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THE FDIC’S TARGETING OF 

REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 16, 2016 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services 

Serial No. 114–79 

( 

(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas, Chairman 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina, 

Vice Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin 

ROBERT HURT, Virginia 

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio 

STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee 

MARLIN A. STUTZMAN, Indiana 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida 

ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

ANDY BARR, Kentucky 

KEITH J. ROTHFUS, Pennsylvania 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

FRANK GUINTA, New Hampshire 

SCOTT TIPTON, Colorado 

ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas 

BRUCE POLIQUIN, Maine 

MIA LOVE, Utah 

FRENCH HILL, Arkansas 

TOM EMMER, Minnesota 

MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking 

Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

JOHN C. CARNEY, JR., Delaware 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

DANIEL T. KILDEE, Michigan 

PATRICK MURPHY, Florida 

JOHN K. DELANEY, Maryland 

KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona 

JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio 

DENNY HECK, Washington 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

SHANNON MCGAHN, Staff Director 

JAMES H. CLINGER, Chief Counsel 

(III) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania, 

Vice Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

ROBERT HURT, Virginia 

STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

SCOTT TIPTON, Colorado 

BRUCE POLIQUIN, Maine 

FRENCH HILL, Arkansas 

AL GREEN, Texas, Ranking Member 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

JOHN K. DELANEY, Maryland 

JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio 

DENNY HECK, Washington 

KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on: 

March 16, 2016 ................................................................................................. 1 

Appendix: 

March 16, 2016 ................................................................................................. 29 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 2016 

Gibson, Fred W., Jr., Acting Inspector General, Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation ........................................................................................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

Prepared statements: 

Beatty, Hon. Joyce ............................................................................................ 30 

Gibson, Fred W., Jr. ......................................................................................... 31 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Green, Hon. Al: 

FDIC Office of Inspector General Audit Report dated June 2006, ‘‘Challenges and FDIC Efforts Related to Predatory Lending’’ .......................... 48 

Waters, Hon. Maxine: 

Written statement of the National Consumer Law Center .......................... 89 

(1) 

THE FDIC’S TARGETING OF 

REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS 

Wednesday, March 16, 2016 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in room 

2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sean P. Duffy [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Duffy, Hultgren, Tipton, 

Poliquin, Hill; Green, Cleaver, Ellison, and Sinema. 

Chairman DUFFY. The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations will come to order. Today’s hearing is entitled, ‘‘The 

FDIC’s Targeting of Refund Anticipation Loans.’’ 

Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess of 

the subcommittee at any time. 

Also, without objection, members of the full Financial Services 

Committee who are not members of the subcommittee may participate in today’s hearing for the purposes of making an opening 

statement and questioning our witness. 

The Chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes for an opening 

statement. 

A year ago this month, the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee heard testimony from the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on its role in Operation Choke Point, 

which was a law enforcement initiative launched by the Department of Justice to choke off legal businesses from the financial system in an effort, they say, to combat consumer fraud. 

Although the FDIC has repeatedly denied that it was involved in 

the DOJ-named Operation Choke Point, it is clear from the investigative work of this committee and other committees that the 

FDIC cooperated closely with the DOJ in identifying so-called highrisk merchants and severing their ties with the financial system 

through its supervisory authority. 

Payday lenders, gun dealers, and other perfectly legal industries 

were targeted by the FDIC based on the Corporation’s own decision 

about which industries were favorable and which industries were 

unfavorable. 

Regrettably, we are here today to learn about a separate but no 

less egregious effort by the FDIC to target refund anticipation 

loans (RALs) which, simply put, are loans based on anticipated 

Federal tax refunds. 

2 

A recent Inspector General report of inquiry into the FDIC’s supervisory approach to refund anticipation loans reveals a troubling 

pattern by the FDIC officials of targeting legitimate and legal activities through abusive and unfair regulatory practices. 

The I.G. uncovered this targeting when performing its audit on 

the FDIC’s involvement in the Operation Choke Point initiative, 

which was released in September of 2015. Though only an executive summary of this extensive 180-page report of inquiry is being 

made public, I am concerned because the full report details actions 

of several FDIC employees who were also involved in the Operation 

Choke Point initiative. 

According to the Inspector General, the FDIC ‘‘set in motion a series of interrelated events affecting three institutions that involved 

aggressive and unprecedented efforts to use the FDIC’s supervisory 

and enforcement powers, circumvention of certain controls surrounding the exercise of enforcement power, damage to the morale 

of certain field examination staff, and high cost to the three impacted institutions.’’ 

In an effort to cause the three banks it supervised to exit the 

RAL business, the FDIC’s Washington office also used ‘‘strong 

moral suasion’’ in late 2009 and early 2010. 

The FDIC also used its powers to inappropriately reject underwriting plans and pressure field staff to assign lower ratings in 

safety and soundness examinations for at least two of the institutions, and used unprecedented examination resources to conduct an 

intrusive horizontal review when one bank continued offering 

RALs. 

The Inspector General’s report also found that the FDIC’s legal 

division believed that to proceed with such enforcement remedies 

against the banks represented high litigation risk, but the agency 

proceeded anyway. All three banks ultimately, and no surprise, 

exited the RAL business by April of 2012. 

After FDIC Chair Sheila Bair asked management to look into a 

complaint made by one of these targeted institutions, FDIC management did not accurately and fully describe the abusive behavior 

to Chairman Bair. This kind of behavior cannot and will not be tolerated by Congress and the American people who expect much 

more from their government and their government bureaucrats. 

I am concerned that the FDIC has repeatedly demonstrated a 

disregard for the rule of law, for the limitations of its power, and 

for the financial institutions that it is supposed to serve. The work 

of this subcommittee is an important way to hold the Corporation 

accountable and to expose its behavior to ensure that it is kept in 

check. 

That concludes my remarks. I will now recognize the ranking 

member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 

Green, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I thank the witness for appearing today. 

I would like to note from the outset that this was not an Operation Choke Point activity. My belief is that the witness will validate this contention. While there were things that, in the opinion 

of the I.G., merited his attention, this was not a Choke Point activVerDate Nov 24 2008 19:49 Apr 27, 2017 Jkt 023887 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\23887.TXT TERI
3 

ity. This is something that occurred 5 years ago. It has been resolved and disciplinary action has been taken. 

I do think that there is some currency, some merit, some value, 

if you will, in examining this question of safety and soundness. And 

I say this because this is one of the reasons why the FDIC was engaged in the process. 

We have loans that are anticipation loans, loans that are predicated upon a person receiving a certain amount of tax relief in 

terms of a refund. And unfortunately, for many of these persons, 

most of whom are low-income, earned-income-tax-credit folks—I 

will explain that at a later time if I need to—most of these loans 

did not materialize as expected. 

Perhaps ‘‘most’’ is too strong, ‘‘a good many.’’ How many is a good 

many? Too many did not materialize as expected, so the anticipated return was sometimes less than what was expected, which 

means then that the bank has an obligation that may or may not 

be fulfilled. 

An interesting thing about the loans has to do with how they 

were generated. This is not a circumstance where a person comes 

into the bank and talks to a loan officer in the bank to acquire a 

loan. These loans were generated away from the bank in the office 

of some third person, some third party, and they were generated 

by persons who were tax preparers, for the most part. 

These persons, in a de facto sense, became the loan officer, the 

loan originator, the underwriter. I am not sure it is a good practice 

for banks to have this kind of circumstance exist, but for our purposes today we won’t go too deeply into it. It did exist. 

And under these circumstances, information was acquired, but 

that information didn’t always prove to be true and there were occasions when the loans were not honored in the sense that they 

weren’t repaid. 

So there are some safety and soundness questions here. Should 

banks be allowed to allow others—‘‘others’’ meaning persons outside of the bank—to underwrite loans that they anticipate will be 

covered by a tax refund when we know that not all tax refunds as 

they are anticipated are fulfilled? 

For example, you are scheduled to get a tax refund of X number 

of dollars but you have child support you haven’t paid. You have 

other obligations that can encroach upon that refund. So you don’t 

get the refund of X number of dollars. You get X minus some number of dollars. 

And as a result we have a bank now that has a client who is required to pay this money, but it was assumed from the outset that 

the money would be immediately available, almost guaranteed by 

way of the earned income tax credit refund that a certain person 

might get. 

So my point is this. I think that there is much to be said about 

the I.G’s report, but there is a lot to be said also about the kind 

of business that was being regulated and whether the safety and 

soundness of the banks were in question as a result of the types 

of businesses with which these banks were associating themselves. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the 2 seconds that I 

have. 

Chairman DUFFY. The gentleman yields back his 2 seconds. 

4 

I now want to welcome our witness, Fred Gibson. Mr. Gibson is 

the FDIC’s Acting Inspector General. Welcome. In his role, he is responsible for all facets of the Office of Inspector General’s mission, 

which broadly is to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse affecting the programs and operations of the FDIC, and to keep the 

Chairman of the FDIC and the Congress fully informed. 

We thank him for his work and for being with us here today. He 

will be recognized for 5 minutes to give an oral presentation of his 

testimony. And without objection, his written statement will be 

made a part of the record. 

Once the witness has finished presenting his testimony, each 

member of the subcommittee will have 5 minutes within which to 

ask questions of our witness. 

Mr. Gibson, on your table, and you are well aware of this, you 

have three lights: the green means go; the yellow means you have 

a minute left; and the red means your time is up. We will try to 

remain true to the lights and the time, but I have a limited panel 

here today so we might show some generosity with the gavel. 

The microphone is sensitive. Please make sure you are speaking 

directly into it. And so with that, Mr. Gibson, you are recognized 

for 5 minutes to give a presentation of your statement. 

STATEMENT OF FRED W. GIBSON, JR., ACTING INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION 

Mr. GIBSON. Chairman Duffy, Ranking Member Green, and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to 

speak with the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee today 

regarding our report on the FDIC’s supervisory treatment of refund 

anticipation loans or RALs. 

Our work on RALs is an outgrowth of work we performed in response to an October 2014 request from 35 Members of the Congress concerning the FDIC’s participation in the Department of 

Justice’s Operation Choke Point. 

During early stages of Operation Choke Point the Department of 

Justice attached a list of businesses, referred to as a high-risk list, 

to subpoena seeking information from a variety of organizations, 

including some financial institutions. The high-risk list, derived 

from an FDIC publication, was at the heart of the concern surrounding Operation Choke Point and was the starting point for our 

review. 

In our audit, we assessed the FDIC’s supervisory approach to financial institutions that conducted business with merchants on the 

high-risk list. We concluded that the FDIC’s supervisory approach 

was within the broad authorities that it is granted under the FDI 

Act. 

However, the manner in which the FDIC carried out its supervisory approach was not consistent, not always consistent with the 

FDIC’s written policy and guidance. Payday lending in particular 

fell into this category. 

We also concluded that the FDIC’s participation, direct participation in Operation Choke Point was limited to a few communications 

from FDIC staff to DOJ employees at the time the DOJ’s initiative 

was implemented. 

5 

During the course of that audit, we began to learn of the FDIC’s 

supervisory approach to institutions offering RALs. Broadly speaking, refund anticipation loans are products offered to individuals 

through tax preparers that enable individuals filing returns to obtain a portion of their refund immediately. 

RALs can be legally offered in most locations. Because they are 

short-term, high-rate loans, the FDIC considered them to have similarities to payday loans. RALs were not on the high-risk list and 

were not associated with DOJ’s Operation Choke Point. 

However, we noted that the FDIC’s approach to institutions offering this product appeared to be similar to those prompting the 

original congressional request regarding Operation Choke Point. As 

a result, we decided to perform additional work regarding RALs 

which led to the report that we are discussing today. 

This report contains information relating to open banks, supervisory matters, and information that is protected under the Privacy 

Act, which under the law cannot be publicly disclosed at this time. 

I have provided as my written statement the executive summary 

of the report accompanied by the executive summary of the FDIC’s 

response in a separate letter from the Board of the FDIC. 

I respectfully request that that written statement be included in 

the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indicating you would do 

so. 

In summary, our review of the FDIC’s supervisory approach to 

RALs strongly reinforced the concerns raised in our September 

2015 audit. While the number of institutions offering RALs was 

limited, RALs were a nationwide product and the FDIC’s supervisory approach affected both the product and all of the FDIC-regulated institutions offering it. 

With this report, we concluded that the FDIC’s decision-making 

process and supervisory expectations need to be more transparent. 

We found that the goal to eliminate RALs as a product line and 

the FDIC’s approach in reaching that goal was not in keeping with 

that transparency. 

Taking our two reports together we believe: that the FDIC needs 

to examine how the actions described in the report unfolded as 

they did; that they should establish more meaningful controls over 

the exercise of certain supervisory tools; and lastly that the FDIC 

should create meaningful appeal and oversight mechanisms with 

remedies for institutions should they be subject to abusive treatment. 

The FDIC should also consider how its culture played into the 

events which our report details. On March 11th, I received a memo 

signed by each of the Directors committing to review and consider 

the key issues raised in our report and to provide a status update 

on their efforts by June 30th. 

Thank you for the opportunity to present our work. I am happy 

to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gibson can be found on page 31 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman DUFFY. Thank you, Mr. Gibson. 

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. I just want 

to be clear. In regard to the refund anticipation loans and the three 

institutions that were subject to pressure by the FDIC, were those 

6 

institutions facing safety and soundness issues based on their participation in refund anticipation loans? Was it a safety and soundness issue for those banks? 

Mr. GIBSON. The FDIC would argue that there were safety and 

soundness issues associated with refund anticipation loans, so from 

that perspective, I think the answer is yes. 

Chairman DUFFY. And what was their argument? 

Mr. GIBSON. I’m sorry? 

Chairman DUFFY. What was their argument? 

Mr. GIBSON. The argument shifted over the course of time depending upon the time that we are talking about. There were questions that the— 

Chairman DUFFY. Questions that either it was a work-inprogress, an argument-in-progress, depending on— 

Mr. GIBSON. I think it was. The argument shifted from various 

issues surrounding safety and soundness of the product, the manner in which the product was underwritten. The last issue that was 

raised, for example, was the loss of something called the debt indicator, an IRS tool that would enable institutions to have certain information about the borrowers. 

Chairman DUFFY. Were they finding a high default rate with 

these loans? 

Mr. GIBSON. No. 

Chairman DUFFY. So to the banks’ safety and soundness, do they 

see a real threat to the safety of the bank? 

Mr. GIBSON. I think there is an argument to be made that numbers don’t lie. The fact is is that the institutions never experienced 

a loss rate on these loans that exceeded 2 percent. In fact, in most 

years the loss rate on the loan was at the loans was significantly 

less than that. And that is true. We looked from 2007 forward to 

2011, and during that period the loss rates were all less than 2 percent. 

Chairman DUFFY. So the FDIC might try to make the argument 

of safety and soundness, but the facts showed something quite different. Is that fair to say? 

Mr. GIBSON. The performance of the loans would suggest that 

there wasn’t that much risk. 

Chairman DUFFY. And you didn’t see deceitful behavior, fraudulent behavior from these banks with the clients that they served 

or customers that they served at a high rate did you? 

Mr. GIBSON. We didn’t go and really examine the individual programs of the banks to make a call on something like that. But in 

the course of our work, we didn’t become familiar with any such 

problem, no. 

Chairman DUFFY. Did the FDIC make that argument to you that 

there is fraud and deceit being used by the financial institutions 

with their customers? 

Mr. GIBSON. They never argued that there was fraud or deceit 

being used, to my knowledge. 

Chairman DUFFY. One of my concerns is you have a product that 

doesn’t affect the safety and soundness of the bank arguably, and 

it appears that the customers who are using the products know 

what they are getting and understand the terms of what they are 

getting. 

7 

And here we have the FDIC stepping in using their judgment for 

the free will of the American people, which gives a lot of us concern, not just in this program but also with Operation Choke Point. 

The Congress uses its moral judgment as Representatives of the 

people. We didn’t give that authority to the FDIC. 

In your report, Anthony Lowe, the Regional Director of the FDIC 

Chicago office, and Mark Pearce, the Director of Consumer Protection, were mentioned, I think in our search, 300 times in a 180- 

page report. Obviously if you reviewed, and you did, the Choke 

Point reports by Congress, and you were involved in that as well, 

these are two common names that came up in Choke Point as well. 

Can you describe Mr. Lowe’s and Mr. Pearce’s roles in the refund 

anticipation loan investigation that you did? 

Mr. GIBSON. I am reluctant to discuss too many details for privacy concerns, but let me think about what I can say. Mr. Lowe 

is the Regional Director of the FDIC in the Chicago region. All 

three of the institutions offering refund anticipation loans were in 

the Chicago region and accordingly were supervised by an examination staff that Mr. Lowe supervises. Mr. Lowe directs that examination staff and is responsible for it. 

Mr. Pearce was the head of the Division of Consumer Protection 

at the time of these events, and as such was responsible for oversight of the consumer protection side, the compliance side, as it 

were, of the examination function. 

Both played roles in the course of this: Mr. Lowe from the standpoint of the implementation of directions that were received from 

headquarters in Washington; and Mr. Pearce at a higher level with 

respect to the policy of the FDIC concerning refund anticipation 

loans, as well as its implementation. 

Chairman DUFFY. I am almost done here, but in the refund anticipation loans we saw with Mr. Lowe’s and Mr. Pearce’s involvement with the prior investigations with Choke Point, we had a 

chance to review the e-mail correspondence when they were targeting short-term lenders. Have these two been reprimanded? Do 

they still work for the FDIC? Have they been fired? What do you 

know about their employment status? 

Mr. GIBSON. Both are still employed by the FDIC. And I cannot 

speak to any personnel action that may have been taken. I 

wouldn’t know about that. 

Chairman DUFFY. And we are not surprised by that. My time has 

expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. 

Cleaver, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Gibson, thank you for being here. These RALs are products 

that have been around now for a while, and my first question is, 

do you see anything inherently evil with RALs, particularly those 

which are issued from reputable companies? 

Mr. GIBSON. I don’t really know that I have a position on RALs, 

per se. They seem to me to be a loan product that is being offered 

to people and that is really what they boil down to. 

Mr. CLEAVER. I am thinking about that, yes, that there are some 

benefits. One, of course, is that the recipient of the loan which is 

based on anticipated refunds is able to get that refund not only 

8 

more quickly, but it would allow them to speed up some delayed 

attention towards financial challenges. And so, I guess I don’t see 

them as being evil. 

And my other concern and that made more impact, the FDIC, 

than you as the Inspector General, but that every entity providing 

RALs is not designed to rip them off. And so I think we may be 

doing a disservice if we have a conversation that would suggest 

that everybody who is doing it is a rip-off agent. 

Now, at the same time, I do agree with your recommendations 

that you made, that the I.G. made. I think those are right on target. And I don’t think a reputable entity would back away from 

that. I would think that all of the reputable institutions doing 

RALs would probably jump right on it and say that they can do 

this: better communications internally and externally; improved 

guidance to supervised institutions; and an enhanced appeals process, which is what you have recommended. 

If that is cleaned up, and I don’t know if this ends up in your 

purview, if those recommendations are taken do you see that as the 

most significant step that could be taken in terms of allowing this 

to be something that we live with? I don’t particularly like high interest rates, even though it is a high interest rate for a short period 

of time. The truth of the matter is some people do in fact need that. 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I think with respect to the recommendations 

that we made, the FDIC’s Board indicated that they would provide 

us with a status update by June 30th. They indicated they would 

take the key issues under consideration and advise us about exactly what they were going to do in response to that. 

At that point in time, we will take a look at them. And I hope 

that they will be responsive to the issues that we have raised and 

we can address it at that point in time. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Do you have any idea about—my concern is ‘‘Uncle 

Willie’s tax preparation company.’’ Uncle Willie is an automobile 

body shop owner when he is not in tax season and he is a good 

human being, but I am just wondering how many of those kinds 

of things were involved in offering the RALs on behalf of, let us 

say, small banks, community banks? 

Mr. GIBSON. The three banks that offered the RALs had different 

programs under which they would take a look at the folks who 

were offering these things. And one of the risks associated with offering these sorts of products is the risk that the person offering 

the product to the public isn’t going to follow the law. 

The banks all had mitigation programs. One bank had a fairly 

extensive audit program that went out and looked at a very large 

number of the people who were offering these in order to assure 

that they were complying with the law. 

They made suggestions directly to the board of directors of that 

institution. And the board of directors, as I understand it, took action in order to remediate any of the issues that came up. So there 

was attention that was being paid by certainly that institution, to 

what was going on with the individual RAL offerors, the people 

who were offering the loans. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Yes, but there are some of the lenders who are 

also banks themselves, who have a subsidiary that are actually 

banks, but I think those are all at another level. 

9 

I am sorry I have run over, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DUFFY. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. 

Hill, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HILL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and the ranking 

member for this interesting hearing. 

Mr. Gibson, thank you for being with us today. Do you know off 

the top of your head when reputation risk was added into the 

CAMELS rating process? My guess is sometime around the mid2000s or so, but I just—if you might know? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I do not know. I don’t know that CAMELS particular, that reputation risk is necessarily—it is not an individual 

component of CAMELS. I am not too sure if that— 

Mr. HILL. No, but it was added in the exam manual sometime 

in 2000 that everything had reputation risk, and that boards needed to review that, particularly in new product development areas. 

But you agree that banks are responsible for their own product development consistent with the laws and regulations? 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, sir, I do. 

Mr. HILL. And I think banks are supposed to offer products 

based on consumer needs, which we see in CRA. You get extra 

credit in community reinvestment exams if you show survey results 

of your consumer base, your neighborhoods. And so from surveys 

or word of mouth that banks get credit for doing product innovation and trying to meet consumer needs, you have seen that, I’m 

sure, in your work? 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, we have. 

Mr. HILL. And banks have obligations for consumer compliance 

and for fair dealing under a number of statutes. So it always concerns me when I hear these stories of a regional office or a particular examiner kind of going rogue on taking the place of the 

microprudential manager of the bank about what he or she should 

not do in the product development arena. 

And that was kind of the whole point that we were frustrated 

about with Operation Choke Point, because I had a lot of customers 

who had legitimate reasons for refund anticipation loans, such as 

paying off a credit card after Christmas, car downpayments, home 

improvement, or tuition payments for a semester. 

And so when we had these sorts of activities by our regulators 

we are actually contradicting. We are hypocritical. We are saying 

that consumers want these products like overdraft protection or 

prepaid cards or refund anticipation loans and then we don’t facilitate banks offering them. 

In fact, we, through moral suasion and other ways, defeat that 

causing these consumers who want the product to migrate out to 

the unbanked, unregulated or under-regulated segments. So again, 

that is one of my biggest frustrations in this process. 

Do you think it is fair to say that if banks do product innovation, 

and their board of directors reviews that product, and that they 

offer it and they accept the reputational risk and the financial risk 

with it, that generally a bank should be able to innovate, based on 

your work at the FDIC? 

10 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I think as a general proposition that it is up to 

the bank to mitigate the risks that are associated with the product 

that it offers. 

As you pointed out, we create laws that establish requirements 

that banks are obligated to follow. And we supervise for the purpose of ensuring that they are doing so in a safe and sound manner, but ultimately, risk is the bank’s job. 

Mr. HILL. Right. So from your review of Mr. Lowe’s work, is it 

fair to say that the Chicago regional office was off the reservation 

on pursuing this compared to the national policy directives from 

Washington? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I think with respect to the RALs, what our 

work shows is that the national policy informed what Mr. Lowe 

did. I think that the national policy directed how the RALs should 

be supervised. The banks offering RALs should be supervised ultimately. 

Mr. HILL. But what is setting that apart from any other consumer loan product? I don’t understand. If it is that we have measured loss ratio, if we are in compliance with all the lending consumer disclosure laws, and we are operating in a fair dealing manner, why is this loan or why is this product being separated out 

from any other consumer credit decision to finance a car or finance 

a new air conditioning system for a home? 

Why is this being singled out? It is because of somebody’s idea 

that it is bad. Isn’t that right? Instead of a financial— 

Mr. GIBSON. I really can’t answer the question. And I am sorry 

to say that I can’t because I can’t point to something specific that 

says, this is why we are doing this with respect to RALs. The FDIC 

chose not to issue any guidance or policies with respect to that particular product. 

Now, there is general guidance associated with kind of the type 

of lending here and third-party risk concerns, but there is no specific guidance on this particular product which we can turn to that 

answers that question. 

Mr. HILL. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DUFFY. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Green, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, thank you. 

Sir, I believe you will agree that the FDIC has a mandate when 

it comes to safety and soundness. Is this correct? 

Mr. GIBSON. Absolutely. 

Mr. GREEN. And I believe that their opinion is of great value 

when it comes to safety and soundness? 

Mr. GIBSON. As do I. 

Mr. GREEN. And you would probably also concur and agree that 

while you can give opinions about the process, the ultimate judge 

of safety and soundness is the FDIC. 

Mr. GIBSON. I’m sorry, sir; I am having difficulty hearing you. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. While you may give an opinion about a process, the ultimate judge of safety and soundness is the FDIC. 

Mr. GIBSON. Oh, absolutely. Yes, sir. 

11 

Mr. GREEN. So any opinion that you give today, and you are a 

wonderful person. I love you. I know your mother does. But my 

mother loves me, but that is just your opinion. You don’t have the 

mandate that the FDIC has. And by the way, you have not gone 

so far as to say that there was not a safety and soundness issue. 

That is a fair statement, isn’t it? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I didn’t say that there wasn’t a safety and 

soundness issue, but what I would point out— 

Mr. GREEN. Let me just do this. I will let somebody—my time is 

limited and perhaps someone else— 

Mr. GIBSON. That is fine. 

Mr. GREEN. —will work with you. Let us talk about the quality 

of these loans. You did not give an opinion about the quality of the 

loans. I think you sort of indicated that you had no position on the 

quality, the quality in terms of whether or not these are good products or bad products in the main? 

Mr. GIBSON. That is correct. 

Mr. GREEN. So with the banks having the duty to effectively 

manage safety and soundness, they have to determine something 

with reference to quality because the banks also have one other 

mandate. 

I think you will agree that the banks have a duty to also have 

a consumer protection component. Let me strike that and make it 

that the FDIC has this duty. The FDIC has a certain consumer 

protection component associated with it. Is this true? 

Mr. GIBSON. That is true. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. So you have the FDIC with a consumer protection component. They have the safety and soundness component. 

They have a real concern, especially given how certain underwriting standards in 2008 created a crisis that had a domino impact across the globe. 

Now, this is not of that magnitude, obviously, but they still have 

that safety and soundness concern, and they still have to deal with 

consumer protection issues, which is why we have to now examine 

the product itself because the FDIC has to give some value judgment about these products. 

And clearly, some of these RALs had annual percentage rates of 

as much as 500 percent, some, not all, just some. Look, I agree that 

if you need money you have to be able to go in and get it if you 

need it. But I also think that we have to have some protections for 

consumers, especially low-income people. It is a balancing test that 

we have to engage in. 

So with the 500 percent, with the underwriting being performed 

off campus away from the bank, and you couple that with the opportunity for fraud, you indicated there were some systems in 

place, but you did not go out and evaluate each individual underwriter, did you? 

Mr. GIBSON. Of course not. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. So you really don’t know. You really don’t 

know what those individual underwriters were doing, do you? You 

don’t know. Come on— 

Mr. GIBSON. Do I personally know? No, of course not. 

12 

Mr. GREEN. Of course you don’t. You are the I.G., and you didn’t 

go out and examine them, so you don’t know. I think that is a fair 

statement, isn’t it? 

Mr. GIBSON. It is a statement. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Well, it is a fair statement. You weren’t there. 

You don’t know. You didn’t examine them. If you want to find a 

clever way to say I know, tell me what that clever way is? 

Mr. GIBSON. I wouldn’t say that it is a clever way, but what I 

would point out is this. One of the institutions was to receive, 

based on the examination of the bank, an overall rating of two. 

That is a pretty good CAMELS rating, particularly if I— 

Mr. GREEN. Can you do this a little bit faster because I have another question for you? 

Mr. GIBSON. That is fine. I will be as quick as I can. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. 

Mr. GIBSON. The point I would make is that the DCP examiners, 

the consumer protection examiners of the FDIC reviewed that rating for that institution that was offering RALs, and they concurred 

in it. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Let us do this. 

Mr. GIBSON. They didn’t have a problem with giving that rating. 

Mr. GREEN. I appreciate your commentary. Let us do this. Do 

you agree that there was not a culture at the FDIC with reference 

to this type of product—there was not a culture at the FDIC? There 

was not a culture as it relates to what they were doing in auditing 

these products? There was not a culture there? Do you agree with 

that? 

Mr. GIBSON. I am not sure what you mean, sir. I’m sorry. 

Mr. GREEN. Do you agree that this was not widespread, that all 

of the employees were involved in some sort of conspiracy to go out 

and put an end to these products? Do you agree with that? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I think that this involved a decision that was 

made at a headquarters level and was passed down to the field to 

execute. And I don’t think anybody else was involved in it. 

Mr. GREEN. So there is not a culture at the FDIC. And do you 

also agree that you have been working with the FDIC and they are 

going to give you some indications as to the corrective actions that 

have been taken? 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, they will. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. 

Mr. GIBSON. I believe they will. 

Mr. GREEN. And finally, and I thank you for allowing me to go 

over, Mr. Chairman, do you also agree that this was not, ‘‘N–O– 

T’’, not a part of Operation Choke Point? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, Operation Choke Point was a DOJ program. 

Mr. GREEN. I am going to— 

Mr. GIBSON. And this wasn’t part of a DOJ program, correct. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. All right. So then that is another way of saying it was N–O–T a part of Operation Choke Point, right? 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Thank you. 

Chairman DUFFY. The gentleman yields back the time he doesn’t 

have. 

Mr. GREEN. It is done. 

13 

Chairman DUFFY. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Poliquin, from 

Maine, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it very 

much. 

Mr. Gibson, thank you very much for being here. I appreciate it. 

I am a business owner, and before I became State Treasurer of 

Maine a few years ago, and before serving in Congress, I was in 

the private sector my entire life. 

And do you know one of the things that absolutely gives me fits 

is that this big, strong arm of the Federal Government, and I could 

extend that and say State and local government also, that continues to put pressure on our employers. 

One of the things that we parents all want are better opportunities for our kids. More jobs, we want to make sure they are healthy 

and safe and they get a good education. 

The Competitive Enterprise Institute computes that a couple of 

years ago, and presumably in 2015 also, the total cost to our employers in this country for Federal regulations only, Mr. Gibson, 

not State, just Federal regulations is $1.9 trillion—$1.9 trillion on 

our businesses in this country. 

Now our businesses, of course, pass along these costs to the folks 

who buy their products or their services. So we end up paying for 

all this overregulation. 

Now, overregulation is bad enough, and I bet I spend 25 percent 

of my time, Mr. Chairman, 25 percent of my time here in Congress, 

being here for a year, listening to business owners or folks who represent business owners with one simple request: ‘‘Get the government off my back. I know how to make money. I am an entrepreneur. I know how to take risk, invest my own savings, grow the 

economy. In doing that, I will hire more people and I will pay you 

more.’’ That is what we want. 

So now comes this Operation Choke Point or something similar 

to it. This is alarming. And Mr. Gibson, I am guessing as an I.G. 

you are also alarmed or you wouldn’t be here. Now, we are in a 

free enterprise economy where if you have a legal business, you 

should be able to conduct that operation, that business legally and 

lawfully in this country. 

But all of a sudden we see, Mr. Chairman, a few months ago we 

had a hearing on this that—there is a list of companies that the 

Justice Department didn’t like, when you sell firearms legally or 

fireworks legally or tobacco legally or alcohol legally. 

Let us go put pressure on the FDIC. Let us put pressure on the 

regulators to stop these businesses by choking off their credit. And 

now, we have a situation that I think is very concerning. It takes 

it to another level. 

Unless I am mistaken, Mr. Gibson, and maybe you can shed light 

on this, and I quote from the Deputy Director of Policy at the 

FDIC, ‘‘Marty Gruenberg who runs the FDIC thought it was a 

strong document,’’ referring to a document that was written a few 

years before, which is a guideline in dealing with these issues, ‘‘I 

thought it was a strong document.’’ 

But he stated that, ‘‘his instinct was to wait to issue a document 

like this until after we—i.e., the FDIC—had taken strong specific 

14 

action with one or more of our RAL lenders.’’ He said he believes 

these lenders are recalcitrant and would ignore the directive. 

So in other words, these are the cops showing up at your door, 

arresting you, and then after they do that saying now we will issue 

a guideline on what the heck the law is. Am I getting this wrong? 

What am I missing here? 

Can you imagine the behavior of the Federal Government that 

is supposed to help our citizens in this country, help our businesses, help our families live better lives with more opportunity 

and more freedom? And now these regulators are saying we don’t 

like your business, or worse, we will put pressure on you now and 

we will write the regulation after. What am I missing here, Mr. 

Gibson? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I believe that one of the issues that is raised 

by the facts that are contained in this report does relate to the 

transparency of the decisions that are being made by the government. I believe that the government should be able and should be 

willing to explain to people why it is it is doing what it is doing. 

And that in this particular case, the FDIC didn’t achieve that end. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Let us drill down there a minute, Mr. Gibson, if 

you don’t mind, in my remaining time. We both agree, and by the 

way I salute you for your work, keep digging. Absolutely keep 

digging. And you operate independently within FDIC and I know 

you have that authority and that power. 

Do you think, and I think you just said you didn’t, that they have 

not explained why they conducted themselves the way they did? Is 

that what I am hearing? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I think at the time there was no transparency 

really associated with the FDIC’s reasons for taking the actions 

that it took. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. And why do you think today— 

Mr. GIBSON. That is what I am saying. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. —they have taken those actions, sir? 

Mr. GIBSON. Pardon me? 

Mr. POLIQUIN. And why do you think today, they took those actions when they did? Do you have an opinion now? 

Mr. GIBSON. The FDIC says that they believe that these products 

represented safety and soundness issues and consumer protection 

issues— 

Mr. POLIQUIN. But does that just— 

Mr. GIBSON. —and were not appropriate for that. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. But does that justify putting pressure by regulators on a bank to shut this down and then afterwards issuing 

guidelines? 

Mr. GIBSON. In my view, they should have explained why it was 

they felt that way. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. What is next? Do you see anything coming down 

the road? What is next? Buying a new pair of tennis shoes even 

if you don’t like the color? What is next? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time. 

Chairman DUFFY. The gentleman’s time has expired. We are now 

going to go into a second round so that the gentleman from Maine 

will have another chance to continue his questioning or comments. 

And with that, the Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes. 

15 

I want to follow up, Mr. Gibson, on the points that were just 

made by Mr. Poliquin. This is stunning to me, the fact that this 

individual by the name of Marty Gruenberg, in essence in an email, was saying that, let us go through enforcement first and we 

will talk about guidance in our financial institution letter later. 

This individual, Marty Gruenberg, is he a low-level individual at 

the FDIC? 

Mr. GIBSON. No, sir. 

Chairman DUFFY. Who is he? 

Mr. GIBSON. Mr. Gruenberg currently is the Chairman of the 

FDIC. 

Chairman DUFFY. The Chairman of the FDIC, a-ha. The Chairman is the one who is saying let us go through an enforcement 

measure and let us look at guidance at a later date. Did the guidance in the form of a financial institution letter, a field letter, ever 

come from the FDIC? 

Mr. GIBSON. Specifically with respect to this product, no, sir. 

Chairman DUFFY. And so, it is no wonder that the individuals involved in this report, Anthony Lowe and Mark Pearce, are still 

working for the FDIC. 

Frankly, they are following the directive of the Chairman of the 

FDIC. Their boss is in up to his armpits in the report that you provided to this committee. Yes? Is Mr. Gruenberg part of this? Did 

Mr. Gruenberg know what was going on? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, that e-mail wasn’t written by Mr. Gruenberg. 

It represents what someone believe that he said. 

Chairman DUFFY. Right, but it represented a comment that Mr. 

Gruenberg made— 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes. 

Chairman DUFFY. —about holding off. And Mr. Gruenberg, as 

the Chair, said, let us enforce first, in essence, and we will give 

guidance later, right? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, that is what he reportedly said. 

Chairman DUFFY. And did they do enforcement first? 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes. 

Chairman DUFFY. Yes, and frankly the guidance never came, correct, because everybody got out of the business? 

Mr. GIBSON. That is correct. 

Chairman DUFFY. No wonder changes haven’t been made at the 

FDIC and Mr. Gruenberg was a part of Operation Choke Point. 

And as Mr. Poliquin indicates, we are in a situation where we have 

a nanny state. Mother government will tell us what products are 

good and bad for us. 

I think, as Mr. Cleaver indicated, we have people who find themselves in hard times, who might need to get a little money early 

from their tax return. They might have to get a short-term loan because their car broke down. Or the family pet got hit by a car and 

has to go to the vet, and they need to get short-term money. 

And we are turning everyone away from an opportunity to access 

cash in the short term because we think we know best or they 

think they know best in Washington. 

And if you can’t turn to a bank or a short-term lender, where do 

you turn? You are going to turn to Uncle Vinny, not uncle, Mr. 

16 

Vinny down the street. And he is not too kind when you don’t 

repay. And this is concerning stuff. 

Let me ask you this. In regard to the banks that were involved 

in your investigation, was any pressure put on the banks with any 

downgrade of their CAMELS rating that you found? 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, sir, there was. 

Chairman DUFFY. Could you explain that? 

Mr. GIBSON. A downgrade of the CAMELS rating results in increased assessments. It can result in limitations on the bank’s ability to engage in certain activities. In this case, the downgrade of 

an institution from a two to a three basically reinforced a prohibition on that institution participating in the purchase of assets of 

failed institutions, which was part of their business strategy. 

So, changes in CAMELS ratings cause significant effects on financial institutions. 

Chairman DUFFY. I think I read somewhere in your report that 

the FDIC was concerned there might be a high litigation cost to 

going after these three banks that are referenced in the report. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. GIBSON. They did. 

Chairman DUFFY. And it is fair to say that when your CAMELS 

rating is reduced, due pressure is applied, and people get out of the 

business instead of litigating it? Is that fair to say? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I don’t know what the reasons were that people 

got out of the business. We didn’t speak with them. But it is possible. 

Chairman DUFFY. It is possible. I would just note that you look 

at what is taking place and the fact that last year alone 80,000 

pages of new rules and regulations have come from the Federal 

Government. 

It is hard enough to comply with the rules that are put out that 

people can try to read and try to comply with, but it is even harder 

when you have a regulatory body of our financial industry that 

tries to enforce first and give guidance later. 

We should know what the rules are. The rules of the game 

should be clear. We should all be able to understand them and we 

should all be able to follow them. This is frightening that we have 

another Act by the FDIC that goes through enforcement first and 

guidance, if we are lucky, second. 

I want to thank you again, Mr. Gibson, you and your team for 

the hard work they have put into this investigation, and I appreciate your willingness to testify before this committee. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman DUFFY. My time has expired. 

And I now yield to the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Cleaver, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think I sufficiently raised the issues that I needed to raise. I 

would like to yield the balance of my time to the ranking member. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Cleaver. I greatly appreciate your 

sharing your time with me. 

Sir, with reference to the chairperson of the FDIC, is it true that 

the statements that were called to your attention, and we want to 

make sure that this is clear on the record, were statements that 

17 

we would probably call hearsay in some circumstances? Is that a 

fair statement? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, that is fair. 

Mr. GREEN. I’m sorry. Say that again? 

Mr. GIBSON. That is fair. 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, hearsay. Somebody heard it or they say that 

they heard it and they then repeat it. That is not the most reliable 

evidence. In fact, it would take some sort of exception to the hearsay rule for it to be admitted in court. Of course, we bend the rules 

around here, so that just about anything that we want to say gets 

heard. 

But I want to kind of defend his reputation because I believe him 

to be an honorable man. And I don’t think that he had a circumstance wherein he had an outcome that he desired and hence 

any means necessary to get to the outcome was the methodology 

employed. I just don’t see the evidence of that as it relates to him. 

Now, let us go to what I have here as intelligence. I have here 

an indication that in 2006, there was a report by the FDIC’s Office 

of Inspector General. Are you associated with that office, sir? 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, I was. 

Mr. GREEN. You were? All right. And how long were you there? 

Mr. GIBSON. I have been there for a long time. I have been with 

the FDIC Office of Inspector General since the sunset of the RTC, 

which was 1995 or— 

Mr. GREEN. So it is fair to say that you would be familiar with 

this report? 

Mr. GIBSON. I don’t know if I would be familiar with a report 

from— 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. The style of the report is, ‘‘The Challenges and 

FDIC Efforts Related to Predatory Lending.’’ 

Mr. GIBSON. I am sorry, sir. I am not specifically familiar with 

the report at this time. 

Mr. GREEN. Not specific. I don’t want you to have read it in its 

entirety, but have you heard of such a report existing? 

Mr. GIBSON. It doesn’t surprise me that we did one at all. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. And would it surprise you to know that the report indicates that borrowers lose more than $25 billion annually 

due to predatory mortgages, payday loans, lending abuses involving 

overdraft loans, excessive credit card debt, and tax fund loans. 

Would it surprise you to know that is in the report? 

Mr. GIBSON. No. 

Mr. GREEN. And if this is the case, we would then focus on the 

refund loans and someone would conclude that predatory lending, 

not being a good thing, that we ought to regulate these tax refund 

loans. I am not saying eliminate, but I am saying that the FDIC 

ought to regulate them to the extent that they don’t create a part 

of this $25 billion in predatory mortgages and other loans as well. 

But that shouldn’t be a part of that. Don’t you agree? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I don’t know if I can comment on that. 

Mr. GREEN. All right, I will accept that. Sir, I think that was a 

fair comment. I will accept that you won’t comment on that. I will 

give my editorial, my commentary, and I think that we clearly expect the FDIC to deal with predatory lending. And we ought to 

make sure that we deal with these refund loans. 

18 

Let me give you a case in point, what we will call a case in point. 

A person goes in to the tax preparer. The tax preparer says, okay, 

I can get you this refund and I will charge you a certain amount 

of money because I am going to help you get a refund. The tax preparer makes a mistake or two, not intentionally, and the person 

does not get the amount of loan refund, well, doesn’t get the 

amount of refund that the loan is for. 

And as a result, these persons who make these loans, they sign 

agreements. And when they sign these agreements, there is language contained therein requiring them to have to pay for the 

amount that the loan was for even if the refund is a lot less. You 

agree with this, don’t you? 

Mr. GIBSON. I think so. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. I think you are thinking right. And so given 

that they have to pay for that loan, and given that you have a person who is getting this loan with an earned income tax credit, 

needed the money right away, now we have a person who doesn’t 

have the loan. He spent that money already. And then, they have 

this obligation that was not expected. 

That happened in these circumstances such that poor people, 

people who needed the money found themselves having to repay 

loans that they didn’t expect to have to pay because of mistakes 

that were made in tax preparation. 

I yield back. 

Chairman DUFFY. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Hill, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. HILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again just, I think, to the 

ranking member, the FDIC exam manuals and exam process cover 

all consumer lending. All consumer loans have to be in compliance 

with the statutes and regulations. There is just nothing per se that 

distinguished these loans from another kind of consumer loan in 

the exam process. 

So that is why I have been searching for the point of why they 

have been singled out and why this kind of a project or the Choke 

Point project is so off the norm from the FDIC or the DOJ’s process. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to you, 

sir. 

Chairman DUFFY. Thank you, Mr. Hill. 

I just want to be clear that, again, Mr. Gibson, the allegation 

wasn’t being made on predatory lending, was it, in regard to your 

investigation? 

Mr. GIBSON. Not that I am aware of. 

Chairman DUFFY. And to Mr. Green’s point, this was not about 

the FDIC regulating these loans. They were there to eliminate 

these loans. Is that what you found? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, what our report found was that there was a decision that was reached that FDIC’s supervised institutions should 

not be offering refund anticipation loans. So the goal was to get 

them out of refund anticipation loans. So that is the goal. 

Chairman DUFFY. So you would agree that is not regulating, that 

is eliminating, correct? 

Mr. GIBSON. It is not regulating. 

19 

Chairman DUFFY. Did you have a chance to talk to Chairman 

Gruenberg about this? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, we have talked about it, yes. 

Chairman DUFFY. Did he know that this elimination was taking 

place in regard to— 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I did not speak with him personally or directly 

about that. I really don’t know. 

Chairman DUFFY. Did someone on your team? Did someone on 

your team speak with Mr. Gruenberg? 

Mr. GIBSON. Mr. Gruenberg really had little recollection of these 

events, sir. 

Chairman DUFFY. And it is my understanding that the quote 

that was given by the Deputy Director of Policy from the FDIC, 

which stated that Mr. Gruenberg thought it was a strong document, meaning to fill, but stated that his instinct was to ‘‘wait to 

issue a document like this until we had a strong, specific action 

with one or more of our RAL lenders,’’ meaning he wanted to go 

through enforcement before regulation. 

Did you ask Mr. Gruenberg or did your team ask Mr. Gruenberg 

about that e-mail? 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, sir, and he didn’t recall it. 

Chairman DUFFY. So he didn’t deny it, per your recollection? 

Mr. GIBSON. He didn’t recall. 

Chairman DUFFY. So he didn’t deny it? 

Mr. GIBSON. Not that I know of. 

Chairman DUFFY. Okay. And it is also fair to say that Mr. Pearce 

in an e-mail said, ‘‘I want to see if we can achieve a resolution with 

Bank A,’’ that was redacted, ‘‘in the next month or two then follow 

up with something like this in the May timeframe before institutions get going on next year’s product.’’ Then you are following up 

with a fill. Is that correct? That is the— 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, if it is quoted and I don’t remember the specific 

language of the e-mail, but if it is in our report then that is exactly 

what the e-mail said. 

Chairman DUFFY. And how many people did you interview in regard to your investigation? 

Mr. GIBSON. We interviewed 25 or 26 people with respect to this 

and well over 100 in connection with the original audit we did in 

the Choke Point era. 

Chairman DUFFY. So how high does this go? Who is making the 

decisions? Mr. Hill is a former banker who is obviously outraged 

by the actions of the FDIC. 

Who is in control of the FDIC? Does it go to the top or is there 

someone below Mr. Gruenberg who is making these decisions, 

whether it is in regard to Choke Point or it is in regard to the current topic refund anticipation loans? 

Mr. GIBSON. I think with respect to refund anticipation loans, the 

only answer that I can give you is that the decision was made by 

no one, but it was made by everyone. I can’t point to a specific decision-maker because I can’t find anything that identifies somebody. 

The origin of the discussion in recent times, in 2008, was an email from Chairman Bair or a question that Chairman Bair asked 

about why FDIC banks should be offering these products. It seems 

to have just moved forward from there. 

20 

Chairman DUFFY. But it is obvious that Mr. Gruenberg knew 

about the program, at least by way of some of the e-mails that you 

discovered. So my question is, is Mr. Gruenberg a negligent leader 

at the FDIC or is he complicit in all the bad behavior at the FDIC? 

Because it has to be one or the other. Either he is involved and 

complicit or he doesn’t know what is going on, and someone else 

is running the FDIC and he has checked out. 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I believe that Mr. Gruenberg was generally at 

least aware of what was going on with respect to RALs. What I can 

tell you is that members of the board did most of these briefings 

and received information from management and in a variety of different ways each of the inside members of the board was engaged 

in these activities. 

Chairman DUFFY. My time from Mr. Hill has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. 

Ellison, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ELLISON. Right next door to you. 

Chairman DUFFY. I know. You are my neighbor. 

Mr. ELLISON. That is right. Well, anyway, thank you Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Ranking Member. I have long been critical of refund 

anticipation loans, RAL loans. These short-term high-cost bank 

loans secured by the taxpayers’ expected tax refund are often predatory and expensive. I would say always, but there might be some 

that aren’t and I just don’t know about them. But all the ones I 

have ever seen have been bad. 

I believe in many cases they violate the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). A RAL preparer will typically charge tax preparation fees, loan administration fees, and bank fees in addition to 

other fees that a borrower can avoid by filing directly with the IRS. 

And I know your report starts in 2003 when refund anticipation 

loans or RALs were turning into a huge wealth-stripping problem. 

Professional tax preparers, as well as thousands of small independent preparers, were brokering these deals on behalf of insured 

financial institutions. These 7- to 14-day loans were paid by the actual IRS refund. The RAL preparers were often able to offer these 

loans because they partnered with banks. 

Numerous consumer groups decried this practice and urged regulators to stop the practice. And according to your report, most large 

banks stopped being involved with RALs. JPMorgan Chase, HSBC, 

and Santa Barbara Bank and Trust all stopped financing RALs. 

So I guess my question is, is that right? The most well-known 

RAL preparers, H&R Block and Jackson-Hewitt, stopped offering 

RALs? Would you agree? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I don’t really know. I am not here to talk about 

whether RALs are good or bad products, frankly. It is the FDIC’s 

supervisory approach to those three institutions— 

Mr. ELLISON. Okay. So did the IRS make an effort to stop RALs 

too by not allowing tax preparers to use its so-called debt indicator? 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes. I believe they did. 

Mr. ELLISON. Okay. And is it possible that the FDIC could have 

had a legitimate supervisory concern for the safety and soundness 

of institutions engaged in RALs? 

Mr. GIBSON. The FDIC did have supervisory concerns with respect to the institutions offering RALs. In fact, the debt indicator 

21 

or the loss of the debt indicator is something that the FDIC mentions as a reason for that concern. What I would point out in that 

particular regard is that the debt indicator was one of 80 to 120 

factors that were used by institutions in evaluating the loan that 

they were making. 

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you. In looking at your report, is it true that 

the FDIC staff identified compliance deficiencies at the three small 

financial institutions that were offering RALs? 

Mr. GIBSON. I’m sorry. Could you repeat that, sir? 

Mr. ELLISON. So in looking at your report, is it true that FDIC 

staff identified compliance deficiencies at the three small financial 

institutions that were offering RALs? 

Mr. GIBSON. I believe there were some compliance deficiencies 

that were identified, yes. 

Mr. ELLISON. Okay. So I am looking at perhaps weak electronic 

return origination training, a lack of RAL program audit coverage, 

and even substantive violation of the ECOA? Does that ring a bell 

for you? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, that could be. Yes. 

Mr. ELLISON. Okay. So if the FDIC had already identified previous violations with these three institutions on notice that the 

agency was concerned about their performance in RALs? 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, sir, all I can say on that regard, again, with 

respect to one institution, that institution received a CAMELS rating of two from the safety and soundness examiner during that 

same period of time. 

The compliance examiners reviewed that examination, weighed 

in on it, and they concurred in a rating of two for that institution. 

The conclusion I would draw from that is that they weren’t overly 

concerned about the extent of those compliance violations. 

Mr. ELLISON. Okay. Thank you, and that is all I have for you 

today. 

Chairman DUFFY. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Hultgren, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Gibson, thank you so much for being here. I appreciate you 

being here to testify, and I also appreciate your office looking into 

what appears to look very similar to the abuse of power that was 

uncovered by the Operation Choke Point. 

I respect that the names of some of the affected institutions will 

and need to remain anonymous for the purposes of your report and 

for this investigation, but I also understand that they may have 

been in my district or at least in Illinois given the role of the 

FDIC’s Chicago Regional Director. 

In late 2009, the FDIC contended that Bank A had expanded its 

RAL program while operating under a 2009 cease-and-desist order. 

This perceived expansion prompted M. Anthony Lowe, the FDIC 

Chicago Regional Director since 1985, to send a letter to the institution’s board of directors dated September 30, 2009, expressing 

concern about the bank’s RAL products and requesting a plan for 

discontinuing this type of lending. 

In separate letters, both dated February 3, 2010, Mr. Lowe notified the boards of the two remaining institutions that RALs were 

22 

unacceptable for the banks and that plans should be developed for 

the expeditious exit of those lines of business. 

The FDIC OIG determined that the FDIC’s letter to all three institutions were coordinated through the Washington office, including the then Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection and 

the legal division. And there was discussion of a global approach 

at the FDIC to deal with the RAL products as well. 

Notably the OIG found that, ‘‘The verbiage included text from 

letters that had been sent to banks engaged in payday lending’’ as 

covered in the OIG September 2015 audit on Operation Choke 

Point. 

The specific language is as follows, ‘‘We find that RALs are costly 

and offer limited utility for consumers as compared to traditional 

loan products. They also carry a high degree of risk to an institution, including third-party reputational compliance and legal exposures. These risks may expose the bank to individual and class actions by borrowers and local regulatory authorities. Consequently, 

we find RALs unacceptable for the bank.’’ 

All three banks considered in this report of inquiry are located 

in the Chicago region. Is that correct? 

Mr. GIBSON. They were located in the region—yes. They were located in the region, sir. 

Mr. HULTGREN. And the Chicago Regional Director supervising 

these banks is Anthony Lowe. Is that correct? 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, sir, it is. 

Mr. HULTGREN. This is the same Anthony Lowe who was mentioned in your September 2015 Operation Choke Point audit, is 

that right? 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, sir, it is. 

Mr. HULTGREN. And Mr. Lowe was responsible for sending several letters to banks asking them to stop their payday lending businesses. Isn’t that correct? 

Mr. GIBSON. Mr. Lowe sent some letters, sir. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Actually, in an informal interview with the committee staff on June 2, 2015, Mr. Lowe indicated that there may 

even be a letter template floating around the FDIC’s Washington 

office for such letters. Would that surprise you? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I don’t know whether there was or there wasn’t. 

I don’t remember seeing a template, per se. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Okay. Let me move on. On December 17, 2014 

FDIC Chairman Martin Gruenberg requested that the FDIC OIG 

‘‘conduct a fact-finding review of the actions of FDIC staff.’’ That 

is ‘‘in regards to the Operation Choke Point initiative.’’ 

His request was prompted by concerns raised by Congressman 

Luetkemeyer in a December 10, 2014, letter which asks that the 

role of the five FDIC officials and others as appropriate be examined. 

The FDIC OIG addressed the roles of the five individuals in its 

audit report Number AUID15–008, dated September 2015, entitled, 

and I quote—‘‘The FDIC’s Role in Operation Choke Point and Supervisory Approach to Institutions That Conducted Business With 

Merchants Associated With High Risk Activities.’’ 

23 

In that audit, the FDIC OIG committed to conduct additional 

work on the role of the FDIC staff with respect to the agency’s supervisory approach to financial institutions that offered RALs. 

The FDIC’s OIG’s more recent report of inquiry reveals that two 

of the five officials referenced by the Congressman—Mark Pearce, 

Director, Division of Depositor and Consumer Protection; and M. 

Anthony Lowe, Chicago Regional Director—as well as others at the 

agency played key roles in forcing banks to exit the RALs business. 

What was the impetus from the OIG’s report of inquiry into refund anticipation loans? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, as we were doing the work with respect to Operation Choke Point, we became aware of the FDIC’s approach to 

refund anticipation loans. There were some similarities in that approach and it struck us that there were concerns that were similar 

to the concerns that were raised in the letter from 35 Members of 

Congress that triggered our original work. 

So we elected to continue to conduct work with respect to RALs 

even though they were a product that wasn’t really directly involved in the DOJ’s Operation Choke Point. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Okay. Did the OIG determine any overlap in the 

FDIC officials involved in targeting refund anticipation loans and 

working with DOJ in carrying out Operation Choke Point? 

Mr. GIBSON. No, sir. I don’t believe so. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Okay. I see my time has expired. 

I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DUFFY. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Green, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let us talk some more 

about Mr. Gruenberg. These activities that occurred, did they occur 

prior to 2011? 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, some of them did. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. And is it true that Mr. Gruenberg became 

Chair in 2011, if you know? 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, it is. 

Mr. GREEN. And as a result, it would be inappropriate and misleading to imply that Mr. Gruenberg was Chair when these activities took place? 

Mr. GIBSON. Mr. Gruenberg was the Vice Chairman. That is correct. 

Mr. GREEN. He was not the Chair? 

Mr. GIBSON. No, he was not. 

Mr. GREEN. He was not the Chair. He was there, but he was not 

the Chair? 

Mr. GIBSON. No, he was not. 

Mr. GREEN. And it seems as though we were trying to imply that 

as Chairman, he had knowledge of these things. He was a Vice 

Chair. He was there, but he was not the Chair. As a matter of fact, 

there was another person who was Chair, who, of course is obviously no longer there, Ms. Bair. Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. GIBSON. That is correct. 

Mr. GREEN. And is it also true that Mr. Gruenberg was the person who asked for the investigation? 

24 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, sir, Mr. Gruenberg had asked us to conduct investigative work. That is true. 

Mr. GREEN. Yes. 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, it is true. It is true. It is okay to just say it is 

true because it is. He is the person who caused you to come over 

to perform the investigation because he requested it. True? 

Mr. GIBSON. He requested the investigation. 

Mr. GREEN. So that is true? Do you have a problem saying it is 

true, sir? 

Mr. GIBSON. I don’t have a problem with saying— 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Is it true that he is the person who asked for 

the investigation? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I don’t know that I accept the premise of all of 

your questions. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. 

Mr. GIBSON. That is why— 

Mr. GREEN. Did he ask for an investigation— 

Mr. GIBSON. —on that project. 

Mr. GREEN. Pardon me? Did he ask for an investigation? 

Mr. GIBSON. He did. 

Mr. GREEN. And did he ask for the investigation as it related to 

Operation Choke Point? 

Mr. GIBSON. He did. 

Mr. GREEN. And is it true that when you got there, you decided 

that you were going to expand the investigation into this other 

area, but he was the reason that you arrived because he asked for 

the investigation into Operation Choke Point? 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. And by the way, you did not do an audit. You 

did a review. 

Mr. GIBSON. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Now, let us go to something else with reference to elimination versus regulation. The product still exists, 

doesn’t it? RALs? 

Mr. GIBSON. As far as I know, it does. Insofar as I know, it does. 

FDIC-supervised institutions don’t offer it. 

Mr. GREEN. Yes. And they were in the business of protecting 

banks, but they don’t have jurisdiction over many other institutions 

that have the opportunity to present this product to the public. Is 

that a fair statement? Other institutions do this now. There are 

other institutions that are doing it. Banks don’t. 

Mr. GIBSON. I assume that there are, yes, but— 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. The FDIC— 

Mr. GIBSON. —I am not aware of the industry— 

Mr. GREEN. And well, you are not aware, but let us do it this 

way since I have to get this answer on the record for my own purposes. You agree that this product still exists but not with FDIC 

institutions, right? 

Mr. GIBSON. I believe that is true. Yes. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. So the FDIC, while it did, as my colleagues 

have indicated, deal with the product as it related to them, the 

FDIC could not eliminate this product so there are others that are 

doing it. 

25 

It is just the FDIC, the entity in charge of safety and soundness, 

has a duty to protect consumers. This entity decided that it wasn’t 

in the best interests of the banks to do this, and it moved to eliminate this as a product within these three institutions. Is that a fair 

statement? 

Mr. GIBSON. Apparently so. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Now, final comment to you, sir, is this. Look, 

I appreciate your testimony here today. I really do. And after we 

finish, I am going to come down and shake your hand and offer you 

lunch. But I do want you to know that Mr. Gruenberg is not the 

source of this, and I don’t want you to get caught up in some sort 

of implication that Mr. Gruenberg was the genesis of this and that 

this, all of this was emanating from him. He was a really bad manager, because that is just not the case. 

He did what he could when he found out about things, the Choke 

Point circumstance he called to your attention, and also he has 

taken a corrective action once you have called it to his attention. 

He is going to be reporting to you again in June. 

So I am just a person who wants to see people treated fairly, and 

I think Mr. Gruenberg has not been treated fairly today. And I am 

going to stand up for him. 

I yield back. 

Chairman DUFFY. The gentleman yields back. Hopefully, he is 

paying for lunch when he offers that to you, Mr. Gibson. 

[laughter] 

Chairman DUFFY. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

Maine, Mr. Poliquin, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. 

Gibson, for continuing to be here. I appreciate it very much. 

We all know in any organization that the bad behavior of that 

organization starts at the top if there is bad behavior. How long 

has Mr. Gruenberg been at the FDIC, sir? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, he was appointed as Vice Chairman of the 

Board of Directors. I am not sure what year that was honestly. It 

was a number of years before he became the Chairman of the 

FDIC. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. And how do you become a chairman of a major 

regulator like this in Washington? How did he become the Chairman? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, you are appointed by the President and— 

Mr. POLIQUIN. And how long is Mr. Gruenberg’s term appointed 

by the President? 

Mr. GIBSON. Pardon me? 

Mr. POLIQUIN. How long does Mr. Gruenberg’s term last? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I may have to get back to you on that, but I 

believe it is 5 years. I could be wrong, but— 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Okay. And how long have you been the I.G. at the 

FDIC? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I have been the acting I.G. at the FDIC for almost 3 years now. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Okay. So your time has overlapped with that of 

Mr. Gruenberg’s. Is that correct? 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, it is. 

26 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Okay, fine. If I am not mistaken, Mr. Gruenberg 

was in a position of extreme authority at the FDIC during Operation Choke Point, is that correct? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, he was either the Vice Chairman or the Chairman, but I am not sure— 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Okay. How many Chairmen— 

Mr. GIBSON. —what the timeframe of Operation— 

Mr. POLIQUIN. How many Chairmen do you have at the FDIC? 

Mr. GIBSON. We have one. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. And how many Vice Chairmen do you have? 

Mr. GIBSON. We have one. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Okay. So he was either the top banana or the 

number two guy, right? 

Mr. GIBSON. That is correct. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Okay, fine. You must associate with Mr. 

Gruenberg professionally and maybe otherwise with other I.G.s in 

this town embedded in other major regulators like the FDIC. Do 

you know who your counterparts are? 

Mr. GIBSON. I know who my counterparts are, yes, sir. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Okay. Do you think that the behavior of Operation 

Choke Point where Mr. Gruenberg was there and was in a position 

of authority and did nothing to stop it when it was exposed in their 

coordinated work with Justice? Do you find this unusual for other 

government agencies here in Washington? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, what I would point out is that our audit found 

that the FDIC had minimal direct involvement with Operation 

Choke Point. And in fact, the FDIC’s communications with DOJ at 

the time Operation Choke Point initiated ceased because Chairman 

or Vice Chairman Gruenberg—I believe he may have been the 

Chairman at the time—basically indicated that the FDIC shouldn’t 

participate in those. 

Now, I can’t really speak to the rest of your question. I am not 

sure that I can associate that with the heads of other agencies. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Do you recall the genesis of Operation Choke 

Point, Mr. Gibson? 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, sir. I think I do. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Could you tell us a little bit about it? 

Mr. GIBSON. Operation Choke Point was a program that was initiated by the Department of Justice. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Who was the head banana at the Department of 

Justice at that time? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I believe Eric Holder was the Attorney General 

at the time. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Mr. Holder was the Attorney General at the time? 

And how long was Mr. Holder’s term? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I don’t know that he had a term. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Okay, but he was appointed by whom? 

Mr. GIBSON. He was appointed by President Obama. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Okay, so what you are telling me is in some shape 

or form it is the Administration that is responsible for appointing 

all of these regulators, either top people— 

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. —or those who eventually become the top people. 

This behavior with respect to Choke Point using Federal regulators 

27 

to force banking regulators to choke off credit to legally operating 

businesses has been conducted recently over the last 7 years. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I believe Operation Choke Point was conducted 

during that timeframe. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Okay, fine. And how long have you been in this 

town, Mr. Gibson? 

Mr. GIBSON. Longer than I care to admit. 

[laughter] 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Okay. That is a fair statement. Do you find that 

this sort of behavior has happened throughout different parts of 

this Federal Government for the last 7 years? Is it unique to this 

period of time? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I am genuinely not sure how to answer that 

question. I don’t know that I would accept the premise that things 

are necessarily different now than they were prior to that period 

of time. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. And do you find in the last 7 years, Mr. Gibson, 

that there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Federal 

Government to put burdensome regulations on legally run businesses— 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir— 

Mr. POLIQUIN. —that we haven’t seen in the past? 

Mr. GIBSON. I honestly don’t have an empirical basis on which 

I can make an assessment about that. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. How can we find out that information? 

Mr. GIBSON. That is a good question. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. And to whom do we go? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I am sure there are studies that are done which 

address that. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Another study. We don’t—okay. 

Mr. GIBSON. I— 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Can you cite any of those studies? 

Mr. GIBSON. I’m sorry? 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Could you cite any of those studies for our committee now? 

Mr. GIBSON. No, I am afraid I can’t. I am only— 

Mr. POLIQUIN. And where we might go to find out— 

Mr. GIBSON. In terms of burdensome regulation, none. I am not 

an expert on that subject. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Where might we go to find out if such studies existed? 

Mr. GIBSON. Sir, I think the Congressional Research Service 

would be a place to start. 

Mr. POLIQUIN. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time. 

Chairman DUFFY. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas for 5 seconds. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I referenced earlier an I.G. report, and at this time I would like 

to place that report in the record if there are no objections. It is 

styled, ‘‘Challenges and FDIC Efforts Related to Predatory Lending.’’ 

28 

Chairman DUFFY. Without objection, it is so ordered, and your 5 

seconds has expired as well. 

I want to thank Mr. Gibson, you and your team, for your work 

and your testimony today. We are grateful for that. 

The Chair notes that some Members may have additional questions for this witness, which they may wish to submit in writing. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 legislative days for Members to submit written questions to this witness 

and to place his responses in the record. Also, without objection, 

Members will have 5 legislative days to submit extraneous materials to the Chair for inclusion in the record. 

And with that, I note without further objection, this hearing is 

adjourned. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman DUFFY. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(29) 

A P P E N D I X 

March 16, 2016 

30 


23887.001

CONGRESSWOMAN JOYCE BEATTY (OH-03) 

STATEMENT !:<'OR THE RECORD 

FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE 

MARCH 16, 2016 

Thank you Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Green. 

I would like to thank Acting Federal Insurance Deposit Corporation 

Inspector General Gibson for stepping up in his role at the agency while we 

impatiently await a FDIC Inspector General to receive a simple up or down 

vote in committee or by the full Senate. 

On October 23rct, 2014, President Obama nominated Jay Lerner to the 

position of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Inspector General - 17 

months ago in OCTOBER 2014. 

While Mr. Lerner finally received a confirmation hearing in September of 

2015 from the Senate Banking Committee- almost a full year after his 

nomination was sent to the committee, to date he still has not received a up 

or down vote. 

Like so many of President Obama's nominees, he has been held up by 

Senate Republicans. 

If House Republicans are really serious about oversight and culture change 

at our administrative agencies then they should pressure their fellow 

Republican colleagues in the Senate to fulfill their constitutional duties to 

advise and consent. 

They should pressure Senate Republicans to hold hearings and vote on the 

President's nominees. 

Without this pressure, it is difficult to take House Republican rhetoric 

attacking senior leadership at the FDIC seriously today when they will not 

even commit as a party to confirm or hold a vote on a FDIC Inspector 

GeneraL 
31 


23887.002

IG Office of Inspector Genera! 

Testimony 

Before the Committee on Financial Services, 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Report of Inquiry into the 

FDIC's Supervisory Approach to 

Refund Anticipation loans 

and the Involvement of 

FDIC leadership and Personnel 

Statement of Fred W. Gibson, Jr. 

Acting Inspector General 

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

March 16, 2016 
32 


23887.003

Statement of Fred W. Gibson, Jr. 

Acting Inspector General, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

March 16, 2016 

House Committee on Financial Services 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

Chairman Duffy, Ranking Member Green, and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to present the results of our work on 

the FDIC's Supervisory Approach to Refund Anticipation Loans and the Involvement of FDIC 

Leadership and Personnel. (Report No. OIG-16-001.) 

I am submitting for the record the Office of Inspector General's Executive Summary of this 

report. Our Executive Summary explains why and how we conducted this work and what we 

learned as a result. It also raises matters for the FOIC's consideration. 

Along with our Executive Summary, I am including two sets of comments from the FDIC. The 

first comments were received following issuance of our draft report. They are signed by the 

Director of the Division of Risk Management Supervision and the FDIC General Counsel and 

reflect the signatories' summary of the lengthier set of written comments they provided to us 

at that time. I received the second set of comments on the final report from the Members of 

the Board of Directors of the FDIC on March 11, 2016. As noted in our Executive Summary, we 

had requested that the Corporation advise us within 60 days from the date of our final report 

on the steps it would take to address the matters raised for its consideration. The Board of 

Directors' response outlines initial steps and indicates the Board will update our office on its 

progress by June 30, 2016. My office will continue to monitor the Corporation's efforts going 

forward. 

I appreciate the Subcommittee's interest in our work and will be pleased to answer any 

questions you and other Members may have. 

1 
33 


23887.004

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

Report of Inquiry into the FDIC's Supervisory Approach 

to Refund Anticipation loans and the Involvement of 

FDIC leadership and Personnel 

Report No. OIG-16-001 

February 19, 2016 

Why and How We Conducted This Inquiry 

On December 17, 2014, Chairman Gruenberg requested that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

(FDIC) Office of Inspector General (OIG) conduct a "fact-finding review of the actions of FDIC staff' in the 

Department of Justice's Operation Choke Point. The Chairman's request was prompted by concerns 

raised by a letter from a member of Congress, dated December 10, 2014, asking that the role offive 

FDIC officials, and others as appropriate, be examined. Our office addressed the actions of the five FDIC 

officials in connection with Operation Choke Point in the OIG's September 2015 Report, The FDIC's Role 

in Operation Choke Point and Supervisory Approach to Institutions that Conducted Business with 

Merchants Associated with High-Risk Activities (AUD-15-008) (the Audit). 

In that report, the OIG indicated that it would conduct further work on the role of FDIC staff with 

respect to the Corporation's supervisory approach to financial institutions that offered a credit product 

known as a refund anticipation loan (RAL). A RAL is a particular type of loan product, typically offered 

through a national or local tax preparation company in conjunction with the filing of a taxpayer's income 

tax return. 1 Although tax preparation firms were not specifically associated with Operation Choke Point, 

and RAls are financial products offered by banks and not a line of business related to Operation Choke 

Point, information we identified in the course of the Audit raised sufficient concern to cause us to also 

review the FDIC's supervisory approach to institutions offering RAls and the roles of FDIC personnel in 

that process. 

This report describes our work and findings. It is based on interviews with knowledgeable individuals 

and an extensive review and analysis of FDIC internal emails, correspondence, supervisory materials, 

and other documents. 

What We Learned 

The FDIC had a lengthy supervisory relationship with institutions offering RAls, dating to the 1980s. In 

January 2008, the then-FDIC Chairman, Sheila Bair, asked why FDIC-regulated institutions would be 

allowed to offer RAls. 2 Shortly thereafter, the FDIC began to try to cause banks it supervised, which are 

the focus of this review, to exit the business line. In late December 2010, the Office of the Comptroller 

of the Currency (OCC) required an institution it supervised to exit RAls effective with the 2011 tax 

season. During this time period, the Internal Revenue Service also withdrew access to an underwriting 

The tax preparer, sometimes referred to as an electronic refund originator (ERO), works in cooperation with the 

financial institution to advance a portion of the tax refund claimed by individuals in the fonn of a loan. Typically the 

loan amount would include the tax return preparation cost, other fees and a finance charge. 

The Chainnan's question was raised in the context of an incoming letter from a number of consumer advocacy 

groups. This letter, together with similar correspondence in 2009, expressed concern that RALs harmed consumers. 
34 


23887.005

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

Report of Inquiry into the FDIC's Supervisory Approach 

to Refund Anticipation Loans and the Involvement of 

FDIC Leadership and Personnel 

Report No. OIG-16-001 

February 19, 2016 

tool it formerly provided to tax preparers and banks that had been used to mitigate certain risks 

associated with RAls. Ultimately, the FDIC caused all three of its supervised institutions that then 

continued to facilitate RAls to exit the business in 2011 and 2012. 

RALs were, and remain, legal activities, but ultimately were seen by the FDIC as risky to the banks and 

potentially harmful to consumers. 3 As discussed in our report, the FDIC's articulated rationale for 

requiring banks to exit RAls morphed over time. The decision to cause FDIC-supervised banks to exit 

RAls was implemented by certain Division Directors, the Chicago Regional Director, and their 

subordinates, and supported by each of the FDIC's Inside Directors. The basis for this decision was not 

fully transparent because the FDIC chose not to issue formal guidance on RAls, applying more generic 

guidance applicable to broader areas of supervisory concern. Yet the decision set in motion a series of 

interrelated events affecting three institutions that involved aggressive and unprecedented efforts to 

use the FDIC's supervisory and enforcement powers, circumvention of certain controls surrounding the 

exercise of enforcement power, damage to the morale of certain field examination staff, and high costs 

to the three impacted institutions. 

The Washington Office pressured field staff to assign lower ratings in the 2010 Safety and Soundness 

examinations for two institutions that had RAL programs. The Washington Office also required changing 

related examination report narratives. In one instance a ratings downgrade appeared to be 

predetermined before the examination began. In another case, the downgrade further limited an 

institution from pursuing a strategy of acquiring failed institutions. The institution's desire to do so was 

then leveraged by the FDIC in its negotiations regarding the institution's exit from RAls. Although the 

examiners in the field did not agree with lowering the ratings of the two institutions, the FDIC did not 

document these disagreements in one instance, and only partially documented the disagreement in 

another, in contravention of its policy and a recommendation in a prior OIG report. 

The absence of significant examination-based evidence of harm caused by RAL programs could have 

caused FDIC management to reconsider its initial assessment that these programs posed significant risk 

to the institutions offering them. However, lack of such evidence did not change the FDIC's supervisory 

approach. The FDIC's actions also ultimately resulted in large insurance assessment increases, 

reputational damage to the banks, as well as litigation and other costs for the banks that tried to remain 

in the RAL business. 

The FDIC's current and historical policy is that it will not criticize, discourage, or prohibit banks that have 

appropriate controls in place from doing business with customers who are operating consistent with federal and 

state law. The FDIC applies this policy to services offered to bank customers. i.e., depositors or borrowers. 

Because RALs are offered through EROs and are third-party relahonships, the FDIC does not believe this policy applies. 
35 


23887.006

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

Report of Inquiry into the FDIC's Supervisory Approach 

to Refund Anticipation Loans and the Involvement of 

FDIC Leadership and Personnel 

Report No. OIG-16-001 

February 19, 2016 

The Washington Office also used a cursory analysis of underwriting plans that two banks submitted to 

show their mitigation of perceived risk to reject those plans. In fact, when the initial review suggested 

these underwriting plans could effectively mitigate certain risks, the Washington Office narrowed and 

repeated its request to solicit a different outcome. It appears that the decision to reject the plans had 

been made before the review was complete. The alleged insufficiency of the underwriting plans also 

formed the basis for an enforcement action against one of the banks. 

While the FDIC's Legal Division believed the pursuit of an enforcement remedy against the banks 

presented "high litigation risk," the FDIC chose to pursue such remedies. Members of the Board, 

including the then-Chairman of the Case Review Committee, were involved in drafting the language of a 

proposed enforcement order and in advising management on the development of supervisory support 

for the enforcement case. The FDIC also attempted to strengthen its case by pursuing a compliancebased rationale. To that end, in early 2011 the FDIC employed extraordinary examination resources in 

an attempt to identify compliance violations that would require the bank to exit RALs. This examination 

effort, in the form of a "horizontal review," involved deploying an unprecedented 400 examiners to 

examine 250 tax preparers throughout the country and the remaining bank offering RALs. The 

horizontal review was used as leverage in negotiations to get the final bank to exit RALs. Ultimately, the 

results of the horizontal review were used for little else. 

The FDIC also employed what it termed "strong moral suasion" to persuade each of the banks to stop 

offering RAls. What began as persuasion degenerated into meetings and telephone calls where banks 

were abusively threatened by an FDIC attorney. In one instance, non-public supervisory information 

was disclosed about one bank to another as a ploy to undercut the latter's negotiating position to 

continue its RAL program. 

When one institution questioned the FDIC's tactics and behavior of its personnel in a letter to thenChairman Bair and the other FDIC Board members, the then-Chairman asked FDIC management to look 

into the complaint. FDIC management looked into the complaint but did not accurately and fully 

describe the abusive behavior. Nevertheless, the behavior was widely known internally and, in effect, 

condoned. Other complaints from the banks languished and ultimately were not addressed or 

investigated independently. Ratings appeals that included these complaints were not considered 

because they were voided by the FDIC's filing of formal enforcement actions. These complaints were 

eventually subsumed by settlement processes that, in the case of one bank, appeared to trade improved 

ratings and the right to purchase failing institutions for an agreement to exit RALs permanently. 

Conclusion and Matters for Consideration 

The facts developed by this review strongly reinforce the concerns and issues raised in the OIG's earlier 

Audit. In our view, the FDIC must candidly consider its leadership practices, its pr~cess and procedures, 
36 


23887.007

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

Report of Inquiry into the FDIC's Supervisory Approach 

to Refund Anticipation Loans and the Involvement of 

FDIC Leadership and Personnel 

Report No. OIG-16-001 

February 19, 2016 

and the conduct of multiple individuals who made and implemented the decision to require banks to 

exit RALs. While we acknowledge that the events described in our report surrounding RAls involved 

only three of the FDIC's many supervised institutions, the severity ofthe events warrants such 

consideration. The FDIC needs to ask how the actions described in our report could unfold as they did, 

in light of the FDIC's stated core values of integrity, accountability, and fairness. Further, the 

Corporation must address how it can avoid similar occurrences in the future. 

In December 2015, in response to concerns raised in the Audit, the FDIC removed the term "moral 

suasion" from its guidance. We appreciate the central importance of informal discussions and 

persuasion to the supervisory process; however, we believe more needs to be done to subject the use of 

moral suasion, and its equivalents, to meaningful scrutiny and oversight, and to create equitable 

remedies for institutions should they be subject to abusive treatment. 

Because our work is in the nature of a review, and not an audit conducted in accordance with 

government auditing standards, we are not making formal recommendations. However, we request 

that the FDIC report to us, 60 days from the date of our final report, on the steps it will take to address 

the matters raised for its consideration. 

The Corporation's Response 

The OIG transmitted a draft copy of this report to the FDIC on January 21, 2016. We asked the 

Corporation to review the draft and identify any factual inaccuracies they believed existed in the report. 

We met with staff from the FDIC, on February 10, 2016, to consider whether any factual clarifications 

were appropriate, reviewed the documentation they provided, and subsequently made some 

clarifications to the report. The Corporation also requested that we include its response to our report 

herewith. We have provided the FDIC's full response at Appendix 9. The FDIC's response has not 

changed our overall view of the facts. 
37 


23887.008

FDIC Summary Comments on the Draft Report 

FDICI 

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

ff:IJ 171h Stree! NW. Washing.oo. DC 20429.9$() 

Dlvtston cf Risk M<na;Jemenl SLPervisn:n 

leg30MSJm 

DATE: 

MEMORANDUM TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

February 17, 2016 

Fred W. Gibson, Jr. 

Acting inspector General 

Doreen R. Eberley /S/ 

Director, Division of Risk Management Supervision 

Charles Yi /Sf 

General Counsel 

Resporu;e to the Draft Report of Inquiry into the FD lC' s 

Supervisory Approach to Refund Anticipation Loans and the 

Involvement of FDIC Leadership and Personnel 

Thank you for the opportunity to review aud respond to the Draft Ruport of Inquiry 

(Draft Report) into The FDIC 's Supen•isory Approach toRe.fimdAnticipationLoans and the 

Involvement of FDIC Leadership and Personnel, prepared by the FDIC's Office oflnspector 

General (OIG). We believe that the supervision and enforcement activities discussed in the Draft 

Report were supported hy the supervisory record and hanilled in accordance with FDIC policy. 

These activities occurred more than five years ago with respect to the three banks that offered 

refund anticipation loans (RALs). 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

In August 2015, the FDIC Office oflnspector General (OIG) determined to conduct a 

review of the role of FDIC staff with respect to the FDIC' s supervisory approach to three 

institutions that offered refund anticipation loans, or RALs. The findings were presented to 

FDIC in a Draft Report on January 21, 2016 (Draft Report). The Draft Report presented the 

OIG's view of the FDIC's handling of its supervisory responsibilities with respect to these three 

financial institutions that offered RALs between five and eigbt years ago. 

We believe that the supervision and enforcement activities identified by the OIG were 

supported by the supervisory record and handled in accordance with FDIC Policy. 

Summary of FDIC Response 

• RALs, as described in a GAO report', are short-term, high-interest bank loans that are 

advertised and brokered by both national chain and local tax preparation companies. 

RALs carry a heightened level of credit, fraud, third-partY, and compliance risk because 

1 United States Govennnent Accomtability Office Report, GA0..08-800R Refund Anticipation Loans 

(June 5, 2008) (stating "the annual percentage rate on RALs can be over 500 percent"), 
38 


23887.009

FDIC Summary Comments on the Draft Report 

February 17, 2016 

they are not offered by bank loan officers, but by several hundred to several thousand 

storefront tax preparers (also referred to as electronic refund originators (EROs)). 

• FDIC must provide strong oversight to ensure that the financial institutions it supervises 

are offering the product in a safe and sound manner and in compliance with applicable 

guidance and laws. 

• FDIC issued relevant guidan(:e for banks malcing RAl.s. In respon.:.:e to an OIG audit, 

FDIC issued a Supervisory Policy on Predatory Lending. Further, to describe its 

expectations for hanks making loans through third-parties, FDIC issued Guidance on 

Managing TI1ird-Party Risks. 

• Supervisory issues were identified by field compliance examiners as early a" 2004, 

including substantive violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, weak ERO training, 

and a lack of R..-\L program audit coverage. 

• One community bank grew its RAL program rapidly. nearly doubling the number of 

EROs through wh:ich it originated tax products between 2001 and 2004 to more than 

5,600, and then nearly doubling that number again by 2011 to more than 11.000. By 

comparison, one ofthe three largest banks in the country at that time originated tax 

products through 13,000 EROs. 

• Supervisory concerns increased through 2008 and 2009, as the management of two banks 

did not follow regulatory recommendations and directions. including provisions of 

cnforcemL.'!lt actions. 

• One of the three RAL banks moved its origination business to an affiliate without prior 

notice to the FDIC, effectively removing the RAL origination activity from FDIC 

supervision. 

• The exit of large national banks and a thrift from the RAL business raised additional 

concems, because similar prior exits had led to the business moving to the much sma11cr 

FDIC-supervised community banks. 

• All three RAL banks conceded that the Joss of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Debt 

Indicator would result in increased credit risk to the bank. The Debt Indicator was a key 

underwriting tool, supplied by the IRS. and used by the hanks to predict the likelihood 

that a valid tax refund would be ofl:~ct by other debt. Two of the three banks were unable 

to fully mitigate the risk ~vTeated by the loss of the Debt Indicator, and neither substituted 

credit underwriting based on borrower ability to repay. The third bank may have had an 

acceptable underwriting substitute, but had such deficient controls and oversight that its 

RAL program was otherwise not safe and sound. 

• The combination of risks outlined above cansed the FDIC to ask the banks to exit the 

RAL business. All three banks declined. 

• When poor practices. of bank managements were not fully factored into examination 

ratings for two banks, Washington senior management p~ovided direction to regional 

management. consistent with policy. 

• Two banks were properly downgraded in the 2010 examination cycle based on wdldefined weaknesses. 

• 'D1e banks continued to decline to exit the poorly managed RAL programs. 
39 


23887.010

FDIC Summary Comments on the Draft Report 

February 17,2016 

• Senior FDIC management recommended enforcement actions based on the supervisory 

records ofthe institutions. 

• Senior FDIC management appropriately briefed the FDIC Chainnan and other Board 

members on the supervisory actions being taken. 

• \\'hile some members of the Legal Division raised concerns about litigation risk. the 

supervisory records supported approval of the enforcement cases., and supervision and 

legal officials ultimately approved them. 

• The recommendations for enforcement action were reviewed by the FDIC's Case Review 

Committee (CRC). consistent with the FDIC Bylaws and the CRC governing documents. 

• One of the final enforcement actions described violations oflaw by one of the RAL 

banks becau_<;e of its efforts to impede examination activities. 

• Settlement of the approved enforcement actions addressed the supervisory issues and was 

handled consistently with FDlC policy. It is not unusual for institutions that cannot 

engage in expansionary activities because of their condition to take steps to remedy 

regulatory concerns in order to regain the ability to expand. 

We look forward to reviewing the details of the final report and will provide actions to be 

taken in response within the 60-day timcframe specified by the OIG. 

lntl'oduction 

We reviewed the materials relied upon by the OIG. which included select email 

communications between FDIC employees, one former employee's personal notes, draft reports 

of examination, and information from interviews that OIG staff conducted with select past and 

current FDIC personnel. Having reviewed relevant materials, we believe that the supen'ision 

and enforcement activities that occurred with respect to the three banks discussed in the Draft 

Report were supported by the supervisory record and handled in accordance with FDIC policy. 

Nonetheless, the Draft Report did identify areas where better communication, both internally and 

ex1emally, could have improved understanding of the agency's supervisory expectations and 

ba..o:;es for action. Additionally, the Draft Report describes at lea-:t one instance in which a fonner 

employee- new to the FDIC at the time 2 -communicated with external parties in an overly 

aggressive manner. The FDIC docs not condone such conduct, that type of conduct is not 

consistent with FDIC policy, and steps were taken to address the conduct at the time. 

Risks of Refimd AnticipaJion Loans 

RALs are short~tenn, high~interest bank loans that are advertised and brokered by both 

national chain and local tax preparation companies. By their very nature, R.Als carry a 

heighlt!ned level of 1....1edit. fraud, third-party, and compliance risk. Financial institutions must 

execute strong oversight of the storefront tax prcparcrs (also referred to as electronic refund 

originators (EROs)) that originate RA.Lo;; because banks are responsible for the actions of their 

third-party agents. Similarly, supervisory authorities must provide strong oversight to ensure 

2 The employee left the agency later that same year 

8 
40 


23887.011

FDIC Summary Comments on the Draft Report 

February 17,2016 

that financial institutions are offering the product in a safe and sound mannt."f and ln compliance 

with applicable guidance md laws. Fewer than 10 financial institutions have ever offered RALs . 

. FDIC Took an Incremental Approach to Supervising Banks that Offered RALs 

TI1e Draft Report suggests that actions taken by the FDIC represented a sharp and rapid 

escalation in oversight of the in'>titutions with RAL programs. The supervisory record, however. 

indicates that concerns were mised about risk management oversight of the RAL programs at the 

institutions for a number of years. 

111e FDIC first developed supervisory concems with the risk management practices and 

oversight provided by the board and senior management oftwo institutions in 2004. FDIC had 

concems with another RAL lender at the time that was not reviewed by the OIG. 'That lender 

exited the business in 2006 when it..'i tax preparation partner wanted to .offer a product the bank 

deemed too risky. 

Between 2004 and 2009, the two institutions were subject to annual risk management 

examinations and two compliance examinations. The examinations identified repeated 

weaknesses in risk management practices. Both banks' RAL programs expt.-"fienced heavier than 

nonnal losses in 2007. Examinations in 2008 showed continuing weaknesses in risk 

management practices and board and senior management oversight, and both institutions' 

compliance ratings were downgraded to k-ss-than-satisfactory levels. Examinations in 2009 

showed contlnued weaknesses in risk management practices and oversight, and both institutions 

were downgraded to an unsatisfactory level for compliance and "'Needs to Improve" for CRA.. 

By December 2009, FDIC continued to have a variety of concerns with the RAL 

programs ofboth institutions. One of the institutions had moved the RAL business to an affiliate 

for the 2009 tax season and was not in compliance with a February 2009 Cease and Desist Order 

requiring enhancement of its program oversight. Later, that institution entered into contracts to 

e>.:pand its ERO lender base without the required prior notice to the FDIC. 

Another institution was operating under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 

requiring it to improve its oversight, audit, and internal controls over its: RAL business. The 

bank's management was not in compliance with those provisions of the MOlT. 

Given identified risk management weaknesses .1md concerns about one institution's 

continued expansion, in December 2009, FDIC directed the institution to deliver a plan to exit 

the RAL business. Based on similar concerns with another hank's risk-management weaknesses, 

and reports that the Internal Revenue Service was contemplating discontinuance of its Debt 

Indicator. a key underwriting tool for RAL lending. FDIC s~nt similar letters to two other banks 

in February 2010, requesting that they develop and submit plans to exit the RAL business. 

Tite letters sent to all three of the hanks expressed concern about the utility oft he product 

to the consumer given high fees. This concern was consistent with the FDIC's Supervisory 

4 
41 


23887.012

FDIC Summary Comments on the Draft Report 

Fcbmary 17, 2016 

Policy on PrOOatory Lending, \\hich !'ltated that sign.s of pr¢datory lending indudi!d, among 

uthvTS. the la..:k of a fair cxchang<.! of value. AllthNt.: institution~ dcdin..:d the rcqu..:stlhat they 

deYdop a plan to .::xit the businc.ss. 

FDIC had Operati••• Guitfallcefor Banh Engaged in R4Ls 

"Illc Draft Report suggests that the FDIC did not have guidance that was applicable to 

RAI.s. In fat-1.. the FDIC has wcii-L>stahlishcd guidanc~ forth~ supervision of hanks that oH\.:r 

RALs. stemming from longst.utding guidanc< gtwerning predatory lending as 'Well as guidance 

fnr hanks engaged in third~party lending urrang~mcnts. 

In June 2006. the OIG's Audits and Evaluations staff issued O!G Report 06-0ll. 

Challenges and J-7)/C Ffii:Jrts Related lo Predatory !.ending. 'lhe Rt:port n.:cnmm0ndcd that 

FI)JC issu~ a policy on prl!datory lending. and FDIC complied. 'll1~ Policy. which wa.<> is!';ut!d in 

January 2007, state!', ''[sjigns ofpr~dalory lending include the lack of a f3ir exchange- of\·aluc or 

loan pricing that reaches h~:yond the risk that a horrow..::r represents or other cu...,tomary 

standards:'3 Further, FDIC issued FIL-44-2008, Gwdance fOr :\fanaging Thu·d-Party Risk, in 

Jun~ 200K 1loth pice~ of guidance were- rckvant to the banls engaged in the R:\I, husini.·s.s. 

IleaJquurters Ma11ageme11t Proper/)' O••ersaw R<'IJi<mal Offices 

The DraH Report sugg.:sh:d that decisions hy FDIC ollicials to change draft ratings 

a.<>signed by ~xamin~rs \Hre improper and unfounded. However. such ovc-r:s1ght is appropriate 

and lhe review of the examination documents sugg.:::-;ts the chang~.--s had a strong ~upcrvisory 

basis, 

In 2010. FDlC headquart~ffi in~trucWd the Chicago R'l!gional Otlice to ~msid!O>"r bank 

prncticl!'s. not just th¢ir Ctltient financial condition.t;, in assigning rating.'> to two banks with 

identified w~aknessi!S in their RAL programs, This instruction was consis.tent with interagency 

rating guidelin~s. The in:;truction wa,<;:; also consistent with the concept of fonvard~looking 

supervision that tlle FDIC had emphasized in response to OIG recommendations following 

~iatcriaJ Loss Rcvit:::v,,.s of failed banks. 

Forward-looking sup.;-rvision encourages examiners to consider the fact that even 

financially strong institutions can experience stress in cas.::s in which risk.<.: an: not properly 

monitored. measured. and managed. Further. examiners are encouraged to lake proactiv~ and 

proere:'>.-.ive ad ion to encm1rage banks to adopt preemptive measures to address risk.<; before their 

profitability and viability is impa<-•kd. 

1 :;:.,~Imps:\\'\\'\\' fdJC !;:0\'·DCW~·news'tinan.:in! 21lllTfJ!tl7(J()(' h!ml. FDIC rinanciallns.Uti.Uit1nl.cft{'r (>-:,::()()7, 

l·V!C's !:;:l.lpen'!:.ory Policy on Pr-\.-Jatory Lending. January ~2. 2<JU7, 
42 


23887.013

FDIC Summary Comments on the Draft Report 

February 17, 2016 

The ratings for the two banks were fully supported by the weaknesses identified in both 

banks' risk management practices and board and senior management oversight of their RAL 

businesses. 

Supen•isory Practices were Appropriate and Risk-Focused, Consiste~1t with Longstanding 

Policy 

During 2010, FDIC's concerns about the safety and soundness ofRAL programs grew. 

OCC and OTS had each directed a large institution to exit the RAL business, and an additional 

large fmancial institution exited the RAL lending business on its own. The FDIC was concerned 

that the activities would migrate to the three FDIC supervised community banks, two of which 

had documented weaknesses in the oversight of their existing RAL programs. Further, the IRS 

announced in August it would discontinue the Debt Indicator (DI) before the 2011 tax season; 

the DI had proven to be a key tool for reducing credit risk in RALs. In November 2010, the 

institutions were asked to outline their plans for mitigating the resulting increase in credit risk 

following the loss of the tool. All three institutions conceded that the loss oft he DI would result 

in increased risk to their banks. Despite these concerns. all three insti1utions continued to decline 

to exit the business. Finally, in December 2010, OCC directed the ftnal national bank making 

RAL<> to exit the business before the 20 II tax season. 

In response to these concerns, as well as the ongoing compliance issues that were being 

identified by 2010 riskwrnanagement examinations, the FDIC planned to conduct unannounced 

horizontal reviews of EROs during the 2011 tax season. 1l1ese types of reviews were not a novel 

supervisory tool for the FDIC; in fact third-party agent.:; of one of the institutions had prcviou..<;;ly 

been the subject of a horizontal review in 2004 that covered two additional FDIC-supervised 

institutions. 

Tbe 2011 horizontal review ultimately only covered EROs of one of the banks. The 

review confinned that the institution had violated law by interfering with the FDIC's review of 

the EROs during the 2009 compliance examination and during the 2011 horizontal review by 

coaching ERO staff and providing scripted answers. 'Ibe review identified a number of 

additional violations of consumer laws illld unsafe and unsound practices, violations of a Consent 

Order, and violations of Treasury regulations for allowing third~party vendors to transfer up to 

4.300 bank accounts for Social Security recipients without the customers' knowledge or consent 

FDJC's Enforcement Actions Were Legally Supported 

Contrary to what the Draft Report suggests, the prt.-sence of litigation risk does not mean 

an enforcement action has no legal ba<;is. While some in the Legal Division -in particular the 

Deputy General Counsel, Supervision Branch (DGC)- believed that enforcement action again<>t 

one institution presented litigation risk. the G-eneral Counsel and the DGC both approved the 

enforcement actions taken by the FDIC. TI1eir own actions demonstrated their belief that the 

enforcement action was leg~lly supportable. 

6 
43 


23887.014

FDIC Summary Comments on the Draft Report 

February 17,2016 

The decision to pursue an enforcement action against the bank despite the presence of 

Htigation risk is consistent with guidance offered by the OlG. In a 2014 report on enforcement 

actions, the OIG noted that legal officials need to ensure that their risk appetite aligns with that 

ofthe agency head and should clearly communicate the legal risks of pursuing a particular 

enforcement action, but the agency head or senior official with delegated authority should set the 

level of litigation risk that the agency is willing to assume. 

Moreover it is important to note that experienced enforcement cotmsel and subject matter 

experts in the Legal Division reviewed and responded to the concerns raised by the Chicago 

Regional Counsel in a series of memoranda. 

CommunicaJions BE!lWeen FDIC Board Members and Staff U:'ere Appropriate 

The Draft Report suggests that discussions between staff and FDIC Board members on 

the RAL programs were unusual and inappropriate. However. as dist:ussed below, such 

discussions are expected and appropriate. No member of the FDIC Board directed FDIC staffto 

order any banks to discontinue offering RAL products or to take any action that was not 

supported by supervisory findings. 

Tite FDIC bylaws set forth the organizational structure of the FDIC and the foundation 

for communications and exercise of authority of both the FDIC Board and its Oftl.cers. ·n,e FDIC Board has overall responsibility for managing the FDIC, while day~to-day responsibility 

for managing the FDIC and supervising its Officers is delegated to the FDIC Chaim1an. FDIC 

Officers have a duty to keep the Chainnan infOrmed of their actions as well as other Board 

members as appropriate~ and they meet this duty through regular briefings of the Chairman and 

updates to other Board members about the ongoing activities in tlteir organizations. 

Case Rel•ie»• Committee Acted Consistent{l' J.f'ith Existing Guidelines 

Contrary to the suggestion in the Draft Report, the Case Review Committee (CRC) acted 

consistentJy with existing guidelines in connection with the issuance of the Notice of Charges 

against an institution in February 2011. The CRC is a standing committee of the FDIC Board of 

Directors that is responsible for overseeing enforcement matters. Its voting members consist of 

one internal FDIC Board member who serves as the CRC Chairman and one special assistant or 

deputy to ~ach of the other four FDIC Board members. 

First, the Notice of Charges sought a Cease & Desist Order (C&D) which does not 

require CRC approval under goveming documents. Authority to issue C&D Orders was 

delegated to staff and therefore the CRC was not required to vote on the C&D Order. 

Second, CRC goveming documents provide for staff to consult with the CRC Chainnan 

if a proposed enforcement action may affect FDIC policy, attract unusual attention or publicity, 

or involve an issue offir:-:t impression. Under such circumstances, the CRC Chairman may, in 

his or her discretion, determine whether review and approval by the CRC would be desirable, in 

7 
44 


23887.015

FDIC Summary Comments on the Draft Report 

February 17, 20!6 

which case the matter would be heard by the CRC. Thus, the Notice of Charges did not require a 

CRC vote. 

Finally, CRC governing documents provide that the CRC Chainnan is expected to take 

an active role in the enforcement process and to meet regularly with senior supervision and legal 

enforcement personnel to review enforcement activities and matters. As such, it was wholly 

pennissible and appropriate for the CRC Chaim1an to engage with staff in active debate over a 

matter affecting the FDIC. 

Settlement Discussions Were Handled Proper(r 

The FDIC acted consistently with outstanding agency policy when conducting settlement 

discussions. [n the ca.~c referenced by the OIG, the bank was prevented from participating in 

failed bank acquisitions by two issues: an outstanding enforcement action and compliance and 

risk-management problems stemming from its RAL program. Once the bank settled its 

enforcement action and agreed to exit the RALs business, there was no reason to prevent the 

hank from qualifying for the "'failed bank bid list." To do otherwise could have been arbitrary 

and unduly punitive:. 

Conclusion 

The FDIC had longstanding supervisory histories with respect to RALs. To differing 

degrees, the institutions engaged in the RAL business had a record of supervisory deficiencies 

identified by examination staff ln both risk management and compliance stemming from their 

RAL programs. These issues formed the basis for the examination and enforcement actions 

described in the report. Nonetheless. the Draft Report did identify areas where better 

communication., both internally and e>..1emally, could have improved understanding of the 

agency's supervisory expectations and bases for action. Additionally, the Draft Report describes 

at least one instance in which a former employee ... new to the FDIC at the time 4 - communicated 

with e>."iemal parties in an overly aggressive manner. l11e FDIC does not condone such conduct, 

that type of conduct is not consistent with FDIC policy, and steps were taken to address the 

conduct at the time. 

We look forward to reviewing the details of the final report <Utd wilJ provide actions to be 

taken in re!<ponse within the 60-day timeframe specified by the OIG. 

4 The employee left the agency later that same year 
45 


23887.016

FDIE 

FDIC Board of Directors 

Comments on the Final Report 

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

'5JJ 17th Street NW, Wa<ngm, DC 20i2s.99Xl 

TO: 

FROM: 

Fred W. Gibson 

Acting Inspector General 

Thomas M" Hoenig/S/ Vice Chairman 

Thomas J< Curry /S/ 

March II, 2016 

Director (Comptroller of the Currency) 

Richard Cordray /S / Director (Director of the Consmner Finance Protection Bureau) 

SUBJECT: Response to Office of Inspector General Report No< OIG-!6-001 

BoadofOire::tors 

Titank you for the opportunity to review and respond to the final Report oflnqtriry (Final 

Report) into The FDIC 's Supervisory Approach to RefondAnticipation Loans and the 

Involvement of FDIC Leadership and Personnel, prepared by the FDIC's Office oflnspector 

General (O!G)< \\lhile the FDIC's response to the Draft Report of Inquiry on February 17, 2016, 

addressed the factual record, this response addresses the matters raised by the OJG for 

consideration. 

FDIC Board Review of Policy Matters Raised in the Final Report 

The 01G requested that FDIC consider the issues contained in the Final Report and 

apprise the OJG of any actions FDIC will take as a result In response, the FDIC Board of 

Directors (FDIC Board or Board) willlUldertake a review of the key issues raised in the Final 

Re:(X)rt for consideration. As a starting point, the FDIC Board reiterates its commitment to 

the Mission, Vision, and Corporate Values of the FDIC" Additionally, the FDIC Board 

commits to review and consider the following matters: 

• the clarity and sufficiency of parameters applied to the use of moral suasion, or its 

equivalents; 

• the adequacy of existing vehicles for examiners and other employees to report what 

they believe to be inappropriate actions or direction; 

• the effectiveness and timeliness of avenues of redress available to banks that believe 

supervisory powers are not used appropriately; and 

• the governance and procedures of the Board and its committees. 
46 


23887.017

FDIC Board of Directors 

Comments on the Final Report 

-2-

lnterimAcJions in Response to the Final Report 

In addition to this Board-level review, the FDIC has identified a number of interim 

actions that may be taken now to be responsive to the OIG's concerns and further strengthen 

the FDJC's supervision programs. 

Issuance if Internal Guidance Regarding Commumcation with Bankers 

To further reinforce expectations that communication with bankers be dear and balanced, 

the Division of Risk Management Supervision (RMS) will issue a Regional Director 

Memorandum (RD Memo) Best Practices: Commumcation and Coordination with Bank 

lvfanagement 1n Carrying Out Forward-Loolang, R1sk-Based Supervision. lbe RD Memo will: 

• set forth communication expectations and best practices for each stage of the supervisory 

cycle: pre-examination planning... on-site examination activity. post-examination report 

review, and the period between examinations; 

• reinfOrce the importance of communicating matters involving policy or recommendations 

in writing on FDIC letterhead or through a report of examination and documenting all 

such communications in FDIC records; and 

• provide expanded instructions for report of examination content and style, the focus of 

which wil1 be that fact-based, diplomatic and objective language is ordinarily more 

effective than criticism in achieving corrective action or adoption of recommended 

improvements. 

Enhancement of Appeals Processes 

The FDIC agrees that banks should have meaningful avenues of redress if they 

believe supervisory powers are not used appropriately, including when the appeals process is 

not available. The Supervision Appeals Review Conunittee (SARC) guidelines were 

amended in 2008, after notice and comment, to modify the supervisory dctcm1inations 

eligible for appeal and align the FDJC's appeal procedures with those of the other federal 

banking agencies. Prior to 2008, the FDIC was the only federal banking agency that 

expressly allowed review of detenninations that underlie fonna1 enforcement actions, which 

are subject to a separate due process. 

The FDIC Board will review and reconsider the changes made in 2008 to the SARC 

eliglbility requirements as part of the Board-level review of the clarity and appropriateness of 

the roles and responsibilities of existing Board conunittees and the effectiveness and 

timeliness of avenues of redress available to banks that believe supervisory powers are not 

used appropriately. Additionally, RMS and the Division of Depositor and Consumer 

Protection (DCP) will devt!lop a process for the review of appeals that are received but are 

deemed ineligible for the fOrmal review process to ensure that any matters in the appeal that 

require FDIC management's attention, including employee hehavior, an.!: addressed. The 

process will require that such reviews be completed in a timely manner. similar to that 

atford¢d those appeaJs eligible for the fonnal process. 
47 


23887.018

FDIC Board of Directors 

Comments on the Final Report 

-3-

Issuance of External Guidance Regarding Expectations for Communication and Handling of 

Disagreements 

RMS and DCP will update and reissue Financial Institution Letter (FIL) 13-2011, 

Reminder on FDIC E.Xammation Findmgs. This FIL: 

reinforces FDIC's expectations for communications between FDIC and bankers; 

encourages banks to provide feedback on supervisory programs and to seek clarity on 

FDIC findings and recommendations as necessary; 

encourages institutions with concerns about examination findings to discuss those 

concerns with the examiner-in-charge or to contact field office or regional office 

personnel; 

provides an avenue for institution.<> to appeal examination findings through a fonnal 

appeals process; and 

provides a confidential, neutral and independent sounding board through the FDIC Office 

of the Ombudsman. 

Issuance of Industry Guidance on Lending Through Third Parties 

In respon<e to the findings of the Final Report and prior 010 audits, the FDIC has begun 

developing guidance to address the risks associated with banks making loans through third 

parties as well as risk management practices that would be expected of banks engaging in these 

activities to mitigate the risk..:;. lbis new guidance will supplement and expand on the guidance 

contained in FIL-44-2008, Gwdanceforlvfanaging Third-Party Risk, and will specifically 

address the risks associated with banks making loans through rent-a-charter relationships. agent 

relationships, and other third-party relationships. FDIC stalfwil1 present the guidance to the 

FDIC's Board of Directors for consideration. As new products and delivery channels emerge, 

the FDIC commits to fully consider whether the issuance of specific regulatory guidance is 

warranted. 

Independent Review 

The FDIC ha<> hired out<>ide counsel to conduct an independent review of the Final Report 

and supporting materials to advise whether there is a basis for personnel action or changes to 

personnel policie$. 

Next Steps 

We appreciate the oppor1tmity to provide a response to the Final Report. The FDIC will 

provide a status update of the efforts outlined above by June 30, 2016. 
48 


23887.019

Office of 

Inspector General 

June 2006 

Report No. 06·011 

Challenges and FDIC Efforts Related to 

Predatory Lending 

AIIDIT RF.PORT 
49 


23887.020

Background and Purpose of 

Audit 

Predatory lending typically involves 

imposing unfair and abusive loan tenns 

on borrowers, and statistics show that 

borrowers lose more than $25 billion 

annually due to predatory practices. 

Predatory lending can be detrimental to 

consumers and increases the financial 

and reputation risk for financial 

institutions. Characteristics potentially 

associated with predatory lending 

include, but are not limited to, 

(I) abusive collection practices, 

(2) balloon payments with unrealistic 

repayment terms, (3) equity stripping 

associated with repeat refinancing and 

excessive fees, and (4) excessive 

interest rates that may involve steering a 

borrower to a higher-cost loan. 

The FDIC is responsible for evaluating 

FDIC-supervised financial institutions' 

compliance with federal consumer 

protection laws and regulations. 

including several that address predatory 

lending. To evaluate compliance, the 

FDIC conducts examinations of 

institutional practices regarding fair 

lending, privacy, and other consumer 

protection laws. 

The objective of this audit was to 

determine the challenges faced and the 

efforts taken by the FDIC to identify, 

assess, and address the risks posed to 

FDIC-supervised financial institutions 

and consumers from predatory lending 

practices. We also gained an 

understanding of the efforts taken by 

the other federal baaking regulators to 

address predatory lending. 

To view the full report, go to 

www.fdicig.gov/2006reports.asp 

Report No. 06-011 

June2006 

Challenges and FDIC Efforts Related to Predatory 

Lending 

Results of Audit 

The FDIC faces significant challenges associated with identifying, 

assessing, and addressing the risks posed to FDIC-supervised institutions 

and consumers by predatory lending. Specifically, (I) each loan 

transaction must be viewed in its totality to detennine whether it may be 

predatory; (2) FDJC-supervised institutions can have direct or indirect 

involvement in predatory lending; and (3) nontraditional mortgages and 

other loan products are now available that contain terms that may be 

viewed as appropriate for some borrowers, but predatory for others. 

Further, the FDIC must ensure that its efforts to combat predatory lending 

do not limit consumer access to legitimate sources of credit. 

FDIC guidance issued to examiners, FDIC-supervised financial 

institutions, and consumers addresses predatory lending. However, the 

guidance does not fonnally articulate a supervisory approach to address 

predatory lending and was not issued for the explicit purpose of 

identifying, assessing, and addressing the risks that such lending practices 

pose to institutions and consumers. Further, certain characteristics 

potentially indicative of predatory lending were not covered. The lack of 

an articulated supervisory approach and gaps in coverage could result in 

increased risk that predatory lending practices occur, are not detected. and 

harm institutions and consumers. 

Recommendations and Management Response 

The report recommends that the FDIC describe in policy its overall 

approach to addressing predatory lending and review existing examiner, 

financial institution, and consumer guidance and determine whether 

additional guidance is needed to address the risks associated with 

predatory lending. Additionally, the report identifies for the FDIC's 

consideration other federal banking regulatory agencies' actions to 

identify, assess, and address predatory lending. 

FDIC management agreed with the recommendations. The FDIC will 

develop an overall supervisory approach to predatory lending that will 

include a review of existing supervisory policies and practices. Based 

on that review, the Corporation will also develop additional guidance 

to address predatory lending, if necessary. 
50 


23887.021

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

BACKGROUND 

RESULTS OF AUDIT 

CHALLENGES RELATED TO PREDATORY LENDING 

Transactions Must be Viewed in Totality 

Direct or Indirect Institutional Involvement 

Variety of Loan Products 

Maintaining Consumer Access to Credit 

FDIC EFFORTS TO ADDRESS PREDATORY LENDING 

CHALLENGES 

FDIC Guidance Related to Predatory Lending 

Guidance to FDIC Examiners 

Guidance to FDIC-Supervised Institutions 

Consumer Education 

Conclusion and Recommendations 

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION 

Jointly Issued Guidance 

Individual Regulatory Guidance 

Conclusion 

CORPORATION COMMENTS AND OIG EVALUATION 

APPENDIX I: OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY 

APPENDIX II: CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 

APPENDIX III: CHARACTERISTICS POTENTIALLY 

ASSOCIATED WITH PREDATORY LENDING 

APPENDIX IV: INFORMATION PROVIDED BY OTHER 

FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 

APPENDIX V: CORPORATION COMMENTS 

APPENDIX VI: MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

1 

2 

3 

3 

4 

4 

4 

5 

5 

7 

11 

12 

13 

14 

14 

15 

17 

17 

18 

24 

26 

28 

31 

37 
51 


23887.022

TABLES 

Table 1: OIG Analysis of Coverage for Characteristics Potentially 

Associated With Predatory Lending 

Table 2: Analysis of Reputational Risk for FRB-Supervised 

Financial Institutions 

ACRONYMS 

AMTPA 

ANPR 

ARM 

CRA 

CRC 

DSC 

ECOA 

ED 

FCRA 

FDCPA 

FFIEC 

FHA 

FIL 

FRB 

FTC 

GAO 

GLBA 

HOEPA 

HUD 

NCUA 

occ 

OIG 

OTS 

RESPA 

ROE 

TILA 

Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act 

Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

Adjustable Rate Mortgage 

Community Reinvestment Act 

Consumer Response Center 

Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection 

Equal Credit Opportunity Act 

Examination Documentation 

Fair Credit Reporting Act 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 

Fair Housing Act 

Financial Institution Letter 

Federal Reserve Board 

Federal Trade Commission 

Government Accountability Office 

Gramm-Leach-Biiley Act 

Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act 

Department of Housing and Urban Development 

National Credit Union Administration 

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 

Office of Inspector General 

Office of Thrift Supervision 

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 

Report of Examination 

Truth in Lending Act 

6 

17 
52 


23887.023

FDIG 

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

3501 Fairrax Drive, Arlington, VA 22226 

Office of Audits 

Office of Inspector General 

DATE: June 7, 2006 

MEMORANDUM TO: Sandra L. Thompson, Acting Director 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection 

Russell A. Rau [Electronically produced version; original signed by Russell A. Rau] 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits 

Challenges and FDIC Efforts Related to Predatory Lending 

(Report No. 06-011) 

This report presents the results of the subject FDIC Office of Inspector General's (OIG) audit. 

Although there is no universally accepted definition, predatory lending typically involves 

imposing unfair and abusive loan terms on borrowers, often through aggressive sales tactics; 

taking advantage of borrowers' lack of understanding of complicated transactions; and outright 

deception. The objective of this audit was to determine the challenges faced and efforts taken by 

the FDIC to identify, assess, and address the risks posed to institutions and consumers from 

predatory lending. Also, we gained an understanding of the efforts taken to address predatory 

lending by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 

(OCC), Federal Reserve Board (FRB), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and Department of 

Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Appendix I of this report discusses our objective, 

scope, and methodology in detail. 

BACKGROUND 

According to the Center for Responsible Lending, which is a research and policy organization 

whose main components include legislative and policy advocacy, borrowers lose more than 

$25 billion annually due to predatory mortgages, payday loans, and lending abuses involving 

overdraft loans, excessive credit card debt, and tax refund loans. Predatory lending can be 

detrimental not only to consumers but also to financial institutions because such practices could 

(1) lead to a high volume of foreclosures, which are costly to the mortgage holder; (2) undermine 

the reputation of financial institutions and the public's trust in the financial services industry; and 

(3) subject institutions that engage in or unintentionally support predatory lending to the risk of 

costly litigation. 

Within the FDIC, the Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection (DSC) has primary 

responsibility for dealing with issues related to predatory lending. DSC addresses predatory 

lending and the effect that such lending might have on institutions and consumers as part of its 

safety and soundness and compliance examinations. For example, DSC examiners evaluate an 

institution's compliance with various consumer protection, fair lending, and privacy laws, 
53 


23887.024

including the following that address predatory, unfair, abusive, or deceptive acts or practices. 

(See Appendix II for more details.) 

Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) 

Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) 

Fair Housing Act (FHA) 

Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) 

Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEP A) 

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) 

Truth in Lending Act (TILA) 

DSC has issued guidance to examiners, financial institutions, and consumers regarding issues 

related to predatory, unfair, abusive, or deceptive acts or practices. Further, the FDIC's national 

Consumer Response Center (CRC), established in July 2002, receives, investigates, and responds 

to complaints involving FDIC-supervised institutions and answers inquiries from consumers 

about consumer protection laws and banking practices. For the period January I, 2003 through 

November 7, 2005, CRC identified 23 possible predatory lending complaints and inquiries. In 

response, CRC investigated or referred complaints to the responsible federal banking regulator as 

deemed appropriate, or otherwise disposed of the complaints. More specifically: 

eight complaints were investigated by the FDIC, and no evidence was found that the 

financial institution violated a consumer protection law or regulation; 

seven complaints were referred to other agencies because those circumstances did not 

involve FDIC-supervised institutions; 

four inquiries were information requests from consumers about payday or predatory 

lending; 

two complaints were investigated by the FDIC, and the Corporation did not intervene due 

to litigation between the consumer and the financial institution; and 

two complaints were not investigated by the FDIC because the consumer did not provide 

enough information about the nature of the complaint. 

RESULTS OF AUDIT 

Overall, we found that the FDIC faces significant challenges associated with identifying, 

assessing, and addressing the risks posed to FDIC-superviscd institutions and consumers by 

predatory lending. Specifically, (I) each loan transaction must be viewed in its totality to 

determine whether it may be predatory; (2) FDIC-supervised institutions can have direct or 

indirect involvement in predatory lending; and (3) nontraditional mortgages and other loan 

products are now available that contain terms that may be viewed as appropriate for some 

2 
54 


23887.025

borrowers but predatory for others. Further, the FDIC must ensure that its efforts to combat 

predatory lending do not limit consumer access to legitimate sources of credit. 

FDIC guidance issued to examiners, FDIC-supervised financial institutions, and consumers 

addresses predatory lending. However, the guidance does not formally articulate a supervisory 

approach to address predatory lending and was not issued for the explicit purpose of identifying, 

assessing, and addressing the risks that such lending practices pose to institutions and consumers. 

Further, certain characteristics potentially indicative of predatory lending were not covered. The 

lack of an articulated supervisory approach and gaps in coverage could result in increased risk 

that predatory lending practices occur, are not detected, and harm institutions and consumers. 

Therefore, the FDIC needs to clarify for examiners and institutions its overall approach to 

addressing predatory lending and enhance guidance to bring increased attention to associated 

characteristics. 

Additionally, this report identifies for the FDIC's consideration other federal banking regulatory 

agencies' actions to identify, assess, and address predatory lending. 

CHALLENGES RELATED TO PREDATORY LENDING 

The following discusses in detail significant challenges that the FDIC faces with respect to 

combating predatory lending. 

Transactions Must be Viewed in Totality 

Identifying or recognizing predatory lending in a specific loan transaction can be a challenge 

because each loan transaction must be viewed in its totality, including the associated marketing 

practices, terms of the agreement, various parties involved in the loan transaction, and financial 

sophistication of the parties involved. As a result, there is no simple "checklist" to follow in 

identifying predatory lending. 

Additionally, borrowers can be susceptible to predatory lending practices in several phases of the 

loan transaction as described below. 

Marketing Phase. Lenders may employ aggressive marketing techniques that target 

specific borrowers or communities. 

Loan Underwriting Phase. Lenders may require borrowers to pay additional fees or accept 

additional and unnecessary services or products in order to receive a loan. 

Loan Execution Phase. Lenders may suggest refinancing, or "flipping" a loan (at an 

additional fee) without economic gain for the borrower. 

When used in an unfair, abusive, or deceptive manner and depending on the circumstances faced 

by the specific borrower and the borrower's financial sophistication, the activities could, in fact, 

be predatory. 

3 
55 


23887.026

Direct or Indirect Institutional Involvement 

A financial institution's involvement in predatory lending is not always obvious because such 

involvement may be direct or indirect. Direct involvement might involve a financial institution 

extending predatory loans to borrowers or using a network of loan brokers that have access to 

subprime lenders. A financial institution's indirect involvement in the predatory lending 

process-knowingly or unknowingly-may result from acquiring or forming subsidiaries that 

specialize in subprime lending, lending to subprime lenders, servicing loans, investing in assetbacked securities, or participating in the securitization process. Accordingly, determining an 

institution's involvement in predatory lending is difficult for FDIC examiners. 

Variety of Loan Products 

The fixed-rate mortgage is now just one of an array of loan products. Such loan products 

include: (1) no-money-down loans; (2) adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) with negative 

amortization and interest-only options; and (3) Option-ARMs, which give borrowers increased 

options in repaying the mortgage. Regulatory experience with nontraditional mortgage lending 

programs has shown that prudent management of these programs requires increased attention to 

product development, underwriting, compliance, and risk-management functions. Further, 

although these loan products may be appropriate for certain consumers, the federal regulatory 

agencies are concerned that these products and practices are being offered to some borrowers 

who may not otherwise qualify for traditional fixed-rate or ARM loans and may not fully 

understand the associated risks. 

Maintaining Consumer Access to Credit 

It has been widely recognized that there is a close relationship between predatory lendingwhich is detrimental to the consumer-and subprime lending-which has a legitimate place in 

the financial services industry, in that subprime lending serves the market of borrowers whose 

credit histories would not permit them to quality for a conventional "prime" loan. This challenge 

is evidenced in testimony by the Comptroller of the Currency before the Committee on Banking 

and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, May 24,2000: 

While we clearly need to address real abuses that exist, particularly in connection with 

home-secured loans, we also need to preserve and encourage consumer access to credit, 

meaningful consumer choice, and competition in the provision of financial services to 

low- and moderate-income families. Determining how to draw the line between 

predatory and legitimate credit practices in a way that will both combat abuses and 

advance these other objectives is a major challenge. 

Further, as many as 12 million households either have no relationship with traditional financial 

institutions or depend on "fringe lenders,'' such as pawnshops, payday lenders, and rent-to-own 

stores, for their credit needs. Such fringe lenders, which remain largely unregulated, frequently 

4 
56 


23887.027

charge excessively high fees and can expose borrowers to predatory, unfair, abusive, or deceptive 

acts or practices. 1 

Thus, in combating predatory lending, the FDIC's challenge lies in preventing the unintended 

consequence oflimiting consumer access to legitimate credit sources. 

FDIC EFFORTS TO ADDRESS PREDATORY LENDING CHALLENGES 

The FDIC has taken action to address significant challenges related to predatory lending by 

providing guidance in various forms to examiners, FDIC-supervised institutions, and consumers. 

However, the guidance does not formally articulate the Corporation's overall supervisory 

approach for addressing predatory lending and is contained in multiple policies, procedures, and 

memoranda. Generally, this guidance was not issued for the explicit purpose of addressing 

predatory lending. In addition, the guidance covers many, but not all, of the characteristics often 

associated with predatory lending. Consequently, predatory lending may not receive sufficient 

attention, which increases the risk that such practices could occur, may not be detected, and may 

harm institutions and borrowers. 

FDIC Guidance Related to Predatory Lending 

The FDIC has provided guidance related to predatory lending to examiners in safety and 

soundness and compliance examination policies and procedures and Regional Directors 

Memoranda and to institutions the FDIC supervises in financial institution letters (FIL).2 The 

FDIC has also provided guidance to consumers on predatory lending through its adult education 

program-Money Smart-and the FDIC Consumer News publication. However, we found that 

the FDIC' s guidance did not articulate the overall supervisory approach for identifying, 

assessing, and addressing predatory lending and either varied or did not explicitly cover some 

predatory lending characteristics, depending on the source of the guidance. 

Numerous lending characteristics, when considered either individually or in combination, could 

indicate whether predatory lending has occurred. Our research identified 21 characteristics that 

are potentially associated with predatory lending. Some of these characteristics are not 

prohibited by law, but may be predatory if they are determined to be associated with unfair, 

abusive, or deceptive lending practices. Table 1 shows the characteristics identified by our 

research and indicates whether there is some coverage in established FDIC guidance. 

1 FDIC Banking Review, 2005, Volume 17, No. I, Limited-Purpose Banks: Their Specialties, Performance. and 

Prospects. 

2 FILs may announce new regulations, special alerts concerning entities operating illegally as financial institutions, 

new FDIC publications, or a variety of other matters. 

5 
57 


23887.028

Table 1: OIG Analysis of Coverage for Characteristics Potentially Associated With 

Predatory Lending• 

Characteristic ~:~:~::.~ Com~==M.=o=ney"'===l Smart 

The "'v'" indicates that guldance included some cover~e of the c 

Abusive Collection Practices <~' <~' 

Balloon Payments With Unrealistic Repayment Terms <I' <I' <~' 

efault in Connection With Refinancing 

Equity Stripping Associated With Repeat Refinancing and 

Excessive Fees 

Excessive Fees not Justified by the Costs of Services Provided 

and the Credit and Interest Rate Risks Involved 

Excessive Interest Rates That May Involve "Steering" a 

Borrower to a Higher-Cost Loan 

Fraud, Deception, and Abuse 

High Loan-to-Value Ratio That May Negatively Impact a 

Borrower's Ability to Avoid Unaffordable Debt 

Lending Without Regard to Abilitv to Repay 

Loan Flipping Without Economic Gain for the Borrower, 

Resulting in Equity Stri£I>i1lg_ 

Mandatory Arbitration Clauses 

Payday Lending 

Pre-payment Penalties That May Trap Borrowers in High-Cost 

Loans 

Refinancing of Special Mortgages Without Economic Gain for 

the Borrower, Resulti~in ~_i_ty_ Stripping 

Refinancing Unsecured Debt Without Economic Gain for the 

Borrower, Resultil!Jl_in_§_u_i_ty_Stripping 

Repetitive Refinancing Without Economic Gain for the 

Borrower, Resulting in Equity Striooing 

Single-Premium Credit Insurance That is Added to the Total 

Loan Amount and Increases the Total Interest Paid 

Spurious Open-End Loans 

Steering Borrowers Who Qualify for Lower-Cost Loans to 

Higher-Cost Financing 

Subprime Lending Within Which Predatory Lending Generally 

Occursc 

Yield-Spread Premiums With Incentives to Steer Borrowers 

into Higher-Cost Loans 

Source. OIG rev1ew ofDSC gmdance provtded to exammers. FDIC-superv1sed financ1al mstttutwns, and 

consumers. 

a Appendix III provides details on the characteristics that may be predatory if they are detennined to be associated 

with unfair, abusive, or deceptive lending practices. 

b Examination guidance includes examination policies, procedures. and Regional Directors Memoranda. 

c According to the DSC Risk A1anagement.Manual of Examination Policies, there is not a universal definition of a 

subprime loan in the industry, but subprime lending is generally characterized as a lending program or strategy that 

targets borrowers who pose a significantly higher risk of default than traditional retail banking customers. 

6 
58 


23887.029

Coverage of the lending characteristics in Table I can vary depending on their nature, and certain 

characteristics may appropriately lend themselves to being covered under one type of 

examination (e.g., safety and soundness or compliance) in comparison to another. As a result, 

we fully recognize that there may be legitimate reasons why certain characteristics may not be 

included in a particular form of guidance. However, three of the characteristics were not 

explicitly covered by any of the guidance-specifically, (I) encouragement of default, 

(2) refinancing of special mortgages, and (3) refinancing unsecured debt. 

There may be other lending characteristics associated with predatory lending practices that are 

not included in Table I. Further, we recognize that defining lending practices that constitute 

predatory lending is not easy and that consideration must be given to the context in which 

lending practices occur. Some lending practices may be abusive in the context of high-cost 

loans; others may be unacceptable in all contexts; and others, not necessarily abusive for all 

high-cost borrowers, may be abusive for a particular borrower due to deception. We discuss, in 

detail, coverage of the characteristics by the various forms of FDIC guidance in the following 

sections of the report. 

Guidance to FDIC Examiners 

The FDIC conducts and provides guidance on examinations to determine the safety and 

soundness of financial institutions and whether institutions are complying with consumer 

protection laws and regulations. DSC's examination guidance does not articulate the FDIC's 

overall supervisory approach for addressing predatory lending. Further, the FDIC's safety and 

soundness examination and compliance examination guidance addresses many, but not all of the 

potentially predatory lending characteristics that our research identified. 

Safety and Soundness Examination Guidance 

We found that DSC's safety and soundness examination guidance covered the following 

characteristics. 

Subprime Lending Examination Documentation (ED) Module 

Abusive collection practices. 

Excessive fees not justified by the costs of services provided and the credit and interest 

rate risks involved. 

Excessive interest rates that may involve ''steering" a borrower to a higher-cost loan. 

Fraud, deception, and abuse. 

Lending without regard to ability to repay. 

Loan flipping without economic gain for the borrower, resulting in equity stripping. 

7 
59 


23887.030

Subprimc lending within which predatory lending generally occurs. 

Residential Real Estate Lending ED Module 

High loan-to-value ratio that may negatively impact a borrower's ability to avoid 

unaffordable debt. 

Payday Lending Guidance 

Payday lending (a particular type of subprime lending) guidance also includes guidance 

on lending without regard to the ability to repay and information on various consumer 

protection laws, including the TILA, ECOA, FCRA, FDCPA, and FTC Act.3 

As of September 30, 2005, the FDIC reported 91 (about 2 percent) of the 5,257 FDICsupervised institutions as subprime lenders based on aggregate credit exposure in subprime loans 

equal to or greater than 25 percent or more of Tier I capital. As a result, use of the Subprime 

Lending ED Module and coverage of the seven characteristics noted above could be limited to a 

small number of FDIC-supervised institutions. 

In addition to the subprime, residential real estate, and payday lending guidance, we found that 

the Mortgage Banking ED Module does not specifically reference any of the characteristics but 

does contain the following step in the Internal Controls section of the segment entitled, Core 

Analysis Procedures, as shown below: 

Evaluate the bank's process for ensuring compliance with predatory lending laws, including: 

the strategy for handling loans originated and serviced in various jurisdictions; 

procedures to confirm compliance with predatory lending laws and regulations; 

and 

risk controls that are in place to prevent predatory servicing practices. 

The extent to which examiners would perform this step depends upon whether the financial 

institution being examined is classified as a mortgage banker. As of September 2005, the FDIC 

classified 376 (about 7 percent) of its supervised institutions as mortgage bankers, which are 

defined as institutions that deal in mortgages with brokers originating loans and then selling them 

to investors. Further, although the module directs examiners to evaluate the bank's procedures 

for confirming compliance with predatory lending laws and regulations, the module does not 

specify the laws and regulations the examiners should use to make the evaluation. However, 

DSC officials stated that the ED modules resulted from an interagency effort by the FDIC, 

3 The FDIC's subprime lending and payday lending guidance also provides information on the FDIC's expectations 

for prudent risk-management practices for those lending activities. At the time the FDIC released its payday lending 

guidance in March 2005, the Corporation reported that 12 FDIC-supervised institutions were engaging in payday 

lending. 

8 
60 


23887.031

Federal Reserve Board, and Conference of State Bank Supervisors and that because those 

procedures are used by state examiners and federal examiners, it is not practical for the module 

to document every applicable state and federal law and regulation. In addition, DSC officials 

stated that ED modules are an examination tool that focuses on risk management practices and 

guides examiners to establish the appropriate examination scope. In addition, the modules: 

incorporate questions and points of consideration into examination procedures to 

specifically address a bank's risk management strategies for each of its major business 

activities and 

direct examiners to consider areas of potential risk and associated risk control practices to 

facilitate an effective supervisory program. 

Further, DSC officials stated that the Subprime Lending and Mortgage Banking ED Modules are 

supplemental modules or reference modules to be used in conjunction with core ED modules. 

Examiners are not required to duplicate efforts already addressed in core procedures or 

elsewhere, since ultimately, the conclusions will be brought forward to the Core Analysis 

Decision Factors. 

The safety and soundness examination guidance did not cover the following characteristics: 

balloon payments with unrealistic repayment terms; 

encouragement of default in connection with refinancing; 

equity stripping associated with repeat refinancing and excessive fees; 

mandatory arbitration clauses; 

pre-payment penalties that may trap borrowers in high-cost loans; 

refinancing of special mortgages without economic gain for the borrower, resulting in 

equity stripping; 

refinancing unsecured debt without economic gain for the borrower, resulting in equity 

stripping; 

repetitive refinancing without economic gain for the borrower, resulting in equity 

stripping; 

single-premium credit insurance that is added to the total loan amount and increases the 

total interest paid; 

spurious open-end loans; 

steering of borrowers who qualify for lower-cost loans to higher-cost financing; and 

9 
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23887.032

yield-spread premiums with incentives to steer borrowers into higher-cost loans. 

Lacking coverage of certain characteristics could be significant because predatory lending may 

cause safety and soundness problems. For example: 

Balloon Payments With Unrealistic Repayment Terms. A financial institution may 

structure loans with initial low monthly payments but include a balloon payment that the 

borrower cannot afford in an attempt to trap the borrower into refinancing and paying 

additional fees at the end of the loan term. However, if the borrower is unable to 

restructure the loan and the collateral value declines, the institution is left without 

adequate sources of repayment for the loan. Higher loan losses could lead to safety and 

soundness concerns. 

Refinancing Unsecured Debt Without Economic Gain for the Borrower, Resulting 

in Equity Stripping. A financial institution that engages in refinancing unsecured debt, 

using a borrower's home as collateral, may eventually incur higher loan losses. 

Borrowers may continue to incur additional unsecured debt and may default on the loan. 

If a borrower defaults, the institution is dependent upon the collateral for any recovery on 

the loan. The bank would absorb foreclosure costs and any decline in collateral value. 

An institution that makes a loan to a consumer based predominantly on the liquidation 

value of the borrower's collateral, rather than on determination of the borrower's 

repayment ability, may be engaging in a fundamentally unsafe and unsound banking 

practice. This practice increases not only the risk to the bank that the loan will default 

but also the bank's potential loss exposure upon default. 

Compliance Examination Guidance 

Compliance examination procedures include guidance for examiner use in determining 

compliance with a number of consumer protection laws and regulations, including HOEP A, 

TILA, RESPA, and the FTC Act. Examiners use these procedures if the examiner decides, 

through the risk-focused compliance examination process, to test the bank's compliance with a 

particular law or regulation. Noncompliance can result in civil liability and negative publicity as 

well as the FDIC's imposition of formal or informal actions to correct noncompliance. Further, 

it is important to note that the FDIC can rely on the FTC Act as authority for issuing enforcement 

actions against financial institutions for unfair, abusive, and deceptive acts or practices, which 

could include any or all of the characteristics potentially associated with predatory lending that 

our research identified. 

The FDICs compliance examination procedures include reference to many of the characteristics 

that we identified in conducting the audit but do not cover the following: 

encouragement of default in connection with refinancing; 

equity stripping associated with repeat refinancing and excessive fees; 

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high loan-to-value ratio that may negatively impact a borrower's ability to avoid 

unaffordable debt; 

mandatory arbitration clauses; 

refinancing of special mortgages without economic gain for the borrower, resulting in 

equity stripping; 

refinancing unsecured debt without economic gain for the borrower, resulting in equity 

stripping; and 

steering of borrowers who qualify for lower-cost loans to higher-cost financing. 

Further, of those characteristics, neither the compliance nor safety and soundness examination 

guidance covered: (1) encouragement of default in connection with refinancing; (2) equity 

stripping associated with repeat refinancing and excessive fees; (3) mandatory arbitration 

clauses; (4) refinancing of special mortgages without economic gain for the borrower, resulting 

in equity stripping; (5) refinancing unsecured debt without economic gain for the borrower, 

resulting in equity stripping; and (6) steering of borrowers who qualify for lower-cost loans to 

higher-cost financing. These characteristics could cause detrimental consequences such as 

defaults and foreclosures to borrowers. Although we did not identify specific coverage of the 

seven characteristics in compliance examination guidance, as noted earlier, those characteristics 

could indicate noncompliance with the FTC Act if the loan was made in an unfair, abusive, or 

deceptive manner. 

On June 17, 2005, the FDIC issued examination guidance entitled, Procedures for Determining 

Compliance With the Prohibition on Unfair and Deceptive Acts or Practices found in Section 5 

of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The purpose of that guidance is to strengthen the FDIC's 

ability to apply Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits such acts or practices. In addition, 

although examination guidance states that most banking organizations do not engage in unfair or 

deceptive acts or practices, advances in banking technology and changes in the lending 

organizational structure have contributed to financial institutions' participating in non-banking 

activities and provided the ability to structure complex financial products and sophisticated 

marketing methods. The pace and complexity of these advances have increased the potential risk 

for consumer harm. However, the examination guidance does not specifically address predatory 

lending practices. 

Guidance to FDIC-Supervised Institutions 

The FILs issued to FDIC-supervised institutions include information on all of the characteristics 

that we identified except for the following: 

encouragement of default in connection with refinancing; 

refinancing of special mortgages without economic gain for the borrower, resulting in 

equity stripping; and 

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refinancing unsecured debt without economic gain for the borrower, resulting in equity 

stripping. 

Encouragement of default may influence a borrower to breach an existing loan to subsequently 

refinance all or part of a loan, which could result in higher loan balances and additional interest 

and fees. In addition, encouraging a borrower to use equity in a residence as collateral to 

refinance unsecured debt, such as credit card debt, could jeopardize the borrower's equity in the 

residence and could, ultimately, result in the borrower losing the residence. Refinancing special 

mortgages could also negatively affect terms that may have been favorable to the borrower, 

leaving the borrower with loan terms that do not provide a tangible economic benefit. 

Enhancing the FILs to cover these characteristics would help to ensure that financial institutions 

protect consumers by avoiding these practices, when appropriate. 

Consumer Education 

The FDIC has included information related to predatory lending in its adult education 

program-Money Smart-and its FDIC Consumer News publication. Money Smart includes 

information on many of the characteristics that we identified but does not include coverage of the 

following: 

encouragement of default in connection with refinancing; 

mandatory arbitration clauses; 

refinancing of special mortgages without economic gain for the borrower, resulting in 

equity stripping; 

refinancing unsecured debt without economic gain for the borrower, resulting in equity 

stripping; 

spurious open-end loans; 

steering of borrowers who qualify for lower-cost loans to higher-cost financing; and 

yield-spread premiums with incentives to steer borrowers into higher-cost loans. 

The FDIC created Money Smart as a training program to help adults outside the financial 

mainstream enhance their financial management skills and create positive banking relationships. 

Ten comprehensive modules comprise the Money Smart curriculum and cover basic financial 

topics to help consumers understand banking basics. The modules include information on bank 

services, credit, budgeting, savings, credit cards, loans, and homeownership. The program also 

provides information in the following areas to assist consumers in avoiding predatory lending: 

loan payment decisions, 

loan rejection, 

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predatory lending and TILA, 

predatory loan offers, 

predatory lending tactics, and 

what to do if consumers believe they are victims of a predatory loan. 

Information on predatory lending also addresses mortgage loans, credit cards, and installment 

loans. The program is available through the Internet, classroom instruction, or CD-ROM and is 

available in multiple languages, including Spanish, Korean, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Russian. 

The FDIC Consumer News provides practical guidance on how to become a smarter, safer user 

of financial services. The Summer 2002 edition of the FDIC Consumer News article entitled, 

High-Cost "Predatory·· Home Loans: How to Avoid the Traps, advised consumers that: 

... something is robbing homeowners of money and putting many of these same families 

at risk of losing their homes. . .. There is no clear-cut definition of a predatory loan, but 

many experts agree that it is the result of a company misleading, tricking and sometimes 

coercing someone of taking out a home loan (typically a home equity loan or mortgage 

refinancing) at excessive costs and without regard to the homeowner's ability to repay. 

Victims who have trouble repaying a predatory loan often face harassing collection 

tactics or are encouraged to refinance the loan at even higher fees. 

The publication also acknowledged some of the consumer protection laws, including TILA and 

HOEPA. 

FDIC guidance to consumers could be enhanced to provide coverage on the seven characteristics 

not already addressed to make consumers better aware of the potential negative effects of 

predatory lending. 

Conclusion and Recommendations 

FDIC officials have stated that federally insured depository institutions have a good record of 

avoiding involvement in predatory lending practices. Those financial institutions, which are 

banks. thrifts, or credit unions, are subject to federal and state oversight and supervision, unlike 

most subprime lenders. Further, financial institutions' regulatory agencies have stated that their 

monitoring and examination activities have revealed little evidence of predatory lending 

practices by federally regulated depository institutions. However, as consumers enjoy more 

access to credit from a wider variety of sources, opportunities have expanded for predatory 

lending. Education is one way to help people achieve financial literacy and avoid abusive loans, 

but supervision and oversight should also play an important role in preventing predatory lending 

practices. 

The FDIC has recognized the importance of its role in this regard by establishing a strategic goal 

to ensure that consumers' rights are protected and by responding to consumer complaints and 

inquiries related to predatory lending. The FDIC has also taken steps to provide guidance to its 

examiners, FDIC-supervised financial institutions, and consumers on many of the characteristics 

related to predatory lending. However, the Corporation could bring more attention to combating 

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predatory lending by establishing and articulating its overall supervisory approach for 

identifying, assessing, and addressing the risks associated with predatory lending and ensuring 

that characteristics of predatory lending are addressed in examiner, institution, and consumer 

guidance. 

We recommend that the Director, DSC: 

(!)Describe in policy the FDIC's overall supervisory approach to predatory lending. 

(2) Review existing examiner, financial institution, and consumer guidance and determine 

whether additional guidance is needed to address the risks associated with predatory 

lending. 

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION 

The FDIC and some members of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 

(FFIEC)4 have addressed predatory lending in various ways. These include jointly issued 

guidance, performance measurement, consumer information on predatory lending, and 

assessment of risk associated with predatory lending. Appendix IV contains supplemental 

information from some of the other federal banking regulatory agencies regarding their efforts 

related to predatory lending. 

Jointly Issued Guidance 

The FFIEC members have jointly issued guidance to examiners, financial institutions, and 

consumers on supervisory and consumer issues related to some predatory lending characteristics. 

For example, the FFIEC issued guidance and examination procedures on subprime lending in 

January 2001 and on fair lending in August 2004. Further, the FFIEC members issued guidance 

to consumers entitled, Putting Your Home on the Loan Line is Risky Business.5 The brochure 

provides information on the following: 

Groups targeted by abusive lenders or contractors-homeowners with low incomes or 

credit problems and the elderly. 

Steps consumers can take to protect themselves, including: 

o considering multiple options for sources of credit; 

o contacting several lenders for possible credit; 

4 The FFIEC, which consists of all federal financial institution regulatory agencies, is a formal interagency body 

empowered to prescribe uniform principles, standards, and report forms for the federal examination of financial 

institutions by the FDIC, OTS, OCC, FRB, and National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). The FFIEC makes 

recommendations to promote unifonnity in the supervision of financial institutions. The scope of our audit did not 

include the NCUA. 5 The following agencies also participated in the issuance of the consumer brochure: HUD, Department of Justice, 

Federal Housing Finance Board, FTC, and Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. 

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o comparison shopping for loan terms, conditions, payment options, points, fees, 

and penalties; and 

o understanding consumer rights and cancellation options. 

Contact information for federal banking regulatory agencies, the Department of Justice, 

HUD, Federal Housing Finance Board, and Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 

Oversight. 

In addition, in March 2004, the FDIC and FRB jointly published guidance for state-chartered 

institutions on unfair or deceptive acts or practices prohibited by Section 5 of the FTC Act. This 

guidance explains how institutions could avoid engaging in practices that might be viewed as 

unfair or deceptive. 

Individual Regulatory Guidance 

The individual members of the FFIEC have issued guidance to their examiners and supervised 

institutions. 

Office of Thrift Supervision Guidance 

OTS has issued examination-scoping guidance and a Strategic Plan that specifically addresses 

predatory lending. The OTS Examination Scope Worksheet, which examiners use to determine 

whether a specific issue should be included in the examination scope, includes a line item for an 

assessment of predatory lending issues. Further, the OTS Strategic Plan includes a performance 

goal to maintain a thrift industry that effectively complies with consumer protection laws. As 

stated in the plan, one of the strategies OTS uses for achieving performance is to "conduct 

examinations with a top-down, risk focused approach that promotes comprehensive compliance 

management including the establishment of adequate internal controls to ensure regulatory 

compliance and to avoid predatory practices." 

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Guidance 

OCC has issued industry guidance addressing predatory lending. 

In February 2003, OCC issued two advisory letters related to predatory lending to the 

national banks and operating subsidiaries it supervises. The advisory letters: 

o describe loan attributes that are often considered predatory and establish standards 

for policies and procedures for monitoring loan transactions to avoid making, 

brokering, or purchasing loans with such attributes; 

o state OCC's position that predatory lending will affect a national bank's 

Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) rating;6 and 

6 On July 19,2005, the federal banking agencies approved CRA final rules, effective September l, 2005. Those 

rules include clarification on when discrimination or other illegal credit practices by a bank or its affiliate will 

adversely affect an evaluation of the bank's CRA perfonnance. 

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o clarify ways in which predatory lending practices can create legal, safety and 

soundness, and reputational risks for national banks. 

In January 2004, OCC issued a rule adopting anti-predatory lending standards that 

expressly prohibit national banks from (I) making consumer and mortgage loans based 

predominantly on the bank's realization of the foreclosure value of the borrower's 

collateral, without regard for the borrower's ability to repay, and (2) engaging in unfair 

and deceptive practices within the meaning of Section 5 of the FTC Act. 

In September 2004, OCC issued an advisory letter alerting national banks regarding 

OCC's concerns about certain credit card marketing and account management practices. 

These practices may entail unfair or deceptive acts or practices and may expose a bank to 

compliance and reputational risks. 

In February 2005, OCC issued guidelines on national bank residential mortgage lending 

standards to further the OCC's goal of ensuring that national banks do not become 

involved in predatory, abusive, unfair, or deceptive residential mortgage lending 

practices. The guidelines are enforceable pursuant to the process provided in Section 39 

of the FDT Act and Part 30 of OCC regulations. The new guidelines incorporated key 

elements of the OCC's February 2003 advisory letters. 

Federal Reserve Board Guidance 

The FRB has issued examination guidance on assessing financial institutions' risks related to 

predatory lending. FRB's Risk-Focused Consumer Compliance Supervision Program, dated 

December 2003, states that FRB examiners evaluate consumer compliance risks during 

specialized consumer compliance examinations. The consumer compliance risk profile 

incorporates an assessment of operational, legal, and reputational risks arising from a bank's 

consumer compliance activities. 

In evaluating reputational risk during safety and soundness examinations, examiners are to 

determine whether the bank's risk is "low," "moderate," or "high" in accordance with FRB 

guidance. In addition, examiners assign a trend indicator of"increasing," "stable," or 

"decreasing." The risk assessment considers the (I) level of inherent risk involved in each of the 

bank's significant business activities and (2) strength of risk management systems in place to 

control the level of risk in these activities. Table 2 on the next page shows that FRB examiners 

consider the level of rcputational risk specifically related to predatory lending for FRBsupervised financial institutions. 

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Table2: Analysis of Reputational Risk for FRB-Supervised Financia II nst1tuhons 

Reputational Risk 

Low Moderate High 

Business strategy and/or bank Business strategy and/or bank Business strategy and/or bank 

products unlikely to raise products may raise concern products likely to raise serious 

concern regarding predatory regarding predatory lending concern regarding predatory 

lending and/or unfair and and/or unfair and deceptive acts lending and/or unfair and 

deceptive acts or practices. or practices. deceptive acts or practices. 

Source: FRB Rzsk-l·ocused Consumer Complzance Supervzszon Program, dated December 200o. ' 

Conclusion 

It is not our intention to conclude on whether one agency's approach to addressing predatory 

lending is better than another. We recognize that the OCC and OTS supervisory approaches to 

predatory lending are based, in large part, on their authority to charter and supervise institutions 

whose operations are largely defined and bound by federal statutes and regulations. Unlike the 

OCC and OTS, the FDIC is not a chartering authority and shares regulatory oversight of the 

institutions it supervises with the appropriate state supervisor that can address predatory lending 

through applicable state and local laws and regulations. Nevertheless, the FDIC should consider 

the merits of the other federal banking regulatory agencies in establishing the Corporation's 

supervisory approach to this important issue. Additional information on OTS and OCC 

predatory lending efforts is in Appendix IV. 

CORPORATION COMMENTS AND OIG EVALUATION 

A draft of this report was issued on February 24, 2006. On June I, 2006, the Acting Director, 

DSC, provided a written response to the draft report. The DSC response is presented in its 

entirety in Appendix V. A summary of management's response to the recommendations is in 

Appendix VI. 

In its response to recommendations I and 2, DSC stated that it agreed with the recommendations 

and would develop an overall supervisory approach to predatory lending that will include a 

review of existing supervisory policies and practices. Based on that review, DSC will also 

develop additional enhanced guidance to address predatory lending, if necessary. DSC agreed to 

complete these actions by December 31, 2006. These agreed-upon actions meet the intent of our 

recommendations, which will remain open for reporting purposes until we have determined that 

the actions have been completed and are effective. 

In addition to addressing the recommendations in the draft report, DSC's response provided an 

overview of its past and ongoing efforts to address predatory lending, including (I) examination 

guidance and training, (2) enforcement policy, (3) speeches and testimony, and (4) financial 

education. 

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APPENDIX I 

OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY 

Objective 

The overall objective of this audit was to detennine the challenges faced and efforts taken by the 

FDIC to identify, assess, and address the risks posed to institutions and consumers from 

predatory lending. As part of this objective, we contacted other federal regulators to detennine 

the policies, procedures, and guidance the banking regulators, FTC, and HUD had issued to 

address these risks. We perfonned our audit from April 2005 through January 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Scope and Methodology 

To achieve the objective, we interviewed FDIC officials in: 

DSC's headquarters in Washington, D.C., responsible for conducting safety and 

soundness and compliance examinations ofFDIC-supervised financial institutions. 

DSC's Kansas City Regional Office, CRC, responsible for investigating consumer 

complaints about FDIC-supervised institutions and for responding to consumer inquiries 

about consumer laws and regulations and banking practices. We obtained infonnation 

on policies and procedures related to consumer complaints and inquiries and statistics on 

the number of complaints and inquiries received since 2003 that related to predatory 

lending. 

The Office of Ombudsman, which acts as a liaison for the banking industry and the 

general public, to facilitate the resolution of problems and complaints in a fair, impartial, 

and timely manner. 

In addition, we reviewed: 

Prior audit reports and various articles related to predatory and subprime lending. 

FDIC regulations and DSC policies and procedures manuals, including related 

examination procedures for safety and soundness and compliance examinations; and 

FILs used to provide guidance and announce new regulations and special alerts to 

FDIC-supervised institutions. 

Literature and the training modules for, and perfonnance measures related to, the 

FDIC's Money Smart program. 

The FDIC's 2005-2010 Strategic Plan, 2005 Annual Performance Plan, and the 

FDIC/DSC 2004 Business Line Objectives to detennine whether the Corporation had 

developed perfonnance measures related to consumer protection, in general, and 

predatory lending, in particular. 

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APPENDIX I 

Infonnation obtained during interviews with other federal banking regulatory agencies, 

FTC, and HUD and those agencies' respective Web sites on: 

examination policies and procedures and 

information provided to examiners, financial institutions, and consumers. 

During the audit, we coordinated with the other FDIC OIG Office of Audits directorates, Office 

of Investigations, and Office of Counsel and GAO to determine whether there were prior or 

ongoing audits, studies, or investigations related to predatory lending. Regarding congressional 

issues or interests related to predatory lending, we coordinated with the FDIC OIG Office of 

Management and Congressional Relations. We did not consider any pending legislation that 

might relate to predatory lending. 

We gathered data on the federal banking regulatory agencies' policies and procedures related to 

predatory lending, including examination guidance and information provided to FDIC-insured 

financial institutions; policies and procedures for handling consumer complaints; policies and 

procedures related to cited violations and enforcement and/or supervisory actions; and training. 

We coordinated this asfect of our review through the respective federal agency Inspector 

General organizations. 

In addition, we reviewed congressional testimony related to predatory lending and reports issued 

by GAO, HUD and Treasury, OCC, Freddie Mac, the Center for Responsible Lending, and the 

FDIC on payday and subprime lending and identified a set of 21 characteristics sometimes 

associated with predatory, unfair, abusive, and deceptive acts or practices. Because there is no 

specific definition for predatory lending, we used those characteristics in reviewing DSC 

policies, examination procedures (safety and soundness and compliance), FILs, and Regional 

Directors Memoranda to develop a matrix on the extent of coverage the FDIC's guidance 

provides on those characteristics. Appendix Ill provides a list of the characteristics and their 

definitions. 

Compliance With Laws and Regulations 

We reviewed the DSC Compliance Examination Manual and compliance examination 

procedures to identify guidance for examiners on consumer protection laws that relate to 

predatory and subprime lending. We identified the following laws related to predatory and 

subprime lending. 

Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 

Fair Credit Reporting Act, 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 

Fair Housing Act, 

Federal Trade Commission Act, 

7 We coordinated meetings with FRB and FTC program officials through their respective Offices of Inspector 

General. Our contact with HUD, OCC, and OTS was limited to meetings with their OIG officials and review of 

information obtained from their agency Web sites. 

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Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, 

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and 

Truth in Lending Act. 

APPENDIX I 

Appendix II provides details on the requirements of each law. During this audit, we did not 

contact any state regulatory agencies to determine their efforts to identify, assess, and address 

predatory lending or financial institutions' compliance with state laws regarding predatory 

lending. We also did not determine whether the FDIC reviews its supervised financial 

institutions for compliance with state predatory lending laws. 

DSC officials provided a sample of reports of examination (ROEs) that included instances in 

which DSC cited financial institutions for noncompliance with some consumer protection laws. 

We reviewed those ROEs solely to familiarize ourselves with how DSC addresses 

noncompliance with consumer protection laws. We did not review the ROEs or any applicable 

examination work papers to determine the extent of coverage of predatory lending characteristics 

during safety and soundness or compliance examinations. 

In April 1975, the FDIC complied with the FTC Act in establishing a separate office to receive 

and respond to complaints about financial institutions that it supervises. In addition, effective 

July I, 2002, the FDIC centralized its consumer affairs function with the establishment of the 

CRC within DSC. The CRC receives, investigates, and responds to complaints involving FDICsupervised institutions and answers inquiries from consumers about consumer protection laws 

and banking practices. We did not identify any instances of FDIC noncompliance with pertinent 

laws and regulations. 

Reliance on Computer-based Data, Government Performance and Results Act, Fraud and 

Hlegal Acts, and Internal Control 

Validity and Reliability of Data from Computer-based Systems 

We did not use any computer-based data for evaluative purposes. Although we obtained 

information from DSC's automated Specialized Tracking and Reporting System (STARS) on the 

number and type of consumer complaints and inquiries regarding predatory lending, we did not 

rely on this information to achieve our audit objective. Accordingly, we did not conduct any 

independent testing of computer data. 

Performance Measures 

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 directs Executive Branch agencies to 

develop a strategic plan, align agency programs and activities with concrete missions and goals, 

manage and measure results to justify appropriations and authorizations, and design budgets that 

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APPENDIX I 

reflect strategic missions. In fulfilling its primary supervisory responsibilities, the FDIC pursues 

two strategic goals: 

FDIC-supervised institutions are safe and sound, and 

consumers' rights are protected, and FDIC-supervised institutions invest in their 

communities. 

The FDIC's Strategic Plan is implemented through the Corporation's Annual Performance Plan. 

The annual plan identifies performance goals, indicators, and targets for each strategic objective. 

In reviewing the FDIC's Strategic Plan and Annual Performance Plan, we did not identify any 

strategies or performance goals directly related to predatory lending. 

Fraud and Illegal Acts 

The objective of this audit did not lend itself to testing for fraud and illegal acts. Accordingly, 

the survey and audit programs did not include specific audit steps to test for fraud and illegal 

acts. However, we were alert to situations or transactions that could have been indicative of 

fraud or illegal acts, and no such acts came to our attention. 

Internal Controls Reviewed 

During the audit, we gained an understanding of relevant control activities related to 

examinations by reviewing DSC policies and procedures as presented in DSC's Compliance 

Examination Manual, Risk Management Manual of Examination Policies, safety and soundness 

examination documentation modules, and Regional Director Memoranda. 

Summary of Prior Audit Coverage 

GAO Audit 

In January 2004, GAO issued Audit Report GA0-04-280 entitled, Federal and State Agencies 

Face Challenges in Combating Predatory Lending. Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, 

Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate, requested that GAO evaluate issues related to 

predatory home mortgage lending. GAO's report discusses(!) federal laws related to predatory 

lending and federal agencies' efforts to enforce them; (2) actions taken by states to address 

predatory lending; (3) the secondary market's role in facilitating or inhibiting predatory lending; 

(4) ways in which consumer education, mortgage counseling, and loan disclosures may deter 

predatory lending; and (5) the relationship between predatory lending activities and elderly 

consumers. 

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APPENDIX I 

FDIC OIG Audits 

The FDIC OIG conducted three previous audits related to fair lending, subprime lending, and 

consumer protection but has not conducted any previous audits specifically related to predatory 

lending. 

On March 26,2002, the OJG issued Audit Report 02-009, The Division of Compliance and 

Consumer Affairs' Risk-Scoping Process for Fair Lending Examinations, on the fair lending 

examination risk-scoping process as conducted by the Division of Compliance and Consumer 

Affairs.8 The audit focused on the FDIC's application of the FFIEC InteragenGy Fair Lending 

Examination Procedures and did not directly relate to the scope of our audit. 

On March 18, 2003, the FDIC OIG issued Audit Report 03-019, The Division of Supervision and 

Consumer Protection's Examination Assessment ojSubprime Lending, in which the OIG 

concluded that: 

DSC had taken reasonable steps to ensure that institutions (1) effectively manage risks 

associated with subprime lending programs and price loans based on risk, (2) establish 

adequate allowance levels to cover loan and lease losses, and (3) maintain capital levels 

that ref1ect the additional inherent risks associated with subprime lending. 

Interagency policies and procedures for examinations of subprime banks provided 

examiners with the necessary guidance to identify and assess the condition of subprime 

Joan programs in insured institutions, and the examiners adequately implemented this 

guidance. The procedures specifically addressed the management of risk associated with 

subprime lending programs, stressed the need for banks' risk management programs to 

address loan pricing, and set forth the requirements for calculating and maintaining 

adequate allowances for loan and lease losses and capital levels. 

FDIC examiners conducted pre-examination planning that included steps to look for 

indications of subprime lending programs and generally followed the interagency 

subprime lending examination procedures involving examinations of capital levels during 

onsite examinations. In addition, DSC maintained a quarterly database to assist in 

monitoring the condition ofFDIC-insured institutions with subprime lending programs. 

Further, examiners noted that institutions had implemented corrective actions as a result 

ofDSC examination findings related to the banks' subprime lending activities, including 

requirements for maintaining adequate levels of capital and adequate allowances to cover 

loan and lease losses. 

The OIG reported that existing guidance may not have been sufficient for ensuring that models 

used by banks to estimate the creditworthiness of credit applicants made correct predictions. As 

a result, there was a potential for a lack of consistency in onsite examinations of banks with 

subprime lending programs, particularly with regard to allowances for losses and capital-level 

8 Effective June 30, 2002, the FDIC's Division of Supervision and Division of Compliance and Consumer Affairs 

merged to form the new DSC. 

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APPENDIX I 

calculations. Also, in order for lenders to appropriately stratifY the additional default risk and 

price the sub prime products accordingly, constant monitoring and testing of credit scoring 

models were required to ensure that projected results were in line with actual performance. The 

FDIC agreed with the OIG's observations and planned to offer additional training for a select 

group of specialists on custom credit scoring. 

On September 23, 2005, the FDIC OIG issued Audit Report 05-038 entitled, Division of 

Supervision and Consumer Protection's Risk-Focused Compliance Examination Process. The 

OIG concluded that DSC examiners generally complied with the policies and procedures related 

to risk-scoping compliance examinations and that the Risk Profile and Scoping Memorandums 

prepared by examiners provided an adequate basis for planned examination coverage. The 

examiners (I) reviewed bank policies, procedures, disclosures, and forms for compliance with 

consumer protection laws and regulations for each examination reviewed and (2) planned for 

transaction testing or spot checks in all compliance areas over the course of two consecutive 

examinations- a period of2 to 6 years, depending on an institution's size and ratings. 

Additionally, examiners conducted transaction testing or spot checks in those areas for which 

apparent violations had been found at previous compliance examinations. However, the OIG 

found that examination documentation did not always show the transaction testing or spot checks 

conducted during the onsite portion of the examinations, including testing to ensure the 

reliability of the institutions' compliance review functions. Examiners also did not always 

document whether the examination reviewed all the compliance areas in the planned scope of 

review. As a result, DSC could not assure that the extent of testing was appropriate except for 

those areas in which examiners had identified violations and included them in ROEs. We 

recommended that DSC clarifY and reinforce requirements that examiners adequately document 

the scope of the work performed, including transaction testing and spot checks of the reliability 

of the institutions' compliance review functions, during the onsite portion of compliance 

examinations. 

DSC concurred with the recommendation and issued Regional Directors Memorandum 

No. 2005-035, DSC 's June 2003 Revised Compliance Examination, which included guidance on: 

documenting changes in the scope of an examination, 

documenting spot checks of regulations, 

providing cross-checks to additional information available in Examiner Summaries, and 

providing descriptions of examination procedures used to conduct the examination. 

We also reviewed the joint HUD and Treasury predatory lending report, Curbing Predatory 

Home Mortgage Lending, dated June 2000. The report proposed a four-point plan to address 

predatory lending practices--( I) improving consumer literacy and disclosures, (2) prohibiting 

harmful sales practices in the mortgage market, (3) restricting abusive terms and conditions on 

high-cost loans, and (4) improving market structure as it relates to CRA credit to banks and 

thrifts. 

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23887.046

APPENDIX II 

CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 

Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) ECOA prohibits discrimination based on race, color, 

religion, national origin, sex, marital status, and age in any aspect of a credit transaction. The 

FRB issued Regulation B, which describes lending acts and practices that are specifically 

prohibited, permitted, or required under ECOA. 

Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) FCRA requires that consumer reporting agencies adopt 

reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, 

insurance, and other information in a manner that is fair and equitable to the consumer with 

regard to confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of information. On July 19, 

2000, the FFIEC issued revised examination procedures to incorporate changes made to the 

FCRA as a result of the Gramm-Leach-Biiley Act (GLBA).9 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCP A) - FDCPA protects reputable debt collectors from 

unfair competition and encourages consistent state action to protect consumers from abuses in 

debt collection. On September 5, 1997, the FFIEC issued revised guidance to incorporate 

changes made to the FDCPA by the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act 

(EGRPRA). EGRPRA amended the FDCPA by requiring debt collectors to inform debtors that 

they are attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained could be used for that 

purpose. 

Fair Housing Act (FHA)- The FHA prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, 

national origin, sex, familial status, and handicap in residential real-estate-related transactions, 

including making loans to buy, build, repair, or improve a dwelling. Lenders may not 

discriminate in mortgage lending based on any of the prohibited factors. 

Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) The FTC Act authorizes the FTC to prohibit and 

take action against unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. On March II, 

2004, the FDIC and FRB issued standards that will be considered by the agencies as they carry 

out their responsibility to enforce the prohibitions against unfair or deceptive trade practices 

described in the FTC Act as they apply to acts and practices of state-chartered banks. 

Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA)- Congress enacted HOEPA in 

response to evidence of abusive mortgage lending, particularly lending that involves excessive 

interest rates and fees. HOEPA identifies a class of high-cost mortgage loans and requires that 

consumers who enter into these transactions be provided with additional disclosures intended to 

facilitate comparison with other loan products. HOEPA restricts the use of certain loan terms 

associated with abusive lending and authorizes FRB to issue regulations that prohibit specific 

types of mortgage lending practices found to be abusive. On December 20,2001, FRB amended 

9 

In addition to refonning the financial services industry, GLBA addressed concerns relating to consumer financial 

privacy. Title V of the GLBA established major privacy provisions under Subtitles A and B. Subtitle A provides a 

mechanism to protect the confidentiality of a consumer's nonpublic personal infonnation. Subtitle B prohibits 

"pretext calling," which is a deceptive practice used to obtain infonnation on the financial assets of consumers. 

Criminal penalties and regulatory and administrative enforcement mechanisms are established to help prevent this 

practice. 

24 
76 


23887.047

APPENDIX II 

the provisions of Regulation Z that implement HOEPA. The amendments restrict certain unfair 

practices and strengthen HOEPA's prohibition against extending credit without regard to a 

borrower's ability to repay it. 

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESP A)- RESPA requires lenders, mortgage 

brokers, or servicers of home loans to provide borrowers with pertinent and timely disclosures 

regarding the nature and costs of the real estate settlement process. The Act also protects 

borrowers against certain abusive practices, such as kickbacks, and places limitations upon the 

use of escrow accounts. HUD promulgated Regulation X, which implements RESPA. 

Truth in Lending Act (TILA)- TILA requires meaningful disclosure of credit and leasing 

terms so that consumers will be able to more readily compare terms in different credit and lease 

transactions. TILA also protects the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing, credit 

card, and leasing transactions. FRB issued Regulation Z, which implements TILA. The 

regulation requires accurate disclosure of true cost and terms of credit. The regulation also 

regulates certain credit card practices, provides for fair and timely resolution of credit billing 

disputes, and requires that a maximum interest rate be stated in variable rate contracts secured by 

the consumer's dwelling. 

25 

23887.048

Excessive Interest 

Rates 

Mandatory Arbitrati 

Clauses 

APPE

CHARACTERISTICS POTENTIALLY ASSOCIATED WITH PREDATORY LENDING 

clauses limit homeowners· choices for dispute resolution, thereby preventing victims of predatory lend

suing for damages. 

26 

23887.049

Subprime Lending 

Yield-Spread 

Premiums 

APPE

27 
79 


23887.050

INFORMATION PROVIDED BY OTHER 

FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 

APPENDIX IV 

This appendix contains chronological information related to actions taken by OTS and OCC to 

address predatory lending. The appendix includes (I) information discussed in detail in our 

report in the section entitled, Issues for Consideration, and (2) supplemental information 

provided by OCC and OTS that was not included in our review of the agencies' efforts to address 

predatory lending and, therefore, was not verified during the audit. (The supplemental 

information is excerpted and shown in italics below.) 

OTS has issued examination-scoping guidance and a Strategic Plan that specifically addresses 

predatory lending. The OTS Examination Scope Worksheet, which examiners use to determine 

whether a specific issue should be included in the examination scope, includes a line item for an 

assessment of predatory lending issues. Further, the OTS Strategic Plan includes a performance 

goal to maintain a thrift industry that effectively complies with consumer protection laws. As 

stated in the plan, one of the strategies OTS uses for achieving performance is to "conduct 

examinations with a top-down, risk focused approach that promotes comprehensive compliance 

management including the establishment of adequate internal controls to ensure regulatory 

compliance and to avoid predatory practices." 

OTS received numerous comments from financial institutions and other interested parties 

when OTS issued an ANPR [Advance Notice of Proposed Rule making) on "Responsible 

Alternative Mortgage Lending'" in April2000. (65 Fed. Reg. 17811 (April5, 2000)). 

OTS's rule, created during a high interest rate environment when many state laws 

prohibited ARMS, granted state-chartered thrifts and non-depository institutions 

preemption under the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act from state laws on 

alternative mortgages. Over the years, this preemption frustrated the statesfrom 

enforcing consumer protections relating to prepayment penalties and late charges. OTS 

addressed the issue in September 2002 in its final rulemaking on the Alternative 

Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (AMTP A). 

In addition, OTS has taken a number of affirmative steps to stop or prevent institutions 

from offering loans with predatory characteristics. These actions include directing 

institutions (and requiring them through normal and formal enforcement actions) to close 

certain types of lending programs and directing certain institutions to divest their thrift 

charters. OTS also makes referraL~ concerning possible Equal Credit Opportunity Act 

violations by mortgage brokers and others to the Federal Trade Commission and 

Department of Justice, and discrimination complaints to Department of.lustice and the 

Department of Housing and Urban Development. 

28 
80 


23887.051

APPENDIX IV 

In addition to the interagency guidance noted previously, OTS has issued guidance on 

title loan programs and payday lending10 in CEO [Chief Executive Officer] Letters I 3 I 

and 132. This guidance states that OTS will closely review the activities of savings 

associations engaged in title loan programs and payday lending to ensure that they are 

following prudent, non-abusive lending practices. 

The OCC conducts risk-based consumer compliance reviews that require examiners to 

determine the quantity of risk inherent in the bank 's products and services associated 

with consumer protection laws and regulations, including those addressing predatory 

lending and unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Consumer complaint data are 

reviewed and analyzedfor early warning indicators of potential unfair, deceptive, 

abusive, and predatmy practices. Examiners also evaluate the adequacy of the financial 

institution's risk management practices used to identifY, measure, monitor, and control 

the institution's compliance and reputation risk. If the quantity of risk is high and 

exposes the institution to sign[ficant risk or the compliance management system is 

inadequate to address the quantity of risk identified, examiners may expand their review 

to ensure the institution is in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 

In December 2004, OCC issued revised risk-based Retail Lending Examination 

Procedures. Minimum examination procedures are used in all banks, and they may 

indicate the need for more extensive review of all or parts of a bank's retail/ending 

activities. As part of the minimum examination procedures, examiners determine 

whether the bank's lending activities include indicators of predatory lending, such as 

whether underwriting policies provide appropriate guidance on assessing that the 

borrower's capacity to repay the loan is based on a consideration of the borrower's 

income, financial resources, and debt service obligations, and whether the bank's 

policies and procedures provide adequate guidance to avoid discriminatory, unfair, 

deceptive, predatory, and abusive lending practices. {f examiners determine that 

supplemental examination procedures are necessary, those procedures include 

assessments that identifY predatory lending practices. 

In July 2000. the OCC issued an advisory letter addressing abusive lending practices. 

The advisory letter identified a number of practices that may indicate that an 

institution may be engaging in abusive lending and violations()[ fair lending statutes 

and other consumer protection provisions. 

In November 2000. the OCC issued an advisory letter alerting national banks to 

concerns raised by title lending arrangements with third parties. Such arrangements 

raise significant consumer protection concerns, because of the high cost of the loan, 

and may involve abusive lending and collection practices. 

10 A title loan is a short-term consumer loan made to an individual secured by clear title to the borrower's vehicle. 

Payday loans are small-dollar, short-tenn loans that borrowers promise to repay out oftheir next paycheck. 

29 
81 


23887.052

APPENDIX IV 

Also in November 2000, the OCC issued an advisory letter to ensure that any 

national bank that engages in payday lending does so in a safe and sound manner 

and does not engage in abusive practices that would increase the compliance, legal, 

and reputational risks associated with payday lending and could harm the bank's 

customers. 

In March 2002, the OCC issued an advisory to inform national banks and their 

operating subsidiaries about the risks present in engaging in lending and marketing 

practices that may constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and to help 

national banks to avoid being placed in jeopardy of penalties, judgments, and harm 

to their reputations that can result from such practices. 

In February 2003, OCC issued two advisory letters related to predatory lending to the 

national banks and operating subsidiaries it supervises, as discussed earlier in this 

report. 

In January 2004, OCC issued a rule adopting anti-predatory lending standards that 

expressly prohibit national banks from making consumer and mortgage loans based 

predominantly on the foreclosure value of the borrower's collateral and engaging in 

unfair and deceptive practices, as discussed earlier in this report. 

In April 2004, the OCC issued an advisory letter intended to help national banks 

ident(fY risks that are presented by secured credit cards and to provide guidance on 

how to address such risks, so that national banks that elect to offer secured credit 

cards do so in a safe and sound manner that treats customers fairly and promotes 

responsible credit access. 

In September 2004, OCC issued an advisory letter alerting national banks regarding 

OCC's concerns about certain credit card marketing and account management 

practices, as discussed earlier in this report. 

In February 2005, OCC issued guidelines for national bank residential mortgage 

lending standards to further the OCC's goal of ensuring that national banks do not 

become involved in predatory, abusive, unfair, or deceptive residential mortgage 

lending practices, as discussed earlier in this report. 

The OCC has used its 12 U.S. C. [United States Code]§ 1818 enforcement authority to 

bring actions against national banks that have engaged in urifair or deceptive acts or 

practices. These enforcement actions include two predatory mortgage lending cases and 

several cases involving credit card issuers that engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or 

practices. The eriforcement actions have resulted in over $300 million in relief for 

consumers. 

30 
82 


23887.053

CORPORATION COJ.\.!Il\.1ENTS 

FDII 

Feelanll Deposit Insurance Corporation 550 11'111 Simi NW, Wa:llling!M, D.C.21l!29-9900 

DATE: Tune 1,2006 

TO: Stephen M. Beard 

Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits 

AooendixV 

FROM: Sandra L. Thompson [Electronically produced ver.;ion; original signed by Sandre L. Thompstm] 

Acting Director 

CONCUR: John F. Bovenzi [Electmnicallyproduced vemion; original signed by Jolm F. Bovenzi] 

Deputy to the Chairman and ChieC Operating Officer 

SUBJECT: Draft Report Entitled Challenges and FDIC Efforts Related to Predatory Lending 

(Assignment No. 2005-023) 

This memorandum represents the Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection 

(DSC) response to the draft report entitled, Challenges and FDIC Efforts Related ro Predatory 

Lending. (Assignment No.200S-023) ("Draft Report .. ) prepared by the FDIC's Office of 

Inspector General {OTG). The objective of the OIG audit, started on March 2, 2005, was to 

determine challenges faced and effons undertaken by the FDIC to identify, assess, and address 

the risks posed to institutions and consumers by predatory lending. The OIG also reviewed the 

efforts taken by the other federal banking regulators to addness predatory lending. 

The Draft Report recognizes the significant supervisory challenges attendant to predatory 

lending and identifies certain cbarecteristics that are potentially indicative of predatory len<lmg 

activities. The Draft Report recommends that the FDIC 1} clarify its overall approach to 

predatory lending. and 2) review existing guidance to identify gaps in examiner coverage of 

predatory lending. DSC agrees with these recommendations and will develop an overall 

supervisory approach to predatory lending that wiU include a review of existing supervisory 

policies and practices. DSC will also review existing examiner guidance and. if necessary, 

develop additional guidance to address predatory lending. These actions will be completed by 

year-end. 

Overview 

The FDIC ensures thlrt the 5,000 banks under its supervision engage in safe and sound 

lending. adhere to consumer protection laws, and invest in their coromunitlcs. Predatory lending 

often involves both borrower dteeption and poor underwriting standards. The FDIC thus views 

predatory lending as a major consumer protection challenge and a significant safety and 

soundness concern. FDIC efforts to address predatory lending bave been in place formally since 

1999 and include: examiner guidance in both the risk management and compliance disciplines; 

enforcement policy; public policy advancement through speeches and testimony; and active 

financial edocation and other outreach activities. 
83 


23887.054

APPENDIXV 

Examination Guidance and Training 

Predatory lending is most often associated with abusive lending practices in the subprime 

mortgage market In 200 l, the banking agencies jointly issued Expanded Examination Guidance 

for Subprime Lending Programs. The expanded guidance, which supplements previous 

subprime lending examination guidance issued in 1999, was developed to strengthen the 

examination and supervision of institutions with significant subprime lending programs. 

Moreover, this expanded examination guidance formed the basis of an interagency predatory 

lending examination strategy for risk management and compliance examinations. The FDIC 

took a leadership role to ensure the examination guidance distinguished between well-managed 

and responsible .subprime lending programs and subprime lending programs that involved 

predatory practices. The examination guidance provides a useful overview of the issue of 

predatory lending in the subprime mortgage market and reflects the approach of the agencies to 

the issue. It states, in part: 

The term subprime is often misused to refer to certain "predatory" or "abusive" lending 

practices. The Agencies have previously expressed their support for lending practices 

designed to responsibly service customers and enhance credit access for borrowers with 

special credit needs. Subprime lending that is appropriately underwritten, priced, and 

administered can serve these goals. However, the Agencies also recognize that some 

forms of subprime lending may be abusive or predatory. Some such lending practices 

appear to have been designed to transfer wealth from the borrower to the lender/loan 

originator without a commensurate exchange of value. This is sometimes accomplished 

when the lender structures a loan to a borrower who has little or no ability to repay the 

loan from sources other than the collateral pledged. When default occurs, the lender 

forecloses or otherwise takes possession of the borrower's property (generally the 

borrower's home or automobile). In other cases, the lender may use the threat of 

foreclosure/repossession to pressure the borrower for payment. Typically, predatory 

lending involves at least one, and perhaps all three, of the following elements: 

Making unaffordable loans based on the assets of the borrower rather than 

on the borrower's ability to repay an obligation; 

Inducing a borrower to refinance a loan repeatedly in order to charge high 

points and fees each time the loan is refinanced ("loan flipping"); or 

Engaging in fraud or deception to conceal the true nature of the loan 

obligation, or ancillary products, from an unsuspecting or unsophisticated 

borrower. 

Loans to borrowers who do not demonstrate the capacity to repay the loan, as structured, 

from sources other than the collateral pledged are generally considered unsafe and 

unsound. Such lending practices should be criticized in the Report of Examination as 

imprudent. Further. examiners should refer any loans with the aforementioned 

characteristics to their Agency's respective consumer compliance/fair lending specialists 

for additional review. 

2 

32 
84 


23887.055

APPENDIXV 

In addition to the 200 I guidance, the FDIC has issued guidance on matters related to 

predatory lending, whether or not labeled as such. 1 In 2004, to make certain that the industry 

understood our concerns, the FDIC and Federal Reserve Board jointly issued detailed guidance 

about how to avoid unfair or deceptive practices. And, in June 2005, the FDIC issued 

examination procedures intended to ensure that FDIC examiners have the tools necessary to 

evaluate compliance with the FTC Act. 

The FDIC has also recently worked closely with the other financial regulatory agencies to 

develop guidance for banks about non-traditional mortgage products. As the Draft Report 

recognizes, these products pose a supervisory challenge because they, " ... may contain terms that 

are appropriate for some borrowers but predatory to others"? The proposed guidance addresses 

both safety and soundness and consumer protection concerns. 

Both compliance and risk management examiners at the FDIC have received training in 

the last several years on issues and activities associated with predatory lending. The training 

highlighted issues raised by consumer organizations, findings by several government studies, and 

unfair and deceptive practices found by the federal banking agencies. As a result of this training, 

examiners have a heightened awareness of predatory lending concerns and are prepared to 

address them by applying both consumer protection Jaws and safety and soundness standards. 

Additionally, in 2002, the FDIC established a Fair Lending Examination Specialist Program that 

assigned an expert Fair Lending Examination Specialist to each Regional and Area Office to 

assist compliance examiners in conducting fair lending examinations. These examinations 

include consideration of discriminatory lending and certain predatory lending activities, such as 

discriminatory pricing and steering. 

Enforcement Policy 

The FDIC has vigorously enforced existing consumer protection and fair lending laws 

and regulations, including the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, the Truth in 

Lending Act, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, the Fair Housing Act, the Equal Credit 

Opportunity Act, the Community Reinvestment Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act 

(FTC Act). These authorities provide the FDIC with a range of tools to address predatory 

lending practices. 

The Draft Report states there is no universally accepted definition of predatory lending.3 

In a report issued in June 2000, HUD and the Treasury Department explained that " ... the 

predatory nature of many loans typically is not the result of a single tenn or characteristic, but a 

~Interagency Guidelines for Subprime Lending, published by the FDIC through FlL -20-

99, and Interagency Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs, published by the FDIC 

through Financial Institution Letter (FIL) 9-2001. 

' Draft Report at p. 3. 

J Draft Report at p. 1. 

3 

33 
85 


23887.056

APPENDIXV 

series of characteristics that in combination impose substantial hardship on the borrower". 4 

We agree with the Draft Report that identifYing or recognizing predatory lending in a specific 

loan transaction can be a challenge because each loan transaction must be viewed in its totality, 

including the associated marketing practices, terms of the agreement, various parties involved in 

the loan transaction, and financial sophistication of the parties involved. As a result, there is no 

simple "checklist" to follow in identifying predatory lending.5 

In view of this challenge, we agree with the Draft Report that Section 5 of the FTC Act is 

an important tool to use where otherwise lawful loan features are included in transactions in an 

unfair and deceptive way. These features include balloon payments, high loan to value loans, 

prepayment penalties, mandatory arbitration clauses, high cost ancillary products such as singlepremium life insurance, and high cost fees financed into the loan. While subprime lending is a 

legal activity, some consumers accept subprime products because they have been misled about 

whether they qualify for products with prime rates and terms or about the features of the 

subprime loans. As the Draft Report states: 

[T]he FDIC can rely on the FTC Act as authority for issuing enforcement actions against 

financial institutions for unfair, abusive, and deceptive acts or practices, which could 

include any or all of the characteristics potentially associated with predatory lending that 

our [OIG] research identified during this audit.6 

Although the FDIC to date has not identified violations involving unfair or deceptive 

practices in mortgage lending by FDIC supervised institutions, we have taken enforcement 

action against institutions that violated the FTC Act in a different context involving other credit 

products. OIG staff reviewed compliance examination reports that documented our action. 7 The 

FDIC is prepared to extend enforcement of the FTC Act to mortgage lending. 

Public Policy: Speeches & Testimony 

The FDIC has also made its concerns about predatory lending known in numerous 

speeches and testimony by FDIC officials since 2000. These include speeches before forums 

sponsored by the National Association of Affordable Lenders, the National Congress for 

Community and Economic Development, America's Community Bankers and others, and 

testimony before Congress. These public statements of policy addressed the different types of 

predatory practices discussed in the Draft Report, in addition to others, and laid out strategies to 

identifY and prevent predatory lending. The collected speeches and testimony provided guidance 

not only to the industry, but also communicated the FDIC perspective on predatory lending to 

examiners as well. 

See "The National Predatory Lending Task Force, Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending: 

A Joint Report, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and U.S. Department of Treasury" 

(June 2000). (HUDfTreasury Report). 

' Draft Report at p. 3. 

Draft Report at p. II (emphasis added). 

!.Q. at p.21. 

4 

34 
86 


23887.057

APPENDIX V 

Financial Education 

In addition to our supervisory programs, the FDIC's ongoing public awareness and 

education initiatives play an important part in combating predatory practices and complement 

our supervisory programs. As acknowledged in the Draft Report, the FDIC has long recognized 

the value of consumer education as an additional tool in combating predatory lending abuses. 

The FDIC's award-winning Money Smart financial education program and the FDIC Consumer 

News play an important role in the FDIC's efforts to provide helpful free information to the 

public, financial institutions and our examination staff. 

The FDIC's financial education program is primarily focused on helping low- and 

moderate-income adults develop money-management skills. Two versions are available for freeone for classroom use (in English, Spanish, Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, and Russian), the 

other for computer-based, self-paced learning (in English and Spanish). Classes are otiered 

through an extensive network of Money Smart "partners," including financial institutions, nonprofit organizations and government agencies. Since 2001, about 495,000 people have taken 

Money Smart classes and 95,000 new banking relationships have been established. 

In addition, FDIC Community Affairs staff have hosted or participated in numerous antipredatory lending conferences and forums that promote the use of Money Smart and other means 

to prevent predatory lending or correct its effects on low and moderate-income individuals and 

others. 

Conclusion 

In summary, predatory lending harms individuals and communities and raises risk 

management and consumer compliance concerns for fmancia! institutions. PredatorY loans can 

have a negative impact on a bank's Community Reinvestment Act evaluation. The loans may 

violate fair lending laws and other consumer protection Jaws, resulting in legal or regulatory 

action. Questionable loan underwriting and the risk of litigation raise additional safety and 

soundness concerns. For these reasons, the FDIC maintains a strong supervisory strategy 

developed over several years to combat predatory lending in the financial system through 

vigorous safety and soundness and compliance examination and enforcement, industry outreach 

and adult financial education programs. The development of an articulated overall supervisory 

approach to predatory lending, based on a review of existing supervisory polices and practices 

that address predatory lending, as recommended by the OIG Draft Report, will enhance the 

FDIC's efforts in this area. We will complete this task by year-end. 

5 

35 
87 


23887.058

APPENDIXV 

OIG Recommendation 

"Describe in policy the FDIC's overall supervisory approach to predatory lending." 

DSC Response 

The FDIC agrees that it will be beneficial to articulate an overall supervisory approach as 

stated above to address any predatory lending practices that FDIC examiners may find. By yearend, DSC will develop a formal policy statement describing its approach to combating predatory 

lending. 

OlG Recommendation 

"Review existing examiner, financial institution, and consumer guidance and determine whether 

additional guidance is needed to address predatory lending." 

DSC Response 

The Draft Report suggests that we consider the approaches of the other agencies. The 

supervisory approaches of the OCC and OTS to predatory lending are based, in large part, on 

their authority under the National Bank Act and Home Owners Loan Act to supervise institutions 

pursuant to federal law. The FDIC has worked closely with state supervisors to take action to 

address activities that violate state anti-predatory lending laws. As explained above, the FDIC 

has also required banks subject to its supervision to correct unfuir and deceptive acts or practices 

under the FTC Act and disengage from unsafe or unsound lending practices. 

The Federal Reserve Board, which also works with state authorities, mentions predatory 

lending as a potential risk to be considered when evaluating reputation risk during examinations. 

FDIC examiners undertake a similar risk assessment, although the guidance does not use the 

phrase "predatory lending." Under the FTC Act examination guidance issued in June 2005, 

FDIC compliance examiners must consider the risks for unfair or deceptive acts or practices 

when they develop a risk profile for an institution. To assess this risk, examiners evaluate: 

consumer complaints received by the bank or the FDIC; whether the bank's product lines are 

high risk; the quality of the bank's compliance management system; and the bank's past 

performance. 

We will carefully review any overall supervisory strategy in use by the other agencies 

with an eye to enhancing the FDIC's strategy as the OIG suggests. By year-end, DSC will 

complete the recommended review and determine whether any new or enhanced policy or 

guidance is necessary in light of the strategy statement developed in response to 

Recommendation I. 

6 

36 

23887.059

APPE

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS 

This table presents the management response on the recommendations in our report and the status of the recommendations as 

date of report issuance. 

Open 

Rec. Expected Monetary Resolved:" or 

Number Corrective Action: Taken or Planned/Status Completion Date Benefits Yes or No Closedb 

DSC will develop an overall supervisory December 31, 2006 NA Yes Open 

1 approach to predatory lending that will 

include a review of existing supervisory 

policies and practices. 

DSC will review existing predatory lending December 3 l, 2006 NA Yes Open 

2 guidance and, if necessary, develop 

additional guidance to address predatory 

lending. 

'Resolved- (I) Management concurs with the recommendation, and the planned corrective action is consistent with the recommendation. 

(2) Management does not concur with the recommendation, but planned alternative action is acceptable to the OIG. 

(3) Management agrees to the OIG monetary benefits, or a different amount, or no ($0) amount. Monetary benefits are considered resol

as management provides an amount. 

b Once the OIG determines that the agreed-upon corrective actions have been completed and are effective, the recommendation can be closed. 

37 
89 


23887.060

NCLC"'' 

NATIONAL 

CONSUMER 

LAW 

C !:. NT E R' 

Statement for the Record of 

Chi Chi Wu, National Consumer Law Center 

to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services 

regarding "The FDIC's Targeting of Refund Anticipation Loans" 

March 16, 2016 

Chairman Hensarling. Ranking Member Waters, and Members of the Committee on Financial 

Services: 

Thank you for the opportunity to submit a written statement regarding the hearing entitled "The 

FDIC's Targeting of Refund Anticipation Loans." The National Consumer Law Center (NCLC)1 

has considerable expertise and interest on the issue of refund anticipation loans (RALs ), refund 

anticipation checks (RACs), other tax-time financial products, and taxpayer consumer 

protection.2 We offer our testimony here on behalf of our low-income clients, as well as the 

Consumer Federation of America.3 

We believe the FDIC had good reason to be concerned about the RALs offered by its supervisee 

banks, and should continue to closely supervise these same banks regarding their current tax 

refund-related offerings. The FD!C's actions during the 2011 to 2012 time period were 

measured, appropriate, and necessary to protect both consumers and the safety and soundness of 

banks. In particular: 

• RALs made by FD!C-supervised banks and other banks subjected taxpayers to tripledigit interest rates, skimmed billions from their refunds, and put them at risk of 

unmanageable debt. The FDIC protected taxpayers by stopping RAL abuses. 

• RALs presented a significant risk to the safety and soundness of banks, because of the 

massive levels of errors and fraud from paid tax preparers that still continue to this day. 

The FDIC was entirely justified in getting its supervisee banks to stop making these loans 

1 Since 1969, the nonprofit National Consumer Law Center® (NCLC®) ha' worked for consumer justice and 

economic security for low-income and other disadvantaged people, including older adults, in the U.S. through its 

expertise in policy analysis and advocacy, publications, litigation, expert witness services, and training. 2 NCLC and the Consumer Federation of America have jointly authored annual reports on RALs, RACs and taxtime financial products since 2002. NCLC has also authored a number of other reports on tax-time consumer issues. 

The annual RAL reports and other tax-consumer issue reports are available at www.nclc.org/issues/taxes.html. 3 The Consumer Federation of America is an association of more than 250 nonprofit consumer groups that was 

established in I 968 to advance the consumer interest through research, advocacy and education. 

www.consumerfed.org 
90 


23887.061

in 2011-2012. Its examination of tax preparers acting as bank agents uncovered 

widespread egregious legal violations. 

• The need for FDIC oversight of RAL lending banks and tax preparers continues to this 

day. This year, FDIC-supervised banks are offering RALs that are allegedly "no fee" to 

the consumer, but present a risk of consumer abuse. Refund anticipation checks 

represent a disguised loan of the tax preparation fee, with triple digit annual percentage 

rates (APRs). 

FDIC Actions Stopped RAL Abuse of Taxpayers 

From about the mid-1990s until2012, a handful of banks (including three FDIC-supervised 

banks) made tens of millions of RALs that drained billions of dollars from the refunds of hardworking taxpayers. These RALs were one- to two-week loans made by banks and offered by tax 

preparers, without underwriting for ability to pay and secured by the taxpayer's refund.4 These 

RALs were extremely expensive: with fees from $30 to nearly $140, the APRs for RALs ranged 

from 50% to 500%. RALs also collectively drained billions from taxpayer refunds. From 2002 

to 2012, RALs collectively skimmed over $9.6 billion from the refunds of tens of million 

American taxpayers.5 

RALs targeted low-income taxpayers, especially recipients of the Earned Income Tax Credit 

(EITC). In 2010, over 90% of taxpayers who applied for a RAL were low-income, and nearly 

two-thirds (66%) were EITC recipients. Yet EITC recipients made up only 20% of individual 

taxpayers in that year. 

RALs also presented significant financial risks to taxpayers. If a refund is denied because of a 

preparer's error or for any other reasons, the taxpayer would end up on the hook for the loan. 

This imposed a substantial hardship, because the taxpayer usually had not budgeted to repay this 

loan. The taxpayer might be subjected to debt collection harassment, a damaged credit rating, or 

even have next year's refund grabbed to pay off the loan. 

RALs Pose a Safety & Soundness to Banks 

The harms of RALs are not limited to their impact on consumers. RALs present significant 

safety and soundness risks because the high levels of fraud and errors by tax preparers, who act 

as bank agents when they offer a RAL. In fact, concerns over RALs and tax fraud were 

4 A product related to RALs is the refund anticipation check (RAC). With RACs, the bank opens a temporary bank 

account into which the IRS direct deposits the refund check. After the refund is deposited, the bank issues the 

consumer a check, direct deposit or prepaid card with the refund proceeds minus the RAC fee, tax preparation fee, 

and any add on junk fees. The bank then closes the temporary account. 5 The data in this section is derived from the annual reports of the National Consumer Law Center and Consumer 

Federation of America on RALs, RACs, and other tax-time consumer issues. These reports are all available at 

www .nclc.orglissuesltaxes.html#ral . 

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signilicant enough for the Internal Revenue Service (!RS) to open a rulemaking proceeding 

regarding the issue in 2008.6 

A startling fact about the tax preparation industry is that, in all but four states, paid tax preparers 

are not required to meet any minimum educational, or training standards. The lack 

c.mnn.et"'1"v standards has allowed errors and fraud tax preparers to flourish. As the chart 

mystery shopper tests of tax preparers by Government Accountability Otiice. 

the Treasury Inspector General t<x Tax Administration, and consumer groups have found high 

levels of errors, fraud and other abuses. 7 Fraud bas a direct impact on the safety and soundness 

of RALs, because the accuracy of the tax return is critical in determining whether the loan should 

be made, whether it will be repaid, and whether a subsequent IRS audit could result in problems 

for the bank. 

Law enforcement actions have similarly uncovered massive fraud schemes, including the U.S. 

Department of Justice (USDOJ) action in April2007 against live Jackson Hewitt franchisees that 

falsely claiming $70 million in tax refunds. 

See Complaint, States v. Smart Tax 

United States v. Smart Tax Inc., 07C-1802 (N.D.l!l. 

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In addition to errors and fraud, the role of the tax preparer in making RALs was critical because 

they acted as the bank's agent when making a RAL. Tax preparers solicited customers for the 

loans, explained (or failed to explain) the loan terms to consumers, processed loan 

documentation, obtained the consumer's signature, retained the loan documents on file, and even 

printed RAL checks. They determined the size of the loan and purported to ensure its soundness, 

through their work in preparing the tax return. In short, tax preparers did everything but make 

the ultimate approval decision and fund the loan. Given that these preparers were not- and still 

are not-- supervised by anyone else, it was appropriate and necessary for the FDIC to examine 

them, including when the FDIC conducted visitations of250 tax preparers that offered RALs 

made by Republic Bank & Trust. These visitations were critically important because they found 

that Republic had failed to properly train and monitor its tax preparers, resulting in multiple legal 

violations including:9 

• Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA)- The FDIC found that copies of the written disclosures 

required by TILA were regularly absent from loan files. In addition, nearly 88% of the 

tax pre parers that FDIC investigators called failed to make an oral disclosure of the 

annual percentage rate (APR) when requested. 

• Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act- Tax preparers did not have proper physical and electronic 

safeguards for the protection of confidential consumer information, such as shredders or 

locked dumpsters. Half of the tax preparer offices had no alarm system, even though the 

stores had bank checks inside. 

• Federal Trade Commission Act- The FDIC alleged that Republic engaged in unfair and 

deceptive actions, such as implying that customers would receive the full amount of their 

refunds minus fees in one or two days by getting a RAL, despite the fact that the RAL 

amounts were limited by Republic to $1,500. 

• Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)- The FDIC found tax preparers refused to process 

a RAL application when only one spouse applied for the loan, in violation of the ECOA. 

Nearly half (46.5 percent) oftax preparers who made Republic RALs were in violation of 

at least three different laws. The FDIC found that Republic failed to properly train tax 

preparers to comply with consumer protection laws. In particular, Republic tested preparers' 

knowledge of consumer laws by giving them an online quiz that permitted the preparers to keep 

guessing until they passed the test. In addition, the FDIC alleged that Republic attempted to 

interfere with its investigation by setting up an Internet webpage of Frequently Asked Questions 

to coach tax preparers during the day when the FDIC tested the preparers. 

The high levels of errors and fraud, combined with these multiple legal violations, by themselves 

would have justified the FDIC's actions in 2011 and 2012 to encourage its supervisee banks to 

stop making RALs. However, there was an additional critical factor. The FDIC's actions were 

2:07-cv-11460 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 2, 2007); Complaint. United States v. Smart Tax of North Carolina. Inc., Civ. No. 

5:07-cv-00125-FL (E.D.N.C. Apr. 2. 2007). 9 Amended Notice of Charges for an Order to Cease and Desist. In the Matter of Republic Bank & Trust Co., FDIC10-079b and FDIC-10-216k, May 3. 2011. 

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also based upon the termination of the Debt Indicator by the IRS in August 20 I 0. 10 The Debt 

Indicator was an IRS-provided service that helped tax preparers and banks make RALs by 

notifying them if the borrower's refund would be intercepted by the government for certain 

debts. Without the Debt Indicator, a RAL could go unpaid, harming both the bank and the 

taxpayer. It was entirely appropriate for the FDIC to warn its banks of the safety and soundness 

risks of making RALs without the Debt Indicator. 

It is also important to note that the FDIC was not alone in prompting its supervisee banks to 

leave the RAL market. The Office of Comptroller of Currency (OCC) had forced two of its 

banks (Pacific Capital Bancorp and HSBC) to stop making RALs. 11 The OCC's actions were 

actually stronger, in that it issued regulatory directives prohibiting those two banks from making 

RALs. 

Need For Vigorous FDIC Supervision of RAL Lending Continues to Today 

The FDIC's close supervision ofRAL lending banks was not only appropriate back in 2011 and 

2012, it needs to continue. There is a new generation ofRALs --"advances" that supposedly do 

not impose a charge on the consumer for the loan. Two of the lenders for these "no fee" RALs 

are FDIC supervised banks- Republic Bank & Trust and River City Bank. 

These "no-fee" RALs could present risks to consumers. Even though there is supposedly no 

charge to the consumer, Republic Bank & Trust charges the tax preparer a $35 fee for its "no 

fee" RAL. 12 Preparers might pass along this fee, or charge even more, by padding their tax 

preparation fees or by charging separate "add-on" junk fees. !3 Tax preparation fees are 

extremely non-transparent, and can be high. 14 Few consumers can get a firm price estimate 

before having their refund prepared, so hidden fees can be hard to avoid. Because it can conduct 

examinations, the FDIC is perhaps the only entity that could detect if preparers are passing along 

the $35 fee to consumers without their knowledge. 

10 Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, IRS Removes Debt Indicator for 2011 Tax Filing Season (Aug. 5, 2010), 

available at www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/O,id~2263l O,OO.html. 11 See Press Release, H&R Block, HSBC Terminates Agreement /o Provide RALs at Direction ofOCC (Dec. 24, 

20!0); Press Release, Pacific Capital Bancorp Announces Planned Sale of Re/imd Anticipation Loan and Refond 

Transfer Businesses (Dec. 24, 2009). 12 Republic Bank & Trust, Easy Advance, at https://www.republicrefund.com/Products/EasyAdvance.aspx (visited 

Mar. 11. 2016). 13 For example, there is a similar "no fee" RAL available from Santa Barbara Tax Products Group (SBTPG). One of 

the software providers called "service bureaus" that offers the SBTPG "no fee" RAL is Gannon Service Bureau. 

Gannon offers to provide software with lower upfront costs to the preparer, but the preparer then charges an 

additional $44 "service bureau" fee. Gannon makes it very clear that preparers can hide fees by stating "We charge 

a small $44 service bureau fee that is deducted directly from the taxpayer's return for each bank product you file. 

With our free bank products, we're confident that even after this fee, your clients will save an average of $20 to $60 

per return .... This is money you can stick directly into your own pocket by increasing your own prep fee $20 to $60 

per return, while keeping the overall cost to the client the same as last year." Gannon Service Bureau, 

www.gannonservicebureau.com (visited Mar. 11, 2016). 14 See David Rothstein, Policy Matters Ohio, Improving Tax Preparation with a Model Fee Disclosure Box, June 

2013, available at www.policymattersohio.org/wp-content/uploads/20 13/06/FeeDisclosure Jun20 l3.pdf. 

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River City Bank offers a "no-fee" RAL but does not charge the tax preparer. However, if a 

taxpayer obtains a refund anticipation check, she will pay more. River City offers several RAC 

programs. If a preparer offers "no fee" RALs, then River City will charge the taxpayer $39.95 

for the RAC. But if a tax preparer does not offer the "no-fee" RAL, it has the option of offering 

RACs for a lower fee, either $29.95 or $34.95. This price different could be a hidden finance 

charge for this supposedly "no fee" RAL. 15 

It is also important to note that the FDIC must continue to closely monitor RAL lending because 

the fraud and error issues continue as well. Last year, mystery shopper testing by consumer 

advocacy groups in Florida and North Carolina found inaccuracies in 27 out of the 29 tax returns 

prepared by paid tax preparers. 16 And just last month, the USDOJ filed an enforcement action 

seeking to bar a Liberty Tax Service franchise in South Carolina from preparing tax returns, 

alleging that the franchise deliberately prepared fraudulent returns and inflated federal tax 

refunds by giving taxpayers income from fictional jobs and claiming children that didn't exist. 17 

Finally, the FDIC needs to continue to examine banks like Republic Bank and River City Bank 

when they offer refund anticipation checks (RACs). While the banks claim otherwise, RACs 

increasingly represent nothing more than a disguised loan of the tax preparation fee. When 

taxpayers obtain a RAC simply because they cannot afford the price of tax preparation upfront, 

they are essentially paying to defer payment of the tax preparation fee-which is a loan. If a 

taxpayer pays $35 to defer payment of a $350 tax preparation fee for three weeks, the APR 

would be equivalent to 174%. At least two court decisions have held that a RAC constitutes a 

loan of the tax preparation fee, and thus RAC fees are finance charges under the Truth in 

Lending Act.18 

Conclusion 

The FDIC did the right thing in 2011-2012 by prompting its supervisee banks to stop making 

RALs. Its actions were justified, and it should continue to closely supervise these same banks 

regarding their current tax refund-related offerings. 

15 River City Bank, Product> Pricing, at www.rcbtaxdivision.com/pricing.aspxrymnu~3 (visited Mar. II, 2016) 16 Chi Chi Wu, Alice Vickers, Amelia O'Rourke-Owens, Peter Skillern, and Cara Williams, National Consumer 

Law Center, Florida Alliance for Consumer Protection, Reinvestment Partners, Prepared in Error: Mystery Shoppers 

in Florida and North Carolina Uncover Serious Tax Preparer Problems (Apr. 2015). 17 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, United States v. Haynes, Case No. 3:16-cv-00373-MG 

(D.S.C. Feb. 8, 20 16). 18 United States v. ITS Fin., LLC, 2013 WL 5947222 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 6, 2013); People v. JTH Tax, Inc., 212 Cal. 

App. 4th 1219, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 728 (2013). 

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