that sort of thing, and the 

children you are talking about, whether it is the unaccompanied 

children that are coming across or whether it is the children of people that have come here known as dreamers. But you have got to 

take it in priority, I think, because it all gets so convoluted as a 

total immigration reform package that we are not able to have an 

adult civil conversation about her, right. 

So you mentioned structured technology and personnel. I am 

with you. But if they evade that fence, you pick them up with a 

ground sensor and a camera or a drone, you send the personnel to 

pick them up, and they are let go 2 hours later? We are wasting 

a heck of a lot of money with structured technology and personnel. 

OK? We have got to stop letting them go. 

With that, Madam Chairman, great committee hearing, I would 

love to bring him back when he is not just here for 2 months, when 

he has got a little bit a sense of the agency, and have an in-depth 

conversation about—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. We will. 

Mr. DUNCAN. This may be for the next Congress, but we ought 

to have an operational control hearing to delve more into what that 

looks like. 

So thank you so much. I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Absolutely. On that note, we had a hearing with 

your previous acting chief where we were trying to address the 

issues of situational awareness and operational control. Part of the 

challenges that we have had is how do we measure effectiveness, 

24 

and those numbers have shifted over the years, when we went from 

2010 to measuring operational control to measuring number of apprehensions as some measure of whether you are being successful, 

which I have never understood. Let me just be clear. I mean, if 

number of apprehensions go up when you don’t know what the denominator is, then is that a good thing or is that a bad thing? So 

we addressed this issue in a hearing a couple of months ago. 

I know these are complicated issues, but I do want to follow up 

on the operational control discussion. From my perspective—again, 

it is formed and shaped by my experiences in the military—there 

are two major measurements that I would be looking for as a subcommittee chair here. The first is, you know, what percentage of 

the Southern Border do you have situational awareness of real 

time, not change detection after the fact but real time? So if something is coming up to the international boundary and is attempting 

to go over the border, we actually see it real time, whether that is 

with a person or with a camera or with an airborne asset, manned 

or unmanned, whatever it is. What percentage do we have situational awareness of? 

Now, you may not be able to get to it right away, that is a second 

issue, but what do we actually, if it moves, we see it? Again, these 

are complicated issues, but coming from a simple fighter pilot point 

of view of what is your situational awareness? 

Then the second question being, of those that you see, what can 

you intercept? That is operational control. So first is if it moves, 

you see it. Second is if you see it, you can get it. Right? So then 

you have a sense of the denominator, because you know, like, we 

saw it but we didn’t get it, so it got away. So that is part of, you 

know, the success rate impact. When we pressed on this issue and 

some of the challenges we have with our constituents, quite frankly, in this National dialog is, because the measurements have been 

sort of shifting and number of apprehensions is meaningless to 

most people, they don’t have a sense of like what level of confidence 

do we have. What percentage of the Southern Border, which we are 

focusing on, actually do we have situational awareness and operational control? 

The answer we got out of the previous acting chief was a little 

bit over 50 percent. Fifty-six percent, I think, was the number of 

real-time situational awareness. If it moves, you see it, you know 

something’s coming. Now, that needs to improve, obviously. We 

have got to get ourselves in parallel to a place that you can see it 

and then you can actually do something about it, right, to be able 

to intercept it with the right assets that you need, with the appropriate vehicles, whether that is foot patrol, horse patrol, vehicles, 

ATVs, helicopters, whatever it takes, you know, to be able to actually intercept that, ideally on the south side of our constituents’ 

ranches, not on the north side or 100 miles inland. 

I think that is some of the challenges that bring us to kind-of 

where we are here today. Obviously, if we were able to see what 

moves and intercept what moves as close to the border as possible, 

from my perspective, spending time with the Border Patrol Agents, 

spending time with the residents and ranchers, if we were able to 

do that, not only would you be able to do the mission closer to the 

border as possible, which will impact all the discussions we will 

25 

have in the second panel, but also it impacts the humanitarian element, quite frankly. You are not having to go deal with someone 

out in the desert 80 miles north who is on the verge of dehydration 

and death, right, because you are intercepting them right at the 

border. So all the things that are being referenced, and then less 

would be needing to be picked up at the checkpoints, in theory, 

right? 

I mean, we have got a number of narcotics coming through the 

checkpoints, but if we were able to push the line of scrimmage to 

the border, then less would be actually making it around the border and into the communities and then going into the checkpoints. 

Does that make sense? 

So, I mean, you know, the part of our discussion is what can we 

do and what resources do you need to have intelligence-driven operations, like you have talked about, threat-based, nimble, on your 

feet, as soon as we are effective they are going to shift their tactics? 

They are innovative, they are entrepreneurs, these cartels. So what 

can we do to make sure you have the resources, the policy, the 

manpower, which is a win-win for everybody? This is a win-win for 

the agency, the country, the agents, the ranchers, the residents, I 

mean, all the way around. 

One of my frustrations often is that I feel like sometimes people 

are pit against each other in this discussion. Like, what the border 

residents and ranchers are looking for is not what the Agents or 

the agency is looking for. We are all in this together. I mean, we 

can find where our common interests are to protect our country 

and to keep our community safe, right, and give the tools to the 

Agents that they need that do that, and then that impacts the communities and the residents all the way around. I mean, this is the 

fundamental conversation that we have been having, you know, 

since I have been in Congress, in the time that I was running and 

now, you know, now that I have been in this position in the subcommittee chair. 

So, you know, based on all that and wanting to get in this place, 

which I think we have a common interest, I am trying to get to this 

place where we keep the community safer, we see more, we catch 

more, we give the tools to the agents that they need and push that 

line of scrimmage closer to the border, the question is, what else 

do you need in order to do that? What else do you need from us 

to provide those resources? We are not just going to throw money 

at the problem. Right? Is it more integrated fixed towers? Is it 

more manned and unmanned assets? Is it tactical drones? Is it, you 

know, agent—like what is it that you need in order to push this 

to the border so that if we were to do that, you would see less and 

less coming through checkpoints, less and less incursions and public safety issues, because we are going to push that line of scrimmage south to the international boundary. What else do you need? 

Chief MORGAN. So, ma’am, first of all, I agree with everything 

you just said. Specifically on the situational awareness, I completely agree. That kind-of goes exactly to what I was saying about 

the confidence levels. I also want to challenge the leaders that 

when they tell me what their situational awareness is, tell me 

about what your confidence is with respect to that. Let’s have those 

26 

discussions. So I think you are spot on and I think we do have absolutely the same goal. 

The goal is absolutely, let’s try to interdict everything that we 

can right at the border. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Chief MORGAN. Absolutely, that is the goal. It is a challenging 

and a complex thing, but it is also an exciting thing as well, because it is about strengthening our counternetwork ability. It is 

about reaching out to our partners—not just within the United 

States but our international partners, Canada, Mexico, et cetera. It 

is not about just being in a position to interdict them when they 

hit the border, it is about bringing the fight to them before they 

get to the border. It is about identifying those TCOs. It is about 

dismantling those TCOs through a threat-based, intelligence-driven 

process before they get to the TCO. It is about setting up solid infrastructure, a whole-of-Government approach, whether it is 

through corridor initiatives, whether it is through the joint task 

forces that are established, to make sure that we are working together, that we are gathering intelligence, we are sharing the intelligence, and we are doing joint operations based on that intelligence to utilize our limited resources. 

So there is a whole apparatus about let’s take the fight before 

they even get to the border. Then once they get to the border, as 

you laid it out, I agree, it is totally how you laid it out. You are 

right. Our goal would be is if we are that effective, we don’t need 

additional stuff. 

Now, I would say, from my position, I don’t know what—I think 

it could be unrealistic to say that no matter how good we are, that 

we are going to catch everything at the border. So I would always 

say part of the strategy should always be something in place that 

prevents us from having a single point of failure. I am not saying 

checkpoints will always be that issue, but I think you understand 

what I mean. So, yes, so we have to continue to do that. 

The last part, what do I need? I need to continue that threatbased, intelligence-driven, operationally-focused approach. I need to 

make sure that we have the resources to drive intelligence, to gather intelligence, to disseminate intelligence, to continue to drive 

those operations, to hopefully, as a counternetwork approach, take 

the fight before they get to the border. So definitely looking at our 

intelligence resources. 132 intelligence analysts. Do we need more? 

My gut says we do. 

With the rest of the resources, I don’t think there will ever be 

a chief that sat before you said we wouldn’t need more resources. 

I am not going to be any different in that area. But I think I need 

some more time so that we do take care of the precious taxpayers’ 

money to be able to really tell you what it is we need with respect 

to the infrastructure, the technology, and the manpower. 

On the humanitarian side, absolutely. The border, please, don’t— 

the Border Patrol Agents, when I walked up, they didn’t even know 

I was there. They were treating these kids with dignity, respect, 

and compassion like they were their own. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Chief MORGAN. We will do that, absolutely. But I am just saying 

that there may be an alternative. Like, for example, when I was 

27 

a police officer for Los Angeles Police Department, I would be working the streets of south central L.A. I would catch a felon, I would 

hand him off to a jailer to process. I would go back out on the 

street. So I don’t know, can maybe we do something similar so that 

when we get one of the unaccompanied children, that we turn them 

over to somebody else that can do the processing? Then we get the 

agents back out on the line faster. That is something I am taking 

a look at. I would ask your support for that, because obviously, that 

will take some funding and some push to do that. 

The technology, that is an element too. You mentioned like the 

integrated fixed towers. You know that well. That is going to be a 

great resource in some areas. It doesn’t work in other areas. You 

go to the Buffalo sector with the hills. That technology is not going 

to work. So we need to constantly look at additional technology, 

and so I would probably be looking for support when we come up 

for additional technology. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK, great. Thanks. 

I do want to go back to the agents and how the agents are used. 

We have heard from a couple of different sources that—in the Tucson sector we keep hearing the number about 25 percent of the 

agents are not assigned to patrolling the border. They are assigned 

to doing other things, you know, vehicle officers, you know, just 

other things that are not—it goes back to what you were just talking about. We train them to do a job and we ought to make sure 

that we keep the vast majority of them out there doing that job, 

right? Because that is what they are responsible for. That is what 

is going to build their morale, by the way, and their esprit de corps, 

is they are out there doing the job they were trained to do and not 

all these additional duties and details and other things that are 

really not their core responsibilities. 

Is that 25 percent number across the board or do you have better 

clarity on how many or what percent of the Agents are actually not 

patrolling? 

Chief MORGAN. So, ma’am, I have not seen or been provided the 

25 percent number, so it is premature for me to weigh in on that. 

What I would say is it really depends on who you are talking to 

and their perspective. For example, as we talk about that threatbased, intelligence-driven process, I am pushing folks, leaders out 

in the field to put more people into task forces, right, to leverage 

that kind of whole of Government approach. We should be integrated into the JTTFs, into the BEST teams, into the DEA-led 

strike forces. We need to be in the JTF–West and East and et 

cetera. So we do need to push resources out there. 

Another thing that could be seen is that sometimes a sector—and 

I believe Tucson sector was impacted by this—when another sector, 

like RGV, is getting slammed with an increase, we will mobilize 

the mobilization team and they will go to another sector to assist. 

So some people may have the perspective, they see that and they 

think they are being taken off the line when really they are just 

being reallocated to a line somewhere else that we have a higher 

priority threat going on that we have to do. 

But, again, I am taking a look at that. I am asking the questions. 

The specialty units, you know, do we have the right allocation? 

How many people, you know, do we have off the line and what are 

28 

they specifically doing? Absolutely asking those questions. That is 

a fair question that should be asked. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Chief, I know this is just a snapshot in time, but 

could you get back to us with, you know, of the Agents that you 

have, just, you know, with basic percentages of numbers, how 

many are generally out there on the line? How many are part of 

other taskings and other things? Just, you know, percentages. 

I get that from being in the military, you know, you need people 

in the operations center and all that kind of stuff in order to push 

good information. But if we could get a good sense from you and 

an answer back of where we are on those percentage-wise, and 

then continue the conversation of where it needs to be adjusted to. 

Chief MORGAN. Yes, ma’am. I actually want those numbers for 

myself as well. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. 

One last question related to the—on the second panel, we will 

hear from Dr. Golob from the University of Arizona about the 2014 

study they did with a series of recommendations to enhance, really, 

the data collection and determining the success of whether the 

checkpoints are working and whether they are manned correctly 

and what things can be done to improve that. Have any of those 

recommendations been implemented, and do you agree or disagree 

with those recommendations? 

Chief MORGAN. Yes, ma’am. So I do know, in part—again, that 

is something I still need to do a little bit deeper dive, but it has 

improved dramatically. We are tracking the number of seizures. 

We are tracking the number of apprehensions. We are tracking the 

number of man-hours that is spent at checkpoints and et cetera. So 

there are numerous data points that are being collected so that we 

can try to get closer to coming up with a really solid way to measure the effectiveness of the checkpoints. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. But those specific recommendations from the 

U of A study, I don’t know if you are familiar with them off the 

top of your head. But can you follow up on whether those specific— 

I mean, they put a lot of effort, taxpayer money into studying, as 

a follow-up from the 2009 GAO study—I think it was 2009—about, 

hey, how can we improve our understanding of the effectiveness of 

the checkpoint? 

So can you follow up with us on those specific recommendations, 

do you agree or disagree, and how many have been implemented 

or how many are in the process of being implemented? 

Chief MORGAN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. 

All right. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Duncan from South 

Carolina for a second round. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

I really don’t have another question. I just wanted to tell the 

chief, I apologize that there is not more active participation today. 

You know, we have OGR with Hillary Clinton’s emails, and there 

is just a lot going on on the Hill. I don’t want you to leave here 

going, ‘‘Golly, there was only two Members of Congress, and I had 

to answer all the Chairman’s questions,’’ and all that and think 

there is not interest in this topic, because I can assure you that 

there is. 

29 

You know, Mr. Hurd came briefly. Barletta is very interested in 

visa overstays. Of course, all the way around, with the former 

chairwoman and others, even on the Democrat side, there is interest in this issue. I think, at some point in time, having another 

hearing, having you come back would be awesome. 

But I just didn’t want you to leave here going, ‘‘There is not any 

interest in Congress about what I am doing.’’ There absolutely is. 

It is just the way things go on the Hill sometimes. Just know that 

folks from my State, the Palmetto State, South Carolina, are very 

interested in this. We don’t have a border. We have an international border I guess you fly in, but—anyway. 

Thank you very much. God bless. Godspeed. Thank you to you 

and your men, women that are serving this country in that capacity. I look forward to meeting with you again. I wouldn’t mind setting up something, you know, privately to just get to know you a 

little better, because we want to work going forward. 

Thanks, Chairman. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. Thank you. 

The gentleman yields back. 

This wraps up this portion of our hearing. 

Thanks, Chief, for your testimony. There are potentially some 

questions that are going to come out of the second panel that we 

need to follow up with you on. There may be other Members of the 

committee that have questions for you. So we would ask, when we 

submit those, if we could get those back in writing. Thanks for your 

testimony today. You are dismissed. 

The clerk will prepare the witnesses for the second panel. 

Thanks, Chief Morgan. 

I would like to thank the witnesses of our second panel today. 

I will first introduce them, and then we will start with the testimony. 

Mr. Gary Brasher, fifth-generation Arizonan, currently residing 

in Arizona’s Santa Cruz Valley. Throughout his career, Mr. 

Brasher has established many local businesses, including a fullservice brokerage company, a water and sewer company, a communications company, and a grocery store. Mr. Brasher is a past 

president of the Santa Cruz Valley Citizens Council, the Tubac 

Chamber of Commerce, and currently serves as the vice chair of 

the Green Valley Chamber of Commerce. 

Good to see you. 

Ms. Peggy Davis is a rancher and farmer from the Southern Border area of Arizona, where she has resided for over 40 years. She 

currently serves as a clerk for the Whitewater Draw Natural Resource Conservation District, which assists local farmers and 

ranchers with projects to keep them informed of the most current 

methods and technologies available to sustain their farms and 

ranches for future generations. In recent years, she has become active in bringing a greater awareness to issues in her community associated with border security and illegal immigration. 

Dr. Elyse Golob is the executive director of the National Center 

for Border Security and Immigration, or BORDERS, headquartered 

at the University of Arizona. Funded by the Department of Homeland Security, BORDERS provides crosscutting technology and 

basic research to enhance the Nation’s security. Dr. Golob’s experVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:04 Jun 23, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\114THCONGRESS\16BM0913\16BM0913.TXT HEATH
30 

tise includes cross-border trade, economic development, and border 

management policy. She is currently conducting a joint research 

initiative with Frontex, the European Union border security agency 

based in Warsaw, where she recently organized a 2-day workshop 

for European border guards on artificial intelligence for screening 

and decision support at border crossings. 

Mr. Christian Ramı ́rez is the director of the Southern Border 

Communities Coalition and also serves as the human rights director of Alliance San Diego. Since 1994, Mr. Ramı ́rez has been active 

on issues related to U.S. immigration policy and its impact on 

Southern Border communities. He has presented in international 

and National gatherings on the state of human rights on the U.S.- 

Mexico border. He is a Nationally-recognized spokesperson on immigration and border enforcement issues. 

The witnesses’ full written statements will appear in the record. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Brasher for 5 minutes to testify. 

STATEMENT OF GARY P. BRASHER, PRIVATE CITIZEN 

Mr. BRASHER. Thank you, Chairman McSally, Ranking Member 

Vela, and Members of the committee. My name is Gary Brasher. 

I won’t go into a lot of detail on my background simply because the 

Congresswoman has already touched on that briefly. My written 

testimony, of course, will be in the record, so I have offered the opportunity for you to look at it in detail. 

I have lived in the Santa Cruz Valley for 34 years now as a businessman. As the Chairman expressed, I have a variety of businesses down there. It gives me the opportunity to be in the community and to really listen to what people are saying, not just my own 

experiences but the experiences of others. 

I can tell you that the defense-in-depth strategy has had—and, 

just a moment ago, we heard the chief say it is a multi-layered approach to the defense of our border. It has also had a variety of layers of impact on our communities both south and north of that 

checkpoint. 

I can tell you that when the checkpoint is moved 25 miles north 

of the actual border or, as it was referred to earlier, the line of 

scrimmage is moved, it creates—instead of 261-mile border to defend—you can quickly see the math—it creates a 6,500-square-mile 

area that the chief and his officers have to now defend. That exponentially increases the manpower needed and the area that they 

have to defend, exponentially. 

It has created, unfortunately for those of us south of the checkpoint, what we call kind of a no-man’s-land, an area south of the 

fixed checkpoint but north of the actual border. Once individuals 

involved in bringing illegal immigrants or bringing illegal contraband into the United States, once they get across that actual border, they for the most part have a pretty free run within that 25- 

mile area. The unfortunate thing for those of us that live there is 

that that is where we live, that is where we work, that is where 

our children go to school. So that area that we call the no-man’sland is where we live every single day of our lives. 

As was pointed out earlier, without question, the flanking of that 

checkpoint takes place in the Santa Cruz Valley, without question. 

There are a number of routes, and I put a map on my testimony 

31 

so that you can look at these routes formally. But there is a gas 

line down that runs north and south to the Santa Cruz Valley 

around the checkpoint. There is a power line that runs north and 

south around the checkpoint. There is the Santa Cruz River, which 

provides a great deal of canopy and cover for anybody involved in 

illegal activity to circumvent the checkpoint, to get around it. 

Again, that is where our communities are, that is where our subdivisions are, that is where our businesses are, and people live in 

those areas. So this policy of actually putting people in direct contact with those who are involved in illegal activity is, frankly, 

mind-boggling to me. 

We have to deal with it every day. I have had people show up 

at my home. I live in a subdivision just west of the checkpoint, a 

little bit west of the gas line. I have had individuals show up at 

my front door who are bleeding all over, who have been shot. They 

were apparently in some kind of an altercation with rival gangs, 

trying to steal the drugs they were bringing across. 

I have talked to businessmen time after time about people who 

are just simply concerned about coming south of the checkpoint. In 

many cases—and I know this sounds—there might be some that 

are skeptical about this, but there are people who won’t come down 

to our particular area because they think they need a passport to 

get, ‘‘back into the United States.’’ 

Or they are afraid to go through the checkpoint simply because 

they are not used to that level of, I will use the term ‘‘militarization.’’ Someone from Wisconsin who comes down to the Tubac Golf 

Resort, as an example, to play golf or play in a golf tournament or 

have a luncheon or go to a convention, and they have to go back 

through the checkpoint, for the first time for most of them in their 

lives, they are exposed to drug-sniffing dogs, they are exposed to 

people with semiautomatic weapons strapped across their chests, 

they are exposed to maybe having to go to secondary and have 

their car looked at more carefully. So, when they are making a determination on where to go for an event, where to go for a conference, where to go even for a wedding, and they think about having to go back through that checkpoint, or their guests, many of 

them are just opting not to even come down. They are just going 

to stay north of the checkpoint at some point. 

I fully recognize what the chief said earlier. They have a tough 

job. I want to reiterate that the vast majority of people in the 

Santa Cruz Valley fully support our Border Patrol, fully support 

the tough job that they have to do. They have a very difficult job 

and one that carries with it a lot of risk. 

However, having said that, this multi-layered, multi-tiered 

checkpoint strategy has had tremendous negative impacts on those 

communities both north and south of the border. The staging that 

takes place once they get across the border, meaning staging up to 

decide how they are going to flank that particular facility, puts 

them in our communities on oftentimes a long-term basis, not minutes or hours but days. Then the activity of actually flanking the 

checkpoint puts them oftentimes in direct contact with those of us 

who do business or who live there—another risk. 

I don’t want to miss our friends to the north of the checkpoint, 

primarily in the communities of Green Valley and Sahuarita. They, 

32 

too, have an impact. When those involved in illegal activity flank 

the checkpoint, come around, then they reload in those communities. That is where they reengage with their rides going further 

north. That reconnecting puts people at risk. 

I know one hotelier in the Green Valley area, just as an example, 

who has lost tremendous amounts of business. Unfortunately, there 

is large wash directly behind his hotel that is one of these reconnection points. You can imagine, as people are sitting in their 

hotel room looking down, observing all of this activity going on, 

they have, again, just decided not to come to that particular facility. 

The high-speed chases that oftentimes are the result of Border 

Patrol trying to do their job, trying to catch those involved in illegal activity, circumventing the checkpoint. 

So, whether you are in the area south of the checkpoint, in the 

area where things are staged, whether you are in the area immediately surrounding the checkpoint, where those involved in illegal 

activity are flanking, or whether you are north of the checkpoint, 

where those that have gotten past the checkpoint then reconnect 

with their rides, it has created a tremendous number of consequences for those of us that live in that community. 

I had said earlier, or I said in my written testimony—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. If you could wrap it up. We are over time. 

Mr. BRASHER. Absolutely. I am sorry. 

Ms. MCSALLY. It is OK. 

Mr. BRASHER. With that said, I will just simply say that I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and to speak with you. The 

impacts, whether intended or not, are very real for those of us that 

live in the area. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brasher follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GARY P. BRASHER

SEPTEMBER 13, 2016 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the committee, my 

name is Gary Brasher and I am the regional president and associate broker with 

Russ Lyon/Sotheby’s International Realty in Tubac, Arizona. I am also the president 

and part owner of several other businesses serving Santa Cruz County including a 

water company, a grocery store, a communications company providing internet and 

cable services, and a recreational facility. In short, I am a private businessman who 

has lived and served in the community for over 34 years. 

By way of background, I am a 5th generation native Arizonan married to my wife, 

Tracey, and together we have 4 children and 6 grandchildren, all of whom live in 

the Santa Cruz Valley. Prior to my real estate career, I worked for the Federal Bureau of Investigation in both the Denver and Phoenix field offices. 

After leaving the Bureau, I moved to the Santa Cruz Valley in 1983 and began 

my business career. During my 34 years in the Valley I have served as president 

of the Tubac Chamber of Commerce, president of the Santa Cruz Valley Citizens 

Council, and am currently serving as vice-chair of the Green Valley Chamber of 

Commerce, a position I have held for the last 7 years. I was appointed by the Governor and am serving as co-chair of the Arizona Mexico Commission Real Estate 

Committee for 12 years, as well as serving on the Groundwater Users Advisory 

Board for Santa Cruz County for the last 6 years. I was also on Congresswoman 

Gifford’s Checkpoint Study group that was established years ago to work with the 

Border Patrol (BP) on the very issues I am testifying on today. 

I share this background only to highlight several things: My family’s roots run 

deep in Arizona, the State I love. My history in the Santa Cruz Valley has been 

33 

in large part formed by community service, working with partners on both sides of 

the border to generate trade and good working relationships. Finally, I want to underscore that I’m certainly in favor of strong law enforcement. 

Over the years my partners and I have invested significantly in building homes, 

developing lots, and serving a variety of community needs through our businesses. 

Having a safe, pro-business/tourism environment is critical to our communities in 

the Santa Cruz Valley. Towards that end, I’m grateful for the opportunity to share 

this testimony with this distinguished committee. 

Having lived, worked, and been involved in the community for over 3 decades I 

have had the opportunity to observe the ‘‘defense-in-depth’’ strategy promoted by the 

Border Patrol leadership on a first-hand basis. I want to say at the outset that I 

recognize the BP has a very difficult job and one that includes many risk factors. 

In short, they have a tough job! I know I speak for our entire region when I say 

that we collectively appreciate what the BP does and, for the most part, the manner 

in which they do it. 

That said however, there are a number of areas where I know the BP strategies 

have had significant negative impacts on the communities they serve. Perhaps these 

strategies simply have unintended consequences. However, unintended or not, the 

consequences of the defense-in-depth strategy to those of us who live and work in 

the region is significant. 

DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH THE CHECKPOINT STRATEGY

The Arizona Tucson Sector has approximately 261 linear miles of border with 

Mexico which the BP has indicated cannot be secured. Their response to the purported impossibility of defending this 261-mile line is the ‘‘defense-in-depth’’ strategy. I have spoken to BP personnel on many occasions and this strategy has been 

communicated to me using the following ‘‘football’’ analogy. 

The defense-in-depth checkpoint strategy is a three-tier defense strategy. Using 

their football analogy this strategy involves BP placing resources: (a) At the border 

(front defensive line), (b) near the border patrolling the area in mobile units (linebackers), and (c) at permanent or mobile checkpoints (defensive backs). BP leadership has indicated this approach gives them the best opportunity for success. 

To respond to this analogy and from my personal experience as a defensive back 

for the 1976 Big Eight Champion Colorado Buffalo football team, the defense-indepth strategy is like asking your defensive backs to stand in one location with their 

arms stretched out and hope the offense will run right into them. When I asked my 

former coach and former head coach for the Minnesota Vikings for his thoughts regarding this strategy, he said, ‘‘An NFL coach would not last a week in the league 

implementing an approach like this.’’ 

In the initial portions of this testimony, I will discuss the ramifications of the defense-in-depth strategy from my personal observations, as well as from listening to 

the experiences of others who live and work in the communities south of the checkpoint. In my final portion, I will address some of the current approaches which the 

BP is undertaking with positive results. If expanded, I believe these approaches and 

strategies will better secure our border by placing more resources at the border. 

RAMIFICATIONS OF THE DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH STRATEGY STAGING, FLANKING, AND RELOADING

The defense-in-depth strategy is essentially a moving or relocation of the border 

to a checkpoint 25 miles north of the actual border with Mexico. This new ‘‘line of 

scrimmage’’ increases the area the Tucson Sector BP must defend from the 261 linear miles of actual border with Mexico to over 6,500 square miles. You can clearly 

see the challenge this creates by expanding or moving the ‘‘line of scrimmage.’’ For 

every mile of movement north, it exponentially increases the affected area. (25 miles 

to the checkpoint×261 miles of border=6,525 square miles of territory to secure). 

When checkpoints are established such a great distance from the actual border, 

it creates a ‘‘no-man’s land’’ between the real border and the checkpoint. In other 

words, those involved in illegal activities making it across the real border are now 

in the United States with relative freedom and time to ‘‘stage’’ their next move, 

which is taking the illegal contraband and/or drugs around the checkpoints. By 

flanking the checkpoints they are able to move their contraband to points further 

north. Unfortunately this ‘‘no-man’s’’ land is where we live and work and our children go to school. 

If you look at Exhibit A in your packet you will clearly see there are a number 

of paths around the Interstate–19 (I–19) checkpoint, along with many more that are 

not so obvious. The clear routes around the checkpoint are the railroad tracks, the 

Santa Cruz River, the power line and the El Paso Natural Gas line. These routes 

34 

all provide an opportunity for those involved in illegal activities to move north and 

stay off the major transportation corridor, I–19. 

The less obvious routes used to circumvent the checkpoint are the numerous back 

roads, ranch roads, paths, and trails through the Coronado National Forest and surrounding Bureau of Land Management and private lands. The ‘‘flanking’’ activity 

takes place in the communities between the border and checkpoint—the ‘‘no-man’s 

land’’ that I referred to earlier. 

Unfortunately the areas used to flank the checkpoint are also the very communities, developments, and subdivisions where our residents live and work. In these 

areas, because of the flanking activity, we have experienced too many instances of 

shootings, high-speed chases, and school lockdowns. Sadly, this is an intentional 

outcome of the checkpoint strategy. 

Several years ago, Chief Gilbert, sector chief for the Tucson Sector, indicated at 

a public meeting that part of the strategy of the checkpoints was to ‘‘force’’ those 

involved in illegal activities into the surrounding areas where they would be easier 

to catch. 

In fact, GAO (2005) confirmed the BP strategy of pushing illegal activity around 

the checkpoint. 

‘‘The Border Patrol uses interior traffic checkpoints as a third layer of defense and 

deterrence against potential terrorists and their weapons, contraband smugglers, 

and persons who have entered the country illegally. 

‘‘According to Border Patrol, permanent and tactical checkpoints are part of an integrated, multi-layered enforcement strategy intended to achieve two key law enforcement objectives: 

1. to increase the likelihood of detection and apprehension of illegal entrants of 

all types and thereby to deter other potential illegal entrants from attempting 

to enter the country, who might otherwise believe that successfully crossing the 

border would mean that there were no further barriers to them and 

2. to deter illegal entrants from transiting through permanent checkpoints on 

major roadways, through fear of detection and thereby to cause them to use less 

traveled secondary roads on which the Border Patrol is able to stop all or almost all vehicles making illegal entrants more visible and easier to detect and 

apprehend.’’ (pp. 15–16) 

These ‘‘secondary roads’’ and other areas are where we live and work! This places 

civilians in the direct path of smugglers and the law enforcement agencies pursuing 

them! 

I have to say, I have never experienced a law enforcement strategy which purposely puts people involved in illegal activity in direct contact with law-abiding citizens and actually calls such an action ‘‘a cogent strategy.’’ 

I can testify first-hand to the consequences of the flanking activity by drug cartels 

using these secondary roads and trails to move their contraband. 

• I have had individuals, who were shot by rival gangs as they moved drugs north 

through my neighborhood, show up at my front door seeking medical attention. 

• I have found a dead body in this area—that of an individual who was shot in 

a deal that apparently went bad while trying to ‘‘stage up’’ before moving drugs 

around the checkpoint. 

• When our daughters were growing up, I frequently experienced that knot you 

get in your stomach as a parent when your children are coming home late at 

night, alone in their vehicles. That’s because I learned that late night is when 

many of the cartels come alive and start their flanking activities. For me, it got 

to the point where I told our daughters that I would meet them, no matter the 

time, off the freeway interchange near our residence and have them follow me 

home to insure their safety. 

Areas north of the checkpoint are also placed at risk because of the defense-indepth checkpoint strategy. These are the areas where the ‘‘re-loading’’ takes place, 

the process by which the smugglers ‘‘re-connect’’ with their rides to continue their 

travel north of the checkpoint once they have successfully flanked it. 

Being the vice-chair of the Green Valley Chamber for over 7 years has given me 

a new appreciation for and insight into the tremendous challenges faced by our 

neighbors north of the checkpoint. Businesses and homeowners in these northern 

areas have reported ‘‘high speed chases’’ in their neighborhoods when BP tries to 

interdict the flanking and re-loading activity. 

I know of one hotel owner in Green Valley whose property borders a wash that 

has become a major pick-up point north of the checkpoint. He reports a loss of business because his clients state they don’t want to stay in an area so near to drug 

activity. 

35 

In another instance, a high speed chase resulted in the pursued vehicle steering 

off the road to avoid arrest and eventually driving right into the bedroom wall of 

a home. Had the vehicle crashed into this home a foot or so differently, it would 

have surely hit the residents who were in their bedroom asleep at the time. 

These personal stories and experiences are told by others in the community and 

are also documented in several in-depth examinations of the effectiveness and impacts of the BP’s defense-in-depth checkpoint strategy, a strategy that calls for moving or re-locating the border 25 or so miles from the actual border by using fixed 

checkpoints like the one on I–19. 

Residents of the communities affected feel this strategy underestimates the intelligence of the enemy we are fighting. The assumption that these criminals will not 

circumvent fixed checkpoints and traverse through our neighborhoods, ranches, 

communities, and public lands is not based in reality. 

GOVERNMENT STUDIES QUESTION CHECKPOINT EFFECTIVNESS

GAO continues to report concerns over Border Patrol’s lack of sufficient data resulting in its inability to examine the effectiveness of its defense-in-depth checkpoint 

strategy (GAO, 2009; GAO, 2012). 

In 2009, GAO reported that Border Patrol was proceeding with checkpoint construction without adequate information on the effectiveness of checkpoints and its 

adverse impacts on the public safety and quality of life for Southern Arizonans. 

GAO found that there were ‘‘information gaps and reporting issues’’ because of insufficient data. Thus, the agency was unable to compare the cost-effectiveness of 

checkpoints to other strategies. Further, it reported that Border Patrol had misrepresented its checkpoint performance. 

Again in 2012, GAO reported that because of data limitations the Border Patrol 

was unable to compare the effectiveness of how resources are deployed among sectors. Each sector collects and reports the data differently thus precluding comparison. Policy makers and Border Patrol leadership are unable to effectively assess the 

effectiveness of tactics such as checkpoints and yet Border Patrol continues to call 

checkpoints critical to their defense-in-depth strategy. 

In spite of concerns for the comparability of the data among strategies or sectors, 

GAO (2009) reported specific data for the I–19 checkpoint. 

• ‘‘94% of all apprehensions of illegal immigrants in the vicinity of the I–19 checkpoint occurred in the areas surrounding the checkpoint, while only 6% took 

place at the checkpoint itself.’’ 

These statistics make it clear the checkpoint is driving criminal activities into the 

area surrounding the checkpoint. 

IMPACTS ON REAL ESTATE VALUES AND BUSINESS

In September 2014, the Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy at the University of Arizona, working on behalf of the National Center for Border Security and 

Immigration, published its study on the impacts of the I–19 checkpoint on the surrounding communities. They found the I–19 checkpoint is having a significant impact on the property values of the community surrounding the I–19 facility. 

Researchers reported: ‘‘After the checkpoint canopy was installed property values 

in Tubac/Rio Rico decreased approximately $2,769 per 3-month period or $11,076 

per year’’ (p. 31) when compared to the values of properties north of the checkpoint 

over the same time period. 

Given that the checkpoint was operational in 2008 and this report was completed 

in 2014, you can see the significant effect this annual reduction in Tubac/Rio Rico 

property values has had and frankly continues to have to this very day. 

Tourism is a major economic driver in Arizona. The Arizona Office of Tourism reports that tourism spending generates $3.6 billion in economic activity annually and 

employs over 30,000 individuals in southern Arizona alone. 

Tubac, a rural community 20 miles from the border and only about 3 miles south 

of the I–19 checkpoint, has been a major tourist destination due to its abundant historical, cultural, artistic and recreational resources. However, we know of many visitors and potential residents who have cancelled vacations or real estate purchases 

due to concerns about the permanent checkpoint. 

There are literally hundreds of personal stories about individuals who were thinking about coming to Tubac for everything from a simple dinner to a wedding or convention, yet decided to go elsewhere because they didn’t want to experience the 

‘‘militarized’’ checkpoint. For them, it’s the daunting thought of returning home from 

Tubac only to be stopped 3 miles north on the major inter-State highway at a Department of Homeland Security checkpoint. The driver and others in the car are 

asked by a uniformed officer if they are U.S. citizens while drug-sniffing dogs smell 

36 

the exterior of the vehicle as it moves along. On the right, suspicious vehicles are 

dismantled and searched while the driver and occupants watch while they are detained nearby. 

As the former president of the Tubac Chamber of Commerce I can attest to the 

number of phone calls the Chamber has received over the years asking everything 

from, ‘‘Is it safe in Tubac?’’ to, ‘‘Will I need to bring my passport to get back in the 

United States?′′ 

Some of the concerns expressed by those wishing to visit the area are so subtle. 

Just recently I came to learn about a young woman who had recently had a small 

child. The young woman’s mother invited her to have lunch with her at the Tubac 

Golf Resort, located about 2 miles south of the checkpoint. 

The daughter joined her for lunch, but was worried sick about what was going 

to happen when she went back through the checkpoint. She didn’t know if she 

should bring her child’s birth certificate or if she was going to have to prove citizenship some other way? I understand stories such as this might be met with skepticism by some, but my point is that the impacts on our community in some cases 

are tangible and statistical and easy to see, while others are subtle and insidious 

and not nearly so obvious, but just as harmful to the overall economy of the area. 

In addition to the clear negative impacts of the checkpoints on tourism, property 

values, business, and overall commerce in the area, the flanking and circumventing 

of the checkpoints also impact significantly on our farming and ranching communities as well as our public lands. The defense-in-depth strategy has caused considerable interruption for ranching and farming operations, including: 

• Ranch fences are cut 

• High-speed chases occur across private land as BP tries to apprehend individuals going around the checkpoints 

• Livestock are buzzed by low-flying helicopters operated by the BP. 

Furthermore, many of our National Forest and BLM areas are speckled with 

signs that read, ‘‘Drug smuggling activity in the area. Please use caution.’’ Can you 

imagine the impact this sign would have on a group who may wish to come to the 

area to enjoy some of our most treasured natural, open spaces such as Madera Canyon or Patagonia State Park? Or, imagine a Boy or Girl Scout troop who wants to 

come to the area for an outing. What scout leader in their right mind would take 

a group of young people into an area posted with signs such as this? 

I’d like to make a final personal observation on this matter. As just one voice in 

a crowd of voices on this topic and one who is proud of our country and all for which 

it stands, I believe one of the greatest threats we face as a Nation, if not THE greatest threat, is the accumulating debt the United States incurs each year and the interest being calculated on this debt. With our National debt clock nearing $18 trillion and rising at an unprecedented pace, it seems we are way past the time to look 

carefully at every dollar spent and every resource expended in order to make sure 

we are getting the greatest gain for our dollars. 

I can think of few greater goals than protecting our Nation’s borders. However, 

I don’t believe any agency is above having to sharpen their pencils and make sure 

we as a Nation are getting the greatest benefit for the money with which they are 

entrusted. 

From reading the various GAO reports referenced in this testimony, it appears 

the BP has not been held to the same standard that any family or business in this 

country has to face every day. Do the number of personnel, vehicles, technology, and 

other resources being spent at the I–19 Checkpoint justify the results? With only 

6% of all interdictions of those who enter the country for an illegal purpose being 

caught at the checkpoint, speaking as one citizen, I believe it is time to ‘‘redeploy’’ 

resources and compress our interdiction efforts as close to the border, if not at the 

border. In a word, I believe it is time to move the ‘‘line of scrimmage’’ back to our 

border with Mexico. 

POTENTIALLY PROMISING BP STRATEGIES

I believe the foregoing begs the question, ‘‘What can be done to better secure our 

border while making the best use of our resources?’’ 

It seems the BP has seen positive results by utilizing a variety of different enforcement tactics at the actual border. Though skeptics may question claims of success given BP’s track-record on data collection, I and others in our communities believe these strategies hold significant promise and can be expanded throughout the 

Sector. Further to this point, these tactics have the potential for a much less negative impact on our communities than the current three-tier strategy. 

Components of these tactics include, but are not limited to, utilizing: 

37 

1. Areal drones for observation and communication with enforcement officers on 

the ground. 

2. Vehicle barriers at the border to block likely paths utilized by smugglers with 

all-terrain vehicles crossing the border. 

3. Roving and/or non-permanent checkpoints at pre-determined locations. 

4. Forward Operating Bases (FOBs)—continuing the use of FOBs for those 

areas of the border that are particularly rough or possess difficult terrain. 

5. Enhanced communications—enabling agencies (Sheriff’s Office, ICE, BP, and 

police) to share intelligence AND communicate with one another in the field 

using the same radio frequency. 

6. Enhanced infrared technology at the border including the use of virtual fencing. 

In other words, I urge you to take the resources devoted to the ‘‘stationary,’’ thirdtier checkpoint that accounts for only 6% of all apprehensions, and devote them toward building a stronger, more robust, more ‘‘mobile’’ second-tier in which 94% of 

all apprehensions occur. Eventually, with success and compression of efforts toward 

creating a defendable single-tier strategy, we can once again stand confident in our 

ability to secure our borders at the border. 

SUMMARY

Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to briefly share with 

you today my thoughts, observations, and experiences regarding the defense-indepth strategy. As I shared at the outset, I am a supporter of the BP. Having a 

law enforcement background, myself, and coming from a military family (my father 

retired as Major General) I understand the need for strategy and policy. However, 

as a private businessman I also understand the need to be open to new ideas, to 

remain fluid, and to remain aware of your competition or, in this case, our country’s 

enemies, whether they are terrorists trying to enter the United States or those who 

continue to erode our culture and society with drugs. 

We are united in our collective goals to provide a safe environment for ourselves, 

our families, our employees, and our fellow citizens. We can disagree on policy and 

approach, but at the end of the day we all want a safer and more secure border 

and a better America. It is from that perspective that I offer this testimony. Again, 

thank you for allowing me to appear here today. 

SOURCES

J. Jenkins, J. Proudfoot, J. Marquardson, J. Gans, E. Golob, and J. Nunamaker. 

(September, 2014). Checking on checkpoints: An assessment of U.S. Border Patrol 

checkpoint operations, performance, and impacts. National Center for Border Security and Immigration (BORDERS): University of Arizona. 

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), (July, 2005). Border Patrol: Available 

data on interior checkpoints suggest differences in sector performance. Report to Congressional Requestors, GAO–05–435. 

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), (August, 2009). Border Patrol: Checkpoints to contribute toward Border Patrol’s mission, but more consistent data collection and performance measurement could improve effectiveness. Report to Congressional Requestors, GAO–09–824. 

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), (December, 2012). Key elements of 

new strategic plan not yet in place to inform border security status and resource 

needs. Report to Congressional Requestors, GAO–13–25. 

38 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks, Mr. Brasher. We will get more in 

the discussion, but thanks for the testimony. 

The Chair now recognizes Ms. Davis for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF PEGGY DAVIS, PRIVATE CITIZEN 

Ms. DAVIS. Yes, Chairman McSally, Members of the committee, 

I thank you for the opportunity today. 

Border checkpoints are not always staffed, and they are not always open. If the resources used to staff them were directly at the 

border, then they would interdict illegal activity before it actually 

reaches the interior. 


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Our ranch is 25 miles north, and our family has been in Cochise 

County since 1867. We have always had some illegals, but in 1986 

we saw hordes of them and a change in their attitude. They began 

to be destructive. They cut fences, drained waterlines, killed animals, robbed homes, stole vehicles, trampled grass, and left tons of 

trash. 

In the trash, we have found plastic, backpacks, blankets, diapers, 

hypodermic needles, medicines, human waste, and pregnancy tests. 

Trash from Mexico is hazardous to us and has killed cows because 

they eat blankets and plastic bags. By 1995, the trash was out of 

control, so the county hauled away 16 dumptruck loads just from 

a small area on our ranch. That is just one example. 

Environmental damage is extensive on the border. Illegals came 

through by the millions. They trampled grazing land, destroyed foliage, drained millions of gallons of water used by wildlife. The 

damage has changed the landscape. Footpaths caused soil erosion 

when the rains came. Wildlife waters were destroyed because of 

human waste. 

The Tucson sector chief at the time, David Aguilar, was the architect of the defense-in-depth strategy. In 2000, he actually came 

to our home and explained that Operation Hold the Line in El Paso 

focused on intercepting and preventing illegal entries at the border, 

and Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego proved to be very effective. 

This forced the illegal activity into the rural areas of Arizona. The 

plan was designed to secure the cities, where they have seconds or 

minutes to catch illegals, but instead of putting agents near the 

border in the rural areas, they would be deployed 25 miles or more 

north of the border to allow hours or days to catch them. 

If the El Paso plan worked so well, then why doesn’t the Border 

Patrol do the same thing in the rural areas, I ask. Residents along 

the border have begged for agents to be on the border for over 15 

years. Even though the success of Hold the Line and Gatekeeper 

were due to stopping the flow of illegal traffic directly at the border, we have been told that it would not work or that it was too 

dangerous. If the border is too dangerous for agents, then why is 

it not too dangerous for residents? 

Chief Aguilar made the following statement to the Arizona Republic: ‘‘The border it not a defined line but a corridor between the 

U.S. and Mexico.’’ This corridor is at least 30 miles inside the interior. How can a Government official state that the border is not a 

boundary? 

We hear repeatedly that agents are on the border, but when Border Patrol refers to agents on the border, they are actually referring to the 30-plus-mile corridor instead of the international boundary. 

In 2010, our friend Robert Krentz was murdered on his own 

property 30 miles north of the border. Rob stopped to help an illegal pretending to be injured. As he stopped, the man shot him. 

The checkpoint nearest to me is 15 miles north and is open only 

if weather permits. Another is rarely open. Being the checkpoints 

cannot be manned 24/7, those agents should be deployed very close 

to the border instead. 

John Ladd’s ranch is on the border with 10 miles of 13-foot metal 

wall fencing and $42 million of government infrastructure. Drug 

40 

cartels frequently cut the fence and drive their loads 3 miles north 

to the nearest highway; then they drive back through the opening 

in the fence. Sometimes they even weld it back in place. In a 26- 

month time period, 54 trucks have accomplished this task and only 

1 was caught. 

The Brian Terry station was only 4 miles away. Brian Terry was 

also inside Aguilar’s corridor when he was killed. Cartel scouts 

camp on mountains within Aguilar’s corridor and report Border Patrol activities to the drug cartel. 

The San Pedro River runs out of Mexico into the United States, 

and across the river is a 3-mile strand barbed wire fence. Occasionally, one agent is watching this quarter-mile area. For 3 to 4 

months in the summer, floodgates are raised in the border fence to 

allow floodwater out of Mexico into the U.S. Border Patrol covers 

the holes in the fence with just three strands of barbed wire, and 

anyone can walk in. 

Signs, such as this one, are not uncommon in the corridor. I am 

aghast that our border is so poorly protected that these signs are 

necessary. 

Diversionary fires in Aguilar’s corridor have been set by drug 

runners. They have destroyed hundreds of thousands of acres of 

forest, grassland, wildlife, and homes. Also, land values have 

dropped to about half of their previous value. 

In closing, checkpoints would not be necessary if the Agents were 

on the border. I have additional comments and examples in my 

written record. I thank you for your time. 

I just want to say that I do respect the Border Patrol and the 

daunting task that they have on a daily basis. I just think that it 

is time to move on and change the strategy. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Davis follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PEGGY DAVIS

SEPTEMBER 13, 2016 

Since 1924 the men and women of the U.S. Border Patrol have been asked to protect the United States border from all enemies, foreign and domestic. This is the 

first line of the Holding the Line in the 21st Century USBP handbook. While I realize it is a stretch to say that illegal traffic from south of the border are enemies, 

my argument remains that these people are no less than invaders. My statement 

is, and always will be that if you enter this country illegally, your very first act is 

an unlawful one. By breaking the first law of the land, how would we expect these 

people to respect any other law in America? Many of them don’t. 

The Border Patrol checkpoints, while they probably catch some illegal drugs are 

not always staffed and are not always open. If the resources used to staff the checkpoints were directly AT the international boundary it stands to reason that they 

would deter or interdict the drugs before they actually get into the interior. 

Our family ranch is 12 miles southeast of Tombstone, Arizona and lies 25 miles 

north of the Mexican border. My husband’s family has been in Cochise County, Arizona since 1867. For many years we lived peaceably with people from Mexico who 

traveled through from time to time. We had a mutual respect for each other and 

showed compassion when either of us needed help. However, after 1986 we began 

to see a significant change in the attitudes of the people illegally coming north. They 

began to be disrespectful of our property and sometimes confrontational. They cut 

fences, drained water tanks, killed animals, robbed our home, slept in our barn, 

stole a vehicle, trampled the grass for our cattle, and left literally tons of trash. In 

this trash we find plastic bottles, backpacks, plastic bags, blankets, clothing, diapers, feminine hygiene products, cell phone chargers, rotting food, hypodermic needles, medicines, human waste, and pregnancy tests. Abandoned cars and van seats 

41 

are regularly left in pastures or along the roads. There has been every gender and 

age that crossed through our property. Picking up this trash was a health hazard 

for us and ingesting it is not healthy for our livestock. More than once we have 

found dead cows because they tried to eat plastic bags or acrylic blankets. When 

cattle try to eat these things, they can’t digest them so they die a long and miserable death. 


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42 

In 1995 the trash left by illegal aliens in southern Arizona was out of control. At 

our ranch alone we have a draw that was a major path that they took on their way 

north. Because it was a low place that wasn’t easily seen, illegal aliens used it as 

their trash dumpster. Cochise County sent some at-risk kids to pick up trash. They 

hauled away 16 dump truck loads in one session. Every other rancher has a similar 

story to tell. Keep in mind that our ranch is 25 miles north of the international 

boundary. The trash left behind is a health hazard for everyone, not just our cattle. 

My family has personally picked up countless truck loads, not knowing what kind 

of health hazards we might face. 

Because of the volume of illegal traffic across our property from 1986 to the 

present, the environmental damage in the borderlands has been extensive. Illegal 

crossers came through southern Arizona by the millions. In their wake they trampled valuable grazing land, destroyed fragile foliage and cacti, drained tens of thousands of gallons of stock water used by wildlife, cut fences and left tons of trash. 

The damage left behind has changed the landscape in many places. Foot paths 

caused soil erosion when the rains came in the summer. Some of the water holes 

for wildlife were left unusable because of human waste. 

In 2000 David Aguilar, then Tucson Sector Chief and who later served as the U.S. 

Chief of the Border Patrol from 2004–2010, had reached out to the ranchers in our 

area who had been experiencing daily illegal traffic and vandalism for several years. 

He brought with him two of his superiors from the San Diego Sector to our home. 

They explained that Operation Hold the Line in El Paso in 1993, which focused on 

intercepting and preventing illegal entries at the border, and Operation Gatekeeper 

in San Diego proved to be very effective in curtailing the flow into their areas. This 

forced the illegal activity by alien crossers into the rural areas of Arizona. Chief 

Aguilar was the architect of the Holding the Line Strategic Handbook which outlines the Defense-in-Depth Strategy. The Chief explained that the plan is designed 

to secure the cities, which are the most populated areas. In the cities they only have 

seconds or minutes to catch illegals before they disappear into society. This forces 

illegal traffic into the rural areas. However, instead of putting agents near the international boundary in the rural areas, they would be deployed 25 plus miles north 

of the border to allow hours or days to catch those who crossed the border illegally! 

I distinctly remember Chief Aguilar asking me what I thought about this plan. I 

replied that I thought it was the dumbest idea I had ever heard. I shared my 

thoughts with him about how nonsensical it was to allow aliens to get well inside 

of the actual border instead of catching them right at the boundary line like they 

had been doing in El Paso. I asked, if the El Paso plan worked so well, then why 

doesn’t the Border Patrol do the same thing in the rural areas? I received no answer. Time has proven that aliens will go anywhere they need to go to avoid detection. This failed strategy has forced illegal aliens into the rural areas of Arizona 

where ranchers and other rural residents have become the first line of defense because the majority of the Border Patrol agents are north of where we live! Ranchers 

and residents along the border have begged for agents on the border for over 15 

years. Even though the success of Hold the Line and Gatekeeper were largely due 

to stopping the flow of illegal traffic directly at the border, we have been told repeatedly for the last 15 years that ‘‘it would not work’’. Later in 2011, Border Patrol 

Council President T.J. Bonner admitted to several ranchers on a Congressional conference call that the council did not want Agents to patrol at the border because 

it was too dangerous. I submit to Congress that if the border is too dangerous for 

agents, then why is it not too dangerous for residents? We have become sacrificial 

lambs. 

43 

In 2010, Chief Aguilar made the following statement to the Arizona Republic 

newspaper: The border is not a defined line, but a corridor between the United 

States and Mexico. This ‘‘corridor’’ Chief Aguilar eludes to is 30 to 100 miles inside 

the interior of the United States. How can a Government official have the audacity 

to state that the border is not a boundary? We hear repeatedly that agents ARE 

on the border, when we know that isn’t a fact. When Border Patrol refers to agents 

on the border, they are actually referring to the 25–30 mile ‘‘corridor’’ instead of the 

actual international boundary. I maintain that Mexico definitely has a boundary 

and their immigration laws are tougher than ours. 

In 2010, our good friend, Rob Krentz was murdered on his own property 30 miles 

north of the border. Rob was a humanitarian and stopped to render aid to an illegal 

that was pretending to be injured. As he stopped to try to help, the man shot him 

and his dog. Evidence showed that the man was an illegal drug runner who had 

robbed at least two nearby residents on his way south. At one place he stole a gun, 

which he used to shoot Rob. Further on, he stole food. The food wrappers were found 

at the murder location. The day of Rob’s murder there were no Border Patrol Agents 

nearby. It took the Sheriff’s department over 12 hours to find his body. 

My personal opinion is that rural residents are expendable to those in power. We 

aren’t many votes and our land and livelihoods are not important to most of the 

population. Keeping the cities and highways patrolled allows for the majority of the 

population to feel safe, thus securing more votes. 

Border Patrol checkpoints, while they may catch some illegal drugs are not very 

valuable as a deterrent tool. For example, the checkpoint which is nearest to me 

is about 15 miles north. At this checkpoint there are no less than 10 Border Patrol 

vehicles on any given day parked there. There are usually two or three agents stopping cars and sometimes there is also a drug dog. The checkpoint is open only if 

weather permits! If there are high winds or rain, the checkpoint is immediately 

closed. Drug traffickers only need to look at the weather report to determine if it 

is safe to avoid detection. 

On Highway 191 30 miles north of Douglas there is a checkpoint which is rarely 

open, even when the weather is good. We travel through this a few times per week, 

and we estimate that it is open less than 25% of the time. We are told that they 

are understaffed. In order for checkpoints to do any good, they must remain open 

24/7, and they shouldn’t close because of inclement weather. When we asked about 

why they close when it is rainy or windy, we were told it was because it was a danger to the Agents. I fail to see how. In short, perhaps if the checkpoints cannot be 


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manned 24/7, those Agents should be deployed at the border instead of having 

checkpoints. 

That being said, there is NOT a checkpoint at all on Highway 80 traveling north 

of Douglas, Arizona through the San Bernardino Valley; a remote area of southern 

Arizona which is the main drug trafficking route out of Sonora, Mexico. This is also 

the area where the Krentz Ranch is located and where Rob was murdered. Residents in this area are vandalized and threatened on a regular basis. There are very 

few agents on the international boundary stopping illegal crossers from entering, so 

they have a free ride into the interior. After they drop their load, they rob and vandalize on their way back south. One homeowner near Portal had been robbed over 

100 times. At this point their home had lost so much value that they couldn’t sell 

it. They had to walk away and abandon it. In addition, drug traffickers on their way 

back south after they have dropped their load are told to rob as many residents as 

they can. With the majority of the agents north of them, they are free to do whatever they want on their way back across the border. We are told that they are 

threatened by the drug cartel that if they fail to steal as much money and firearms 

as they can, members of their families will be killed. This makes them very desperate, which was probably the case with the man who murdered Rob Krentz. 

The large checkpoint station on Interstate 19 from Nogales to Tucson is a sore 

subject for those people living nearby. There is a lot of traffic out of Nogales. Drug 

runners know that they will be stopped there, and it forces them into the outlying 

areas. I know people who live there and sometimes they find cartel members sitting 

in their yard furniture waiting for a ride. 

My son was robbed by drug traffickers who were on their way back south to cross 

back into Mexico. They took nearly everything he owned. They even pried up the 

boards on the floor of the house. After eating all of his food, they used his electric 

clippers, shaved their hair and left the hair in the entry way as a calling card. 

There were no agents nearby. The County Sheriff said that the hair that was left 

was sort of a message that they could come and go as they please, and to try to 

stop them would mean consequences. 

My husband found a dead body on our ranch in July 2012. The Sheriff’s Department determined that it was the body of a drug runner. The man had on brand new 

Nike shoes and new clothes. His wallet contained a Bally’s Fitness card. The cause 

of death could not be determined, but his backpack was empty. It is possible that 

he was not traveling alone and his companion took the drugs and/or money and left 

him for dead. All of my rancher friends have found one or more dead bodies on their 

property. Allowing them to come into Arizona instead of stopping them at the international boundary has created a humanitarian crisis for them. If they knew they 

couldn’t cross illegally, then they wouldn’t put their lives at risk. 

In January of 2001, my husband and I were out of the State, so our daughter 

came home from Tucson where she attended college at the University of Arizona, 

to check on our home and to feed our horses. It was snowing so she fed in a hurry 

and went back to our house. In a few minutes our dogs began to bark violently and 

she looked out the window to see what they were barking at. A man was standing 

in the front yard. He was wearing a nice leather bomber jacket and he yelled at 

her in English to open the door. Instead she cracked the window to ask him what 

he wanted. He replied that he and his friend, who he said was crippled, wanted a 

ride to town. She said that she couldn’t give him a ride which made him angry. He 

said that his friend wanted to confront her when she was feeding the horses, but 

he wanted to wait to make sure she was alone first. This statement made her very 

nervous, so she said that she was not alone, but that her Dad was on another part 

of the ranch and was on his way home. At this point she told him that she could 

call the Border Patrol and he got even angrier. He began waving one arm and 

yelling at her, saying ‘‘a Mexican would help me’’. She picked up the phone to call 

for help and he left. She made three phone calls. The first one was to the Border 

Patrol who said they couldn’t be there for about 45 minutes. Next she called the 

Sheriff’s Department and she also called a friend who lived about 15 miles away. 

It was the friend who arrived first. The Sheriff’s deputy arrived next, and the last 

to show up was the Border Patrol. After the Sheriff’s deputy arrived, they concluded 

in their search of the outlying buildings on the ranch that a knife was missing from 

a butcher block. My daughter had noticed that the man wouldn’t use but one arm 

while talking to her. The other hand he kept behind his back. We can only conclude 

that this man meant to do her harm when he got her alone. Obviously, both men 

got away. My daughter attended college with many people from the Middle East. 

Based on his statement that ‘‘a Mexican would help me,’’ and his appearance and 

accent, she concluded that he was not Mexican but from a Middle Eastern country. 

John Ladd’s ranch is on the Mexican border. He has 101⁄2 miles of border fence. 

On his ranch, the U.S. Government built a 13-foot metal wall with $42 million of 

45 

infrastructure complete with cameras, lights, and sensors. Between April 2012 and 

August 2014, 54 times drug cartel members cut the fence with a saw or a torch, 

lay down the fencing, drove their drug load 3 miles north to highway 92 and drove 

back through the opening in the fence unmolested. If they had ample time, sometimes they would even weld it back in place. Only one was caught, and that was 

because the drug runner hit an embankment and deployed his air bag. It is important to note that the Brian Terry Border Patrol Station was only 4 miles away. If 

Agents were on the international boundary instead of 25 to 100 miles north these 

incidents would not have happened. Over the years, the Ladd Ranch estimates over 

half a million people have crossed his land. On their way through to a community 

near you, some of them cut his fences, killed livestock, left trash, and vandalized 

his home. Many ranchers feel as if they are prisoners in their own home. 


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Last year, fellow rancher Kelly Kimbro was driving from her ranch into Douglas, 

AZ along the border road. This is a very remote area. Suddenly she saw 13 men 

run out of the brush and into the road when they ran in front of her vehicle and 

forced her to stop. Needless to say, she was terrified. They jumped on the hood of 

her truck and into the back. She rolled her window down part way and spoke to 

them in Spanish. They answered her in English and explained they were from 

India, not Mexico, and they wanted her to call the Border Patrol so they could turn 

themselves in as refugees. Obviously there were no Agents on the border. 

On one occasion, my husband was out riding a horse on our ranch when he came 

upon 7 aliens. He told them in Spanish to stop. One of them ran up to him and 

grabbed his bridle reins, intending to pull him off of his horse. Confrontations like 

this are common among border residents. 

One time, a fellow rancher was driving his truck and horse trailer on his ranch 

road. When he stopped to open a gate, illegals jumped out of the brush, got in his 

pickup and drove off leaving him stranded with his truck, gun, phone, trailer, and 

horse stolen. 

One morning my husband went to our barn to do the chores and 13 illegals were 

asleep in our barn. It wasn’t uncommon to find one or two sleeping there. 

Last December near Animas, New Mexico drug runners kidnapped a man who 

worked for a local company who provided well service for ranchers in the area. They 

tied him up, threw him in the back of their truck with their load of drugs and forced 

him to guide them to Willcox, Arizona to deliver their load. When they were close 

to Willcox, he was blindfolded and left over night. The next day he was found and 

rescued. Had there been Agents near the border, this wouldn’t have happened. 

Virtually every rancher I know who lives near the border has a horror story to 

tell similar to these. I don’t know even one who has not been vandalized. I had to 

quit my job as a Mary Kay Sales Director because I needed to drive at night and 

the drug traffic made it unsafe to do so, and there is not adequate cell phone service 

where we live. I back my car in the garage so nobody can sneak in while I am closing the automatic door. 

Drug scouts frequently set up camp on the mountains of southern Arizona. They 

have sophisticated equipment that I am told puts ours to shame. Within Aguilar’s 

‘‘corridor’’ most of the Border Patrol is north of the scouts, but the few Agents in 

this area are easily located by the scouts and they pass on the information to the 

drug mules who can easily avoid the small number of Agents within this area. They 

know when shift changes occur, and this is usually the time when the drug runners 

have a green light to travel north. 


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47 

Another problem is that many of the Border Patrol stations are many miles north 

of the international boundary. Some are as much as 80 to 100 miles north. Tucson, 

Casa Grande, and Willcox are three examples. More Forward Operating Bases are 

needed. A brand new one was built east of Douglas in an area that desperately 

needs it, but it is not in use. 

Those of us who live in proximity of the border see first-hand the failures of the 

Border Patrol. While we know the Agents would like to do their job, their hands 

are tied to bureaucratic and political decisions. Last year a few of us met with DHS 

Secretary Jeh Johnson. After recounting our examples he said that he knew we had 

problems. However, he also stated that he was appointed by the President and will 

support his policies. These policies do not help our cause; rather they increase the 

chance of further problems. Ranchers along the border have become the ‘‘bad guys.’’ 

We are labeled vigilantes and racists, which is far from the truth. I had personally 

provided shelter, food, and water, given medicine and care to hundreds of illegal 

crossers over the past 40 years. All of my fellow ranchers have done the same. I 

have never personally known a case of abuse by a rancher to an alien in all of those 

years. The Mexican people are our neighbors, but the strategy of our Government 

and the reluctance to enforce the law has created an atmosphere of animosity at 

times. 

I have read the entire Holding the Line Handbook, and I find it to be a fascinating work of fiction in places. For example, on Page 10 the Risk-Based Approach 

to apprehending illegal aliens is described as compared to NASA identifying the 

highest-risk areas near the International Space Station and how they can avoid 

space debris! These similarities are compared, even though space debris is hardly 

a living breathing human being. The comparison is not valid and insults my intelligence. 

One of the most troubling aspects of not patrolling the international boundary and 

putting the majority of agents 50 miles or more from the border, is the probability 

of Transnational Criminal Organizations and terrorists entering our country. The 

example on John Ladd’s ranch of the 54 drug traffickers breaking through the wall 

is evidence that other unsavory characters and come and go as they please. On the 

San Pedro River, which runs out of Mexico and into the United States west of the 

Ladd Ranch, the 13-ft. wall ends and there is a 3-strand barbed wire fence going 

across the river. During flash flood season there is often no fence at all. I have been 

there dozens of times and rarely is an Agent watching this quarter-mile area which 

almost never has water running through it. Anyone can simply walk in. Also, during 

this same season the flood gates are raised from mid-June until the end of September to allow flood water to flow out of Mexico. The Border Patrol covers those 

holes in the fence with 3 strands of barbed wire which isn’t even stretched tightly. 

48 


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In parts of southern Arizona as far north as 100 miles there are signs which have 

been put up by the Government stating, ‘‘CAUTION. Smuggling activity is common 

in this area, due to proximity of the border. Be aware of your surroundings at all 

times.’’ I should not have to be advised by my own Government to beware of foreign 

drug smugglers in my own country. If my country were enforcing the immigration 

laws on the books, this wouldn’t be an issue. 


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Diversionary fires in Aguilar’s ‘‘corridor’’ have been set by illegal aliens and drug 

runners. They have destroyed hundreds of thousands of acres of valuable forest, 

grassland, wildlife, homes, and other resources. 

Many of the old-time family ranchers in the area have sold out to big companies 

with absent owners in order to get away from the vandalism problems and for their 

safety. Land values in our region have dropped to about half of their value in the 

1980’s simply because nobody wants to live in an area overrun by illegal aliens. 

It is a terrible lie when the Government tells America that the border is secure. 

It seems to be a calculated plan to not enforce immigration laws. A lot of powerful 

people have something to gain by allowing illegal aliens to invade our country. 

Meanwhile, the American public is suffering and our National security and sovereignty as a Nation is in jeopardy. 

For the checkpoints to be really affective, they should be open 24/7. If there is 

not enough staff to keep them open round-the-clock, then perhaps they should be 

patrolling the border itself. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Ms. Davis. I appreciate it. 

The Chair now recognizes Dr. Golob for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ELYSE GOLOB, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CENTER FOR BORDER SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 

Ms. GOLOB. Chairman McSally and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here to address you today. 

I am the executive director of the National Center for Border Security and Immigration, known as BORDERS, headquartered at 

the University of Arizona. From 2008 to 2016, we were designated 

a center of excellence by the DHS Science and Technology Directorate Office of University Programs. Since that time, we continue 

to receive funding from DHS, from DOD, IARPA, as well as other 

international agencies to conduct this work. We are a proud member of the new center of the excellence headquartered at the University of Houston. 


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In 2009, the GAO came out with a report assessing interior traffic checkpoints and recommended that Border Patrol implement 

improvements in four different areas: The first area is data quality 

and integrity; the second area is to examine the impacts these 

checkpoints have on local communities; third, to determine how effective these checkpoints actually are, what is their performance effectiveness; and, fourth, to develop a managerial tool for better 

managing the number of lanes, the hours, and the resources allocated to these checkpoints. The University of Arizona was provided with $500,000 to conduct 

this study. During the course of the study, we worked closely with 

Border Patrol, specifically the Office of Strategic Planning, Policy, 

and Analysis. We submitted bimonthly reports. We were assigned 

a point of contact in the agency, and we provided regular briefings 

to headquarters personnel. So we did not operate in a vacuum; we 

walked hand-in-hand with Border Patrol throughout this process. 

To conduct this study, we paid site visits to 7 sectors—6 on the 

Southern Border and 1 on the Northern Border—to observe the 

checkpoint operations. At these checkpoints, we received briefings 

from the chief, we observed operations, and we interviewed agents 

there. 

We also were provided with apprehension data from the e3 system, cleansed data without identifying factors, for a period of 2008 

to 2011, as well as checkpoint activity reports. 

For community impacts, we conducted interviews with local community members near the border, specifically law enforcement, resort owners, business owners, school officials, as well as citizens. 

For the performance measures, we did an in-depth review of various strategies for measuring effectiveness. For the managerial 

tool, we developed a checkpoint simulation model. 

To our findings. 

Specifically in the area of data quality and integrity, the gold 

standard for data quality is accuracy, consistency, and comprehensiveness of the data. In analyzing droves of e3 apprehension data, 

we determined there were still a lot of errors and inconsistencies 

and data that was entered incorrectly. We were assured by Border 

Patrol that measures have been taken to improve data collection. 

We provided them with a list of recommendations, including agent 

refresher training courses, drop-down menus, automatic alerts, and 

other measures to prevent these data issues. 

In the area of community impacts, we found that, interviewing 

community members, their concerns fell into three general areas. 

The first area was inconvenience factors—wait times at the checkpoints, missed meetings, and so forth. The second factor was circumvention impacts because of illegal activity, trying to circumvent 

the checkpoint. Neighboring communities voiced that they experienced public safety issues and high-speed chases through their 

neighborhoods. Finally, economic harm. We found that there was 

a wide-spread perception that there was harm to the local community based on loss of tourism and depressed housing prices because 

of a public perception that the border was a dangerous area. 

In terms of recommendations for community impacts, we analyzed circumvention data around the I–19 corridor, which we used 

as our case study, and found that, indeed, communities south of the 

52 

checkpoint, such as Tubac, had more circumvention apprehensions 

than communities north of the border. So this is one area that we 

recommended that Border Patrol continued to monitor, the circumvention and neighboring activities. 

As far as real estate prices, we looked at housing prices for communities south of the checkpoint, Rio Rico and Tubac, and north 

of the border in Green Valley and found that, while the data indicated there was some loss in the prices south of the checkpoint in 

Tubac, that they were not statistically significant enough to definitively say that the checkpoint caused the difference. This was complicated by the fact that our real estate data collection overlapped 

with the housing crisis and the general U.S. economic crisis 2008 

to 2010, so further research is needed on the area. 

I will conclude with talking about the effectiveness of checkpoints, since this is an issue that Chairman McSally raised. 

Right now, checkpoints are measured by their apprehensions and 

their seizures. I can’t stress strongly enough that this is an activity 

measure, it is not an effectiveness measure. If you don’t know how 

much illicit activity is getting through, you don’t know how effectively you are performing. You know, if 100 apprehension are made 

a day and 101 people try to get through, you are doing pretty well. 

If 100 apprehensions are made a day but 1,000 people are trying 

to get through, then you are only 10 percent effective. 

We provided specific recommendations to Border Patrol that the 

most practical, efficient, and non-biased way of measuring checkpoint effectiveness is by conducting red-teaming efforts, which refers to a team of agents from different Federal agencies who would, 

in effect, play-act the role of smugglers or illegal immigrants attempting to get through a checkpoint, carefully trained with a specific script. Then an evaluation could be made of how many members of the red team Border Patrol catches at the checkpoint. 

This interdiction data can provide a proxy for what the base 

level, what the denominator of illegal activity is getting through 

and can be used by checkpoints to measure their effectiveness 

level. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. If you wouldn’t mind wrapping up, and 

then we can maybe get more into that in the Q&A. 

Ms. GOLOB. Certainly. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. 

Ms. GOLOB. In terms of performance models, we developed a simulation model measuring current and predicted traffic flows and resource allocations at Border Patrol that they could use to determine the adequate levels. 

I would be happy to answer questions during the next period. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Golob follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELYSE GOLOB

SEPTEMBER 13, 2016 

Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify regarding Border Patrol’s defensein-depth strategy with a focus on interior checkpoints. My name is Elyse Golob and 

I am the executive director of the National Center for Border Security and Immigration (BORDERS) headquartered at the University of Arizona. As a DHS Center of 

Excellence from 2008–2015, BORDERS was funded by the Science and Technology 

Directorate, Office of University Programs. As a Center Emeritus, we continue to 

53 

1 Jenkins, J., J. Proudfoot, J. Marquadson, J. Gans, E. Golob, J. Nunamaker, 2014. Checking 

on Checkpoints: An Assessment of U.S. Border Patrol Checkpoint Operations, Performance, and 

Impacts. http://borders.arizona.edu/cms/sites/default/files/checking-on-checkpointsl2014-09- 

09.pdf. 2 See Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol’s Mission, but More Consistent Data Collection 

and Performance Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness, U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO–09–824, August 2009, www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-824. 3 Along the U.S.-Mexico border, we visited 5 checkpoints in the San Diego Sector (located at 

Temecula I–15, Rainbow, San Clemente I–5, Hwy 94, and I–8), 4 in the Tucson Sector (Arivaca 

Rd, I–19, SR 80, and SR 90), 4 in the EI Paso Sector (I–10, White Sands Hwy 70—MM 198.5, 

Alamogordo Hwy 54, and US 180), and 2 in the Rio Grande Sector (Falfurrias and Kingsville), 

Along the U.S.-Canada border, we visited 2 checkpoints in the Swanton Sector (I–87 and the 

Massena Station tactical checkpoint). 

conducted research on border security, trade and immigration with funding grants 

from DHS, NSF, DOD, IARPA, the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) and 

Frontex, the European Union border management agency. 

In 2011, the U.S. Border Patrol asked BORDERS to evaluate a U.S. Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) review ofthe agency’s traffic checkpoints. Our findings 

and recommendations were published in the 2014 report, ‘‘Checking on Checkpoints: 

An Assessment of U.S. Border Patrol Checkpoint Operations, Performance and Impacts’’.1

BACKGROUND

The U.S. Border Patrol operates traffic checkpoints on interior U.S. roads to interdict and deter unauthorized immigration, contraband smuggling, and terrorism. In 

2009, the GAO evaluated checkpoint operations 2 and, as a result, recommended 

that the Border Patrol implement improvement in four areas: 

1. Data Integrity and Quality.—Establish internal controls and management 

oversight to ensure the accuracy, consistency, and completeness of checkpoint 

performance data. 

2. Community Impacts.—Examine the impact that checkpoints have on the 

quality of life in local communities. 

3. Performance Models and Measures.—Evaluate the usefulness of a checkpoints 

by comparing rates of apprehension and seizures to undetected illegal activity 

passing through the checkpoint. 

4. Managerial Tool Development.—Determine the optimal number of inspection 

lanes needed at checkpoints based on current and predicted traffic volumes, and 

assess required staffing needs. 

In 2010, U.S. Border Patrol asked BORDERS to conduct an independent and objective assessment of checkpoint operations to respond to GAO’s comments. We received funding of $500,000 to undertake this study. Our research team consisted of 

3 faculty members and 6 doctoral students. 

During the course of the study, we were assigned a point of contact at Border Patrol, Office of Strategic Planning, Policy, and Analysis, submitted bi-monthly reports 

and met periodically with headquarters personnel for briefings, clarification, and 

feedback. 

The final report was released in 2014. 

METHODOLOGY

To conduct a comprehensive checkpoint assessment, we gathered and analyzed information from several sources: 

Site visits.—We visited 17 checkpoints in 5 Border Patrol Sectors on the Southern 

and Northern Borders, including permanent and tactical stops.3 These included the 

San Diego, Tucson, El Paso, Rio Grande Sectors on the U.S.-Mexico border; and the 

Swanton Sector on the U.S.-Canada border. 

At each site visit, the sector chief briefed us on the current threats and developments. We also examined the checkpoint’s layout, infrastructure, and technology; observed on-going operations, including primary screening and secondary screening; 

and interviewed agents. 

Apprehension data.—The Border Patrol provided us with cleansed apprehension 

data from its e3 data-collection system (2006–2011) and from the Checkpoint Activity Report (CAR) system (2007–2011). 

Specifically, we received data for 26 variables (a subset of the data in the e3 system) related to apprehended individuals, including: (a) Location and time of arrest; 

(b) manner, time, and location of entry into the United States; and (c) citizenship 

of the individual arrested, whether the individual was smuggled in, and, if so, the 

cost to the individual to be smuggled in. We received several data sets from the 

54 

CAR system containing checkpoint profiles, referrals, apprehension counts, seizure 

counts, and operation hours. 

Community data.—We conducted interviews with community members and stakeholders in surrounding areas to identify the quality of life impacts of checkpoints. 

We analyzed circumvention rates and real estate sales data (2009–2012) in communities north and south of the checkpoint to determine its impact on local communities. 

Performance Measures.—We undertook an in-depth review of potential methodologies to estimate illegal flow and provide a baseline for checkpoint effectiveness. 

Managerial Tool Development.—Using commercially-available software, we developed a simulation model of a checkpoint to assess resources and staffing needs to 

meet current and future traffic demands. 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Data Integrity and Quality 

Data integrity and quality are measured by the accuracy, consistency, and completeness of the collected data. To evaluate the data collection protocols at checkpoints, we examined data from the e3 system and the Checkpoint Activity Report 

(CAR) module. The e3 is an internal system used by agents to process and record 

data about apprehended individuals, such as apprehension location, smuggling information, and the date and time of apprehension. The CAR report contains checkpoint operational and infrastructure data, including checkpoint profile reports, number of apprehensions and seizures, operational hours, and personnel. We also used 

the information gathered during the site visits to better understand data collection 

processes. 

Findings.—We found that while data integrity and quality have substantially increased since the 2009 GAO assessment, there were aspects of data collection and 

management that still need improvement. 

Specifically, we found that the e3 data had errors in the data fields for apprehension latitude and longitude, entry manner, smuggling method and cost, distance 

from port of entry (POE), and entry date and time. In the CAR data set, we found 

errors in the checkpoint profile records. (See Appendix A). 

Recommendations.—To address these shortcomings, we recommend that the Border Patrol implement changes in agent training, correct past errors in data entry, 

and improve the current e3 system to include real-time alerts for questionable data, 

drop-down menus and automate data entry of certain fields. 

Agent training.—We recommend that the Border Patrol provide refresher 

courses on how to enter data and why data quality is important. 

Correct past errors.—We recommend that Border Patrol run automated scripts 

on these data to correct transposed apprehension latitude-longitude data and inconsistent labels for entry manner. 

e3 system.—We suggest several improvements to the current interface: 

a. Automatic alerts.—Available if the apprehension latitude-longitude entry is 

not within the agent’s assigned sector, the smuggling cost is exorbitantly high, 

or the miles from POE is abnormally high. 

b. Drop-down selection box.—Available for for fields such as ‘‘entry manner.’’ 

c. Automated data collection.—Allowing agents to transfer the apprehension 

latitude and longitude from their GPS devices directly to the e3 system, and 

automatically calculating the distance from POE based on latitude and longitude data. 

2. Community Impacts 

While our aim was to identify and measure the impacts of checkpoints on nearby 

communities, it quickly became apparent that no one checkpoint could encapsulate 

all possible effects. Since the type and magnitude of impacts differ by the local factors such as size, population, economic base and terrain, we sought a case study 

that could provide a generalizable approach. We selected the checkpoint along U.S. 

Interstate 19 (I–19) between Tucson and Nogales, Arizona, as a case study (see Appendix B), as it captured several major factors including traffic volume, proximity 

of communities, economic diversity, and a mountainous topography. 

Located on a 25-mile north-south artery, the I–19 checkpoint affects both commercial and personal traffic. It bisects several long established communities to its south 

and north. To the south, lie Tubac (4 miles), Rio Rico (10 miles) and Nogales (on 

the border) with a combined population of 41,000. To the north, are the communities 

of Amado, Green Valley, and Sahuarita with a total population of 55,000. The principal economic engines ofthe region are real estate, tourism, mining, farming, and 

55 

ranching. The corridor is located in a mountainous region, with mountains to the 

east and west. 

For the study, we interviewed representatives from the Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Office, Tubac Golf Resort and Spa, Esplendor Resort, Fresh Produce Association 

of Americas, various Tubac business and community representatives; residents of 

Tubac, Green Valley, and Sahuarita; and local schools officials. We found consistency in the perspectives of this wide range of individuals with regard to the checkpoint. 

These concerns can be grouped into three broad categories: (1) Circumvention impacts with attendant public safety and law-enforcement costs; (2) inconvenience impacts deriving from unpredictable wait times and risk of secondary screening for 

those who travel through the checkpoint; and (3) economic harm impacts deriving 

both from changing public perceptions about the dangers of the border region, including a decline in housing prices and tourism. 

Findings 

1. Circumvention impacts.—The presence of the checkpoint may cause those engaged in illegal activity to attempt to circumvent the checkpoint. This circumvention, often referred to as flanking, pushes drug and human smuggling 

into neighborhoods and creates public safety problems in communities both 

south and north of the checkpoint. Community members have experienced highspeed chases through neighborhoods, Blackhawk helicopters deployed near population centers, school lockdowns, and similar disruptions. Our statistical analysis of apprehension data before and after the I–19 checkpoint began operations 

(2009–2012) showed that while circumvention impacts are experienced by communities north and south of a checkpoint, they are disproportionately borne by 

communities that lie south of the checkpoint. 

2. Inconvenience impacts.—Virtually all community members south of the 

checkpoints reported missed meetings or airline flights due to the unpredictable 

wait times. Others believed that Hispanic citizens were subject to racial 

profiling . . . In many instances, it was difficult to quantify these impacts. 

Further research is needed. 

3. Economic harm impacts.—Residents expressed concern that the checkpoint’s 

presence contributed to the perception that the border region is dangerous, 

which in turn negatively impacts tourism and hurts real-estate values. Regarding tourism, it was difficult to disentangle the effects of the general economic 

downturn, negative publicity from SB1070, and the impacts of the checkpoint 

itself. 

A regression analysis of real estate price data in communities south (Tubac-Rio 

Rico) and north (Green Valley) of the checkpoint, provided marginally statistically 

significant evidence of downward pressure on housing prices. However, since the 

available data was limited and it was difficult to isolate the checkpoint’s impacts 

from those of the housing crisis and other economic conditions, these results must 

be seen as suggestive, rather than definitive. 

Recommendations.—Our analysis identified a variety of quantitative measures of 

a checkpoint’s impacts on surrounding communities, and we recommend that Border 

Patrol consider regularly examining them. These include: 

Analysis of apprehension data relative to the roads or highways on which a 

given checkpoint is located, which provides a statistical measure of circumvention activity. 

Analysis of real estate prices in adjacent communities to gauge the impact of the 

checkpoint on the housing market. 

Analysis of local law enforcement referrals to Border Patrol, which provides an 

additional indication of circumvention activity around a checkpoint. 

Analysis of enforcement activity around schools including data on school lockdowns, which provides a measure of circumvention activity specifically affecting 

children. 

3. Performance Models and Measures 

The GAO report recommended that Border Patrol develop a model that compares 

apprehensions and seizures to the total level of illegal activity passing through 

checkpoints undetected. Since this baseline is unknown and cannot be extrapolated 

from available data, we explored proxy measures of total flow that could measure 

checkpoint effectiveness. 

Findings.—We found that most practical, accurate, and unbiased approach to get 

an realistic approximation of the checkpoint’s effectiveness in deterring illegal activity is through ‘‘red teaming.’’ 

56 

4 Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program, 2007, 8–26. 

A red team is ‘‘a group of subject-matter experts of various appropriate disciplinary backgrounds who provide an independent peer review of plans and processes; 

acts as the adversary’s advocate; and knowledgeably role-play the adversary, using 

a controlled, realistic, interactive process during operations planning, training, and 

exercising’’.4 Red teaming has been successfully deployed in other agencies, including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), 

and the National Nuclear Security Administration. It is currently used at Border 

Patrol checkpoints to measure the accuracy of radiation detectors. 

In a checkpoint context, red teaming would be carried out by actors knowledgeably role-playing the adversary in an attempt to bypass checkpoint security carrying 

false documents, illegal drugs, radiation (i.e., proxy for nuclear weapons), or other 

illegal items. The rate at which red team actors are detected at checkpoints will 

allow the Border Patrol to calculate an interdiction rate for illegal activities. 

Red-teaming would provide the Border Patrol with valuable information, including: (a) Accuracy rates of detecting illegal activities during red-teaming, (b) measurable indicators of how resource allocation influences this accuracy rate, (c) objective 

and quantitative baselines of a checkpoint’s detection accuracy rate to gauge improvement over time, and (d) focused areas of improvement for checkpoint operations. 

Recommendations. We recommend that the Border Patrol: 

• Calculate an interdiction rate of illegal activity through red-teaming.—Our report provided guidance to ensure valid and reliable red-teaming including red 

team composition, maintaining objectivity and confidentiality, generating a 

statement of evaluation objectives, determining the frequency of red-teaming attempts, selecting checkpoints for red-teaming and understanding safety issues. 

4. Managerial Tool Development 

The 2009 GAO report emphasized the need to consider traffic volume and needs 

assessment in allocating resources to checkpoints. To address this, we created a 

checkpoint simulation and visualization tool to help the Border Patrol make informed resource allocations, conduct workforce planning needs assessments, and determine the number of open inspection lanes (see Appendix C). 

Findings.—The simulation tool that we built is a realistic computerized representation of an actual checkpoint that models common components, including pre-primary screening, primary screening, secondary screening, violation processing, traffic 

flows (actual or anticipated), screening times for different types of vehicles, number 

of inspection lanes, number of agents, secondary screening capacity, number of 

backscatter machines, and other checkpoint components. 

Using the simulation model, the Border Patrol can assess the required resources 

and staffing to meet current and future traffic demands and predict how making 

resource changes to a checkpoint would influence important outcomes such as wait 

time, screening time, traffic flushing, queue length, resource utilization, screening 

capacity, and arrests. 

Recommendations.—We recommend that the Border Patrol: Adopt a checkpoint 

simulation model to analyze current and expected traffic volumes to determine the 

number of inspection lanes at checkpoints; and determine workforce needs. 

SUMMARY

Our report addressed the recommendations made in GAO’s 2009 report. Specifically, it addressed recommendations that can aid Border Patrol in: (1) Continuing 

to improve the consistency, accuracy, integrity, and completeness of data in the e3 

and CAR module systems; (2) better assessing the impact of checkpoint on surrounding communities; (3) evaluating the performance of checkpoints on detecting 

illegal activity; and, (4) making more informed resource allocation decisions. 

57 

ATTACHMENTS

Appendix A. Data Integrity and Quality 


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Appendix B. Community Impacts 


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Appendix C. Managerial Tools Appendix 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Dr. Golob. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Ramı ́rez for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTIAN RAMI ́REZ, DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN 

BORDER COMMUNITIES COALITION 

Mr. RAMI ́REZ. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman and 

Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify. I represent the Southern Border Communities 

Coalition, which brings together over 60 community organizations 

in the 4 Southern Border States. 

I was born in the borderlands. They are my home. I know the 

subcommittee will agree that the Southern Border is one of our Nation’s most beautiful, vibrant, and unique regions. It includes remarkable desert landscapes, the scenic Rio Grande River, distinctive mountains, and extraordinary valleys. 

Several important binational metropolitan areas make up the 

borderlands, and hundreds of thousands of acres of sensitive habitat protect endangered species. Ancestral indigenous communities 

have called the borderlands home since before the physical structure divided their people. Ancient roots are now dissected by modern borders. Nearly 12 million people call our precious borderlands 

home. 

The Southern Border is also an economic engine for North America. Fifty-six crossing points provide critical gateways to our thirdlargest goods trading partner, where nearly 300,000 vehicle crossVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:04 Jun 23, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\114THCONGRESS\16BM0913\16BM0913.TXT HEATH

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60 

ings occur daily. U.S. trade with Mexico totaled $583 billion in 

2015. 

The border landscape also includes a heavy presence of Federal 

law enforcement, making the Southern Border one of the most militarized regions in the Western Hemisphere. In the year 2000, there 

were 8,600 Border Patrol Agents. By 2014, the number more than 

doubled to almost 21,000. 

Border enforcement spending increased seven-fold from 1980 to 

1995 and then more than tripled from 1995 to 2003. Appropriations 

for Border Patrol have grown steadily from $1 billion in fiscal year 

2000 to over $13 billion in fiscal year 2016. 

However, this dramatic increase of CBP personnel and equipment has not been accompanied by commensurate accountability, 

oversight, and transparency mechanisms, leading to palpable mistrust between Southern Border residents and the CBP, the largest 

law enforcement agency in our Nation. 

Based on outdated rules created without significant public debate, DHS has interpreted section 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act to allow Border Patrol to operate interior checkpoints and engage in other enforcement up to 100 miles from land 

and maritime borders. 

Virtually everyone that I know has been subjected to questioning 

at checkpoints. In some communities, residents must pass through 

Border Patrol checkpoints to reach work, school, medical appointments, places of worship. This has an enormous economic and civil 

rights impact on our communities. Even I feel compelled to carry 

proof of citizenship at all times in order to prevent unnecessary 

delays or worse. 

Perhaps what is most hurtful is that my toddler son must also 

have a U.S. passport in order to clear the checkpoint. Whenever we 

drive east to visit his grandparents in Imperial County or if we decide to go north to go to Disneyland, my family must show our 

passports to prove U.S. citizenship. As you may know, U.S. citizens 

are not required to carry proof of citizenship. But we do so because 

Border Patrol Agents too often treat us as second-class citizens. 

For border residents, the land of the free that most enjoy has 

been converted into the land of checkpoints. In no other part of this 

Nation are people required to prove who they are as they go about 

their daily lives. 

As director of the Southern Border Communities Coalition, I see 

and experience first-hand the great impact CBP’s excessive footprint has on residents along the border. In the small town of 

Arivaca, hundreds of community members have rallied against racial profiling of their neighbors at checkpoints that choke off their 

daily activities. 

In southern New Mexico, my good friend Jorge grew up commuting through Government checkpoints from his hometown in 

Salem to Las Cruces to grocery shop, to see a movie, and, most recently, to obtain a master’s degree from New Mexico State University. Jorge is always respectfully confirming his U.S. citizenship to 

Agents, but Agents have interrogated him about where he was 

born and detained him for dogs to sniff his vehicle because he refused to consent to a search. 

61 

In the RGV, residents have refused to evacuate their homes in 

water-related emergencies for fear that they will be apprehended 

by Border Patrol. My colleagues in Brooks County contend with 

hundreds of tragic migrant deaths each year because the Falfurrias 

checkpoint is placed 50 miles north of the actual border. 

CBP fails to assess the impact of defense-in-depth on human and 

civil rights and on our quality of life for border residents. Our 

friends along the Northern Border have also endured enforcement 

practices that undermine the trust between border residents and 

CBP. From Washington State, to the streets of Detroit, to up-State 

New York, border residents experience excessive use of force, racial 

profiling, and unconstitutional searches and seizures. 

No one is more concerned about the security of the homeland 

than border residents, but we are equally concerned about our 

quality of life. Congress should reduce the reach of CBP operations 

to a maximum of 25 miles from the land or maritime border and 

reduce the area where agents can enter private property without 

a warrant to 10 miles. 

DHS and CBP must immediately ban racial profiling and implement comprehensive data collection and public reporting on Border 

Patrol’s activities. We urge CBP to implement Commissioner 

Kerlikowske’s transparency and accountability reforms, including 

body-worn cameras, with a strong policy framework and an effective, responsive complaint system. 

Ultimately, border residents want what our fellow citizens already enjoy: The ability to move from point A to point B without 

excessive Government intrusion. I remain hopeful that one day my 

son will be able to visit his grandparents without the indignity of 

armed agents at a checkpoint interrogating him about whether he 

belongs in this Nation or not. 

I thank you for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ramı ́rez follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTIAN RAMI ́REZ, DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN BORDER

COMMUNITIES COALITION; JENNIFER JOHNSON, BORDER POLICY ADVISOR, SOUTHERN BORDER COMMUNITIES COALITION; KARIN JOHANSON, DIRECTOR, ACLU WASHINGTON LEGISLATIVE OFFICE; CHRISTOPHER RICKERD, POLICY COUNSEL, ACLU 

WASHINGTON LEGISLATIVE OFFICE; VICKI B. GAUBECA, DIRECTOR, ACLU OF NEW

MEXICO, REGIONAL CENTER FOR BORDER RIGHTS; AND BRIAN ERICKSON, BORDER

POLICY STRATEGIST, ACLU OF NEW MEXICO, REGIONAL CENTER FOR BORDER

RIGHTS

SEPTEMBER 13, 2016 

INTRODUCTION

Advocates and residents throughout the border region comprise the Southern Border Communities Coalition (SBCC). SBCC brings together more than 60 organizations from San Diego, California, to Brownsville, Texas, to ensure that border enforcement policies and practices are accountable and fair, respect human dignity 

and human rights, and prevent loss of life in the region. 

For nearly 100 years, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), a member of 

SBCC, has been our Nation’s guardian of liberty, working in courts, legislatures, 

and communities to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties that the 

Constitution and laws of the United States guarantee everyone. With more than a 

million members, activists, and supporters, the ACLU is a Nation-wide organization 

that fights tirelessly in all 50 States, Puerto Rico, and Washington, DC, for the principle that every individual’s rights must be protected equally under the law. The 

ACLU of New Mexico’s Regional Center for Border Rights (RCBR) stands with border communities to defend and protect America’s Constitutional guarantees of 

62 

1Michele Mittelstadt et al., ‘‘Through the Prism of National Security: Major Immigration Policy and Program Changes in the Decade since 9/11.’’ (Migration Policy Institute, Aug. 2011), 3, 

available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FS23lPost-9-11policy.pdf. 2Ted Robbins, ‘‘U.S. Grows an Industrial Complex Along The Border.’’ NPR (Sept. 12, 2012), 

available at http://www.npr.org/2012/09/12/160758471/u-s-grows-an-industrial-complexalong-the-border. 3For more on the 100-mile zone please see https://www.aclu.org/constitution-100-mile-border-zone and https://www.aclu.org/aclu-factsheet-customs-and-border-protections-100-mile-zone. 

equality and justice for all families to live freely, safely, and with dignity. The 

RCBR works in conjunction with ACLU affiliates in California, Arizona, Texas, 

Michigan, Washington, New York, and Vermont. 

SBCC and the ACLU submit this statement to provide the subcommittee with an 

appraisal based on border residents’ perspectives to describe the civil liberties and 

quality of life effects of the Border Patrol’s ‘‘Defense-in-Depth’’ strategy that relies 

on roving patrols and numerous checkpoints far from the actual borders. CBP’s 

checkpoints and patrols are massively intrusive yet ineffective interior enforcement 

operations. We are deeply concerned about how the Border Patrol conducts enforcement in the ‘‘100-mile-zone,’’ often infringing rights in such a vast area of the 

United States. 

Severely compounding this overreach is a lack of Border Patrol policies and practices that match best policing standards on matters ranging from body-worn cameras to data collection (see Appendix, Implementing Law Enforcement Best Practices for our Nation’s Biggest Police Force). 

SBCC and the ACLU oppose CBP’s currently exorbitant spending on border enforcement, expenditures which occur without the requisite transparency and oversight, or a proper holistic analysis of border communities’ quality of life. Spending 

on enforcement, particularly at the Southwest Border, has increased dramatically 

this century without commensurate accountability measures, resulting in civilian 

deaths at the hands of CBP personnel, avoidable migrant deaths in the desert, and 

many other civil and human rights abuses at both our Nation’s Southern and Northern Borders. 

From fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2012, the budget for CBP increased by 94 per- cent to $11.65 billion, a leap of $5.65 billion; this following a 20 percent post-9/11 

increase of $1 billion.1 By way of comparison, this jump in funding more than quadrupled the growth rate of NASA’s budget and was almost 10 times that of the National Institutes of Health. For fiscal year 2017, the administration’s budget request 

for CBP is about $14 billion. U.S. taxpayers now spend more on immigration enforcement agencies ($19 billion) than on the FBI, DEA, ATF, U.S. Marshals, and 

Secret Service—combined. Border and immigration enforcement has cost more than 

$250 billion in today’s dollars since 1986. House Appropriations Committee Chairman Hal Rogers’ warning about the irrationality of border spending must be heeded: 

‘‘It is a sort of a mini industrial complex syndrome that has set in there. And we’re 

going to have to guard against it every step of the way.’’2

SBCC and the ACLU urge the subcommittee to focus its efforts on ensuring that 

future border security is conducted humanely and in accordance with best police 

practices, leaving a greatly reduced footprint in border communities. Legislation and 

Congressional oversight should bring transparency and accountability—not war 

equipment or more boots on the ground—to CBP, our Nation’s largest law enforcement agency. 

I. CBP IS IMPROPERLY ACTING AS AN INTERIOR LAW-ENFORCEMENT AGENCY WITHIN THE

UNNECESSARILY LARGE 100-MILE ZONE, YET THESE ACTIVITIES ARE INEFFECTIVE IN

APPREHENDING UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS. 

CBP’s excessive enforcement footprint and mission creep have made it an interior 

police agency that conducts unaccountable roving patrols far from any border and 

maintains intrusive checkpoints that hurt local economies, unjustifiably profile 

Latinos and other people of color, and make few immigration arrests. CBP has become an interior law-enforcement agency through its vast claimed authority to patrol within 100 miles of all land and sea borders, an assertion of power based on 

outdated regulations issued in the 1950s that have not faithfully implemented the 

Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA) limitation to a ‘‘reasonable distance’’ from 

a border.3 Moreover, CBP’s practice of using its warrantless authority under the 

INA to enter private property (excluding dwellings) within 25 miles of a border is 

at times exercised irresponsibly, causing property owners uncompensated fence 

damage and other hardship like livestock lost through unclosed gates. 

CBP’s zone of claimed authority therefore has no statutory basis and originated 

without scrutiny 60 years ago in now-outdated regulations. The area includes twoVerDate Mar 15 2010 15:04 Jun 23, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\114THCONGRESS\16BM0913\16BM0913.TXT HEATH
63 

4See, e.g., Patrick G. Eddington, ‘‘Homeland Insecurity: Checkpoints, Warrantless Searches 

and Security Theater.’’ JustSecurity (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.cato.org/publications/ 

commentary/homeland-insecurity-checkpoints-warrantless-searches-security-theater; Jacob 

Sullum, ‘‘The Border Patrol’s Unconstitutional Drug Dragnet.’’ reason.com (May 25, 2015) 

http://reason.com/archives/2015/05/25/the-border-patrols-unconstitutional-drug. 5 Alan Gomez, ‘‘Border Commissioner, facing heat, promises changes.’’ USA Today (Oct. 30, 

2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/10/30/customs-and-border-commissioner-interview-body-cameras-use-of-force-checkpoints/18110249/. 6http://gao.gov/assets/300/294548.pdf (p.78). 7 Jeffrey Jenkins, Jeffrey G. Proudfoot, Jim Marquardson, Judith Gans, Elyse Golob, and Jay 

Nunamaker, Checking on Checkpoints: An Assessment of U.S. Border Patrol Operations, Performance, and Impacts. Tucson: National Center for Border Security and Immigration (BORDERS), University of Arizona (2014), http://borders.arizona.edu/cms/sites/default/files/ 

checking-on-checkpointsl2014-09-09.pdf. 8 Andrew Becker, G.W. Schulz, and Tia Ghose, ‘‘Four of five Border Patrol drug busts involve 

US citizens, records show.’’ Center for Investigative Reporting (Mar. 26, 2013), http:// 

cironline.org/reports/four-five-border-patrol-drug-busts-involve-us-citizens-records-show-4312. 9 ACLU of Arizona, Record of Abuse: Lawlessness and Impunity in Border Patrol’s Interior Enforcement Operations (2015), 14, http://www.acluaz.org/node/5415. 

thirds of the U.S. population, entire States like Florida and Maine, as well as almost 

all of the country’s top metropolitan areas. The CATO Institute and Reason Magazine/reason.com have led libertarian critiques of the 100- and 25-mile zones.4 This 

breadth of authority has converted CBP, particularly Border Patrol, into an interior 

force that widely roams border communities. Other law enforcement agencies, such 

as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Drug Enforcement Agency 

have responsibility for interior immigration and drug enforcement; CBP’s enforcement far from any actual border is both duplicative and ineffective. 

The agency’s own data have shown that a majority of criminal prosecutions emanating from checkpoint operations are of U.S. citizens for small quantities of drugs, 

including marijuana, even though checkpoints are not general crime-control operations but Constitutionally limited to brief immigration inquiries. Significantly, 

checkpoints also do not provide ‘‘bang for the buck’’ in terms of unauthorized immigrant apprehensions. Although CBP emphasizes that a negative cannot be proven 

with respect to deterrent effect, checkpoint numbers—which haven’t been disclosed 

by the agency since 2013—show that very few migrants are apprehended given the 

resources committed to these operations. Two years ago CBP Commissioner 

Kerlikowske committed to ‘‘a review to collect data on the number of arrests and 

drug seizures at each checkpoint to gauge how effective they really are,’’5 but no 

public data or analysis have been released. Nor has the agency acted on the Government Accountability Office’s 2009 recommendation to implement ‘‘quality of life 

measures . . . to evaluate the impact that checkpoints have on local communities,’’6 a recommendation echoed and elaborated by the University of Arizona in 

2014.7

Consider the last available agency data about the Tucson and Yuma sectors: 

• For fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013, combined checkpoint apprehensions 

for Tucson and Yuma Sectors accounted for just 0.74 percent of those sectors’ 

total apprehensions. In fiscal year 2013, Tucson Sector’s 804 checkpoint apprehensions accounted for just 0.67 percent of the sector’s total apprehensions. 

• While CBP reported that its fiscal year 2012 Nation-wide checkpoint apprehensions accounted for 2 percent of total apprehensions, the data shows Tucson and 

Yuma Sectors’ combined 882 checkpoint apprehensions represented only 0.7 

percent of those sectors’ total apprehensions during the same period. 

• In calendar year 2013, 9 out of 23 Tucson Sector checkpoints reported zero arrests of ‘‘deportable subjects.’’ Fifteen of those checkpoints reported fewer than 

10 arrests of deportable subjects; only 6 reported more than 20 arrests, and only 

2 reported more than 40—those 2 checkpoints accounted for 74 percent of the 

deportable subjects arrested at Tucson Sector checkpoints in 2013. 

• The vast majority of those arrested at Yuma Sector checkpoints are U.S. citizens: In calendar year 2013, 1,535 ‘‘non-deportable subjects’’ were arrested as 

compared to only 197 deportable subjects, a nearly eight-fold differential. In 

2011, non-deportable subject arrests exceeded deportable subject arrests by a 

factor of more than 11, 1,822 to 161. (These numbers are consistent with FOIA 

data obtained by the Center for Investigative Reporting which showed approximately 4 out of 5 drug-related arrests by Border Patrol involved U.S. citizens.)8

• Yuma Sector’s Highway 95 checkpoint—the only checkpoint for which identifying information was not redacted—reported only 1 non-citizen apprehension 

in 3 years. The Highway 95 checkpoint is roughly 75 miles from the border and 

the subject of several abuse complaints.9

64 

10Daniel Denvir, ‘‘Curbing the Unchecked Power of the U.S. Border Patrol.’’ The Atlantic 

CityLab (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.citylab.com/crime/2015/10/curbing-the-unchecked-powerof-the-us-border-patrol/413392/. 11Todd Miller, War on the Border, NY Times, Aug. 18, 2013, http://nyti.ms/1DM0jSo. 12See, e.g., Arizona complaints (2013, http://www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/ 

ACLU%20AZ%20Complaint%20re%20CBP%20Roving%20Patrols%20Oct%209%202013.pdf; 

2014, http://www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/ACLU%20AZ%20Complaint%- 

20re%20CBP%20Checkpoints%20%202014%2001%2015.pdf; 2016, http://www.acluaz.org/sites/ 

default/files/documents/ACLU%20Complaint%20to%20CBP%20OPR%20June%2028%20- 

2016.pdf); ACLU of Arizona report, Record of Abuse, supra; ACLU of New Mexico report, Guilty 

Until Proven Innocent: Border Patrol Discrimination in Southern NM (2015), https://www.aclunm.org/guiltyuntilproveninnocent/2015/05/. 13For ACLU of Arizona’s Know your Rights with Border Patrol advisory please see: http:// 

www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/ACLU%20Border%20Rights%20ENGLISHl1.pdf. 14Denvir, ‘‘Curbing the Unchecked Power,’’ supra. 

CBP has not published data to reflect the significant financial cost of Border Patrol interior operations, so taxpayers do not know the price tag, for example, for 

Yuma Sector’s 200–300 annual checkpoint apprehensions, nor does the agency attempt to quantify the checkpoints’ ‘‘deterrent’’ effect. Still, the agency’s data suggest 

that the limited enforcement gains of most interior checkpoints do not outweigh the 

many harms their operation inflicts upon border communities in the form of additional migrant deaths, wide-spread civil rights and civil liberties abuses, and negative impacts on local businesses and property values. 

II. CBP’S INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES LEAD TO CONSTITUTIONAL ABUSES AND

ECONOMIC HARM. 

CBP’s interior enforcement activities are suboptimal uses of agency resources 

meant to further border-security goals, yet do enormous damage to the quality of 

life of those who live and work in the border region. Border community members 

report harassment, racial profiling, excessive force, and other unlawful treatment by 

CBP agents at checkpoints and during patrol stops. 

To get a sense of these experiences, take two examples of individuals very familiar 

to the subcommittee. In 2009, Representative Beto O’Rourke ‘‘then an El Paso city 

council member, says he was stopped and sent into secondary screening while driving to visit his sister in Carlsbad, New Mexico. ‘I came through and was pulled over 

into secondary, which has never happened to me before. And then my 2-year-old son 

was put into a holding cell while they searched my truck. I didn’t have anything 

worth searching for,’ said O’Rourke. ‘I remember how awful I felt being in that cell 

and how un-American that felt. I had not crossed an international border... yet 

was detained, questioned, and searched without probable cause. And that’s a shitty 

feeling. And a lot of people experience that.’ ’’10 Second, ‘‘Border Patrol Agents 

stopped Senator Patrick Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, 125 miles south of the border, 

in New York. When Mr. Leahy asked what authority the agent had to detain him, 

the agent pointed to his gun and said, ‘That’s all the authority I need.’ ’’11

CBP conducts operations, including checkpoints and roving patrols, far removed 

from the border. Encounters with non-border crossers, including U.S. citizens and 

permanent residents, result in regular CBP enforcement experiences during their 

day-to-day lives. People residing within 100 miles of a border are subject to both 

fixed and roving checkpoints, ostensibly to confirm immigration status but often 

leading to other law enforcement actions. In some communities, residents must pass 

through Border Patrol checkpoints to reach work, school, medical appointments, or 

other daily activities. The ACLU has filed dozens of complaints on behalf of border 

residents regarding checkpoint activities and roving patrols, along with publishing 

numerous reports that details abuses that result from this interior enforcement.12

Away from standing inspection points where all vehicles are stopped, Border Patrol must have ‘‘reasonable suspicion’’ of an immigration violation or crime to pull 

someone over and probable cause to search vehicles. To send a person to ‘‘secondary’’ 

at a checkpoint for a non-immigration inquiry also requires reasonable suspicion. 

However, Border Patrol Agents routinely ignore or misunderstand the limits of their 

legal authority.13 For example, ‘‘[i]n an interview, CBP and Border Patrol Officials 

seemed unsure about what legal requirements, like probable cause, governed agents 

searching cars for possible immigration and general criminal violations. One finally 

stated that probable cause was not necessary to conduct an immigration-related 

search. According to James Lyall, [at the time] an attorney at the ACLU of Arizona, 

that is false: Probable cause, consent, or a warrant is always necessary for a vehicle 

search not conducted at a port of entry. ‘They have no idea what the rules are, in 

part because they can so easily ignore them,’ he says.’’14

65 

15https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/senatelhearinglendinglraciallprofilinglinlamericalwrittenlstatementlromero.pdf (pp. 16–18). 16 Chris Rickerd, ‘‘Border Patrol Violence Must Stop.’’ Huffington Post (June 5, 2015), http:// 

www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-rickerd/border-patrol-violence-must-stoplbl7523786.html. 17 Complaint available at http://www.aclu-wa.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2012-04- 

26--Complaintl0.pdf. 18Manny Fernandez, ‘‘Checkpoints Isolate Many Immigrants in Texas’ Rio Grande Valley.’’ 

New York Times (Nov. 22, 2015) http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/23/us/checkpoints-isolatemany-immigrants-in-texas-rio-grande-valley.html. 19Tina Vasquez, ‘‘Flint’s Undocumented Residents Go Without Care in Wake of Water Crisis.’’ 

Rewire (Sept. 8, 2016), https://rewire.news/article/2016/09/08/flints-undocumented-residentsgo-care-water-crisis/. 20 Correspondence with Eduardo Canales (Sept. 12, 2016) (on file with authors). 21See SBCC, ‘‘Federal Reforms Usher Open Season for Racial Profiling in Border Communities.’’ (Dec. 8, 2014), available at http://soboco.org/federal-reforms-ushers-open-season-for-racial-profiling-in-border-communities/; Chris Rickerd, ‘‘A Dangerous Precedent: Why Allow Racial 

Profiling at or Near the Border?’’ (Dec. 8, 2014), available at https://www.aclu.org/blog/ 

immigrants-rights-racial-justice/dangerous-precedent-why-allow-racial-profiling-or-near-border. 22Letter of October 9, 2015, http://southernborder.org/cpc-chc-capac-urge-dhs-to-end-discriminatory-profiling/. 23 Jorge Rodrı ́guez, ‘‘Border Patrol Chief Must End Biased Policing to Restore Trust in Communities.’’ (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/blog/washington-markup/border-patrol-chiefmust-end-biased-policing-restore-trust-communities. 

Northern border residents have reported Border Patrol Agents conducting roving 

patrols near schools and churches and asking passengers for their documents on 

trains and buses that are traveling far from border crossings.15 Incidents, such as 

the brutal 2015 assault/Tasing of Jessica Cooke—a college criminology senior who 

had applied to work at CBP—at a checkpoint near Waddington, New York, have 

generated fear and distrust as well as millions of video views.16 The ACLU of Washington State brought and settled a class-action lawsuit to end the Border Patrol’s 

practice of stopping vehicles and interrogating occupants without legal justification. 

One of the plaintiffs in the case was an African American corrections officer and 

part-time police officer pulled over for no expressed reason and interrogated about 

his immigration status while wearing his corrections uniform.17

In the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas, residents in mixed-status families say 

they are scared to evacuate their homes in weather-related emergencies for fear 

they will be apprehended by Border Patrol. These checkpoints inhibit U.S. citizen 

children from receiving critical medical care, as reported last year by the New York 

Times 18 and echoed in Flint, Michigan’s water crisis.19 Our colleagues in Brooks 

County, TX, contend with hundreds of tragic migrant deaths each year because the 

Falfurrias checkpoint is 57 miles from the actual border. Eduardo Canales, director 

of the South Texas Human Rights Center, reports that ‘‘there has been a total of 

45 bodies and remains recovered this year alone. These numbers only reflect what 

has been found. I would estimate that at least twice that number have also perished 

and remain scattered all over the brush terrain of Brooks County. These deaths are 

a result of Falfurrias checkpoint.’’20

III. CBP’S ‘‘VICINITY OF THE BORDER’’ EXEMPTION FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S

GUIDANCE ON RACIAL AND OTHER PROFILING BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT MUST

END, AND CBP SHOULD COLLECT DATA TO EVALUATE WHETHER IT IS ENGAGING IN

BIASED POLICING. 

We are dismayed that CBP and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

obtained ‘‘exemptions’’ from the Department of Justice’s 2014 Guidance on the Use 

of Race, Ethnicity, Gender, National Origin, Religion, Sexual Orientation, or Gender 

Identity,21 and have not yet issued follow-up guidance of their own despite urging 

a year ago by the Congressional Progressive, Hispanic, and Asian Pacific American 

Caucuses.22 Often as a result of racial or religious profiling, innocent people are 

daily being stopped, interrogated and searched by Border Patrol without legal justification. As Jorge Rodrı ́guez, a doctoral candidate in New Mexico whose young life 

has been filled with hostile checkpoint experiences, asks, ‘‘Why is Border Patrol permitted to treat me, a U.S. citizen, differently due to the color of my skin?’’23

The Caucuses’ letter emphasized that ‘‘[t]he 2014 DOJ Guidance stresses that 

profiling the public based on intrinsic characteristics is ‘simply not good law enforcement.’ It is also contrary to our Constitutional principles. In Montero-Camargo, the 

Ninth Circuit noted that ‘[s]tops based on race or ethnic appearance send the underlying message to all our citizens that those who are not white are judged by the 

color of their skin alone... that those who are not white enjoy a lesser degree 

of constitutional protection[,] assumed to be potential criminals first and individuals 

66 

24 United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 25 ‘‘Write it up: Bill requiring border patrol to document stops is long overdue.’’ Watertown 

Daily Times (June 6, 2015), http://www.watertowndailytimes.com/opinion/write-it-up-bill-requiring-border-patrol-to-document-stops-is-long-overdue-20150606; ‘‘You aren’t above the law, 

Border Patrol.’’ Arizona Republic (June 10, 2015), http://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/ 

editorial/2015/06/10/you-arent-above-the-law-border-patrol/71036582/. 26David Sommerstein, ‘‘Gillibrand has ‘serious concerns’ about border patrol checkpoints.’’ 

North County Public Radio (June 4, 2015), http://www.northcountrypublicradio.org/news/ 

story/28568/20150603/gillibrand-has-quot-serious-concerns-quot-about-border-patrol-checkpoints. 27President’s Task Force On 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force 

on 21st Century Policing 69 (2015), (Recommendation 2.6, Action Item 1.3.1, and Recommendation 7.1), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/TaskForcelFinalReport.pdf. 28 ACLU Testimony for Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

Hearing on ‘‘Dogs of DHS: How Canine Programs Contribute to Homeland Security,’’ (Mar. 3, 

2016), 6, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/fieldldocument/senatelhsgaclcaninelhearinglaclulstatement-final.pdf. 29Michel Marizco, Living Life Under Federal Watch On The Border, Fronteras/NPR, Aug. 5, 

2013, http://bit.ly/1EHuBaF; Miller, War on the Border, supra (quoting an Amado rancher, ‘‘If 

you conduct business here, you live here, you’re always being watched, you’re always being 

stopped, and you’re treated as if you’re a criminal.’’) 30See, e.g., Fernanda Santos, Border Patrol Scrutiny Stirs Anger in Small Town, NY TIMES, 

June 27, 2014, http://nyti.ms/1EY9oca. 31 Bob Ortega, Border Patrol Sued for Harassing at Arivaca Checkpoint, AZ REPUBLIC, Nov. 

26, 2014, http://bit.ly/1Ec1k6n. 

second.’ Profiling degrades the dignity of individuals and groups singled out based 

on immutable traits.’’24

Both Northern and Southern Border communities are tired of CBP’s opacity; as 

the Caucuses’ letter makes clear, a profiling ban as well as data collection and publication are long overdue: ‘‘Border communities eagerly await these improvements, 

for example, a recent editorial in the Watertown (NY) Daily Times calls for proper 

CBP data collection and expresses surprise that protocols are not already in place: 

‘Given the questions raised over the past few years about racial and ethnic profiling 

by law enforcement agencies across the country, it’s difficult to understand why documenting specific information about people who are stopped by border patrol personnel isn’t being done... Detailing who is being stopped, why they are being 

stopped and what resulted from the stop would go a long way toward ensuring CBP 

Agents are staying within the law.’ The Arizona Republic expressed concern that 

‘[r]esidents of border communities south of Tucson have long complained about racial profiling and harassment at Border Patrol checkpoints. Their demands for information about the effectiveness of individual stops have been rebuffed.’ ’’25 Senator 

Kirsten Gillibrand has proposed a legislative response to this data-collection void 

after expressing dissatisfaction at CBP’s lack of record-keeping.26

Indeed, Border Patrol does not collect data on stops and searches that do not result in arrest, even though the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 

urges Federal law enforcement agencies to ‘‘collect, maintain, and analyze demographic data on all detentions,’’ and adds that ‘‘[t]o embrace a culture of transparency, law enforcement agencies should... regularly post on the Department’s 

website information about stops, summonses, arrests, reported crime, and other law 

enforcement data aggregated by demographics.’’27 This data collection gap makes it 

difficult to detect and deter illegal or abusive treatment of the public at checkpoints 

and during patrol stops. CBP must also improve the effectiveness of Border Patrol 

service canines, which are not certified according to best law-enforcement standards 

and frequently issue false alerts.28

IV. CASE STUDY: CHECKPOINTS IN AND AROUND ARIVACA, ARIZONA

The communities of Arivaca and Amado, Arizona, located about 30 miles from the 

border, live with a substantial Border Patrol presence in their midst—surveillance 

towers, drones, helicopters, and dozens of agents on roving patrols.29 Perhaps the 

most prominent feature of local Border Patrol operations is the 4 vehicle checkpoints 

located within 40 miles of Arivaca and Amado, through which residents must pass 

to go about their daily business. 

Those checkpoints have been the source of numerous civil rights complaints, and 

one of them, the Arivaca Road checkpoint, led to a monitoring campaign by local 

residents demanding its removal. That campaign generated extensive media attention,30 resulted in litigation,31 and produced what appears to be the first and only 

67 

32Paul Ingram, Residents Claim Racial Profiling at Border Patrol Checkpoint, TUCSON SENTINEL, Oct. 19, 2014, http://bit.ly/1B52CeR. 33 Community members’ descriptions of their experiences at the checkpoint are posted to the 

group’s website, http://phparivaca.org/?pagelid=210. 34 ACLU of Ariz., Complaint and Request for Investigation of Abuses at Border Patrol Interior 

Checkpoints in Southern Arizona, Including Unlawful Search and Seizure, Excessive Force, and 

Racial Profiling (Jan. 15, 2014), http://bit.ly/1k73lqO. 35Jacobson et al. v. DHS et al., Case 4:14-cv-02485 (filed D. Ariz., Nov. 20, 2014), http:// 

bit.ly/1NKI99a. 36 Community Report: Campaign Documents Systemic Racial Discrimination at Arizona Border 

Patrol Checkpoint, Oct. 1, 2014, http://bit.ly/1NKChNh. 37 Jacobson Complaint, supra, at 15 ¶ 78. 

objective data available on systemic racial disparities in Border Patrol checkpoint 

operations.32

In July 2013, the Arivaca, Arizona-based organization People Helping People 

(PHP) sponsored a forum for local residents to discuss the Border Patrol presence 

in their community and its impact on their lives. The discussion centered on the 

Arivaca Road checkpoint, with many describing routine harassment and abuse by 

agents. The group later reported: ‘‘[A]ll participants agreed on one point: that something is fundamentally wrong when the Federal Government enters a community 

and implements a policy by which no one, including children on their way to school, 

can leave without being stopped and questioned by armed Federal agents—and 

under which all residents are suspects simply by virtue of where they live.’’ 

PHP initiated a campaign to demand removal of the Arivaca Road checkpoint. The 

group began by documenting abuses of local residents.33 A petition calling for removal, signed by nearly half of Arivaca’s residents and supported by Representative 

Raul Grijalva, was rejected by then-Tucson Sector Chief Padilla. Despite several 

statements by local Border Patrol officials that community concerns, including civil 

rights complaints, would be taken seriously, the agency has taken no public action 

in response to any such complaints. Those include a January 2014 ACLU complaint 

submitted to DHS oversight agencies on behalf of 15 Arizona residents, including 

several from Arivaca, which is still pending.34

In February 2014, PHP initiated a checkpoint-monitoring campaign to collect data 

on checkpoint operations and deter further abuses. Border Patrol immediately responded to the monitoring campaign by creating a roughly 350-foot wide buffer zone 

around the checkpoint; agents repeatedly claimed that exclusive authority within 

the ‘‘enforcement zone’’ was conferred by a county permit—this was unconvincing 

to advocates, as Border Patrol policies explicitly exempt checkpoints from local permitting requirements. After twice more writing to Chief Padilla seeking to resolve 

the dispute, members of PHP filed a lawsuit in November 2014.35

Prior to filing suit, PHP released the initial results of its monitoring campaign. 

Based on more than 100 hours of observation and 2,379 recorded vehicle stops, 

PHP’s report found that Latino motorists were referred for secondary inspection 20 

times more frequently than White motorists, and asked for identification 26 times 

more frequently.36 Meanwhile, monitors observed no arrests or seizures of contraband; Border Patrol officials subsequently admitted that arrests at the Arivaca Road 

checkpoint are extremely rare, and that its primary purpose is ‘‘deterrence.’’37

Two important lessons can be drawn from the experience of the Arivaca community. One is that CBP must expand its data collection to detect and deter abuse. 

To match best law-enforcement practices, such data must include critical information such as perceived race or ethnicity of those stopped, and the duration of and 

reasons for stops and searches. That information relates not just to the civil rights 

of border residents, but also has a direct bearing on the efficacy of operations (if 

agents are wasting time and resources violating the rights of innocent travelers, the 

agency’s mission is compromised). As the PHP report concludes, ‘‘The fact that a 

small volunteer organization can document evidence of discriminatory and unlawful 

conduct by agents shows that the Federal Government can and should do the same, 

while holding agents accountable to the rule of law. The government’s continued 

failure to do so implies that it condones these practices.’’ Secondly, CBP must be 

more transparent and responsive to community concerns, including allegations of 

civil rights abuses. Border Patrol’s response to the PHP campaign—ignoring community complaints and then creating a checkpoint buffer zone, arbitrarily restricting 

residents from observing the treatment of friends and neighbors in their own community—demonstrates that the agency has a long way to go toward its promises of 

increased accountability and transparency. 

68 

38Denvir, ‘‘Curbing the Unchecked Power,’’ supra. 39See, e.g., National Immigration Forum, Body Cameras and CBP: Promoting security, transparency and accountability at our nation’s borders (2015), http://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Body-Cameras-and-CBP-Report-11062015.pdf. 40 Ed Pilkington, ‘‘Images from US Border Patrol facility reveal harsh conditions for immigrants.’’ The Guardian (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/aug/18/ 

us-border-patrol-facility-images-tucson-arizona. 41See Coalition Recommendations to DHS to Improve Complaint Processing (2014), https:// 

www.aclu.org/files/assets/14l5l5lrecommendationsltoldhsltolimprovelcom- plaintlprocessinglfinal.pdf; see also American Immigration Council, No Action Taken: Lack of 

CBP Accountability in Responding to Complaints of Abuse (2014), available at http:// 

www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/no-action-taken-lack-cbp-accountability-respondingcomplaints-abuse. 

CONCLUSION

CBP’s interior enforcement operations run contrary to the reality of border communities, which are safe, diverse, and economically critical to this country. As Representative O’Rourke points out, ‘‘El Paso is the safest city when you look at violent 

crime. There’s no reason to cordon off the U.S. side of the U.S.-Mexico border from 

the rest of the country.’’38 Border communities are forced to endure regular aggression, hostility, and intimidation from a significant percentage of CBP Officers and 

Agents. Border residents, like any community, should not have to live with fear and 

mistrust of law enforcement. 

Border communities are a vital component of the trillion-plus dollars in trade between the United States and its neighbors, and the damaging effects of militarization on them must be addressed by serious oversight and accountability reforms to 

CBP. While the Federal Government has the authority to control our Nation’s borders and regulate immigration, CBP officials must do so in compliance with National and international legal norms and standards. 

As employees of the Nation’s largest law enforcement agency, CBP officials should 

be trained and held to the highest law enforcement standards. Systemic, robust, and 

permanent oversight and accountability mechanisms for CBP must be the starting 

point for any discussion on border security: • A DHS-wide ban on racial, religious, and other offensive profiling that closes 

the ‘‘vicinity of the border’’ exemption to DOJ’s profiling guidance for Federal 

law enforcement; • Robust data collection and publication to ensure that CBP operations comport 

with anti-discrimination law and guidance; • Equipping all CBP personnel with body-worn cameras, within a policy framework including robust privacy protections;39

• Implementing enforceable CBP custody standards;40

• Reforming DHS complaint systems to provide a transparent, uniform, efficient 

process for filing complaints;41 and • Rolling back the antiquated 100-mile zone to properly define ‘‘reasonable distance’’ from the border as no more than 25 miles (10 miles for warrantless entry 

onto private lands). 

Such improvements would create a legacy of CBP reform in order to improve the 

quality of life and restore trust for this and future generations of border residents. 

We urge the subcommittee to prioritize accountability at CBP that transforms border enforcement in a fiscally responsible manner, respects and listens to border residents before imposing policy, and upholds Constitutional rights and American values. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Ramı ́rez. 

The Chair will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for a first 

round of questions. 

I appreciate the testimony of the second panel. I will just share 

that, you know, my perspective as the Chairman of this subcommittee is oftentimes in Washington, DC, people are looking for 

areas of disagreement and divisiveness so that people can take 

their corners and put their jerseys on and figure out, you know, 

where we can find the biggest controversy. 

My intent in this leadership position and with this subcommittee 

hearing is to look for areas of agreement, look for areas where 

across the spectrum and from different perspectives we can find 

some understanding and common ground, which needs to be based 

69 

on facts and needs to be based on the experiences of the people that 

all of you are represented and the facts, Dr. Golob, of, you know, 

the studies you have done related to the impact of the current 

strategy on our communities. 

So I appreciate all of your testimonies, both written and summarized in verbal, in order to present and highlight for the record the 

challenges that communities are having with the defense-in-depth 

strategy, which includes the checkpoints. 

I believe that we can, between Border Patrol leadership, Border 

Patrol Agents, and those that are residents in the border region, 

we can find where those Venn diagrams overlap, as all Americans, 

to identify solutions that are going to have the objective of keeping 

our country safe, keeping our community safe, preserving our civil 

liberties, and making sure that our border communities are not 

being impacted negatively economically, environmentally, across 

the board, all the things that have been presented here today. 

These are things that are not in contradiction with each other. 

I do appreciate that the perspectives of the second panel have 

shown where, again, we can, I think, come to places of agreement 

that there are negative impacts that need to be addressed. People 

across the political spectrum would agree that there are things that 

we need to do maybe better and differently in order to secure our 

border, keep our country safe, keep our communities safe, protect 

our civil liberties, and provide opportunity for individuals, small 

businesses, communities to be able to, you know, grow and prosper 

and meet their economic potential and not have negative impacts 

from the strategy that we currently have. 

So I really appreciate the different perspectives from everybody 

on the panel today. 

Follow-up questions: I know you all didn’t get to some of the 

things that were in your written testimony. I will start with Mr. 

Brasher. 

Again, we have had conversations on multiple occasions about 

the impact in southern Arizona of specifically the checkpoints and 

the defense-in-depth strategy. So you are now Chief Morgan; you 

are now responsible for the mission of keeping these very communities that you are advocating for safe. You know, I know you have 

had multiple conversations and studies about this issue, but we 

want to make sure we also come with solutions, right? So if you 

are in charge, what would you shift the strategy to be? 

Because if we just today got rid of checkpoints but we didn’t address the strategy, then, if you look at the numbers, I mean, that 

is not necessarily making us safer, right? That is not necessarily 

stopping the cartels. That is actually going to have, I think, a negative implication. 

So if you are in charge, you know, what would you do differently, 

and how would that happen, in order to address the issues that you 

have been able to address today in your testimony? 

Mr. BRASHER. You bet. Thank you, Chairman McSally. Again, I 

agree with your comment just a moment ago. I think we are looking for that overlap. 

But to the point specifically that you asked, I think there is a variety of things, actually, that can be done, and I think some of 

70 

them are already being employed by the Border Patrol to one level 

or another already. 

I think rebuilding the port of entry was a huge first step, by the 

way, so that there was more technology available at the border as 

trucks and others are coming across. So I think that was a big step. 

But I also think that—and it was referred to earlier by Chief 

Morgan—I think that the use of aerial vehicles, whether they be 

drones or helicopters, but I think there is technology, certainly, 

that can be giving real-time information to our agents on the 

ground about what is happening right now. So I think that is another technology that can be used. 

I think, in addition, the vehicle barriers that have been used 

with, I think, a great deal of success in areas that are likely for 

those involved in illegal activity to cross. 

So I think the drones, I think the vehicle barriers. I also think 

that, for those areas that are very rough and somewhat inaccessible along the border, I understand that the Border Patrol has 

used what they call the FOBs, or the forward operating bases, 

where they have agents actually out there on horseback and, in 

some cases, with backpacks, patrolling and monitoring those areas. 

I think something as simple, quite frankly, as sharing intelligence with local law enforcement, you know, the sheriffs and the 

police departments in Nogales, things of that nature. I know that 

there have been some hold-ups in the communication element so 

that these people of varying agencies can talk together on the radio 

in real time because they use different bandwidths and things. So 

I think that is an area that could be looked at. 

I also think—I know, some time ago, a virtual fence was looked 

into, and I know that technology had some challenges to it. But I 

think now we are far enough down the road that hopefully some 

of those challenges have been overcome and the use of virtual technology would play a more significant role. 

So I think there is no silver bullet, from my perspective, of one 

thing we can do, but I think using all those things in combination 

would help. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. 

Ms. Davis, same question. You are now in charge of the Border 

Patrol—again, you have shared some of it in your verbal and your 

written testimony—representing the ranchers and the border residents in our community in southern Arizona. What would you recommend we do? 

Ms. DAVIS. I think that Chief Morgan is making a really good 

first step by doing exactly what he is doing right now, in that he 

is going to every single sector and finding out what their individual 

needs are. Because I have friends all along the border, from San 

Diego to Brownsville, Texas, and every sector is really different. 

I spoke with Mr. Morgan this morning briefly, and I said, I understand that each sector—it is bad all across the border, but it is 

different bad, which is not a very grammatically correct statement, 

but it is different bad. They are all different. He has to find out 

what is unique about each one and figure out what works better 

in that particular sector. Really just reaching out, building a personal relationship with all those sector chiefs. 

71 

I think there is a disconnect, sector-to-sector, along the border. 

From 40 years of history with the border, I see that just in Arizona. 

There is not any cohesiveness, or it is not run the same way in 

each sector. So what happens, say, in Santa Cruz County or the 

Sonoita sector is not what happens in the Douglas sector and clear 

over in McAllen, Texas. There needs to be continuity along the border. 

I don’t know how he accomplishes that. I know I am him right 

now, but I don’t know how I accomplish that, except to communicate, communicate, communicate and just really outline the problems of each specific sector and how they relate to each other. Because they all neighbor each other along the border. You have to 

become good neighbors with those people and decide what is acceptable in this sector and what is acceptable in this one and make 

them cohesive. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So not a one-size-fits-all—— 

Ms. DAVIS. Right. 

Ms. MCSALLY [continuing]. But also being adaptable and nimble, 

right? 

Ms. DAVIS. Exactly. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Because the bad guys are going to be nimble as 

well, right? 

Ms. DAVIS. Right. They are going to move; they are going to do 

their thing. Like the little Dutch boy with his finger in the dike, 

wherever you stop it up, they are going to go around. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Ms. DAVIS. Let me just say that I do agree with Mr. Ramı ́rez 

that none of us like to be profiled. None of us do. I don’t, you know, 

necessarily appreciate having a police force presence either. But I 

know we have to have some strong leadership and backup, and, 

you know, I could see that happening if there is more communication. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks, Ms. Davis. 

Dr. Golob, I don’t know if you find yourself in a position to be 

able to answer that question, not just for the study on the checkpoints but all the research and the efforts that have happened at 

the university with the border center of excellence. Do you have 

any perspective, if you were in charge, how you would address 

things differently? 

Ms. GOLOB. Certainly. If I was wearing the green hat, I think 

there are some low-lying issues that would be relatively easy for 

Border Patrol to implement. Specifically, the data integrity and 

quality issues are fairly straightforward. You know, any smart 

master’s or doctoral student could implement them in a short 

amount of time. 

I know, you know, getting the funds for technology change isn’t 

as easy as it may sound and dealing with an agency’s budget, but 

those are relatively quick, inexpensive changes that can be made. 

As well as the simulation model for checkpoints, for managing traffic and resource allocation, is a relatively easy thing to fix. 

The harder-level issues to address are, first, the efficiency and effectiveness issues. It is difficult for an agency to undergo a test and 

evaluation of how well they are performing. We have all had job 

evaluations that had us in a high sense of nervousness, but I think 

72 

it is ultimately to Border Patrol and the Nation’s benefit for an objective assessment of their performance effectiveness, be it by redteaming, as we recommended, or some other measure. We, as the 

citizens, need no know how well checkpoints are doing before we 

can decide what to do about them. 

Finally, community impacts. You know, that is a much messier 

issue to address because it encompasses so many factors, as the 

other panel members addressed. But, from my perspective, trying 

to see which data can be analyzed, you know, can be put in a quantitative form, such as housing prices, such as school lock-downs, 

such as incidences of profiling. By gathering that data, Border Patrol can present a more accurate and transparent picture to the 

border residents. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you, Dr. Golob. 

Mr. Ramı ́rez. 

Mr. RAMI ́REZ. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I would agree with Dr. Golob. You know, one of the things that 

we need to know is how effective are these checkpoints. Without 

that transparency, without that accountability, without that oversight, what it has created has been a mistrust between local residents and the CBP. I think that that should about our biggest concern. 

You know, we enjoy wonderful relationships with local law enforcement, and we know that the best way to provide public safety 

is by ensuring that local residents could call their local police station and say, you know, I see something that is suspect here—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Mr. RAMI ́REZ [continuing]. Can you come check it out? 

I will tell you, when it comes to Border Patrol, that is not the 

case. We have serious problems with corruption. We have a perception in the public that this agency operates with impunity, that it 

lacks transparency. 

But I think that the Commissioner has taken important steps in 

the last couple of years. We have been engaged in a very robust 

conversation with the Commissioner, Southern Border and Northern Border communities. I think that Chief Morgan, in his previous 

capacity at CBP, when he was heading internal affairs, you know, 

in an interim capacity, created the conditions for more transparency. 

Without those transparency, accountability, and oversight mechanisms that are urgently needed in CBP, it is very difficult to have 

communities say, you know what, I am going to call Border Patrol 

if I see something going on, because of the experiences that I described. We all have been mistreated. You know, what makes me 

a suspect is the color of my skin. Unless we reverse that and force 

DHS to follow the same guidelines the Department of Justice has 

done in terms of banning racial profiling, it will be very difficult 

to regain that trust. 

However, I do want to reiterate that the Commissioner has taken 

wonderful steps in the direction of added accountability and oversight. But we need to make sure that we implement those reforms 

as soon as possible so that we could narrow the gap between communities and CBP. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. 

73 

The Chair now recognizes my colleague from Texas, Ms. Sheila 

Jackson Lee, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the Chairman very much. 

Let me specifically say to our witnesses, I appreciate very much 

your testimony. I was delayed because I was in a meeting on criminal justice reform, but I wanted to make sure that I had an opportunity to at least hear some of the very important testimony. 

I want to say to Ms. Davis and Mr. Brasher, that is the reason 

that we have what we call the People’s House, for you to petition 

your Government. I have heard you. I am from Texas. I have spent 

a lot of time on the border, walking the border, traveling to the 

border, traveling over the border to Mexico, looking at the resources. I have been on the Homeland Security Committee where, 

in the few days after 9/11, I came on this committee in its formulation, when we formulated the Homeland Security Committee. If 

there was anything embedded in my heart, it was to protect the 

American people. 

So I want to just add some comments. When I co-chaired this 

committee, or was the Ranking Member, with Candice Miller from 

Michigan, the Northern Border, we wrote 1417, the Border Results 

Act of 2013. It was a bipartisan, comprehensive border security bill. 

Now, it insisted on 90-percent operational control—and I would always be eager to raise that number, but that was its initial writing—of the illegal border crosses. That is certainly far from where 

we are today. We are not at that. 

I think what was good about it is that it directed the Secretary 

of the Department to develop and report to Congress for approval 

a National strategy to gain and maintain operational control of the 

Nation’s border. That is what I am hearing you say, and I am going 

to just ask a brief question about that. 

Because to live your lives, to have operational control would be 

great, that you could know what was going on, contain those who 

are illegally crossing. But it also gave the direction for advanced 

technology and from existing taxpayer-owned Department of Defense technology being brought back from Iraq and Afghanistan. 

We have a lot of overlap and a lot of opportunities to use some of 

the talents and work that was already done. 

What I think what was important about this for Mr. Ramı ́rez as 

well, it required our oversight agency—that is the General Accounting Office; that is the numbers guys—to do an independent 

investigative team or arm of Congress to verify the viability of the 

Department’s strategy—were they meeting their goals, the implementation plan, the metrics, and results. That is what I hear all 

of you saying: Let’s get something that works. 

So I just want to ask a brief question to Mr. Brasher, and then 

I have some questions for Mr. Ramı ́rez. I want to thank Dr. Golob, 

because we need academics dealing with this issue. 

Mr. Brasher, you want something that works at the border. Is 

that my understanding? 

Mr. BRASHER. Yes, Congresswoman. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So there is discussion about moving the line 

of scrimmage, and, certainly, I think we need to listen to you. 

So my point would be, in making that determination, is the 

data—do you want us to listen to you but also to do that pilot or 

74 

to implement, going forward on enhanced border security, but getting the data and making sure we are getting it right? Would that 

be helpful do you? 

Mr. BRASHER. Yes, Congresswoman. Absolutely. I am not suggesting we go out, excuse the term, willy-nilly and just start changing things. I think to get the data, as Ms. Golob indicated, and 

then sitting down and having a cogent discussion about where that 

overlap is and what solutions exists. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Ms. Davis, listening to you articulate—I want 

to immediately give you solutions, but the data, is that important 

to you so that we get the results that you need to have to continue 

your business and your life? 

Ms. DAVIS. Well, data is important, of course. I think it always 

is, you know. It is an important thing to know. When you see it 

change over the years, you know that something is either being 

helped or hindered. But I think, as we live day-to-day, those of us 

who live in the borderlands, we just—we feel it—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Right. 

Ms. DAVIS [continuing]. More than anything. 

I think it is important to note that it is not just about my safety 

or my family’s safety. I feel like this is my country, and National 

security is at risk. 

I think that you would have a more humanitarian approach if 

you stopped the traffic at the border. I don’t think you would have 

the deaths. I mean, every rancher I know has found dead bodies—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I know. 

Ms. DAVIS [continuing]. On their property. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I have been there. 

Ms. DAVIS. It is disheartening when you find that. You feel for 

these people. I don’t want people to think that we are not humanitarian, because I have taken care of a lot of illegals that have come 

through over the years with medicine and help and water and food 

and all of the above. 

But, while figures are important, I can see it and I can feel it 

on a daily basis whether it is working or not. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, that was the underlying premise of the 

legislation that we drafted a year or 2 ago, which is actually action. 

It was at that time called the Border Results Act of 2013. So we 

want to do that as well. 

Let me go on to Dr. Golob. Then, if the Chairman yields, I would 

like to be able to ask Mr. Ramı ́rez a question. 

Dr. Golob, the former Commissioner—and as I understand Commissioner Morgan’s testimony, that he has just been here for a 

while, that he has to get his hands around the issue. He wants to 

determine whether the resources are being used in the right place. 

The previous Commissioner, Kerlikowske, committed to reviewing 

checkpoint data to assess their efficiency as a border security tool 

and to justify the use of resources. 

As we listen to Ms. Davis and Mr. Brasher, they have said results. In your academic analysis, would that be a good methodology 

for the Government to do to make sure these resources tell us what 

scrimmage line we should be at? 

Dr. Golob. 

75 

Ms. GOLOB. Yes, with the caveat that we need to understand 

what data is being provided to us and what it is actually measuring. You know, as we discussed before, apprehension data in 

itself is only giving you a snapshot in time of what is happening. 

We have to understand how much activity is going through and 

what percentage of that unknown level of activity the apprehension 

data is capturing, and only till we know that and develop a proxy 

data for measuring the unknown quantity of illegal activity can we 

know how effective apprehension data is. Otherwise, the apprehension data and other similar snapshots can be interpreted or manipulated over time. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Knowledge is actually power. I indicated how 

long I have been on this committee, and it was at a time when our 

Border Patrol Agents were at a very small number. We collectively, 

in a bipartisan manner, enhanced those numbers. But also, I was 

out on the border with Border Patrol Agents at night, and we gave 

simple things like night goggles, laptops, which a decade or so ago 

they did not have. 

So I am very cognizant of that, as I am cognizant I think, Doctor, 

that your work can also enhance Mr. Ramı ́rez’s concern, when we 

talk about making sure if we get the right information that we 

don’t violate the civil liberties of individuals and certainly Americans. I thank you for that. Thank you for that instruction. 

I just want to move to Mr. Ramı ́rez, if I can, and acknowledge 

the point of what you spoke, Mr. Ramı ́rez. That is, of course, people 

who reside along the Southern Border, especially those Americans 

of Mexican ancestry or Hispanic descent that have resided in the 

United States for eons and certainly, as you well know, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico. Certainly, there are iconic families and we have 

worked together with the Mexican-American community for decades, centuries, on-going. It is important that those generational 

linkages bestows upon them and all citizens their civil liberties. I 

am concerned about the great work that you are doing. 

If I might just pose for a moment the question that I hope, one 

or two, that you can answer. The GAO has previously reported that 

a component of the strategy for checkpoints is to cause illegal entrants to use less-traveled secondary roads on which they are more 

visible. Moreover, GAO has reported that Border Patrol officials 

stated that other priorities sometimes precluded positioning more 

than a minimum number of Agents and resources when checkpoint 

circumvention occurs. 

Has the Border Patrol taken steps, in your working with them 

over the years, to minimize the danger to migrants who may seek 

to circumvent the checkpoints? Has it tried to minimize the impact 

on surrounding neighborhoods, ranches, and communities? What 

more must be done? 

Mr. RAMI ́REZ. Thank you very much, Congresswoman, for your 

comments and your question. As I mentioned earlier, the last 2 

years, Commissioner Kerlikowske and his team have been diligent 

about meeting with Southern Border and Northern Border communities. However, there is a huge mistrust between CBP and border 

communities, particularly people of color living on the Southern 

Border and increasingly so along the Northern Border with Canada. 

76 

There are some commitments that the commissioner has made in 

terms of deploying, for instance, body-worn cameras, to ensure that 

CBP, the largest law enforcement agency in the Nation, complies 

with 21st Century policing best practices. That was a commitment 

that was made several years ago, and we have not yet seen the implementation of body-worn cameras. We have urged the Department of Homeland Security to follow the example of the Department of Justice in issuing guidance on racial profiling, and DHS 

still has not—is behind. 

So without having those basic policies in place, it is very difficult 

for CBP to continue to do its important mission without gaining 

the trust of families, as you mentioned, Congresswoman, who have 

been there even before the border was there. It is about time that 

the largest law enforcement agency in this Nation leads by example in the important conversation that we are having in this Nation 

about policing reform. 

Without those basic components, Congresswoman, I would say 

that it will be very difficult for CBP to gain the trust, not only of 

residents, but of our local and State elected officials. So in order 

for us to reevaluate the checkpoints, we need to make sure that 

local elected officials at school districts, at Tribal governments are 

also part of the conversation to look at what is the impact of checkpoints in our daily lives. 

We haven’t had that conversation ever. The time to have that 

conversation is now. That is why I appreciate very much this subcommittee having an opportunity for us finally to have an important conversation about the impact that checkpoints have on our 

daily lives. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me quickly wrap up and just make this 

point and ask two questions. First of all, I think the Chairman 

knows I am a strong supporter of comprehensive immigration reform that is a holistic view of access to citizenship, but also the 

strong handling of the border. I am not a person who runs away 

from that issue and I don’t think you run away from it. 

I just noticed that the Border Patrol had a strategic plan, and 

probably under the previous commissioner, now going on Border 

Community Liaison Program, ranch liaison, and town hall meetings, which I hope that Ms. Davis and Mr. Brasher have been involved and I hope you have been involved. If not, this is something 

we want to encourage, because this is how they hear about the concerns on the ground. 

So I want to just pose these questions, because I don’t hear any 

adverse viewpoint from you about the responsibilities of the Federal Government securing the border. But you are looking at the 

way to do it and the way to respect all of the citizens that travel. 

So would you share with me some of your civil liberties challenges and concerns with the stopping that is going on? Might I 

qualify this by saying, having worked with them, having spoken to 

them in large numbers, able, hardworking public servants Border 

Patrol Agents are. I know that. Many of them have to leave their 

family. They are posted somewhere else from where their family is. 

So let me publicly thank them for their service. 

What we are trying to do here is to make a matrix that will 

work. So if you would share that, and share as well the comment 

77 

that you made about racial profiling, maybe you have an anecdotal 

assessment, so that we can look at how we use our Border Patrol 

checkpoints to make them effective for the law enforcement duties, 

but also comport with the very basic value of this Nation is the 

equality of all persons. If you could talk about the civil liberties 

that you see and the issue of racial profiling. 

Mr. RAMI ́REZ. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. Perhaps 

the biggest travesty in the border region and one that, regardless 

of where we stand on the issue of immigration reform, is the moral 

obligation we have as a Nation to stop the deaths of our brothers 

and sisters traveling across the border. 

Operation Gatekeeper and Operation Hold the Line were mentioned earlier with Chief Morgan. Those two policies are directly 

responsible for the deaths of thousands of folks. More than 20 

years later, the time has come for us to reevaluate that moral 

weight that we have on our Nation’s shoulders. So addressing that 

issue is important. 

We have worked with the commissioner to do things like deploy 

rescue beacons so that when folks are in distress, they can press 

a button, a signal will be sent, and we can then deploy the searchand-rescue elite team of the Border Patrol to prevent that death. 

That is perhaps the No. 1 civil rights atrocity that we are facing 

at the border, and all of us, I believe, have seen the ill effects that 

that has on our communities. 

When it comes to the issues of racial profiling, Congresswoman, 

I mentioned earlier, you know, I can’t leave my hometown of San 

Diego without going through a checkpoint. If I want to visit my inlaws in the neighboring county to the east, I have to go through 

a checkpoint. I have to carry my U.S. passport with me and my 

child has to also carry his U.S. passport with him to visit his 

grandparents. If we want to go to Disneyland, it is the same thing, 

to the north. 

The time to end the shameful practice of racial profiling has 

come. The entity that must lead by example is the largest law enforcement agency in this Nation, which is Customs and Border Protection. 

The Department of Justice has issued guidance in that regard. 

The White House has issued guidelines for 21st Century policing. 

That is the No. 1 civil rights violation that we are facing as U.S. 

citizens in our own country. I have to show proof of citizenship 

when I want to take my child to visit his grandparents in the 

United States. We have never left the Nation. 

So that is perhaps the most dramatic impact that this lack of accountability and lack of transparency, heavy-handed enforcement 

has on our daily lives. 

I will conclude, Congresswoman, with saying that the issues of 

use of force in our region have been addressed adequately, first by 

Mr. Morgan in his previous capacity as head of internal affairs at 

CBP and hopefully now in his current tenure, but we still have unresolved issues of use of force in our community. We are talking 

about U.S. citizens. We are talking about children. We are talking 

about Mexican nationals standing on the Mexican side of the border who have been killed by CBP Agents and Officers. Those cases 

remain unresolved. 

78 

In order for us to protect the homeland, we must ensure that we 

protect the basic values that we hold dear to our Nation, and those 

are the values of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 

I will tell you, Congresswoman, we will be happy the day that 

I am able to take my kid to see his grandparents and I don’t have 

to be pulled over to question a 2-year-old’s nationality. That is a 

shameful practice in this country and it must come to an end. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I want to thank the witnesses. I want to 

thank the Chairman. She has been enormously kind. This is a passion of mine, and I am excited that I got to hear the real important 

people that were here on this panel. 

I just want to conclude by saying that, Madam Chairman, we 

had developed from 2012 to 2016 this outreach program, Border 

Community Liaison Program. I didn’t get a chance to ask ranch liaison and town hall meetings. Maybe we will have another hearing 

where we bring additional representatives out of New Mexico, 

Texas, and to hear how those meetings are working. 

Then I do think Mr. Ramı ́rez—and I have heard no contrary testimony—is very much worth listening to, developing the racial 

profiling matrix to try and deal with those citizens traveling about. 

I think he specifically, since he is from San Diego, talking about, 

as he said, going up north, but going up north in his State of California and having not crossed any border and then having to be 

subjected to that. 

So from Ms. Davis wanting results and making sure that checkpoints—there is action in checkpoints and that there is an effective 

checkpoint, I think what we have got here is a meeting of the 

minds that we have got to be reasonable. You were here, but I 

would encourage to look again at H.R. 1417 and however it could 

be updated, coalesced with our colleagues on both sides of the aisle. 

We drew bipartisan support. There were some bumps in the road 

about the 90 percent versus 100. I don’t know if anyone can reach 

that number. But certainly, in keeping with Mr. Ramı ́rez’s admonition, we could look at this question again and find the reasonable 

common ground. 

I don’t know whether, Madam Chair, I could encourage you with 

a smile to join me on comprehensive immigration reform, which is 

certainly still there. I think if we had that legislation, we wouldn’t 

have a number that keeps going up and down, we are not sure, 11 

million individuals who are seeking status here. 

But I think our work here is about border security, and I think 

these have been very instructive testimonies. To each and every 

one of you, I am so grateful that you came this morning. Thank 

you. I am going to get to work on the great suggestions that you 

have made. 

I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK, great. Thank you. OK. I have a lot of other 

questions, but I first want to comment that, you know, we don’t 

have the voice of the agents at the table today, and I think it is 

important. I have heard you all say, but it is important to reiterate 

that we have men and women out there that are putting on the 

uniform every single day to serve their country in a different way 

to keep our country and our community safe. Many of them are 

veterans and it is a continuation of their service. 

79 

We recently lost Manuel Alvarez in the Tucson sector because of 

the dangers of the type of job that they do. We recently had a 

shooting incident at a port of entry, although that wasn’t Border 

Patrol, it was CBP, but still, this is a dangerous job. We have men 

and women in our community that are saying, here am I, send me, 

I want to help keep our community and our country safe. As Chief 

Morgan mentioned, 7,542 assaults on agents happening. 

When I was in the military, when we would see challenges of any 

issues related to, you know, mission execution, we would always 

ask, as leaders, have we given them the guidance, resources, and 

training that they need in order to do the job and do it well? 

So we, I think, should be asking ourselves from this committee 

to the Border Patrol leadership in Washington, DC, guidance, resources, and training for them to be able to do the job. None of 

them get out of bed in the morning and say, let’s not secure the 

border. Right? These men and women are doing what they are told 

to do with the training and the resources that they have been 

given. We are here to look at the bigger picture of what needs to 

change as far as the guidance, you know, the resources, the training, the policies equipping them. 

I mean, when I was out with them on a no-notice ride-along out 

there, didn’t let anybody know we were going to be out there, a few 

months ago, they talked about how many of them are out by themselves patrolling at night without any night vision goggles. This 

doesn’t make any sense. 

So I know, Mr. Ramı ́rez, you talked about the increase of the resources that we are using toward border security, but we need to 

make sure—and this is part of our discussion today—those resources are used well, it is the right amount of resources, the right 

amount of manpower to execute the correct strategy, to make sure 

that we are being effective, you know, implementing the right technologies. Again, we are taking care of the men and women to make 

sure that they are compensated, you know, for their service and all 

the elements that go with that. We are not investing in strategies 

that don’t work, which gets to the discussion today of effectiveness. 

How do we know we are being effective with our resources unless 

we are measuring it well, and we can have a thoughtful discussion 

on how to adjust the strategy in order to get to the objectives that, 

again, we can all agree on. Keep the country safe, keep the community safe, protect civil liberties, you know, don’t impact the daily 

lives and, you know, the economic situation and the security situation for our communities. I mean, those are things we can all agree 

upon. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Chair. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I apologize. May I just put into the record 

‘‘Moving the Line of Scrimmage,’’ ask unanimous consent. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Without objection. Absolutely. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

[The information follows:] 

80 

STATEMENT FROM PHP, ARIZONA

SEPTEMBER 13, 2016 

‘‘MOVING THE LINE OF SCRIMMAGE’’ 

This statement is regarding the Border and Maritime Security Subcommittee Hearing on the U.S. Border Patrol’s Defense-In-Depth Strategy. 

People Helping People in the Border Zone is a community organization in Arivaca, 

Arizona which supports local residents dealing with the negative impacts of the Defense-in-Depth strategy. 

Despite the 20 years of increasing militarization in and near our community (located 11 miles from the U.S./Mexico border), we know from first-hand experience 

that large numbers of migrants and refugees are still not deterred from crossing the 

border. The Defense-in-Depth strategy pushes migrants into grueling and often 

deadly treks into the United States through rural regions, and places local border 

communities under an undue level of military-style policing. The Defense-in-Depth 

strategy has put thousands of Border Patrol Agents in our communities, leading to 

the routine violation of our Constitutional and civil rights as they patrol far into 

the U.S. interior. In our small border community, we also witness the human tragedy caused by border militarization policies first-hand. All of us have encountered 

and continue to encounter lost, sick, and injured immigrants at our doors, and we 

live weighed down by the knowledge that many more uncounted persons have died, 

and are still dying, in the hills around our homes. 

The Defense-in-Depth strategy of interior checkpoints is something with which 

we, as border residents, must grapple every day. Our community is surrounded by 

interior Border Patrol checkpoints. The checkpoint we most frequently encounter is 

located 25 miles north of the border. In order to leave our community to go to work, 

to take our children to school, to visit friends, or to run errands outside of our small 

town, we must pass through a checkpoint. At these road blockades, armed Federal 

agents routinely question residents about their citizenship status, but also are 

known to engage in prolonged and excessive questioning, warrantless searches, harassment, and, at times, outright abuse. Our community has documented how racial 

profiling of local residents at that interior checkpoint is systematic. Through long 

experience, we have come to understand that interior checkpoints are not just for 

immigration enforcement—something they seem to do very little of. Instead, they 

place our small rural community under perpetual surveillance and directly contribute to the overall loss of Constitutional rights that we experience under the Defense-In-Depth strategy. 

The Border Patrol has refused to keep and/or make public (even to Government 

oversight agencies) the kind of data that would demonstrate the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of interior checkpoints as an immigration enforcement measure. Nonetheless, these southern Arizona checkpoints, which were originally billed as ‘‘temporary and tactical,’’ have been in place for over 9 years, operating 24/7. 

Given the absence of any evidentiary justification for the continued use of interior 

checkpoints, the lack of oversight of agents working at them, and the frequency with 

which our community members have endured harassment and abuse at the checkpoints, we in Arivaca have been forced to take upon ourselves the task of checkpoint 

monitoring in order to collect data and deter abuse. The Defense-In-Depth strategy 

places an undue burden on small border towns to hold Border Patrol Agents to basic 

accountability standards. Without local initiatives such as citizen monitoring of 

checkpoints, the agency operates in remote rural communities with virtual impunity. 

While peaceably observing over 2,300 vehicle stops in 2014 at the Arivaca Road 

checkpoint near Amado, Arizona, monitors never once witnessed the apprehension 

of an undocumented person. Neither did they ever observe Border Patrol Agents 

interdicting drugs or contraband from any vehicle on Arivaca Road. 

These findings made clear to many in our community that the placement of interior checkpoints so far from the border does not significantly increase apprehensions 

of those crossing into the United States, but only serves to increase the length and 

difficulty of their journeys as they seek to circumvent the interior checkpoint system. 

During our monitoring efforts we also discovered that racial profiling is acute at 

these interior checkpoints. We found that Latino drivers are 26 times more likely 

to be prompted to show ID than white motorists. While comprising a small minority 

of motorists—some 11 percent of traffic through the checkpoint—Latinos are 20 

times more likely to be pulled into secondary inspection by Border Patrol Agents. 

This shocking evidence of racial profiling is undeniable. 

81 

Defense-In-Depth border strategy needlessly targets borderlands residents 

through general policing operations which reach far beyond the jurisdiction of a Federal immigration enforcement agency. Because these policies are on-going in our 

rural community, we continue to monitor local Border Patrol checkpoints to deter 

abuse and collect data. 

In addition to leading to migrant deaths and racial profiling, we have seen the 

Defense-In-Depth strategy deteriorate the quality of life in Arivaca. The presence 

of checkpoints on all major roads in and out of our town makes the area appearing 

policed and dangerous to the public. As a consequence, we have seen property values plummet and local businesses close their doors. 

We have watched our children become accustomed to encountering armed Agents 

as they travel to school each day. Under Defense-In-Depth policing, Border Patrol 

helicopters now swarm low over our properties and drones watch us from high in 

the skies. Thousands of motion sensors have been buried in the lands around our 

homes and surveillance towers are perched nearby. Our Constitutional rights now 

take a back seat to vague claims of ‘‘National security’’ necessity. A supposedly temporary infringement of citizen rights has become permanent. All told, life in our 

rural community has been radically altered by Government policies which treat our 

communities as war zones. 

To many of us who have experienced first-hand 20 years of borderland militarization, it is clear that strategies such as ‘‘Defense-In-Depth,’’ ‘‘Prevention Through Deterrence,’’ and ‘‘Consequence Delivery System’’ have only increased the suffering of 

desperate people and exacerbated the difficulties faced by border communities. Military-style Federal law enforcement, either at the border or ‘‘In-Depth,’’ is a deeply 

ineffectual and harmful response to the forces that continue to propel undocumented 

immigration and the illicit movement of drugs and contraband. Decades of close experience with these policies have convinced us that militarizing the interior borderlands must no longer be used as a substitute for the economic and social policy reforms needed to address the root causes of border problems. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So, again, I just want to, you know, remind ourselves that, even with the conversation that we have had, our intent needs to be to find where we can better equip these men and 

women that are out there serving with the guidance, the resources, 

and the training that they need, with, you know, the context of the 

information that we are presenting today. I know there have been 

many conversations at the local level, at the liaison meetings, the 

sector level. We have a new chief of the Border Patrol. So this is 

our opportunity again to take a fresh look with new leadership to 

find that common ground where we are good stewards of taxpayers’ 

resources, we are providing the resources to the men and women 

who are serving, who are doing a very dangerous job. Right? We 

are having the right strategy that they are going to go out and execute on a daily basis in order to keep us safe. So I feel it is important to provide that context as we are, you know, moving forward 

in our discussion here. 

I will also say that we have got two bills, two of my bills, that 

passed unanimously in the House related to some of the things we 

are talking about. One of them is the Border Security Technology 

Accountability Act, which simply says let’s make sure if there is an 

investment in technology, that it has procurement guidelines and 

oversight and accountability to make sure it is not wasting taxpayers’ resources. We have seen a lot of wasted resources in the 

past. Passed unanimously in the House, being held up in the Senate. 

We have another one that is addressing the full new threat assessment of the Southern Border, the situational awareness, operational control, just a full fresh threat assessment so that we can 

have, again, a common understanding of what we are dealing with 

as we are addressing, OK, now that we understand what we are 

82 

dealing with, what is the best way to adjust our strategy to address 

the threat? So I look forward to those bills passing through the 

Senate so we can move forward on these important issues. 

So I want to follow up with a second round with everybody of— 

again, we don’t have Chief Morgan at the table with you. So last 

round, I asked you to be Chief Morgan. Now, you know, we have 

the opportunity to follow up with him, with questions from us to 

him, about the issues related to this current strategy. 

So what questions would you have to Chief Morgan that you 

would like us to ask him related to your testimony and related to 

addressing this defense-in-depth and interior checkpoints focus 

that we have today? Starting with Mr. Brasher. 

Mr. BRASHER. Thank you, Congresswoman. You know, I think in 

terms of a question, maybe I would say it is a question and an invitation. I recognize—as we said earlier, I know he has got a tough 

job. He has got a whole border. I am focused more on Arizona’s border right now. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Mr. BRASHER. But I think he is on the right track by getting out 

in the communities. Frankly, with all respect to he and his leadership team, I think it would be wonderful if he would come and sit 

down with people such as ourselves in these actual communities 

and just start a dialog. 

The questions I might come up with right now may be similar 

or totally different to the questions that other people, you know, in 

our communities would bring up. So I know that is easier said than 

done. I know that oftentimes when people in leadership travel, it 

is just not easy. You travel with public relations people, et cetera. 

I applaud—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. A bit of a bubble sometimes. 

Mr. BRASHER. Yes. I applaud you going out with an agent oneon-one and just watching what they experience. But I think it is 

those kinds of experiences, though, that will bring a lot of what we 

are sharing in our testimonies, you know, full circle. 

I would encourage him to abandon his uniform for a moment and 

drive through the checkpoints and just observe and just watch how 

the interaction takes place, what happens with the dogs, what happens when someone goes over to secondary and oftentimes is subjected to what might be referred to as the indignity of standing by 

while your car is torn apart or you are questioned more in-depth, 

of coming down and sitting in a coffee shop with real 

businesspeople who are sharing the stories and the anecdotes. 

So I know that is a long-winded answer, perhaps, to a simple 

question, but I think there will be more questions that would come 

from something like that, and I think they would be very valuable 

for him as he forms his strategic plan moving forward. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. 

Ms. Davis. 

Ms. DAVIS. Well, I have a million questions for him. He will have 

to take a deep breath. I actually invited him myself this morning 

to come down to the Southern Border in Arizona and see that it 

is very different than Texas. 

I think I would ask him, one thing would be, how do you plan 

to make that whole border a cohesive thing? How do you make it 

83 

the U.S. border, not the Tucson sector of the border? I am just 

going to reiterate more cohesiveness there. I just think that is really important. I have already forgotten my second idea. 

Ms. MCSALLY. That is OK. I mean, we have invited him and we 

will continue to. We know he is just getting his feet on the ground, 

you know, to Arizona. Look, our subcommittee has oversight of the 

entire border, right? So he needs to get out to Texas and New Mexico and California and talk to not just the dog-and-pony show that 

often comes with leadership visiting the field but actually talking 

to residents, talking to businesses, talking to people, you know, 

those that are seeing the impacts and the agents, to get the 

unfiltered—— 

Ms. DAVIS. Well, one of the things that concerns me and I know 

concerns Mr. Ramı ́rez is it is not unique to Hispanics. Sometimes 

when you go through the Border Patrol check, you feel like you are 

being interrogated. You know, I have had to open my trunk for no 

reason, you know. I think one of the things he has to do is make 

sure that those agents react and relate to the people coming 

through like they are really human people that—you know, assume 

that we have a right to be there. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Ms. DAVIS. I think it is an interaction between the public and the 

Border Patrol, and you don’t want to think of them as the enemy; 

you want to think of them as your friend. So I think that is one 

comment I would have to him. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So some of that is, I think, relationship-building 

in the community, and then making sure there is continuity of 

training for practices of what is probable cause and how they can 

do the searches and things, is what I have heard. 

Look, I agree. This is America, not the Gaza Strip. Right? So to 

have law-abiding American citizens have to be subjected to this 

often to just go about their daily business, this is ideally not where 

we want to be. Again, we have got to balance that with where we 

are right now and, you know, start moving toward, I think, a strategy that addresses all the issues that have been here today in a 

way that is thoughtful and not reckless and creating more 

vulnerabilities. But I think we can all agree that the more we can, 

you know, move the line of scrimmage and not have the impacts 

that have been talked about today, I think the better off we are 

going to be across the border. So thank you. 

Dr. Golob. 

Ms. GOLOB. Yes, Chairman McSally. I would follow up on the 

question that you asked Chief Morgan. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yes. 

Ms. GOLOB. What have you done with the recommendations that 

were made in the University of Arizona study? Because I do not 

have a good answer on that. The research team at the university 

put in a tremendous amount—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Amount of effort. 

Ms. GOLOB [continuing]. Of brainpower and time and hours and 

thoughtfulness and dialog with Border Patrol to make sure that we 

understood their issues. We did not want to impose our framework 

on them. We wanted to use their framework to inform our research. 

84 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Ms. GOLOB. We provided very specific recommendations. 

I would greatly appreciate a sit-down with Chief Morgan to, 

frankly, discuss, you know, did these recommendations work for 

you? 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Ms. GOLOB. If not, why not? You know, is there another way we 

could approach their problem? Is there other restraints that you 

have, as Border Patrol chief, that prevents you from implementing 

some of the recommendations? If so, what other measures can we 

take? 

I firmly believe in action-oriented research and data-driven research, and would greatly appreciate the opportunity to help push 

these recommendations or other recommendations to be useful to 

Border Patrol and in protecting our Nation. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I agree, Dr. Golob. This goes back to being a good 

steward of the limited resources that we have. If the taxpayer has 

invested in the brain power and the efforts of all of you at the University of Arizona, what are we doing with it to make sure that it 

is useful, you know? A partnership of follow-up of, you know, what 

else we could be doing moving forward, I think, is extremely important with all the expertise that your team has provided. So when 

we do invite the chief there, we will make sure that it includes a 

visit or meeting to your team for sure. 

I think about it—again, I am always framed by my experiences 

in the military. If you are out there doing the job as a Border Patrol Agent, you know, you are spending 2 hours doing your job and 

you are spending 8 hours processing information. I mean, data is 

important, but you got to make it usable for the Agent so they are 

not spending 8 hours inputting data in a non-user-friendly way or 

they are fat-fingering it into two or three different systems, based 

on how many reports they have to do. That goes back to the morale 

issue of there is nothing worse than an inefficient use of our resources of agents that we are asking them to provide more data, 

but we are not giving them the systems. The process is that they 

provide data once and it is usable, let the back end figure out how 

to make it usable so that we can assess it well, as opposed to putting it on the front end and making the agents have to do more 

and more cumbersome, bureaucratic processes so that we have better data. So that has to be tuned in as we are, you know, moving 

forward addressing improving the data for sure to make it usable. 

Mr. Ramı ́rez. 

Mr. RAMI ́REZ. Thank you, Chairman. I think my fellow panelists 

touched on something that is fundamental, which is to have ongoing conversations with folks who live there, who experience the 

situation on a daily basis, and who actually have solutions. We are 

not part of the problem here; we are part of the solution. The problem has been, when the bureaucracy fails to understand and pick 

up the recommendations that for several years we have been putting on the table before CBP and the Department of Homeland Security. 

But I will point on one important issue, Chairman, which is the 

issue of retention, you know, of Border Patrol Agents. As I said, I 

grew up on the Southern Border. A lot of my classmates from high 

85 

school and college are Border Patrol Agents. They understand what 

the border is about. They understand the binational character of 

our communities and that we go back and forth. But a lot of 

those—a lot of my good friends don’t stay as Border Patrol Agents 

because of the morale issues. 

If we don’t have folks being recruited from the communities that 

these agents were sworn to protect, it is very difficult to understand really the historic legacy that borderlands have had. There 

is the issue of recruitment, particularly recruitment of women. We 

have to look into why are we not recruiting enough women for Border Patrol. I believe only 5 percent of the force are only women. 

If we look at how do we train our agents better, how do we recruit agents from communities, how do we recruit women, I think 

that then we will develop a much better relationship with folks. I 

will guarantee you that, you know, if somebody staffing a checkpoint, a Border Patrol you know, say, hey, I know who you are, you 

know, you are my neighbor, you are my friend, we go to the same 

church, our kids, you know, are on the same, you know, baseball 

league, it will be a different relationship. 

I think it is about toning down the way that Border Patrol carries itself in our communities and ensuring that we have a much 

better relationship. That has to begin at the top, because the folks 

on the ground want to do that. Unfortunately, the good folks who 

want to work for Border Patrol aren’t being retained by the agency. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. 

All right. Well, this was a robust discussion. I really appreciate 

the time and the effort of all the panelists to come out today to testify before the subcommittee. We will continue to be addressing 

and highlighting the issues and the challenges related to defensein-depth, as Chief Morgan gets his feet on the ground, to follow up 

with him and to work together to find ways that we can make sure 

that we are securing our border well, to keep our country and communities safe, while taking into account all the impacts that have 

been shared today by those that are representing parts of the communities that are being impacted by this current strategy. So I 

really appreciate all of your perspectives and the time and effort 

you took to testify today. 

Let’s see. A little bureaucracy here. The Members of the committee may have some additional questions for the witnesses, so we 

would ask that you please respond in writing when we send those 

to you. Pursuant to committee rule VII(e), the hearing record will 

be held open for 10 days. 

Without objection, the committee now stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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