alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### SERVED: August 28, 2015 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS

WASHINGTON, DC
IN THE MATTER OF

GENE HARRISON FAADOCKETNO. [TO BE ASSIGNED] (Civil Penalty Action) FDMS NO. FAA 2014-0860
ORDEROF DISMISSAL The Federal Aviation Administration (hereinafter referredto as "FAA'') filed a Complaint. Gene Harrison (hereinafter "Harrison") filed a Request for Hearing. On August 21, 2015 the parties submitted a letter representing the case has been settled and Harrison seeks to withdrawhis Request for Hearing. 14 C.F.R. § 13.215 states: "At any time before or during a hearing, an agency attorney may withdraw a complaint orparty may**wir~draw** a request for a hearing withoutthe consent ofthe administrative lawjudge. Ifan agency attorney withdraws the complaint or a party withdraws the request for a hearing and the answer, the administrative lawjudge shall dismiss the proceedings under this subpart withprejudice." WHEREFORE, the within filed Requestto Withdraw Complaint having beenread and considered, itis ORDERED as follows: 1. 2. Harrison's prayerto withdraw Request for hearing be and is hereby granted; and This proceeding be and are hereby dismissed with prejudice.

Richard C. Goodwin U.S. Administrative LawJudge
Attachment

- Service List,. ,, .·1

SERVICE LIST- BYU.S. MAIL ORIGINAL & ONE COPY Federal Aviation Administration 800 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, DC 20591 Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1000 1

Gene Harrison, 

### Respondent 3705 Arctic Blvd. Apt. 543 Anchorage, AK 99503 TEL: 907-727-4719 Jeanine Gotimer, 

### Complainant's Counsel Federal Aviation Administration ONE COPY

Office ofRegional Counsel, Eastern Region 1 Aviation Plaza Jamaica, NY 11434 TEL: 718-553-3272 FAX: 718-995-5699 The Honorable Richard C. Goodwin,

### Administrative Law Judge Office ofHearings, M-20 U.S. Department ofTransportation 1200New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (Ell-310) Washington, DC 20590 TEL: 202-366-5121 StaffAssistant FAX: 202-366-7536 DocketNo. FAA-2014-0860 (Civil PenaltyAction)

1 Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following address: Federal Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite2W1000, Washington, DC 20591; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430. 2
1 ... T h i s pr oce edi n g a r i s es ou t of Cau s e N o. 2009- CR
- 6566 , s t y l ed S t a t e v . Ja so n M i ea rs , p e n d ing in the 3 7 9 th Jud i ci al D i st ri ct C o urt , B exar C o unt y , T exas , t he H o no rable Ro n R angel presi d i ng. i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION
No
. 04 -0 9- 00 56 6- CR IN RE J ason M IEA RS Orig inal Mandamus Proce eding 1 PER C URI AM Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: October 7, 2009 PETI TI ON F OR WR I T OF MANDAMUS DEN I ED On Se pte mbe r 8 , 2 00 9, re la tor Jaso n M ie a rs fi le d a

pe tit ion for wr it o f m a nd a mus , complaining of the trial court’s failure to r ule on his motion to dismiss counsel, o b j ec t i o n t o an expert, and petition for wr it of habea s corpus. How ever , on September 24, 2009, the trial court denied r elator’ s motion t o dismiss his counsel. Ther efor e, we DENY A S MOOT relator’s petition for wr it of mandamus as it perta ins to his m otion to dis miss counsel. As to relator ’s re maining c omplaints, counsel has been appointed to re prese nt relator in the criminal proc eedingpending in the t ri al co u rt for whic h he is curr ently confine d. A cr iminal04
- 09
- 00 56 6- CR

- 2- defe ndant is not entitled to hy brid repr esentation of any form. See D unn v. State, 819 S.W .2d 510, 52 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ); se e als o R ob ins on v . S tat e , 240 S.W .3d 919, 9 2 2 (T ex . C ri m . App. 20 07 ); Pa tri c k

v . S tat e , 906 S.W .2d 481, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Consequently , the trial cour t did no t abu se its dis c re tio n b y de c lin ingto r

ule on re la tor ’s pr o s e objection and petition filed in the criminal proc eedingpending in the trial court. The ref ore, w e conc lude that re lator has not shown himself entitled to mandamus relief. According ly , the petition is denied. T EX . R. A PP . P. 52.8(a)
.

PER C URI AM DO NO T PU B L I SH
III

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. RES. 259

Commending the President and the special delegation to Haiti, and supporting

the United States Armed Forces in Haiti.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 20 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 12), 1994

Mr. MITCHELL (for himself and Mr. DOLE) submitted the following resolution;

which was considered

RESOLUTION

Commending the President and the special delegation to

Haiti, and supporting the United States Armed Forces

in Haiti.

Whereas the special delegation sent to Haiti on September

17, 1994, has succeeded in convincing the de facto authorities in Haiti to agree to leave power;

Whereas on September 18, 1994, after an agreement was

reached in Port-au-Prince that day, the President ordered the present deployment of men and women of the

United States Armed Forces in and around Haiti;

Whereas U.S. and multilateral sanctions have imposed a

heavy burden on the Haitian people; and

Whereas the Congress and the people of the United States

have great pride in the men and women of the United
2

SRES 259 IS

States Armed forces and fully support them in all their

efforts overseas, including those in Haiti: Now, therefore,

be it

1 Resolved, That the Senate—

2 (1) commends the efforts of the President in

3 sending former President Jimmy Carter, retired

4 General Colin Powell and Senator Sam Nunn to

5 Haiti in an effort to avoid the loss of American lives;

6 (2) fully supports the men and women of the

7 United States Armed Forces in Haiti who are per8 forming with professional excellence and dedicated

9 patriotism;

10 (3) supports the departure from power of the

11 de facto authorities in Haiti, and Haitian efforts to

12 achieve national reconciliation, democracy, and the

13 rule of law;

14 (4) supports lifting without delay of U.S. uni15 lateral economic sanctions on Haiti, and lifting with16 out delay of economic sanctions imposed pursuant to

17 U.N. resolutions in accordance with such resolutions;

18 and

19 (5) supports a prompt and orderly withdrawal

20 of all United States Armed Forces from Haiti as

21 soon as possible.

Æ
GAYLA R. MAY CSR, RPR 27th Judicial District Court P. O. Box 747 Belton, TX 76513

(254) 933-5270

September 25, 2015

Mr. Jeffrey D. Kyle, Clerk Third District of Texas Court of Appeals P. O. Box 12547 Capitol Station Austin, TX 78711
Re: Trial Court No. 72,941; Karl Lee Wiggins Vs. The State of Texas; 27th District Court, Bell C ounty, TX; Case No. 03-15-00 385-CR
Dear Mr. Kyle:
In reference to the appeal of Kar l Lee Wiggins Vs. State, COA 0 3-15-00385-CR, I am requesting a one-week extension in or der for me to gather the e xhibits. I am home with a husband recovering from back s urgery and I thought I had scanne d the exhibits on my computer. However, I cannot lo cate them and I believe the due date is today, September 25. I am requesting until October 2, 2015, in order to file the Rep orter's Record.

Thank you,

Gayla R. May 27th District Court Bell-Lampasas Counties
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

VIRGINIA ANN KURSCHINSKE,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 100 WAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 15th day of September, 2020

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED

.
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17

- 10097 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
VEROD WOODARD , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:15

- CR

- 412

- 1

Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Verod Woodard pleaded guilty to one count of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), and received a sentence of 283 months in prison, to be followed by a three

- year te rm of supervised release. The underlying “crime of violence” was carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119. On appeal, Woodard contends that the enactment of § 2119 exceeded Congress’s authority under

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED August 28, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 17-10097 Document: 00514133158 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/28/2017No. 17

- 10097

2 the Commerce Clause. In United States v. Coleman , 78 F.3d 154, 158

- 59 (5th Cir. 1996), this court rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the carjacking statute. Woodard concedes that his argument is foreclosed by Coleman , although he contends that the holding has been called into question by the Suprem e Court’s decision in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius , 567 U.S. 519 (2012). As that case did not address the constitutionality of § 2119, we are bound by our decision in Coleman

. See United States v. Alcan tar , 733 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2013).
I n addition, Woodard asserts that the firearm conviction was invalid because carjacking no longer qualifies as a “crime of violence” in light of Johnson v. United States , 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). As he concedes, his argument
that the ruling in Johnson rende rs § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Gonzalez

- Longoria , 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) , petition for cert. filed (Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 16

- 6259)

. See United States v. Jones , 854 F.3d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed (July 17 , 2017) (No. 17

- 5285). Although in Lynch v. Dimaya , 137 S. Ct. 31 (2016), the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutional in light of Johnson , we are boun d by our own precedent unless and until that precedent is altered by a decision of the Supreme Court. See Wicker v. McCotter , 798 F.2d 155, 157

- 58 (5th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, Woodard’s unopposed motion for summary disposition is GRANTED. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Case: 17-10097 Document: 00514133158 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/28/2017
§ 1.691(a)-3 Character of gross income. ( a ) The right to receive an amount of income in respect of a decedent shall be treated in the hands of the estate, or by the person entitled to receive such amount by bequest, devise, or inheritance from the decedent or by reason of his death, as if it had been acquired in the transaction by which the decedent (or a prior decedent) acquired such right, and shall be considered as having the same character it would have had if the decedent (or a prior decedent) had lived and received such amount. The provisions of section 1014(a), relating to the basis of property acquired from a decedent, and section 1022, relating to the basis of property acquired from certain decedents who died in 2010, do not apply to these amounts in the hands of the estate and such persons. See sections 1014(c) and 1022(f).
( b ) The application of paragraph (a) of this section may be illustrated by the following: ( 1 ) If the income would have been capital gain to the decedent, if he had lived and had received it, from the sale of property, held for more than 1 year (6 months for taxable years beginning before 1977; 9 months for taxable years beginning in 1977), the income, when received, shall be treated in the hands of the estate or of such person as capital gain from the sale of the property, held for more than 1 year (6 months for taxable years beginning before 1977; 9 months for taxable years beginning in 1977), in the same manner as if such person had held the property for the period the decedent held it, and had made the sale.
( 2 ) If the income is interest on United States obligations which were owned by the decedent, such income shall be treated as interest on United States obligations in the hands of the person receiving it, for the purpose of determining the credit provided by section 35, as if such person had owned the obligations with respect to which such interest is paid.
( 3 ) If the amounts received would be subject to special treatment under part I (section 1301 and following), subchapter Q, chapter 1 of the Code, relating to income attributable to serveral taxable years, as in effect for taxable years beginning before January 1, 1964, if the decedent had lived and included such amounts in his gross income, such sections apply with respect to the recipient of the income.
( 4 ) The provisions of sections 632 and 1347, relating to the tax attributable to the sale of certain oil or gas property and to certain claims against the United States, apply to any amount included in gross income, the right to which was obtained by the decedent by a sale or claim within the provisions of those sections.
( c ) *Effective/applicability dates.* The last two sentences of paragraph (a) of this section apply on and after January 19, 2017. For rules before January 19, 2017, see § 1.691(a)-3 as contained in 26 CFR part 1 revised as of April 1, 2016.
[T.D. 6500, 25 FR 11814, Nov. 26, 1960, as amended by T.D. 6885, 31 FR 7803, June 2, 1966; T.D. 7728, 45 FR 72650, Nov. 3, 1980; T.D. 9811, 82 FR 6239, Jan. 19, 2017]
38973.

#### UNITED BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF OMAHA v. GLISSON.

Decided November 9, 1961

Rehearing denied December 13, 1961.

*123*Hitch, Miller & Beckmann, Joe R. Young, Jr.,*for plaintiff in error.

*Cramford, Leeb ■& Calhoun, John R. Calhoun,*contra.

Frankum, Judge.

Defendant contends that the plaintiff’s petition does not state a cause of action because of the following provision of the policy: “The provisions of this policy relating to benefits, other than life insurance benefits, do not cover (a) *124accidental bodily injuries arising out of or in the course of the employment of the protected person or his dependents or sickness covered by a Workmen’s Compensation Act or similar legislation. . .”

The defendant contends that it is not obligated to pay the plaintiff for hospital and medical expenses incurred by him as a result of injuries to his person arising out of or in the course of his employment regardless of whether such expenses are, or are not, covered by workmen’s compensation. In other words, the defendant contends that the phrase “covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or similar legislation” modifies only the word “sickness.” If a provision of an insurance policy is ambiguous or subject to more than one construction, the construction most favorable to the insured will be adopted. *John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Frazer,*194 Ga. 201 (20 SE2d 915); *Prudential Ins. Co. v. Chestnut,*8 Ga. App. 246 (68 SE 952).

In *Whitaker v. State,*11 Ga. App. 208 (5) (75 SE 258), it was held: “The word ‘or’ is generally used as a disjunctive, and to express the notion that the two clauses which it connects are alternative; but this is not always so; it may properly be used to introduce a statement which is an amplification or explanation of a preceding statement.”

In many cases the disjunctive “or” is construed to mean “and.” *Clay v. Central R. & Bkg. Co.,*84 Ga. 345 (10 SE 967). See also *Everitt v. LaSpeyre,*195 Ga. 377 (24 SE2d 381).

We are of the opinion that the exclusion clause of the policy above quoted does not relieve the defendant of liability for hospital and medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff as a result of accidental injuries to his person simply because he sustained such injuries while performing duties in the course of his employment, unless he would have a cause of action for such expenses under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or similar legislation. The petition affirmatively alleges that the plaintiff was “not covered by workmen’s compensation or similar legislation” at the time he suffered the injuries to his person.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Jordan, J., concur.*
#### Ann J. Loss et al. *v.*Haines Builders, Inc., et al.

*Raphael Korff,*for the appellees (defendants).

*William A. Loss,*pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).

Argued April 7

decided April 7, 1964

The motion by the defendants to dismiss the appeal from the Superior Court in Fairfield County is denied.
#### § 1.332-5 Distributions in liquidation as affecting minority interests.

Upon the liquidation of a corporation in pursuance of a plan of complete liquidation, the gain or loss of minority shareholders shall be determined without regard to section 332, since it does not apply to that part of distributions in liquidation received by minority shareholders.
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 16**  **- 6181** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v.

MICHAEL ALONZA RUFUS , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Columbia

. Margaret B. Seymour , Senior District Judge. ( 3:02

- cr
- 00550

- MBS

- 1 )

Submitted : June 30, 2016 Decided: July 11, 2016

Before GREGORY , Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Michael Alonza Rufus, Appellant Pro Se. Beth Drake, Acting United States Attorney, William Kenneth Witherspoon, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not bindi ng precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Michael Alonza Rufus appeals the district court ’s order denying his motion for a writ of error coram nobis pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012). We have reviewed the record and find
no reversible error. According ly, we a ffirm the district

court ’s order. See United States v. Rufus , No. 3:02

- cr
- 00550

-
MBS

- 1 (D.S.C. Jan. 5, 2016). We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the materials before th is court and ar gument would not aid
the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Editorial Note on Part 868
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 868 appear at 73 FR 35341, June 23, 2008.

§ 868.6885 Medical gas yoke assembly. ( a ) *Identification.* A medical gas yoke assembly is a device intended to connect medical gas cylinders to regulators or needle valves to supply gases for anesthesia or respiratory therapy. The device may include a particulate filter.
( b ) *Classification.* Class I (general controls). The device is exempt from the premarket notification procedures in subpart E of part 807 of this chapter subject to the limitations in § 868.9.
[47 FR 31142, July 16, 1982, as amended at 61 FR 1121, Jan. 16, 1996; 66 FR 38796, July 25, 2001]
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-16-00219-CV

Larry Joe Morgan

v.

Richard Scott Walker §

§

§

§ From the 236th District Court

of Tarrant County (236-282599-15)

August 18, 2016

Per Curiam



### JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that

the appeal should be dismissed. It is ordered that the appeal is dismissed for

want of jurisdiction.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

PER CURIAM
§ 1.537-2 Grounds for accumulation of earnings and profits. ( a ) *In general.* Whether a particular ground or grounds for the accumulation of earnings and profits indicate that the earnings and profits have been accumulated for the reasonable needs of the business or beyond such needs is dependent upon the particular circumstances of the case. Listed below in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section are some of the grounds which may be used as guides under ordinary circumstances.
( b ) *Reasonable accumulation of earnings and profits.* Although the following grounds are not exclusive, one or more of such grounds, if supported by sufficient facts, may indicate that the earnings and profits of a corporation are being accumulated for the reasonable needs of the business provided the general requirements under §§ 1.537-1 and 1.537-3 are satisfied: ( 1 ) To provide for bona fide expansion of business or replacement of plant;
( 2 ) To acquire a business enterprise through purchasing stock or assets;
( 3 ) To provide for the retirement of bona fide indebtedness created in connection with the trade or business, such as the establishment of a sinking fund for the purpose of retiring bonds issued by the corporation in accordance with contract obligations incurred on issue;
( 4 ) To provide necessary working capital for the business, such as, for the procurement of inventories;
( 5 ) To provide for investments or loans to suppliers or customers if necessary in order to maintain the business of the corporation; or
( 6 ) To provide for the payment of reasonably anticipated product liability losses, as defined in section 172(j), §§ 1.172-13(b)(1), and 1.537-1(f).
( c ) *Unreasonable accumulations of earnings and profits.* Although the following purposes are not exclusive, accumulations of earnings and profits to meet any one of such objectives may indicate that the earnings and profits of a corporation are being accumulated beyond the reasonable needs of the business: ( 1 ) Loans to shareholders, or the expenditure of funds of the corporation for the personal benefit of the shareholders;
( 2 ) Loans having no reasonable relation to the conduct of the business made to relatives or friends of shareholders, or to other persons;
( 3 ) Loans to another corporation, the business of which is not that of the taxpayer corporation, if the capital stock of such other corporation is owned, directly or indirectly, by the shareholder or shareholders of the taxpayer corporation and such shareholder or shareholders are in control of both corporations;
( 4 ) Investments in properties, or securities which are unrelated to the activities of the business of the taxpayer corporation; or
( 5 ) Retention of earnings and profits to provide against unrealistic hazards.
[T.D. 6500, 25 FR 11737, Nov. 26, 1960, as amended by T.D. 8096, 51 FR 30484, Aug. 27, 1986]
Filed 7/9/09 by Clerk of Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2009 ND 121

In the Interest of B.K. and D.K., Children

Kevin Miller, Petitioner and Appellee

v.

B.K., Child; D.K., Child; J.K., Mother; L.K., Father;

Sherrice Roness, Guardian Ad Litem; and Executive

Director of the N.D. Department of Human Services, Respondents

J.K., Mother,Respondent and Appellant

No. 20090027

Appeal from the Juvenile Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, the Honorable Bruce A. Romanick, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Per Curiam.

Jeffrey Ryan Ubben, Courthouse, 514 East Thayer Avenue, Bismarck, N.D. 58501, for petitioner and appellee; submitted on brief.

Tatum O’Brien Lindbo, Box 2105, Fargo, N.D. 58107-2105 and Carlye Shea Gast, 655 1st Avenue North, Suite 150, Fargo, N.D. 58102, for respondent and appellant; submitted on brief.

Interest of B.K. and D.K.

No. 20090027

Per Curiam.

[¶1]The mother of a six-year-old boy and a five-year-old girl appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to the children.  She argues the judicial referee and the district court erred in determining the children are deprived and in terminating her parental rights.  She also argues the judicial referee erred in denying her motion for written closing arguments at the end of the evidentiary hearing.  Because the findings supporting the decision to terminate parental rights are not clearly erroneous and the judicial referee did not abuse her discretion in denying the motion, we summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2) and (4).

[¶2]Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.

Carol Ronning Kapsner

Mary Muehlen Maring

Daniel J. Crothers

Dale V. Sandstrom