J-A01019-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TERRENCE R. YOAST

Appellant No. 3877 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence imposed September 27, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No: CP-46-CR-0002236-2017; CP-46-CR-0002233-

2017; CP-46-CR-0002231-2017

BEFORE: OTT, STABILE, AND MCLAUGHLIN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MAY 29, 2019

Appellant, Terrence R. Yoast, appeals pro se from the judgment of 

sentence the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County imposed on 

September 27, 2017. On appeal, Appellant argues the evidence was 

insufficient to support his convictions. We disagree. Accordingly, we affirm 

the judgment of sentence.

The trial court, sitting as the fact-finder, summarized the facts and 

procedural history as follows:

Officer Fischer testified that on December 15, 2016 he received a 

harassment call for 402 Beech Street in Pottstown, Montgomery 

County. Ms. Aphrodite Hussain had called police for harassment, 

advised police of the interactions she had with [Appellant], and 

showed police text messages between herself and [Appellant]. 

Officer Fischer then called [Appellant] to find out his side of the 

story. He advised [Appellant] that Ms. Hussain was offended, 

and that it would be best if [Appellant] communicated through 

Ms. Hussain’s attorney rather than direct contact for any civil 
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issues they had pending. Officer Fischer advised [Appellant] that 

he should stop contacting Ms. Hussain, but [Appellant] said this 

was not a police issue and he would not stop contacting her as 

she was his tenant. Officer Fischer advised [Appellant] to 

resolve their civil issues with the district justice and that the 

harassment was a police issue [that] needed to cease. An hour 

later, police were contacted again, and Ms. Hussain advised that 

[Appellant] had continued with his harassing text messages. 

Police issued a citation[,] which was mailed to [Appellant], but 

later withdrawn due to other pending cases.

From December 11-15, 2016, there were over 40 pages of text 

messages between [Appellant] and Ms. Hussain. Some of the 

text messages sent by [Appellant] said “Feel free to supplement 

your body with additional layers of clothing and realize you are 

not in the Bermuda Triangle where you can walk around in a 

bikini and still feel warm.” [Appellant] also, in response to Ms. 

Hussain’s text that her daughter had wet the bed and she 

needed access to a washer to wash the sheets urgently, texted 

“You peed the bed?” and after being told that was not the 

case[,] [Appellant] replied “you propped (sic?) it and then 

blamed it on [your daughter]. That is so weak.”

Officer Schmalbach was called to 402 Beech Street on December 

23, 2016 by Ms. Hussain complaining of harassing text messages 

from [Appellant]. Officer Schmalbach contacted Officer Fischer 

to determine that this was not an isolated incident, but an 

ongoing course of conduct. After speaking to Officer Fischer, 

Officer Schmalbach issued a summons for harassment. Some of 

the text messages at issue included [Appellant] telling Ms. 

Hussain that “You don’t want to scald [your daughter] with hot 

water anyway. I think you are being very improvident as a 

mother.”

Then on February 26, 2017, Corporal O’Neill arrived for another 

complaint at 402 Beech Street. Ms. Hussain told police that 

[Appellant] had been at the property for an excessive amount of 

time and she did not feel comfortable with him being on the 

property. Ms. Hussain was upset and said [Appellant] had called 

her a “bitch” and other words. [Appellant] claimed to be 

installing a washer, so police told him to leave after installing it 

and believed that the situation was resolved.
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However, police received another harassment complaint, and 

Officer Portock was called to the 402 Beech Street property on 

March 2, 2017. Police were notified by multiple callers that a 

person was kicking a vehicle and taking photographs. He 

encountered [Appellant] in his car driving away from the 

address, and [Appellant] said he had been taking photographs. 

Ms. Hallinger lived across the street from Ms. Hussain and on 

March 2, 2017 heard yelling outside. She looked out the window 

and saw [Appellant] walking down the street with the phone in 

his hand, and then return and kick Ms. Hussain’s car. Ms. 

Hussain went onto her porch and there were words exchanged 

between [Appellant] and Ms. Hussain or yelling in general.

Finally, Ms. Hussain testified about [Appellant] threatening her 

and how [Appellant] told her the prior tenant had lost his Section 

8 housing and that if Ms. Hussain kept “F’ing with him, [she 

would] be next. He seen plenty of losers like me get kicked off 

the program for running their mouth.” Ms. Hussain testified that 

on December 15, 2016 she returned home and things were not 

in their place at her home, and she felt [Appellant] had been in 

her property without her consent. On December 23, 2016, she 

called police again, after the text messages regarding the 

Bermuda triangle, her daughter wetting the bed, and being an 

improvident mother. Ms. Hussain also testified that on February 

26, 2016, [Appellant] came to the apartment without notice 

around 2 or 3 P.M. and then Ms. Hussain called police around 

7:30 P.M. She testified that [Appellant] wandered around the 

yard for 5 hours with a rake for a very small area of land. Ms. 

Hussain asked when [Appellant] was going to leave the property 

and [Appellant] said “F you. He would say the B word. You are 

a low life. Go back to your F’ing country. Shut the F up.” Ms. 

Hussain was afraid because [Appellant] had a key to her 

apartment as the landlord and “he has mentioned that people 

from the neighborhood are going to – may possibly be 

threatening me some time soon.” Finally, on March 2, 2017, the 

police were called by Ms. Hussain who saw [Appellant] recording 

himself and he was kicking and yelling, going through trash

cans, and kicking the trash cans and Ms. Hussain’s car.

[Appellant] testified in his own defense. Unsurprisingly, his 

testimony was contradictory to the Commonwealth’s evidence. 

[Appellant] denies that he kicked the car or had a verbal 

confrontation with Ms. Hussain on March 2, 2017. Following the 

[b]ench trial, [the trial c]ourt found [A]ppellant Not Guilty on 
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Docket 2236-2017, guilty of summary harassment on Docket 

2233-2017, and guilty of summary harassment on Docket 2231-

2017. [The trial c]ourt sentenced [Appellant] to time served to 

60 days on each docket running concurrent. [Appellant] filed a 

pro se post-sentence motion while still represented by counsel. 

[The trial c]ourt conducted a Grazier hearing, and on the 

request of [Appellant], allowed him to proceed pro se.

[1]

 

[Appellant] then filed a timely post-sentence motion[,] which 

[the trial c]ourt denied. Subsequently, [Appellant] filed a timely 

Notice of Appeal.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/17/18, at 1-4 (citations to the record omitted). 

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his two 

convictions of summary harassment under Section 2709(a)(3) of the Crimes 

Code, which reads: “A person commits the crime of harassment when, with 

intent to harass, annoy or alarm another, the person . . . engages in a 

course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which serve no legitimate 

purpose[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(3).

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine 

whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as 

verdict winner, were sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 119, 126 (Pa. 

2013). “[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth 

____________________________________________

1

In an order entered December 1, 2017, the trial court noted that 

“[f]ollowing a Grazier hearing on October 23, 2017, [Appellant] was found 

to have knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel 

on appeal.” Trial Court Order to Clarify the Record, 12/1/17, at 1.
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need not preclude every possibility of innocence.” Commonwealth v. 

Colon-Plaza, 136 A.3d 521, 525–26 (Pa. Super. 2016). It is within the 

province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded to each 

witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 792–93 (Pa. Super. 2015). The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the 

crime by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. 

Crosley, 180 A.3d 761, 767 (Pa. Super. 2018). As an appellate court, we 

may not reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the 

fact-finder. Commonwealth v. Rogal, 120 A.3d 994, 1001 (Pa. Super. 

2015).

Appellant’s brief spans more than 70 pages, rambling essentially 

about every single piece of evidence the Commonwealth put on the record 

against him. The statement of questions involved on appeal, which includes 

seven issues for our review, spans more than six pages. The only way to 

make sense of so much verbosity is to rely on Appellant’s own summary of 

the argument.

2

 Appellant’s main argument is that electronic 

____________________________________________

2

Indeed, as also recognized by Appellant, “this complexity of nonsense 

consisting of 247-page Bench Trial Transcript and 475-page Reproduced 

Record, can be reduced to a fundamentally simple summary of argument,” 

Appellant’s Brief at 29, i.e., electronic communications (texts) do not qualify 

as an act under Section 103 of Crimes Code. 

It does not help that the Commonwealth failed to file its brief, despite being 

granted twice an extension to do so. Pursuant to our second order, the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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communications (texts) do not constitute an “act” as defined in Section 103 

of the Crimes Code,

3 or otherwise qualify as “course of conduct.”4

 For the 

reasons stated below, we conclude the issue is waived.

Appellant raised eleven issues before the trial court. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 1/17/18, at 5-7. In his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant 

challenged the trial court’s findings as to the relevancy or the 

characterization of the “improvident” statement (first five issues), the 

“horrible mother” statement (sixth issue), and the kicking of victim’s car 

bumper (last five issues). Yet, there is no mention anywhere of the issue 

Appellant raises in his brief to this Court–-as noted, before this Court

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Commonwealth’s brief had to be filed on or before October 4, 2018. As of 

the date of this writing, there is no brief or explanation why a brief has not 

been filed as ordered. 

3 “‘Act’. A bodily movement whether voluntary or involuntary.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 103.

 

4 Section 2709(f) defines “course of conduct” as follows:

“Course of conduct.” A pattern of actions composed of more than 

one act over a period of time, however short, evidencing a 

continuity of conduct. The term includes lewd, lascivious, 

threatening or obscene words, language, drawings, caricatures 

or actions, either in person or anonymously. Acts indicating a 

course of conduct which occur in more than one jurisdiction may 

be used by any other jurisdiction in which an act occurred as 

evidence of a continuing pattern of conduct or a course of 

conduct.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(f).
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Appellant is arguing that electronic communications do not constitute an 

“act” or otherwise qualify as “course of conduct.” Thus, the issue raised in 

his appellate brief is raised for the first time on appeal. As such, the issue is 

waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).5 

In his summary of the argument, Appellant also argues that 

“Appellant’s verbal in-person utterance of de minim[i]s profanity . . . on 

February 26, 2017 that she was a ‘bitch’, was responsive to perceived 

harassment and outside the scope of ‘lewd, lascivious, threatening or 

obscene words.” Additionally, Appellant argues that the “solitary” act of 

kicking the victim’s car does not qualify as a “course of conduct” or a 

repeated act. Appellant’s Brief at 30-31.

____________________________________________

5 Even if not waived for failure to raise it in his Rule 1925(b) statement, 

Appellant is not entitled to relief. Appellant emphasizes that electronic 

communications are not an “act” for purposes of Section 2709(a)(3) because 

they do not involve a bodily movement. Appellant focuses on the method of 

delivery of the harassing message as opposed to the underlying acts or 

course of conduct giving rise to the instant conviction. The relevant acts or 

course of conduct here is the repeated texting, i.e., typing messages, to 

victim for no legitimate purposes. Additionally, as noted, Appellant’s 

relevant conduct for purposes of establishing a violation of Section 

2709(a)(3) was not limited to the texting, but included in-person offensive 

language and physical actions (yelling, digging through garbage, and kicking 

victims’ car). 

Additionally, Appellant argues that Section 2709(a)(3) is different from 

similar subsections of the same harassment statute, i.e., Sections

2709(a)(4)-(a)(7), which specifically include electronic communications. 

Even if true, Appellant provided no authority, nor could we find any, to 

support Appellant’s allegation that the elements of the crime under Section 

2709(a)(3) cannot be met by texting. 
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These two issues were adequately addressed in the trial court opinion, 

which we adopt as ours. Trial Court Opinion, 1/17/18, at 8-13. In essence, 

[w]hen evaluating the totality of the evidence regarding 

[Appellant]’s interactions with Ms. Hussain, there are numerous 

conversations where [Appellant] is making statements that have 

no relation to the landlord/tenant relationship. [Appellant]’s 

comments about Ms. Hussain not living in the Bermuda 

[T]riangle, being the person who wet the bed rather than her 

daughter and being “weak” for “blaming” the situation on her 

daughter, in addition to the comment about not wanting to scald 

her daughter and being an improvident mother combined to 

create prior incidents which served no legitimate purpose and 

were intended to harass Ms. Hussain, or at least annoy her. Ms. 

Hussain told [Appellant] she found those comments offensive, 

and [Appellant] was on notice that making those kind of 

comments was at least annoying to Ms. Hussain. [Appellant] 

threatened Ms. Hussain by saying that if she kept “F’ing with 

him, [she would] be next. He seen plenty losers like me get 

kicked off the program for running their mouth.” [Appellant] 

would also say “F you. He would say the B word. You are a low 

life. Go back to your F’ing country. Shut the F up.” 

[Appellant]’s intent after that could be only to annoy, alarm, or 

harass Ms. Hussain. This course of conduct continued until it 

culminated on February 26, 2017 with [Appellant] calling Ms. 

Hussain a “bitch.” None of these comments or insults served a 

legitimate purpose. [Appellant] was more than capable of 

having civil, professional, landlord/tenant conversations as 

evidenced by other text messages. His repeated comments and 

insults served no legitimate purpose and were intended to 

harass and annoy Ms. Hussain. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/17/18, at 8-9 (citations to record omitted). 

Specifically, with regard to the use of the B word on February 26, 

2017, the trial court found that “[w]hile [Appellant] may believe his 

communication was responsive, [the trial court] found that it was not 

responsive to anything, and that [Appellant] engaged in activity without 
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legitimate purpose with the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm Ms. Hussain.” 

Id. at 12. 

With regard to the kicking of victim’s vehicle, which Appellant 

characterizes as an isolated event, the trial court noted: 

[Appellant]’s actions on March 2, 2017, where he went through 

the garbage, was yelling outside the apartment, and was filming 

the property culminating in [Appellant] going to Ms. Hussain’s 

car and kicking the bumper did not serve a legitimate purpose 

and consisted of more than one act. Thus, [Appellant]’s actions 

on March 2, 2017 formed a course of conduct on their own and 

this was not an isolated incident.

Id. at 11-12. 

For the reasons stated above, we conclude Appellant waived his claim 

before this Court because he failed to raise it below, and, to the extent any 

other issues are properly before this Court, we conclude that the trial court 

properly addressed said issues. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s 

September 27, 2017 judgment of sentence. We further direct that a copy of 

the trial court’s January 17, 2018 opinion be attached to any future filings in 

this case.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/29/19