DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

FELIX JOSUE MARTINEZ,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D17-2321

[October 10, 2018]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; Charles E. Burton, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2003-CF003597-AXXX-MB.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Benjamin Eisenberg, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard 

Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

MIRMAN, LAWRENCE, Associate Judge.

At the age of seventeen, Appellant, Felix Martinez, shot two people who 

were seated in a car during the course of a drug transaction. One lived, 

the other perished. A jury convicted Appellant of second degree murder 

with a firearm, attempted second degree murder with a firearm, and 

shooting into an occupied vehicle. The trial court originally sentenced 

Appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole on the second 

degree murder with a firearm count and to thirty years in prison with a 

minimum mandatory of twenty-five years under Florida’s 10-20-Life 

statute.1 However, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. 

 

1 The 10-20-Life statute, which is codified in section 775.087 of the Florida 

Statutes, provides for mandatory minimum sentences for certain offenses when 

a defendant possesses a firearm (minimum of either three years or ten years 

depending on the offense), discharges a firearm (minimum of twenty years), or 

discharges a firearm and as the result of the discharge, inflicts death or great 

bodily harm (minimum of twenty-five years). 
2

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and the subsequent codification of section 

921.1401 of the Florida Statutes, Appellant was resentenced to fifty years 

on the second degree murder with a firearm count and to thirty years on 

the attempted second degree murder with a firearm count. These terms 

were imposed concurrent and each carried a twenty-five year minimum 

mandatory under the 10-20-Life statute. Appellant appeals the 

constitutionality of his new sentence, arguing that Miller prohibits 

imposition of statutory minimum mandatories, such as those contained in 

the 10-20-Life statute, to juvenile offenders. We reject Appellant’s 

argument and affirm his sentence. 

The starting point for analyzing Appellant’s claim on appeal are two

United States Supreme Court decisions: Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 

(2010) and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). In Graham, the court 

provided that any sentence imposed on a juvenile offender for a nonhomicide offense must provide a “meaningful opportunity [for the offender] 

to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” 560 

U.S. at 75. Following Graham, the Miller court held that before imposing 

a life sentence on a juvenile for a homicide offense, the sentencing court 

must first “take into account how children are different, and how those 

differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in 

prison.” 567 U.S. at 480.

In response to Graham and Miller, the Florida Legislature adopted 

chapter 2014–220, Laws of Florida, which is primarily codified in sections 

921.1401 and 921.1402 of the Florida Statutes. These laws outline the

factors a court must take into account when considering whether a 

juvenile offender should be sentenced to life and provide a review 

mechanism for certain sentences imposed upon juveniles who commit 

capital, life, or first degree felonies. §§ 921.1401−.1402, Fla. Stat. (2014). 

The Florida Supreme Court has since provided that all juvenile offenders 

who were given life sentences (whether discretionary or mandatory, 

homicide or not) without consideration of the factors enumerated in 

Graham and Miller are entitled to be resentenced pursuant to sections 

921.1401−.1402 of the Florida Statutes. Kelsey v. State, 206 So. 3d 5, 11 

(Fla. 2016); Landrum v. State, 192 So. 3d 459, 460−61 (Fla. 2016). 

Appellant now argues that although he was resentenced as required by 

Miller and Landrum, the trial court’s imposition of minimum mandatories 

under Florida’s 10-20-Life statute nonetheless rendered his sentences 

unconstitutional. Reducing his argument to its simplest form, Appellant 

argues that any mandatory minimum sentence as applied to a juvenile 

offender divests the trial court of the authority to consider the juvenile 
3

offender’s “youth and its attendant circumstances,” and, therefore, 

violates the mandates of Miller and Landrum. We disagree.

This Court’s decision in St. Val v. State, 174 So. 3d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2015), is instructive. There, we affirmed a juvenile offender’s twenty-five 

year minimum mandatory sentence for the crime of attempted first degree 

murder and, in doing so, held that minimum mandatory sentencing 

schemes not resulting in sentences of life without parole do not violate the 

principles espoused in Graham and Miller as applied to juvenile offenders. 

Id. at 448−49. We concluded that “unlike a life without parole sentence,” 

a twenty-five year mandatory sentence as imposed on a juvenile offender 

allows for a “meaningful opportunity” for release and does “not result in a 

juvenile being classified as ‘forever [] a danger to society’” Id. at 449−50 

(quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 472).

Despite the parallels between the holding in St. Val and the instant 

case, Appellant argues that St. Val is not controlling because the St. Val 

court based its decision on the possibility for release and did not consider 

the specific argument raised by Appellant, which is that minimum 

mandatory sentences are unconstitutional because they prevent a juvenile 

offender from receiving individualized sentencing. Although the St. Val

court did not specifically address the “individualized sentencing” concerns 

espoused by Miller, its holding was clear: non-life minimum mandatories 

imposed on juvenile offenders are not unconstitutional under Graham or 

Miller. Id. This holding does not leave any room for Appellant’s nuanced 

argument. 

Alternatively, Appellant suggests that St. Val was incorrectly decided in 

light of the Florida Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Landrum. 

Specifically, Appellant argues that the St. Val court narrowly viewed Miller

as limiting its disapproval to mandatory sentencing schemes resulting in 

life without parole. However, in Landrum, the Florida Supreme Court 

noted “that the Miller court had no intention of limiting its rule of requiring 

individualized sentencing for juvenile offenders only to mandatorilyimposed sentences of life without parole, when a sentencing court’s 

exercise of discretion was not informed by Miller’s considerations.” 192 

So. 3d at 467. Thus, Appellant maintains that St. Val’s interpretation of 

Miller is at odds with Landrum.

Appellant’s argument on this point also misses the mark. While 

Landrum does clarify that the holding of Miller applies to more than 

just mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole imposed on 

a juvenile offender, it does not expand Miller to the bounds advocated by 

Appellant—that is—to all sentences imposed on a juvenile offender. 
4

Rather, the Landrum court clarified that any life sentence imposed on a 

juvenile offender, whether mandatory or discretionary, must be informed 

by the individualized considerations outlined in Miller. 192 So. 3d at 469. 

As explained by the St. Val court, a twenty-five year minimum mandatory 

sentence as imposed on a juvenile offender is not the same as a life 

sentence. 174 So. 3d at 449−50. Thus, Landrum did not alter the holding 

of St. Val and, therefore, it remains that a twenty-five year minimum 

mandatory sentence “does not violate the stricture of Graham or Miller.” 

Id. at 449.

Additional support for this conclusion can be found in our sister court’s 

decision in Young v. State, 219 So. 3d 206 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). The Young

court held that a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence imposed on a 

juvenile offender under the 10-20-Life statute did not violate Miller or 

Graham. 219 So. 3d at 209. In line with St. Val, the court reasoned that 

although the minimum mandatory “does limit, to some extent, the 

discretion of a trial court in sentencing a juvenile offender,” such a 

limitation did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment when the 

sentence still allowed for “‘meaningful opportunity’ for early release at a 

young age.” Id. at 209−10. The court also rejected the same “individual 

considerations” argument raised by Appellant here, holding that it was 

without merit because the juvenile received an individualized sentencing 

hearing pursuant to section 921.1401(1) wherein the court considered 

whether a “term of life imprisonment” was an appropriate sentence. Id. at 

209. 

Together, St. Val and Young establish that a sentence with a non-life 

minimum mandatory imposed against a juvenile offender facing a potential 

life sentence does not violate Graham or Miller so long as the juvenile was 

afforded an individualized sentencing hearing pursuant to section 

921.1401 and is later afforded periodic judicial review of his or her 

sentence as provided in section 921.1402. Simply put, there is nothing 

about the 10-20-Life statute’s minimum mandatory scheme that divests 

the court of the authority to consider whether a life sentence is appropriate 

for a juvenile offender. While it does prevent courts from fashioning 

sentences less than the applicable minimum mandatory, nothing in Miller 

or Landrum require a sentencing court to have absolute discretion in 

fashioning an unrestricted term of years sentence for a juvenile offender 

subject to a life sentence. Rather, the law merely requires the sentencing 

court to consider the offender’s individual circumstances when 

determining “whether life imprisonment or a term of years equal to life 

imprisonment is an appropriate sentence.” § 921.1401(2), Fla. Stat. 

(2016). 
5

Here, the trial court considered the propriety of imposing a life sentence 

against Appellant at a section 921.1401 hearing wherein Appellant 

presented individualized evidence “relevant to the offense and the 

defendant’s youth and attendant circumstances.” Based on its 

consideration of this evidence and the relevant factors, the trial court 

determined that life was not an appropriate sentence for Appellant’s 

homicide offense and instead sentenced him to fifty years in prison. We

hold that this inquiry satisfied Miller’s and Landrum’s “individualized 

circumstances” mandates regardless of the minimum mandatory imposed 

under the 10-20-Life statute and, therefore, affirm Appellant’s sentence.

Appellant also argues that section 921.1401 supersedes the 10-20-Life 

statute as applied to juveniles. We also reject this argument as, by its 

terms, section 921.1401 does not supersede the 10-20-Life statute. See 

Young, 219 So. 3d at 210–11 (holding that “there is no clear indication 

that when it enacted the juvenile sentencing laws in 2014, the Florida 

Legislature intended to affect the [mandatory minimums outlined in the 

10-20-Life statute]”). 

Affirmed.

CIKLIN and CONNER, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.