VOLUME 3, NUMBER 1 SUMMER 2017
U.S. Marines in Afghanistan,

2010–2014

Anthology and Bibliography

Paul Westermeyer and Christopher N. Blaker, 2017. 

Cloth. 312 pp.

This anthology is organized into six 

parts: one section for each year and a 

final section devoted to a broader overview 

of Marine participation in the Afghanistan 

conflict. This work is not meant to be an 

authoritative history but rather a selected record 

of Marine contributions to the Afghan war effort as captured 

by the media and other sources. It is intended to be used as a starting point 

for the general public and academic researchers.

Visit www.usmcu.edu/historydivision for a digital copy or email history.division@usmcu

.edu for a print edition.

U.S. MARINES IN AFGHANISTAN, 2010–2014

ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

U.S. Marines in the 

Global War on Terrorism

Story to tell?

Marine Corps History is accepting article and book review 

submissions for 2017–18.

The editors are currently looking for articles on all topics within the long history of the Corps: 

Civil War, Spanish-American War, Banana Wars, WWI, WWII, Korea, Cold War, Vietnam, 

Iraq, Afghanistan, and women and minorities in the military. We are particularly interested in 

masters and PhD students who are ready to venture into scholarly publishing. Articles must 

be at least 4,000 words, footnoted according to Chicago Manual of Style, and 

focus on some aspect of the Corps either directly or indirectly, including 

foreign marines and joint operations. 

For more information about submission guidelines or history books available for 

review, please contact the senior editor at angela.anderson@usmcu.edu.
SUMMER 2017 1

PRESIDENT

Marine Corps University

Brigadier General William J. Bowers

...

DIRECTOR

History Division

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Paul J. Weber

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

Cassandra Bennett

...

HISTORIES BRANCH

Douglas Nash, Paul W. Westermeyer, 

Dr. Breanne Robertson 

...

HISTORICAL REFERENCE BRANCH

Annette D. Amerman (Branch Head)

Kara R. Newcomer, Ryan Musselman

...

ARCHIVES BRANCH

Dr. James Ginther Jr. (Branch Head)

Steve Coode, Christopher Ellis, John 

Lyles, Shelley McIntosh, Sheila Phillips, 

Nancy Whitfield, Alisa Whitley

...

ORAL HISTORY AND VIDEO SECTION

Dr. Fred Allison

...

EDITING AND DESIGN BRANCH

Angela J. Anderson (Branch Head) 

Dr. Alexandra Kindell, Robert A. Kocher, 

Young-hee Krouse, Stephani L. Miller

...

MARINE CORPS

HISTORY DIVISION

2044 Broadway Street

Quantico, Virginia 22134

Telephone (703) 432-4877

www.usmcu.edu/historydivision

...

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Department of the Navy

Headquarters United States

Marine Corps

3000 Marine Corps Pentagon 

Room 2B253

Washington, DC 20530-3000

OFFICIAL BUSINESS 

PCN 10600011300

ISSN 2381-375X

Director’s Foreword

Charles P. Neimeyer, PhD

ARTICLES

The Last to Fall: 

The 1922 March, Battles, and Deaths of the U.S. Marines at Gettysburg

Richard D. L. Fulton and James Rada Jr.

The Legend of Suicide Charley:

Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 

and the Battle for Henderson Field, 24–25 October 1942

Major Gary Cozzens, USMCR (Ret)

Royal Marines Commandos at Limbang, 1962

Captain Derek Oakley, MBE, RM

The “Afloat-Ready Battalion”:

The Development of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious 

Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit, 1898–1978

Colonel Douglas E. Nash Sr., USA (Ret)

National Museum of the Marine Corps: The Final Phase

Charles Grow

IN MEMORIAM

Colonel John H. Glenn Jr., USMC (Ret)

Colonel Julia E. Hamblet, USMC (Ret)

Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L. Bartlett, USMC (Ret)

Major Norman T. Hatch, USMCR (Ret)

REVIEW ESSAY

The Hindenburg Line and King of Battle: Artillery in World War I

Reviewed by Major Peter L. Belmonte, USAF (Ret)

BOOK REVIEWS

Hell Before Their Very Eyes: American Soldiers Liberate Concentration 

Camps in Germany, April 1945

Reviewed by Jacob Stoil, PhD

Storming the City: U.S. Military Performance in Urban Warfare 

from World War II to Vietnam

Reviewed by Douglas E. Nash

The Equus Men: Rhodesia’s Mounted Infantry: The Grey’s Scouts, 

1896–1980

Reviewed by Charles D. Melson

Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking 

in the Post-Cold War Era

Reviewed by Mark R. Folse

Originals: How Non-Conformists Move the World

Reviewed by Richard A. McConnell, PhD

A Companion to the Meuse-Argonne Campaign

Reviewed by Douglas V. Johnson, PhD

3

5

25

50

62

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94

100

104

106

109

113

115

118

120

122

124

 Volume 3, Number 1 Summer 2017

Cover Art: Let's go get 'em! Marines, by 

Capt Guiness, color lithograph, ca. 1942.

Poster showing Marines bearing rifles with 

bayonets and flags in a jungle.

Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, LC-USZC4-9891
Did you know . . .

All History Division publications—books and this magazine—can be sent to you free of charge. Shop 

our full catalog of titles at www.usmcu.edu/historydivision and click on the publications link. Email 

your requests to history.division@usmcu.edu.
Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

Director, History Division

Marine Corps University

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer is responsible for the collection, production, 

publication, and dissemination of Marine Corps history and manages 

the functioning of a wide variety of Marine Corps historical programs. 

FOREWORD

DIRECTOR’S

The Marine Corps History Division has been 

running smoothly since we occupied the new 

Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons Marine 

Corps History Center in the fall of 2016. Since then, we 

have had several classes of future commanding officers 

and sergeants major complete the Cornerstone Course 

at Marine Corps University. Consequently, we have received renewed interest in our historical unit archives 

and reference files from an increasingly large number 

of active duty Marines. In July 2017, for example, the 

entire 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, visited Marine Corps 

Base Quantico, Virginia, as part of their centennial 

founding celebration (1917–2017). The History Division 

Reference Branch Head, Ms. Annette Amerman, presented a lecture on the 1917 establishment of Quantico 

and the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, World War I history.

This edition of Marine Corps History is again full of 

interesting material on the history of our Corps and is 

perhaps more eclectic than past editions. The first article, “The Last to Fall,” by Richard D. L. Fulton and James 

Rada Jr. deals with a little-known aspect of Marine 

Corps history. During the 1920s, largely at the behest 

of double Medal of Honor recipient and Marine Corps 

Base Quantico commanding general, Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler, the Marine Corps sponsored 

a series of Civil War battlefield reenactments with the 

Quantico Marines playing the role of both Union and 

Confederate forces. This article discusses the 1922 reenactment at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, where the authors show that even “staged” battles are not without 

their cost. Next, a very timely article by Major Gary 

Cozzens, USMCR (Ret), titled “The Legend of Suicide 

Charley.” Written just in time for the 75th anniversary 

of the Marine Corps battle for Guadalcanal, and using 

never-before-published material from actual participants, Cozzens recounts the legendary stand of Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller’s 1st Battalion, 

7th Marines, in the epic struggle for Henderson Field 

during the bloody evening of 24–25 October 1942. The 

author focuses on the infantry company that held the 

center of Puller’s line, “Suicide Charley,” and helped 

repel six major Japanese assaults in a single night. The 

article that follows offers an interesting personal account written by Royal Marine Captain Derek Oakley, 

MBE. Captain Oakley’s article nicely covers a major 

counterinsurgency operation conducted by the Royal 

Marines in Brunei in 1962 and includes a daring and 

successful rescue of hostages temporarily incarcerated 

by rebels in the town of Limbang. Oakley’s story also 

3
4 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

features the activities of then-Captain Jeremy Moore, 

RM, who would later play a major role during the 1982 

Falklands crisis as a major general. Our final article 

comes from Colonel Douglas Nash Sr., USA (Ret), and 

senior historian for the Histories Branch of the Marine Corps History Division. Nash’s piece is focused 

on the formation and evolution of the U.S. Navy/

Marine Corps Amphibious Ready Group. This is a 

timely article as today’s Marine Corps is once again 

emphasizing its amphibious roots. 

At the urging of our readers, we have included 

the obituaries of some extraordinary Marines. First 

and foremost was the passing of Marine colonel, astronaut, and former U.S. senator from Ohio, John H. 

Glenn Jr. A legend in the field of aviation and space 

exploration, Senator Glenn treasured his time as an officer of Marines and flew numerous combat missions 

as a USMC aviator. History Division also honors Colonel Julia Hamblet, who passed away this year just short 

of her 101st birthday. Colonel Hamblet was one of the 

first women to enroll in the Women’s Reserve Officer Training Program at Mount Holyoke College during World War II. She was retained as one of the few 

women Marine Corps officers (at that time) to remain 

on active duty after the war and did not retire until 

the mid-1960s. Her pathbreaking service to the Corps 

as one of its top women leaders was simply incredible. 

Finally, we note the passing of two giants in the field 

of Marine Corps history with the loss of Lieutenant 

Colonel Merrill Bartlett and Major Norman T. Hatch. 

Both of these gentlemen made incredible, awardwinning contributions to the history of the Corps. Few 

people are aware, for example, that Major Hatch was 

the only serving Marine to win an Academy Award 

for his documentary on the Marine Corps at Tarawa 

in 1943, and many of our Marine Corps schools today 

still use elements of Bartlett’s seminal Assault from the 

Sea as required reading. 

As in previous issues, MCH contains a number 

of excellent book reviews on the latest scholarship in 

military history. The Marine Corps History Division 

is looking forward to the publication of the fourth volume of Marine Corps History. Each edition seems to get 

slightly better than the preceding one. We would love 

to hear what our readers think. Feedback on the current issue or submissions for future issues can be sent 

to history.division@usmcu.edu. 

• 1775 •

Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division 

Image from U.S. Marine Corps recruitment poster showing Marines firing artillery from a ship, ca. 1917.
5

The Last to Fall

THE 1922 MARCH, BATTLES, AND DEATHS 

OF THE U.S. MARINES AT GETTYSBURG

by Richard D. L. Fulton and James Rada Jr.

The U.S. Marines are known for having fought 

valiantly in World War I (WWI) in such situations as the Battles of Belleau Wood and 

Blanc Mont in France, where they earned a reputation 

for being tenacious and skillful warfighters. After the 

deadly skirmishes to drive out the entrenched German 

troops, Army General John J. Pershing, commander of 

the American Expeditionary Forces, said, “The deadliest weapon in the world is a Marine and his rifle.”1

However, that belief didn’t stop Pershing, President 

Woodrow Wilson, and others from wanting to disband 

the Marine Corps after the war had been won and to 

absorb the Marines into the Army. Additionally, the 

Corps had to deal with the drawdown in numbers following WWI.

Major General Commandant John A. Lejeune understood that his Service needed to fight for survival in 

the political arena just as hard as it fought on the battlefield. Lejeune formulated a campaign to raise public 

awareness and increase support for the Marine Corps. 

The birthday of the Marine Corps, celebrated each 

year on 10 November, would easily serve as part of the 

public relations push by the Marine Corps to focus 

on its traditions, as could the major Marine elements 

tied to iconic battles or moments of Marine Corps 

history.2

 This article highlights General Lejeune’s two1

 Ed Gilbert and Catherine Gilbert, US Marine in World War I 

(Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2016), 20.

2

 GySgt Thomas E. Williams (Ret), intvw with author, 12 December 2014, hereafter Williams December intvw.

pronged plan to improve the skills and abilities of the 

Corps by applying lessons learned to introduce new 

tactical doctrines and also to prevent the Service from 

being dissolved by raising public awareness about the 

Marine Corps.

“Instead of going to obscure places to conduct 

war games and learning lessons learned and learning 

how to integrate armor, artillery, and aviation into 

war fighting, he would do it at iconic places and put 

the Marines out in front of the public,” Gunnery Sergeant Thomas E. Williams said.3

 At the time, the national parks and battlefields, such as Gettysburg, were 

still under control of the U.S. War Department, which 

meant the Marines could use them as a training ground.

General Smedley D. Butler assumed command of 

Marine Barracks Quantico, Virginia, at the end of June 

1920 and is credited with the idea to stage exercises at 

these landmarks. He saw the reenactments as a handson way to teach Civil War tactical decisions and to 

focus positive public opinion on the Marine Corps.4

The Marines conducted four Civil War training 

exercises between 1921 and 1924. They reenacted the 

Battles of the Wilderness (1921), Gettysburg (1922), 

New Market (1923), and Antietam (1924). Of these, 

the event at Gettysburg drew the largest crowds and 

was the one that the Marines traveled the farthest 

to conduct. These events attracted attention across 

3

 Ibid.

4Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas, “Marines at the Battle of the Wilderness—1921,” Leatherneck, September 2014, 19.
6 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

the nation, in part, because of the size of the group 

marching through towns and across the countryside. 

The Gettysburg Star and Sentinel called it the greatest 

military maneuver under the flag in a time of peace.5

President Warren G. Harding was invited to the 

1921 exercises in Virginia. He witnessed the reenactment first-hand and walked along behind the Marines 

during the fighting. He told the Marines after a Sunday morning worship service: 

It was suggested that I stand here before you 

mainly that we might be better acquainted. 

After all it is ours to serve together. I cannot tell you how inspiring it had been to sit 

in worship with you and how greatly I have 

enjoyed being in camp with you. I shall not 

exaggerate a single word when I tell you 

that from my boyhood to the present hour I 

have always had a very profound regard for 

the United States Marines, and I am leaving 

camp today with that regard strengthened 

and genuine affection added.6

General Lejeune’s efforts were already bearing fruit.

Marching to Gettysburg

Early in the morning of 19 June 1922, 5,500 Marines—

roughly one-quarter of the Corps—left Marine Barracks Quantico. Four Navy tug boats towed eight large 

barges full of Marines up the Potomac River toward 

Washington, DC.7 Meanwhile, tanks and artillery 

pieces towed by trucks rolled out along the Richmond 

Road headed for the same destination.8

The march involved the entire 5th and 6th Regiments, a squadron of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 

and elements of the 10th Marine Regiment Artillery.9

5

 “Marines Begin Big Sham Battle,” Star and Sentinel (Gettysburg, 

PA), 1 October 1921, 3.

6

 “President Sees Army Camp Life,” Boston (MA) Post, 3 October 

1921, 8. 

7

 “Marines Are on the March Here,” Gettysburg (PA) Times, 20 

June 1922, 1.

8

 “President Saluted by 5,000 Marines,” Washington Post, 20 June 

1922, 3.

9

 Williams December intvw.

U.S. Marine Corps Historical Company 

Promotional advertisement for the 1922 Marine encampment and maneuvers, developed jointly by the Gettysburg and Chambersburg chambers of commerce.

Base map from Library of Congress, adapted by History Division

A map of the 1922 Marine Corps march to Gettysburg, PA. “A” marks 

Camp Lejeune in Washington, DC; and “B” marks Camp Neville in 

Bethesda, MD. Before reaching their final destination, they would pass 

through Camp Richards in Gaithersburg, MD; Camp McCawley in 

Ridgeville, MD; Camp Feland in Frederick, MD; and Camp Haines in 

Thurmont, MD.
SUMMER 2017 7

The Sun noted that these Marines were ready for anything and had cleared Quantico of everything that 

could be moved.10 Raymond Tompkins noted how “the 

5,000 men are carrying the equipment of a complete 

division of nearly 20,000. In the machine-gun outfits 

especially the personnel is skeletonized, while the material is complete. Companies of 88 men are carrying 

ammunition, range finders and other technical gear 

for companies of about 140.”11

The Marines erected their first night’s camp in 

East Potomac Park, south of the Washington Monument. It was named Camp Lejeune, following General 

Butler’s practice of naming camps after prominent 

Marine Corps generals.

Once the camp was organized and the men fed, 

the Marines fell into formation and marched from 

the camp and through the East Gate of the White 

House around 1830. At the South Portico, President 

Harding, the first lady, General Lejeune, and other 

distinguished guests watched the Marines pass by as 

Harding returned the salute the marching Marines 

gave him. General Butler led the Marines in the re10 “Marines Complete Hike Preparations,” The Sun (Baltimore), 

19 June 1921, 3.

11 Raymond S. Tompkins, “Marines Are Marching on to Gettysburg,” The Sun (Baltimore), 25 June 1922, part 5, 4.

Archives and Special Collections Branch, Marine Corps History Division 

Marine Camp Lejeune at East Potomac Park, Washington, DC.

view, but as he reached the portico, he left them and 

took his place with the other observers. It was the first 

time that troops had passed in review through the 

White House grounds since the Civil War.12

This event marked initial success in the Marine 

Corps’ efforts to influence the decision makers who 

held its future in their hands. President Harding, who 

had two planned meetings with the Marines on this 

march, would actually meet with them three times.13

Even after a long and arduous day, the Marines were 

still on the road by 0600 the next morning. “Although 

the hour was early as the force swung out of the Capital, a considerable crowd cheered the marchers as they 

passed from East Potomac Park to the route leading 

to Wisconsin Ave., and out,” the Washington Post reported.14

The thousands of infantrymen marched along at 

roughly three miles per hour, while the artillery pieces 

and tanks traveled about twice that speed. Captain W. 

S. Shelby, an administrative aid to the District Police, 

12 Capt John H. Craige, “The Marines at Gettysburg,” Marine 

Corps Gazette 7, no. 3 (September 1922): 250.

13 The third opportunity came with an unplanned visit while the 

Marines were camped in Frederick, MD, headed back to Quantico in July.

14 “Marine Army Sees Movies of Itself on Eve of ‘War’,” Washington Post, 21 June 1921, 7.

Library of Congress

Marines passing in review in front of the White House on 19 June 1922.
8 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

estimated that walking eight abreast, it would take 

three hours for the Marine line to pass.15

The second day’s march was 12.5 miles and the 

Marine line stretched out for more than a mile along 

Rockville Pike in Maryland. At one point, the line of 

more than 5,000 Marines, 24 guns, and more than 200 

trucks was reported to be two miles long.16

Each company had four Cole carts, which were 

piled high with the lower rolls of their packs. A pair 

of Marines pulled each cart for a distance before they 

switched with another pair. It was a rough time for 

Marines pulling the cart, but it lasted for only a short 

stretch of the march. “But by the time the fourth or 

fifth pair of men take their turn, they are normally 

tired with marching, and the pulling comes hard. And 

they say ‘The hills are hell’,” The Sun reported.17

General Lejeune reviewed the line along the 

march. The Marines stopped at the Charles Corby 

estate just outside of Bethesda at 1100 and set up 

Camp Neville in honor of Major General Wendell C. 

Neville. Once the setup was complete, local officials 

and some curious residents toured the camp. That 

evening, the Marines marched to the east end of the 

estate, which formed a natural amphitheater. There, 

the troops enjoyed a cartoon on the screen set up for 

their entertainment and then watched themselves in 

the Washington, DC, march from the day before. The 

Marine Photographic Section had filmed the Marines, 

and the Navy Aviation Photographic Unit then developed and rushed the film to the Corby estate to 

be viewed. “It is the first time on record when a force 

on the march has taken its own moving pictures and 

seen them exhibited within 24 hours. The show greatly 

pleased the men and was also viewed by members of 

the Corby family and several nearby residents,” the 

Washington Post reported.18

The Marines invited the public into their encampments to meet the men and see their equipment. 

15 Tompkins, “Marines Are Marching on to Gettysburg.” 

16 “Marine Army Sees Movies of Itself on Eve of ‘War’.” 

17 “Marines Rest in the Hills on Their Way to Gettysburg,” The 

Sun (Baltimore), 23 June 1922, 2. 18 “Marine Army Sees Movies of Itself on Eve of ‘War’.” 

It was one more way the Corps began garnering public 

support. The march was not specifically described to 

the public as an effort to save the Service, but that was 

the effect. And the public did turn out. Hundreds of 

people visited the encampments and thousands lined 

the route along which the Marines traveled.

The following day, 22 June, the East Coast Expeditionary Force once again broke camp and headed north toward Gaithersburg, Maryland. This day’s 

march was 12 miles long. As in many towns along the 

route, residents turned out to watch the largest military procession seen in their lives pass by their homes 

and businesses. The Marines tried to give them a good 

show, singing as they marched along the roads.

“It seemed that every one was out to see the 

troops in Rockville. Front porches were filled with 

people, clerks watched from stores, and business was 

suspended excepting what was done to serve the men 

as they took the opportunity to quench their thirst or 

replenish the supply of tobacco or cigarettes. Water 

bottles were filled and many kinds of residents delighted in throwing fruit to the men who rested along 

the curb,” the Washington Post reported.19

While the first two days of the expedition had 

been easy marching, the third day marked the start of 

the Marines’ training exercises. They sent out scouts 

and proceeded as if they were in a hostile environment. The exercise was to assume that a hostile force 

had captured Gaithersburg and the railhead. It was the 

Marines’ job to free the town and its residents. “Warily 

and in scattered detachment, preceded by skirmishers 

and advance guards who would ‘clean out the enemy’ 

in the roadside woods. The ‘enemy’ had their American flags hanging out and ‘sniped’ the [M]arines with 

apples, oranges, drinks of water and bottles of milk,” 

the Washington Post reported.20

Around noon, the scouts made contact with a 

supposedly hostile army advancing toward the Marine 

column. Airplanes dropped messages to Marines on 

19 “Mimic War Serious Play, Marines Find on the March,” Washington Post, 3 July 1922, 3. 20 “Marines Stage Big Battle, then Lose at Baseball,” Washington 

Post, 23 June 1922, 1.
SUMMER 2017 9

the ground and they reacted as if they were in an actual hostile situation. “Fighting imaginary foes is the 

‘Gyrenes’ idea of something to do on a quiet evening 

at home when one is tired of bridge and knitting. The 

United States [M]arine is not an enthusiastic shadow 

boxer. He likes to feel a wallop land,” according to The

Sun.21

The exercise lasted for about two hours and the 

Marines finished their march to erect Camp Richards, 

named for Brigadier General George Richards, about 

two miles north of Gaithersburg. Once the camp was 

set up, the Marines spent the afternoon and next 

day playing baseball games against American Legion 

teams from Gaithersburg and Ridgeville, Maryland. 

News of the games spurred Corps pride as odds were 

offered on the outcomes.22

The first casualty of the trip occurred Thursday, 

22 June, when a truck ran over a Marine’s foot. Another potential casualty was avoided when Marine pilot 

Captain George W. Hamilton made a rough but safe 

landing in his plane upon returning from Quantico.23

On Friday, 23 June, the Marines marched 15 miles 

to Ridgeville.24 They left the next morning, marching 

east along the National Pike. The first Marines began arriving in Frederick at 0900, but the bulk of the 

group arrived around noon. By then, streetcars were 

carrying signs throughout the city announcing that 

the Marines had arrived at the fairgrounds.25 The Marines were greeted with flags hanging from windows 

and thousands of people lining the road into the city.

Once the Marines were encamped at Camp Feland, Frederick Mayor Lloyd C. Culler led a delegation out to the fairgrounds to greet them. Culler urged 

General Butler to stay through Sunday, but the general 

insisted the schedule had to be kept. However, he did 

21 Around 1900, Navy sailors began using the term Gyrene as a derogatory reference to a Marine. “Marines Complete Hike Preparations,” The Sun (Baltimore), 19 June 1921. 22 “Marines Rest in the Hills.” 

23 Ibid.

24 “5,000 Marines Camp at Ridgeville: Corps Reach Frederick at 

Noon Today,” Frederick (MD) Post, 24 June 1922, 1.

25 “Road-Weary Marines Find Frederick’s Gates Wide Open,” The 

Sun (Baltimore), 25 June 1922, 4.

U.S. Marine Corps Historical Company

Marines enter Frederick, MD, on their way to Gettysburg. This photo 

is frequently printed in reverse, but the side on which the Marines are 

wearing their equipment and the mileage sign indicate this is the proper orientation.

U.S. Marine Corps Historical Company

Marines march along North Market Street in Frederick, MD, on their 

way to Gettysburg.

invite any Civil War veterans in Frederick to be special guests of the Marine Corps at Gettysburg.26 Butler 

attended a chamber of commerce dinner in nearby 

Braddock Heights, Maryland, as their guest of honor.27

That evening, the public enjoyed concerts from 

26 “Frederick Welcomes 5,000 Marines Arriving at Noon for 

Day’s Stay while Enroute to Gettysburg,” Frederick (MD) News, 24 

June 1922, 1.

27 “Marines Complete Hike Reaching Camp Gettysburg Today,” 

Frederick (MD) News, 26 June 1922, 5.
10 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

U.S. Marine Corps Historical Company

Marines pose for a photograph at Camp Lejeune, Washington, DC.

the expeditionary Marine Corps Band, and then later the Marines settled down to watch movies before 

turning in for the evening. All of these events served 

as increased public relations for the Marines. They 

made friends, and in doing so, drew positive press, not 

only from the newspapers along their travel route, but 

newspapers all over the country. 

The Sabbath saw no rest for the Marines. In fact, 

it would be the longest day of marching for the entire 

journey. They marched 18 miles north to reach Thurmont, Maryland. It also turned out to be the hottest 

day of the event. The Marines had been singing when 

they left Frederick, and they were singing as they entered Thurmont and the last mile of the hike around 

1345.28

“Everyone from the small boy to the aged veteran 

was up and out to await and see the soldiers. Sunday 

School and church attendance suffered severely, and 

no doubt the few who did attend wished they were 

out on the street. Many persons remained in town 

preferring to miss their dinners rather than miss seeing this great military outfit arrive. Every porch along 

the State Road was crowded with people watching 

28 “Modern ‘Barbara Frietchies’ Greet Marines in Frederick,” The 

Sun (Baltimore), 26 June 1922, 2.

U.S. Marine Corps Historical Company

Marines camped at the Frederick, MD, fairgrounds on their way to Gettysburg.

the passing trucks,” the Catoctin Clarion reported.29 By 

1430, the Marines marched into a clover field about a 

mile north of Thurmont and sat down. Camp Haines, 

named in honor of Brigadier General Henry C. Haines, 

had been erected on the Hooker Lewis Farm for them. 

The next morning, 26 June, the Marines made 

their final 15-mile march to Gettysburg, settling in at 

Camp Harding, near the base of the Virginia Memorial on the Gettysburg battlefield. 

29 “Marines Camp Here,” Catoctin Clarion (Mechanicstown, MD), 

29 June 1922, 3.
SUMMER 2017 11

Robert S. Kinnaird Collection of Historic Thurmont Photographs

Marines entering Thurmont, MD, on 25 June 1922.

Robert S. Kinnaird Collection of Historic Thurmont Photographs

Marines moving through Thurmont, MD, to Camp Haines on 25 June 

1922.

Camp Harding

An area between Emmitsburg Road and West Confederate Avenue, adjacent to Seminary Ridge, was 

designated for Camp Harding, named in honor of 

President Warren G. Harding. By naming the camp 

after the president, it not only showed respect for the 

commander in chief, but it also curried favor from a 

man whose support was needed to keep the Marine 

Corps strong.  Even before units of the Marine East 

Coast Expeditionary Force left their base of operations at Quantico, along with approximately 1,000 

pieces of motorized equipment, work had commenced 

on Camp Harding. As early as 19 June, local plumber 

A. B. Plank, who had been awarded the encampment 

water and sewer contract, began working on water 

supplies to ensure that the 300 showers being installed 
12 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

Courtesy of the Town of Emmitsburg, MD

The Marines pass through the Emmitsburg Town Square, MD, on their way to Gettysburg on 26 June. 

U.S. Marine Corps Historical Company

Camp Harding at Gettysburg, PA.

in two bathhouses, also under construction, received 

an adequate supply of water.30

On 27 June, the Signal Corps established radio 

contact with Washington, New York, Philadelphia, 

and the Marine Corps barracks at Quantico and set 

up a radio network throughout the encampment to allow officers and staff to communicate with each other 

on-site, as well as to communicate with various aircraft being used.31

The Gettysburg Times noted that the connections 

with Quantico did more than allow radio communications between the Gettysburg battlefield camp and 

the Virginia headquarters. “The feat established a new 

record for speed in long distance radio communica30 “Marine Camp Is Being Laid Out,” Gettysburg (PA) Times, 20 

June 1922, 1; and R. S. T., “Marines to Begin Rehearsals of Pickett’s Charge Today,” The Sun (Baltimore), 28 June 1922, 1.

31 “Camp Is Being Shaken Down,” Gettysburg (PA) Times, 27 June 

1922, 2.
SUMMER 2017 13

tion, as the points were reached within a half hour 

after the work of establishing the large system . . . had 

been started.”32

The Marines on-site also provided the encampment with its own phone service setup for the troops 

and their command, with lines also being connected 

to those of the Bell Telephone Company to enable 

“outside” calls. The phone system as installed conceivably made it possible for the encampment to have its 

own unique telephone exchange.33 The final size of the 

encampment was reported by various newspapers to 

have been from 65 to 100 acres.34

The Canvas White House

Due to the planned stay of President Harding and his 

wife, Florence, in the Marine encampment for a portion of the military demonstrations and reenactments 

at Gettysburg, a structure was erected for the couple, 

as well as for use by members of the presidential entourage.

32 Ibid.

33 “Harding Will Review Marines,” Gettysburg (PA) Times, 19 June 

1922, 1.

34 GySgt Thomas E. Williams (Ret), intvw with author, 29 January 2015.

The so-called Canvas White House (or Gettysburg White House) was not merely to provide a 

showpiece for the event or to serve solely as convenient quarters for the president and dignitaries at the 

maneuvers, though it certainly was all those things as 

well. The Baltimore Sun reported, “It will house the 

President and Mrs. Harding . . . [and] the office force 

he brings along to keep the executive department of 

the Government going . . . so that the country may 

progress as rapidly, while ‘Pickett’s Marines’ are charging as it does in Washington.”35

The Gettysburg Times described the presidential 

compound as “one of the most elaborate quarters ever 

provided the President of the United States in any 

camp.” The Sun compared the appearance of the canvas presidential complex at the encampment site to “a 

magic castle in the wilderness.”36

The entire tent complex of the presidential compound formed a semicircle, fronting a semicircular 

drive. The completed nine-structure complex of canvas and wood was 400 feet in length and 175 feet in 

width and comprised 16 rooms. Initially, the finished 

compound was to have been painted white, but that 

plan was amended sometime around 29 June.37

Three buildings flanked each side of the main 

presidential structure, each a combination of reception area and bedroom, and were intended for the 

men in the presidential entourage. At the end of each 

row of three sat a larger structure, each with living 

rooms and bedrooms, which were intended for the 

women in the presidential group.38

The interior walls and ceilings of the Canvas 

White House were covered with plasterboard and 

other materials, mainly to conceal such structural 

elements as bare studs and rafters.39 The presidential 

35 R. S. T., “Marines to Begin Rehearsals of Pickett’s Charge Today.” 

36 “White House Is Being Erected,” Gettysburg (PA) Times, 28 June 

1922, 3; and R. S. T., “Marines to Begin Rehearsals of Pickett’s 

Charge Today.” 

37 “White House Is Being Erected.” 

38 Ibid.

39 “Dress Rehearsal for the Charge,” Gettysburg (PA) Times, 30 June 

1922, 3.

U.S. Marine Corps Historical Company

The Canvas White House as it appeared without the additional tentage 

for male and female guests.
14 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

compound was well lit, with the electricity provided 

by on-site generators. The generators not only provided enough power for the interior lighting that had 

been installed in the two-dozen rooms of the complex, 

but also for “long lines of incandescent bulbs” outside 

along the frontage of the compound tents.40

The Canvas White House was “officially” completed on 29 June with the installation of six porcelain bathtubs, which had been flown in “strapped to” 

Martin MBT twin-engine bomber/torpedo planes and 

“flown over the mountains to Gettysburg,” The Sun reported; the article further noted the concern that the 

heavy porcelain bathtubs could be damaged during 

overland transport, that “these are the first bathtubs 

ever carried by airplane, it is believed.”41

A Tragic Beginning

On 26 June, the celebratory arrival of the Corps 

was marred by the deaths of Marine aviator Captain George Wallis Hamilton and Gunnery Sergeant 

George Russell Martin.42

Captain Hamilton was in command of a squadron of fighters providing simulated “scout duty” while 

escorting the Marine infantry. Captain Hamilton, 

along with Gunnery Sergeant Martin, were flying a 

De Havilland DH-4B biplane fighter at the rear of the 

squadron of four planes as they left their encampment 

at Thurmont, Maryland, shortly after noon on 26 July 

and proceeded north.43

Nothing amiss among the planes was noticed until the squadron approached the landing field at Camp 

Harding. Two of the planes landed safely in the fields 

near the intersection of Long Lane and Emmitsburg 

40 “Camp Made Ready for President,” Gettysburg (PA) Times, 29 

June 1922, 1.

41 Raymond S. Tompkins, “Marines Plan to Reenact Famous Battle Every Year,” The Sun (Baltimore), 3 July 1922, 3. 42 For his service during World War I, Hamilton was awarded 

two Distinguished Service Crosses, the Navy Cross, and four Silver Stars.

43 Discrepancies exist in the recorded history for this event. “Captain Hamilton and Sergeant Martin Killed When Plane Fell,” Star 

and Sentinel (Gettysburg, PA), 1 July 1922, 1; and R. S. T., “Marine 

Aviators Crash to Death on Battlefield of Gettysburg,” The Sun 

(Baltimore), 27 June 1922, 1.

Harris & Ewing Collection, Library of Congress

Gen Smedley D. Butler, President Warren Harding, Gen John J. Pershing, and MajGen Commandant John A. Lejeune in front of the Canvas 

White House. 

U.S. Marine Corps Historical Company

Left: Capt George Hamilton. Right: GySgt George Martin in the Buffalo 

(NY) Evening News, 27 June 1922.

Road.44 Eyewitnesses then saw Captain Hamilton’s 

plane go into a nosedive that developed into a tailspin 

that brought the plane crashing into the ground.45

Aviation magazine reported, 

44 “Captain Hamilton and Sergeant Martin Killed When Plane 

Fell.” 

45 Ibid.
SUMMER 2017 15

According to Capt. John Craige, Aide to 

General LeJeune, who had just stepped out 

of a Marine Corps plane when he heard a 

formation of five planes overhead, Captain 

Hamilton, the leader in a DH4 signaled that 

he was about to land and cut his engine. 

From a height of about 500 ft. the plane 

went into a slow spin from which the pilot 

was seen to partially regain control, apparently about 100 feet from the ground.46

Leatherneck reported, “As the crippled plane descended, at a rate of approximately 200 miles an hour 

. . . [it impacted the crash site,] striking the ground at 

an angle of 45 degrees. Several hundred persons witnessed the fatal plunge.”47 The plane crashed on the 

William Johns farm at approximately 1305 in the afternoon and within 50 feet of tents and equestrian equipment belonging to Lew Dufour’s Exposition, which 

had set up along Steinwehr Avenue.48

The Star and Sentinel reported that Martin was 

pulled from the wreckage, alive but bleeding heavily 

from a head wound. Hamilton was found deceased 

within the wreckage. Both men were rushed to Warner 

Hospital in Gettysburg, though Martin died shortly 

after reaching the hospital.49

Leatherneck stated in its report of the event, 

In the opinion of the accompanying aviators, the accident was due to the difference 

in the reading of the altimeter, by which fliers estimate their distance from the ground, 

at Quantico and Gettysburg. Quantico is 

on sea level, while Gettysburg is 600 feet 

above sea level. Consequently, when the altimeter reads 1,000 feet at the latter place, 

the actual distance is only 400 feet.50

46 “Marine Aviation,” Aviation, 17 July 1922, 77.

47 “Death of Captain Hamilton and Sergeant Martin Saddens 

Troops,” Leatherneck, July 1922.

48 “Captain Hamilton and Sergeant Martin Killed When Plane 

Fell.” 

49 Ibid.

50 “Death of Captain Hamilton and Sergeant Martin Saddens 

Troops.” 

Hamilton and Martin were listed as killed in the 

line of duty in the service of their country, and the 

deaths of the two Marines may be the only military 

deaths that have occurred on the Gettysburg battlefield since 1863.51 Marine officers believed Hamilton 

tried his best to avoid the crowds at the carnival, 

knowing his plane was in trouble. According to the 

Gettysburg Times, the aircraft could have struck the 

carnival if Hamilton had continued to maneuver the 

plane out of its plunge toward the earth, and that 

could have led to many more deaths.52

An Educational Process

To properly portray Pickett’s Charge, the commanders of the expedition felt that it would be necessary 

for the soldiers to know the particulars concerning 

the events that had occurred on the grounds 59 years 

earlier.

The Sun reported that “Brig.-Gen. Smedley D. 

Butler is determined that his men shall know the real 

history of the battle of Gettysburg before they fight 

it again. They will be handicapped . . . by an official 

guide battalion that has found the battle of Gettysburg commonplace and has trimmed it up to suit 

modern tourists.”53 On 28 June, two battalions of Marines toured the battlefield aboard 20 trucks, with an 

“official guide” in each. These educational tours were 

conducted leading up to 1 July.54

Since most of the Marines would be portraying 

Confederate forces in the upcoming reenactments of 

Pickett’s Charge, the color of their brown uniforms 

could readily pass as butternut, the same color of the 

uniforms worn by some Confederate units, which had 

been achieved by dyeing cloth with oil from the bark 

of the butternut tree.55 With that, half of the clothing battle was essentially won by default. However, 

51 “Attend Funeral of Dead Aviator,” Gettysburg (PA) Times, 29 

June 1922, 1.

52 Ibid.

53 R. S. T., “Marines Are Told the Story of Battle,” The Sun (Baltimore), 29 June 1922, 2.

54 Ibid.

55 John D. Wright, The Language of the Civil War (Westport, CT: 

Oryx Press, 2001), 48.
16 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

half was not enough for the U.S. Marine Corps. The 

Marines were already accustomed to carrying blanket 

rolls on campaign marches, so they merely used these 

rolls for Confederate reenactment purposes as well.

Field officers also spent time studying the Battle 

of Gettysburg Cyclorama to get an overview of how the 

grand spectacle of Pickett’s Charge may have looked. 

The immense, panoramic painting was executed by 

artist Paul Dominique Philippoteaux and his assistants, with the finished product first exhibited in Chicago in 1883.56

Battle for Herr’s Ridge

The Marines scrambled sometime before 1100 on the 

morning of 29 July for an impromptu call to arms. 

Orders were passed down indicating that “flank and 

advance guard [of the enemy] had seized Seminary 

Ridge from the Chambersburg road to the sharp bend 

in West Confederate avenue.” Units from the 6th 

and 10th Regiments attacked and seized McPherson’s 

Ridge at 1100.57

The enemy consisted of a regiment of infantry 

and a battery of 75mm cannons that represented the 

defensive position on Herr’s Ridge. As they were driven off McPherson’s Ridge, the men fell back west of 

Willoughby Run and established a defensive position 

along Herr’s Ridge. Aircraft were deployed to conduct 

reconnaissance, patrolling the enemy-occupied territory between Herr’s Ridge and Cashtown northwest 

of Gettysburg.58

This was a no-holds-barred exercise, as reflected in the details of the unfolding engagement in the 

newspaper: 

The attacking forces are accompanied with 

all auxiliary arms, field rations for one day, 

being maintained at all rail heads. The Marine Quartermaster Corps have been or56 R. S. T., “Marines Are Told the Story of Battle”; and “The Battle 

of Gettysburg in Art,” National Park Service, U.S. Department 

of the Interior, http://www.nps.gov/gett/learn/historyculture

/gettysburg-cyclorama.htm, accessed 15 January 2016.

57 “Attack Made on Seminary Ridge,” Star and Sentinel (Gettysburg, PA), 1 July 1922, 3.

58 Ibid.

dered out as a salvage squad, assisted by the 

Engineers. The Sanitary Inspector will attend to the proper burial of all “casualties” 

while two Chaplains are detailed to look after the burial and keep records of the men 

killed.59

A battalion of Marines from the 5th Regiment 

was posted in the area of Lincoln Square to serve as 

reinforcements. Radios were deployed and telephone 

lines laid by the Signal Corps to allow all of the units 

to stay in touch with the command, the other units 

involved, and even the airplanes overhead. Even the 

“big ears” were set up to monitor the sky for any sign 

of enemy aircraft.60

Aside from concluding the fight for Herr’s Ridge, 

the commanders at the encampment managed to inject a few more rehearsals of the charge into an otherwise busy schedule of finishing final touches to the 

camp and preparing for the presidential visit, along 

with dozens of federal and state dignitaries, foreign 

dignitaries and emissaries, and tens of thousands of 

spectators.

The President Arrives

President Harding and his entourage of more than 40 

members of his staff, Secret Service, and select reporters left Washington shortly after noon on Saturday, 

1 July.60 For the Hardings, it was the beginning of a 

weeklong vacation. The presidential party also included the first lady, General Pershing, retiring budget 

director Charles G. Dawes, Army Medical Corps Brigadier General Charles E. Sawyer (who served as the 

president’s personal physician), and the president’s 

personal secretary, George B. Christian Jr. 

As the president and his entourage arrived in 

front of the Canvas White House, artillery provided 

a 21-gun salute.61 The president inspected the camp 

59 Ibid.

60 “City Prepares to Welcome the President Here,” The News 

(Frederick, MD), 1 July 1922, 1.

61 “Harding Made Brief Visit Here,” Gettysburg (PA) Times, 3 July 

1922, 1.
SUMMER 2017 17

with General Butler and then returned to the Canvas 

White House to prepare to watch the Pickett’s Charge 

reenactment, which began at 1700 that evening. The 

group watched from a vantage point in an observation 

tower on Cemetery Ridge to get the full sweep of the 

historical reenactment that lasted less than an hour. 

Following the excitement of the afternoon, the president and his party were guests at a dinner in their 

honor in the Marine camp.

The Battle Is Joined

An estimated 100,000 spectators turned out to watch 

the reenactment. The Star and Sentinel reported, “For 

miles on the front and either flank of the territory 

over which the charge was made, as well as from other 

points of vantage, including the Round Tops, a great 

throng of people, who motored here from nearby sections of the country, witnessed the pageant.”62

At approximately 1700, “candles” were set off to 

provide a smoke screen signal for the Confederate artillery barrage to begin. Two of the Confederate 75mm 

guns fired, representing the opening barrage of the 

artillery “concealed” in an artillery park on Seminary 

Ridge. A number of the 75mm guns also were placed 

62 “Harding and Pershing View Re-enactment of Pickett’s 

Charge,” Gettysburg (PA) Times, 3 July 1922, 1.

U.S. Marine Corps Historical Company 

A view of Pickett’s Charge as presented by the Marines.

along Cemetery Ridge and around Little Round Top 

to represent the federal artillery.63

“At 5 o’clock little clouds of white smoke jetted up from the ground under the far off trees,” The

Sun reported. “Off to the left they started first, then 

spread out toward the west in a solid white line, until 

the line seemed lost in the distance. It grew thicker 

and thicker, rising until it hid the trees. Suddenly red 

flashes split through the white wall, and next second 

the boom of a gun rolled across the mountain.”64

The guns were then rolled forward by hand from 

the artillery park behind Seminary Ridge until they 

were standing hub-to-hub along the period smoothbore guns of the Confederate Army on West Confederate Avenue. This placed them approximately 1,400 

yards from their intended targets on Cemetery Ridge. 

When the artillery commenced firing, “the recoil of 

the 75mm guns shook the earth.”65 George Chandler 

wrote that the 75mm howitzers also used black powder rounds to add to the effect of the “fog of war” on 

the field and to provide an authentic appearance to 

the battle reenactment.66

The opening barrage represented a 30-minute 

version of the 1863 duel in which Confederate Colonel Edward P. Alexander, commanding General James 

Longstreet’s reserve artillery, was ordered to direct the 

opening of a two-hour barrage of 140 Confederate cannon aimed primarily at the center of the Union line 

on Cemetery Ridge, as a prelude to Pickett’s Charge. 

Witnesses claimed, “Faster and faster the flashes of 

red came through and quicker and quicker the artillery thunder rolled over the fields, until it sounded 

like the beating of drums. . . . Guns roared both ways 

across the field now. Puffs of smoke leaped out from 

the Round Tops on the left of the Union Line and 

63 Little Round Top represents one of two rocky hills south of 

Gettysburg between Emmitsburg and Taneytown Roads. Capt 

George M. Chandler, “Gettysburg, 1922,” Infantry Journal 21, no. 

1 (July 1922): 380.

64 R. S. T., “Pickett’s Gettysburg Charge Dramatized in Marine 

Attack,” The Sun (Baltimore), 2 July 1922, 1.

65 Chandler, “Gettysburg, 1922”; and “Harding and Pershing View 

Re-enactment of Pickett’s Charge.” 

66 Chandler, “Gettysburg, 1922.” 
18 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

from Cemetery Hill on the right. The flashes along 

Seminary Ridge persisted.”67

When the half-hour barrage subsided, the Marines representing the Southern advance began, preceded by a skirmish line of sharpshooters that was 

deployed about 20 paces in front of the battle line. 

To aid spectators in keeping track of the units on the 

field, the Confederate regiments carried white and 

red Army signal flags as their respective battle flags, 

while the names of the generals who were represented 

in the charge were written in white on blue cloth.68

At first, there was so much smoke on the field 

from the smoke candles and the artillery rapidly firing black powder-filled rounds into the air that the 

advancing Confederate battle line was not easily discerned. When they were spotted in the haze, spectators said it appeared the ghosts of soldiers past had 

returned out of time itself and onto the battlefield. 

“Then they began to move forward . . . and for the 

watchers there was a thrill as though the ghosts of 

Pickett’s men were massed once more for another try 

for victory. . . . [T]here were six lines of men stretching 

along a mile front,” one reporter wrote.69 The Gettysburg Times noted, “In spectre [sic] like form, it seemed, 

as the figures were dimly outlined through the dense 

smoke of battle, that the soldiers of the Confederacy had actually come back and were reenacting that 

charge which proved fatal to the cause of the Southern 

States.”70

The Confederate Marines advanced shoulder-toshoulder, nineteenth-century style, until they reached 

the Emmitsburg Road, where they must then address 

surmounting the fencing that represented the last ob67 R. S. T., “Pickett’s Gettysburg Charge Dramatized in Marine 

Attack.”

68 Chandler, “Gettysburg, 1922.” 

69 “General Pickett’s Charge Staged for Harding,” New York Tribune, 2 July 1922, 3.

70 “Harding and Pershing View Re-enactment of Pickett’s 

Charge.” 

U.S. Marine Corps Historical Company

U.S. Marines reenact Pickett’s Charge using flags to help spectators 

identify which Confederate units are being represented.

stacle in their path to the High Water Mark.71 The Sun

reported that 

Now the crackling of rifles was a steady chorus, and the men were plainly living figures. 

They fell upon the fence in clouds, like mobs 

of insects alighting, firing furiously. Some 

toppled over the fence, fell headlong in the 

road and lay there. Some went suddenly 

limp across the top rail and hung like clothes 

drying in the sun. But the mass of them went 

over, crossed the road, climbed the next 

fence and were at the foot of the knoll.72

Some of the advancing troops also had been provided with shotguns loaded with black powder rounds 

that they would fire toward the ground as the troops 

progressed to simulate artillery shell explosions. The 

Marines in the vicinity of the “explosions” would then 

71 This spot on the Gettysburg battlefield is called the “High 

Water Mark of the Confederacy” because it represents both 

the farthest point of advance for Confederate troops but also 

the Confederacy’s most significant push into Union territory 

and thus their failed, best chance at routing the Union army.

72 R. S. T., “Pickett’s Gettysburg Charge Dramatized in Marine 

Attack.” 
SUMMER 2017 19

fall “dead” or “wounded” around the detonation produced.73

After crossing the Emmitsburg Road, the Marines 

continued on toward the stone wall that comprised 

the High Water Mark of the Battle of Gettysburg at 

the crest of Cemetery Ridge. However, before the advance continued, a portion of the Marines charged the 

Codori homestead on the east side of the road, routing an army of chickens. “Chickens on the farm, terrified by the sudden appearance of these khaki-clad 

figures and heavy rifle fire, flew in all directions for 

safety,” the Star and Sentinel reported.74

At 1720, the climactic storming of “The Angle” 

began, led by Major William P. Upshur, portraying 

Confederate General Lewis A. Armistead.75 As the final 

moments played out, The Sun reported that “the din of 

firing was fearful. From the far-off woods on Seminary 

ridge the cannonade had almost ceased, but from all 

around . . . the Union guns now roared a thunderous 

chorus. Then came the ‘rebel yell’ and the last rush. They 

were at the stone fence, in a yelling, shooting mass. The 

Confederates were at the Bloody Angle again.”76

Upshur placed his hat on his sword, led his 

Marines over the wall, and was subsequently “mortally wounded,” falling beside one of the Union guns 

in the battery at a crucial angle in the Union defense. 

The collision of the Confederate Marines with those 

representing the Union seemed so realistic that those 

observing the attack from immediately behind the 

Union line began to retreat as well. “As the attackers crossed the wall with all the enthusiasm and fury 

of real battle, the crowds of people who lined Hancock 

[A]venue, to view the event, instinctively fell back 

73 Chandler, “Gettysburg, 1922.” 

74 “Harding and Pershing View Re-enactment of Pickett’s 

Charge.” 

75 The Angle (or Bloody Angle) within the Gettysburg battlefield 

represents the site along Cemetery Ridge where approximately 

150 Confederates broke through the Union line on 3 July 1863. 

Upshur’s father had been wounded in the service of the Confederate States during the actual war, while Upshur was a Medal of 

Honor recipient for his actions in Haiti in 1915.

76 R. S. T., “Pickett’s Gettysburg Charge Dramatized in Marine 

Attack.” 

as before a real foe,” the Star and Sentinel reported.77

The charge, having reached the maximum point 

of penetration of the Union line, had ended, and 

the hundreds of “wounded” Confederates made their 

way across the fields they had previously charged 

across to assail the enemy position on Cemetery 

Ridge. “A shivering yellow pup, with tail tucked into 

its dragging belly, crept to the side of one of the fallen 

[M]arines who lay spraddled [sic] out with his closed 

eyes to the sun,” the New York Tribune reported. “The 

pup licked his face sympathetically once, twice, then 

the stricken ‘Confederate’ leaped to his feet and rejoined his fighting but now retreating comrades.”78

Then the fields suddenly fell silent as “a bugle was 

sounded from the High Water Mark, which called the 

‘dead’ and ‘wounded’ to arise . . . [followed by] loud applause, from all sections of the large fields, greeted this 

‘awakening’ of the dead.”79

By 0930 on the morning of 2 July, the president 

and his party left Gettysburg for Marion, Ohio, the 

president’s hometown. He would spend the next few 

days there celebrating the town’s centennial anniversary.

The Grand Finale

The Fourth of July represented the grand finale, for 

all intents and purposes, to the more-than-week-long 

training and battle demonstration campaign around 

Gettysburg. The focus of the day’s warfare was a presentation of Pickett’s Charge as if it had been fought 

in 1922 and, for a welcome change, the weather seemed 

to be predominantly on the Marines’ side.

The Marines held nothing back regarding the 

equipment they had hauled up to the Gettysburg 

battlefield, including the airplanes and howitzers previously used, as well as hydrogen-filled observation 

balloons, tanks, machine guns, antiaircraft guns, monitoring devices, radio communications, and mortars. 

The fury began around 0900, when spectators 

77 “Harding and Pershing View Re-enactment of Pickett’s 

Charge.” 

78 “General Pickett’s Charge Staged for Harding.” 

79 “Harding and Pershing View Re-enactment of Pickett’s 

Charge.” 
20 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

Courtesy Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association

Gettysburg battlefield map for 1–3 July 1863.
SUMMER 2017 21

saw an observation balloon ascend to approximately 

2,000 feet. The balloon hovered above the Marine 

camp to represent a Confederate observation craft. 

As soon as all the balloons were aloft, artillery posted on Seminary Ridge fired. The purpose of the balloons was to ascertain the effect of the rounds being 

aimed at the enemy positions.80 A squadron of four 

enemy planes, representing Union aircraft, suddenly 

appeared above Cemetery Ridge to defend the forces 

located there. And just as quickly, two squadrons of 

fighters representing Southern forces rushed up and 

toward the enemy planes, which were soon engaged in 

a dogfight, “in which nose dives, spins, loops, Immelman turns and other war maneuvers of fighting aircraft succeeded each other in rapid succession, while 

bursts of machine gun fire from aloft told when a pilot 

has succeeded in securing a deadly position on the tail 

80 “ ‘Modern Gettysburg’ Fought by Marines in Air Thrillers,” New 

York Tribune, 5 July 1922, 3.

of some other craft,” the New York Tribune reported.81

One of the enemy Union planes suddenly broke 

off and dove at the targeted observation balloon: 

“Speeding like an angry wasp straight at the big ‘sausage,’ it veered away and circled the balloon with a ‘tattat-tat’ of machine gun fire. Then it headed back to 

join its fellows.”82 The assault on the balloon was brief 

but fatal. Flames appeared and then spread rapidly 

throughout the craft, which had been inflated with a 

“half-million cubic feet of hydrogen gas.” A dummy, it 

was generally reported, wearing a parachute was cast 

forth from the observation basket attached to the underside of the balloon, while a second figure fell to 

the earth without a chute. As the burning balloon fell 

somewhere on the west side of Seminary Ridge, along 

with the slowly descending “parachutist,” the crowd 

stood stunned, some believing that the figures were 

81 Named for Max Immelmann, a German World War I ace, the 

Immelmann turn is a maneuver in which the aircraft accelerates to execute an upward half loop and then inverts with a half 

roll to level flight in the opposite direction at a higher altitude. 

“ ‘Modern Gettysburg’ Fought by Marines in Air Thrillers.” 

82 R. S. T., “Cemetery Hill Capitulates to Marine Attack,” The Sun 

(Baltimore), 5 July 1922, 1.

U.S. Marine Corps Historical Company

Burning U.S. Navy observation balloon falling to the ground after being “shot down” over Gettysburg.

U. S. Marine Corps Historical Company

Navy observation balloon burning on the ground behind Seminary 

Ridge.
22 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

actually people, and that one of them had fallen to 

certain death.83

The Sun reported that, unbeknownst to the many 

spectators, the fire and discharge of the occupants of 

the basket had been controlled from the ground via 

wires, one of which was electrified to ignite the balloon. The Sun also reported that there were two observation balloons aloft, only one of which was sent up to 

serve as the one slated for destruction.84

The New York Tribune wrote that the balloon was 

ignited by “the use of composition bullets, of the kind 

used in signal pistols, which were burned in the air, 

being totally consumed in about five hundred feet, yet 

having hardness enough to penetrate the skin of the 

balloon at short range.”85 Yet another report places a 

living, and rather daring, Marine in the balloon to ignite the balloon, throw out the dummy without the 

parachute, then parachute to escape. In a poorly written account, the Democrat and Chronicle wrote that “a 

thrill was provided when one of the large observation 

balloons was fired by an attacking airplane and [sent] 

flaming to the ground several hundred feet below, 

after the observer had leaped to safety with a great 

parachute.”86

There was no opening artillery barrage as there 

had been during the beginning of the reenactments on 

1 and 3 July. This time, the artillery were staged farther 

away in the woods, 3,000–3,500 feet behind the ridge, 

and they fired during the whole charge, with airplanes 

acting as their spotters.87

Following the initial air action, at around 1030, 

a smokescreen was laid down on the field in advance 

of the Confederate troops, until approximately 1040 

when the Marines began their assault. Unlike the 

reenactments of 1 and 3 July, the Confederates attacked the Union position as they would have done 

in a “modern” engagement with squads and platoons 

83 Ibid.

84 Accounts of this event vary. R. S. T., “Cemetery Hill Capitulates to Marine Attack.” 

85 “ ‘Modern Gettysburg’ Fought by Marines in Air Thrillers.” 

86 “50,000 See Marines Re-enact ‘Pickett’s Charge’ of July, ’63,” 

Democrat and Chronicle (Rochester, NY), 5 July 1922.

87 Chandler, “Gettysburg, 1922.” 

rather than in long shoulder-to-shoulder firing lines.88

The Marines crossed the Codori fields toward the 

enemy position on Cemetery Ridge in several waves. 

The idea was to deprive the enemy of a target-rich environment.89 Each wave of squads would advance 20–

30 feet and then lay prone as a second group advanced 

to reinforce them. In this manner, the waves of men 

leapfrogged each other toward their objective.90

“The machine guns were really there yesterday 

[4 July]. They were firing real bullets. Machine guns 

can’t fire blank ammunition. So were all the other machine guns in the woods on Seminary Ridge. But pits 

had been dug all around them and the bullets were 

diving harmlessly into the earth,” The Sun reported. 

Further confirming this, the Washington Post noted 

that “the machine guns used ball ammunition, for machine guns will not function with blank ammunition. 

The guns were emplaced in previously prepared pits, 

and the stream of steel-jacketed lead was pumped into 

the soggy earth.”91

At some point during the advance, machine gun 

crews made their way toward Emmitsburg Road, establishing positions along the west side and eventually the east side, when help arrived to get them there. 

“The audience heard only the thunder of artillery, the 

ceaseless tat-tat-tat of machine guns and the crack of 

rifles,” The Sun reported. “They saw little but puffs of 

smoke and now and then a few men running, only to 

disappear suddenly as though the ground had swallowed them . . . because that is the way men fight in 

these days.”92

The Washington Post wrote that the engagement 

readily established that “a squad of eight men can 

approximate the fire power of a battalion of the last 

century.” The reporter further noted that “it became 

88 F. A. Mallen, “Battle of Gettysburg Re-Fought by Marines during Downpour of Rain,” Frederick (MD) Post, 5 July 1922, 1.

89 R. S. T., “Cemetery Hill Capitulates to Marine Attack.” 

90 Mallen, “Battle of Gettysburg Re-Fought by Marines During 

Downpour of Rain.” 

91 R. S. T., “Cemetery Hill Capitulates to Marine Attack”; and 

“Marines Thrill 125,000 with Modern Maneuvers,” Gettysburg (PA) 

Times, 5 July 1922, 1.

92 R. S. T., “Cemetery Hill Capitulates to Marine Attack.” 
SUMMER 2017 23

quite apparent to the spectators that modern warfare 

resolves into movements wherein men fight desperately to kill men they can barely see and are sent to 

their death by men to whom they are not visible. The 

inspiring clash of contact combat is a thing of the 

past.”93

Little by little, the squads of Marine infantry 

and machine gunners made their way toward a key 

position—the occupation of Emmitsburg Road—preliminary to the charge upon the High Water Mark, 

as fighters strafed the Union stronghold, and simulated artillery and mortar strikes detonated over both 

sides of Emmitsburg Road. Not only had the Union 

Marines posted the entanglements to obstruct the 

progress of their Southern counterparts, but also established fortified machine gun positions.94

As the battle approached a climactic conclusion, 

the Confederates seemed to run into stiff opposition 

in and around the Codori house and farm buildings, 

which neither small-arms, machine-gun, nor light 

artillery fire could clear, resulting in the troops who 

were attempting to capture that position calling for 

armor support to help.95

93 “Marines Thrill 125,000 with Modern Maneuvers.” 

94Chandler, “Gettysburg, 1922,” 380.

95 “Marines Thrill 125,000 with Modern Maneuvers.” 

Archives and Special Collections Branch, Marine Corps History Division

Marines begin to fall as the battle to capture the Codori house and 

farmstead gets underway.

Four M1917 light tanks rolled into action, two on 

the right of the Marine attack and two on the left, and 

then charged the enemy lines. “The tanks appeared 

and went after a machine gun nest with machine gun 

fire and then contemptuously ignored the small arms 

fire and ironed out some barb wire entanglements,” 

Chandler wrote.96

The pair of tanks on the right of the Marine assault immediately made for the Codori house and outbuildings. “The tanks went sneeringly up to the Codori 

house, around the barn, around to the back door, 

through the chicken yards, up the front porch, firing 

explosive shells [supposedly] through the windows,” 

The Sun stated. “In a few moments they waddled away, 

and you could almost imagine them chuckling horribly, heading again toward the rear to sleep and snore 

until there was no more killing to do. The enemy in 

the Codori House was silenced forever.”97 One of the 

tanks at the Codori house became a “causality” in the 

attack and was taken out of action by enemy fire.98

Once the Marines had seized both sides of the 

road and had driven off the Union defenders, creating a clear path to the High Water Mark, the charge 

was declared over by the officers on the determination that, at this point, “the defenders in consequence 

would be so shaken in morale that their retreat would 

be inevitable and the position, Cemetery ridge, won 

[by the Marines portraying the Southern forces].”99

With the Battle of Gettysburg refought and 

rewon, the Marines began breaking down Camp 

Harding on 5 July. After a week on the Gettysburg battlefield, it was time to retrace their steps 

back to Quantico. A company of engineers left 

for Thurmont on 5 July to begin setting up the 

camp there.100 Some planes returned to Quantico 

since they would only be needed for mail service 

and not maneuvers. The Canvas White House 

96 Mallen, “Battle of Gettysburg Re-Fought by Marines During 

Downpour of Rain”; and Chandler, “Gettysburg, 1922.”

97 R. S. T., “Cemetery Hill Capitulates to Marine Attack.” 

98 “Marines Thrill 125,000 with Modern Maneuvers.” 

99 Ibid.

100 F. A. Mallen, “Marines Anxious to Get Back to Fred’k,” Daily 

News (Frederick, MD), 6 July 1922, 9.
24 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

was disassembled and shipped back to Quantico.101

Although the Marines had felt snubbed by the 

town of Gettysburg, the town finally realized what it 

had too late: “This town has found them a different 

body of troops than they thought, and now everyone seems to regret that the Marines were not given 

a more cordial reception on their arrival.”102 Part of 

the softening attitude may have been that residents 

saw how anxious other towns were for the Marines to 

visit them for maneuvers. Other cities were already 

making requests to host the 1923 maneuvers: “Scores 

of places throughout the country have asked for the 

camp next year, but it is the idea to have scenes of historical interest used regularly because of the peculiar 

adaptability for movements of troops and the lessons 

of patriotism they teach.”103

Results

The multipronged mission to save the Marine Corps 

was advancing successfully. Public opinion would 

serve as a strong motivating factor for the Service, 

101 “Marines Are Ready to Break Camp,” The Sun (Baltimore), 6 

July 1922, 7.

102 Mallen, “Marines Anxious to Get Back to Fred’k.” 

103 “Marines Are Ready to Break Camp.”

Congress, and the president. In the end, General 

Lejeune achieved what he had set out to do. The Marines received positive publicity from the reenactments. Repeated over a number of years, it kept the 

Marine Corps in the public eye in an encouraging 

manner. “All along their line of march from Quantico 

to Emmitsburg, the Marines received tremendous ovations,” one newspaper noted.104

The reenactments won over the public and the 

decision makers, though the Marine Corps’ numbers 

continued to drop for a few more years. From a high 

of 75,000 in the last year of WWI, enlistment fell to 

18,000 in 1925 before ticking up again.105 While disappointing for Marine leaders, at least talk of disbanding 

the Marine Corps ended, and the Corps won another 

fight until the fury of battle eventually receded from 

the public memory. Other elements of the public 

awareness campaign, such as the birthday celebration 

and the history behind uniform elements, took hold 

and are still part of the Marine Corps tradition today.

• 1775 •

104 “Sea Soldiers Not Impressed,” Gettysburg (PA) Times, 7 July 

1922; and “Sea Soldiers Not Impressed,” Gettysburg (PA) Times, 8 

July 1922.

105 “The Presidents and the Marines,” Marine Corps Gazette 17, no. 

4 (February 1933): 20–21.
by Major Gary Cozzens, USMCR (Ret)*

The 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv) landed on 

Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, on 7 August 

1942, and during the next four months, the 

division participated in an ongoing fight to prevent 

the Japanese from recapturing the island and Henderson Field. Yet, the official historian of the 1st MarDiv 

wrote, “There are two Guadalcanals: the battle and the 

legend.”1

One of those legends was born on the night of 

24 October when the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, occupied defensive positions south of Henderson Field in 

a sector normally held by two infantry battalions. The 

understrength Company C anchored the center of the 

line and bore the brunt of at least six separate attacks 

by the Japanese that night.2 Although the fighting was 

*This account is based on primary source information provided 

by the members of Company C, who participated in the Battle for 

Henderson Field the night of 24–25 October 1942. The author’s personal papers concerning the history of Company C, 1st Battalion, 

7th Marines (Suicide Charley), are located at the Archives Branch, 

History Division, Marine Corps University (MCU), Quantico, 

VA, hereafter Cozzens Personal Papers. The author would like to 

thank the late George D. MacGillivray, the late Marshall W. Moore, 

Angela Anderson, Roberta Haldane, Kara Newcomer, and Alisa 

Whitley for their assistance in preparing this article.

1

 George McMillan, The Old Breed: A History of the First Marine Division in World War II (Washington, DC: Infantry Press, 1949), 25. 2

 Stanley Coleman Jersey, Hell’s Islands: The Untold Story of Guadalcanal (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 291.

The Legend 

of Suicide Charley

COMPANY C, 1ST BATTALION, 7TH MARINES, 

AND THE BATTLE FOR HENDERSON FIELD,

24–25 OCTOBER 1942

desperate, Company C Marines held the line. Later, 

on the morning of 25 October, a handmade flag appeared over the Company C line that had been made 

from white Japanese parachute material and showed a 

skull-and-crossbones crudely inscribed with “Suicide 

Charley, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.”3

Since that night 75 years ago, Company C has 

been known as Suicide Charley, though the origin of 

the nickname and the guidon are not widely known 

outside the company.4 While only a vignette, the lore 

surrounding Suicide Charley is the type of legend that 

exemplifies Marine Corps history. This article documents the fight on the night of 24 October and the 

origin of the Suicide Charley legacy.

Formed in Cuba on 1 January 1941, 1st Battalion, 

7th Marines, was commanded by the legendary Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller. After the 

bombing of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, the 7th Marines 

became the nucleus of the 3d Marine Brigade and 

deployed to protect American Samoa in April 1942. 

While the 1stMarDiv landed on Guadalcanal on 7 Au3 7th Marines History: Traditions and Customs, 7th Marines Order 

15750.1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1963). 

Note that the spelling on the original guidon (Charley) is used in 

this article rather than the traditional spelling (Charlie).

4

 The term guidon refers to a small flag, particularly one carried 

by a military unit as a unit marker.

25
26 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

Charley Company

This company photograph is widely used in books 

and publications on Guadalcanal. No publication 

identifies the unit pictured except in Major John L. 

Zimmerman’s official monograph, which captioned 

the photograph as “Fresh troops of the 2d Marine 

Division during a halt.”1

 The troops are obviously 

fresh and free of disease, their equipment clean and 

uniforms in good shape. Most of these Marines are 

armed with M1903 bolt-action Springfield rifles and 

carry M1905 bayonets and M1941 packs. Two men 

high on the hill at left wear mortar vests, and one 

1

 Maj John L. Zimmerman, USMCR, The Guadalcanal Campaign 

(Washington, DC: Historical Division, Headquarters Marine 

Corps, 1949), 129.

standing in the center has on a World War I-type 

grenade vest. The Marine seated at far left holds a 

Browning Automatic Rifle.

In December 1990, the author interviewed 

Charles Ramsey, a member of Company C on Guadalcanal, who affirmed that this photograph was 

Company C and was taken sometime between the 

time the company arrived on Guadalcanal on 14 September 1942 and their first fight along the Matanikau River on 23 September. Ramsey sits high in the 

center of the picture with his chin resting on his left 

hand.2

2

 Charles Ramsey, intvw with Gary Cozzens, December 1990, 

Woodland Hills, CA.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 50938

Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, on Guadalcanal between 14 and 23 September 1942 before the first battle on the Matanikau River.
SUMMER 2017 27

gust 1942, 7th Marines did not arrive until 14 September 1942.5

The battalion’s table of organization included 

three infantry companies, one machine gun company, 

and a headquarters company. Headquarters Company 

included a platoon of 81mm mortarmen. A machine 

gun platoon was attached to each rifle company during combat. It was not unusual to have a machine gun 

platoon attached to a rifle company for months at a 

time. Each infantry company consisted of four platoons—three infantry platoons and one platoon of 

5

 LtCol Frank O. Hough, USMCR, Maj Verle E. Ludwig, USMC, 

and Henry I. Shaw Jr., Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal: History of U.S. 

Marine Corps Operations in World War II, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: 

Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 

1958), 311.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 91933

LtCol Puller, commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, on Guadalcanal.

.30-caliber air-cooled light machine guns and 60mm 

mortars. A 37mm gun platoon also was attached to 

each battalion from the regimental weapons company. 

At this time, the Marines were using old equipment 

and did not have radios. Communication took place 

either by telephone or runner. The total strength of 

the company was 171 Marines.6

Soon after arrival on Guadalcanal, Lieutenant 

Colonel Puller’s Marines participated in two major 

actions. The first occurred along the Matanikau River 

on 23 September along the northern portion of the 

Marines’ perimeter. After moving down the river, 

Companies A and B landed west of Point Cruz, near 

Honiara, an action in which the battalion executive officer, Major Otho Rogers, was killed.7

 Captain Charles 

W. Kelly Jr., commanding officer of Company C, assumed Roger’s billet, and Captain Marshall W. Moore 

became the commanding officer of Charley Company. 

In a second action on 7–9 October, Charley Company 

acted as the main effort in a regimental-size attack, 

catching the Japanese 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, in a 

draw inflicting 700 casualties.8

Defense of Sector Three

After fighting along the Matanikau River, Puller’s 

Marines were assigned to defend the eastern half of 

Sector Three south of Henderson Field. Lieutenant 

Colonel Herman H. Hanneken’s 2d Battalion, 7th 

Marines, had been to the 1st Battalion’s right flank of 

Sector Three on the forward slope of Edson’s Ridge, 

but had redeployed on 23 October to the Matanikau 

6

 Marshall W. Moore to Gary W. Cozzens, 9 May 1986; and Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, Muster Roll (MRoll), October 1942, National Archives T-977, U.S. Marine Corps Muster 

Rolls, 1893–1958, Roll 0547.

7

 In an ill-conceived plan, Companies A and B were sent to the 

area near Koli Point via landing craft with Rogers in command. 

They walked into an ambush, and if Puller had not gotten them 

out, they would have been decimated. As a result of the action, 

Rogers was killed, Kelly became battalion executive officer, and 

Moore became Company C commander.

8

 Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, MRoll, 314–21; and Jersey, Hell’s Islands, 252.
28 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

Captain Marshall W. Moore

Marshall W. Moore was 

born in Geneva, New 

York, on 17 September 1917. He enlisted 

in the Marine Corps 

in Buffalo and reported to Quantico, Virginia, on 18 October 

1940 as a private first 

class. Following Officer 

Candidate School, he 

attended Officers Class 

and was commissioned 

a second lieutenant in 

1941. Moore joined 1st 

Battalion, 7th Marines, 

at New River, North 

Carolina, and was initially assigned to Company A 

as 3d Platoon commander. 

He was promoted to first lieutenant on 28 February 1942. He then became commanding officer of 

Company C on Guadalcanal on 27 September, participating in all of Company C’s battles, until immediately after the action at Koli Point when, on 3 

December 1942, he was evacuated as suffering from 

malaria, yellow jaundice, amoebic dysentery, and 

excessive weight loss (40 pounds). 

For his actions in the defense of Henderson Field on the night of 24 October, Moore 

was awarded the Silver Star. After recovering 

his health, he assumed command of Company A 

and led that unit in the battle on New Britain. 

Following World War II, Moore remained in the 

Marine Corps Reserve and retired as a colonel 

in 1958. His son, John, also a Marine infantry officer, was killed in Vietnam in December 1968. 

Marshall Moore died on 22 February 2004 and 

is buried in the Glenwood Cemetery in Geneva, 

New York.1

Moore’s Silver Star citation reads:

The President of the United States of 

America takes pleasure in presenting the 

Silver Star to Captain Marshall W. Moore, 

United States Marine Corps Reserve, for 

conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity as 

Commanding Officer of Company C, 

First Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST 

Marine Division, in action against enemy 

Japanese forces at Guadalcanal, Solomon 

Islands, on the night of October 24, 1942. 

Despite continuous and dangerous assaults by a numerically superior Japanese 

force which was attempting to smash the 

Lunga defense lines, Captain Moore daringly commanded his men in maintaining 

our positions and repulsing the enemy. 

With utter disregard for his own personal safety, he led his company in brilliant and devastating counterattacks and 

contributed to the rout and virtual annihilation of an entire Japanese regiment. 

His indomitable fighting spirit and grim 

determination served as an inspiration to 

the men under his command and were in 

keeping with the highest traditions of the 

United States Naval Service.

2

1

 Marshall Moore to Gary Cozzens, Cozzens Personal Papers.

2

 MacGillivray to Cozzens; and Jane Blakeney, Heroes: U.S. 

Marine Corps, 1861–1955 (Washington, DC: Guthrie Lithograph 

Co., 1957), 212.

Photo courtesy of Col Marshall W. 

Moore, USMCR (Ret)

Maj Marshall W. Moore (ca. 1944) 

was the commanding officer during the fight for Henderson Field.
SUMMER 2017 29

Lewis B. Puller Collection, COLL/794, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division 

Battalion formation of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, on Guadalcanal, September 1942.

River in anticipation of the next Japanese attack.9 As 

a result, Puller’s Marines assumed the defense for all of 

Sector Three in the 1st MarDiv’s perimeter, approximately 2,500 meters normally assigned to two infantry 

battalions.10

Leadership within the Marine ranks demonstrated the confidence the Marines brought to the situation. In addition to Moore, other leaders in Company 

C included First Sergeant Lewis C. Oleksiak; Gunnery 

Sergeant Charles Livelsberger; platoon commanders First Lieutenants Karl H. Schmidt Jr., Arthur H. 

Wyman, and Marine Gunner William Fleming (2d 

9

 Edson’s Ridge, better known for the Battle of Bloody Ridge, 

was named for LtCol Merritt A. Edson, commander of the 1st 

Raider Battalion.

10 Richard B. Frank, Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the 

Landmark Battle (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), 348–52; and 

Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, 333.

Platoon); and platoon Sergeants Robert L. Domokus 

(1st Platoon), London L. Traw (2d Platoon), and Simon Viger (3d Platoon).11

Puller and Kelly discussed the employment of 

the battalion and decided Kelly would take one platoon from each rifle company with attached machine 

guns, and occupy the position vacated by Hanneken. 

The terrain was much more favorable for defense, 

and Puller and Kelly thought it could be held with 

fewer men. This method of filling in the gap proved 

to be fortuitous. Kelly was accompanied by Captain 

William Watson, the battalion S2 (intelligence), communicators, and a couple corpsmen. The composite 

company spent its time bringing in ammunition and 

11 Platoon sergeant was a rank at this time equivalent to the modern rank of staff sergeant. Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, MRoll.
30 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

Library of Congress, LC-DIG-ppmsca-22672

Bloody Knoll by Howard Brodie. Brodie—an artist for Yank, the Army newspaper—was assigned to sketch Marines and soldiers on Guadalcanal in late 

1942 and early 1943. Here, he captures a fighting hole with a Marine on watch and one trying to get some sleep.

supplies and familiarizing themselves with the defensive features of the area.12

It was obvious to the Marines that a large-scale 

Japanese attack would be a real threat in the near future. 

Accordingly, Puller’s Marines improved the defensive 

line and registered the final protective line in the perimeter defense. Barbed wire was woven into double 

apron fences and hung with empty ration cans and 

items that would make a racket and expose attempts 

to breach the wire. Fields of fire were cleared for the 

automatic weapons and mortar and artillery targets 

were preregistered. The Marines also removed the 

machine guns from disabled airplanes at Henderson 

12 Charles W. Kelly Jr. to Eric Hammel, 25 August 1980, Hammel Personal Papers, Archives Branch, History Division, MCU, 

Quantico, VA, hereafter Hammel Personal Papers. 

Field and incorporated them into the defensive fires.13

All during the day of 24 October, Puller drove 

his men to complete their defensive positions. From 

left to right facing south, Puller’s defense consisted 

of Company A (Captain Regan Fuller), Company 

C (Captain Moore), Company B (Captain Robert 

H. Haggerty), and the composite company (Captain 

Kelly). The battalion’s weapons company, Company 

D (Captain Robert J. Rodgers), had machine guns 

attached to each line company. Master Gunnery Sergeant Ray Fowel’s 81mm mortars provided indirect 

fire support. A platoon of four 37mm antitank guns 

(used in an antipersonnel role) from Captain Joseph 

E. Buckley’s regimental weapons company also inter13 Ibid.
SUMMER 2017 31

spersed in the line.14 Several hundred yards in front of 

Company A’s position sat a combat outpost manned 

by platoon Sergeant Ralph Briggs’ platoon. To Company A’s left (east) was 2d Battalion, 164th Infantry, 

an Army National Guard battalion from North Dakota and Minnesota. The point where Company A’s 

line joined the Army National guardsmen had been 

14 Two of the guns were with Company A and one each with 

Company B and Company C. Crewmembers for the Company 

C gun included Sgt Carl A. Peterson, Cpl Noel L. Sharpton, Cpl 

Paul J. Plyler, PFC James Balog, PFC Floyd M. Gates, PFC George 

Mason, Pvt George A. Gottshall, and Pvt Keith Fullerton. George 

MacGillivray to Gary Cozzens, 14 October 1993, Cozzens Personal Papers; and Weapons Company, 7th Marines, MRoll, October 

1942, National Archives T-977, U.S. Marine Corps Muster Rolls, 

1893–1958, Roll 0547.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 5157

A cheval-de-frise in front of the Charley Company lines during the defense of Henderson Field.

coined “Coffin Corner,” while the open area in front 

of the lines was called the “Bowling Alley.”15

A trail ran through the center of Company C’s position that was protected by a cheval-de-frise, which in 

turn was set into a double apron of barbed wire.16 The 

Marines opened and closed this cheval-de-frise to allow patrols in and out through the perimeter. Sergeant 

15 Company A’s line was held by one platoon. Sgt Briggs’ platoon 

was placed at the combat outpost in front of the battalion lines, 

and one platoon was detached to Captain Kelly’s composite 

company. Burke Davis, Marine!: The Life of Chesty Puller (Boston: 

Little, Brown, 1962), 153; Col Jon T. Hoffman, USMCR, Chesty: 

The Story of Lieutenant General Lewis B. Puller, USMC (New York: 

Random House, 2001), 184; and Frank, Guadalcanal, 352–54. 

16 The cheval-de-frise is a defensive obstacle consisting of a frame 

covered with many projecting spikes or spears.
32 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

John Basilone and his section of heavy water-cooled 

.30-caliber Browning machine guns from Company 

D were attached to Company C and emplaced in the 

company’s line. It was at this point that the major 

Japanese attack occurred on the night of 24 October.17

After only a month as company commander, 

Moore was now faced with establishing a defensive 

position with one-third of his company detached. On 

the afternoon of the attack, Moore sat in the company 

command post, feeling uneasy about the situation. 

He suggested that his Marines string another double 

apron of barbed wire behind the cheval-de-frise. At 

approximately 1600, they put on heavy gloves and 

strung more barbed wire, paying particular attention 

to the area behind the cheval-de-frise. The wire was 

strung in such a way as to make it very difficult to get 

through in the dark; so difficult, in fact, that a person would have to weave through. This tactic proved 

a great asset, as the Japanese apparently did not know 

it was there. Moore’s men also installed trip flares in 

the wire.18

Throughout the line, foxholes were deepened, 

crew-served weapons positions prepared, targets registered, and tactical wire emplaced. Some fighting 

positions were large enough for three men and surrounded with sandbags, leaving only a window to 

shoot through and a crawl space in the rear through 

which to enter and exit. The fighting holes were then 

covered by laying coconut logs on the sandbags, with 

another tier of sandbags atop the logs.19

Runners took messages from the battalion commander to the front lines where Company C was on 

the edge of the jungle. The company had cleared foliage in front of its positions about 100 yards into the 

jungle. In this stage of the war, Marines were using 

the M1903 Springfield .30-caliber rifles left over from 

World War I. 20

Meanwhile, the Japanese were not idle. A Marine 

17 Moore to Hammel; and Bill Sanford to Gary Cozzens, 17 May 

1990, Cozzens Personal Papers.

18 Moore to Hammel.

19 Charles Ramsey to Gary Cozzens, 24 June 1990, Cozzens Personal Papers.

20 Sanford to Cozzens.

on patrol saw a Japanese officer observing Henderson 

Field through field glasses.21 Another Marine observed 

a large amount of smoke, apparently from cooking 

fires, rising from the jungle floor in Lunga Valley, two 

miles south of Puller’s position.22 Unfortunately, those 

two pieces of information never reached Puller.

These Japanese soldiers of the 17th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake, were some of Japan’s finest, particularly the 

regiments of Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama’s 

2d (Sendai) Division whose motto was “Duty is heavier 

than a mountain, but death is lighter than a feather.”23

Colonel Masajiro Furumiya’s 29th Infantry Regiment, 

followed by Colonel Toshiso Hiryasu’s 16th Infantry 

Regiment, would spearhead the attack by the Japanese 

left flank under the command of Major General Yumio Nasu. The right flank attack, under the command 

of Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi, would consist 

of Colonel Akinosuka Oka’s 124th Infantry Regiment

supported by Colonel Toshinari Shoji’s 230th Infantry 

Regiment. Kawaguchi balked at his orders to attack 

the right side of the Marines’ line and was relieved as 

the commander of the right wing by Colonel Shoji. 

According to General Hyakutake’s original plan, the 

attack was to occur on 18 October, but the intense 

jungle terrain and the uncooperative weather caused 

a postponement until the 22d that was later pushed 

back to the evening of 24 October.24

As the Sendai Division approached from the south, 

it reached a point it believed to be about a mile south of 

Henderson Field by about 1400. With the attack set for 

1900, the two wings of the division opened four trails 

through the jungle to the American lines. Rain began 

to fall about 1600 and intensified an hour later, causing 

21 Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, 118. 22 Col Robert D. Heinl Jr., Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775–1962 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1962), 

368.

23 Robert Leckie, Challenge for the Pacific: Guadalcanal: The Turning 

Point of the War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 211. 24 For a comprehensive account of Japanese actions, see Jersey, 

Hell’s Island, 281–93; Eric Hammel, Guadalcanal: Starvation Island

(New York: Crown Publishers, 1987), 338–50; Frank, Guadalcanal, 

346–48; and Hoffman, Chesty, 185.
SUMMER 2017 33

Map by History Division

Battle for Henderson Field, 24–25 October 1942.

chaos among the Japanese. Darkness further obscured 

their ability to navigate. Due to these difficulties, the 

Sendai Division missed its assigned attack time and was 

still moving north when the rain ended and the clouds 

opened up to reveal a brilliant full moon.25

After the battle, a diary written by First Lieutenant Kozaburo Miyazawa, commanding officer of 

2d Machine Gun Company, 2d Battalion, 29th Regiment,

was discovered that detailed the devastation to the 

Japanese soldiers. The 29th Regiment was to assault Mukade (Bloody Ridge) with one blow and sweep all the 

artillery positions west of the airfield.26 As the regiment advanced to complete the mission, an officer 

patrol was dispatched to observe Marine lines due to 

25 Frank, Guadalcanal, 352–35; and Hoffman, Chesty, 185.

26 In Japanese, the term mukade refers to the centipede, which is 

what the Japanese soldiers called the ridge because of its shape.

extremely difficult terrain as a heavy rain fell, delaying the unit’s advance. Miyazawa wrote on 24 October 

that the Japanese finally encountered the Marines. The 

Japanese regiment was advancing with 3d Battalion in 

the lead and 1st Battalion on the right front. However, 

as no movement could be seen, contact could not be 

maintained. The 2d Battalion was to have been the reserve for the infantry group, but it followed directly 

behind the regiment.27 On the east flank of the Japanese attack, Shoji’s force turned right to run parallel 

to the Marines’ lines. All but one battalion—1st Battalion, 230th Infantry—failed to make contact with the 

Americans and drifted out of the action.28

The Japanese Attack

With darkness fast approaching, the Marines prepared for the coming onslaught. Lieutenant Colonel 

Puller ordered the lines on the field telephones to be 

left open for instant communications with subordinates. At approximately 2100, rain began to fall again, 

making the night even darker under the thick jungle 

canopy. 

At 2130, the combat outpost from Company A 

reported to the battalion that it was surrounded by 

the Japanese. Puller directed them to push to their left 

(east) and return through 2d Battalion, 164th Infantry, to Company A’s position if possible. A short time 

later, the Japanese taunted the Marines by yelling, 

“Blood for the Emperor!” and “Marine you die!,” in an 

attempt to entice them to give away their position. 

After more than a month on the island, Puller’s men 

were too wise to fire at the voices. Instead, they replied 

with their own taunt, “Blood for Franklin and Eleanor 

[Roosevelt].”29 Suddenly, at 2200 on 24 October, the 

27 Kozaburo Miyazawa, “Diary,” SOPAC 0500 N-1:016467, Guadalcanal File, Archives Branch, History Division.

28 Frank, Guadalcanal, 353–54; and John Miller Jr., The War in the 

Pacific: Guadalcanal: First Offensive, CMH Pub 5-3 (Washington, 

DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1995), 160–62.

29 Davis, Marine!, 155; and Leckie, Challenge for the Pacific, 265.
34 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

Japanese came toward the Marines’ lines in a rush.30

Luckily for Captain Moore’s men, the cheval-de-frise

in front of Company C’s position caught the Japa30 There is controversy over the exact time and date of the Japanese attack. The following references reflect the differences: official records put the initial attack at 2200 on 24 October 1942 in 

“Summary of Operations, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 24–25 October 1942,” Reference Branch, History Division, MCU, Quantico, 

VA; shortly after midnight on 25 October in James S. Santelli, 

A Brief History of the 7th Marines (Washington, DC: History and 

Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1980), 11; at 

about 2200 on 24 October in Hammel, Guadalcanal, 348–51; at 

about 2130 on 24 October in Davis, Marine!, 152–55; at about 2200 

on 24 October in Hoffman, Chesty, 186–87; at about 0030 on 25 

October in McMillian, The Old Breed, 105–6; at about 0030 on 25 

October 1942 in Zimmerman, Guadalcanal, 118; at about 0030 on 

25 October in Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, 333; and at about 0300 on 25 October in Heinl, Soldiers of 

the Sea, 368–69. These times may all be correct and may account 

for the different waves of the Japanese attack.

nese by surprise and they were momentarily halted.31

Japanese records indicate that it was Colonel 

Shoji’s 1st Battalion, 230th Infantry, that hit Puller’s 

lines first on the right at 2200, running into Company 

A. They were followed by the whole of Major General Yumio Nasu’s left wing, attacking in a column of 

battalions. The 9th Company, 3d Battalion, 29th Infantry, rapidly moved straight into the cheval-de-frise in 

front of Company C and was decimated.32

Marine artillery and mortars were firing supporting missions in such volleys that the powder bags 

heated in the weapons and “cooked off” from hot barrels, causing “short rounds narrowly missing the Ma31 Hammel, Guadalcanal, 346–57, 361–63; and Davis, Marine!, 155.

32 Frank, Guadalcanal, 351–54; Hoffman, Chesty, 188–89; and 

Moore to Hammel.

Library of Congress, LC-DIG-ppmsca-22675

Inside a Dugout by Howard Brodie. This sketch of a .30-caliber heavy Browning machine gun depicts what Sgt John Basilone and his machine gunners 

would have looked like in the fight for Henderson Field on the night of 24 October 1942.
SUMMER 2017 35

rine’s position.”33 Moore’s men had emplaced their 

barbed wire entanglements so securely that wave after 

wave of Japanese assault troops were hung up and died 

on it. The company eventually was infiltrated, but afterward, the Japanese seemed confused and made little effort to take advantage of the penetration.34

Sergeant John Basilone

At 0015 and again at 0300, General Marayama’s Sendai 

Division attacked in the most concentrated effort of 

the night. When the first wave came, the Marines kept 

firing and drove the Japanese back. Ammunition supplies were getting low, so Basilone left the guns and 

ran to his next gun position to get more. Upon his return, a runner arrived and told Basilone that the Japanese had broken through the emplacements on the 

right, killing two of the crew and wounding three, and 

the guns were jammed. Basilone moved up the trail 

and found 18-year-old Private Cecil H. Evans screaming at the Japanese to “come on.” Basilone returned to 

his own guns, grabbed one machine gun, and told the 

crew to follow him up the trail. While he cleared the 

jams on the other two guns, the Marines set up their 

weapons. The Japanese still coming at the lines pinned 

the Marines down at their positions. Basilone rolled 

over from one gun to another, firing as fast as they 

could be loaded. The ammunition belts were in bad 

shape because they had been dragged on the ground, 

forcing the gunners to scrape the mud out of the receiver. Still, some Japanese soldiers infiltrated behind 

the lines, so the Marines would have to stop firing and 

shoot at infiltrators with small arms. At dawn, the 

gun barrels were burnt out after Basilone’s machine 

gun section fired 26,000 rounds.35

Company C was stretched out over a wide area 

in a very thin line that had been decimated by heavy 

casualties and illness. Sergeant Louis S. Maravelas of 

2d Platoon and his squad were in position to the right 

33 Hammel, Guadalcanal, 354–55.

34 Ramsey to Cozzens.

35 McMillian, The Old Breed, 106–7. For a thorough account of 

Basilone’s actions, see Hugh Ambrose, The Pacific: Hell Was an 

Ocean Away (New York: NAL Caliber, 2010), 117–24.

of Basilone’s section protecting the guns, and in the 

confusion of the fight, they could not see to the right 

of the line. Firing was heavy and contact between platoons was very poor. Maravelas and his Marines fixed 

bayonets and returned fire. Basilone had the bodies of 

the dead Japanese piled two, three, and four high in 

front of his emplacement.36

Reserves Committed

The Marines poured their fire into the Japanese attack, which was centered on Company C’s line. Puller telephoned Brigadier General Pedro A. Del Valle, 

commanding officer of the 11th Marines, requesting 

artillery support. The battalion’s operations officer, 

Captain Charles J. Beasley, called Colonel Gerald C. 

Thomas, the division chief of staff, requesting reinforcements.37

As the situation became more serious, Lieutenant Colonel Julian N. Frisbie, the 7th Marines regimental executive officer, called Captain Kelly from 

the regimental command post 600 yards directly behind Kelly’s position and told the captain he was sending up a battalion of the U.S. Army’s 164th Infantry. 

He asked if Kelly could guide them into position in 

Puller’s area. Kelly told Frisbie he would have runners 

there by the time the Army troops got up to the lines. 

The fortunate result of Puller’s method of filling in the 

area Hanneken’s battalion had vacated with a platoon 

from each company position in Kelly’s area was that 

it was a simple matter for each platoon to send a man 

to Kelly, since they were thoroughly familiar with the 

location of their parent units and the access routes. 

The runners arrived at Kelly’s command post, where 

he briefed them on their task. Kelly then ordered Captain William Watson to take the guides to Frisbie’s position and to be sure that they each picked up an Army 

company to lead to their own company area. The 7th 

Marines chaplain, Father Matthew F. Keough, led the 

Army battalion into position with Marines from Captain Kelly’s position acting as guides to their parent 

36 Louis Maravelas to Gary Cozzens, 29 May 1990, Cozzens Personal Papers.

37 Hammel, Guadalcanal, 352–53; and Davis, Marine!, 154.
36 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

Official U.S. Marine Corps 

photo 56976

Sgt John Basilone receives his 

Medal of Honor on 21 May 1943 in 

Australia. Basilone was a machine 

gun section leader from Company 

D attached to Suicide Charley on 

the night of 24 October 1942.

Sergeant John Basilone

MEDAL OF HONOR CITATION

For extraordinary heroism and conspicuous gallantry in action against enemy Japanese forces, while 

serving with First Battalion, Seventh Marines, First 

Marine Division, in the Lunga Area, Guadalcanal, 

Solomon Islands, on October 24 and 25, 1942. While 

the enemy was hammering at the Marines’ defensive 

positions, Sergeant Basilone, in charge of two heavy 

machine guns, fought valiantly to check the savage 

and determined advance. In a fierce frontal assault 

with the Japanese blasting his guns with grenades 

and mortar fire, one of Sergeant Basilone’s sections, 

with its gun crews, was put out of action, leaving 

only two men to carry on. Moving an extra gun into 

position, he placed it into action, then, under continual fire, repaired another and personally managed 

it, gallantly holding his line, until replacements arrived. A little later, with ammunition critically low 

and the supply lines 

cut off, Sergeant Basilone, at great risk of 

his life and in the face 

of continued enemy 

attack, battled his way 

through hostile lines 

with urgently needed 

shells for his gunners, 

thereby contributing 

in a large measure to 

the virtual annihilation 

of a Japanese regiment. 

His great personal valor and courageous initiative were in keeping with the highest traditions 

of the United States Naval service.1

1

 Blakeney, Heroes, 16.

companies.38 While the Army units moved forward, 

Company L, 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, reinforced 

Company A; Company I, 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, 

reinforced Company B; and Company K, 3d Battalion, 

164th Infantry, reinforced Charley Company. All the 

Army companies were in position by 0345. The movement went smoothly and the reinforcements were fed 

in from behind the Marine company positions. The 

soldiers were fed into the line piecemeal rather than 

as tactical units.39

From Kelly’s position on the ridge, it was readily 

apparent when the new troops were in position, as the 

38 Hammel, Guadalcanal, 353–54; Davis, Marine!, 158; Hoffman, 

Chesty, 188; Frank, Guadalcanal, 355; and “Summary of Operations, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 24–25 October 1942.”

39 Mark Stille, Guadalcanal 1942–43: America’s First Victory on the 

Road to Tokyo (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2015), 70–71; and 

Edward A. Dieckmann Sr., “Manila John Basilone,” Marine Corps 

Gazette 47, no. 10 (October 1962): 29–32. 

sound and tempo of firing picked up significantly. The 

Army units were armed with M1 Garand .30-caliber 

rifles, which had a much higher rate of fire than the 

old Springfields used by the Marines. The sounds of 

the battle were deafening at times, only to diminish 

and then pick up again as the Japanese rolled back in. 

Up on the ridge, Captain Kelly felt he had a grandstand seat—he could see the action laid out in front 

of him, though off to the left on the low ground, he 

could only guess at the progress of the battle. Puller 

called in all the available artillery, and Kelly heard it 

firing at such reduced range that its rounds were coming in close overhead—so close that a few short rounds 

landed behind Marine lines. Fortunately, no casualties 

resulted from friendly fire.40

The next assault by the Japanese at about 0400 

was somewhat unexpected in its execution. Marine 

40 Kelly to Hammel; and Maravelas to Cozzens.
SUMMER 2017 37

and Army units were mixed into the line piecemeal. 

At daylight, although the American line had held, a 

small Japanese salient existed between Companies C 

and B, plus the infiltrators who had penetrated the 

lines.

One of the Marines leading reinforcements into 

the lines that night was Private Theodore G. West. 

Though wounded and unable to fight, West continued to maintain his position on the line and directed 

reinforcements into position and into the fight. His 

actions “contributed materially to restoring our line 

and to the eventual rout and virtual annihilation of 

an entire Japanese regiment.” For his actions, Private 

West was awarded the Navy Cross.41 In his official report of the battle, Puller stated that “the conduct of 

[A]rmy reinforcements on the night of 24–25 October 

were exemplary and they arrived just in time.”42

Captain Kelly and his composite company also 

saw action on the night of 24 October, but not to the 

extent of the rest of the battalion. Kelly kept his phone 

41 “Theodore Gerard West,” Hall of Valor, Valor.MilitaryTimes

.com; and Blakeney, Heroes, 115. 42 “Summary of Operations, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 24–25 October 1942.”

Private Theodore G. West 

NAVY CROSS CITATION

The President of the United States takes pleasure 

in presenting the Navy Cross to Theodore Gerard 

West, Private, U.S. Marine Corps (Reserve), for 

extraordinary heroism and conspicuous devotion 

to duty while serving with Company C, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST Marine Division, 

during action against enemy Japanese forces in the 

Lunga Area of Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, on 25 

October 1942. During a heavy attack by a numerically superior enemy force, Private West, although 

wounded to such an extent that he was unable to 

lines open and tied into the battalion’s communication net to allow constant communication with Puller 

and the other frontline command posts. It was raining 

hard and pitch dark when the Japanese finally came to 

the wire, and they were massed when the order came 

to open fire. It could not have been a more ideal situation from a defensive standpoint. The Japanese piled 

up on the wire, mowed down as they advanced. They 

would back off to regroup and then, at the shouted 

urging of their officers, they would advance again in a 

banzai charge.43

Miyazawa’s diary recorded that, when Japanese 

encountered the Marines, it was necessary to advance 

along a trail made by the Americans. The Marines had 

excellent detectors set up to announce Japanese movement, resulting in intense machine-gun and mortar 

fire. Even though it was night, the Marines had effective plots that inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese. 

However, the 3d Battalion, 29th Infantry, commander 

strove to break through. Each company began its ordered assault, but because of the heavy concentration 

of mortar and machine-gun fire, the attempt was de43 Kelly to Hammel.

handle a rifle, remained in his position until reinforcements arrived, then rendered invaluable assistance by placing two rifle squads and directing 

their fire. His gallant action thereafter contributed 

materially to restoring our line and to the eventual 

rout and virtual annihilation of an entire Japanese 

regiment. His courageous devotion to duty, maintained for nearly seven hours after he was severely 

injured, was in keeping with the highest traditions 

of the United States Naval Service.1

1

 “Theodore Gerard West”; and Blakeney, Heroes, 115.
38 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

layed. About this time, the regimental commander, 

Colonel Masajiro Furumiya with 7th Company, penetrated the Marines’ position, but made no progress. 

Finally, dawn broke and American fire became more 

intense, almost annihilating 3d Battalion. According to 

Miyazawa, Japanese battle losses at the mukade were 

estimated at 350 killed, 500 wounded, and 200 missing 

for a total of 1,050.44

All night on 24 October, the Japanese hit Company C with a regiment of troops in waves of suicidal 

attacks. They threw their bodies into the machine gun 

emplacements, forcing the gunners to evacuate the 

bunkers and fire from the top. During the night, Marines transported ammunition to the frontlines.45

One Company C machine gun emplacement 

on the right side burned out the lands and grooves 

of two air-cooled .30-caliber barrels for their machine 

gun.46 The 2d Platoon sergeant, London Traw, was on 

the right with a water-cooled .30-caliber machine gun. 

He was blown up with Japanese dynamite and killed 

that night.47 The medical personnel in the battalion 

aid station cared for the wounded under exceedingly 

adverse conditions. They worked in virtual darkness 

and heavy rain amid tremendous battle noises to save 

the most severely wounded.48

At approximately 0500, a small group of Japanese from the 7th Company, 3d Battalion, 29th Infantry, 

broke through the Marine lines and drove a salient 

between Companies B and C. The penetration was 

quickly sealed, and Company C held the line throughout the night despite multiple Japanese attacks. Thirty-seven Japanese were killed, reducing the salient, 

and 41 more died in the rear of the 1st Battalion, 7th 

Marines, line the following day during the moppingup effort led by First Lieutenants Arthur H. Wyman 

44 Miyazawa, “Diary.” 

45 Ramsey to Cozzens.

46 The Marine squad included Sgt Edward Lewis, Cpl Mike 

Heinz, and Pvts Neal Lenz, Art Miller, Petrocco Edgar Petraco, 

Richard Zimmerman, and Charles Ramsey. Ibid.

47 The USS Traw (DE 350), a destroyer escort, was laid down on 19 

December 1943 and launched on 12 February 1944. It saw action 

in both the European and Pacific theaters. 

48 Kelly to Hammel.

and Karl Schmidt and Sergeant Robert L. Domokos.49

After sunrise, the Japanese mounted one more serious 

attack, but were easily beaten back.50

Private Ralph Tulloch of the regimental weapons 

company had gone to sleep in the back of an open 

truck. Upon being awakened, he was ordered to the 

ammo dump and picked up a load to take to the 1st 

Battalion, 7th Marines. Tulloch had not been to 1st 

Battalion’s position and asked if someone at the ammo 

dump would ride shotgun to guide the way. The normal route was under enemy attack.

With as much ammo as he could stow in the 

truck, Tulloch slowly left the ammo dump. He turned 

left on a trail at the foot of Bloody Ridge and headed 

into the jungle east toward 1st Battalion’s lines. Heavy 

rain continued, though an occasional sliver of moonlight helped guide the driver. At the base of Bloody 

Ridge, the ground was slippery with mud, and water 

stood a foot deep. 

It was now 0300 on 25 October, and the main 

attack of the Japanese focused on Company C’s position. With tracers and the sound of rounds from Japanese machine guns overhead and debris from the trees 

falling, Tulloch struggled against his instinct to stop 

and find cover. After some time driving in blackness, 

Tulloch turned on the blackout lights, but they did 

not help. He stopped the truck and picked up a piece 

of wood that gave off what he called foxfire. He asked 

the guide to walk on the left side of the trail holding 

the foxfire where he could see it along the trail.51

Tulloch passed what he later learned was 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, moving along the trail to reinforce Puller’s battalion. He was stopped by someone 

from the battalion command post, who asked him to 

unload part of the machine gun and rifle ammo there. 

Tulloch and the guide carried some to the front lines 

a short distance away to supply the machine guns for 

49 Wyman, Schmidt, and Domokos were awarded commendations for this action. George MacGillivray to Gary Cozzens, 8 

September 1993, Cozzens Personal Papers.

50 “Summary of Operations, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 24–25 October 1942.”

51 Foxfire is a naturally occurring phosphorescent glow created by 

a species of fungi as wood decays.
SUMMER 2017 39

Sergeant Basilone, while the rifle ammo was placed 

under a poncho at the Company C command post.

The truck slid off the trail at the base of the ridge, 

leaving Tulloch’s vehicle mired in mud, with all four 

wheels spinning. Trapped inside the vehicle, he could 

not get out and a sniper started firing at him. Three 

or four rounds hit the truck bed and ricocheted. One 

round hit the lower left corner of the windshield, forcing Tulloch to take cover in front of the truck and return fire blindly in the general direction of the sniper. 

After about 30 minutes of quiet, Tulloch managed to 

get the truck out and go after another load of mortar, 

37mm, rifle, and machine gun ammo, water, and rations, which he delivered at daylight.52

The Morning After

The Marines exacted a heavy toll in the Battle for 

Henderson Field. Major General Yumino Nasu (commander of the left wing), Colonel Yoshi Hiroyasu (16th 

Infantry), and Colonel Masajiro Furumiya (29th Infantry) were killed in action. Japanese reports account for 

more than 1,050 killed, missing, or wounded from the 

29th Infantry alone. American figures showed 250 dead 

Japanese were found within the 1st Battalion’s lines, 

25 of whom were officers. A total of 1,462 dead Japanese were counted in front of the battalion’s position. 

Another account states that after the night of attacks, 

more than 400 Japanese were counted in the cone of 

machine gun fire in front of Company C’s position; 

they were buried in a common grave.53

Kamekichi Kusano, a 23-year-old private in 7th

Company, 2d Battalion, 29th Regiment, wrote: “The 29th

[Infantry] attacked the first day and was led into a trap 

and the majority of the regiment was killed. The dead 

were piled three and four deep. Only two or three 

hundred survived the attack.”54

52 Ralph Tulloch, “Guadalcanal Echoes,” Guadalcanal Campaign 

Veterans, January 1993, 7. Tulloch was meritoriously promoted to 

corporal for his actions this night.

53 Hammel, Guadalcanal, 350; Davis, Marine!, 161–62; and Ramsey 

to Cozzens.

54 Kamekichi Kusano, “Diary,” Item 867, Record Group 127, Entry 

39A, Box 17, Captured Japanese documents, National Archives, 

Washington, DC.

John Stannard, then a sergeant in Company E, 

3d Battalion, 164th Infantry Regiment, recalled that 

“the carnage of the battlefield was a sight that perhaps 

only the combat infantryman, who has fought at close 

quarters, could fully comprehend and look upon without a feeling of horror.”55

At daylight the next morning, the front lines revealed a stack of dead Japanese piled up in front of 

Company C’s position. The U.S. Army was left to clean 

up and quickly bury the dead to prevent diseases. Korean prisoners, whom the Japanese had brought onto 

the island as forced labor, were assigned to bury the 

Japanese dead. Marine engineers blew three holes in 

front of Company A’s old position, and in three days, 

the Koreans buried more than 700 dead Japanese.56

Casualties for Puller’s battalion were 19 dead, 

30 wounded, and 12 missing. Company C’s casualties were 9 dead and 9 wounded.57 To date, the battalion had suffered 24 percent casualties and 37 

percent officer casualties on Guadalcanal.58 Puller 

later summed up the fight: “We held them because we 

were well dug in, a whole regiment of artillery was 

55 John E. Stannard, The Battle of Coffin Corner and Other Comments 

Concerning the Guadalcanal Campaign (Gallatine, TN: privately 

printed, 1992).

56 Arthur Miller to Gary Cozzens, 26 November 1990, Cozzens 

Personal Papers; George MacGillivray to Gary Cozzens, 26 June 

1990, Cozzens Personal Papers; and Richard Fisher to Gary Cozzens, 10 November 1990, Cozzens Personal Papers.

57 Those killed were Sgt London L. Traw, PFC Victor I. Cooper, 

PFC James J. Nitche, PFC Peter M. Barbagelata, PFC Charles A. 

Andrews, Pvt George W. Hogarty, Pvt Marvin R. McClanahan, 

Pvt Arthur J. Picard, and Pvt Edgar Petraco. They were interred 

in the 1st MarDiv cemetery on Guadalcanal. See 1st Battalion, 7th 

Marines, Muster Report 33a, 26 October 1942, Archives Branch, 

History Division. For information on Marine burials on Guadalcanal, see Christopher J. Martin, “The Aftermath of Hell: Graves 

Registration Policy and U.S. Marine Corps Losses in the Solomon Islands during World War II,” Marine Corps History 2, no. 

2 (Winter 2016): 56–64. Those wounded included Cpl James E. 

Weeks, PFC Tracey L. Anderson, PFC Roderick W. Cumming, 

PFC Dominico D’Alfonso, PFC Ralph J. Hicks, PFC Charles A. 

Poor, PFC Richard J. Rhoume, Pvt Henry S. Woodruff, and Pvt 

Theodore G. West. See 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, Muster Report 

33a.

58 “Summary of Operations, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 24–25 October 1942.”
40 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

backing us up, and there was plenty of barbed wire.”59

When the Marines were relieved by the soldiers 

and sent to new positions farther up on Bloody Ridge, 

they all were equipped with the new M1 Garand rifles 

instead of their issued Springfield bolt-action rifles. 

Soon after, however, a directive ordered the return of 

the M1 rifles to the Army and the Marines got their 

old Springfields back.60

The 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, relieved Puller 

from perimeter defense and he shifted his battalion 

on the ridge, so what was left of the 1st Battalion, 7th 

Marines, now occupied the position previously held 

by 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. The rain stopped and 

sunlight hit the ridge, giving the Marines a chance to 

dry out and rest. That night, the Japanese tried a repeat performance, with their main effort coming at 

the same area as before, though now occupied by 3d 

Battalion, 164th Infantry. They made desultory attempts on 1st Battalion, 7th Marines’ new position on 

the ridge, a few straggled down the bank of the Lunga 

River, and some were simply laggards who were lost. 

At 0800 on 26 October, General Hyakutake ordered 

his forces to retreat.61

Usually conservative when awarding personal 

decorations, the Marine Corps recognized Company C’s stubborn defense the night of 24–25 October. Charley Company Marines received one Navy 

Cross, two Silver Stars, one Bronze Star, and nine 

commendations for their actions that night. In addition to Basilone’s Congressional Medal of Honor, 

attachments to Company C were awarded two Navy 

Crosses, two Silver Stars, and one commendation.62

59 Mike Phifer, “Bloody Brawl on Guadalcanal,” Military Heritage, 

May 2016, 69.

60 Marshall W. Moore to Gary Cozzens, 9 May 1990; and Billy R. 

Sanford to Gary Cozzens, 18 May 1991, Cozzens Personal Papers.

61 Kelly to Hammel, 25 August 1980, Hammel Papers; Frank, Guadalcanal, 364; and Jersey, Hell’s Islands, 292.

62 Award records are scattered and not well documented. Fleming was later killed in action on Cape Gloucester. See MacGillivray to Cozzens; and Blakeney, Heroes, 113, 98, 191, 180.

The Suicide Charley Guidon

The morning of 25 October saw the collapse of the 

Japanese attack and the defensive line of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, still intact. Later that morning, 

a flag appeared over Charley Company’s position. It 

had been fashioned from white Japanese parachute 

material and crudely painted with a skull and crossbones and the inscription “Suicide Charley, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.” The flag would continue to appear 

throughout the hard-fought battle for Guadalcanal.63

No picture of the original guidon is known to 

exist, however, the best evidence comes from oral history interviews conducted with the U.S. Marines who 

saw the original guidon on the morning of 25 October. 

Private First Class Richard L. Fisher remembers: 

The guidon was sticking in the ground near 

the foxhole of PFC William Wentz during 

the day between the Japanese attacks of 

October 24th and 25th. I asked PFC Paul 

Hatfield who made it. Paul just shook his 

head. . . . I was with a small group that rotated back behind the lines for chow and 

the guidon was near one of Basilone’s machine gun emplacements when I returned. 

I tried to sleep for a while. Later Puller, 

Capt. Kelly and our quartermaster sergeant 

came by and I woke up. [Corporal Edward] 

Kleason, quartermaster sergeant, was carrying the flag. Puller was smoking a pipe. He 

grinned out of the corner of his mouth. “Go 

back to sleep old man, we may not get any 

tonight.” Kleason kept the guidon in a box 

in his tent. I only saw it that one morning.64

Private Ralph Tulloch of the regimental weapons 

company also remembers seeing the Suicide Charley 

guidon that same morning: 

[T]he only time I remember seeing it [the 

flag] was after the 1st Battalion moved to 

the right on Bloody Ridge, taking over the 

63 7th Marines History, 10.

64 Richard Fisher to Gary Cozzens, 10 November 1990, Cozzens 

Personal Papers.
SUMMER 2017 41

positions where the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines had been three or four days before, 

they [2d Battalion, 7th Marines] moved to 

the Matanikau River area. This would have 

been 25 or 26 October 1942. A few days later 

the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines moved to the 

Koli Point area, which Weapons Company, 

7th Marines supported. However, I don’t 

recall seeing the flag at that time, 4–10 November 1942, nor do I recall seeing it again. 

. . . It is my theory that the flag was made 

to signify that any enemy attacking Charley 

Company was committing suicide.65

Private First Class Gilbert Lozier adds:

A few months after I was wounded [8 October], I ran into a C Company Marine at 

New Caledonia. He told me what had happened after I had left. That line we were 

holding was hit by a very large number of 

Japanese. Our Marines held on for a while, 

but the Japanese broke through. There was 

some hand-to-hand fighting in which several members of my squad were killed, but 

we were able to close the Japanese gain, and 

kill those who had gone through the gap. 

Sergeant Basilone was awarded the Medal 

of Honor for his actions. This is where the 

term “Suicide Charley” started.66

Private First Class Clarence E. Angevine recalls 

seeing the guidon and gives a clue as to who might 

have painted it:

The man you are trying to find who made 

that flag is probably Phil South [Private 

Phillip South]. He was from Manhattan, 

Montana. One of the guys that was in on 

that flag deal name was Pokana. These guys 

were from the third platoon of the compa65 Ralph L. Tulloch to Gary Cozzens, 29 November 1993, Cozzens 

Personal Papers.

66 Gilbert Lozier to Gary Cozzens, 19 January 1993, Cozzens Personal Papers.

ny and I was in the first platoon. Of course 

Company C was the one that got the brunt 

of that. That is what really started . . . “Suicide Charley” and all of the other things 

that went along with it. We didn’t get hurt 

too badly, but it made the guys have a lot of 

thoughts about they were sticking us out in 

the front all of the time. That was one of the 

reasons that all of this started. I did see one 

of those flags that was made out of a silk 

parachute. It was drawn on there. The only 

guy that I know that could really draw good 

was Phil South. He was an artist in a way. 

The last time I saw him was in the middle 

Photo courtesy of MSgt William H. Wilander, USMC (Ret)

Earliest known photograph of the Suicide Charley guidon. TSgt William Wilander, the first sergeant of Company C, stands in front of the 

company command post in Korea, 1951. Wilander helped design the 

new guidon and sent the company property sergeant to Seoul to have 

it made.
42 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

of the campaign on [Cape] Gloucester. He 

was evacuated and I never heard from him 

since.67

The Tradition Continues

The battalion next conducted offensive operations 

at Koli Point in November before withdrawing from 

Guadalcanal in December 1942 and deploying to Australia for recovery. The battalion fought next on New 

Britain, but the Suicide Charley guidon was not seen 

again until the bloody Battle of Peleliu (Operation 

67 No Marine named Pokana has been found on the October 1942 

Company C muster rolls. Clarence Angevine to Gary Cozzens, 15 

July 1996, Cozzens Personal Papers. Angevine was awarded the 

Navy Cross for actions on Cape Gloucester on 10 January 1944.

Photo from author’s collection

Company C formation in Okinawa, 1987. Company 1stSgt Donald L. Fox served in Charley Company twice. As a young Marine in the early 1960s, 

he carried the Suicide Charley guidon. He returned to the battalion in the 1980s and became the company first sergeant.

Stalemate). During that time, a replica of the original 

guidon appeared briefly to inspire the tired Marines 

to victory.68

The symbol next appeared in Korea. While on 

rest and recuperation in Seoul, some members of 

Company C had a new Suicide Charley guidon made 

and proudly bore it back to the company. The guidon 

was carried throughout the conflict in Vietnam, and 

it then crossed the minefields into Kuwait in 1990–91, 

when Lieutenant Colonel James N. Mattis led 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, during Operation Desert Storm 

(First Gulf War). Company C bore the standard before them when they participated in humanitarian aid 

efforts in Somalia during Operation Provide Comfort 

68 7th Marines History, 10.
SUMMER 2017 43

(1991), and it was present in both Afghanistan and 

Iraq during Operations Enduring Freedom (2001–3) 

and Iraqi Freedom (2003). 

The white Suicide Charley guidon has traveled 

the world with the company. The National Museum of 

the Marine Corps holds two versions in its collection, 

and replicas abound among the company’s former 

members.69 Today, the Suicide Charley guidon is carried in all formations, and Company C, 1st Battalion, 

7th Marines, is better known to its Marines and those 

who know its history as Suicide Charley.70

(article continues with award citations next page)

69 Henry I. Shaw Jr. to Capt Gary Cozzens, 4 March 1986, Cozzens Personal Papers.

70 7th Marines History, 10.
44 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

SERGEANT ARCHIE D. ARMSTEAD

Navy Commendation Medal

For devotion to duty during adverse conditions during engagements with the enemy from September to 

early December 1942. Throughout this entire period, 

Sergeant Armstead served with honor and distinction. On October 24th, he served as acting Platoon 

Sergeant in an especially commendable manner, with 

a platoon defense of the Lunga Area on Guadalcanal 

Island against an enemy force of superior numbers. 

The platoon was subjected to enemy fire from all enAwards for Battle of Henderson Field

Name Unit Award Date

Company C 1942

Sgt Archie D. Armstead 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Navy Commendation Medal 24 October 

PltSgt Robert L. Domokos 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Navy Commendation Medal 24 October 

MG William McK. Fleming 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Navy Commendation Medal 24–25 October 

Sgt John M. Kozak 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Navy Commendation Medal 24 October 

Sgt Edward Lewis 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Navy Commendation Medal 24–25 October 

GySgt Charles K. Livelsberger 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Navy Commendation Medal 24–25 October 

Capt Marshall W. Moore 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Silver Star 24 October 

1stLt Karl H. Schmidt 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Navy Commendation Medal 24 October 

PltSgt London L. Traw 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Silver Star 24–25 October 

PltSgt Simon Vigor 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Navy Commendation Medal 24 October 

Pvt Theodore G. West 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Navy Cross 25 October 

1stLt Arthur H. Wyman 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Navy Commendation Medal 24 October 

Attached to Company C

PltSgt John Basilone Company D, 1st Battalion, 

7th Marines

Medal of Honor 24–25 October 

Pvt Billie J. Crumpton Company D, 1st Battalion, 

7th Marines

Navy Cross 24–25 October 

Pvt Cecil H. Evans Company D, 1st Battalion, 

7th Marines

Silver Star 24–25 October

Pvt Sam Hirsch Company D, 1st Battalion, 

7th Marines

Silver Star 24 October 

Cpl Noel L. Sharpton Weapons Company, 7th Marines Navy Commendation Medal 24 October

PFC Jack Sugarman Company D, 1st Battalion, 

7th Marines

Navy Cross 24–25 October

emy weapons and helped to repulse repeated enemy 

assaults. In his position of leadership, Sergeant Armstead, coolly and deliberately, without regard for his 

safety, assisted in directing the fire of his platoon, until 

his platoon leader was killed. Immediately he assumed 

the duties of his leader, serving with courage and skill, 

in addition to performing his own. By his intelligent 

action, he contributed greatly to the rout and virtual 

annihilation of a Japanese Regiment, which resulted 

in the Marine victory.
SUMMER 2017 45

PLATOON SERGEANT 

JOHN BASILONE

Medal of Honor

The President of the United States of America, in the 

name of Congress, takes pleasure in presenting the 

Medal of Honor to Sergeant John “Manila John” Basilone, United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary 

heroism and conspicuous gallantry in action against 

enemy Japanese forces, above and beyond the call of 

duty, while serving with the First Battalion, Seventh 

Marines, FIRST Marine Division in the Lunga Area, 

Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, on the night of 24–25 

October 1942. While the enemy was hammering at the 

Marines’ defensive positions, Sergeant Basilone, in 

charge of two sections of heavy machine guns, fought 

valiantly to check the savage and determined assault. 

In a fierce frontal attack with the Japanese blasting 

his guns with grenades and mortar fire, one of Sergeant Basilone’s sections, with its guncrews, was put 

out of action, leaving only two men able to carry on. 

Moving an extra gun into position, he placed it in action, then, under continual fire, repaired another and 

personally manned it, gallantly holding his line until 

replacements arrived. A little later, with ammunition 

critically low and the supply lines cut off, Sergeant 

Basilone, at great risk of his life and in the face of 

continued enemy attack, battled his way through hostile lines with urgently needed shells for his gunners, 

thereby contributing in large measure to the virtual 

annihilation of a Japanese regiment. His great personal valor and courageous initiative were in keeping 

with the highest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service.

Note: Platoon Sergeant Basilone was a member of Company D and was attached to Company C when he was 

awarded the Medal of Honor during the second Battle of 

Bloody Ridge on Guadalcanal.

PRIVATE BILLIE J. CRUMPTON

Navy Cross

The President of the United States of America takes 

pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Private Billie 

Joe Crumpton, United States Marine Corps Reserve, 

for extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty while 

serving with a heavy machine-gun crew in Company 

D, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST Marine 

Division, during the action against enemy Japanese 

forces on Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, on the night 

of 24–25 October 1942. When his squad leader and the 

remainder of his crew were killed or wounded during a mass frontal attack by hostile forces, Private 

Crumpton, although he, himself, was severely injured, 

gallantly stood by his gun and by maintaining effective fire, kept the enemy from penetrating the sector. 

Later, after his gun had been put out of action, he 

remained in an exposed position beside the disabled 

weapon and resumed fire with his rifle until wounds 

from exploding hand grenades forced him out of the 

fight. By his courageous devotion to duty and grim 

determination in the face of great danger, he contributed materially to the defeat and virtual annihilation 

of a Japanese regiment.

PLATOON SERGEANT 

ROBERT L. DOMOKOS

Navy Commendation Medal

For bravery and devotion to duty in an engagement 

with the enemy in the British Solomon Islands on 

October 24, 1942. The Company in which Platoon 

Sergeant Domokos was attached was assigned to the 

defense of a sector of the Lunga area, Guadalcanal. 

The enemy had forced a salient in the line. Sergeant 

Domokos took command of a small force of Marines 

and by his skill and courageous leadership succeeded 

in the line and annihilating the enemy forces which 

had penetrated it.

PRIVATE CECIL H. EVANS

Silver Star

The President of the United States of America takes 

pleasure in presenting the Silver Star to Private Cecil 

H. Evans, United States Marine Corps, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity while serving with a 
46 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

heavy machine-gun crew in Company D, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST Marine Division, during 

action against enemy Japanese forces on Guadalcanal, 

Solomon Islands, 24 and 25 October 1942. When his 

squad leader and the remainder of his crew were killed 

or wounded during a mass frontal attack by hostile 

forces, Private Evans, manning his rifle from a dangerously exposed position, prevented hostile troops from 

overrunning the gun position until the disabled weapon could be replaced. His heroic conduct, maintained 

at great personal risk in the face of grave danger, was 

in keeping with the highest traditions of the United 

States Naval Service.

MARINE GUNNER 

WILLIAM McK. FLEMING

Navy Commendation Medal

For devotion to duty under adverse conditions during engagements with the enemy in the British Solomon Islands from September to early December 1942. 

Throughout this entire period, Marine Gunner Fleming served with honor and distinction. He was serving as platoon leader on October 24 and 25 with the 

Marines in defense of the Lunga area on Guadalcanal 

Island when the enemy attacked with superior numbers. Without regard for his own safety, under severe 

enemy fire, and in the face of repeated enemy assaults, 

he displayed great courage and leadership. During the 

long hours of the attack, in rain and under darkness, 

he so skillfully lead his men that he contributed greatly to the rout and virtual annihilation of a Japanese 

Regiment, which resulted in a Marine victory. 

Note: William Fleming received a field commission to second 

lieutenant and was later killed in action on New Britain.

PRIVATE SAM HIRSCH

Silver Star

The President of the United States of America takes 

pleasure in presenting the Silver Star to Private Sam 

Hirsch, United States Marine Corps Reserve, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity while serving with 

Company D, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST 

Marine Division in action against enemy Japanese 

forces at Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands on October 

24, 1942. During dangerous assaults against the main 

Lunga Defense line by a numerically superior Japanese force, Private Hirsch, despite the intense fire of 

enemy machine guns, mortars and rifles proceeded 

with courageous initiative to carry ammunition and 

spare parts from his company dump to machine gun 

positions in the forward area where such supplies 

were critically low. In addition, he fearlessly continued to load ammunition belts at the company dump, 

although exposed to the fire of infiltrating enemy 

groups. His heroic and intrepid conduct, maintained 

without regard for his own personal safety, contributed immeasurably to the ultimate success of our forces 

in this engagement and was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

SERGEANT JOHN M. KOZAK

Navy Commendation Medal

For devotion to duty under adverse conditions during engagements with the enemy in the British Solomon Islands from September to early December 1942. 

On October 24 while serving as a platoon leader of 

a weapons platoon in defense of the Lunga area on 

Guadalcanal Island, Sergeant Kozak and his comrades 

were heavily engaged with an enemy force, vastly superior in numbers. Under severe enemy fire and in 

the face of repeated assault waves he coolly and deliberately, without regard for his own personal safety, 

directed and controlled fire of the machine guns of 

his platoon upon the enemy until the devastating fire 

of the Marines turned the battle into utter defeat and 

the virtual annihilation of an enemy regiment. By his 

skill and determination and his extraordinary heroism under enemy fire, Sergeant Kozak distinguished 

himself in the line of his profession and contributed 

greatly to the Marine victory.
SUMMER 2017 47

SERGEANT EDWARD LEWIS

Navy Commendation Medal

For devotion to duty under adverse conditions during engagements with the enemy in the British Solomon Islands from September to early December 1942. 

While serving as a section leader of a weapons platoon 

in the defense of the Lunga area, Guadalcanal, the platoon was heavily engaged with an enemy force, vastly 

superior in numbers. The enemy was placing heavy 

fire from all of their weapons. Sergeant Lewis coolly 

and deliberately, without regard for his own personal 

safety, directed and controlled the fire of the machine 

guns of his section upon repeated assaulting waves of 

the enemy until the devastating fire of the Marines 

turned the battle into utter defeat and the virtual 

annihilation of an enemy regiment. By his skill and 

determination and his extraordinary heroism under 

enemy fire, Sergeant Lewis distinguished himself, in 

the line of his profession and contributed greatly to 

the Marine victory.

GUNNERY SERGEANT 

CHARLES K. LIVELSBERGER

Navy Commendation Medal

For devotion to duty under adverse conditions during engagements with the enemy in the British Solomon Islands from September to early December 1942. 

While serving as a platoon leader of a weapons platoon 

in the absence of a commissioned officer, in defense of 

the Lunga area, Guadalcanal Island, the platoon was 

heavily engaged with an enemy force, vastly superior 

in numbers. The enemy was placing heavy fire with 

all of their weapons. Gunnery Sergeant Livelsberger 

coolly and deliberately, without regard for his own 

personal safety, directed and controlled the fire of the 

machine guns of his section upon repeated assaulting 

waves of the enemy until the devastating fire of the 

Marines turned the battle into utter defeat and the 

virtual annihilation of an enemy regiment. By his skill 

and determination and his extraordinary heroism under enemy fire, Sergeant Livelsberger distinguished 

himself, in the line of his profession and contributed 

greatly to the Marine victory.

CAPTAIN MARSHALL W. MOORE

Silver Star

The President of the United States of America takes 

pleasure in presenting the Silver Star to Captain 

Marshall W. Moore, United States Marine Corps 

Reserve, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity 

as Commanding Officer of Company C, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST Marine Division, in 

action against enemy Japanese forces at Guadalcanal, 

Solomon Islands, on the night of October 24, 1942. Despite continuous and dangerous assaults by a numerically superior Japanese force which was attempting to 

smash the Lunga defense lines, Captain Moore daringly commanded his men in maintaining our positions 

and repulsing the enemy. With utter disregard for his 

own personal safety, he led his company in brilliant 

and devastating counterattacks and contributed to 

the rout and virtual annihilation of an entire Japanese 

regiment. His indomitable fighting spirit and grim determination served as an inspiration to the men under 

his command and were in keeping with the highest 

traditions of the United States Naval Service.

FIRST LIEUTENANT 

KARL H. SCHMIDT

Navy Commendation Medal

For bravery and devotion to duty in an engagement 

with the enemy in the British Solomon Islands on 

October 24, 1942. The company to which Lieutenant 

Schmidt was attached was assigned to the defense of a 

sector of the Lunga area, Guadalcanal. The enemy had 

forced a salient in the line. Lieutenant Schmidt took 

command of a small force of Marines and by his skill 

and courageous leadership succeeded in reestablishing 

the line and annihilating the enemy force which had 

penetrated it.

CORPORAL NOEL L. SHARPTON

Navy Commendation Medal

For bravery and devotion to duty under adverse conditions during engagements with the enemy in the 

British Solomon Islands from September to early De-
48 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

cember 1942. Throughout this period Corporal Sharpton served with honor and distinction. During the 

engagement on October 24, the enemy attacked with 

a force of greatly superior numbers placing severe fire 

and making repeated assaults. Without regard for his 

own safety under these extreme conditions he continued to direct the fire of his gun and contributed greatly to devastating the enemy who were utterly defeated 

and virtually annihilated. By his courage and skill, he 

enhanced the Marine victory. 

Note: Corporal Sharpton was a member of the 7th Marines 

Regimental Weapons Company. His 37mm gun was attached to Company C during the second Battle for Bloody 

Ridge.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS 

JACK SUGARMAN

Navy Cross

The President of the United States of America takes 

pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Private First 

Class Jack Sugarman, United States Marine Corps 

Reserve, for extraordinary heroism and conspicuous 

devotion to duty while serving with Company D, First 

Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST Marine Division, 

during action against enemy Japanese forces in the 

Solomon Islands Area on the night of October 24–25, 

1942. During a mass frontal attack by a numerically 

superior enemy force, Private First Class Sugarman, 

with his gun temporarily out of action and his position threatened by hostile troops, removed the weapon and, with the aid of a comrade, repaired and place 

it back in action under heavy fire. On four separate 

occasions he saved the gun from capture, repaired it 

under fire and continued to maintain effective resistance against masses of attacking Japanese. By his 

skill and determination, he inflicted heavy casualties 

upon the enemy and helped prevent a break-through 

in our lines, which at that time, was weakly held by a 

small group of riflemen. His actions throughout were 

in keeping with the highest traditions of the United 

States Naval Service.

PLATOON SERGEANT 

LONDON L. TRAW

Silver Star

The President of the United States of America takes 

pride in presenting the Silver Star (Posthumously) to 

Platoon Sergeant London Lewis Traw, United States 

Marine Corps, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity while serving with the First Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST Marine Division during action against 

enemy Japanese forces in the Lunga Area, Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands on October 24 and 25, 1942. 

Undeterred by terrific enemy fire, Platoon Sergeant 

Traw coolly directed and controlled the fire of the machine guns of his section against repeated assaults of 

enemy forces greatly superior in numbers. The combat 

achievements of his platoon under his inspiring and 

courageous leadership contributed greatly to the rout 

and virtual annihilation of a Japanese regiment. He 

gallantly gave up his life in the service of his country.

PLATOON SERGEANT 

SIMON VIGOR

Navy Commendation Medal

For devotion to duty under adverse conditions during 

engagements with the enemy in the British Solomon 

Island from September to early December 1942. On 

October 24 while serving as a platoon sergeant of a 

platoon in defense of the Lunga area on Guadalcanal 

Island, Platoon Sergeant Vigor and his comrades were 

heavily engaged with an enemy force, vastly superior 

in numbers. While under heavy fire from all enemy 

weapons he coolly and deliberately, without regard for 

his own personal safety, directed and controlled the 

fire of his platoon upon repeated assaulting waves of 

the enemy until the devastating fire of the Marines 

turned the battle into utter defeat and the virtual annihilation of a Japanese Regiment. By his skill and 

determination and his heroism under enemy fire, he 

distinguished himself in the line of his profession and 

contributed greatly to the Marine victory.
SUMMER 2017 49

PRIVATE THEODORE G. WEST

Navy Cross

The President of the United States takes pleasure in 

presenting the Navy Cross to Theodore Gerard West, 

Private, U.S. Marine Corps (Reserve), for extraordinary heroism and conspicuous devotion to duty 

while serving with Company C, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST Marine Division, during action 

against enemy Japanese forces in the Lunga Area of 

Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands on 25 October 1942. 

During a heavy attack by a numerically superior enemy force, Private West, although wounded to such an 

extent that he was unable to handle a rifle, remained 

in his position until reinforcements arrived, then rendered invaluable assistance by placing two rifle squads 

and directing their fire. His gallant action thereafter 

contributed materially to restoring our line and to 

the eventual rout and virtual annihilation of an entire 

Japanese regiment. His courageous devotion to duty, 

maintained for nearly seven hours after he was severely injured, was in keeping with the highest traditions 

of the United States Naval Service.

FIRST LIEUTENANT 

ARTHUR H. WYMAN

Navy Commendation Medal

For bravery and devotion to duty in an engagement 

with the enemy in the British Solomon Islands on 

October 24, 1942. The company to which Lieutenant 

Wyman was attached was assigned to the defense of a 

sector of the Lunga area, Guadalcanal. The enemy had 

forced a salient in the line. Lieutenant Wyman took 

command of a small force of Marines and by his skill 

and courageous leadership succeeded in reestablishing 

the line and annihilating the enemy force which had 

penetrated it.

• 1775 •
Royal Marines 

Commandos at Limbang, 

1962

by Captain Derek Oakley, MBE, RM*

Until 1962, the island of Borneo, the third largest island in the world, was divided into a vast southern area under Indonesian rule 

and three British dependencies—Sarawak (the largest), 

North Borneo and, sandwiched between them, the tiny 

but very rich protectorate of Brunei. With British interests gradually declining in this part of the Far East, a 

federation of these three Borneo states along the north 

coast was emerging. Although the indigenous tribes of 

the Borneo jungle were basically hard working and distant from political and territorial ideals, many, including the Kedayans, were of Indonesian origin. Through 

such tribes, the Indonesian Army had infiltrated and 

trained some in the use of arms so that, when the time 

was right, they could rebel against the Sultan of Brunei, Omar Ali Saifuddin. The Federation of Malaya had 

achieved independence in 1957 and its prime minister, 

Tunku Abdul Rahman, proposed in 1961 that a larger 

federated state of Malaysia be formed embracing Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo. There 

was considerable dissension and unrest in Brunei and 

* The story of the daring assault on 12 December 1962 by Company L, 42 Commando, on Limbang, Sarawak, Malaysia, to rescue 14 hostages 

held by Indonesian rebels was supported by officers and ratings from the Royal Navy minesweepers HMS Fiskerton (M 1206) and HMS 

Chawton (M 1209). This article is based on the operational reports written at the time by Capt Jeremy Moore (MC), Royal Marines (RM), 

and LtCol E. Robin Bridges, Order of the British Empire (OBE), RM. The personal accounts included have been supplemented by those of 

the author and edited to include new material. Oakley served in the Royal Marines for 42 years. After service at sea, he saw active service 

in Malaya (1949), Port Said (1956), Northern Ireland (1957), Brunei (1962), and Borneo (1963). He later became editor of the Royal Marines 

journal The Globe & Laurel, and in retirement, he is now vice president of the Royal Marines Historical Society. He won the 1983 U.S. Marine 

Corps Historical Foundation award for his coverage of the Falklands Campaign. Editorial note: the terms and spellings used are U.S. English 

equivalents for military terminology.

Map adapted by History Division

Map of Borneo as it was in 1962, showing British possessions—Sarawak, 

Brunei, and North Borneo.

50
SUMMER 2017 51

Sarawak over the proposal, while Indonesia immediately opposed it.1

Such was the background to a revolt that was 

sparked off in the first few days of December 1962, 

when several towns, including Brunei Town and Limbang, a small community 12 miles upriver and across 

the border into Sarawak, were occupied by Indonesian 

rebels. This article highlights the courageous civilians already present on the island and the Royal Marines who 

would later come to their rescue on this far-flung shore. 

Richard Morris, the British resident of the 5th 

Division of Sarawak, lived here.2 Although intelligence 

1

 The Federation of Malaya included nine Malay states and two 

British settlements, Penang and Malacca. Eileen Chanin, Limbang 

Rebellion: 7 Days in December 1962 (Kensington: University of New 

South Wales Press, 2013), 6.

2

 A resident, or in full, resident minister, is a government official 

required to take up permanent residence in another country. As 

a representative of their government, the resident officially has 

diplomatic functions that are often seen as a form of indirect 

rule.

had revealed that the revolt was planned for 5 December, the seizure of hostages at Limbang, Seria, Miri, 

and other towns in Brunei did not take place until the 

morning of the 8th. Morris, an Australian, had served 

17 years in the Sarawak administration, first going to 

the country with the Australian Army during World 

War II. He had spent two years (1954–56) as assistant 

resident in Brunei, knew the country well, and was 

happiest with the natives deep in the ulu, the Malayan 

word for jungle.3 In 1961, Morris was appointed resident of the 5th Division at Limbang and soon heard 

warnings of unrest. 

Now in late 1962, Morris and his wife had been 

looking forward to the arrival of their two children—

Geraldine (age 15) and Adrian (age 13)—from Australia for Christmas.4

 However, in late November, 

when Morris heard whispers that an insurrection was 

planned for Brunei, he cancelled the children’s visit. 

He also reported his concerns to higher authority, but 

a visit from the inspector general of the Malayan Police found insufficient evidence to be alarmed.5

In the first days of December 1962, Richard Morris realized that trouble was imminent, and indeed 

signalled to the Sarawak capital of Kuching that there 

was a possibility of a revolt in his northern area the 

week before revolt broke out. This information appears never to have reached the military intelligence 

services in Singapore. He met Lord George Nigel 

Douglas-Hamilton, 10th Earl of Selkirk, the commissioner general for South East Asia, in Brunei on 6 December, and gave his staff the probable “enemy” order 

of battle and warned that a rebellion would likely 

erupt in a couple of days’ time. His wife Dorothy, who 

was with him at the time, had recently been appointed 

president of the Limbang group of the Red Cross.6

The Hostages’ View

The night the revolt broke out, the Morrises and a 

dozen other hostages, including two European women 

3

 Chanin, Limbang Rebellion, 16. 4

 Ibid., 35.

5

 Ibid., 41.

6

 Ibid., 35.

Map adapted by History Division

Map of the Far East in 1962, including Malaya and Borneo.
52 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

and a Peace Corps officer, were captured and incarcerated in Limbang, while four Sarawak constabulary 

officers were killed during the attack.7 Dorothy Morris provides a vivid description of events from the 

hostages’ point of view.8

 She wrote that, even though 

they had some warning, the revolt came as a complete 

surprise when they were suddenly ambushed in their 

own compound on the night of 8 December and led 

down in the dark to the dense jungle just above a small 

stream with very steep banks. The hostages sat there 

with every form of biting nightlife assailing them, 

Morris clad only in his underpants without much seat 

7

 Richard Francis, “The Raid on Limbang—1962,” Naval Historical 

Review, March 2003. 8

 Dorothy Morris, “Etiquette and Alka Seltzers,” Globe & Laurel: 

Journal of the Royal Marines 42 (March/April 1964): 102–4.

in them and the inevitable perished elastic band at 

the top and no safety pins. In the short time available, he had not been able to locate any more dignified 

clothing, though his wife had been able to dress more 

adequately, including a pair of heavy shoes. Morris 

was savagely bound with nylon fishing cord, but his 

wife’s hands were left free. Two decidedly questionable bandits sat on either side of her clutching an arm, 

while another pointed a kris (a Malay dagger with a 

wavy blade) unpleasantly close to Morris’ back. After 

an hour, they were ordered up the slope to a clearing 

above the residency, when Dorothy Morris lost her 

footing and slid down to the bottom, earning bruises 

from hip to shin. Suddenly, large numbers of rebels, all 

looking scruffy and intent despite a mix of uniforms 

and weapons, filed past them. Some stopped and 

stared with no noticeable reaction to the scene, and 

Photo courtesy of Eileen Chanin

Richard and Dorothy Morris, the resident and his wife, who were both taken hostage, pictured in 1954 with members of the Sarawak Constabulary 

at Kanowit, seven years before the rebellion. Morris was working with the police force at the time, which was in the process of being developed.
SUMMER 2017 53

one, whose aim was fortunately very poor, attempted 

to spit in her face.9

Shortly afterward, the Morrises were moved to 

the jail, where they found Police Inspectors Abang Zain 

bin Abang Latif and Latif bin Basah, with King Shih 

Fan, a Public Works Department engineer, and three 

other policemen. Inspector Latif had been wounded at 

some point. Morris, still clad only in his underpants, 

was used as a human shield on the way up to the police 

station. Later that day, the Morrises were allowed back 

to the residency to collect some clothes and belongings. 

The following afternoon, their spirits rose considerably when the hastily reconstituted Limbang 

Red Cross led by Inche Omar bin Sanauddin, a retired postmaster, and the wife of the Public Works 

Department superintendent, appeared with coffee, 

rice, towels, codeine, bandages, and ointment for the 

wounded police inspector in the next cell. Dorothy 

Morris recalls that these tireless, brave, and devoted 

few did more than they will ever know for the comfort of those behind bars. She recalled that one of 

the most unsettling aspects of their incarceration 

was the distasteful business of being glared at by 

their guards through the bars of their only window. 

In the meantime, three Catholic priests and a member of the United States Peace Corps—18 year-old 

Fritz Klattenhoff—were detained in the police station along with another member of the Public Works 

Department.10

By 10 December, the tougher, more dedicated 

rebel elements had been dispatched to the outskirts 

upriver as rumors spread that the Dyaks (loyal aboriginal Sarawak headhunters) were coming down to “do 

over” the rebels. That night, Dorothy heard whispered 

discussions in Malay between the guards sitting at the 

top of the steps just outside the cell door. Although 

she only heard snatches, there was frequent mention 

of “prisoners,” “sunrise,” and “shooting.” 

Dorothy Morris would later state that she will 

never know, nor does she want to know now, whether 

it was her over-taxed imagination or wishful thinking 

9

 Morris, “Etiquette and Alka Seltzers.”

10 Ibid.

on behalf of the guards, but she prayed she and her 

husband would be given courage to face whatever lay 

ahead, and then prayed again for her children so many 

hundreds of miles away in Australia.11

On 11 December, there was a change in the attitude of their guards, who took every opportunity 

to whisper to them that their hearts were not really 

in the enterprise and they hoped the “Tuan” resident 

would deal gently with them when it was all over. 

Though the Morrises were not aware of it at the time, 

the military chief of the rebels, Yassin Affandy, had 

passed through Limbang on his way to Temburoung 

District and realized quickly that his cause was lost in 

the shadow of coming British forces.12 The feeling that 

something was about to happen was further strengthened when friendly visitors conveyed news of British 

military successes in Brunei Town, Kuala Belait, Seria, 

and Miri. That day, most of the hostages were moved 

to the hospital. In spite of the change in conditions, 

the hostages did not get much sleep that night, with 

the significant increase in guards and noise. They must 

have sensed something was about to happen. At first 

light the next morning, Dorothy Morris writes, 

We didn’t enjoy the bangs and the flying 

glass one bit, but I do well remember the 

glorious sound . . . calling on the rebels to 

surrender . . . during which we sang our little ditty about “Green Bonnets.”13

The hostages’ identities were quickly established, 

and then they heard Sergeant Dennis Smith’s reassuring voice saying, “Come on out, old girl.” When the 

Morrises emerged through the rather jagged aperture 

of the broken window, Richard Morris recalls,

It was 0620 when we climbed out of the 

window. The last eighteen minutes were 

now part of history, minor history maybe, 

but terribly important to all those who had 

played a part in its making. The fire-fight 

was over, but there was still quite a lot of 

11 Chanin, Limbang Rebellion, 72–73. 12 Ibid., 78.

13 Ibid., 139.
54 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

shooting and the occasional crump of a 

grenade at the beach-head was extended.14

The hostages did not waste time with pleasantries but quickly moved into the hospital ward where 

the other hostages had been held. They were all present and correct, if a trifle dazed. With plenty to do in 

preparing beds and bandages for the wounded, Dorothy found it difficult to believe that the worst was 

over. She later wrote, “Any sense of joy was tempered 

for all of us to one of quiet thankfulness mixed with 

great sadness and the consciousness of a debt we could 

never repay, by the presence of the dead and wounded 

around us.”15

The Military Response

As news of these events filtered through to Singapore, two companies from the Royal Gurkha Rifles 

on standby were moved to the Royal Air Force (RAF) 

stations in Singapore at RAF Changi and RAF Seletar to fly to Labuan, a small island off the coast of 

Brunei.16 Some flights were diverted to Brunei Town 

airfield when it became clear the North Kalimantan 

National Army (TNKU) rebels had failed to seize 

control of the capital. This TNKU militia had been 

supplied by Indonesia and was linked to the Brunei 

People’s Party, which favored a North Borneo Federation. Landing late in the evening of 8 December, the 

Gurkhas advanced immediately toward Brunei Town 

and engaged in a series of actions that resulted in six 

casualties, including two dead. The Gurkhas met such 

fierce resistance when they moved toward Seria that 

14 Ibid., 140.

15 Morris, “Etiquette and Alka Seltzers.”

16 The Royal Gurkha Rifles is a two-battalion light infantry 

regiment serving in the British Army and entirely composed of 

Nepalese soldiers recruited from within Nepal since the days of 

the British East India Company. Gurkhas are known as brutal 

fighters and fiercely loyal to the British Crown.  Gurkhas have 

fought on nearly all of Great Britain’s battlefields since they were 

formed 200 years ago, including Burma in World War II, Malaya, 

the Falklands, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In addition to their warrior 

spirit, they also are known for their Kukri knife, a distinctively 

shaped weapon they wield in hand-to-hand combat. Byron 

Farwell, The Gurkhas (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990).

they were forced to return to Brunei Town to counter 

the ongoing rebel threat there and near the airfield 

until reinforcement arrived.17

Additional British forces available to react to the 

rebellion were stationed in Singapore. Those selected 

to offer further support to the situation confronting 

the Gurkha Infantry Brigade, who had already restored order in Brunei, were the Royal Marines of 42 

Commando.18 The 3d Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, at this time consisted of 42 Commando, who 

had been looking forward to Christmas in Singapore 

after an extremely busy year of exercises, and 40 Commando, who were embarked on HMS Albion (R 07) 

off Mombasa, Kenya. Brigade headquarters had only 

recently returned from controlling exercises in the 

Aden Protectorate in southern Arabia, while 45 Commando were under independent operational command and on active service in Aden. On 8 December, 

42 Commando was put at short notice to move to Brunei, and two days later they were on their way. Their 

Commando Headquarters and Company L flew first 

into Labuan and then into Brunei Town, where the 

Gurkha Rifles had already restored order.

At 0600 on 11 December 1962, Brigadier A. G. 

Patterson, OBE, MC, commander of 99 Gurkha Infantry Brigade and now in command of operations 

against the Indonesian terrorists, greeted the newly 

arrived company commander of Company L, 42 Commando Royal Marines, Captain Jeremy Moore, who 

had earned a Military Cross in the Malayan jungle 10 

years earlier. Perched on the hood of his vehicle, the 

brigadier made his directive quite clear: “Your Company will rescue the hostages at Limbang.” 

During the next 24 hours, one of the most audacious amphibious raids in post-war Commando history was planned and executed, turning the whole 

course of the Borneo campaign. At that time, only 56 

men of Company L had reached Brunei, plus a section of Vickers .303-inch medium machine gunners; 

however, with a few other additions, the final number on the raid totaled 89. Intelligence was scarce but 

17 Francis, “The Raid on Limbang.”

18 Ibid.
SUMMER 2017 55

they believed that about a dozen hostages were being 

held in Limbang, including Resident Richard Morris 

and his wife, Dorothy, another woman, and U.S. Peace 

Corps Officer Fritz Klattenhoff. 

As Captain Moore, his second in command, 

Lieutenant Peter Waters, and his company sergeant 

major, Quartermaster Sergeant Cyril Scoins, took 

stock of the situation, the Marines prepared for the 

ordeal to come. Approximately three hours later, 

the commanding officer of 42 Commando, Lieutenant Colonel Robin Bridges, and his intelligence officer, Lieutenant Ian Walden, arrived to take over 

the difficult responsibility of obtaining information 

and intelligence for the operation. They managed 

to fly over Limbang, but their view was obscured 

by low cloud cover and they achieved little toward 

the situation on the ground. It was clear in everyone’s mind that speed and surprise were essential. 

The decision was soon made that the raid would 

have to take place at dawn the following morning.

Of prime importance was the need to find some 

river craft in which to mount the operation. Lieutenant J. P. Davis, some newly arrived naval ranks, and 

the author set about this task, inspecting the myriad 

small boats along the Brunei waterfront. There were 

hundreds of them, but none were particularly suitable for transporting 100 men upriver for 12 miles and 

then carrying out a possible frontal assault against an 

unknown enemy. Just as they reached the north end 

of the extensive waterfront, they came across two old 

Z-craft belonging to the Brunei government that appeared to be in working order.19 While there were no 

signs of any crew, one of them had on board two yellow bulldozers, which apparently were used to push 

the craft off the mud when they got stuck. Nevertheless, the two craft suited the Commando purpose admirably and the bulldozers went on the raid. 

Just after midday, two coastal minesweepers, 

the HMS Fiskerton and HMS Chawton, sailed into the 

harbor, subsequently providing the only reliable communications between Brunei and Singapore. They had 

been piloted downriver by Captain Erskine Muton, 

the local director of the Brunei State Marine Department. The Royal Navy immediately took command of 

the situation, providing their two first lieutenants to 

command the Z-craft and engine room staff to ensure 

they were both in working order.

The minesweeper captains, Lieutenant Harry 

Mucklow, RN, and Lieutenant Jeremy Black, RN, 

came ashore and, with Captain Moore, helped in the 

detailed planning. This was the first meeting between 

Moore and Black who, 20 years later, would find themselves in action together again in the South Atlantic 

when Moore was the force commander and Black 

was the captain of the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible 

(R 05) during the Falklands campaign. By late afternoon, the engines and maneuvering ability of both 

19 Z-craft are basically a pontoon landing craft with an engine 

room at the back for the propulsion and a bridge over the top for 

navigating. The deck is flat and open, sitting only about two feet 

above the water, with a ramp at the front from which tanks can 

be loaded and unloaded.

Map by author

Sketch of Limbang, showing the positions of the jail, hospital, police 

station, and residency, where hostages were being held by the rebels.
56 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

craft had been thoroughly checked by the seamen and 

engineers, and were pronounced fit for their task. The 

only protection for those embarked were large backpacks acting as sandbags, a few earth-filled oil drums 

and the crafts’ own 1.5-inch wooden planking. 

Meanwhile, Moore was collecting as much intelligence as possible, but he found that he had no 

more than small-scale maps and one out-of-date aerial 

photograph to help him. He knew that a small police 

launch that had approached Limbang two days earlier had been driven off by heavy small-arms fire. The 

strength of the enemy and his dispositions were virtually unknown, as estimates varied from 30 to more 

than 100, but it was obvious that the rebels were there 

in some numbers and that they had captured police 

weapons to add to their own. However, Moore assessed that their firepower would be fairly ineffective 

beyond 100 yards, and at close quarters, the two sides 

would be about equal. He knew that his highly trained 

Marines would therefore be more than a match against 

what appeared to be a poorly led enemy. 

Moore anticipated that he might be able, by a 

show of force, to bluff the rebels into surrendering. 

If that failed, or if the operation was prolonged, the 

rebels would either shoot the hostages out of hand or 

threaten to do so to force him to withdraw. His prime 

concern was the safety of the hostages, but he did not 

know where they were being held. Several possible locations presented themselves—the police station, the 

jail, the hospital, and the British residency—which 

were all separated by about 300 yards. Moore decided 

that the police station, almost in the center, was the 

most likely place for the rebels to set up their headquarters. He planned to eliminate this location before 

they had a chance to harm the hostages. His simple 

plan was to overwhelm their positions as fast as possible, each Marine withholding fire until the rebels 

opened up. He intended to call on the enemy to surrender in the hope that, by a brave show of force, he 

could bluff his way in.

That afternoon, ammunition and equipment were 

checked, the Vickers .303-inch medium machine guns 

were mounted forward on the Z-craft where they 

would be most effective, while food and rest were 

Photo by author

The only aerial photograph of Limbang, which was taken in 1959, that 

was available to brief the attacking force.

Photo by author

Royal Marines Commandos embarking before the raid. These backpacks were used partly as protection from enemy fire.
SUMMER 2017 57

hastily taken during what was left of the day. To arrive off Limbang at dawn, they set sail about midnight, guided by Captain Muton, who had earlier led 

the minesweepers down the river to Brunei Town. 

Muton admitted that he had never sailed that part of 

the Limbang River before. HMS Chawton’s Lieutenant David Willis, RN, cast off the leading craft at 1203 

on 12 December. He was aided considerably by a clear 

night and a nearly full moon. The Commandos’ route 

lay along a series of complicated winding channels between 30 and 100 yards wide flanked by the dangerous 

nipa swamp.20 The Royal Marines on board, already 

exhausted from nearly two days without proper sleep 

since leaving Singapore, snatched whatever rest they 

could, but the excitement and anticipation allowed 

them little rest. 

The two craft, keeping just within visual distance, slowly edged their way down the narrow 

channels as silently as they could, no lights or noise 

emanating from those on deck, leaving only the grinding engines to announce their presence to any waiting ambushers. After half an hour, the leading craft 

slewed across the river as one of its engines failed, but 

was soon fixed. Occasionally, in the narrower passages, the craft bumped perilously against the mangrove 

roots. By 0200, both craft reached the main Limbang 

River, approximately five miles from the town, where 

they remained hidden in the shadows of the jungle 

edges until 0430. This was a frustratingly anxious time 

for the Marine Commandos. Some lay awake contemplating the inevitable battle ahead, wondering what 

their first taste of action would be like; others fitfully 

slept with their weapons in their hands. The mangrove 

branches hid the bright moon casting shadows above 

them, allowing imaginations to conjure up alarming 

configurations.

Many of the dozing Marines were nudged awake 

as the engines started up again at 0430, and the two 

craft nosed their way into the much wider Limbang 

River, leaving the passengers feeling naked and ex20 Nipa is a monotypic genus of palm found in Australasia. These 

palms integrate with mangroves in transition zones between salt 

and fresh water.

posed in the fading moonlight. Last minute checks 

were made as the craft rounded the final bend toward 

the small town. They saw the dim lights of the town 

in the distance. Ever more slowly, the two craft drew 

nearer, and then to the surprise of everyone on board, 

the lights in the town suddenly went out. They would 

later learn that it was the routine as dawn approached. 

As silently as their engines allowed, and with about 50 

yards between them, the leading craft came level with 

the northern edge of the town. Captain Moore, with 

his Malay-speaking intelligence sergeant, David Smith, 

alongside peered into the ever-lightening distance. At 

300 yards, they saw movement everywhere as Limbang 

grew nearer. The bazaar area seemed alive, and they 

could just make out the police station. “Full ahead” 

was ordered, and the leading craft surged toward the 

bank. Moore turned to Sergeant Smith, who through 

his loudspeaker informed the enemy that the rebellion 

was over and that they should lay down their arms 

and surrender. At this, a hail of bullets greeted the 

approaching Royal Marines. The response from each 

craft was instantaneous, and by the time the leading 

craft had beached about 30 yards from the police station about 20 seconds later, it was clear that Company 

L had the fire initiative thanks largely to the heavy 

weight of lead pouring from the Vickers medium machine guns. 

Moore recalled,

We drove our landing craft straight at the 

bank, opposite the police station, with the 

second craft with the Vickers in support. 

. . . [T]he enemy had light machine guns, 

lots of rifles and shotguns, so the fire was 

heavy and a number of people were hit.

Two Marines of the leading troop were killed 

even before they got to the bank, and Lieutenant 

Peter Waters was hit in the leg as he jumped ashore. 

The coxswain of the leading craft also was hit, as were 

Lieutenant Davis and a seaman in the second craft still 

standing off and giving covering fire.21 Number 5 Troop 

21 The term coxswain refers to the sailor who has the charge of the 

boat and its crew and who usually steers.
58 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

stormed ashore, clearing the police station in its stride, 

with Corporal Bill Lester taking his section across the 

road, mopping up, and providing a cut off to the rear. 

Sergeant John Bickford, a Corps footballer and physical 

training instructor, and his section commander, Corporal Bob Rawlinson, pressed home the attack, though 

Rawlinson had been wounded in the back.

Meanwhile, with the coxswain wounded, the 

leading craft had drifted off the bank, but Lieutenant 

David Willis immediately took the wheel and drove 

the craft back into the bank. Being very unwieldy, he 

beached it halfway between the residency and the hospital, approximately 150 yards from the initial landing. 

Captain Moore reassessed the situation and ordered 

Painting by Terence Cuneo, courtesy of the Cuneo Trust and Royal Marines Museum

Royal Marines of Company L, 42 Commando, with their two converted Z-craft, attacking Limbang against strong opposition.

his troop sergeant, Sergeant Wally Macfarlane, ashore 

with the reserve section. Sergeant Smith, having decided that his loudspeaker was no longer a suitable 

weapon, accompanied them. By this time, only sporadic fire could be heard, and Sergeant Macfarlane 

moved stealthily north, clearing the enemy from the 

jungle edges that came right down to the bank in places. They reached the hospital without incident, where 

Macfarlane decided to press on to join up with the 

initial landing force near the police station. Suddenly, 

a group of determined enemy opened fire, killing the 

troop sergeant and two Marines. 

Through the sounds of battle, Sergeant Smith 

heard inharmonious singing coming from within the 
SUMMER 2017 59

hospital. Recognizing the tune as a version of “Coming Round the Mountain,” he called out to them in 

English and was able to identify the Morrises, along 

with several other hostages, who were unharmed 

but severely shocked. Their guards had fled. Captain 

Moore, his main task of freeing this group of hostages 

achieved, checked with Richard Morris to ensure that 

there were no more held in other locations. As he did 

so, one remaining rebel loosed a round from his shotgun, fortunately quite inaccurately, before disappearing into the close jungle.

During this time, the second craft had been maneuvering in the fast-flowing river to give the best 

supporting fire possible. The company sergeant major 

had taken command of the situation when Lieutenant 

Davis was severely wounded. At this juncture, the reserve sections on the second craft came ashore before 

the craft once again took up a position midstream, 

covering any eventuality with its medium machine 

guns.22

A number of the rebels were soon routed by 

Number 5 Troop in the area of an attap house, while 

Number 6 Troop cleared the police station and Number 4 Troop moved north past the mosque to the back 

of the bazaar, where one of the rebels engaged them 

from a room full of women and children.23 He was 

soon dislodged with no further casualties. From this 

time onward, most of the enemy resistance had collapsed, although a number of dissidents held out in 

town and the surrounding jungle. As a result, considerable movement and sniping continued during the 

next 24 hours.24

As soon as the second craft beached, Royal Navy 

Sick Berth Attendant Terry Clarke made his way to 

the hospital and set up a dressing station, treating the 

casualties while the released hostages helped him to 

prepare dressings. Ironically, four of the six cases of 

22 “Brunei Revolt: The Assault on Limbang 42 Commando,” 

Arcre.com, transcribed from original at TNA WO 305/2519.

23 An attap house is a traditional dwelling found in Brunei, 

Indonesia, and Malaysia. It was named for the attap palm, which 

provides materials for both the wattle in the walls and the 

thatching for the roofs.

24 “Brunei Revolt.”

gunshot wounds were in the legs, though additional 

casualties would come in later as a result of men falling through the roofs of buildings during searches. 

Sergeant Smith set about interrogating the hostages 

and other prisoners, discovering that others were still 

being held in the jail and the southern area of Limbang. By late afternoon, this area also had been systematically cleared and a total of 14 hostages had been 

rescued unharmed.25

Later in the morning, the Z-craft returned to Brunei, this time rather more quickly and triumphantly, 

bringing the hostages and the casualties with them. 

Company L had lost five dead and five wounded, plus 

one sailor wounded. The police had lost six men. The 

wounded were quickly flown to Labuan, Malaysia, and 

then evacuated to Singapore. As Dorothy Morris came 

ashore, relief showing in her taut face, she handed the 

author two letters for her children—Geraldine and 

Adrian—safe at school in Australia. Originally, they 

were due to arrive in Limbang any day that week for 

the Christmas holidays. 

That afternoon, the author accompanied Brigadier A. G. Patterson, the commander of 99th Gurkha 

Infantry Brigade, down to Limbang by boat to assess 

the situation. They met Richard Morris for the first 

time, along with Jeremy Moore, who gave them a firsthand account of the action. It was clear that the training, professionalism, and bravery of the Royal Marines 

had won the day.

As Company L consolidated during the next 

few days, 15 rebel bodies were found and approximately 50 prisoners were taken. It was later learned 

that many others died of wounds in the jungle. Of 

the nearly 350 rebels who had held Limbang initially, many later simply discarded their uniforms and 

melted anonymously into the bazaar areas of the 

town. Much later, Captain Jeremy Moore made the 

following observations:

It is perhaps interesting to note that, 

though my assessment of where the enemy 

headquarters might be was right, I was quite 

wrong about the hostages. Furthermore, it 

25 Chanin, Limbang Rebellion, 145.
60 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

was chance that the second beaching happened where it did, that resulted in us taking the hospital from the direction we did. 

It could be that this saved us heavier casualties, though I assess the most important 

factor in the success of the operation was 

first class leadership by junior NCOs. Their 

section battle craft was a joy to watch, and 

the credit for this belongs to the Troop and 

Section commanders.26

Aftermath

Though the actions in Brunei lasted only a few days, 

there is no doubt that they acted as a catalyst for what 

followed.27 They kick-started a four-year jungle campaign that became known as Confrontation, a term 

coined by the Indonesians.28 This covered three phases starting in April 1963 and ending in August 1966, 

when General Suharto replaced General Sukarno as 

president of Indonesia in a coup and the end of Confrontation was ratified.29 During this campaign, there 

was considerable cross-border activity by both sides 

deep in the jungles of Borneo; this was indeed a junior 

leader’s war. 

Although several British infantry battalions 

served in Borneo, the brunt of the campaign was born 

by the eight Gurkha battalions and 40 and 42 Royal 

Marines Commandos. Between December 1962 and 

September 1966, there was almost always one Royal 

Marines Commando group in Borneo, and on more 

26 Francis, “The Raid on Limbang.”

27 LtCol Brian Edwards, RM, After Limbang: A Royal Marines 

Anthology of Experiences of the Confrontation with Indonesia, 

December 1962 to September 1966, Special Publication no. 36 

(Hampshire, UK: Royal Marines Historical Society, 2010), 5.

28 The term Confrontation was coined by Indonesia’s Foreign 

Minister, Dr. Subandrio, in January 1963, and refers to Indonesia’s 

efforts to destabilize the new federation. The war officially began 

with Indonesia’s launch of a series of cross-border raids into 

Malaysian territory early in 1963. “Indonesian Confrontation, 

1962–1966,” Australian War Memorial, https://www.awm.gov.au

/atwar/indonesian-confrontation/.

29 Julian Thompson, The Royal Marines: From Sea Soldiers to Special 

Force (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 2000), 525.

Photo by author

U.S. Peace Corps Officer Fritz Klattenhoff (center with hands on hips), 

who was one of the hostages, returns with casualties to Brunei on the 

second Z-craft.

Photo by author

Leading Z-craft approaching the jetty after returning from the raid.

Photo by author

Casualties arriving back in Brunei Town lying on the Z-craft before being evacuated by air to Singapore.
SUMMER 2017 61

than one occasion, both were present.30 This was indeed a case of the Royal Marines being “first in, last 

out.”31

For the action at Limbang, Captain Moore was 

awarded a bar to his Military Cross; Corporals Rawlinson and Lester were awarded Military Medals;

30 Ibid.

31 This motto, imprimo exculto, was adopted in 1942 during the 

formation of the Commandos.

Organization of a Royal Marines 

Commando in 1962

A Royal Marines Commando is the equivalent of a 

U.S. Army battalion, with a total of approximately 

680 men. The 42 Commando had been reformed 

from a very different wartime organization just two 

months before the Limbang operation. A Commando contains three rifle companies, a headquarters 

Lieutenant David Willis, RN, received a Distinguished 

Service Cross; and Sick Berth Attendant Terry Clarke 

received a commendation. Richard Morris would 

later receive the Most Excellent Order of the British 

Empire (OBE).

• 1775 •

company, and a support company with reconnaissance (or recce), mortar, antitank, and assault engineer troops. The new organization retained the 

wartime name of troops rather than platoons for 

the subunits within each company, and each troop 

had sections.
by Colonel Douglas E. Nash Sr., USA (Ret)*

As any student of naval and maritime history 

knows, sea power is the ability of a nation to 

use and control the sea and to prevent an 

opponent from using it. Merely having a fleet is not 

enough; any nation that wishes to control the sea must 

be able to project its power in real or concrete form. 

According to current U.S. Navy doctrine, power projection in and from the sea includes a broad spectrum 

of offensive operations to destroy enemy forces or to 

prevent enemy forces from approaching within range 

of friendly forces. History shows that there are generally three ways to accomplish this goal: amphibious 

assault, attack of targets ashore, or support of sea control operations.1

 The United States is, of course, the 

world’s leading maritime power; a key component of 

its maritime power projection capability is the U.S. 

* Douglas E. Nash Sr. was born in Charlotte, NC, and grew up 

in an Air Force family. He enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1974 

and graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point 

in 1980. After 32 years of service in a variety of armor, cavalry, 

and special operations assignments, he retired at the Pentagon 

in 2006. He has masters degrees in international relations and in 

military history and has authored several books, including Hell’s 

Gate: The Battle of the Cherkassy Pocket, January to February 1944

(2002) and Victory Was Beyond Their Grasp: With the 272nd VolksGrenadier Division from the Hürtgen Forest to the Heart of the Reich

(2008), which was nominated for the 2008 Pulitzer Prize for nonfiction. He is currently serving as the senior historian for Marine 

Corps History Division.

1 Naval Operations Concept 2010: Implementing the Maritime Strategy

(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2010), 51.

The “Afloat-Ready Battalion”

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. NAVY-MARINE CORPS 

AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP/MARINE EXPEDITIONARY 

UNIT, 1898–1978

Navy and Marine Corps’ Amphibious Ready Group/

Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU), a force that 

is increasingly relevant in today’s complex operating environment. The way in which the ARG/MEU 

concept evolved is an excellent example of how the 

Marine Corps has successfully adapted throughout its 

history in response to changing political and military 

circumstances. 

Whenever a Marine Air-Ground Task Force 

(MAGTF) consisting of a battalion landing team, 

composite air squadron, and combat logistics battalion is embarked aboard a Navy Amphibious Squadron (PhibRon), an ARG/MEU is created. Up to three 

can operate continuously in the areas of responsibility 

assigned to the Geographic Combatant Commands 

(GCC), including the Pacific, Central, African, and 

European commands. These versatile units provide the 

president of the United States, acting in his capacity 

as the commander in chief of the U.S. Armed Services, 

and the GCC commanders with credible deterrence 

and response capability across the range of military 

operations. ARG/MEUs serve as forward-deployed, 

flexible sea-based MAGTFs—an afloat-ready force—a 

force capable of conducting amphibious operations to 

respond to a crisis, conduct limited contingency operations, introduce follow-on forces, or support designated special operations forces at a moment’s notice. 

ARG/MEUs are characterized by their sea-based forward presence, expeditionary nature, ability to plan 

for and respond to crises, combined arms integration, 

62
SUMMER 2017 63

and interoperability with joint, combined, and special 

operations forces in support of theater requirements.2

However, the ARG/MEU concept did not simply spring into existence overnight. Its inception as 

an afloat-ready force dates back to the late 1800s and 

reflects a confluence of three factors: policy (i.e., the 

political-military need for afloat-ready forces by the 

U.S. government, and by extension, the U.S. Navy); 

the maturation of the Marine Corps’ expeditionary 

doctrine that featured the ARG/MEU as its centerpiece; and the technological development of aircraft 

and amphibious assault shipping that enabled the 

MAGTF to operate in its maritime environment. This 

article will lay out the historical milestones of this 

concept, including its early origins, and show how 

policy, doctrine, and technology have contributed to 

the evolution over the past 118 years of the force deployed around the globe today.

Historical Origins

of the Afloat-Ready Force

Since its inception in 1775, the U.S. Marine Corps 

has contributed a detachment of Marines, numbering 

anywhere from 6 to 60 Marines, to nearly every major warship’s complement, from sloop to frigate, until 

the turn of the nineteenth century. Serving as “naval 

infantry” when needed, as marksmen in the “fighting 

tops” of sailing ships during sea battles, and as the 

ship’s guard, they also were ready to enforce shipboard 

discipline when necessary. Should a landing party be 

ordered to go ashore to fight or land for less warlike 

purposes as part of a naval expedition, Marines would 

make up a portion of the party, but would usually be 

outnumbered by Navy bluejackets, who were part of 

the ship’s normal complement. 

As a rule, large numbers of Marines would not 

normally be embarked on a Navy ship, especially in 

cases where a fleet or flotilla might sail on missions 

lasting weeks or even months. There was simply no 

reason for them to do so, unless embarked on a troopship where they would be landed as part of a land 

2 Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit: Overview

(Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 2013), 1.

campaign led by the U.S. Army. Exceptions were 

made should a large-scale amphibious landing be contemplated, such as at Veracruz, Mexico, in 1847, or 

Fort Fisher, North Carolina, in 1864, but Marines did 

not ordinarily embark to serve as a fleet’s contingency 

landing force to be landed if and when a commodore 

saw fit. There was simply no room aboard contemporary warships for anything larger than a detachment 

of up to 60 men. 

Despite this record, at least one naval officer during this period advanced the idea of having an embarked landing force sailing with the fleet at all times. 

The officer, Navy Commander Bowman H. McCalla, 

had recorded his suggestion in an after action report 

about the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps expedition of 

April 1885 to the Isthmus of Panama, then still part of 

Columbia. Noting how readily the brigade of Marines 

restored peace and prevented an insurrection once 

ashore, McCalla wrote that “in future naval operations 

an additional number of seamen and marines, organized in naval brigades, will be carried in transports 

accompanying the battle ships.” Though the seeds of 

an idea had been sown, the Navy Department did not 

concur and would continue to adhere to existing practice of forming ad hoc landing forces when needed.3

That policy changed in 1898, when the United 

States declared war on Spain. Confronted by a maritime enemy with naval and land forces stationed 

around the globe defending various overseas colonies, 

such as Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, the 

U.S. Navy was challenged by the enormous distances 

involved in simply closing the distance to do battle. 

Another aspect of naval warfare that had changed 

since the Marine Corps’ inception was the introduction of steam-powered warships, which had completely replaced wooden sailing ships by the end of 

the nineteenth century. Instead of being driven by inexhaustible wind power, ships were now dependent 

upon coal to fire their steam plants, which enabled 

them to travel faster and at a steadier pace than with 

3

 Bowman H. McCalla, Report of Commander McCalla upon the Naval Expedition to the Isthmus of Panama, April 1885 (Washington, 

DC: Navy Department, 1885), 43–81.
64 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

sail power. However, steel-hulled steam-powered warships could not carry enough coal, the fuel of choice, 

to travel 8,000 miles or more to reach some of Spain’s 

far-flung possessions, where they presumably would 

do battle with the Spanish fleet once they arrived. 

Therefore, coaling stations and advanced bases located along the way were necessary and in fact became of 

strategic importance to the Navy. 

While ships could and often did take on coal 

at sea, this was a slow and hazardous process that 

exposed a warship to danger while it had come to a 

complete stop and “hove to” alongside a fleet collier, 

unlike in today’s Navy, where underway replenishment is a common procedure. A coaling station in a 

protected harbor or port was thought to be far more 

preferable. However, a protected harbor would most 

likely have to be taken from the enemy, who might be 

using it for the same purpose. While, in theory, sailors 

could (and occasionally did) fight as part of a landing 

party, the only infantry the Navy had of any strength 

was the fleet’s few embarked Marines who actually 

had trained for ground combat as their stock-in-trade. 

To be effective, such an expeditionary landing force 

would have to be at least of battalion size (several hundred men), including artillery, which could embark 

and remain on board as an afloat-ready battalion and 

land whenever the naval commander deemed the situation required boots on the ground (in modern parlance) or when U.S. foreign policy dictated that they 

land. And therein lies the true genesis of the fleet’s 

“ready reserve” force, the forerunner of today’s Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit.

Huntington’s Battalion

The Marine Corps’ first ready reserve force or afloat 

battalion was “Huntington’s Battalion,” which was activated for expeditionary service during the SpanishAmerican War on 16 April 1898. Composed of Marines 

recruited from nearly every shipyard and naval installation detachment on the East Coast of the United 

States, it was created by the Colonel Commandant of 

the Marine Corps, Colonel Charles C. Heywood, in 

anticipation that the Navy would ask for such a force, 

but without knowing exactly how, when, or where it 

Naval History and Heritage Command, 

NH48984

Col Robert W. Huntington as a major in 

the 1870s.

would be employed. This ad hoc organization, known 

officially as the 1st Marine Battalion (Reinforced), 

consisted of 654 Marines and one Navy surgeon. 

It was organized into five infantry companies 

and one artillery battery equipped with four 3-inch 

rapid-fire guns and a battery of four Colt-Browning 

M1895 machine guns.4 There was, of course, no aircraft 

to support this modest force, since the Wright brothers’ pioneering flight was still five years out. Having 

received no definite mission from the Navy’s Atlantic 

Fleet, the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel 

Robert W. Huntington, was ordered to have his men 

board the converted transport USS Panther (1889) in 

New York City on 22 April 1898. While underway, 

they learned that they were bound for the naval blockade of Cuba.

The Panther was hardly suited as an attack transport. It was old and crowded, having been purchased 

with the intent of carrying only half the number of 

Marines that were actually embarked. A former South 

American banana freighter, its hasty conversion to 

a troopship failed to address many of the amenities 

taken for granted today, such as adequate 

ventilation and heads 

(toilets) and galley (kitchen) spaces. 

Given the time constraints, it was the 

best the Navy could 

do. After nearly two 

months in limbo, 

half of the time being spent ashore at 

Key West, Florida, 

and the other half 

afloat, Huntington 

and his battalion 

were finally landed 

at Guantánamo Bay, 

4

 John J. Reber, “Huntington’s Battalion Was the Forerunner of 

Today’s FMF,” Marine Corps Gazette 63, no. 11 (November 1979).
SUMMER 2017 65

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 514827

Marine officers who landed with 1st Marine Battalion (Reinforced) 

at Guantánamo, Cuba, on 10 June 1898 (from left): 1stLt Herbert L. 

Draper, adjutant; Col Robert W. Huntington, battalion commander; 

and Capt Charles L. McCawley, assistant quartermaster.

Marine Corps Archives Branch, History Division 

Marching off to war in the late afternoon on Friday, 22 April 1898, the 

battalion, preceded by the New York Navy Yard band playing the popular “The Girl I Left behind Me,” is led down Navy Street in Brooklyn, 

NY, under the command of LtCol Huntington astride Old Tom (Capt 

George F. Elliot’s charger). 

Cuba, on 10 June 1898 at the site the Atlantic Fleet 

had selected for a protected coaling station.5

For Huntington and his Marines, the landing 

could not have come soon enough. Besides having 

to cope with crowded and uncomfortably hot living 

conditions aboard the Panther, a variety of command5

 Incidentally, the same bay is still in use by the U.S. Navy 118 

years later.

related issues had arisen between Huntington and the 

ship’s captain, Commander George C. Ritter, since 

embarking in April. One well-known example involved Ritter’s order forbidding his crew to assist the 

Marines in landing their supplies and equipment, forcing the Marines to do it by themselves, thus prolonging the landing operation. Additionally, the Marines 

were not allowed to land all of their rifle ammunition, 

since Commander Ritter claimed he needed it kept 

aboard to serve as ship’s ballast. 

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH68336

USS Panther, ca. 1902–3.

Marine Corps Historical Reference Branch, 

History Division, courtesy of Col Robert W. Huntington 

U.S. Marines of Huntington’s Battalion training at Key West, FL, prior 

to the invasion of Cuba, 1898. 
66 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

Moreover, Ritter, following Navy custom, insisted on establishing his authority over the Marines on 

every matter, large or small. While this certainly was 

his prerogative in regard to a normal Marine Corps 

ship’s detachment, Huntington believed that this authority was overstated in regard to an embarked Marine battalion, which was under the command of its 

duly appointed commander. Timely intervention at 

one point by the overall flotilla commander, Commander McCalla of the warship USS Marblehead (CL 

12), ensured the cooperation of both the ship’s captain 

and commander of the landing force for the duration 

of the operation.

Nevertheless, Huntington’s Battalion was successfully landed on 10 June with all of his men, guns, 

tents, and equipage and they immediately went about 

securing the heights surrounding the bay. The Spanish defending force was resoundingly defeated at the 

Battle of Cuzco Wells on 14 June, leaving the battlefield to the Marines. Not only did the Marines fight 

ashore as an independent, all-arms force for the first 

time, new techniques in ship-to-shore communication, fire support, and inter-Service cooperation also 

were established, if not perfected. With the heights 

secure and the Spanish bottled up safely in the town 

of Caimanera, McCalla’s flotilla sailed into the excellent harbor and used it continuously for the next 

several months, which was finally established as a permanent U.S. naval base by treaty when the war was 

over. Following the war’s conclusion, Huntington and 

his Marines sailed back to the United States, arriving 

at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on 26 August 1898.6

Back on American soil on 19 September 1898, 

Colonel Commandant Heywood ordered the battalion paraded and then had it disbanded, with its 

Marines being sent back to the various East Coast 

barracks and naval installations from whence they 

6

 Surprisingly, 98 percent of the men had been unaffected by any 

tropical disease, compared to the Army contingent in the Cuban 

campaign, which suffered inordinately from such diseases as yellow fever. Their good fortune was attributed to the fact that, for 

most of the campaign, the Marines had been embarked aboard a 

ship away from the swampy lowlands, and while they were ashore 

had practiced rigorous field sanitation procedures. 

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH72745

CDR Bowman H. McCalla, captain of the USS Marblehead at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. 

had come.7 Although Huntington’s Battalion had successfully accomplished its mission, Heywood did not 

contemplate this expeditionary adventure becoming a 

standing requirement. Instead, the Colonel Commandant saw it as a distraction from the Marine Corps’ 

traditional role, which he felt was continuing to serve 

as ship’s detachments and guarding the various naval 

installations throughout the United States. Whether 

he or the Marine Corps cared for the concept or not, 

7

 The origination of military parades harkens back to military 

formations during close-order maneuvers. More recently, the actions became strictly ceremonial in nature, particularly during 

the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when military units were 

returning from deployments or as a means to demonstrate the 

military might of a nation.
SUMMER 2017 67

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 

The first bloody engagement of U.S. troops on Cuban soil. U.S. Marines going ashore at Guantánamo with their Krag–Jørgensen rifles in June 1898. 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 515613

Group of Marine officers at Portsmouth, NH, immediately after the 

Spanish-American War and their return from Cuba. Col Huntington 

(front row, fifth from right) with his line and staff officers, August 1898.

the afloat-ready battalion had proven itself in practice, and the U.S. Navy took notice.

The Afloat-Ready Battalion Concept

Revived by the Navy

The next incarnation of the afloat-ready battalion 

came four years later in the form of Russell’s, Haines’, 

Pope’s, and Lejeune’s Battalions. At the beginning 

of September 1902, the USS Panther once again embarked a Marine battalion (16 officers and 325 enlisted 

men) at the request of Secretary of the Navy William 

H. Moody, who had stated his desire the previous July 

to have such a battalion ready for training with the 

fleet, as well as to be on hand to serve in an expeditionary capacity and ready to land anywhere the fleet 

deemed it desirable to do so.8

Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin R. 

Russell, this first afloat-ready battalion was composed 

of men from the Marine Barracks Brooklyn Navy 

Yard and Philadelphia Navy Yard. Hastily formed for 

service in what they were told would be Western Caribbean waters, the battalion sailed on 14 September 

1902. Upon arrival off the coast of Columbia, the Panther would serve as a station ship, able to launch an 

expeditionary battalion-size landing force anywhere 

in the region at a moment’s notice. It and its three 

successor battalions would protect American interests during ongoing unrest in Honduras and Panama 

for the next 16 months, serving as an important tool of 

U.S. national policy in the region.

The Marines did not have to wait long. On 23 

September, on orders from Rear Admiral Silas Casey 

III, commander of naval forces in the Caribbean, Russell and his Marines landed at Colón in what is now 

modern-day Panama, to protect U.S. interests during 

8

 Allan R. Millett and Jack Shulimson, Commandants of the Marine 

Corps (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2004), 140.
68 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH49185

Maj General Charles C. Heywood, 9th Commandant of the Marine 

Corps (1891–1903). During his tenure, he expanded the Corps and 

helped strengthen its amphibious capabilities.

Marine Corps Historical Reference Branch, History Division photo 

Col John H. Russell Jr., commander of Russell’s Battalion, shown here 

as a major in 1902, U.S. Naval Academy Class of 1892 and future Major 

General Commandant of the Marine Corps.

a period of civil unrest between Colombia and the 

United States, which exercised governmental authority over the region where the Panama Canal was being 

built. The landing of a disciplined battalion of wellarmed and -equipped Marines, and its visible presence 

throughout the city, was enough to convince the warring parties—loyalists and separatists—to stand down 

and cease their violent acts against the local government in Colón and American businesses. 

After two uneventful months of patrolling and 

supporting the local police, the battalion once again 

embarked on board the Panther on 18 November and 

sailed for the advanced naval base at Culebra, an island off the coast of Puerto Rico, where the Marines 

disembarked and conducted training ashore.9 By 30 

November 1902, most of Russell’s men had become 

sick from various tropical diseases incurred after two 

and a half months of service in the Caribbean, forcing the weakened battalion to return to the United 

9

 Ibid.

States, where it was immediately disbanded. Despite 

the lingering effects of the various tropical illnesses, 

the presence of an armed and well-trained battalion of 

Marines embarked aboard a station ship had proved 

its worth.

Meanwhile, once again at the behest of the Navy, 

another Marine battalion was formed on 5 November 

that same year in Norfolk, also for service in the Caribbean. This battalion, commanded by Colonel Percival C. Pope, was sent directly to Culebra aboard the 

transport USS Prairie (AD 5) to train with Russell’s 

Battalion, since the immediate need for troops in Panama had seemingly passed. Discovering that Russell’s 

Battalion had been forced to return to the United 

States for health reasons, the flotilla commander decided to keep Pope’s Battalion on station aboard the 

Prairie instead. 

Pope was no stranger to service afloat. He had 

served on the staff of Huntington’s Battalion at Guantánamo Bay and was a good choice to lead the new battalion, which was nearly twice as large as Russell’s. It 

was a balanced force, consisting of 600 men organized 
SUMMER 2017 69

into six companies, along with artillery, machine guns, 

and rudimentary signal equipment. However, in fleshing out this battalion, the East Coast was effectively 

denuded of nearly every able-bodied Marine who had 

not deployed with Russell five months earlier. It also 

forced the Colonel Commandant to delay his plans 

to create an advanced base defense force, which had 

become the Marine Corps’ primary focus since the 

Spanish-American War. 

Emphasis Shifts

to Advanced Base Force

With its traditional role of serving as ship’s detachments threatened by the increasing modernization of 

the Navy, which felt that it no longer needed such a 

seemingly anachronistic body of troops on board its 

ships, Marine Corps leaders belatedly realized that the 

advanced base force was where its future lay.10 After its 

victory in 1898, the United States had acquired a farflung overseas empire with coaling stations located 

all around the globe that needed to be defended or 

seized if the president deemed it necessary. The ensuing deployments of not only Pope’s Battalion in an 

expeditionary capacity, but of two subsequent ones, 

forced Heywood to delay his plans for creating such a 

force for at least two more years, since it was patently 

obvious that nothing could be done until the Navy 

overcame its desire to keep large numbers of Marines 

embarked on station ships or until it became impractical to continue doing so. 

Nevertheless, Admiral George Dewey, commander of the Atlantic Fleet and hero of the Battle of Manila Bay, remained enthusiastic about the utility of an 

embarked ready battalion. Shortly after the SpanishAmerican War had concluded, he commented that “If 

there had been 5,000 Marines under my command at 

Manila Bay, the city would have surrendered to me on 

May 1, 1898, and could have been properly garrisoned.”11

The further utility of the Marines for service in 

the Caribbean was evinced by Dewey’s deputy, Rear 

Admiral H. C. Taylor, in a letter to the secretary of the 

Navy, in which he asserted that the Marines served two 

10 At the time, an advanced base force was understood to be a coastal or naval base defense force designed to establish mobile and 

fixed bases in the event major landing operations would be necessary beyond U.S. shores.

11 James D. Hittle, “Sea Power and the Balanced Fleet,” Marine 

Corps Gazette 32, no. 2 (February 1948): 57.

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH85788

Col Percival C. Pope (shown here as a major in 1890), commander of 

Pope’s Battalion, 1902. 

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH105835

USS Prairie in a harbor, while she was fitted with sailing rig for training 

ship service, ca. 1901–5. 
70 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

purposes: one of “being ready for service anywhere,” 

and the other “that of improving the base and harbor” 

of Culebra as “a most valuable adjunct.”12 It was not 

an entirely negative development for Pope’s Marines, 

who gained valuable experience in constructing and 

defending an advanced base during a lengthy exercise 

carried out by the Navy that ended on 3 January 1903. 

That same month, Colonel Pope handed over 

command of his battalion in Culebra to Major Henry C. Haines, who then was ordered to transfer his 

Marines back aboard the creaking Panther later that 

month. They would serve aboard this station ship as 

part of the Atlantic Fleet’s newly activated “Caribbean Squadron” until late July 1903. Finally landed in 

Maine to take part in Army-Navy joint maneuvers at 

the end of that month, Haines and his battalion sailed 

to the Philadelphia Navy Yard in August 1903, where 

he was relieved of command by Major John A. Lejeune 

in October. 

The Floating Battalion 

of the Atlantic Fleet

Lejeune’s Battalion, now known by the Navy as the 

“Floating Battalion of the Atlantic Fleet,” then embarked aboard the transport USS Dixie (1893) and 

sailed once more to the Caribbean to take part in the 

upcoming 1903–4 winter maneuvers.13 That exercise 

never came to pass because Lejeune and his men were 

diverted from Culebra to Panama instead, where they 

went ashore at Colón on 5 November to discourage 

Colombian forces from invading. Joined two months 

later by Brigadier General George F. Elliott’s provisional Marine brigade, Lejeune and his men participated in the Panama Canal crisis of 1903–4, but did 

not see combat. 

After Colombia backed down from its threats to 

invade Panama, mainly due to the presence of Elliott’s 

Brigade, peace was restored and Panamanian independence was formally recognized. No longer needed, Lejeune’s Battalion returned to the United States 

12 Millett and Shulimson, Commandants of the Marine Corps, 141.

13 Spencer C. Tucker, Almanac of American Military History: 1000–

1830, vol. 1 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2012), 1210.

in February 1904, where it was finally disbanded.14

Though Pope’s, Russel’s, Haines’, and Lejeune’s 

Battalions had satisfactorily served as precursors for 

the Navy’s forces afloat-ready concept, the Marine 

Corps recorded its objections to the overall concept, 

feeling that it was a diversion from what it saw as its 

evolving primary mission of serving as the fleet’s nascent base defense force. In addition to this objection, 

Colonel Commandant Heywood complained in 1903 

that this unfunded program came out of the Marine 

Corps’ thinly stretched budget and was not compensated for by the Navy, that it used “borrowed” manpower needed elsewhere, and that the proper onboard 

equipment and small boats needed to receive, store, 

and land supplies were lacking on the ships used to 

14 Ibid., 1213.

Marine Corps History Division photo 

BGen George F. Elliot (shown here as a major general while serving as 

the 10th Commandant of the Marine Corps), commander of Elliott’s 

Brigade, 1903.
SUMMER 2017 71

carry the Marines. There was also the issue of the ships 

themselves—the USS Panther, Prairie, and Dixie—which 

were never intended to serve as troopships and had 

undergone inadequate conversion to prepare them for 

that role. They were cramped, poorly ventilated, and 

lacked adequate space for the embarked Marines to 

exercise or perform any sort of drills.

Another issue that continually raised its head 

was the never-ending conflict of authority between 

the successive Marine battalion commanders and each 

ship’s captain. In many cases, not only did the ship’s 

captain insist on enforcing his writ upon every Marine on board, circumventing the Marine Corps chain 

of command, but some ship’s captains also attempted 

to give precise instructions on the employment of the 

Marines once they had gone ashore. However it might 

vex Colonel Commandant Heywood and his successor 

Brigadier General Commandant Elliott, there was little either of them could do about it, since they had no 

authority over their Marines from Washington, DC, 

once they were sailing as part of the fleet, unless, like 

Elliott, he sailed with his Marines to command them 

in person as commander of the provisional brigade 

sent to Panama. 

While Heywood or Elliott could complain to the 

Navy about this practice, both had to confront the 

admiral’s belief, deeply rooted in tradition, that anyone embarked on a U.S. Navy warship was subject to 

the captain’s authority. Heywood, when he first confronted this assertion, countered that this was nonsense, given that the Panther, Prairie, and Dixie were 

mere troopships, which by naval custom gave the commander of the landing force authority over his own 

men. Unfortunately for Heywood, the Navy’s counterargument that the presence of a few small-caliber 

cannon on board these converted freighters buttressed 

its contention that these were indeed warships, which 

practically ended all discussion of the matter during 

the rest of his and Elliott’s tenure.

Despite the ineffective resistance of the Marine 

Corps, which was in any case subordinate to the Navy, 

the latter Service still wanted to continue the practice. 

After the success in Panama and elsewhere, the Navy 

believed that an embarked battalion of Marines enhanced the Navy’s expeditionary capability. However, 

events conspired to end the practice altogether for 

nearly 43 years. During the first decade of the twentieth century, the United States quickly discovered 

that its new overseas empire needed to be policed and 

that the numbers of troops on hand, both Army and 

Marine Corps, were insufficient for the purpose. The 

Marine Corps especially found itself pulled in every 

direction, having to send detachments to protect new 

naval bases in the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, 

and Cuba, as well as the American legation in China. 

While the authorized size of the Marine Corps had 

increased, it still had not attained the minimum number of Marines that Colonel Commandant Heywood 

felt adequate—a total of 10,000 men—to meet all of 

the Corps’ commitments, most especially when it was 

focused on the evolving advanced base defense force 

concept.

The dichotomy between the desires of the Navy, 

which wanted an expeditionary afloat-ready battalion, 

and the Marines Corps, which wanted an advanced 

base defense force, would continue unresolved until 

1947. During the interval, both Services were consumed 

by a variety of challenges, including modernizing the 

fleet, fighting World War I, participating in a series 

of protracted counterguerrilla and nation-building 

operations in the Caribbean during the 1920s and ’30s 

(the Banana Wars), experimenting with air-ground 

cooperation, and—most important from the Marine 

Corps perspective—developing and maturing the advanced base force concept that included the concept 

of amphibious assault against a defended beachhead. 

These and other events, including successfully waging 

World War II, required the complete dedication and 

cooperation of both sea Services to achieve their goals.

Afloat-Ready Battalion Concept

Rediscovered by State Department

This is where things stood until December 1947, when 

the concept was resurrected at the beginning of the 

Cold War. On this occasion, it was not the Navy that 

called for an afloat-ready force, but the U.S. Department of State, which felt that the United States needed a variety of policy options to employ as a counter 
72 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

to what had become an increasingly belligerent and 

assertive Soviet Union. In April and again in December of that year, Ambassador George F. Kennan called 

for a scalable, highly mobile amphibious reaction force 

that could be based at sea and prepared to conduct a 

landing operation anywhere in the Mediterranean Sea 

to assist U.S. allies threatened by Communist expansion.15 Instead of seeking a military confrontation with 

the Soviet Union, which was engaged in destabilizing 

several Western European nations and consolidating 

its control over Eastern Europe, Kennan believed that 

U.S. goals would best be achieved by containing the 

Soviet threat over a long period by using diplomatic, 

informational, military, and economic (DIME) levers 

of power.

Kennan was serving at the time as Secretary of 

State George C. Marshall Jr.’s influential director of 

policy planning and was highly respected throughout 

the U.S. government for his depth of understanding of 

the growing Soviet menace. When the Soviet Union 

began to exert diplomatic and military pressure upon 

Greece and Italy throughout the summer and fall of 

1947, the State Department was able to convince President Harry S. Truman that to assist these democratic 

governments, both threatened by Communist agitation, the Navy could help further the nascent “containment policy” and Truman Doctrine against the Soviet 

Union by conducting a variety of fleet exercises and 

amphibious demonstrations that would send a signal 

to Josef Stalin of the inadvisability of continuing his 

destabilizing actions.16

Consequently, in addition to sending additional 

ships of the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean 

as ordered by the president, the commander of U.S. 

naval forces in the Mediterranean, Vice Admiral Bern15 Kenneth W. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1947–1949, vol. 2 (Washington, 

DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, 1996), 6.

16 Allan K. Henrikson, “The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance: 1948–1952,” Naval War College Review 32, no. 3 (May/June 

1980): 12. Editor’s note: the May/June 1980 issue of Navy War College Review was published bearing the incorrect volume number 

(32); the correct volume number for all 1980 issues is 33. 

Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, HEC12925

Ambassador George F. Kennan in 1947. 

hard H. Bieri, also requested that a battalion-size 

Marine Corps landing force be deployed to bolster 

the fleet’s striking power, which up to that point did 

not include any battalion landing teams. The request 

was duly approved and an order by the chief of naval operations dated 20 December 1947 directed the 

temporary assignment of a reinforced Marine battalion to augment existing Marine detachments on 

Sixth Fleet warships and to provide a ready landing 

force.17 This order brought about the actual resurrection and implementation of the afloat-ready battalion 

concept, the first time since Pope’s, Haines’, Russel’s, 

and Lejeune’s Battalions of 1902–4 that an amphibious 

expeditionary force would embark aboard Navy ships 

17 John G. Norris, “Navy Places Its Top Strategist in Command of 

Area,” Washington Post, 6 January 1948.
SUMMER 2017 73

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH80-G-701987

RAdm Bernhard H. Bieri, U.S. Navy.

and remain on station, awaiting a possible contingency order that could result in their landing on a foreign 

shore at a moment’s notice. 

Within days of receiving this order, a battalion 

landing team of 1,000 Marines from the 2d Marine 

Regiment (Reinforced), along with vehicles, tanks, 

artillery, and supplies, formed up and began loading 

on board the World War II-vintage U.S. Navy attack 

transports USS Bexar (APA 237) and USS Montague

(AKA 98) in Morehead City, North Carolina.18 Sailing from the East Coast on 5 January 1948, this force 

remained afloat with the Sixth Fleet for three months 

in the eastern Mediterranean, returning on 12 March 

1948 after being replaced by a similar battalion from 

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, a move that initiated 

a series of cruises that would normally last six months.

Unlike its lukewarm acceptance of the concept in 1903, the Marine Corps embraced this new 

mission enthusiastically. Embroiled as it was in the 

1947–48 military roles and missions debate, which 

involved nothing less than the continuing survival of 

the Marine Corps as a Service, this type of mission 

was tailor-made for what it specialized in—expeditionary operations and amphibious assault—as part of 

the Navy’s “balanced fleet.”19 Having proven its ability 

to carry out these kinds of assignments in the Pacific 

during World War II, the Marine Corps felt that it 

was uniquely suited for the afloat-ready battalion mission in the Mediterranean, as compared to the U.S. 

Army, which was almost fully committed to occupation duties in Germany, Japan, China, and Italy. The 

greatest obstacle to filling the Navy’s requirement was 

that the number of existing battalion landing teams 

had been reduced to six, of which only half were considered to be available for service with the Sixth Fleet 

in the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, and elsewhere.20

Though it was never committed to battle, the 

first afloat-ready battalion to deploy to the Mediterranean participated in several amphibious exercises 

within close proximity of Greece and Italy, a move 

18 Ibid.

19 Hittle, “Sea Power and the Balanced Fleet,” 59.

20 Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 150.

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH66834

USS Bexar (APA 237) underway off San Diego, CA, ca. 1954. 
74 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

that the Soviets could not fail to notice. Combined 

with other political and military signals being sent by 

the U.S. government at the time, the presence of the 

amphibious force and the national resolve that it signified were enough to influence the Soviet Union to 

decrease its support to the Communist rebel movements in Greece, Italy, and Turkey, granting the governments of these countries the breathing space they 

needed to renew efforts to bolster their defenses 

against their respective insurgencies.21

Evolution of the Mediterranean 

Afloat Battalion 1948–60

This first afloat-ready battalion, though still a powerful unit by today’s standards, was not a true combined Marine air-ground organization in the modern 

sense. The battalion landing team was not paired with 

an aviation component and lacked a commander and 

staff to exercise command and control of any Marine Corps air and ground units that might operate 

together. It was completely dependent on its troop 

transports for logistical support, having none of its 

own, rendering it unable to operate independently 

ashore for more than a few days. To compound command and control issues, neither the Bexar nor the 

Montague was equipped with the communications gear 

that would have allowed the battalion commander to 

exercise control over his forces while afloat. It was a 

stopgap, expedient solution but it was enough to send 

the right message of political will.

Though Marine fixed-wing aircraft were operating aboard aircraft carriers of the Sixth Fleet at the 

time, they fell under the Navy’s control and were not 

considered to be part of the afloat-ready battalion’s 

“force package” or authorized temporary organizational structure. The battalion and its equipment were 

not configured for an amphibious assault either, since 

neither of the two attack transports were accompanied by the necessary landing ships, tank (LSTs) nor 

did they carry any landing vehicles, tracked (LVTs) 

21 George F. Kennan, Report by the Policy Planning Staff: Review 

of Current Trends—U.S. Foreign Policy, Policy Planning Staff Paper 

no. 23 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 1948).

like those recently used during the war with Japan 

with such great effect. It also had no helicopters of its 

own, a newly introduced aerial system that had not 

yet gone far beyond the experimental stage but one 

that showed great future promise as a means of landing troops in support of an amphibious assault.

Nevertheless, this move initiated the Marine 

Corps’ practice of maintaining an air and landing 

force with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean on 

a recurring basis, a practice which, except for shortterm breaks in continuity due to overwhelming requirements for troops elsewhere (e.g., the Korean and 

Vietnam Wars), has continued from 1948 to the present day. That same year, this afloat-ready battalion 

also was given its first name—the Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Battalion, or NELM 

Battalion.22 In 1960, the Sixth Fleet redesignated it as 

the Landing Force, Mediterranean, or LanForMed, 

but little else changed. 

The Doctrinal Revolution of the 1950s

Except for the existing battalion landing team doctrine dating back to the late 1940s, the Marine Corps 

had yet to devise a tactical system or a way of thinking 

about how to incorporate all of the disparate elements 

needed to make such an air-ground force capable of operating in a nuclear environment complete. Even had 

there been doctrine, or helicopters advanced enough 

to carry troops and cargo, in 1948 there was as yet no 

ship suitable enough to serve as a floating base, though 

aircraft carriers did hold promise. Unfortunately, the 

Navy was reluctant to allocate its large fleet carriers or 

the funding for such a project, not convinced yet that 

the helicopter would prove itself as the panacea that 

the Marine Corps thought it was. Fixed-wing aviation 

continued to operate from aircraft carriers assigned to 

the various fleets.

Between January 1948 and early 1960, a succession of NELM Battalions continued sailing with the 

Sixth Fleet throughout the Mediterranean. However, 

a portent of the future gradually began to take shape 

22 “Marines Are on Their Way,” Sunday Star-News (Wilmington, 

NC), 13 January 1957, 8-A.
SUMMER 2017 75

upon the publication of a bulletin on 9 November 

1954 written by General Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr., 

Commandant of the Marine Corps.23 Weighing the in23 Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr., The Marine Air-Ground Task Force Concept (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1954).

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A17399

U.S. Marines and Lebanese Army personnel debark from LCTs with one of the Marine Corps’ new M50 Ontos, light armored antitank vehicle. This 

unit was from the NELM Battalion assigned to the Navy’s Sixth Fleet.

creasing capability of the Marine Corps’ rotary- and 

fixed-wing aviation elements, and foreseeing how 

they might work in concert with ground combat elements, Shepherd decreed that a new organizational 

structure—what he termed a Marine Air-Ground Task 

Force, or MAGTF—would be needed in the future to 

enable the Marine Corps to continue its amphibious 
76 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

warfare mission while at the same time leveraging new 

technology to make it a more lethal and agile force.

Shepherd stated that the “future employment 

of Fleet Marine Force elements will normally involve 

organization as air-ground task forces in which air 

and ground units will habitually operate as a single 

operational command” and that this Marine AirGround Task Force should consist of a balanced allarms team.24 Shepherd was not prescriptive in the 

bulletin as to the actual makeup of the force, but he 

was clearly influenced by the all-helicopter amphibious assault concept, commonly referred to as vertical 

envelopment, which foresaw an even greater employment of the helicopter than was possible at the time. 

More importantly, Shepherd stressed the importance 

of all arms—air, ground, and logistics—being placed 

under the command of a single Marine commander 

not tasked with the additional duty of commanding 

one of the MAGTF’s components.25

While Shepherd’s bulletin was important, it was 

not yet settled as doctrine and commanders of Marine 

Corps units in service with the various fleets were not 

bound to follow it. A year later, however, Shepherd’s 

thoughts were reinforced by Concept of Future Amphibious Operations, Landing Force Bulletin 17 (LFB17), which did have the force of doctrine behind it.26

This bulletin stressed that the MAGTF concept was 

uniquely suited toward the conduct of vertical envelopment as part of amphibious operations in a nuclear 

environment and that MAGTFs must leverage all of 

its elements to achieve success. However, the bulletin 

did not actually provide much guidance concerning 

how the doctrine was to be put into practice, leaving 

it up to the commanders to decide what a MAGTF actually was and what it would look like. Additionally, 

24 While the development of MAGTF doctrine did have some influence on the continuing evolution of the afloat-ready battalion 

concept, particularly in regard to the integration of the aviation 

element, it is a separate concept that evolved along parallel lines 

and will be covered in greater detail in a future volume of this 

publication.

25 Shepherd, The Marine Air-Ground Task Force Concept, 2.

26 Concept of Future Amphibious Operations, LFB-17 (Washington, 

DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1955).

Marine Corps Historical Reference Branch, History Division photo 

Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, 20th Commandant of the Marine Corps 

(1952–56).

the Marine Corps was still without a suitable seagoing 

platform to carry such a force, even had there been 

a consensus with the Navy as to what it was to be. 

Though smaller escort carriers had been made temporarily available to the Marine Corps for training 

exercises and experimental purposes since 1948, no 

dedicated or purpose-built Navy ships yet existed that 

could transport and support the kind of MAGTF that 

Shepherd envisioned.

Impact of New Doctrine 

on the Fleet Marine Force

Armed with the knowledge that incorporating helicopters into the afloat-ready battalion concept was 

now expected to become standard practice, beginning 

in 1956, all three Marine Expeditionary Forces, or 

MEFs (I MEF, II MEF, and III MEF), began to experiment using the forces assigned to them; but each MEF 

headquarters, faced with different challenges posed by 
SUMMER 2017 77

its area of operations and the availability of amphibious shipping, approached the matter differently. One 

of the first prototype MAGTFs that deployed consisted of 6th Marine Regiment Headquarters, with one 

battalion landing team, joined by two Marine Medium Helicopter Squadrons (HMM)—HMM-261 and 

HMM-262. This force left Morehead City for NELM 

Battalion duty with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean on 20 August 1957, making it the first standing 

MAGTF to serve in that capacity on a rotating basis.27 The regimental headquarters served as the overall command and control element of the MAGTF, 

but the limitations of existing amphibious shipping 

meant that its helicopters had to embark aboard fleet 

carriers, leaving the MAGTF commander with little 

authority over their employment until they could be 

landed and joined with the rest of the MAGTF ashore, 

the same procedure that governed employment of 

fixed-wing aircraft.

Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, 

there were many examples of the NELM Battalion/

LanForMed being used to conduct noncombatant 

evacuation operations and to support humanitarian assistance operations, such as the Suez Crisis of 

1956, the Lebanon Crisis of 1958, and the Cyprus Crisis of 1965, among others. On 14 July 1958, President 

Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the NELM Battalion, 

along with two additional battalion landing teams, to 

land in Lebanon to evacuate American citizens and 

to forestall a coup of the democratically elected government. Joined by elements from the 2d Marine Division that were already afloat in the Mediterranean 

with the Sixth Fleet for an exercise, the NELM Battalion was quickly landed and began conducting operations nearly a week before the U.S. Army’s airborne 

task force, entirely dependent on airlift, arrived from 

Germany.28 The ability of the afloat-ready battalion 

with its associated aviation element to land and begin 

27 Ralph W. Donnelly, Gabrielle M. Neufeld, and Carolyn A. Tyson, A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps, 1947–1964, vol. 

III, Marine Corps Historical Reference Pamphlet (Washington, 

DC: Historical Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1971), 34.

28 Ibid., 36.

conducting operations within 48 hours of notification 

was a powerful testament to the utility of the concept, 

once again proving the usefulness it first demonstrated in 1898. 

New and Modified Ships 

Make Their Appearance

Meanwhile, a new class of Navy ships pointed toward the possibilities of the modern MAGTF. On 20 

July 1956, the USS Thetis Bay (CVE 90), a converted 

World War II escort carrier, was recommissioned by 

the Navy as a landing platform, helicopter (LPH) ship, 

which was the Marine Corps’ first amphibious assault 

ship able to embark both the troops from the battalion landing team and 12 aircraft from a composite helicopter squadron, combining the functions of both 

an aircraft carrier and attack transport, changing the 

way afloat-ready battalions would operate forever.29

Though the Thetis Bay primarily served as a training 

platform, it saw many operational deployments as 

the Marine Corps worked out the technical details of 

the vertical envelopment concept. On 10 November 

1958, the first permanent Marine aviation detachment 

afloat was activated for service and would ultimately 

serve on board the USS Boxer (LPH 4), a converted 

World War II Essex-class fleet carrier, then undergoing 

conversion at Norfolk, Virginia.30 The unit was activated to provide supply, maintenance, and flight deck 

control to Marine helicopter squadrons and troops assigned to the Boxer once the ship was placed back into 

service. 

This trend accelerated in 1959, when the USS 

Boxer was finally recommissioned on 30 January. Twice 

as large as the Thetis Bay, the Boxer carried up to 30 

helicopters (21 on deck and 9 in the hangar deck) as 

well as nearly 2,000 Marines of an embarked battalion 

29 “’Copter Carrier Commissioned,” Naval Aviation News, September 1956; and “Fuji Feels Marine Assault,” Naval Aviation 

News, December 1957, 36.

30 Like many of the ships from this period, the Boxer saw a great 

deal of change during its service. Originally classified as an aircraft carrier (CV 21) in 1945, it was repeatedly reclassified, first 

as an attack carrier (CVA 21) then as an antisubmarine carrier 

(CVS 21).
78 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

landing team.31 Two other converted Essex-class carriers, the USS Princeton (LPH 5) and USS Valley Forge

(LPH 8), soon followed, joining the Boxer and the USS 

Thetis Bay. 

Finally, the Marine Corps had the major pieces 

of what would constitute the future amphibious force, 

but these converted carriers had their limitations. For 

example, while they could embark troops via helicopters, they had no surface landing craft of their own, 

forcing the Navy and Marine Corps to continue to rely 

on LSTs and landing ship, docks (LSDs) to carry the 

ship-to-shore craft that would transport the bulk of 

the battalion landing team and the logistics elements 

31 LtCol Eugene W. Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, 1946–1962, ed. 

Maj William J. Sambito (Washington, DC: History and Museums 

Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1976), 87–88.

ashore. These vessels were much slower than the Essexclass ships, often requiring the LPHs to sail separately.

With four LPHs on hand between 1959 and 1964, 

the Marine Corps focused on merging the MAGTF 

concept with the afloat-ready battalion concept. The 

half-formed doctrine still lagged behind the evolution 

of landing craft and helicopters. Realizing this, the 

Navy and the Marine Corps began working closely together in both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets as their 

experimentation progressed, though again each fleet 

approached the challenge differently. For example, 

in 1960, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea announced the initiation of the Fast Amphibious Force 

(FAF) concept. 

According to an article in the Marine Corps Gazette, which represented the unofficial voice of the 

Marine Corps’ leadership, the FAF consisted of an 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A17497, courtesy of TSgt Ed Scullin 

Marines landing in Lebanon, 15 July 1958. These were the first and second waves of Marines to hit the beach at the airport in Beirut. These Marines 

were from Golf Company, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines. 
SUMMER 2017 79

Naval History and Heritage Command, 19-N-69574

USS Thetis Bay (LPH 6), the first Marine Corps landing platform, helicopter.

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH97288, courtesy of Grantham 

U.S. Marine Corps HUS-1 Seahorse helicopters lift off the USS Boxer’s 

(LPH 4) flight deck during operations off Vieques Island, Puerto Rico, 

with the 10th Provisional Marine Brigade on 8 March 1959. 

afloat-ready battalion, a composite helicopter squadron, and a small logistics element embarked aboard 

the ships of a Navy amphibious squadron, consisting 

of fast amphibious ships (including an LPH) capable 

of steaming at 20 knots that would allow them to 

avoid slower Soviet submarines. The concept stressed 

that both the Marine and Navy elements of the FAF 

must train and operate in concert with one another to 

boost proficiency and overall effectiveness. Although 

the FAF concept was intended to be implemented in 

both Pacific (with the Seventh) and Atlantic (with the 

Sixth) Fleets, it only seems to have been put into effect 

under that title in the Atlantic.32

The Fleets Experiment 

with New Concepts

As the outlines of future amphibious doctrine began 

to take hold, the concepts for Marine Expeditionary 

Unit (MEU), Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), 

Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and Marine Expeditionary Corps (MEC) had become common usage 

within the Marine Corps by 1960, though they had 

32 R. A. Stephens, “Fast Amphibious Force,” Marine Corps Gazette

45, no. 1 (January 1961): 46–47.

not yet been encapsulated in doctrine.33 This led to 

misunderstandings throughout the Marine Corps regarding their exact usage and composition, whether it 

applied to the NELM Battalion (redesignated in 1960 

as the Landing Force, Mediterranean, or LanForMed) 

or the FAF. 

For example, the 24th MEU (the first recorded 

use of that designation) was activated at Cherry Point, 

North Carolina, on 15 November 1960. It consisted of 

a brigade headquarters, a battalion landing team from 

the 2d Marine Division, and a provisional Marine aviation group consisting of a light helicopter transport 

squadron and an ordnance-laden attack or jet fighter 

squadron embarked separately on an aircraft carrier 

with the Sixth Fleet.34 Technically speaking, it was 

a MAGTF, but not quite like the MEU as they are 

known today, and it did not deploy to the Mediterranean for LanForMed Battalion duty, but deployed 

only for a series of training exercises. One possible 

reason is that the Sixth Fleet did not perceive the FAF 

as a permanent organization; its primary purpose ap33 “Fleet Marine Force,” Marine Corps Gazette 44, no. 7 (July 1960): 

A-1.

34 Donnelly, Neufeld, and Tyson, A Chronology of the United States 

Marine Corps, 43.
80 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

pears to have been to serve as a means to train and 

familiarize Marines with the emerging doctrinal concepts. 

The Sixth Fleet’s FAF went through a number 

of permutations over the next several years, as different units rotated in and out within its structure, but 

the FAF itself, which at one point included the provisional 16th MEB, never existed for more than three 

months at a time.35 By the time the Vietnam War began in 1965, it appears to have disappeared altogether, 

as the demands for ships and battalion landing teams 

outweighed all other considerations, though the LanForMed Battalion deployments appear to have continued unabated throughout the 1960s.

The introduction of the FAF concept evolved 

along similar lines with the Seventh Fleet during the 

early 1960s, but with some typical differences in the 

operational style between the Atlantic and Pacific 

Fleets. In 1961, the Seventh Fleet, under the guidance 

of its commander, Admiral Harry D. Felt, designated 

its FAF equivalent as the Amphibious Ready Group or 

ARG. Felt, with Marine Corps support, first proposed 

the organization of such task forces to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, who concurred. This force, the Navy and Marine Corps’ first 

ARG, was designated Task Force 76.5 and based out 

of the U.S. Naval Base Subic Bay in the Philippines.36

The prototype ARG consisted of an amphibious 

squadron with three to four “fast” ships (one LPH, one 

LSD, and/or an attack cargo ship or AKA) and a Special Landing Force (SLF) instead of a MEU, consisting of a battalion landing team from the 3d Marine 

Division based in Okinawa and a composite helicopter squadron that included both utility and heavy-lift 

aircraft. Thus combined, the ARG/SLF would rotate 

its embarked Marine units every six months, remaining at sea “on station” in support of various Southeast 

Asia contingencies involving Laos, Cambodia, Thai35 “Marine Expeditionary Brigade Returns from Mediterranean 

Area Maneuvers,” Camp Lejeune Globe, 8 June 1961, 6.

36 Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States 

Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat, 

1959–1965, vol. II (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1986), 42.

land, and Vietnam between 1960 and 1964, but was 

not deployed ashore. That would change during the 

summer of 1965, when the United States stepped up 

its involvement in South Vietnam.37

The first MAGTF to sail the Atlantic with its own 

aviation element was built around battalion landing 

teams from 3d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, and 

1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, in February 1961 

and included aviation elements from the 2d Marine 

Aircraft Wing. With an 83-man headquarters element 

provided by 2d Marine Division, this force was designated as 4th MEB. It was joined shortly thereafter by 

the 24th MEU, which was already at sea sailing as part 

of the aforementioned FAF. Combined, the 4th MEB 

included the USS Boxer and the fast attack transports 

from the Navy’s Amphibious Squadrons 2 and 8.38

This was the first time that a balanced, selfcontained, brigade-size MAGTF had participated in a 

routine afloat mission in the Atlantic and Caribbean. 

It had not been activated for any specifically designated contingency, such as those brigade-size task forces 

that had been quickly created or stood up for the Lebanon or Cyprus crises. Instead, like the FAF before 

it, the MEB served as an enormous sea-going laboratory for amphibious warfare. Though much larger 

than a MEU, the 4th MEB allowed the Marine Corps 

to experiment with both its new ships and doctrinal 

concepts during Exercise LantPhibEx 1-61 before the 

brigade was deactivated after three months at sea.

A cursory examination reveals that both the 

Pacific and Atlantic Fleets composited or assembled 

their afloat-ready forces differently. Those activated 

for service in the Atlantic, the Caribbean, or in the 

Mediterranean as LanForMed, tended to be somewhat 

larger than the special landing force in the Pacific, 

usually approaching a Marine Expeditionary Brigade 

(as shown above in the case of the 4th MEB) in size 

versus that of a battalion landing team-size Marine 

Expeditionary Unit. Thus, even as late as 1962, it appears that the Marine Corps had still not completely 

37 Ibid., 474, 529.

38 “Marines at Work: 4th MEB,” Marine Corps Gazette 45, no. 4 

(April 1961): 4–5.
SUMMER 2017 81

settled the argument about what exactly a MAGTF or 

a MEU was and what were its constituent elements. 

Marine Corps Order

Settles the Doctrine Debate

While the evidence indicates that nearly every seniorlevel Marine (e.g., lieutenant colonel and above) were 

in general agreement about the overall MAGTF concept, opinions differed widely as to their size, mission, composition, and other important topics. On 27 

December 1962, the MAGTF debate was settled once 

and for all when Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3120.3 was 

issued by Headquarters Marine Corps after extensive 

consultation with the Navy, which, after all, would 

be providing the amphibious warfare ships to carry 

them. This order, signed by Commandant of the Marine Corps General David M. Shoup, formally codified 

a MAGTF’s composition in doctrine and specifically 

enumerated the four types of MAGTFs based on the 

size of the command.39

39 MCO 3120.3, The Organization of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces

(Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1962).

The order stated that a MAGTF, regardless of size, 

would henceforth consist of a ground combat element 

(GCE), a command element (CE), an aviation combat 

element (ACE), and a combat service support element 

or CSSE (now called logistics combat element, or LCE). 

Additionally, the order specified that a MEU would be 

based on a battalion landing team, just as the first battalion landing team had been in 1898, and would be 

augmented by a composite helicopter squadron and a 

dedicated logistics battalion. Though the doctrine was 

quickly accepted and the terminology agreed upon, 

the Seventh Fleet, demonstrating its independent 

streak, continued to use the term special landing force

for the MEU sailing with the ARG in the Pacific.40

In line with the declaration laying out the composition of a MEU, the order further stated that a 

MEB was to be based on a reinforced regimental combat team, a composite air group, and a logistics regiment. The MEF would be based on a Marine division, 

air wing, and appropriately sized logistics elements. 

40 Ibid., enclosures 1–2.

Official U.S. Navy photo, 1142349

U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet Amphibious Ready Group underway in March 1965 (from left): USS Bexar (APA 237), USS Princeton (LPH 5), USS Thomaston

(LSD 28), and USS O’Bannon (DD 450). Sikorsky UH-34D Seahorse helicopters of HMM-365 fly above the ships while Princeton’s crew spells out the 

task group designations, “TG 76.5/79.5,” on the flight deck.
82 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

The MEC, though the term was never used in practice 

due to the U.S. Army’s objections, was to be based on 

two or more Marine divisions, with an appropriately 

sized air wing and logistics element. In practice, however, the MEF has effectively functioned as a corpssize headquarters, demonstrated by the performance 

of I MEF during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and 

during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. 

The Marine Corps

Internalizes the Concept

Simply stating “Let there be MEUs, MEBs, MEFs, and 

MECs” was not the same as creating these organizations. A great deal of learning had to be accomplished 

and many different subordinate doctrinal publications, tables of organization, tables of equipment, and 

reams of Service regulations had to be written. The 

best way to try out new doctrine was through actual 

practice using real Marines and real ships, where lessons could be learned and modifications made. New 

organizations had to be created out of thin air, so to 

speak, since they may not have existed before or even 

been contemplated in the original 1961 order. 

For instance, MEU headquarters generally did 

not exist in the early 1960s. The usual practice was 

to take a Marine division or regimental headquarters 

and either increase its capability with more staff and 

equipment to make a MEU headquarters or strip down 

a division headquarters to the bare essentials to create 

a MEB headquarters. For a more permanent solution, 

MEU headquarters had to be designed and built into 

future budgets so the manpower spaces could be allocated, equipment purchased, and funding for training 

programmed.

An excellent example of how each MEF worked 

through the task of incorporating the new doctrine 

can be seen in how the Pacific Fleet’s SLF evolved. 

The first SLF created in 1960 lacked a separate command element. Instead, the commander of the battalion landing team or the commander of the helicopter 

squadron, depending on which was senior, served in 

a dual capacity as both battalion commander and 

SLF commander. With the addition of an aviation 

element consisting of a mixed rotary-wing squadron, 

Marine Corps Historical Reference Branch, 

History Division photo 

Gen David M. Shoup, 22d Commandant of the Marine Corps (1960–63).

this quickly proved to be an unworkable arrangement, 

since the battalion landing team commander lacked 

the expertise and communications means to command and control it. Consequently, III MEF in Okinawa authorized the activation of a small permanent 

SLF command element in 1965.41 A year later, this 

staff had evolved into a true MAGTF headquarters 

approximately the size and capability of an infantry 

regiment’s staff.42

As the demand for more troops to support the 

Marines in Vietnam increased, the ARG/SLF was in41 Jack Shulimson and Maj Charles M. Johnson, U.S. Marines in 

Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965 (Washington, DC: History and Museum Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1978), 

196, 200–1.

42 Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War, 1966

(Washington, DC: History and Museum Division, Headquarters 

Marine Corps, 1982), 297.
SUMMER 2017 83

Defense Department (U.S. Navy) 1110983

Marines from the Pacific Fleet’s Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force wade ashore near Da Nang, Republic of Vietnam, ca. 1965.

creasingly employed ashore, where it took part in numerous ground combat operations, so much so that 

the Navy decided it needed another ARG/SLF activated just to ensure that the Seventh Fleet still had 

a reserve landing capability should other emergencies 

arise in the Pacific Rim not involving Vietnam. Accordingly, a second ARG/SLF, or ARG-B, was created 

to complement the original ARG, now designated 

ARG-A. From 1965 to 1969, both ARGs rotated between service with the fleet and ashore in support of 

III MAF in South Vietnam. During this period, both 

ARGs carried out 62 amphibious landing operations 

in Vietnam while taking part in dozens of cruises with 

Seventh Fleet.43

The only change that occurred during this period 

worth noting involved the renaming of Marine Expe43 Benis M. Frank and Ralph F. Moody, “SLF Operations in Vietnam” (unpublished paper, History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1972), Section VII, 4.

ditionary Units, which, due to perceived South Vietnamese sensitivity to the term expeditionary (with the 

attendant negative connotations of French Colonial 

rule), were redesignated as Marine Amphibious Units 

or MAUs in 1965. Between 1965 and 1990, a variety of 

former MEUs carried over this term until all existing 

MAUs reverted to their former naming convention 

of MEU. Except for the name change, everything else 

remained the same. Finally, even the Seventh Fleet’s 

special landing force was redesignated as a MAU in 

1969, then once again as a MEU by 1988.44

U.S. Navy Support

to the ARG/MEU Concept

The final piece of the afloat-ready battalion concept 

44 Jonathan D. Geithner, Historical ARG/MEU Employment (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2015), 3–4; and All Marines Message 023/88, 

Change of Marine Corps Task Unit Designations (Washington, DC: 

Headquarters Marine Corps, 5 February 1988).
84 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

involved related activities of the U.S. Navy, which had 

continuously coordinated its ship design initiative 

with the Marine Corps. While the ARG/MEU concept had become embedded in Navy practice, if not 

in doctrine, purpose-built ships to replace the World 

War II-vintage ships did not arrive in the fleet until 

26 August 1961, when the first LPH was built as such 

from the keel up, and the USS Iwo Jima (LPH 2) was 

commissioned. Six others of its class soon followed. 

These ships were capable of carrying 26 helicopters 

and nearly 2,000 Marines of a reinforced battalion 

landing team, equating to 193 officers and 1,806 men.45

45 “Iwo Jima (LPH-2), 1961–1993,” Naval History and Heritage 

Command, 10 November 2015, http://www.history.navy.mil

/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/i/iwo-jima.html. 

However, as impressive as these vessels were in 

terms of their vertical envelopment capability, they 

lacked a well deck, thus forcing the ARG/MEU to 

rely on older LSTs and LSDs to carry the ship-toshore “connectors” (LVTs, LCVPs, LCUs, etc.) for 

over-the-beach amphibious capability. Fortunately, by 

1962, a new type of amphibious warship, the landing 

platform, dock or LPD (known today as amphibious 

transport docks), entered service, easing the reliance 

on the World War II-era vessels. It had both a well 

deck and purpose-built helicopter landing platforms, 

giving it a versatility that the older ships lacked.

By 1970, composition of ARGs, at least as far as 

the Navy was concerned, had become a settled issue 

due to the retirement of the rest of the few remaining World War II-era amphibious ships and the conNaval History and Heritage Command, NH107670, courtesy of PHC A. L. Smith 

USS Okinawa (LPH 3) underway in the South China Sea in January 1969 with several CH-34 Seahorse helicopters parked on her flight deck.
SUMMER 2017 85

struction of enough new ones to replace them. The 

“standardized” ARG/MEU was now composed of an 

amphibious squadron (PhibRon) consisting of one 

LPH (later replaced by the amphibious assault ship, 

general purpose, or LHA), one LPD, and one LSD combined with a MEU of 2,200 Marines. However, fixedwing aircraft were still embarked aboard Navy fleet 

carriers, which were not part of the ARG/MEU combination. War plans directed that, once a beachhead 

had been taken, airstrips would then be seized or constructed, allowing fixed-wing aircraft to land, where 

they would then revert to ARG/MEU control. This 

unsatisfactory situation would not change until 1979. 

The slower Newport-class LSTs and attack cargo 

ships, or AKAs, were relegated to other amphibious 

squadrons before they were phased out entirely by 

2000, being superseded by the new classes of ships 

being commissioned. Attack transports (APAs), the 

last vestige of the World War II-type attack transport, 

also were completely phased out by 1980. Though 

the ARG/MEU composition had been settled for 

nearly 40 years, it was not until 2010 that it was finally 

codified in the U.S. Navy’s Operational Instruction 

OPNAV 3501.316B on 21 October.46

Evolution into Today’s ARG/MEU

The last significant development occurred on 29 May 

1976, when the first Tarawa-class LHA was commis46 OPNAV 3501.316B, Policy for Baseline Composition and Basic Mission Capabilities of Major Afloat Navy and Naval Groups (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 21 October 2010).

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH107694, courtesy of PH3 Houchins 

USS Raleigh (LPD 1) underway at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, on 1 February 1963. The ship carries two CH-34 Seahorse helicopters parked on her afterdeck.
86 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

sioned. The USS Tarawa (LHA 1) was the first LHA 

with a well deck for carrying and launching landing 

craft, utility (LCU), amphibious assault vehiclespersonnel 7 (AAV-P7), and landing craft, air cushion (LCAC). There were five of these enormous ships 

built, each capable of carrying as many as 41 helicopters or a balanced mix of Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea 

Knights, Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallions, Bell AH-1W 

Super Cobras, and Bell UH-1 Iroquois, as well as 1,903 

troops.47 The USS Tarawa deployed on its first West47 Amphibious Ships and Landing Craft Data Book, Marine Corps 

Reference Publication 3-31B (Washington, DC: Headquarters 

Marine Corps, 2001), 3–5.

ern Pacific cruise in March 1979 and, for the first time, 

operated with a McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier 

vertical short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) jet squadron, in addition to an embarked helicopter squadron 

in a successful experiment to determine the feasibility 

of VSTOL aircraft operating from an LHA. 

With the addition of the AV-8B Harrier, the 

ARG/MEU combination finally had its own organic 

fixed-wing aircraft squadron, capable of providing 

combat air patrol coverage as well as close air support 

to the MEU. Today, ARG/MEUs often deploy as part 

of an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) consisting of 

an aircraft carrier or other surface warfare combatants. 

Since 2015, the more-capable USS Wasp-class LHDs 

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH107654

USS Tarawa (LHA 1) underway in the Pacific Ocean in March 1979. Note the light-colored Douglas A-4 Skyhawk parked between two AV-8 Harriers 

on the ship’s starboard after flight deck. 
SUMMER 2017 87

and the new USS America-class LHAs have completely 

replaced the Tarawa-class LHAs. Both classes of ships 

now operate with the new Bell Boeing MV-22 Osprey 

and will soon host the newly introduced Lockheed 

Martin F-35 Lightning II VSTOL aircraft, which is replacing the AV-8B. One thing has not changed, however. Conventional Marine fixed-wing aviation assets, 

such as the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet, still 

operate from the decks of Navy fleet carriers. Once 

suitable airfields are constructed ashore, they will deploy as part of the ARG/MEU, though the Naval Task 

Group commander still retains the option of having 

them operate under his control.

Introduction of the MEU 

(Special Operations Capable) Concept

Another change to the ARG/MEU concept occurred 

in December 1985, when the 26th MAU (redesignated 

as a MEU in 1988) received the special operations capable, or SOC, designation, becoming the 26th MAU 

(SOC). Though the actual organization of the MAU 

itself did not change, its mission profile did, based 

upon an increasing awareness within the Department of Defense that the growth of terrorism around 

the world required an effective military response 

that went beyond traditional capabilities, bordering 

on those ordinarily possessed by special operations 

forces (SOF). The addition of a SOC designation to 

Official U.S. Navy photo, courtesy of PO3 Devin M. Langer 

An AV-8B Harrier, assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 163 (VMM-163) (Rein), hovers above the flight deck during a vertical takeoff 

from the amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island (LHD 8) on 23 August 2016. As the flagship of the Makin Island ARG, the ship is deployed with 

the embarked 11th MEU to support maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet area of 

operations. 
88 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

its title signified that a MAU had been issued certain 

equipment “enhancements” and had trained to a rigid standard prior to deploying. Once it had arrived 

on station, a MAU (SOC) might be called upon to 

accomplish special operations-like missions, such as 

in extremis hostage rescue or noncombatant rescue operations and antiterrorist operations.48 By 1987, all deploying MAUs were required to train to MAU (SOC) 

status.

Marine Amphibious Units from that point onward would only receive the MAU (SOC) designation 

prior to deployment after they had met special operations certification requirements; otherwise, when not 

deployed, they would retain the normal MAU title (in 

1988, they were once again redesignated MEUs and 

became MEU [SOCs]). This concept remained in effect from 1985 until 2005, when the newly activated 

special operations companies of Marine Corps Special 

Operations Command (MARSOC) began to assume 

the mission and MEUs finally dropped the SOC appellation.49 Currently, MEUs can only use the SOC 

designation if a Marine Corps special operations 

component is attached to carry out specific special 

operations-related missions, though in practice this 

rarely occurs due to the high demand for their services 

within the U.S. Special Operations Command.

48 Report of Examination of Marine Corps Special Operations Enhancements (Norfolk, VA: Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, 1985).

49 Frank L. Kalesnik, “MARSOC: U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command, The First Decade, 2006–2016” (PhD 

dissertation, MARSOC, 2016), 6–7. According to MCO 3120.9B, 

the MEU (SOC) was required to demonstrate interoperability 

with the embarked Naval Special Warfare Task Unit (SEALs) 

prior to deploying. Other sources suggest that the SEALs stopped 

deploying with MEUs shortly before 2001.

Conclusion

While current operational concepts, such as a disaggregated or split-based ARG/MEU, have recently 

been put into practice, the core concept of the ARG/

MEU remains unchanged and will probably stay that 

way for the foreseeable future. As this article has 

shown, during the past 118 years, a progression of 

changes in national security policy, Service doctrine, 

and technology have combined to provide today’s 

afloat-ready force the capability that Lieutenant Colonel Huntington could only dream about. Though the 

modern expeditionary amphibious force, with its warships, aircraft, and landing craft, is far removed from 

the afloat-ready battalion that saw its debut during 

the Spanish-American War, the concept itself—that 

of having an embarked self-sustaining battalion-size 

force ready to be landed anytime, anywhere at the 

order of the U.S. government—has hardly changed at 

all. Though debate may swirl around the notion that 

amphibious warfare has become obsolete, one thing is 

certain—as long as there is a U.S. Marine Corps, there 

will be an ARG/MEU at sea somewhere, ready for the 

call to carry out the nation’s bidding.

• 1775 •
National Museum 

of the Marine Corps

THE FINAL PHASE

by Charles Grow

Deputy Director, National Museum of the Marine Corps

The original concept for the National Museum 

of the Marine Corps (NMMC) was to honor 

the courage and sacrifice of all Marines. That 

concept drove a master plan, which subdivided this 

major undertaking into phases: first and final. The 

first phase opened in two subphases. The first three 

historical galleries opened in 2006 and covered World 

War II, Korea, and Vietnam. The next three opened in 

2010, adding the years 1775 through 1918, which significantly completed the first phase. 

The final phase is a 10-year project, which is half 

complete. NMMC started artifact preparation in 

2010, exhibit design spanned 2013 to 2016, and exhibits 

fabrication has started. The final phase project adds 

several new galleries that will open between 2017 and 

2021. The Combat Art Gallery was the first to open to 

the public on 9 July 2017. 

Honor, Courage, Commitment: Marine Corps Combat Art, 1975–2015 is the inaugural exhibit in the new 

Combat Art Gallery. NMMC chose that 40-year period because it foreshadows the large historical galleries 

that open in 2018 and 2019. The exhibit consists of 100 

works by 22 artists, all of whom wore the eagle, globe, 

and anchor. This first exhibit will be up through April 

2018, when it will be replaced by an exhibit that celebrates the centennial of the end of World War I. Looking forward, NMMC also reached out to the George 

W. Bush Presidential Library to get into the queue to 

exhibit the former president’s recently painted colMarine Corps Heritage Foundation, photo courtesy of Sisson Studios

Aerial photograph shows the 135-acre Marine Corps Heritage Centerand the National Museum of the Marine Corps during June 2017. 

National Museum of the Marine Corps, photo courtesy of Angie McCrary

Lin Ezell, director of the National Museum of the Marine Corps, gives 

a tour of the newly opened Combat Art Gallery to Mrs. Karen Pence, 

Second Lady of the United States, and BGen Thomas A. Gorry, commanding general of Marine Corps University. 

89
90 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

lection titled “Portraits of Courage.” NMMC hopes 

to pair the president’s paintings with similar exhibits 

for an emotive offering that includes the Joe Bonham 

Project, Lima Company Memorial, and Semper Fi: How 

I Met My Father. The Joe Bonham Project is a collection 

of portraits of wounded warriors drawn from life by 

several artists.1 Lima Company exhibit titled The Eyes 

of Freedom is a collection of life-size portraits of 23 Marines and corpsmen from Ohio who lost their lives in 

Iraq while serving with Lima Company, 3d Battalion, 

25th Marine Regiment.2 Tom Hubbard’s Semper Fi is a 

collection of ceramics, mixed media, and photography 

documenting his journey to learn about his father, a 

U.S. Marine killed in Vietnam in 1966.3

An artist’s studio sets beside the art gallery. Visitors will be able to see new studio art created by Marines and visiting artists. Comfortably sized for two 

artists, the studio can be used for drawing, painting, 

and sculpture. NMMC is also looking for collaborative opportunities with wounded warriors and the art 

therapists who support them. 

The Marine Corps Heritage Foundation is scheduled to open a new giant-screen theater with a signature film in July 2017. We, the Marines, narrated by Gene 

Hackman, wows visitors with a high-tempo, heartpumping, 40-minute experience of today’s Corps in action.

Immediately downstairs from the Combat Art 

Gallery, exhibit fabricators have already begun work 

on the Children’s Gallery, which is on schedule to 

open in November 2017. Our first decade taught us 

that Marine families love to visit the museum, so the 

Children’s Gallery incorporates those lessons and focuses on the needs of young learners. The space is kid 

friendly, with a stroller parking lot outside the engraved glass front that will help to mitigate the noise 

generated by little ones. This gallery is adjacent to two 

1

 Carol King, “Portraits of War,” New York Times, 25 May 2012. 2

 Brian Albrecht, “Lima Company Memorial Honoring Fallen 

Marines on Display in Ohio Statehouse Rotunda,” Cleveland

.com, 8 February 2014.

3

 Elaine Simon, “Semper Fidelis: How I Met My Father Exhibition,” Kent (OH) Patch, 20 March 2012.

new 40-student classrooms and a new student lunchroom. When complete, this suite of spaces will help to 

meet the needs of NMMC’s younger visitors. 

The next two years—2018 and 2019—mark a significant milestone as NMMC opens the historical galleries that present the Corps’ history from right after 

Vietnam through today. The museum, being a learning organization like the Marine Corps, incorporated 

a series of lessons learned into the design of these new 

spaces. For instance, before we thought about design, 

we spoke to key stakeholders, including the formal 

professional military education schools aboard Quantico at Marine Corps University, teachers in Prince 

William County, and the specialists who manage 

every occupational field in the Marine Corps. They 

helped shape the story and prioritize the messages. 

Then we approached USMC Manpower and Reserve 

Affairs, who helped us identify a number of individuals with interesting stories; their former sergeant 

major, Thomas G. Eggerling, was immensely helpful. 

NMMC also received dedicated support from History 

Division, who assigned a full-time historian, Douglas 

Nash, to assist with the research and writing. We established and relied upon a diverse group of senior 

advisors who represented a broad swath of the Marine 

Air-Ground Task Force, officers, enlisted, men, women, and a non-Marine academic. NMMC also adjusted 

the design to accommodate four large overlooks that 

allow visitors to: a) interact with the new galleries in 

a different way, and b) watch the progress being made 

over the next two years. Visitors can already see the 

McDonnell-Douglas F/A-18A Hornet resting on its 

mount and an M60 Patton main battle tank mounted 

in the corner of the Operation Desert Storm exhibit. 

The Hornet is mounted on a post, low to the ground, 

with its port wing nearly touching the deck and its 

starboard wing pointing toward the roof. This aircraft 

was stationed with a Reserve squadron at Joint Base 

Andrews, Maryland, and responded to the 9/11 attack 

on the Pentagon. The tank was the first vehicle in its 

unit to breech the berm between Saudi Arabia and 

Kuwait in 1991. 

The NMMC exhibits team has already started 

casting figures from real Marines, which will be used 
SUMMER 2017 91

in the tableaus around the LAV-25 light armored vehicle and the MRAP all-terrain vehicle (MATV). Exhibits specialist Alice Webb reached out to Marines 

who performed those missions to ensure that all of the 

uniforms, props, poses, and story points were correct. 

The museum owes a debt of gratitude to Major General H. Stacy Clardy III for support in this area; he 

helped us obtain the LAV-25 and locate crewmen who 

knew exactly how to dress and act while recreating the 

march to Baghdad. 

The curators have written all of the exhibit text, 

photo captions, and object labels, and our director is 

steadily editing every word. They also have gathered 

and prepared more than 400 objects, almost all of 

which have a rich personal history. An abbreviated 

list includes the blood-caked ribbons and pilots wings 

worn by Captain Michael R. Norfleet when he was 

seriously wounded in the federal building bombed by 

Timothy McVeigh; the police uniform and dress blues 

of Reserve Marine Sergeant Major Michael S. Curtin, 

who earned a posthumous Medal of Honor from the 

New York Police Department; the helmet of Lieutenant Colonel Ben Edwards, who was an advisor with an 

National Museum of the Marine Corps

This artist’s concept shows a bird’s-eye view of the Children’s Gallery, which will open to the public in November 2017. Young visitors will learn 

about the history of the Corps through letters home, which change over time from handwritten script to V-mail to email. Kids can explore geography 

through a large textured globe and try on uniforms to see themselves as Marines throughout time. 

National Museum of the Marine Corps

McDonnell-Douglas F/A-18A installed in gallery. 
92 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

Afghan unit that came under attack, with the bullet 

that hit his forehead still lodged in the helmet; Sergeant Rafael Peralta’s rifle that was battle damaged 

when he fell on a grenade to save the lives of other Marines; and so many more.4

 Contracts are pending for 

the hardware and media productions that will make 

the galleries come alive. Exhibit lighting has been installed through approximately half of the new gallery 

4

 Chris Day, “OKC Bombing: A Survivor’s Story,” Edmond (OK) 

Sun, 16 April 2015; Sgt Ian Leones, USMCR, “Reserve Marines 

Remember Their Fallen Brothers,” Marines.mil, 31 August 2016; 

Howard Altman, “Retired Marine Opens Tampa Home to Afghan Comrade,” Tampa Bay (FL) Times, 30 October 2013; and Carl 

Prine, “Mattis Could Award Medal of Honor to Marine Hero 

Rafael Peralta,” Task & Purpose, 7 February 2017.

National Museum of the Marine Corps

This artist’s concept provides a view into the Hall of Valor, which will open to the public in Fall 2020. The Hall of Valor includes two interrelated 

exhibits. As visitors enter the space, they will be drawn down a narrow hallway finished with honed sandstone that features a large copper-clad sign 

with embossed stars. Two heavy iron gates, fixed in the open position, guard the entrance to a circular room with a coffered, domed ceiling and a 

large oculus through which visitors will see an infinity star field. Around the perimeter of the room, carved stone columns and cast bronze metalwork suggest that this space is different than the rest of the museum. Each Medal of Honor recipient’s portrait will be displayed in a cast bronze 

frame, and their stories will be told in interactive exhibits.

spaces. Every day, signs show that progress continues 

at a steady pace. 

During 2020, NMMC will open the Sports Gallery and the Hall of Valor. The Sports Gallery addresses that small cadre of Marine athletes who were 

elected into the Marine Corps Sports Hall of Fame 

or were professional athletes. Curators have been 

collecting artifacts that speak to football, baseball, 

basketball, track, boxing, track, and golf. The Sports 

Gallery also will explore the value of sports in helping wounded warriors recover and rehabilitate. The 

physical space into which the Sports Gallery will be 

built is complete. The Hall of Valor will be a standalone gallery just off of Leatherneck Gallery and next 

to the Medal of Honor Theater. The Hall of Valor 

will include a space to recognize Marines and sailors 
SUMMER 2017 93

who, while serving with Marines, earned the Medal 

of Honor. The space will feature a circular room inspired by the Lincoln Tomb, including a coffered 

dome ceiling with an oculus through which visitors 

can gaze at an infinite star field. Abraham Lincoln 

was president when Corporal John F. Mackie became 

the first Marine to be awarded the Medal of Honor.5

Finally, in 2021, NMMC will open a large Changing Gallery and small Inter-War Gallery, which 

completes the final phase. The Changing Gallery is 

sufficiently sized to roll in a number of wheeled or 

tracked vehicles and small aircraft. It provides the 

space and flexibility to keep the story updated and 

current well beyond the final phase. The Inter-War 

Gallery will fit into a space temporarily used as offices, a classroom, and docent lounge. It will explore 

the creative period when Marines like Lieutenant 

Colonel Earl H. “Pete” Ellis and Lieutenant General 

Victor H. Krulak developed strategies for countering 

the coming war with Japan and worked with industry 

to develop the hardware necessary for an island hopping campaign. Visitors will walk around the original 

Roebling Alligator, or landing vehicle, tracked (LVT), 

which is the predecessor of the amphibious assault vehicles that eventually become the amphibious assault 

vehicle AAV-P7. Overhead, visitors will be reminded 

of the development of Marine air by a fully restored 

Vickers FB-5 biplane that will be installed inverted, as 

if it is tipping over the top of a loop and beginning to 

fall toward the earth. 

Some visitors have asked what the museum has 

planned for after the final phase is complete. Our response is that good museums are never done. We will 

start updating existing galleries, which will be 15 years 

old by then. However, the long-range vision is to break 

outside the walls of the NMMC and extend the museum’s influence to those who cannot visit Quantico. 

• 1775 •

5

 “First USMC Medal of Honor Recipient: John Freeman Mackie 

(1835–1910),” Naval History (blog), U.S. Naval Institute, 15 May 

2011.

National Museum of the Marine Corps, photo courtesy of Mitch Garringer

An M60 tank rests on its mount in the Forward Deployed Gallery, 

scheduled to open to the public in November 2018. Charlie Company, 

3d Tank Battalion, rolled this tank off a maritime prepositioning ship 

at al-Jubay, Saudi Arabia, during Operation Desert Shield. This M60 

was the first in its unit to cross the berm during Operation Desert 

Storm. It will be marked and displayed as it was when it crossed the 

line of departure, with “Genesis II” painted on its tube. Curators have 

been in contact with the tank commander, former Capt Ed Dunlap, to 

ensure the equipment strapped to the outside is historically accurate. 
IN MEMORIAM

Colonel John H. Glenn Jr., USMC (Ret)

18 July 1921–8 December 2016

by Fred H. Allison 

Marine Colonel John Glenn, aviator, astronaut, and 

Ohio senator, passed away on 8 December 2016. Glenn 

served 21 years, 9 months, and 4 days in the U.S. Marine Corps. He is best remembered as the first American to orbit the Earth. 

Glenn was born in Cambridge, Ohio, on 18 

July 1921. His father was a plumber, and his mother 

taught school. He grew up in New Concord, Ohio, 

the quintessential American town—small, religious, 

and patriotic. It was home of the Presbyterian-based 

Muskingum College, where Glenn attended until 

World War II drew him into active service. 

He went into naval flight training as a Naval 

Aviation Cadet. As he approached the end of flight 

training in 1943, he and fellow cadet, Thomas H. Miller, who would become a three-star Marine general 

and life-long friend, were notified that they had the 

qualifications to become Marines, though they had 

not given it serious thought. They had always envisioned flying from carriers. They attended a brief on 

Marine aviation. Two Marine veterans of Guadalcanal 

gave the presentation—one an aviator and the other 

a ground officer. They spoke about the recently concluded Guadalcanal battle and how aviation played 

a key role in the Marines’ success in that desperate 

fight. Glenn wanted to get into combat, and Marine 

aviation seemed to promise combat soon. He also was 

Photo courtesy NASA

John Glen’s official National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

photograph.

94
SUMMER 2017 95

inspired by the idea of assisting ground troops to accomplish their objectives and stay alive. He and Miller 

enthusiastically opted for the Marine Corps.1

Glenn and Miller ended up in the same squadron, Marine Fighting Squadron 155 (VMF-155, initially Marine Observation Squadron 155), flying Vought 

F4U Corsairs in the Marshall Islands. Arriving in July 

1944, the squadron flew interdiction strikes, hitting 

bypassed Japanese-occupied islands. At that time, the 

Marshalls were the backwaters of the Pacific War. The 

strikes, or “milk runs,” were plenty dangerous. On his 

first mission, Glenn’s wingman was hit by antiaircraft 

fire. Miller recalled, “He just flew into the water. It 

wasn’t because we were making a dangerously low 

pull-out or anything. He just never, ever, pulled out 

of his dive . . . it really shook John up.”2

 Glenn flew 59 

combat missions with VMF-155. He was awarded two 

Distinguished Flying Crosses (DFC). 

Before going to the Pacific, Glenn married his 

beloved Annie; “the wind beneath my wings,” he 

called her.3 Annie was afflicted with a severe stuttering impediment, and Glenn remained intensely loyal 

and protective of her throughout their life together. 

Glenn’s public life, however, was an extreme challenge 

for her. She underwent an effective treatment in 1978 

that cured her stuttering. They had two children, David and Lyn. 

In 1953, Glenn, now a major, asked for and was 

assigned to Korea, where the Korean War continued. 

He joined VMF-311, flying interdiction and close air 

support missions in the Grumman F9F-5 Panther 

jet aircraft. Intense enemy fire along the front lines, 

1

 LtGen Thomas H. Miller, intvw with Benis Frank and Maj 

Frank Batha, 16 December 1982, 1–2. Miller also commented that, 

for a Naval Cadet to be considered for the Marine Corps, he had 

to be in the top 10 percent of his class in flying and academic 

grades. See also John Glenn, “Glenn: An American Life,” Reader’s 

Digest, May 2000, 95, 98. 2

 This was Miles F. Goodman, killed in action on 10 July 1944. 

Tom Miller continued: “His folks ran a furniture store in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. We kept in contact with them for years.” 

Miller intvw, 38. 

3

 John Glenn with Nick Taylor, John Glenn: A Memoir (New York: 

Bantam Books, 1999). Glenn dedicated this book to his wife in 

those terms. 

where Marine pilots laid down ordnance for Marine 

infantry, made for exciting flying. On one mission, 

Glenn’s F9 was pierced by more than 200 shell fragments from antiaircraft artillery fire. On another mission, 300 fragments hit his Panther; one hole measured 

approximately two feet across. Another pilot in the 

squadron, famed baseball player Ted Williams, was 

a reservist who had been called to active duty. They 

often flew together. Glenn remarked, “He was a fine 

pilot and I liked to fly with him.”4 Glenn flew 63 missions with VMF-311 and earned another DFC. 

In July 1953, Glenn served as an exchange pilot 

with the U.S. Air Force’s 25th Fighter Squadron. Flying North American F-86 Sabre jet fighters along the 

North Korea-China border, the 25th Fighter Squadron’s mission was keeping Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15s 

from coming south from sanctuary bases in China. 

Within days of the end of fighting, Glenn scored three 

4

 Ibid., 135. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

Glen (left) and Miller with Marine Fighting Squadron 155.
96 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

MiG kills. In one engagement, a flight of 16 MiG-15s 

attacked. Glenn’s wingman was hit and he struggled 

to keep his F-86 in the air. Glenn turned into the 

enemy fighters with guns blazing. His attack struck 

one of the MiGs and the others broke off their attack. This allowed his wingman to return safely to 

home base. For this action, Glenn was awarded his 

fourth DFC. Glenn commented on combat flying: “If 

you’re going to be a fighter pilot, you don’t hold back. 

. . . You go all out. If you’re not going to go all out, then 

you ought to get out of the business and do something 

else.”5 Glenn flew so aggressively that the Air Force 

pilots painted “MIG-Mad Marine” in big bold letters 

on his F-86. He flew 27 combat missions with the Air 

Force. 

After the Korean War, Glenn, now a test pilot, 

was assigned as the project officer for the Marine 

Corps and Navy’s new fighter, the Vought F-8U Crusader. On 16 July 1957, Glenn flew an F8U-1P nonstop 

from Los Alamitos Naval Air Station, California, to 

Floyd Bennett Field, New York, at supersonic speeds.6

This was the first supersonic transcontinental flight, 

with a cruising altitude of about 50,000 feet. During 

the flight, he had to aerial refuel three times, which 

required descending to 25,000 feet, slowing down to 

about 300 knots, and adroitly plugging into the tanker’s hose. He still broke the old record by more than 

20 minutes, clocking in at 3 hours, 23 minutes, and 

8 seconds. He was awarded his fifth DFC for this 

achievement. 

With the onset of the space race, Glenn was 

among the first American astronauts for the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) 

Mercury program.7 Seven men—three from the Air 

Force, three from the Navy, and one Marine—were 

5 Sgt Kurt Sutton, “A Legend Built on Leadership,” Marines, November 1995, 27–28. 

6

 The F8U-1P version of the Crusader was an unarmed photographic reconnaissance aircraft.

7

 Project Mercury was NASA’s program to put the first American 

astronauts into space and orbit the planet.

selected out of a field of 80 candidates.8 He was the 

oldest of the seven at 37 years, and he did not have a 

college degree. Glenn was highly regarded by his fellow astronauts and the public. His enthusiasm and allAmerican persona made him attractive to the press 

and a U.S. public that sought good role models. When 

a couple of his fellow astronauts’ off-duty shenanigans 

threatened that image, Glenn scolded them. His wellplaced concern was that these activities threatened 

the loss of public support for the space program. 

He was not the first of the seven to go into 

space. Two previous flights had put U.S. astronauts in 

suborbital space.9 He was, however, the first American to orbit the Earth. The significance of this flight 

went beyond a technological achievement. Glenn’s 

flight represented an American beachhead in space, 

a springboard upon which was built further space exploration that allowed the United States to eventually 

overtake and surpass the Soviet Union. 

It could not have come at a better time. The U.S. 

space program had been humiliated by the Soviets’ 

success. They were first to put a satellite in orbit, the 

notorious Sputnik I in 1957, and a Soviet astronaut, 

Yuri A. Gagarin, was the first man to go into space 

and orbit the Earth one time during his April 1961 

flight. Another Soviet astronaut had orbited the Earth 

17 times in August 1961. In the meantime, the U.S. program had seen a disheartening number of spectacular 

and public failures.

The space race was more than just scientific competition. The Cold War was a harsh reality and the 

race for space represented an important front, if not 

the main front of the war. Technology was the strategic 

pivot in this war. The nation with technological superiority could dominate its adversary. Glenn’s planned 

flight was delayed 10 times for weather or technical dif8

 Glenn’s good friend, LtGen Thomas Miller, asserted that the 

Commandant, Gen Randolph M. Pate, “raised hell” when the 

initial list came out without a Marine. Sgt Kurt Sutton, “Do It 

Again, and It Got One, Again,” Marines, January 1998, 24. 

9

 The first American in space was Alan B. Shepard Jr. on 5 May 

1961, followed by Virgil I. “Gus” Grissom on 21 July 1961. Both 

flights lasted approximately 15 minutes. 
SUMMER 2017 97

ficulties before it finally went up on 20 February 1962. 

It was not perfect, however; far from it. During 

the flight, the automatic flight controls failed, which 

required that Glenn fly the capsule manually the last 

two of the three planned orbits. Then a faulty sensor 

indicated that the heat shield, necessary to keep the 

capsule and Glenn from incinerating on reentry, was 

loose. This caused a great stir—on the ground—Glenn’s 

heartbeat remained basically the same. He was, however, acutely aware of the heat building during reentry. 

He radioed NASA: “A real fireball outside.” Fortunately, the shield was not loose. Glenn brought Friendship 7 in close to the targeted landing place about 800 

miles southeast of Florida and within 6 miles of the 

destroyer USS Noa (DD 841). 

Glenn was the nation’s hero. Like Charles A. 

Lindbergh’s 1927 flight across the Atlantic, Glenn’s 

flight boosted American pride and confidence in its 

ability to prevail on the technological frontier. The 

United States went on to win not only the race to 

the moon, but also the Cold War. The tickertape parade in New York City that celebrated Glenn’s flight 

saw 3,500 tons of celebratory paper tossed along the 

parade route. Muskingum College awarded him the 

bachelor of science degree he had started but never 

finished during World War II, and the Marine Corps 

Aviation Association named him as the first Marine 

pilot of the year. 

He felt comfortable in the spotlight and was 

befriended by President John F. Kennedy and his 

Photo courtesy NASA

On 20 February 1962, Glenn piloted the Mercury-Atlas 6, or Friendship 7, spacecraft on the first manned orbital mission the United States launched 

from Kennedy Space Center, FL.
98 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

younger brother Robert F. It was perhaps due to the 

latter’s influence that Glenn opted for a political life. 

He submitted his resignation from the Marine Corps 

in 1964.10 In so doing, he deferred on a pending promotion to colonel, believing that the Corps would be 

best served by an officer who planned to remain on 

active duty. President Lyndon B. Johnson ensured that 

he was promoted anyway by giving the Marines an additional colonel slot. He received his silver eagles in a 

White House ceremony. 

His first two attempts to become a U.S. senator representing Ohio failed.11 In his third attempt 

in 1974, his opponent, a well-financed former labor 

lawyer and opponent of the Vietnam War, regularly 

characterized Glenn as a man who had never held a 

job. Glenn turned the tables in a debate in Cleveland. 

Glenn responded to his opponent: 

I ask you to go with me, as I went the other 

day, to a Veterans Hospital and look those 

men, with their mangled bodies, in the eye 

and tell them they didn’t hold a job. You go 

with me to any gold-star mother and you 

look her in the eye and tell her that her son 

did not hold a job. . . . You go with me on 

Memorial Day coming up, and you stand 

on Arlington National Cemetery—where 

I have more friends than I like to remember—and you watch those waving flags, and 

you stand there, and you think about this 

nation, and you tell me that those people 

didn’t have a job. 

I tell you, Howard Metzenbaum: you 

should be on your knees every day of your 

life thanking God that there were some 

men . . . who held a job. And they required 

a dedication to purpose and a love of country and a dedication to duty that was more 

10 Glenn was in line for promotion to colonel. He asked to be 

retired before the promotion, believing that a Marine was promoted not only for past performance but also future promise, 

saying, “I didn’t think it was fair to make somebody else wait another year when I was going to retire anyway.” Glenn and Taylor, 

John Glenn, 310. 11 These were political races in 1964 and 1970. 

important than life itself. And their selfsacrifice is what made this country possible.12

An extended standing ovation followed. Glenn won 

the election by more than 90,000 votes.

Democratic U.S. Senator John Glenn was a solid 

ally of the Marine Corps. The Vietnam War had taken 

a serious toll on the Services. Equipment, weaponry, 

rolling stock, and aircraft were worn out and outdated. Personnel issues—drugs, racial conflict, and poor 

discipline—plagued the ranks. The military’s esteem in 

the public eye had hit rock bottom. America’s Cold 

War adversaries took note of the Vietnam debacle and 

assumed a more aggressive posture. Global terrorism 

became a threat to stability and national security. Marine leaders stepped forward, vowing “never again,” 

and began rebuilding and resetting the Marine Corps. 

The important acquisitions, programs, policies, and 

developments undertaken during the late 1970s and 

80s built the modern Marine Corps, a combat-ready 

force unsurpassed in readiness and capability. Glenn 

remained a trusted politician and a faithful proponent at a critical node within the U.S. Congress during his tenure spanning 25 years. 

Glenn served in the Senate until 1999. A year before he retired at 77 years old, he went back to space as 

a crewmember on the space shuttle Discovery. Glenn 

continued to fly until age 90, saying that “old people, 

he insisted, should not let the calendar dictate their 

lives.”13

Glenn credited the Marine Corps with his success. He wrote: 

I had learned a set of virtues from the 

time I was a child. . . . Those convictions 

are reflected in the Marine Corps’ simple 

but far-reaching motto, Semper Fidelis—

Always Faithful. That was what Pete 

Haines, the skipper of my Corsair squadron back in World War II, had meant when 

he said the Marines were different, that you 

12 Kurt F. Stone, The Jews of Capitol Hill: A Compendium of Jewish 

Congressional Members (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow 2011), 283.

13 “Obituary: John Glenn Died on December 8th,” Economist, 17 

December 2016, 82. 
SUMMER 2017 99

would trust your life to another Marine. 

You’d risk getting hurt yourself before you’d 

let your buddy down. When you had that 

kind of faith and loyalty and discipline, the 

next steps were that much easier. You’d do 

anything before you let your loved ones, or 

your country, down.14

John Glenn did not let his country or his Corps 

down. 

• 1775 •

14 Glenn and Taylor, John Glenn, 312.
IN MEMORIAM

Colonel Julia E. Hamblet, USMC (Ret)

12 May 1916–17 April 2017

Julia Estelle Hamblet was born in Winchester, Massachusetts, on 12 May 1916. After attending the Hartridge School in Plainfield, New Jersey, she entered 

Vassar College in Poughkeepsie, New York. She graduated in 1937 with a bachelor of arts degree. She obtained her master’s degree in public administration at 

Ohio State University in 1951.

From 1937 to 1943, she served with the U.S. Information Service in Washington, DC. In April 1943, 

she entered the Marine Corps and was assigned to the 

first Marine Corps Women’s Reserve Officer Training Class at Mount Holyoke College, Massachusetts. 

After completing the course, she was commissioned 

a first lieutenant in the Women’s Reserve on 4 May 

1943. Hamblet was then selected as adjutant to thenCaptain Katherine A. Towle at the Women’s Recruit 

Training Center at Hunter College in New York. She 

was promoted to captain on 7 February 1944 and to 

major on 31 August 1944.

During subsequent tours of duty, Major Hamblet served at Marine bases in Camp Lejeune, North 

Carolina; Camp Pendleton, California; and Quantico, Virginia. Before the end of World War II, she 

was commanding Aviation Women’s Reserve Group 

I, numbering approximately 2,600 women, at the Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina. 

For her service during this period, she was awarded a 

Commandant’s Letter of Commendation with commendation ribbon.

Major Hamblet was released from active duty in 

July 1946, but after two months was recalled to Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, to serve as 

the third director of the Women’s Reserve from September 1946 to November 1948—succeeding Colonel 

Towle.

Following demobilization, the ranks of the 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

Col Julia E. Hamblet, USMC, Director of Women Marines.

100
SUMMER 2017 101

Defense Department (Marine Corps) photo

Col Hamblett boards a Douglas F3D Skyknight at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC, for her first jet flight. The ranking officer of Women 

Marines received special permission to return to Washington, DC, by jet following a brief inspection.
102 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

Women’s Reserve dwindled to 8 officers and 159 enlisted. With the passage of the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act in 1948, a transfer of personnel 

into the regular components of the Marine Corps 

with the title of Women Marines was effected. Major 

Hamblet thus accepted a regular commission in the 

Women Marines on 4 November 1948. On 24 August 

1949, she was promoted to lieutenant colonel.

In 1951, after completing graduate work at Ohio 

State University, she was assigned to the staff of the 

commander, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, with headquarters in Hawaii. The following year, she was named 

officer in charge of the Women Officers Training Detachment, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico.

On 1 May 1953, she assumed duty as the director 

of Women Marines, again succeeding Colonel Towle 

who was retiring. The post carried with it the rank of 

colonel, and Colonel Hamblet continued to serve in 

that capacity when her four year tour of duty was extended to 1 March 1959. Later in that same month, she 

was assigned duty in Naples, Italy, as military secretary to the commander in chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe.

In May 1962, on her return from Italy, Colonel 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) photo

Col Hamblet has the insignia of her present rank placed on her shoulders by Col Katherine A. Towle, USMC, retiring director of Women Marines, 

and Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps. 
SUMMER 2017 103

Hamblet reported to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot 

Parris Island, South Carolina, as commanding officer, 

Women’s Recruit Training Battalion, and served in 

this capacity until her retirement three years later on 1 

May 1965. She was awarded the Legion of Merit upon 

retirement for “outstanding service as planner, administrator and leader of Women Marines throughout a 

distinguished career which encompassed every major 

assignment in the women’s program.”

Colonel Hamblet went on to work for the U.S. 

Office of Education (later the Education Department) from 1965 to 1978, working in elementary and 

secondary education programs. For several years, she 

was based in Seattle, Washington, before she returned 

to Alexandria, Virginia. She moved to Williamsburg, 

Virginia, in 1986. 

Colonel Hamblet passed away on 17 April 2017 in 

Williamsburg at the age of 100. She was laid to rest in 

Harmony Grove Cemetery in Salem, Massachusetts. 

• 1775 •
IN MEMORIAM

Lieutenant Colonel Merrill 

L. Bartlett, USMC (Ret)

8 April 1939–5 February 2017

It was with great sadness that Marine 

Corps History Division was informed 

of the passing of Merrill Bartlett on 5 

February 2017. Born on 8 April 1939, 

Bartlett grew up in Colfax, Washington. After graduating high school in 

1957, he attended Washington State 

University and graduated with a 

Pharmacy degree in 1963. 

Bartlett enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve 

and rose to the rank of corporal before being commissioned a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps 

on 5 June 1963. He trained as an artillery officer and 

served in the 11th, 12th, and 13th Marines during his 

career. From 1968 to 1969, he served with the 13th Interrogation Translation Team in Vietnam, and for his 

service was awarded the Navy Commendation Medal. 

Bartlett’s final assignment was with the U.S. Naval 

Academy, where he taught history to the midshipmen from 1977 to his retirement in 1983. For his dedicated service during those years, he received the Navy 

Achievement Medal and the Legion of Merit.

After retiring from the Corps, Bartlett became a 

prolific researcher, historian, and writer. He authored 

more than 125 articles for various publications, including Leatherneck, Marine Corps Gazette, Fortitudine, and 

Naval History. He published numerous books, including Assault from the Sea, Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare (1983); Lejeune: A Marine’s Life, 1867–1942 

(1991); Leathernecks: An Illustrated History of the United 

States Marine Corps (2008); and The U.S. Marine Corps: 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

LtCol Merrill Bartlett.

104
SUMMER 2017 105

An Illustrated History (1984). In the past few years, 

Bartlett had been researching early Medal of Honor 

recipients at the National Archives, History Division, 

and other repositories across the country. His contributions to Marine Corps historical scholarship will 

continue to shape the narrative for years to come, and 

those who knew him will miss the self-described curmudgeon.

• 1775 •
IN MEMORIAM

Major Norman T. Hatch, USMCR (Ret)

2 March 1921–22 April 2017

It was with deep sympathy that the History Division 

learned of the passing of retired Major Norman T. 

Hatch on 22 April 2017 at the age of 96. 

Hatch was born in Boston, Massachusetts, on 2 

March 1921, and enlisted in the Marine Corps in July 

1939 at the age of 18. Graduating from Gloucester High 

School in the midst of the Great Depression, jobs were 

scarce. According to a 2005 interview, Hatch enlisted 

in the Marine Corps because he “needed a place to live 

and someplace where I could get three meals a day.” 

After recruit training, he was sent to Washington, 

DC, and became part of Marine Corps Institute as an 

instructor and later as a member of Leatherneck magazine before being assigned to the U.S. Navy’s public 

relations office. The March of Times School of Pictorial Journalism in New York City advertised a course 

in newsreel technique, and Hatch, with his staff photographers, took the course. 

Two years later, he found himself carrying 90 

pounds of camera equipment through waist-deep water across the reef at Tarawa. Covering the battle as 

it raged on and as bullets whizzed by was part of the 

job, and Hatch did it without giving a second thought 

to his own safety. “I’ve got to be here . . . I’ve got to 

document what [they] were doing,” he told reporters 

in 2005. The footage he and his fellow combat correspondents captured was turned into a documentary 

called With the Marines at Tarawa, which won the best 

documentary award by the National Board of Review 

in 1944 and an Academy Award for best documentary 

(short subjects) in 1945. 

Rising to technical sergeant, Hatch was appointed a warrant officer and assigned to San Diego, 

California, for duty with the 5th Marine Division in 

June 1944. On 19 February 1945, along with the rest 

of the division, he and his fellow combat corresponDefense Department (Marine Corps) photo 111403, 

courtesy of SSgt M.A. Cornelius

CWO Norman Hatch, officer with 5th Marines, on Iwo Jima in February 1945.

106
SUMMER 2017 107

Official U.S. Marine Corps photos

Top: U.S. Marines photographed during the Battle of Tarawa in November 1943, including then-SSgt Hatch (back row on right). Bottom: in the 

shadow of a wrecked tank, Hatch makes friends with a kitten caught in the battle.
108 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

dents landed on Iwo Jima, Japan. For his service on 

Iwo, he was awarded a Letter of Commendation from 

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz for his “cool-headedness 

under fire, and devotion to duty in combat.” Later, the 

Bronze Star with “V” also was awarded to Hatch for 

Iwo Jima.

Hatch returned to the United States in late 1945, 

and in late 1946, he returned to inactive status in the 

Marine Corps Reserve. Remaining in the Reserves, he 

was able to receive a commission in 1950 and continued to serve the Corps while living in the Washington, 

DC area. Promoted to captain in 1952 and then to major in 1960, Hatch retired from the Reserves in 1967.

His service to the Corps continued for many 

decades, providing vital details to the Corps’ historians, archivists, and curators on the earliest days of the 

combat correspondents and other aspects of World 

War II. Hatch remained engaged in the history of the 

Corps to the end. His service will not soon be forgotten. He is survived by his loving wife, Lois, his son, N. 

Thomas, and daughter, Colby. 

• 1775 •
REVIEW ESSAY

Major Peter L. Belmonte, USAF (Ret)*

World War I was marked by changes and developments in tactics, fortifications, and weapons. Sometimes weapons development drove changes in tactics; 

sometimes manpower and tactical considerations 

drove changes in fortifications. The two fine books 

reviewed here show how these situations developed.

It is said British soldiers would theorize about 

walking from the North Sea to Switzerland entirely 

within the extensive Allied trench system—a seemingly impossible feat for the reader to comprehend. The 

Germans, of course, had their own extensive trench 

system. The Hindenburg Line, which some of those 

British soldiers attacked in 1917 and 1918, was an imposing and formidable obstacle.

Authors Patrick Osborn and Marc Romanych 

have joined with illustrator Adam Hook to produce 

this fine treatise on the Hindenburg Line. According 

to the authors, “the origin of the Hindenburg, or Siegfried, fortifications lay in two major German defeats 

of 1916” (p. 7). Fighting at Verdun and the Somme resulted in 700,000 casualties in the German Army, in 

addition to the loss and expenditure of large amounts 

of supplies and ammunition. These losses resulted in 

the adoption of defensive tactics and the idea to cre-

* Maj Peter L. Belmonte is the author of several books, including 

Days of Perfect Hell: The U.S. 26th Infantry Regiment in the MeuseArgonne Offensive, October–November 1918 (2015) and CalabrianAmericans in the US Military During World War I (2017).

The Hindenburg Line. By Patrick Osborn and Marc Romanych. (New York: Osprey, 2016. Pp. 64. $19.00 paperback; 

$11.99 e-book.)

King of Battle: Artillery in World War I. Edited by Sanders Marble. (Boston: Brill, 2016. Pp. 396. $199.00 cloth.)

ate a new defensive line that would shorten the existing line and provide savings in men and material. The 

new positions consisted of a series of five lines, or systems, that “formed a continuous fortified front from 

the Belgian coast to the Moselle River” (p. 12).

After covering the construction of these positions, the authors review changes in German tactics 

that culminated in deeper defensive zones by 1917. 

They provide a description of the organization of a 

defensive zone, complete with interesting data on 

barbed wire obstacles and antitank mines. Text and 

illustrations depict the emplacement of concrete bunkers, artillery positions, and tank barricades. The authors’ operational history of the system covers French 

locations in Cambrai, Amiens, St. Quentin Canal, 

Meuse-Argonne, and others.

In short, the authors point out that Germany 

could afford no more battles with heavy losses, yet, 

with the Americans coming on the scene, they could 

not win the war by remaining in defensive positions, 

no matter how strong. In the end, “the Allies, employing new combined-arms tactics and weapons, especially tanks, were able to nullify any advantages the 

fortifications provided to the German army. Germany’s last line of defense was a forlorn hope” (p. 60).

The text is enhanced by many photographs depicting examples of trenches, shelters, strongpoints, 

and construction activity. Hook’s illustrations, crosssections of shelters, and other visual aids help the 

109
110 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

reader understand some of the detail of the fortifications. Several maps orient the reader to the trench system along the entire western front. The book does not 

contain footnotes; however, the bibliography, while 

only one page, seems adequate.

At 64 pages, this is an easy read that is packed 

with a lot of good information. People who are just 

beginning to read about World War I, especially the 

climactic year, 1918, should consider reading this book 

first. It will give them a good idea of what the Allies 

faced in their final offensive to end the war. More experienced readers will enjoy this concise treatise too.

In defense of such trench and fortification systems as the Hindenburg Line, or in preparation to attack them, artillery proved to be the king of battle in 

World War I. The new book, King of Battle: Artillery in 

World War I, is an excellent international study of artillery during the war. Whether comparatively smaller 

cannons or mortars manned by infantrymen or huge 

railroad guns served by sailors, these pieces made 

themselves known on the battlefield, causing death 

and destruction and driving changes in fortifications 

and tactics. World War I artillery even “holds the 

dubious distinction of causing a new diagnosis, 

shellshock” (p. vii). While acknowledging that scholars 

have written about artillery since the war, editor Dr. 

Sanders Marble then states: “Overall, there are only 

a few books examining artillery in World War I on a 

comparative, international basis” (p. vii). Marble and 

his contributors seek to address the gap with this book.

The international team of scholars covers the following countries: Britain, France, Germany, AustriaHungary, Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire, Italy, Serbia, 

Russia, United States, India, and Romania. The fact 

that each contributor used native sources makes this 

book particularly valuable to many English-speaking 

readers who would find such sources inaccessible. 

Each of the contributors focused on different aspects 

of their topic, and each used a varied scheme of arrangement to present their information. Not surprisingly, certain patterns emerge; in particular, areas of 

common concern among all nations become apparent. 

For example, all nations seem to have suffered from 

material and ammunition shortages, some severely 

so. Most nations struggled with the need to integrate 

field guns with heavy howitzers and mortars and to 

incorporate all within a coherent, effective tactical 

framework.

Setting the stage for the national histories, Bruce 

Gudmundsson (Marine Corps University) provides 

an interesting introduction, citing two pre-World 

War I inventions that prompted what he calls a technological revolution in artillery. The integrated recoil 

system, which allowed the carriage of an artillery 

piece to remain still during firing, produced a significantly faster rate of fire. Before this, improvements in 

gunpowder, explosives, and steel technology resulted 

in artillery projectiles that carried larger and more effective payloads farther than pre-1880s pieces. Next, 

Gudmundsson presents an overview of the myriad 

types of artillery pieces and projectiles of the era. This 

is followed up with brief discussions of artillery unit 

organization and techniques of employment.

Sanders Marble starts the national histories with 

a review of British artillery. After a brief introduction, Marble covers British artillery chronologically. 

For each year, Marble examines how tactics evolved 

against a backdrop of munitions shortages, weapons 

development, and organizational changes. For example, 1914 found British commanders adjusting to the 

importance of heavy artillery. Marble gives an example 

of tactical adaptation and resulting problems in 1915: 

“Due to munitions shortages . . . a decent bombardment meant a narrow attack, which meant punishing flanking fire” (pp. 38–39). Heavier bombardments 

and improved indirect fire techniques marked later 

years. Marble also includes “Behind the Lines” and 

“Beyond the Western Front” sections for each year. In 

his conclusion, Marble states that, in the end, despite 

evolving tactics and techniques, “the British did not 

embrace the idea of artillery conquers/infantry occupies” (p. 61).

Gudmundsson follows with his analysis of French 

artillery. According to him, “the history of the artillery 

of the French Army of the First World War is a tale of 

extremes” (p. 62). They had the best specimens of some 

artillery pieces and the worst of others. Gudmundsson 

organizes his chapter mostly by an examination of the 
SUMMER 2017 111

various classes of guns, howitzers, and mortars. Numerous charts throughout reflect the characteristics 

of the pieces. He addresses the French shell shortage, 

industrial mobilization, changes in tactics, motorization, naval pieces, and artillery unit organization. This 

chapter offers a thorough analysis of the topic. 

Major General David T. Zabecki (USA, Ret; 

University of Birmingham, UK) covers German artillery in the next chapter. Zabecki provides a wonderful analysis of German views on mobility and fire and 

maneuver. His discussion of high explosive, shrapnel, 

and gas shells is clear and edifying. Zabecki discusses 

field artillery, foot artillery, trench mortars, command 

and control, and fire control. Rounded out with an 

analysis of German fire support doctrine and tactics, 

this chapter serves as a fine examination of German 

artillery.

Independent scholar John R. Schindler adopts a 

chronological approach to Austria-Hungary’s artillery. 

Their army was hamstrung by internal politics before 

the war, and adequate funding was slow to materialize. Schindler concludes: “The tragedy of the AustroHungarian artillery was that it had mastered the art 

of 20th century combat just when the Dual Monarchy lost the ability to materially sustain such efforts” 

(p. 156).

Colonel Dmitri Minchev (Ret; president of the 

Bulgarian Commission for Military History) covers 

Bulgarian artillery chronologically against the background of their three major campaigns: Serbia in 1915, 

Romania in 1916, and Salonika, Greece, in 1915–18. 

Minchev also covers fire control, sound ranging, and 

the different types of fire support.

Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Erickson (USA, 

Ret; Marine Corps University) provides a chronological review of artillery operations of the Ottoman 

Army. In common with other countries, the Ottomans were plagued by munitions shortages and, in the 

end, “failed to provide the weapons and munitions 

necessary for the fielding of a 20th century artillery 

arm” (p. 195).

Colonel Filippo Cappellano (Archivio dell’ Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore Esercito) covers 

Italian artillery. As with other nations’ artillery, the 

Italians suffered from a dearth of munitions. Their 

tactics, too, changed as the war progressed, developing, for example, the idea that artillery should be used 

to pave the way for one’s own infantry attack, instead 

of waiting until the attack is underway. Cappellano 

also discusses the changes in manning and organization during the war.

James Lyon (Centre for Southeast European 

Studies of the University of Graz) next discusses Serbia’s artillery, which benefited from experience in the 

First and Second Balkan Wars (1912 and 1913). Serbia 

had to contend with exhaustion (physical and economic) from these previous wars, as well as shortages 

of munitions during the World War. So acute was the 

shortage that, at one point, division commanders “demanded a strict account of each shell fired” (p. 238). 

Lyon covers Serbia’s battles chronologically, and this 

chapter is an excellent account of Serbia’s heroic efforts.

Andrey Pavlov (School of International Relations, 

Saint Petersburg State University) reports on Russia’s artillery. Pavlov describes the efforts to upgrade 

the Russian Army following the Russo-Japanese War. 

Despite these efforts, “the munitions famine became 

one of the most important reasons behind the heavy 

defeats which the Russian army suffered in the campaign of 1915” (p. 260). Indeed, at one point, artillery 

units were restricted to firing only one shell per gun 

per day. Pavlov also covers developing tactics, foreign 

aid, heavy artillery, and trench artillery. Just when 

Russian artillery was strongest, revolution halted Russian participation in the war.

Janice E. McKenney, an independent scholar, 

provides a fine chapter on the United States’ artillery. 

Her thorough essay covers personnel, equipment and 

organization, training, and the need to acquire artillery pieces from foreign suppliers. McKenney reviews 

railway artillery, coast artillery, and trench mortars; 

each of these types of units served in action in France. 

Her “Operations” section covers changing tactics, infantry and artillery coordination, intelligence, supply, 

fire support, and aerial observation.

Kaushik Roy (Jadavpur University, Kolkata; and 

Peace Research Institute, Oslo) discusses many inter-
112 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

esting facts about India’s artillery during the war. After discussing the prewar state of Indian artillery, Roy 

addresses wartime organization and manning. British 

officials, fearful of the presence of large numbers of 

trained Indians in the country, kept recruitment low. 

According to Roy, “due to the Martial Race theory regarding recruitment, Indian artillery personnel were 

recruited only from the Jat Sikhs and Muslims from 

Punjab” (p. 304). Roy addresses Indian performance 

in East Africa, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Gallipoli. 

Indian artillery tactics and training improved during 

the war despite a limited industrial base and governmental financial constraints.

Cornel I. Scafes (independent scholar) and Ioan 

Scafes (department head, King Ferdinand I National 

Military Museum, Bucharest) conclude the national 

surveys with their essay on Romanian artillery. The 

authors discuss the period of initial Romanian neutrality, followed by the campaigns of 1916, 1917, and 

1918. Romania, too, struggled with shortages and a 

lack of trained personnel. In common with other 

nations, Romania improved its equipment, tactics, 

and training as the war went on. This chapter is augmented by a fine map and 13 interesting photographs.

Boyd L. Dastrup (U.S. Army Field Artillery 

School) provides a conclusion and summary. Dastrup 

reviews changes in munitions, motorization, tactics, 

and methods of firing to support his general conclusion that “the challenges of the war forced armies to 

modernize their artillery” (p. 360). This was evident 

in the shift to indirect fire, an increase in the use of 

heavy artillery and high explosives, and a move toward 

improved traction and motorization.

Although King of Battle is easy to read, some of 

the writing and tables are fairly technical. Each chapter can, of course, be read independently. This book 

will appeal mainly to artillery aficionados and scholars, although the generalist reader will certainly learn 

a lot about changing tactics and the adaptability of 

artillery to counter those tactics. The reported high 

retail cost of this book probably puts it beyond the 

reach of the average reader. Scholars and serious artillery enthusiasts would be well advised to seek out a 

copy at Service academy libraries or other institutions 

of higher learning. More casual readers might want to 

wait until used copies appear for sale at a lower cost.

• 1775 •
BOOK REVIEWS

Jacob Stoil, PhD*

As historical topics of research go, writing about the 

Holocaust presents something of paradox. At first 

glance, the field might seem full. Books, articles, and 

documentaries have covered many aspects of it. At 

the same time, Holocaust denial, claims of Holocaust 

exaggeration, and the trivialization of the Holocaust 

abound and perhaps are growing. In Hell Before Their 

Very Eyes, John C. McManus attempts to step into the 

center of this paradox. In one sense, the book covers 

little new ground, but in another, by reframing the 

Holocaust through the eyes of the American soldiers 

who liberated concentration camps, it offers an important contribution in combating the tendency to 

trivialize the horrors to which these Americans bore 

witness. In doing so, it also raises some intriguing 

questions about the U.S. military during liberation 

that merit further consideration and serious study.

Starting with the preface, McManus identifies 

the nature of the problems that Hell Before Their Very 

Eyes seeks to address, namely Holocaust denial and 

claims of Holocaust exaggeration. To counter these 

problems, he focuses on presenting the experiences 

of American forces involved in the liberation of three 

major concentration camps in Germany: Ohrdruf, Bu-

* Jacob Stoil holds a doctorate in history from the University of 

Oxford and a master’s in the history of warfare and a bachelor’s 

degree from King’s College London.

Hell Before Their Very Eyes: American Soldiers Liberate Concentration Camps in Germany, April 1945. By John C. McManus. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015. Pp. 208. $50.00 cloth; $19.95 paperback and ebook.)

chenwald, and Dachau. The cases build upon each other, with the majority of the book spent on Dachau. In 

each instance, McManus provides a thorough account 

of liberation and the horrors the liberators witnessed. 

In some cases, he goes into more depth, explaining 

and settling controversies, such as which unit liberated Dachau and questions about U.S. soldiers taking 

part in reprisal killings of Nazi personnel. The graphic 

and detailed nature of the considerations of the three 

liberations, which are largely drawn from eyewitness 

accounts, fulfills the purpose of the book, leaving the 

reader without any doubt about the nearly unparalleled barbarity of the Holocaust.

Throughout the book, McManus presents several 

intriguing and repeating patterns that are worthy of 

further examination. In each case of liberation, McManus notes that the American soldiers had no idea what 

they were going to encounter, or even that there were 

camps in the area. By the liberation of Dachau, U.S. 

soldiers encountering escaped victims of that camp 

had so little knowledge of what was happening that 

they did not believe the inmates’ assertions that such 

a place existed. This is particularly hard to understand 

because the divisions involved in camp liberation had 

received orders to secure the camp at Dachau, and the 

Americans had already liberated several camps, including Buchenwald and Ohrdruf. Additionally, the 

locations and some realities of both Buchenwald and 

Dachau were certainly known, as both were in op113
114 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

eration prior to the outbreak of the war and, in the 

case of Buchenwald, the Allies had aerial photos taken in 1944 in which the camp was labeled. There was 

also intelligence from Special Operations Executive 

agents who had escaped the camps. All of this begs 

the question of why the units operating in the area of 

the camps were not informed. Why were soldiers not 

told what to expect? Unfortunately, having repeatedly 

narrated this pattern, McManus digs no deeper. Hell 

Before Their Very Eyes implies that, because of their 

lack of prior knowledge, the liberators had to make 

do with the supplies on hand, and no special instructions or preparations were made. It seems more than 

possible that, as precious time went by before medical 

teams and nutritionists could arrive, lives were lost. 

These questions may be beyond the scope of McManus’s work, but having raised the issue, the author 

leaves the reader wanting answers.

In a similar vein, the witnesses themselves are 

somewhat absent from the book. From the title and 

the prologue, it appears that Hell Before Their Very Eyes

will cut interesting new ground in focusing on the experiences and perspectives of those Americans who 

liberated the concentration camps. The book is peppered with vignettes and quotes from these witnesses. 

At times, it notes the ethnicity of the liberators, mentioning Jewish or German heritage. It would be interesting and worthwhile to see how ethnic, religious, 

and other identities affected the experience of taking 

part in the liberation. Conspicuous in their absence 

are the voices of the African American personnel who 

encountered the camps. This is particularly surprising given the wealth of material on the subject. The 

long-term effects of the liberation on soldiers provides 

another fertile ground for further inquiry. Although 

there are subchapters in the epilogue that present 

some exploration, the work leaves room for a more 

robust investigation. 

Overall, John McManus’s Hell Before Their Very 

Eyes provides a good and important introductory resource for those unfamiliar with the true horrors of 

the Holocaust and a good reminder for those who may 

have forgotten. For those looking for a more scholarly discussion, Hell Before Their Very Eyes raises more 

questions than it answers, but this is not necessarily 

a negative. In a field full of excellent histories, McManus points toward some new directions for further 

research. 

• 1775 •
SUMMER 2017 115

Douglas E. Nash*

As any Marine or soldier who took part in the Second 

Battle of Fallujah will tell you, urban warfare is difficult. 

House-to-house fighting, with its close-range engagement distances, extensive use of firepower, and potential for massive collateral damage, is the kind of mission 

that most troops would rather avoid if given the choice. 

But all too often, they do not get that choice, and when 

directed to do so, usually go about this most challenging of assignments with little time to prepare and even 

less time to train. 

Although urban warfare is becoming increasingly 

likely in the expanding megacities proliferating along 

the world’s littorals at a rapid pace, American military 

planners apparently would rather avoid discussing the 

topic altogether, preferring to conduct operations in 

the wide open spaces of the desert or countryside rather than being sucked into city fighting—and for good 

reason. This reluctance is altogether understandable, 

given the high cost in casualties suffered and massive 

expenditures of ammunition, but it does little to prepare our armed forces for the kinds of battles in which 

they will increasingly find themselves involved. 

This new book, Storming the City by defense analyst Alec Wahlman, demonstrates that modern Marines 

and soldiers are not alone in their negative regard of urban warfare. In fact, American military planners since 

* Douglas E. Nash, colonel, USA (Ret), works as the lead historian at History Division, Marine Corps University, Quantico, 

VA. He is the author of Hell’s Gate: The Battle of the Cherkassy 

Pocket, January to February 1944 (2002) and Victory Was Beyond 

Their Grasp: With the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division from the Hürtgen Forest to the Heart of the Reich (2008) and is currently researching Marine Corps amphibious warfare for an upcoming History 

Division anthology.

Storming the City: U.S. Military Performance in Urban Warfare from World War II to Vietnam. By Alec Wahlman. 

(Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2015. Pp. 400. $29.95 cloth; $23.96 e-book.)

the early days of the country’s founding have avoided it 

as much as possible too. With the rare exception of examples of city fighting during the Mexican-American 

War in 1847 and the 1862 Battle of Fredericksburg during the Civil War, the topic had been little studied or 

commented on until World War II, and no appreciable 

doctrine had been written until then either, being regarded as more of an aberration than a common type 

of military operation.

To illustrate how effectively American troops have 

tackled this challenging mission during World War II 

and afterward, the author selected four examples of urban warfare ranging over a 24-year period (1944–68) involving three different wars: the Battles of Manila and 

Aachen in World War II, the 1950 battle for Seoul during the Korean War, and the 1968 Battle of Hue during 

the Vietnam conflict. All of these battles involved U.S. 

Army and/or Marine Corps forces, ranging in size from 

an infantry regiment with two battalions (Aachen) up 

to and including multidivision operations (Seoul and 

Manila).

While Wahlman provides good thumbnail histories of each of these urban battles that are worth studying in their own right, the true value of his book lies in 

the analytical model he created to determine how each 

of these fights differed and what elements common to 

all four contributed to ultimate American success. Understanding and applying this model to recent battles 

fought in Iraq and Afghanistan would not only aid historians, but would prove useful for current or future 

planning efforts, supporting increased command and 

staff effectiveness during the run-up to urban fighting 

and possibly resulting in fewer military and civilian casualties and with less collateral damage to urban area 

infrastructure. 
116 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

Wahlman’s main thesis is that American ground 

combat forces have been successful in conducting military operations in urban terrain primarily due to two 

factors: transferable competence and battlefield adaptation. The first term, transferable competence, simply 

means that the skills that make U.S. forces successful 

in conducting high-intensity ground combat operations in open or wooded terrain are readily transferable to the urban environment, such as the quality of 

small unit leadership, the emphasis on firepower and 

the logistical support that makes this possible, the coordination and orchestration of combined arms, the 

experience gained in previous combat situations, and 

the design of armored vehicles that makes the infantry’s 

firepower employment more effective. 

The second term, battlefield adaptation, concerns 

how units, with little or no knowledge and experience of urban combat, rapidly learn and adjust their 

tactics—how they fight—to succeed in the strange and 

challenging world of the urban jungle. Historically, 

American troops, both Marines and soldiers, frequently have exhibited the ability to change and adapt to 

various challenges using tactics, techniques, and procedures described in their doctrinal manuals, which serve 

as points of departure, relying on a “spirit of innovation 

and flexibility” that is almost unique to American military culture and deviates from doctrine if and when the 

situation calls for it (p. 6). 

Wahlman believes that this uniqueness is no accident; he believes that it is imbedded in the American 

character, as well. Just as important, according to the 

author, is the historical tendency displayed by American commanders, who push decision-making authority 

down to the lowest level of leadership possible to allow 

the commander to make the right decisions as well as 

to provide him the firepower he needs to get the job 

done. This favorable trend began to accelerate during 

World War II and has continued to the present day. 

While history shows that commanders have not always 

followed this dictum, the success achieved in the battles 

for Manila, Aachen, Seoul, and Hue were made possible because the local commanders at the point of the 

spear were given nearly everything they asked for (with 

the exception of the Battle of Manila, when General 

Douglas MacArthur denied requests for close-air support) to overcome their opponent. Even in 1944, fear of 

excessive collateral damage influenced decision makers. 

To assess how these two factors allow the observer 

to quantify battlefield performance in urban conditions, Wahlman selected five metrics. These measurement tools—command, control, and communications; 

firepower and survivability; mobility and countermobility; logistics; and dealing with the local population—are ideally suited to evaluating combat in urban 

environments because they are readily observable and 

quantifiable. That is, you can examine the evidence 

from these battles using situation reports, oral interviews, and after action reports to compare one battle 

against another to determine whether certain trends 

can be identified, such as whether advancements in urban combat tactics, techniques, and procedures are taking place. It also allows the observer to determine how 

much ammunition was used, how many civilians were 

evacuated or treated in hospitals, and what means were 

used to effectively communicate with troops engaged 

in combat. Using this methodology, the author came to 

the conclusion that, while the United States has been 

uniformly successful in city fighting, its efficiency has 

been declining in relative terms since 1944. 

Finally, the author exposes two myths that have 

been used, in his opinion, as excuses by commanders 

or staffs (and even strategic leaders) to avoid urban 

fighting. The first is the myth that any attacker in an 

urban setting must enjoy 3 to 1 superiority in numbers 

when going against prepared defenses. After a careful 

analysis, Wahlman demonstrates that in none of the 

cases cited did U.S. forces enjoy anything greater than 

a 1.5 to 1 advantage (as in Manila), and in the other 

cases, were either on par with the enemy in numbers 

or (as in Aachen) were outnumbered. In all four cases 

studied, American forces prevailed despite the overall 

lack of numerical advantage. The difference, according 

to the author’s model and borne out by his analysis, 

was that U.S. forces were simply better trained, led, 

and equipped than their opponents; were backed up 

by overwhelming firepower; and were sustained by a 

seemingly inexhaustible logistics pipeline. 

The other myth is that urban combat is a propo-
SUMMER 2017 117

sition best left to the infantry, who are better suited 

for house-to-house fighting. Time and again, the author 

demonstrates that the key to success in an urban fight 

is the integration of all arms—infantry, combat engineer, artillery, air, and most of all, armor. While tanks 

are admittedly at a greater disadvantage when operating in cities, if backed by infantry providing close-in 

protection, they can be devastatingly effective against 

fortified enemy positions. Artillery and close air support are also combat multipliers, but a correspondingly 

robust logistics system must be in place to feed the voracious ammunition appetites typical of modern city 

fighting.

The effectiveness of the all-arms approach was 

tellingly demonstrated (again) in the battles of Fallujah, where M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks in support 

of individual infantry platoons blasted enemy positions 

with their powerful 120mm guns, firing high-explosive 

antitank ammunition. In fact, any attacking force that 

decides to go into a city without armor is likely to suffer heavy casualties, as witnessed by the Wehrmacht’s

failed attempt to take Stalingrad in 1942 with only token armored support. Even in Hue, when teamed with 

infantry and tanks, the lightly armored 106mm recoilless rifle-equipped M50 Ontos antitank vehicle was 

strikingly successful against enemy positions located in 

buildings and street-level bunkers. Of course, the opposite can be true as well—the overreliance on armor to 

the detriment of infantry led to the Russian Army’s disastrous performance during the first battle of Grozny, 

Chechnya, in 1996, when on several occasions armorheavy battle groups were completely wiped out by light 

infantry operating in the city. Maintaining balance between all arms is therefore essential.

The author chose not to apply his analytical model to more recent urban fights, such as the two battles 

for Fallujah or Marjah. In an email to the reviewer, he 

stated that he believes that these battles are still too 

recent for a detailed analysis. Wahlman does make the 

case, however, that even though U.S. forces were uniformly successful during the 24-year period in question, 

he noticed a slow, almost imperceptible decrease in 

overall competency. He explains this phenomenon by 

stating that commanders and staffs were being taught 

increasingly less about urban operations during their 

professional military education and conducted little or 

no training in built-up areas despite a rapidly evolving 

doctrine that provided an adequate intellectual foundation for addressing this type of combat. 

Whether this tendency has gotten worse can be 

argued, but additional causes for professional concern 

are the ever-growing population densities of modern 

megacities, fear of collateral damage resulting from 

overuse of firepower, the ever-increasing complexity 

of rules of engagement, and the intrusion of modern 

media on the battlefield, beaming images of alleged 

atrocities into the world’s living rooms. All of these can 

combine to discourage serious thinking about urban 

warfare, but combat in cities is not going away—if anything, it is becoming more prevalent, as demonstrated 

in the ongoing Syrian civil war.

Fortunately, many of these concerns are adequately covered in the current doctrinal publications, 

the U.S. Army’s Field Manual 3-06, Urban Operations 

(2006), and the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 

3-35.3, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (1998). 

Though these manuals have been revised and updated 

and are considered to be the last word on the subject, 

Wahlman feels that commanders and leaders in both 

Services must continue to stress the basics in their craft 

to ensure that the two factors discussed in the beginning of the book are still emphasized: competence in 

their warfighting craft that can be transferred from 

battlefield to battlefield, and the continuing ability to 

adapt existing weapons and tactics toward the unique 

challenges posed by the urban environment. Their continuing ability to do so is borne out by the marked success enjoyed by Marine and Army forces in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, though as the author might caution, they 

should not take their innate tendency of transferable 

competence and battlefield adaptation for granted—

they must be fostered and encouraged, not assumed to 

be ever-present.

• 1775 •
118 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

Charles D. Melson*

Alexandre Binda’s intimate knowledge of the Grey’s 

Scouts, a mounted infantry unit created in 1975, 

comes from being a member of the United Kingdom’s 

colonial Rhodesian Army for 15 years and of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, and from writing regimental 

histories of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, Rhodesian 

African Rifles, and Rhodesia Regiment. As a participant and observer, Binda narrates his story with immediacy and context. Based on a conglomeration of 

formal and informal sources, he tells a story “before 

the colors fade” from the viewpoint of those who were 

there. As such, the book crosses the space between 

memoir and history. This is popular history as seen by 

the organization and its members without the benefit 

of documentation, and while intense, it cannot be authenticated or exact in the details. 

Binda begins his account of the Grey’s Scouts 

with approximately 40 pages on the origin of the 

unit’s name during the 1896 Matabeleland Rebellion 

(Second Matabele War) between indigenous tribes. 

The subsequent chapters are arranged chronologically, covering the period 1975–1980, during the bitter conflict that witnessed Rhodesia’s transformation 

into Zimbabwe. Appendices provide a reconstructed 

nominal roll, awards, unit songs, and verses, with 

maps and abundant photographs added. One important fact about the Grey’s Scouts was its multiracial 

composition, which allowed it to continue after independence, while other racially exclusive organizations 

* Maj Charles D. Melson, USMC (Ret), was chief historian for 

the U.S. Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA. He has 

published numerous works on military history, including in the 

Journal of Slavic Military History, and is the author of the awardwinning Operation Knight’s Move.

The Equus Men: Rhodesia’s Mounted Infantry: The Grey’s Scouts, 1896–1980. By Alexandre Binda. (West Midlands, UK: 

Helion & Company, 2015 Pp. 288. £55.00 cloth.) 

(Special Air Service, Rhodesian Light Infantry) were 

disbanded. 

In July 1975, an experimental mounted infantry 

unit under Major Alexander Fraser-Kirk was formed 

by the Rhodesia Army. It was manned by regulars, 

territorials, and national servicemen. They fought on 

horseback and were most active in the Rhodesian border areas. On 26 March 1976, the unit was named after 

a historical predecessor: Captain George Grey. Frederick C. Selous commented in 1896 that “Mr. Grey 

got together 23 good men and rode back to Tokwe the 

same evening. These men formed the nucleus of the 

force which had done splendid service in the suppression of the present rebellion under the name of Grey’s 

Scouts” to put down the Matabele and Mashona. A 

regimental song, “The Grey’s Scouts Ride Again,” 

characterized Rhodesia’s foremost mounted unit, although the police force and internal affairs also had 

horse-mounted elements. 

Based at Inkomo Barracks, the regiment began as 

a single squadron, expanding to a battalion-size unit 

of 800 men organized into a headquarters, support, 

and three combat squadrons (A, B, and C) with approximately 450 men and 400 horses at full strength. 

Each squadron had three troops consisting of four 

eight-man sections (the basic four-man patrol or half 

section). A support squadron included reconnaissance, mortar (60mm and 81mm), and tracker dog 

(fox hounds) sections. Normal headquarters and support elements were provided, including motor transports of hard mine-and-ambush proof and soft horse 

carrying vehicles. 

Starting with a four-and-one-half month selection and training course, horse and rider were kept 

together to develop and keep affinity and trust, in-
SUMMER 2017 119

cluding gun proofing. The basic requirements for a 

Grey’s Scout recruit included weighing 160 pounds 

or less, and having experience as a soldier; in this instance, military experience was more desired than riding skills. Mounts came from various sources, with the 

majority being small, mature horses from South Africa (cross breeds of bossiekops [farm ponies] and Basuto 

ponies were preferred). Packhorses carried stores, ammunition, and crew-served weapons that could weigh 

more than 300 pounds. For example, a mortar tube 

was strapped to a pack frame, balanced on the other 

side by ammunition, with the baseplate mounted on 

the pommel. Tack came from local manufacturers, 

including a McClellan-style cavalry saddle and pack 

frame.

The roles of the Grey’s Scouts encompassed longrange reconnaissance patrolling of rural areas, tracking, and follow-up on horseback; deep penetration in 

support of armored cars; and serving as dismounted 

infantry when needed. The unit operated in areas 

where the terrain limited vehicle and foot mobility, 

such as along the eastern and southeastern border, often in conjunction with the border minefield cordon. 

Much of its deployments supported the engineers and 

patrolled the border, although occasionally it provided support to the units engaged in external operations. One American participant remarked that it was 

used “on border control and sweeps that resulted in 

successful contact situations for the Selous Scouts.”

Patrols lasted up to 10 days with self-supply of 

local fodder and concentrated horse pellets. Two sections would work together and cover up to 40 kilometers in a day. A horse and rider could alternate a 

7-kilometer-per-hour (kmh) walk with a 12-kmh trot 

(the trot was found to be uncomfortable and dislodged equipment), and a canter at 18 kmh could be 

attained. Various horse camouflage techniques were 

tried with sometimes visually astonishing results. 

Commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Mick McKenna believed vehicle-drawn horse boxes allowed 

the Grey’s Scouts to be quickly inserted into areas, to 

follow up on tracks, and to pursue retreating groups. 

The horses placed the rider well above the high savannah grass and meant that the section, equipped with 

radios, could spread out to cover a wide front, making 

ambush difficult—a startled horse would simply burst 

out from the ambush. Horses, unlike vehicles, moved 

silently through the bush. The speed of the horse allowed running men to be overtaken easily. Like Rhodesia’s Special Air Service and Selous Scouts, the unit 

suffered a degree of notoriety during the war, but this 

did not stop them from continuing to operate after 

Zimbabwe’s independence as a mounted infantry unit 

for border control and antipoaching operations. 

The Rhodesian Combined Operations headquarters regarded the Grey’s Scouts in the same way it did 

the Special Air Service, Selous Scouts, Fire Forces, 

and the border cordon, which were under its direct 

control. There may be some question as to this status, as the unit’s standards were not comparable to either the more exclusive Special Air Service or Selous 

Scouts. Still, the group was a unique response to a specific situation and often operated where other special 

forces were not as successful. 

For those interested in counterinsurgency in 

Rhodesia in the 1960s and 1970s, this book offers insight into an innovative response to cross-border terrorist incursions. Instead of technology, biology was 

used to provide mobility. If they could not run the 

terrorists down with personnel and helicopters, then 

adding horses to the mix might solve the problem of 

chasing men on foot in broken terrain. This resulted 

in the formation of a mounted infantry unit that was 

employed throughout the country to augment more 

conventional counterguerrilla forces spread thin over 

“MMBA” (miles and miles of bloody Africa). The narrative provides a unit history, including its ups and 

downs in morale and discipline. Once the regiment 

was established, the narrative weaves through a series 

of internal deployments and contacts with the various terrorists and guerrillas who were the face of enemy forces in the rural area. Also included in the book 

are descriptions of a number of external operations 

into neighboring countries that provided the guerrillas sanctuary. These detailed impressions of small unit 

combat are the book’s main strengths.

• 1775 •
120 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

Mark R. Folse*

Peter Haynes’ Toward a New Maritime Strategy explores 

why the U.S. Navy failed to promulgate a maritime 

strategy after the Cold War and seeks to explain why 

it finally adopted one in 2007. He argues that the U.S. 

Navy’s 2007 publication of A Cooperative Strategy for 

21st Century Seapower represented an important shift 

in American naval thought toward a maritime strategy aimed at protecting the global system of countries 

linked by economic, political, and security interests 

established by the United States and its allies after 

World War II. Contrary to traditional naval thinking, the new  strategy made preventing wars just as 

important as winning  them. Haynes contends that 

such institutional quirks as threat-centric worldviews, 

narrow-minded admirals, and disagreements with the 

other naval Services made the Navy slow in adopting 

a global maritime strategy. Well researched and finely 

articulated, this intellectual history illuminates the 

post-Cold War Navy’s challenges and ways of thinking 

quite well. 

From 1945 to 1989, Navy officers and strategists 

focused on defeating the Soviets, which meant most 

of their attention went to military technology, naval 

operations, the size of the Navy, and funding. During 

the Cold War, the Navy’s senior officers, the chiefs 

of naval operations (CNOs), took on smaller roles in 

developing naval strategy. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 gave 

the combatant and geographic commanders, lower in 

rank to the CNOs but in command of deployed units 

around the world, more say in what the Navy needed 

* Mark R. Folse is a PhD candidate at the University of Alabama History Department in Tuscaloosa.

Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era. By Peter D. Haynes. (Annapolis, 

MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015. Pp. 304. $49.95 cloth.) 

in terms of technology and manpower. The CNO’s 

job shifted away from developing strategy as a result. 

“These CNOs assumed that they were not responsible 

for anything other than equipping, training, and organizing the Navy,” Haynes asserts, and “strategy was 

someone else’s job”—in this instance, the geographic 

commanders (p. 9). Geographic commanders worried 

about naval operations, not strategy. This way of 

thinking continued after the Cold War. 

Narrow service and educational backgrounds of 

the senior Navy leadership limited the institution’s 

knowledge base to one that centered on technology 

and engineering. For example, Haynes points out that 

submariners, who “were (and still are) considered first 

and foremost nuclear engineers,” had no experience 

or education in international relations or strategic 

studies (p. 22). From 1982 to 1994, three CNOs were 

former submariners. Haynes argues that “understanding how to employ complex weapons systems now 

took up a far greater percentage of an officer’s career” 

(p. 22). Therefore, most of the senior Navy leadership 

after the Cold War were technical and operational 

experts in their fields, but poor strategists. Haynes 

sharply criticizes these officers because they “shaped 

an understanding of U.S. naval strategy that was limited to how the fleet should be balanced, rationalized, 

and employed” (p. 245). Their limited understanding 

of how the Navy could or should help safeguard the 

global economic and political system was inexcusable 

to Haynes. 

The Navy-Marine Corps relationship constituted 

another factor that kept the Navy from thinking globally and developing a useful maritime strategy. Since 

Goldwater-Nichols, Marines had a say in naval strategic statements that required consensus with the Navy 
SUMMER 2017 121

to move forward. Haynes argues that Marine Commandants (e.g., Generals Alfred M. Gray and Charles 

C. Krulak) had very narrow backgrounds that limited their strategic vision to littoral and expeditionary warfare and away from global strategy. Therefore, 

throughout the 1990s, whenever Navy leaders spoke of 

globalization, the Marines could not get on board because their thinking was “shaped by the Marine Corps’ 

identity, which is all about warfighting” (p. 246). Essentially, the lack of strategic consensus between two 

linked, but different, naval Services hampered the development of a maritime strategy. 

Haynes argues that it was not until the U.S. military faced possible defeat in Iraq between 2004 and 

2007 and the emergence of two maverick thinkers that 

the Navy adopted a maritime strategy. Long ground 

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, fought mostly by the 

Army and Marines, forced Navy leaders to rethink 

their institution’s purpose. CNO Admiral Michael 

G. Mullen and Vice Admiral John G. Morgan Jr. recognized that  al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks 

threatened not just the United States, but the international system that it helped create during the Cold 

War. The naval Services (i.e., Navy, Marine Corps, and 

Coast Guard), together with U.S. allies, therefore, 

should cooperate and focus on protecting that system of global trade and free markets. They outlined 

their strategy in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 

Seapower. 

Haynes concludes that A Cooperative Strategy, with 

its global and systemic view of world affairs, was a step 

in the right direction strategically for the Navy, but 

more changes were necessary to make the approach 

permanent. He recommends that the Navy employ 

strategists with advanced degrees in political economics, international finance, security, history, and 

strategic studies to become more adept at thinking 

strategically, and “explain in clearer and more compelling terms the merits of a maritime-systemic strategic 

approach” to both naval and civilian audiences (p. 252).  

One criticism of Haynes’ book is his assumption that a maritime strategy is best for the United 

States and its Navy. This book is persuasive if one 

agrees with that basic premise. However, readers who 

believe that the Navy and other military institutions 

should focus on warfighting first and foremost may be 

a tough audience. Some believe that the Navy’s elevation of humanitarian and disaster relief missions to 

the same level of concern as nuclear and conventional 

military threat deterrence means a reduction in warfighting capabilities. Funding and training time would 

have to shift from one to the other. Whether students 

and teachers of history, strategic studies, and military 

thought agree with Haynes’ underlying assumptions 

or not, all are encouraged to read this book and consider its implications.

• 1775 •
122 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

Richard A. McConnell, PhD*

The Declaration of Independence promises 

Americans the unalienable rights to life, 

liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In the 

quest for happiness, many of us choose to 

enjoy the world as it is. Originals embrace 

the uphill battle, striving to make the world 

as it could be.

~Adam Grant

In Originals, Adam Grant provides an engaging description of how divergent thinkers pursue novel 

ideas, driving progress in disciplines ranging from 

selling eyeglasses online, writing historical speeches 

that change the world, analyzing intelligence, and 

distributing computers. As the above excerpt implies, original thinkers seek to break out of the status 

quo, reaching out to that which accepted convention 

might maintain is impossible and establishing a new 

standard for their disciplines. This book is for anyone 

curious about how creative trendsetters develop new 

ideas, challenge assumptions, speak truth to power, 

and avoid groupthink while carefully fostering the wavering flame of innovative ideas. Originals may especially interest military professionals as they challenge 

accepted conventional thinking in the ongoing effort 

to anticipate the unexpected in an ever more complex 

world. Readers beware: Grant presents case studies 

and research that fly in the face of conventional wisdom regarding how to inaugurate groundbreaking endeavors with a hope of success. 

* Dr. Richard A. McConnell, lieutenant colonel, USA (Ret), 

is an assistant professor at the Department of Army Tactics, 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Originals: How Non-Conformists Move the World. By Adam Grant. (New York: Penguin Random House, 2016. Pp. 

336. $27.00 cloth; $17.00 paperback; $40.00 audio book.)

Early in Originals, Grant describes a unique 

groundbreaking effort by an American prescription 

glasses company, Warby Parker, to change the industry by selling prescription glasses completely online. 

Five years ago, most glasses-wearing customers would 

not have considered buying glasses online because of 

the accepted convention of going to a shop and trying 

on frames. Warby Parker’s founders challenged this 

accepted paradigm, resulting in a company valued at 

more than $1 billion. This case study might challenge 

reader perceptions of how innovative thinkers behave. 

Instead of going all in on Warby Parker and pursuing 

this endeavor full time, company founders balanced 

risk while questioning established paradigms by splitting their time between Warby Parker and their day 

jobs. This account of innovators hedging their bets 

seems as counterintuitive as Grant’s explanation of 

how nonconformist originals employ strategic procrastination to ensure the best innovative outcomes. 

Grant relates the story of how Martin Luther 

King Jr. procrastinated during his preparation for his 

monumental “I Have a Dream” speech that defined a 

generation of civil rights activists. This account tells 

an interesting story of how originals forge the unique 

and groundbreaking by putting off completion of a 

project until it has a chance to mature. Martin Luther 

King agonized over his pending oration in front of 

the Lincoln Memorial in 1963, constantly revising and 

reimagining it. In none of the drafts did he mention 

the notion of his dream. Yet, during the address, when 

Mahalia Jackson shouted, “Tell ’em about the dream, 

Martin,” King improvised what has become iconic for 

a movement that reshaped America. Grant describes 

suspending the completion of an idea as strategic procrastination. Divergent original thinkers allow novel 
SUMMER 2017 123

ideas to incubate in their minds by refusing to rush 

to completion because, once they are complete, they 

stop thinking about that idea. Such procrastination 

may seem nonsensical to some readers, as many learn 

to work proactively to complete a project ahead of 

schedule, while Grant advocates postponement to 

achieve higher-quality ideas. Such approaches could 

put originals at odds with superiors who may expect 

results based on probable outcomes. 

One of the biggest challenges to original thinkers 

is how to present their novel ideas to organizational 

leaders. Many innovators have great ideas that are never heard because they have not obtained the credibility to present those notions and have them successfully 

adopted. Grant calls this credibility idiosyncrasy credits

and applies this term to two cases: one at the Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA) and another at Apple. In 

one case, a CIA analyst wanted to improve information sharing through a wiki-like system but initially 

failed due to a lack of idiosyncrasy credits that she 

gained some years later. In another case, a distribution executive at Apple succeeded in getting her perspective heard because of her level of credibility with 

organizational leaders. This section of Originals might 

be the most useful to readers who find themselves in 

possession of an innovative idea and faced with advocating adoption of that idea to organizational leaders.

Originals provides a paradigm-breaking view of 

nonconformist innovation that is well supported with 

case studies, anecdotes, and research. Although Grant 

draws from scholarly research, this book is not written 

only for that community. Originals is for any audience 

interested in how revolutionary thinkers successfully 

develop ideas, present visions for the way ahead, and 

avoid the perils of groupthink. This book would definitely be a great selection for military professionals 

who wish to hone their critical and creative thinking 

skills. An outstanding selection for civilian and military readers alike, Originals engagingly points the way 

to innovative trailblazing. 

• 1775 •
124 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

Douglas V. Johnson, PhD*

In 29 chapters, editor Edward G. Lengel provides a 

comprehensive account of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign. This book represents an ambitious effort that 

mostly succeeds. Several chapters are among the best 

accounts of aspects of this campaign the reviewer has 

ever read. 

As a compendium, the coverage is broader than 

any published work on the campaign published thus 

far, dealing with most aspects of the American Expeditionary Forces’ organizational and functional elements. Here the reader will find accounts covering 

medical, signal, air, artillery, logistical, command and 

control, equipping, and doctrine in brief but enlightening essays. The long-overdue addition to existing literature covering elements of the French contribution, 

particularly that of French armored employment, is 

among the very best written and supported in the collection. The inclusion of German action at the midcommand level, illustrated by a simple, but nicely 

illustrative map (chapter 16, by Markus Klauer) helps 

round it out.

As with any multiauthor effort, some chapters 

are better than others, and almost all rely upon the 

American Battle Monuments Commission’s maps for 

support. Those illustrations supported different narratives, and thus, readers are occasionally left to their 

imagination as to the exact location of some places, 

* LtCol Douglas V. Johnson, PhD, USA (Ret), taught military 

history and associated subjects at the U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College and School of Advanced Military Studies 

in Fort Leavenworth, KS; at the U.S. Military Academy in West 

Point, NY; and at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA. 

Johnson coauthored Soissons, 1918 (1999) with Col Rolfe L. Hillman Jr. (Ret).

A Companion to the Meuse-Argonne Campaign. Edited by Edward G. Lengel. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 

2014. Pp. 552. $200.95 cloth; $160.99 e-book.)

though in no case is the omission a serious matter. 

Lengel rightly calls our attention to a theme he 

has pursued in his previous writings: that not all who 

won glory for their actions deserve the accolades, and 

that many others deserve equal or greater notice. The 

worship of William L. “Billy” Mitchel, for example, 

has been in decline for several years; but chapter 18 on 

“Airpower during the Meuse-Argonne Campaign” by 

Thomas Withington provides a nicely balanced analysis of the evidence, with which American soldiers 

being strafed regularly by German aircraft would be 

more likely to agree. 

Chapter 19 by Patrick R. Osborn, “French Armored Support during the First Phase of the Campaign,” relies on original French sources seldom seen 

or exploited by American authors. We must make 

special mention of this chapter because American accounts that include the actions of supporting French 

tanks will need to be very carefully reexamined. Lest 

the reader suspect the French of writing with later 

history in mind, it should be noted that most French 

accounts are immediate battle reports by junior to 

midgrade officers. 

Chapter 26 by Douglas Mastriano might have 

made a better second or third chapter, and this reviewer would suggest the book be read in that order. 

The argument Mastriano analyzes is one that was set 

in motion by flamingly partisan materials published 

by Brigadier General Henry J. Reilly in 1928, claiming 

the Americans won the war and wildly upsetting the 

British in particular. Read this section early, as it will 

give even deeper context to the several chapters dealing with specific tactical actions. Who won the war 

is hardly worth two minutes debate these days, but 

to make such a claim in light of the horrible cost of 
SUMMER 2017 125

unpreparedness, stupidity, inflexibility, and pride, so 

well illuminated in those other chapters, is enough to 

cause one to think more deeply about it all. Readers 

should consider following Mastriano’s chapter with 

Klauer’s on the German High Command.

The evolution of infantry tactics as embodied in 

doctrine, training, and practice—each a very different 

set of circumstances and seldom in full harmony—remains a point of major disagreement among authors 

of the subject and understandably depends largely 

upon which units were studied and when. Those wishing to pursue this question ought to avail themselves 

of several very good doctoral dissertations on the subjects.1

Whatever conclusions one may reach based on 

particular unit performance, the Report of the Superior 

Board on Organization and Tactics (1919) leads simply to 

more head scratching. Jeffrey LaMonica’s chapter 21 

discusses infantry tactics during the campaign and is 

a good place to begin the study.

This unique compilation is worth the time to 

read and study, providing a solid point of reference 

from which to appreciate those events of a century 

ago.

• 1775 •

1

 James Victory, “Soldiers in the Making: The Forces that Shaped 

the Infantry Training of White Soldiers in the United States 

Army in World War I” (PhD dissertation, Kansas State University, 1990); and Henry Jerry Osterhoudt, “The Evolution of U.S. 

Army Assault Tactics, 1778–1919: The Search for Sound Doctrine” 

(PhD dissertation, Duke University, 1986).
126 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 3, NO. 1

Marine Corps History Division is actively searching 

for contributors to Marine Corps History (MCH). MCH

is a scholarly, military history periodical published twice a 

year (summer and winter). Our focus is on all aspects of the 

Corps’ history, culture, and doctrine. Articles should be no 

less than 4,000 words and footnoted according to Chicago 

Manual of Style. For more information about submitting 

an article or writing a book review, please email history.

division@usmcu.edu with the subject line of “Marine Corps 

History Submission.”

Submissions

COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Marines in World War II

25 works in series | paperback

This History Division series is devoted to U.S. Marines in World War II and was originally published 

for the education and training of Marines as a part 

of the U.S. Department of Defense’s observance of 

the 50th anniversary of victory in that war. These 

in-depth studies written by Marine Corps historians 

cover the conflict from the opening moves in 1939 to 

securing the surrender of Japan in 1945.

Digital editions are available of all titles on the History Division website at www.usmcu.edu/historydivision. Print copies 

can be requested at history.division@usmcu.edu as available.
SUMMER 2017 127

COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Marines in the Korean War

11 works in series | paperback

This History Division series is devoted to U.S. Marines in the Korean War and was originally published for the education and training of Marines as a 

part of the U.S. Department of Defense’s observance 

of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war. These 

in-depth studies written by Marine Corps historians cover the conflict from the recapture of Seoul in 

1950 to the signing of the Armistice in 1953.

Digital editions are available of all titles on the History Division website at www.usmcu.edu/historydivision. Print copies 

can be requested at history.division@usmcu.edu as available.
In Persistent Battle

U.S. Marines in Operation Harvest Moon

8 December to 20 December 1965

Nicholas J. Schlosser, PhD

Operation Harvest Moon revealed 

a number of problems in how Marines coordinated counterguerrilla 

operations and used helicopters to 

lift formations into combat zones. 

In the course of the operation, the 

commanding general was relieved 

due to his inability to provide clear 

direction to his units. Although the 

Marine forces were able to exact a 

heavy price from their Viet Cong 

adversaries, the main enemy units 

were able to retreat and regroup, 

leaving the valley far from secure. Although the engagement did 

not produce the seemingly decisive result of Starlite or later battles like Hue City, Harvest Moon was arguably more representative of the American experience in Vietnam as a whole.

United States Marine Corps 

in the First World War

Anthology, Selected Bibliography, and 

Annotated Order of Battle

Annette D. Amerman 

The aim of this collection of articles is to give readers the broad 

historical strokes to U.S. Marine 

Corps participation in World 

War I, as well as to show that the 

Corps’ contribution to the war 

effort was not limited to the 4th 

Marine Brigade. World War I 

created the modern-day Marine 

Corps; an adaptive force-in-readiness even when seemingly relegated to ship and barracks duty.

Hill of Angels

U.S. Marines and the Battle 

for Con Thien 1967 to 1968

Colonel Joseph C. Long, 

USMCR

The Battle for Con Thien 

was not a single event. 

Rather, it was an amalgamation of unit actions 

that can arguably be said 

to have lasted for years, the 

result of the strategies and 

attitudes of senior leadership generally far removed 

from the battlefield. Hill of 

Angels focuses first on the 

planning and building of the controversial obstacle system 

of which Con Thien was an anchor. It then examines the 

period of the battle’s most intense combat—beginning in 

May 1967, when Marines first occupied the hill, and continuing until the early part of 1968. 

The United States Marine Corps

in the World War

Major Edwin N. McClellan

The United States Marine 

Corps in the World War provides succinct, factual, and 

historical information on 

the Marine Corps during the 

First World War. Published 

initially in 1920 as the first 

book from the newly created Historical Section of the 

Marine Corps, McClellan’s 

history of Marines in the 

first global war has stood the 

test of time with its statistical and concise details of the 

growth, activities, and combat exploits of Marines. 

MARINE CORPS HISTORY DIVISION’S

New Releases

Visit www.usmcu.edu/historydivision for digital copies or email history.division@usmcu.edu for print editions.
Marine Corps History

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website at www.usmcu.edu/historydivision under Publications.