J-S35032-18, J-S35033-18 & J-S35034-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.A.L., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.L., NATURAL MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 225 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree January 10, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): A-8489

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.L., NATURAL 

MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 230 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree January 10, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): A-8490

IN THE INTEREST OF: G.K.L., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.L., NATURAL 

MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 231 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree January 10, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): A-8488
J-S35032-18, J-S35033-18 & J-S35034-18

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BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JULY 16, 2018

In these consolidated and related appeals, T.L. (Mother) appeals from 

the decrees that involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her two sons, 

J.D., born in June 2009, and M.L., born in October 2010, and her daughter, 

G.L., born in December 2013 (collectively, Children), pursuant to the Adoption 

Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b).1 For the reasons that follow, 

we affirm.2

The relevant factual and procedural history of this case is as follows. 

Mother is the biological mother of Children. On September 28, 2012, Mother 

contacted Luzerne County Children and Youth Services (the Agency), 

reporting “fears she was having of hurting the two boys based on their 

behavioral issues and her inability to deal with those behavioral issues.” N.T., 

7/31/17, at 56-57. Mother initially agreed to voluntarily place Children in the 

physical custody of the Agency. Upon the conclusion of the voluntary 

placement period, however, the Agency sought and received a shelter care 

____________________________________________

1 This Court listed Mother’s appeals challenging the termination of her parental 

rights to her three children consecutively for disposition. For ease of analysis, 

however, we address them in this one memorandum.

2 The orphans’ court also terminated the parental rights of J.D.’s father, M.L.’s 

father, and G.L.’s father. No father has filed an appeal, nor are they a party 

to the present appeal.
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order transferring physical and legal custody of Children to the Agency. Id.

at 57. 

On October 27, 2016, the Agency filed a petition to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights to Children and to change Children’s permanency goal from 

reunification to adoption. Between June 1, 2017 and October 31, 2017, the 

orphans’ court held several hearings on the petition.3 On January 10, 2018, 

the orphans’ court entered its decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights to 

Children. Mother timely filed notices of appeal on January 31, 2018, along 

with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal. 

On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review and 

determination:

1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING 

PARENTAL RIGHTS AND/OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS 

TESTIMONY OFFERED DID NOT ESTABLISH BY CLEAR AND 

CONVINCING EVIDENCE THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 

ADOPTION ACT OF 1980, October 15, P.L. 934, no. 163, 1, 23, 

Pa.C.S.A. Section 2511(a)(2)(5) and (8) IN THAT [MOTHER] 

HAS NOT CAUSED THE CHILD TO BE WITHOUT ESSENTIAL 

PARENTAL CARE, CONTROL, OR SUBSISTENCE NECESSARY 

BECAUSE SHE HAS ENGAGED IN COURT-ORDERED SERVICES 

____________________________________________

3 At the hearing, Children were represented by Paul Delaney, Esquire as both 

guardian ad litem and legal counsel. Prior to the commencement of the 

termination hearing, Attorney Delaney indicated on the record that he did not 

“perceive [any] conflict whatsoever with respect to any of the three minor 

children.” N.T., 6/1/17, at 25-26. As such, the orphans’ court in this case 

was not required to appoint legal counsel and a separate guardian ad litem for 

Children. See In re D.L.B., 166 A.3d 322, 329 (Pa. Super. 2017) (declining 

to remand for appointment of additional counsel for a child represented by a 

guardian ad litem, a practicing attorney, because the child’s best and legal 

interests were not in conflict). 
J-S35032-18, J-S35033-18 & J-S35034-18

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THAT HAVE REMEDIED THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT 

ORIGINALLY GAVE RISE TO THE CHILD’S PLACEMENT.

2. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING 

PARENTAL RIGHTS AND/OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 

GIVING PRIMARY CONSIDERATION PURSUANT TO 23 

Pa.C.S.A. SECTION 2511(b) TO THE DEVELOPMENTAL, 

PHYSICAL, AND EMOTIONAL NEEDS AND WELFARE OF THE 

CHILD BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY TESTIMONY 

THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT FOR 

THE COURT’S DECISION TAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 

MINOR CHILD WOULD BE SERVED BY TERMINATING 

[MOTHER’S] PARENTAL RIGHTS.

Mother’s Brief at 3-4 (suggested answers omitted).

We begin our analysis with this Court’s standard of review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 
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termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b). We need only agree with 

the court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section

2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we 

analyze the court’s decision to terminate under Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), 

which provides as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot 

or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * * 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 
J-S35032-18, J-S35033-18 & J-S35034-18

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environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving notice of the filing 

of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b). 

To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must produce clear and convincing evidence that the following three 

conditions are met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. In re Adoption of M.E.P., 

825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). The 

grounds for termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2), due to 

parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not limited to affirmative 

misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well 

as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 

(Pa. Super. 2002). 

Parents have an “affirmative duty” to work toward the return of their 

children. See In re Julissa O., 746 A.2d 1137, 1141 (Pa. Super. 2000) 

(citations omitted). “This ‘affirmative duty,’ at minimum, requires a showing 

by the parent of a willingness to cooperate . . . to obtain the rehabilitative 
J-S35032-18, J-S35033-18 & J-S35034-18

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services necessary for the performance of parental duties and 

responsibilities.” Id. (citation omitted). 

In granting the Agency’s petition for involuntary termination, the 

orphans’ court found that Mother has been unable to remedy the conditions 

that initially resulted in Children’s placement. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

3/2/18, at 18. In particular, the orphans’ court noted that credible testimony 

was presented at the termination hearing to establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that Mother continues to struggle with her alcohol addiction, mental 

health, and her parenting of Children. Id. at 6. The orphans’ court held that 

Mother was “unable to provide the proper and essential care for her children 

that is necessary for their well-being,” and concluded that involuntarily 

terminating Mother’s parental rights was in Children’s best interests. Id. 

Mother argues that she has complied with the objectives put in place by 

the Agency. Mother’s Brief at 32-33. Moreover, Mother asserts that the trial 

court erred when it “did not seem to give weight to the success that [Mother] 

has had, nor did it give consideration to the fact that [it] was [Mother’s] idea 

to voluntary[ily] place her children with the Agency because she needed help.” 

Id. at 35. 

Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s decision. 

Following Children’s adjudication, Mother was directed to complete the 

following objectives before Children would be returned to her care: undergo 

drug and alcohol treatment and comply with all recommendations, address 
J-S35032-18, J-S35033-18 & J-S35034-18

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mental health concerns, and improve parenting skills. N.T., 7/31/17, at 57. 

These problems rendered Mother incapable of parenting Children at the time 

of their placement.

Although Mother attended several drug treatment programs, she has 

failed to achieve sobriety. Ryan Hogan, Mother’s clinical supervisor at 

Wyoming Valley Alcohol and Drug Services, testified regarding Mother’s 

participation in substance abuse treatment. In particular, Mr. Hogan testified 

that Mother initially engaged in substance abuse treatment in January 2013. 

N.T., 6/1/17, at 29. After relapsing in July 2014, Mother was referred to a 

higher level of care, which included partial hospitalization. Id. at 31. Mother 

successfully completed her substance abuse treatment in October 2014. Id.

at 33. 

Mother reported a relapse in her recovery in December 2014 and 

reengaged in substance abuse treatment. Id. at 33. Mother complied with 

all of the treatment recommendations and was successfully discharged from 

treatment in April 2015. Id. at 34. However, Mother relapsed again in 

September 2015. Id. Mother re-entered treatment, but was unsuccessfully 

discharged in January 2016 due to poor attendance and poor compliance with 

the treatment recommendation. Id. at 34-35. Mr. Hogan reported that 

Mother underwent another substance abuse evaluation in March 2016, but 

failed to enroll in treatment or comply with the facility recommendations. Id.

at 36. 
J-S35032-18, J-S35033-18 & J-S35034-18

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Mother was re-evaluated for treatment for a fifth time in October 2016. 

Id. at 37. Mr. Hogan testified that Mother completed the initial treatment 

program, but failed to comply with the relapse prevention. Id. Accordingly, 

Mother was discharged from counseling in January 2017. Id. at 38-39. 

Finally, Mr. Hogan reported that the day before the termination hearing, 

Mother was again re-evaluated for substance abuse treatment. Id. at 39. He 

testified that Mother has been recommended for partial hospitalization 

treatment based on her reported alcohol use. Id.

Paul Dorang, Mother’s case manager through Intensive Family 

Reunification Services, testified that Mother attended visits with Children 

under the influence of alcohol. N.T., 6/1/17, at 65. Because of Mother’s 

continued substance abuse, Mother’s in-home visits with Children were 

suspended and visits were relocated to the Agency for supervision. Id. Mr. 

Dorang stated that Mother was under the influence of alcohol during “at least 

six” of the twenty-two sessions he supervised. Id. at 66. 

Mother also failed to address the Agency’s concerns regarding her 

mental health. Alicia Singer, the senior clinician with Community Counseling 

Services testified that since October 2012, Mother has participated in 

individual therapy and medication management. N.T., 6/1/17, at 84. 

Altogether, Mother had 106 scheduled appointments with Community 

Counseling Services – 43 therapy appointments and 63 medication 

management appointments. Id. Of the 43 therapy appointments, Ms. Singer 
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testified that Mother attended only 22 appointments, failed to appear for 12 

appointments, and cancelled 8 appointments.4 Id. Ms. Singer also reported 

that of the 63 medication management appointments, Mother only attended 

29 appointments, failed to appear for 25 appointments, and cancelled 9 

appointments. Id. Ms. Singer testified that Mother’s case was closed due to 

noncompliance in February 2016. Id. Mother re-engaged in mental health 

treatment in September 2016, but her case was closed that same month after 

Mother failed to attend three consecutive appointments. Id. at 85.

Finally, caseworker Cathy Sheridan testified that although Mother 

completed parenting classes, she failed to “utilize[e] the skills she was 

learning when she actually was with her children.” N.T., 6/1/17, at 120. 

Mother failed to demonstrate that she possessed the parenting skills 

necessary for the Agency to transition from supervised visits to unsupervised 

or overnight visits. N.T., 7/31/17, at 63.

Based on the foregoing, the record confirms the orphans’ court’s 

determination that Mother is incapable of parenting Children, and that she 

cannot, or will not, remedy her parental incapacity. In the five years prior to 

the termination hearing, Mother failed to comply with her mental health 

treatment and maintain sobriety for any appreciable amount of time. Mother’s 

failure to address these concerns, and the danger they pose to Children, is 

____________________________________________

4 One appointment was cancelled by the therapist.
J-S35032-18, J-S35033-18 & J-S35034-18

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compelling. As this Court has stated, “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance 

while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting 

responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s 

need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claim of progress and hope 

for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 

2006). We therefore find no error or abuse of discretion in the orphans’ court’s 

decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Children pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).

We next consider whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b).

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, 

Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and 

the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, 

however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, 

between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of 

our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child 

is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, 

it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated 

that the trial court should consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships and whether any existing 

parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.
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In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

The orphans’ court concluded that it was in Children’s best interests to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights and allow Foster Parents to adopt them. 

Specifically, the orphans’ court stated:

This court finds that the Mother cannot offer to her children the 

basic physical, developmental and emotional needs that her 

children require and should have throughout their future life. 

Mother has been given ample time to address and remedy her 

problems, but has failed to successfully do so. The [c]ourt finds 

that she is not able to meet her children’s needs. In stark 

contrast, the foster parents have amply demonstrated they meet 

the physical, developmental and emotional needs of the minor 

children, G.L., M.L., and J.D., and they have thrived under their 

care. The children need consistency and deserve a permanent 

home with loving capable parents.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/2/18, at 29.

Although Mother has expressed her desire to raise Children, she has not 

been able to meet the essential needs of Children. Notably, Mother has not

maintained sobriety, nor demonstrated an ability to utilize proper parenting 

skills. Likewise, Mother has failed to comply with her mental health treatment 

throughout Children’s entire dependency. 

Additionally, Sara Caster, Mother’s case manager at Family Care, 

testified that J.D. and M.L. have resided with Foster Parents since September 

2012, and G.L. began residing with Foster Parents in December 2013, shortly 

after she was born. N.T., 10/3/17, at 22-23. Ms. Caster explained that 
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Children have adjusted well to living with their foster parents. Foster Parents 

provide Children with a home, meet their needs, maintain much-needed 

stability, and provide a parent-child relationship. Id. at 26-27. Children have 

bonded with Foster Parents, sometimes referring to them as “mom” and “dad.” 

Id. at 27. Ms. Caster further testified that Children separate easily from 

Mother at the conclusion of visits and that terminating Mother’s parental rights 

would not cause Children any irreparable harm. Id. at 30-31. 

Although Mother’s love for Children is not in question, along with her 

desire for the opportunity to parent Children, a parent’s own feelings of love 

and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. 

See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). A child’s life “simply 

cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to 

handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d at 732. 

Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his 

child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the 

child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in 

a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 856. 

In sum, because the orphans’ court’s findings are supported by the record and 

free of legal error, we affirm the orphans’ court’s termination of Mother’s 

parental rights. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.

Decrees affirmed.
J-S35032-18, J-S35033-18 & J-S35034-18

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 07/16/2018