No 

No. 98-383

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1998 MT 317N

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JOSEPH W. PINKLEY,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District,

In and for the County of Toole,

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No 

The Honorable Marc G. Buyske, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Patricia J. Jordan,

Assistant Attorney General; Elizabeth Horsman, Assistant Attorney 

General, Special Deputy Toole County Attorney; Helena, Montana

For Respondent:

Robert G. Olson, Frisbee, Moore & Olson; Cut Bank, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: November 12, 1998

Decided: December 23, 1998

Filed:

__________________________________________

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No 

Clerk

Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶1. Pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal 

Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent but shall be 

filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be 

reported by case title, Supreme Court cause number, and result to the State Reporter 

Publishing Company and to West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases 

issued by this Court. 

¶2. The defendant, Joseph W. Pinkley, was charged by information in the District 

Court for the Ninth Judicial District in Toole County with misdemeanor sexual 

assault and official misconduct. Pinkley moved to suppress statements that he had 

made to Toole County law enforcement officials. Following a hearing, the District 

Court granted the motion to suppress the statements. The State appeals. We affirm 

the order of the District Court. 

¶3. The sole issue on appeal is whether Pinkley was entitled to a Miranda warning 

prior to being questioned by the law enforcement officials.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶4. Joseph Pinkley, a deputy sheriff for Toole County, was on duty during the early 

morning of December 6, 1997, when, at approximately 2:30 a.m., a woman contacted 

the Toole County Sheriff and alleged that an officer had sexually assaulted her. In 

response to the complaint, Sheriff Vern Anderson, Undersheriff David Robins, and 

Chief Deputy Donna Matoon all went directly to the home of the woman's friend 

where they personally interviewed the complainant. Based on the woman's 

description of the officer, it was clear to them that she was referring to Pinkley. 

¶5. Robins went immediately to the Toole County Sheriff's Department. Pinkley, who 

was still in uniform and on duty, noticed Robins, who usually works the day shift, 

and asked Robins, "What's the problem?" Robins answered, "Let's go in the back 

and talk." 

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¶6. Robins and Pinkley went to the officers' workroom, which for security reasons is 

accessible only to authorized personnel of the Sheriff's Department. However, unlike 

the evidence locker and the Sheriff's and Undersheriff's offices, the workroom is 

unlocked and officers have free access to the workroom. 

¶7. Robins asked Pinkley whether he had had any dealings that night with the 

complainant. Pinkley told him that he and another officer had given her a ride home 

after they had noticed her walking home in the cold while intoxicated. Robins 

testified that he remembered telling Pinkley that the reason for his question was that 

the woman had made an allegation that Pinkley had sexually assaulted her. Robins 

then told Pinkley that he wanted to wait to discuss the matter any further until 

Anderson and Matoon, who had taken the woman home after their interview with 

her, arrived. Robins had coffee while they waited in the workroom. 

¶8. When the other officers arrived, they joined Robins and Pinkley in the 

workroom. Robins testified that Pinkley was asked again to describe his dealings 

with the woman. Pinkley answered questions from the officers, all of whom were his 

supervisors, and who at times sought clarification of Pinkley's answers. After the 

meeting, Robins instructed Pinkley to prepare a written statement, and Pinkley did 

so. At no point during or prior to either his oral or written statements was Pinkley 

advised of his Miranda(1) rights. 

¶9. Pinkley's description of his dealings with the woman contradicted the woman's 

allegations. For that reason, on December 8, 1997, Robins requested an independent 

investigation by the Criminal Investigation Bureau of the Montana Department of 

Justice. On December 11, the investigating agent from the CIB interviewed Pinkley 

after advising him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona.

¶10. On February 5, 1998, Pinkley was charged by information in the District Court 

with misdemeanor sexual assault and misdemeanor official misconduct. He pled not 

guilty to both charges, and later moved to suppress both the written and oral 

statements that he made on December 6, 1997, based on the fact that he had not first 

been given a Miranda warning. After a hearing, the District Court granted the 

motion to suppress. It found that there had been a custodial interrogation, prior to 

which Pinkley was entitled to a Miranda warning. The District Court also rejected 

the State's argument that Pinkley's knowledge of Miranda rights excused the need for 

a Miranda warning in this case. 

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DISCUSSION

¶11. Was Pinkley entitled to a Miranda warning prior to being questioned by the law 

enforcement officials? 

¶12. We review a district court's order to suppress to determine whether the district 

court's interpretation and application of the law is correct. See State v. Scheetz

(Mont. 1997), 950 P.2d 722, 724, 54 St. Rep. 1286, 1287.

¶13. "For the Miranda protections to apply, the defendant must be subject to 

custodial interrogation." State v. Woods (1997), 283 Mont. 359, 368, 942 P.2d 88, 94. 

Custodial interrogation is any situation in which "a reasonable person being 

interrogated would feel he was in custody or otherwise significantly deprived of his 

freedom." Woods, 283 Mont. at 368, 942 P.2d at 94. The State contends that Pinkley 

was neither in custody nor subject to interrogation and, therefore, that he was not 

entitled to a Miranda warning. 

¶14. In Woods, 283 Mont. at 370, 942 P.2d at 95, we determined that whether a 

defendant's statements are the result of interrogation depends on the existence of 

some degree of compulsion. Here, Pinkley was asked specific questions about his 

conduct that night by his superior officers and was expected to provide answers to 

the officers' inquiries. He was also instructed to restate in writing his version of the 

events. It is reasonable to assume that Pinkley felt compelled to respond to his 

superiors' inquiries. In fact, Robins testified that Pinkley would have been 

insubordinate had he refused to do so. We conclude that he was, therefore, 

interrogated.

¶15. Whether Pinkley was in custody was a factual question. See Woods, 283 Mont. at 

368, 942 P.2d at 94. We held in State v. Rushton (1994), 264 Mont. 248, 255-56, 870 

P.2d 1355, 1360, that "[i]f a person has no free right to leave, either from the express 

or implied conduct of police officers, then the interrogation is custodial in nature." 

The factors which we consider in our determination of whether an interrogation is 

custodial include "the time and place of interrogation, the length and mood of 

interrogation, and persons present during the questioning." Rushton, 264 Mont. at 

256, 870 P.2d at 1360.

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¶16. The District Court relied heavily on the persons present for, and the time and 

place of, the interrogation, stating that "a reasonable person would not have felt free 

to leave this interrogation." We agree. The fact that Pinkley's superiors had gathered 

at a time of day they would not normally be present to question him about the 

complaint against him strongly suggested that he was not free to leave. Although the 

location was less significant than it would have been to a "civilian," it was still within 

the confines of a law enforcement facility; and, finally, everyone present was a law 

enforcement official. The State has offered no evidence of the length or mood of the 

interrogation to suggest that it was anything but custodial.

¶17. We conclude, therefore, that the District Court correctly concluded that 

Pinkley's interrogation was custodial and affirm the order of the District Court.

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

We Concur:

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

1. 1Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 

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