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63–995 PDF ★ (STAR PRINT) 2011

S. HRG. 111–856 

NOMINATION OF DAVID B. BUCKLEY 

TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 

(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

DAVID GRANNIS, Staff Director 

LOUIS B. TUCKER, Minority Staff Director 

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

CONTENTS 

SEPTEMBER 21, 2010 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California .................. 1 

Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Missouri ....... 4 

WITNESS 

Buckley, David B., Inspector General of the Central Intelligence AgencyDesignate .............................................................................................................. 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

Letter from Sam Nunn, Dated September 15, 2010, to Senator Dianne Feinstein ....................................................................................................................... 3 

Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees .................................... 18 

Prehearing Questions and Responses .................................................................... 32 

Letter from Robert I. Cusick, Office of Government Ethics, Dated August 

12, 2010, to Senator Dianne Feinstein, Transmitting Public Financial Disclosure Report ....................................................................................................... 41 

Letter from David B. Buckley, Dated September 24, 2010, to Senator Dianne 

Feinstein ............................................................................................................... 49 

Letter from David B. Buckley, Dated June 17, 2010, to Stephen W. Preston .... 51 

(1) 

NOMINATION OF DAVID B. BUCKLEY 

TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:58 p.m., in Room 

SD–124, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne 

Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Wyden, Whitehouse, and Bond. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The Committee will come to order. 

We meet today in open session to consider the President’s nomination of Mr. David Buckley to become the Inspector General of the 

Central Intelligence Agency. As the Committee knows, this position 

has remained vacant since the retirement of John Helgerson in 

March, 2009. 

In April, 2010, Vice Chairman Bond and I wrote a letter to President Obama pointing out the importance of the position and the 

need to nominate and confirm a strong, independent auditor and 

investigator at the CIA. The President has nominated Mr. Buckley, 

who has had more than 30 years of experience in government service that should provide him with an excellent background for the 

challenges he’ll face when confirmed. 

Before getting to Mr. Buckley’s bio, I’d like to make just a few 

comments on the very unique role of his position. Inspectors General are critical in every department and agency. They conduct audits and inspections to ensure appropriate use of taxpayer money, 

compliance with the law, and provide an independent assessment 

of how well an agency is carrying out its mission. As circumstances 

warrant, the Inspector General carries out investigations into allegations of wrongdoing and makes recommendations for accountability, as warranted. 

These functions are all the more important in an agency that, by 

design and necessity, shields its operations from the public and the 

press, and even from the large majority of its own personnel. 

This Committee has seen firsthand the importance of the CIA Inspector General function. While we can’t talk about many of the reports and audits that this office has produced, it is no understateVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:31 May 11, 2011 Jkt 066164 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66164.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
2 

ment to say that they’ve had a major impact on the Committee’s 

understanding of CIA programs and, at times, have led directly to 

major changes in those programs. 

The 2004 special review into CIA detention and interrogation 

practices, conducted under the auspices of former IG John 

Helgerson, was a watershed moment. The report raised major questions about the program’s legality and compliance, and led to 

changes and additional reviews of this program. Other recent CIA 

Inspector General reports have recommended changes to operations, uncovered misallocation and poor use of funds, and recommended CIA officers be held accountable for problems it found 

in covert action programs. 

To a degree, the Committee relies on the CIA to bring forward 

to us notifications of its operations, analysis, and its problems. 

While these notifications alert us of an issue, we on the Committee 

are frequently reliant on the CIA IG to use the resources of the office to explain matters fully and accurately. We are also reliant on 

the office of the Inspector General to uncover issues that might not 

be immediately apparent and to do an independent review of those 

issues. Ideally, the Committee and the Inspector General can play 

a mutually beneficial role, with each side bringing forward matters 

for the other to review. 

As I noted, for the past 18 months the CIA has been without a 

Senate-confirmed Inspector General. I want to note the Committee’s appreciation to Patricia Lewis, the Deputy CIA Inspector General, who has acted as the IG and run the IG office during this vacancy. I imagine that she, as much as anyone, is happy to see that 

Mr. Buckley will, I trust, be confirmed shortly. 

David Buckley has been a career public servant. He enlisted on 

active duty with the Air Force in 1976, specializing in investigations. He continued service with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations as a civilian in 1984, working for three years before 

moving to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

under then-Chairman Sam Nunn. I’ll insert in the record, at this 

point, a letter to the Committee from former Senator Nunn recommending Mr. Buckley. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

3 


Insert offset folio 001 here 63995.001
4 

Mr. Buckley then served from 2005 to 2007 as the minority staff 

director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 

As such, he had a purview of the entire intelligence community, including the CIA, and developed an understanding from the Congressional point of view of the important relationship that Committees have with the CIA Inspector General. 

Finally, Mr. Buckley has worked as a senior manager at Deloitte 

Consulting since 2007, consulting in the national security arena. 

In short, David Buckley has spent 34 years in a career focused 

on conducting oversight, much of it in the defense and intelligence 

areas. He has agreed to fill this important position and I believe 

his background makes him an excellent candidate. 

I’d now like to turn to Vice Chairman Bond, and then ask Mr. 

Buckley to make any introductions he wishes before turning to his 

opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Buckley, congratulations on your nomination and for appearing before the Committee. I extend a warm welcome to your family 

here, and those others who are friends and supporters. 

And it’s clear from the discussions we had and your statement 

for the record that you really understand the importance of the position for which you’ve been nominated. Now, as the Chair said, we 

in no way minimize the work and the role of other inspectors general, but at the CIA, given the extreme sensitivity, the necessary 

secrecy of the intelligence mission, the IG position is extremely important. 

If confirmed as the next Inspector General, you’ll have the 

weighty responsibility of ensuring the Director and Congressional 

Intelligence Committees are fully informed of any violations of the 

law or deficiencies in CIA programs. That means you would often 

have the unenviable task of determining whether or not there are 

such violations. Now that may not make you the most popular person at the Agency, but it does mean that you will be expected, and 

we will expect you, to be fully impartial and above reproach in your 

own conduct. 

You’ll also be responsible for recommending policies to promote 

economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the agency. That’s always 

a good buzz word. I’ve always heard people talk about it; I’ve never 

seen them do it. But, we wish you luck. 

At a time when the taxpayers are stretched thin and our federal 

deficit has skyrocketed, every federal agency has to tighten its belt 

and become more efficient. As the Inspector General, you are expected to play a key role helping the CIA do its part to cut spending without cutting back on our national security interests. 

Now, in your statement for the record you noted that you believe 

the CIA Inspector General ‘‘needs to establish and maintain quality 

communications with the Intelligence Committees,’’ and it’s extremely imperative that Congress be kept fully informed. Well, we 

could not agree more. That’s the heart of the matter. I ask that 

whenever you find yourself in a situation considering whether to 

inform Congress of some difficult issue, please err on the side of 

5 

disclosure. If you do so, you will find this Committee a supportive 

partner. If you choose not to, that’s not a good way to start off. 

Because the CIA’s work is classified, it’s not often that the American people get to see the work that you do. Today’s hearing is your 

opportunity to give everyone from my colleagues, the people here 

in the audience, an idea of who you are and how you intend to perform the role. 

Again, as the Chair has indicated, you have a wealth of experience—the Department of Defense, Department of Treasury, both 

houses of Congress—which qualify you well for the position. Over 

three decades you’ve established a record of distinguished public 

service. 

In short, I and the rest of the Committee have the highest expectations for your performance. I look forward to hearing more about 

your views about this demanding, important position and how you 

plan to tackle its challenges. Congratulations on your nomination. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Now I’d like to proceed with several pro forma questions and one 

other, and then ask you, Mr. Buckley, to make any introductions 

you’d care to and a statement, if you wish. 

Here are the questions: Do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in other venues when invited? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. I do. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to send officials from your office to appear before the Committee and designated staff when invited? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. I do and I will. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to provide documents or any 

other materials requested by the Committee in order for it to carry 

out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. I do. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Will you ensure that your office provides 

such material to the Committee when requested? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. I will. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to inform and fully brief, to 

the fullest extent possible, all members of this Committee rather 

than only the Chairman and Vice Chairman on intelligence activities and covert actions? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. I will. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Now, one other question: Is it your intention to seek a waiver or accept a waiver, if offered, allowing you 

to receive a federal retirement annuity in addition to the statutory 

salary for the position to which you have been nominated? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. It is not. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

If you’d like to proceed and introduce your family and then make 

us any statement you might wish to do. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID B. BUCKLEY, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 

AGENCY INSPECTOR GENERAL-DESIGNATE 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I would like to introduce my wife of 26 years, Janice; my daughter, my mother, my youngest brother and my stepfather. They’ve 

6 

all traveled here today to be with me. My two sons are away at college—further away than my daughter is—and they’re hopefully 

watching on the Internet. But I’m really pleased, Madam Chairman, that they’re able to join me today, along with several friends 

in the audience. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. And we very much welcome 

them. It’s a delight to have you here. 

Please go ahead with your statement. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Thank you. 

Madam Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear here 

today before you as you consider my nomination to be the Inspector 

General of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

I am deeply honored that President Obama has nominated me 

for consideration for this position. 

At the risk of being redundant, during more than three decades 

of government service—including 31 years as a direct government 

employee—I have married, have three children, have been and remain active in my community and my church, and count myself 

blessed in those endeavors. It would be my honor to continue serving the country as the Inspector General, Central Intelligence 

Agency, if confirmed for this position. 

I would like to briefly speak to my background and qualifications 

and then share some observations with you regarding the role of 

the Inspector General, CIA. 

As you indicated, Madam Chairman, I enlisted into active service 

to the military in 1976 and went directly into law enforcement and 

criminal investigative work for the Air Force. I was honorably discharged and remained in the reserves for a few more years, but became a civilian special agent and counterespionage case officer with 

the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. 

I conducted criminal investigations and counterespionage operations. I received specialized investigative training and was also 

trained in the conduct of clandestine human intelligence collections 

by the Defense Intelligence and Central Intelligence Agencies. 

In 1987, I became a professional staff member of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and as investigator for the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, where I had the honor to 

serve Senator Sam Nunn and the other members for seven years, 

conducting investigations and oversight of government operations 

and other matters of import to the United States Senate. 

Then from 1995 to 1998, I was the special assistant to the Department of Defense Inspector General, and, while there, realizing 

the need for more oversight of the Department of Defense intelligence enterprise, worked to establish a position of Assistant Inspector General for Intelligence Review. 

In 1998, I briefly served as the Assistant Director for Defense 

and National Security Investigations at GAO’s Office of Special Investigations, until later that year when I was asked by the Department of Treasury to help stand up the newly authorized Treasury 

Inspector General for Tax Administration. I spent six years at the 

IG for Tax Administration as an Assistant Inspector General for 

Investigations. 

7 

In 2005, I was asked by Ranking Member Jane Harman of the 

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to join the staff 

and became the minority staff director for the 109th Congress. 

Since retiring from federal service in 2007, I have been working 

as a consultant for the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense and intelligence community agencies. 

I believe the role and mission of Inspector General is important 

in any agency, but absolutely vital at the Central Intelligence 

Agency. The Inspector General reports to the Director and is an essential element of the proper functioning of the agency. 

The director needs an independent oversight element to provide 

unbiased assessments, based on the professional tools that auditors, investigators and inspectors bring. The CIA is involved in 

international high-risk operations and activities, the vast majority 

of which are done in secret in order to protect them from detection 

by our adversaries. These factors, as well as the consequences of 

any abuse in such programs, demand that oversight be both vigorous and sensitive. 

Furthermore, in the absence of transparency and public scrutiny, 

the CIA relies on the Inspector General, as well as Congress’ Intelligence Committees, to provide independent oversight. In this context, the Inspector General’s Office is often the only organization 

able to probe the agency’s intelligence programs to detect instances 

of fraud, waste or abuse. 

In addition to reporting to the Director, I believe the CIA Inspector General needs to establish and maintain quality communications with the Senate and House Intelligence Committees. I believe 

it is critical that Congress be kept informed of the issues of concern 

to the Inspector General and that the Inspector General also be responsive to concerns raised by the Congress. 

An appropriate level of communication is also necessary between 

the CIA Inspector General and other inspectors general of the intelligence community and the other members of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, so that the CIA can 

also benefit from government-wide best practices. 

Madam Chairman, Vice Chairman Bond, Senators, the role of the 

Inspector General is a difficult job to do well. The job requires a 

great deal of skill, tact and professionalism. If confirmed, I pledge 

to do my best in the execution of those responsibilities in leading 

the office and in working with the Agency’s leadership, its employees and the Congress. 

Before I close, I’d like to thank the Committee staff for their assistance and hard work. And I know that, if confirmed, I’ll be working closely with them, as well as the Members. I look forward to 

that. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you today 

and I’ll do my best to answer your questions. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID B. BUCKLEY, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INSPECTOR GENERAL-DESIGNATE

Madam Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you 

for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today as you consider my nomination to be the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

I am deeply honored that President Obama has nominated me for consideration 

to this position. Before I get too far into my testimony, I would ask your indulgence 

8 

and allow me to recognize my wife of 26 years, Janice, who is here today, and the 

several friends who have come to the hearing to show their support for me. Our 

three children are in college and were unable to travel here today. I am flattered 

by and thankful for the support of my family and friends. 

During more than three decades in government service—including 31 years as a 

direct government employee—I have married, had three children (now all in college), have remained active in service to my community and church, and count myself blessed in all those endeavors. It would be my honor to continue serving my 

country as the CIA IG if confirmed for this position. 

Madam Chairman, I would like to speak to my background and qualifications, and 

then share some observations about the role of the Inspector General, CIA. 

Madam Chairman, I entered active military service in 1976. I spent eight years 

in law enforcement and investigations for the Air Force, and then was honorably 

discharged and became a civilian special agent and counterespionage case officer for 

the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. I conducted criminal investigations 

and counterespionage operations with the FBI. I received specialized investigative 

training and I was trained in clandestine human intelligence operations by the DIA 

and CIA. In 1987, I became a professional staff member at the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee as an investigator for the Permanent Subcommittee on 

Investigations, where I had the honor of working for PSI Chairman Senator Sam 

Nunn for seven years, conducting investigations and oversight of government operations and other matters of import to the Senate. Then, from 1995–1998, I was the 

special assistant to the Department of Defense Inspector General and, realizing the 

need for more oversight of the DoD intelligence enterprise, worked to establish the 

position of Assistant Inspector General for Intelligence Review there. In 1998, I 

briefly served as the Assistant Director for Defense and National Security investigations at GAO’s Office of Special Investigations until later that year I was asked to 

help stand up the newly authorized Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration. I spent six years at TIGTA as the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations. In 2005, I was asked by then Ranking Member Jane Harman of the House 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to join the staff, where I became the 

Minority Staff Director for the 109th Congress. Since 2007, I have been working as 

a consultant for DHS, DoD and intelligence community agencies. 

Madam Chairman, I believe the role and mission of Inspector General is important in any agency, but absolutely vital at the Central Intelligence Agency. The Inspector General reports to the Director and is an essential element of the proper 

functioning of the Agency. The Director needs an independent oversight element to 

provide unbiased assessments, based on the professional tools that auditors, investigators and inspectors bring. The CIA is involved in international high-risk operations and activities, the vast majority of which are done in secret and often with 

an intentionally deceptive cover in order to protect them from detection by our adversaries. These factors, as well as the consequences of any abuse in such programs, 

demand that oversight be both vigorous and sensitive. Furthermore, in the absence 

of transparency and public scrutiny, the CIA relies on the IG, as well as Congress’ 

intelligence committees, to provide independent oversight. In this context, the Inspector General’s office is often the only organization able to probe the Agency’s intelligence programs to detect instances of waste, fraud and abuse. 

In addition to reporting to the Director, I believe that the CIA IG needs to establish and maintain quality communication with the Senate and House intelligence 

committees. I believe it is critical that Congress be kept informed of the issues of 

concern to the IG, and that the IG also be responsive to concerns raised by Congress. An appropriate level of communication is also necessary between the CIA IG 

and the other inspectors general in the intelligence community, as well as members 

of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, so that the CIA can 

benefit from government-wide best practices. 

Madam Chairman, as someone recently observed, the role of the Inspector General is a difficult job to do well and an easy job to do poorly. The job requires a 

great deal of skill, tact, and professionalism. If confirmed, I pledge to do my best 

in the execution of those responsibilities in leading the office and in working with 

the Agency’s leadership, its employees and the Congress. Thank you again for the 

opportunity to testify today, and I will do my best to answer your questions. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. 

There will be five-minute rounds. And so if you can keep your 

answers relatively concise, that will be appreciated. 

The size of the intelligence budget has doubled since September 

11. While the CIA’s budget is classified, it’s grown enormously as 

9 

well. A directive signed by President Bush in November of 2004 instructed the CIA to increase its case officers and all-source analysts 

by 50 percent and to double its technical personnel. The number 

of contractors employed by the Agency, often to conduct what at 

least I believe is an inherently governmental function, skyrocketed 

until Director Hayden and now Director Panetta have started to 

put some controls in place. 

Here’s the question. How would you see the role of the Inspector 

General in reviewing and making recommendations on the overall 

size of the CIA, its budget, its personnel levels and its use of contractors? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I would approach the task of assisting the Director in reviewing 

the basic missions and functions of the Central Intelligence Agency 

and looking at those issues. It’s an agency that’s been tasked with 

huge demands in this era of high risk to the nation and in defending our nation. 

But a risk-based approach in the prioritization of mission and in 

looking for economies and efficiencies that could be taken during 

that review is the way I would probably use my auditors and inspectors to focus on that problem set. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I think it’s fair to say, and I think the Vice 

Chairman would agree with me, that we believe there are entirely 

too many contractors doing inherent governmental functions, and 

that that should be closely examined. 

Second question: Based on your numerous positions in IG offices 

and as a congressional investigator, how do you approach the challenge of needing to conduct very detailed reviews that may result 

in referrals for prosecution or other disciplinary measures for agency personnel, without getting into an adversarial relationship? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Thank you. 

The role of investigators, or anyone that is engaged in oversight, 

is a particularly tricky job. It requires professionalism and independence of function and of mind. 

The nice thing about being a government investigator, particularly an internal affairs function, is that the vast majority of government employees are there to do their job, do it well, and do it 

honestly. And there are just a few, in my experience, that can 

cause trouble or have things go sideways. 

I think the vast majority of employees look forward to working 

with the independent investigators to make sure that their workplace is free of fraud, waste, abuse or other kinds of misconduct. 

And I intend on making sure that the Agency views the office of 

the Inspector General as a place that they can trust and respect, 

first and foremost. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Last quick question: Under an arrangement between the IG and 

the congressional Intelligence Committees in 2001, the CIA IG conducts a detailed review on each authorized covert action program 

every three years. This has been extremely helpful to our congressional oversight. Here’s the question. Do you plan to continue this 

practice? 

10 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Yes, I do. And, in addition, I think that a top-tobottom review, at least at a high level, is essential in planning the 

audits and inspections for the Office of Inspector General. 

So while a routine, every-three-years audit will obviously get 

some coverage of each of the covert actions, I’m also open to reviewing a covert action 12 months later, if that’s what’s required to 

make sure that things stay on track. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I appreciate that answer. 

Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I begin, obviously, with our own personal interest, and that’s 

standards for notifying Congress. You’re supposed to report any 

particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses or deficiency immediately to the Director, and, within seven days of being informed, the Director must report them to the Committee. 

What standards would you apply in deciding whether a problem, 

abuse or deficiency is particularly serious or flagrant—the language of the requirement? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Yes, sir. I have given this some thought, and will 

review it again, if confirmed and in office. 

But a serious or flagrant event, in my mind, is at least any felony or felonious allegation, or could be, depending on the position 

of the person. If it’s an allegation against an individual employee, 

it could be a serious misdemeanor, depending on the circumstances 

surrounding the incident. 

Deficiencies in operations could be wide-ranging, Mr. Vice Chairman. But you do have my commitment to probably be overnotifying 

the Committee, at least at first, so we can fine-tune our relationship and communications. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Should the Committee ask you to testify, 

do you believe that you’d have to get the approval of the CIA Director to do so? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. I do not. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Now, one of the things the Chair and I 

and the rest of the Committee have been very interested in is 

leaks. We’ve had too much damage; we’ve lost too much information because of leaks. 

What do you think, as an Inspector General, you can do to prevent leaks or discourage or uncover them? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Leaks are an incredibly large problem in our intelligence community and in our defense establishment. I think that 

the role of the Inspector General, first and foremost, is to review 

the policies and procedures and activities of the Agency, the CIA, 

in its efforts to stem leaks. And that’s where I would probably 

start, with looking at their programs to determine whether those 

policies and efforts are being carried out in an appropriate manner 

or if we’ve got some better ideas that we could offer that could institutionalize training, certification and the like. 

Vice Chairman BOND. One of the motivating factors, I believe, in 

leaks, number one, they think it’s an unpunished crime. They can 

get publicity for this, and be a real champion. 

11 

What could be done, could you suggest anything as the IG, that 

would make the publicity or any such publicity less attractive or 

impinge upon their game plan? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. I think regardless of the type of crime, but particularly in leaks, that the motivation of the offender is one of the 

hardest things to come to grips with as the investigation is taking 

place. And, Senator, as I presume you know, when leak investigations are opened, they’re largely conducted by the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation and the Office of Security. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Yes. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Again, I think that the whole process of attempting to limit, understand and deter leaks probably needs to be 

taken. We need to take a look at the whole process—what are we 

doing to stem that tide and what additional things can we add to 

the programs and policies that would strengthen our ability to 

deter leaks. 

Vice Chairman BOND. As I understand it, most of these crime reports, though, do originate with the Agency and they may be expected to put together a preliminary case to turn it over to the 

DOJ. And I thought that’s perhaps where you might come in, and 

if your work discovers that, you may be the one to institute it. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. I will take a look at that. If confirmed, I will be 

happy to take a look at the soup-to-nuts program and also the role 

of the Office of Inspector General in the leaks avoidance. 

Vice Chairman BOND. A final question. Do you, from what you 

know of the legal authority, do you have sufficient clear authority 

for your statutory responsibilities and expectations for congressional independence and effectiveness, or do you see any clarified 

authorities that you might need? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Senator, I am familiar with the intelligence authorization bill that the Senate passed, and there are several provisions in that legislation that the Senate has passed that would give 

the office of the Inspector General maybe some further independence, or at least an appearance of independence, as it relates to the 

General Counsel and a separate appropriation request. I support 

both of those. I think those are both good ideas. 

Relative to other matters regarding the jurisdiction or authorities 

of the office, I would have to wait to get in place to review those. 

But I promise you I will do that, if confirmed, and get back to the 

Committee. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you, Mr. Buckley. We appreciate 

the plug for our authorization bill. It’s about time. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Yes. Yes, sir. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Buckley, welcome. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Thank you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And thank you for giving me some time 

the other day. I appreciate it; enjoyed the opportunity to meet you. 

The CIA’s detention and interrogation program has been the subject of considerable inquiry by Congress, by the Department of Justice, presumably also internally. As a general proposition, as a matter of corporate governance, if you will, I believe that a chief execuVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:31 May 11, 2011 Jkt 066164 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\66164.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
12 

tive official of an organization against which allegations have been 

made should have a chain of reporting to him- or herself about that 

incident that does not involve employees implicated in that incident 

or conduct. 

Do you agree with me that that’s a fairly basic principle of corporate governance with respect to internal investigations of claims 

of misconduct? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. I do, and I think, Senator, I believe that that’s one 

of the essential roles of the Inspector General, to offer that independent capability to audit, investigate, and inspect. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. I would like to ask your assurance that 

when, as and if you are confirmed and take this position, that you 

familiarize yourself with the existing chain of reporting relating to 

the CIA’s detention and interrogation program to the Director so 

that you are in a position to respond to questions from this Committee, from members of this Committee, about whether or not, as 

it presently is constituted it meets that standard of corporate governance. Are you willing to do that? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. I am. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Okay. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Yes. Thank you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. That’s the only question I had. I enjoyed 

talking with you and look forward to working with you in your new 

position. 

I want to thank you for your many years of government service 

in a variety of different organizations and, despite your presumably 

more lucrative tenure in the private sector, your willingness to step 

away from that and return to the service of your country in this 

role. And it may have been with—I gather you have three children 

in college. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. I do, Senator. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. So it’s a fairly consequential choice for you 

to have made, and I want you to know that I appreciate it; I believe all of us appreciate it. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Thank you. I’m honored. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Whitehouse. I’m glad you made that statement. I know that both the 

Vice Chairman and I concur with it, and we, too, thank you, Mr. 

Buckley. 

Senator Wyden is on his way. I beg your pardon. He just entered 

the room. While he is walking up to the podium, let me ask you 

this. As you use your prior experience and as you review the powers of the CIA IG, do you believe you have all the authority that 

you would need to proceed in a vigorous and effective way? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Madam Chair, as I understand the authorities of 

the office today and the mission that lies ahead and the mission 

that the good employees of that office are performing today, I believe so. However, as I indicated, I think it’s important to take a 

look at, today, 2010, what the position of the office and the authorities of the office require. And I will come back to you if I see any 

deficiencies in those authorities. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Senator Wyden. 

13 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thanks 

to you and the Vice Cair for holding this open. As you know, I’ve 

taken a great interest in this position over the years and very 

much appreciate your holding this hearing. 

In 2007, the former CIA Director began his own inquiry into the 

operations of the CIA Inspector General’s Office. As you know, I 

was quite outspoken in terms of taking objection to this approach, 

this type of inquiry because I was of the view it posed a direct 

threat to the Inspector General’s independence. I made it clear that 

I would do everything I could to oppose this kind of approach. 

Other members of the Committee voiced their objections as well, 

and the inquiry was terminated. 

Now, in your response to the pre-hearing questionnaire, you stated that you do not believe it’s appropriate for agency heads to investigate their own Inspector General, and you suggest a number 

of ways that agency heads can properly address their concerns 

about inspectors general without resorting to what in my view is 

an extremely inappropriate step. 

So my question is, if a future CIA Director decides that they are 

unhappy with the Inspector General and wants to undermine the 

office’s independence, my sense is we’re not going to see anything 

quite as ham-handed as what we saw before, somebody just going 

out and opening their own investigation. 

But it’s certainly easy to think that there would be more subtle 

ways that the Director could try to undermine an Inspector General to limit the Inspector General’s activities. They could, for example, restrict access to certain personnel. They could attempt to 

limit the resources that an office has or use classification as an excuse for limiting the Inspector General’s access to information. 

My question to you is, if you are confirmed as Inspector General, 

and a future director begins to undermine your office’s independence and your effectiveness, how would you respond to something 

like that? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Thank you, Senator Wyden. I appreciate that 

question. My first response would be to discuss the matter with the 

Director and to let him know—him or her—my position on the matter. Presuming, based on your question, that it was the intent to 

subtly undermine the office, my first stop would be right here. I 

think that the first place that I would turn are the Committees. I 

presume that an intermediate step could be the Director of National Intelligence, but within the statute, I believe that the Committee is the right place to start if I perceive the undermining of 

the office’s authorities or its independence, whether they be subtle 

through budget or space, or access to information or personnel. 

Senator WYDEN. The question, also if I might, with respect to the 

release of Inspector General reports. The Inspector General’s Office 

produces a lot of audits and reports that are routine, where the office is basically providing management consulting to the rest of the 

CIA, but it also generates a modest number of reports that are of 

significant national interest. And I have felt for some time that it’s 

important to make appropriately redacted versions of these reports 

available to the public. 

One in particular is the Inspector General’s report that was done 

a number of years ago on the CIA’s activities in the run-up to 9/ 

14 

11. Senator Bond and I had to work for years and years to get this 

report declassified. We thought it was of significant historical 

value. It made the case for a number of reforms that Congress tried 

to implement. And as the two of us worked on a bipartisan basis 

to declassify the report, it wasn’t exactly clear who was responsible 

for balancing the CIA’s natural almost penchant for secrecy with 

the need to determine whether disclosure would be in the public interest. 

In your view, how would you go about striking that balance? 

How should that balance be struck? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Senator, as you know, the authority to classify information does not rest with the Inspector General. And if the 

Agency is appropriately classifying information—we’ll just start 

there, if you don’t mind—and the matter is appropriately classified 

and plain on its face that it should be so, in order to declassify the 

information—make it either through a redaction or declassification—we have to rely upon the Director or whoever the classification authority is to make that determination. 

And, as the Inspector General, I will work with you and with the 

Agency to make sure that the reports that my office produces will 

be relevant and informative to the folks that need the information—the Director and the Committees. And then if an effort is 

made to declassify those or required to declassify or redact, I will 

certainly participate wholeheartedly in that endeavor. 

Senator WYDEN. Madam Chair, I had one additional question. 

Would it be appropriate to ask it at this time? 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. It certainly would be. 

Senator WYDEN. Okay. One last question with respect to legal interpretations you all do, and I want to put it in the context of some 

of the discussion about interrogations. In 2004, the CIA Inspector 

General conducted a special review of the CIA detention and interrogation program. Much of that analysis is still classified, but anyone who reads the unclassified version can see that the Inspector 

General’s Office conducted its own independent analysis of CIA interrogations, the meaning of various laws with respect to torture. 

And I think it would be fair to say that the Office of the Inspector General didn’t necessarily agree with all of the legal conclusions 

that were reached by the CIA General Counsel’s office. And I think 

it’s also clear today that the CIA General Counsel’s office made 

some mistakes, costly mistakes, by relying on questionable legal 

opinions from the Department of Justice, rather than on legal analysis that would actually stand up to public scrutiny. 

So my question is, do you believe that it is appropriate for the 

Office of the CIA Inspector General to conduct its own legal analysis, rather than to rely on the conclusions of the CIA General 

Counsel? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Thank you, Senator. As you know, the CIA General Counsel is the chief legal officer for the Director, for the Central Intelligence Agency. That said, yes, I believe that it is appropriate to review underpinnings of activities, whether they’re legal 

or policy in nature. And if it’s based on a legal interpretation, the 

Office of the Inspector General has their own attorneys. And yes, 

I think it’s fair game to be able to look at those. 

15 

Senator WYDEN. And who would you notify if you thought that 

the CIA General Counsel was wrong? We all know what the politics of this are, and I’m not going to try to drag in the Bybee memo 

and things of this nature. But I do want to know, if you thought 

that the CIA General Counsel was wrong, who would you notify? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. I would notify the Director first, and if I learned 

or we felt, the office felt that the wrong interpretation or the apparent interpretation was leading to activities that we thought were 

improper, I believe that might raise to a serious deficiency as outlined in the statute, which would require a written notification to 

the Congress. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator. 

Just an additional question, if you’d like to ask. I’m finished. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Two general areas. Ten years ago President Clinton directed major intelligence agencies to produce 

auditable financial statements. I used to be an auditor. I thought 

that was great. So far, only NRO’s financial statements have received a clean opinion. CIA’s statement got a disclaimer of opinion, 

auditor-speak of an F. 

How important do you think it is for the CIA to achieve clean 

financial statements to prevent fraud, waste, abuse? What can you 

do to help the CIA achieve that goal? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Thank you, Vice Chairman. I agree that the books 

and records of any agency, but particularly an intelligence agency, 

need to balance. And having not seen the audit reports—or the financial statements, for that matter—I can only envision some of 

the things that might cause a problem in balancing those books 

from an auditor perspective. 

But to answer your question, I will work closely with the chief 

financial officer, and obviously our audit staff does today and will 

continue to work closely with the CIA’s CFO to get those books and 

records in an auditable format so they can be audited without disclaimer, or without at least a material disclaimer. 

Vice Chairman BOND. All right. Let’s see. 

We’re also interested in assuring that the CIA is accountable. We 

need to have a culture of personal accountability. Do you have any 

ideas on establishing accountability, or what do you think are the 

necessary ingredients, and what can you as CIA OIG leader do to 

establish and oversee the procedures to make sure they work? 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Yes, sir. Well, I’m a big proponent of accountability in service and in deed. I will just speak, I guess, from an 

investigation standpoint. As the office conducts investigations, it 

obviously is going to find shortcomings in personal behavior. I 

think it’s an important role of the Inspector General not so much 

to recommend the course of action that might be indicated based 

on the misbehavior, but to make sure that appropriate action is 

taken by the authority that has that responsibility. 

So the first thing that I would recommend is to take a look and 

see if you’ve got a pattern or practice of not holding people accountable. You can do that through an audit, by looking back, what’s the 

pattern of practice based on the activities, the investigations, audits or inspections that have indicated impropriety, and where accountability has been recommended. Then you can figure out if 

16 

you’ve got a pattern or if you’ve got just a one- or two-off type of 

situation. 

And the second thing is to actually track the activity or the action taken based on the investigation that’s been referred for action, and that’s something that I think is the responsibility of the 

Inspector General, to make sure that the work product is being 

used effectively, first of all. Are we giving them a quality product 

that they can base action upon, and are they taking appropriate action, and keep a record of that and report that information as appropriate. 

Vice Chairman BOND. I might just add by way of a side note that 

we have seen in other areas of the IC where somebody who has 

botched a job has moved out and up to get that person out of a job 

and give them an even better assignment, which has raised hackles 

and I think has not served the community well. 

Well, I thank you, Mr. Buckley, and wish you well. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Vice Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Buckley. You’ve been straightforward, concise 

and direct and it’s very much appreciated. 

It is my hope, Members, to have Mr. Buckley’s nomination confirmed by the full Senate prior to the upcoming recess, so I’d like 

to ask that any Members with remaining questions submit those 

questions by Thursday noon. That’s two or three hours short of 48 

hours. And then the Committee can vote on the nomination not 

later than next Tuesday. So that’s agreeable, and we will proceed 

along those lines. 

And I thank you very much, and your family. My sense is you 

will be confirmed and we wish you a very, very good and strong 

tenure. So thank you very much. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the Committee adjourned.] 

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