FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT April 24, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [ P U B L I S H ]
IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 06- 1615 8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Dock etNo. 0 3- 21 75 9- CV-J EM COL INTH OMA S, on behalf of him se lf and a ll oth er s si m il arl y si tu at ed , Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll an t,
ve rs us GEORGE, HA RTZ, LUND EEN, FULMER, JOHNSTONE, KING, AND STEVENS, P.A., CHARLES MIC HEL HARTZ , in di vi du al ly, Defen da nt s- App el le es .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (A pr il 24, 200 8) Be fo re T JO FL A T , MA RC U S an d W IL SO N , Ci rc uit Jud ge s.2

W IL SO N, Circuit Judge: Colin Thom as (“ Thom as”) a ppeals the dist rict court’ s grant of summ ary j u d g me n ta g a i n s th i s c l a i m th a ta t t o rn e y C h ar l e s M i c h a e l H art z an dth e l awf i rm, G e o r g e , Ha rt z , Lu n d e e n , F u l mer , J o h n s t o n e , Ki n g an dS t e v e n s , P
. A
. ( c o l l e c t i v e l y,

“ Hartz”) violated th e D river’ s Privacy Protection Ac t (“ D PP A ”) by w ro ngf ull y ob ta in in g a ndus in g p ers on al in fo rm at io n c on ta in edin dri ve r’s li cen se reco rd s. We a f f i rm. I. BACKG ROUND O n M ar ch28, 200 2, H ar

tz pur ch as ed

f ro m the F lor ida

D ep ar tm en t of H igh w ay S af ety and M oto r V eh ic le s th e re gis tr at ioninf orm at ionof

a ll ind ivi dua ls in M iam i- D ad e Co unty

w ho r eg ist er ed

both ne wand u se d m oto r ve hic le s f ro m January 1, 200 0 th ro ugh Marc h 31 , 200 2. O n N ove m be r 15, 200 2, H ar

tz purchased the sam e inform ation for the period April 1, 2002 through Novem ber 15, 200 2. I n to ta l, H ar

tz a cc um ulate d 28 4, 000 dr ivi ng r ec or ds o f Fl or ida
re sid en ts. S inc e T hom as ha d purc ha se d and r eg ist er ed aCh ev ro le t I m

pa lain June 20 02 , hi s n am e an d a dd res s was in cl ud edin th e in fo rm at io n o bt ai ne d b y Hart z. Thom as broughtsuit un der the D PPAseeking: (1) $2,500 in statutory liquid ated dam ag es ; ( 2) e qui ta

ble r el ie f fo r the de str

uc tio n of il le ga lly obt ai ne d r ec or ds; and (3 ) certi fic at io n o f a cl as s o f co ns um ers .3 II. D ISCU SSION Thom as challenges two orders of the district court: (1) the grant of sum m ary j udgm en t i n f

av or of H ar tz ; and ( 2) the de nia l of

T hom as ’ m oti on t o c om

pe l the p r o du c t i o no f

d i s c o v e ry. A. The Distr ict C ourt’ s Sum m ary Judgm ent Orde r W e rev ie w th e d is tri ctco ur t’s g ran t o f su m m ary jud gm en t d e n ov o. H ollom an v . M

ail-W el l C orp. , 44 3 F .3d83 2, 8 36 (11 th Cir . 20 06 ). T he D PP A“ re gul at es the dis cl osur e of pe rs ona l i nf

orm at ionc ont ai ne d in the records of state m otor vehicle departm ents (DMV s).” R en o v . Co ndon , 528 U
. S. 141 , 143 , 120 S
. Ct
. 666 , 668 , 145 L
. E d. 2d 5 87 ( 2000 ). O ne se ct ionof the D PP Apr ohi bit s di sc los ur es of pe rs ona l i nf

orm at ionby

astate ’ s de partm en t of
m ot orve hi cl es an d a ny offi cer, em pl oyee, or c on tra ct orth ereo f, see 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (a ), w hil e a se parate se ct ionpr ovi de s apr ivate c au se of a ct iona ga ins t pe rs ons w ho know ing ly

obt ai n, dis cl ose , or

use pe rs ona l i nf

orm at ionf

ro m am oto r ve hi cl e rec or d, see18 U. S. C. § 272 4(a). D es pit e the se pr ohi bit ion s, Co ngr es s m ad e cl ear that no t a ll obt ai nm en t, di sc lo su re, o r us e o f pe rs on al in fo rm at io n fr om m ot orve hi cl e rec or ds is wron gf ul
. In § 2 72 1( b) , th e DPPA p ro vi de s fo ur te en “pe rm is si bl e u se s,” o ne of wh ic h a ll ows fo r the inf

orm at ionto be use d inc onne ct ionw ith“ inv es tig at ionin an tic ipatio n of4

litigatio n” (here after , “ the litigatio n clause”): For use in connection with any civil, cr im inal, adm inistrative, or ar bitral pr oc ee din g inany

F ed er al , S tate , or

loc al c ourt or

a ge nc y or be fo re any se lf- reg ul at ory

bo dy, inc lu di ng th e se rv ic e o f pr oc es s, inv es tigati on in ant ic ipa tio n of

li tigati on , and the e xe cutio n or e nf or ce m en t of

j udgm en ts an d or de rs , or

pur suant t o an or de r of

aF ed er al , S tate , or

loc al c ourt. 18 U. S. C. § 272 1(b)(4) ( em phasis add ed). H ar tz a sse rt ed

be lowthat i t ob ta ine d and u se d th e ve hic le r ec or ds f or the pur pose of ide nti fy ing pot en tia l w itn es se s to te sti fy in law sui ts a ga ins t auto m obi le de al er shi ps. A t sum

m ar y j udgm en t, the dis tr ic t c ourt he ld tha t T hom as f ai le d to
ra ise an is sue of

m at er ia l f

ac t a s to the ina

ppl ic ab ili ty

of the li tig at ionc lause and fa ile d to r ai se suf

fi ci en t e vid en ce a s to any a lle ge d im

pe rm iss ibl e obt ai nm en t or
use . T hom as c ont en ds tha t the c ourt: (1 ) er ro ne ousl y pla ce d th e bur de n on T hom as to show“ a pur

pose not pe rm itt ed ” unde r 18 U
. S. C. § 27 24( a) ; and ( 2) im properly we ighed th e sum

m ary j udgm ent evidence. As set f orth below, neither of the se arg um en ts h as m er it. 1. Bu rden of P roof Un der 18 U. S. C. § 2724 (a) Thom as asserts that the litigation clause in § 2721 (b)(4) c onsti tutes an affir m ative defense for

which the defe ndant carries the burden of proof. Whether the “perm issib le uses” listed in § 27 21(b) constitu te aff irm ative defenses for which de fe ndants c ar

ry the bur de n of

pr oof is a m atte r of

f ir st i m pr es sio n f or thi s c ir cu it5

an d ha s no t be ena ddr es se d by our sis te r ci rc uit s. T he tou ch sto ne f

or de te rm ini ng the bur de n of pr oof und er astatut or y c au se of act io n i s t he st atut e it se lf. Sc haf fe r v . W ea st , 546 U
. S. 49, 56, 126 S
. Ct
. 528 , 534, 163 L. E d. 2d 387 (200 5). When a statute is silent as to who bears the burden of pr oof , w e re sort t o “ the or din ar y de fa ult r ule that pl ai nti ff

s be ar the r isk of failing to prov e their cla im s.” Id
. The ordinary

default rule, however, “ adm its of exceptions .” Id
. a t 57 , 126 S. Ct
. a t 53 4. O ne suc h e xc ep tio n is that “ ce rt ai n e le m en ts o f a pla int if f’ s c la im
m ay be shifted to defendants, when such elem ents can fair ly be chara cterize d as affir m ative defenses or exem

ption s.” Id
. ; ac co rd F

ed
. T radeCo m m ’n v . M

orton Sal t C o. , 334 U
. S. 37, 44- 45, 68 S
. Ct
. 822 , 827 , 92 L
. E d. 119 6 ( 1948 ) (“ [T ] he general rule of statutory

construction that the bur de n of pr ovi ng j ust if

ic at ionor ex em pti on unde r a spe ci al e xc ep tio n to the pr ohi bit ion s of astatut e ge ne ra lly

r es ts
on on e who cla im s i ts be ne fit s, re qu ire s t ha t re sp on de ntun de rta ke th is pro of
. . . .” ) (internal f

ootn ote om itted). A nothe r ex ce pti on i s th at c ourts w ill “ not

pla ce the bur de n up on a

li tig an t of establishi ng facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary .” Schaffer , 546 U
. S. a t 60 , 126 S
. Ct
. a t 53 6 ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks o m itt ed ). T his
ex ce pti on, how ev er , “ is f ar f ro m be ing uni ve rs al , and h as m any qua lif ic at ion sThe DPPA define s “per son” as “ an individual, org anization or entity , but does not 1 include a State or

ag ency there of.” 18 U .S.C. § 2725(2).

6 upon its application .” Id . (in te rn al qu ot at io n m ark s o m it te d)
. While there have been som e circ um stances wher e the Suprem e Court has placed the burden of persuasion o ver an entire claim on the defendant at the outs et of a pr oc eed in g, se e id. a t 57 , 126 S
. Ct
. a t 53 4- 35 ( ci tin g A las ka D ep ’t of E nv tl. Co ns er va ti on v. EPA , 540 U
. S. 461 , 494 , 124 S
. Ct
. 983 , 157 L
. E d. 2d 9 67 (2004)), such instances “ are extrem ely rar e. ” Id
. , 126 S
. Ct
. a t 53 5. Ine xam ini ng the statut e, w e fi rs t tur n to the D PP A ’ s pr ovi sio n f or ac ivi l
ca use of a ct ion : Ape rs on w ho know ing ly obt ai ns, dis cl ose s or

use s pe rs ona l i nf

orm at ion , 1 from a m otor vehicle record, for a purpos e not perm itted und er this chapter sha ll be li ab le to the ind ivi dua l t o whom the inf orm at ionpe rt ai ns, w ho m ay br ing ac ivi l a ct ionin a U nit ed S tate s di str ic t c ourt. 18 U. S. C.A . § 2724(a). Inastr ai ght fo rw ar d f

as hio n, se ct ion272 4( a) se ts f orth thr ee e le m en ts g ivi ng rise to liability , i. e. , that a defendant (1) knowingly obtained, disclosed o r used pe rs ona l i nf

orm at ion , ( 2) f

ro m am oto r ve hic le r ec or d, ( 3) f or apur pose not pe rm it te d. Th e p la in m ean in g o f th e th irdfact oris th atitis on ly sati sf ie d i f sh own that obtain m ent, disclosure, or use was not for a purpose enum erate d und er § 2721 (b ). S ec tio n 27 21( b) pr ovi de s inf ull :7

(b ) P er m iss ib le u se s. --P ersonal inform ation refer red to in subs ection (a) sha ll be dis cl ose d f

or use in co nne ct ionw ithm atte rs of m oto r ve hic le or driver safe ty

and theft, m otor vehicle em issio ns, m otor vehicle product al te ratio ns, r ec al ls, or

a dvi sor ie s, pe rf

orm an ce m oni tor ing of

m oto r ve hic le s and d ea le rs by

m oto r ve hic le m anuf

ac tur er s, and r em ova l of

non owne r re co rd s f

ro m the or igi na l owne r re co rd s of m oto r ve hic le m anufacturer s to carry

out the pu rposes of titles I and IVof the A nti Car Thef t Ac t of 1992, the Autom obile Inform ation Disclosure Ac t (15 U. S. C. 1231 et seq.) , the C lean Air Ac t (42 U. S. C. 7401 et seq.) , and chapters 301, 305 , and 3 21- 331 of ti tle 49, and, sub

j ec t t o su bse ct ion( a) (2 ), m ay

be dis cl ose d a s f

oll ow s: (1 ) For use by

any governm ent agency , including any court or law en fo rc em en t a ge nc y , in carr y ing out it s f unc tio ns, or

any pr ivate pe rs on o r en tity a ct ing on b eh al f of

aF ed er al , S tate , or

loc al a ge nc y

in carr y ing out it s fu nc ti on s. (2 ) F or use in co nne ct ionw ithm atte rs of m oto r ve hic le or

dr ive r sa fe ty an d th ef t; m oto r ve hic le e m iss ion s; m oto r ve hic le pr oduc t a lte ratio ns, re ca lls , or a dvi sor ie s; p er fo rm an ce m oni tor ing of m oto r ve hic le s, m oto r ve hic le part s and d ea le rs ; m oto r ve hic le m ar ke t r es earc h a ct ivi tie s, inc lud ing sur

ve y r es earc h; and r em ova l of non -o w ne r re co rd s f

ro m the or ig in al own er re co rd s o f m ot orve hi cl e m an uf actur ers . (3 ) F or use in the nor

m al c our se of

bus ine ss b y

ale git im at e busi ne ss o r its agents, em

ploy ees, or contractors, but on ly
-- (A) to ve ri fy

the a cc ur ac y

of pe rs ona l i nf

orm at ionsub m itt ed

by the ind ivi dua l t o th e busi ne ss o r its a ge nts , e m plo y ee s, or

c ontra ct or s; an d (B) if such inform ation as so subm itted is no t correc t or is no lon ger correc t, to obtain the correct inform ation, but onl y for the purposes of pr ev en tin g f

ra ud b y , pur sui ng l eg al r em ed ie s a ga ins t, or reco ve rin g o n ade btor s ecu rit y in te res t ag ai ns t, t he in di vi du al
. (4 ) F or use in co nne ct ionw ithany c ivi l, c ri m ina l, a dm ini str at ive , or arbitral procee ding in any Feder al, State, or local court or agency or before any se lf -r eg ulator y body , inc lud ing the se rv ic e of pr oc es s, inv es tig at ionin an tic ipatio n of

li tig at ion , and the e xe cutio n or e nf or ce m en t of

j udgm en ts an d o rd ers , or p ur su an t t o a n o rd er o f a Fed eral , Sta te , or l oc al co ur t.8

(5 ) For use in research ac tivities, and for use in producin g statistical re ports, so l ong as the pe rs ona l i nf orm at ionis not

pub lis he d, r ed isc los ed , orus edto co nt actin di vi du al s. (6 ) For use by

any insurer or insurance support organization , or bya selfins ur ed e nti ty , or it s a ge nts , e m

plo y ee s, or

c ontra ct or s, in co nne ct ionw ith cl ai m s i nv es ti ga ti on act iv it ie s, an ti frau d a ct iv it ie s, ra ti ng or u nd erwri ti ng . (7 ) For use in providin g noti ce to the owner s of towed or im poun ded ve hi cl es . (8 ) For use by

any licensed private investig ative agency or licensed se cu rit y servi ce fo r an y

pu rp os e p erm it te d u nd er t hi s s ub se ct io n. (9 ) For use by

an em ploy er or its agent or insurer to obtain or verify inf orm at ionr el at ing to a hol de r of ac om m er ci al dr ive r' s li ce nse that i s requi redun de r ch ap te r 31 3 o f ti tl e 4 9. (1 0) F or use in co nne ct ionw iththe ope ratio n of pr ivate tol l transpo rt at ion faci li ti es . (1 1) F or any oth er use in re spon se to re que sts f or ind ivi dua l m oto r ve hic le re co rd s if the S tate ha s ob ta ine d th e expr es s c onse nt o f the pe rs on t o who m su ch pe rs on al in fo rm at io n p ert ai ns . (1 2) F or bul k di str ibu tio n f

or sur ve y s, m ar ke tin g or sol ic itatio ns i f the State has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such pe rs on al in fo rm at io n p ert ai ns . (1 3) For use by

any requester, if the re quester dem onstrates it has ob tained th e wri tt en co ns en t o f th e in di vi du al to who m th e in fo rm at io n p ert ai ns . (1 4) F or any oth er use spe ci fi ca lly

auth or iz ed

und er the lawof

the S tate that ho lds the r ec or d, if

suc h us e is r el at ed

to the ope ratio n of

am oto r v e h i c l e o r

p ub l i c s a f

e ty. 18 U
. S. C. § 27 21. Inr ea din g § 2 724( a) and § 272 1( b) tog ethe r, w e co nc lud e that the D PP Ais sil en t onw hic h party

c ar ri es the bur de n of

pr oof and, a s su ch , the bur de n is pr ope rl y upo n th e pla int if

f. T hom as arg ue s th at

the pe rm iss ibl e use s li ste d in9

§ 27 21( b) f

unc tio n a s st at

uto ry e xc ep tio ns and, the re fo re , the de fe ndants sho uld
carry th e b ur de n o f pr oo f to sec ur e en ti tl em en t o f su ch ex cep ti on s. W e dis ag re e. T he D PP Apla inl y se ts f orth thr ee e le m en ts g ivi ng r ise to lia bil ity , the thi rd

of w hic h is w he the r the sub j ec t a ct w as “f or a pur posenot permitted
. ” 18 U
. S. C. § 27 24( a) ( em pha sis a dde d)
. T he e m

pha siz ed langua ge does notfram e the § 2721(b) enum erations as exceptions to a general norm
. That is, Co ngr es s c oul d have sa id, f or e xam ple : “ Ape rs on who know ing ly obt ai ns, dis cl ose s, or

use s pe rs ona l i nf

orm at ion , f

ro m am oto r ve hic le r ec or d, sha ll be lia bleto theindiv idu al to w hom theinf orm ati on p er tai ns, e

xc ep t as pro vi de d in 18 U
. S. C. § 27 21( b) .” But Congress did no t so draft § 2724 (a), and if w e re ad it as
suc h, w e pla ce the bur de n of pr ovi ng a

§ 27 21( b) e num er at ionupo n th e de fe ndant
w he n C ongr es s ha s no t i nstru ct ed us t o do so. Jus t a s w e w ill not w ri te w or ds i nto a st atut e to pro vi de a di ffer en t, o r m or e p refe rab le m ean in g, se e, e . g. , Badaracco v. Comm 'r of Internal Reve nue, 464 U
. S. 386 , 398 , 104 S
. Ct
. 756 , 764 , 78 L
. E d. 2d 549 (1 984) ( “ Co urts are not auth or iz ed

to re w ri te astatut e be ca

use the y m igh t deem its effe cts susceptibl e of im provem ent.”) , so, too, w ill we not alter statutory str uc tur e an d langua ge f

or the pur pose of tr igg er ing appl ic at ionof ar ule of
co ns tru ct io n. See D ore lie n v . U
. S. A tt’ y G en . , 317 F. 3d 13 14, 1321 (11t h Cir. 20 03 ) (en ba nc ) (“ Ourrol e is no t t o s eco nd -g ue ss Co ng res s’s dr aft in g c ho ic es .Un lik e § 2 72 4( a )’ s p ri vate c a us e of a c tio n, § 2 72 1( a ) i s d ir e c te d at st ate mot or ve hic le 2 depar tments and offic ers, e mploy ees, a nd contra ctors ther eof—not private individuals—and prohibits only

disclosures—not obtainment and use
. 10 Rathe r, our

f unc tio n is to ap ply statut es , to ca rr y out the e xpr es sio n of

the le gis lativ e w ill that i s e m bodi ed in the m , not

to ‘ im pr ove ’ statut es by

a lte ri ng them .” (internal quotation m arks and alterations om itted)). Co ngr es s is a de pt at dr af

tin g ge ne ra l no rm s th at

pr ovi de f or e xc ep tio ns, and fr eque ntl y

doe s so ; i nde ed , it

did j ust thi s w iththe D PP Ain § 27 21( a)
. I n bo th 2 subp ar ts o f § 27 21( a) , Co ngr es s e xpl ic itl y e xc ep te d th e § 27 24( b) e num er at ion s: (a ) In ge ne ra l. --AState depar tm ent of m otor vehicles, and any officer , em plo y ee , or

c ontra ct or

the re of , sha ll not kno w ing ly

dis cl ose or

oth er w ise mak e av a i l ab l e t o an y p e r s o no r e n t i ty: (1 ) pe rs ona l i nf

orm at ion , a s de fi ne d in18 U
. S. C. 272 5( 3) , about any ind ivi dua l ob ta ine d by

the de partm en t i n c onne ct ionw itham oto r ve hic le reco rd , ex ce

pt a s pr ov ide d in sub se ct ion ( b) of thi s se ct ion ; or (2 ) highl y restricte d personal inform ation, as defined in 18 U. S. C. 2725 (4), ab out any ind ivi dua l ob ta ine d by

the de partm en t i n c onne ct ionw itha m oto r ve hic le r ec or d, w ith out the e xpr es s c onse nt o f the pe rs on t o whom su ch in fo rm at io n app li es , exce pt uses permitted in su bsections (b)(1), (b )( 4) , ( b) (6 ), and ( b) (9 ) : Prov ide d, T ha t su

bse ct ion( a) (2 ) sha ll not

in any wa y af fe ctth e u s e o f o rg an d o n at i o ni n fo rmat i o no nan i n d i v i du al ’s dr ive r’ s li ce nse or

a ff ec t the a dm ini str at ionof

or gan do na tio n in iti at ive s in the S tate s. 18 U. S. C. § 272 4(a) ( em

phasis add ed). Se ct ion272 1( a) pla inl y

se ts u p th e enum er at ion s in§ 27 21( b) a s e xc ep tio ns,
w he re as § 27 24( a) pla inl y doe s no t. W e do n ot b el ie ve that this dif fe re nc e inWe n ote that pl a c ingthe burd e n u po n th e de fe nd ant t o s ho w the thi rd e le me nt w ou ld 3 essentially

rele g ate the motion to dismiss stag e to somethingless than a spe ed bump in § 2724(a) actions. Plaintiffs could survive a Fe d. R. Civ. P . 12(b)( 6) cha lleng e upon the ba re a lleg ation of a def endant’ s mere obta inment of information fr om a vehicle rec ord. 11 la ng ua ge is m ean in gl es s. See Russello v. United States , 464 U. S. 16, 23, 104 S. Ct. 296, 300, 78 L. Ed. 2d 17 (198 3) (“ [W ] here Congress includes particular langua ge in one se ct ionof astatut e but

om its it in an oth er

se ct ionof

the sam e A ct , it is g en er al ly

pr es um ed

that C ongr es s a ct s in te nti ona lly and p ur pose ly in the disparate inclusio n or exclusion .” (internal quotation m arks om itted)). 3 T hom as a lso arg ue s th at

the bur de n to sho w“ fo r a pur pose not pe rm itt ed ” shou ld b e al loc at ed

to de fe ndants be ca

use the f ac tua l pr es en ce of

any one pe rm iss ibl e pur

pose in § 27 21( b) is “pe cu liarl y w ith in the kno w le dge ” of the de fen da nt . Schaffer , 546 U
. S. a t 60 , 126 S
. Ct
. a t 53 6 ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks
om itt ed ). F ro m

the out se t, w e re co gni ze that the S upr em e Co urt i s c autio us i n it s ap pl ic at io n o f th is rul e. Id
. ( statin g th at the “ ‘ ru le is far fr om

be ing uni ve rs al and ha s m any qua lif ic at ion s up on i ts a

ppl ic at ion
. ’ ” (quot ing Greanleaf’s Lessee v. B irt h , 6 P et . 302 , 312 , 8 L
. E d. 406 ( 1832 ); c iti ng 2 J. S tr ong, Mc Co rm ic k on E vid en ce § 33 7, p. 413 ( 5the d. 199 9) ( “ V er y of te n on e m ust ple ad and p ro ve
m atte rs a s to w hic h hi s a dve rs ar y ha s su pe ri or a cc es s to the pr oof

. ”) ))
. W e have pr ev iou sly

appl ie d th is r

ule w he re apla int if

f w oul d be unr ea sona

bly r equir ed “ to12

spe cu late w he the r de fe ndants int en d to a sse rt [ a statut or

y de fe nse ] and c oul d r es ult in unfair surprise at trial. ” Ja cks on v. Se ab oa rd Co as t Li ne R. R. , 678 F
. 2d 9 92, 1013 ( 11th C ir
. 198 2)
. I n th is i nst an ce , w e ar e unc onvi nc ed that f ac ts g ivi ng r ise the § 27 21( b) e num er at ion s are so p ec uli ar ly w ith in the kno w le dge of the de fen da ntas t o c au se a sh ift in g o f th e b ur de n o f pr oo f. Many of the § 27 21( b) e num er at ion s are ti ed to a part ic ular oc cu

pa tio n or or ga ni zat io n a ndit s co rres po nd in g l awfu l n eedforth e in fo rm at io n. See 18 U. S. C. § 272 1(b)(1) ( governm ent agency ); § 2721(b)(4) (legal investigatio n, ser vice, pr oc ee din gs, and e nf

or ce m en t) ; § 2721 (b )( 5) ( re se ar ch er s) ; § 2721 (b )( 6) (i nsur an ce ); § 27 21( b) (7 ) (t ow ed or im poun de d ve hic le ); § 27 21( b) (8 ) (p ri va te inv es tig at ive a ge nc y

or se curi ty se rv ic e) ; § 2721 (b )( 10) ( pr ivate tol l transpo rt at ion faci li ti es ). Oth er § 27 21 (b ) en um erat io ns po in t t o apa rti cu lariz edpu rp os e. See 18 U. S. C. § 272 1 (b)(2) ( safety , thef t, e m issio ns, product alteration, per form ance
m oni tor ing , part s and d ea le rs , r es earc h, upd at ing of r ec or ds) ; § 27 21( b) (3 ) (v er if

ic at ionof ind ivi dua l’ s su

bm iss ionof

inf orm at ion ); § 27 21( b) (9 ) (e m

plo y er ve ri fi catio n of

e m plo y ee ’ s in fo rm at ion ); § 27 21( b) (1 4) (s tate auth or iz ed

use r el at ed

to ope ratio n of

ve hic le or

pub lic sa fe ty ). F ina lly , the
rem ai ni ng th ree e nu m erat io ns on ly app ly whe n t he pl ai nt iff ha s p ro vi de d c on se nt . See 18 U.S.C. § 2 72 1( b) (1 1) -(1 3)
.13

Thus, f or exam ple, if a plaintiff nam es a lawfirm (as her e) or an insu rance agency as the defendant, there is a high probabili ty that subs ection (b)(4) is at iss ue in the f

orm er and ( b) (6 ) in the latte r. S im ilarl y , if apla int if f is a r ec ipi en t of
a m as s m ar

ke tin g le tte r, it

is no s ec re t tha t ( b) (1 2) is at iss ue , whic h a llo w s f

or bul k di str ibu tio n of

sol ic itatio ns o nly

if e xpr es s c onse nt i s ob ta ine d. Upon cl ose ex am inatio n of

§ 27 21( b) , w e co nc lud e that pl ai nti ff s w ill not ty pic al ly be le ft in the dark a s to w hic h § 2 721( b) e num er at ion , if any , w ill be a sse rt ed

a s a ppl ic ab le by the defendant. W e ar e confident that proper use of discovery tools, such as interrogatories, r equests for adm issio ns, and depositi ons, will re veal which
en um erat io ns m ay

ap pl y an d wh ere apl ai nt iff

m us t ac co rd in gl y

aim it s ar gu m en t. In the end, where Congress does not sq uarely address the question , where the statut e’ s stru ct

ur e an d langua ge do n ot s ugge st a shi ft of the bur de n to the defendant (through u se of statutory exceptions, for e xam

ple), and where plaintiffs
ar e not pe cu liarl y

a t a dis advanta ge in the dis co ve ry of ne ce ssary

f ac ts, w e w ill not sh iftth e b ur de n o r pr oo f, oran y ele m en t t he reo f, to th e d efen da nt . 2. Wh ethe r th e D istrict C ourt Im proper ly Weighed th e Su m m ary Judgm ent E vidence Upon Har tz’ s m otion for sum

m ary j udgm ent, the district court re cognized the e vid en ce sho w ing that ob ta inm en t of the inf orm at ionw as f

or the pur pose ofSpecifica lly , Har tz contends that the case , Beac on Prop. Mgmt., Inc . v. PNR, Inc
. , 785 4 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) , require d plaintiffs bring ing c laims under the F lorida De ceptive and Unf air Tr ade Pra ctices A ct to demonstrate that the defe ndant had a custom and pra ctice of eng ag ing in de ceptive a cts ag ainst individuals other than the subject plaintiff. It bear s mentioning that the F lorida Supreme Court r ever sed PNR on Ma rc h 1 3, 20 03 , w e ll a ft e r H art z ha d o bta ine d th e ve hic le re c or ds
. See P NR, Inc. v . Beac on Prop. Mngmt ., 842 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 2003). 14 H ar tz ’ s inve sti ga tio n inanti ci pa tio n of li tig at ion
. ( D
. E
. 336 a t 9. ) S pe ci fi ca lly , in his a ff idavit , Ch ar le s M ic ha el H ar tz ave rr ed that he r eque ste d th e inf

orm at ion because the autom obile dealers he w as litigating against wer e asserting that pla int if fs ne ed ed to ple ad and p ro ve m

ult ipl e ac ts o f de ce pti ve and unf ai r tr ad e pr act ic es to st at e a d ecep ti ve an d u nf ai r tr ad e p ract ic e cl ai m

un de r Fl or id a la w. (D
. E
. 30 at Appx. B, ¶

5. ) T hom as doe s no t c ont en d th at thi s w as am er itl es s or ev enm ist ak envie wof

the lawa t the ti m e. T he c ourt ne xt r ec ogni ze d th at the 4 de posi tio n te sti m ony

sub m itt ed

by H ar tz sho w ed

that the inf

orm at ionw as use d to
se nd o ne -thous an d “ Cu sto m and P ra ct ic e” le tte rs , w hic h a im ed a t ob ta ini ng ev ide nc e show ing ac ust om and p ra ct ic e of

de ce pti ve a ct s e nga ge d inby dealerships. (D .E . 336 at 9.) In this vein, a copy of the Custom

and Prac tice letter
w as pr oduc ed

in dis co ve ry

a s w el l a s th e num

be r of ind ivi dua ls t o whom

H ar tz ha d s en t t he let te rs . Inr es pons e to this e vid en ce , T hom as m ad e thr ee c la im s: ( 1) H ar tz did not ide nti fy the nam es of

spe ci fi c ca se s gi vin g r ise to the Cu sto m and P ra ct ic e le tte rs ;15

(2 ) H ar tz obt ai ne d alarg e num

be r of nam es , m ost

of w hom ne ve r re ce ive d a Cu sto m and P ra ct ic e le tte r; and ( 3) T hom as ’ inf orm at ionw as use d, w ith out his express consent, to assem ble and send ou t a m arketing letter. T he district court he ld tha t T hom as f

ai le d to c re at e a ge nui ne iss ue of m at er ia l f

ac t a s to “ a pur

pose no t p erm it te d.” W e ag ree. Fi rs t, a s e xpr es se d by

the dis tr ic t c ourt, T hom as ’ a sse rt ionthat H ar tz did not spe ci fy w hic h c as es gave r ise to the Cu sto m and P ra ct ic e le tte rs is not age nui ne is su e o f m at eri al factwhen Tho m as , hi m se lf, never requested suc h in fo rm at ion fr om H ar tz . T hom as w as not

in a posi tio n to be pa ssi ve ; i t w as inc um be nt u pon him to co m e fo rw ar d w ithsom e ev ide nc e show ing that the li tig at ionc lause did not ap pl y , whi ch he fai le d t o d o. Id
. Se co nd, a s th e dis tr ic t c ourt r igh tly de te rm ine d, the f

ac t tha t m any

r ec or ds
w er e re tr ie ve d, but

onl y ac om parativ el y

sm al l num

be r w er e use d f

or Cu sto m and Pr ac tic e le tte rs did

not , by it se lf , r ai se age nui ne iss ue of

m at er ia l f

ac t a s to
w he the r the li tig at ionc lause appl ie d. B y a ff ixi ng s ign if

ic an ce sol el y

to the
nu m b ero f r ec o rd s re l at i n g t o l et t er s s en to u t , Th o m as o v er l o o k edth atHa rt z’s ini tia l r ev ie wof

the tot al am ount

of r ec or ds i s j ust

a s m uc h ti ed to “ inv es tig at ion in anticipatio n of litigatio n” as the eventual sending out. T hom as failed, however to di sc red it , or e ve n a ddres s, t he in it ia l re vi ew.Thomas also ar gues that a pa rticular e x cer

pt from Har

tz’s depositi on indicates a “sec ond 5 ulterior motive” f

or obtainingthe vehicle rec ords; i.e., they wer e obtained f

or the purpose of c re atin ga data ba se of wi tne sse s f

or pr os pe c tiv e , n ot- y e t- fi le d li tig atio n— a s o pp os e d to c ur re ntl y 16 Third, Thom as attem

pted to argue that Hartz’ s use of the inform ation was not f or ali tig at ionpur

pose , but r athe r fo r the pur

pose of se ndi ng T hom as a
m arketing letter. T hom as did notproduce such a letter and, at depositio n, T hom as te sti fi ed that he w as “ le ss than f

if ty -p er ce nt” or

“ fi fty -p er ce nt” c er

ta in tha t he actually rec eived a letter: Q : H ows ur e ar e y outhaty our e c e i ve d the l e t t e r f r om the H art z c om

pany ? A: I wo ul d s ay

les s t ha n 5 0 p erce nt . 50 pe rcen t, s om ewh ere a ro un d t he re. You co ul d fl ip a co in pro babl y wou ldbe ab ou t ri gh t. (D.E. 33 6 a t 1 3.) Furthe r, T hom as a tte ste d th at if he did r ec ei ve ale tte r, he r ec ei ve d it in June of 20 00
. Id
. H ar

tz poi nte d ou t tha t su chale tte r, if r ec ei ve d, c oul d no t be r el ev an t to this c as e as it

w as und isp ute d th at

it did not r eque st the inf

orm at ionf

ro m the de pa rtment o f m ot orve hi cl es un ti l 2 00 2. Id
. T he dis tr ic t c our t c or re ct ly determ ined that thi s evidence wa s insu fficient to ra ise a genuine issu e of m aterial fact
. Se e Young v. Ci tyof P alm B ay , 358 F. 3d 85 9, 860 (11th Cir. 2004) (“ A m ere sc int ill a of

e vid en ce in supp ort of

the non m ovi ng p ar

ty w ill not suf fi ce to
overcom e a m otion for sum m ary j udgm ent.”)
. On the basis of the evidence before the dis tr ic t c ourt, w e fi nd n o e rr or in the de ci sio n to gr an t sum m ar y j udgm en t. 5pendingcase s. Our re view of the rec ord re veals that Thomas did not ra ise this particular

argument below and, a s such, the ar gument is waived. Irving v. M azda Motor Corp. , 136 F.3d 76 4, 76 9 ( 11 th C ir . 1 99 8) . N on e the le ss, the argume nt i s w ith out me ri t. T he lit ig atio n c la us e ref ers to investig ation in anticipation of litigation. Thus, even if the a ccumulation of pote ntial witnesses re lated, in par

t, to certa in case s not y et filed, we do not see how pr e-suit investig ation can be considere d per se inapplicable to the litig ation clause
. 17 B. The Distr ict C ourt’ s Den ial of the M otion to C om pel Inhis F ir st R eque st f

or P ro duc tio n, T hom as r eque ste d “ al l l ette rs se nt b y [H ar tz ] to re sid en ts o f Mi am i- D ad e Co unty of fe ri ng t o r ev ie wdoc um en ts . . . recei ve d i n c on ne ct io n [wi th ] th e p ur ch as e o r le as e o f a n ew ve hi cl e.” (D.E. 49 at 10.) T hom as asserts that this request covered Hartz’ s Custom and Prac tice Le tters. Hartz obj ected on ground s of overbreadth, r elevance, retaliation, w ork pr oduc t, and atto rn ey -c lie nt p ri vil eg e. Upon T hom as ’ Mo tio n to Co m pe l, the dis tr ic t c ourt de cl ine d to or de r the pr oduc tio n of a ll one -thous an d C ust om and Prac tice L etters. (D .E . 164 at 3.) A t the hearing on the m otion , it bec am e clear that a copy

of one of the Custom

and Prac tice letters w as alrea dy in discov ery (D
. E
. 173 a t 49 , 61) , and c ouns el f or H ar tz pr ovi de d ac opy

of that l ette r to b oth
co un se l fo r Tho m as an d t he co ur t. ( Id .) Bec ause the Custom and Prac tice letters
re late d to the obt ai nm en t of w itn es se s inong oin g law sui ts a ga ins t auto m obi le de al er shi ps, the dis tr ic t c ourt e xpr es se d c onc er n th at the le tte rs w er e co ve re d by th e work p ro du ctpri vi le ge . See F ed
. R. Ci v. P
. 26( b) (3 )( A ) (“ O rd inari ly , aparty
m ay not dis co ve r doc um en ts and t an gib le thi ngs that are pr ep ar ed in an tic ipatio nThree copies of the Custom and Practice L etter in the r ecor d follow this ge nera l form 6 state d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt . ( D. E. 26 9 at E x. D, B ate s 6 40 , 8 85 , 1 09 5. ) T hat is , th e le tte rs ’ pref atory re: line provide s the title of the re lated ca se and the introductory sentenc e states that the law f ir m “ re pr e se nts [name of

pla int if f] i n th e a bo ve c a pti on e d matte r a

nd we are pr e se ntl y conductingthe leg al discover y proce ss.” Id . The letter s g o on to state the g ener al alleg ations a g a ins t th e de a le rs hip and fu rt he r e xpla in t

hat si nc e there c ipi e nt p ur c ha se d o r l e a se d a ve hic le from the de aler ship at the same time as the plaintiff, the law f irm would appre ciate the opportunity

to speak with the re cipient “so a s to further e stablish evidence of the c ustom and prac tice used at [ the] dealership.” Id . At the hea ring , the cour

t rea d out-loud the introductory line of the letter

to emphasize the point that the letters re fer red to pa rticular c ases. ( D.E. 173 at 65.) 18 of litigation or for tr ial by or for anoth er party

. . . .” ). Specif

ically , the district
co urt st at ed : “ a le tte r [s en t] out to som eo ne w ho i s invol ve d inthe law sui t say ing ,

‘ w e ar e loo kin g f

or w itn es se s who w er e . . . de fr au de d by thi s c ar de al er shi p because I’ m

repre senting Joe Sm ith,’ that m ight b e w ork product.” (D .E . 173 at 61. ) C ouns el f

or T hom as the n st at ed : “ I ag re e w iththat” and p ro ce ed ed to 6 ad dr es s a d iff

eren t m at te r. (

Id
. a t 61 -6 2. ) T he iss ue w as not r ev isi te d pr ior

to the court’ s ultim ate denial of T hom as’ m otion to com pel the Custom

and Prac tice le tt ers . Ourst an da rdof r ev ie w is ab us e o f di sc ret io n. Ca stle v. San gam o W es ton , Inc. , 744 F. 2d 14 64, 1466 (11t h Cir. 1984 ) (per curiam). “ [W ] hen em

ploy ing an abuse-of-discretion standard, w e m ust affirm unless we find that the district court has m ade a c lear e rror of j udgm ent, or has a pplied th e wrong legal standard.” United States v. F

razier , 38 7 F .3d12 44 , 12 59 (11 th Cir . 20 04 ).The a rgument advanc ed by

Thomas in his Motion t o Compel and at the he aringwas that 7 Har tz waived the work pr oduct privileg e by failingto produce a privileg e docume nt log. ( D.E. 49 at 5-7; D.E. 173 at 65.) 19 Thom as argues that any

privilege Har

tz had in the Custom

and Prac tice le tte rs w as w ai ve d be ca

use H ar tz r el ie d onthe le tte rs in as se rt ing that the li tig at ion cl au se appl ie d. T hom as c ont en ds tha t be ca use the le tte rs r em ai ne d pr ote ct ed , he
wa s p re v en t edfr o m

ad eq u at el y t es t i n g wh et h erth e l i t i g at i o ncl au s e ap p l i ed . We decline to address this waiver ar gum ent. T hom as did notraise it below in either his Motio n to Com

pel (D .E . 49 at 5-7, 14) or at the hear ing (D. E. 173 at 65). 7 In d ee d , a s s etfo rt h ab o v e, Th o m as ’ co u n s el af fi rmat i v el y ag re edwi th th e c o u rt ’s work product reasoning. T hom as cannot now argue that such reasoning was
erro ne ou s. See Irvi ng v . M azda M oto r C orp. , 136 F
. 3d 7 64, 769 ( 11th C ir
. 199 8) (“ Too often our colleagues on the dist rict courts com plain that th e appellate ca ses about which they

rea d wer e not the cases argued before them .” ). A c c o r d i n g l y, w e a f

f i rm. AFFIR MED.