NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

CARMEN JESSICA VASQUEZ, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

ANTONIO L. VASQUEZ, JR., Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0654 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2017-094025

 FC2018-095321

The Honorable Marvin L. Davis, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

Saldivar & Associates, PLLC, Phoenix

By Maria David

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Byrl R. Lane, PC, Phoenix

By Byrl Raymond Lane

Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

Alexander R. Arpad Attorney at Law, Phoenix

By Alexander R. Arpad

Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

FILED 9-6-2022
VASQUEZ v. VASQUEZ

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Carmen Jessica Vasquez (“Mother”) challenges portions of 

the decree of dissolution between her and Antonio L. Vasquez, Jr. 

(“Father”). For the following reasons, we affirm in part and vacate and 

remand in part.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The parties were married in 1992. Mother worked 

sporadically throughout the marriage and was the primary caregiver for 

the children, while Father was the main financial support for the family. 

Because of Mother’s poor credit history, in 2004 Father purchased the 

family residence in his name only and Mother signed a disclaimer deed 

waiving any interest in the property.

¶3 In June 2017, Mother filed a petition for dissolution of 

marriage. Of the five children born during their marriage, two were still 

minors at the time the dissolution proceedings began.

¶4 A few months after filing the dissolution petition, Mother 

filed a motion for temporary orders, requesting in relevant part, court 

orders regarding the marital home, parenting time, and child support. 

Mother alleged Father suffered from alcohol abuse and was behaving 

irrationally, including texting his children he was suicidal. She requested 

he be awarded supervised visitation. She additionally requested she be 

awarded exclusive use of the marital home while Father continued to be 

responsible for the mortgage payments.

¶5 The parties subsequently reached an agreement pursuant to 

Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“ARFLP”) 69 (“the 2017 temporary 

orders”), whereby they would exercise equal legal decision-making

authority over the two minor children and Father would have parenting 

time for several hours on Tuesday and Wednesday, as well as every other 

weekend. Father was not permitted to consume alcohol during his

parenting time, and he was required to take medication and participate in 
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Decision of the Court

3

counseling as recommended by his physician. Father was also ordered to 

pay $900 in monthly child support. The parties were to equally split the 

costs of unreimbursed medical expenses. Mother was given exclusive use 

of the marital home and Father was responsible for mortgage payments.

¶6 In August 2018, Mother filed an expedited motion for 

temporary orders. As relevant here, Mother requested orders regarding

parenting time, legal decision making, child support, spousal maintenance, 

the marital home, and attorneys’ fees. Mother again alleged Father abused 

alcohol and threatened suicide to the parties’ children. She also contended 

Father neglected to make mortgage payments on the marital home for 

nearly a year, and it was scheduled for a foreclosure auction unless a 

balance of about $9,000 was paid in full.

¶7 In September 2018, the court issued its temporary orders (“the 

2018 temporary orders”), awarding Mother sole legal decision-making

authority. Father was not allowed parenting time or communication with 

the two minor children until he completed mental health treatment. Father 

was ordered to pay $695 in monthly child support and $1,000 in monthly 

spousal maintenance, and an income withholding order was issued. The 

superior court granted Mother a $3,000 interim award of attorneys’ fees, 

which would begin accruing interest if not paid in full by December 2018. 

Finally, the court ordered Father to pay the balance of the mortgage

arrearage or sign a quitclaim deed to Mother in two weeks’ time, or a civil 

arrest warrant would be issued. All other prior temporary orders from the 

2017 agreement remained in effect.

¶8 Although Father initially failed to pay the mortgage balance, 

and a civil warrant was issued for his arrest, he eventually paid the amount 

due and the court quashed the warrant. Father did not pay the attorneys’ 

fee award to Mother.

¶9 In September 2021, a trial was held. By this time, only one of 

the parties’ children was a minor. Mother sought sole legal decisionmaking authority and parenting time, as well as $1,200 in monthly child

support and $1,500 in monthly spousal maintenance. Mother argued the 

marital residence should be treated by the court as community property 

and that she was entitled to a 50% interest. Father argued he was entitled 

to equal legal decision-making authority, equal parenting time, a child 

support order consistent with the Arizona Child Support Guidelines, 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 25-320 app. (2018) 
VASQUEZ v. VASQUEZ

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(“Guidelines”),1 and that neither party was entitled to spousal support. 

Finally, he argued the marital home was his separate property, although he 

recognized Mother was entitled to an equitable lien.

¶10 After trial, the court entered a final decree awarding joint 

legal decision-making authority to the parties over the parties’ remaining 

minor child. Father was awarded supervised parenting time and ordered 

to pay monthly child support of $962 pursuant to the Guidelines. The 

superior court additionally found Mother was entitled to spousal 

maintenance and awarded her $1,000 per month for five years. The 

superior court noted Mother signed a disclaimer deed to the marital home 

and awarded it to Father as his sole and separate property. The superior 

court found Mother had “waived any rights/interest in the [marital home] 

and failed to meet her burden in establishing any community interest claim 

by not providing the required information to perform the proper analysis.”

¶11 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to

A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Community Lien

¶12 Mother argues the court erred when it awarded the house to 

Father as his separate property and declined to award her a community 

lien. We review de novo the legal question of whether property should be 

classified as community or separate. Bell-Kilbourn v. Bell-Kilbourn, 216 Ariz. 

521, 523, ¶ 4 (App. 2007). The existence and value of an equitable lien 

presents mixed questions of fact and law. Valento v. Valento, 225 Ariz. 477, 

481, ¶ 11 (App. 2010). This court defers to the superior court’s factual 

findings unless clearly erroneous or unsupported by any credible evidence 

but draws its own legal conclusions from those facts. Id.

¶13 Property acquired during marriage is presumed to be 

community property, and the spouse seeking to rebut that presumption 

must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the property is separate.

A.R.S. § 25-211(A); Brebaugh v. Deane, 211 Ariz. 95, 97-98, ¶ 6 (App. 2005). 

A signed disclaimer deed provides this proof and, absent fraud or mistake, 

1 The 2018 version of the Arizona Child Support Guidelines was in 

effect at the time the superior court entered the final decree. Accordingly, 

we apply that version to our analysis. See Pearson v. Pearson, 190 Ariz. 231, 

233 n.1 (App. 1997).
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rebuts the community presumption. Bell-Kilbourn, 216 Ariz. at 524, ¶¶ 10-

11. Here, Mother signed a disclaimer deed, and she does not challenge its 

validity. Accordingly, the evidence supports a finding that the marital 

home is Father’s separate property.

¶14 “A separate property residence remains separate property 

even if the community contributes funds and uses the residence as a family 

home.” Femiano v. Maust, 248 Ariz. 613, 617, ¶ 17 (App. 2020). However, as 

Mother recognizes, “capital contributions made with community funds 

create a community interest in the separate asset that may be vindicated 

through an equitable lien.” Id. Here, the undisputed evidence shows that 

the property was used as the family home and community funds were used 

to pay the mortgage and make improvements on the property. Aside from

Father’s argument that Mother waived her claim to a lien, he concedes that 

she would otherwise have been entitled to a community lien on the 

property. There is no evidence that Father had any earnings which could 

be characterized as separate property. Since there is a presumption that 

property earned during the marriage is community property, which Father

has not rebutted, his income used to pay the mortgage are community 

contributions. See Brebaugh, 211 Ariz. at 97-98, ¶ 6. Thus, the community is 

entitled to an equitable lien.

¶15 Father argues that Mother has waived any interest in the 

home by failing to raise this argument at trial. But in her 2019 Resolution 

Management Conference statement, Mother raised the issue of a 

community lien. And, at trial, Mother testified that the home was an asset 

to be divided. Father knew the calculation of the equitable lien was at issue,

and in his pretrial statement he calculated the value of Mother’s community 

lien at $35,371. We therefore decline to find waiver. See Nold v. Nold, 232 

Ariz. 270, 273-74, ¶¶ 10, 20 (App. 2013) (waiver is a discretionary doctrine, 

not an “unalterable rule,” and the superior court has an “obligation to 

equitably divide” community property).

¶16 Accordingly, we remand to the superior court to conduct 

further proceedings to determine the value of the community lien and to 

make any other equitable adjustments to the decree if needed.

II. Child Support

¶17 Mother argues the superior court erred in its determination of 

the child support award. We generally review child support awards for an 

abuse of discretion. Kelsey v. Kelsey, 186 Ariz. 49, 53 (App. 1996). An abuse 

of discretion occurs when the superior court commits an error of law, or 
VASQUEZ v. VASQUEZ

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when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the 

court’s conclusions, is devoid of competent evidence. Hurd v. Hurd, 223 

Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 19 (App. 2009). We review de novo the superior court’s 

interpretation of the Guidelines. Clay v. Clay, 208 Ariz. 200, 202, ¶ 5 (App. 

2004).

¶18 The court ordered Father to pay $962 in monthly child 

support pursuant to the Guidelines. Mother argues the court erred in 

failing to award an upward deviation of child support in the amount of 

$1,200. In order to grant an upward deviation, the superior court must find 

that “[a]pplication of the guidelines is inappropriate or unjust in the 

particular case,” and it is in the best interests of the children. A.R.S. § 25-

320 app. § 20(A). Mother concedes that her failure to request specific 

findings of fact pursuant to ARFLP 82 “waived the argument on appeal that 

the superior court was obligated to explain why a deviation was not 

warranted.” Nia v. Nia, 242 Ariz. 419, 425, ¶ 26 (App. 2017). When, as here, 

neither party requested findings of fact or conclusions of law, we presume 

that the court “found every fact necessary to support the judgment.” Neal 

v. Neal, 116 Ariz. 590, 592 (1977).

¶19 Mother contends an upward deviation is appropriate because

she is currently unable to work, and her only form of income is child 

support and spousal maintenance. “In determining child support, the 

superior court must consider the reasonable needs of the children in light 

of the parents’ resources.” Nash v. Nash, 232 Ariz. 473, 479, ¶ 23 (App. 2013). 

Mother has failed to demonstrate that the child’s needs are not currently 

met with the child support award as prescribed by the Guidelines. As 

Mother recognizes, the parties “did not have an extravagant standard of 

living during the marriage,” and there is no evidence Father has significant 

financial resources such that application of the Guidelines would be 

“inappropriate or unjust.” A.R.S. § 25-320 app. § 20(A)(1). Mother is 

essentially asking this court to reweigh the evidence, but we must give due 

regard to the superior court’s ruling, and we do not reweigh evidence on 

appeal. See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52, ¶ 16. The court did not abuse its discretion 

in declining to award an upward deviation of Father’s child support 

obligation.

¶20 Mother also argues the court erred in calculating Father’s 

income. The court attributed to Father an income of $66,144. Mother argues 

Father’s overtime and bonuses should be considered part of his income, and 

he should be attributed no less than the salary he earned during 2020: 

$87,940 (a significant portion of which was from overtime work). Father 

testified that he was starting a new job with a smaller company, and so he 
VASQUEZ v. VASQUEZ

Decision of the Court

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could no longer work overtime like he did in prior years. Mother claims 

Father is trying to evade his support obligations by starting a job with lower 

income, but his base salary is essentially the same—$30.50 per hour as 

opposed to $31.80 per hour. Even if Father could still work overtime in his 

new job, a contested issue left to the determination of the superior court, 

that court is not obligated to include overtime pay as part of a father’s 

income for child support calculation purposes; the Guidelines provide that 

the court may consider overtime pay if it is historically earned, but it is not 

mandated to do so. A.R.S. § 25-320 app. § 5(A) (“Generally, the court 

should not attribute income greater than what would have been earned 

from full-time employment. Each parent should have the choice of working 

additional hours through overtime or at a second job without increasing the 

child support award.”). We find no error.

¶21 Finally, Mother contends the court erred in failing to credit 

her for $280 in monthly educational expenses when calculating the child 

support obligation. Mother briefly testified that she had to pay $30 per 

month for a laptop and another $250 per month for internet for their son’s 

speech therapy. However, Mother did not expressly request the court 

credit her this amount in special educational expenses, nor did she include 

this amount on her proposed child support worksheets. Under the 

Guidelines, the court is under no obligation to credit extra educational 

expenses. A.R.S. § 25-320 app. § 9(B)(2) (the court “[m]ay add to the Basic 

Child Support Obligation amounts for” education expenses) (emphasis 

added). Further, Mother provided no evidence to substantiate the existence 

of these expenses. See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52, ¶ 16 (credibility determinations 

are within the province of the superior court). The superior court did not 

err in failing to credit Mother for these educational expenses.

III. Spousal Maintenance

¶22 Mother argues the superior court erred in the amount and 

duration of the spousal maintenance award. We review the superior court’s 

award of spousal maintenance for an abuse of discretion and will affirm if 

there is any reasonable evidence to support it. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 

Ariz. 343, 348, ¶ 14 (App. 1998).

¶23 Once the superior court determines a spouse meets the 

statutory requirements for maintenance in A.R.S. § 25-319(A), the court 

must then consider the factors in A.R.S. § 25-319(B) to determine a 

maintenance award that is “in an amount and for a period of time as the 

court deems just.” A.R.S. § 25-319(B).
VASQUEZ v. VASQUEZ

Decision of the Court

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¶24 The superior court awarded Mother $1,000 in monthly 

spousal support for a period of five years. Mother contends the court erred 

in failing to award her the requested $1,500 per month. In the decree, the 

superior court expressly considered and weighed all the factors in A.R.S. 

§ 25-319(B). Mother contends the court did not give enough weight to her 

financial needs, Father’s earning capabilities, Mother’s contributions to 

Father’s career, and the duration of the marriage. Mother is asking us to 

reweigh the factors and evidence, but again, we do not reweigh evidence 

on appeal. See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52, ¶ 16.

¶25 Mother also argues the court erred in failing to award her 

spousal maintenance for an indefinite period. Mother contends she is 

unable to be self-sufficient through employment because her current health 

condition prevents her from working. The superior court did note that 

Mother was currently unable to work because of her physical condition. 

However, Mother did not argue that she is permanently disabled, and she 

did not provide evidence that she would be unable to work in the future. 

The superior court awarded Mother five years of spousal support to allow 

her time “to secure additional employment and arrange for any training 

[she] need[s] to secure appropriate employment.” The award is modifiable 

and keeps open the possibility for Mother to seek modification of the award 

should her medical conditions persist. The evidence supports the court’s 

judgment. We find no error. The superior court did not abuse its discretion 

in determining the amount and duration of the spousal support award.

IV. Temporary Orders

¶26 Mother argues the superior court erred by failing to include

in the final judgment an interim attorneys’ fee award, support arrears, and 

reimbursement for various expenses in order to satisfy the 2017 and 2018 

temporary orders. “Temporary orders signed by the court and filed by the 

clerk are enforceable as final orders but terminate and are unenforceable 

upon dismissal of the action, or following entry of a final decree, judgment, 

or order, unless that final decree, judgment, or order provides otherwise.”

Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 47(j)(1); see also A.R.S. § 25-315(F)(4).

A. $3,000 Attorneys’ Fee Award

¶27 First, Mother argues the court erred by failing to include in 

the final decree the $3,000 attorneys’ fees plus interest awarded to Mother 

in the 2018 temporary orders. Father concedes he has not yet complied with 

this order and intended to pay the attorneys’ fee award with proceeds from 

community property in Mother’s possession.
VASQUEZ v. VASQUEZ

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¶28 The attorneys’ fee award within the temporary orders was

never incorporated into the final judgment. Without incorporation into the 

final judgment, upon entry of the decree, those orders would terminate and 

become unenforceable. A.R.S. § 25-315(F)(4) (“A temporary order or 

preliminary injunction . . . [t]erminates when the final decree is entered or 

when the petition for dissolution, legal separation or annulment is 

dismissed.”). Father argues the attorneys’ fee award, while admittedly 

made in the context of a temporary order, was a “discrete award embodied 

in a signed judgment rather than a temporary order.” However, there is no 

language in the 2018 temporary orders or the final decree that indicate any 

of the rulings within the 2018 temporary order would not terminate upon 

entry of the final decree. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 47(j)(1).

¶29 Mother timely raised Father’s noncompliance with the 

attorneys’ fee award at trial, and the court failed to address the issue in the 

decree. Father does not dispute that he has failed to pay Mother the

attorneys’ fee award plus interest. We therefore remand for the court to 

amend the decree to account for the $3,000 attorneys’ fee award plus 

interest owed to Mother.

B. Support Arrears

¶30 Mother also argues the court failed to enter final orders 

regarding support arrearages from Father’s failure to pay support under 

the 2017 and 2018 temporary orders.

¶31 However, in her pretrial statement, Mother argued that 

Father only owed arrearages between May 2017 and October 2017 in the 

amount of $3,762.39. But Mother did not file her petition for dissolution 

until June 2017, and child support and spousal maintenance were not 

ordered until October 2017. Father was not ordered to pay support between 

May and October 2017, and so he cannot owe any arrearages during this 

time frame.

¶32 Insofar as Mother alleges Father has failed to pay spousal or 

child support since October 2017, Mother failed to properly raise this issue 

before the court. Mother claims she testified at trial that Father has 

complied with “none” of the 2017 temporary orders. But aside from this 

very vague testimony, Mother did not clearly raise the issue of support 

arrearages, and regardless, she has provided no evidence or calculation of 

arrears allegedly owed by Father. Following both the 2017 and 2018 

temporary orders, income withholding orders were issued, and it appears 

support has been automatically withheld from Father’s paychecks. In the 
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four years between the court’s temporary orders for support and the final 

decree, Mother never filed a notice or motion arguing Father was not 

paying his support obligations. See Orfaly v. Tucson Symphony Soc’y, 209 

Ariz. 260, 265, ¶ 15 (App. 2004) (arguments raised for the first time on 

appeal generally deemed waived); Sholes v. Fernando, 228 Ariz. 455, 460, 

¶ 14 n.3 (App. 2011) (arguments that are unsupported by citation to the 

record are deemed waived). We find no error.

C. Reimbursement for Medical and Educational Expenses

¶33 Finally, Mother argues she is entitled to reimbursement for

medical and educational expenses pursuant to the 2017 and 2018 temporary 

orders. However, Mother fails to point to any language in these court 

orders that expressly required the parties to equally pay for educational 

expenses. The superior court did not err in failing to require 

reimbursement for these education expenses.

¶34 Mother additionally argues the court failed to enter final 

orders regarding reimbursement for a $50 medical expense. The 2017 and 

2018 orders did require Father to pay half of uncovered medical expenses. 

However, the only evidence Mother provides of uncovered medical 

expenses is a billing summary sheet that indicates she made a $50 payment 

for one of the children’s dentist appointments in July 2017. The temporary 

orders were not in effect until September 2017, and so the parties were not 

yet ordered to equally pay for medical expenses when Mother made this 

$50 payment. The superior court did not err in denying Mother’s request 

for reimbursement.

CONCLUSION

¶35 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate in part and remand for 

further proceedings for the superior court to determine the value of the 

community lien. We also remand for the court to include in the final decree 

the $3,000 interim attorneys’ fee award plus interest. We affirm the final 

decree in all other respects.

¶36 Both parties request their attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal. 

We have considered the relative financial resources of the parties and the 

reasonableness of the positions asserted on appeal. In re Marriage of 

Williams, 219 Ariz. 546, 550, ¶ 15 (App. 2008). In the exercise of our 

discretion, we grant Mother a partial award of attorneys’ fees in addition to 
VASQUEZ v. VASQUEZ

Decision of the Court

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her costs on appeal, upon compliance with ARCAP 21.