*CMH Pub 104-14-1 

GERMAN DEFENSE TACTICS 

against 

RUSSIAN BREAKTHROUGHS 

tTbls pubUcntlon replaces DA Pam 20-288, October 1951. 
Facsimile Edition, 1984, 1988,2004 

Center of Milital'Y History 

United States Army 

·Washington, D.C. 
PREFACE 

This study was prepared . (or the Historical Division, EUCOM, 

by a group of former German genernls and general staff offi cers. The 

name.~ of the contributors Itrc not announced at t.his time. The prillcipll'} authot', who by the end of the wor had attained the rank of general (Generaloberst), served on the Eastern Front throughout the 

Russian campaign and the subsequent retreat into tho plains of northern Germany. He was successively commander of an infantry 

brigade, a panzer division (November 1941 to February 1943), and 

two different corps in the battles for Kharkov and Belgorod. Appointed commander of a. panzer army on 1 December 1943, he participated in the withdra.walllcross southern Russia until t.he Germans 

rcn.ch~d the Carpathians. In August 1944 he WitS transferred to 

Army Group Center, Ilnd his last assignment was with Army Group 

Weichsel. During this final phase of his military career, he played 

nn impol"tant part in the retreat frum Lithuania, East Prussia, and 

Pomerania. 

The reader is reminded that all publications in the GERMAN REPOlrr 

SERlES were written by Germans from the German point of view and 

that the procedures of the German Army differed considerably from 

those of the United States Army. Throughout this pamphlet the 

point of departure for tactical innovations was official German combat doctrine and authorized German tables of organization and equipment. Moreover,.it must not be overlooked that a fundamental 

condition of German operations in Russia was the almost consistent 

German inferiority in both manpower and materiel. Various other 

facl.m·s colored the a uthors' thinking in ways unfamiliar to Americans. 

Every effort hns been made to retain the point of view, the expresBio ~ and even the prejudices of the authors. 

CONTENTS Po,_ PART ONE. INTRODUCTlON.. __ ____ . ________________________ ______ • I 

PART TWO. ACTIVE DEFENSE 

Chap!tl 1 . Frontal Counterattack ____ .. _____ • _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 3 

i. Flank Attack. _______________ . ___________________________ 9 

3. Spoiling Attock._______ _________________________ _______ __ l S 

4. Defensive Pincer' _________ ________________________________ 20 

PART THREE. PASSIVE DEFENSE 

Chapter 5. Defense in Place With Mobile Reterve' ._. _____ •• ___________ . 21 

6, Position Defente In Sirang Points and Improvlsea Fomenu______ 34 

7. Improvil .... d Zone Deren' e ___________________ . ... __ .________ 36 

8. Isthmus Defens_The Sea 01 Flank Proleclion ________________ _ 4 1 

PART FOUR. RETROGRADE MOVEMENTS 

Chaph!19. Delaying and Blacking Acllonl .____________________________ 57 

10. Delay an Succeillye Potltions _________________________ .____ _ 64 

PART FIVE. DEFENSE AGAINST BREAK.THROUGH5-

A COMBINATION OF DEFENSE TACT1CS_____________ _ 71 

PA RT SIX, CONCLUS10NS ____________ ___ __ ___ _____ • ___ _ ____ _ _ _ _ ___ 79 

MAPS 

N •. 

I . Gene ral Refe r. n •• Mop 

2. frontol Co ... nterolto.k (March 19431 

3. flank Alla.k (Ea. to,n Galicia, April 19441 

4. Spoiling Alt ,~ (Noyember 19431 

5 . Oofon.ly. Pln.o" (Bailio of 'ho Volkhoy, 10 Jonuory_28 J ... ne 19421 

6. Oofon' o In Pla.e whh Mobil. Resorves (Wlntor 1943_441 

7 . Improylsod lone o.lonso In EOlt Pr"ula (Jon ... ary 19451 

8. Isthm .... O. f. n .. (Th. Soeo a . Fleonk Protocllon, Crlm, eo, 1943-441 

9 . Doleoylng and 810cklng Actions IO"embl r 194 31 

1 O. D, loy on Su ..... ly, Po. lit on. (A ... g ... . ' 19431 

11 . R ... nleon Brea k-Th roug h Allemp'eo' KI.oyogrCld: 

A. 5_ 7 Janua,y 1944 

B. 8_ 10 Jeon ... o,y 1944 

C. 10- 16 Jan ... ary 1944 

Un .. q .... n .. In. I • • bock cOYlr' 

PART ONE 

INTRODUCTION 

By means of short. narrlltives bnsed on act.unl experience, this study 

endeavors to describe the characteristics of Russian break-throughs 

and the counlermellsures employed by the Germans. No attempt has 

been made to present anything like a complete picture. Since these 

reports were written from memory, some of the dntes and figures may 

be inaccurate. A few combat na rratives contain other than strictly 

tactical details in an effort to convey some oC the emotiollal factors 

which affected the actions of troop commanders and their men in 

different situations. 

Each of the fo11owing chapters deals with onc of the more frequently employed tactics to prevent or contain bl'cak-throughs. It 

should be pointed out, however, that only in rare instances wns one 

Bingle method used. Most often one tactical mensure predominated 

in an operation, with two or three others, or even more, complementing 

it. During extended defensive operations even the predominant 

method changed occasionally. The use of a combination of defense 

tactics without preponderance of any aile often proved effective. On 

many occasions the parent unit employed one specific defense method 

while its subordinate units had to use other tactics. No two situations 

wel"e alike, and each had to be treated on its own merits. The selection 

of the type of defensive ladics depended on the intuitive perception 

of the commander in the fi eld as well as upon the circumstances. 

This PUbUcntiOD replaces DA Pam 20-233, October 0~1. 

PART TWO 

ACTIVE DEFENSE 

Chapter 1 

FRONTAL COUNTERAnACK 

One of the simplest methods of seali ng off a. brenk-through or eliminating a. penetration is the frontal counterattack. Usually, such a. 

counterattack can be launched only if the break-through is minor and 

can be localized, Ilnd if both shoulders are secure. Moreover, sufficient 

reserves must 00 available to close the breach by a quick counterthrust 

before the enemy is able to widen the gnp. Once hostile preparations 

for a break-through have been clearly recognized, it is most effective 

to move the reserves close to the r ear of the threatened sector. While 

the reserves must be close enough for instantaneous effective employment, they should be sufficiently removed from the front line so as 

not to forfeit prematurely their freedom of maneuver. In t.heir 

assembly areas the reserves must be concealed from enemy observation 

and air attacks and must. not be exposed to hostile preparation fire. 

Obviously, reserves should have maximum fire power and mobility j 

armored divisions come closest to t.hese requirements beclluse they combine tremendous striking for ce with concent.rated fire power. Infnntry supported by assault guns will often restore the situation so 

long as the break-through is local. 

A counterattack is far more complicated if, before its eft'ect is felt 

by the enemy, the shoulders begin to crumble, the breach is widened, 

and the enemy attack gains ground in depth. But even in this event., 

it is best to maintain t.he tactical integrity of t.he reserve so t.hat. upon 

commitment. it can overrun t.he em'my infantry in one powerful thrust 

and regain t.he key positions of the former line. Only t.hen should 

attempts be made to close t.he smaller gaps by fianl(ing actions. As 

a countermeasure against. the disintegration of t.he shoulders and as 

support to the flanking actions, it will prove effective to prot.ect the 

open flanks of t.he break-through area with artillery and to assemble 

small local reserves behind t.hem. Frequently one infant.ry company 

supported by assault guns will suffice for t.his purpose. 

It would be a. mistake to attempt to close an extensive breach across 

its entire width by overextending the at.tack frontage of the main 

r eserve force. A counterat.t.ack delivered under such circumstances 

3 
4 OfRMAN _EPQRT nilES 

would not have sufficient striking power and wou ld be in danger of 

losing its punch and bogging down before it reached its object.ive. On 

the other hand, a delayed commitment of the reserves wi1l result in a.n 

expansion of the breach; then, the counterattacking force will be faced 

with an entirely neW situation with whi ch it will be unable to cope 

alone. Such a delay often leads to heavy losses which can only be 

offset by committ.ing additional forces. 

'Whenever the ellemy achieves a major break-through that causes 

the collapse of a wide sector of the front (thirty miles or more), the 

local reserves will always be insufficient to close the gap by frontal 

counterat.tack. Piecemeal commitment of individual divisions in 

a gap of this width will simply lead to their engulfment by the advancing hostile avalanche. Only a strong force consi'Sting of several 

corps will be able to stem the tide and halt the enemy advance in the 

depth of the defense 01' to close the gap by a counterattack. There will 

usually be a considerable time lapse, however, before a force of such 

strength can be released from other sectors and moved to the breakthrough area. Meanwhile, attempts must be made to narrow the 

breach by withdrll.wing to a shorter line II.nd by strengthE'.ning the 

resistance in the sectors adjacent to the gap. 

The German offensive to recapture Kharkov and Belgorod presents 

a good example 01 a 1rontal counterattack. By 23 November 1942 

the Russians had closed the ring around Stalingrnd and started the 

most powerful winter offensive of the war. Advancing rapidly, they 

annihilated in quick succession the Romanian, Italian, and Hungarian 

units along the ChiI' and Don Rivers and opened a 350-mile gap in the 

German front. This breach was equal to the total length of the western 

front in World War I. Initially, only isolated German divisionsl committed in support of the allied and satellite forces, stood in the way of 

the Russians, like the stays of a corset. The bulk of the German reserves, including five fully equipped panzer divisions, were tied down 

in western Europe because of the invasion of North Afrir.a by Allied 

foroos. Some of these divisions later appeared on the eastern front. 

The German armies in the Caucasus, in danger of being cut offl 

were forced to withdraw. Their motorized units, mainly First Panzer 

Army, were committed along the Donets in order to strengthen the 

southern wing of Army Group Don. North of the gapl the Second 

Army was forced to evacuate Voronezh and the Don front, and its 

southern wing was pushed far back to the west. Gradually, two-t.hirds 

of the entire Eastern Front began to sway and crumble. Russian 

pressure mounted constantly and the only solution was to withdraw 

farther and farther to the west. The Russians poured in a never 

ending stream of hastily reorganized divisions and continued their 

drive. Three hostile armies converged on Kharkov and in midFebruury 1943 succeeded in capturing this impoltant traffic center by 
DEfENSE TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN BREAK-THROUGHS 5 

It concellt.ric attnck. (Map 2) But their next thl'llst\ aimed nt Poltavn, 

ground to a halt 30 miles short of the city b('.calloo the Soviet troops 

were too exhausted. to continue. Now they placed all their hopes in 

the Third Tfl.nk Army commanded by their most cllpnble tank expert, 

General Popov. In mid-February Popov advanced practically without resistance in the direction northwest of Dnepropetrovsk with the 

apparent intention of reaching the Dnepr bend. His objective wa~ 

to cross the Dnepr before the German forces were able to build up 

their defenses along the river, but it soon becllme obvious t.hat his 

forces lacked tho necessary drive. Meanwhile\ the Germuns were 

building up strength fol' a front.al r.ount.eratt.ack. 

The divisions arriving f!"Om the West detrAined at Poltuva behind 

a defensive screen established by Provisional Corps Ralls. This corps 

held the· line with three infantry divisions nm! the reconnuissnnce 

regiment of the 3d SS Panzer Division. Its othel' motorized elemf'.llts, 

the Panzer Division Grossdeutschland and the Fuehrer Escort Ratta.lion, were in rest Itrens west of Poltavn, close t.o the front They 

fOI'med a mobile reserve to be committed ill the (Went.. that the enemy 

n!,tempted to capture Poltava by 1m cnveloping !,hrust through the 

gap to the north. The Russians actually tried to outflank Poltava, 

but this danger was eliminated by German infantry supported by the 

l'econnll.issnnce regiment and tactical Luftwaffe units. D\\ring lhese 

actions the enemy showed definite signs of weakness and exhaustion, 

and the time fol' n major counlernttack seemed to be approaching. 

Quick action was indicated since the snow was beginning to thaw. 

Mud formed on the ground and soon all movements would becomQ 

impossible. But deep down the soil was solidly fl'Ozcn. Cold nighu,; 

prevcnted a quick thaw and favored movements during the ea rly morning hours. Meanwhile, the battle-weary German front-line troops 

were granted a short breathing spell and given the opport unity to 

integrate newly arrived replacements and equipment. 

By 10 March 1943 the counterattack forces stood ready to jump 

off; their morale was excellent. The main effort was placed on the 

southern wing whem terruin conditions favored the employment of 

armor. Here, the Grossdeutschland Division was assembled and given 

the mission of attacking toward Valki. Adjucent on the left\ the 

320th Infantry Division jumped off after It preparation fl'om nil guns 

of two divisions\ supported by corps artillery. The infantry penetrated the enemy positions, mopped up a st.rong point on the main 

Poltava-Kharkov highway, and pushed the enemy beyond a flooded 

brook on the other side of the town. This normally insignificant 

watercourse hud suddenly grown into It raging torrent which brought 

the att.ack to all unexpected halt after a gain of only one mile. The 

tanks of the Grossdeutschlnnd Division attempted to overcome the 

swift current farther upstream and finally succeeded in crossing after 
6 OliMAN REPOIl SEltIIES 

several hours. More than eighty tanks broke through the second enemy 

position 011 the east bank of the brook and rolled toward Valki. Soon 

nn improvised bridge was thrown across the brook and the attack 

regained its momentum. In the sector adjacent to the north, the 167th 

and 168th Infantry Divisions penetrated the enemy position!> after 

hen.vy fighting, captured a numoor of villages, and attempted to establish contact with the LI Infantry Corps on the left. The reinforced 

reconnaissance regiment, committed between the 320th and the 167th 

Divisions, closed in on the enemy positions situated in the woods and 

penetrated deep into the forest. Its tanks advanced along the ra.iJroad 

tracks running parallel to the woods. By afternoon Corps RallS was 

making progress along its entire front and kept the crumbling enemy 

forces on the move. 

On the second day of the thrust the corps committed all its forces 

in n. concentric attack on Bogodukhov. For this purpose the corps 

zone was narrowed to 10 miles. Its width had already boon reduced 

Il'om 60 to 25 miles by the end of the first day. The enemy forces 

holding Bogodukhov were unable to resist the onslaught of the German ground troops which were closely supported. by the Luftwaffe. 

The city fell after brief house-to-house fighting. Corps Raus then 

establishe4 contact with the spearheads of the I SS Panzer Corps 

which had just entered Olshany, fifteen miles southeast of Bogodukhov, After annihilating strong enemy forces in the Olsha.ny area, the 

panzer corps turned to the east to envelop Kharkov and cut off the 

enemy's route of withdrawal to the north. 

While the main force of Provisional Corps Raus was to advance 

northward in an attempt to establish contact with the LI Corps and 

thereby cut off the enemy forces in the Akhtyrka area, the 320th Division WIlS to screen the pivoting movement of the I SS Panzer Corps, 

Ever increasing mud and floods slowed the advance at every step. 

Although all bridges across the swollen Vorskla, Udy, and Lopan 

Rivers had been destroyed, the infantry and panzer units were 

nevertheless able to reach their daily objectives. Many motor vehicles 

and horse-drawn artillery pieces, however, bogged down along the 

way. On the other hand, the considerably lighter artillery of the 

Russians and their Pan;e [Ed,: Russian peasant] wagons pulled 

through everywhere and escaped the German advance, 

The Grossdeutschland Division carried the main effort and reached 

the upper Vorskla, with the 167th Division following closely. Since 

the LI Corps on the southern wing of Second Army lagged far behind, 

no contact with that corps could be established and the enemy around 

Akhtyrka escaped encirclement. The continuation of the operation by 

a thrust on Tomarovka. required the panzer forces to pivot to the east., 

changitlg the direction of their advance. They were replaced by elements of the 167th Division which were to hold a line facing north 
DEF!NU TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN IIEAK_THROUGHS 7 

to provide flank cover. The advance toward Tomarovlea was delayed 

because territorial gains toward the east automatically led to ltD extension of the open flank. 

By the second day of -this eastward thrust, the strong 167th Division was almost entirely immobilized along the flank. The Arrival 

of LI Corps had to be awaited: before the eastward thrust could be 

resumed. The main reason for this delay was that the boundary 

between Army' Groups Center and South ran along the Vorskla 

River. The Army High Command, responsible for co-oJ:dinatmg the 

operations of the two army groups, was too far removed, and its 

decisions therefore were too slow to keep abreast of the fast-moving 

events at the front. Finally, the Army High CommJl.nd ordered 

LI Corps to relieve the 167th Division. The advance continued and 

the Grossdeutschland Division entered Tomarovka.. On its approach 

to the town, the division destroyed a considerable number of Russian 

tanks while many undamaged ones, which had bogged down in the 

mud, were retrieved and turned against the enemy. 

It was in this action that Tiger tanks-engaged the Russian T34's 

for the first timej the results were more than gratifying for the 

Germans. For instance, two Tigers, acting as an armored point, 

destroyed a pacle of T34's. Normally the Russian tanks would stand 

in ambush at the hitherto safe distance of 1,350 yards and wait for 

the German tanks to expose themselves upon their exit from a village. 

They would then take the German tanks under fire while the Panthers 

were still outranged. Until now, these tactics had been foolproof. 

This time, however, the Russians had miscalculated. Instead of leaving the village, the Tigers took up well-camouflaged positions and 

made full use of their longer range. Within a short time they 

knocked out sixteen T34's which were sitting in open terrain and, 

when the others turned about, the Tigers pursued the fleeing Russians and destroyed eighteen more tanks. It was observed that the 

SS-mm. armor-piercing shells had such a terrific impact that they 

ripped off the turrets of many T34's and hurled them several yards. 

The German soldiers' immediate reaction was to coin the phrase, "The 

T34 raises its hat whenever it meets a. Tiger." The performance of 

the new German tanks was a great morale booster. 

Farther to the south, Kharkov was captured by the 1st SS Panzer 

Division after four days of street fighting during which Tigers again 

played a decisive role. The 2d SS Panzer Division turned north, 

advanced on Belgorod, captured the city, and linked up with the 

Grossdeutschland Division which had thrust · beyond Tomarovka. 

The capture of the two cities secured the anchors of the new German 

line along the Donets. Between these two points. two German divisions slowly struggled through the mud in their elort to reach the 

west bank of the river. 
8 GEIMAN IIPOtT SERIES 

The Russian elements that were able to cross the Donets were badly 

mauled. German reconnaissance units, advancing beyond the river, 

met with little resista.nce. Even though t.he German attack divisions 

were fully capable of continuing their drive, t.he over-all situation and 

the prevailing mud made it inadvisable. 

The objective of the frontal counterattack had been achieved. The 

breach, open lOt' four months, was closed and the greo.tcsl Russian 

winter offensive was stopped. After suffering a defeat of gigtllltic proportions, the Germans once again held a continuous line anchored on 

the Donets River. 
Chapter 2 

FLANK ATTACK 

The defender will often find it expedient to attack the flank of an 

enemy penetration with the objective of cutting off and destroying 

the hostile forces that have broken through. Such tactics are effective 

only when a secure shoulder provides the defender with a spring~ 

board for an attack which is launched straight across the gnp to the 

other shoulder, or when a natural obstacle, such IlS a large body of 

water or a swamp, serves as an anvil against which he" can crush the 

attacker. An effective flank attack requires a balanced force with 

adequate striking power whose strength need not necessarily exceed 

one-third of the total enemy forces committed in the break-through. 

The more powerful and mobile the force, the quicker the defender will 

attain his objective. Unsupported infantry is incapable of mounting 

a successful flank attack against an armored penetration. In such a 

situation infantry must always be supported by strong assault gun 

and armored units as well as sizable antitank forces. 

The defender who attacks the flank of an enemy penetration runs 

the risk of exposing his own flank and must thel'efore take this fuctol' 

into account when he pllllls the counterattack. The danger is usually 

less serious than anticipated because, during the initial stages of the 

break-through, the attacker usually commits his forces almost exclusively nlong the axis of advance without giving much attention to his 

flanks. These rush tnct.ics are practical, however, only so long as the 

defendCl' has neither the means nor the opportunity for immediate, 

effective counteraction. During their invnsion of Russia. in 1941, 

for instance, the Germans did not present the Russians with ally such 

opening. On the other hand, during the Russian counteroffenscs in 

1942, the German command always had strong armored forces at its 

disposal, making it inadvisable for the enemy to be careless in exposing his flanks. Bitter experience was to teach the Russian that flanks 

must be protected until he finally made them so tank-proof that they 

could only be overpowered with heavy casualties. For this reason 

the German flank uttacks grudually lost their sting after 1943 and 

were more often l'epulsed. 

Flank attacks arc pnliiculnrly effective when employed to eliminate 

hostile river crossings. The forces which cross first can usually be 

shattered or wiped out without too much difficulty because they rarely 

have adequate defensive protection. This happened, for instance, 

along the Teterev in December 1943. (Chapter 3) The defender 

9 
10 GERMAN REPOn SlIUES 

will find it much more difficult, wen-nigh impossible, to eliminate 

a strongly fortified enemy bridgehead which has adequate fire support 

from the far bank of the river. 

A t the beginning of Apri11944, the Germans launched a flank attack 

which proved very effective in remedying a preca rious situation. 

After heavy winter fighting in eastern Galicia and Podolia, the Fourth 

Panzer Army, with three corps, was on a line extending from Kovel 

in Lho north, th;.'ough Brody, to Berezhany in the south. (Map 3) 

The Russian colcirc1ement of Brody was imminent. There was & 

gtlp between that. town and the army's left. wing, and the anny right 

flank was exposed, The so-called forl.ress Ternopol, 18 miles to the 

front of the sout.h wing, had been encircled for ten days. The First 

Panzer Army, forming a roving pocket, was moving north of the 

Dnestr River toward the gap on Fourth Panzer Anny's southern 

flank. Strong Russian forces were driving westward past the pocket 

on both sides of the river. 

Although the over-all situation was far from satisfactory, the 

Fourt.h Panzer Army had at least stopped its retrograde movement. 

The 8nny was intact after many critical battles and had inflicted 

heavy losses upon the enemy during the winter. Dcspite evident 

battle weariness, the Russians continued their attempts to take Brody 

in order to gain a route to Lvov. They did succood in encircling the 

city on several occasions. The encirclements were broken each time 

by the provisional armored Task Foree Friebe, made up of one battalion of Tigers and one of Panthers. This tasl( force, augmented 

by a rocket projector brigade equipped with 900 late-type launchers, 

destroyed the enemy while he was still in his assembly area. preparing 

for the final all-out attack. The Russians abandoned the siege of 

Brody and, in a. most unusual change of tactics, used their newly 

arrived forces to form a continuous front line opposite the army 

center. The XIII Infantry Corps followed suit and linked up with 

the XLII Infantry Corps to the north, thus closing the gap north 

of Brody. The armored task force was now available for other 

missions. 

The anny's exposed right flank was under light attack. The Russians captured a few villages, but they were promptly retaken by 

local reserves supported by an annored battalion which moved freely 

along t.he flank. The army front was intact and the southern flank, 

though exposed, was secure. 

Still, the Russian forces which had bypassed the roving pocket 

continued their westward drive. Their annored spearheads s'Outh of 

the Dnestr entered Stanislav, and those to the north of the river approached the fortified area around the Galich bridgehead. Quickly 

gathered German infantry, together with advance elements of the 
OfFF.NSE TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN BItEAK-THROUGHS 11 

Hungarian First Army, which was assembling in the Stanislav-Nadvornaya area, drove the enemy out of Stanislav after street fighting. 

North of the river, however, the enemy, hampered only by muddy terrain, reached the Zlota Lipa valley. His axis of advance pointed 

toward the Drohobycz oil fields. 

The forward elements of the forces in the pocket had by now 

reached the ChOl'tkuv area. The Fourth Panzer Army was given the 

mission of relieving the First Panzer Army by a flank attack, and it 

received strong reinforcements for the execution of this task. The 

flank att.'Lck wns to be launched to the southeast from Berezhany, while 

a secondary thrust to the Dnestl' was to pinch off and destroy the Russian infantry divisions which had penetrated as far as the Galich area. 

As a preliminary step, the first elements of the 100th Light. Infantry Division, detraining in the army rear area, were ordered to 

capture the terrain south of Berezhany. Elements of another infantry division were to· take the area south of Rogatin. Both of these 

operations were designed to secure the unloading of II SS Panzer 

Corps, which had been transferred from Italy. Within a few days 

after detrnining the corps was ready to jump off. Aware of the 

t.hreat to their flank, the Russians used all their ava ilable air power 

to harass the assembly of the German forces which were restricted to 

t,he only two usable roads in the area. This enemy interference, however, was negligible compared to the difficulties presented by the 

muddy tenain. 

The 100th Light" Infantry Division was to clear the way for the 

decisive thrust, with the panzer corps following close behind. The 

only available all-weather road permitting major mechanized movements, led via Podgaytse to Buchach. The infantry had the mission 

of capturing heavily defended Podgaytse to open the road for the 

panzer thrust. Hardly had the enemy screening force been dislodged 

from the wooded heights south of Berezhany, when the infantry ran 

into huge snowdrifts which covered the entire road to It dept.h of several feet along 200- to !lOO-yard stretches. It was impossible to bypass 

these obstacles because of the rugged, snow-covered terrain on both 

sides of the road. Security guards were posted and the combat troops, 

equipped only with intrenching tools and a few locally procured 

shovels, began to clear the snow. After several hours of steady work, 

a single lane was opened and around noon it was possible to move Hp 

the artillery and tanks which were essential for the impending operation against Podgaytse. 

Despite the delay, the infantry took dIe strongly organized high 

ground in front of Podgaytse the same day. The division's Tiger 

battalion knocked out the T34's and antitank gun positions which defended the entrance to the towll, but in SO doillg completely blockod 
12 GEIMAN llPOll UI'IS 

its own advance. The main entrance alone was clogged by sixteen 

disabled Russian tanks and, as the infantry edged forward in houseto-house fighting, the wrecks were towed off, pushed ,aSide, or blown 

up. By late evening the Tigers had thrust across the town, knocking 

out thirty-six additional tanks in their advance. The infantry mopped 

up during the night and on the next morning turned eastward toward the Strypa River to secure the left flank. of the panzer corps 

and to make way for ita advance. 

The 10th SS Panzer Division now took the lead, with 100 tanks 

spearheading the movement. At the southern edge of Podgaytse. the 

division ran into strong resistance from skillfully concealed antitank 

guns which were too well entrenched to be attacked frontally and 

could not be bypassed because of the deep water ditches, ravines, and 

swamps on both sides of the road. After close reconnaissance, the 

guns were finally knocked out one by one with concentrated panzer 

and artillery fire. The way cleared, the tanks rolled forward. To 

avoid further delay, the division commander decided to drive cross· 

country to Buchach, but the route taken for a short cut proved to be 

a quagmire. Only the division commander with five lead tanks got 

through. Although he was able to establish contact with the spear· 

heads of the First. Panzer Army, this· achievement. served no pract.ical 

purpose as long as the highway from Podgayt.se to Buchach was still 

in enemy hands. The hasty decision to leave t.his highway delayed 

the operat.ion and cut. off t.he division commander from his troops. 

Their tanks bogged down, the panzer troops, fighting as infantry 

under the corps commander, undertook the clearance of the highway. 

Host.ile antitank fire interfered with their advance, and the Soviets 

offered st.rong resist.ance in the villages n.long the road. But., subjected to increasing pressure bot.h from the panzer corps and the 

infantry division approaching from the Galich area, their efforts were 

in vain. That evening, near the bend of the road west of Buchach, 

the Russian infantry divisions fleeing east.ward along the Dncstr were 

blocked off, hurled against the river, a.nd destroyed with the help of 

newly arrived infantry forces. The attack units regrouped and then 

turned castward. On 5 April Buchach was reached, and the axis of 

withdrawal of the encircled army was cleared. The Russians did not 

readily yield the prize which was being wrung from their grasp. In 

fierce pursuit they tried to cross the swollen Strypa to cut the escape 

artery, but they were no match for the liberat.ing forces. Whenever 

they got across the river, they were immediately thrown back. 

By mid-April the right wing of the Fourth Panzer Army had deployed hE!hind the Strypa, and the front, anchored on the Dnestr to 

the south, included a bridgehead across the Strypa opposite Buchach. 

On this line fixed positions were organi1..ed. The objective of the flank 

attllck-stabilization of t he front. in eastern Galicia-was attained 
DEFENSE TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN BREAK.THROUGHS .3 

wiLh the liberation of the First Panzer Army from encirclement and 

its l'eint.egmtion into the German defense system. 

In another installce, hostile armored forces opened a 20·mile gap 

through which the Russians poured reinforcements. The Gcrman 

command wanted to close the breach by a flank attack but had only 

one panzer division for this purpose. The division was much too 

weak fol' this mission, all the more since the enemy had committed 

sh'ong forces to widen the gap and was protecting his souLhern flank 

with powerful armored and antitank units. The operution was there· 

fore divided into several phases. As an initial step the crumbling 

shoulder south of the gap was strengthened, and theil a preliminary 

panzer attack narrowed the breach to ten miles. Immediately niter 

its replacement by infantry units, the panzer division was ready for 

the main plmsc of the operation- the closing of the gap. In a surprise night attack against the enemy flank, the mechanized infnntry 

overcame the tank and antitank cover, and the German tanks, immedintely following, succeeded in closing the gap. Furious enemy 

atltlcks agai nst the newly established defense line were repelled, but 

now the nortlwl'n anchor, held by a recently activated division, gave 

way in Lila fnce of heavily. mounting pressure. Finnlly, this danger 

wns eliminated by t he timely arrivnl of reinfOrcements. This example 

clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of n well-executed flank aLtack 

even though it may have to be carried out with comparatively weak 

tank forces. The' importance of securing Lhe shoulders at Lhe base 

of a break-through is only too obvious. 

The flank nLLack is very frequently used in local counterattacks and 

i:; an integral part of many large-scale defensive operations. A 

bl'cak-tllI'ough on a very wide frontage by overwhelmingly supel'ior 

armor cannot be eliminnted by a flank attack even though strong tank 

forces may be available to the defender, because the attacker usually 

protects his interior flanks with adequate armor and antitank gun 

fronts. But even if the flank attack should surmount this obstacle, 

the attacker still has sutlicient time to shift strong tank units from his 

main effort to the threatened interior flank in order to eliminate the 

danger. Under the most favorable circumstances, the defender's 

armored units may be able to divert the attacker's main force by 

compelling him to establish a new defense line on his flank. This 

happened west of Kiev in November 1943 when the Germans first 

succeeded in thwarting the enemy's attack plan, but later saw their 

own plans frustrated. The result was an extension of their own front 

line which tied down the German reserves committed in the flank 

attack. Moreovcr, by leaving their own flank open, the Germans 

encollraged the Russ.ians to press their nttacks in that direction. 

Frequently, the threat of a flank attack by armored forces will alarm 

the attacker so much that he will halt his offensive in order to avoid 
14 OIlMAN IErol' SERIES 

the annihilation of those of his forces which have broken through. 

He will be especially apprehensive if, only shortly before, he has 

BuBered. a severe blow by a flank attack or some other armored thrust. 

During the German relief thrust toward Stalingrad, for in tan~ 

panzer forces turned against the flank of the advancing Russian infantry, who fled panic-stricken. This was not surprising since earlier 

that m9nth a Russian cavalry corps had been annihilated by a flank 

attack of a strong panzer division at Pokhlebin on the AkSay River 

and two Russian infantry divisions had been routed north of the river 

by similar methods. (SeeCMH Pub 104-12, Russian Combat Methods 

in World War II, pp. 69 fr.) 
Chapter 3 

SPOtLiNG ATTACK 

Tho spoiling Il.Ltndc-a surprise thrust into tho onemy at.tack preparations- is a very effective, though rare, op<'I'ation. IL" ptll'pOSC is 

to disorganizo the enemy's assembly and thereby delay and weaken 

his offensive or to force him to launch his attack at a less vulncrnble 

point. 

Such nn attack from the defensive can be undctiaken only under 

certain conditions. The enemy assembly area. must be easily accessible to a. surprise. th rust., and the defender must have strong armored 

reserves on hand. The terrain and road net must fucililute quick 

rnnn<"uver under cover of darkness. All attllek plans must be concealed from the enemy, 01' he must be deceived with regard to the rca I 

intentions. For this renson, it is impcrnt.ivc t.hat one nct withoUL 

delay, 

Thesc prerequisites cxisted only on rare occasions, Howeyel', Lhe 

Germans wero prc..<;cnt.OO with It perfect opportunity to exploit them 

at the beginning of Novembc,' 1943, (Map 4) The Russinlls had 

broken through nOlth of Ki ev, and thero were indications t.hat they 

intended to cnvelop t he nOlthern wing of Army Group South, The 

forces at the disposal of the First Ukranian Front were insullicicnt 

to attuin this objective. The Soviets advanced sixty miles to the 

west, cllpt.ured tho impOItnnt l'uilroad junction of Fastov, neutralized 

ZhiLomil" und encircled t.he LIX lnfnntry Corps ill I(OI'osoon, But 

a German flank attack by urmol'ed units forced the Russians to pull 

back across the Teterev. Although Zhitomir was l'elieved, Fustov 

remai ned in enemy hands, and the sicge of Korosten continued. The 

Fourt.h Panzer Anny front, which had faced east before the Russian 

offensive, gave way and was now facing nortll. Both the Gel'man a.nd 

the Russian flanks were open to the west. Because of their inability 

to close this gap, the Gcrmans extended an open invitation to the 

Russians, to continue their offensive in order to exploit the success they 

IllLd hitherto achieved. They had n. uniquo opportunity to executt~ 

It wido envelopment out of their assembly area north of Zhitomir. 

Troop concentrations and road repairs performed behind the hostile 

lines indicated the imminent resumption of the Soviet offensive which 

would first threaten the Fourth Panzer Anny and subsequently the 

entire army group. 

The situation called for immediato action, and tho Gennllns thereforo decided to avert the threat by striking the flank of the hostile atIS 
16 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

tack pr~pflrfltions with strong panzer fOl'Ces. The XLVIn Pnll1.er 

Corps, with the 1st. SS, 7th, and 1st Panzer Divisions, was wiLhdl'awn 

from the Il'ont and assembled behind the center of the army sector. 

Meanwhile the approach routes-some of which led through marshy 

wooded tClTllin-lYcl'c l'econlloiten d. bridges repaired, and the llilrtisail \1nits rnmpnnt in the forests dispen;ed by the secllrity division responsible for Ihis area. Immediately afterwHl'd, the comLnt c\cllu:mts 

of 1\11 throo pllllZCI' divisions moved out in brond daylight. and marched 

along tho muin highway through Zhitomil' in order to deceive the 

enemy into believing t.hat st rong forc('s were being shift('d to another 

sector of the fl'ont. It was later cstablishNl I.hat this deception was 

completely suc<'essful. In any event, these. preliminary steps were 

actually inevitable since th(>. movements connected with t.h(>m had 

to be executed t.o enable the Germans to strike deep into the open 

enemy fl ank. Without this att.empt at deception, t.he movements 

would have required two nights, since t.he nPI"'Oach and nssembly of 

such a ~tro ng panzel' corps could not be effeded in one night. By 

cllrl'ying out the movements by dllY, they could be timed so that the 

units renchcd their turn-off point.s along the main highway shortly 

altel'dusk. By that time hllif the itinernry had beell covered and 

the mo,rellwnts continued without intcl'1'uption. The enemy had no 

opportunity to observe the turning movements of the corps, first to 

the I\orth, then toward the east. 

The entire movement procl'eded according to plan without enemy 

intedel'encc. 011 4 December 1943, at 0600, all t1iree pnnzer divisions were poised for attack along the Zhitomir-Kol'ostell highway, At the same time all the GHQ artillery, n rocket-projector 

brigade with launchers of different calibers up to 320-mm., and an 

armored tl'llin, were moved into position behind the left wing of XIII 

Infant.ry Corps 011 the extreme end of the open flank. These preparations, as well as the concentration of strong I'eserves behind XlII 

Corps wing, were to lead t.he Russians into assuming that the German 

aUack would continue all the army left wing, exactly whert! it hlld 

bogged down the previous month. The Russians were easily convinced 

of these intentions because their own reaction in similar situations was 

identical, When a heavy concentrat.ion was delivered in this sector at dawn and a Gel'man infantry division launched a frontal at· 

tack immediately afterward, t.he enemy felt absolutely certain that 

his estimates were correct. He shifted strong reserves to this sector 

and counterattacked, only to be stopped in his tracks by the concentrated fire of 300 rocket launchers, The Russians were still completely unaware of the impending flnnk attaC'k. Only nfter they had 

moved all available forces and weapons c10se to the front line, did two 

German corps comprising five divisions simultaneously attack their 

right flank. The main thrust was executed by the three divisions of 
DEFENSE TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN 8I1EAIC-THROUGHS 17 

XLVIII Panzer Corps which advanced. east toward the Teterev 

HiveI'. Some 1st SS Panzer Division elements were to turn south 

and at1llck the Russian forces from the renr. The 7th Panzer Division 

,vas to cover the COl'pS left. flank and establish" contact with LIX 

Corps, which was breaking out of encircled Korosten. 

Completely surprised by this flank attack, the enemy offered little 

resistance during the first dny. The mine fields emplaced by the 

Russians to Pl'ott'ct their open flunk were easily discovered from the 

ail' and bypassed. The entire flank was CI'ush(ld and destroyed by t.he 

attack from the rear. Within a few hours the Oe-.rman tanks penetrated deep into the enemy artillery emplacements, overran batteries 

under cover of light ground fog, nnd destroyed the guns, Since the 

ground wns frozen nnd covered by only a thin layer of snow, the 

tanks '~ere uble to mO.ve quickly and according to schedule. By 

the end of the first clay, the panzer divisions had advl\nced fifteen to 

twenty milp.s into the enemy's flank, taken numerous prisoners, and 

captured aU of his artillery. The LIX Corps hftd achieved its breakout and established contact with the panzer COI'pS. The ZhitomirKDrosten highwny ftod railroad line were once again in German hands. 

The completeness of the surprise achieved guaro.nteed the success of 

the operation. Only weak remnants of the enemy fol'ces escaped 

to the east. 

The thrust was continued during t.he second day. But its momentum was greatJy impaired. by heftvy fog and a breakdown of the 1st 

88 Panzer Division supply system. Even though this division 

dl'opped out becftuse of ammunition and fuel shol'tages, the othel' divisions ndvanced twelve more miles, The enemy resistancc remained 

negligible, As the attack progressed, t.he elements of the XIII Corps 

gradually joined the panzer corps thrust along the sectors in which 

the flunk attack had swept away all enemy opposition. Farther north, 

however, t.he LIX Corps was heavily engaged and progressed only step 

by step. 

It was not until the third day that. the first. enemy countermeasures 

were felt., but the few Russian armored and infantry units thrown 

across the lower Teterev were incapable of withstftnding t.he powerful 

drive of the panzer corps. The Russians' newly established defenses 

were quickly overrun and several Soviet tanks destroyed during this 

action. Armed points of the 1st Panzer Division reached the Teterev 

south of the railroad bridge. The 69th Infantry Division, operating 

on the right wing of XIII Corps, crossed the Telerev at Radomyshl 

and joined the panzer corps advance. On the other hRnd, the sizable 

Russian forces remaining in the swampy forests along the Irsha held 

out so tenaciously that the LIX Corps wit.h its two infantry divisions 

was unable to overcome their resistance. West of the Teterov. the 

enemy troops were reduced to a few bridgeheads. During the night, 
,. GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

however, these were reinforced to It point where they nearly burst with 

personnel and equipment. A new enemy army attempted to reverse 

the tide at any cost. 

During the fourth day, heavy enemy nttacks struck at the XIII 

Corps and XLVIII Panzer Corps sectors. Most of them were checked 

and territorial gains were made by moans of armored counterattacks. 

By the end of the day, however, the center of XIII Corps was in 

danger of being overrun. 

The Germans now decided to elimilHlte the enemy bridgeheads. On 

the Mth day of the drivo the 1st Panzer Division and t.he 1st SS Panzer 

Division formed the jaws of It pincers movement intended to annihilate 

all enemy forces remaining on the west. bank of the Teterev. The 

weak 7th Panzer Division Wllll to protect the north flank. Desperate 

enemy attempts to withst.and the onslaught of 200 tanks were in vain. 

One bridgehead after another was crushed or reduced by the powerful 

drive of the pan7.er divisions. By noon armored points eStablished 

('ontnct within the perimeter of the fifth and last enemy bridgehead. 

The bridges were blown up and the bulk of the enemy equipment, 

together with many prisoners, fell into German hands. The day 

culminated in an all-out attack by all available panzer forces and 

strong elements of XIII Corps against those enemy units which had 

dented the German lines during the preceding day. It ended in their 

encirclement and annihilation. 

Thus, the first objective of the operation was achieved. The surprise 

thrust from the defensive penetrated an area forty-five miles in depth 

and completely destroyed one Russian army and a second one suffered 

such heavy casualties that it was at Jeast temporarily rendered ineffective. Enemy cnsualties numbered thousands dead, wounded, or 

prisoners; more than 200 enemy tanks were destroyed and approximately 800 artillery pieces captured. German losses were light. The 

front line was short.ened and now faced eastj it was held solely by Germnn infantry divisions. TIle XLVIII Panzer Corps was available 

for another mission. 

The second phase of the thrust had the objec~ive of consolid'l.ting 

the German lines. In order to clear the SW!lmpy forests along the 

Irsha of hostile forces and establish direct contact between LIX and 

XUI Corps, the XL VIII Panzer Corps moved to the Korost.en area 

and launched a pincers attack against tho enemy forces in the swamps. 

Two panzer divisions and K orpsaoteilwng "E" [Ed. : a provisional 

unit of divisional strength formed by three weakened infa.ntry 

divisions, each organized into onc r~giment] attacked from Korosoon, 

north 'of tho Irsha, toward tl,le southenst, and the 7th Panzer and 112th 

Infantry Division thrUl'.t from positions south of the river toward the 

northeast. The northern spearhead, advancing in open terrain along 

the railroad to Kiev, initially made good progress, whereas the south-
OEfENSE TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN BRIAK-THROUGHS 19 

ern thrust was slowed down by heavy fighting in the wooded terrain. 

Nevertheless, the two armored speadheads established contact by the 

second day. The marshy forests along the Irsha were still being 

combed when strong Russian tank formations suddenly launched a 

flank attack from the north. Soviet armor and infantry also moved up 

from Kiev. According to statements made by prisoners of war, the 

Russians anticipated a German offensive t<> capture Kiev and therefore committed all units available in the area. In view of their 

limited strength, the Germans had not planned such a large-scale 

operation, quite apart from the difficulties they would have had in 

getting through the marshy forests extending between the Teterev 

and the Dnepr. Actually, the objective of the surpriscthrust had been 

fully achieved, and the intended creation of a continuous infantry front 

was well under way. In spite of the reckless expenditure of newly 

arrived armored and infantry forces, thc Russian counterattack did 

not gain any gl'Ound. All enemy attacks were repelled after stubborn 

fighting. On the very first day of the clash, the enemy lost more than 

eighty tanks. During the following two days, 150 additional tanks 

were destroyed by the Germans, and the Russian counterattack bogged 

down eventually. Minor thrusts supported by tanks were directed 

against the XIII Corps sector but were equally futile. 

The consolidat.ing phase of the thrust accentuated the effects of the 

initial surprise attack. Two additional Russian armies were so badly 

mauled that they were incapable of offensive action. The acute threat 

ill t.he area north of Zhitomir was thereby eliminated. A few weel<s 

later the Russian Christmas offensive was launched at a less vulnerable 

sector of the fl'ont, nn obvious indication that the enemy ha.d been 

forced to change his plans. 

The spoiling attack therefore achieved the dual purpose of relieving 

an encircled corps and enabling the Germans to build up a continuous 

front where previously t.here had been a wide gap. The annihilation 

of strong enemy forces was all incidental, though important result of 

this operation. A frontal counterattack would not have been successful in this case, quite aside from the heavy casualties it would have 

involved. 

Frontal thrusts into enemy attack preparations can be employed 

only in minor operations. Their success depends on achieving complete surprise as, for instance, during night raids. A singularly wellexecuted frontal surprise thrust was launched at the beginning of 

March 1945, when a detachment of young German naval cadets carried 

out a raid fl'Om a bridgehead north of Stettin. Well equipped with 

Panze'l'faWJts [Ed.: recoilless antitank grenade launchers], they struck 

at t.he center of the assembly area of a Russian tank brigade and 

tirstl'o),cd all its thirty-six tanks. 
Chap'er 4 

DEFENSIVE PINCERS 

Since defensive pincers are the most effective countermeasure 

against an enemy break-through, they should be applied whenever 

the tactical situation permits and the necessary forces are available. 

If these forces have sufficient striking power and mobility, the application of defensive pincers wil1 reverse an unfavorable situation very 

quickly and decisively. The immediate objective is to seal off the 

enemy penetration by flank attacks launched simultaneously from 

both shoulders. IdcaUy: this maneuver should lead to a "Cannae" 

-the encirclement and destruction of the enemy force which has 

broken through. 

The jaws of the pincers must attack simultaneously, overcome the 

hostile flank protection, and link up before enemy countermeaS\lres 

can become effective. If the jaws do not st.rike at the same time, 

the enemy will be given an opport.unity to reinforce that interior 

flank which is not under at.tack and the maneuver may easily fail. 

A typical example for such a failure wa.s the Russian pincers at.tack 

which wa.s launched during the summer of 1941 in an attempt to 

eliminato the German bridgehead at the Porechye on the Luga, (See 

CMH Pub 104-12, pp. 42 If.) 

Another indispensable prerequisite for the success of defensive 

pincers is the close co-ordination of all participating units under one 

command, In minor actions the exercise of unified command will not 

meet with any particular difficulties. Complications arise during 

large-scale operations when some of the partiC'.ipating divisions are 

separated by long distances and belong to dit!erent armies or army 

groups. In such instances it is expedient to make a single army or 

army group command responsibl e for the entire operation. A similar 

procedure must be followed even in. minor actions if the enemy attempts to break through at a sector boundary-a common practice with 

the Russians. 

Defensive pincers can eliminate even comparatively major breakthroughs. During the course of such an operation several divisions or 

corps may regain their freedom of maneuver as, for instance, after 

the Russian break-through near Belgorod in 1943. At that time th-. 

armored wedge which the enemy had driven to a depth of 100 miles 

was pinched ott at the base of the penetration, and his thru&t was 

checked by a pincers movement carried out by two panzer corps, starting from the two opposite shoulders. 

20 
DEFENSE TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN IllEAK-THIOUGHS 21 

When the jaws of the pincers are too weak or the terrain too difficult 

to tie oft the enemy forces that have broken through, protracted fight. 

ing involving many critical situations and the formation of curiously 

shaped front lines will result. In the Russian campaign this occurred 

for the first time during the battle along the Volkhov in the winter of 

1941-42, when the city of Leningrad came close to extinction, one 

million civilians being stfLrved or frozen to death. Even the Russian 

soldiers were inadequately fed and equipped and by the end of the 

winter half of them were dead. 

Faced by this situation, the Soviet leaders decided that Leningrad 

must be relieved at all cost. For this mission a new command staff 

was formed under General Merezkov, and the Fifty-ninth and Second 

Assault Armies, moving up with strong, fresh forces, were integrated 

into the front line built up along the Volkhov River. (Map 5) At 

t-he same time six divisions from the Leningrad sector were shifted 

farther east to strengthen the Russian Fifly·fourlh Army. After 

the German spearheads had been withdrawn from Volkhovstroy, fight.-

ing continued along a broad front extending from Novgorod to Lodva. 

Although the German forces dug foxholes and trenches in the frozen 

swampy forests and snowdri(ts, they lacked adequately prepared positions and supply routes. 

In this situation, between 10 and 13 January 1942, the Second 

Assault Army, led by General Vlassov, achieved a break-through 

across the Volkhov. Five divisions and one ski brigade reached the 

Novgorod-Chudovo highway and railroad line and pushed back the 

German screening (orce along a twenty-mile front. The Germans 

attempted to re-form t.heir lines along the highway. Islands of resist.-

ance in encircled Mostki Ilnd in Spasskaya Polist prevented a German 

rout, but a fifteen-mile gap was opened in the German line, leaving the 

Russians free access to the rear of the Eighteenth Army. The Second 

Assault Army struck across no man's land through the forests to the 

northwest. The attack plan called for cutting the Tosno-Chudovo 

Rollbahn [Ed.: road designated as a main axis of motorized transportation] and the disruption of the other German supply routes in 

conjunction with frontal attacks along the Leningrad sector. If the 

Russians succeeded, most of Eighteenth Army would be lost with only 

a few remnants escaping to the west. The Russian spearheads advanced 50 milcs, mooting virtually no resistance. 

The German command and troops performed extraordinary feats 

during these weeks of extreme danger. Battalions, combat teams, 

even entire divisions were improvised and thrown into battle. No 

task was left undone; virgin territory was explored; new expedients 

were developed. All service forces were employed in combat. troops 

of other arms suddenly becoming infantrymen. This was a struggle 

for survival waged simultaneously against an enemy superior in 
22 GEIMAN REPORT SEIIIES 

manpower and materiel and against the terrors of a fierce winter. 

Besides struggling against a cunning enemy, the Germans also had 

to !:1teel and conquer themselves. Yet the impossible was accom~ 

plished. Only 12 miles separated the enemy spearheads from. their 

objectives when they were suddenly stopped, repelled, and shattered. 

On 25 February one enemy force that had penetrated close to the 

RollbaAn west of Lyuban was cut oft' from its rear communications 

and annihilated. A new inner front extending over 120 miles was 

built up around the Volkhov pocket and connected with the outer 

front. It ran straight across the marshes north of Lake limen, 

followed the course of the Oredezh and the railroad tracks connecting 

Divcnskiy with Chudovo. The danger had not yet been overcome. 

In view of the la.test setback, the Soviet command reduced its objectives, but its new jntentions presented an even greater danger. For 

several weeks the Russian Fifty-fourth Anny had attacked the thinly 

held German line in the swamps south of Lake Ladog{l.. These attacks were repelled by the 269th Infantry Division and units of 

XXVIII Corps. The Fifty-fourth Army received additional forces 

and was given the mission of breaking through at Pogostye and 

thrusting toward Lyuban. At the SRme time the Second Assa.ult 

Anny in the pocket stopped its westwRrd drive and assembled its 

forces south of Lyuban. Strong elements of the Fifty-second and 

F ifty-ninth Armies followed into the pocket to cover the rear and 

the flanks of the Russian forces. The Fifty-fourth and Second Assault Armies were to launch a. pincers attack, cut off the Germa.n I 

Infantry Corps, and encircle and annihilate it. Once this was accomplished, the road to Leningrad would be open again. 

By now the Volkhov pocket held fourteen Russian infantry divisions, supported by three cavalry divisions, seven cRvalry brigades, 

one tank brigade, and five GHQ artillery regiments. The Fiftyfourth Army had reached a strength of twelve divisions. Its striking 

power centered in an armored force of 200 tanks, most of which were 

T34's capable of operating under winter conditions. The German 

defense forces had no equivalent materiel to oppose them. Jumping 

off on {) March, the Fifty-fourth Army therefore had no difficulty in 

penetrating the German lines and widening the gap until it reached 

ten miles in width and twelve miles in depth. The German infantry 

formed a. human wa.ll in an attempt to stop the enemy. Although its 

number was at no time more than 3,500, it withstood the onslaught of 

90,000 Russians. The German forces yielded ground, lost some engagements, but fina.l victory was theirs because the Russians were 

denied the opportunity to exploit their local penetra.tions. The enemy 

was finally forced to discontinue the offensive three weeks after he 

had launched his first attack in this sector. 

The encircled Second Assault Army was even leEle successful when 
DEF~N5E TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN BREAK_THROUGHS 23 

it. hurled its forces against the German lines fOl'ming the northern 

hOllnda ry of the pockeL During several weeks of fierce stl'uggle, t.lll' 

Russian!l wcre incapable of overcoming the German. resistullce. "'lInt. 

filiall y paral yzcd them wa.s the disnster that took place to their rear. 

On 15 Ma rch, clements of I Corps with the SS Police Division in 

t.he lead went over to the attack west of Spasskaya Polist and struck at 

the enemy supply routes. Elements of the XXVIII Corps COli ' 

verged from the soulh. Aft.er great hardships, the German spearheads linl<ed up on 19 March, Even though this ring around the 

Vollcho\' }>ocketcould not be fully mlli ntai ned in the face of incessullt 

counterattacks by supt'l"ior Russian forces, the escape gap was kept. 

down to apPI'ox!mately t.wo miles. The Russinns la id t.he tracks fo:' 

t\\'o nnnow-gage field railways through the gap, but. their capacity was 

insufficient to supply the 180,000 men within the pocket. 

When, nfter a series of attacks and counternttncks, the front wns 

tHbi i~d, the German lines formed a "finger" culling o~ the Russian axis of movement. It was t.welve miles long, but in no plncc more 

thnn two to t.wo and a. half miles in width. There was not a single 

point within this finger which could not be swept by enemy heavy 

welt pons fire from the cast or from the west.. 

At first the Soviets made some vain attempts to envelop the finger 

t.hrough the swamps in the rear and cut it off at its base. In April 

t.he Russians decided to make an extl'Cme effOl't, On 29 April the 

Fifty-ninth Army threw seven infnntl'Y regiments and two armored 

brigades into an attack nlong a narrow front. Thrusti ng westward 

from positions north of Mostki, they were to li nk with (our divisions 

attncking eastward. This Russian attack had to succeed, Two gaps, 

each two miles in width, were torn Open on either side of the finger 

which was lacerated to the bone, During the next few days the for· 

tunes of war changed frequently. F inally, undaunted courage and 

supreme devotion triumphed. By 13 May the Russian regiments 

which had penetrated the German li nes were encircled and shattered) 

and the fonner main line of resistance was re-estnblished. 

The die was cast, The Volkhov pocket had become untenable for 

the Russians, and their withdrawal began about 15 May. The cavalry 

corps farthest to the northwest was withdrawn, the collcentrntion south 

of Lyuban was dispersed, and medium artillery as well as supply 

units were pulled out. The Germans soon recognized the enemy intent.ions. On 22 May German forces launched the pursuit from north and 

west across mud and slush and reduced the pocket to It twelve-mile 

square by 30 May. On that day the Germans also sealed the small 

escape gap and established a blocking position across the Soviet supply 

route in the vicinity of Myasnoy Bor. 

The struggle entered its final phase, a phase which was to last four 

more weeks. While the German spearheads steadily narrowed the 
24 GERMAN UPORT SERIES 

enemy-held territory, the Soviets, with courage horn of desperation, 

furiously sought to extricate t.hemselves from the pocket. In their 

quest. for safety alld escape from death, elements of eight divisions 

repeated their daily attacks in waves of four to six regiments. The 

Russians pinned their main hope on the Fifty-ninth Army which was 

to brenk through from the east. Without intelTupLion this firmy fltlacked 2-26 June, delivl'ring Il crescendo of fil'f' and hurling e\'er 

incrensmg mASSes of infantry and tanks into the bnttle. The cnr nage 

rene,lied tremendous proportions. At times it seemed as if the Russians 

might achlcve a break-through aftet: all, but the Germans always 

succeeded in hurling them back. Only small groups escaped. The 

encircled forces were split into sevE'ral smaller pockets, and all organized resistance of the Second Assault Army censed by 25 June. The 

Ru ssian casua lties in the pocket amounted to 60,000 dead and prisoners, among the latter General Vlassov and numerous high-ranking 

commanders and staff officers. Six infantry divisions and six brigades 

were annihilated. Nine additional divisions were either totally or 

partially destroyed. The Soviets had suffered terrific losses, expended 

more than twenty divisions, and spent themselves in a vain, six-month 

effort to break the ring around Leningrnd. 

Another incomplete pincers movement led to curiously shaped front. 

lines during the fighting neal' Rzhev in January 1942, where a German 

pocket separated the main body of enemy forces from a Russian 

pocket. In this instance the Russian forces in the pocket had only 

poor supply routes at their disposal, and more than 100,000 men had 

to subsist for several months under the most precarious circumstances. 

The Russian cavalry corps, trapped in the swampy forests southwest 

of Sychevka after its pocket was reduced by the Snail Offensive was 

in such a pitiful situation that the men first ate the meat and later 

chewed the hides of their horses to keep from stnrving. Despite 

their plight, the Russians refused to consider abandoning their pocket. 

(Sec CMH Pub 104-1, I Military Improvisations during the Russian 

Campaign, pp. 7 fr.) 

Two additional incomplete pincers movements arc worthy of mention. In March 1944, First Panzer Army formed a roving pocket 

when its pincers attack failed to liberate the encircled German forces 

near Chcrkassy. Finally, during the battle near Lvov in July 1944, 

the Germans were forced to hold simultaneously two parallel fronts} 

twenty-five miles apart. The forward front line had a gap which 

was narrowed to three miles by a pincers attack, whereas the other 

line was open on the flanks. This extraordinary synthesis of defense 

lines, as well as the interlocking pockets, were caused by German 

and Russian pincers} the jaws of which were not completely closed. 

Defensive pincers are the preferred method of eliminating an enemy 

bridgehead. German experience shows that there are no safer tactics 
DEfENSE TACTICS AGAINST IUSSIAN aUAK-THIOUGHS 25 

for wiping Ollt. bridg('hends and inflicting heavy losses 011 the enemy. 

Chnpter 3 con tains a d('scl'ipfion of the elimination of five newly 

fOl'med ell('my bridgchends ncl'OSS th(>. Tet erev which W('loo \\'iped out 

in one dny by n, pincers aft,ft ck rxecuted by strong pnwr.er forces. 

The most. effectiv~ pincers nt.tncks 111'0 tho!'ie whi ch. inMead of being 

dil't'cled ngnin!;t bot h flAnks, simuitnnf'ollsly ell\'clop the rnemy's front 

and rcnt'. However, the jnw of t he pincers that is to stl'ilt\· the hostile 

I'(,UI' In'Nt is in dang\:r (d bf' in~ attacked in its ;0\\'1\ renl', as happlmcd, 

fill' exumpJe, during the Hussinll defcnse against, the GCl'1llilll brenkthrongh of the I.eningl'ftd li ne, In this "ppration fill' (1~'nllaH S ex(', 

('uled two simuitnnCOlis pincers attncks. The forward d:lWs pilwhed 

off the Rltssinn front line and slmttercd it while the n';I!' pim;(,I'S 

en\'C'ioped nnd infli('tccl heuvy cnsnaltirs Oil the urmol'cd 1'~ lS CI'VeS which 

had been thrown in to lend assistance. (See CMH Pub 104-12, 

pp. 62 11.) 

By some eX!l'noroinaI'Y eil'cumstancc it lJlay occnsionnlly be fensible 

10 1\h'j],:o ut, both en('my flanks I\nd simultam·ously (!nvc1op his front 

lind "('aI', T his double pinccl's maneuYer will nearly :dwnys lend to 

tho ('omplete encirclement alHI annihilat ion of the enemy forces, For 

insflllwc, in March 1043 in the lower Onepr bend, the pulverizing jllws 

of a double pinccrs movement destroyed t.he Third Russinn Tank 

Army. 

'fhe sllccess of pi ncers atlll.cks is conti ng('nt upon the size of the 

forces (lvRilnbl(' in a. given silunti on. Wllf'llever the Inelit'a1 situat.ion ofTers all opport.unity fol' t.he use of d~fen~ive pine(,I's hul:. !\\'nilnble forces Ilre insufficient., it will prove mot'j\ atlvlIrllng('oHs to 

Ilssemble a ll avnilabl e units I\nd launch a powerftll fl nn1, Ilt!ack. 

PART THREE 

PASSIVE DEFENSE 

Chapter 5 

DEFENSE IN PLACE WITH MOBILE RESERVES 

Even large-scale offensives can be stopped by 1\ defense in place if 

a. number of successive positions are available and the infllntry holding 

the front line has strong Ilrtillcry, tank, and assault gun support. 

The resel"VCS must be mobile so they can be shifted from one sector 

to Illl oiher in time to prevent or at lenst contain an enomy penetration. 

This can be achieved only if the rond net is in good condition and 

sufficient transportation is available. 

A confli ct. entailing simult aneous fighting in different theaters of 

war and at different. fronts within cnch theater may easily produce a 

shortage of combat forces which call be overcome only by improvising 

rcscrves. In stich It situation, security and supply troops, as well as 

other service units, may have to be committed along extensive, qu iet 

sect.ors to release combat forces for the fOI'mation of NServes. A 

correct estimate of the enemy's intentions is essential for the timely 

withdrawal of units from apparently safe sectors. 

In the operati ons ncllr Ol's11a during t.}w winter of 1943-44, the 

Germans employed defense-in-plaee tactics and denied the Russi ans 

the lISO of the Minsk- 8molellsk llo11bahn for severnl months. In this 

inst.ance, ra ilroad an d highway communications were excellent, and 

the mobility of the rese l'ves, together with the constl'llction of defensive 

positions in depth, prevented a Russian break-through. Used in other 

sectors, the same tactic pl'oved ineffective when road flets were bad 

or when the Russians massed a thousand 01' more tanks to force a 

break-t.hrough, and the German!'; had uo adequate weapons to oppose 

them. Had the enemy used !mcll a mass of armor at Orsha , the Germails would have been nnable to hold with a defense in place. 

Even nt, Qrsha the t,:('.llcml situation of Fourth Army wus anyt.hing 

but favorable. (Mup 6) By the end of Sepl.ember 1943, the army 

had just completed n strategic withdrawal from positions east of 

Smolensk under ext I'eme ditnculties. In accordance with orders 

from Al'lny Group Center, the army was to occupy the Panther 

position east of the Dne}>r in order to dcny the Ulissians access to 

Orsha, the commnnication center on the Dnepr, where three railroad 

27 
28 OIlMAN llPOIT SlIIES 

lines and the Moscow- Minsk and Leningrad-Kiev highways intersect. 

The capture of Orsha would have jeopardized the position of Third 

Panzer Army adjacent to the north and Ninth Army to the south. 

The Fourth Army sector was seventy~five miles wide and f&n from a 

point ten miles north of the llollhahn to the southern outskirts of 

Chausy. The army had three corps with eleven divisions whose 

combat efficiency was greatly reduced by the hard fighting and the 

withdrawal they had recently undergone. With the exception of 

one reorganized division, the combat strength of the diviRions had 

dropped to that of regiments, and their weapons and equipment were 

inadequate. At first the Panther position was very thinly held. Wit.h 

the arrival of replacements and the introduction of various expedients, the army gradually succeeded in building up a fairly adequate 

defense system. 

The construction of the Panther position began in August 1943. 

In some sectors the position consisted of two paranel trenches, in 

others of only one. A number of trenches had not been completed 

by the time the line was occupied and in these sectors the defense 

system was only a cordon of individual strong points. Tactical wire 

was strung intermittently and dugouts were few. Natural obstacles 

had been integrated into the defense line wherever possible. From 

a tactical point of view, some of the sites were not too well selected 

because they ran along unsuitable forward slopes. Enemy fire soon 

led to the abandonment of these positions and forced the Germans 

to dig in on reverse slopes. Observation was adequate a.nd, though 

the position was far from perfect, it offered the weakened German 

forces the possibility of making a stand. 

The Russians had followed the German withdrawal very closely. 

They assembled their forces in front of the position and made careful 

preparations for a break-through. They did not attack until 12 Octoher and the German troops made good uso of this delay to improve 

their defense area. The German command expected that the immediate objective of the impending Russian attack would be to take 

Lenino, cut the Orsha-Gol'ki highway, link up with strong partisan 

groups operating in the forests northwest of Gorki, turn toward Orsha, 

and advance along the RoUbahn to Minsk. 

The reserves of the Fourth Anny consisted of several assault gun 

battalions, some motorized antitank units, GHQ artillery, rocket proiector regimen~ and engineer and construction units. The success 

of the defense in place depended upon correctly timing the shift of 

the mobile elements of these reserves to threatened areas or sectors 

already under attack. No outside assistance was to be counted on, but 

the army intended to withdraw battalions, regiments, and even divi-
DEFENSE TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN .REAK*THROUGHS 29 

sions from quiet sectors and move them to critical points once the 

Russian attac.k was in full swing. In so doing, the army commander 

was ready to take great risks in stripping quiet sectors of the front. 

The task of shifting these forces was greatly facilitated by the 

availability of excelhlllt routes of communication. From the lateral 

highway and railroad line connecting Vitebsk with Orsha and Mogilev, routes branched off to each corps sector. Truck transportatioll, 

earmarked for supply functions, was diverted to troop movements. 

All roads and highways were clearly marked, and construction units 

maintained them in serviceable condition, a task which was especially 

difficult in spring and required a lot of manpower. Particular care 

was given to the marking and maintenance of panzer roads. Special 

bridges had to be constructed or fords provided for heavy tanks and 

assault guns because the existing bridges could not cuny such loads. 

Rllilroad operations were conducted up to points immediately behind 

t.he front line. 

Instead of giving the weuk combat forccs a well-deserved rest, the 

army commander was forced lo issue strict orders that all front-lino 

ll'oops work without interruption on improving the forward positions. 

An exacting, at times even petty, control system hud to be imposed 

by the army to find out where the construction work was lagging and 

how weak points could be reinforced. By this method the defense 

system gradually gained depth, a.nd one obstacle after another was 

constructed. Finally, the Panther position consisted of two con~ 

tinuous trenches and It fortification system protecting the artillery 

gun positions. As soon as the Panther position was sufliciently strong, 

sevent! other posit.ions were constrllcted in the rear. The first two 

were spaced at six-mile intervals, and the third covered Mogilev, 

Shklov, Kopys, and Orsha on the Dnepr by the construction of perimeter defenses east of the rivel'. These bridgeheads had (l dept.h of 

three to five miles and were interconnected by a trench linkillg their 

most forward points. Numel'Ous switch positions were built between 

t.he individual trenches and fortified lines so that, in cuse one sector 

was lost, contact between units would not be disl·upted. Contl'ary to 

(,.lIstomary German technique, these switch positions cOlluected the 

successive trenches diagonally and not vertically. Another position 

(>xtending nOlth beyond Ol'sha. was built along the west bank of the 

Dllepr. During the winter the Germans also constructed a strong 

position fnrtiler to the rear along the Beresillll. 

The antiaircraft artillery, as well as t.he few available planes, were 

held in reserve to be committed in sectors under attack. The flexibility 

of the mobile antiaircrnft guns greatly strengtheued the defense sys* 

tern. Effective reconnaissance was of great importunce. Informatioll ohtl\ined from groulld recollllaissance, sound rallgillg, and air 
30 OEIMAN IEPOI.f SERIES 

observation usually provided the Germans with sufficient intelligenoo 

to determine the scope and time of Russian attacks with exactitude. 

Thus, the anny was able to introduce effective countermeasures even 

before t.he beginning of an a.ttack. 

The Russians launched altogot.her eight major thl'USts against. tho 

German defense system. Their last attempt. lo break t.hrough was 

warded off at the beginning of Apri11944. The Dncpr defenses were 

still intact after six months of bittle struggle. The Russians failed to 

force IL break-through in the direction of Orsha. and 'Mogilev despite 

a series of frontal, flanking, and enveloping attacks. An analysis of 

this German success shows that the Fourt.h Army was able to compensato for a one-to-ten inferiority in manpower and mat~l'iel only by 

ex ploiting all possibiJitics for defense and co-ordinat.ing all its forces. 

For this purpose the army hnd t.o interfere in det.ails of the command 

functions of its subordinate corps and divisions, a procedurc altogether 

contrary to German doctrinc, but one which proved necessnry in this 

insta1lCC. Orders £01' the formation of reserves, the purpose of which 

could be lUlderstood only from the perspective of the over-all situation, frequently did not make sense to lower echelon commanders. 

TIlO same may be said for ROme of the orders pertaining to improving 

positions, constructing roads, transferring stocks of ammunition, and 

similar delllnnds. 

The unusually good communications made it possible to shift reserves hooly. When Russian attacks were at. their heavi est., the rate 

of t.ransfer was stepped up to two bat.talions per day. The withdrawal of 1m entire division from the front and its subsequent movement to another sector usua lly required severn.1 consecutive nights. 

During the first night one 01' two battalions were pulled out, and 

adjacent sectors extended. During the following night. t.he width of 

the adjacent sectors was equali zed and one or two more battalions 

were withdrawn in the same manner. This was continued at the 

same rate until the movement was completed. The transfer of forces 

would have been accomplished much faster had si ngle battalions boon 

withdra.wn from different divisions, but the army a.voided this procedure whenever possibJe since it attempted to mainulin t.he orgnnizatioM1 integrity of its divisions, 

Before the first Russian thrnst, the corps sector whel'c the enemy onslaught was expected was widened by the inclusion of two additional 

divisional sectors. This was contrary LQ the established procedure 

of narrowing that defense sector where an attack was expected. The 

purpose of this measure was to enable the corps to form strong re.-

serves from its own forces and shift t.hem to the points where they were 

most needed. In this case, the widening of the defense sector proved 

effective since all Russian attacks were halted. 
DEFENSE TACTICS AGA INST RUSSIAN BIlEAK-THROUGHS 3 1 

1n allothel' instance a motorized infant.ry divisioll , which had but 

five organic battalions in line at. t.he beginning of the fifth Russian 

thrust, was subjected to particularly heavy attacks. By lhe time 

the fighling abated on the fifth day, fifteen additiona l battalions had 

been brought into the divisional sector, and t.he front was held. At 

the same time, the German lines in quiet sectors were so overextended 

that one mile of frontage was occupied by only thirty men. The 

slightest attack would hnve penetrated the line in these sectors, but 

the Hnssians did not attempt to lnunch one. 

To command and troops alike, the construction of reserve positions 

guve n sense of security which t.hey ol'dinarily lacked in the Russian 

thearer. At no time did their existence lower the ·resista.nce of the 

troops 01' indu('.e them to withdraw before it. became absolutely necessary. The infantry felt reassured by the effective tactics the army 

elliployed in massing its artillel'y, The army artillery comma.nder 

held fa l'-I'eaching authority over all organic artillery, giving full support to whichever corps was under attack and withdrawing nnits not 

needed in quiet. sedot's, He made all arrangements to provide an 

ndeql1ato supply of ammunition by diverting supplies slated for quiet 

secLors and using them where they were most. needed. Supply move~ 

ments were facilitated by the availability of the main highway and 

rail mud leading from Minsk which, however, were frequently cut 

by partisan attacks. During lulls in the fighting, ammunition was 

saved for impending enemy thrusts, 

The mass employment. of supporting units such as assault gun, 

panzer, tactical air support, antiaircraft, and antitank elements was 

stressed by the army commander. These units were pulled out wherever they were not !tbsolutely essential and shifted to sectors under 

nttack. 

The Hllssian offensive tactics during these operations varied little 

from those used e!\rliel' in the campaign. The infantry fought 

bravely, launching attack upon attack, often with only a few hours' 

intervaL Manpower wns no problem to the Russians. In seemingly 

never-ending waves, they came out of their trenches, advanced, withdrew, and retumed to the attack. During tho five thrusts along the 

i\-finsk- Smolensk highway, the Russians usually renewed their attacks 

Itt t.he identical spot where they had tried before, They persist.ed in 

their efforts to force a break-through at a particular point and entirely 

disrega rded the cost- A more flexible command might have considered other solutions. 

The Russian was capable of concentrating tremendous fire power 

nnd employing artillery effectively, During the first day of an operation, artillery fire was well coordinated, but thereafter its unity of 
32 GEIMAN IlPORT SElIES 

effort gradually disintegrated and its effectiveness decreased. During 

the second thrust he nssembled approximately 800 pi eces along Ii sixmile front and fired a quantity of ammunition which was hitherto 

unsurpassed in the Russian theater of operations. The number of 

German guns available for counterfire was approximately 250. On 

the first day of the thrust the Russians achieved a deep penetration 

between the Doepr and the Minsk highway. An attempt to straighten 

out the salient was unsuccessful. The Ilext day the Russians penetrated the German lines north of the highway and isolated an entire 

artillery battalion-group, In spite of the commitment of additionnl 

reserves, the German line had become so fragile that the army decided 

to withdraw to the second line of the Panther position. When the 

Russians renewed their attack, it seemed that their artillery lacked 

unity of effort and co·ordination. The Germans repelled all further 

assaults and prevented a break·through. 

Russian camouRage and concealment were excellent. The enemy 

moved at night and disappeared from sight during daylight, hiding 

in villages and wooded areas. Although the Russians often regrouped 

their forces, their movements could rarely be observed. 

The Soviet lower command echelons often lacked initiative. After 

having succeeded in pushing back the German line for instance, the 

Russians had difficulty in sustaining the momentum of the attack and 

in assembling their infantry and arti11ery forces for an aUack 011 the 

next objective. On the other hand, the enemy showed extraordinary 

skill in exploiting even the smallest penetration with amazing speed. 

Because of these infiltration tactics, the Germans were forced to make 

every possible effort to immediately seal off penetrations, however 

small their own counterattack force. Otherwise, it would have been 

impossible or would have involved heavy casualties to ferret the Russian out of the break-through area.. Once they had sufficient time to 

organize positions, even planned attacks by fresh units often fai1ed 

to overcome tho stubborn resistance offered by the Russians. 

The enemy's zone of attack was usually strictly limited, almost as 

if it had boon cut to measure. The German supporting weapons outside the attack zone proper were not neutralized. For instance, the 

flanking fire delivered by a German arti11ery battalion-group from 

an adjacent sector straight into the Russian attack waves was not 

interfered with in any way. 

The Russian rarely launched diversionary attacks at points outside 

the main zone of attack. Considering the extent to which the Germans had weakened the quiet sectors of their front, such diversionary 

attacks would probably have caused some very critical situations. 

The Russian proved once again that he was practically immune to 
DEFENSE TACTICS AGAINST I USSIAN IIEAK-THIOUGHS 33 

unfavorable weather conditions. S'now, rain, cold, and ice affected 

him but litUe. His winter clothing was of excellent quality. 

Except for attacks against German infantry in the front line, the 

enemy air force was almost inactive, although German antiaircraft 

defenses were inadequate. Since the Russians never undertook strategic air operations, the Germans were able to move supp1ies without 

enemy interference. 
Chapter 6 

POSITION DEFENSE tN STRONG POINTS AND 

IMPROVISED FORTRESSES 

Tho defender who decides to hold ouL in plnce in strong points 

and improvised fort.resses usulllly employs emergency measures rather 

than defense Lnctics. The Germans were forced to resort to such measures because of the acute mllllpowcr lind malCricl shortages from which 

they suffered once t.he Wil l" had spread all ovcr Europe and to North 

Afl'icu. III nUBsi n, the overextended front linc.s, the bit.ler st.ruggle 

agll insta. superior enemy, lind the clements of natu re led to an expendi. 

tu re of forces for which German manpowcl" resources and industrial 

pot.cnLia l were illsumcicnt.. The long duration of Lhe Will' accentuated 

these deficiencies with the result th at position defense in imp,"ovised 

strong points and forlresses became evc,' morc frequent. Excessive ' 

losses. difficulttermin, and bad wenther fOl'ccd the Germans to anchor 

their defense system on inhabited localities along wide sectors and to 

usc Lilese defensc a.reas as subst.itutes for a continuous front line. 

These tact.ics ollen proved effecti ve because they helped to gain time 

and overcome critical situations. D uring t.he winter or during the 

muddy seasons, for instance, holding vi1lagcs Ilnd towns was the only 

way to cscape annihilation. Then, it wns the weathcl' and terrain 

thut imposed the adoption of these emCl'gency mensures, During the 

summer and dry wc.1.ther many an enemy break-through attempt was 

delayed and whitt.led down by the smne inctics until the Gennans 

wel'e cn pnble of containi ng the Russians along a. continuous line 

prepured in the rear~ 

Service troops took a major part in the defense of inhabited localities, I n most instances they built and improved fortifications in arells 

whcl'e they wel'o stationed and made strong points of them. Frequcnt.ly, sup ply clements were organized into alert units Ilnd committed as replacements in the most forward fortified aJ'Cas. The 

system of mutunlly sUPPOl·ting st.rong points provided for defense 

in depth Ilnd mnximum utilization of nil available forces fol' combat 

purposes, Every soldier in a headqullrters or service unit and in rear 

installations received combllt tra ining with emphasis on proficiency 

in the use of antitank weapons in close combllt. Whenever the training schedule was rigidly adhered to) the rcsults wel'C favorable. In 

1943, for instance, in Zolochev (nellr Khat'kov ) a divisional bakery 

company stopped Russian tank units which had broken through, 

destroyed several innks, and forced the remaini ng ones to tUrn about. 

34 
D~fENSE TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN BREA,K_THROUGHS 35 

The practice of defending st.rong points should, however, not. be 

overdone or adopleo as n. sta.nding operating procedure. It would be 

wrong to order all ullit tra ins and supply trucks to r.top in the midst 

of a withdmwal and make their service personnel fight to the last 

man. If snch an order was obeyed to the letter, it would lead to the 

loss of nil transportation facilitiC8 and disrupt t.raffic. This, in turn, 

would jeopardize the supply of the combat forces, greatly impair 

freedom of maneuvel', and result in disaster. 

During the batt.1e for Lithuania in October 19-14, the G('lman defense based on fOI't.ified inhabited localities did not actua lly stop or 

even delay t.he Russians fOl' long, but. it achieved a certain continuit.y 

in Lhe defense and checked t.he enemy advance by causing many delays 

and infli cLing casua1t.ies. Since no new reserves could be formed or 

provided by army g l'Ollp, a number of service schools and headquart ers 

units, all available trains n.!ld supply troops, as well as all other 

IUlxiliary units, had to be employed in t.he defense. They strengthened 

the resistance at Cl'ucial defiles and potential points of penetration. 

A tigh tly knit dcfe,nsive network was built up which even strong 

enemy forces could penetrate or bypass only by a time-consuming 

process. The st.rongly defended towns Ilsually withstood the enemy's 

daylight attacks. During the evening hours, however, the Russians 

bypnssed or attacked t.hese towns from all sides, a.nd the German 

clements had to be wit.hdl'UWIl under covel' of darkness t.o escflpe 

encirclement. and annihilation. In the meant.ime, renewed resistanco 

was ol'ganized nlong anot.her line, which the German forces occupied 

by dawn and t.he process was repeated. The Uus!'iinlls did not advance 

mOI-c than five to six milcs a !~y, even in the sector where they placed 

their main effort. They did not achieve a break-through 0 1' open a 

gap in the front. Once they reached the Mcmel Rivcr, the German 

forces, rei nforced by other improvised units, brought. t.he enemy 

offensive Lo a halt. 
Chapter 7 

IMPROVISED ZONE DEFENSE 

A variant of zone defense was improvised by the Germans during 

the battles for the city of Lvov and for East Prussia. in the final 

phase of WorJd War II. Though similar to the doctrine of elastic 

defense in depth and the evacuation of forward positions introduced 

during the First WorJd War, the"Se defensive tactics are not identical 

with any others employed before 1944. The characteristics of this 

improvisation, as appJied during the battle for Lvov, have boon explained in CMH Pub 104-1, pp. 27 ft Since the prerequisites for their 

successful application rarely existed, and since most German commanders in the field doubted their practicability and utility, these 

tactics were not employed on any other front. Besides, the over-all 

situation was so critical that there was a general reluctance to introduce experiments. By the second half of 1944 the Germans rarely 

had sufficicnt time for the construction of numerous positions or for 

the thorough indoctrination and trn.ining of troops. Only the most 

ardent faith in this improvisation could overcome an handicaps 

and achieve final success. During both battles improvised zone 

defenso tactics helped to keep intaet the combat strength of the 

German divisions subjected to terrific concontrations and to prevent 

the ellemy from breaking through. On both occasions the Russians 

suffered heavy casualties and were forced to shift their main effort 

to other sectors. 

In East Prussia the Third Panzer Army, with its 9 weak divisions, 

liO tanks, 400 artillery pieces, and insignificant air support was opposed to 44 Russian divisions, 800 tanks, 3,000 guns, and strong air 

forces. The use of improvised zone defense tactics enabled the army 

to stop the Russian onslaught for one month, after which the collapse 

of the adjacent armies forced a withdrawal from this sector. During December 1944 special training in zone defense was introduced 

with the active participation of both command anti troops. Army 

engineer and construction units supervised the paramilitary Ilnd civilian labor forces building position after position. Antitank ob· 

stacles, mine fields, and a system of local strong pOints and nests of 

resistance, fifty miles in depth, were built. (Map 7) The foremost 

fifteen-mile belt was fortified on the basis of the lessons learned at 

Lvov. Everyone, from corps commander to private, made strenuous 

efforts to improve the defense system. Strong points and pillboxes 

were to aft'ord maximum protection and defensi ve pow~r by the con· 

36 
OffENSE TACTICS AGAINST IIUSSIAN 8REAK.THIIOUGHS 37 

struct.ion of perimeter defenses. At t.he same t.ime precautionfl were 

taken to prevent. pillboxes or nests of resistance from becoming traps 

for their defenders. Tactical details and technical improvisations 

were carefully planned to preclude disagreeable surprises. All of 

East Prussia became one fortress with the zone defense area. its 

strongest. outpost. The morale of the troops wus excellent, and t.hey 

faced coming events with confidence. 

The Russians attempted a war of nerves by announcing the start of 

their offensive at three different times and by telegraphing their 

punches in advance. The Germans did not take lhe.c;e announcements 

lOo seriously and refused to be intimidated by the Russian show of 

armored stl'ength in front. of their Jines. They WCI'e more concerned 

about Uussian preparations along a railroad embankment, a few hun· 

dred yards in front. of the German Jines, re t.he enemy brought 

up antitank guns and dug eight pas.<;ages through a dam which his 

tanks wel'6 ullable to sllrmount.. These preparations were too close 

to remain unobserved, llithough t.he Russians t.ried to cover the noise 

of lhe nig htly demolitions by heavy mortar fire and camouflaged t.he 

passages wiLh boards and foliage. This was the line on which thl3 

Russinns emplaced their most forward heavy weapons which were to 

eliminate any German interference by direct fire and \!over the tanks 

ndvanci ng through the gaps in the embankment. Ot.her indic!ltions 

of an imminent. major offensive were t.he trenches dug by the Russians 

to f!lcilitnte the approach of infant.ry spea rheads and the construe· 

tion of positions oonllecled by communication trenches to provide 

cover for the assembly of t.he first·wave infllntry. Changes in the 

daily ael'ial photographs provided information on newly constructed 

emplacements and showed fresh t.racks in the snow lending to am· 

munit.ion dumps Ilnd battery positions. Ueports from agents gave 

information on t.he anivai of new divisions, and a few radio signals, 

intercepted despite t he enforcement. of stri ct. radio silence by the 

Russians, uncovered t he location of forward command posts. These 

indications made it. clear where t.he Russians intcnded to place their 

main effort and at wllattime and with which forces they planned to 

start. t.he attack. The Russian a.ttack preparat.ions were met.hodical: 

enemy artillery observers occupied newly constructed observation 

posts; medium guns registered cuutiously; enemy fighters suddenly 

swept the sky to slop GeI'man aeriall'6connaissance ; and dive bombers 

plastered approach routes, command posts, and towns behind the 

German front with machine gun fire and bombs, Toget.her with 

heavy Russia.n troop movements toward t.he front, palticularly dur· 

ing the nights of '9 a.nd 10 January, these indications were closely 

observed and studied to enable the army colnmander to give the code 

word for the withdrawal to the main battle position at the right 

moment. It. required steady nerves and expert evaluation of combat 
38 GEltMAN !lEPORT $flUES 

intelligence not to exhaust the troops by repeated premature withdrawals or to suffer heavy casualties from the enemy's barrage because 

delayed withdrawal orders had jeopo.rdized the defensive maneuver. 

On 11 January there was a noticeable reduction in enemy combat 

activity and movements. The German troops were nervously wait· 

ing for the orders which were to spare them from the enemy's deadly 

fire, but they failed to receive any such order at the front line. Instead, 

the graduating class of the Luftwaffe Academy was to be conductt'd 

on a tour of the army sector. The young officer candidates watched 

demonstrations by the newly arrived 5th Panzer Division and inspected the fortifications of the battle position. Since the front was 

calm, it was possible to fulfill their request to visit some outposts and 

observe the enemy's positions and movements. Here and there an 

enemy machine gun fire~ a few rounds, breaking the silence of n 

sunny afternoon. Suddenly, some projectiles whizzed through the 

air and dug up the earth near a crossroads. Several mortar shells 

exploded near the outposts, and the platoon leader shouted the command: "Take cover." Detected by the enemy, the visitors quickly took 

cover in a. deep dugout. After a few more rounds registered in the 

vicinity, two German artillery salvos hit back at the enemy observation posts and silence was restored. Proud of their front·line experience, the officer candidates returned unharmed to the rear. 

The following day was even more peaceful. No new clues regarding 

the probable H Hour of the enemy attack were observed by the outposts. On the other hand, radio intercepts as well as the latest observations of night reconnaissance planes left no doubt that strong Russian columns were moving into their assembly areas, that the artillery 

emplacements were fully occupied, and that the arllled units had 

moved up into the depth of the concentration area. -The German 

army commander therefore decided to give the code word at 2200 on 12 

January. The evacuation of the two forward lines went smoothly and 

the units moved into the battle position. Tlu~e hours later the movement was completed, the new command posts were occupied, and the 

signal communications functioned normally. 

As usual before a major Russian offensive, several deserters arrived 

at German outposts; their statements agreed-a heavy artillery preparation at 0600 was to precede the launching of the attack on 13 January. The army commander immediately issued orders that the 

German artillery deliver at 0530 a concentration on the assembly 

areas of the enemy infantry and use the two basic loads set aside for 

this purpose. Thus, a heavy German preparation led off the second 

battle for East Prussia. At 0000 the enemy unleashed a hail of fire 

with more than 3,000 pieces pouring shells of all calibers on the two 

forward German positions evacuated only a few hours earlier. By 

t,hen the German infantry and artillery occupied the battle position 
DlfENSE TACJlCS AOAINST I USSIAN lllAK.THIOUGHS 39 

which had its forward boundary in the third position. The area fire, 

covering up to three miles in depth, was scattered and damaged only 

ovacuated towns and former command posts, the obvious targets of 

the Russian artillery. The German reserves were hidden in the woods 

and remained unharmed by the preparation fire. By 0800, after 

pulverizing the first position, the Russian fire concentrated on the 

second one, but with less intensity. Half an hour later tho shells were 

scattered in the depth of the battle position, gradually diminishing 

to area or harassing fire without definite targets. 

Following the first salvos of artillery fire, the Russian infantry 

had gone into action, carefully advancing through thick fog which 

covered the terrain until 1100. Only slightly delayed by the fire of 

German rear points left behind in the first position, the Russians soon 

rushed beyond this obstacle. But even before they reached the evacu· 

ated second position, they were pinned down by artillery and rocket 

fire. Their reports, announcing the capture of the first and second 

German positions to higher headquarters, failed to mention that they 

had taken no prisoners or booty. It was not until 1000 that they 

reached the forward line of the battle position. Pinned down by the 

fire of all German guns and the ladder fire of the rocket projector 

}ldgade, their advance came to a sudden halt. The Russian infantry 

!-Cnt out distress signals for immediate tank support. Poor visibility 

prevented the enemy from taking advantage of his superiority in fire 

power and in the air. Nevertheless, the Russian infantry succeeded 

in penetrating between individual strong points. When the fog lifted, 

these spearheads were cut off and annihilated. 

The Russians directed their main thrust against the only elevation 

in this area, near Kussen, which they captured around noon after a 

strong armored attack. Their infantry, attempting to follow the 

tanks, was repelled with heavy casualties along the forward line of 

the main bat.tle position. The Russian annored units, however, continued their thrust from the Kussen area because the German anti· 

tank guns were unable to cope with such masses of tanks. This threat 

was all t.he more serious since enemy planes appeared in great number 

and were initially unopposed. They bombed towns, roads, evacu· 

ated command posts, and artillery emplacements and attacked everything that moved on the ground. German planes, Gal led to the rescue, 

attacked the low-flying Russian formations, shot down several planes, 

and dispersed the rest. This was the cue for the German counterattack. Leading the attack, 6th Panzer Division columns emerged 

from the protective cover of the forests and launched simultaneous 

thrusts against the flank and rear of the Russian Armor in the Kussen 

area.. The clash, in which the panzer division was supported by an 

assault gun brigade and rocket.·firing planes, raged for several hours. 

After the Germans recaptured Kussen, Russian tank reserves made a 
40 GlItMAN It£PORf SEalES 

counterattack, but were turned back by assault guns and fighter planes. 

The German infantry, supported by assault guns, tore gaps into 

the Russian attack columns which had been weakened by heavy artillery and rocket fire. Before long the entire enemy attack force 

wavered and fell back in confusion. During the evening the former 

main line of resistance was reoccupied by the German infantry. The 

booty was rich, aside from 122 burned-out tanks piled up on the slopes 

near Kussen. Improvised zone defense had saved the Oerman forces 

from being annihilated and had stopped all enemy break-through 

attempts. 

The Russians continued their assaults during the following days, 

feeding them with a constant flow of men and materiel. They were 

unable, however, to repeat the deadly preparation of the first day 

because they lacked the necessary ammunition. Despite tenfold 

superiority and extreme sacrifices, they made little headway and were 

unable to overcome the zone defense belt. The high ground near 

Kussen changed hands several times, and 200 additional enemy tanks 

met with destruction in that area. The enemy finally succeeded in 

penetrating some marshy woods to the south of the zone defense area 

and forced the panzer army to withdraw in order to escape 

envelopment. 
Chapter 8 

ISTHMUS DEFENSE-THE SEA AS flANK PROTECTION 

Military history offers many examples of the defense of an isthmus. 

This terra in feature affords a multitude of opportunities to deny the 

attacker access to large and usually important areas with a minimum 

f;>xpenditure of forces. The short frontage of an isthmus defense ran 

be anchored on bodies of wat.er, and the line can be quickly fortified 

and easily defended. Although the adjacent shore line has to be 

secured, this can often be achieved with small forces. An isthmus 

separating two oceans is an unsurmountable obstacle if the defender's 

flanks are protected by superior air and naval forces. Evcn with 

inadequate naval forces, the defender will be able to repel enemy 

landings with the help of artillery and air power or to destroy a 

beachhead with mobile ground forces. During World War I the 

British were unable to b"eak through the Turkish line on the Gnllipoli Peninsula, despit.e their overwhelming superiority on the sea and 

in the air. 

An isthmus between lakes can also be of great tactical value. The 

Battle of Tannenberg in ]914 offers a valid example. In this bat.tle 

(he Germans took advantage of the fortified isthmus near Loetzen, 

in the East Prussinn lake distriet, to delay the Russian First Army 

until the German Eighth Army had completed the encirclement and 

annihilation of the Russian Fourth Army. 

Both during the Russi an withdrawal in 1942 and that of the Ger. 

mans in 1943, the swampy isthmus between Lake Peipus and the 

Baltic Sea proved R formidable obstacle. The German thrust on 

Leningrad was blocked along the isthmus near Narva until an envelopment from the south across the Luga forced the Russiflns to nbandon their positions. The Russian offensive in 1943 encountered simi~ 

lar difficulties when it was stalled at the same isthmus. 

In 1941-42 weak RussiRIl forces delayed the Gel'man Rdvance for a 

long time on the strongly fortified isthmus of Kerch in the Crimea. 

With the reversal of the tide in H143, two German corps, blocking 

the Perekop and Kerch Isthmuses, succeeded in deJnyi ng the many· 

times superior RussiRn armies for six months. The story of the defense of the two Crimean isthmuses by the Germans shows how effectively break-through attempts CRn be frustrnted by taking advantage 

of this geographic feature. The subsequent withdrawal to Sevastopol 

indicates the importance of the sen as flank protection. At the beginning of October 1943 the mi$iOll of defending the Crimea was ns41 
42 GElMAN urolT SElI!S 

signed to the German Seventeenth Army. The forces available for 

this mission were constant ly dwi ndling si nce onc division afler anot.her 

was transferred to t.he Sixth Army which was trying to stem the 

Russian onslaughl..lwl'th of t.he Crimea. By mid-October Seventeenth 

Army had two corps with t.wo Germnn and four Romanian divisions 

at its disposa l. Olle Romanian corps guarded t~e south coast of 

the Crimen. (Map 8) 

The V Infantry Corps was to prevent an enemy landing on the 

Kerch Peninsula or throw t.he Russians back into the sea wherever 

they landed. If possible, the corps. was to form mobile reserves. 

The area under the jurisdiction of the V Corps inc1uded the city 

of Feodosiya wh.jeh, during the winter 1941-42, had been the target 

of an amphibious operation conducted by the Russian Black Sea 

Fleet, resulting in 1\0 ext l'cmely critical situation, The port of Feodosiya and the sUlTounding wl'I'itory was held by Tusk F orce Krieger, 

a motley unit composed of two weak battalions of limited service and 

ovel'-age German personnel and one Azerbaijan and one Turkoman 

bnttalion, Three divisions-the German 98th Infantry Division and 

the Romanian 6th CnvaIry Ilnd 10th Infnntry Divisions-were available for the 'defense of the approximately 200-mile coast line of the 

Kerch Peninsula. The 6th Romnni nn Cavalry Division was good but 

numCl'icaIly weak, wherens the Romanian infantry division was militarily and politically unr('li nble. Although there were many instances of individual bravery in the performance of these Romanian 

troops, they were subject to pani c when faced by tanks and lacked 

stnmina under hcnvy, continuous artillery fire. Under these circumstances it was obvious thnt the German 98th Infantry Division 

had to be committed in the most vulnerable sector around the city 

of Kel'ch, with Elt,igen as boundary in the south nnd Cape Tnrkhan in 

the north. Sill('(l the combat stl-ength of t.he 98th Infantry Division 

had dropped to Ilpproximately 40 to 50 mcn per company, a continuous 

line of defense along the entire coast was out of the question. After 

one regiment had been designated as sector reserve, the r emaining 

forces were just about sutlicient to man strong points in the port a.reas 

and at the extreme end of the peninsula at Zhukovka, with security 

dctnchments patro11ing the other parts of the coast. 

The 6th Romaniun Cllvalry Division wns responsible for guarding 

the south coast of the peninSUla and the 10th Romanil\ll Infantry 

Division covercd the north coast from Cape Tarkhan to Ak-Monay. 

The Luftwaffe was extremely weak, with the shortage of reconnaissance planes a malter of rea l concern to the German command. At 

times only olle recon naissance plane was ex pected to cover the entire 

Crimea . As a result, the V Corps lacked information about the size 

of fhe Russian hmding preparations, whi ch doubtl ess were in progress 

on the other side of the Stl'tlits of Kerch. Ally plan to delay these 
OffENse TACTICS AG"INST RUSSIAN 8REAK.THROUGHS 43 

preparlltions by air attacks was fl'llst.rated by the lack of intelligence 

on Russian conccntnlt.ions on the Taman Peninsula, Obviously, the 

Germans had no clue as to t.he pl'Obable Russian landing points. 

During the night. of 19-20 October 1943, one Russian division landed 

at Eltigen which was defended by a company from the 98th Division 

numbering forty-six men, Immediately alerted, the German reserves 

were able to narrow down the Russian beachhead but were not sumcient.ly st.ron g to eliminate it. While t.his fighting was under way, 

t.he Hussians all.empled to land in force nea r t.he cit.y of Kerch during 

the night. of 31 October- l November. The landing part.ies in the port 

of KCi'ch propel' and along the coast. between Kerch and Zhukovka 

were repulsed, But immediately nort.h of Zhukovka the Russians 

overcame the security detachment and moved in reserves, widening 

the beachhCftd ill the course of a. bayonet engagement. Soon the Russian pressure from t.he newly won beachhead increased so that. a. German counterat.tack WIIS out of the question, After overcoming some 

critical sit.uat.ions, t.he German forces in this sector were barely able 

to hold the important heights nort.heast of t.he city of Kerch, Thus 

began a fierce struggle which was t.o scesaw in the immediate vicinity 

of the city fOl" five long months. 

The area which t.he Russians had chosen for their main landing had 

one great disadvant.age. They had gained a toehold on the easternmost put of the peninsula on a comparat.ively narrow isthmus which 

protruded beyond the city of Kerch, The Russians were unable to 

deploy their forces or expand their beachhead until they had captured 

the city and the high ground nOl"lh of it. Tho German defense could 

succeed only if t.he Russians remained hemmed in on the small isthmus, 

German defense tactics therefore called fOl" blocking the Russi:ms on 

Mount Mit.ridates, overlooking Kel'ch, and along the mountain range 

nort.h of t.he city, denying them access to the rest of the peninsula, 

This German plan succeeded although the Russians gradually built 

up t.heir beachhead until it contained t.welve divisions including many 

tanks. The 98th Di vision bore the brunt of the fighting against t.his 

superior force during the months of November, December, and January, It was assisted by one German infant.ry regiment whi ch Seventeenth Army had moved across the Crimea from the Pel'ekop area and 

by some ROimmian bat.talions which were held in reserve and committed in emergencies, Elements of the only assault gun battalion 

in the CI'imea repeatedly intervened at danger points, Toward t.he 

end of J anuary 1944, when' t.he weakened line of the 98th Division 

was at. the point of breaking, the 73d Infantry Division was brought 

in by nil' without its art.i llery components. 

On 7 December 1943 the Gth Romanian Cavalry Division, concen· 

trating all its forces and assisted by the assault gun batta lion, eliminated the Eltigen beachhead which menaced UlA German ilank and 
44 GilMAN II!POIT SEIIlfS 

was close to the main landing. Although the operation was successful 

and resulted in the capture of 2,000 Russian prisoners, it led to an 

unexpected crisis. During the night, elements of the Eltigen force 

broke through the Romanian line and moved north to link up with the 

Kerch beachhead. This force overran several batteries which were 

zeroed in on the main Russian beachhead and before dawn attacked 

German artillery outposts on Mount Mitridates from the rear. From 

there some Russian elements infiltrated into the southwestern part 

of the city of Kerch. The Russian commander of the Kerch beach· 

head, who had launched an attack as soon as he knew about the 

German assault on Elt.igen, recognized the favorable opportunity and 

redoubled his efforts to link up with the Eltigen force. Since there 

were no readily available German reserves, this critical situation had 

to be overcome by the forces on hand. Three assault detachments 

were formed by pulling combat-seasoned troops out of the line. They 

recaptured Mount Mitridates in one swoop and held on to it. Later 

on, elements of the 3d Romanian Mountain Division, moving up from 

the north const of the Kerch Peninsula, annihilated the remnants of 

the Eltigen force. 

The 98th and 'l3d Divisions, reinforced by Romanian troops, with· 

stood four major Russian attacks launched from the Kerch beachhead. 

Individual heights and key trenches constantly changed hands during 

the weeks of bitter fighting. German counterattacks alternated with 

minor local withdrawals and corrections in the front line in order to 

save manpower and -reduce casualties. All these actions were dominated by the primary consideration of holding the key position on 

Mount Mitridates and the area to its north. Another landing gave 

the Russians control over the northern mole of the port of Kerch and 

the eastern part of the city, but the Germans kept their hold on the 

western portion and the crucial mountain. The Russians also landed 

along the coast of the Sea of Azov near Cape Tarkhan, where they 

captured an important hill. German counterattacks restored the situation somewhat. 

Two outside threats hovered over the fighting around Kerch: the 

Russian Black Sea Fleet and the impending defeat of the German 

Sixth Army defending the land communications with the Crimea. 

A large-scale landing, for instance at Feodosiya or Sevastopol, in 

co-operation with the Russian Black Sea Fleet, would have put the 

German forces in the Crimea in an untenable position because they 

were powerless to prevent any such attack. Actually, the Russians 

did not commit their fleet, not even for a deceptive maneuver. They 

seemed to attach more importance to keeping their fleet intact than to 

achieving a quick suecess in the Crimea. This was easily compr&-

hensible since the offensive north of the Sea of Azov proceeded so well 

that there was every reason to expect that the Crjmea would fall sooner 
DEFlNS! TACTICS AGAINST IUSSIAN BIEAK-1H.OUOHS 4S 

or later. While the Elt.igen beachhead was being reduced by the 

Romanians, the badly shat.tered divisions of the German Sixth Army 

were dl'iven back to Melitopo1. At the time of the main enemy landing near Kerch, t.he Russiall armies in the north crossed the Dnepr and 

achieved a break-through toward Krivoi Rog. By the beginning of 

November 1943, t.he Russian forces north of the Crimea were at.tacking 

the Perekop Isthmus whi ch connects the Crimea. wit.h the mainland. 

The German forces in the Crimea were cut off and hemmed in. The 

Russialls continued their advance on the mainland and by mid-December had reached the Kherson and Nikopol bridg<,heads and t.he 

Kirovograd area. With the continuation of the Russian offensive in 

January 1944, all hope for a German counterattack hom the Nikopol 

bridgehead had definitely vanished.. Nikopol was evacuated on 8 

February, Kherson on 13 March, and Odessa. fell on 8 April 1044. 

The German units in the Crimea were isolated far behind t.he Russian lines without hope for relief. 

By t.he end of March, the fourth major attack 011 Kerch was repelled by the Germans. On the morning of 5 ApI'il, a heavy artillery 

preparat.ion preceded another attack, resulting in an inSignificant 

penet.rat.ion norOI of Kerch. This was sealed off by a. German counterattack on the next day. For the first time the Russian attack was cocrdinated with simultaneous assaults against the XLIX Mountain 

Corps on the Perekop Isthmus. There, the situation was similar to 

t.hat. at Kerch. So long as the weak and gradually tiring German 

(orees were able to contain the Russians on the narrow ist.hmus, they 

hnd a chance of putting up a successfu l defense. Once the Russians 

got through this bottleneck and penetl'ated into the open terrain of 

the northern Crimea, Germans had no means of stopping them, The 

so-called Gneisenau position had been constructed in an arc around 

Simferopol, but this position was incomplete and could serve only 

as immediate protection for the city proper. The Russians were free 

to bypass it to the west or east. The distance from Kmsnoperekopsk 

to Sim(eropol is 60 miles by air, that from Kerch to Simferopol 110 

miles, In the event that the Russians should break through at the 

Perckop Isthmus, Seventeenth Army planned that the XLIX and 

V Corps join forces in the Simferopol area, In view of the disparity 

in the distance to be covered, it seemed questionable whether V Corps, 

wit.hdrawing on foot, would be able to reach Sim(eropol in time. 

If the Crimea was to be evacuated, Sevastopol was the only possible 

port. of embarkation for crossing the Black Sea to Romania. The 

port of Yalta was much too sma)), inaccessible, and surrounded by 

mountains. The Russians knew this' only too well and there was every 

reason to believe that, once they had broken through the Perekop 

Isthmus, they would bypass the Glleisenau position with their armored 

and motorized units and thrust st.raight toward Sevastopol. 
46 GEIMAN IEPOU SERIES 

Although there was a close similarity between the situations at 

Kerch and Krasnoperekopsk, the latter had one peculi arity. This was 

the fi at, shallow, muddy island and lagoon region of the Sivllsh east 

of the isthmus. The Russians had built some causeways over this 

almost impassible area j German planes occasionally succeeded in 

damaging the causeways, but were u.nnble to destroy them. Shortage 

of ammunition prevented their destruction by artillery fire, as in general the scarcity of ammunition had become an ever-present problem 

nfter the separation of the Crimea from the mainland. On 8 April the 

Russians launched an aU-out offensive in the XLIX Corps area and 

achieved major penetrations in the Sivash region and 011 the isthmus. 

The next day V COI'PS was warned that the situation in the XLI X 

Corps sector was tense and that the withdrawal to Simferopol might 

be ordered for thc following day. Several plans for the withdrawal 

had been studied and prepared for the event of a voluntary or forced 

GCl'mll n CVllcllIltion of the Crimea. _\s one of the first measures, the 

assa ul t gu n battalion, some of tho artillery, and all the Luftwaffe 

elements in the V Corps area werc to be transferred to XLIX Corps. 

On tho morning of 10 April, V Corps received orders to start its 

withdrawal to Sevastopol via Simferopol by 1900. 

During the winter the so-called Parpach position had been constructed across the narrowest. isthmus of the Kerch Peninsula and 

strengt.hened by a continuous wire obstacle, an ant.it.ank ditch, Rnd 

emergency shelters. But. the infant.ry could not possibly reach this 

defense line in a one-night mnrch from Kerch. An intermediate position was therefore to be established between Kerch and Parpnch on 

either side of YUl'fovka !llld this line was to be reached before dawn 

and held during the day. The withdrawal to the Parpach line was 

to be comp.leted during the following night. The first. units to be 

withdrawn from t.he front were to secure the most important. roads 

and terrai n features ahead of the intermediate posit.ion and cover the 

withdrawal of the mai n body. Upon completion of this mission, the 

securit.y detnchments Were to fight. a rear guard action, withdraw behind the intermediate position, and form a reserve force. This plan 

could not be carried out because the critical situatioll in the Perekop 

Isthmus necessitated the immediate transfer of these elements. As 

a r08ult, the covering positiollS were inadequately manned and the 

corps was without reserves. 

Except for a reconnaissance in force, the Russians in the Kerch 

beachhead were inactive on 10 April. After the V Corps had transferred all its fighter planes to the XLIX Corps area, the Russian air 

force reigned supreme and became extremely active. Since the Russian forces in the north crossed most of the Perekop Isthmus and the 

Sivash flats, the enemy command at Kerch felt certain that the with-
DEFENSE TACIICS AGAINST RUSSIAN IREAK-THROUGHS 47 

drawal of the V Corps was imminent. Any attempt at deceiving 

them as to the German intentions was futil e. 

Nevertheless, the disengagement carried out during the night of 

10--11 April proceeded without unforseen incident. J usl before midnight the Russians entered the German positions, held by rear guards. 

A few Russian tanks, followed by motorized infantry, took up th~, 

pursuit of the German units moving toward the intermediate position. 

This line was not fortified and followed the so-called Tartar Wall, 

an ancient wall leading from Lake Uzunln rskoye via Murfovka to 

the Kasantipskiy Bay on the Sea of Azov. The 6th Romanian 

Cavalry occupied the sector between the lake and Murfovlm, the 

73d Division the central one on both sides of the Kerch- Feodosiya 

highway, and the 98th Division the northm·n sector up to Knsnntipskiy 

Bay. The avernge strength of the German companies varied between 30 and 40 men. Despite the fact that the Crimea had been 

cut off from the mainland since November 1943, fourteen-day f urloughs were granted to all soldiers who had not been on leave for a 

year or more. Although this was an excellent way of boosting momle, 

the German units in the Crimea gra du ally lost their battle-tested 

cadre bccause few of the men returned to their outfits. Upon returning from furlough, Army Group A intercepted them at Odessa 

while they were waiting for transportation, organized them into 

battalions, and committed them on the mainland. 

The ICerch Peninsula is a rolling treeless steppe. Trees are so rRre 

that the four high ones standing west of the village Libknekhtovka 

were a landmark which served as a point of orientation for the entire 

area. Outside the inhabited places there is no covel' or concealment 

in the open tm'rain. The forests of the Yailn mot'mt.ains began at 

Stary Krym, west of Feodosiya. There, too, began the territory of 

the partisans. Firmly entrenched, strong partisan forces had intercepted the traffic along the Feodosiya-Simferopol highwfLY for many 

months, forc ing t.h('. Germans to travel ill armed convoys. 

Shortly after 0700 on 11 April, even before front-line reports could 

be evaluated, the Russians launched a powerful thrust in the 'l3d 

Division sector north of the Kerch- Feodosiya highway. After suffering heavy casua lties, the Germans succeeded in stopping the Russian 

tanks and supporting infantry about one mile behind the intermediate 

position. While the Germans were struggling to get this situation 

under control, a fierce Russian attack hit the 6th Romani an Division 

sector. The lack of reserves made itself felt. During the early after~ 

noon, Russian tanks broke through at Murfovka, thrust deep into 

the rear area, wrought havoc with the Romanian trains, and reached 

Arma-Eli, t.wenty-five miles behind the intermediate position. Rus~ 

sian infantry poured through the gap opened by t he armor. 
48 OfIMAN IEPO.' SEIIES 

This was 8. fun fledged break-through with no German reserves to 

stop it. The original intention to hoJd the intermediate position till 

dusk and withdraw to the Parpach position under cover of darkness 

could no longer be carried out under the prevailing circumstances. 

It was altogether doubtful whether the German infantry and the 

horse-drawn artillery would reach the Parpach position before the 

Russians. If the Russians exploited the break-through and moved 

up strong motorized forces behind their armored spearheads at Armll.-

Eli, they could easily penetrate and outflank the position held by 

weak security detachments. Once the Russians captured the Parpach 

position, the V Corps faced certain encirclement and destruction on 

the Kerch Peninsula. 

The Russians recognized t.his possibility and moved up motorized 

forces behind their armored force at Arma·EIi. In addition, they 

went over to the attack along the entire front. Nevertheless, they 

did not overrun the Parpach position although some individual tanks 

succeeded in crossing the antitank ditch nlong the Feodosiya road 

where the Germans had delayed the demolitions too long. It is diffi· 

cult to determine in retrospect exactly how the Germans were able to 

hold the Parpach position. The weak security detachments were 

reinforced by troops shifted from one danger spot to another, and the 

Russians also seemed to show some reluctance to throw their fu]) 

weight against the line they had themselves so successfully defended 

during the winter ID41-42. Undoubtedly, the lower echelon com· 

manders of the Russian spearhead units were divel'ted from their 

objective by the extraordinary spectacle: which unfolded in front of 

their eyes: fleeing supply columns, rows of vehicles in the distance, 

horse·drawn art.ilIery, long lines of trucks, and smaH detachments of 

troops stumbling northwestward in wild disorder, The Russians could 

not resist the temptat.ion to aUack such easy prey and, destroying 

many columns of vehicles, forgot about the more important objective--

the Parpach position. 

The daylight retreat from the intermediate to the Parpach position 

over a distance of thirty miles led to bitter fighting on 11 April, 

causing more casualties than anyone of the long defensive engage· 

ments around Kerch. Russian fighter and fighter·bomber formations 

lllet with no opposition in the air and could lend their full support 

to the Russian ground forces. The steppe, with its lack of cover, 

provided the Russian fliers with a variety of targets. Tho Russian 

fighters seemed to concentrate on prime movers and draft horses pull· 

ing heavy weapons and artillery as well as on infantry units on 

the march, while the fighter-bombers attacked horse-drawn and motorized convoys. As a result the Germans lost most of thuir horsedrawn artillery in the steppe since they had to blow up the pieces 

utter the horses had been killed from the air. Light and medium 
DlFfNSE TACTICS AGA1NST IUSSIAN .IEAI(-THIOUGHS 49 

howit.zers and antitank guns fared only slightly better. The retreating infantry forces faced many difficulties in the steppe. Subjected 

to cont.inuous air attacks, their plight was worsened by frontal and 

fl ank attacks on the ground while individual Russian tanks blocked 

their route of withdrawal. The approach of darkness brought some 

relief, although the Russians continued their air nLtncks on roads, 

towllS, and communication centers. 

The V Corps had suffered a major defeat on 11 April. The 6th 

Romanian Cavalry Division was wiped outcxcept for small remnants 

which reached the Parpnch position and were assigned to a smnll 

sector on the right wing. The last clements of the 73d and 98th Divi· 

sions did not arrive in the position until the morning of 12 April, after 

fighting their way back step by step. The casualties were henvy-one 

regiment of the 73d Division was reduced to 200 men, its reconnaissance battalion to 50. Avail able forces were no longer suffi cient to 

man the Parpach position in its entire fifteen-mile length. Artillery 

and ant.ia ircraft persollnel had to be used as infantry in order to occupy the most important points. Despite their exhaustion and t.he 

enemy's numerical superiorit.y, the German troops repelled all atlRcks 

throughout. the day and eliminated minor penetrnlions in hand-tohand fight.ing. 

Nevertheless, there was no doubt this weak defense force would 

have to give way to the moun ting Russi an pressure before long. 

Since the German artillery whi ch had escaped the carnage was too 

weak to counteract, let. alone crush, Russian attack prepa rat.ions and 

armored concentrntions, the Ge rmans had to defend the Parpach 

li ne with small arms and mnchine gUllS. 

There were other reasons for It change in the planned withdl'flwa l 

schedule. Signal commun ica tiolls between V Corps and Seventee nth 

Army were disrupted on 12 April. No reliable information regarding the situation on the XLI X Corps front was ava ilable but, according to rumors, 'Russian tanks had ca ptured the ra ilroad junction at 

Dzhankoy, twelve miles south of the Perekop Isthmus. Around noon 

the first reliable reports rece ived from sc n ·ice units traveling from 

Fcodosiya to Simfcl'opol were anything but reassuring. At Zuya, 

twelve miles northeast. of Simfcl'opol, they had encountered Russi an 

tanks and had also been intercepted by partisan units emerging from 

the forests. A motorcycle messenger returning from KarQsuba1.al' 

reported that another colulllll was fired on by Russian tan ks in the 

same vicinity. 

The significance of this information was that armored Russian elements had broken through or bypassed the Gneisenau position. The 

distance f" om the P nl'pach position to Zuya. was sixty miles by air. 

The question was whet her the V Corps would be able to reach Simferopol in time to join fOI·ces wilh the XLIX Mou ntain Corps. In 
50 GlIMAN IEPORT SfRlES 

any event, it seemed certain that the corps would have to fight its 

way back while holding off the Russian divisions fanning out of the 

Kerch beachhead. If the Russian tanks at Zuya and Karnsubazar 

were not just advance detachments but. elements of a. strong force 

thrusting from the Perekop Isthmus, the continuation of the V Corps 

withdrawal toward Simferopol wns 110 longer feasible. II) this event, 

the only way out of the trap WfiS to tU1'1l south at Saly, six miles west 

of Stary Kl'ym, and to reach Sev8stopol by the coastal road across 

the Yaila and Yalta Mountains. The distance from Simfcropol to 

Sevastopol is 40 miles by air, that from the Parpach position to Sev8stopol105 milos. If the Russians had actually reached Zuyn or the 

nrcn. west of Simferopol in force, the V Corps would probably arrive 

in front of Sevasoopol after its capLure by the Russians. 

No matter wheLher the V Corps wit.hdrew via Simferopol or along 

the coastal road via Sudak, it had to take immediate sLeps to secure 

and hold the area around Saly where the road branches off the main 

Simferopol highway to the south. If the Russians got there first they 

would deprive the corps of both routes of withdrawal. Since the 

corps had no reserves, it could only use the troops fighting in the Parpach position. This meant that tho position would have to be evacuated immediately after dusk on 12 April and that the troops withdraw to the Saly area in one night. The remllants of the 6th Romanian Cavalry Division and the 73d Division received orders to 

move to the Sudak area and the 98th Division was to occupy the high 

ground norLh and west of Snly. 

The events which t.ook place on the afternoon of 12 April complicated t he implemenl.ntion of these orders but, instead of changing 

their scope, speeded up their exccution. During the early afternoon 

a strong Russian armored column drove past the northeMl anchor 

of the Parpach position near the Selt of Azov and penetrated into AkMonay, but was stopped in that town. Immediately afterward, at 

1530, Russian motorized units broke through Itt the boundary between 

the 6th Romanian Cavalry Division and tho 73d Division along the 

road to Fcodosiya. 

At 1615, when the fighting for the Pnrpach position reached a 

decisive stage, telephone communications with army were re-established for a short period. Army confirmed that. the Gneiscnau position was lost and that the Russians exercised strong pressure in the 

Simferopol area. A link-up wiLh the XLIX Corps at Simferopol was 

no longer feasible. The V Corps was to attempt to reach Sevastopol 

via the coastal rond_ This decision did not modify the orders issued 

by the corps_ Once again the Germans had to evacuate their positions 

during the daylight hours. The withdrawal of the 98th Division 

wus further complicat.ed by the fact that it had t.o take place over open 

terrain, between Ak-Monay, and Vladislavovka 1 where there is no 
DEFENSE TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN IR(AIC. IHROUGHS 51 

cover. The exact loclltion of the XLIX Corps was still unknown. 

Moroover, here were conflict.ing reports about a Russian advanco (rom 

Karasubazar to\yard Saly. Sury Krym, a town in t.he foot.hills of the 

Yaila Mountains sit.uated along t.he route of withdrawal of t.he 'l3d 

Division, was suddenly attacked by partisans who descended from the 

surrounding woods disguised as peaceful civilians. The 73d Division 

was faced with a difficult situation since it had to ward off the pursuing 

enemy forces on its front while partisans blocked its route of withdrawn l at Slary Kl·ym. The division tried to clear a path in hnrd 

house·to-house fighting, gained temporary possession of n. few city 

blocks, and was thus ablc to detour t.he vehicular traffic which had to 

pass through the toWIl. Except for brief intervals, the fighting in 

Stary Krym continued all through the night of 12-13 April. 

On the morning of 13 April the 73<1 Division, its line facing cast., 

held t.he high ground 011 eil.her side of Stary Krym. Enemy forces in 

hot pursuit attacked the German positions and linl{ed up with the 

part.isalls in the town. 'rhe 73d Division, joined by t.he remnants of 

the 6th Romanian Cavalry Division, was ordered to hold the high 

ground westof Stary Krym unt.il the 98th Division hn.d passed through 

Saly on tho march f;Q Sudo.k. Upon completion of this mission, the 

73d Division was to withdraw immediately to the wooded heights sout.h 

of Snly and block the enemy advance toward Sud Ilk. 

These movements went according to plan because the corps concentrated all its rema,ining forces wit.hin a narrow area despite continuous 

Russiall air al.tacks. This was cont.rary to established doctrine but the 

heavily wooded motilltainous terrain provided good cover for the corps 

troops and hid their sudden pivoting movement to the sout.h. Tho 

Russians were deceived by German reconaissanco in force west of 

5aly which led them to believe that the bulk of the V Corps was 

ret.reating toward Karasubazar. Tho Russian react.ion was to throw 

all available forces into a west.ward drive from Stary Krym. The 

98th Division reached t.he Sudak area wit.hout meeting resistance and 

the 73d Division had no particular difficulty in warding off the un-coordinated Russian a.ttacks against its blocking position on the high 

ground two miles south of Saly. 

Romanian demolition p!u·ties along the winding road between 

Feodosiya and Sudak had prepared a number of charges t.o bo blown 

up after the last vehicles (rom Fcodosiya had passed t.he demolition 

points, closing the road to a RU&6 ian advance. While the successful 

pivot.ing maneuver to t.he sout.h constituted a. minor success, the object.ive of reaching Sevastopol by the coastal route through t.he Yaila 

Mountains before its capture by the Russians was much more difficult 

to att.ain. Russian news broadcasts announcod the capt.ure of Simferopol and reported fight.ing southwest. of the city. A quick glanco 

at. the map indicated only too cleady Wle difficulties the V Corps would 
52 GEltMAN REPOIl SEIIES 

have to fllee. The obstacles presented by the lcrrain of the long 

mounl.uinous route were considerable. The I Uomunian Corps had 

been unsuccessful in dislodging the part.isans from lha Yaila Mountains. If the partisans blew up one single turn ill t.he road, they 

could jeopardize t.he entire withdrawal. A Russian landing at 

Alushta or Yalta would have the same effect., Aside from the SalySudak road, firmly held by the Germans, no less t.han seven usable 

roads bmnch off lo t.he south across the mount.ains from the SalyKarasubll.zar- Zuya- Simferopol- BllkhchisllrIl.Y highway, and most. 

were in Russian hands. At least. t.hree of these are improved roads, 

suitable for all types oC troop movements. The Uussians therefore 

had a variety of possibilities to block t.he V Corps wit.hdrawaland t.hey 

also had t.he necessary forces at. their disposal. Twelve divisions wit.h 

many tanks advanced from the Kerch Peninsula. with an equal number 

thrusting across the Crimea from Krasnoperekopsk. A joint drive of 

these powedul forces in t.he direction of Sevllst.opol would crush the 

weak German forces. On the other hand, most of t.he Russian divisions 

were infllntry units ma rching on foot and their link·up was bound to 

take some time. If the V Corps plan was to succeed, it could only be 

achieved by outrunning the Russians. The only possible solution 

was to provide motor tnmsportlltion for the weak German units which 

had suffered such heavy losses during the withdrawal from the Kerch 

Peninsula. The corps and GHQ troops as well as the flak art.iIlery 

had organic truck transportation and it was therefore a matter of 

providing motor transportation for the infantry units, horse-drawn 

artillery, and horse-drawn supply columns. Mostof the trucks needed 

were taken from army motor pools and supply depots. They were 

commandeered, unloaded, and used for t.he movement. of troops. The 

naval coast artillery, which had to blow up its fixed batteries near 

Feodosiya and along the coast, supplied a certain number of trucks. 

The tractors belonging to German agricultural organizations in the 

Crimea and the normally untouchable trucks of the well-equipped 

Organization Toot (Ed.: paramilitary construction organization of 

the Nazi Party, auxiliary to the Wehrmacht] ullits were also put into 

8Crvioo. 

In Sudak, the corps suddenly ran into severa] Romanian battaJions 

without any transportation. Although this addition to the corps 

strength was welcome, the presence of the Roma.nians was bound to 

slow down the withdrawal of the now motorized V Corps. Despite 

unrelenting Russian air attacks, the bulk of the Romanian units wa.s 

loaded on Navy landing craft in the small harbor of Sudak and taken 

to Sevastopol by sen.. The rest rode along the coastal road to Alushta 

on German trucks with their horse-drawn service units following. 

The simplest and qui ckest way to reach Sevastopol was to drive 

from Sudak during the following night, from 18 to 14 April. It 
DEFENSE TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN BREAK_THROUGHS 53 

turned out that this was impossible, not because of enemy interference, 

but because more Romanian units were encountered between Sudak 

and Alu9hta. Some of them were withdrawing to Alushta to embark 

in that port, while olhers blocked the roads against a Russian advance 

through the mountains, The withdrnwnl of t.he German forces slowed 

down until all the Romanian units along the const were embarked in 

Alushta and Yalta. 

Russian pressure on t.he 73d Division front increased during t.he 

afterlloon of 13 Apl'il. Fighting a delaying action, t.he division wit.hdrew 9f.ep by step southward from Saly. It was planned that the 98th 

Division move to Alushta at dusk. The 73d Division was t.o follow at 

a one-hour int.erval and, acting as rear gua rd, occupy the high g l'ound 

west of Uskut. But the enemy cancelled all these plans, As soon as 

dusk set in, firing began east and nort.h, and very shortly thereafter, 

also southeast of Sudak. At first it was small arms fire, but then heavy 

machine guns and antitank guns opened up, and finally there were 

sharp reports of tank fire. Since the V Corps had no tanks, these 

could only be Russian. It was nevel' determined how these tanks 

suddenly appearcd in the Sudak area, but it was believed that they 

might have come from Feodosiya along side roads. 

This surprise attack was particularly inopportune becnuse it separated the 98th Division from t.he 73d. Moreover, it cut the only 

highway nlong the const leading to Uskut. No detours for motor 

vehicles were available. A counterattack conducted by the 98th Division during the night established that the opposing forces were mainly 

partisans. No sooner was conl,act l'e·established between the two German divisions, than a seeond enemy raid began an~ ,_ Russ ian tanks 

pc:letrated into the Center of Sudak. This new threat was finally 

eliminated by another German counterattnck. 

The withdrawal of the 98t,h Division was thereby delayed until after 

midnight. Direct enemy int.edel'ence was negligible during the night 

march which, however, t.urned out to be full of adventures because 

most of the drivers were inexperienced. The road leadi ng through 

the Yaila Mountains was very poor and many steep turns were without 

guard rails. At several steep gradients the roadbed was as slippery as 

soap. Artillery pieces with long barl'els had to back up several times 

before they could negotiate some of the narrow turns. There were 

endless traffic jams a.ll along the road. Since the drivers were not 

allowed to use headlights, a number of vehicles plunged into the abyss. 

Fire signals on the mountain tops and bunting farm houses along the 

road revealed thl1.tthe partisans were never far off, 

During 14 April the 98th Division rea ched the aJ'ea. northeast of 

Alushta, while the real' gUIl.I'ds of the '73d Division covered the withdrawal west of Uskut. The demolitions were set off according to plan 
54 GEIMAN ItIEPOIU SElIES 

and no Romanians were left behind. The over-all situation continued 

to be uncertain all through the day since wire communications with 

army were interrupted most of the time. Atmospheric conditions 

made it impossible to establish radio contact. The V Corps comllmnder believed thut, aft.cr the capture of Simferopol, the Russian 

command would drive straight to SevastopoJ. If the RussilUlS entered 

the city on the heels of the XLIX Corps, the Scventoonlh Army was 

doomed. The V Corps commander was therefore not surprised to 

find t.hat there was no strong enemy pressure along the roads leading 

across Lhe mountains toward the south coast. H e expected the Russians to block the seven mountain roads and attack via Bakhchisaray 

toward Yalta or ForO$. 

Reports from German reconna issance patrols confirmed these suspIcions. Some Russian units advanced along the BakhchisarayYalta. road which had been mined and was blocked by a Romanian 

blLt-talion, while stronger forces thrust southward in the direction of 

Fol'Os. Midway between Bakhchisaray and Foros some hastily assembled German units were digging in, but it was difficult to predict 

how long they would be able to withstand the Russian pressure. Every 

possible step had to be taken to move the V Corps troops into Sevastopol before the escape route was closed. 

During the night of 14-15 April, the V Corps established telephone 

communications with Seventeenth Army at its new command post in 

Sevastopol. Thl} XLIX Mountain Corps had succeeded in stalling 

the Russian advance at the ramparts of Sevastopol, but anny doubted 

whether the weak German units on the BakhchisarILy- Foros road could 

hold out throughout 15 April. The arrival of the V Corps waS essential for the defense of Sevastopol which was indefensible witi).out 

immediate reinforcement.. If the V Corps was unable to reach the 

city, Seventeenth Army had no other choice but to form a beachhead 

at some favorable point along the coast and wait for evacuation by 

dle sea. 

A rough estimate by the corps commander indicated that the corps 

could not possibly arrive in Sevllstopol on 15 April unless it started 

its withdrawal from Alushta. no later than 1000, since this was not 

just a drive over notmal terrain but over a rugged mountain road across 

partisan-infested territory. The chances of reaching Sevastopol beforo regular Russian troops or partisans cut the road were slight. 

Was this sufficient reason to give up trying to reach the cityj After 

all, the corps was strong enough to fight its way back to Sevastopol. 

If it stayed put and formed a beachhead at Alushta or Yalta, the cOrps 

would lose a.ll heavy weapons and trucks should the troops be evacuated by sea. In addition, this desperate expedient could still be tried 

after all efforts to reach Sevastopol had failed. 
DEFENSE TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN IIItEAK-THROUGHS 55 

The COI'PS commander thcrefore issued orders that an German 

units move out of Alushta during the morning of 15 April immediately aft.er the Romanians had completed the embarkation of their 

forces. The 98th Division! acting as advance guard! was to be ready 

at 1000. The 73d Division was to follow at a one-mile interval. The 

town commander of Alushta was instructed to hold a position north 

of AIllshta with two Romauian infantry battalions until the evening 

of 15 April and to embark under cover of darkness. He was allotted 

the Iltlccssary landing craft and a German staff was put in charge of 

t.he final loading operations. 

While the corps commander issued these orders during the early 

morning hours, the Russi ans suddenly attacked the two Romanian 

infHntry battalions blocking the road to Alusht.a. German liaison 

officers attached to the two battalions reported that some of the companies wcre ialling back. Soon afterward! individual soldiers were 

seen running through the streets of AbshtlL toward the boats. It 

was not without difficulty that these stragglers were returned to their 

outfits which had continued to resist and had meanwhile repelled 

the Russians. 

The 98th Division started moving out of Alushta by 1100 and the 

othcr troop movements took place according to plan. At Yalta, the 

Gel"lllans were joined by Romanian troops which had secured the 

road to Bakhchisaray. The Russian air force was ineffective because 

thick fog rose from the Black Sea and hid the coast line around Yalta, 

forcing the pla.nes to drop their loads at random. The coastal road 

out of Yalta is modern and of exCellent construction. Interference 

by part.isans was broken up by immediate countermeasures and none 

of the many road turns were blown up by them. One such demolition 

placed at the rig-ht point! might have blocked the entire mountain 

road ano cut off the corps. 

After the last tru ck had gone through, the extensive demolitions 

prepa red by the Germans were set off. The rocky defile at Foros 

collapsed in a cloud of dust and a short distance from there a stoop 

turn, including the buttress, rolled down the mountain slope. None 

too SOOIl, the V Corps marched into Fortress Sevastopol. Two hours 

Int er t.he Russians cut off the la!.t approaches by land. 

PART FOUR 

RETROGRADE MOVEMENTS 

Chapter 9 

DELAYING AND BLOCKING ACTIONS 

One of the frequently tried and always dfeclive methods of defense 

against break-throughs consists of delaying and blocking a main 

enemy thrust with the he.lp of strong reserves. Like most others, these 

defense tactics presuppose the existence or early availability of adequate reserves. Com pal'ed to the enemy attack forces t.hese reserves 

may be much weaker without necessarily being at it disndvant.age. 

During the Russian Christmas offensive in 1943, for instance, the 

<'!lcmy wedge had a fi ve-lo-one superiority over the German hlocJdng 

forces. In such a case the block must be sufficiently resilient to withstand the terrific impact of hostile tank forces and must be absolutely 

shockproof. Tht; block should be placed in favorable terrain if it is 

to prevent the enemy advance or divert it.s ux is. 

Whenever a blocking force fai ls in its mission, it must bc withdrawn 

to another line farther to the rear. Its essential task is to disable as 

many hostile tanks as possible in order to weaken the enemis striking 

power and re-establish the balance of forces. An attack by infantry 

without the assistance of armor will rarely constitute a threat to tankl'Iupported units. 

Eventually, the block will form the nucleus of the new defense line 

t,hat is to be built up. The lille must be extended 011 both wings as 

soon as· possible and be strengthened by forces moved up from other 

sectors which are not under attack. Tactical expedients, dictated by 

momentary needs, often lead to confusion in the disposition of units. 

The command must attempt to eliminate these deficiellcies at the 

earliest possible moment. The methods used and sequence observed in 

closing any remaining gaps will depend upon the situation and local 

conditions. Overextended frontages and shortage of manpower will 

often prevent a further extension of sectors. Along the German front 

in Russia in 1944, quite a few gaps remained open for weeks or even 

months-for instance the so-called Wehrmacht Gap in the Pripyat 

marshes. Grollnd and air recollnnissallce had to be constantly Oil lhe 

alert since the Uussinns rarely fa illfd to take advantage of such gaps 

by some surprise move. 

57 
58 GUMAN IEP01T SUIU 

It is extremely important to recognize the exact time at which the 

enemy finally abandons his att.acks against a blocking force, only to 

renew them with fresh troops on the flank, at some other gap, or in a 

different sector. Often the destruction of his last remtl.inin~ tanks and 

the fading of his infantry assaults will indicate the change in the 

enemy's intentions. Whenever the Germans observed any such indications, they immediately withdrew all their tanks from the blocking 

foroo in order to build up strong reserves. This was all the morc 

ncceSS!lry since they could not count on the arrival of reinforcements, 

except. in rare instances. 

'Vhenever towns or major natural obstacJes such as· rivers are situ. 

ated within the break-through area, it will prove advantageous to integrate them into the defense system. Towns should be organ ized for 

all-al'Ound defense and, in accordance with their characteristics, obstacles should be used to strengthen the block. If extensive marshes or 

other impassible areas ure close behind the front Jine, the routes for bypnfi..<; ing them in case of a withdrawal must be determined in advance. 

Eflicient guides, road repairs, bridges, corduroy roads, secure defiles, 

and timely orders for withdrawal are some of the numerous clements 

for the success of such difficult retrograde movements. 

The duration of each delaying action by a. blocking foroo} the 

number of successive withdrawals, and the depth of a ret.rograde move.. 

ment depend upon the over-all Bituation} the terrain conditions, and 

the distribution of forcbS, and therefore vary in each instance. Three 

CQ-ordi nated withdrawa.ls to a total depth of sixty miles were necessary 

during the Russian Christmas offensive in 1943. Additional intermediate movements of minor significance were performed by individual units whenever they were under particularly hcnvy pressure. 

Strong resistance in every position was essential to accomplish the 

delaying mission. P art.ial withdrawals were permitted only with the 

approval of the army commandel·. The retrograde movement of the 

entil'e blocking force was contingent upon his personal ordera. 

The Russian offensive followed the operations described in Chapter 1. Even during the fighting in the Teterev-Irsha t.riangle, German 

aerial reconnaissance reported increasing rail traffic from the northwest in the direction of Kiev. (Map 9) Day and night., enemy 

troop transports incl uding hundreds of tanks moved across the Dnepr 

bridges toward the west. Doubtless the Russians transferred strong 

armored ILnd infantry un its into the Kiev area. They either intended 

to commit them in an effort to regain the terrain they had lost northeast of Zhitomir, or they planned a new operation. Since no now 

units were identified along the Teterev front} everything seemed to 

indicate that prepa.rations for a llew major offensive were under way. 

It was not until t.he last. days before Christmas that the Russians 

stal't.eci local probing attacks along ILnd to the south of the Kiev-
OEFfNSf TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN IUAk-THIOUGHS 59 

Zhitomir highway in order to find some weak poinlfl in the German 

dii'iposit.ions and to acquire advantageous jump-ofT posit ions. Air 

photographs, t.aken d aily, indicated a steady increase in the number 

of ellemy artillery emplacements which at first remained unoccupied, 

New batt.eries moved into the emplncements and lldjusted their fire, 

These were clear indicat.ions of nn impending enemy offensive, Russinn Utllk movements, conducted si muhnneously on the right nrmy 

wing near Kanev along the Dnepl', did not fi t into the gencm\ picture 

and were CArried out so clumsily that. they were immediately recognized as fl'ints. Even though radio inool'cept'l indicated no change, 

t.he hcavy tl'uck !'I'A lli e "'hich sta rt ed to roll towa rd the II'ont. every 

night. after 20 December left no doubt that the Russian at.tack was 

imminent.. German l'ecOllllniSSllnce planes sighted between two nnd 

three thousnnd loaded trucks rolling from Kiev to the front during 

several successive nights with jus!' as many returning empty, This 

wa s t.he best indication lhat the enemy would soon launch his attack 

in !,his Sed Ol'. The suddCll culm descending upon the front on 23 

Decemool' decei ved nobody. On the con!,rary, it ind icnl,ed that the 

Russian offensive could stllr!, at any moment, especially since the 

Russians liked 1.0 launch large-scale operations on Ch ristmas Eve, 

believing Lhnt the Gennan soldiers could be caugh!' oft guard on this 

imlJortan!' religious festiva l. 

The Germans took a number of precauLionary steps to a.bsorb the 

initin l shock of the first enemy nssnult.s and to ndd t.o the depth of 

their defense. The fully motorized ar!,illery division, wh ich had 

nl'rived only two wee\<s earli er and had been committed on a quiet 

seolor in accordance with specific orders issued by Hitl er, was now 

moved to Zhitomir, This division was equipped with 60 light and 

10 medium pieces and 24 assault guns, and was therefore particularly 

cn pable or shattering mass attacks. In addition, the XLVIII Panzer 

Corps was pulled ou!, and assembled in the vicinity of Korosten. A 

motorized infanll'Y d ivision, undergoing rchabilil:ttion in rest areas 

wesl of Berdichcv, was to form a. regimental combat team wilh all 

those clements whi ch were ready for commitment;. This combat team 

actually consisted of two motorized infantry battalions, onc light 

artillery bnttnlion, and one signal company_ Tho wenk local resCI'ves neftI' the }Cicv- Zhitomir highwny were reinforced with fOl'ly 

tanks. Allhough the. formation of reserves was of vital importance, 

army was unable to relievo any ot.her units because its front was 

so grent.1y overextended. Army group could not help at this time, 

and the l1'oul-th Panzer Army therefore had to Cace the Russian onslaught with "cry meager reserves, 

An nntitank ditch was dug uPP"oximately ten miles behind the 

main line of resislance. Its enswrll section lay behind an Ullfordable 

stream. The imlJOrtant railroad junctions lit Zhitomir, Berdichev, 
60 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

and Kuzatin WCI'C protected by fOltifications for the defense of which, 

however, only alert units formed by service troops were available. 

All nonessential rolling stock lind supplies were evacuated to the west. 

As expected, the Russi an offensive began on 24 December south of 

the Kiev-Zhitomil' highway, After It heavy one·llOur preparation, 

the enemy succeeded in breaching the positions held by two undersl..rcngth panzel' divisions. But. the two divisions conti nued to defend 

their main line of rcsistance although they were completely encircled. 

By noon this Russian force I'ellched lhe antj t.nnk ditch and crossed 

it at some points. A second powerful armored t.hrust penetrated 

the overextended front in the central sector dUl'ing the morning. 

Only slightly delayed by local resistance, several hundred enemy 

tanks rolled in an endless stream toward Berdichev. Here too, the 

antitank ditch caused little delay because the Germans lacked sufficient manpower for its effective defense. By the end of the first day 

the enemy force forming the main effort reached the Kiev- Zhitomil' 

railroad line. 

Another enemy t.hrust, carried out farther nort.h in the direction 

of Zhitomir propel', initially made slow progreSS in the swampy 

forests south of the highway because of the strong Gel'man antitank 

fronts. During the night the two encirc1ed panzer divisions, ordered 

to break out. to the west, attacked the enemy from the rear and disorganized him so completely that he was incapable of continuing 

the attack on the next da.y. 

In an effort to stem the Russian advance, the XLVIII Pnnzer 

Corps was withdra.wn from the Korosten area and committed in It 

counterattack south of the Teterev. The corps commander had orders 

to block the hostile advance behind the undulating terrain between 

Kazatin and Berdichev and to delay the Russians as long as possible. 

Up to this time some 800 enemy tanks Ilad appeared in this area. 

When the pa.nzer corps arrived south of the Teterov at dawn, enemy 

tank columns, many miles long, suddenly came into view. The corps 

commander could not resist the temptation and, instead of following 

his instructions, he decided to make an immediate surprise att.ack 

against the open enemy flank. But this flank attack had no chance 

of sU,cceeding because 150 Oerman tanks could not combat or even 

deflect the axis of the mass of Russian armor which had meanwhile 

grown to 1,000 tanks. As expected, the enemy quickly recovered from 

his initial surprise and held off the panzer corps with one~fourth of 

his armor and some antitank weapons. Although the panzer corps 

disabled Seventy-eight tanks, it was unable to overcome this obstacle. 

The bulk of two Russian tank armies rolled on to the area north of 

Kazatin which was defended by a regimental combat team of the 

20th Panzer Division, the twenty-four assault guns of the artillery 

division, and the alert units stationed within the city limits. If this 
DHENSE TACTICS AGA INST RUSSIAN BREAK·THROUGHS 61 

unforeseen threat was to be met and a break.through in depth to be 

prevented, the ot.her elements of the artillery division which had just 

moved into the Zhitomir area had to be pulled out immediately !lnd 

transfelTed to Knalin. Traffic bottlenecks, created by the simultam~ous use of the Zhitomir- Kazatin road by units of the panzer co rps 

trnveling in the sanlC direction, were unavoidable. The excellent 

condition of the asphalt road made it possible to pour enough reo 

inforcements into Kazatin at the last moment, ennbling the Germans 

to withstand the impact of the Ru ssian onslaught. 

l'heother enemy thrllsts in the Bel'dichev area and east of Zhitomir 

were also brought to a hall. Thl!!" the XLVIIl Panz"Cr Corps wa s 

afforded sufficient time to comply with its original orders and Inke 

up posit.ions between Kazfttin and Bel'dichev. The corps arrived on 

26 December, just in time to sec the Russians streaming int.o Kazalin. 

Their next objeclil·e was to cut t.he Zhitomil'- Vinnitsa highway. The 

German tanks repelled the enemy spearheads and rctool{ the ridge east 

of the highway. The Russians then split the ir attack forces and at· 

tempted to find a. weak point for a break·through to lhe west, but 

the panzer units took advuntage of the good road net and always 

reached the critical point in time to block I·he advance of the hostile 

armor. Woll concealed by terrain and brush, they let the Russian 

tanks approach and scored direct hits before they were discovere.d. 

On one day alone, 26 December, more than 200 cnemy tan],s succumbed 

to these tactics. By the third day of the thrust the break·through 

area of the at.ta cking Russian tank armies wus blocked by the panzer 

corps which constantly received infantry reinforcements. For fi ve 

days the Russians tl"ied to break through this blocking force. The 

only visible result they achieved was their mounting losses of armor. 

When the enemy realized the futility of his efforts, he changed the 

direction of his thrust and att empted to unhinge both flanks of the 

blocking force by outflanking Zhitomir in the north and bypassing 

Kazatin on the south. To counteract this move, the LIX Corps was 

withdrawn fWIlI KOl'osten to Novogrnd·Volynskiy and the XIII 

Corps evacuated Zhilomir in ordel' to take up new positions south 

of the swampy forest.s along the Teterev.. In addition, all available 

elements of two divisions were moved closer to Kazatin to extend the 

front of the blocking force. A local withdrawal of the XLVIII 

Panzer Corps completed these measures and helped to build up n. 

new, integrated defense system. On the other hund, Hitler refused 

to permit the withdl'a wal of the two right wing corps in position 

along the Dilepr bend although these forces were in immi nent danger 

of being cut off. A light screening force maintained contact between 

these two corps and the rest of the heavi ly engaged Fourth Panzer 

Army. For the tillle being the Russians probed this screening force 

without realizing their opportu nity. Before long, howevcl·, the pres· 
62 GERMAN REPORT SERIES 

sure on the VII Infantry Corps front increased, the salient was overextended, and t.he front line wns breached. The enemy poured more 

find more troops into the gap north of Uman without meet.ing any 

opposition. Then~ was stil l a possibility of extricating the two corps 

from the tightening noose, although they were seriollsly threatened 

from the rear. Had they been allowed to use detours or to break 

through, they could lla.vO l'c-established contact with the Fourth 

Panzer Army and would have been integraled into the second blocking lille put up by the army. But the two corps were ordered to stay 

in place de..'lpite increasingly emphatic requcst." addressed to Hitl er. 

Dy the time the German command fully renlized the danger, the enemy 

had assembled one army north of Uman with a second one following 

close behind. The sta ff of First Panzer Army-and two battle-weary 

panz<!r divisions-was qu ickly relieved in another sector, shifted 

to Uman, and put in chn rge of the two corps cut off in the north. 

In the meantime, heavy fighti ng continued for weeks along the 

F01Jl'th Panzel' Army front, In the center, the XIII Corps was 

weakened by the heavy 10SS'Cs of equipment it had suffered during its 

withdl'1l w:tI across the swampy woods south of Zhitomir. Realizing 

this weakness, the Russians concentrated their ~mnor opposite the 

sector held by this corps, They anticipated that the break-through 

t.hey had hitherto been denied could be achieved by attacking the sector. 

During this phase of the fighting they attained several small peneIl'aLions. These were quicldy eliminated with tho assistance of 

X LVIII Panzer Corps units, but the divisions of XIII Corps were 

gradually reduced and crushed, Their remnants held out among the 

pa.nzer units and, to unify the command, they were subordinated to 

the panzer corps and the staff of XIII Corps was withdrawn. In a 

last desperate attempt to break through, the Russians massed all available tanks ItIld penetrated the Gel'lnan lines. But in the subsequent 

melee all sevenLy tanks th~lt had gone through were put out of action. 

Thus ended the attacks along this sector during the last days of 

Janlllu'y. 

The Russian armored thrust on Vinnitsa failed at about the same 

time after enemy pcl~rhea s had come within rcach of Zlunerinka, 

the impol'lant railroad junction from which the double-track lines 

brunch olf to Odessa. The XXVIII Infantry Corps, recently transfelTed from the northern front, launched. a powCl'ful counterattack 

with one panzer and three strong infantry divisions, repelled the 

host.ile lank army, and cut off those elements which had advanced as 

fUI' as ZhmCl·inka. 

The last major enemy thrust against the extreme west wing of 

Fourth Panzer Army was directed against the Shepetovkn railroad 

station. One weak infantry division held Shepetovka against vastly 
DfFENSE TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN IREAK-THROUGH$ 63 

superior enemy forces, but this Russian attack also fa.iled. A subsequent attempt to cut off thc LIX from the XLVIII Panzcr Corps by 

an enveloping thrust via Polonnoye was equally unsucccs.<;ful. An 

additional infantry division transferred from the northern fl'ont was 

detrained in Shepetovka in time to launch a. counterattack. The 

division recaptured Polonnoye, scaled the gap, und re-cstablished COlltact with thc adjacent panzer corps. 

This brought the Russian Christmus offensive to its end. AHel' 

fivo weeks of hard struggle, Fourth Panzer Army with its four corps 

and somo 200 tanks had scored a major defensive succoss' against six 

enemy armies with 1,200 tanks. Although the Russians forced the 

Germans to withdrnw their front lines by about sixt.y miles, they 

did not achieve a strategic break-through with far-reaching objectives. 

Thcir plan had been to crush Fourth Panzcr Army, unhinge the two 

army groups in the Ukraine, and nail them against the Black Sea or 

push them into Romania. This plan failed a-nd, in vicw of its proportions, the territoria-l gains obtained by tim Russia-ns were really 

insignificant. The Fourth Pallzer Army remained intact and held 

a continuous front line. This defensive success was achieved be· 

cause, after the third day of the Russian offensive, a strong panzer 

eorps was employed as blocking force. At that. time the center of the 

army sector had he(m broken through and gaps up to ninety miles in 

width extended on its flanks. But the blocking force formed the steel 

clamp that held together the isolated infantry corps and preserved 

the army from disintegration. The Russians were ullablo to split ihis 

solid army front. of twelve divisions. By fighting three successive 

delnying actions, the blocking force had prevented a break-through 

and st.nbilized the situntion sufficiently to permit the formation of a 

continuous front. 
Chapter 10 

DELAY ON SUCCESSIVE POSITIONS 

In a situntion where enemy infantry attempts to break through 

without much armored support, a delaying action in successive positions may be the most promising defensive tactic. The underlying 

principle of this maneuver is to inflict casualties upon the enemy without becoming too closely engaged. By offering limited resistance on 

successive positions, the defender attempts to weaken the enemy until 

his forces are'too disorganized to mount a sustained offensive. Alter 

the hostile attacks have lost their momentum, strong resistance may 

he offered on a permanent position or a counteroffensive may be 

launched. Delaying actions are therefore temporary expedients to 

prevent a break-through by trading a minimum of space for a. maximum amount of time to allow the defender to move up new forces. 

Complications arise when the flanks of a weak delaying force are 

open to attacks by strong hostile annor supported by ample reserves. 

In August 1943, during the delaying action south of Belgorod, the 

Germans reached Kharkov after co-ordinated withdrawals from eight 

successive positions which they held during daylight and evacuated 

under cover of darkne::;s. (Map 10) The distance covered by each 

withdrawal varied between five and six miles. Kharkov was held for 

a week and then the delaying operation was continued by a withdrawal 

via. Polta.va. toward the Dnepr. During this pha.se, however, the unfavorable situation in the Kiev area compelled the German commander 

to accelerate the withdra.wal, forcing him to abandon 120 miles of 

terrain within twelve days. During the retrograde movement from 

Belgorod to Kl'emenchug on the Dneper, the enemy was never able to 

break through or push by the flanks. The entire delaying force, consisting of twelve divisions, crossed the Dnepr and established a permanent defense line on the west bank of the river. 

The auspices for this delaying action were not favorable. After the 

failure of Operation ZITAOELLE, the German pincers attack on 

Kursk in July 1943, the Russians held the initiative. They launched 

the pursuit with powerful reserves, while the Germans withdrew to 

the posi!-ions they had held before the ill-fated offensive. The XI 

Infantry Corps moved into the heavily fortified defensive system 

anchored on Belgorod and repelled all enemy attacks act·oss the Doneta 

River. The Fourth Panzer Army, adjacent to the northwest, tried to 

offer resistance in open terrain and was overrun by strong Russian 

annored forces. Remna.nts of one of its infantry divisions sought 

64 
OrffN$E TACTICS AOAINST RUSSIAN IIEAI(·THROUGHS 65 

refuge behind the left. wing of the XI Corps. An attempt by Fourth 

Panzer Army to close the gap by an armored counternttack was unsuccessful. The Russian tanks advanced without. milch interference 

and reached Bogodukhov on 6 August. This enemy thrust endangered the XI Corps north of Belgorod. Russian almored spearhends 

advanced toward Poltava and Akhtyrka fifty miles to the rear, while 

other enemy forces attncked the front nod flank of the corps to encircle 

and annihilate it. The corps front formed a doop sa lient into enemy 

territory which might have disintegrated with complete encirclement 

its final destiny. This wou ld have meant a widening of the gAp frOIll 

15 to 50 miles and the immediate loss of 5 divisions. To prevent such 

a disaster the corps had to withdraw from Belgorod, but the retrograde movement was to be gradual in order to gain time for the preparation of countermeasures. In view of the limited strength of the 

corps, it would have boon 0. mistake to attempt to close the gnp by 

widening the COl'pS sector nor was any such plan feasible since the 

enemy kept up his pressure on the entire front. On the contrary, t.he 

corps had to keep its forces together and form a solid block against 

the superior enemy forces. 

These conside rations determined the conduct of operations, The 

corps commander decided to fight a delaying action in successive 

positions until the corps reached Kharkov and then to hold the city. 

The corps had to build up a front facing north and protect its left 

fl ank agai nst an enemy envelopment, while the right flank was 

anchored on the Doneta Ri ver. Elements of two infantry divisions 

were reinfOl'ced by an assault gun ba ttalion, an antitank battalion, and 

twelve Tiger tanks to provide covel' for the left flank. 

During the night from 5 to 6 August, Delgorod was evncunted after 

heavy street fighting and the next position, prepared on the high 

ground immediately south of the city, was occupied. Luftwaffe and 

service troops defended the rand crossings in the swampy lowlands 

along the Lopan Ri ver agai nst enemy spearheads threatening the deep 

flank. The greatest danger, however, loomed along the 13eJgorodKhllrkov Rollbahn, whel'e the enemy massed his forces in Illl attempt 

to brenk through to Khal'kov. A full-strength assault gun bat.talion, 

with forty-two self-propelled guns, moving up from ICharkov, was 

to protect the highway. Its mobility and fire power we l'e to enable 

the battalion to stop any possi bl9 armol'ed break-I.hrough. 

The position south of Belgorod wns held for one day and nba ndoned 

after the enemy had deployed his forces_ Cont inued resistance in one 

position would ha ve led to henvy casualties and the annihilation of 

the isolated corps. Constant ellemy attempts to outfla nk the left 

wing submitted the command to a severe nervous stl'lIin and made 

extreme demands on the physicnl endurance of the troops, However 

great the sacrifices, t h~y had t.o be made if worse disnstel' was to be 
66 GERMAN REPORT SERifS 

averted. On 9 August the limits of endurance seemed to have been 

exceeded when, after an all-night evacuation, the Germans failed to 

reach the llew phase line by dawn. Enemy spearheads bl'oke through 

along the Rollbahn and the whereabouts of an entire division, the 

IGSth Infantry Division, was uncertain. News from the Donets and 

Lopan sectors was no less alarming. Enemy 8111101' had bl'oi{(m out 

of the Doncts bridgehead, other Russian forces had crossed the Lopan, 

and the assault gun battalion fwm Khul'kov had failed to arrive. 

Low-flying hostile plnncs in great numbers dropped fragmentation 

bombs and machine gunned troops on the march. Suffering heary 

casualties, the German fOl'(:es g l'Ow restless. A few division commanders came over to tho corps command post, which by then was 

situated close to the front line, and requ ested authorization for an 

immediate speedy withdrawal to Kharkov in view of the critical 

situation and the low moralo of their forces. Suddenly several trucks 

loaded with stl'agglers came tearing down the highway, ignoring all 

stop signals. When the trucks were finally brought to a halt, the 

str'agglel's explained that they had become separated from their 168th 

Division unit and had been seized by panic when they were subjected 

to an armored assau1t farther up the road. Their intention was to 

drive straight through to Kharkov, at that time forty miles behind 

the German front. They reported that their division had been wiped 

out and Il.dded that the 88·mm. antiaircraft batteries, detailed to block 

the highway, were no longel' in place. 

Evm:y experienced combat commander is familiar with this sort of 

panic which, ill a criticn.l situation, may seize an entire body of troops. 

Mass hysteria of this type can be overcome only by energetic actions 

and a display of perfect composure. The example set by a true leader 

can have mil'llculous effects. He must stay with his troops, remain 

cool, issue precise orders, and inspire confidence by his behavior. 

Good soldiers never desert such a leader. News of the presonce of 

high ranking commanders up front travels like wildfire along the 

entire frout line, bolstering everyone's morale. It means a sud.den 

change fl'Om gloom to hope, from imminent defeat to victory. 

This is exactly what happened. The corps commander stood at a 

cl'ucial point along the Rollbahn, orient.ing unit commanders and assigning them a mission in the new defense system which he attempted 

to build up, Self-propelled antitank guns arriving at this instant 

were immediately committed to block the highway against an armored 

break-through which seemed imminent as t.he fire fmm approaching 

t.anks came cvel' closor. The corps commander quickly drove past the 

newly est.ablished line toward the din of battle to find out for him· 

self whether t.he antiaircraft guns were holding out. Driving around 

a corner, he suddenly witnessed the destruction of a Russian tank by 

the impl'ovised antitank front. He counted eleven more disabled 
OffENSE TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN BR~AIC-THROUGHS 67 

tanks and saw the remaining enemy armor wit.hdrAw st raight into 

an extensive mine field where one tank aftel' another wa s blown up, 

Shorlly afterwa rd, Gennan fighter plane.'> appt'nred} and shot. down 

mor{) t han n dozen enemy ai rcraft, clcn ring the ail' ov('r the corps 

fronl;. German heavy wea pons and ul'lillery pinned the enemy infantlY to the ground when they ndvlInced on n broad fron t. The 

threat of a break-t.hrough along the Rollbahn was eli minnted and the 

German lines held. 

The GLh Panzer Division on the left flank faced a dini cult. situation when, in addition to its own sedor, it had to Illke over the one 

previously held by ille missing 168th Division. The enellly exerted 

heavy preSSHl'Il and Ule IHlI1zel' division requested immediate an titank 

sllpport.. The corps commander dispatched lwelve antitank gUllS 

and IIl"1'nnged for an nil' strike on tJl(~ Russian tank column advancing 

east. of lhe Lopan Ri ve!', These combined efforts preV(mted the immedinte collnpsc of the Germun flnnk covel'. 

Delayed by txaffic jams, the long-a waited assault. gUll battalion did 

not arrive until nOOIl, A£t.el' refueling in some gullies covered with 

underbrush, it was committed in a counterattack uguinst the enemy 

tanks t.hreatening the left fl unk. T he massed attack of the forty-two 

guns surprised the enemy and hit him hard, The assault gu ns destroyed all enemy tanks and antit.ank guns on the eust bank of t.he 

Lopnn, shattered !..he nussinn bridgehead, and drove t.he remaining 

enemy forces across the river. By early afternoon the sit.uation was 

under control. Reports from the Donets sector indicated that the 

enemy was unable to enlarge his bridgehead in the face of stubborn 

resistance from GCl"lllnn infantl'y units supported by assault. gUlls. 

Even though an entire division was missing, the corps h!~d scored 

an initial defensive success, The enemy's intention to annihilate the 

Gel'man forces by a concentric attack from three sides had failed. 

Heavy Rw:;sian losses in personnel lInd materiel, including si xty 

disabled tanks, resulted fl'Om the day's operations. 

During the night to 10 August, the corps made all unobserved withdrawal to n. hastily prepared position about six miles to the south, 

the salient points of which were occupied by advance detachments. 

Wcnk real' guards, left behind in the fOJ'mel' position, led t.he enemy 

to believe t.h at t.he line WIlS fully occupied. The next morning, when 

Russian infantry attl.lciwd the position nfter n. heavy concentration, 

they found only the rear party maintaining contact. The German 

troops, exhausted by the previous dny's fighting and t.he night march, 

wcre nble to recuperate during the morning hours. By noon the first 

enemy patrols cautiollsly nppl'oached the new position. Its gun 

emplacemenls and strong points were well caliloufinged, and enemy 

gl'ound and nil' reconnaissancc lhCl"C fore failed to locate them. Three 
68 GEIMAN ItEJOOITT nilES 

divisions held the line; one of them had left its positions a.long the 

DOllcts to join the corps. 

The Russian attacks resumed during the afternoon with increasing 

viol enef'. The most dlUlgerous Russian arm W/l.S not the badly mauled 

armor or the tactical air support, but the powerful artilh~I'Y. III this 

instance, the effect of the henvy artillery fire was not so devastating 

since the excellent camouflage of potential German targets forced the 

nu~sinns to deliver flat trajectory fire. But whenever German machine gun s 01' heavy weapons fired from open lel'rain, they were spotted 

by hostile observers and qui ckly neutralized. If they were to escnpe 

destruction, they had to lise well-concealed and read ily accessible 

altC'I'nate und dummy positions. 

By the evening of 10 August, the enemy attacks had lost some of 

their sting. In view of the experience of the last few days, the Russi nns made probing thrust.s after dusk to maintain contAct with the 

corps in case of another Ge!'man night withdl"llwal. The enemy infontl'y was given a hot reception and, after all attacks had been 

repulsed, the corps withdrew to the next prepared position, By the 

timB the infnntry occupied the new li ne, the bulk of the altillery and 

antitank guns were ready to lire. Forming a solid block, the corps 

was.unshnken by renewed enemy onslaughts. 

The same delaying tactics were employed during the following days. 

The withdrawal to successive positions was exhausting, but the 

casualty rate remained low. The enemy suffered dispropoltionately 

high losses, which foreed him t.o gradually relax the pressure on the 

German lines. The corps front was shOltened and strengthened by 

units no longer needed fOl' flank protection, and reserves were formed. 

The 168th Division, miSSing fo!' several days, was found in a wellconcealed area when the corps commander made a reeonnaissallce trip 

north of Kharkov. The division commander explained that he had 

undCl"Stood his unit was t.o act as corps reserve Ilnd that he had therefore withdrawn to the forests twenty-fi ve miles behind the front.. 

Afler his conduct. had been castigated in no uncertain terms, he was 

told t.o commit his division as covering force in the next, position t.o 

be occupied. This made it possible to pull out the 6th Panzer Division, 

designate it COI'pS reserve, and move it to the forest area for a well· 

deserved rest. 

The XLII Infantl'y Corps, adjacent to the right, was forced to 

join the xr Corps withdrawal during the night of 11- 12 August beCtluse its defense line along the Donets fanned a deep salient in Russian-held territory. The infa.ntry division on the left wing of this 

corps had not. previously been engaged in fL tank battle; it offered little 

resistance to strong Russian armored forces, which broke through 

without difficulty Ilnd suddenly appeared in the rear of the Xl Corps 

front outside Kharkov. The situation became even more critical 
DEfENSE TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN aREAK_THROUGHS 69 

when t.he recruits of II. newly arrived regiment., overcome by fear of the 

approaching Russian t.anks, ran for their lives unt.ilthey were stopped 

at. t.he bridges in tho suburbs of Khal·kov. Strong enemy infantry 

poured through the wide gap to exploit t.he initial brenk-through 

achieved by the tanks. The 6th Pnnzer Division wa s immediately 

alerted and its spenrllends intercepted the enemy in the SOUt.h<'flstern 

outskirts of Kharkov where he had occupied the big tractor plant.. 

The division counterattacked, dislodged the enemy fl·om the factory 

after fierce fighting, destroyed many tanks, dispersed the Russian infantry , and closed the gap. The danger was eliminated for the time 

being. 

Tank fright is frequent among n('wly actiYated infnnh)· divisions 

when t.raining in nntimochanized defense has been neglected. Combined arms training with al·mored or assault g'un units is essential in 

orde r to give each soldier the <,xp<,ri<'llce of lwing overrun by a tank 

while in his foxhole and to acqunini him with the use of nntitank 

weapons. 

A recently arrived pnnzer division strengthened the corps flank and 

blocked t.he approach rOlltes to Kh arkov. The battles fOl· Khnrkov 

proper have been analyzed in CMH Pub 104-12, pages 53-56. The 

evacuation of Kharkov by the Germans became necessary because of unfavorable developments on the southern front. It. was 

carried out without difficulty on 18 August, and a previously prepared position a few miles to the west was occupied by the corps. 

The new position was situated on high ground protected by a 

swampy vaUey cutting across the approach roads. It was considerably shorter than the position skirting Kharkov and could therefore 

be held very effectively. 

During t.he withdrawal of the German real" guard, the ollly bridgo 

acmss the lllnl"shes which had been left. intnct. collapsed under the 

weight of some Hornets (88-mlll. tank destmyers). One infantry 

battalion reinforced by eight HOI·nets was t.hereby cut off on the east 

bank. TIl(> enemy attempts to annihilale this sma ll rear g"unnl were 

frust.rated by nerlllan units supporting the bridgehead frolll the west 

blink. The real· gunrd he.ld out for t.wenty-four hours until the bridge 

was repaired nnd il could cross under co\'er of darkness. 

In ilS new position, t.he corps had to ward off sOllie fierce attacks 

by enemy fOl-ces t.ry ing to envelop both flanks. Several local pelletrat.ions were sen led off by armored {·ollnterattacks. But even this 

strong position had 1.0 00 evacuated nfter a short while since it formed 

!~ dung('rolls sn li ent. to t.he east. aft er t.he adjnccnt units were forced 1.0 

pull out:. The II('xl, withdrawal It'd the eorps into expos('d. flnt. ter· 

ra in where it. hnd to ('xt(,Il<l il<.; willbl"i> lint il tlw s(·("jor co\"('I"('(1 the fortymilo stretch between tho Kolomak !I lid the llerestova Uivers. 
70 GEtMAN IEPOIT SUIES 

In the meantime the over-all situation forced general withdrILwal 

behind the Dnepr River. The XI Corps was given the mission of 

organizing and covering the withdrawal of twelve divisions across the 

highway and railroad bridges at Kremenchug. (See CMH Pub 104-1, 

pp. 82 ft.) During this rctrograde movement, the same delaying 

tactics were employed which had been so successful during the withdrawal from Belgorod to Khnrk .. v. Again and ngaiu, delay on 

successive positions forced the enemy to make time-consuming preparations for battle and to suffer heavy casualties, leading to the 

gradual exhaustion of his forces. The Russians rccogni7.cd these 

int.cntions and tried every day to force the issue by achieving 

an armored break-through. Above a11, the enemy wanted to capture major cities commanding the road net needed for speedy maneuver. In view of the rainy weather, the possession of hard-surface 

highways became a. decisive factor to both sides since the mud 

prevented any movement off the roads. The Germans took this factor 

into account and concentrated t.heir antitank defenses in and around 

important towns. During this phase, c\ties were therefore far more 

important than during the fighting in the area north of Kharkov. 

The enemy achieved only one armored break-through when he blocked 

the German withdrawal across the Orchik Ri ver near K arlovka. A 

critical situation developed because of additional delays in the river 

crossing caused by floods, mud, and the steepness of the west bank. 

There was a grave danger that enemy tanks might reach the weakly 

held west bank before the arrival of the German units which were 

forced to take devious routes. The densely populated suburban area 

of Karlovka near the river was set ablaze by enemy artillery fire, which 

meant a further delay in the crossing. Demolitions of factories, railroad inst.a.l1ations, depots, and supplies, ordered by higher headquarters in line with a German scorched earth policy, caused still more 

delays. A major enemy break-through at this point seemed certain, 

when suddenly the Russian tanks were forced to slow down because of 

mud, and the danger subsided. 

With a change in the weather the ground dried; the infantry 

divisions were able to move faster and the daily rate of withdrawal 

was stepped up to twenty to thirty miles. The Russian tanks did not 

renew their pressur", until tllO corps halted for several days at the 

Kremonchug bridgehead. Russian striking power was impaired by 

several weeks of German delaying actions on successive positions. 

The enemy counteroffensive had spent itself. 
PART FIVE 

DEFENSE AGAINST BREAK-THROUGHA COMBINATION OF DEFENSE TACTICS 

Every protracted defensive engagement requires the application 

of a combinat.ion of tactics which correspond to the changes in the 

situation. During t he Russian campaign several defensive methods 

were employed simultaneously or sllccessively with no single one 

exercising a predomillflut or, even less, a decisive influence on the 

out.come of the operation. Even within one action, subordinate 

units sometimes applied tactics differing from those used by the main 

body. At the beginning of August 1944, for instance, during the 

fighting along the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains, six infantry 

battalions blocked the enemy advance while the two divisions to which 

t hey belongcd carried out a simultaneous flank attack. As a rule, 

defensive actions are designated by t.he tactical measure which pre* 

dominntes. During the battle for East Prussia, for instance, the 

Germans at first used improvised zone defense tactics. Subsequent 

Russian break*through attempts were frustrated by defensive pincers, 

flank at.tacks, delaying and blocking maneuvers, and at.tacks with 

reversed fronts, but the outcome of t.he battle was determined by 

the employment of zone defense tactics. 

On the other hand, a combination of defense tactics stopped the 

mnjol' ofi'ensive in which the Russians drove from the Volga to the 

Dnepl' in the winter of 1942-43. Delaying and blocking maneuvers by 

panzer and infantry units, combined with pincers, flank thrusts, and 

the encirclement of an armored corps prevented a Russian break* 

through to Rostov in December 1942. This would have endangered 

the German troops in the Caucasus and south of Stalingrad. In 

another instance, dgid defense by infantry combined with mobile 

maneuvers of armored units stopped a Russian break-through attempt 

toward the Sea, of Azov during J anuary and February 1943. Delay 

011 successive posit.ions during the withdrawal toward the Dnepr in 

the summer of 1043 slowed down t.he enemy's thrust to t.he west and 

made it possible to move up German reinforcements. The pincers 

att.ack following that retl'Ogmde movement crushed the Russian 

armored wedge in the Dnepr bend and broke the backbone of the 

offensive. 

71 
72 GEIMAN lfPOItT SElIES 

During the flght.ing near Rirovograd in January 1944, the Germans employed delaying and blocking tactics, defensive pincers, 

flank attacks, envelopments, and break-through ml\mmvers which were 

of equal importnnre and followed each other in qu ick succession. For 

t.his reason !.he Kirovograd operation is a typical example of the application of combi ned defense tactics. 

Toward tho end of 1943, the Russian operalions in the south seemed 

to indicat.c that the Soviet command planned to brenk through the 

German front in several places, split the forces of Army Groups A 

and South, lind drive them int.o the Black Sea and toward the Romanian border. III line with t.hese plans the Second Uk ranian Front 

launched a major offem;ive in December 1943 in order to break through 

in the Kirovogrnd arcn. The Rus.~i ans opened a breach in the Eighth 

Army front, but th is initial attempt was frustrated by swift counternttncks of German motorized units. During the first days of January 

1944, German gronnd and ail' reconnaissance as well as radio intercepts indi cated Russian concentrations and attack preparations. 

Strong artillery forces were assembli ng in the rear of the Russian 

Jines. While only about sixty Russian tanks were discovered in the 

concentl'ation areas close to the German front, intelligence estimates 

assumed that strong amlOred forccs were located in rest areas farther to the rear. 

The Eighth AI'my front was overextended and few reserves were 

available to conduct an active defensc. It seemed unlikely that. any 

sizable units could be shifted from sectors not. un ~e r at.tack because 

all the divisions were underst.rength and the enemy exercised pressure 

along the enth'c front. The al'lnol-ed clements of t.wo palU'-er divisions 

committed along the front line were held back as corps reserves. 

Eight. GHQ artillery battalions were available to strengthen the two 

potential centerS of gravity. Artillery ammunition on hand was 

abundant, a fact. which partly compensated for the Gel'man inferiority 

in number of guns. 

The Hussians launched their attack at 0600 on 5 January, jumping 

off from their two principal concentration areas. Preceded by half 

an hour's artillery preparation and several air strikes, massed infantry poured t.hrough the ga.ps in the German front in an attempt to 

break through to the Kirovograd area. Following closely, additional 

infantry and some antitank units widened the areas of penetration 

and secured the interior flanks for the advancing Russian armor. In 

conjunction with the two main thrusts the Russians conducted holding 

attacks in varying strength along the entire army front.. By the time 

the infantry assault got under way, the heavy prepara.tion, in which 

two·thirds of the enemy's batteries participated, had neutralized most 

of the German artillery and inflicted extremely hea.vy casualties. The 

combat strength of some divisions dropped even lower-evcn before 
OEfENSE tACTICS AGAINST IUSSIAN 'IEAK-THIOUGHS 73 

the start. of the offensive the 2d Parachute Division held a t.welve-mile 

sector wit.h 3,200 men and the 10th Panzer GI-enadier Division covered 

eleven miles of frontage wit.h 3,700 men. The Russian infllllt.l·y forces, 

six to seven di visions strong and supported by armored groups of 

varying strength, achieved deep penetrations during the morning 

hours. At the southern point of ma.in effort they a.dva,nccd 6 miles 

on a. 4-mile front, a.nd in the XLVII Pan7-cr Corps sector 13 miles Oil 

a to-mile front. (Map llA) 

\Vhen t.he Russian almol'ed forces attempted to ex ploit t.he initial 

break-t.hrough, the Ge l'man corps reserves launched small-scale flank 

aU.acks. Supported by antitank un its, they destroyed altogether 

ninety-three enemy tanks, mainly in the southern sector. Nevert heless, it became evident that the Eight.h Army forces alone would be 

unable to seal the gaps in the front. As requested by arlll y, the 3d 

Panm!' Division wns t.rallsfel'l'ed during the late mo.'ning and committed in the XLVII Panzer Corps sector. III the southern breakthrough area, approximately 200 Russian tanks werc held up by 

diversiona.ry flank attacks before they could reach the lngul River. 

In the northern area of penetration, however, the cOllntel'lhrusts carried out by elements of 11t.h Panzer Division fai led to stop the armored 

forces driving toward the southwest. There, the enemy threatened 

to envelop Kirovograd from the north and west and cause its fall by 

cutting the German lifelines. 

On this first day of the Russian offensive the Gennans destroyed 153 

enemy tanks and caused heavy casualtie.<;, but their own losses were 

proportionately high. The 10th Panzel' Grenadier Division, for instance, lost 620 men in one day. By the end of the day the situation 

was confused since, despite a German withdrawal to Adzhamka and 

a corresponding shortening of the line, the Rnssian penetrations were 

not adequately sea led off. 

During the night the enemy moved strong infantry forces into 

the newly captured lena in. Approximately t.wenty-two infantry 

divisions were equal1y divided between the two al-ens of penetration. 

The. .. e divisions had been hastily .'eol'ganized and their replncements 

consisted of inadequately truined troops; nevel·theless! the over-all 

mt.io of infantry st.t'ength was eight. to one in favor of the Russi an s. 

The Russian infantry protected the interior flanks of the penetra. 

tion by I\. quick build-up of antitank gun fronts echeloned in depth. 

Lacking centrali zed flre direction and fl exibility in forming points of 

main effort, the Russia n artillery did not make its overwhelming 

superiority properly felt, This was partly due to trnnsportation and 

supply dilliculties which delayed the arrival of many Russian artillery 

un its. Not. until the ca pt ure of KirO\'ogrnd was the enemy able to 

mnss his Rrtillery effectively. The Germnn art iJlery played an importunt part in the defense, delivering well-co-ordinated concentra tions 
74 GERMAN REPORT SERIIiS 

with high expenditure of ammunition. During the first day of the 

offensive the Germans expended six to seven times more ammunition 

than the enemy, firing approximately 177,000 rounds against 29,000. 

This enabled them to inflict extremely heavy casualties and break up 

Russian attack preparations. In view of the high casualty rate suf· 

fered by the German infantry, the artillery was in some sectors, espe· 

dally along the shoulders of the gaps, the sole obstacle confronting the 

Russinns. 

Statements by prisoners of war and captured documents permitted 

the Germans to estimate the Russian armor at 620 tanks. Against 

t·hese forces the Germans could assemble only 56 tanks and 109 assault 

guns. The enomy regrouped and reinforced his armor in the northern 

penetmtion area during the night of 5 January. His mobile units were 

deployed in accordance with German doctrine but lacked concentration of effort in one direction and paid t90 much attention to flank 

cover. The latter fact was probably due-to the relentless local flank 

attacks which the Germans conducted even when they only had a few 

tanks on hand. During these small·scale actions the German tank 

crews proved their superiority over and over again. Moreover, this 

type of acti ve defense decei ved the enemy as to German strength. 

When the enemy renewed his attack on the morning of 6 January, 

the Germans were able to tic down strong forces by active defense 

and to delay the advance of some Russian armored units by hit-andrun tactics. In the north, however, the 3d Panzer Division counternttll cks failed to close the gap and in the south the enemy tanks thrust 

toward Kirovograd without much obstruction, reaching the southern 

suburbs of the city by evening. The other jaw of the Russian pincer 

crossed the Illgul River at Severinka, cut the Kil'ovograd-Novomirgorod highway, and threatened Kirovograd from the north. 

Since German resistance east of the Ingul had crumbled, the army 

commander intended to block any further break·thl'ough attempts to 

the west by moving up new forces which were to annihilate the enemy 

spearheads west of the river. For this reason he urgently requE'sted 

reinforcements from army group. Even a further withdrawal and 

shortening of lines would not have led to the formation of counterattack forces since every man was needed up front. The army group 

replied that advance units of Panzer Division Grossdeutschland were 

to arrive in the area. southwest of Kirovograd during the evening of 

7 January in order to close the gap south of the city. Until then the 

German forces had to gain time and contain the enemy in a series 

of quickly changing seesaw actions. East of the Ingul, a reinforced 

panzer battalion made an enveloping thrust, attempting to cut the 

enemy's real' communicat.ions. After initia l success the attack hogged 

down against strong resistance by antitank gUlls. When the three 

divisions holding out in the sectOl· between the two arE'as of penetra-
DEFfNSE!' TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN BREAK-1HltOUOH5 7S 

tion were pulled back to defend the perimeter of Kirovogrnd, one 

of them-the 14th Panzer Division-was given the mission of closing 

the southern gap. But during the night, while the preparatory movement took place, strong Russian infantry and armored force!'> penetrated into Kirovogrnd from the south and hit the assembly of 14th 

Panzer Division. In stiff house-to-house fighting the enemy advanced 

to the railroad tracks and breached the perimeter defense. The two 

other divisions were fighting their way back north of the tracks Whell 

they were suddenly attacked by enemy forces from three sides, 

squeezed into Lelekovka, and isolated. In its withdrawal from Kil'Ovograd, the 14th Panzer Divhdon succeeded in establishing contact with 

the Lelekovka force nfter some bitter fighting. After withdrawing 

to the west bank of the Ingul, the 3d Panzer Division attacked the 

Russill.n armored concentrations but met with little resistance when 

the enemy sidestepped the attack. (Map llB) 

Southwest of Kirovograd, the newly arrived units of the Grossdeutschland Division werc thrown piecemeal against strong Russian 

forces advancing unobstructed toward the southwest and succeeded in 

delaying the enemy advance. 

The attempt to block the Russian advance in front of Kirovograd 

had failed. The isolated force at Lelekovka, forming the last anchor 

of the German position in this area, held out and tied down strong 

enemy forces, thereby preventing a junction between the two areas of 

penetration. But on each side the enemy's motorized and armored 

forces poured through the gaps, crossed the Ingul, and assembled on 

the west bank for a major brea.k-through. During the night of 8- 9 

January, a strong armored force advanced as far as Malyye Vislci, 

overran the command post of the XLVII Pnnzer Corps, and threatelled rear communications. 

In this situation it was imperative that the army stabilize the front 

wherever possible and then close the gaps. Since the available forces 

were inadequate for a co-ordinated effort, it was necessary to resort to 

local expedients. Above all, the blocking forces had to pin down 

strong enemy units by vigorous resistance. Then, those Russian forces 

that had broken through had to be weakened by limited objective attacks and armored thrusts so that they would be incapable of breaking 

through to the west in strength. This was achieved by a series of 

local actions. By the evening of 9 January, the Grossdeutschland 

Division pounced on the fl anks of the enemy forces advancing southwest of Kirovograd and turned them back. The gap in the sector 

adjacent to the right was temporarily closed by a frontal counterattack of newly arrived improvised units. 

The closing of the gap to the left of the Grossdeut.schland Division 

was accomplished by a pincers attack which cut off two Russian infantry divisions and some armored units. Afoor their annihilation 
76 GERMAN IlPOlT SERIES 

the Germans recaptured the high ground near Karlovka and restored 

tho front line southwest of Kirovograd by a frontnl counterattack. 

In the northern sector, elements of the 3d Pamer Division were 

given the mission of restoring the situation at Mnlyye Viski. After 

heavy fighting the enemy's tank losses were 90 high that he was forced 

to withdraw his troops from this area. The isolated German forces 

holding out at Lelekovka were in a. precarious situation. Unrelenting 

Russian ground attacks, supported by waves of fighter bombers, left no 

doubt about the outcome of this unequal struggle. The shortage of 

ammunition was only partly relieved by air drops. A relief thrust 

by the 11th Panzer Division did not materialize because the division 

was unable to froo itself from a holding attack by superior Russian 

forces. As a last resort, a motori7.ed infantry battalion was reinforced 

with a few tanks and assembled in the Bolshay Vyska area. After 

overcoming stiff resistance, the task force advanced across enemy-held 

territory via Gruznoye to Oboznovkn. During the night of 9 January, 

the pocket force in Lelekovka broke out;, linked up with the relief 

force, and withdrew to Gruznoye. The defense in place at Lelekovka 

had delayed and finally prevented an enemy break-through to the west. 

The XLVII Panzer Corps front was consolidated along the line 

Karlovka-west of Gruznoy~V1adimirovka and the XI Corps, adjacent to the north, was aligned with the panzer corps. This withdra.wal permitted the t.ransfer of the 282d Infantry Division to the 

panzer corps, whi ch held the division in reserve against a.ny further 

Russian break-through attempts in its sector. Despite the heavy tank 

losses they had suffered, the Russians were expected to renew their 

aUAcks a.fter regrouping their forces. 

By 11 January the enemy launched a new attack in the GruznoycVla.dimirovka area. after an artillery preparation lasting half an hour. 

(Map 110) His armor was organized into several strong attack 

formations which were to pave the way for the infantry_ The German blocking forces were unable to hold the line which wn!'; breached 

in several placeS. During the following day the penetrations were 

partly sealed off by local counterat.tacks. After the arrival of se-ieral 

infantry divisions from ot.her sectors, the enemy, on 15 January, resumed his attacks with a heavy artillery preparation. Eleven infantry divisions, supported by tanks, breached the German line between 

Gruznoye and Vladimirovka, opening a seven-mile gap to a depth of 

three miles. Tho three German divisions holding this sector were 

split up and isolated. Resisting stubbornly, they fought their way 

to the shoulders of the area of penetration andl by clinging to their 

positions, made it. possible to close the gap on the next. day. 

On 16 Ja.nuary, while the Russiansconcentrated all available ground 

forces and air support for an all-out att.ack, the newly arrived 3d 

S8 Panzer Division made a spoiling attack into tho enemy's offensive 
DEFENSE TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN BREAK-THIOUGHS 71 

preparations. The three German divisions holding the shoulders 

joined the paJU'.er forces and c10sed the gap. 

The Russian break-through attempts had failed after twelve days 

of bitter fighting in the Kirovograd area. The thirt.y·one Russian 

infant.ry divisions used during th is operation were weakened to such 

an extent. t.hat. many regiments were reduced to 300-400 men. By 

17 January only about 120 Russian tanks were available for commitment. Throughout the entire operation the German anny commander was ha ndica.pped by the low st.rengt.h of his units which 

dropped at an alarming rate under the pressure of the Russian offensive. Unable to echelon his forces in depth, he had no means of 

prevent.ing the enemy from exploiting local penetrations in t.he German front.. Intermediate and lower commands were rarely in a position to form reservcs. The weak corps reserves, usually consisting 

of small armored units, succeeded in delaying t.he enemy and inflict.ing 

slight. losses, but were incapable of turning the tide. The complew 

lack of general· reserves forced the army commander to resort to 

improvised tactics. During the entire struggle in the Kirovograd 

area, the army commander was under strict orders prohibiting retirement. to shorter lines, otherwise he might have regained his freedom of maneuver aJ1d would have been able to form reserves in 

divisional strength. Finally, after having received reinforcements, 

the German Eighth Army fnlstrllted all further Russian breakthrough attempts. During this ten-day period the Germans had 

demonstrated extraordinary fl exibility in the use of different defense 

tactics. 

PART SIX 

CONCLUSIONS 

The dynamic offensives executed by the German Army during t.he 

first pltrLo! the Russian campaign ground to a. halt in front of Moscow 

and at Stali ngrad. During the following months of bitter struggle 

against a tenacious enemy who cleverly exploited the vast space Elnd 

climatic conditions of his homeland,IGerman strength declined so much 

that t.he subsequent :Russian counteroffensives could no longer be repulsed. It was Hitler's worst mistake not to have recognized the impending disaster in time or, if he did realize it, to have dismissed it in 

his peremptory manner. This obstinate denial of obvious facts forced 

the German Army to fight a series of defensive actions against breakthroughs along overextended front lines during the second part of 

t.he Russian campaign. Every t.ime t.he Germans succeeded after ext.reme sacrifices in closing one gap, t.he line gave way at. anot.her point.. 

Resolutely they went to their doom in a long succession of exhaust.ing 

battles and withdrawals. The disintegration of t.he German forces 

was speeded up when corps, and even entire armies, under orders to 

hold critical cities and areas, were cut off from the main force. The 

perfection of defense tactics and the superhuman efforts of the field 

forces were insufficient to turn the tide so long as the Germans were 

unable to restore a balance of strength essential to an eventual victory 

over the Russians. Under the prevailing circumst.ances an equilibrium 

in the fields of manpower and materiel was beyond expectation. But 

it was within the realm of possibility that the Oerman military performance in the field first equal and later outdistance the Russian. As 

a prel'equisite, the German potential should have been brought into the 

proper relationship with t.he elements of time and space to compensate 

for t.he Russian superiority in manpower and materiel so that victory 

could eventually have been achieved t.hrough the application of superior strategy. At no time should the German Army have expended 

its strength as recklessly as it was required to do in front of Moscow 

and at St.alingrad. The Russians thereby gai ned a superiority which 

enabled them to hold the initiative, Contrary to Hitler's concepts, 

a timely halt in the offensive or a temporary withdrawal would not 

have undermined the confidence of the field forces, but would have 

led to additional successes, the sum total of which might have brought 

the war with Russia to a. favorable conclusion. 

79 
80 GEIMAN .uPOU SEllin 

After the Stalingrad disaster the Germans fought delaying actions 

along a ,000 mile front for a four-month period. Even then they 

succeeded in 6(!aling off the wide gaps and stahilizing tohe front and 

achieved a defensive victory by March 1943. Howevcl', the German 

lines were overextended and the panzer forces, reconstituted during 

a lull lasting three months, were still too weak to withstand the renewed onslaught of the forces which the Rns.c;ians hR.d meanwhile 

moved up. Once again the ellemy broke through the German front, 

but this time the eleven best., fully reorganized pnn~,er divisions which 

were assembled in the Kharkov-Poltava area were able 10 frustrate 

the Russian intentions by a determined count.crattack. Even so~ the 

lime had not yet come to seize the initiat.ive. The Russians still had 

to suffer heavier casualties. If necessary, the Germans should have 

abandoned more terrain and shortened their lines to establish a balance 

of strength which would have prevented other break·through!>. Only 

then could a decisive German counteroffenRive have assured a German 

victory in Russia before the Allies landed in France. Defeat of 

the western powers was contingent upon Russia's being driven out 

of the war. 

The German defense against Russian break-t.hroughs, as presented 

in this study, was only a means toward attai ning this over-.all objective. In 194~ the German Army in Russia almost succeeded in putting 

an end to enemy break.throughs by adroitly combining various defense 

tactics. Victory was once agai n in the offing, but it turned out to be 

a Russian one. Before the eleven panzer divisions could come to grip 

with Russian reserves and annihilate them, the German at:mor· was 

thrown into Operation ZITADELLE in July 1943 and bled white when 

it ran into a fortified system of hithert.o unknown strength and depth. 

Hitler thereby fulfilled the enemy's keenest hopes and presonted him 

with the palm pf victory. The subsequent Russian counteroffensive, 

conducted with powerful reserves which were fully intact, broke 

through the German line. The enemy break-throughs started anew 

not only in this sector but also in others, where no adL'quate reserves 

were available. 

At best, skillful defense tactics and supreme personal sacrifices were 

instrumental in producing local, temporary relief. The German strategy of self-sacrifice precluded the possibility of stabilizing the front 

along a line which by then had been shortened by the course of events. 

Finally, a suggestion to shift all German forces from the West to the 

East in order to SLOp the Red Army's invasion of Germany and prevent 

the territorial expansion of communism was turned down by H itler. 

While he belived his principal enemies t.o be in the Wes~ the German 

military leaders, for all their antagonism toward the western powers, 

considered Russia their irreconcilable enemy. 

2004 - 307·)68