MISSILE DEFENSE

Some Progress 

Delivering 

Capabilities, but 

Challenges with 

Testing Transparency 

and Requirements 

Development Need to 

Be Addressed

Report to Congressional Committees

May 2017

GAO-17-381

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-381, a report to 

congressional committees

May 2017

MISSILE DEFENSE

Some Progress Delivering Capabilities, but 

Challenges with Testing Transparency and 

Requirements Development Need to Be Addressed

What GAO Found

In fiscal year 2016, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) made some progress in 

achieving its testing and delivery goals for individual elements of the Ballistic 

Missile Defense System (BMDS) and for capabilities that can be derived when 

individual elements are combined (known as BMDS level capabilities), but it was 

not able to complete its planned fiscal year goals. Specifically, MDA conducted 

10 flight tests, including a major operational test, but it had to delay others,

limiting the knowledge gained in fiscal year 2016. In addition, MDA delivered new 

interceptors, upgraded fielded interceptors and delivered five BMDS level 

capabilities. However, testing revealed that the BMDS level capabilities delivered

will not likely provide robust defense as planned. The figure below highlights key 

progress MDA made for fiscal year 2016 against its planned goals.

Figure: Missile Defense Agency’s Progress for Fiscal Year 2016 Against Planned Goals

MDA’s integrated test schedule continues to be aggressive, resulting in frequent 

changes to planned testing from year to year. These changes are not clearly 

tracked which reduces the traceability of planned test objectives—what 

requirements have been met and when. Furthermore, MDA requests more than 

$1 billion in funding each fiscal year for tests, but the cost estimates to support 

the request are inconsistent and lack transparency. Until MDA addresses the 

limited traceability in its test schedule and transparency of the associated costs,

the ability to track test progress costs will remain difficult.

MDA’s efforts for exploring, developing, producing, and delivering its next 

generation of capabilities, such as new ground-, air-, and space-based sensors 

and interceptors, include several best practices of a sound business case. For 

example, MDA plans to incorporate mature technologies and realistic cost 

estimates in its efforts. However, the process lacks warfighter-approved 

requirements and sufficient input from Department of Defense (DOD)

components. For example, design approaches for several efforts include tradeoffs that favor acquiring capabilities sooner and at a lower cost but are at risk of 

lacking the performance necessary to defeat future threats. By allowing MDA to 

define requirements but not address concerns with system designs and 

acquisition strategies, there is an undue level of emphasis being placed on the 

judgment, needs, and preferences of MDA ahead of the warfighter, decreasing 

DOD-wide support for some future efforts. View GAO-17-381. For more information, 

contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or 

chaplainc@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2002, MDA has been developing 

a Ballistic Missile Defense System

comprised of a command and control 

system, radars that can identify 

incoming threats, and intercepting 

missiles. MDA has received 

approximately $123 billion and is 

planning to spend an additional $37 

billion through fiscal year 2021 to 

continue its efforts.

The National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2012 included a 

provision that GAO assess the extent 

to which MDA has achieved its 

acquisition goals and objectives. This 

report addresses the progress and 

challenges in fiscal year 2016 

associated with MDA: (1) achieving 

fiscal year 2016 testing, asset, and 

capability delivery goals, (2) ensuring 

transparency of test schedules and 

costs, and (3) establishing a sound 

business case for future efforts. GAO 

reviewed the planned fiscal year 2016 

baselines as stated in the BMDS 

Accountability Report and other 

program documentation and assessed 

them against program and baseline 

reviews and GAO’s acquisition best 

practices guides. In addition, GAO

interviewed DOD and MDA officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making four recommendations 

to the Department of Defense to 

increase transparency into testing and 

cost estimates, and improve

acquisition strategies for MDA’s future

efforts. DOD concurred with part of

GAO’s first recommendation, but it did 

not concur with the remaining parts or 

other three recommendations. GAO 

continues to believe the 

recommendations are valid as 

discussed in this report. 
Page i GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Letter 1

Background 4

MDA Made Progress in Fiscal Year 2016 Conducting Tests and 

Delivering Assets and BMDS level Capabilities but It Did Not 

Meet Its Planned Goals 13

MDA’s Testing Schedule Remains Aggressive and Associated 

Costs Lack Transparency 23

MDA Incorporated Several Elements of a Sound Business Case 

for Its Next Generation Efforts but Concerns with Requirements 

and Acquisition Strategies Could Hamper Efforts 40

Conclusions 62

Recommendations for Executive Action 63

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 65

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense 74

Appendix II Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Weapons System 80

Appendix III Aegis Ashore 84

Appendix IV Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) 

Block IB 87

Appendix V Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)

Block IIA 90

Appendix VI Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications 

(C2BMC) 93

Appendix VII Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) 97

Contents
Page ii GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Appendix VIII Targets and Countermeasures 101

Appendix IX Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 105

Appendix X GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 108

Related GAO Products 109

Tables

Table 1: Description of Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) 

Elements 4

Table 2: Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Current Plan for 

Delivery of Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) 

Level Capabilities 10

Table 3: Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Fiscal Year 2016 Flight 

Tests, Status, and Description 14

Table 4: Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Asset Delivery Goals 

and Status for Fiscal Year 2016 17

Table 5: Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Fiscal Year 2016 

Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Level 

Capabilities for Regional Defense 19

Table 6: Description of the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Next 

Generation Efforts 42

Table 7: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program Facts 81

Table 8: Aegis Ashore Program Facts 85

Table 9: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Standard Missile-3 

(SM-3) Block IB Program Facts 88

Table 10: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Standard Missile3 (SM-3) Block IIA Program Facts 91

Table 11: Command, Control, Battle Management, and 

Communications (C2BMC) Program Facts 94

Table 12: Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Program 

Facts 98

Table 13: Targets and Countermeasure Program Facts 102

Table 14: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Program 

Facts 106
Page iii GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Figures

Figure 1: Ballistic Missile Defense System Architecture Overview 6

Figure 2: Elements of a Sound Business Case 12

Figure 3: Deviations in Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) 

Capability Delivery Plan by Increment 21

Figure 4: Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Flight Test Execution 

for the Ballistic Missile Defense System for Fiscal Years 

2010-2016 24

Figure 5: Traced Versus Actual Changes to One of Missile 

Defense Agency’s Flight Test for Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense (GMD) 26

Figure 6: Assessment of Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) 

Scheduling Policies against GAO’s Identified Best 

Practices for Scheduling 28

Figure 7: Assessment of Two of Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) 

Individual Flight Test Schedules Against Attributes of the 

Well-Constructed Characteristic in GAO’s Best Practices 

Guide for Scheduling 31

Figure 8: Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Process for 

Determining Total Costs and Funding Needs for Tests 

Included in Its Integrated Test Schedule 33

Figure 9: Assessment of Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) 

Element and Test Level Test Cost Estimates Against 

GAO’s Identified Best Practices for Cost Estimating 35

Figure 10: Notional View of Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) 

Requirement-Setting Process 51

Figure 11: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Appendix II 80

Figure 12: Aegis Ashore Appendix III 84

Figure 13: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Standard Missile-3 

Block IB 2017 Appendix IV 87

Figure 14: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Standard Missile-3 

Block IIA Appendix V 90

Figure 15: Command, Control, Battle Management, and 

93

97

101

Communications Appendix VI 

Figure 16: Ground-based Midcourse Defense Appendix VII 

Figure 17: Targets and Countermeasures Appendix VIII 

Figure 18: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Appendix IX 105
Page iv GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Abbreviations 

AA Aegis Ashore

ACL Achievable Capabilities List

ADT Alternate Divert Thrusters

Aegis BMD Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

AN/TPY-2 Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance and

 Control Model 2 

AWS Aegis Weapon System

BAR BMDS Accountability Report 

BMD Ballistic Missile Defense

BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System

CAPE Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation

C2BMC Command, Control, Battle Management, and

 Communications 

CE-I Capability Enhancement-I 

CE-II Capability Enhancement-II 

CENTCOM United States Central Command

COCOM Combatant Command

CTV Control Test Vehicle 

CU Capability Upgrade

DASD (DT&E) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

 Developmental Test and Evaluation

DOD Department of Defense 

DOT&E Director, Operational Test and Evaluation

eMRBM Extended Medium Range Ballistic Missile 

EOR Engage on Remote

EPAA European Phased Adaptive Approach

EKV Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle

EUCOM United States European Command

FTG Flight Test Ground-based Interceptor

FTM Flight Test Standard Missile 

FTO Flight Test Operational 

FTT Flight Test THAAD Interceptor

FTX Flight Test Other

FY Fiscal Year

GBI Ground-based Interceptor

GMD Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

GTD Ground Test Distributed

GTI Ground Test Integrated

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
Page v GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

IMTP Integrated Master Test Plan

JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development

 System

JFCC IMD Joint Functional Component Command for

 Integrated Missile Defense

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council

LRDR Long Range Discrimination Radar

MDA Missile Defense Agency 

MDEB Missile Defense Executive Board

MIP Master Integration Plan

MOKV Multi-Object Kill Vehicle 

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NMCC National Military Command Center

NORTHCOM United States Northern Command

OTA Operational Test Agency

PAA Phase Adaptive Approach

PAC-3 Patriot Advanced Capability-3

PACOM United States Pacific Command

PCL Prioritized Capabilities List

RKV Redesigned Kill Vehicle

SCD SM-3 Cooperative Development Program

SFTM SCD Flight Test Standard Missile

SKA Space-based Kill Assessment

SM-3 Standard Missile-3 

STRATCOM United States Strategic Command

TRMP-T Test Resources Mission Planning-Tool

TSRM Third Stage Rocket Motor

TU Threat Upgrade

THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,

 Technology and Logistics

WBS Work Breakdown Structure

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Page 1 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

May 30, 2017

Congressional Committees

Since 2002, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has received 

approximately $123 billion to develop, integrate, and deliver the Ballistic 

Missile Defense System (BMDS). MDA is planning to spend an additional 

$37 billion through fiscal year 2021 to continue its efforts to develop the 

system to detect, track, and defeat enemy ballistic missiles. To date, we 

have provided 13 reports covering MDA’s annual progress and made 

recommendations to address challenges in developing and fielding BMDS 

capabilities, as well as other transparency, accountability, and oversight 

issues.1 While MDA has taken steps to implement some of our 

recommendations, going forward, it will continue to face important 

challenges as it works to develop, integrate, and deliver capability, 

increase transparency, and strengthen its investment decisions.

Various National Defense Authorization Acts since 2002 have included 

provisions for us to prepare annual assessments of MDA’s progress 

toward meeting its acquisition goals.2 Specifically, the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, as amended, required us to report 

annually on the extent to which MDA has achieved its acquisition goals 

and objectives, as reported in its acquisition baselines in the BMDS 

Accountability Report (BAR), and include any other findings and 

recommendations on MDA’s acquisition programs and accountability, as 

appropriate.3 This year, to fulfill our responsibilities under the mandate, 

our review addresses the: (1) progress, if any, MDA and its missile 

defense elements made in achieving its fiscal year 2016 testing and 

delivery goals; (2) transparency of test schedules and costs; and (3) 

 1

Related GAO products are listed at the end of this report. 

2

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-107, § 232(g) 

(2001); Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. 

L. No. 108-375, § 233 (2004); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 

Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 232; John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 224 (2006); National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 225; and National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 232 (2011).

3

Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 232 (a) (2011). The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2016 extended our reviews through fiscal year 2020. See Pub. L. No. 114-92 §1688 

(2015).

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

extent to which MDA has established a sound business case for future 

efforts.

For this report, we focused on MDA’s testing, asset and BMDS level 

delivery goals. To assess MDA’s fiscal year 2016 progress towards 

meeting its testing, asset and BMDS level capability goals, we reviewed 

the planned baselines as stated in the BAR approved February 20, 2015, 

that aligns with their fiscal year 2016 budget request and systems 

engineering documents, including the recent Master Integration Plans 

approved October 2015 and May 2016. These documents contain MDA’s 

plans for the fiscal year. We compared the planned efforts to annual 

progress as detailed in key management documents, including program 

and baseline reviews, as well as flight test plans. In addition, we 

assessed MDA responses to GAO questionnaires that we provided to 

certain BMDS elements included in this report to obtain program 

information on fiscal year testing and asset delivery progress, along with 

program plans to reduce acquisition risks. Lastly, we reviewed available 

system engineering and integration planning documents—including prior 

years’ Master Integration Plans, which contain descriptions, risks, and 

schedules for BMDS level capability deliveries—and MDA responses to 

GAO data collection instruments. We also met with officials MDA program 

offices, from the BMDS Operational Test Agency, Office of the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Test and Evaluation, 

and MDA’s Testing and Engineering Directorates to discuss issues 

surrounding testing and delivering capabilities.

To assess the transparency of test schedules and costs, we reviewed 

MDA’s integrated test schedule, MDA’s testing policies, and other 

relevant documentation to determine testing progress to date. We 

compared MDA’s schedules against best practices in the GAO’s

Schedule Assessment Guide and assessed specifically two individual test 

schedules, FTT-18 and GTI-07A, to determine the extent to which they 

reflected key estimating practices that are fundamental to having a 

reliable schedule.4 We also evaluated the extent to which MDA 

scheduling guidance aligned with leading schedule estimating practices 

from GAO’s Schedule Assessment Guide.5 For the test cost estimates, 

we analyzed both element and test level cost estimates and assessed 

 4

GAO, GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules, 

GAO-16-89G (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 22, 2015).

5

GAO-16-89G.
Page 3 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

them against leading cost estimating practices identified in the GAO’s 

Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.6 We also met with MDA officials 

from various programs, including Terminal High Area Altitude Defense 

and Targets and Countermeasures and MDA’s Directorates for Cost and 

Testing to discuss cost estimating practices. In addition, we met with 

DOD’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office.

To assess the extent to which MDA has established a sound business

case for its next generation BMDS capabilities, we determined which 

efforts constituted MDA’s next generation efforts by reviewing MDA’s 

fiscal year 2017 budget request and identified efforts that were projected 

to be fielded in or around fiscal years 2020 through 2025 and beyond. 

Where available, we assessed the acquisition plans of these efforts 

against GAO’s identified best practices for establishing a sound business 

case that were previously developed in our work on defense 

acquisitions.7 To discuss the next generation efforts, we met with MDA 

officials from the Advanced Technology, GMD, and Sensors programs, as 

well as from the office of the Director for Engineering. We also met with 

officials from DOD’s Office of Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, 

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental 

Test and Evaluation, DOD’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

office, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, U.S. Northern Command, Joint Functional 

Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and selected 

contractors.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2016 to May 2017 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

 6

GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs (Supersedes GAO-07-1134SP), GAO-09-3SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009).

7

For examples, see GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Joint Action Needed by DOD and 

Congress to Improve Outcomes, GAO-16-187T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 2015); 

Defense Acquisitions: Sound Business Case Needed to Implement Missile Defense 

Agency’s Targets Program, GAO-08-1113 (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 26, 2008); Defense 

Acquisitions: Improved Business Case Is Needed for Future Combat System’s Successful 

Outcome, GAO-06-367 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2006); and Best Practices: A More 

Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO-00-199 

(Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2000).
Page 4 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

MDA is developing a variety of systems, known as elements, to enable 

the warfighter to defend against enemy ballistic missiles. The ultimate 

goal is to integrate these various elements to function as a single system, 

the BMDS. Table 1 provides a list and description of certain elements 

included in our review and appendixes II-IX contain more detailed 

information on their fiscal year 2016 activities.

Table 1: Description of Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Elementsa

BMDS elements Description 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Weapon 

System

Aegis BMD includes ship- and land-based ballistic missile defense capabilities 

using a radar, command and control, and Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors. It 

is included on certain Navy ships and Aegis Ashore sites. 

• Aegis BMD Standard Missile-3 SM-3 

Block IB 

Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB features capabilities to identify, discriminate, and track 

objects during flight to defend against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range 

ballistic missiles threats. The program is currently developing an upgrade to the 

interceptor called the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB Threat Upgrade (TU).

• Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIA Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIA has increased range, more sensitive seeker technology, 

and an advanced kill vehicle from the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IA to defend against 

medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

a

• Aegis Ashore Aegis Ashore, a land-based version of Aegis BMD, uses SM-3 interceptors and 

Aegis BMD capabilities as they become available and will have three locations: one 

test site and two operational sites. 

Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance 

and Control Model 2 (AN/TPY-2)

AN/TPY-2 is a transportable X-band high-resolution radar capable of tracking 

ballistic missiles of all ranges that can be used in two modes: (1) forward-based 

mode—to support Aegis BMD and Ground-based Midcourse Defense, or (2) 

terminal mode—to support Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. Element level 

upgrades for AN/TPY-2s are planned for delivery, and integration efforts have 

started. The radars have been have been deployed to various geographic locations 

including Japan and Turkey. 

Command, Control, Battle Management, and 

Communications (C2BMC) 

C2BMC is a globally deployed system of hardware—workstations, servers, and 

network equipment—and software that links and integrates individual elements, 

allowing users to plan ballistic missile defense operations, see the battle develop, 

and manage networked sensors. 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) GMD is a ground-based system with launch, communications, and fire control 

components that use interceptors with a booster and a kill vehicle to defend against 

intermediate- and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. There are two versions 

of interceptors that are currently fielded at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air 

Force Base, California: (1) the initial kill vehicle, Capability Enhancement (CE)-I, 

and (2) the upgraded version, CE-II. Both versions are paired with the first 

generation boost vehicle. MDA is currently developing an interceptor version with 

an upgraded kill vehicle, called CE-II Block I, and a new, second generation boost 

vehicle to address obsolescence issues and problems previously discovered during

flight testing. 

Background
Page 5 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

BMDS elements Description 

Targets and Countermeasuresb Targets and Countermeasures provide a variety of highly complex short-, medium-, 

intermediate-, and intercontinental-range targets to represent realistic threats 

during BMDS flight testing. 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) THAAD is a mobile, ground-based system to defend against short- and mediumrange threats using a battery that consists of interceptors, launchers, a radar, and 

fire control and communication systems. 

GAO analysis of MDA data. I GAO-17-381

a

This table details the elements included in this review, but MDA is developing additional elements for 

the BMDS that are not included in this review because they fall outside the scope of the BAR.

b

Target and Countermeasures provides assets to test the performance and capabilities of the BMDS 

elements, but these testing assets are not operationally fielded.

The elements, when integrated as the BMDS, are designed to destroy 

enemy ballistic missiles of various ranges, speeds, sizes, and 

performance characteristics in different phases of flight. Once an enemy 

ballistic missile has been launched, sensors and interceptors are 

coordinated via the command and control, battle management, and 

communications system to enable the warfighter to detect, track, or 

engage it. The performance that is derived when capabilities of individual 

elements are combined this way is known as BMDS level capabilities. 

Figure 1 shows the flight phases, intercept ranges and time frames, and 

the elements that make up the BMDS.
Page 6 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Figure 1: Ballistic Missile Defense System Architecture Overview

When MDA was established in 2002, it was granted exceptional 

flexibilities to set requirements and manage the acquisition of the 

BMDS—developed as a single program—that allow MDA to expedite the 

fielding of assets and integrated ballistic missile defense capabilities. 

These flexibilities enable divergence from DOD’s traditional acquisition 

lifecycle and defer the application of acquisition policies and laws 

designed to facilitate oversight and accountability until a mature capability 

is ready to be handed over to a military service for production and 

operation. These laws and policies include such things as

MDA’s Acquisition 

Flexibilities and Steps to 

Improve Traceability and 

Oversight
Page 7 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

• obtaining the approval of a higher-level acquisition executive before 

making changes to an approved baseline,8

• reporting certain increases in unit cost measured from the original or 

current baseline, 9

• obtaining an independent lifecycle cost estimate prior to beginning 

system development and/or production and deployment,10 and

• regularly providing detailed program status information to Congress, 

including specific costs, in Selected Acquisition Reports.11

In response to concerns related to MDA’s flexibilities, Congress and DOD 

have taken a number of actions. For example, Congress enacted 

legislation in 2008 requiring MDA to establish cost, schedule, and 

performance baselines—starting points against which to measure 

progress—for each element that has entered the equivalent of system 

development or is being produced or acquired for operational fielding.12

MDA reported its newly established baselines to Congress for the first 

time in its June 2010 BAR. Since that time, Congress has provided more 

detailed requirements for the content of these baselines.13 Additionally, to 

enhance oversight of the information provided in the BAR, MDA has 

continued to incorporate suggestions and recommendations from us to 

include: (1) explanations or major changes experienced by each element 

over the past year; (2) adding buy and delivery information for each 

element that has advanced to production and fielding; and (3) 

descriptions for cost items not contained in elements’ baselines. While 

 8 DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, Enc. 1 para. 4 

and Table 3. (Jan. 7, 2015)(incorp. change 1, eff. Jan. 26, 2017).

9

10 U.S.C. § 2433.

1010 U.S.C. § 2434.

1110 U.S.C. § 2432.

12National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 223(g), 

repealed by Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 231(b)(2) (2011). 

13See, e.g., the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-

81, § 231, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 225, that requires the MDA Director to establish and 

maintain an acquisition baseline for each program element of the BMDS and each 

designated major subprogram of such program elements before the date on which the 

program element or major subprogram enters the equivalent of engineering and 

manufacturing development and before production and deployment. This law details 

specific requirements for the contents of the acquisition baseline.
Page 8 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

these are positive steps, all of our prior recommendations have not yet 

been fully implemented.

Testing, in general, is performed to collect critical data on individual 

elements or as the integrated BMDS to: (1) determine whether it is 

properly designed, built, and integrated; (2) understand its performance, 

including its capabilities and limitations; and (3) support next steps and 

decisions. MDA’s testing, specifically, combines both developmental and 

operational, the former verifying the design will satisfy requirements and 

the latter demonstrating the system can successfully accomplish its 

mission in the hands of the warfighter under realistic conditions. In 

addition, MDA uses multiple methods including ground and flight testing 

to determine whether the element’s or BMDS’s design will satisfy the 

desired capabilities:

• Ground Testing—utilizes modeling and simulations which are

computer representations that simulate the system’s performance to 

assess the capabilities and limitations of how elements or the BMDS 

perform under a wider variety of conditions than can be accomplished 

through the limited number of flight tests conducted. Ground tests 

enable MDA to repeatedly conduct scenarios that may be too costly or 

subject to constraints as a flight test. To ensure that the models and 

simulations accurately represent the element or BMDS level, each 

undergoes verification, validation, and accreditation—an official 

certification that it operates as intended in representative, real-world 

conditions. The BMDS Operational Test Agency (OTA)—an 

independent assessor—performs the verification, validation, and 

accreditation.

• Flight Testing—includes intercept and non-intercept testing. Flight 

tests use actual elements to assess and demonstrate performance. 

Flight tests alone are insufficient because they only demonstrate a 

single collection data point of element and system performance. Flight 

tests are, however, an essential tool used to validate performance of 

the elements and, eventually, the BMDS. Flight tests are also 

necessary to anchor models and simulations and to ensure they 

accurately reflect real performance.14 Non-intercept tests enable 

evaluation of specific performance aspects or scenarios and 

potentially reduce risks for future tests.

 14GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Charting a Course for Improved Missile Defense Testing

GAO-09-403T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2009). 

MDA’s Testing Approach
Page 9 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

MDA uses individual test schedules to tactically manage a single test 

event and the Integrated Master Test Plan (hereafter referred to as the 

integrated test schedule) to strategically manage all of the element and

BMDS level tests. Individual test schedules are created as the execution 

date for a test is approaching and elaborates the specific details for each 

test, including assigned personnel, roles and responsibilities, dates, and 

tasks. Whereas MDA’s testing baseline—the integrated test schedule—

designates all of its element and BMDS level testing for the upcoming and 

future fiscal years and supports its funding requests. Specifically, it 

identifies each test by name, including the type of test, any targets (if 

applicable), and the fiscal year quarter it is planned for execution. The 

integrated test schedule is finalized and signed annually. Midway through 

the year, MDA updates the integrated test schedule with any changes in a 

memo that is approved by DOD testing officials. MDA has multiple lines of 

funding to pay for any costs associated with testing. The Director for 

Testing manages and executes testing using its funding lines. In addition, 

each MDA element has its own funding lines for testing and Targets and 

Countermeasures provide targets that are test assets.

MDA is using an incremental approach—a series of deliveries that build 

upon, expand, or add to what is currently available—to deliver its BMDS 

level capabilities. BMDS level capabilities are intended to achieve 

performance levels that cannot be realized by the elements working 

independently, including intercepting threats sooner, defending larger 

areas, and countering more threats simultaneously. For example, a 

BMDS level capability called Engage on Remote, integrates Aegis BMD 

with forward-based radars and C2BMC to allow the warfighter to acquire 

and intercept an enemy ballistic missile sooner and, consequently, defend 

a larger area. BMDS capabilities, such as Engage on Remote, are 

grouped with others to meet specific ballistic missile defense goals and 

are delivered in increments. In fiscal year 2016, MDA was planning to 

deliver an additional 6 increments beyond the delivered Increment 2, 

each consisting of 3 to 11 BMDS level capabilities. The increments and 

associated capabilities are to be delivered annually or bi-annually in 

support of presidentially directed or agency goals for Homeland and 

MDA’s Incremental 

Approach for Delivering 

BMDS level Capabilities
Page 10 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Regional defense—including the European Phased Adaptive Approach 

(EPAA)—as shown in table 2.15

Table 2: Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Current Plan for Delivery of Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Level 

Capabilities

Increment Description of capabilities Delivery date Number of BMDS

level capabilities

Increment 2 Robust Medium Range Ballistic Missile Defense/European 

Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase 2

Delivered December 

2015

5 total/3 for EPAA 

Phase 2

Increment 3 Near Term Discrimination Improvements to Homeland Defense December 2016a 3

Increment 4 BMDS Enhanced Homeland Defense December 2017 5

Increment 5 Robust Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Defense/ EPAA 

Phase 3 

December 2018 7 total/

1 for EPAA Phase 

3 

Increment 6 Homeland Defense and Mid Term Discrimination Improvements 

for Homeland Defense 

December 2020 11

Increment 7 N/Ab December 2022 6

Increment 8 N/Ab December 2025 8

Source: GAO analysis of MDA data. | GAO-17-381

a

While planned for December 2016, according to MDA officials, Near Term Improvements to the 

Homeland Defense were delivered and approved by the MDA Director on March 23, 2017.

b

MDA officials told us that they are moving away from naming the increments or focusing on regional 

vs. homeland defense missions as future ones are planned to include a mix of regional and homeland 

capabilities in each increment.

Most of the planned increments focus on defending the United States 

homeland against intermediate- and intercontinental-range enemy 

ballistic missiles by integrating GMD, C2BMC, and various sensors. Other 

increments are being developed for regional defense to protect U.S. allies 

and forces deployed to Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe against 

short-, medium-, and intermediate-range enemy ballistic missiles. 

Regional defense is achieved by integrating Aegis BMD, THAAD, 

C2BMC, Patriot Advanced Capability-3, and allies’ weapon systems and 

various sensors.16 In fiscal year 2016, MDA also took steps to increase its 

cyber defense capability, expected as part of Increment 4, necessary for 

 15EPAA was announced by the President in 2009, which lays out policy commitments to 

deliver specific BMDS level capabilities to defend European countries that are members of 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization against enemy ballistic missiles.

16Programs that have been transferred to a military service for production, operation, or 

sustainment such as the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 program are not covered in this 

assessment.
Page 11 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data across the 

BMDS. The first delivery of this capability is planned for December 2017 

and upgrades are to follow with future increment deliveries.

MDA tracks its BMDS level capability goals in systems engineering 

documents, such as the Master Integration Plan, System Specification 

Document, and System Description Document. These documents 

describe how element level upgrades are synchronized to support 

deliveries of BMDS level capabilities, including the time frames by which 

elements need to complete development in order to be available for 

integration and test events. These plans also identify test and 

assessment needs to confirm capability delivery goals, as well as 

potential challenges and risks. A Technical Capability Declaration memo 

is the final step in MDA’s process for delivering a BMDS level capability 

for operational use and is issued by the Director, MDA. The memo 

describes how the capabilities were assessed and the ability of the 

system to meet technical specifications under limited set of conditions. It 

indicates readiness for the warfighter’s assessment of the system’s 

operational utility through the Operational Readiness and Acceptance 

process.

Our prior work has shown that establishing a sound business case is 

essential to achieving better program outcomes.17 A sound business case 

provides decision makers with confidence that the weapon system being 

acquired is necessary, achievable, and prudent. For example, in 2015, we 

reported that a sound business case provides credible evidence that (1) 

the warfighter’s needs are valid and can best be met with the chosen 

concept, and (2) the chosen concept can be developed and produced 

within existing resources.18 Key enablers to accomplish this include the 

following:

• defining clear, affordable, and achievable requirements;

• proving technologies before they are included in a weapon system; 

and

• incorporating knowledge-based acquisition best practices that include 

realistic cost estimates.

 17For examples, see GAO-08-1113 and GAO-06-367.

18GAO-16-187T.

Best Practices for a Sound 

Business Case
Page 12 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

As seen below in figure 2, when all of the elements of a sound business 

case come together, the result is a business case that expends resources 

early to minimize risk, thereby increasing the likelihood that the capability 

will be delivered on time, within budget, and with the necessary 

performance.

Figure 2: Elements of a Sound Business Case

A sound business case also represents the most acceptable compromise 

among competing priorities and, as indicated by our prior work on 

defense acquisitions, requires patience to take the necessary time upfront to produce well-informed requirements and mature technologies.19

For MDA, the agency is tasked with developing, producing, and fielding 

new capabilities as rapidly as possible but also expects such capabilities 

to be affordable and highly reliable, available, and effective. The central 

challenge of producing a sound business case is finding an acceptable 

balance between these competing priorities. Finding a balance between 

resources available (i.e., time and funding) and needed operational 

 19See GAO, Weapon System Requirements: Detailed Systems Engineering Prior to 

Product Development Positions Programs for Success, GAO-17-77 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 17, 2016); and Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can 

Improve Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-162 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 

1999).
Page 13 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

attributes (i.e., reliability and effectiveness) is essential as is the buy-in 

from across the department because DOD components provide varying 

perspectives because of their unique areas of expertise and experience. 

Depending on the circumstance, a business case that includes some 

acquisition risk, such as deferring a flight test or performing concurrent 

development and production, may be justified. However, the more a 

business case relies on such measures to meet critical program 

objectives, the more risk is added to the program, increasing the 

likelihood the program will fail to meet those objectives and sustain 

support from within the department.

MDA conducted several key tests and delivered assets and BMDS level 

capabilities—performance aspects attained by integrating multiple 

elements to work together—but did not meet its goals as detailed in its 

fiscal year 2016 baselines. Specifically, MDA conducted 10 flight tests for 

fiscal year 2016, most notably, its second BMDS operational test; 

however target and system malfunctions led to retests, cost increases, 

and schedule changes. In addition, MDA delivered assets that increase 

the warfighter’s ability to defend against incoming enemy ballistic 

missiles. While MDA did not meet its asset delivery goals, it took positive 

steps to address some of the key causes for not doing so, including 

improving parts quality issues and in certain cases taking steps to reduce 

concurrency. MDA delivered a total of five BMDS level capabilities, but 

according to DOT&E and BMDS OTA assessments, testing was 

insufficient and the capabilities, as delivered, do not likely provide the 

robust capability as planned. MDA is continuing work on its future 

increments for regional and homeland defense, but ongoing technical, 

schedule and funding challenges also place some of these capabilities at 

risk.

MDA conducted a total of 10 flight tests in fiscal year 2016, three of the 

four that it planned to conduct and seven others that were delayed from a 

prior fiscal year, retests, or tests that were added to address system or 

target malfunctions. Specifically, MDA conducted seven non-intercept 

tests to evaluate various capabilities for Aegis BMD, Aegis Ashore, and 

GMD and its second BMDS operational test, which demonstrated regional 

defense capabilities and supported the EPAA Phase 2 declaration in 

December 2015. Table 3 provides details for all flight tests in fiscal year 

2016. For more details on each element’s testing, see appendixes II-IX.

MDA Made Progress 

in Fiscal Year 2016 

Conducting Tests and 

Delivering Assets and 

BMDS level 

Capabilities but It Did 

Not Meet Its Planned 

Goals

MDA Conducted Most of 

Its Planned Flight Tests for 

Fiscal Year 2016, but 

Target and System 

Malfunctions Led to 

Retests, Cost Increases, 

and Schedule Changes
Page 14 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Table 3: Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Fiscal Year 2016 Flight Tests, Status, and Descriptiona

Planned test’s name Flight test type Conducted 

(Yes or no)

Status and description

1 GM CTV-02+ Non-intercept Yes Met Objectives. Non-intercept test to evaluate Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense’s (GMD) Capability Enhancement (CE)-II 

interceptor’s alternate divert thrusters. A kill vehicle electrical 

component failed which prevented one of the thrusters from working 

for a segment of the test.

2 FTX-21 Non-intercept Yes Met Objectives. Non-intercept test to demonstrate an Aegis Ballistic 

Missile Defense’s 5.0 (BMD) ship’s ability to detect and track a 

medium-range threat.

3 SCD CTV-02 Non-intercept Yes Met Objectives. Non-intercept test of Aegis BMD’s SM-3 Block IIA 

interceptor.

4 SFTM-01 Intercept No Delayed to fiscal year 2017. First of six intercept tests to support the 

production decision for Aegis BMD’s SM-3 Block IIA interceptor. This 

test was successfully conducted the second quarter of fiscal year 

2017. 

Other test’s name Flight test type Conducted 

(Yes or no)

Status and description

5 AA CTV-02 Non-intercept Yes New test – Met Objectives. Non-intercept test to verify the 

performance of the Aegis BMD’s Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block IB 

Threat Upgrade (TU) interceptor from the Aegis Ashore site prior to its 

use in FTO-02 E1a. 

6 FTO-02 E1a Intercept Yes Retest – Met Objectives. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) 

operational test using Aegis Ashore and supporting elements to 

demonstrate capabilities for the European Phased Adaptive Approach 

(EPAA) Phase 2 declaration in December 2015. The initial attempt in 

fiscal year 2015 failed after a new intermediate-range target 

malfunctioned.

7 FTO-02 E2 Intercept Yes Delayed from Prior Fiscal Year - Target Malfunction. BMDS 

operational test to demonstrate regional defense capabilities. The 

short- range target’s parachute malfunctioned necessitating a retest, 

which was successful.

Other test’s name Flight test type Conducted 

(Yes or no)

Status and description

8 FTO-02 E2a Intercept Yes Retest – Met Objectives. BMDS operational test to demonstrate 

regional defense capabilities. Aegis BMD’s SM-2 Block IIIA 

interceptor engaged a cruise missile, but the SM-3 Block IB TU 

interceptor experienced an anomaly and failed to intercept a mediumrange target. THAAD intercepted a short-range target and Aegis 

BMD’s missed target, demonstrating a layered regional defense. 

9 FTT-18 Intercept No Delayed from Fiscal Year 2015 – Delayed to Fiscal Year 2017.

Intercept test to demonstrate THAAD’s capability against an

intermediate-range threat. This test was delayed from fiscal year 2015 

to accommodate the retest of the BMDS operational tests. 
Page 15 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

10 SM CTV-01 Non-intercept Yes New test– System Malfunction. Non-intercept test to demonstrate 

the performance of design modifications to Aegis BMD’s SM-3 Block 

IB TU third-stage rocket motor (TSRM) nozzle in support the 

production decision. System failed during the initial stage of the test.

11 SM CTV-01a Non-intercept Yes Retest – Met Objectives. Non-intercept test to demonstrate the 

performance of design modifications to Aegis BMD’s SM-3 Block IB 

TU TSRM nozzle in support the production decision.

12 SM CTV-02 Non-intercept Yes New test – Met Objectives. Non-intercept test to demonstrate the 

performance of design modifications to Aegis BMD’s SM-3 Block IB 

TU TSRM nozzle in support the production decision.

Source: GAO analysis of MDA data. | GAO-17-381

a

Our methodology for this assessment only includes MDA-led and funded tests, so other tests that 

MDA participated in fiscal year 2016, such as those internationally or for Patriot, are not included in 

the table above or analysis included herein.

Most of the tests MDA conducted in fiscal year 2016 were either tests 

delayed from a prior fiscal year, retests, or new tests MDA added to 

address system or target malfunctions, some of which had significant cost 

and schedule impacts. For example, four new tests were added 

specifically to evaluate Aegis BMD system performance, one of which 

experienced a system failure, and required a retest. The first event of 

MDA’s second major BMDS operational test—FTO-02 E1—included a 

new intermediate-range target which malfunctioned due to a safety switch 

that did not indicate, as designed, that it had safely cleared the aircraft 

once it was launched. The malfunction prevented the target from 

executing sequential steps and flying as intended and therefore the test 

had to be repeated.20 We previously recommended that MDA fly each 

new target in a non-intercept test to verify its performance and reduce 

risks prior to its use in an intercept test, but it has not implemented this 

recommendation.21 Consequently, costs for this first event of the BMDS 

operational test doubled, increasing from $96 million to $192 million. 

Despite the costly impacts from the use of a new target, MDA plans to 

use a new intercontinental-range target during an upcoming GMD 

intercept test—FTG-15—that is designed to demonstrate the CE-II Block I 

interceptor’s and its second generation booster’s performance in support 

of the goal to field 44 interceptors by the end of 2017. Due to the addition 

of tests delayed from prior fiscal years, retests, and new tests, MDA had 

 20We previously reported this target failure in GAO, Missile Defense: Ballistic Missile 

Defense System Testing Delays Affect Delivery of Capabilities, GAO-16-339R 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2016).

21GAO, Missile Defense: Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition 

Management, GAO-13-432 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2013).
Page 16 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

to reduce conflicts in its test schedule by delaying multiple, and in at least 

one instance critical, tests. For example, to accommodate the retest of 

both events for the BMDS operational test, THAAD’s first flight test to 

demonstrate its capability against an intermediate-range threat has 

previously been delayed and is now delayed to at least the third quarter of 

fiscal year 2017, although it is a critical test for the Army which has had a 

THAAD battery deployed to defend against this threat range since 2013.22

MDA delivered various assets in fiscal year 2016 to increase the 

warfighter’s ability to defend against enemy ballistic missile attacks; 

however, it did not meet its asset and BMDS level capability delivery 

goals. For example, MDA delivered the Aegis Ashore site in Romania in 

December 2015 to provide increased protection of Europe. Also, MDA 

delivered the majority of its planned Aegis BMD interceptors, some of its 

planned THAAD interceptors, and made upgrades to existing GMD 

interceptors. Table 4 below highlights the assets MDA delivered in fiscal 

year 2016. For more details on each element’s assets, see appendixes IIIX.

 22We previously reported the delays to this test in GAO-16-339R.

MDA Delivered Some 

Assets and Took Positive 

Steps to Resolve Key 

Causes That Have 

Inhibited Progress Toward 

Meeting Its Fiscal Year 

Goals
Page 17 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Table 4: Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Asset Delivery Goals and Status for Fiscal 

Year 2016 

Ballistic Missile Defense asset Delivery goal Delivered

Aegis Ballistic 

Missile 

Defense(BMD)a

Aegis Ashore Site (Romania) 1 1

Standard Missile-3 Block IB

Interceptors

47 33

Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Capability 

Enhancement-II Interceptors

8 6b

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)

Interceptors

48 21

Total 104 61

Source: GAO analysis of MDA data. | GAO-17-381

a

MDA delivered the first Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIA interceptor for testing in fiscal year 2017.

b

The GMD interceptors were not new deliveries; rather, upgrades made to existing interceptors.

In 2016, MDA took positive steps to address two key causes that have 

hampered progress in meeting asset delivery goals in prior fiscal years—

parts quality issues and concurrency (i.e., overlap between development, 

testing, and production).

• Parts Quality Issues: We have previously found that parts quality 

issues can lead to rework, cost increases, schedule delays, reduced 

system reliability and availability, and in some cases, a complete halt 

in a program.23 In fiscal year 2016, because of ongoing parts quality 

issues, THAAD’s contractor stopped production of interceptors and 

other MDA elements were also affected by parts quality issues. It is 

MDA’s responsibility, as the government entity, to provide oversight of 

parts quality and ensure procedures are in place and followed. Thus, 

we previously recommended that MDA track such issues and the 

effectiveness of any corrective measures.24 While it had not 

implemented this recommendation, in April 2016, MDA issued a policy 

memo to emphasize parts quality assurance with various 

 23GAO, Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed to Correct 

Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs, GAO-11-404 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 

2011).

24GAO-11-404.
Page 18 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

requirements for doing so, including onsite verification assessments at 

subcontractor facilities.25

• Concurrency: For many years we have reported on MDA’s use of a 

highly concurrent acquisition approach. MDA’s use of concurrency, 

coupled with its aggressive testing schedule, has often left the agency 

in the position of either disrupting or pushing forward with production 

when developmental or testing problems occur.26 Despite our 

recommendation to the contrary, MDA has generally opted to continue 

production prior to validating performance through testing to enable it 

to rapidly deliver assets to the warfighter, albeit with higher risks of 

needing retrofits or fixes to address later address identified 

problems.

27 However, in fiscal year 2016, MDA added new tests 

specifically to evaluate design changes to the third-stage rocket motor 

nozzle of Aegis BMD’s SM-3 Block IB interceptor before inserting it 

into the production line. Also, DOD previously postponed the full-rate 

production decision for this interceptor until these tests were 

completed. Both actions of adding tests to evaluate the design 

changes and postponing the full-rate production decision align with 

prior recommendations we have made.28 These actions reduced the 

risk of additional cost impacts, schedule delays, and production 

disruptions and provided a more robust basis for the production 

decision.

In taking these steps, MDA has lessened some of the risks for its asset 

deliveries. Also, it has reduced risks for the overall operational 

performance of the BMDS because all of the elements have complex 

interactions and interdependencies so not delivering or delivering 

problematic or underperforming assets could affect multiple elements.

 25Missile Defense Agency Policy Memo Number 86, “Parts, Materials, and Processes 

Requirements Verification, (Apr. 7, 2016). 

26As reported in Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by 

Reducing Concurrency, GAO-12-486 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2012), GAO-13-432, 

and Missile Defense: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Acquisition Risk and Improve 

Reporting on System Capabilities, GAO-15-345 (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2015). 

27Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense Components Continue 

with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned, GAO-09-338 (Washington, D.C.: March 

13, 2009).

28GAO-15-345 and Missile Defense: Mixed Progress in Achieving Acquisition Goals and 

Improving Accountability, GAO-14-351 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2014).
Page 19 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

In fiscal year 2016, MDA delivered a total of five BMDS level capabilities 

for regional defense, three of which are specifically designed for the 

EPAA Phase 2. EPAA Phase 2 provides regional defense against 

medium-range ballistic missile threats and builds on the initial phase 

delivered in December 2011. Table 5 provides a description of regional 

defense capabilities and identifies those for EPAA Phase 2 specifically, 

and those that were delivered for its larger regional ballistic missile 

defense effort.

Table 5: Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Fiscal Year 2016 Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Level Capabilities for 

Regional Defense

Number BMDS level capability description Goal for European 

Phased Adaptive 

Approach Phase 2

Capability 

delivered for 

regional BMDS

1 Integration of Aegis Ashore into the BMDS in Europe. Yes Yes

2 Launch on Remote, which allows Aegis ships or Aegis Ashore to launch 

Standard Missile -3 IB interceptors based on cues from radars located closer 

to the threat launch site, via the Command, Control, Battle Management and 

Communications (C2BMC).

Yes Yes

3 BMD System-Track, which allows C2BMC to generate threat tracks (i.e., 

paths) based on data from one or more sensors and post them onto DOD’s 

communication network used by other elements, like Aegis BMD.

Yes Yes

4 Debris mitigation, which improves BMDS performance in the presence of 

debris from threat missile separation, intercepted threat ballistic missiles, 

and waste from missile fuel. 

No Yes

5 Radar Cross-Area of Responsibility, which allows specific radars in Europe 

and the Middle East to collaborate and improve the tracking of threat ballistic 

missiles. 

No Yes

Source: GAO analysis of MDA data. | GAO-17-381

Although MDA delivered regional capabilities as scheduled, DOT&E 

concluded that testing was insufficient and the capabilities, as delivered, 

likely do not provide robust defense against medium-range ballistic 

missiles as planned. First, all four tests used to support the delivery of 

these capabilities included limitations that deviated from how the 

warfighter would use them under realistic conditions. While this is 

unavoidable in some cases due to range limitations, safety concerns and 

cost considerations, in other cases, testing limitations were discovered 

during the test. Second, some of the models and simulations—which are 

needed to assess the integrated BMDS in scenarios that cannot be 

executed during flight testing—were unaccredited and still remain as 

BMDS Level Capabilities 

Were Delivered for 

Regional Defense, but Do 

Not Provide Robust 

Defense as Planned
Page 20 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

such.29 According to the BMDS OTA officials—the agency responsible for 

accrediting the models—having just one unaccredited model in the test 

reduces confidence in the results of the entire assessment. Last, in 

addition to the testing limitations, the tests revealed performance issues 

that could lead to missed or multiple attempts to defeat a single threat. 

For example, there were difficulties tracking targets, discriminating the 

lethal object in the targets, and mitigating interference from any debris. 

Also, there were integration challenges across the various elements 

involved in the tests. For example, during some tests, there were 

difficulties processing data between Aegis BMD and C2BMC. According 

to our analysis, all of these issues combined, significantly lower the 

overall performance of the EPAA Phase 2 capabilities and could be 

exacerbated as the complexity of ballistic missile attacks increase.

Despite delivering EPAA Phase 2 in December 2015, ongoing technical 

and funding issues have led to recurring delays and other changes in 

MDA’s delivery plan. Figure 3 shows changes to MDA’s capability 

delivery plan implemented in fiscal year 2016, including the addition of 

five new capabilities, and 17 delays—three of which were split off from 

larger capabilities.

 29A model is a representation of an actual system. A simulation is a method for 

implementing a model, such as virtual experiments for the purpose of understanding the 

system’s behavior under selected conditions.

Additional BMDS Level 

Capabilities Were Delayed 

and More Are at Risk of 

Delays
Page 21 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Figure 3: Deviations in Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Capability Delivery Plan by Incrementa

a

Increments are composed of Ballistic Missile Defense System-level capabilities to improve the 

integrated system performance.

Examples of deviations in the fiscal year 2016 Capability Delivery Plan 

include the following:

• Automated engagement command and management at the BMDS

level was delayed from Increment 6 in December 2020 to Increment 8 

in December 2025. Previously, this capability was scheduled for 

December 2015, and has been delayed multiple times, in part due to 

C2BMC technical and funding challenges, for a total of a 10-year slip. 

This capability is important because it represents a significant 

increase in BMDS integration by centralizing and automating 

command decisions across the BMDS, to improve coordination and 

deconfliction of engagements by multiple BMD shooters. As such, it is 
Page 22 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

a key upgrade for improving performance against ballistic missile raid 

attacks. According to DOT&E, the BMDS is still not truly integrated, 

but rather a federated system where elements make engagement 

decisions individually.

• Completion of Engage on Remote (EOR) was also delayed again in 

MDA’s 2016 capability delivery plan. Previously, it was planned for full 

delivery in December 2018 as the sole EPAA Phase 3 capability. 

However, in fiscal year 2015, it was split to deliver some content in 

December 2020, largely due to technical challenges with C2BMC. In 

fiscal year 2016, it was further delayed from Increment 6 in December 

2020 to Increment 7 in December 2022, after integration and delivery 

of a new radar was added to Increment 6, according to MDA officials.

• Three BMDS level capabilities designed to improve the Homeland 

Defense architecture in Increment 3 were delayed from December 

2016 to March 2017.

30 They were also delayed previously from 

September to December 2016. While our assessment of these efforts 

found that GMD had development delays for some software upgrades 

leading up to an assessment and integration activities, MDA officials 

told us that the delay was driven by additional time needed to analyze 

testing results.

In addition to the known changes to MDA’s BMDS level Capability 

Delivery Plan in fiscal year 2016, our assessment of MDA’s system 

engineering and element level acquisition management documents 

indicate that additional BMDS level capabilities are at an increased risk 

for delays. Potential for these delays are the result of likely technical 

challenges encountered during the synchronization of individual element

level efforts with the BMDS level schedule. For example:

• For Increment 4 (December 2017), three out of five capabilities could 

be reduced or delayed, as constituent software upgrades for GMD 

and certain sensors, among other elements are at risk to be delivered 

after the beginning of associated integration activities. This, in turn, 

could reduce time to resolve any integration issues, should they be 

discovered. Moreover, according to MDA documentation, the current 

schedule for this increment already leaves little margin to address any 

major integration challenges. In addition, MDA has added BMDS level 

Cyber Defense capability as part of this increment to be delivered in 

 30According to MDA officials, Improvements to the Homeland Defense architecture were 

delivered and approved by the Director, MDA with the Near Term Discrimination Technical 

Capability Declaration on March 23, 2017.
Page 23 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

December 2017. However, MDA is still developing a comprehensive 

cyber-defense strategy to manage this effort and a detailed test plan. 

This plan has been delayed multiple times—most recently from its 

January 2017 release. These delays, according to DOT&E officials, 

are likely to reduce the scope of the first Cyber Defense test, 

scheduled to begin in October 2017. Because MDA is still developing 

its plans, we were unable to assess the extent to which this capability 

will be delivered on time and provide the necessary protections.

• For Increment 5 (December 2018) which includes EPAA Phase 3, six 

out of seven capabilities could be reduced or delayed, as constituent 

upgrades for C2BMC, Aegis BMD, a sensor and THAAD face delays. 

This will compress the integration schedule for these six planned 

capabilities including EOR—the sole EPAA Phase 3 capability— and 

reduce the time to address any integration issues, should they be 

discovered. Additionally, other element level delays have already 

impacted and could further impact EOR.

MDA’s integrated test schedule—its test baseline, commonly referred to 

as the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP)—continues to be aggressive 

despite its increasing pace and complexity and its lack of traceability 

raises questions about what progress has actually been achieved. MDA’s 

individual test schedules—an execution schedule for a specific test within 

the test baseline—may be unreliable and not only deviate from 

scheduling best practices, but MDA’s scheduling policies as well. Finally, 

it was difficult to determine the costs associated with testing due to 

consistency and transparency issues, including the lack of or unclear 

documentation, inconsistent inputs and outputs, and lack of traceability.

As we have previously found, MDA’s integrated test schedule is 

aggressive, in that it includes too many tests and little to no margin 

between the tests reducing MDA’s ability to complete it as planned and 

consequently, the ability to track progress or costs.31 Since fiscal year 

2010, MDA’s test schedule has, on average, included 16 flight tests each 

fiscal year and it has, on average, executed 8, with 4 and 11 being the 

least and most, respectively. Thus, when setbacks occur, such as system 

or target malfunctions, the margin between tests has eroded MDA’s 

flexibility to make schedule adjustments. Consequently, MDA has yet to 

 31Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and Accountability, 

GAO-11-372 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2011); GAO-15-345; and GAO-16-339R. 

MDA’s Testing 

Schedule Remains 

Aggressive and 

Associated Costs 

Lack Transparency

MDA’s Integrated Test 

Schedule Remains 

Aggressive and has 

Limited Traceability
Page 24 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

conduct all of its planned tests for a fiscal year, which has created a 

backlog of tests not conducted. MDA relieves pressure in the schedule by 

delaying and removing tests instead of including sufficient schedule 

margin to ensure executability, as we previously recommended.32 As a 

result, since fiscal year 2012, the tests that it has conducted have 

primarily been either those backlogged from prior fiscal years or new tests 

to address system, target, or other testing setbacks, as shown in figure 4.

Figure 4: Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Flight Test Execution for the Ballistic 

Missile Defense System for Fiscal Years 2010-2016 

Along with the growing backlog, we have found that MDA is increasing 

the complexity and pace of flight testing, as 77 percent are planned to be 

intercept tests through fiscal year 2020 compared to 51 percent to date. 

 32GAO-11-372.
Page 25 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

In addition, both events for MDA’s third and largest BMDS operational 

flight test—FTO-03—are scheduled during this time frame and there are 

multiple tests that will use new targets, both of which increase the risks to 

the execution of all of these tests. For MDA to achieve its planned testing 

through 2020, the tests must be on time and successful; otherwise, it may 

need to make trade-offs among priorities and delay or remove tests. 

When MDA does not conduct tests as planned, it defers the 

demonstration and confirmation of system and capability performance 

which leaves the warfighter with the decision to either not use the system 

or capability or use it with an increased risk that it may not perform as 

intended.

In addition to the growing backlog and increasing pace and complexity, 

MDA’s integrated test schedule does not clearly trace schedule 

changes—a key aspect of a baseline—thereby limiting insight into what is 

happening with each test. MDA updates its integrated test schedule at 

least once annually with new tests that have been added, retests, and 

tests that have been removed, including any movement in fiscal year 

quarters for execution dates. However, these updates are limited to those 

from the prior fiscal year’s version of the integrated test schedule, so any 

changes prior to that version are not captured. As an example of changes 

to a specific test event, the integrated test schedule for fiscal year 2016 

shows a THAAD test—FTT-16—as accelerating a quarter in fiscal year 

2020; however, this test was originally planned to be executed in fiscal 

year 2013, a seven year delay. Also, due to developmental and testing 

setbacks, a GMD’s test objectives were modified which resulted in its 

name being changed three times, it was modified from an intercept to a 

non-intercept, and it was delayed a total of four years, from fiscal year 

2012 to 2016, but the integrated test schedule does not clearly trace 

these changes, as shown in figure 5.
Page 26 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Figure 5: Traced Versus Actual Changes to One of Missile Defense Agency’s Flight Test for Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

(GMD) 

The lack of traceability in MDA’s integrated test schedule makes it difficult 

not only to determine what is happening with a test, but also with its 

testing progress as a whole, including what and when requirements were 

originally planned to be met and which ones have been met, when they 

are met, and with what test. For example, MDA conducted a THAAD 

test—FTT-11—in December 2009 to demonstrate an advanced algorithm 

to meet the Army’s acceptance requirements, but the target failed, 

necessitating a retest. The retest was on the integrated test schedule 

several times, and finally its objectives were combined with the BMDS 

operational test conducted in fiscal year 2016, 6 years later. Over that 

period, THAAD made hardware and software adjustments to its 

interceptors, launchers, and other support equipment. As such, it is 

unclear which of the five THAAD battery equipment sets and over 100 

interceptors that have been delivered to the warfighter before the BMDS 

operational test, if any, have met the Army’s acceptance requirements. 

According to GAO’s best practices for scheduling, a baseline should 
Page 27 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

include the original dates, current dates, and associated changes to 

accurately gauge progress.33 However, the lack of traceability in MDA’s 

integrated test schedule, changes to tests, and overall testing progress 

cannot be discerned without analyzing and comparing multiple 

documents across several fiscal years and preparing a detailed crosswalk 

of the information. Without an adjustment to how MDA traces and reports 

changes to the tests in its integrated test schedule, which could be 

accomplished with a detailed crosswalk, information critical for 

understanding its progress will remain obscured.

MDA’s individual test schedules may not reliably forecast execution 

dates, in part due to deficiencies in, and deviations from, its scheduling 

policies. A schedule is a critical management tool because it defines what 

activities need to be completed, the duration of the activities, and the 

completion date for the activities. The schedule also serves as the basis 

for developing a time-phased budget to pay for the activities. We 

assessed MDA’s scheduling policies and found that they generally align, 

but do not fully meet the four characteristics outlined in GAO’s best 

practices guide for scheduling.34 For example, MDA’s scheduling policies 

set forth requirements to capture and sequence all activities, ensure 

traceability, and maintain a schedule baseline. Figure 6 details our 

assessment.

 33 GAO-16-89G.

34 GAO-16-89G. 

MDA’s Individual Test 

Schedules May Be 

Unreliable and Do Not 

Meet the Agency’s 

Scheduling Standards
Page 28 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Figure 6: Assessment of Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Scheduling Policies against GAO’s Identified Best Practices for 

Scheduling

While MDA’s scheduling policies generally align with the best practices 

we have identified, there are a number of deficiencies, such as a lack of a 

mechanism to ensure that the schedule aligns with the budget, no 

requirement to assign resources to schedules, and unclear guidance on 

risk analysis. Because best practices are interrelated, deficiencies in one 

best practice can cause deficiencies in others. We identified deficiencies 

in each of MDA’s scheduling policies, but the most notable were related 

to the best practices attributes of comprehensive and credible:

Comprehensive. To be comprehensive, a schedule should include (1) all 

activities necessary to accomplish the objectives as defined in the work

breakdown structure (WBS), (2) the resources needed for doing so, and 
Page 29 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

(3) realistic time frames for each activity. MDA’s scheduling policies lack 

the following:

• No requirement for schedule work breakdown structure (WBS) to 

ensure alignment with budget. MDA’s policies that we reviewed 

require schedule activities to align with budget documentation, in 

accordance with best practices, but they do not detail how to ensure 

this alignment. According to best practices, there should be a 

schedule WBS that traces to each activity and aligns with the cost 

WBS.35 A WBS defines, in detail, what work is necessary to 

accomplish a project’s objectives, including the activities the 

government and contractors are to perform. We found that the 

activities included in one of MDA’s flight test schedules did not align 

with its cost estimate. Without a schedule WBS, alignment of the 

schedule and budget cannot be ensured, which could prevent MDA’s, 

Congress’s, and oversight officials’ ability to pinpoint the cost effects 

of schedule adjustments or slippages.

• Resources not required to be assigned to individual test 

schedules. According to best practices, a schedule should reflect the 

resources (e.g., labor, materials, travel, facilities, equipment, and the 

like) needed to do the work, whether the resources will be available 

when needed, and any constraints on funding or time.36 A test 

schedule without assigned resources implies an unlimited amount and 

availability of such. MDA officials stated that information on schedule 

driven resource needs is shared at a high level as part of MDA’s 

budget development process; however, they did not specify what 

information is shared, with whom, or how.

Credible. A schedule is credible if it is horizontally traceable—reflects the 

order of events to achieve outcomes—and vertically traceable—activities 

map to one another—and risk analysis identifies high-priority risks and is 

used to establish a confidence level for meeting the completion date. 

MDA’s scheduling policies are unclear about risk analysis.

• Unclear guidance on when and how to conduct schedule risk 

analysis. MDA’s scheduling policies that we reviewed indicate that a 

schedule risk analysis should be conducted upon request by a 

manager, but it does not specify under what conditions a manager 

should request one, who is responsible for conducting it, or how it is to 

 35GAO-16-89G.

36GAO-16-89G.
Page 30 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

be conducted. According to best practices, programs should include 

the results of a schedule risk analysis in constructing an executable 

baseline schedule because it helps determine the level of confidence 

in meeting the execution date by identifying risks and prioritizing 

threats and opportunities and any necessary schedule contingency.37

MDA officials agreed that its policies are unclear and that they will 

consider adjustments during the next revision.

To evaluate MDA’s implementation of its scheduling policies, we 

assessed the reliability of two individual test schedules—a flight and 

ground test—and found that they only partially meet best practices and 

deviate from MDA’s scheduling standards. Specifically, if the wellconstructed characteristic is not met then the schedule cannot be 

considered reliable because the characteristic encompasses the 

foundational best practices that a schedule must meet. A well-constructed 

schedule is fully sequenced, has a critical path, and calculates

reasonable total float. However, both test schedules were missing key 

information to provide a reliable timeline and execution date. Figure 7 

details our assessment.

 37GAO-16-89G.
Page 31 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Figure 7: Assessment of Two of Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Individual Flight Test Schedules Against Attributes of the 

Well-Constructed Characteristic in GAO’s Best Practices Guide for Scheduling

Both individual test schedules we assessed:

• Lacked properly sequenced activities due to omitted dependencies or 

invalid logic relationships between activities. Without clear and 

complete dependencies and valid logic relationships between 

activities, the schedule cannot predict the effect that unrealistic 

deadlines, delayed activities, external events, scope changes, and 

misallocated resources, among other things, will have on the test’s 

execution date.

• Included an unreasonable amount of total float (i.e., the amount of 

time an activity can be delayed before it affects the test execution 

date). A reasonable amount of total float in a schedule allows 

management to identify activities that could be slipped and resources 

that could be reallocated to other or higher priority activities to be 

completed on time.

• Lacked a valid critical path to test execution. Without a valid critical 

path, those responsible for managing the test cannot provide a 

timeline or identify what activities, if delayed, will delay the test 

execution date.

MDA officials acknowledged the shortcomings in both their scheduling 

policies and individual test schedules. Accordingly, they said that they 

plan to make adjustments to the scheduling policies during their next 

planned revision. As for the individual test schedule’s deviation from MDA 

policies, MDA officials indicated that there are efforts underway to 

develop more detailed, better constructed schedules, but they provided 
Page 32 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

limited details as to what those efforts are, which schedules they apply to, 

and associated timelines. Until MDA fully aligns it scheduling policies with 

best practices and ensures that they are consistently implemented, it is 

likely to continue to create individual test schedules that cannot reliably 

forecast execution dates, which can impede its management of the 

integrated test schedule.

MDA requests more than $1 billion in funding each fiscal year for the tests 

outlined in its integrated test schedule based on internally developed test 

cost estimates, but our analysis found that these estimates are 

inconsistent and lack documented traceability. A cost estimate is the 

summation of individual costs using established methods and valid data. 

The management of the cost estimate involves continually updating it with 

actual costs as they become available, revising it to reflect changes, and 

analyzing differences between the estimated and actual costs.38 Based 

on available data and interviews with relevant officials, we found, and 

MDA confirmed, that it develops cost estimates at two distinct levels, the 

element and the test. Figure 8 depicts the process MDA uses for 

determining its testing costs and associated funding need.

 38GAO-09-3SP.

MDA’s Test Cost 

Estimates Are Inconsistent 

and Lack Transparency
Page 33 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Figure 8: Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Process for Determining Total Costs and Funding Needs for Tests Included in Its 

Integrated Test Schedule
Page 34 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

According to our analysis of MDA documentation, confirmed by MDA 

officials, MDA develops cost estimates at two distinct levels, the element

and the test level. At the element level, an element (e.g., Aegis BMD, 

GMD, THAAD) creates its respective test estimates, as each has its own 

baselines, contractors, military service lead (e.g., Army, Navy), and longestablished traditions and practices. At the test level, MDA’s Cost 

Directorate uses a classified application—the Test Resource Mission 

Planning-Tool (TRMP-T)—to consolidate the element level estimates.39

MDA’s Cost Directorate then adds other costs from various directorates 

into each test level estimate based on that test’s design and associated 

requirements, such as a barge used for transportation or an aircraft used 

for observation. These other costs have supporting estimates that are 

either derived from the Cost Directorate, the elements, or other entity 

within MDA, according to MDA’s Cost Directorate officials. This process is 

used to create test level estimates for all of the tests included in the 

integrated test schedule. The Cost Directorate then sends the estimates 

to the elements, various stakeholders, and MDA management for vetting 

and approval. Finally, MDA performs an affordability review based on the 

estimated total costs for testing, which can be an iterative process to 

resolve any misalignments, determine the funding needs, and submit a 

budget request.

We found that the element level estimates for testing generally align with 

best practices for cost estimating, while the test level estimates had 

significant deficiencies, such as lack of or unclear documentation, 

inconsistent inputs and outputs, and lack of traceability. Best practices 

include a compilation of characteristics and associated attributes that 

agencies can use to develop and maintain reliable cost estimates.40

Developing and maintaining reliable cost estimates ensures agencies 

request the appropriate amount of funds, when the funds are needed, and 

for the expressed purpose. Doing so is imperative, because funds 

provided and spent on one effort mean less are available for other efforts. 

Figure 9 details our assessment of MDA’s element and test level 

estimates against these best practices.

 39TRMP-T has other functions, including tracking discrete test objectives and 

requirements, which are at a classified level, although the test level cost estimates and 

associated outputs are not classified.

40GAO-09-3SP.

Element Level Estimates 

for Testing Substantially 

Met Best Practices for 

Cost Estimating; Test

Level Estimates Did Not
Page 35 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Figure 9: Assessment of Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Element and Test Level Test Cost Estimates Against GAO’s 

Identified Best Practices for Cost Estimating

a

This best practice was not evaluated as the review was focused on test costs only.
Page 36 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Although MDA’s element level estimates generally align with best 

practices, there are some areas for improvement and its test level 

estimates have significant deficiencies. The most notable best practices 

deficiencies in the element and test level estimates related to the 

attributes of comprehensive, well-documented, and accurate as follows:

Comprehensive. An estimate is comprehensive if it includes all costs 

using a WBS for a consistent and visible framework, ensuring that costs 

are neither omitted nor double counted and that all cost-influencing 

ground rules and assumptions are detailed.

• A common test WBS exists; but it is not being used. We found 

that MDA has a common test WBS intended to capture costs 

comprehensively and consistently across the elements; however, 

none of the elements use it for estimating test costs. Currently, each 

element uses its own unique, albeit sometimes similar WBS. Use of a 

common WBS enables data sharing and aggregation, while different 

WBSs may lead to different data collection and cost estimates, with 

varying levels of detail. Also, without a common WBS, it may hinder 

an agency’s ability to track resource allocations and actual amounts 

spent.

Well-Documented. A well-documented estimate includes and traces to 

source data, clearly detailed calculations and results, and explanations of 

why particular methods and references were chosen.

• Limited source data descriptions for element level estimates for 

tests. We found instances where no narrative was provided to 

describe the use or modification of source data. Specifically, MDA 

uses a number of methodologies to create element level estimates 

and among these is an analogy, which involves using a prior test’s 

estimate as the basis for a new test’s estimate. When using an 

analogy, though, it is important to make adjustments to the new 

estimate for unique aspects of the prior test’s estimate that may not 

be applicable and to document this information. For example, if the 

prior test encountered delays and associated cost increases, it should 

be adjusted or removed when serving as the basis for a new test’s 

cost estimate. However, we found that MDA generally did not make 

any adjustments to a new test’s estimate when using an analogy. 

Without adjustments, the cost estimate could be under- or overestimated; thereby creating instances of shortages or overages.

• No documented traceability to the source data for test level 

estimates. We found that some of the data between the element and 
Page 37 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

test level estimates did not align. However, according to MDA Cost 

Directorate officials, the costs in the test level estimate are taken 

directly from the element level estimates, which contain the 

documented estimating methodologies, risk analysis, and other 

source data. Specifically, when we initially compared the estimates, in 

most cases, the costs varied by 50 percent or more, with the costs 

consistently higher in the test level estimate. MDA Cost Directorate 

officials were able to reconcile some of the variances by creating a 

crosswalk and verbally explaining the misalignments. Per best 

practices, a cost estimate should be easily understood and replicated 

by someone other than those who prepared it; otherwise, questions 

about its credibility arise.

• No documented policy or guidance for the process or software

application used to create test level estimates provided by MDA.

We found, based on available data, documentation provided by DOD,

and interviews with relevant officials, that MDA does not have

documented policy or guidance related to its process for creating test

level cost estimates. An agency’s processes, such as those for cost

estimating, should be documented in policy and, in order to be

effective, include guidance on the who, what, when, where, how, and

why of the process.41 Without such, it introduces the possibility of

mistakes and misinformation. For example, we asked various MDA

officials about the test level estimates and received different and

sometimes conflicting responses. However, MDA did not provide a

documented policy or guidance with specific details with which to

weigh the responses against. MDA had an independent contractor

assess the software application used to create its test level estimates

in 2014, and the findings from this assessment include the need to

document the process in its policy and to create guidance for using

the software application.42 Consequently, MDA has been aware of this

deficiency for at least three years, although it has yet to take any

actions to address it. Without documentation or guidance for this

process and software application, MDA has limited and potentially

inconsistent means of providing direction to personnel, and

management responsible for executing and monitoring it and

communicating relevant information to external parties, such as

Congress and oversight entities, as needed.

41GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2014).

42Final Report: MDA Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) Cost Estimating Model 

Independent Verification and Validation. MCR Technologies. Feb. 25, 2014. 
Page 38 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

• No costs per tests specified in budget submissions or other 

external documentation. We found that MDA does not document its 

test level estimates—total costs per test—in its annual budget 

submission, and according to MDA officials, this is because there is 

no requirement to do so. Currently, MDA’s annual budget submission 

includes an overall test funding line for various elements and the 

Directorate for Testing, but we found that neither the specific tests for 

which it is requesting funding nor the costs of each are delineated.

Similarly, MDA’s BAR which presents the current estimate for its 

baselines includes an overall test funding line for each element. The 

issue is that MDA regularly makes changes to the integrated test 

schedule, a companion document to the BAR, without identifying the 

corresponding effects or impacts to its costs and funding needs, 

despite our prior recommendation to do so.43 Without a breakout of 

MDA’s costs by test in its annual budget submission and BAR, how 

many times or how much funding has been requested, received, or 

used for a specific test will continue to be unclear.

Accurate. An estimate is accurate if it is unbiased, based on the most 

likely costs, and has few or no mathematical mistakes.

• Actual costs are not collected. We found that MDA continues to 

have challenges tracking the actual amounts it spends per test.44

Tracking actual amounts spent is important because they are the 

foundation for credible cost estimates and can facilitate internal and 

external oversight and accountability. One of the reasons MDA has 

been challenged to track actual amounts spent is because it does not 

use a common WBS for test costs. Another reason is that the 

elements have coded the actual amounts they have spent differently 

in the payment application used to expend funding. Consequently, the 

inconsistent data on the front end (the WBS) and the backend (the 

payment system) has prevented MDA from aggregating the data for

an accurate total amount spent on a test. MDA recognizes its 

challenge in this regard and in response, it recently issued a memo 

and accompanying guidance that requires the use of specific naming 

 43GAO-11-372.

44GAO-16-339R.
Page 39 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

conventions when coding test cost data with the goal of capturing and 

reporting the complete and accurate cost information for each test.45

• Inconsistent costs provided for tests in response to information 

request. We found that when MDA has responded to a number of 

information requests from a congressional committee or GAO, in 

certain instances, the information provided has been inconsistent. For 

example, MDA has reported the total costs for a specific test using its 

test level cost estimates, but the information for the same test has 

been inconsistent across requests. Specifically, for one test we 

received an estimate of $261 million and later received an estimate of 

$26 million for that same test. Similarly, for another test, Congress 

received an estimate of $212.1 million and we received an estimate of 

$51.01 million for the same test. According to MDA Cost Directorate 

officials, these inconsistencies are attributable to fiscal year 

boundaries set within the test level estimate that exclude some prior 

and future costs. Accordingly, MDA has made adjustments to these

fiscal year boundaries to capture all prior costs and future costs 

through fiscal year 2030, per Cost Directorate officials. While we could 

tie MDA’s rationale to some of the inconsistencies, we could not do so 

for all. Moreover, although we requested clarification, MDA has been 

unable to provide a detailed, documented reconciliation for these 

varying estimates.

MDA officials agreed with the identified shortcomings in both its element 

and test level estimates. However, they did not elaborate on any specific 

actions they are currently or planning to take for improving element and 

test level estimates. Until MDA resolves the deficiencies in its element 

and test level cost estimates, specifically the use of the common test 

WBS, documenting the traceability of source data, breaking out costs by 

tests in budget submission and agency documentation, and codifying 

processes in policy, the lack of transparency for test costs and 

inconsistently reported data are likely to continue.

 45MDA, Individual Flight Test Costs Standard Operating Procedures, Sept. 27, 2016, and 

Memorandum for Capturing and Execution Reporting of Individual Flight Test Costs, Sept. 

28, 2016. 
Page 40 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

MDA currently has several efforts underway for exploring, developing, 

producing, and delivering its next generation of ballistic missile defense 

capabilities. MDA has taken steps to enhance the business case for its 

next generation efforts by performing early concept exploration, maturing 

technologies, and promoting competition for some efforts. MDA also 

incorporated input from DOD components for some of its next generation 

efforts, reducing acquisition risks and improving department-wide support 

for these programs. However, the requirements for MDA’s next 

generation efforts are missing warfighter-validation and approval and 

generally reflect the needs of MDA ahead of the warfighter. For example, 

warfighter and DOD components have voiced their concerns with aspects 

of system design for a new long-range radar, an improved kill vehicle for 

the GMD interceptors, and a new space-based sensor to help assess the 

results of intercepts. Moreover, organizations within the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense have voiced concerns with the acquisition strategy 

for the improved kill vehicle, particularly with decisions to limit 

competition. MDA did not address these concerns and has made trade-off 

decisions that reduce acquisition cost but potentially compromise 

performance to the extent that the new systems may not be able to 

perform their intended mission to defeat the current and future threat.

MDA Incorporated 

Several Elements of a 

Sound Business 

Case for Its Next 

Generation Efforts but 

Concerns with 

Requirements and 

Acquisition Strategies 

Could Hamper Efforts
Page 41 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

MDA is developing advanced technologies to adapt to threat changes 

with the goal of deploying a future BMDS architecture more capable of 

discriminating and intercepting incoming missiles with a higher degree of 

confidence, allowing the warfighter to improve its protection against 

evolving threats. According to MDA, the advanced technologies are 

determined by systems engineering to identify emerging technical 

solutions that will best address gaps in the BMDS and enhance the 

system’s overall capability and performance. As MDA looks to the future, 

not only is it considering what capabilities are needed to defeat the 

evolving threat, it is also considering what improvements are necessary to 

improve the current set of deployed systems, fix known problems, and 

deliver outstanding capabilities that have been delayed over the years.

However, MDA also faces budgetary challenges of balancing and 

prioritizing its portfolio of new investments while also supporting existing 

systems—all within a department-wide portfolio of competing priorities. 

MDA’s next generation efforts represent a significant investment as the 

agency plans to spend over $5.5 billion on these efforts over the next five 

years. Table 6 below describes MDA’s next generation efforts that span 

the 2020 and beyond time frame. 

MDA Has Several Efforts 

Underway for Exploring, 

Developing, Producing, 

and Delivering Its Next 

Generation of Ballistic 

Missile Defense 

Capabilities
Page 42 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Table 6: Description of the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Next Generation Efforts

Type Name Description

Research, concept 

exploration, technology 

demonstration, and 

experimental efforts:

Advanced Concepts 

and Performance and 

Evaluation

MDA is centralizing all advanced technology concept modeling, simulation, software, and 

analysis and utilizing subject matter experts to provide assessments of government, 

university, and industry technology concepts, such as kill vehicles, discrimination sensors, 

space alternatives, and directed energy systems. 

Advanced Research MDA is conducting research and development to create and enable future missile defense 

capability. Top focus areas for the agency include testing radiation-hardened optical 

components, initiating a nano-satellite technology testbed for kill vehicle components, and 

developing advanced materials in support of BMDS applications.

Advanced X-Band 

Radar 

MDA is developing target acquisition and discrimination algorithms for transition to program 

elements for further development and integration into BMDS X-Band Radars. MDA plans to 

use modeling, simulation, and online/offline assessments of live tracking opportunities to 

assess development algorithms prior to transition in an effort to reduce risk. Mid-term 

improvements are planned to field in FY 2019 and far-term improvements around FY2022- FY 

2025.

Directed Energy MDA is exploring two concepts with the goal of integrating a compact, efficient, high power 

laser into a high altitude, long endurance aircraft capable of carrying the laser and destroying 

targets in the boost phase. In FY 2019, MDA plans to evaluate both concepts and select the 

best approach to continue development by FY 2022.

Discrimination Sensor

Prototype 

Development

MDA is funding development of an advanced airborne sensor system, using the operational 

MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aircraft system. MDA intends to concentrate its efforts on developing 

advanced detectors, infrared sensors, and precision tracking and discrimination algorithms. 

According to MDA, the MQ-9 Reaper equipped with an advanced sensor could provide a 

viable quick reaction capability to augment BMDS radars. MDA plans to flight test the effort in 

FY 2019-2021 to achieve operational availability as early as 2023 for a short duration surge 

capability.

Medium Range 

Ballistic Missile 

Defense Sensor

MDA is planning to initiate concept development and analysis for emplacing a new, medium 

range ballistic missile defense sensor intended to improve the defensive coverage of Hawaii. 

MDA previously indicated that preliminary analysis from a global BMDS sensor system 

analysis of alternatives showed the best approach to improve the defense of Hawaii is to 

implement an upgraded version of the Army Navy/Shipboard Radar Surveillance and Control 

Model 1 radar. However, according to multiple DOD components, the analysis of alternatives 

did not identify the upgraded radar as the best approach and that the department will 

determine a capability to pursue once the study is complete. Preliminary estimates indicate 

MDA could field the sensor sometime between FY 2018 and FY 2030, depending on the 

sensor solution that is selected.

MOKV MDA is developing an advanced capability to destroy several objects within a threat complex 

using multiple kill vehicles carried on a single interceptor. MDA is currently focusing on 

competitive development and risk reduction of MOKV concepts with industry in an effort to 

lower developmental risk. MDA plans to deploy interceptors equipped with MOKVs around the 

FY 2029 time frame.

SKA MDA is developing and producing a network of small infrared sensors integrated onto 

commercial host satellites as an experiment to demonstrate kill assessment from space. 

While on orbit, these sensors are intended to observe missile defense intercepts and deliver a 

kill assessment declaration. MDA plans for the network to begin on-orbit deployment in FY 

2018, according to a current estimate from the commercial host. A warfighter evaluation of the 

systems is expected to follow shortly thereafter to determine whether to transition the system 

into an operational role.
Page 43 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Type Name Description

THAAD follow-on MDA is undertaking a risk reduction effort to explore and mature a design concept, validate 

the threat assessment, and develop a life cycle cost estimate for a potential THAAD follow-on 

program. MDA is seeking to increase THAAD’s capabilities, such as extending interceptor 

range and improving sensor performance, to expand battlespace and defended area, increase 

THAAD’s interoperability with other air and missile defense systems, and incorporate threat 

upgrades to keep pace with adversary advances, including hypersonic glide vehicles. MDA 

plans to evaluate the technical merits and affordability of these future capability improvements 

with potential deployment around FY 2025.

Programs undergoing 

development:

Improved Homeland 

Defense Interceptors

MDA is redesigning the Ground-based Midcourse Defense kill vehicle, known as the 

Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) to address ongoing reliability concerns with the current GMD 

kill vehicle. According to MDA, the RKV will be designed to be more reliable, producible, 

testable, and cost-effective. MDA also plans to improve the ground system and modify the 

boost vehicle with tactical upgrades to enhance survivability and expand capabilities against 

emerging threats. MDA plans to begin fielding interceptors equipped with RKVs starting in FY 

2022.

LRDR MDA is developing LRDR to address the need to provide persistent, precision tracking and 

discrimination capability in the Pacific sensor architecture. MDA anticipates the addition of 

LRDR will optimize employment of the GMD interceptor inventory and address evolving 

threats. The radar will be located at Clear Air Force Station, Alaska, with initial operational 

capability planned for 2020.

Legend:

BMDS = Ballistic Missile Defense System

FY = fiscal year

LRDR = Long Range Discrimination Radar

MOKV = Multi-Object Kill Vehicle

RKV = Redesigned Kill Vehicle

SKA = Space-based Kill Assessment

Source: GAO analysis of MDA’s FY 2017 budget request. |GAO-17-381
Page 44 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

MDA is pursuing a number of concept exploration, advanced research, 

technology demonstration, and experimental efforts with a goal to 

transition promising, cutting-edge technology into BMDS applications. 

These efforts are aimed at proving technologies work as intended before 

transitioning to a weapon system program, which our prior work on 

acquisition best practices has shown to be beneficial in minimizing 

development risks in new programs.46 In addition, MDA is incorporating 

aspects of DOD’s Better Buying Power initiative by making use of 

prototypes, emphasizing technology insertion, involving industry in funded 

concept definition efforts, promoting competition in some efforts, 

attempting to achieve affordable programs and dominant capabilities, and 

incentivizing productivity in industry and government.47

MDA is maturing technologies and making use of prototypes as part of its 

Directed Energy and Discrimination Sensor efforts. MDA’s previous 

attempts at quickly developing and fielding a capable, operationally 

suitable, directed energy system and airborne infrared sensor system 

proved unsuccessful.48 However, according to MDA, advancements in the 

field of laser technology may now make it possible for the agency to 

successfully transition the technology into an operationally effective 

missile defense application. Further exploration of unmanned aircraft 

vehicles and sensors that typically perform an information, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance mission for the U.S. Air Force may also allow MDA 

to make use of these existing capabilities in a missile defense application. 

By maturing technologies and making use of prototypes in each of these 

fields, MDA is reducing the potential for costly, time-consuming 

development challenges arising during the technology development 

phase, if and when MDA decides to transition these efforts back to 

 46GAO/NSIAD-99-162.

47DOD’s Better Buying Power initiative outlines a series of actions, guidance, and 

directives aimed at increasing the productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness of DOD’s 

acquisition, technology, and logistics efforts. See e.g., Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Memorandum: “Implementation Directive 

for Better Buying Power 3.0—Achieving Dominant Capabilities through Technical 

Excellence and Innovation” (Apr. 9, 2015).

48The Airborne Laser program was designed as a high-energy chemical laser onboard an 

airplane designed to intercept missiles. The Airborne Infrared program was designed to 

track ballistic missiles shortly after launch by utilizing infrared sensors onboard select 

unmanned aircraft systems. Both programs were canceled by DOD in 2012. We 

previously found these programs faced significant challenges in developing and 

demonstrating an operationally useful capability. See GAO-11-372.

Business Case for MDA’s 

Next Generation Efforts 

Enhanced by Maturing 

Technologies, Performing 

Early Concept Exploration, 

Promoting Competition, 

and Working with DOD 

Components
Page 45 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

weapon system programs. These efforts are consistent with the

recommendation we made in 2006 that DOD programs should 

demonstrate they have captured appropriate knowledge at program start, 

which includes, ensuring that requirements are informed by the systems 

engineering process.49

MDA is also executing advanced research efforts to promote the insertion 

of promising technologies into new or existing programs by funding 

universities and small businesses to research and develop technologies 

which the agency hopes will spur major advancements in missile defense 

capability, decrease the time to transition applications into the BMDS, and 

promote a healthy industrial base by commercializing technology 

developed for the BMDS into private sector applications. An agency-wide 

executive level Research Council is tasked with identifying priorities and 

balancing the research portfolio. In fiscal year 2016, the MDA Research 

Council approved over 150 contract actions to test the scientific, 

technical, and commercial feasibility of particular concepts. These efforts 

are consistent with the recommendation we made in 2006, that in order to 

ensure that a sound business case is developed prior to starting system 

development, DOD should set aside a portion of advanced component 

development and prototype funds for the science and technology 

community to manage the transition of technologies to acquisition 

programs.50

In addition, MDA is performing concept exploration activities in an effort to 

prove concepts work before transitioning them to a weapon system. Prior 

to initiating the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) program, for example, 

MDA performed a concept definition program where the agency 

contracted with three contractors to propose kill vehicle design solutions 

and perform technology maturity assessments. MDA plans to perform a 

similar effort for the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) program. Moreover, 

MDA has two directed energy concept exploration efforts underway to 

determine whether the technology is currently far enough along to where 

it can be developed into a missile defense application. These efforts are 

consistent with the recommendation we made in 2008 that DOD should 

have contractors perform more detailed systems engineering analysis to 

 49GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience Cost and 

Schedule Problems under DOD’s Revised Policy, GAO-06-368 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 

13, 2006).

50GAO, Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD Technology 

Transition Processes, GAO-06-883 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2006).
Page 46 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

develop sound requirements before DOD selects a prime contractor for 

the system’s development contract.51

MDA is also promoting competition in its next generation efforts, 

potentially increasing the value for resources spent on acquiring new 

weapon systems. For example, MDA conducted a competitive source 

selection for the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), which, 

combined with an emphasis on cost realism, savings, and controls, 

places the program in a positive position for delivering capabilities within 

budget. MDA is also incorporating some elements of competition for RKV 

by employing a modular open systems architecture and plans to compete 

a full-rate production contract.52 Our prior work on defense contracting 

shows that incorporating an open systems architecture—a system that 

uses modular design and consensus-based standards for its key 

interfaces—and the acquisition of appropriate data rights (e.g., design 

drawings, specifications, and standards) during program development 

can result in greater competition and reduce costs during production.53

Further, incorporation of an open systems architecture and management 

of data rights can lead to greater competition and reduced upgrade and 

repair costs over a program’s life cycle.

In addition to maturing technologies and promoting competition, MDA is 

also incorporating input from DOD components. Specifically, MDA is 

working with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Developmental Test and Evaluation DASD(DT&E) to develop a 

Developmental Evaluation Framework for LRDR and RKV. According to 

DASD(DT&E)’s fiscal year 2015 annual report, the framework serves as a 

test and evaluation road map and is used to support sound acquisition 

program decisions by showing the correlation between test events, key 

 51GAO, Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed to 

Improve DOD’s Acquisition Environment and Weapon System Quality, GAO-08-294 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2008).

52A modular open systems architecture is a design approach similar to that of a personal 

computer where system components can be added, removed, modified, replaced, or 

sustained by consumers or different manufacturers in addition to the manufacturer that 

developed the system. MDA’s full production, similar to DOD’s full-rate production, is used 

primarily to produce final operational end items to satisfy Warfighter-capability 

requirements. 

53GAO, Defense Contracting: Early Attention in the Acquisition Process Needed to 

Enhance Competition, GAO-14-395 (Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2014).
Page 47 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

resources, and the decision supported.54 In its fiscal year 2014 report, 

DASD(DT&E) recommended that all new work or redesign activities by 

MDA should use a Development Evaluation Framework. According to 

DASD(DT&E) officials, MDA has worked with them to develop an initial, 

first-order framework for both LRDR and RKV. MDA is currently 

performing the technical breakdowns to ensure sufficient detail is included 

to support its test and evaluation efforts. By coordinating with 

DASD(DT&E) to develop the framework for both LRDR and RKV, MDA is 

leveraging the knowledge and experience of individuals outside of the 

agency, potentially increasing department-wide buy-in for the programs.

MDA is also exploring alternative approaches to fielding needed spacebased capabilities to address affordability and threat-based challenges 

typically associated with defense space acquisitions. In 2013, we found 

that, given the significant expense of space programs and the federal 

government’s fiscal limitations, agencies may be able to leverage 

opportunities for hosted payloads on commercial satellites to achieve 

significant cost savings.55 To this end, MDA is pursuing an experimental 

system, called Space-based Kill Assessment (SKA), to potentially provide 

needed capability to the warfighter about whether an incoming, lethal 

enemy ballistic missile was successfully intercepted. MDA plans to deploy 

a network of sensor payloads hosted onboard commercial satellites 

scheduled to be launched by the end of 2018. In addition to ensuring the 

program is more affordable, agency officials stated that MDA is also using 

the program as a pathfinder to identify cost-saving measures for future 

space-based capabilities the agency may pursue to make fielding assets 

 54Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Developmental Test and Evaluation, 

Department of Defense Developmental Test and Evaluation: FY 2015 Annual Report

(March 2016).

55GAO, 2013 Annual Report: Actions Needed to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and 

Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits, GAO-13-279SP (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 9, 2013).
Page 48 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

in space more affordable—a challenge the department has struggled with 

for over the past 30 years.56

MDA plans to obtain an independent cost estimate from DOD’s Office of 

Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) for both the LRDR 

and RKV programs.57 According to GAO best practices guide for 

estimating and managing program costs, conducting an independent 

review of a cost estimate is crucial to establishing confidence in the 

estimate, because, as part of the review process, the estimate is verified, 

modified, and corrected to ensure realism, completeness, and 

consistency.58 However, due to the acquisition flexibilities it has been 

granted, the requirement to obtain independent cost estimates before 

beginning system development and/or production and deployment does 

not yet apply to MDA. Instead, CAPE prepares estimates only at MDA’s 

request. Since we began annual reporting on missile defense in 2004, 

we have been unable to assess overall progress on cost because the 

cost information MDA reported over the years has lacked sufficient 

quality. Because Congress was limited in its ability to evaluate the nearand long-term budget implications of decisions to develop and field 

BMDS elements, in 2008, we recommended the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) 

establish a requirement to estimate BMDS costs using independently 

validated estimates.59 In 2014, we found that although MDA had taken 

positive steps to improve the quality of its cost estimates, including 

 56Since 1984, DOD has spent several billions of dollars on space-based missile tracking 

programs—such as Space-Based Infrared System-low, Space Tracking and Surveillance 

System, and most recently, Precision Tracking Space System—but has yet to 

operationally field such a capability. The Precision Tracking Space System was canceled 

in 2013, in part, because of affordability concerns, as the program was projected to cost 

as much as $22.5 billion over the life of the program. For more information, see GAO, 

Missile Defense: Precision Tracking Space System Evaluation of Alternatives, 

GAO-13-747R (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2013) and Missile Defense: Alternate 

Approaches to Space Tracking and Surveillance System Need to Be Considered, 

GAO-03-597 (Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2003).

57CAPE is the office responsible for, among other items, directly providing the Secretary of 

Defense with independent, analytic advice on the cost-effectiveness of defense systems 

and fitting the defense program to the budgetary limits set for the department by the 

president and Congress.

58GAO-09-3SP.

59GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost Estimates for 

Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense, GAO-08-1068 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 

25, 2008).
Page 49 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

receiving independent cost estimates from CAPE, about half of the cost 

baselines for MDA programs remained unverified.60 As such, obtaining 

independent cost estimates from CAPE would be consistent with our 

2008 recommendation on cost estimates and a recommendation we 

made in 2010 that MDA obtain CAPE independent cost estimates.61

Consequently, obtaining independent cost estimates could increase buyin from within the department for the LRDR and RKV programs because 

it would increase confidence that MDA has a reasonable understanding 

of the systems’ expected costs. This may provide decision makers 

confidence that the funding MDA requests is based in realism and better 

reflect the actual resources the agency needs.

Most DOD weapon system programs are managed within DOD’s 

acquisition framework, which includes distinct, decision-support 

processes for determining requirements and managing the acquisition 

system. Each process is managed and overseen by different 

organizations—also referred to as components—and leaders within DOD 

and the military departments. At the DOD level, the USD(AT&L) is 

responsible for the acquisition function and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are 

responsible for implementing the requirements process through what is 

called the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

(JCIDS). As part of this process, high-level, operational requirements of 

major weapon systems are first generated, vetted, and put forward for 

DOD-level review and approval. Following military service-level reviews 

and approvals, the high-level operational requirements are assessed and 

validated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the advice of 

the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which is comprised of 

 60GAO, Missile Defense: Cost Estimating Practices Have Improved, and Continued 

Evaluation Will Determine Effectiveness, GAO-15-210R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12, 

2014).

61GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides Opportunity to 

Strengthen Acquisition Approach, GAO-10-311 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2010).

MDA’s Requirements for 

Its Next Generation Efforts 

Include Warfighter’s Input, 

but Not Validation and 

Approval

MDA’s Requirement-Setting 

Process
Page 50 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

the Vice Chiefs of Staff of each military service. High-level requirements 

go through a refinement process in the early stages of an acquisition 

program, where the requirements are broken down into technical 

requirements and then specifications. As the acquisition program goes 

through the iterative phases of the acquisition process, the military 

service chief’s role diminishes and the acquisition executive’s role 

becomes more prominent.62

MDA’s unique acquisition authorities include exemption from the JCIDS 

process, including oversight and validation of missile defense 

requirements from the JROC. Instead, as described in Figure 10 below, 

MDA follows a unique requirements-setting process that starts with a 

Warfighter Involvement Process where U.S. Strategic Command, 

representing the views of all the combatant commands, military services, 

and joint staff, articulates missile defense capabilities needed in a 

Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL). MDA assesses the PCL based on 

whether the capabilities are affordable and achievable in a given time and 

with realistic technology. In addition, MDA also performs its own analysis 

to identify capability needs and gaps. This effort results in a document 

produced by MDA called the Achievable Capabilities List (ACL). The ACL 

is intended to document the MDA program of record compared against 

the PCL and addresses the technology, budget, schedule, or other factors 

regarding the implementation of each desired warfighter capability. Once 

MDA approves the ACL, it is briefed to the agency’s oversight board, the 

Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB), and becomes the 

requirements by which the agency operates. The warfighter evaluates the 

ACL for adequacy and sufficiency to inform the standing committees 

within the MDEB, which includes an operational forces standing 

committee that is chaired by the Deputy Commander of U.S. Strategic 

Command. Although the ACL is subject to MDEB oversight, the document 

is not coordinated with, nor is it subject to, warfighter review or approval 

before the document is finalized. According to officials from MDA and 

USD(AT&L), differing views between MDA and the warfighter regarding 

the requirements MDA should pursue are typically resolved in DOD’s 

budget planning process, where compromises are reached to fund 

 62According to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 includes a series of provisions intended to clarify 

the roles of senior acquisition officials in the acquisition process. Changes to DOD’s 

management structure are intended to align responsibilities with the services to the 

maximum extent practicable while providing a greater role for the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense to lead on innovation and provide effective and targeted oversight on major 

weapon systems programs. 
Page 51 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

important warfighter priorities that may not be addressed by the ACL. 

Figure 10 provides a graphic detailing MDA’s requirement setting 

process. 

Figure 10: Notional View of Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Requirement-Setting Process
Page 52 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

MDA’s requirements-setting process is designed to expeditiously define 

requirements and allow flexibility for MDA to respond to evolving needs 

and changes to the threat. Under this process, the “developer” (i.e., MDA) 

instead of the “user” (i.e., the warfighter) sets the requirements. Allowing 

MDA to define both the high- and low-level requirements enables the 

agency to make trades between resources and performance attributes, 

which provides the agency with significant flexibility to make fundamental 

changes to what it ultimately delivers to the warfighter. MDA refers to this 

approach as “capability-based acquisitions” where requirements are 

established based on an uncertain and evolving threat rather than a 

validated threat assessment. As part of this approach, a desired capability 

is identified but, rather than developing firm, informed requirements up 

front, the end-state requirements are unknown at program initiation. The

requirements are expected to be refined through demonstration, 

managing risk, and continuous warfighter feedback.

Although MDA establishes its own requirements, it receives input from the 

warfighter. For example, MDA’s Joint Warfighter Support Program is 

tasked with engaging the warfighter through the Warfighter Involvement 

Process to identify gaps, seams, and needs in warfighting capability. In 

addition, according to officials, the MDEB’s governance structure is 

chartered to harmonize any issues associated with the BMD program 

efforts and includes standing committees, such as the Operational Forces 

Standing Committee. If disagreements exist between MDA and the 

warfighter, the MDEB’s standing committees are designed to resolve the 

issues before the MDEB convenes. In addition, as part of the ACL 

development effort, MDA’s process includes assessing and correlating 

the warfighter-provided PCL with the MDA program of record, mapping 

out each of the warfighter’s priorities with capabilities that MDA either 

currently plans to deliver or capabilities the agency plans to consider. 

Moreover, the ACL also incorporates capability gap assessments 

performed by the Joint Staff into the ACL in an effort to engage the 

warfighter and ensure their concerns are considered in the requirements 

the agency pursues.

By allowing MDA to define the full range of requirements and not 

requiring the agency to go through a process to validate its requirements, 

there is the potential that the agency may pursue solutions that are 

unnecessary, insufficient, or not a priority. Under JCIDS, requirements 

undergo a rigorous, multi-step process to verify the existence of a 

capability gap and that a solution is needed. However, requirements 

established in the ACL do not undergo a similar validation and approval 

process. For example, in 2008, the military services, Joint Staff, and 

Requirements Missing 

Warfighter Validation and 

Approval
Page 53 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Combatant Commands voiced concerns that they have insufficient 

involvement in the requirements process and that the JROC role in 

MDA’s requirement-setting process is inadequate.63 Although changes 

have been implemented to improve warfighter involvement, limitations 

continue to exist. For example, MDA does not follow the JCIDS process 

and is not required to submit the requirements established in the ACL for 

its next generation efforts to the JROC. However, in 2014, MDA 

performed some limited outreach with the JROC and obtained the board’s 

acceptance for a set of broadly-outlined goals and attributes of homeland 

ballistic missile defense. This was the first requirements document to go 

through the JROC since the start of the BMDS program in 2002, 

according to the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated 

Missile Defense (JFCC IMD). Led by U.S. Strategic Command, JFCC 

IMD is comprised of warfighter personnel from the military services and is 

tasked with synchronizing missile defense plans, conducting missile 

defense operations support, and advocating for missile defense 

capabilities.

MDA’s outreach to the JROC afforded the council with the opportunity to 

shape the baseline for current and future homeland missile defense 

capabilities, according to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

However, the JROC’s input was limited to reviewing broadly-defined 

goals and the council did not validate or endorse specifically-defined 

BMDS requirements. For example, according to MDA’s fiscal year 2016 

budget request documentation, the JROC was briefed and concurred with 

the LRDR requirements in the fall of 2014. In addition, the Director, MDA 

stated in an April 2016 hearing before the House Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces that the agency was able to navigate 

the LRDR requirements through the JROC in about 6 weeks.64 However, 

neither the JROC memorandum nor the briefing cited by MDA that was 

presented to the JROC included any specific mention of LRDR or the 

program’s requirements. Rather, the JROC accepted broadly-defined 

operational attributes, such as assuring homeland BMDS assets are 

interoperable and sufficiently robust to perform in a spectrum of 

conditions. Although the JROC’s review and acceptance of these broadly-

 63Institute for Defense Analysis: Study on the Mission, Roles, and Structure of the Missile 

Defense Agency (MDA), IDA Paper P-4374 (Alexandria, Va.: Aug. 2008).

64The Missile Defeat Posture and Strategy of the United States—The FY17 President’s 

Budget Request, Before the H. Armed Services S. Comm. on Strategic Forces, 114th

Cong. (2016) (statement of Director, Missile Defense Agency Vice Admiral James Syring).
Page 54 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

defined attributes is noteworthy, it does not reflect the committee’s 

validation or concurrence with system-specific requirements.

While MDA’s current requirements-setting process does not require 

coordination or approval of the ACL from the warfighter, according to U.S. 

Northern Command—the warfighter primarily responsible for defending 

the United States homeland from ballistic missile attacks—coordinating 

the ACL with the warfighter would be a straight-forward tasking. However, 

according to officials from MDA and Office of the USD(AT&L), the 

warfighter is provided with an opportunity to express its views of the ACL 

in the operational forces standing committee, and, if necessary, bring its 

concerns to the MDEB. Although the MDEB has the authority to make 

changes to the ACL, since the oversight board’s formation in 2009, it has 

never required MDA to make a change to the ACL. Moreover, there is no 

mechanism within the ACL-development process to allow MDA and the 

warfighter, at the working level, to address disagreements nor is there a 

process for the warfighter to appeal or amend the ACL once it is 

approved by MDA.

DOD has recently initiated reviews of MDA’s requirement-setting process, 

the MDEB’s oversight process, and aspects of the ACL that impact the 

warfighter, which may influence MDA’s requirements-setting process. In 

2016, the MDEB established plans to assess MDA’s oversight and 

acquisition processes. As part of this effort, the USD(AT&L) plans to 

assess how it can optimize the MDEB and its standing committee’s 

process and requested the Joint Staff and U.S. Strategic Command to 

review MDA’s requirement-development and validation process. In 

addition, JFCC IMD stated that in 2017, it plans to produce a Global 

Integrated Air and Missile Defense Assessment that will include an 

assessment of the ACL to review aspects that impact the warfighter. 

These reviews have the potential as being initial steps for determining 

whether departmental changes to MDA’s requirement-setting process are 

needed and, if so, what those changes should include.

The technical requirements for some of MDA’s next generation efforts, 

such as LRDR, RKV, and SKA, reflect an emphasis on the developer’s 

concerns ahead of the warfighter’s concerns and do not address some 

issues raised by DOD components. Under the JCIDS process, 

requirements should generally reflect the needs of the warfighter and—as 

we found in 2011—sometimes do not include trade-offs important to the 

Decisions Made on Three New 

Efforts Reflect RequirementsSetting Challenge
Page 55 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

developer, namely cost and schedule objectives.65 Conversely, under 

MDA’s requirement-setting process, the requirements for MDA’s next 

generation efforts generally reflect the needs of the developer ahead of 

those of the warfighter. For example, design approaches for LRDR, RKV, 

and SKA include trade-offs that favor fielding capabilities sooner and less 

expensively. However, officials from multiple DOD components have 

warned these trade-offs compromise performance and reliability, 

potentially resulting in the warfighter receiving capabilities that are 

insufficient to defeat the current and future threat. DOD has previously 

cancelled missile defense programs when technical challenges and 

affordability concerns were too great for the department to justify 

continuing the efforts.66 In addition, research published by DOD’s 

Defense Acquisition University indicated that several factors greatly 

influence defense acquisition program termination, including, having an 

inadequate requirements definition process, lack of understanding of the 

operational environment, failure to get stakeholder buy-in, and a lack of 

communication with stakeholders.67 If MDA does not address concerns 

from DOD components, and performance risks for LRDR, RKV, and SKA 

manifest, the programs may experience significant disruptions to address 

the problems and the department may face a similar decision about 

whether to continue pursuing these systems. For example:

• LRDR: MDA’s planned use of the S-band frequency for LRDR meets 

MDA’s needs to quickly and affordably acquire the system but may 

lack sufficient performance margin to meet the warfighter’s needs. 

Our prior work on improving defense acquisitions has shown that 

early involvement from stakeholders, such as engineers and testers, 

in pre-system development reviews helped facilitate requirement 

trade-offs and reduced the risk for cost and schedule growth.68

Analysis of potential LRDR frequencies performed at the request of 

 65GAO, DOD Weapon Systems: Missed Trade-off Opportunities During Requirements 

Reviews, GAO-11-502 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2011).

66GAO-14-351 and GAO-13-432.

67Lt Col Patrick Clowney, USAF (Ret.), Jason Dever, and Steven Stuban, “Department of 

Defense Acquisition Program Terminations: Analysis of 11 Program Management 

Factors,” Defense Acquisition Research Journal, vol. 23, no. 3, (2016).

68For examples, see GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Better Approach Needed to Account for 

Number, Cost, and Performance of Non-Major Programs, GAO-15-188 (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 2, 2015); and Weapons Acquisition Reform: Reform Act Is Helping DOD 

Acquisition Programs Reduce Risk, but Implementation Challenges Remain, GAO-13-103 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 2012).
Page 56 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

MDA by a panel of federally funded research and development 

centers and university affiliated research centers in December 2014 

indicated that both the X-band and S-band frequencies could meet the 

requirements established by MDA for the radar. In addition, MDA’s 

market research indicated that the use of S-band opened up some 

more affordable options from industry that may not have been 

available had it selected X-band. According to MDA officials, they 

briefed senior-level officials from the MDEB’s operational forces 

standing committee about its plans to select the S-band and received 

approval from the MDEB to proceed. However, MDA did not consult 

JFCC IMD—the military personnel who advocate for needed 

capabilities and provide operational support for BMDS radars—

regarding the planned use of S-band for LRDR and any potential 

limitations that might exist. Moreover, results from the December 2014 

LRDR frequency study also indicated that less design margin exists 

with S-band, as the data would need to be improved to that of X-band 

performance level to meet requirements. DASD(DT&E) officials 

expressed concerns that inherent limitations exist within LRDR’s 

design selection, beyond radar band selection, that are significant 

enough to raise doubts as to whether LRDR can perform meaningful 

discrimination.

In addition, MDA plans to declare LRDR ready for use in fiscal year 

2020 based on a schedule that saves time through concurrent system 

development and production, which benefits MDA but transfers risk to 

the warfighter and local communities. MDA has previously deployed 

assets prior to warfighter acceptance based on deadline-driven 

schedules that transferred operational risk and implementation 

challenges to the warfighter. For example, in 2006, we found that 

MDA succeeded in fielding the first block of initial missile defense 

capability, but the block included fewer components than planned, 

cost more than anticipated, and its performance was unverified.69

More recently, in 2014, we found that MDA deployed assets in Europe 

although arrangements for working with allies and construction on 

infrastructure, such as housing and dining facilities for soldiers, had 

yet to be completed.70 Similarly, MDA plans to declare LRDR as 

operationally available to the warfighter prior to conducting any flight 

 69GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability but Falls 

Short of Original Goals, GAO-06-327 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2006).

70GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Address Implementation Issues and 

Estimate Long-Term Costs for European Capabilities, GAO-14-314 (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 11, 2014).
Page 57 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

testing that demonstrates the radar’s required performance, running 

the risk that there may be unknown and unmitigated capability gaps in 

the fielded system, according to MDA. In addition, a November 2016 

study of LRDR’s power system performed for MDA by a contractor 

indicated that agreements with the commercial power provider places 

limitations on the warfighter’s ability to operate the radar without 

consulting the commercial power provider in advance and that 

emergency activation of the radar could result in other customers 

having their power supply temporary switched off. Moreover, the study 

indicated that an assessment of the impact of LRDR’s electrical load 

on the commercial power provider’s system was needed and that it 

had yet to be conducted—an assessment MDA previously told us the 

agency had performed and found the risk to be low for service 

interruptions to nearby communities. DASD(DT&E) officials raised 

concerns that activating LRDR prior to assessing its operational 

suitability and impact on the commercial power system creates the 

risk where a failure could potentially present a public safety hazard, 

causing loss of necessary power integrity to civil resources such as 

local police and hospitals.

• RKV: MDA plans to use the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIA seeker—a kill 

vehicle guidance system component—in the RKV to achieve schedule 

goals, but the component may not have sufficient performance to 

defeat some intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-range threats.71

MDA maintains that the seeker’s expected maturity and other key 

desirable attributes led the agency to choose the seeker. However, 

the seeker was not designed to perform against an ICBM-range threat 

and internal MDA and independent analyses indicated the Aegis BMD 

SM-3 Block IIA seeker may not be the best option available for the 

RKV. In addition, officials from multiple DOD components, such as 

DASD(DT&E), U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Strategic 

Command, have raised concerns with the seeker’s capability to detect 

and track threats in an ICBM-range environment, which, when 

combined with the seeker’s expected acquisition range, may impact 

its discrimination capability and warfighter decision timelines.

As MDA was formulating the RKV acquisition strategy, CAPE officials 

stressed the need for MDA to carry risk mitigation design efforts for 

the seeker and other high-risk components. To this end, CAPE and 

USD(AT&L) officials stated that senior defense officials committed to 

 71Intercontinental ballistic missiles have a range of over 5,500 kilometers.
Page 58 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

provide MDA with the necessary funds but MDA declined the offer 

because, according to the agency, carrying the additional design 

efforts would require more time to complete development and likely 

delay delivery of initial production RKVs. U.S. Northern Command 

officials are currently advocating for MDA to carry a second, 

alternative seeker design through the program’s product development. 

MDA and JFCC IMD officials acknowledged the concerns and stated 

that the program will consider developing a second seeker if 

warranted by the results of analysis presented at the preliminary 

design review.

• SKA: The design approach MDA selected for SKA may be suitable as 

an experimental effort to observe flight tests; however, according to 

DOD officials, the agency will likely need to pursue other, more 

capable solutions to provide the warfighter with the capability to 

determine whether an enemy-launched, nuclear-armed ballistic 

missile was successfully intercepted—a capability referred to as kill 

assessment. For a kill assessment capability to provide useful 

information that the warfighter can act upon, it must determine, with a 

high level of accuracy, whether the interceptor: (1) successfully killed 

the enemy’s re-entry vehicle—the payload of a ballistic missile which 

carries the warhead; (2) hit, but did not kill the re-entry vehicle; (3) 

missed the targeted object; or (4) intercepted a decoy or other nonlethal object rather than the re-entry vehicle. U.S. Combatant 

Commanders have repeatedly stressed the need for a kill assessment 

capability and, over the years, DOD has funded multiple efforts to 

provide that capability to the warfighter. Although these efforts have 

provided useful information, the kill assessment mission has proven to 

be very challenging for MDA and over time, became a low priority for 

the agency. However, the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2014 required MDA to develop a plan to deliver an 

improved kill assessment capability by 2019 to support homeland 

missile defense.72 In response, MDA proposed the SKA effort, which 

is intended to be an experiment but will become an operational asset 

for homeland defense if proven to work as designed.

The requirements MDA established for SKA enabled the agency to 

pursue its preferred design approach but are unlikely to meet the 

warfighter’s need for an effective kill assessment capability. MDA 

determined, without input from the warfighter, that SKA would not be 

 72Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 237 (2013).
Page 59 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

required to discern whether the object that was intercepted was, in 

fact, the re-entry vehicle and not a decoy or other non-lethal—a 

capability referred to as discrimination. Instead, according to MDA, 

SKA’s design is based on the assumption that the BMDS radars, 

C2BMC, and GMD interceptors will successfully discriminate the reentry vehicle—an assumption contraindicated by shortcomings 

revealed from prior MDA flight testing and capability assessments of 

the BMDS. JFCC IMD stated that post-intercept discrimination is 

necessary for an effective kill assessment capability. Without 

verification that the intercepted object was lethal, the warfighter runs 

the risk of wasting interceptors on non-lethal objects, or allowing lethal 

re-entry vehicles to leak through our defenses and strike the United 

States because the object was falsely identified as non-lethal.

Concerns have also been raised that SKA may be unable to 

accurately determine, with a high level of accuracy, whether the 

intercepted re-entry vehicle was killed, and not just hit. MDA designed 

SKA based on results observed from prior flight testing, which 

(DASD)DT&E officials stated generally do not represent the 

engagement scenarios and subsequent impact scene expected to 

occur when defending the United States from an enemy-launched 

intercontinental ballistic missiles, which travel at much higher speeds 

and produce unique impact phenomena. Officials also raised 

concerns that SKA will rely upon computer models that have not been 

independently verified and validated, which may ultimately lead to 

providing the warfighter with unreliable assessments. Findings and 

observations from prior flight tests, experiments, studies, and 

analyses performed by researchers and analysts from DOD, NASA, 

federally funded research and development centers, and other 

organizations are consistent with DASD(DT&E)’s concerns about the 

potential limitations of SKA’s measurements. To this end, JFCC IMD 

officials stated that although they are optimistic about the possible 

capabilities for which SKA intends to provide to the warfighter, it does 

not view SKA—and its intended design—as a proven, operationally 

sustainable solution.
Page 60 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

The RKV program lacks department-wide support because organizations 

within DOD did not fully agree with the program’s acquisition strategy and 

many of their concerns have gone unaddressed by MDA. Typically, 

acquisition strategies for new MDA programs are not approved by the 

USD(AT&L). However, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2015 required the RKV acquisition plan to be subject to approval by 

the USD(AT&L), who, in turn, required MDA to coordinate with DOD 

acquisition components to develop the report.73 MDA subsequently 

revised its initial RKV acquisition strategy based on feedback from DOD’s 

acquisition components by reducing some high-risk practices, aligning 

production decisions with flight testing, and adding schedule margin and 

an additional flight test. These inputs improved the RKV acquisition 

strategy and the program’s overall business case because it reduced the 

program’s reliance on high risk acquisition practices and resolved 

concerns that would have potentially gone unaddressed. MDA has 

previously pursued weapon systems without obtaining sufficient buy-in 

from within the department. For example, as we found in 2013, a CAPE 

review of the Precision Tracking Space System determined the program 

had significant technical, programmatic, and affordability risks—issues we 

had previously reported and MDA did not address—which led to the 

Secretary of Defense cancelling the program.74

Some DOD components did not fully agree with the RKV acquisition 

strategy and have raised concerns about the program’s design, 

development method, schedule, and cost. By not addressing these 

concerns, failing to get department-wide support for the acquisition 

strategy, and deciding not to implement risk reduction measures for highrisk components, MDA has put the RKV program in jeopardy of following 

along the same path as the Precision Tracking Space System. For 

example, in September 2015, CAPE issued a memorandum stating that it 

remained concerned that the RKV schedule is risky and expects MDA will 

have to adjust its plans to reflect development delays. CAPE also stated 

that it was not convinced that the proposed competitive strategy will 

actually engender competition and that claims of presumed savings are 

unsubstantiated. DOD acquisition officials expressed concerns that 

MDA’s modular design architecture will provide little-to-no benefit for 

 73Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 1663(d) (2014).

74GAO-13-747R. 

MDA’s Decision Not to 

Address Major Concerns 

with RKV’s Acquisition 

Strategy Could Hamper 

Support for the Program if 

Unaddressed
Page 61 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

improving competition. DOD officials continue to state MDA will be reliant 

upon the specific contractors who designed the RKV’s subsystems to 

continue to participate in full-rate production in order to avoid any delays 

that might result from competitively selecting different suppliers. If the 

design also changed, the delays would be even further exacerbated. As 

such, CAPE recommended the program report regularly to an oversight 

subcommittee within the MDEB on its progress and challenges.

Officials from multiple components within the Office of the USD(AT&L) 

have raised other similar concerns which MDA declined to address. For 

example, in 2013, MDA determined that a redesign of the GMD kill 

vehicle was necessary and obtained initial concepts from Boeing, 

Raytheon, and Lockheed Martin on new, potential kill vehicle designs. 

MDA assessed those concepts and decided against conducting a full and 

open competition to select a single concept. Instead, MDA merged the 

contractors’ concepts into a single, “best-of-breed” RKV design and 

tasked them with collaboratively developing the RKV. According to MDA, 

it could not perform a full and open competition because it would take too 

much time and the agency would not be able to meet its requirement to 

begin fielding RKVs in 2020—a requirement MDA established for itself. 

However, our assessment of internal MDA analysis indicated that when 

comparing schedule projections with comparable risk levels, the industry 

teaming approach had no significant schedule advantage over competing 

the RKV development effort. Moreover, recent adjustments to the RKV 

schedule now indicate production to begin in 2022. MDA subsequently 

received feedback from DOD components regarding the lack of 

competition present in RKV’s acquisition strategy. By not addressing 

concerns raised by DOD’s components regarding the lack of RKV 

competition and adjusting its acquisition strategy, MDA missed some of 

the potential benefits typically achieved through competition.

DOD acquisition officials also raised concerns with MDA’s plan to award a 

full-rate production contract in advance of USD(AT&L) making the 

respective production decision. By doing so, MDA is at risk of creating 

avoidable and potentially significant financial risks for the government 

because activities scheduled to occur after the contract is awarded (e.g.,

flight testing, production, etc.) may reveal problems with the contractor’s 

performance or the system’s design, either of which may be costly to 

resolve. According to MDA’s RKV acquisition strategy, the program plans 

to award a full-rate production contract in the third quarter of fiscal year 

2019 and make a full-rate production decision in the second quarter of 

fiscal year 2020. Generally, the full-rate production decision is intended to 

be based on a review of the results from operational testing, initial 
Page 62 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

manufacturing, and limited deployment and the USD(AT&L) is the 

decision authority for MDA’s production decisions, including RKV.75 To 

reduce risk, MDA stated that it plans to include in the production contract 

a stipulation that references the successful execution of flight testing. 

Although stipulations such as these might mitigate some of the risks the 

agency faces, it is also possible that this type of contingency may 

increase the contractor’s proposed prices due to the risks that the 

contractor would assume in accepting this contingency. Moreover, 

awarding the RKV full-rate production contract in advance of completing 

flight testing potentially commits the department to buying a product prior 

to demonstrating the system is operationally useful and may require 

further design changes due to knowledge learned from testing and initial 

production—as was the case for the current GMD kill vehicle. Because 

the contract award and production decision are several years out, an 

opportunity currently exists for MDA to modify its plans so that the full-rate 

production contract award occurs after the production decision so as to 

avoid any potential disruptions or concerns that might reduce support 

from key DOD decision makers.

MDA continues to make mixed progress in fielding additional assets and 

demonstrating an increased capability against emerging threats. In terms 

of progress, of particular significance are the delivery of BMDS level 

capabilities to support the presidentially mandated delivery of EPAA 

Phase 2 and the conduct of an operational test that demonstrated a 

layered BMDS with multiple combat systems sharing common defended 

areas and shot opportunities against two threat-representative ballistic 

missiles. However, the program is still operating at a self-imposed fast 

pace, as production and fielding of assets occurs despite the inability to 

thoroughly validate them due to testing delays. By adopting high-risk 

approaches to meet its schedule goals, MDA exacerbates the broad span 

of technical, engineering, and developmental challenges that already face 

the agency. This is especially evident in the GMD program, where MDA 

has continued to field GMD interceptors although testing to demonstrate 

its capability against an ICBM range target has been further delayed. 

However, continuing to deliver assets before key knowledge is obtained 

places MDA at risk for increased cost and schedule delays. In addition, it 

reduces the warfighter’s insights into the system’s capabilities and 

limitations.

 75Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, Directive 5134.09 (2009).

Conclusions
Page 63 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Further, the success of MDA’s testing schedule hinges on it being realistic 

(i.e., executable) and resourced with sufficient time, funding, and reliable 

targets. MDA has internal scheduling policies designed to help it plan and 

execute tests, but some deviations and shortcomings, such as lack of a 

requirement to assign resources and a developed work breakdown 

structure, may be undermining its ability to effectively do this. 

Consequently, the same challenges and associated cost and schedule 

impacts that it has already experienced are likely to continue.

The business case for MDA’s next generation efforts reflects the overall 

challenges the agency faces with accomplishing its unique mission to 

quickly develop, produce, and field first-of-its-kind military capabilities that 

are also affordable, reliable, and effective. MDA incorporated several 

elements of a sound business case for its next generation efforts, such as 

performing early concept exploration, maturing technologies, and 

promoting competition. However, the requirements for MDA’ s next 

generation efforts are missing warfighter approval and generally reflect 

the needs and preferences of MDA ahead of the warfighter. In addition, 

the RKV acquisition strategy lacks industry competition. By not 

addressing concerns raised by DOD’s components regarding the lack of 

RKV competition, MDA has missed some of the potential benefits 

typically achieved through competition such as reducing developmental 

time and reducing overall program costs. If steps are not taken to 

increase buy-in from DOD’s warfighting and acquisition components for 

MDA’s next generation efforts, the agency runs the risk of pursuing efforts 

that may be unneeded, unaffordable, ineffective, and later canceled.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four 

actions to strengthen MDA’s acquisition efforts and strengthen oversight.

1. To increase traceability and insight into MDA’s test program, require 

MDA to

a. include a detailed crosswalk of changes to each test, such as 

names, planned execution dates, test types, targets, and other 

modifications, in each iteration of its Integrated Master Test 

Plan;

b. address deficiencies in its test scheduling policy by better 

aligning it with best practices for scheduling, including the use 

of a schedule WBS that clearly traces each activity to the cost 

WBS, properly assigning resources to schedules, and 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
Page 64 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

clarifying guidance on when and how to conduct schedule risk 

analysis;

c. rectify deficiencies in its element and test level cost estimates 

by requiring the use of the common test WBS, documenting 

the traceability of source data, and codifying the processes 

and associated information for the software application 

(TRMP-T) used to create the test level cost estimates in policy; 

and

d. break out funding requests by test in the BAR and other 

budget documentation submitted during the annual budget 

submission.

2. To improve MDA’s requirement-setting process and ensure it includes 

an appropriate balance between MDA and warfighter priorities, 

require MDA to develop a plan to transition operational requirements 

analysis currently performed within MDA’s Achievable Capabilities List 

to the U.S. Combatant Commanders, with U.S. Strategic Command 

as the lead entity and, in the interim, require MDA to obtain their 

concurrence of the Achievable Capabilities List prior to its release.

3. To ensure that the RKV acquisition strategy continues to remain 

viable, promotes effective competition, and addresses concerns 

raised by DOD components, require the Director, CAPE to perform a 

comprehensive review of the RKV acquisition strategy and provide 

any recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that the Director 

deems necessary and appropriate to obtain CAPE’s concurrence for 

the RKV program’s acquisition strategy. Any decision to award a fullrate production contract should be delayed until after MDA has 

received approval from the USD(AT&L) to proceed to full-rate 

production.

4. To ensure that future acquisition strategies MDA develops for its new 

efforts reflect an appropriate balance between timeliness, affordability, 

reliability, and effectiveness and achieve department-wide buy-in, the 

Secretary of Defense should require MDA to produce acquisition 

strategies for all its major new efforts that are subject to review by the 

Director, CAPE and review and approval by the USD(AT&L).
Page 65 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. DOD’s 

comments are reprinted in appendix I and are summarized below. DOD 

and MDA also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 

appropriate.

In its comments, DOD concurred with part of our first recommendation to 

increase traceability and insight into MDA’s testing program, but it did not 

concur with the remaining parts or our other three recommendations 

regarding improving MDA’s processes for setting requirements and 

formulating acquisition strategies, specifically with CAPE performing a 

comprehensive review of the RKV acquisition strategy. As we describe 

below, DOD challenged several of the facts underpinning our 

recommendations and findings—facts that we independently corroborated 

and, in certain instances, re-confirmed upon receiving DOD’s comments. 

Further, DOD cited concerns for actions that we did not include in our 

recommendations. For example, DOD stated in its response to our first 

recommendation that it disagreed with using MDA’s Test Resource 

Mission Planning-Tool as a cost model—a recommendation we did not 

make. However, we modified our recommendations in three instances to 

address concerns that DOD cited that would prevent it from acting upon 

them. Those modifications are also described below.

DOD concurred with the first part of our four-part recommendation to 

increase traceability and insight into MDA’s test program by agreeing to 

include a detailed crosswalk of changes to each test in the Integrated 

Master Test Plan (IMTP) beginning with future versions. However, it did 

not concur with the remaining three parts of this recommendation that 

include steps related to scheduling, cost, and reporting:

• Scheduling. DOD did not concur with our recommended steps to 

improve the reliability of MDA’s test schedules, including clarifying 

when and how to conduct schedule risk analysis, using a test 

schedule Work Breakdown Schedule (WBS) designed to capture all of 

the detailed activities and easily track planned versus accomplished 

activities, and assigning resources to each test schedule. DOD stated 

that it believes the benefits do not outweigh the costs. Despite its nonconcurrence, DOD noted that MDA is revising its scheduling policy to 

address when and how to conduct schedule risk analysis and the 

shortcomings in its test schedules.

DOD commented that using a test schedule WBS is cost prohibitive 

and only provides marginal gain over the crosswalk MDA plans to 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 66 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

implement in its next test plan, IMTP 19.1. We disagree with DOD’s 

comment because the test schedule WBS that we recommended and 

the crosswalk that MDA is planning to implement are distinct solutions 

to two very different issues. A test schedule WBS is a planning 

framework for a single test that is designed to capture all of the 

detailed activities and instructions in order to achieve the test’s 

objectives and easily track the activities that have been completed 

versus those that are outstanding. Beyond being a framework to 

capture all activities and track progress, a test schedule WBS is also a 

means to align the schedule to the associated cost estimate (i.e., 

budget), and enables actual costs to be incorporated back into the 

test cost estimate to understand correlations between the schedule 

and costs, such as the effects from schedule adjustments or 

slippages. In contrast, a crosswalk traces changes that have already 

occurred to each test over time (e.g., test name, execution date, test 

type, and target type). Each provides a means for tracking tests, but 

with discrete purposes at different points in time and thus, are not 

interchangeable—one does not suffice in lieu of the other. Currently, 

MDA’s scheduling policy requires schedule activities to align with the 

cost estimate, but the policy does not detail how to ensure this 

alignment. Misaligned test schedules and cost estimates can lead to 

unknown scope and expenses, under- or over-allocated resources, 

and unrealistic test execution dates. We believe it is reasonable to 

conclude that the lack of a test schedule WBS is a contributing factor 

for MDA consistently falling short of its testing goals each year and 

the unclear cost implications for doing so. Thus, we maintain our 

position that using a test schedule WBS would improve the reliability 

of test schedules and increase insight.

DOD also stated that MDA’s current approach for assigning resources 

to tests, which includes high-level reviews and planning meetings 

prior to the test’s execution, is adequate. In concept, MDA’s current 

approach appears to be dynamic, allowing it to assign and use 

resources at the point when they are needed; however, in practice, 

MDA often needs resources well in advance of the test execution 

which means costs are being accrued without being assigned to a 

specific test. Consequently, when MDA delays or removes a test, 

those costs may be unaccounted for. Further, a test schedule without 

assigned resources implies that an unlimited amount and availability 

of resources exist. Considering MDA’s test record, which is constantly 

in flux, there could be questions about the intentions of its approach. 

We acknowledge that assigning resources to schedules may be 

challenging in some instances; however, it is a critical step when 
Page 67 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

creating a schedule because it: (1) confirms that the timeframes of 

activities are realistic and rational; (2) helps calculate and resolve 

resource conflicts; and (3) ensures that resources are available when 

they are needed.

• Costs. DOD did not concur with steps to improve consistency and 

transparency in MDA’s test costs that align with best practices for 

internal controls and cost estimating.76 Specifically, we recommended 

that MDA codify its processes and information in policy for the Test 

Resources Mission Planning-Tool (TRMP-T), a classified application 

used to create test level cost estimates that support its budget request 

each fiscal year. DOD did not address this recommendation but, 

instead, commented that it did not agree with our recommendation to 

use TRMP-T as a cost model. We did not recommend that TRMP-T 

be used as a cost model, nor was it our intent for MDA to do so. It is 

our understanding that MDA is already using TRMP-T as a cost 

model. Specifically, information we received from senior MDA officials 

and various documents we reviewed indicate TRMP-T is a cost model 

and that MDA is using it as such. For example, in February 2014, an 

independent contractor providing support to MDA assessed the 

software application used to create MDA’s test-level estimates and 

identified a number of shortcomings, including, among other things, 

the need to document it in policy. DOD contends, however, that 

TRMP-T is not a cost model but rather an integration and reporting 

tool for test costs and other test information, such as requirements 

and resources. If it were simply an integration and reporting tool, the 

costs in the element level cost estimates would mirror those in TRMPT for each test, but as we found and have said in this report, the costs 

consistently varied from those in TRMP-T.

Furthermore, DOD’s rationale for not concurring with our 

recommendation is that MDA’s current processes align with best 

practices for cost estimating and therefore do not need to be modified. 

However, our recommendation was based on numerous deficiencies 

we identified during our assessment of MDA’s current policies and 

processes against best practices. We stand by our conclusion that 

because MDA’s test level estimates from TRMP-T are used as the 

basis for the budget request and to inform decision makers, they 

should encompass all of the best practice characteristics to be 

 76GAO-14-704G and GAO-09-3SP.
Page 68 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

reliable, which include using a common test estimate WBS to capture 

costs and documenting the traceability of source data.

• Reporting. To increase transparency into MDA’s test costs, we 

recommended that it break out its funding requests by test in the BAR 

and other budget documentation each year. DOD did not concur with 

our recommendation under the rationale that it is unrealistic and that 

there is no requirement to do so. MDA has consistently fallen short of 

its test goals, which has led to frequent changes to tests without 

identifying the corresponding effects to its costs and funding needs, 

despite our prior recommendation to do so.77 Specifically, the frequent 

changes and lack of transparency have created challenges for 

identifying how many times or how much funding MDA has requested, 

received, and obligated per test each fiscal year and across multiple 

fiscal years. The transparency of testing costs has been a particular 

concern for Congress. For example, the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 requires MDA to submit a 

notification to congressional defense committees that includes, among 

other things, costs by test, at least once every 180 days (i.e., twice 

per year).78 We therefore maintain that breaking out funding requests 

by test will improve transparency into planned versus actual test costs 

and aid departmental and congressional decision makers as they 

make difficult choices of where to invest limited resources.

DOD did not concur with our second recommendation to require MDA to 

develop a plan to transition requirements analysis currently performed in 

MDA’s ACL to JFCC IMD and, in the interim, require MDA to obtain JFCC 

IMD’s concurrence of the ACL prior to its release. In its response, DOD 

stated our recommendation was based on conclusions drawn from 

information that does not accurately represent the missile defense 

requirement-setting process. DOD contends that the warfighter, rather 

than MDA, leads the process for generating, validating, and approving 

missile defense requirements through generation of the PCL. However, 

DOD also stated in its description of the process that the ACL addresses 

each item in the PCL and informs the warfighter on how, when, and if 

those capabilities can or will be delivered. In addition, MDA’s acquisition 

instruction states that the results of ACL are translated into BMDS 

system-level requirements. As such, while the PCL identifies warfighter 

 77GAO-11-372.

78National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328 § 1695 

(2016). 
Page 69 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

needs, the ACL, rather than the PCL, leads to specific program-level 

requirements and programmatic specifications. As we found in our 

review, the process as it currently functions places an undue emphasis on 

the needs of MDA ahead of the warfighter. In response to DOD’s 

assertions that we did not accurately represent the process, we consulted 

with both JFCC IMD and U.S. Northern Command—key components of 

the warfighter community—and both concurred that our assessment of 

the requirements-setting process was accurate. We maintain that while 

the warfighter currently plays an important role in providing input into 

MDA’s requirements-setting process, it has not been provided with the 

responsibility of establishing operational requirements to which MDA must 

adhere. Instead, MDA decides which requirements it will pursue, from 

operational to system-specific requirements.

DOD also stated in its response to this recommendation that the 

requirements analysis performed in the ACL is an inherently acquisitionrelated function and, therefore, inappropriate for the warfighter to perform. 

Moreover, the response stated that JFCC IMD does not have the skill 

sets, nor the engineering simulations and models to perform this type of 

requirements analysis. DOD’s response conflates the technical and 

engineering expertise that MDA, as the material developer, brings to bear 

on the requirements-setting process with the operational expertise 

brought to bear by the warfighter as being one and the same. The 

warfighter’s expertise is based on decades of experience gained from 

operating missile defense platforms and its understanding of the 

capabilities and limitations of these systems. In addition, although DOD 

stated in its response that JFCC IMD currently lacks the engineering 

simulations and models needed to perform such requirements analyses, it 

did not explain why these assets could not be transitioned to the 

warfighter or why the warfighter would or should not be able to access 

these tools. During subsequent discussions with DOD officials regarding 

our recommendation, some officials were unfamiliar with JFCC IMD’s 

role, responsibilities, and utility in advocating warfighter needs. To provide 

clarity, we revised our recommendation to identify the U.S. Combatant 

Commands, with U.S. STRATCOM as the lead entity that should take 

responsibility for setting operational requirements for missile defense 

capabilities, as opposed to JFCC IMD. We also clarified that our 

recommendation is aimed at transitioning operational requirements to the 

warfighter so that the responsibility for generating system-specific 

requirements remains with MDA.

We also acknowledge that MDA has a valid and appropriate role in the 

requirements-setting process and that the current process has afforded 
Page 70 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

MDA a level of flexibility to respond to requests from senior leaders. We 

also agree that MDA’s requirements-setting process currently provides a 

significant amount of warfighter involvement, that MDA has demonstrated 

responsiveness to warfighter needs, and that the interests of both groups 

are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, both have a vested interest in seeing 

that new capabilities are fielded as quickly as feasible. However, our 

findings indicate that an imbalance exists in the current requirementssetting process regarding MDA’s ability to establish operational 

requirements, rather than the warfighter. Specifically, DOD has opted to 

continue to rely upon the contractors, program managers, and senior

executives at MDA to perform the task of determining operational 

requirements—a task that JFCC IMD contends is best suited for the men 

and women experienced in defending the United States from ballistic 

missile attacks. We believe that our recommendation would provide the 

warfighter with this responsibility.

DOD also did not concur with our third recommendation for the Director, 

CAPE to perform a comprehensive review of the RKV acquisition strategy 

and delay any decision to award a full-rate production contract until after 

MDA has received approval from the USD(AT&L) to proceed with full-rate 

production. In its response, DOD stated that the Joint Staff, the OSD staff, 

and CAPE conducted a comprehensive review of the RKV acquisition 

strategy before the USD(AT&L) approved the strategy. We agree with 

DOD that the strategy was reviewed by several organizations and that the 

USD(AT&L) ultimately approved the strategy. However, CAPE, along with 

several other organizations, raised serious concerns about the program’s 

design, development method, schedule, and cost, and did not fully agree 

with the strategy. As we noted in our report, MDA did not obtain CAPE’s 

concurrence on the strategy and CAPE officials continue to voice serious 

concerns with the strategy. While MDA received the senior leadership 

approval it was required to obtain, we found that MDA did not build 

consensus and support across the department for the RKV acquisition 

strategy. As indicated in our report, the lack of stakeholder buy-in can be 

a key driver for program cancellation, and, as such, DOD should take the 

steps necessary to ensure that such buy-in exists across the department 

for how MDA plans to acquire the RKV. We believe this can be 

accomplished, in part, by having CAPE perform a comprehensive review 

and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding any 

changes CAPE determines are necessary to gain it’s concurrence of the 

strategy.

In its response, DOD also stated that our recommendation would require 

a change in CAPE’s statutorily defined responsibilities. We do not believe 
Page 71 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

any such changes are needed for DOD to implement our 

recommendation. We also consulted with a representative from the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense’s Office of General Counsel, who agreed that 

no legal barriers to implementing our recommendations exist.

In addition, as we stated in our report, there is precedent for CAPE 

performing studies similar to what we recommend. For example, CAPE 

previously conducted a comprehensive review of the Precision Tracking 

Space System. As we reported in 2013, the study included an analysis of 

the program’s cost, schedule, technical design, and acquisition strategy, 

which resulted in a group of senior DOD officials presenting options to the 

Secretary of Defense in response to the study’s findings.79 We believe 

this 2013 CAPE study of the Precision Tracking Space System would be 

an appropriate model for an RKV comprehensive review, as we 

recommend in our report.

DOD did not substantively address the second part of our 

recommendation regarding delaying any decision to award a full-rate 

production contract until cleared by the USD(AT&L). In its response, DOD 

cited current departmental policy regarding the USD(AT&L)’s authority in 

approving decisions for programs to proceed to full-rate production, 

including RKV. DOD did not acknowledge the concerns we raised in our 

report, nor did it state whether or not it concurred with our 

recommendation to delay any full-rate production contract award until the 

USD(AT&L) approved proceeding to full-rate production. However, recent 

GMD program plans indicate the agency is still planning to award a fullrate contract for new GMD interceptors that include the RKV in advance 

of the RKV’s full-rate production decision. As we note in our report, MDA 

runs the risk of creating avoidable and potentially significant financial risks 

to the government because activities scheduled to occur after the contract 

is awarded may reveal costly problems that the government failed to 

consider at the time the contract was awarded. In order to ensure 

departmental approval and oversight and to reduce the financial risks, we 

continue to maintain that DOD should delay any decision to award a fullrate production contract for RKV until after the USD(AT&L) has approved 

the program to proceed with full-rate production.

Lastly, DOD did not concur with our fourth recommendation that the 

Secretary of Defense should require MDA to produce acquisition 

 79GAO-13-747R.
Page 72 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

strategies for all its major new efforts that are subject to review and 

approval from the Director, CAPE and USD(AT&L). In its response, DOD 

stated that under current DOD policy, the Director, MDA is responsible for 

BMDS development and acquisition strategies and must only obtain 

USD(AT&L) approval for production-related decisions. DOD also noted 

that the recommendation would require changes to CAPE’s statutorily 

defined responsibilities. We disagree that such a change is needed to 

implement the recommendation and when we consulted with an official

from the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Office of General Counsel, 

the official agreed that no legal barriers exist that would prevent the 

Secretary of Defense from directing CAPE or USD(AT&L) to review and 

approve MDA’s future acquisition strategies.

The intent of our recommendation was to leverage the unique expertise 

that the many components across DOD have to offer to ensure MDA’s 

acquisition strategies are robust, risk-balanced, and supported across the 

department. After reviewing DOD’s comments, we revised the 

recommendation to clarify that it is focused on MDA’s acquisition 

strategies that would be subject to CAPE’s review, and not approval, so 

as to preserve CAPE’s intended role of serving as an independent 

advisor to the Secretary of Defense rather than acting as a decision 

authority.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, and to the Director, MDA. In 

addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix X.

Cristina Chaplain 

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Page 73 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

List of Committees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman

The Honorable Richard Durbin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Kay Granger

Chairwoman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of 

Defense

Page 74 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of 

Defense

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Appendix I: Comments from the Department of 

Defense

Page 76 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of 

Defense

Page 77 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of 

Defense

Page 78 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of 

Defense

Page 79 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) Weapons System

Page 80 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Figure 11: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Appendix II

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense is the naval component of the Missile 

Defense Agency’s (MDA) Ballistic Missile Defense System. It consists of 

the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Weapon System (AWS), including a 

radar, and Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors.

MDA is developing the AWS in versions called spirals that expand on 

preceding capabilities. Deliveries of the spirals are planned to support 

MDA’s Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA)—a set of BMDS level 

capabilities designed to defend specific geographic regions—including 

the European PAA (EPAA)— in the December 2015 and 2018 time 

frame. In December 2015, in support of EPAA Phase 2, MDA delivered 

an upgrade for ships called Aegis AWS 5.0 Capability Upgrade (5.0CU) 

and the land based Aegis Ashore, although with less than planned 

testing.1 In addition, MDA is developing Aegis BMD capability to improve 

discrimination and capability to support defense of the United States 

known as Near-Term Discrimination Improvements for Homeland 

Defense. For specifics on Aegis Ashore and the Aegis SM-3 interceptors, 

see appendixes III, IV and V, respectively. Table 7 provides key fiscal 

year 2016 AWS program facts.

 1 Aegis AWS 5.0CU expands the battle-space and raid size capability and improves 

performance against medium and intermediate range threats. It also expands capability to 

intercept threats in the late phase of flight. 

Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) Weapons System

Program Overview
Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) Weapons System

Page 81 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Table 7: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program Facts

Source: GAO analysis of Missile Defense Agency data│GAO-17-381

The Aegis BMD program supported the European Phased Adaptive 

Approach (EPAA) Phase 2 delivery in December 2015 with the delivery of 

AWS 5.0CU. However, another spiral that was part of the original concept 

was delayed. EPAA Phase 2 capability was supported, in part, by two 

BMDS level operational flight tests called Flight Test Operational (FTO)-2 

Event 1a and FTO-02 Event 2a. While MDA experienced challenges in 

fiscal year 2015 with the initial attempts at both tests, once conducted, 

they demonstrated AWS capabilities, allowing EPAA Phase 2 declared 

delivered.2 Specifically:

• MDA successfully conducted FTO-02 Event 1a in December 2015. In 

the test, the Aegis Ashore test installation in Hawaii engaged an airlaunched medium range target with the upgraded Aegis BMD 

Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block IB interceptor using data from the 

collocated off board radar. The initial test attempt in June 2015—FT0-

02 Event 1—failed after a new intermediate-range target 

malfunctioned. As we previously reported, the delay between the 

initial test and the retest reduced the time available to assess all 

aspects of performance prior to the Romania site delivery.3 In 

addition, although the system intercepted the target, the Aegis Ashore 

installation was not equipped with operational version of the planned 

 2

A Technical Capability Declaration memo is the final step in MDA’s process for delivering 

a BMDS level capability for operational use and is issued by the Director, MDA. The 

memo describes how the capabilities were assessed and the ability of the system to meet 

technical specifications. It indicates readiness for warfighter’s assessment of the system’s 

operational utility.

3

Missile Defense: Ballistic Missile Defense System Testing Delays Affect Delivery of 

Capabilities, GAO-16-339R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2016).

Major Assets Delivered

Fiscal Year 2016 

Aegis Weapon System 5.0 Capability Upgrade for ships and land based Aegis Ashore was delivered in December 2015. 

Fiscal Year 2016 Flight Test Performance

Test Name Test Date Test Result

FTO-02 Event 2a November 2015 Success

FT0-02 Event 1a December 2015 Success

Aegis BMD program 

supported EPAA 

Phase 2 in December 

2015, but with less 

capability than 

planned
Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) Weapons System

Page 82 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

software known as AWS Baseline 9.B1, which reduced the extent the 

test reflected the operational architecture.

• MDA conducted FTO-02 Event 2a, in November 2015. The test was 

designed to demonstrate a layered BMDS with Aegis BMD and 

Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) sharing common 

defended areas and shot opportunities against two threatrepresentative ballistic missile targets. The primary Aegis BMD test 

objective was to conduct a ballistic missile engagement in the 

presence of debris generated by a THAAD intercept, while 

simultaneously conducting anti-air warfare against an anti-ship cruise 

missile target. Although the Aegis ship successfully engaged the 

cruise missile, the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB failed in flight, 

preventing an intercept of the ballistic missile target.4 Moreover, 

according to the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, the 

scenario with two Aegis targets was less stressing than prior test of 

similar capabilities. However, despite the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB 

failure, THAAD intercepted the target, MDA was able to collect 

important data on AWS tracking and engagement processing 

performance. For further details on the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB and 

THAAD programs, see appendix IV and IX.

Both upgraded software packages— Baseline 9.B1 and 9.C1— offer 

advanced defense capabilities and integration capability with other 

systems external to the Aegis ships. However, according to MDA officials 

both versions required updates, after the EPAA Phase 2 delivery, which 

were certified July 2016. Additionally, according to DOT&E, testing of 

Baseline 9.B1 indicated that the weapons system has software issues, 

which lowers its reliability and availability.

In fiscal year 2016, Aegis BMD continued to assess options for 

developing AWS 4.1, which was initially planned to provide ballistic 

missile defense capabilities for additional ships. Specifically, the upgrade 

was initially planned to be retrofitted on ships, especially those planned 

for EPAA Phase 2 as ships equipped with Baseline 9.C1 were slated for 

other regions. However, the effort was put on hold last year, following 

development challenges and program funding issues. For example, as we 

reported in May 2015, technical assessments revealed challenges with 

 4

A failure review board determined a component in the guidance section failed resulting in 

the failure. The program addressed the problem by implementing improved screening and 

testing of the part prior to being installed onto the interceptor. The new process changes 

were implemented and successfully flown in a controlled test flight.

Additional AWS upgrades 

initially planned for EPAA 

Phase 2 now planned 

through December 2020
Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) Weapons System

Page 83 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

matching Baseline 9.C1 performance characteristics on ships which 

utilize older hardware.5 This year however, MDA continued to explore 

options to deliver this capability, but not in support of EPAA Phase 2. 

Rather, current plans indicate full delivery in December 2020.

Aegis BMD also participated in two key BMD system-level assessments 

for the delivery of discrimination upgrades for Homeland Defense. The 

tests, called Ground Test Integrated -06 Part 2 and Ground Test 

Distributed -06 Part 2, employed models and simulations to assess 

upgraded AWS software— including AWS 4.0.3 and AWS 3.6.3. The new 

software is designed to provide upgrades for discrimination and 

interoperability with other BMDS elements. According to MDA, the tests 

successfully demonstrated the upgrades but analysis delayed the delivery 

of the associated capability planned for March 2017.

Aegis BMD made progress in development of AWS 5.1 for Aegis ships 

(Baseline 9.C2) and Aegis Ashore (Baseline 9.B2). AWS 5.1 improves 

AWS 5.0CU capability against longer range and more complex threats in 

the middle and terminal phases of flight. It also extends defended areas 

by engaging threats based on tracks from forward-based sensors. These 

AWS versions, expected to be delivered in December 2018, are slated to 

support EPAA Phase 3 and defend against intermediate range ballistic 

missile attacks.

However, the program schedule to meet EPAA Phase 3 lacks margins 

and has risk. For example, the deliveries of AWS Baseline 9.C2 and 9.B2 

are now planned at the beginning of EPAA Phase 3 integration activities, 

leaving no time to rectify challenges that could still arise during 

development. Moreover, communication upgrades for this AWS version, 

are now behind schedule. Program documentation indicates that the lag 

in development could result in compatibility issues between these 

upgrades with the rest of the weapons system. This, in turn, could require 

retrofits and reduce performance. In addition, C2BMC delays deferred 

completion of Aegis BMD’s capability to intercept threats based on tracks 

from forward-based sensors until fiscal year 2021. For further details on 

C2BMC, see appendix VI.

 5

GAO, Missile Defense: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Acquisition Risk and Improve 

Reporting on System Capabilities, GAO-15-345 (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2015).

Aegis Weapon 

System continued its 

efforts to increase 

capability for defense 

of the United States

AWS upgrades for 

EPAA Phase 3 could 

be at schedule risk
Appendix III: Aegis Ashore

Page 84 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Figure 12: Aegis Ashore Appendix III

Aegis Ashore is a land-based, or ashore, version of the ship-based Aegis 

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). Aegis Ashore is designed to track and 

intercept ballistic missiles in the middle of their flight using Aegis BMD 

Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors. Key components include a 

vertical launching system, interceptors, and an enclosure, referred to as a 

deckhouse, that contains the SPY-1 radar and command and control 

system.

Aegis Ashore will share many components with the sea-based Aegis 

BMD and will use future versions of the Aegis weapon system currently in 

development. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plans to equip Aegis 

Ashore with a modified version of the Aegis weapon system software that 

will share many components with the sea-based Aegis BMD. MDA 

deployed an operational site in Romania in fiscal year 2016 and plans an 

operational site in Poland in the 2018 time frame.1 Both operational sites 

are being deployed to provide additional coverage for the defense of 

Europe.

In addition, DOD deployed a test facility in Hawaii in April 2014. The test 

facility will be used to flight test Aegis Ashore, and in some cases, Aegis 

BMD SM-3 interceptors, as upgrades become available. For further 

details on the Aegis Weapon System and Aegis BMD interceptors,

 1

DOD has awarded contracts for the construction and installation of the Poland facility and 

construction is underway. 

Appendix III: Aegis Ashore

Program Overview
Appendix III: Aegis Ashore

Page 85 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

see appendixes II, IV and V. Table 8 provides key fiscal year 2016 Aegis 

Ashore Program Facts. 

Table 8: Aegis Ashore Program Facts

Source: GAO analysis of Missile Defense Agency data│GAO-17-381

MDA delivered the Aegis Ashore facility in Romania to support the 

European Phased Adaptive Approach Phase 2 declaration in December 

2015, after demonstrating performance with only one intercept test.2 As 

we have previously reported, insufficient testing while fielding assets 

increases the risk of performance shortfalls and increased costs if issues 

are discovered as a result of flight testing.3 In December 2015, MDA 

conducted a BMDS level flight test—FTO-02 Event 1a—intended to 

demonstrate the operational capability of EPAA Phase 2 and Aegis 

Ashore’s ability to defend Europe against medium-range ballistic threats.

In the test, the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense test facility successfully 

engaged an air-launched medium-range target with an upgraded Aegis 

BMD SM-3 Block IB interceptor.

FT0-02 Event 1a was Aegis Ashore’s first and only intercept test prior to 

declaring the site operational. Moreover, since 2013, Aegis Ashore has 

reduced the number of planned intercept tests prior to EPAA Phase 3 

from four to two. According to program officials, they are leveraging data 

 2 European PAA (EPAA) is DOD’s plan to deploy regional BMD capabilities in Europe. 

EPAA is part of U.S. policy. See GAO, Missile Defense: Opportunities Exist to Reduce 

Acquisition Risk and Improve Reporting on System Capabilities, GAO-15-345 

(Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2015).

3 GAO, Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing 

Concurrency, GAO-12-486 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2012).

Major Assets Delivered

Fiscal Year 2016 

Operational facility in Romania delivered in December 2015

Fiscal Year 2016 Flight Test Performance

Test Name Test Date Test Result

AA CTV-02 December 2015 Success (non-intercept flight test to prepare for FTO-02 Event 1a)

FTO-02 Event 1a December 2015 Success

MDA delivered the 

Aegis Ashore site in 

Romania, though with 

limited testing
Appendix III: Aegis Ashore

Page 86 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

from sea-based Aegis BMD tests, however, conditions at sea are different 

than on land, as are the system configurations. While MDA delivered 

Aegis Ashore in Romania, incomplete test data delayed the evaluation of 

Aegis Ashore’s performance against all expected engagement scenarios 

to determine its capabilities and limitations. This analysis is not expected 

to be completed until at least fiscal year 2018.

Construction of the Aegis Ashore site in Poland, the schedule for which 

has already been compressed, has been further complicated due to 

delays in completing work at the site in Romania. The Romanian site’s 

late finish and the Poland site’s slow start has resulted in the Aegis 

Ashore program concurrently working on both sites, leading to the 

increased risk of schedule delays or reduced testing. Aegis Ashore 

program documentation indicated that all work on the Aegis Ashore site in 

Romania was to be complete by December 2015; however work will be

ongoing until at least fiscal year 2017 due to, among other things, the 

necessity to resolve power system issues required to complete system 

verification and validation. Overseeing work at two sites simultaneously 

has placed additional burdens on the program and the contractor’s 

managers. According to program documentation, these issues place the 

program at risk of not being able to meet its testing and delivery 

milestones.

MDA has taken some steps to mitigate the project’s schedule risks. 

According to Aegis Ashore officials; they believe “lessons learned” from 

the construction of the Romania site can be utilized in Poland to offset 

some schedule compression. Specifically, to reduce schedule risks, the 

program plans to add additional personnel and is working with the 

contractor to prevent the delays from further impacting the project 

schedule. Consequently, according to program documentation, the 

program expects to complete the installation and delivery of Aegis Ashore 

Poland on schedule in 2018 and meet the EPAA Phase 3 deadline.

However, further delays could result in either delaying the planned 

delivery or not having sufficient time to conduct all planned testing limiting 

the warfighter’s understanding of the system’s capabilities and limitations.

Delays completing 

the Aegis Ashore 

Romania site pose 

challenges for 

construction of the 

Aegis Ashore in 

Poland
Appendix IV: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB

Page 87 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Figure 13: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Standard Missile-3 Block IB 2017 Appendix IV

The Aegis BMD Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB is a ship-and shore

based missile defense system interceptor designed to intercept short- to 

intermediate-range ballistic missiles during the middle stage of their flight. 

It is an upgraded version of the earlier, SM-3 Block IA and features an 

enhanced seeker capability for increased discrimination, an advanced 

signal processor for engagement coordination, an improved throttleable 

divert and attitude control system for adjusting its course, and increased 

range.1 The SM-3 Block IB interceptor is linked with the Aegis Ballistic

Missile Defense (BMD) Weapons System and Aegis Ashore.

In September 2014, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) began production 

of an upgraded version called the SM-3 Block IB Threat Upgrade (TU) 

which is designed to capitalize on improvements in Aegis Weapon

System capability advancements. It is primarily comprised of software 

upgrades with some associated hardware changes to enhance 

discrimination capability—the ability of the seeker to distinguish the 

incoming missile from other objects.

In fiscal year 2016, the Block IB program overcame prior development 

challenges and successfully intercepted a target in a flight test. We 

previously reported that the SM-3 Block IB production line was repeatedly 

disrupted since 2011 due to flight test anomalies. For additional 

information about the Aegis Weapon Systems, Aegis Ashore and Aegis 

BMD SM-3 Block IIA see Appendices II, III and V, respectively. Table 9

 1

We did not assess the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IA because it has been in production 

since 2005 and is currently operational for regional defense in Europe, as well as other 

regions.

Appendix IV: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB

Program Overview
Appendix IV: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB

Page 88 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

below highlights key fiscal year 2016 Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB program 

facts. 

Table 9: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB Program Facts

Source: GAO analysis of Missile Defense Agency data│GAO-17-381

a

The test is characterized as a success because the test achieved its primary objectives.

b

During the conduct of SM CTV-01, the Aegis BMD SM-3 interceptor failed to launch from the Aegis 

ship.

MDA successfully tested and delivered the Standard Missile-3 Block IB 

for operational use in fiscal year 2016, but the program still faces several 

technical issues, some of which have implications for performance or 

reliability. According to the Department of Operational Test and 

Evaluation, these reliability issues could negatively affect the interceptor’s 

operational effectiveness due to the chance of the missile failing in flight. 

MDA assessed the interceptor’s reliability as being within its 

requirements, but is taking steps to address the risks. These steps 

include redesigning certain components and working with Raytheon to 

address quality and production issues that have been discovered during 

recent reviews.

Addressing reliability concerns discovered during testing introduced 

delays and additional costs. The SM-3 Block IB program experienced two 

separate test failures in fiscal year 2016 that required convening a Failure 

Review Board to identify root causes for the failure and implement 

corrective actions. As a result of the failures, MDA suspended deliveries 

of additional interceptors, and as a result MDA missed its target for 

interceptor delivery. The program has identified the components 

Major Assets Delivered

Fiscal Year 2016 

Delivered 33 Aegis BMD SM-3 IB interceptors in fiscal year 2016 against 47 planned deliveries

Fiscal Year 2016 Flight Test Performance

Test Name Test Date Test Result

FTO-02 E2a October 2015 Successa – SM-3 interceptor failed

FTO-02 E1a December 2015 Success

SM CTV-01 February 2016 System Failureb

SM CTV-01a May 2016 Success (non-intercept)

SM CTV-02 May 2016 Success (non-intercept)

Aegis BMD SM-3

Block IB delivered for 

operational use, but 

technical issues 

remain
Appendix IV: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB

Page 89 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

responsible for the failures and will incorporate fixes during the 

recertification process.

In part in response to one of our prior recommendations, MDA postponed 

putting into production a significant design change to the interceptor’s 

third-stage rocket motor until properly tested.2 MDA further delayed its 

decision to enter full production, from the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2016 

to the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2017 while attempting to address issues 

identified in the most recent test failure. MDA has delayed full production 

multiple times over the life of the SM-3 Block IB, which was initially 

scheduled for fourth quarter, fiscal year 2012.

MDA successfully tested the new third-stage rocket motor design with two 

non-intercept flight tests– Standard Missile Controlled Test Vehicle (SM 

CTV)-01a and SM CTV-02. The redesign is intended to increase 

interceptor reliability, and was necessitated by a test failure in October 

2013. The program initially planned to execute the tests in February 2016, 

but delayed the tests after the SM-3 Block IB failed a diagnostic test 

before the initial attempt. The tests were successfully completed in May 

2016 and the redesign was approved for production in July 2016. The first 

missiles with the redesigned rocket motor are expected for delivery in the 

second quarter of fiscal year 2017. MDA plans to retrofit existing SM-3 

Block IB interceptors during the periodic recertification process. The cost 

to fix each interceptor is expected to be about $545 thousand per 

interceptor.

2

GAO, Missile Defense: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Acquisition Risk and Improve 

Reporting on System Capabilities, GAO-15-345 (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2015).

MDA delayed a full 

production decision 

until it could better 

test and implement 

design changes.
Appendix V: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA

Page 90 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Figure 14: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Standard Missile-3 Block IIA Appendix V

The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) 

interceptor has multiple versions in development or production: the SM-3 

Blocks IA, IB, and IIA. The SM-3 Block IIA interceptor’s design provides 

increased speed, more sensitive seeker technology, and an advanced 

kinetic warhead. It is expected to defend against short-, medium-, and 

intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Additionally, most of the SM-3 Block 

IIA components will differ from other standard missile versions requiring 

new technology being developed for the majority of the SM-3 Block IIA 

components. This interceptor is planned to have increased range 

compared to earlier SM-3s. For additional information on the SM-3 Block 

IB interceptor, see Appendix IV.

Initiated in 2006 as a cooperative development program with Japan, the 

SM-3 Block IIA program was added as a capability to support the 

European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase 3 to defend against 

longer range threats. The SM-3 Block IIA interceptor is planned to be 

fielded with Aegis Weapons System 5.1 by the 2018 time frame and is 

expected to provide engage on remote capability, in which data from 

other sensors is used to engage a target, and expand the range available 

to intercept a ballistic missile. For additional information on the Aegis 

Weapon Systems, see Appendix II. Table 10 provides key fiscal year 

2016 Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIA program facts.

Appendix V: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA

Program Overview
Appendix V: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA

Page 91 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Table 10: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA Program Facts

Source: GAO analysis of Missile Defense Agency data│GAO-17-381

The Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIA conducted one test in fiscal year 2016, 

which revealed some technical challenges. Although delayed due to 

developmental challenges with the guidance system, the SM-3 Block IIA 

program conducted a non-intercept test named Standard Missile-3 

Cooperative Development Controlled Test Vehicle (SCD CTV)-01 in June 

2015, as well as the second non-intercept test–SCD CTV-02–in 

December 2015. Both tests demonstrated key capabilities including the 

ability to control the interceptor through the final rocket stage, separation 

of the kinetic warhead, and operation of the warhead after separation. 

The tests were successful by these measures, but still exposed some 

technical problems that could affect its schedule and result in further cost 

overruns. These challenges include design issues with missile guidance 

systems, which steer the interceptor to the target, and missile 

communication with sensors.

In order to assess these issues and incorporate lessons learned, the next 

test, which was also the first intercept test – Standard Missile-3 Block IIA 

Flight Test Mission (SFTM)-01 – was delayed from the end of fiscal year 

2016 to February, 2017.1 MDA previously stated that any further delay in 

SFTM-01 could impact the schedule for SFTM-02, and with it, MDA’s 

initial production decision scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 

2017. Program documentation also stated that additional schedule delays 

could affect future planned testing and increase overall program cost.

Despite these risks, MDA does not believe these issues will impact the 

schedule for EPAA Phase 3.

 1 MDA completed SFTM-01 February 3, 2017. Program officials stated that the test was a 

success. However, the test analysis is ongoing. 

Major Assets Delivered

Fiscal Year 2016 

N/A

Note: The program remains in product development and testing

Fiscal Year 2016 Flight Test Performance

Test Name Test Date Test Result

SCD CTV-02 December 2015 Success (non-intercept)

Aegis BMD SM-3

Block IIA testing 

revealed technical 

challenges
Appendix V: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA

Page 92 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

The development of the SM-3 Block IIA continues to deal with cost 

growth, in addition to schedule problems and technical issues, all of which 

threaten the ability to deliver an effective interceptor on time and within 

budget. The Missile Defense Agency reports that the contractor’s 

estimated cost at program completion increased by around $61 million. 

While the program has implemented some mitigation measures, 

according to program documentation, additional growth threatens to result 

in funding shortfalls.

The program has also experienced a delay in awarding the contract for 

the materials needed to build interceptor test rounds, which has had 

further impact on the program schedule. In particular, the procurement 

delay has required adjustments to Flight Test Mission (FTM) -29, the first 

flight test designed to fire the interceptor against an intermediate-range 

target while relying on remote sensor data. While the program is taking 

steps to mitigate the delay, risk remains that the test will be delayed 

which could affect the scheduled EPAA Phase 3 declaration date.

The program faces 

several challenges, 

including persistent 

cost growth and 

schedule risks
Appendix VI: Command, Control, Battle 

Management, and Communications (C2BMC)

Page 93 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Figure 15: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications Appendix VI

C2BMC is a global system of hardware—workstations, servers, and 

network equipment—and software that link ad integrated individual 

missile defense elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System 

(BMDS). It allows users to plan operations, see the battle develop, and 

manage sensors. As the integrator, C2BMC enables the defense of a 

larger area than the individual BMDS elements operating independently 

and against more missiles simultaneously, thereby conserving interceptor 

inventory. C2BMC delivers capabilities via software spirals and hardware 

upgrades. Currently, C2BMC’s fielded spiral is named Spiral 6.4, but the 

program is working on multiple efforts that are expected to provide 

additional capabilities. Table 11 provides key fiscal year 2016 C2BMC 

program facts. 

Appendix VI: Command, Control, Battle 

Management, and Communications 

(C2BMC)

Program Overview
Appendix VI: Command, Control, Battle 

Management, and Communications (C2BMC)

Page 94 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Table 11: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) Program Facts

Source: GAO analysis of Missile Defense Agency data│GAO-17-381

a

The list represents a portion of the tests C2BMC participates in, but is not comprehensive.

During fiscal year 2016, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) demonstrated 

C2BMC capabilities in a number of flight and ground tests. These 

capabilities included threat assessment and evaluation, management of 

sensor resources, reporting of missile tracks for use by BMDS shooters 

like Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), and engagement monitoring. 

For example:

• During BMDS level grounds tests, it demonstrated performance of the 

currently fielded spiral, which received upgrades to support 

discrimination efforts for Homeland Defense. Specifically, Spiral 6.4-3 

provided discrimination tasking of a forward positioned radar for longrange threats, multiple-radar discrimination tasking of a threat, and 

several fixes related to sequencing and timing of messages.

• During Ground-based Midcourse (GM) Controlled Test Vehicle-02+, 

MDA collected data on fire control, enhanced tracking, post-intercept 

assessment, and discrimination for upcoming Spiral 8.2.

• During Flight Test Operational-02 Event 1a, C2BMC demonstrated 

support to a key European Phased Adaptive Approach Phase 2 

capability called Launch on Remote via processing of a BMDS radar’s 

tracking data, reporting of this track onto DOD’s communication 

network for use by Aegis BMD.

However, MDA’s fiscal year 2016 assessment of C2BMC has limitations.

For example, although it was assessed during ground tests, C2BMC’s 

control of two AN/TPY-2 radars has not been operationally flight tested. 

Moreover, according to the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 

Major Assets Delivered

Fiscal Year 2016 

Spiral 6.4 remains in operational use for all geographical areas. 

Fiscal Year 2016 Flight Test Performancea

Test Name Test Date Test Result

FTO-02 E2a October 2015 Success – SM-3 interceptor failed

FTO-02 E1a December 2015 Success

GM CTV-02+ January 2016 Success

C2BMC 

demonstrated new 

capabilities but 

testing had limitations
Appendix VI: Command, Control, Battle 

Management, and Communications (C2BMC)

Page 95 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

C2BMC has not demonstrated real-time engagement direction 

capabilities, which would significantly increase BMD system-level 

integration.

C2BMC continued sustainment for Spiral 6.4, by awarding a new 

sustainment task order in December 2015, and delivered capability 

upgrades to this spiral in order to support the assessment and BMD 

system-level discrimination upgrades for Homeland Defense. While MDA 

is developing Spiral 8.2-1 to replace Spiral 6.4 in the December 2017 time 

frame, schedule delays require that Spiral 6.4 remains operational in 

Europe and in the Middle East until the delivery of Spiral 8.2-3 in 

December 2018.

The need to sustain Spiral 6.4 until 2018 however, increases performance 

risk and sustainment cost due to cyber vulnerabilities, as the spiral uses 

outdated Windows XP. According to program documentation, critical 

security vulnerabilities are a potential risk while the spiral remains 

operational. The potential consequences include degraded situational 

awareness, reduced mission planning capabilities, and target location 

reporting which would affect the way the warfighter would be able to 

conduct an engagement. The program continues to monitor this risk to 

address vulnerabilities and to mitigate new threats as they are 

discovered.

Schedule delays 

increase sustainment 

costs performance 

risks for Spiral 6.4
Appendix VI: Command, Control, Battle 

Management, and Communications (C2BMC)

Page 96 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

MDA is developing spirals that are expected to provide additional 

protections for defending the United States and for EPAA Phase 3—

Spiral 8.2-1 and 8.2-3, respectively. However, the spirals are 

experiencing challenges in development that could affect planned 

capability deliveries. Specifically:

• Spiral 8.2-1— planned to support Enhanced Homeland Defense 

capabilities in December 2017.1 The spiral completed element level 

development activities and completed early integration testing to 

address some interoperability concerns with other elements. 

Nonetheless, C2BMC continues to monitor interoperability issues as a 

risk. According to program documentation, the probability that 

interoperability issues could be discovered during BMD system-level 

ground testing is very high, based on experience from previous tests 

and the lack of usual risk reduction ground testing, that was removed 

last year due to fiscal constraints and testing reprioritization. Removal 

of this test, however, reduced opportunities to find and fix 

interoperability issues. Should one of the more significant deficiencies 

be discovered, program documentation indicates that performance of 

C2BMC and Enhanced Homeland Defense capabilities may be 

degraded.

• Spiral 8.2-3 is planned to support EPAA Phase 3 delivery in 

December 2018.2 However, the program is currently tracking a risk to 

an element level C2BMC capability needed for EPAA Phase 3 called 

Engage on Remote.3 Specifically, program documentation indicates 

quality of tracking data provided by C2BMC may be lower than 

expected and reduce the likelihood of the successful outcome of 

engagements utilizing Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense in Engage on 

Remote scenarios.

 1

Enhanced Homeland Defense is a set of development and fielding activities that add 

capability for defense of the United States. It includes the fielding of 44 Ground based 

interceptors, increasing the reliability of the kill vehicle and improving discrimination for the 

Ground-based Midcourse defense. For further details on the Ground-based Midcourse 

defense, see appendix VII. 

2

EPAA Phase 3 is being developed to expand the existing protection of Europe.

3

Engage on Remote integrates Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense with forward-based radars 

and C2BMC to allow the warfighter to acquire and intercept an enemy ballistic missile 

sooner and, consequently, defend a larger area. For further details on Aegis BMD, see 

appendix II.

Future spirals are in 

development, 

however, 

developmental 

challenges could 

affect planned 

capabilities
Appendix VII: Ground-based Midcourse

Defense (GMD)

Page 97 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Figure 16: Ground-based Midcourse Defense Appendix VII

The GMD program is a ground-based defense system designed to defend 

the United States against a limited intermediate and intercontinental

ballistic missile attack in the middle part of their flight. Key components 

include a ground-based interceptor consisting of a booster with an 

exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) on top, as well as a communication 

system and a fire control capability. The kill vehicle uses on-board 

sensors and divert capabilities to steer itself into the threat missile to 

destroy it.

There are two versions of interceptors that are currently fielded, the 

version with the initial kill vehicle, called Capability Enhancement (CE)-I, 

and the upgraded version, called CE-II. Both of these interceptor versions 

are paired with the first generation boost vehicle. The Missile Defense 

Agency (MDA) is currently developing a new interceptor version called 

CE-II Block I, consisting of new divert thrusters and an upgraded boost 

vehicle that addresses obsolescence issues and problems previously 

discovered during flight testing. In addition, MDA initiated the 

development of a Redesigned Kill Vehicle that is intended to address 

concerns about GMD’s fleet reliability. According to program officials, the 

Redesigned Kill Vehicles are not expected to begin fielding until 2022 and 

are not covered in this appendix because it has not been baselined.

In March 2013, the Secretary of Defense announced plans to increase 

the number of deployed GMD interceptors called Ground-based 

interceptors (GBI) from 30 to 44 by the end of 2017 to add protection to 

the homeland and to stay ahead of long-range ballistic missile threats. 

Table 12 highlights key fiscal year 2016 GMD program facts. 

Appendix VII: Ground-based Midcourse 

Defense (GMD)

Program Overview
Appendix VII: Ground-based Midcourse 

Defense (GMD)

Page 98 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Table 12: Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Program Facts

Source: GAO analysis of Missile Defense Agency data│GAO-17-381

a

GM CTV-02+ was designed to demonstrate ADTs for future GMD interceptors. A kill vehicle 

component failed which prevented one of the thrusters from working for a segment of the test. 

GMD continued to demonstrate additional capability when it conducted a 

non-intercept flight test named GMD Controlled Flight Test-02+ (GM CTV02+), however developmental challenges caused MDA to delay the 

second planned test until at least the third quarter of fiscal year 2017. On 

January 28, 2016, MDA conducted a non-intercept flight test for the GMD 

program. The test was designed to demonstrate discrimination 

functionality and a new alternate divert thruster (ADT) system. As we 

previously reported, MDA initiated the development of the ADT—a 

component that steers the kill vehicle in flight—to address the systemic 

problem of in-flight vibration.1 According to DOT&E, the ADTs turned on 

and off as commanded and performed nominally, but the EKV 

experienced an anomaly—most likely damage caused by an foreignobject in a subcomponent not considered part of the ADT system. In 

2016, DOT&E reported that GMD demonstrates a limited defense 

capability in part, because of the system’s low reliability and the continual 

discovery of new failure modes during testing. In addition, although the 

test was able to capture significant data for increasing GMD’s 

discrimination capability, according to officials from the Director, 

Developmental Test and Evaluation, the threat scene lacked a realistic 

representation.

MDA delayed the planned intercept test—Flight Test GMD (FTG)-15—

from the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2016 until at least the third quarter of 

1

GAO, Missile Defense: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Acquisition Risk and Improve 

Reporting on System Capabilities, GAO-15-345 (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2015).

Major Assets Delivered

Fiscal Year 2016 

Delivered six upgraded ground-based Interceptors against the planned eight 

In-flight Interceptor Communications System Data Terminal at Fort Drum, New York

Fiscal Year 2016 Flight Test Performance

Test Name Test Date Test Result

GM CTV-02+ January 2016 Success, but failure mode observeda

FTG-15 4th Quarter Fiscal year 2016 Delayed until 3rd Quarter Fiscal Year 2017

GMD flight testing 

continued in fiscal 

year 2016, although it 

did not conduct all 

tests scheduled for 

the year, increasing 

risk to the fielding 

plan for interceptors.
Appendix VII: Ground-based Midcourse 

Defense (GMD)

Page 99 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

fiscal year 2017. FTG-15 is designed to be the first GMD test against an 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile range target using upgraded avionics in 

the booster. We have previously reported on the need for GMD to 

conduct this test so the warfighter can have a better understanding on the 

interceptor’s capabilities and limitations.2 According to program 

documentation, FTG-15 was delayed, in part, due to developmental 

challenges with the interceptor.

Delays in conducting FTG-15 increase the risk to completing the fielding 

of 44 GBIs by the end of December 2017. According to program 

documentation, the program recognizes that to complete the deadline, 

concurrency is warranted, but is taking mitigation steps to reduce the 

risks of a compressed schedule. As we have previously reported, GMD is 

relying on high-risk acquisition practices, including concurrent 

development and fielding to achieve its goal of fielding 44 interceptors by 

the end of 2017.3 Delaying FTG-15, increases this risk associated with 

fielding interceptors within its established time frame because it will 

reduce the time between the conduct of the test and the subsequent 

manufacturing and fielding of the GBIs necessary to complete the 

requirement.

GMD continued to make progress in completing its planned fielding of 44 

GBIs by the end of calendar year 2017 by refurbishing, delivering, and 

fielding six of the planned eight GBIs. Upgrades of CE-II interceptors is 

ongoing the GMD program experienced developmental setbacks that 

resulted in necessary changes to the CE-II interceptor’s guidance system.

In addition to fielding interceptors, GMD increased its capability by 

completing the installation of an additional communication location in July 

2016 called the In-Flight Interceptor Communications System—designed 

to serve as the communications link to interceptors. The In-Flight

Interceptor Communications System serves an important function as it 

provides the GMD system with one last opportunity to send data about 

the threat location as well as the inflight status of the GBI during an 

engagement. According to the Director, MDA, the site at Fort Drum, New 

2

GAO-15-345. 

3

Missile Defense: Ballistic Missile Defense System Testing Delays Affect Delivery of 

Capabilities, GAO-16-339R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2016).

GMD increased its 

capability by 

refurbishing and 

fielding 6 of 8 planned 

Ground-based 

Interceptors and 

installing an 

additional 

communication 

location
Appendix VII: Ground-based Midcourse 

Defense (GMD)

Page 100 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

York will enable communication with GBIs over longer distances and 

improve defenses for the Eastern United States.
Appendix VIII: Targets and Countermeasures

Page 101 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Figure 17: Targets and Countermeasures Appendix VIII

The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Targets and 

Countermeasures program provides centrally managed targets for a cost 

effective, integrated system level approach to BMDS testing. The Missile 

Defense Agency’s (MDA) Targets and Countermeasures (hereafter 

referred to as Targets) designs, develops, and procures missiles to serve 

as targets during the testing of independent or integrated ballistic missile 

defense elements. As such, targets are test assets and are not 

operationally fielded. A typical target consists of a launch vehicle with one 

or more boosters, a control module that steers the vehicle after the 

booster stage separates, a payload module that can deploy 

countermeasures, and a surrogate re-entry vehicle. The Targets program 

provides multiple short-, medium-, intermediate-, and intercontinental 

range targets for testing the BMDS elements. However, the numbers of 

each vary based on element requirements and testing schedules.

The Targets program acquires many types of targets covering the full 

spectrum of threat missile capabilities and ranges. Based on engineering 

assessments of threat intelligence data, the BMDS Targets Program 

develops, builds, and supports the launch of Short Range Ballistic Missile 

(Less than 1000 Kilometer range) targets, Medium Range Ballistic Missile 

(1000-3000 Kilometer Range) targets, Intermediate Range Ballistic 

Missile (3000-5500 Kilometer Range) targets, Intercontinental Ballistic 

Missile (greater than 5500 Kilometer range) targets, and Multiclass 

Components to test, verify, and validate the performance of the BMDS 

against threats. While some targets have been used by MDA’s test 

program for years, others have been added recently or are now being 

developed to more closely represent current and future threats. The 

quality and availability of these targets are instrumental to the execution 

of MDA’s flight test schedule. Table 13 provides key fiscal year 2016 

Targets and Countermeasure program facts.

Appendix VIII: Targets and Countermeasures

Program Overview:
Appendix VIII: Targets and Countermeasures

Page 102 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Table 13: Targets and Countermeasure Program Facts

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data│GAO-17-381

In fiscal year 2016, MDA was successful in conducting two operational 

flight tests, but was unable to complete its planned flight test plan due, in 

part, to target failures in two prior tests for the targets program. The 

failures in conducting the tests resulted in MDA readjusting its test plan to 

reconduct the two flight tests. As we previously reported, targets’ 

reliability and availability problems have significantly affected BMDS 

development and testing schedules since 2006, and issues have grown 

even more problematic in recent years.1 In addition, these problems have 

caused delays in MDA’s test program resulting in less testing than 

planned and the delivery of assets before testing has demonstrated the 

assets capabilities and limitations.

According to the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, the 

operational flight tests—Flight Test Operational (FTO)-02 Events 1 and 

2—were designed as events necessary to provide critical data for the 

assessment of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase 

1

See Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense Components 

Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned, GAO-09-338 (Washington, 

D.C.: March 13, 2009); Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by 

Reducing Concurrency, GAO-12-486 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2012); and Missile 

Defense: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Acquisition Risk and Improve Reporting on 

System Capabilities, GAO-15-345 (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2015).

Major Assets Delivered

Fiscal Year 2016 

Targets provided 5 targets to be used in flight testing

Fiscal Year 2016 Flight Test Performance

Test Name Test Date Test Result 

FTO-02 Event 1a December 2015 Target performed nominally

FTO-02 Event 2a November 2015 Target performed nominally

FTO-02 Event 2 October 2015 Target failed

FTX-21 May 2016 Target performed nominally

GM CTV-02+ January 2016 Target performed nominally

Targets program 

overcame prior failure 

to complete two 

operational tests in 

fiscal year 2016
Appendix VIII: Targets and Countermeasures

Page 103 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

2.2 Specifically, the two tests were to demonstrate Aegis Ashore’s 

capability to defend Europe against medium range threats and the ability 

to integrate EPAA capabilities.

• FTO-02 Event 1—attempted June 2015—a new intermediate-range

target malfunctioned due to a safety switch that did not indicate, as

designed, that it had safely cleared the aircraft from which it is

launched. The malfunction prevented the target from executing

sequential steps and failed to fly as intended and therefore the test

had to be repeated.3 MDA reallocated another intermediate range

target and successfully conducted the test in December, 2015.

Consequently, costs for this first event of the BMDS operational test

doubled, increasing from about $96 million to $192 million.

• During FTO-02 Event 2—attempted October 2015—the short-range

air launched target’s parachute failed to open causing the agency to

replan the test. It was successfully conducted as FTO-02 Event 2a

October 31, 2015.

While MDA was able to conduct the two tests in fiscal year 2016, the 

need to repeat the flight tests compressed the time available to analyze 

any test results and precluded the validation of key models used in the 

ground tests before the European Phased Adaptive Approach Phase 2 

delivery in December 2015.4 Specifically, as originally planned, MDA and 

relevant test officials had up to approximately 6 months to analyze test 

results, whereas the retests only allowed between 9 and 48 days. In 

addition, testing prioritization caused MDA to reschedule a test to support 

the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) test—FTT-18—to 

fiscal year 2017. FTT-18 is intended to demonstrate THAAD’s capability 

against intermediate range threats. This test is necessary because 

THAAD has already deployed a battery to Guam to defend against this 

range. Consequently, it will be four years that the asset will be deployed 

before its capability has been demonstrated. For additional information on 

THAAD, see appendix IX.

2 The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) provides defense of regional allies 

and United State forces in Europe. Phase 2 builds on the previously delivered Phase 1. 

For further details about EPAA, see GAO, Regional Missile Defense: DOD’s 2014 Report 

Generally Addressed Required Reporting Elements, but Excluded Additional Key Details, 

GAO-15-32 (Washington, D.C. December, 2014).

3 Missile Defense: Ballistic Missile Defense System Testing Delays Affect Delivery of 

Capabilities, GAO-16-339R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2016).

4 GAO-15-345. 
Appendix VIII: Targets and Countermeasures

Page 104 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

MDA has experienced test failures and delays due to problems with target 

performance and availability. Specifically, as we previously reported, the 

use of new, untested targets introduces higher risk for failure that can 

mean costly and time consuming retests.5 Accordingly, we recommended 

that MDA add a non-intercept flight test for each new target type to verify 

its performance and reduce risk for future tests. DOD partially concurred 

with our recommendation, stating that the agency will weigh risk against 

the cost, schedule and programmatic impacts. However, as noted above, 

the failure in FT0-02 Event 1 cost an additional $223 million to reconduct 

and resulted in the delay of demonstrating a capability of a fielded asset.

Due to the addition of new tests and retests in fiscal year 2016, MDA had 

to deconflict its test schedule by delaying multiple, in some instances 

critical, tests. For example, GMD’s next intercept flight test—Flight Test 

GMD (FTG)-15 was delayed from fiscal year 2016 until the first quarter of 

fiscal year 2017 (subsequently delayed until at least the third quarter of 

fiscal year 2017 due to booster issues). FTG-15 carries an increased risk 

as it will be the first flight of a new range target. Specifically, MDA plans to 

use a new intercontinental-range target during the test that is necessary 

to demonstrate GMD’s capability against this range and also a new 

booster design before completing its mandated goal of fielding 44 

interceptors by the end of 2017. Any further delays in conducting the test, 

will reduce the time necessary to assess the flight test data, incorporate 

any “lessons learned” into the design— if necessary— and complete the 

requirement to field 44 interceptors by the end of calendar year 2017. For 

further details on the GMD program, see appendix VII.

5 GAO, Missile Defense: Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition 

Management, GAO-13-432 (Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2013). 

Continued use of 

targets without risk 

reduction flight tests 

increase risk of cost 

growth and schedule 

delays
Appendix IX: Terminal High Altitude Area

Defense (THAAD)

Page 105 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Figure 18: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Appendix IX 

THAAD is a rapidly-deployable ground-based system able to defend 

against short- and medium-range ballistic missile attacks during the 

middle and end stages of a missile’s flight. THAAD is organized as a 

battery that consists of interceptors, launchers, a radar, a fire control and 

communications system, and other support equipment. The first two 

batteries have been conditionally accepted by the Army for operational 

use. In December 2014, THAAD received urgent materiel release 

approval from the Commanding General of the United States Army 

Aviation and Missile Command to enable an earlier delivery of equipment 

for the next two batteries for operational use to meet the Army’s request 

to support urgent warfighter needs.1 The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 

plans to continue THAAD production through fiscal year 2025, for a total 

of 7 batteries, 428 interceptors, and 7 radars.

MDA has two THAAD acquisition efforts—THAAD 1.0 and THAAD 2.0. 

THAAD 1.0 is for the production of the batteries, interceptors, and 

supporting hardware and provides the warfighter with initial integrated 

defense against short- and medium-range threats in one region. THAAD 

2.0 is primarily software enhancements that expand THAAD’s ability to 

1

The materiel release process ensures that a weapon system is safe, suitable, and 

supportable prior to placing it in the hands of the warfighter. Generally, all weapon 

systems used by the Army must go through the materiel release process. An urgent 

materiel release provides a limited certification of a weapon system’s safety, suitability, 

and supportability and bypasses the standard materiel release process to meet pressing 

operational needs or demands. THAAD must complete a full materiel release process for 

this weapon system in the future. Army Regulation 700-142.

Appendix IX: Terminal High Altitude Area 

Defense (THAAD)

Program Overview:
Appendix IX: Terminal High Altitude Area 

Defense (THAAD)

Page 106 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

defend against threats in multiple regions and at different ranges, and 

adds debris mitigation and other upgrades.

THAAD currently has two hardware configurations—one for the first two 

batteries and another to address obsolescence issues for the remaining 

five batteries. However, the program plans to equip the first two batteries 

with the upgraded hardware by fiscal year 2018. Table 14 provides key 

fiscal year 2016 THAAD program facts.

Table 14: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Program Facts

Source: GAO analysis of Missile Defense Agency data│GAO-17-381

MDA demonstrated increased capability for THAAD in fiscal year 2016, 

however delays in its flight test schedule resulted in a key capability 

remaining unproven. In Flight Test Operational-02 Event 2a, THAAD 

successfully demonstrated its effectiveness against theater and regional 

threats in October 2015. For the first time, THAAD interceptors that 

represent the fielded configuration intercepted one complex short range 

and one medium range threat-representative target. In addition to testing 

against new threat characteristics and addressing outstanding conditions 

needed to support the Army’s full acceptance of the its equipment, 

THAAD demonstrated advanced software in its radar. However, recent 

obsolescence redesigns of hardware and software, which were fully 

integrated for the first time in this test, caused unintended problems.

Despite demonstrating increased developmental capability, a delay to a 

key flight test— FTT-18—results in the system’s capability against an 

intermediate-range threat remaining unproven. In 2013, MDA delivered 

THAAD assets to Guam, at the Army’s request, to defend against 

intermediate-range threats although this capability had not been 

demonstrated in a flight test. As we previously reported, MDA did expect 

to conduct a flight test against this threat in fiscal year 2015, however, 

Major Assets Delivered

Fiscal Year 2016 

THAAD delivered 21 of the planned 48 THAAD interceptors

Battery 6 equipment was delivered in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2016 as planned

Fiscal Year 2016 Flight Test Performance

Test Name Test Date Test Result

FTO-02 Event 2a October 2015 Success

THAAD successfully 

participated in a key 

Ballistic Missile 

Defense test, but did 

not complete its 

planned schedule
Appendix IX: Terminal High Altitude Area 

Defense (THAAD)

Page 107 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

due to testing prioritization, FTT-18 will not be attempted until at least the 

third quarter of fiscal year 2017. As such, THAAD program officials 

currently have limited data necessary to provide information on how the 

system will perform against an intermediate-range threat. However, 

program officials expect THAAD to perform successfully based on 

modeling and simulations and analysis from a previous flight test that 

used a medium-range target with a velocity close to that of an 

intermediate-range target.2 If THAAD does not perform as expected 

during FTT-18, the program may have to retrofit its currently deployed 

assets at an additional cost.

In fiscal year 2016, MDA delivered 21 of its planned 48 THAAD 

interceptors due to parts quality issues that resulted in production of the 

interceptor being temporarily halted. Specifically, during component 

testing, Lockheed Martin—THAAD’s contractor—discovered an issue with 

a connector in the interceptor, as it failed multiple testing iterations. Upon 

investigation, the contractor learned that one of its sub-vendors changed 

the manufacturing process on the connector without informing Lockheed 

Martin and, as a result, production was temporarily halted. According to 

THAAD program officials, there has been a renewed emphasis on parts 

quality supported by a policy memo to emphasize parts quality assurance 

and the verification of implementation of various requirements for doing 

so, including onsite verification assessments at subcontractor facilities.3

 2 A model is a representation of an actual system via computer simulations that can 

predict how the system might perform or survive under various conditions or in a range of 

hostile environments. A simulation is a method for implementing a model, such as 

experiments for the purpose of understanding the system’s behavior under selected 

conditions. Models and simulations are critical to understanding performance beyond what 

demonstrated in flight testing, as testing against realistic ballistic missile raids is 

impossible during flight test due to cost and safety constraints. 

3

Missile Defense Agency Policy Memo Number 86, “Parts, Materials, and Processes 

Requirements Verification,” (April 7, 2016). 

Parts quality issues 

resulted in the 

production of the 

interceptor being 

temporarily halted
Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 108 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Cristina Chaplain (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, LaTonya Miller, Assistant 

Director; Matthew Ambrose; Jeff Cherwonik; Jennifer Echard; Stephanie 

Gustafson; Helena Johnson; Joe Kirschbaum; Jason T. Lee; Katherine 

Lenane; Wiktor Niewiadomski; Karen Richey; Steven Stern; Brian Tittle; 

Hai V. Tran; Alyssa Weir; and Robin Wilson.

Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact:

Staff 

Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products

Page 109 GAO-17-381 Missile Defense

Report Number Report Date Report Title

GAO-16-339R Apr, 2016 Missile Defense: Ballistic Missile Defense System Testing Delays Affect Delivery 

of Capabilities

GAO-15-345 Mar. 2015 Missile Defense: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Acquisition Risk and Improve 

Reporting on System Capabilities 

GAO-14-351 Apr. 2014 Missile Defense: Mixed Progress in Achieving Acquisition Goals and Improving 

Accountability

GAO-13-432 Apr. 2013 Missile Defense: Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition 

Management

GAO-12-486 Apr. 2012 Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing 

Concurrency

GAO-11-372 Mar. 2011 Missile Defense: Actions Need to Improve Transparency and Accountability

GAO-10-311 Feb. 2010 Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides Opportunity to 

Strengthen Acquisition Approach

GAO-09-338 Mar. 2009 Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense Components 

Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned

GAO-08-448 Mar. 2008 Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but Program is 

Short of Meeting Goals

GAO-07-387 Mar. 2007 Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisitions Strategy Generates Results 

but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost

GAO-06-327 Mar. 2006 Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability but Falls 

Short of Original Goals

GAO-05-243 Mar. 2005 Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004

GAO-04-409 Apr. 2004 Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and Accountability

Related GAO Products

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