MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 20 ME 71 Docket: Cum

- 19

- 392 Submitted

On	Briefs: April 14 ,	2020 Decided: May	19,	2020 Revised: June 23 ,	2020 Panel: MEAD, GORMAN ,	JABAR , HUMPHREY, HORTON,	and	CONNORS, JJ. Majority : MEAD, GORMAN , JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON,	and	CONNORS, JJ. Concurrence /

Dissent : JABAR, J.

TIMOTHY	R.	LIBBY

v. KYLE	ESTABROOK
HORTON,	J. [¶1] Timothy	 R.	 Libby	 appeals	 from	 a judgment of	 the	 District C ourt (Portland, J.	French,	J. )	dismissing ,	for	lack	of	standing, his	petition to	establish
de facto	parentage of	his	stepson ,	the	biological	child	of	Kyle	Estabrook .		Libby contends that the	court	abused	its	discretion	in declinin g	to	hold	an	evidentiary hearing to	 determine	 disputed	 facts	 relevant	 to his standing. We	 vacate the judgment and	remand	for such	a	hearing

.2 I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ]		The	following	fact ual	assertions are taken from	Libby’s	affidavit	in support	of	his	petition and	from	the	procedural	record ,	except	where	otherwise indicated. See Young	v.	King ,	2019 ME	78,	¶	2,	208	A.3d	762. [¶ 3 ] The	 child	 was	 nine	 years old	 when	 Libby	 filed	 his	 petition	 to establish	de	facto	parentage. Libby i s	the child’s	stepfather ,	and	Es tabrook	is
the child’s biological	father. The	child’s	mother	died	in	March 2019. [¶ 4 ] Libby and	the child’s	mother met	and	began	dating	in 2012 ,	when
the child was	 three	 years	 old .	 	 Shortly	 thereafter,	 Libby	 moved	 in	 with	 the
mother	and	 the	child ,	and th e	 three	“spent	 time	 together	as	a	 family.”		While Libby	was	deployed to	Afghanistan in	2013	and	2014,	the	mother	and	the	child participated	in	events	with	 Libby’s	 family.		When	 Libby	returned,	he	and	 the mother	 purchased	 a	 house	 together	 in	 Lewiston and	 eventually married	 in September	 2017. While	 living	 together ,	 Libby	 and	 the	 mother	 shared responsibility	for	caring	for	the	child

. [¶ 5 ]		According	to	Libby, Estabrook’s	contact	with	the	child during	this
time was	 “sporadic	 and	 inconsistent ,”	 and	 he did	 not	 have	 “ more frequent
contact”	with	the	child	until	2017.3 [¶ 6 ]		The	child	considers	Libby’s	family	to	be	his	family,	and	he	refers	to Libby’s	 family	 members	 as his “Pop

- Pop ,” “ Grandma,”	 uncles,	 aunts,	 and cousins.		Likewise,	Libby’s	family	considers the	child to	be part	of	their	family. Libby,	the	mother,	and	the	child	celebrated	holidays	and	birthdays	with	Libby’s family and attended	 all	 of	 the “Family	 D ay ” events	 held	 by	 Libby’s	 National
Guard	unit. [¶ 7 ]	 	 The	 mother	 died	 unexpectedly	 in	 March	 2019 .	 	 Estabrook	 took custody	of	the	child	after	the	mother’s	death. Neither Libby nor	the	mother’s family has	seen	the	child	since	the	mother’s	funeral. [¶ 8 ]	 	 In	 May	 2019,	 Libby	 filed	 a	 petition	 to	 be	 adjudicated the	 child’s
de facto	 parent. See 19

- A	 M.R.S.	 § 1891 (20 20 )

. With	 his	 petition,	 Libby included	an	affidavit	alleging facts	to	support	the	existence	of	a	de facto	parent relationship	with	the	child. See id. § 1891(2)(A). [¶ 9 ]	 	 As	 permitted	 by	 statute, Estabrook	 filed	 his	 own	 affidavit , s ee	id. § 1891(2)(B), and he requested	that	Libby’s	petition	be	dismissed. Estabrook’s affidavit	 contravenes	many	 of	 Libby’s	 factual	 assertions and presents	 a	 very different	 picture of the parties’ respective relationships	 with	 the	 child

. Estabrook denies that	he	had	only	sporadic	contact	with	his	son	before	2017 ; he	instead assert s that	the	child	consistently	resided	with	him	roughly	half	the4 time.		He	also contends that	Libby	“often	kept	[the	child]	from	me	and	isolated [the	mother	 and	 the	child]	 from	 their	 extended	 family,	instead	making	 them ‘adopt’	his	family	as	their	own.” Finally, Estabrook	rejects	the	notion	that	Libby has	taken	on	a	parental	role, stating th at the	mother	left	Libby	and	lived	with the	child	in	a	motel	shortly	before	she	died	and	that any	relationship	between Libby	and	the	child	is	due	solely	to	“the	fact	that	[the	child]	spent	half	his	time with	[the	mother]” while	Libby	and	the	mother	were	to gether. [¶1 0 ] After	reviewing	the	parties’	affidavits,	t he	court	dismissed	Libby’s petition for	lack	 of	 standing

. In	 concluding	 that	 Libby	was	 not	 entitled	 to	 a hearing	to	resolve	disputed	facts	in	the	parties’	affidavits,	the	court	focused	on
one	elemen t	of	standing:	whether	 the	mother	“understood,	acknowledged	or accepted that or	 behaved	 as	 though”	 Libby	 was	 a	 parent	 to	 the	 child. Id. § 18 9 1(3)(C).		In	its	decision,	the	court reasoned , [Libby]	has	not	shown	 that	 [the	mother]	acknowledged	his role	as	be ing	anything	other	than	a	support	system	for	her	and	[the child].		 [Libby’s]	attestations,	even	 taken	as	 true,	 fail	 to	establish that	[the	child’s]	parents	understood,	acknowledged,	accepted,	or behaved	as	though	[Libby was the	child’s]	parent.

.	.	.	. .	 .	 .	While	it	 appears	 that	 [Libby]	has	provided	care	 to	 [the child],	 the	 court	 finds	 that	 he	 has	 done	 so	 as	 [the	 mother’s] husband,	not	as	a	person	who	has	fully	and	completely	undertaken5 a	 permanent,	 unequivocal,	 committed	 and	 responsible	 parental role in	[the	child’s]	life	.	.	.	. (Footnote	omitted) ( q uot ation marks	omitted)

. T he	court thus	determined that Libby	could	not	establish	a	necessary	element	of	standing even	if	the	facts	in	his affidavit	were	true

. [¶1 1 ]		Libby	thereafter	filed	a	motion	for reconsideration	and	for	relief from the judgment. See M.R.	Civ.	P.	59(e),	60(b)(1),	(3). With	this	motion,	Libby attached	affidavits	from	the	child’s	maternal	grandparents. The	grandparents’ affidavits contradict	many	of	the	statements	in	Estabrook’s	af fidavit. 1 The	court denied	this	motion,	and Libby	timely	appealed. See 19

- A	M.R.S.	§ 104 (2020); M.R.	App.	P.	2B(c) (1)

.

1 The	parties sharply dispute	whether	the trial court	can	rely	on	a non party’s	affidavit	in	deciding whether	the	petitioner	has	established	standing and	whether	we	can	rely	on	a	nonparty’s	affidavit	in resolving	this	appeal

. W e	confine	ourselves	to	the	facts	contained	in Libby ’s and	Estabrook’s initial affidavits	 because	 we	 conclude	 that the	 court	 should	 have	 convened	 an evidentiary hearing	 to determine	standing on	the	basis	of	th o se	affidavits	alone. We	 take	 this	 opportunity	 to	 note	 that	 the	 plain	 language	 of the	 de facto	 parentage	 statute (1) requires	 the petitioner	 and any respondent each	 to fil e a single affidavit	 and (2) contains	 no provision	authorizing third

- party	affidavits

. See 19

- A	M.R.S.	 § 1891(2)(A)

- (B)	 (20 20 ).	 	 That	 said, section	1891	does not require	the parties’	affidavits	to	be	made	on	personal	knowledge. Compare	id. , with M.R.	Civ.	P.	56(e)	(requiring,	in	the	context	of	a	motion	for	summary	judgment,	that	“[s]upporting and	opposing	affidavits	 .	 .	 .	be	made	on	personal	 knowledge,	 .	 .	 .	set	 forth	such	 f acts	as	would	be admissible	 in	 evidence,	 and	 .	 .	 .	 show affirmatively that	 the	 affiant	 is	 competent	 to	 testify	 to	 the matters stated therein”).		Unlike	a	motion	for	summary	judgment

— which,	if	granted,	is	a	substitute for	a	trial	on	the	merits

— the	affidavit s	filed	in	a	de	facto	parentage	case	concern the	threshold	issue of	 standing. Moreover,	 the	 affidavits	 in	 a	 de	 facto	 parentage	 proceeding	 are	 not necessarily a substitute	 for	 a hearing	 because	 the	 District	 Court	 has	 discretion	 to	 hold	 a	 hearing	 at	which	 t he parties would be	 required	 to prove	 the disputed facts	 contained	 in	 their	 affidavits	 by	 way	 of admissible	evidence

. See 19

- A M.R.S. § 1891(2)(C) (20 20 ) .		Therefore,	it	is	appropriate	for	a	party ’s affidavit to	include	facts	about	which	third

- party witnesses	may	be	able	to	give	admissible	testimony.6 II.		DISCUSSION [¶1 2 ] Title	 19

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 1891	 allows	 a	 person	 to	 establish	 legal parentage	of	a	child

— and	to	obtain	the	rights	of	a legal	parent

— by	a	judicial decree	 acknowledging	 “the	 development	 of [a] parental	 relationship	 over
time.” Stitham	 v.	 Henderson ,	 2001	 ME	 52,	 ¶ 24,	 768	 A.2d	 598	 (Saufley,	 J., concurring) ; see 19

- A	M.R.S.	§ 1891(4)(B). [¶1 3 ]	 	 “[T]o	 protect	 against	 unwarranted	 intrusions	 into	 an	 intact family’s	 life,” Davis	 v.	 McGuire ,	 2018	 ME	 72,	 ¶	 14,	 186	 A.3d	 837 (quotation marks	omitted),	a party	who seeks	to	be adjudicated	a	de	facto	parent	of	a	child

“ must	 make	 an	 initial	 showing	 of	 sta nding	 that	 will	 determine	 whether	 the court	 will	 hold	 a	 plenary	 hearing	 on	 the	 ultimate	 question	 of	 whether	 that person	is	a	de facto	parent , ” i d. ¶	13

. By	statute,	s tanding	must	be	addressed pursuant	to	the	following	three

- step	process: First,	 the	 claima nt	 is	 required	 to	 file	 an	 affidavit	 along	 with	 the complaint,	stating	specific	facts	that	track	the	elements	of	a	de facto parenthood	claim. Next,	 the	adverse	party	may	 file	a	 responsive affidavit	along	with	a	responsive	pleading. Finally,	the	court	is	t o review	 the	parties ’ submissions	 and	 either [determine] based	 on the	parties ’ submissions	whether	 the	claimant	has	demonstrated standing,	or,	in	its	sole	discretion,	if	necessary	and	on	an	expedited basis,	hold	a	hearing	to	determine	disputed	facts	that	a re	necessary and	material	to	the	issue	of	standing.7 Id. ¶	 15 (citations	 omitted)	 (quotation	 marks	 omitted); see 19

- A	 M.R.S. § 1891(2). [¶1 4 ] The	 petitioner	 has	 the	 burden	 of	 establishing	 standing	 by	 a preponderance	 of	 the	 evidence,	 regardless	 of	 whether the	 court	 decides	 the issue	 on	 the	 affidavits	 or	 following	 a n	 evidentiary hearing. See Davis , 2018 ME 72, ¶¶	1 3

- 26 ,	186	A.3d	837 .		To prove standing,	the	petitioner	must show	the	following:
A. The	person	has	resided	with	the	child	for	a	significant	period of time;
B. The	person	has	engaged	in	consistent	caretaking	of	the	child;
C. A	 bonded	 and	 dependent	 relationship	 has	 been	 established between	the	child	and	the	person,	the	relationship	was	fostered	or supported	by	another	parent	of	 the	child	and	 the	per son	and	 the other parent have	understood,	acknowledged	or	accepted	that	or behaved	as	though	the	person	is	a	parent	of	the	child;
D. The	person	has	accepted	full	and	permanent	responsibilities	as a	parent	of	the	child	without	expectation	of	financial	comp ensation; and
E. The	continuing	relationship	between	the	person	and	the	child	is in	the	best	interest	of	the	child. [ 2 ]
19

- A	M.R.S.	§ 1891 (2)(C), (3)(A)

- (E).

2 There	is	an	open	question	“whether	proof	of	the	statutory	elements	alone	is	a	constitutionally adequate	foundation	for	a	de	facto	parenthood	determination,	or	whether	a	petitioner	must	prove something more	than	those	statutory	elements	to	make	the	statute	constitutional	as	applied.” Davis v.	McGuire ,	2018	ME	72,	¶	15	n.7,	186	A.3d	837. We	do	not	reach	that	issue	in	this	case. See	Young	v. King ,	2019	ME	78,	¶	8	n.2,	208	A.3d	762.8 [¶1 5 ]		W hen	 the	 trial	court	dismisses	a	de	 facto	parentage	petition for lack	of	standing without	holding	a n	evidentiary hearing,	we	review	the	court’s decision	not	to	hold	a	hearing	for	an	abuse	of	discretion. See	Young ,	2019 ME 78,	¶ ¶ 11

- 12,	208 A.3d 762.		The	court	abuses	its	discretion	in declining	to	hold a	hearing if	(1)	the facts	in the	petitioner’s	affidavit	“ could	have	led	to	a	finding that	[the	petitioner]	ha [ s ] standing”	and	(2)	there	are	“material	facts	that	the parties	have	disputed	in	their	affidavits.” Id. ¶	11

. [¶1 6 ] We	conclude	that Libby’s	assertions,	if	believed,	could	h ave	led	t o a	finding that	he	has	standing. Most	importantly,	Libby avers that	he	and	the mother	essentially	coparented	the	child	for	a	majority	of	the	child’s	life and	that Estabrook’s	 involvement	 with	 the	 child	 was	 “sporadic	 and	 inconsistent” for most	of this	time. If	true,	these attestations could	demonstrate	that	the	mother understood	 that	and	behaved	as	 though Libby occup ied the	parental	vacuum
that Libby	 says existed because	 of Estabrook’s	 lack	 of	 engagement	 with	 the
child for	a	significant	period	of	the	child’s	life

. Cf. Kilborn	v.	Carey , 2016	ME	78, ¶¶	18

- 21,	140	A.3d	461	(“[T]here	was	ample	evidence	in	the	record	to	support the	court’s	finding	that	[the	petitioner’s]	parental	role	was	unequivocal,	despite9 [the	 legal	 fat her’s]	 peripheral	 presence [in	 the	 child’s	 life] and	 objection	 to formal	adoption	.	.	.	.”). 3 [¶1 7 ] Furthermore,	Libby avers that	(1)	 the	child	understands	Libby’s family	 to	 be	 his	 own	 family	 and	 (2)	 Libby,	 the	 mother,	 and	 the	 child	 have participated	 in	 f amily	 events	 with	 Libby’s	 family	 and	 with	 Libby’s	 National
Guard u nit

. These assertions ,	if	believed, also tend	 to	 show that	 the	mother “understood,	acknowledged	or	accepted that or	behaved	as	though”	Libby	was a	parent	to	the	child.		19

- A	M.R.S.	§ 1891(3)(C); see	Y oung ,	201 9 ME 78,	¶	12,
208 A.3d	 762	 (explaining	 that this element	 of standing can	 be	 satisfied	 by evidence	 that	 the	 legal	 parent	 “allowed	 others	 in	 the	 community

.	 .	 . to understand	[the	petitioner]	to	be	the	child’s	[parent]”). [¶1 8 ]		Es tabrook	sharply	disputes Libby’s	contentions

. For	example,	h e contends	 that (1) the	child	believes he	is	part	 of	 Libby’s	 family only	because Libby	intentionally	isolated the	mother and	the	child	from	others,	including	the mother’s	family ;	(2) the	mother	l eft	Libby	and lived in	a	motel	with	the	child shortly	before	she	died ; and	(3) th ere	was	no	vacant	parental	role	for	Libby	to

3 Title	19

- A	M.R.S. §	1891	(20 20 )	was	not	effective	at	the	time	we	issued	our	opinion	in Kilborn	v. Carey

. See 2016	ME	78,	¶	1	n.1,	140	A.3d	461.		Although	the standard	we	applied	in Kilborn has	now been	superseded	by	section	1891,	we	have previously observed	that	this	statu te	codifies	the	common law	principle	that	a	person	cannot	become	a	de	facto	parent	unless	the	child’s	legal	parent	recognizes the	person	as	a	parent. See Davis ,	2018	ME	72,	¶	31	n.11,	186	A.3d	837.10 fill	 because	 Estabrook has	 been consistently	 involved	 in	 the	 child’s	 life

. Therefore,	 the	 parties’	 affidavits	 contain	 disputed	 facts	 that	 are	 material	 to
whether	the	mother “ understood,	acknowledged or accepted that or	behaved as	though ” Libby	was the	child’s	parent

. 19

- A	M.R.S.	§ 1891(3)(C). [¶1 9 ]		Because	 the	 facts	in	 Libby’ s	affidavit , if	proved , could	support	 a finding	 that	 he	 has	 standing	 and	 because Estabrook’s	 affidavit	 generates dispute d material	 facts	 that must	be	 resolved	 to determine	 Libby’s	 standing , the court went	 beyond	 its	 discretion	 in	 declining	 to	 convene	 an	 ev identiary hearing	 to	 resolve those fact ual	 disputes

. Compare Young ,	 2019	 ME	 78, ¶¶ 11

- 13,	208	A.3d	 762, with Lamkin	v.	 Lamkin ,	2018	ME	76,	 ¶ ¶ 26

- 27 ,	186 A.3d 1276	(affirming	the	dismissal	of	a petition	for	grandparent	visitation	and de	facto	parentage without	a	hearing	where	the	petitioner	“failed	to present [ in her	affidavit ] evidence	of	[several	elements	of	standing]”)

. We	remand	for	the
court	 to	 conduct an	 evidentiary	 hearing on	 standing. If	 Libby	 establishes standing,	then	the	court must determine , either at a	consolidated or	a	separate hearing,	 whether Libby	 has	 proved the	 existence	 of	 a de	 facto	 parentage relationship by	clear	and	convincing	evidence. 4 See 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	1891 (2)(D)

.

4 As	 we	 noted	 in Young ,	 2019	 ME	 78,	 ¶	 13	 n.4,	 208	 A.3d	 7 62,	 the	 court	 may	 consolidate	 a preliminary hearing	on	standing	with	a	hearing	on	the	merits	“after	consideration	of	(1)	the	relative complexity	 of	 the	 factual	 issues	 of	 standing	 and	 de	 facto	 parenthood;	 (2)	 the	 time	 and	 expense involved	in	conducting	sepa rate	hearings	on	those	subjects;	and	(3)	the	benefits	and	burdens	upon11 [¶ 20 ] Our decision	in	this	case	is	a	narrow	one. We	have	observed	that

“ p arental	rights	disputes	can	be	heavily	factbound , ” Young ,	2019	ME	78,	¶	13,
208 A.3d 762 ,	and	our	decision	is	based	on	the	specific	facts	contained	in	the parties’	affidavits.		In	particular, our	decision	in	this	case cannot	be	read for	the proposition	that	a ny stepparent has	standing	to petition	for de	facto	parent age based	 solely	 on	 the time spent with	 a	 child in	 the	 ordinary	 course	 of that person’s marriage	 to the	child’s	legal	parent

. Rather, a stepparent

— like	any other	 petition er — has	 the	 burden	 to	 prove	 all	 the	 elements	 of	 standing, including	that a legal	parent of	the	child intended	for	the	stepparent	to	assume a	parental	role, see 19

- A	M.R.S.	§ 1891(3)(C). In	this	case, Libby asserts that	the mother	intended	for	Libby	to	fill	the fatherly role	that Libby	claims Estabrook
had vacated by	having	limited	involvement	with	the	child	for most	of	the	child’s life .		This	contention,	combined	with	 Libby’s other	averments	and	in	light	 of

the	 parties

— including	 the	 disruption,	 caused	 by	 the	 de	 facto	 parentage	 proceeding,	 of	 the	 legal parent’s	constitutionally	protected	relationship	with	the	child

— that	would	be	presented	b y	separate hearings	as	opposed	to	a	single	hearing	that	addresses	both	subjects.” (Citation	omitted.) In	many de	facto	parentage	cases,	a	single	hearing	will	be	less	disruptive	to	the	parent

- child	relationship	and more	efficient	in	terms	of	court	and	par ty	resources.12 Estabroo k’s	 denial	 of	 these	 facts ,	 warranted	 a	 hearing	 to	 determine	 Libby’s standing. 5 The	entry	is: Judgment vacated.		Remanded	for	an	evidentiary hearing.

JABAR ,	J.,	concurring in	part	and	dissenting	in	part. [¶ 2 1] I concur	with	the	Court ’ s	remanding	the	case	to	the	trial	court,	but
I do	not	agree	that	it	is	necessary	for	the	trial	court	to	conduct	a	hearing	on	the issue	 of	 standing. The	 record	 in	 this	 matter	 already	 establishes	 sufficient undisputed	 facts	constituting	prima	 facie	evidence of	standing that allow	 the
court	to	reach	the	merits. [¶ 22 ] The	de	facto	parentage chapter of	the	Maine	Parentage	Act	(MPA) , 19

- A	 M.R.S.	 §§	 1831

- 1939	 (2020), sets	 out	 the	 procedure	 that	 a	 court	 must follow	when	a	person	seeks	to	be	adjudicated	a	de	fact o	parent. See 19

- A	M.R.S.

5 In	his	brief, Libby	also	argues	 that	the	record	compelled	 the	court	 to	 find,	based	on	the	 facts asserted	 in	 his	 affidavit, that he	 had	 established	 standing	 by	 a	 preponderance	 of	 the evidence. Because	“material	facts	are	contested”	in	the	parties’	affidavits, Young ,	2019	ME	78,	¶	13, 208	A.3d 762; see	supra ¶¶ 16

- 18 ,	we	conclude	that	the	record	did	not	compel	a	finding	that	Libby	has	standing.13 §	189 1

. The	procedure	begins	with	a	determination	 of	standing	pursuant	 to
section 1891(2) , which	consists	of	a	multi

- step	process. 6 [¶ 23 ] First , the	claimant must file	an	affidavit	with	the	complaint	seeking de	facto	parentage alleging	under	oath “ specific	facts ” that	track	the	elements of	a	de	facto	parent	relationship. Id

. §	1891(2)(A)

. Next,	an	adverse	party	may file	 a	 response	 to	 the	 putative	 de	 facto	 parent ’ s	 pleading	 and	 affidavit. Id

. § 1891(2)(B)

. Then,	pursuant	to section 1891(2)(C) ,	the	court	must	review	the parties ’ submissions	and	determine	whether	the	putative	de	facto	parent	has

6 T he	Legislature	has	enacted	the	following	process for	a	person	to	establish	standing : A. A	person	seeking	to	be	adjudicated	a	de	facto	parent	of	a	child	shall	file	with	the initial	pleadings	an	affidavit	alleging	under	oath	specific	facts	to	support	the	existence of	 a	 de	 facto	 parent	 relationship	with	 th e	 child	 as	 set	 forth	 in subsection	 3

. The pleadings	and	affidavit	must	be	served	upon	all	parents	and	legal	guardians	of	the child	and	any	other	party	to	the	proceeding. B. An	adverse	party,	parent	or	legal	guardian	who	files	a	pleading	in	response	to	the pleadings	in	paragraph	A	shall	also	file	an	affidavit	in	response,	serving	all	parties	to the	proceeding	with	a	copy. C. The	 court	 shall	 determine on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 pleadings	 and	 affidavits	 under paragraphs	A and	B	whether	the	person	seeking	to	be	adjudicated	a	de	facto	parent has	presented	prima	facie	evidence	of	the	requirements	set	forth	in subsection	3

. The court	may	in	its	sole	discretion,	if	necessary	and	on	an	expedited	basis,	hold	a	hearing to	determi ne	disputed	facts	that	are	necessary	and	material	to	the	issue	of	standing. D. If	 the	 court ’ s	 determination	 under	 paragraph	 C	 is	 in	 the	 affirmative,	 the	 party claiming	 de	 facto	 parentage	 has	 standing	 to	 proceed	 to	 adjudication	 under subsection 3

. 19

- A	M.R. S.	§	1891(2)	(2020).14 presented	 prima	 facie	 evidence	 of	 the	 requirements	 set	 forth	 in section 1891(3)(A)

- (E)

. 7 [¶ 24 ] “ Prima	 facie	 evidence	 requires	 only some	 evidence	 on	 every element	 of	 proof	 necessary	 to	 obtain	 the	 desired	 remedy	 [or	 judgment]. ”
Camden	Nat'l	Bank	v.	Weintraub ,	2016	ME	101,	¶	11,	143	A.3d	788 (quotation marks	 omitted); see Cookson	 v.	 State ,	 2014	 ME	 24,	 ¶	 16,	 86	 A.3d	 1186

.

“ [P]rima facie proof	is	a	low	standard	that	does	not	depend	on	the	reliability	or the	credibility	of	evidence,	all	of	which	may	be	considered	at	some	later	time	in the	process. ” Weintraub ,	2016	ME	101,	¶	11,	143	A.3d	788 (quotation	marks omitted). Thus, “ prima	facie evidence ” to	establish	standing	requires	only	some

7 Title 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	1891(3)	(20 20 ) sets	forth	the	requirement that the	 person	 has	 fully	 and	 completely	 undertaken	 a	 permanent,	 unequivocal, committed	and	responsible	parental	role	in	the	child ’ s	life. Such	a	finding	requires	a determination	by	the	court	that: A. The	person	has	resided	with	the	child	for	a	significant	period	of	time; B. The	person	has	engaged	in	consistent	caretaking	of	the	child; C. A	bonded	and	dependent	relationship	has	been	established	between	the	child	and t he	person,	the	relationship	was	fostered	or	supported	by	another	parent	of	the	child and	the	person	and	the	other	parent	have	understood,	acknowledged	or	accepted	that or	behaved	as	though	the	person	is	a	parent	of	the	child; D. The	person	has	accepted	ful l	and	permanent	responsibilities	as	a	parent	of	the	child without	expectation	of	financial	compensation;	and E
. The	continuing	relationship	between	the	person	and	the	child	is	in	the	best	interest of	the	child.15 evidence	 on each element	 of	 proof	 necessary	 to support	 the	 existence	 of	 a
de facto	parent	relationship	with	the	child	as	set	forth	in section 1891(3)

. [¶ 25 ] If	 the	 presented	 evidence	 is	 uncontested,	 then the	 court	 must accept	the	evidence	as	true	and	determine	whether	the	uncontested	evidence constitutes	prima	 facie	evidence	of	 the	statutory	elements	laid	out	in section 1891(3)	of	the	MPA

. See 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	1891(2)(C) ; see	also Weintraub ,	2016	ME 101,	 ¶¶ 11

- 17,	 143	 A.3d	 788 ; Nader	 v.	 Me.	 Democratic	 Party ,	 2012	 ME	 57, ¶¶ 33

- 35,	41	A.3d	551

. If	there	are	competing	affidavits,	then	the	court	must determine	whether	there	are	undisputed	facts	contained	within	the	competing affidavits	that	constitute	prima	fac ie	evidence	of	the	required	elements	under
section 1891(3)

. See 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	1891(2)(C) .		Where	the	undisputed	facts	are sufficient	 to	constitute	prima	 facie	evidence,	it	will	be	unnecessary	 to	hold	a hearing	 to	consider	 the	disputed	 facts	 that	are	neces sary	and	material	 to	 the issue	of	standing

. See id. [¶ 26 ] Although	the	parties ’ affidavits	do	contain	disputed	facts,	they	also contain	many	undisputed	facts	concerning	the	relationship	between Libby and the	child

. The	undisputed	facts	establish	the	following	narrative

. [¶ 27 ] Libby	 began	 living	 with child and	 his	 mother in	 October	 2012,
when the	 child was	 three years	 old

. Except	 for Libby’s deployment	 to16 Afghanistan	from	August	2013 until July	2014,	Libby, the	ch ild,	and	the	child’s
mother continued	 to live	 together	 as	a	 family	unit until	2019

. In	September
2014 , Libby and	the	child’s	mother purchased their	first	home together. During the	years	that	they	lived	together , Libby	was	responsible	for	at	least	half	of the child’s	daycare pick

- ups	and	drop

- offs. L ibby	w a s	res p onsible	for waking	the
child in	the	morning,	getting	him	dressed,	and	getting	him	to	daycare. When
the	child entered	primary	school,	Libby	was	actively	involved	in	his	schooling and	 participated	 in	 school	 events,	 including	 meet

- and

- greet	 events at	 the elementary	school

. [¶ 28 ] Libby	 brought the	 child to his soccer ,	 baseball, and	 basketball practices	and	games, and he would	practice	with the	child in their	backyard. During	holidays , the	child celebrated	with	Libby’s	family	and	referred	to	Libby’s mother	and	father	as “G randma ” and “ Pop

- Pop. ” He would	call	Libby’s	brothers
and	their	wives his “ uncles ” and “ aunts ”	and	considered	their	children	to	be	his
cousins

. He attended day camps	with those cousins and	Libby’s	mother

. He would regularly attend	Sunday	dinners	at	Libby’s	parents ’ home. [¶ 29 ] Libby continues	to	carry the	child on	his health insurance	plan ,	as he	has	done since	he	began	working	at Bath	 Iron	Works in	2015

. The	child
attended all Family	Day s held	by	Libby’s	National	Guard	unit	with his	mother17 and Libby. E ver	since the	child was	three	years	old , Libby	has	accepted	full	and permanent	 responsibility	as	a	parent	 of the	child without	any	expectation	 of financial	compensation. The	child	considers	Libby	to	be	one	of	his	parents. [¶ 30 ] Notwithstanding	 the	 presence	 of	 disputed	 facts,	 the	 above
narrati ve	of	undisputed	facts	constitute s sufficient	prima	facie	evidence	of	all of	the	elements	contained	in section 1891(3)

. It	is	undisputed	that	Libby,	the child,	and	the	child’s	mother	lived	together	as	a	family	for	the	majority	of	the child’s	 life	 and	 that Libby	 consistently	 cared	 for	 the	 child	 during	 that	 time. There	is	no	dispute	that	a	bonded	and	dependent	relationship	existed	between Libby	 and	 the	 child.	 	 That	 relationship	 was	 fostered	 and	 supported	 by	 the child’s	mother,	who	“understood,	acknowledged or	accepted	that	or	behaved	as though	[Libby]	is	a	parent	of	the	child,” 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	1891(3)(C) ,	as	evidenced by	the	undisputed	facts	that	Libby	carried	the	child	on	his	health	insurance ; the child	attended	all	family	days	at	Libby’s	work ; the	child	was included	in	Libby’s family	Christmas	card	photo ; and	the	child	referred	to	Libby’s	family	members as	his	own	grandparents,	aunts,	uncles,	and	cousins. It	is	also	undisputed	that the	child	considers	Libby	to	be	one	of	his	parents. For	these	reasons, Libby has presented	 prima	 facie	 evidence	 to	 establish	 standing	 to	 bring	 a	 de facto parentage	claim.18 [¶ 3 1] Standing	 is	 a	 preliminary	 hurdle	 that	 putative	 de	 facto	 parents must	overcome	to	get	their	day	in	court. Under	the	statute,	a	finding	of	standing
in	no way	establishes	those	elements;	it	is	simply	a procedural	mechanism to ensure	 that	 only	 legitimate	 cases	 of	 de	 facto	 parenthood	 proceed. See
19

- A M.R.S.	 § 1891

. After	 satisfying	 the	 standing	 requirement,	 the	 putative
de facto	parent still	has	the	burden to prove , by	clear	and	convincing	evidence , the	necessary	elements	under section 1891(3)

. [¶ 32 ] At	 this	 juncture	 of	 the	 case,	 the	 undisputed	 facts	 present	 a prima facie claim	of	de	facto	parentage. There	is	no	need	for	a	hearing	on	this preliminary	 matt er. I would	 remand	 for	 a	 hearing	 on	 the	 merits	 of Libby’ s petition	for	de	facto	parentage. See 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	1891(3)

- (4)

.

Sarah	 C.	 Mitchell,	 Esq.,	 and	 Amy	 Dieterich,	 Esq.,	 Skelton	 Taintor	 &	 Abbott, Auburn,	for	appellant	Timothy	R.	Libby Kim	Pittman,	Esq.,	and	Suzanne	E.	Thompson,	Esq.,	Vincent,	Kantz,	Pittman	& Thompson,	LLC,	Portland,	for	appellee	Kyle	Estabrook

Portland	District	Court	docket	number	FM

- 2019

- 395 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY