alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 95-5231

THERON RATH LIVINGSTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge.

(CR-94-260-DKC)

Submitted: January 11, 1996

Decided: February 2, 1996

Before RUSSELL, HALL, and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

David L. Zeiger, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Lynne A. Battaglia, United States Attorney, John F. Purcell, Jr., Assistant United

States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Theron Rath Livingston pled guilty to one count of distributing

crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995), and

was sentenced to serve a term of 70 months imprisonment. He contends on appeal that the district court erred in departing downward by

only two offense levels under USSG § 5K1.1,* as requested by the

government. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The extent of a downward departure cannot be challenged on

appeal by a defendant unless the departure resulted in a sentence

imposed in violation of law or resulted from an incorrect application

of the guidelines. United States v. Hill, 70 F.3d 321, 324 (4th Cir.

1995). Livingston asserts that the district court failed to make an independent assessment of the usefulness of his cooperation. However,

the record does not bear out his assertion. The district court heard an

extensive discussion of Livingston's cooperation both from the government and from Livingston's wife and mother. Livingston also submitted a chronology of his efforts to assist the government. The

district court found that Livingston's delay in entering his guilty plea

and beginning his cooperation had diminished his ability to provide

useful information. We find that the district court properly assessed

Livingston's assistance before deciding that a two-level departure was

appropriate.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

_________________________________________________________________

*United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov.

1994).

 2
# C_2014380EN.01001801.xml

| 27.10.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 380/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.10.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 380/18

---

Action brought on 28 August 2014 — Dellmeier/OHMI — Dell (LEXDELL)

(Case T-641/14)

2014/C 380/24

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Alexandra Dellmeier (München, Germany) (represented by: J. Khöber, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Dell, Inc. (Round Rock, US)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | Annul the decision of the Second Board of Appeal No R 0966/2013-2 of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market dated 4 June 2014 regarding the opposition proceedings No B 1  698 2892 against Community Trademark Application No 008114779 ‘LEXDELL’ and reject the opposition in its entirety. |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the decision of the Second Board of Appeal No R 0966/2013-2 of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market dated 4 June 2014 regarding the opposition proceedings No B 1  698 2892 against Community Trademark Application No 008114779 ‘LEXDELL’ and reject the opposition in its entirety.

| — | Order the defendant to pay the costs incurred in the proceedings before the Court. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the defendant to pay the costs incurred in the proceedings before the Court.

| — | Set a date for an Oral Hearing for the case that findings of the Court are not possible without an Oral Hearing. |
| --- | --- |

—

Set a date for an Oral Hearing for the case that findings of the Court are not possible without an Oral Hearing.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

Applicant for a Community trade mark: The applicant.

Applicant for a Community trade mark:

Community trade mark concerned: The community word mark ‘LEXDELL’ for goods and services in classes 16, 25, 41 and 45 — Community trade mark application No 8 1 14  779.

Community trade mark concerned:

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: The other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings:

Mark or sign cited in opposition: Community figurative trade mark containing the verbal element ‘DELL’ registered under the No 6 4 20  641.

Mark or sign cited in opposition:

Decision of the Opposition Division: Partially upheld the opposition.

Decision of the Opposition Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Rejected the appeal.

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Infringement of Articles 8(1)(b) and 8(5) of Regulation No 207/2009.

Pleas in law:

---
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Deborah Lorraine Terry a/k/a * From the County Court at

Deborah Lorraine Reed a/k/a Law of Erath County,

Deborah Lorraine Aikman. Trial Court No. 41,954.

Vs. No. 11-11-00140-CR * May 2, 2013

The State of Texas, * Memorandum Opinion by Willson, J.

 (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

 McCall, J., and Willson, J.)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is 

no error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s 

opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 230 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. RES. 230

  To designate and assign two permanent Senate offices to each State.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                June 20 (legislative day, June 7), 1994

 Mr. Wofford submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
               the Committee on Rules and Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
  To designate and assign two permanent Senate offices to each State.

    Resolved, That (a) effective on January 3, 1995, the Committee on 
Rules and Administration shall begin to designate two permanent offices 
for each State.
    (b) The designation of permanent offices shall be accomplished--
            (1) in a manner consistent with the current rules and 
        practices of the Senate; and
            (2) in the most efficient and cost-effective manner 
        practicable.
    (c) Not later than June 30, 1995, each State shall be designated 
two permanent offices for the Senators from such State.
    (d) Each Senator upon taking office shall be assigned a permanent 
office designated to the State that the Senator represents.
    (e) Effective December 31, 1995, no funds appropriated to the 
Senate shall be used for the purpose of moving a Senator from the 
office to which the Senator has been assigned.
    (f) All funds saved by the implementation of this resolution shall 
be dedicated to deficit reduction.

                                 <all>
```
DARION HATTEN

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 16

- 5043

__________ ___________________/

Opinion filed May 1 , 2017.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Suwannee County

. Paul S. Bryan , Judge

.

Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender,

Tallahassee , for Appellant.

Pamela J o Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS, C.J., MAKAR, and JAY, JJ., CONCUR.
NO. 07-10-0114-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B OCTOBER 12, 2010

__________________ ____________ WILLIE GENE MILES, Appellant

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

_______________ ______________ FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 8 OF TRAVIS COUNTY; NO. C-1-CR-09-211566; HON. CARLOS BARRERA, PRESIDING

__________________ ____________ Dismissal

__________________ ____________ Before QUINN, C.J., a nd CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. Appellant, Willie Gene Miles, appeals his conv iction for driving while intoxicated. After abating the cause, this court receiv ed a supplemental clerk’ s record wherein a motion to dismiss the appeal signed by both appellant and counsel had been filed in Travis County on October 1, 2010. Therefore, the conditions precedent to the voluntary dismissal of an appeal, see T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.2(a), have been satisfied.2 Accordingly, we reinstate the appeal, gr ant the motion, and dismiss the appeal. And, having dismissed same on appellant 's own motion, no rehearing will be entertained, and the mandate shall issue forthwith.

Per Curiam

Do not publish.
###### Editorial Note on Part 1

#### Editorial Note:

IRS redesignated the following sections to appear below the undesignated center heading “Regulations Applicable to Certain Bonds Sold Prior to July 8, 1997” and preceding the undesignated center heading “Deductions for Personal Exemptions.” See 62 FR 25507 and 25513, May 9, 1997 for the specific sections involved in the redesignation.

#### § 1.409A-5 Funding. [Reserved]
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   Exhibit 10.74


                              ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT


         THIS ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT is executed and delivered this 13th day of
November, 1996, by SOFTEN REALTY, L.L.C., a Delaware limited liability company
("Purchaser").


                               W I T N E S E T H:

         WHEREAS, Purchaser, and Sierra Tucson, Inc. a Delaware corporation,
have entered into that certain Asset Purchase Agreement, dated as of November
13, 1996 (the "Purchase Agreement"), pursuant to which Purchaser has agreed to
purchase substantially all of the assets of Seller for the consideration set
forth therein.

         NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby
acknowledged, Purchaser hereby agrees as follows:

         1. Definitions. Capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined
shall have the meanings set forth in the Purchase Agreement.

         2. Assumption of Assumed Liabilities. Purchaser does hereby assume from
Seller the Assumed Liabilities. Purchaser shall perform, satisfy and discharge
all of the Assumed Liabilities in accordance with their terms, effective as of
12:01 a.m. on November 14, 1996.

         3. Liabilities Not Assumed. Purchaser is not assuming, and nothing in
this Assumption Agreement shall obligate Purchaser to assume, any liabilities of
Seller or any other Person other than the Assumed Liabilities.

         4. Miscellaneous.

                  (a) The assumption by Purchaser of the Assumed Liabilities
shall in no way expand the rights or remedies of any third party against
Purchaser as compared to the rights and remedies such third party would have had
against Seller had Purchaser not assumed the Assumed Liabilities.

                  (b) This instrument is being delivered pursuant to the
Purchase Agreement and shall be construed consistently therewith. 
<PAGE>   2


This instrument is not intended to, and does not in any manner, enlarge,
diminish or modify the rights and obligations of the parties to the Purchase
Agreement.

                  (c) This instrument shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware without reference to the
choice of law provisions thereof.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Purchaser has caused this Assumption Agreement to
be duly executed and delivered as of the day and year first above written.

                                        PURCHASER:

                                        SOFTEN REALTY, L.L.C., a Delaware
                                        limited liability company

                                        By:      NEXTHEALTH, INC., a Delaware
                                                 corporation, Manager



                                        By /s/ Bob Walton
                                          _______________________________
                                          Name:  Bob Walton
                                          Title: Authorized Representative


                                       -2-
#### Cross *v.*Cross, Executor, et al.

[No. 18,930.

Filed March 27, 1901.]

Appeal and -ERROR.-^-'Jieserwd! *Questions of Law.*— Practice.—The rule that alleged errors occurring during the progress of the trial cannot he considered on appeal unless the same are presented'to the trial' court as a ground for a new trial applies to- questions of law-reserved upon the trial-under §642 Burns 1894.

From the Rush Circuit'Court.

*Affirmed.*

*B. L. Smith, O. Oambern, D. L. Smith*and *O. W. Young,*for appellant.

*W. H. Martin, J. D. Megee*and' *J. E. Watson,*for appellees.

*379Monks, J.

Appellant brought this action to contest the will of Jacob Cross, deceased. This appeal was taken under §642 Burns 1894, §630 R. S. 1881 and Horner 1897, which provides for reserving questions of law decided by the court during the progress of the trial for the decision of the Supreme. Court. . . . ..

It is insisted by appellant that the court erred in giving certain instructions to the jury. No moti.on for .a new trial was made in [he court below. It is settled that unless an alleged error occurring during the progress of the trial is presented to the trial court as a ground for a new trial, .the same can not. be considered on appeal. The rule applies to questions of law reserved upon the trial under §642 (630), *supra,*as well as to questions reserved upon the trial under the general rules of practice authorized by the.code. *Conner*v. *Town of Marion,*112 Ind. 517, 520, *521; Rousseau*v. *Corey,*62 Ind. 250; *Starner*v. *State, 61*Ind. 360; *Love*v. *Carpenter,*30 Ind. 284; *Garver*v. *Daubenspeck,*22 Ind. 238; Ewbank’s Manual, §§44, 96, pp. 65, 66, 134.

Judgment affirmed.
Pursuant to 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determin ed that thi s opinio n should not * be publishe d an d is not precede nt except under the limit ed circu mstance s set forth in 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5 .4. 

### INTHE UNI TED S TATESCOU RT OFAPPEALS

FORTHE FIFTH CIRCU IT

N o. 09- 60395 S u m m ary C al en da r
S C O T T A N D E R S O N , P l a i n ti ff - A p p ell a n t v. O F F IC E D E P O T IN C , D efen da n t- A pp el l ee

A pp ealf

rom t h e U n i t ed S t ates D i st ri ctC ou rt f o rt he So ut he r n Di s t r i c to f M i s s i s s i ppi U SD C N o. 3: 08- C V

- 288
B ef ore R E AV L E Y , D AV IS, an d H AY N E S , C i rcui tJu dg es . P E R C U R I A M: * T h e is s u e s a p p e lla n t ra is e s d o n o t re a c h th e c o n tr o llin g d is p o s itio n o f th is
case. Th at i s w h et h er pl ai n t i f f

- ap pel l an tpresented an y evi den ce, di rector c i r c um s t ant i al , t hathi s di s c har ge w as m o t i va t e d byra c i aldi s c r i m i nat i o n on t he pa r to f t he de f

e nda nt . The di s t r i c tj udg e c o r r e c t l y r ul e d t hatw h et h ert he d e fen d a n t d isch a rg e d th e p la in tiff fo r u sin gw h a t c o u ld b e a ra cia l slu r, of itse lf,
w as no te vi de nc e o f

de fe nda nt ’ s di s c r i m i nat i o n. AF F I RMED. United States Court of App eals Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D Janua ry 11, 2010 Cha rl es R. F ulb ru g e II I Clerk Case: 09-60395 Document: 00511000422 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/11/2010
§ 1.613A-2 Exemption for certain domestic gas wells. ( a ) The allowance for depletion under section 611 shall be computed in accordance with section 613 with respect to: ( 1 ) Regulated natural gas (as defined in paragraph (c) of § 1.613A-7),
( 2 ) Natural gas sold under a fixed contract (as defined in paragraph (d) of § 1.613A-7), and
( 3 ) Any geothermal deposit in the United States or in a possession of the United States that is determined to be a gas well within the meaning of former section 613(b)(1)(A) (as in effect before enactment of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975) for taxable years ending after December 31, 1974, and before October 1, 1978 (see section 613(e) for depletion on geothermal deposits thereafter),
( b ) For taxable years ending after September 30, 1978, the allowance for depletion under section 611 shall be computed in accordance with section 613 with respect to any qualified natural gas from geopressured brine (as defined in paragraph (e) of § 1.613A-7), and 10 percent shall be deemed to be specified in section 613(b) for purposes of section 613(a).
( c ) For special rules applicable to partnerships, S corporations, trusts, and estates, see paragraphs (e), (f), and (g) of § 1.613A-3.
( d ) The provisions of this section may be illustrated by the following examples:
Example 1. A is a producer of natural gas which is sold by A under a contract in effect on February 1, 1975. The contract provides for an increase in the price of the gas sold under the contract to the highest price paid to a producer for natural gas in the area. The gas sold by A qualifies under section 613A(b)(1)(B) for percentage depletion as gas sold under a fixed contract until its price increases, but is presumed not to qualify thereafter unless A demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the price increase in no event takes increases in tax liabilities into account.
Example 2. B is a producer of natural gas which is sold by B under a contract in effect on February 1, 1975. The contract provides that beginning January 1, 1980, the price of the gas may be renegotiated. Such a provision does not disqualify gas from qualifying for the exemption under section 613A(b)(1)(B) with respect to the gas sold prior to January 1, 1980. However, gas sold on or after January 1, 1980, does not qualify for the exemption whether or not the price of the gas is renegotiated.
[T.D. 8348, 56 FR 21939, May 13, 1991, as amended by T.D. 8437, 57 FR 43899, Sept. 23, 1992; 58 FR 6678, Feb. 1, 1993]
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

August 26, 2021

No. 04-21-00043-CV

RCI ENTERTAINMENT (SAN ANTONIO), INC, D/B/A XTC CABARET. (“XTC”),

Appellant

v.

THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, Mayor Ron Nirenberg, and Michael E. Shannon, in their 

Official Capacities,

Appellees

From the 408th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2020-CI-23536

Honorable Norma Gonzales, Judge Presiding

ORDER

Appellees’ brief was originally due July 26, 2021; however, the court granted an 

extension of time until August 25, 2021. Appellees have filed an unopposed motion asking for a 

further thirty-day extension of time to file the brief. 

We grant the motion and order appellees’ brief due September 24, 2021. Counsel is 

advised that no further extensions of time will be granted absent a motion, filed before the brief 

is due, that (1) demonstrates extraordinary circumstances justifying further delay, (2) advises the 

court of the efforts counsel has expended in preparing the brief, and (3) provides the court 

reasonable assurance that the brief will be completed and filed by the requested extended 

deadline. The court does not generally consider a heavy work schedule to be an extraordinary 

circumstance.

_________________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 26th day of August, 2021.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
#### Joseph Page et al. *v.*Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Southington et al.

Argued March 5

decided March 5, 1968

*John V. Zisk, Jr.,*for the appellants (defendant Repczynski et al.).

It appearing that the defendants Joseph J. Repczynski and Caroline Chudzinski in the above-entitled action have failed to prosecute their appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County with proper diligence, it is, under Practice Book § 696, ordered by the Supreme Court, suo motu, that the appeal be and hereby is dismissed unless they file their brief on or before March 19, 1968.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 **

U.S.C. § 636(c).

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision ***

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Lopez’s

request for oral argument is denied.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KENNETH LOPEZ,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

SUE HUBBARD; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 10-17364

D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01928-GEBGGH

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Gregory G. Hollows, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**

Submitted September 27, 2011*** 

Before: SILVERMAN, W. FLETCHER, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Kenneth Lopez appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants

FILED

OCT 11 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 10-17364

were deliberately indifferent to his safety by not ordering that he be single-celled. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v.

Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any ground

supported by the record, Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., 389 F.3d 802,

811 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Lopez failed

to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were

deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to him when they

denied his request for single-cell status. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

837, 843-44 (1994) (explaining that a prison official is not liable for failing to

protect one inmate from another unless the prisoner shows that he was housed

under conditions that posed a substantial risk of serious harm, and that the prison

official acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s safety).

AFFIRMED.