IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2014 WY 98

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2014

August 1, 2014

BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL 

RESPONSIBILITY, WYOMING 

STATE BAR,

Petitioner,

v.

ANDREA RICHARD, WSB No. 5-2848,

Respondent.

D-14-0001

ORDER SUSPENDING ATTORNEY

FROM PRACTICE OF LAW AND ASSESSING COSTS

[¶1] This matter comes before the Court upon a Report and Recommendation by 

Petitioner, the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Wyoming State Bar (the 

Board) for a three year suspension of Andrea L. Richard’s license to practice law. 

Having reviewed the Report and Recommendation and Ms. Richard’s objection to it, 

considered the oral arguments of counsel and performed an independent and thorough 

review of the Board record, the Court concludes Ms. Richard violated numerous 

provisions of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct in many instances and adopts 

the recommendation of the Board to suspend Ms. Richard from the practice of law for 

three years.

FACTS

[¶2] This is an attorney discipline case that arose out of Ms. Richard’s alleged 

violations of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct in seven different court 

proceedings between 2006 and 2012. We present the facts of each of the underlying 

cases separately.

1

1 We emphasize that our recitation of the facts is based upon an independent review of the entire record in 

this matter and is not simply a repetition of the findings of the Board.

 
1. Fields v. Waterhouse

[¶3] Ms. Richard represented the Fields in this action filed in district court in Teton 

County, Wyoming, involving interior decorating services the defendants provided for the 

Fields’ condominium in Jackson. The defendants served written discovery requests on 

the Fields on August 11, 2006. In October 2006, defendants filed a motion to compel and 

for sanctions. By order entered in November 2006 after a hearing, Judge Guthrie

required the Fields to provide specific detailed answers to interrogatories and to produce 

specified documents to defendants within thirty days. Judge Guthrie also stated: “. . . the 

matters relating to discovery and the discovery disputes between the parties are 

complicated, time consuming, and caused significant undue expenditure of time (and 

therefore expense) by the parties, their counsel, and this Court.” “In the interest of 

judicial economy and to reduce the time required by [the] Court and expense to the 

parties,” Judge Guthrie appointed a special master for discovery. Although she denied 

the motion for sanctions, Judge Guthrie did so without prejudice, expressly stating that 

the motion could be renewed if the Fields failed to fully comply with the order. 

[¶4] Seven months later, in June 2007, defendants filed a motion for sanction of 

dismissal, claiming the Fields had violated Judge Guthrie’s November 2006 order 

requiring them to respond to discovery requests. After briefing by the parties and a 

hearing, Judge Cranfill, to whom the case had been re-assigned, issued a decision letter in 

September 2007, again ordering the Fields to provide specific detailed answers to the 

same interrogatories and produce the same documents identified in the earlier order. The 

September 2007 decision letter also ordered the Fields to produce a document referenced 

in their complaint and any DVDs relating to the matters alleged in their complaint. 

Although recognizing that the Fields had continued to ignore the court’s orders, Judge 

Cranfill denied the motion for sanction of dismissal. He stated, however:

The Court is deeply concerned with the discovery matters that 

have come to light. It appears that Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ 

counsel have formed a pattern regarding discovery that this 

Court will not tolerate . . . if Plaintiffs’ refusal to take part in 

meaningful discovery continues, Defendants may file another 

motion. Any and all sanctions will be considered in the 

future if such a motion is made by Defendants.

[¶5] In November 2007, defendants again moved for dismissal claiming the Fields had 

violated the two earlier orders requiring them to respond to discovery requests. After a 

hearing, Judge Cranfill issued a decision letter and order granting the motion and 

dismissing the case. In his decision letter, Judge Cranfill stated: “Plaintiffs have 

egregiously failed to follow this Court’s orders, and this pattern of behavior has

continued after the Court warned that this behavior would result in ‘any and all’ sanctions 

2
being imposed upon them.” He concluded the severe sanction of dismissal with prejudice 

was appropriate, stating further, “Plaintiffs’ complete disregard of this Court’s orders has 

been blatant and egregious.” For her work on the case, Ms. Richard billed her clients 

over $300,000 in fees and costs. 

[¶6] As a consequence of Ms. Richard’s failure to comply with the discovery 

requirements of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and the district court’s orders, bar 

counsel charged her with violating Rules 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 8.4(d) of the Rules of 

Professional Conduct.

2 After a hearing, the Board concluded bar counsel proved by clear 

2 Those rules provide in relevant part as follows:

Rule 3.1. Meritorious claims and contentions.

(a) A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, 

unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith 

argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.

. . . .

(c) The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, 

motion, or other court document; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, formed after 

reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 

for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed for any improper 

purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.

Rule 3.2. Expediting litigation.

A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the 

client.

Rule 3.4. Fairness to opposing party and counsel.

A lawyer shall not:

(a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal 

a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist 

another person to do any such act;

(b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a 

witness that is prohibited by law;

(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based 

on an assertion that no valid obligation exists;

(d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent 

effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party;

Rule 8.4. Misconduct.

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

. . . .

3

 
and convincing evidence that Ms. Richard violated Rules 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4. The Board 

concluded bar counsel did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that she violated 

Rule 8.4(d) and dismissed that charge. The Board further concluded that as a result of 

Ms. Richard’s violations, the parties were exposed to unnecessary expense and delays, 

and opposing counsel was forced to put in substantial time resulting in higher legal fees 

in attempting to obtain discovery. The Board also concluded Ms. Richard’s clients 

suffered because their claims were dismissed with prejudice and they incurred substantial

attorney fees and costs.

2. Centennial v. AECOM

[¶7] Ms. Richard represented AECOM in this breach of contract action filed in federal 

district court in 2009. Centennial sought to collect payments allegedly due from 

AECOM under the contract. It alleged that AECOM had approved extra costs Centennial 

incurred in performing under the contract. When a change order was submitted after the 

extra costs had been incurred, the project owner did not approve them. AECOM asserted 

it did not have to pay Centennial because Centennial did not obtain a change order in 

advance. Centennial alleged the parties’ prior course of dealing demonstrated the 

practice was to complete the work first and obtain approval for the excess costs later. 

Ms. Richard filed an answer on behalf of AECOM asserting the exact opposite—the prior 

course of dealings showed that AECOM required change order approval before excess 

costs were incurred. Ms. Richard also claimed Centennial had advised AECOM 

repeatedly that the cost overrun would be around $50,000. 

[¶8] Centennial provided documentation to AECOM showing the parties’ prior course of 

dealing and sought to obtain similar documentation from AECOM. Despite having 

asserted prior course of dealing in its answer, AECOM refused to produce the 

documentation on the ground that it was not relevant. AECOM also refused to produce 

other information Centennial had requested on the ground that it was privileged or 

prepared in anticipation of litigation. Ms. Richard filed an affidavit supporting the 

refusal to produce the information, stating that she had reviewed the documentation and 

it, in fact, fell within the exceptions. 

[¶9] In October 2009, Centennial took the deposition of AECOM’s program manager. 

He testified that the $50,000 cost overrun figure asserted in AECOM’s pleadings came 

from him, not from Centennial. Despite this testimony refuting the assertion, Ms. 

Richard subsequently included the assertion in her pretrial memorandum and submitted a 

jury instruction containing the assertion. 

(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;

4

 
[¶10] In January 2010, AECOM filed a brief in opposition to a summary judgment 

motion filed by Centennial. Although the brief cited to an affidavit and exhibits, no 

affidavit or exhibits were attached. When the affidavit was later filed, unsigned and after 

the deadline, it did not contain the statements the brief represented it contained. The 

same day the unsigned affidavit was filed AECOM also filed a motion for extension of 

time to file the exhibits missing from the brief. In response, Centennial filed a reply brief 

in which it identified sixteen misrepresentations of fact made in AECOM’s brief. 

[¶11] On March 1, 2010, Centennial sought an order compelling production or an in 

camera review of the documentation withheld as privileged or prepared in anticipation of 

litigation and, on March 29, 2010, Magistrate Beaman ordered AECOM to submit the 

documentation for his review. On April 12, 2010, the magistrate entered an order finding 

that none of the documents at issue were prepared in anticipation of litigation and 

directing AECOM to produce them. With regard to the documents AECOM contended 

were privileged, the magistrate concluded most of them were in fact privileged but 

identified a number of them that were not and ordered AECOM to produce those

identified as not privileged. The magistrate ordered AECOM to produce the documents 

by April 16, 2010. 

[¶12] Meanwhile, on March 26, 2010, Centennial had filed a motion for sanctions to 

compel AECOM to produce course of dealing discovery. After a hearing, the magistrate

entered an order on the motion. Addressing the parties’ discovery history, the magistrate 

found in relevant part:

The parties submitted their initial disclosures on July 31, 

2009.

Centennial’s initial disclosure named a number of potential 

witnesses, identified the discoverable information each 

witness possessed and contained an extensive list of 

documents, compilations, tangible evidence and its 

computation of damages.

AECOM submitted a “barebones” initial disclosure, “which 

simply provided the names of three individuals and 

‘identified’ general documents it stated it might rely on, such 

as ‘correspondence’ and ‘invoices’.”

On October 21, 2009, Centennial submitted its responses to 

AECOM’s first discovery request, in which, with the 

exception of two objections, it fully answered each 

interrogatory and request for production and identified nine 

5
projects where AECOM had paid extra costs without advance 

change orders.

On October 26, 2009, AECOM submitted its responses to 

Centennial’s first discovery request, in which it objected to 

“every single interrogatory, request for production and 

request for admission”, provided “vague and inexact” 

responses, pointed to approximately 2000 possible documents 

where answers might be found and objected to the request for 

evidence concerning the parties’ prior course of dealing.

On November 21, 2009, AECOM submitted its response to 

Centennial’s second discovery request, again failing “to 

provide any solid answer” to the request concerning prior 

course of dealing, objecting “in each and every response to 

written discovery on the specious grounds of relevance”, and, 

in responding to interrogatories concerning prior course of 

dealing, directing Centennial to the deposition of an AECOM 

employee who testified he had no firsthand knowledge of the 

parties’ history concerning change orders.

On March 23, 2010, the Court entered an order denying 

summary judgment in which it stated that evidence of the 

parties’ prior course of dealing would be permitted at trial. 

AECOM thereafter submitted its second disclosure statement 

which suffered “from the same defects” as the prior 

disclosure statements.

After Centennial filed its motion for sanctions to compel 

discovery, AECOM submitted a third initial disclosure 

statement which “still does not provide any information 

regarding course of dealing” and, once again, contains 

“evasive,” “vague and imprecise” responses. 

[¶13] The magistrate concluded Centennial had made multiple good faith attempts to get 

AECOM to adequately respond to its discovery requests and AECOM had “hindered 

those attempts at every turn,” “made the routine discovery process in this case anything 

but routine” and continued to refuse to provide “any substantive discovery of course of 

dealing” even though the issue had existed since July 2009. The magistrate further 

stated:

The Court finds prejudice is palpable in this matter. 

The record lays [bare] a pattern of dilatory behavior on the 

6
part of [AECOM]. The discovery issue at bar was originally 

generated in July 2009. [AECOM]’s scant . . . initial 

disclosure set the stage for the course of discovery in this case 

and, from that time forward, [AECOM] has consistently 

avoided producing any documentation based on its unilateral 

and conclusory assertions of lack of relevancy. . . . [AECOM] 

has thwarted the discovery process at every turn and has done

so for months and months. . . .

. . . .

[AECOM]’s actions further create financial burdens on 

[Centennial] since [Centennial]’s counsel is forced to 

repeatedly follow up . . . to request information that should 

have been provided as a part of the ordinary course of 

discovery. Moreover, the tortured discovery history in this 

case has made it close to impossible for [Centennial] to 

effectively prepare its trial strategy. [AECOM] has failed to 

provide any substantive discovery, therefore, [Centennial] is 

left to speculate as to defenses that may be presented at trial.

[¶14] Despite these findings, the magistrate denied Centennial’s motion for sanctions 

and gave AECOM another chance to provide proper disclosures. The magistrate ordered 

AECOM to fully respond by May 11, 2010. Ms. Richard appealed to U.S. District Court 

Judge William F. Downes, who affirmed the magistrate’s order. 

[¶15] Meanwhile, after receiving AECOM’s responses to some discovery requests on 

April 16, 2010, Centennial filed a motion for leave to amend its complaint to add four 

new causes of action it had been unaware of prior to receiving the responses. Finding 

that the amendment just before trial was attributable to AECOM’s late disclosures, the 

magistrate granted the motion. AECOM again appealed to Judge Downes, who affirmed 

the order. 

[¶16] On June 4, 2010, Centennial filed a motion to compel AECOM to cooperate in 

depositions and answer written discovery and a motion for sanctions in which it alleged 

that AECOM was continuing not to cooperate with discovery in violation of the Court’s 

orders. Judge Downes entered an order granting the motion to compel but did not award 

sanctions at that time. 

[¶17] AECOM filed a motion to continue the trial which was scheduled to commence on 

June 22, 2010. Judge Downes denied the motion, stating that the record reflected a 

“complete lack of diligence and cooperation” by AECOM; AECOM had “misdirected 

significant time and precious resources” of its own, the Court and Centennial in the last 

weeks before trial with “wasteful and unsupported motions and appeals”; and AECOM 

7
should not be allowed to benefit from further delay “caused by its own dilatory 

behavior.” 

[¶18] On June 17, 2010, less than a week before trial, Judge Downes entered an order on 

Centennial’s motion for sanctions. The order states in relevant part:

From a review of the pleadings and record in this 

matter, it appears that [Centennial] may have good grounds 

justifying an award of substantial sanctions. [AECOM]’s 

pattern of conduct is an egregious violation of the rules 

governing discovery obligations. There must be a biting 

sanction to such dilatory and obstructive conduct. . . .

[AECOM] is forewarned that a monetary sanction is likely to 

be imposed.

[¶19] The case proceeded to trial, resulting in a jury verdict for Centennial. On August 

6, 2010, Centennial filed an additional motion for sanctions against AECOM. The Court 

entered an order granting the motion, finding:

Ms. Richard’s April 16, 2010 certification that AECOM has 

produced the documents specified in the magistrate’s April 

12, 2010 order was not accurate in that one particular 

document was not produced; although Centennial notified 

Ms. Richard that the document had been omitted, Ms. 

Richard let more than a month go by before she produced it 

even though “it would have taken [AECOM] but a few 

minutes to verify that the item had not been produced and to 

cure this violation of the Court’s Order.” 

Ms. Richard failed to comply with the April 27 order in that 

the responses to Centennial’s second discovery request 

contained evasive and bad faith denials of four requests to 

admit, failed to identify any course of dealing evidence,

willfully disregarded the magistrate’s order to identify 

specific documents responsive to the document request and 

withheld responsive documents for months. 

Ms. Richard failed to show the failure to produce responsive 

documents was inadvertent; rather, the record showed “a 

complete disregard of her obligation to act with care and in

good faith.” 

8
Ms. Richard’s belated production in June 2010 of handwritten 

notes of AECOM’s lead witness precluded a fair opportunity 

for Centennial to investigate or discover the true facts, 

prejudicing three of its claims on which it did not succeed at 

trial. 

Ms. Richard’s belated and evasive responses to discovery 

requests relating to Centennial’s interference with contract 

claims caused unfairness to the latter’s ability to present that 

claim; “[h]aving failed to cooperate fairly in responding to . . 

. discovery, [AECOM] then infused corporate 

representatives/trial witness with partial knowledge of partial 

facts, seeking and obtaining tactical advantage in the limited 

time to prepare brought by its own dilatory behavior.” 

[¶20] The Court concluded:

[AECOM]’s pattern of obstructive behavior has been 

pervasive and persistent throughout the entire course of 

written discovery and detrimental to the function of the 

judicial process. [AECOM] has evinced a cavalier disregard 

for the rights of the Plaintiff, the Rules of Civil Procedure 

governing discovery, and the Orders of this Court seeking to 

enforce those rules, and similar behavior continued even after 

the April 12 Order and the April 27 Order spelled out vividly 

the previous departures by [AECOM] from acceptable 

standards of conduct and provided further opportunities for 

[AECOM] to cure the inadequacies and alter the behavior.

Taking into account the willfulness of the discovery misconduct and the prejudice to 

Centennial, the Court ordered AECOM to pay attorney fees in the amount of $58,361.51. 

Ms. Richard appealed the order imposing sanctions to the Tenth Circuit Court of 

Appeals, which affirmed the order. 

[¶21] As a consequence of what occurred in AECOM, counsel for Centennial filed a 

grievance against Ms. Richard with the Board. After conducting an investigation, bar 

counsel filed a charge against Ms. Richard for violating Rules 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 5.1, 5.3, 

8.4(c) and 8.4(d).3 After the hearing, the Board concluded bar counsel proved by clear 

3 Rule 3.3. Candor toward the tribunal.

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:

9

 
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of 

material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;

(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the 

lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or

(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness 

called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer 

shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may 

refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer 

reasonably believes is false.

(b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person 

intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding 

shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.

(c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and 

apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.

(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the 

lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.

Rule 5.1. Responsibilities of partners, managers, and supervisory lawyers.

(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers 

possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the 

firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules 

of Professional Conduct.

(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable 

efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer’s violation of the Rules of Professional 

Conduct if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the 

other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the 

conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial 

action. 

Rule 5.3. Responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistants.

With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:

(a) a partner and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable 

managerial authority in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect 

measures giving reasonable assurance that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional 

obligations of the lawyer;

10

 
and convincing evidence that Ms. Richard violated Rules 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 8.4(c) and 

8.4(d). The Board concluded bar counsel did not prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that Ms. Richard violated Rules 5.1 and 5.3 and dismissed those charges. The Board 

concluded Ms. Richard’s conduct resulted in unnecessary expense and delay and 

AECOM incurred over $250,000 in fees and expenses.

3. Big-D v. Starrett 

[¶22] Ms. Richard represented Starrett Properties, LLC and Morris Starrett (Starrett) in 

this breach of contract case filed in 2008 in the district court in Teton County, Wyoming. 

Big-D sought to recover costs it had incurred in constructing a home on Lot 81. Ms. 

Richard filed a counterclaim on behalf of her clients claiming Big-D breached the 

contract for the home on Lot 81 as well as two other contracts on different lots. 

[¶23] In February 2011, the district court entered an order of partial summary 

adjudication in which it ruled that Starrett was barred from bringing claims relating to the

two lots covered by different contracts. During the deposition of Starrett’s expert 

witness, which was taken after the February 2011 ruling, the following exchange 

occurred during counsel for Big-D’s questioning:

Q. Do you know how much Big-D is claiming in 

escalation costs?

A. If you combine lot 81 and lot 85, around a quarter 

million.

(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts 

to ensure that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and

(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the 

Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct 

involved; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the 

person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a 

time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.

Rule 8.4. Misconduct.

. . . .

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

11

 
Q. Are you aware that the judge has ruled that there are 

no claims on lot 85 allowed in this lawsuit?

Ms. Richards: And I’m going to object because it calls for a 

legal conclusion. 

I think the judge has ruled there are promissory estoppel

claims in this case. The judge has ruled that the 

consequential damage clause bars claims on 81 and 85, but I 

don’t think he’s excluded all promises on 81 and 85, so we’ll 

just agree to disagree. . . .

. . . .

Q. [By Big-D’s counsel] Have you read the Motion for 

Partial Summary Judgment and the order that the judge issued

on that motion?

A. No.

Q. So you’re not aware that he – one of his orders was, 

and I think this is verbatim, “claims related to lot 75 and 85 

are barred”?

Ms. Richards: And, [counsel], I’ll just say again that, you 

know, my hope was you can explore all of his opinions and 

knowledge, then the legal issues will be left for you and I to 

work out.

[¶24] The following exchange occurred during Ms. Richard’s questioning of the witness:

Q. When you looked at documents – now, I guess I 

understood you to say that you looked at project documents 

for all three projects; 81 –

A. Actually, not 75 --

Q. -- 75 and 85.

A. -- to much extent; yeah.

Q. Okay, so you spent most of your time on 81 and 85?

12
A. That’s correct.

[Big-D’s counsel]: And I’m going to object because 85 is 

irrelevant –

Ms. Richard: And you can state your objection.

[Bid D’s counsel]: Yeah, and I’m going to move for a 

mistrial if evidence – and sanctions if evidence regarding 85 

is introduced.

Ms. Richard: And you can make your motion, but I think you 

have to wait until he rules on Monday.

. . . .

Q. [By Ms. Richard]: So, were there any patterns that 

you were able to correlate or notice between 81 and 85 in 

terms of how the projects were managed by Big-D?

[Big-D’s counsel]: I’m going to make a standing objection 

on the record to any questions and any testimony and 

evidence provided regarding lot 85. It’s irrelevant. It’s been 

excluded by the judge.

[¶25] Two days later, Ms. Richard went to opposing counsel’s office. She related what 

had occurred at the deposition to Big D’s co-counsel, who had not been present. She 

informed him that she was not going to accept being threatened with sanctions and said 

she wanted to see if he was involved in his co-counsel’s threat. When asked why she was 

in his office, Ms. Richard said she wanted to make it clear what the limit was so that he 

would understand the boundaries. Ms. Richard tape recorded the confrontation without 

counsel’s knowledge. Counsel sent a letter to bar counsel describing what had occurred 

and stating that Ms. Richard verbally threatened him. 

[¶26] Meanwhile, in late February of 2011, the parties submitted their pretrial 

memoranda. Ms. Richard’s memorandum listed exhibits A through Z, AA through NN, 

BB through LL and OO through VV. On March 7, 2011, one week before trial and three 

days after the pre-trial conference, Ms. Richard submitted an amended pretrial 

memorandum re-listing exhibits A through Z, re-lettering exhibits AA through NN as R1 

through R14 and adding different exhibits as AA through ZZ. On March 11, 2011, at 

4:56 p.m. the Friday before trial was to begin the following Monday, Ms. Richard filed a 

revised exhibit list adding exhibits AAA through HHH. Ms. Richard sent the revised 

13
exhibit list to opposing counsel the following day, Saturday, March 12, two days before 

trial. 

[¶27] On the first day of trial, opposing counsel informed Judge Sanderson that Ms. 

Richard’s latest revised exhibit list included exhibits she had never seen. Ms. Richard

told the judge the only new exhibits were deposition transcripts. In fact, in addition to 

deposition transcripts, the late filed revised list included the following categories of 

exhibits that had not been previously listed: 

DDD Big D Emails

EEE Sterrett Defendants Emails

FFF Lot 85 Pay Applications and Change Orders

GGG Lot 81 Change Orders

HHH Big D Project Files, Lots 75, 81 and 85.

[¶28] On March 15, 2011, Judge Sanderson continued the trial indefinitely so that a 

number of matters raised by Ms. Richard could be briefed, considered and ruled upon. 

After further consideration, the judge declared a mistrial and released the jury. The trial 

was re-scheduled for October 2011. Subsequently, pretrial motions were filed and the 

judge entered orders precluding Ms. Richard from amending her counterclaim to add a 

promissory estoppel claim in regard to Lot 85; introducing any claims or evidence 

relating to Lot 75 or 85 (this was the second time the Court made this ruling); bringing 

claims for quality or defective work relating to Lot 81; and, in light of the waiver 

provision in the contract, claiming consequential or delay damages. 

[¶29] Big-D then filed a motion for partial summary judgment in regard to the amount 

due under the prime contract and two change orders. The court granted the motion, 

finding there was a valid, unambiguous contract for Lot 81; the contract was properly 

modified by the two change orders; the total contract price after the change orders was 

$1,509,811.00; Sterrett paid $1,194,425.04 of the amount owed and, therefore, breached 

the contract by failing to pay the remaining $315,386.42; Sterrett also owed interest in the 

amount of $126,225.99; the only issues remaining for trial were Big-D’s breach of 

contract and unjust enrichment claims related to two additional change orders and 

Sterretts’ counterclaim for breach of contract related to delay. Concerned that the 

remaining claims were not viable, Judge Sanderson asked the parties to present briefs 

defending the remaining claims. After considering the briefs, he dismissed the remaining 

claims with prejudice. 

[¶30] In his decision letter issued prior to the order of the dismissal, Judge Sanderson

stated:

The Court has made a continual and repeated effort in pretrial 

conferences (note the plural) and summary judgment motions 

14
to get the Defendant to simplify the issues by stating exactly 

what is being claimed and on what legal theory it relies. The 

Court needed to get the case simplified so it could make 

proper evidentiary rulings and proper jury instructions so the 

jury could decide the case. The Court believes it is an 

attorney’s duty as an officer of the court to assist in this while 

still representing her/his client’s interests. . . .

The Court has ruled on motions for partial summary 

adjudication . . . only to see the same claims dressed 

differently raised again. At last instance the Court even 

raised the point that the contract appeared to cover all of the 

disputes and constituted the entire agreement of the parties 

and gave the parties the time they requested to point out 

where the Court was wrong. The only thing that came up at 

this hearing where there may be a dispute that fell within a 

breach of contract was that a stainless steel range hood was 

used rather than a more expensive copper one and that there 

were going to be fancier garage doors. This being the only 

apparent dispute, Ms. Richard did not state what the amount 

of the damage was at the hearing. Counsel has the duty of 

making sure that the counterclaim meets the subject matter 

jurisdiction of this Court.

The other matters, i.e. the interest calculation and other 

credits were either not raised at all or not with sufficient 

particularity for the Court to conclude there was a genuine 

dispute.

The Court agrees that the pleadings filed after 

November 10, 2011 are simply an effort to revive or 

reconsider what has already been ruled upon. The Motion to 

Strike [filed by Big-D] is granted.

As to [Big-D’s] motion for sanctions, the Court 

believes the granting of [the] motion to strike pleadings 

adequately resolves the matter[.]

In summary, the court acknowledges that the

Defendant may have lost a legitimate basis for an offset 

somewhere, but it was the Defendant’s responsibility to state 

it clearly and cogently within the times previously set. The 

15
Court can only rule on what is presented, not on what is 

brought up afterward. 

[¶31] Both parties appealed the order of dismissal. One of the issues presented on appeal 

was whether Mr. Sterrett was individually liable for the amount awarded in the partial 

summary judgment. Big-D Signature Corp. v. Sterrett Properties, 2012 WY 138, ¶¶ 27-

28, 288 P.3d 72, 79 (Wyo. 2012). Based upon Ms. Richard’s concession during oral 

argument, this Court concluded the contract bound him individually. During her 

argument, Ms. Richard told the Court a particular affidavit was included in the appellate 

record; in fact, the affidavit was not in the record. This Court found in favor of Big-D on 

all other substantive issues presented, including Sterrett’s counterclaim and whether BigD was entitled to relief under the two additional change orders on the basis of an oral 

contract. The latter issue was remanded to the district court. 

[¶32] Back in district court, Big-D moved for dismissal of the case, stating that it had 

analyzed the costs and benefits of pursuing the claims arising from the two additional 

change orders and was electing not to pursue them. Sterrett v. Big-D, 2013 WY 154, ¶ 6, 

314 P.3d 1155, 1156-57 (Wyo. 2013). Ms. Richard filed an objection to the motion 

asserting that final judgment was not appropriate until her counterclaim had been 

adjudicated. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the 

counterclaim had been dismissed in the original action and that dismissal had been 

affirmed by this Court on appeal. After the district court entered the order of dismissal, 

Ms. Richard filed a motion for costs and attorney fees, even though judgment had been 

entered against her client for $441,612.41 in the original action. The district court denied 

the motion and, on Big-D’s motion, awarded sanctions against Ms. Richard. 

[¶33] Meanwhile, Ms. Richard appealed the orders dismissing Big-D’s claims on the two 

additional change orders and denying her claim for attorney fees. This Court held that no

counterclaims remained for trial after we affirmed the district court’s order dismissing 

them in the first appeal and any other claims were moot upon the district court’s 

subsequent order dismissing them on Big-D’s motion. We further held that the district 

court properly denied Ms. Richard’s motion for attorney fees, stating “it would be absurd 

to classify [her clients] as the ‘prevailing party’” given that a judgment of over 

$400,000.00 was entered against them in the litigation. 

 

[¶34] As a consequence of Ms. Richard’s actions, counsel for Big-D filed a grievance 

against Ms. Richard with the Board. After investigating, bar counsel filed charges 

against Ms. Richard claiming she violated Rules 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 5.1, 5.3, 8.4(c) and 8.4(d). 

The Board concluded bar counsel proved by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. 

Richard violated Rules 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 8.4(c) and 8.4(d). The Board concluded bar counsel 

did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Richard violated Rules 5.1 and 

5.3 and dismissed those charges. The Board concluded Ms. Richard’s conduct exposed 

16
the parties to unnecessary expense and delay and her clients incurred over $125,000 in 

fees and expenses.

 

4. Haden v. Bontecou Construction

[¶35] Ms. Richard represented Bontecou Construction in this dispute between a 

homeowner and a builder over the cost of construction of a house in Teton County, 

Wyoming. A series of emails contained in the record reflects that counsel for Haden 

requested that a computer be produced at a deposition scheduled on November 4, 2009. 

The computer was not produced and it was not until December 10, 2009, that Ms. 

Richard produced documents obtained from an inspection of the computer. Ms. Richard

did not produce the privilege log showing what documents she withheld until December 

22, 2009. 

[¶36] On February 9, 2010, counsel for Haden filed a request for inspection of other 

computers containing Bontecou’s files on the construction. Ms. Richard objected, 

asserting the request was overly broad and burdensome. Judge Guthrie granted the 

request on March 24, 2010, noting that the scope of the request was identical to an earlier 

request made by Ms. Richard for computer inspection and was not, therefore, overly 

broad or burdensome. When the inspection still did not occur, Haden filed a motion for 

forensic inspection of Bontecou’s computers on May 6, 2010. 

[¶37] On May 13, 2010, counsel for Haden also filed a motion to compel production of 

the privilege log for Mr. Bontecou’s electronic files and for sanctions for discovery 

abuses. Ms. Richard filed an opposition to the motion and counsel for Haden submitted a 

reply brief to which he attached the April 12, 2010, and April 27, 2010, discovery orders 

issued by the federal magistrate in Centennial v. AECOM. Counsel sought to show a 

pattern of discovery abuse by Ms. Richard. Two weeks later, Ms. Richard arrived at the 

offices of Haden’s counsel and demanded to speak with opposing counsel. When she 

was told he was on the phone, Ms. Richard proceeded to his office, ordered him to get off 

the phone, demanded to know where he got the AECOM orders and told him “you have 

no idea who you’re messing with” and “I will bring the full weight of this upon you.” 

Ms. Richard followed up the confrontation with a letter threatening to seek W.R.C.P. 11 

sanctions if counsel did not withdraw his reply brief. 

[¶38] In early June 2010, counsel for Haden contacted Ms. Richard about setting up a 

time for his forensic computer inspector to have access to the Bontecou computers. After 

several emails back and forth, Ms. Richard stated the inspection could be scheduled “for 

any day the following week.” Counsel for Haden replied that his inspector could be there 

June 16, at 9:00 a.m. and reiterated an earlier request for specific information about the 

computers so the inspection could be performed. On June 14 and 15, counsel for Haden 

followed up with emails informing Ms. Richard that the inspector would arrive for the 

inspection by 10:30 at the latest and needed the information requested earlier. On June 

17
16, 2010, the inspector arrived at Bontecou’s offices and was not allowed inside. 

Counsel for Haden emailed Ms. Richard at 10:40 that morning, asked when he would be 

allowed in and reiterated that time for the inspection was limited because his inspector 

was scheduled to fly out at 5:40 that evening. Counsel sent a second email at 11:30 a.m. 

stating that if the inspector was not allowed in by noon, he might not be able to complete 

the inspection. Ms. Richard replied that she would be at Bontecou’s offices at noon and 

the inspection could take place then. Upon being allowed in, Haden’s inspector was 

presented with a modified copy of the inspection protocol the court had approved. The 

original protocol allowed inspection of an external hard drive containing time capsule 

information; the modification did not allow inspection of the hard drive. Ms. Richard

told the inspector that opposing counsel had agreed to modify the protocol. Opposing 

counsel knew nothing about the modification until the inspector informed him. 

[¶39] In order to complete the inspection, Haden’s forensic computer inspector 

rescheduled his departure time to the following afternoon. Counsel informed Ms. 

Richard and stated that if access was not provided to the external hard drive, he would 

ask for an emergency hearing. The following day, Ms. Richard wrote a letter to opposing 

counsel stating that he had unilaterally scheduled the inspection, the inspection took 

longer than expected due to the inspector’s software and Mr. Haden would have to bear 

that expense as well as the expense associated with disrupting Bountecou’s business 

during the inspection. She requested payment in the amount of $1,375.00 by June 25, 

2010. 

[¶40] Haden’s counsel filed a grievance against Ms. Richard. After investigating the 

claims, bar counsel charged Ms. Richard with violations of Rules 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 8.4(c) and 

8.4(d). The Board concluded bar counsel proved by clear and convincing evidence that 

Ms. Richard violated Rules 3.2, 3.4 and 8.4(c) but did not meet his burden of proving 

violations of Rules 3.1 and 8.4(d). 

5. Shindell v. Shindell

[¶41] This was a divorce action filed in district court in Teton County. The divorce 

decree entered in 2004 awarded primary custody of the parties’ two minor children to the 

mother and liberal visitation to the father. Seven years later, in 2011, Ms. Richard filed a 

petition on behalf of the mother to modify visitation by either suspending father’s 

visitation until the Department of Family Services (DFS) could investigate or requiring

visitation to occur in Jackson, Wyoming. The petition alleged: “A licensed professional 

counselor has concerns that [father] is abusive to the children both emotionally and, at 

times, physically” and “does not appear to have the ability to provide adequate care for 

each child” during visitation. The petition further alleged that counsel “is of the opinion 

that [father]’s interaction and communication with the children has deteriorated and is 

increasingly abusive and destructive.” 

18
[¶42] In support of the petition, Ms. Richard presented an affidavit from the licensed 

professional counselor which stated:

1. I am a licensed Professional Counselor in the State of 

Wyoming.

2. I have interviewed the Shindell children.

3. It is my opinion that [father]’s behavior towards his

children creates concerns that [he] is abusive to the 

children both emotionally and physically.

4. In my opinion, it does not appear that [father] has the 

ability to provide adequate care for each child throughout 

each period of responsibility and visitation.

5. I believe that [father]’s interaction and communication 

with the children has deteriorated and is increasingly 

abusive and destructive.

[¶43] At a hearing on the petition, the counselor testified that he had not treated the 

Shindell children since 2002 or 2003; his only meeting with them since 2003 was for 

about a half-hour when he met with them to explain the legal process for the hearing; he 

had never diagnosed, tested or had anyone else test the children; he was not qualified to 

perform a formal psychological assessment and had not done so with the children; and 

virtually everything he had to say at the hearing was based on what the mother told him. 

Upon questioning by Judge Tyler, the following exchange occurred:

Court: . . . Are you a counselor for these girls or not?

Witness: No, not at present.

Court: And in what capacity are you coming forward with 

opinions if you’re not their counselor?

Witness: As their former counselor and as a trusted 

advisor to their mother.

Court: Is the manner in which you conducted this 

interview with the girls on that one occasion for however 

long it was on whatever date it was your normal way of 

conducting your professional services?

19
Witness: No. 

Judge Tyler ruled the testimony was inadmissible.

[¶44] Counsel for the father filed a grievance against Ms. Richard. After investigating, 

bar counsel filed charges against Ms. Richard for violations of Rules 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 8.4(c) 

and 8.4(d). After the hearing, the Board concluded bar counsel met his burden of proving 

all of the violations except the alleged violation of Rule 3.4, which it dismissed. 

6. Miller v. Henderson 

 

[¶45] Ms. Richard represented the plaintiff in this proceeding filed in district court in 

Teton County. On August 23, 2012, Ms. Richard served notice of the video deposition 

testimony of a witness to take place the following day. During opposing counsel’s crossexamination of the witness, Ms. Richard interrupted and asked to be allowed to proceed 

with re-direct examination, saying that she had to leave. Opposing counsel objected and 

Ms. Richard proceeded to question the witness. When Ms. Richard continued her 

questioning over counsel’s repeated objection, counsel called the judge and a telephone 

hearing was conducted. Judge James ruled that opposing counsel would be allowed to 

complete his cross-examination before Ms. Richard conducted re-direct examination and 

declined to impose a time limit on cross-examination. After Judge James’ ruling, Ms. 

Richard continued to ask her to impose a time limit on cross-examination. When the 

telephone hearing concluded, Ms. Richard persisted in her demand that she be allowed to 

question the witness and that opposing counsel limit his cross-examination to a specified 

time.

[¶46] As a result of her conduct during the video tape deposition, bar counsel charged 

Ms. Richard with violating Rule 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 8.4(c) and 8.4(d).4

 After deliberating, 

the Board concluded there was clear and convincing evidence of violations of Rules 3.4, 

3.5 and 8.4(d), but dismissed the charges under Rules 3.1, 3.3 and 8.4(c). 

7. Dorf v. City of Evansville

[¶47] Ms. Richard represented the plaintiff in this action filed in federal district court 

against the City and two individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Judge Skavdahl granted the 

individual defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on April 22, 2012, finding 

4 Rule 3.5. Impartiality and decorum of the tribunal.

A lawyer shall not:

(a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law;

20

 
that the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief. On 

September 7, 2012, the court likewise dismissed the complaint against the City. In the 

later order, Judge Skavdahl described the following events:

The day before the deadline for responding to the 

City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, Ms. Richard

filed a motion for extension of time. She did not indicate she 

would be asking the court to reconsider its ruling [as to the 

individual defendants] or that she would be seeking leave to 

amend the complaint. At 11:52 p.m. on the day her response 

was due, Ms. Richard filed a motion for reconsideration, 

opposition to the City’s motion and motion to amend the 

amended complaint. The following day, she filed a revised 

motion for reconsideration and opposition to the City’s 

motion. An hour later, she filed a motion seeking additional 

time to file the revised motion and opposition, stating that the 

revision was necessary to correct typographical errors and

add additional authority and subsequent history of cited cases

and an extension should be granted in the interests of justice.

After the clerk’s office advised Ms. Richard that filing 

two separate documents in a single submission violated the 

court’s electronic case filing procedures and she needed to 

file her motion for reconsideration and response to the City’s 

motion as separate documents, Ms. Richard re-filed the same 

exact document twice, stating that the authority and argument 

supporting both pleadings was the same. Ms. Richard did not 

separate the facts, supporting authority and argument relating 

to her motion to reconsider from those relating to her 

response to the City’s motion. 

[¶48] Judge Skavdahl expressed uncertainty about which version of Ms. Richard’s brief 

he should properly consider—the one filed at 11:52 p.m. on the date to which the original 

deadline had been extended or the revised motion filed the following evening. 

Considering the reasons Ms. Richard gave for the revised motion, the judge concluded 

she had filed a rough draft of the motion and response on the due date and sought to file a 

corrected version the following evening. Citing a previous order he had entered striking 

a supplemental post-deadline memorandum Ms. Richard had filed under substantially 

similar circumstances and for which she failed to establish either good cause or excusable 

neglect, Judge Skavdahl stated “[t]his practice illustrates a troubling and unmistakable 

pattern in counsel’s approach to briefing.”

21
[¶49] Judge Skavdahl acknowledged that striking the revised brief was warranted, but 

declined to do so. He recognized Ms. Richard’s “ongoing failure to adhere to the 

deadlines of the Court” and the difficulties presented to the defendants faced with 

reading, comparing and responding to multiple versions of the same brief; he concluded, 

however, that Ms. Richard’s failings should not work a hardship on her client. Judge 

Skavdahl considered the late filed revised motion and response and granted judgment on 

the pleadings for the defendants.

[¶50] Bar counsel charged Ms. Richard with violating Rules 1.1, 3.1, 3.4(c) and 8.4(d).5

 

After hearing the evidence and deliberating, the Board concluded bar counsel had proved 

by clear and convincing evidence violations of Rules 3.1, 3.4(c) and 8.4(d) but not a 

violation of Rule 1.1 and dismissed the latter charge. 

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE

[¶51] The purposes of the state bar disciplinary procedure are to maintain “the integrity 

of the bar,” “to prevent the transgressions of an individual lawyer from bringing its image 

into disrepute” and to “protect the public and the administration of justice.” Bd. of Prof’l

Responsibility v. Casper, 2014 WY 22, ¶ 7, 318 P.3d 790, 793 (Wyo. 2014); Bd. of Prof’l 

Responsibility v. Davidson, 2009 WY 48, ¶ 17, 205 P.3d 1008, 1015 (Wyo. 2009); In re

Clark, 613 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Wyo. 1980). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-2-114 (LexisNexis 2013) 

charges this Court with adopting rules of “practice and procedure in all courts of this 

state, for the purpose of promoting the speedy and efficient determination of litigation 

upon its merits.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-2-118 (a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2013) further charges 

this Court with adopting rules establishing “practice and procedure for disciplining, 

suspending, and disbarring attorneys.” 

[¶52] Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-5-104 (LexisNexis 2013), membership to the bar 

is by petition to the Wyoming Supreme Court. Pursuant to §1(a) of the Disciplinary 

Code for the Wyoming State Bar, attorneys are “subject to the exclusive disciplinary 

jurisdiction of this Court and the Board . . . .” Disciplinary proceedings are “necessarily 

incident to the inherent power of courts to control properly their own affairs.” State Bd. 

of Law Examiners v. Brown, 53 Wyo. 42, 49, 77 P.2d 626, 628 (Wyo. 1938). The Board 

acts as an arm of this Court in taking evidence and making findings and 

recommendations to this Court. Mendicino v. Whitchurch, 565 P.2d 460, 475 (Wyo. 

1977). Although we give due consideration to the Board’s findings and 

5 Rule 1.1. Competence.

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires 

the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.

22

 
recommendations, the “ultimate judgment in these cases is vested in the Court.” Casper, 

¶ 8, 318 P.3d at 793-94, citing Mendicino, 565 P.2d at 466. See also Davidson, ¶ 1, 205 

P.3d at 1012. 

[¶53] In determining whether discipline is appropriate in these special proceedings, this 

Court must be satisfied that “substantial, clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence” 

exists to sustain the findings of the Board. Mendicino, 565 P.2d at 475. Clear and 

convincing evidence is “that kind of proof that would persuade a trier of fact that the truth 

of the contention is highly probable.” SMH v. State, 2012 WY 165, ¶ 19, 290 P.3d 1104, 

1109 (Wyo. 2012); Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283, 291 (Wyo. 1989). The clear and 

convincing standard must be applied consistently to each and every charge against the 

attorney. Id. 

DISCUSSION

[¶54] Ms. Richard conceded generally at the hearing before the Board that she failed to 

adhere to the rules of the tribunal in Fields, AECOM, Sterrett, Miller and Dorf. Through 

counsel, she admitted during oral argument before this Court that her conduct probably

violated in many instances the Code of Professional Conduct. Counsel specifically 

conceded that Ms. Richard’s attempts to comply with the magistrate’s discovery orders in 

AECOM fell short and were improper. Despite these general concessions and 

admissions, we find it appropriate to address the specific rules Ms. Richard’s is alleged to 

have violated and the conduct supporting our conclusion that she violated those rules. 

Meritorious Claims and Contentions – Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 3.1

[¶55] As reflected in footnote 1, Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 3.1(a) and (c), respectively,

prohibit a lawyer from asserting frivolous claims and provide that by his or her signature 

an attorney certifies that a court document is not submitted for an improper purpose, such 

as unnecessary delay or to increase the cost of litigation. In Fields, after service of 

discovery requests on her clients in August of 2006, Ms. Richard still had not provided 

adequate responses three months later when Judge Guthrie entered the first court order 

requiring her to participate in meaningful discovery. Despite Judge Guthrie’s order, Ms. 

Richard still had not provided complete discovery responses nearly a year later when in 

September 2007, Judge Cranfill issued his decision letter again ordering her clients to 

provide detailed answers to the same discovery requests indentified in the earlier order. 

After a hearing in January 2008, nearly a year and a half after service of the discovery 

requests and after a third motion to compel, Judge Cranfill in March of 2008 dismissed 

the case with prejudice based solely on the egregious failure by Ms. Richard and her 

clients to comply with the court’s orders to provide meaningful discovery.

[¶56] In the three orders entered over the course of nearly a year and a half, two district 

judges concluded that Ms. Richard had not participated in meaningful discovery and 

23
disregarded their orders to do so. By her conduct, Ms. Richard caused unnecessary delay 

and increased the cost of litigation. Clear and convincing evidence supports the 

conclusion that in Fields Ms. Richard violated Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 3.1.

[¶57] As noted above, counsel for Ms. Richard conceded in oral argument that his client 

failed to comply with the magistrate’s discovery orders in AECOM. The record also 

shows that rather than complying with one of those orders, Ms. Richard appealed the 

order to Judge Downes. Even after orders from the magistrate and Judge Downes 

required her to provide proper discovery responses, Ms. Richard continued to withhold

discovery resulting in another motion to compel and order granting the motion. Ms. 

Richard also made frivolous claims in AECOM. First, after pleading the parties prior 

course of dealings in her answer, she claimed that evidence of the parties’ prior dealings 

was not relevant and would not be produced. Second, after incorrectly attributing the 

$50,000 cost overrun figure to Centennial in her answer, she continued to make the same 

assertion in court documents even after her witness testified the figure was not 

Centennial’s, but his. Ultimately, Judge Downes concluded Ms. Richard’s obstructive 

behavior was willful, detrimental to the judicial process and departed from acceptable 

standards of conduct and imposed sanctions of nearly $60,000. Consistent with her 

earlier behavior in the case, Ms. Richard appealed the order imposing sanctions to the 

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The order was affirmed. As in Fields, Ms. Richard’s 

actions in AECOM caused unnecessary delay and increased the cost of litigation. Clear 

and convincing evidence supports the conclusion that Ms. Richard violated Wyo. R. Prof.

Conduct 3.1 in AECOM.

[¶58] Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 3.1 (a) prohibits a lawyer from asserting an issue unless 

there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous. Rule 3.1 (c) 

contemplates that by his or her signature, a lawyer certifies that a pleading is well 

grounded in fact and warranted by good faith argument. In Shindell, Ms. Richard drafted 

and signed a pleading in 2011 asserting the father was physically and emotionally 

abusive to his children, lacked the ability to provide adequate care for them during 

visitation and was increasingly abusive and destructive. When Ms. Richard made these 

assertions in the pleading, the counselor upon whose opinions she was relying was not 

the children’s counselor and had not been their counselor since 2002 or 2003. Under 

these circumstances, the assertions in her 2011 pleading concerning the father were not 

well grounded in fact and were not warranted by good faith argument. Clear and 

convincing evidence supports the conclusion that Ms. Richard violated Wyo. R. Prof.

Conduct 3.1 in Shindell. 

[¶59] In Dorf, after obtaining an extension of time to file a responsive brief, Ms. Richard 

signed and filed a few minutes before midnight on the due date a rough draft of the brief

containing typographical errors and incomplete citations to legal authority. In the same 

document, she requested leave to amend her complaint and asked the court to reconsider 

a prior ruling. She attempted to correct the errors in the brief by filing revisions the 

24
following evening after the deadline. Still later, she filed a motion for an extension of the 

already extended deadline to allow her to file the revisions. Upon being informed the 

rules did not allow her to submit two documents in one submission and she would need to 

re-file her brief and motion to amend separately, Ms. Richard re-filed the same document 

twice, stating that the same argument and authority applied to both. Ms. Richard’s 

request for an extension of time to fix typographical errors and provide complete legal 

authority to what amounted to a rough draft did not constitute a good faith argument for 

the extension. Clear and convincing evidence supports the conclusion that in Dorf Ms. 

Richard violated Rule 3.1. 

Expediting Litigation – Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 3.2

[¶60] Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 3.2, set out in footnote 1, requires a lawyer to make 

reasonable efforts to expedite litigation. As reflected in the facts and discussion above, 

Ms. Richard by her actions did the exact opposite in Fields and AECOM. Discovery that 

should have been provided earlier was not provided, nor was it provided after court 

orders to produce it. Rather than expediting the litigation, Ms. Richard’s refusal resulted 

in dismissal of the complaint in Fields and delay and significant monetary sanctions in 

AECOM. Clear and convincing evidence supports the conclusion that in Fields and 

AECOM Ms. Richard violated Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 3.2. The record likewise supports 

that conclusion in Starrett and Haden. 

[¶61] In Starrett, Ms. Richard persisted in attempting to discover evidence concerning 

two lots after the district court barred claims concerning those lots. Additionally, after 

submitting her pretrial memorandum listing Starrett’s exhibits and after the pretrial 

conference, Ms. Richard submitted an amended exhibit list one week before trial in 

which she re-numbered previous exhibits and added new ones. Two days before trial she 

submitted yet another revised exhibit list adding differently numbered and new exhibits. 

Judge Sanderson’s orders also reflect difficulty in getting Ms. Richard to simplify the 

issues so the court could make evidentiary rulings and delay caused by motions to revive 

or reconsider matters previously decided. After Judge Sanderson dismissed her 

counterclaim, Ms. Richard appealed and this Court affirmed his decision. After Judge 

Sanderson dismissed the remaining claims on remand, Ms. Richard filed a second appeal 

claiming again that the counterclaim survived. She also claimed error in the denial of her 

motion for attorney fees, even though her client clearly was not the prevailing party in the 

litigation. Contrary to Rule 3.2, these actions by Ms. Richard unnecessarily delayed 

rather than expedited the litigation. 

[¶62] The record in Haden likewise reflects a course of action on Ms. Richard’s part that 

delayed and obstructed the litigation. Despite opposing counsel’s repeated efforts to 

obtain discovery, Ms. Richard unreasonably delayed in producing computers for 

inspection, documents obtained from computer inspections and privilege logs identifying 

documents that were withheld. Her actions with regard to the inspection when it finally 

25
did occur were obstructionist and caused further expense and delay. Clear and 

convincing evidence supports the conclusion that she violated Rule 3.2.

Candor Toward the Tribunal – Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3

[¶63] Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a) prohibits a lawyer from making a false statement of 

fact or law to a tribunal and, when such a statement is made, requires a lawyer to correct 

it. Rule 3.3(c) prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence that he or she knows to be false 

and requires the lawyer to take remedial measures if such evidence is offered. In 

AECOM, evidence was presented that Ms. Richard said she would disclose information 

and then did not disclose it. She also filed an affidavit stating that she had reviewed all 

the documents she was withholding and they were privileged or prepared in anticipation 

of litigation when many of the documents clearly were not privilege or prepared in 

anticipation of litigation. In addition, Ms. Richard made an allegation in her 

counterclaim that was not true; then, even after a witness testified it was not true, Ms. 

Richard submitted a pretrial memorandum and jury instruction to the court containing the 

same false allegation. She stated facts in her brief in response to a summary judgment 

motion that were not supported by the referenced affidavit. Clear and convincing 

evidence supports the conclusion that Ms. Richard’s actions in AECOM violated Wyo. R.

Prof. Conduct 3.3. 

[¶64] Ms. Richard likewise violated Rule 3.3 when in Starrett she represented to the 

court that her re-revised exhibit list submitted two days before trial added only 

depositions when, in fact, her final exhibit list identified other exhibits that had not been 

listed previously. Finally, the statement in her 2011 petition in Shindell that a counselor 

who had not seen the children since 2002 and 2003 believed their father was 

“increasingly abusive” supports the conclusion that Ms. Richard violated Rule 3.3. The 

statements are particularly troubling given that they were made in a case involving 

children where candor before the tribunal is especially critical. 

Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel – Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4

[¶65] Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4 prohibits a lawyer from obstructing another party’s 

access to evidence or knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of the tribunal 

and requires a lawyer to make reasonably diligent efforts to comply with proper 

discovery requests. As discussed above, Ms. Richard obstructed another party’s access to 

evidence and failed to make reasonable efforts to comply with proper discovery requests 

in Fields, AECOM, Starrett and Haden by refusing to produce discoverable information, 

forcing opposing counsel to file repeated motions to compel and disobeying court orders 

to produce the requested information.

[¶66] Additionally, Ms. Richard knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of 

the tribunal in Miller when after Judge James ruled that opposing counsel would be 

26
allowed to finish his cross examination and no time limit would be set, she continued to 

insist on setting a time limit. Our review of the video tape confirms that she acted in 

deliberate indifference to fundamental discovery rules, the judge’s order, the rules of 

professional conduct and basic professionalism. Ms. Richard also knowingly disobeyed 

an obligation under the rules of the tribunal in Dorf when she filed a rough draft of a brief 

and then, after the filing deadline had passed, filed a corrected version and, still later, 

filed a motion to file the corrected version. Clear and convincing evidence exists in these 

six cases that Ms. Richard violated Rule 3.4. 

Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal – Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 3.5

[¶67] Rule 3.5(d) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a 

tribunal. Comment [5] specifies that the duty to refrain from disruptive conduct applies 

to any proceeding of a tribunal, including a deposition. In Miller, Ms. Richard engaged 

in disruptive conduct when, during the video-tape trial deposition, she interrupted 

opposing counsel’s cross examination of the witness and insisted that she be allowed to 

finish her questioning so that she could leave. When opposing counsel objected, Ms. 

Richard questioned the witness over his efforts to stop her. After a phone call to the 

district court judge, who ruled that opposing counsel was allowed to complete his cross 

examination before Ms. Richard resumed questioning and no time limit would be set on 

the examination, Ms. Richard continued to argue that time limits be set. When the phone 

call concluded, Ms. Richard ignored the judge’s ruling and demanded that opposing 

counsel limit his questioning to a specific time. The record demonstrates that Ms. 

Richard violated Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 3.5 in Miller.

Misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation – Wyo. R. Prof. 

Conduct 8.4(c)

[¶68] Rule 8.4(c) provides that a lawyer commits professional misconduct when he or 

she engages in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. The 

evidence in AECOM, Starrett, Haden and Shindell demonstrates that Ms. Richard made 

repeated misrepresentations concerning discovery and other matters and proves clearly 

and convincingly that she violated Rule 8.4(c).

Misconduct – conduct prejudicial to administration of justice – Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 

8.4(d)

[¶69] Rule 8.4(d) provides that a lawyer commits professional misconduct when he or 

she engages in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Ms. Richard’s 

conduct in AECOM, Starrett, Shindell, Miller and Dorf was prejudicial to the 

administration of justice. The evidence clearly and convincingly shows that she violated 

Rule 8.4(d).

27
Determination of Appropriate Sanctions

[¶70] In its Report and Recommendation regarding imposition of appropriate sanctions, 

the Board found in pertinent part as follows:

267. In determining an appropriate sanction, the 

Board is guided by the American Bar Association’s 

“Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline” (hereafter

referred to as the “ABA Standards”) which state, “The 

purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings is to protect the 

public and the administration of justice from lawyers who

have not discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely 

properly to discharge their professional duties to clients, the 

public, the legal system, and the legal profession.”

268. ABA Standard 3.0 lists four factors to be 

considered in imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer 

misconduct:

(a) the duty violated;

(b) the lawyer’s mental state;

(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s 

misconduct; and

(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.

The First Factor: The Duty Violated

269. Much of Respondent’s misconduct falls within

the heading “Violation of Duties Owed to the Legal System,” 

which the ABA Standards subcategorize as “False 

Statements, Fraud and Misrepresentation” (Standard 6.1) 

and “Abuse of the Legal Process” (Standard 6.2). These 

standards apply to situations in which lawyers are found to 

have violated Rules 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.

270. Standard 6.1, “False Statements, Fraud, and 

Misrepresentation,” provides:

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon

application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the

following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases

involving conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 

28
justice or that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation to a court:

6.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a 

lawyer, with the intent to deceive the court, makes a 

false statement, submits a false document, or improperly 

withholds material information, and causes serious or 

potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a 

significant or potentially significant adverse effect on 

the legal proceeding.

6.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a 

lawyer knows that false statements or documents are 

being submitted to the court or that material information 

is improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial 

action, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to 

the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially 

adverse effect on the legal proceeding.

6.13 Reprimand [i.e., “public censure” under Section

4(a)(iii) of Wyoming’s Disciplinary Code] is generally

appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in 

determining whether the statements or documents are 

false or in taking remedial action when material 

information is being withheld, and causes injury or 

potential injury to a party to the legal system, or causes 

an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal 

proceeding.

6.14. Admonition [i.e., “private reprimand” under 

Section 4(b) of Wyoming’s Disciplinary Code] is 

generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an 

isolated instance of neglect in determining whether the 

submitted statements or documents are false or in failing 

to disclose material information upon learning of its 

falsity, and causes little or no actual or potential injury 

to a party, or causes little or no adverse or potentially 

adverse effect on the legal proceeding.

271. [Standard] 6.2, “Abuse of the Legal Process,” 

provides:

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, 

upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the

following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases

involving failure to expedite litigation or bring a meritorious 

29
claim, or failure to obey any obligation under the rules of the 

tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that 

no valid obligation exists:

6.21 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a 

lawyer knowingly violates a court order or a rule with 

the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, 

and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party 

or causes serious or potentially serious interference with 

a legal proceeding.

6.22 Suspension is generally appropriate when a 

lawyer knows that he or she is violating a court order or 

rule, and causes injury or potential injury to a client or a 

party, or causes interference or potential interference 

with a legal proceeding.

6.23 Reprimand [i.e., “public censure” under Section

4(a)(iii) of Wyoming’s Disciplinary Code] is generally

appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails to comply 

with a court order or rule, and causes injury or potential 

injury to a client or other party, or causes interference or 

potential interference with a legal proceeding. 

6.24 Admonition [i.e., “private reprimand” under 

Section 4(b) of Wyoming’s Disciplinary Code] is 

generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an 

isolated instance of negligence in complying with a 

court order or rule, and causes little or no actual or 

potential injury to a party, or causes little or no actual or 

potential interference with a legal proceeding.

272. Standard 5.1 sets forth the sanction guidelines 

for lawyers who demonstrate a failure to maintain personal 

integrity and is applicable to situations in which lawyers have 

committed a violation of Rule 8.4(c) (conduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation): 

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon

application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the

following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases [. . .] 

with conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation:

5.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when:

(a) [criminal act]

30
(b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional 

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation that seriously adversely 

reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.

 

5.12 [Criminal conduct]

5.13 Reprimand [i.e., “public censure” under Section

4(a)(iii) of Wyoming’s Disciplinary Code] is generally

appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in any 

other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the 

lawyer’s fitness to practice law.

5.14 Admonition [i.e., “private reprimand” under 

Section 4(b) of Wyoming’s Disciplinary Code] is 

generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in any 

other conduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s 

fitness to practice law. 

The Second Factor: The Lawyer’s Mental State

273. The preamble to the ABA Standards includes 

the following discussion regarding mental state:

The mental states used in this model are defined as 

follows. The most culpable mental state is that of intent, 

when the lawyer acts with the conscious objective or 

purpose to accomplish a particular result. The next most 

culpable mental state is that of knowledge, when the 

lawyer acts with conscious awareness of the nature or 

attendant circumstances of his or her conduct both 

without the conscious objective or purpose to 

accomplish a particular result. The least culpable mental 

state is negligence, when a lawyer fails to be aware of a 

substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result 

will follow, which failure is a deviation of a care that a 

reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation.

274. Given that the Board has found multiple 

violations of each of these categories of the Rules, the

appropriate sanction under the Guidelines therefore turns on 

whether the Board finds Respondent to have acted 

“knowingly” or “intentionally” as so defined. There is no 

31
question under the clear and convincing evidence presented at 

the hearing but that Respondent’s misconduct was intentional.

The Third Factor: The Potential or Actual Injury Caused by 

the Lawyer’s Misconduct

275. Under the ABA Standards, “injury” is defined 

as “harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or the 

profession which results from a lawyer’s misconduct. The 

level of injury can range from ‘serious’ injury to ‘little or no’ 

injury; a reference to ‘injury’ alone indicates any level of 

injury greater than ‘little or no’ injury.” “Potential injury” is 

defined as “harm to a client, the public, the legal system or 

the profession that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the 

lawyer’s misconduct, and which, but for some intervening 

factor or event, would probably have resulted from the 

lawyer’s misconduct.”

276. As is demonstrated by the Board’s detailed 

findings . . . with respect to Respondent’s misconduct, in each 

of the seven cases Respondent’s misconduct inflicted actual, 

substantial injury on the parties, their counsel and the court. 

Taken together, these acts of misconduct demonstrate 

contempt on the part of Respondent for the legal process, the 

rules governing that process, and the administration of justice. 

The actual costs in terms of increased expenses, delays and 

burdens on the parties, their counsel and the courts are 

incapable of being fully measured.

The Fourth Factor: The Existence Of Aggravating

Or Mitigating Factors

277. ABA Standard 9.0, entitled “Aggravation and 

Mitigation,” provides as follows:

9.1 Generally

After misconduct has been established, aggravating and 

mitigating circumstances may be considered in deciding what 

sanction to impose.

9.2 Aggravation

32
9.21 Definition. Aggravation or aggravating 

circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 

justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be 

imposed.

9.22 Factors which may be considered in aggravation. 

Aggravating factors include:

(a) prior disciplinary offenses;

(b) dishonest or selfish motive;

(c) a pattern of misconduct;

(d) multiple offenses;

(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary 

proceeding by intentionally failing to 

comply with rules or orders of the 

disciplinary agency;

(f) submission of false evidence, false 

statements, or other deceptive practices 

during the disciplinary process;

(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of 

conduct;

(h) vulnerability of the victim;

(i) substantial experience in the practice of law;

(j) indifference in making restitution; and

(k) illegal conduct, including that involving the 

use of controlled substances.

9.3 Mitigation

9.31 Definition. Mitigation or mitigating 

circumstances are any considerations or factors that 

may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be

imposed.

9.32 Factors which may be considered in mitigation. 

Mitigating factors include:

(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record;

(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;

(c) personal or emotional problems;

(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution 

or to rectify consequences of misconduct;

(e) full and free disclosure of disciplinary board 

or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;

(f) inexperience in the practice of law;

33
(g) character or reputation;

(h) physical disability;

(i) mental disability or chemical dependency 

including alcoholism or drug abuse when:

(1) there is medical evidence that the 

respondent is affected by a chemical 

dependency or mental disability;

(2) the chemical dependency or mental 

disability caused the misconduct;

(3) the respondent’s recovery from the 

chemical dependency or mental

disability is demonstrated by a 

meaningful and sustained period of

successful rehabilitation; and

(4) the recovery arrested the misconduct 

and recurrence of that misconduct is 

unlikely.

(j) delay in disciplinary proceedings;

(k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;

(1) remorse; and

(m) remoteness of prior offenses.

9.4 Factors Which Are Neither Aggravating nor 

Mitigating. 

The following factors should not be considered as 

either aggravating or mitigating:

(a) forced or compelled restitution;

(b) agreeing to the client’s demand for certain 

improper behavior or result;

(c) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;

(d) resignation prior to completion of 

disciplinary proceedings;

(e) complainant’s recommendation as to 

sanction; and

(f) failure of injured client to complain.

278. The Board finds that Respondent’s payment of 

the $58,000 sanction award in [AECOM], which Respondent 

testified was a requirement of AECOM in order to gain its 

consent for Respondent to pursue the appeal of Judge 

Downes's order, is a factor that should not be considered as 

either aggravating or mitigating. 

34
279. The Board finds the following mitigating

factors: (1) absence of a prior disciplinary record and (2) 

personal or emotional problems. Respondent testified that 

during a portion of the period during which the misconduct . . 

. occurred, she was going through a divorce and dealing with 

its consequences. Respondent also offered testimony of her 

background that resulted in her responding to challenges in a 

dysfunctional and not constructive manner. Witnesses for 

respondent described therapy modalities that would benefit 

Respondent to deal with her responsive mechanism when 

challenged. 

280. The Board finds the following aggravating

factors: (1) substantial experience in the practice of law (2) 

dishonest motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple 

offenses; (5) vulnerability of the victim; (6) refusal to 

acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct; and (7) bad 

faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by 

intentionally failing to comply with the Disciplinary Code 

and the orders of the Board.

281. The Board’s finding of vulnerability of the 

victim in this matter encompasses several “victims.” As 

discussed above, the parties, their counsel, the courts and the 

legal profession generally have all suffered as a result of 

Respondent’s actions.

282. With respect to Respondent’s refusal to 

acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct, the Board 

finds that although Respondent expressed remorse near the 

end of the hearing, at every prior stage of the disciplinary 

proceeding Respondent was defiant and emphatic in her 

denial of any wrongdoing on her part, as she was in each of 

the underlying litigation matters.

283. The pleadings filed by the Respondent that were 

repeated and re-argued after having been denied, is evident 

upon review of the transcript of the final pretrial 

conference.[

6

] Those actions in this proceeding are further 

6

 Among the documents Ms. Richard filed in the disciplinary process were the following: Petition for 

Investigation into Breaches of Confidentiality in the Matter of Andrea Richard; Motion to Disclose 

35

 
evidence of the Respondent’s conduct and how she repeated 

in this matter, the same conduct that was found in the 

different matters to be a violation of the Rules of Professional 

Conduct. Such conduct includes intentionally failing to 

comply with the Disciplinary Code and the orders of the 

Board. To not be caught up in the unnecessary generation of 

words and pages any more than it already has, the Board 

simply refers to the record in this matter as the pleadings 

evidence the Respondent’s conduct of disregarding the rules. 

The record further exhibits the same inability or 

unwillingness to comply with the orders of the tribunal as 

with different courts, and the same behavior appears to be 

calculated to obstruct the process.

284. Suffice it to say that the record is replete with 

evidence of Respondent’s conduct in this disciplinary 

proceeding of her intentional failure to comply with the 

Disciplinary Code the orders of the Board, just as she has 

with the different courts. Such conduct is found to be 

evidence of obstruction of the process

285. In light of the foregoing findings, the 

appropriate sanction is a three-year suspension of 

Respondent’s right to practice law in Wyoming. While the 

Board is unable to require counseling, it urges Respondent to 

seek assistance in order to avoid repetition of past practice.

[¶71] Although the Board recommended a three-year suspension from the practice of law 

as the appropriate sanction, bar counsel urges this Court to disbar Ms. Richard from 

Exculpatory and Impeachment Evidence; Reply to Bar Counsel’s Response to Motion to Disclose 

Exculpatory and Impeachment Evidence; Request for and Memorandum in Support of Special Bar 

Counsel; Opposition to Bar Counsel’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Formal Charge; 

Withdrawal of Request for Special Bar Counsel; Response to Motion for Order Directing Respondent to 

Cease and Desist [in filings with officers and commissioners of the State Bar]; Opposition to Bar 

Counsel’s Motion to Compel; Motion for Summary Judgment; Opposition to Bar Counsel’s Motion for 

Leave to File Fourth Amended Formal Charge; Opposition to Bar Counsel’s Motion for Protective Order; 

Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; Supplemental Witness and Exhibit List; 

Motion to Bifurcate; Opposition to Bar Counsel’s Motion for Sanctions; Request for Additional Time to 

File Motion to Expand Board’s Protective Order; Motion for Individual Trials and Separate Decisions on 

Each Charge; Motion to Dismiss for Bar Counsel’s Usurpation of the Judicial Oversight Function; 

Motion for Dismissal and Disqualification of Current Bar Counsel; Objections to Order on Final Pretrial 

Conference; Proposed Report and Recommendation; Exhibits to Proposed Report and Recommendation; 

Supplemental Exhibits to Proposed Report and Recommendation; Supplemental Proposed Report and 

Recommendation; Opposition to Bar Counsel’s Motion to Strike Respondent’s Post Hearing Filings. 

36

 
practicing law in the State of Wyoming. Addressing the first factor to be considered in 

imposing a sanction, the duty violated, bar counsel asserts that disbarment is the 

appropriate sanction under the Standards the Board found applicable to Ms. Richard’s 

misconduct. Under Standard 6.1, bar counsel argues disbarment is appropriate because

Ms. Richard made false statements and improperly withheld material information with 

the intent to deceive the court, causing serious injury to the parties and adversely 

affecting the legal proceeding. Sanction 6.11. Bar counsel contends disbarment is 

likewise appropriate under Standard 6.2 because Ms. Richard time and again knowingly 

violated court orders and rules, causing injury to the parties and interfering with the legal 

proceedings. Sanction 6.12. Bar counsel also contends disbarment is appropriate under 

Standard 5.1 because Ms. Richard engaged in intentional conduct involving dishonesty, 

deceit and misrepresentation which seriously reflects adversely on her fitness to practice 

law. Sanction 5.11.

[¶72] In addition to the Standards the Board found applicable to Ms. Richard’s conduct, 

bar counsel asserts Standard 4.5 is applicable. Standard 4.5 concerns lawyers who 

display a lack of competence and recommends disbarment “when a lawyer’s course of 

conduct demonstrates that the lawyer does not understand the most fundamental legal 

doctrines or procedures, and the lawyer’s conduct causes injury or potential injury to the 

client.” Sanction 4.51. Bar counsel contends that Ms. Richard’s conduct in the seven 

underlying cases and the disciplinary proceeding demonstrates that she does not 

understand even the most basic aspects of the legal process.

[¶73] Turning to the second factor to be considered in imposing a sanction, the lawyer’s 

mental state, bar counsel asserts the Board correctly concluded Ms. Richard’s misconduct 

was intentional—her conscious objective was to withhold discovery, ignore court orders 

and rules, obstruct the legal process and gain advantage for herself and/or her client. Bar 

counsel further asserts the record is clear that Ms. Richard’s misconduct satisfied the 

third factor for imposing a sanction in that it caused serious injury to the parties, opposing 

counsel, the courts, the judicial process and the public’s confidence in the administration 

of justice. 

[¶74] Given the Board’s findings on the aggravating and mitigating factors under the 

fourth factor, bar counsel asserts the recommendation for a three year suspension is not 

sustainable. Rather, each of the duties Ms. Richard violated points to disbarment—she 

acted intentionally and caused serious injury. She satisfied most of the eleven 

aggravating factors—she has substantial experience in the practice of law, she acted 

dishonestly or with a selfish motive, there was a pattern of misconduct, there were 

multiple offenses, she acted in bad faith to obstruct the disciplinary process by 

intentionally failing to comply with the rules, she refused until the very end of the process 

to acknowledge the wrongfulness of her conduct and the victims were vulnerable. Bar 

counsel contends all of the evidence taken together demands disbarment as the only 

appropriate sanction.

37
[¶75] In contrast, before this Court, Ms. Richard characterizes her conduct as negligent. 

She asked in her brief that the Court reject the Board’s report and recommendation and 

reverse and vacate the matter. Alternatively, she asked the Court to enter summary 

judgment in her favor. As yet another alternative, she asked the Court to impose a 

sanction such as a public or private reprimand. In oral argument, her counsel suggested 

imposing a period of suspension, deferring the suspension and requiring Ms. Richard to 

meet specified conditions, such as attending continuing legal education classes, having 

her work monitored by another member of the Bar and obtaining psychological 

counseling.

[¶76] We conclude none of the sanctions the parties have requested are appropriate in 

this case. The cases bar counsel cites from other jurisdictions in support of disbarment 

involve more serious misconduct. In State v. Godlove, 318 P.3d 1086, 1090 (Okla. 

2013), disciplinary proceedings were commenced after a lawyer filed six cases and more 

than twenty pleadings collaterally attacking a final order entered in another case

confirming other parties as trustees of a trust, filed more documents after the state 

supreme court recognized the finality of the order, filed documents on behalf of her client 

after he was enjoined from filing such documents, and filed three actions against the 

confirmed trustees and their counsel for “jurisdictional fraud” in obtaining the 

trusteeship. On seventeen occasions, she also sought the recusal of the assigned judge 

after an adverse ruling. Although she did not comply with the recusal rule by presenting 

her motion to the chief or presiding judge, she argued the assigned judge had no 

jurisdiction to act in the proceedings until the recusal motion was decided. She even filed 

an application asking the state supreme court to assume jurisdiction. After the 

disciplinary proceedings commenced, the lawyer failed to respond to the board’s 

inquiries, did not file an answer, did not appear at the hearing and filed no documents. 

Id. at 1088. The Oklahoma court imposed a sanction of disbarment, pointing in large part 

to the attorney’s repeated filing of frivolous litigation. Id. at 1095. 

[¶77] In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 915-918 (Mo. 1997), in addition to discovery 

abuses, the lawyer filed a wrongful discharge claim although she knew her clients had 

released their employer from employment-related claims; pursued a slander claim even 

after an affidavit showed there was no factual basis for the claim; disregarded wellestablished state law; advanced claims by threatening to contact the media and 

government agencies; used a forged document to support a sexual harassment claim long 

after learning it was a forgery; made unsupported allegations that a manager had been the 

subject of prior sexual harassment charges; affirmatively represented that she did not 

know a party had relocated in support of a motion to join the party when she in fact knew 

of the relocation a year earlier; intentionally withheld the name of a significant witness in 

an attempt to surprise the opposing party at trial; called witnesses to testify at trial when 

she could not connect their testimony to her client, knowing that the court had ruled she 

could present the testimony only if she connected it to her client; and filed a frivolous 

38
motion for sanctions against opposing counsel and an appeal from the denial of the 

motion based solely upon her personal animosity toward the lawyer. Based in large part 

on the evidence showing the lawyer intentionally submitted a false document, 

intentionally made false statements and intentionally withheld material information, the 

Missouri court disbarred her.

 

[¶78] This Court does not agree with Ms. Richard’s characterization of her conduct as 

negligent. In case after case, she has demonstrated an intentional, willful refusal to 

respond appropriately to discovery requests, comply with court orders and follow the 

rules of procedure. She has also repeatedly demonstrated a total lack of concern for 

honest communication with opposing counsel and the courts. Looking at each case 

individually, without considering the other six cases, Ms. Richard’s conduct might be 

seen as an isolated event, resembling behavior members of the bar have seen from some 

other lawyer in some other case. Taken together, however, Ms. Richard’s conduct in the 

seven cases clearly shows not an isolated event but a consistent pattern of misbehavior 

affecting many, many people. Eight judges sitting in seven districts and lawyers in five 

different law firms have struggled with Ms. Richard’s obstructionist tactics. The clients 

of those five law firms as well as Ms. Richard’s clients have incurred unnecessary 

expense and been subjected to needlessly prolonged litigation because of her misconduct. 

The video-tape deposition in Miller clearly shows the witness in that case was also a 

victim of Ms. Richard’s unacceptable behavior. 

[¶79] Ms. Richard’s actions bring her perilously close to disbarment. However, no 

accusation has been made that she repeatedly filed frivolous lawsuits, as occurred in 

Godlove, or that she knowingly used a forged document or filed multiple lawsuits for 

which she knew there was no basis, as occurred in Caranchini. Although we view Ms. 

Richard’s conduct as unacceptable, extremely serious and an abuse of the judicial system, 

we are not persuaded that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. Neither do we agree 

that a public or private reprimand is sufficient. Ms. Richard’s repeated violation of the 

rules and court orders demonstrates that a period of time away from the practice of law is 

warranted and necessary. Although disbarment is within the range of possible sanctions 

for the violations that occurred in the seven cases, the Board decided after hearing the 

testimony of all the witnesses not to recommend disbarment. Given the Board’s 

recommendation and the fact that Ms. Richard has no prior disciplinary record, this Court

concludes based upon this record and these facts that a three year suspension from the 

practice of law is an appropriate sanction. However, given her multi-year pattern of 

behavior, there is a probability that other complaints may come before the Board, and in 

that event this Court may have no alternative but to impose a sanction of disbarment.

[¶80] Our duty in cases of lawyer misconduct is to protect the public. Despite court 

orders to comply with the rules, stern words from respected judges, dismissals of her 

cases, and the imposition of sanctions, Ms. Richard has continued to demonstrate 

behaviors in litigation that are simply not acceptable. Even in this matter, Ms. Richard’s 

39
actions unnecessarily thwarted, obstructed and delayed the disciplinary process. Other 

than the belated statements of her counsel during this appeal, there is nothing in this 

record to indicate that Ms. Richard has learned anything from any of the seven cases or 

this proceeding. The judicial system must respond in a manner that protects the public 

from Ms. Richard’s extensive pattern of behavior that has affected so many people. A 

three year suspension from practicing law provides that protection. In accordance with § 

24 of the Wyoming Disciplinary Code, Ms. Richard may petition the Board for 

reinstatement ninety days prior to the expiration of the three year period. If she hopes to 

return to the practice of law at that point, Ms. Richard must use those three years to 

inform herself as to the duties and responsibilities of members of the Wyoming Bar, basic 

legal procedure and the rules of practice applicable in Wyoming courts. 

[¶81] IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED THAT:

1. Andrea L. Richard shall be suspended from the practice of law for a period 

of three years, commencing August 1, 2014;

2. Within 15 days of the date of the final order of suspension, Andrea L. 

Richard shall comply with all requirements of Rule 22 of the Disciplinary Code;

3. By January 30, 2015, Andrea L. Richard shall pay costs of $41,770.76 

associated with the disciplinary proceedings and an administrative fee of $500; 

4. Prior to seeking reinstatement to the practice of law in Wyoming, Andrea L. 

Richard shall complete the continuing legal education course required for new admittees 

to the bar specified in Continuing Legal Education Rule 4(b)(1) and (2).

[¶82] DATED this 1st day of August, 2014.

BY THE COURT*†

/s/

E. JAMES BURKE

Chief Justice

*

Justice Hill took no part in the consideration of this matter. Judge Waldrip participated 

by assignment.

†

WALDRIP, D.J., dissents from the sanction imposed by the majority for the following 

reasons:

40
[¶83] The sanction imposed by the majority in this case is a close call. I firmly agree 

with the reasoning of the well-written Order and particularly the statement that:

[o]ur duty in cases of lawyer misconduct is to protect the public. Despite 

court orders to comply with the rules, stern words from respected judges, 

dismissals of her cases, and the imposition of sanctions, Ms. Richard has 

continued to demonstrate behaviors in litigation that are simply not 

acceptable.

As a result, I must disagree with the sanction of a three-year suspension. I would disbar 

Ms. Richard. She has, from the beginning of this procedure until the very end, shown no 

sincere remorse. Even in argument before this Court, she blamed others for her 

misconduct rather than recognize her inappropriate behaviors. Under these 

circumstances, I believe this tribunal’s obligation to protect the public requires the 

ultimate sanction of disbarment. 

41