NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 23a0377n.06

Case No. 22-1722

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MILTON B. JONES,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

MICHIGAN 

OPINION

Before: MOORE, ROGERS, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

ROGERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which GRIFFIN, J., joined. MOORE, 

J. (pp. 10–14), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge. Milton Jones led a gang that trafficked drugs and murdered 

rivals, leading to federal drug and murder charges. The government initially sought the death 

penalty. But in exchange for his cooperation, it permitted him to plead guilty to running a 

continuing criminal enterprise. The district court imposed a 30-year sentence. Jones later moved 

for compassionate release on the basis of COVID-19 and other health issues. After weighing the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the court found that the severity of Jones’s offense conduct warranted 

denial of compassionate release, and Jones appeals. However, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying compassionate relief. In particular, the district court did not rule that victim 

deaths categorically preclude compassionate release, nor did the court fail to consider the § 3553(a) 
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factors or explain adequately its balancing of the relevant considerations. Accordingly, there was 

neither procedural nor substantive error.

From 1995 to 2001, Milton Jones led a criminal enterprise that distributed heroin, 

marijuana, and cocaine in Detroit, Michigan. In that role, Jones presided over the “Dog Pound,” 

a collection of buildings that the gang used to sell drugs and plan robberies, kidnappings, and 

murders—including the murders of rival drug dealers Mark Grice and Antoine Caruthers. 

In 2001, a grand jury charged Jones with murder in furtherance of a continuing criminal 

enterprise (among other charges). 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) (2001). The government notified him

of its intent to seek the death penalty. Jones eventually agreed to cooperate and pleaded guilty to 

running a continuing criminal enterprise. Id. § 848(a)-(c) (2001). In the plea agreement, Jones 

acknowledged that he and other members of the enterprise used the Dog Pound to plan the murders 

of Grice and Caruthers. As a result, Jones stipulated to a Guidelines range of life imprisonment 

based on an enhancement for killing a victim “under circumstances constituting murder.” U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(d)(1). 

Jones challenged the presentence investigation report’s findings that he directly ordered 

the murders of Grice and Caruthers, but the court overruled Jones’s objections to the report. The 

court imposed a 30-year sentence, a downward departure from the Guidelines range of life 

imprisonment. 

More than a decade later, Jones sought compassionate release based on his chronic health 

conditions and the risk to him of serious illness from COVID-19. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 

He also argued that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors favored release, based on his age (65 at that

time), time in custody (19 years at that time), his having served 75% of his sentence, his limited 

mobility, and his unlikelihood of recidivism. He also planned to undergo a kidney transplant as 
No. 22-1722, United States v. Jones

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an alternative to his 11-year long program of thrice-weekly dialysis. He submitted a doctor’s 

declaration that although he had already been hospitalized for COVID-19, he remained at risk of 

reinfection as a result of his diabetes and other conditions. 

The district court denied his request. After Jones had filed his motion, he tested positive 

for COVID-19 and subsequently recovered. While the court acknowledged Jones’s “multiple 

health conditions,” it held that the speculative risk of reinfection alone could not establish an 

extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release.

On appeal, we vacated and remanded. Jones provided sufficient evidence to establish that 

the general risk of reinfection was not merely “speculative,” and Jones himself faced a high risk 

of severe infection of COVID-19. See United States v. Jones, No. 21-1232, 2021 WL 5918305, at 

*2–3 (6th Cir. Sept. 23, 2021). Considering this increased risk, and Jones’s serious medical 

conditions, we held that the district court abused its discretion by relying solely on a previous 

infection to deny compassionate release. See id. at *3.

On remand, the district court again denied compassionate release, but this time on the basis 

that the § 3553(a) factors did not warrant a sentence reduction. The court explained in some detail 

its application of the § 3553(a) factors. The court began by going through Jones’s “lengthy” 

criminal history, including previous convictions for manslaughter, continuing criminal enterprise, 

conspiracy to distribute heroin, and accessory after the fact to murder. From there, the court 

described Jones’s offense conduct, including the murders of Grice and Caruthers. 

Some factors, the court found, weighed in Jones’s favor. Jones’s medical evidence 

indicated he suffered from “serious medical conditions.” Those medical conditions, along with 

his age (66 at the time), had resulted in “severe physical limitations” that reduced his danger to the 

public and “risk of recidivism.” Jones’s “rehabilitat[ive] efforts” in prison also cut in his favor. 
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Other considerations, the court found, did not weigh strongly in either direction. Jones’s 

continued relationship with his family could be viewed favorably. But his history of using his 

“wife, son, and daughter . . . to move drugs and drug proceeds” suggested that his family support 

did “not necessarily provide assurance that he will stay on the right path if released.”

Ultimately, the court deemed that among these factors, the seriousness of Jones’s conduct 

weighed the most. Jones’s involvement in two “heinous” murders, the court explained, 

“showcase[d] an extraordinary lack of respect for the sanctity of human life.” In addition, Jones’s 

distribution of large quantities of cocaine presented a “grave danger to the community’s health and 

wellbeing.” All considered, the “severity of Jones’s offense” and the need to “promote respect for 

the law” “outweigh[ed] [the] other § 3553(a) factors” and precluded “releasing Jones.” 

Jones sought reconsideration, arguing that the court made multiple factual and legal errors 

in its analysis of the § 3553(a) factors. His motion included the contentions that he now makes on 

appeal, one of which was that the district court had adopted a per se rule to deny compassionate 

release when the crime involves murder. The district court denied reconsideration in a 6-page 

order rejecting each of these arguments.

Jones appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion (1) by failing to consider

his serious health conditions, (2) by giving preemptive weight to Jones’s offense conduct to the 

exclusion of all other § 3553(a) factors, (3) by relying on unreliable evidence in the presentence 

report, and (4) by rejecting a sentencing-disparity argument. None of these arguments supports a 

determination that the district court abused its discretion. Without such a determination, we must 

affirm. See United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1112 (6th Cir. 2020). 
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First, Jones contends that the court did not consider his medical conditions and supporting 

records and affidavits. But the court acknowledged Jones’s “serious medical conditions, including 

. . . end-stage renal disease.” It summarized the declarations of Jones’s medical experts as follows: 

Dr. Mark Faber, a nephrologist at Henry Ford Hospital, estimated in November 

2020 that, based on Jones’s disease and age (then 65 years old), Jones’s life 

expectancy was 4.8 years compared to 16.3 years for the general population. 

Additionally according to Dr. Tara Vijayan, a physician specializing in infectious 

diseases and internal medicine, Jones faces an increased vulnerability to COVID19 due to his end-stage renal disease and other health issues. 

The court also noted the possibility that Jones’s daughter would donate a kidney, enabling him to 

cease dialysis. And in the order denying reconsideration, the court reaffirmed that it had 

considered “Jones’s health conditions in the § 3553(a) analysis.” These were sufficient to explain

the court’s reasoning.

Second, Jones argues that the district court assigned “preemptive weight” to Jones’s 

offense conduct to the exclusion of all other § 3553(a) factors. But a fair reading of the court’s 

opinions show that it did nothing of the kind. Acknowledging factors in Jones’s favor, the court 

concluded they were simply “outweighed” by his offense conduct. Denying reconsideration, the 

court reiterated it had “considered and weighed a multitude of factors” and did not “adopt[] a per 

se rule.” 

It is true that the district court’s order quoted language from an unpublished district court 

opinion to the effect that “when the crime is murder,” the “seriousness of the offense is the factor 

under section 3553(a) that carries considerable, if not preemptive, weight.” United States v. Dale, 

No. 92-81127, 2022 WL 163612, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 18, 2022) (citing United States v. Bass, 

17 F.4th 629, 638 (6th Cir. 2021)). The words “considerable, if not preemptive weight” in isolation

could be read in different ways: from “considerable, indeed preemptive weight” to “considerable, 

although not preemptive weight.” We certainly do not read the phrase to mean the former, and 
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our court has neither held nor suggested as much. In Bass, we plainly did not hold that 

the seriousness of a murder offense would categorically preclude compassionate release. Bass, 

17 F.4th at 638. Nor did our unpublished opinion in United States v. Araña, 844 F. App’x 834, 

836–38 (6th Cir. 2021) preclude compassionate release for murder convicts. Indeed, Araña

distinguished rather than rejected cases from other circuits granting compassionate release to 

murder convicts. Id. at 836. 

Jones sought reconsideration in part on the ground that the district court had given

preemptive weight to the offense conduct, relying on the district court’s “if not preemptive” 

language and its citations of Bass and Araña. In response, the district court explicitly denied that 

it had done so, in the following words: 

The Court’s opinion . . . reveals that it considered and weighed a multitude of 

factors, including Jones’s time served, disciplinary record, age, family support, 

rehabilitation efforts, severe physical limitations, and risk of recidivism. The fact 

that the Court afforded heavy weight to the severity of Jones’s crime was within its 

discretion; it does not constitute a mistake of law warranting reconsideration. 

This language flatly disposes of the argument that the district court categorically denied 

compassionate release because the underlying crime involved murder. 

Third, Jones argues that the court clearly erred in concluding that he ordered the murders 

of Grice and Caruthers by relying on “factually unreliable information” from the 2008 presentence 

report. Clear error would amount to an abuse of discretion. See Jones, 980 F.3d at 1112. Jones

argues that the evidence supports only a finding that he reasonably foresaw that his gang would 

carry out the murders. 

We need not decide whether the court erred by relying on the 2008 presentence report; 

ample independent evidence supports the court’s finding that Jones was responsible for the 
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murders.1 We have held that failing to properly address presentence report objections is harmless 

where sufficient evidence independently supports a finding at initial sentencing. See United States 

v. Wright, 747 F.3d 399, 415 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Parrott, 148 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 

1998). It follows a fortiori that any procedural error in considering the facts in a presentence report 

would be harmless if there are sufficient facts to support denial of a later compassionate release 

motion.

In his plea agreement, Jones stipulated to a murder enhancement based on his use of the 

“Dog Pound” to “plan the robberies, kidnap[p]ing[s,] and intentional killings of rival drug 

traffickers . . . includ[ing] the murders of Mark Grice and Antoine Carruthers.” In a previous 

opinion, we viewed Jones’s statement as an admission that he planned the murders. See United 

States v. Jones, 425 F. App’x 449, 455 (6th Cir. 2011). Indeed, at his plea hearing Jones admitted 

using the “Dog Pound” to “plan . . . robberies and kidnappings” that would lead with reasonable 

foreseeability to the murder of Grice and Caruthers by members of Jones’s enterprise. In terms of 

culpability, there is little difference between a gang leader’s planning a murder carried out by his 

subordinates and ordering the murder. For that reason, Jones’s own admissions suffice to support 

the district court’s findings regarding his culpability for the murders. 

Jones, to be sure, denied direct participation in the murders and sought to minimize his 

involvement during the plea hearing. At one point he said, for instance, “[t]o be honest with you 

1

Jones relies on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 to challenge the district court’s use of the 2008 presentence 

report and its description of Jones’s role in the murders. Jones made multiple objections to the report before his 

sentencing, arguing it was unreliable. The sentencing judge summarily overruled Jones’s objections and adopted the 

report. Even if the sentencing judge erred, it is doubtful Jones could raise this Rule 32 challenge years later in a 

motion for compassionate release. Rule 32(i)(3)(B) applies only “[a]t sentencing,” and proceedings under 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) are “sentence-modification proceedings,” not “plenary resentencing[s],” Jones, 980 F.3d at 1107

(citation omitted). Limited proceedings of this sort, the Ninth Circuit explained, do not encompass Rule 32 challenges 

to previously adopted presentence reports, on which district courts are entitled to rely. United States v. Spears, 824 

F.3d 908, 916 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing § 3582(c)(2)). 
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. . . I didn’t have nothing to do with the homicides.” But holding Jones to his earlier admission of 

planning the murders—rather than crediting his subsequent attempts to minimize his culpability—

does not amount to clear error. When “there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 

factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” United States v. Reinberg, 62 

F.4th 266, 269 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).

Finally, Jones contends that the court failed to properly consider “unwarranted sentence 

disparities” created by his 30-year sentence and a codefendant’s 18-year sentence. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(6). But as the district court explained, it had no obligation to do so. Section 3553(a)(6)

“concerns national disparities between defendants with similar criminal histories convicted of 

similar criminal conduct—not disparities between codefendants.” United States v. Conatser, 514 

F.3d 508, 521 (6th Cir. 2008). Following the Guidelines, rather than deviating downward as Jones 

requests, best avoids such disparities. See United States v. Bradley, 897 F.3d 779, 786 (6th Cir. 

2018).

In any event, comparing Jones with his codefendant would not get Jones very far. The 

codefendant’s subordinate role in the enterprise and the lesser severity of his convictions—money 

laundering conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846—justify 

any alleged disparity. Indeed, as stated in the codefendant’s plea agreement, “Jones assumed the 

responsibility [for] overseeing [drug distribution] on behalf of [his codefendant].” Jones himself 

admitted he “directed” the enterprise.

In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to grant compassionate 

release. The court considered the good and the bad. Jones’s “positive record in custody” and his 

“rehabilitation efforts” favored him, as well as his “serious medical conditions,” which mitigated 

his “risk of recidivism” and his danger to “the public.” But the “severity of his crime”—which 
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involved two murders and substantial quantities of cocaine—and the need to “promote respect for 

the law,” “significantly outweighed” these mitigating factors. While it is apparent that the district 

court attached great weight to Jones’s leadership of a cocaine conspiracy responsible for two 

murders, we have repeatedly held in applying the § 3553(a) factors that attaching great weight to 

a single factor is not reversible error. See United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 571 (6th Cir. 

2012); United States v. Thomas, 437 F. App’x 456, 458 (6th Cir. 2011).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The majority finds that the district 

court carefully weighed each of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors before denying Jones’s motion for 

compassionate release, but the district court’s written decisions reflect that the district court 

glossed over Jones’s relevant history and characteristics and gave unreasonable weight to the 

nature and circumstances of Jones’s offense. Because I would hold that this was error that requires 

us to reverse and remand for further proceedings, I respectfully dissent.

District courts have discretion to balance the § 3553(a) factors when evaluating a motion 

for compassionate release, but that discretion is not boundless. See United States v. Ruffin, 978 

F.3d 1000, 1005, 1008 (6th Cir. 2020). A district court abuses its discretion when it “selects a 

sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider relevant 

sentencing factors, or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.’” United 

States v. Sexton, 889 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 813 F.3d 

251, 264 (6th Cir. 2016)). A district court also abuses its discretion when it fails to consider 

relevant evidence, disregards important historical context, or fails to “square” its analysis with the 

particular facts of the case. See United States v. Bass, 17 F.4th 629, 638–41 (6th Cir. 2021).

The district court made two errors that led it to engage in an unreasonable balancing of the 

§ 3553(a) factors. First, the district court did not engage with all of the § 3553(a) factors. The 

district court began its § 3553(a) analysis by listing some—but not all—of the statutory factors. 

See United States v. Jones, No. 01-80571, 2022 WL 1487740, at *4 (E.D. Mich. May 11, 2022), 

reconsideration denied, No. 01-80571, 2022 WL 3044819 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 2, 2022). The district 

court then briefly addressed a few of those factors, including Jones’s risk of recidivism and his 

offense conduct. 2022 WL 1487740, at *4–5. But rather than engage with Jones’s argument that 

his history and circumstances favored a sentence reduction, the district court cut its analysis short, 
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offering only a conclusory remark that Jones’s low risk of recidivism and “any other[] [factors] 

weighing in his favor are significantly outweighed by the severity of his crime.” Id. at *4; see also 

id. at *5 (remarking that “[t]he severity of Jones’s offense outweighs other § 3553(a) factors that 

may weigh in Jones’s favor”). The district court did not identify the other factors weighing in 

Jones’s favor or explain why those factors were outweighed by his offense conduct. A district 

court cannot reasonably balance the § 3553(a) factors by considering some but summarily 

dismissing others. See Sexton, 889 F.3d at 265. Yet that is what the district court did here.

Second, the district court relied on a fundamentally mistaken view of our compassionaterelease caselaw. According to the district court, “[t]he Sixth Circuit has expressed the view that 

‘when the crime is murder,’ the ‘seriousness of the offense is the factor under section 3553(a) that 

carries considerable, if not preemptive, weight[.]’” Jones, 2022 WL 1487740, at *5. That the 

district court held this unsupported view of our caselaw helps to explain why the district court 

found it unnecessary to engage with the unspecified “other” § 3553(a) factors supporting Jones’s 

motion: the district court believed that such factors were effectively irrelevant.

Contrary to the district court’s suggestion, we have neither held nor suggested that a 

defendant’s offense conduct or any other § 3553(a) factor is entitled to preemptive weight. The 

district court’s authority for its assertion is not a published Sixth Circuit decision but rather an 

unpublished district-court decision. See id. (quoting United States v. Dale, No. 92-81127, 2022 

WL 163612, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 18, 2022)). The underlying district-court decision, in turn, 

cites our decision in Bass, where we remarked “a prison term of twenty-two years does not on its 

face appear proportionate to the seriousness of Bass’s offenses, especially in light of the fact that 

his crimes rendered him eligible for the death penalty.” 17 F.4th at 638. Bass’s statement plainly 

does not amount to a holding that the seriousness of a murder offense precludes compassionate 
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release as a matter of law. To the contrary, Bass recognized that there may be “circumstances that 

would warrant compassionate release for a defendant” sentenced to life imprisonment without the 

possibility of release—a sentence more severe than the one Jones is serving. Id. at 640.

The majority affirms that our court has never held that a murder conviction precludes an 

incarcerated person from obtaining compassionate release, but it assigns significant weight to the 

district court’s statement in its order denying reconsideration that the court had not adopted such 

a per se rule. The problem is that the district court’s error goes beyond merely misstating our 

caselaw. Our statement in Bass—and our more general recognition that district courts are 

permitted to place “great weight” on an imprisoned person’s offense conduct, United States 

v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 571 (6th Cir. 2012)—must be understood in context. Bass, for instance, 

was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release. 17 F.4th at 633. We held 

that the district court erred by failing to tailor its compassionate-release decision to the fact that 

the sentencing court had found that there were no circumstances under which Bass could ever be 

released. Id. at 638–41. Here, by contrast, Jones was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment and 

has served 22 years of that sentence. No court has ever found that Jones should never be released. 

By importing Bass’s weighing of the offense conduct and surrounding circumstances of that case 

into this case, and then focusing on Jones’s offense to the near exclusion of all other relevant facts, 

the district court made the same basic conceptual error that we identified in Bass.

Our decision in United States v. Araña—also cited by the district court—highlights the 

difference between what we have held to be an appropriate weighing of the § 3553(a) factors and 

the flawed balancing the district court engaged in here. 844 F. App’x 834 (6th Cir. 2021). Citing 

several health challenges and the COVID-19 pandemic, Araña moved for compassionate release. 

Id. at 835. The district court denied Araña’s motion based on the court’s evaluation of the 
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§ 3553(a) factors. Id. at 835–36. In doing so, the district court “distinguished . . . cases where” 

motions for compassionate release had been granted to other defendants who had been convicted 

of murder. Id. at 836. “In one, the defendant had a life expectancy of less than one year.” Id.

(citing United States v. Wong Chi Fai, No. 93-CR-1340, 2019 WL 3428504, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 

30, 2019)). “In another, the defendant had spent much of his sentence suffering from serious 

illness, meaning that ‘further incarceration in his condition would be greater than necessary to 

serve the purposes of punishment[.]’” Id. (quoting United States v. McGraw, No. 02-cr-00018, 

2019 WL 2059488, at *5 (S.D. Ind. May 9, 2019)). We held that the district court’s careful efforts 

to distinguish these cases supported its denial of Araña’s motion. 844 F. App’x at 838.

The district court’s analysis here pales in comparison. As discussed, the district court did 

not carefully work through each of the § 3553(a) factors cited by Jones or distinguish his case from 

other decisions granting sentence reductions or release to terminally ill prisoners. Nor could it. 

Jones, like Wong Chi Fai, has had his life expectancy dramatically reduced by several different 

health conditions. According to one expert, Jones’s life expectancy is approximately 2.8 years. 

R. 846-15 (Farber Decl. ¶ 3) (Page ID #3530–31). And Jones, like McGraw, has spent much of 

his incarceration suffering from several debilitating illnesses. Jones is 67 and obese, has 

hypertension and kidney failure, and suffers from diabetes mellitus and Charcot foot. Id. ¶¶ 4–5 

(Page ID #3531). He is wheelchair bound and may require limb amputation due to his Charcot 

foot. Id. ¶ 4. He has been receiving dialysis three times a week for eleven years and “will not 

regain kidney function unless he is able to receive a kidney transplant.” Id. ¶ 3 (Page ID #3530); 

see R. 866-1 (Star Destiny Mercede Harrell Jones Decl. ¶¶ 2–3) (Page ID #6721) (declaration of 

Jones’s daughter stating that she has “agreed to donate one of [her] kidneys” to her father if he is 

released and can undergo “the procedure at a Michigan hospital such as the University of Michigan 
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Hospital”). The district court should have considered whether these facts and circumstances 

warranted relief rather than dismissing them out of hand based on Jones’s offense conduct.

In the end, the district court was not required to find that Jones’s medical conditions or 

other circumstances warranted a sentence reduction or release, but the court was obligated to 

consider these facts and each of the § 3553(a) factors when resolving Jones’s motion for 

compassionate release. I would hold that the district court failed to do so, and I would remand the 

case to the district court to allow it to engage in the appropriate review of Jones’s motion. The 

majority fails to correct the district court’s error, and I therefore respectfully dissent.