1 NOTI CE Decisi on fi led 02 /11/ 10. The textof this dec ision m ay be changed or
corrected prior to the filing of a Petit ion for Re hea ri ng o r th e dispos it ion of

the s ame. NO. 5-08-0247 IN T HE AP PEL LA TE C OU RT OF ILLIN OIS

FIF TH DIST RICT

________________________________________________________________________ MARGIE KAIS ER an d LAMAR KAISER , ) Appeal from the ) Circui t Court of Plaintiffs- Appellees, ) S t. C lai r C ou nt y. ) v. ) No. 07-L-564 ) DR. A. DOLL-P OLLARD and SOUTHERN ) OBSTE TRI CS AND GYNE COLOGI CAL ) AS SO CIA TE S, S .C., ) Ho nora ble ) Lloy d A. Cueto, Defendan ts-Appellants. ) Judge, presi ding.

________________________________________________________________________ JUS TIC E C HA PM AN delive red the opin ion o f the c ourt: This appe al invo lves a m otion to transfer a m edica l malp ractice a ction f rom St. Clair Co unty to Clinton County bas ed on improper ve nue. Plaintiff Margie Kais er (t he plai ntiff

) underwent a hy st er ectomyat St. Josep h's Ho spital in C linton C oun ty but w as tran sferre d to St. Elizabet

h's Hospi tal in St. Cla ir County for post operative care. The defendants, the doctor who per for

med t he h y st er ectomy

and heremp loyer, app eal an orde r den ying their m otion to transfer. They argue that venue in St. Clair Cou nty is not proper beca use (1 ) the pla inti ff does not all ege that

the defendant s committ ed any ne gligent acts in St. Clair County and ( 2) al l t he e le ment s of

th e pl ai nt if

f' s c aus e of

actio n ar ose inClint on Co unt y . We aff

ir m. On December 15, 2005 , defenda nt Dr. A nne D oll-Pollard (the def endant) pe rformed
a hysterectomy on the plaintiff. T he surgery wa s perf orm ed at S t. Joseph' s Hospital , which is locat ed in Cli nton County. According to t he all egati ons in the complaint , the de fe nd an t's operative notes indica te that sh e "no ted the existen ce of ble eding" andattem pted to locate the source of the bl eeding but that s he closed t

he pati ent despi te the fact t hat the bleedi ng was2

still occurri ng. After t he surger

y, the pla inti ff's blood pres sure and hemoglobin count dropped wh ile her w hite blo od ce ll coun t rose. H er con dition c ontinu ed to deteri orate. Later that day, a cardi ologisttrans ferred t he pl ain tif

f to St . E liz ab eth 's H os pi tal in St . C lai r C ou nt y. There, doctors perform ed exploratory surgery , duri ng which they found the sour ce of the bleedi ng. Alth oug h the d octo rs w ere abl e to st op the ble eding, the pla inti ff all eges in her
com plain t that she suffere d pe rma nen t inju ries a s a re sult o f co mp licatio ns. On December 13, 2007, the pla inti ff and her husband, Lamar Kaiser, file d a complaint againstthe defendant and her employer, Southern Obstetrics and Gynecological Associat es, S. C. The complaint

alle ged that

the defendant

was negligent

both in her per formance of the surgery and in fa ilin g t o d iag no se th e p lai nt iff's conditi on following t he surger y. According to the complaint, t

he plai ntiff

suffered ongoing complications as a resul t of infect ion and a los s of ox ygen t o her brai n and other organs. I n addressing the question of venue, the complaint

alleg ed th at ve nue wa s pro per in S t. C lair Count y because the di agnosis and treat ment had occu rred th ere, the reby ma king it a cou nty in which a part of the transaction that forme d the basis of the action had occurred . See 735 ILCS 5/2-101 (W est 2006). On Ja nu ar y 1 7, 2008, t he defendants file d a motion t o trans fer the case to Cl inton Co unty on the basi s of improper venue or, a lter

native ly , on the basis of forum non conveniens
. The defe ndan ts argu ed tha t beca use th e plain tiff did not all ege that the car e she had recei ved in St. Clair County was ne gligent , no part of the transaction occurr ed there

. They further

argued that some action by the defendants mustoccu r in a co unty for v enue to be properthere. We note that a lthough forum non convenie ns wa s raised in the tria l court, the parti es apparently

did not conduc t dis covery on the is sue, and the trialcour t did no t rule on i t. On ly ven ue is at iss ue in this a ppe al. On Janu ary 28, the plain tiff s fil ed thei r respons e to the defendants ' moti on. They arguedthat

the st atutor

y l anguage provi ding that venue is pr oper in any

countywher e " som e3

part" of the transaction at i ssue oc curred ( see 735 ILCS 5/2-101 ( West 2006)) makes trans acti onal venue a flexible doctrine. See Tipto n v. E state of Cusick, 273 Il l. App. 3d 226, 228, 651 N .E.2d 635 , 637 (199 5). The y cited pre viou s me dical m alprac tice cas es in which
venue was found to be proper in counti es even though t he plai ntiff

s had not al leged they had recei ved neglig ent ca re in th ose cou nties

. Smith v. Silve r Cross Hospit al , 312 Il l. App. 3d 210, 726 N.E.2d 697 (200 0); Bradbury v. St. Mary' s Hospital

of Kankakee , 273 Il l. App. 3d 555, 652 N.E.2d 1228 (199 5); Tipton v. Estate of Cusick , 273 Il l. App. 3d 226, 651 N.E.2d 635 (1995). In addition, t he plai ntiffs argu ed tha t venu e w as pro per in S t. Clair C oun ty because som e of th e plain tiff's injurie s resulte d fro m the surge ry she un derw ent the re to find and stop the b leed ing

. On February

7, 2008, t

he defendants file d a reply . Theyargued that the c ases ci ted bythe plaintiffs w ere distin gui sha ble. Sm ith and Bradbury involved wrongful death actions,
w hi le in Tipton , the plaintiff al leged that he suffe red a st roke as a r esult

of taki ng a medicati on in C ook Co unt y wh ich h ad b een pre scrib ed e lsew her e. The defendants argued,
as they do in thi s appeal, that t he causes of ac tion involved in a ll t hree cases did not exist until an event occur

red in t he plai ntiff

s' c hosen counti es–the causes of action in Sm ith and Bradbury did not arise unt il t he decedents died, and the cause of acti on in Tipton did not exist until the pla inti ff tookthe medication andsuffere d a s trok e. Sm ith , 312 Il l. App. 3d at 213- 15, 726 N.E.2d at700-02 (fol lowing Bradbury and findi ng that t he decedent' s death in Cook Cou nty wa s sufficient to e stablish venu e there ); Bradbury , 273 Il l. App. 3d at 558, 65 2 N.E.2d at 1230 (explaining that t he place a plaintiff was wronged is the place "where the last eventtakes place which i s necessaryto render the [d efen dant] lia ble"); Tipton , 273 Il l. App. 3d at22 8, 6 51 N .E .2d at 6 37 (f in di ng th at t he pl ain tif

f's act of i ngesti ng a medicati on alle ged to have tri ggeredthe st

roke that caused his injuries was a part of the transacti on forming the basis of his ca use of ac tion).4

On April 3, 2008, the court ent er e d an o rder d enying th e defenda nts' mo tion to transfer. The court di d not include any fa ctualfindings or express leg al analysis in its order. This int erlocutoryappeal fol lowed. Venue is prop er in an y county in which any defendantjoined in good faith resi des or in anycounty

"in which t

he trans acti on or some part thereof occurred out

of which the cause of acti on arose. " 735 ILCS 5/2-101 (West 2006). Here, it i s undi spute d that n eithe r defendantresi des in St. Clair County. Thus, only the second prong of t

he venue statute, the "tran sac tion al" p ron g, is a t issu e. Befo re cons idering the m erits of the defendants' appeal, we must resolve the parti es' content ions regardi ng the standard of revie w to apply . Often, venue motions present mixe d questi ons of la w a nd fact. Corral v. Mervis Indust ries, Inc. , 217 Il l. 2d

144 , 153-54, 839 N.E.2d 524, 530 (2005) . We review the f actualde te rmina tions m ade b y the trial cou rt to determi ne whether the yar e a ga in st th e mani fe st

wei ght of th e e vi de nc e. Howe ve r, we review th e c ou rt's conclusi ons of law de novo

. Corral , 217 Il l. 2d at 154, 839 N.E. 2d at 530. Wh ere there is n o disp ute reg arding the fa cts underlying the court 's de cisi on, we revie w the entir e ruling de novo

. Corral , 217 Ill. 2d at 15 3, 83 9 N .E.2 d at 5 30. The defend ants argue tha t the court below denied t heir moti on base d on "agre ed" facts and did not make any findings of fact. Thus, they contend, our review is de novo . T he plaintiffs, however, cont end that the court "must have" made findings i t did not articulate in its order, becau se wh ether any porti on of the transaction occurred in St. Clair County is a factualquesti on on which the parties disagree. T hey thus conten d that the prop er standard of review is the m anifest-we ight-of-t he- evidence s tandard. They furt her conte nd that because it is impossi ble to de termine on the rec ord before us what factualdetermi nations the court mad e, we must resol ve in the ir favor any doubt s rai sed bythis gap in the record. See Corral , 217 Ill. 2d at 1 57, 83 9 N .E.2d at 532 (exp laining that, when the recor d is i ncomplete,5

an a ppellate court "must presume" that a t rial court "had a sufficient factual basi s for it s holding an d that its order conforms w ith the law"). We ag re e wi thth e d ef

en da nt s. At the plead ing stag e, we take a ll well-p led fa cts in the plaintiff' s complaint as tru e. Safeway Insurance Co. v. Daddono , 334 Il l. App. 3d 215, 218, 777 N.E.2d 693, 695 (2002). T hus, we assume that the plaintiff received negligent care in Clinton Count

y and pos toperative car e in St. Clair County. We assume that t he plai ntiff sufferedinjuries as a resul t of blood loss and infe ction

. We assume that t he blood los s began,
as alle ged, during the surgery performed i n Clinton Count y, and we assume it c ontinued, as alle ged, until surge ons in St. Cla ir County were able t o locat e the source of the bl eeding and stop it. The question b efore us is no t whethe r these allegations are true
. Rather, the question is whetherthe fact s that the pla inti ffs all eged tookplace in St. C lair Co unty form ed a " part" of the transacti on. In ot her words, we ar e a ske d to dete rmine whether the court

below
correc tlydetermined the legal effect of the facts pled b y t he plai ntiff

s. That is a l egal question. We will therefore review the defendants' contentions de novo

. As previous ly

stat ed, the sole i ssue befor e us is whether venue i s prope r under t he trans acti onal prong of our venue s tatut e. Deter mining venue under

this prong requi res us to
co ns id er two key variable s: the nature of the cause of action and the place where the cause of acti on sprang into exis tenc e. Rensing v. Merck & Co. , 367 Il l. App. 3d 1046, 1050, 857 N.E.2d 702, 706 (2 006 ). The p hr as e " tr ans actio n or som e part the reof" in the v enue statute has be en in ter pr ete d b ro ad ly. Tipton , 273 Il l. App. 3d at 228, 651 N.E.2d at 637. It i ncludes all the fact s that

the pla inti ff bears t

he burden of prov ing

. Se rvicemaster Co. v. Mary Thompson Hospital , 1 77 I ll . A pp. 3d 8 85, 890 -9 1, 532 N. E.2d 1009, 1012 (1988) (rel yi ng
on People ex rel. Carpentier v. Lange , 8 Ill. 2d 437, 441, 13 4 N.E .2d 266, 26 7-68 (19 56)). A plaintiff i n a medical malpracti ce acti on has the bur den of proving (1) the standard of care that the defendant 's c onduct is to be measure d against , (2) that t he defe ndan t failed to com ply6

with that s tandard of

care, and (3) t

hatth e d ef

en da nt 's neglige nt care proximate ly caused the pl ain tif f's inju ry. Wied enbe ck v. S earle , 385 Ill . App. 3d 289, 292, 895 N.E.2d 1067, 1069 (2008). Here, the plaintiffs al lege thatthe defendant neglige ntly

performedthe sur gery

and neglig ently faile d to diag nos e the pro blem of in tern al ble edin g. In order t o prove the l atte r alle gation, they

will have to demonstr ate thatthe probl em could have been di agnosed sooner than it was. See Holston v. Sisters of the Third Ord er of S t. Fran cis , 165 Il l. 2d 150, 155, 650 N .E.2d 985 , 988 (199 5). The defendants conten d tha t venue i s proper only i n Clinton Count y because no porti on of

the tran saction occu rred in St. Clair County. This is so, t hey cont end, becaus e (1) the plaintiffs do not

alle ge that

the defendant s committ ed any ne gligent ac ts in St. Cla ir Co unty and (2) t

he plai ntiff

suffered an injury

that gave ris e to a caus e of acti on for medical malpract ice prior

to leaving Clinton County. In addition , the defe ndan ts argu e that th eir "statutory right

to change venue s hould not be t hwarted" by

th e pl ai nt if

fs ' atte mptatfor

umsho ppi ng. In su pport of

their posit ion, t

he defendants rely

heavil y on Jackson v . Reid , 363 I ll. App. 3d 2 71, 84 2 N .E.2d 763 (200 6), w hile the plaintiff s rely prim arily on Sm ith , Bradbury , and Tipton . As w e w ill explain , we fin d the Jackson case distinguishabl e from the case before us despit e some fa ctual sim ilariti es, and we fi nd that t he Tipton case, whil e not pre cise ly ana log ous , pro vid es su ppo rt fo r the plain tiffs ' posi tion

. The defendants argue that because both Sm ith and Bradbury involved t he Wrongful De ath Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 2008)) , the y ar e dist inguis hable fr om the inst ant
case. The Wrongful Death Act provi des a dis tinct cause o f action that allow s surv ivors to
recover damages they su ffe r as a resu lt of t heir dec ede nt's d eath

. Bradbury , 273 Il l. App. 3d at558, 652 N.E.2dat 1230. That cause of ac tion i s separate and di sti nct from any clai m the decedentmight have hadfor the u nde rlying n eglig enc e ha d he surv ived

. Bradbury , 273 I ll.7

App. 3d at 558, 652 N.E.2d at 1230 ( expla inin g that t he Wrongful Death Act does not provide for the surviv al of th e dec eden t's cause of ac tio n). Although wrongful death is a sepa rate and dist inct c ause of act ion, it is neverthe less pr emised on the underlying neglige nce. Bradbury , 273 I ll. App . 3d at 5 58, 65 2 N .E.2d at 123 0. Be caus e of th is, both the under ly ing neg li gen ce and t he d ece den t' s de ath ar e ne ces sa ry to gi ve ris e t o a c la im. Thus, we do n ot a gree w ith the d efen dants that the mere fact th at Sm ith and Bradbury involved clai ms for wrongful deat h makes them inher ent ly disti nguishabl e. However, for
reasons we will expla in mo re fully later, w e find little guidance in Bradbury . In a dditi on, we findthat Sm ith is ina ppo site for a not her reas on. I n th at ca se, the decedent di ed in a Cook County hos pital , but bot h he and the ad minis trator of his esta te (his wid ow ) we re resid ents of Will Co unt y. Sm ith , 312 Il l. App. 3d at 213, 726 N.E. 2d at 700. The defendants s ought
a trans fer to Wil l County based largely

on venue provis ions in the P roba te Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/1-1 et

seq. (W est 1 998 )). Sm ith , 312 Il l. App. 3d at 213-14, 726 N.E.2d at700. That is ob vio usly n ot an issu e in th is ca se. In Jackson , the defendant urologist t reated the plaintiff over the course of four years. The defendant det ermined that a bi late ral ureter al impl antat ion surge rywas necessar y. The medical malp ractice c om plaint a lleged that the defe ndan t was neglig ent in performing t he
su rg er y, in provi ding post operative care, and in det ermining t hat the surgery

was necessary in th e fir st pla ce. Jackson , 36 3 I ll. A pp . 3d at 2 73 , 84 2 N .E .2d at 7 65 . A ll th e d ef en da nt 's treat ment of the pl ainti ff–including both the surg ery and the post operative care–t ook place in P eor ia C oun ty. Jackson , 363 Ill. A pp. 3 d at 2 73, 8 42 N .E.2 d at 7 65. Ho we ver, prio r to determini ng that the surge ry was n ecess ary, the de fend ant ha d ord ered s evera l tests , includ in g X ra ys and sonograms. The plaintiff went to a laboratory in McL ean County for these tests

. Jackson , 363 Ill . App. 3d at 273-74, 842 N.E.2d at 765- 66. The plaintiff filed h er law suit in McLea n Co unt y, a nd the defendant file d a motion t o trans fer to Peoria County based on8

imp rop er v enu e. Jackson , 363 Il l. App. 3d at 272-73, 842 N.E.2d at 765. The plaintiff there argued on appealthat ve nue in McLean County was proper under the transacti onal prong because the te sts or dered by the defendant

and performed i n McLean Co unty formed an " integra l p art" o f he r cau se o f ac tion

. Jackson , 363 Il l. App. 3d at 275, 842 N.E.2d at 767. In rej ecti ng this clai m, the Fourt h Distri ct found i t si gnific ant that allthe deali ngs between the par ties and allthe acts alleg ed to have been negli gent had t aken place in Peo ria C oun ty. Jackson , 363 Il l. App. 3d at 276-77, 842 N.E.2d at 768. The simil arities with the insta nt case are ap paren t: th e defend ant he re did n ot treat th e plain tiff in S t. Clair C ou nt y, and the pl ainti ff does notalle ge that the tr eatment s he recei ved there was neglig ent. Ho we ver , thes e sim ilaritie s, stan din g alo ne, a re n ot d ispo sitive

. We emphasize t

hat the Jackson court di d not hold t hat the nonneglige nt acts of third parti es can neverestabl ish transactional venue. Inde ed, the court ackn owled ged that the term "transacti on" is not

meant to be interpr eted so nar rowly"as to includ e only tho se imm ediate facts from which the caus e of acti on ar ose ." Jackson , 363 Il l. App. 3d at 276, 842 N.E. 2d at767. Th e court also acknowle dged that third-part

y i nterac tions can constitute a part of t he trans acti on if they

" 'have a definite and dir ect bearing on the cause of action.' " Jackson , 363 Ill. App. 3d at 276, 842 N.E.2d at 768 (quoti ng Southern & Cent ral Illinois Laborers'

District Co uncil v. Illinoi

s Health Faci lities Planning Boar d , 331 I ll. App. 3d 1112, 1117, 772 N.E .2d 9 80, 9 84 ( 200 2), abrogated on ot her grounds by Corral , 217 Il l. 2d at 149-50, 839 N.E.2d at 527-28) . The court found only

that t he specif ic third-party

acts at issue there–t

he tests pe rform ed in M cLe an C oun ty–wer e prelim inary acts which, st anding al one, were not enough to establi sh tran sac tion al ve nue . Jackson , 363 Il l. App. 3d at 276, 842 N.E.2d at 768 (citing Lake County Riverboat L.P. v. Illinois Gaming Board , 313 Il l. App. 3d 943, 953, 730 N.E.2d 524 , 532 ( 200 0)). W e belie ve tha t th is conc lusi on was supported by additi onal factors that ar e not present in the case before us.9

First, in Jackson , the court found t hat the plaintiff' s entire caus e of a ction c ame into exist ence in Pe or ia C ou nt y. Jackson , 363 Il l. App. 3d at 277, 842 N.E.2d at 768. Th e court explai ned tha t t he defendant determined that the surgery was necessar

y, performed the
su rg er y, and pro vid ed p osto per ative care in P eor ia C oun ty. Jackson , 363 Il l. App. 3d at 277, 842 N.E.2d at 768. The plaintiff did n ot alleg e that th e tests h ad be en pe rform ed ne gligen tly
or that s he had suffere d any i njury as a res ult of having them per formed. Ins tead, the court explai ned, it was the de fend ant's neg li ge nt interp retation of the test resu lts that led her to conclude that t

he surger

y was neces sary , a deci sion the plai ntiff all eged wa s neg ligent. Jackson , 363 Ill. App. 3d at 277, 842 N.E.2d at 768. The defendants contend that this fact makes Jackson analogous t o our case. We find that pr ecisely t he opposit e is t

rue, how ever. As previously noted, w e must co nsider the natu re of t he p la in ti ffs ' cl ai m. Here, the complaint

alle ges that t

he pl ainti ff suffere d permanent i njuri es as a r esult of the l oss of oxy gen to her br ain an d oth er org ans. T he co mp laint alleg es that th is occu rred d ue to hemorrhaging that be gan when the defendant performed ahysterecto my and did n ot end until surgeons in St. Clair Cou nty were able to stop the bleeding . Obviou sly, t he type of injury they alle ge is cumulative. It may be impossible, even once the e vidence i s full y devel oped ata trial, to dete rmine precis ely how mu ch of the inju ry occurr ed in Clinton Count y and how
muc h o ccurred in St. Cla ir County . The complai nt als o alle ges that the pla inti ff suffere d permanentharm as a resul t of inf ecti on, but i t does not

specify when–or where–the i nfecti on beg an. In addition, t

he plai ntiff

s all eged in a r esponsive pleadi ng that the pla inti ff suffere d injuryas a res ult of the surgery she underwent t o findandtr eat th e bl eed in g. (We p re sum e that this w as a res ult of c om plication s, beca use th ey do no t allege th at the S t. Clair C oun ty
s urgeons were negli gent. ) Any i njuri es that occurred in St. Cla ir County as a res ult of inter vening acts of t

hird par ties may al so be at tri bu table to the defendant' s negligence as a10

normal incide nt to th e risk she crea ted. Easley v. Apollo Detective Agency, Inc. , 69 Il l. App. 3d 920, 938, 387 N. E.2d 1241, 1253 ( 1979); Rest atement ( Second) of Torts §44 3 (1965 ); see Daly v. Carmean , 210 Ill. App. 3d 19, 30-32, 568 N.E.2d 955, 962- 63 (1991) (f inding t hat
a tendered jury ins truction accu rately stated th e law wh ich w ould have expla ined th at a doctor fou nd to be ne gligen t is liabl e " ' for any damages sust ained by

the pla inti ff aris ing from the effor

ts of subs equent heal th care provider s to treatthe c onditi on caused by ' " t he de fe nd an t's neglige nce); s ee also Simmons v. Loll ar , 3 04 F.2d 7 74, 778 (10t h Cir. 1962) (applying this bas ic tort prin cip le wher e the pl ainti ff's decedent di ed due to compli cati ons from a non neglig ent su rgery to treat injuries i nc ur

r eddu e t o t

he de fe nd an t ' s n eg l i ge nc e) ; W. Prosser, Torts §44 , at 278 -79 (4 th ed. 19 71). T hus, th e plain tiffs alleg e injurie s occ urring in both C lin to n C ou nt y an d S t. C lai r C ou nt y. Proving that t he plai ntiff

sustained allthe al leged injuries will be c rucialto their case, which makes the allega tions o f injury in St. Cla ir Co unty an in tegr al pa rt of

their cau se o f ac tion

. It is for this rea son th at we find th e defenda nts' argu men ts disting uishin g bo th Bradbury and Tipton mis plac ed. Bradbury , as prev iously no ted, inv olved a w rong ful de ath cl ai m. The decedent w as a baby wh o wa s born premature ly in Kankakee County . The baby
was tra nsferr ed to a Cook County hospit al, where he died t hree day s lat er. His mother broughta wrongful deat h acti on in Cook County, alle ging that neglige nt medicaltreat ment in Kankakee County had l ed to the ba by's de ath. Bra dbury , 273 Il l. App. 3d at 557, 652 N.E.2d at 1229. There, as here, t he defendan ts a rgued that for purpose s of tr ansacti onal venue, the entir e trans acti on had take n pl ace in K ank ake e C oun ty. Bradbury , 273 Il l. App. 3d at 558, 652 N.E.2d at 1230. One of the defendant s "even [went] so far as to conte nd that death is not

an element of a cause of action for wrongful death." Bradbury , 273 Ill . App. 3d at 55 8, 65 2 N .E.2 d at 1 230
. In rejec ting t

his cl aim, t

he Bradbury court foc used much of it s di sc ussion on t he11

dist inct nature of a w rongfu l death claim. T he cou rt ex pl ain ed th at n ot on ly is th e d ec ed en t's death a necessar

y el ement, i t is "the l as t e lement nece ssary to render

an actor liabl e" for wrongful dea th. Bradbury , 27 3 Il l. App. 3d at 558, 652 N. E. 2d at 12 30. The court thus concludedthat v enu e w as p rop er in the c oun ty wh ere th e de ced ent d ied. Bradbury , 273 I ll. App. 3d at 558, 652 N.E.2d at 1230. We note that the Bradbury court was deal ing with an injurywhich, by

defini tion, can occur i n only one place; a decedent c an on ly die in one
co un ty. The cour t, thus, did not co nside r wh ether a diffe rent res ult w ould have been requir ed in a m edic al m alpr actic e ca se h ad th e ba by sur viv ed. Si m ila rly, Tipton involved an injur y t hat occur

red in only one county . There, the plaintiff suffered per

manent brai n damage and parti al par al ysi s as a re sult of a str oke. Tipton , 2 73 Ill . App. 3d at 228, 651 N.E.2d at 636. He alleged t hat the stroke had been tri ggeredby a m edic ation that e leva ted h is blo od p ress ure . Tipton , 273 Ill . App. 3d at 228, 651 N.E.2d at 637. The m ed ica tio n h ad be en pr es cr ib ed an d d isp en se d i n D u P ag e C ou nt y, but the pla inti ff ingest ed it and sufferedthe stro ke in Co ok C oun ty. Tipton , 273 Il l. App. 3d at 227-28, 651 N.E.2d at636. Th e court fou nd th at Co ok C oun ty was "c learly a 'coun ty in which the transacti on or some part thereof occurred out of w hi ch th e c au se of

ac tio n a ro se .' " Tipton , 273 Il l. App. 3d at 2 28, 651 N.E. 2d at 6 37 ( quo ti ng 7 35 I LCS 5/2-101 (W est 1992)). In reachi ng this conclusi on, the court not ed that the pla inti ff did not

have a cause of acti on until he suffered t he strok e. Tipton , 273 Il l. App. 3d at 228, 651 N.E. 2d at 637. The defe ndan ts here focus on t his l anguage in arguing that Tipton does not support the plainti ffs' posit ion. Here, the y cont end, the plaintiffs didhave a cause of ac tion bef ore the pl ainti ff was trans ferredto St. C lair Co unty and treated there. U nlike th e plain tiff in Tipton , the y argue, the plaintiffs her e all ege that she suffer ed an acti onable i njury prior to leaving Clinton C ou nt y. We find this argument unavai ling. Although the plaintiffs here could state a cause of acti on for medicalmalpract ice base d solely on t he allegations of injury in C lin to n C ou nt y,12

it is not the sa me cause of

acti on they

stat e for the cumulati ve injuries t heyalle ge the pl ainti ff sustained in both counti es. Where, as here, a plai ntiff alle ges that

injuries have been incur red in mu ltiple cou nties, ve nue m ay be pro per in any o r all o f the m. See Pete rson v. Monsa nto Co. , 157 Ill. App. 3d 508, 513 -14, 510 N .E.2d 458 , 462 (198 7). In additi on, we note t

hat the Tipton court emphasi zed tha t tran sacti onal venue i s meant to be a bro ad, flexib le do ctrin e. Tipton , 273 Il l. App. 3d at 228, 651 N .E.2d 63 7. The defendants' unnecessarily narrow int erpret ationof both Tipton and Bradbury is at odd s with this p rinc iple. A se con d i mp ortant d isti nction be tween thi s case and Jackson is the fact t hat the plaintif f here al leges t

hat she r eceived pos toperative car e in St. Clair Count y for the hys te re ct omy

perfo rmed by the de fend ant prior to being releas ed fro m th e hos pit al

. Although not precisely

analogous, we find our previ ous holdi ng in Wierv. Ketterer , 133 I ll. App. 3d 7 51, 4 79 N .E.2 d 41 6 (1 985 ), inst ruc tive. T here, th e plain tiff trav eled th roug h St. Clair County whil e bei ng t ransported by ambulance from Clinton County to St. Louis, M issouri. He allege d that h e suffered hypog lycemia a nd h ypoxia in part du e to the failure of the defendant

doctor t o provide ade qua te me dicalsupervi sion t o the ambulance techni cians as they tran sporte d the p laintiff th roug h St. Cla ir C oun ty. Wier , 133 Ill . App. 3d at752 , 479 N.E .2d a t 41 6-1 7. We note that implici t in t his bri ef recit ation of

facts i s the fac t that the defe ndan t docto r wa s not w ith the p laintiff in the ambulance as i t tr aveled t hrough St. Clair County. We also note t hat it is not entir ely clear from the opi nion whether t he hypog lycemia and hypoxi a began as the ambul ance passed t hrough St. Clair County or continue d th ro ug ho ut th e c ou rse of th e jo ur ne y. This court found these alle gations suffici ent to es tabli sh v enu e in S t. Cla ir C oun ty. Wier , 133 Ill. A pp. 3 d at 7 52, 4 79 N .E.2 d at 4 17. There, as here, the plaintiff di d not all ege that the defendant committed any neglige nt acts or omissi ons while the def endant was in St. Clair Count

y. Rather, as here, the plaintiff13

alle ged that he sustained an inj uryas a resul t of the defendant' s negli gence while the pla intiff
was in St. Clair C ounty . In ad diti on, al though not di scussed in the Wierdecisi on, the plaintiff there c ould not have a claim again st the do ctor un less the docto r had a duty to provide medical s upervis ion to t he am bul ance crew. Pr esumably , thi s duty arose ei ther because t he plai ntiff

was being tr ansferr ed from a Clint on County hos pitalto a dif ferent hosp ital, much as the pl ainti ff was her e, or be caus e the d efen dant d eterm ined th at his admissi on to the St. Louis hospi tal was nec essary . Here, the defendant had a dut y t o provide appr opriate postoper ative care t o the pla inti ff unti l she was well enough to be relea sed from the hospit al. Thus, her al leged fai lur e to do so constituted ongoing neglige nce unti l the plaintiff was ulti mately

relea sed from the hos pital . Thus, t he postoper ative care the plai ntiff recei ved in St. Clair County simply cannot be consider ed anyt hing other

than an integral part of th e su rge ry the d efe nda nt p erfo rme d in Clin ton Co unt y. As a third dist incti on between thi s case and Jack son , we note t

he polic y cons iderations that supporte d the Fourt

h Distri ct' s de cisi on the re. The Jackson court expl ained that the legis lative intent

behind our venue stat

ute was to pr otect

a defendant from having to defend
a lawsuit in a county wit

h "li ttl e or no rel ation to the defendant or the t ransaction that

is the subject of the lawsu it. " Jackson , 363 Ill. App. 3d at 278, 842 N.E.2d at 769. Th e court expresse d a concern t

hat fi nding venue i n McLean County on the fact s before i t could l ead to absurd results. The court explained as follows: "Forexam ple, the legislature could no t have intend ed for a urology surgeon t o be sued in a county when the surgeon's only connecti on to that county is t hat the patie nt was referr ed to him by

a urologi st i n that c ounty . Nor could t he legis latur e have int ended for a cancerspecialist

to be sued in a county when the specialist 's only conn ection to that coun ty is that he re view ed a p atient's rec ords th at we re bro ugh t f rom ther e." (Emp hases in origina l.) Jackson , 363 Il l. App. 3d at 278, 842 N.E. 2d at 769.14

Here, the connection between the pl ainti ffs' case andSt. Cla ir County is much st

ronger t han the connecti on that e xist ed between th e plai ntiff 's c ase in Jackson an d M cL ea n C ou nt y. Thu s, the p olicy

concerns t

hat inf ormed the Jackson court' s decis ion are not present here. W e c on clu de th at v en ue is p ro pe r in St . C lai r C ou nt y. Fi na lly, the de fend ants ar gue th at their right to proper

venue should not

be defeated bythe pla inti ffs' at tem pt at f orum-shopping. As long as venue i s proper in more than one
co un ty, a plai ntiff

is gener ally

entitled to t

he forum of hercho ice. Hall v. Keating , 246 I ll. App. 3d 538, 541, 616 N. E.2d 683, 685 ( 1993) (ci ting Gulf Oil Cor p . v. Gilbert , 330 U. S. 501, 91 L. Ed. 1055, 67 S. Ct. 839 ( 1947)); see als o Tipton , 2 73 I ll . A p p. 3d at229, 65 1 N.E .2d a t 63 7. W e ha ve a lread y con clud ed th at ve nue wa s pro per in S t. Cla ir C oun ty. T here are so me exceptions to thi s princ iple. For example, venue cannot be ba sed upon the res idence of a def endant who was joine d in bad fai th sol ely to est ablis h venue. See 7 35 ILCS 5/2-10 1 (West 2006); see als o Ha ll , 246 Il l. App. 3d at 540, 616 N.E. 2d at 685. Here, the res idence pr ong of the venue s tatut e is not at iss ue. The defendants do not atte mpt to argue that t

he plaintiffs added a

St. Cla ir County -based caus e of acti on or defendant in bad faith so lel y to est abl ish venue t here. Indeed, t

hey ac knowledge that

the pla inti ff recei ved postoper ative care th ere, an d they do not co ntest he r allega tion tha t she co ntinue d to hemorrhage after

leavi ng Clinton Count

y. They ar gue inst ead that the even ts alle ged to have occurred in St. Clair C ountywere so tangential to the cause of acti on that " brazen forum[-]s hopping" is th e on ly pos si bl e motiv e fo r t he " tr ans par ent " c hoi ce o f fo ru m. How ever, we have alread y reache d the o ppo site con clusion . The other e xcep tion to th e rule that a plain tiff is entitledto the ve nue of her choi ce as long a s venue is proper i s the doct rine of forum non convenie ns . Although r aised at the trial c ourt, that doc tri ne is no t before us. Mo reover, we note th at t he facts of this case si mply do not support the defendants' forum-shoppi ng argument. The plaintiff was tr ansferr ed to St. Elizabet h's Hospi tal by

an15

atte nding cardiol ogist

before the plai ntiff

was releas ed from the hospi tal. She did not make the decisi on, and she t herefore di d not–and co uld not–cont rol t he locat ion of the postopera tive care she re ceive d. In o ther w ords, it was not even possible for her to choose a ph ysician in a c oun ty that m igh t be a fav ora ble foru m for h er m alpr actic e ac tion

. In additio n, as p reviou sly discuss ed, this i s not a cas e where St. Cl air County bears no substantial connecti on to the l iti gation. Much of the evidence r egarding t he cause and ext ent of the pla inti ff's injuries wil l come from St. Clair County because that is where she wa s diagnosedand treated. Thus, we are not convinced that this cas e presents so blatant an atte mp t at f

orum -shop ping that w e mu st dep art from the rule that a p laintiff is e ntitled to choose any fo rum where venue is proper. We conclude that t he court properly

denied the motion to tran sfer. For the r easons st ated, we affirm the orderof the trialcourt denying the defendants'
mo tion to tra nsfer.

Affirmed.

WE LC H an d W EX STT EN , JJ., concur.NO. 5-08-0247 IN T HE AP PEL LA TE C OU RT OF ILLIN OIS

FIF TH DIST RICT

___________________________________________________________________________________ MARGIE KAIS ER an d LAMAR KAISER , ) Appeal from the ) Circui t Court of Plaintiffs- Appellees, ) S t. C lai r C ou nt y. ) v. ) No. 07-L-564 ) DR. A. DOLL-P OLLARD and SOUTHERN ) OBSTE TRI CS AND GYNE COLOGI CAL ) AS SO CIA TE S, S .C., ) Ho nora ble ) Lloy d A. Cueto, Defendan ts-Appellants. ) Judge, presi ding.

___________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion Filed : February 11, 2010

___________________________________________________________________________________ Justice s : Honorable M elissa A. Chapman, J.

Honorable Thomas M. Welch, J. , and Ho nor able Jam es M . W exs tten, J ., Concur

___________________________________________________________________________________ Atto rneys DawnA. Sal le rs on, Nancy L. Cardinal e, Timothy

G. Shelton, Hinshaw & Culbertson, for LLP, 222 N. LaSalle, Suite 300, Chicago, I L 60601 Ap pellants

___________________________________________________________________________________ Attorney John Womick, Womick Law Firm, Chtd., 501 Rushing Drive, Herrin, IL 62949 for Appellees

___________________________________________________________________________________