United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 20-2562

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Todd Matthew Haulk, also known as Todd Haulk

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern

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 Submitted: June 14, 2021

Filed: August 24, 2021

[Unpublished]

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Before LOKEN, WOLLMAN, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Todd Matthew Haulk pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine and methamphetamine mixture in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846. At sentencing and over Haulk’s objection, the
district court1

 applied a two-level enhancement to Haulk’s base offense level under

the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines) after finding that he had

“maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled

substance,” see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). With a total offense level of 42 and a

criminal history category of I, Haulk’s sentencing range was 360 months’ to life

imprisonment. The district court varied downward and sentenced Haulk to 240

months’ imprisonment. 

Haulk argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that he maintained

his residence for the purpose of distributing a controlled substance. See United States

v. Miller, 698 F.3d 699, 705 (8th Cir. 2012) (standard of review). For the

enhancement to apply, drug distribution “need not be the sole purpose for which the

premises was maintained, but must be one of the defendant’s primary or principal

uses for the premises, rather than one of the defendant’s incidental or collateral uses

for the premises.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.17. As set forth in the presentence report

(PSR), Haulk purchased his Davenport, Iowa, house in 2012 and was sharing it with

his girlfriend at the time of his offense. He claims that the primary use of the

premises was residential because he did not frequently sell methamphetamine there. 

We have held, however, that the enhancement applies “when a defendant uses the

premises for the purpose of substantial drug-trafficking activities, even if the

premises was also [his] family home at the times in question.” Miller, 698 F.3d at

707.2

1The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Southern District of Iowa.

2Haulk argues that Miller was wrongly decided, but “[i]t is a cardinal rule in

our circuit that one panel is bound by the decision of a prior panel.” Owsley v.

Luebbers, 281 F.3d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

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We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in applying the

enhancement. During the initial search of Haulk’s house, officers seized four pounds

of ice methamphetamine and three firearms. Haulk later admitted to investigators that

he had hidden three pounds of ice methamphetamine in his basement’s drop ceiling

and one pound beneath his basement couch. Haulk also admitted that he had

attempted to weigh the methamphetamine in the house. See United States v. Garcia,

774 F.3d 472, 475 (8th Cir. 2014) (evidence that defendant used premises to store

vehicles containing methamphetamine supported district court’s application of the socalled “stash house enhancement”). Haulk distributed methamphetamine at his house

on at least one occasion, during the process of which he stated that he was awaiting

a mail shipment of more methamphetamine and wanted to obtain additional firearms. 

Haulk thereafter received at his house two mailed packages that an informant told

investigators contained a total of five pounds of methamphetamine. During the

subsequent search of Haulk’s house, officers discovered an additional ten ounces of

ice methamphetamine and another firearm.3 This unobjected-to information set forth

in the PSR supports the district court’s finding that Haulk had maintained his

Davenport house for the purpose of distributing methamphetamine.

Haulk next argues that his 240-month sentence is substantively unreasonable

in light of his lack of a significant adult-age criminal history, his age, his support

system, and the degree to which his aberrant criminal behavior was caused by his

drug addiction. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, we disagree. See Gall v. United

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (standard of review). The district court properly

considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in imposing Haulk’s sentence. It weighed

the “staggering” amount of methamphetamine involved—more than six

kilograms—as well as Haulk’s possession of firearms in connection with the drug

distribution, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, the need for

3Although Haulk disputes whether this methamphetamine is properly attributed

to him, he does not dispute that it was stored in his house.

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adequate deterrence, and the need to protect the public. Against these aggravating

factors, the district court weighed Haulk’s self-described mitigating circumstances. 

See United States v. King, 898 F.3d 797, 810 (8th Cir. 2018) (“The district court’s

decision not to weigh mitigating factors as heavily as [the defendant] would have

preferred does not justify reversal.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

After concluding that the Guidelines failed to address Haulk’s circumstances

adequately and that the sentencing range was thus unreasonable as applied to him, the

district court imposed a sentence that was 120 months below the advisory Guidelines

sentencing range. As we have frequently observed, it is “nearly inconceivable” that

the district court abused its discretion in not varying downward still further. See, e.g.,

United States v. Bevins, 848 F.3d 835, 841 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v.

Lazarski, 560 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 2009)).

The judgment is affirmed.

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