Federal Aviation

Administration

HQ 101038

Answering the Call to Action 

on Airline Safety and Pilot 

Training



January 2010
Table of Contents 

Acknowledgements........................................................................ ii

Executive Summary....................................................................... 1

1.0 Introduction........................................................................... 3

2.0 Background........................................................................... 4

3.0 Action Plan............................................................................ 5

3.1 Fatigue Rulemaking....................................................... 7

3.2 Focused Inspection Initiative............................................. 9

3.3 Training Program Review Guidance.................................... 11

3.4. Air Carrier Commitment to Most Effective Practices................ 12

3.4.1 Pilot Records.................................................... 12

3.4.2 Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) and 

 Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP)................... 13

3.4.3 Contract Provisions............................................. 13

3.5. Labor Organization Commitments...................................... 14

3.5.1 Professional Standards and Ethics Committees............ 14

3.5.2 Code of Ethics................................................... 14

3.5.3 Safety Risk Management Meetings........................... 14

3.6 Mentoring................................................................... 15

3.7 Regional Safety Forums................................................... 17

3.8 Crew Training Requirements............................................. 19

3.9 Guidance on Safety Oversight............................................ 20

4.0 Summary of Findings................................................................ 21

5.0 Recommendations for Additional Action......................................... 24

Appendix 1 Call to Action Background 

Appendix 2 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Action Plan on 

 Airline Safety and Pilot Training 

Appendix 3 Fatigue Rulemaking 

Appendix 4 Focused Inspection Initiative 

Appendix 5 Training Program Review Guidance 

Appendix 6 Air Carrier Commitments 

Appendix 7 Pilot Employee Organization Commitments 

Appendix 8 Regional Safety Forums 

Appendix 9 Material Submitted by Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) 

Appendix 10 Material Submitted by Participants 

Appendix 11 Glossary of Terms 

i
Acknowledgements 

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) wishes to acknowledge the participation and 

ongoing support of the nation’s air carriers, airline trade associations, airline labor 

organizations, and FAA’s aviation safety inspector workforce in conducting the 

June 15, 2009, Call to Action on Airline Safety and Pilot Training, as well as in the 

twelve regional safety forums held between July 21, 2009, and August 27, 2009. 

ii
Executive Summary 

The most important job of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) is to protect the safety of the traveling public. We aim to 

achieve this goal through ensuring that operators provide effective and high quality 

training to flight crews and other personnel; identifying and implementing most effective 

practices; maintaining and improving critical infrastructure; ensuring compliance with 

laws and regulations; developing new laws and regulations when appropriate; and 

working collaboratively with all interested parties. 

On February 12, 2009, a Colgan Air Bombardier Dash-8 Q400, operating as Continental 

Connection Flight 3407, crashed while on approach to Buffalo, New York. The National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted a public hearing on this accident from 

May 12-14, 2009. During that hearing and subsequent congressional hearings on June 10 

and June 11, 2009, several issues came to light regarding pilot training and qualifications, 

flight crew fatigue, and consistency of safety standards between operators. 

In response to this information, on June 15, 2009, Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood 

and FAA Administrator J. Randolph Babbitt initiated a Call to Action on Airline Safety 

and Pilot Training for FAA, air carriers, and labor organizations to jointly identify and 

implement safety improvements. All participants have made progress toward completing 

goals and objectives stated in the June 24, 2009, action plan that resulted from the June 

15, 2009, meeting. 

• Fatigue—The FAA has made substantial progress toward developing a Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) based on the Flight and Duty Time Limitations and 

Rest Requirements (FDR) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) 

recommendations. We anticipate NPRM publication in the spring of 2010. 

• Focused Inspection—The FAA inspected 85 carriers. Fourteen carriers were not 

inspected because they already complied with the intent of the Focused Inspection by 

having FAA-approved Advanced Qualification Programs (AQP). Seventy-six 

carriers (including the 14 AQP carriers) have systems to comply with remedial 

training requirements. An additional 15 carriers have some parts of a remedial 

training system. Eight carriers lacked any component of a remedial training system 

and have received additional scrutiny. Additionally, FAA inspectors observed 2,419 

training/checking events. Corrective action is underway for those deemed 

inadequate. 

• Training Program Review Guidance—The FAA has drafted comprehensive guidance 

for the industry and FAA inspectors as to how to review training in the context of a 

Safety Management System (SMS). Publication will occur in February 2010. 

• Air Carrier Commitments—In response to Administrator Babbitt’s letter requesting 

written confirmation of commitment to practices discussed at the June 15, 2009, 

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meeting, the FAA received responses from 82 percent of part 121 air carriers. These 

carriers represent 99 percent of aircraft operating under part 121. For aircraft 

operating under part 121, 98 percent are operated by carriers who have, or intend to 

implement, an Aviation Safety Action Plan (ASAP) and 94 percent are operated by 

carriers who have, or intend to implement, both ASAP and a Flight Operations 

Quality Assurance (FOQA) program. Also, the largest passenger airlines have taken 

steps to increase communication, data sharing, and cooperation with their partner 

airlines on implementation of effective safety practices. 

• Labor Organization Commitments—In response to Administrator Babbitt’s letter 

requesting written confirmation of commitments discussed in the June 15, 2009, 

meeting, all seven labor organizations responded favorably. To advance this effort, 

the FAA will host a gathering of pilot employee organizations in early 2010 to 

develop actionable guidelines on cockpit discipline and pilot professionalism. 

• Mentoring—The FAA remains strongly committed to developing processes to 

effectively transfer experience among pilots. The FAA will ask participants at the 

planned 2010 gathering of pilot employee organizations to address this topic. 

• Regional Safety Forums—To share the ideas generated at the June 15, 2009, meeting, 

listen to stakeholder comments, and collect additional ideas on enhancing airline 

safety and pilot training, the FAA hosted 12 regional safety forums around the 

country. Common themes included universal concern about pilot fatigue and 

labor/management conflicts, including disagreement as to where to draw the line in 

some cases between industrial relations and operational issues. 

• Crew Training Requirements Rulemaking—The FAA received a large number of 

comments. The Agency has determined that it will be necessary to issue a 

supplemental (revised) NPRM to address some of the issues raised during the 

comment period. We expect to publish the revised proposal in early 2010. 

• Guidance to Aviation Safety Inspectors—The FAA’s Aviation Safety organization 

(AVS) completed this action by including interactive, scenario-based workshops on 

regulatory oversight at its annual All-Managers Conference in August 2009. 

The FAA accomplished significant work on the Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action 

Plan. Through the regional safety forums, the Agency gathered valuable information 

from the aviation community that has been, and will continue to be, reflected in guidance 

material. 

The FAA is committed to completing these actions and to the continued improvement of 

Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan initiatives. Follow up actions include a 

planned gathering of pilot employee organizations in early 2010 to develop actionable 

guidelines on professionalism and the transfer of experience. 

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The DOT and FAA will continue to work with all interested parties to address the issues 

raised by the Colgan 3407 accident and to protect the safety of the traveling public. 

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1.0 Introduction 

The FAA’s most important and primary job is to deliver and ensure the safety of the 

traveling public. The aviation safety record in the United States is a testament to the 

dedication of safety-minded aviation professionals in all parts of the aviation industry, as 

well as in the FAA’s inspector workforce. 

However, an “almost perfect” safety record is not good enough, especially for those who 

suffer the loss of loved ones in aviation accidents. In an agency dedicated to aviation 

safety, any loss is keenly felt. Because accidents such as the tragic loss of Colgan Air 

3407 in Buffalo, New York, in 2009 revealed previously undiscovered risks, it is 

incumbent upon everyone in every part of the system to identify actions to eliminate or 

mitigate those risks. 

This effort requires universal participation and vigilance. It must produce tangible, 

constructive change that immediately improves how we operate and how we fly. 

The FAA must: 

• Make sure that we are meeting and, wherever possible, exceeding the standards. 

• Give passengers confidence in the qualifications of the person flying their plane. 

• Recognize that almost everyone can present ideas that may have made a difference, 

and that will make a difference in the future. 

• Share those ideas and well-established practices in order to achieve excellence. 

• Find effective ways to transfer experience and the intangible, but essential, attitudes 

and behaviors that constitute professionalism. 

• Ensure that good ideas and most effective practices are shared among flight crews as 

quickly as possible. 

History has shown that we are able to implement safety improvements far more quickly 

and effectively when FAA, industry, and labor work together on solutions and voluntarily 

implement agreed-upon change. That was the reason for the Call to Action on Airline 

Safety and Pilot Training launched in Washington, D.C. on June 15, 2009. The goal of 

that session was to deliver not only a plan with specific and concrete action items, but 

also to obtain explicit commitments to implement those actions. As Administrator 

Babbitt stated in his opening remarks: 

I want a commitment from each of you that we will make that process 

work...What we need most of all is for each of us to weigh in and stay in. This is 

our profession, and today, we need to take responsibility. 

In this spirit, this report on the FAA’s Call to Action on Airline Safety and Pilot Training 

describes the progress made toward fulfilling commitments made in the initial meeting on 

June 15, 2009, and it offers recommendations for additional steps to enhance aviation 

safety in the United States. 

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2.0 Background 

On February 12, 2009, a Colgan Air Bombardier Dash-8 Q400, operating as Continental 

Connection Flight 3407, crashed while on approach to Buffalo, New York. The NTSB 

conducted a public hearing on this accident from May 12-14, 2009. During that hearing 

and subsequent congressional hearings on June 10 and June 11, 2009, several issues came 

to light regarding pilot training and qualifications, flight crew fatigue, and the consistency 

of safety standards and compliance between air transportation operators. 

The NTSB has not yet concluded its investigation or issued its findings on the probable 

cause. However, the factual accounts of this accident, including Cockpit Voice Recorder 

(CVR) transcripts and other data, led to intensive focus on the issues of flight crew 

experience, flight crew fatigue, training, and professionalism. The NTSB hearing in May 

2009 and the subsequent congressional hearings in June 2009 also focused on concerns 

related to inadequacies in FAA regulation, air carrier training and supervision, and 

professional standards as promulgated and promoted by employee (labor) organizations. 

Recognizing that FAA, the airlines, and labor organizations all have a role to play in 

addressing and resolving these critical issues, U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood 

and FAA Administrator J. Randolph Babbitt invited representatives from each of these 

groups to Washington, D.C. for a Call to Action on Airline Safety and Pilot Training. 

This event took place on June 15, 2009, with the goal of fostering dialogue to specify 

concrete actions and to elicit voluntary commitments in four key areas: 

• Air carrier management responsibilities for crew education and support; 

• Professional standards and flight discipline; 

• Training standards and performance; and 

• Mentoring relationships between mainline carriers and their regional partners. 

In opening remarks to participants, both Secretary LaHood and Administrator Babbitt 

stressed the need for tangible, constructive actions that will make an immediate 

difference in aviation safety. As Secretary LaHood stated, 

We must inspire confidence in every traveler, every time he or she steps onto an 

airplane. We are acting together now because safety is our highest priority. 

Administrator Babbitt further noted that: 

We need to make sure that we are always looking for ways to improve how we 

operate—that is the foundation of public trust. I know from experience that each 

one of you will come up with an idea or two that would have made a difference, 

and that will make a difference in the future. I know that some of you have 

well-established practices, developed over time that we need to start sharing. 

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3.0 FAA’s Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan 

As a result of the June 15, 2009, Call to Action meeting in Washington, senior officials 

from FAA, U.S. air carriers, and labor organizations agreed on several specific actions to 

improve safety programs and pilot training at the nation's airlines. On June 24, 2009, 

FAA published an Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan (Appendix 2) that 

included the following actions and voluntary commitments: 

• Fatigue Rulemaking: The FAA will establish an ARC to recommend elements for a 

science-based notice of proposed rulemaking on flight and rest limits. 

• Focused Inspection Initiative: The FAA will direct its inspectors to conduct a 

focused review of air carrier flight crewmember training, qualifications, and 

management programs. 

• Training Program Review Guidance: The FAA will publish a Safety Alert for 

Operators (SAFO) on conducting a training program review in the context of a Safety 

Management System (SMS). 

• Air Carriers’ Commitment to Most Effective Practices: The FAA will obtain air 

carriers’ commitment to the following items: (a) voluntary disclosure of FAA records 

from pilot applicants; (b) establishment of a FOQA program and an ASAP; and (c) 

finding specific and concrete ways to ensure that partner carriers implement the larger 

company’s most effective practices for safety. 

• Labor Organizations’ Commitment: The FAA will obtain labor organizations’ 

commitment to: (a) establishing and supporting professional standards and ethics 

committees; (b) establishing and publishing a code of ethics with expectations for 

professional behavior, standards of conduct for professional appearance, and overall 

fitness to fly; and (c) supporting periodic safety risk management meetings between 

FAA and mainline and regional carriers. 

• Mentoring: The FAA will work with industry to create a range of mentoring 

programs. 

• Regional Safety Forums: The FAA, air carriers, and labor organizations will 

conduct at least 10 regional safety forums to discuss the Call to Action initiatives, 

listen to comments, and seek ideas for additional actions. 

• Crew Training Requirements: The FAA will develop a final rule from the NPRM 

on crew training requirements, which is intended to enhance traditional training by 

requiring use of flight simulation training devices for flight crewmembers. 

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• Guidance to Inspectors on Safety Oversight: The FAA will provide training to 

FAA inspectors on the management of contrasting regulatory views within the 

workforce. 

In accordance with the Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan commitments, this 

report summarizes progress on each of these elements, outlines findings, and provides 

recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation and the FAA Administrator on 

additional action items. 

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3.1 Fatigue Rulemaking 

Commitment

As stated in the FAA’s Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan: 

“By July 15, FAA will charter an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) consisting of 

representatives from FAA, industry and labor organizations. The ARC will have until 

September 1, 2009, to draft recommendations to the FAA which would inform a new, 

science-based Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on flight and rest limits.” 

Action Taken

In June 2009, the FAA chartered the Flight and Duty Time Limitations and Rest 

Requirements Aviation Rulemaking Committee (FDR ARC) comprised of labor, 

industry, and FAA representatives. The goal was to develop recommendations for an 

FAA rule based on current fatigue science and a thorough review of international 

approaches to the issue. The FAA chartered the FDR ARC to provide a forum for the 

U.S. aviation community to discuss current approaches to mitigate fatigue found in 

international standards and make recommendations on how the United States should 

modify its regulations. The FDR ARC included 18 members representing airline and 

labor associations. The FAA selected its members based on their extensive certificate 

holder management and/or direct operational experience. 

Specifically, FAA asked the FDR ARC to consider and address the following: 

• A single approach to addressing fatigue that consolidates and replaces existing 

regulatory requirements for parts 121 and 135. 

• Generally accepted principles of human physiology, performance, and alertness based 

on the body of fatigue science. 

• Information on sources of aviation fatigue. 

• Current approaches to develop fatigue mitigation strategies in international standards. 

• The incorporation of Fatigue Risk Management Systems (FRMS) into a rulemaking 

or guidelines. An FRMS is a data-driven process and systematic method to monitor 

and manage safety risks associated with fatigue-related error. 

The FDR ARC met repeatedly over a six-week period beginning July 7, 2009, and 

delivered its final report to the FAA on September 10, 2009. Although it is not 

appropriate to discuss the specifics of FAA’s rulemaking efforts at this time, the Agency 

is working as quickly as possible to complete a draft NPRM. The FAA Associate 

Administrator for Aviation Safety, Margaret Gilligan, noted in her December 1, 2009, 

testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security on Aviation Safety: 

I will readily acknowledge that this effort has been difficult, and has taken us 

longer than we wanted or expected. The events of the last 15 years evidence the 

complexity of the issue and the strong concerns of the parties involved, and those 

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are clear in the current rulemaking as well. At the same time, our focused effort 

since June demonstrates the high priority that Administrator Babbitt and I, along 

with the rest of the FAA team, place on overcoming these challenges and updating 

these regulations to enhance safety. I am confident we will get there. 

Next Steps

The FAA’s FDR rulemaking team has made substantial progress toward developing an 

NPRM based on the FDR ARC recommendations. While the ARC provided a solid 

framework for the NPRM, the rulemaking team is continuing its work to ensure that the 

proposal will be effective, and that it will take into account all of the factors that 

contribute to pilot fatigue. Additional work to strengthen the economic analysis in the 

Regulatory Impact Assessment is also underway. The FAA anticipates publication of the 

FDR NPRM in the spring of 2010. 

To supplement the fatigue rulemaking effort, the FDR rulemaking team is developing 

two Advisory Circulars to provide guidance on FRMS and issues related to commuting. 

The team is also working with the Aircraft Evaluation Group (AEG) to amend Advisory 

Circular 121-31 (Rest Facilities) to conform the designation of Class 1, 2 and 3 rest 

facilities to the new rule language. The FAA will publish both Advisory Circulars as 

drafts when it publishes the NPRM. 

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3.2 Focused Inspection Initiative 

Commitment 

As stated in the FAA’s Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan: 

“Recognizing the urgency of proposals in the Call to Action, FAA has reordered 

priorities contained in a prior June 16 Notice to FAA inspectors and is directing that a 

focused program review of air carrier flight crewmember training, qualification, and 

management be completed sooner. This Notice will be published by June 24. 

The focused program review has two parts. 

Meet with the carrier’s director of operations, director of safety, and company officials 

responsible for flight crewmember training and qualification programs. The purpose of 

these meetings is to determine the carrier’s ability to identify, track, and manage 

low-time flight crewmembers and those who have failed evaluation events or 

demonstrated a repetitive need for additional training. Inspectors will also determine at 

this meeting if the carrier adopted the suggestion in Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 

06015, Remedial Training for Part 121 Pilots. The meetings are to occur as soon as 

possible, but no later than July 15, 2009. 

Inspectors will conduct additional inspections to validate that the carrier’s training and 

qualification programs meet regulatory standards in accordance with FAA guidance 

materials, including, among other items: 

• Review the entire performance history of any pilot in question; 

• Provide remedial training as necessary; and 

• Provide additional oversight by the certificate holder to ensure that performance 

deficiencies are effectively addressed and corrected.” 

Action Taken

The FAA issued Notice 8900.78 (Appendix 4) on June 24, 2009. In accordance with the 

instructions contained in Part I of this Notice, FAA principal operations inspectors (POIs) 

held meetings with 85 air carriers to encourage them to develop systems for identifying, 

tracking, and training low-time and poor performing pilots if they did not already have 

such systems in place. 

Findings from Part I of the Focused Inspection initiative are as follows: 

Seventy-six carriers, including 14 carriers that participate in the AQP for training, already 

have systems to comply with the remedial training requirements in SAFO 06015 

(Appendix 5) Remedial Training for Part 121 Pilots, which promotes voluntary 

implementation of remedial training for pilots with persistent performance deficiencies. 

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Fifteen carriers had some part of a remedial training system. Only eight carriers did not 

have any component of a remedial training system in place, and these carriers received 

additional scrutiny during Part II of the Focused Inspection Initiative. 

During Part II, FAA inspectors observed 2,419 training and checking events to determine 

their adequacy. 

Findings from Part II are as follows: 

The inspector observing the event determined that 14 training events at 5 carriers (or 

approximately 0.6% of the events observed) did not meet regulatory requirements. 

Next Steps 

FAA inspectors are tracking corrective actions by using a new tool within the Air 

Transportation Oversight System (ATOS), which will prompt inspectors to monitor these 

actions as part of their ongoing oversight. This Corrective Action Tracking Tool (CATT) 

is used to ensure an air carrier’s corrective actions are timely and complete. 

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3.3 Training Program Review Guidance

Commitment 

As stated in the FAA’s Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan: 

“Using results from initial elements of the focused inspection initiative, by July 31 FAA 

will develop a SAFO to provide guidance material on conducting a comprehensive 

training program review. This guidance will describe the training program review in the 

context of a safety management system and its role in a corporate safety culture.” 

Action Taken 

The FAA issued Notice 8900.78 on June 24, 2009. This notice instructed Principal 

Operations Inspectors (POIs) to conduct a focused program review of Title 14 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 121 air carrier programs for training, 

checking, and managing flight crewmembers with emphasis on low-time flight 

crewmembers and those who have failed evaluation events and/or demonstrated a 

repetitive need for additional training. 

In the action plan, the FAA indicated intent to develop a SAFO with guidance material on 

conducting a comprehensive training program review in the context of a SMS by 

July 31, 2009. The FAA postponed this date in order to take full advantage of 

information from its focused inspection initiative, as well as from ideas developed in the 

Call to Action safety forums. 

Having completed these activities, the FAA has analyzed this information. The Agency 

developed a proposed SAFO (Appendix 5), and it also intends to draft an accompanying 

notice to FAA inspectors. The draft SAFO provides guidance to air carriers on how to 

conduct a comprehensive training program review, while ensuring that its training 

program uses SMS principles and fits into the carrier’s overall SMS. The accompanying 

notice will require inspectors to conduct surveillance in accordance with the SAFO. The 

FAA intends for these documents to include specific guidance on: 

• Incorporating the training program in the carrier’s overall SMS; 

• Identifying hazards that can be managed by the program, such as low-time crew or 

those with systemic performance problems; 

• Developing appropriate risk management programs to manage the identified hazards, 

such as knowledge requirements for new hires, or specific additional training program 

modules; 

• Using operational data to determine the effectiveness of the risk management 

program; and 

• Using the training program for safety promotion. 

Next Steps

The FAA will publish the draft SAFO, complete development of the notice to inspectors, 

and, based on feedback from the industry, revise these documents as necessary. 

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3.4 Air Carrier Commitment to Most Effective Practices

Commitment 

As stated in the FAA’s Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan: 

“To solidify verbal commitments made at FAA’s June 15 Call to Action, by the end of 

June the Administrator will send a letter to all 100+ part 121 operators and their unions 

and request written commitments to adhere to the highest professional standards, with 

specific commitments on these key topics: 

• Pilot Records: While FAA works with Congress to pursue appropriate amendments to 

the Pilot Records Improvement Act of 1996 (PRIA), air carriers should implement a 

policy of asking pilot applicants for voluntary disclosure of FAA records, including 

notices of disapproval for evaluation events. FAA will also amend Advisory Circular 

120-68D, Pilot Records Improvement Act, to reflect FAA’s expectations in this 

regard. 

• FOQA and ASAP: While FAA works with Congress to assure proper protection of 

voluntarily-provided data, air carriers should establish flight operations quality 

assurance (FOQA) and Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) programs and 

develop data analysis processes to ensure effective use of this information. 

• Contract Provisions: DOT and FAA will develop the authority and processes to 

review agreements between air carriers and their regional partners. Major air carriers 

should seek specific and concrete ways to ensure that their smaller airline partner 

carriers adopt and implement the larger company’s most effective practices for safety, 

including periodic meetings to review, for example, FOQA and ASAP data and to 

constantly emphasize their shared safety philosophy.” 

Action Taken

In June 2009, Administrator Babbitt sent letters to 101 air carriers, all holding part 121 

operating certificates at that time. Three of those air carriers are no longer in business; 

therefore, the FAA tracked responses from the remaining 98 air carriers. 

The Agency received responses from 82 percent of these carriers (80 of 98). These 

responses represent 99 percent of aircraft operating under part 121. Those who replied 

generally committed to the highest professional standards and provided information as 

follows: 

Pilot Records 

Of the 80 carriers who responded, 53 operators (66 percent) reported that they already 

require full disclosure of a pilot applicant’s FAA records. Another 15 operators stated 

that they intend to implement this policy. 

Consequently, 88 percent of part 121 operators either have, or intend to have, a policy in 

place to require full disclosure of a pilot applicant’s FAA records. 

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FOQA and ASAP 

Of those carriers who responded: 

• Twenty-two operators currently have both FOQA and ASAP programs in place. 

• Twenty-eight operators have ASAP and state their intention to implement FOQA. 

• Ten1 operators with ASAP did not state their intention to implement FOQA. 

• Nineteen operators who have neither program at present stated that they will establish 

one or both. 

• Three operators stated that they do not intend to establish either FOQA or ASAP. 

To summarize, the responses show that: 

• Ninety-eight percent of aircraft operating under part 121 are flown by operators that 

have, or intend to implement, ASAP. 

• Ninety-four percent of aircraft operating under part 121 are flown by operators that 

have, or intend to implement, both programs. 

Contract Provisions

Although DOT and FAA are considering whether to modify existing processes for 

granting economic and operating authorities, it is both significant and encouraging to 

note that the industry has already taken steps to address this issue. Recently, the Air 

Transport Association’s (ATA) Safety Council invited directors of safety from both the 

National Air Carrier Association (NACA) and the Regional Airline Association (RAA) to 

attend the quarterly ATA Safety Council meetings and to participate in all professional 

discussions. 

In addition, all passenger airlines that have contract agreements with regional air carriers 

have taken steps to ensure that partner airlines implement the most effective safety 

practices. These carriers have met with partner airlines and established schedules for 

regular meetings. They will analyze ASAP and FOQA data for common risk areas and 

address specific issues, such as winter operations, to identify and implement most 

effective practices. 

Next Steps

The FAA is pleased by the level of positive response to the Administrator’s letter of 

request for written commitments, and the Agency believes that this portion of the Airline 

Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan has achieved its intended outcome. The FAA will 

continue to monitor the fulfillment of these commitments at regular meetings with the 

ATA, RAA, and NACA. 

 

1

 This number includes data from two air carriers who did not respond, but who have an approved ASAP 

with the FAA. 

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3.5 Labor Organization Commitments 

Commitment 

As stated in the FAA’s Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan: 

“We are asking labor organizations for their commitment in the following areas: 

Establish and support professional standards and ethics committees to develop peer audit 

and review procedures, and to elevate ethics and professional standards. 

• Establish and publish a code of ethics that includes expectations for professional 

behavior, standards of conduct for professional appearance, and overall fitness to fly. 

• Support periodic safety risk management meetings between FAA and mainline and 

regional carriers to promote the most effective practices, including periodic analysis 

of FOQA and ASAP data with an emphasis on identifying enhancements to the 

training program.” 

Action Taken

In June 2009, Administrator Babbitt sent letters to seven labor organizations to request 

written commitment in the areas listed above, and all seven responded positively. Some 

of the specific items noted in labor organization responses include: 

• The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) stated that it has a well-established Code of 

Ethics and an active Professional Standards Committee that includes peer-to-peer 

interaction. 

• The US Airways Pilots Association (USAPA) is addressing these topics through its 

committees. 

• Teamsters Local 747 has developed a Professional Standards and Ethics Committee 

Policy Manual to guide its members. In addition, this organization is pursuing 

agreements between labor and management to mutually support this committee. 

Next Steps

As they shared in their responses to the Administrator’s letter, air carrier employee 

organizations have already undertaken important steps to improve pilot professionalism. 

These include ALPA’s development of a white paper, Producing a Professional Airline 

Pilot, which is included in Appendix 9. 

To take this effort to the next level, the FAA will host a gathering of pilot employee 

organizations in early 2010. The goal of this meeting is to facilitate the development a 

set of actionable guidelines on cockpit discipline and pilot professionalism. These 

guidelines will clearly articulate the aviation community’s expectations for professional 

behavior in the flight deck. 

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3.6 Mentoring 

Commitment 

As stated in the FAA’s Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan: 

“To address issues in the professional standards and flight discipline area, by July 31 

FAA will develop and seek industry comments with respect to creating a range of 

mentoring programs. These can include first officer to first officer, captain to captain; and 

captain ‘curing’ programs.” 

Action Taken

The FAA initially intended to develop ideas on flight crew mentoring by July 31, 2009. 

Since few actionable mentoring ideas emerged from the June 15, 2009, meeting, the 

Agency opted to delay this effort in order to benefit from the results of discussion in the 

12 regional safety forums conducted between July 21 and August 27, 2009. 

The results of the regional forums assisted the FAA in identifying several challenges to 

implementing mentoring systems. For example, those involved need to make a personal 

commitment to the mentoring process. It is difficult to develop a program that assures 

this personal commitment. Another challenge is to set goals for the mentoring process 

and to measure the success of the process. 

The FAA remains strongly committed to promoting the development of mechanisms for 

effective transfer of experience and recognizes that any effective mechanism must respect 

and incorporate the idea of a two-way transfer (i.e., each party can learn something from 

the other). The Agency is considering some of the ideas mentioned in the June 15, 2009, 

Call to Action event in Washington, D.C. and the regional safety forums, such as: 

• Establishing Joint Strategic Councils within a “family” of mainline and regional 

partner carriers. This approach could lead to individual as well as corporate 

mentoring relationships. 

• Using the safety conferences periodically held by pilot employee associations’ 

Professional Standards Committees as opportunities for transfer of experience. 

• Exploring mentoring possibilities between air carriers and university aviation 

programs. 

• Using data obtained from the FOQA program to support structured mentoring 

programs; and 

• Requiring new hire pilots who have completed Initial Operating Experience (IOE) to 

observe experienced crews. 

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Next Steps

The FAA is encouraging the air carrier industry and labor organizations to further explore 

these concepts, develop proposals, and implement pilot programs that can be tailored and 

used throughout the industry. 

To facilitate the development of a set of actionable guidelines on cockpit discipline and 

pilot professionalism, the FAA will host a gathering of pilot employee organizations in 

2010. 

Because mentoring, or transfer of experience, is related to cockpit discipline and 

professionalism, the Agency will ask participants to address this topic by developing 

proposals for concrete, practical mechanisms to facilitate structured and measurable 

transfer of experience programs. 

17 

12/31/09 
3.7 Regional Safety Forums

Commitment 

As stated in the FAA’s Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan: 

“In July, FAA will conduct in the Washington, D.C., area the first of a series of at least 

10 regional safety forums to discuss the Call to Action initiatives, listen to stakeholder 

comments, and seek ideas for and commitments to additional actions in the areas in 

which the FAA is already taking specific action. Locations for these events will be 

mainly where different types of operators (including part 135 operators) are based.” 

Action Taken

Consistent with the commitment made in the Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action 

Plan, the FAA hosted the first of 12 regional safety forums in Washington, D.C. on July 

21, 2009. Participants in these forums included chief executive officers, chief pilots, 

directors of operation, and directors of safety for part 121 air carriers and part 135 

carriers; part 142 training center instructors; air carrier association representatives; labor 

organization representatives; and FAA operations inspectors. In order to encourage open 

discussion, these events were closed to press and public. 

The agenda for each of the 12 regional safety forums followed the basic structure 

developed for the initial June 15 Call to Action meeting in Washington, D.C. 

As shown in the chart below, the safety forums were well-attended in all cities, and the 

notes taken at each session (Appendix 8) indicate that they were very successful in 

generating frank discussion. 

Date Location Attendance 

July 21 Washington, D.C. 63 

July 30 Dallas/Fort Worth 234 

July 30 Chicago 75 

August 4 Seattle 57 

August 6 Minneapolis/St. Paul 80 

August 6 Atlanta 183 

August 6 Anchorage 113 

August 20 Miami/Fort Lauderdale 148 

August 20 Denver 87 

August 21 St. Louis 139 

August 27 Las Vegas 96 

August 27 Boston 113 

High = 234 Low = 57 Average = 116 

18 

12/31/09 
The major topics of discussion at each meeting were: 

Air Carrier Management: Common themes included the importance of a safety culture; 

fatigue concerns; the need to pay a “living wage”; the need for better screening of pilots; 

and the need to make better use of ASAP/FOQA data. Participants also expressed 

concern about the time it takes the FAA to process Freedom of Information Action 

(FOIA) and Pilot Record Improvement Act (PRIA) requests. 

To address these issues, the FAA has streamlined the processes for airlines to request 

records, such as notices of disapproval; automated verification for certificate and rating 

information to improve response time; and developed a new form (available on the FAA 

website) for airlines to use when requesting pilot records. 

Training Standards and Performance: Participants stressed the need for common sense 

approaches and the importance of avoiding “cookie-cutter” solutions solely based on 

flight time. Participants expressed interest in tailored training—better use of scenariobased training from individual carrier’s actual operations, Threat and Error Management 

(TEM) training; and non-punitive performance monitoring. 

The FAA has considered the information received from the participants in the forums and 

has drafted an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) to request public 

comments on the quality and content of training, as well as the number of hours, 

necessary for the holder of a commercial pilot certificate to fly in part 121 air carrier 

operations. The FAA also is working aggressively on the rule to enhance training 

standards. 

Professional Standards and Discipline: In virtually every city, there were discussions 

about professionalism, with many noting that it is largely an individual responsibility. 

The FAA will host a gathering of pilot employee organizations in early 2010 to facilitate 

development of actionable guidelines on cockpit discipline and pilot professionalism. 

Mentoring: While there was universal support for the concept, none of the discussions 

resulted in practical or actionable ways to develop mentoring programs. At the planned 

meeting of pilot employee organizations in early 2010 (see above), the FAA will also ask 

the group to develop concrete and measurable guidelines for mentoring. 

Documents associated with the regional safety forums, including the invitation letter, 

agenda, list of cities and dates, PowerPoint presentation, and notes from each session are 

provided in Appendix 8. 

Next Steps

The FAA will host a gathering of pilot employee organizations in early 2010 to facilitate 

development of actionable guidelines on cockpit discipline and pilot professionalism, and 

practical mechanisms for transfer of experience (mentoring). Participants in this meeting 

may draw from ideas generated in the regional safety forums. 

19 

12/31/09 
3.8 Crew Training Requirements 

Commitment

As stated in the FAA’s Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan: 

“The FAA currently has an NPRM open for comment that is intended to enhance 

traditional training programs by requiring the use of flight simulation training devices for 

flight crewmembers, and including additional training requirements in areas critical to 

safety. Upon the close of the public comment period on August 10, FAA will promptly 

review all submissions to the docket and develop a final rule that is consistent with the 

philosophy of enhancing the quality and effectiveness of training rather than focusing on 

traditional quantitative measures such as total flight time. FAA expects that the final rule 

will address the following elements: 

• Train and evaluate flight crewmembers in a complete flight crew environment. 

• Require Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) to be administered to flight 

crewmembers in a Full Flight Simulator (FFS) during recurrent training. 

• Require the use of a qualified Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) for training, 

testing, and checking flight crewmembers. 

• Require special hazard training for flight crewmembers, such as loss of control and 

Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT). 

• Require additional training and practice in the use of Crew Resource Management 

(CRM) principles. 

• Establish requalification training for aircraft dispatchers and crewmembers. 

• Require a Continuous Analysis Process (CAP) for certificate holders.” 

Action Taken

The public comment period for the FAA’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on 

Qualification, Service and Use of Crewmembers and Aircraft Dispatchers closed on 

August 10, 2009. 

After careful consideration of the more than 3,000 pages of comments that it received, the 

FAA has concluded that it will be necessary to address some of the areas raised during 

the public comment period. For example, some comments stated that the FAA failed to 

disclose performance data used to develop the NPRM. The comments also asserted that 

the FAA used statistically invalid data. To address these comments, the FAA is 

conducting technical and accident analyses and is revising the regulatory evaluation. 

Next Steps: 

The FAA is moving expeditiously to develop a supplemental NPRM to permit the public 

to comment on revisions to the initial proposal. The rulemaking team expects to 

complete its work in late February 2010, and the revised proposal is to be published for 

public comment after clearance from DOT and the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB). 

20 

12/31/09 
3.9 Guidance on Safety Oversight 

Commitment

As stated in the FAA’s Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan: 

“Consistent with the report of the Independent Review Team on Managing Risks in Civil 

Aviation, FAA’s Aviation Safety organization will include scenario-based training in this 

area as part of the August AVS All-Managers Conference. This training is intended to 

address issues raised in the report, including: 

• Management of contrasting regulatory views within the workforce, 

• Methods for moderating extremes in regulatory style, and 

• Methods for optimizing the regulatory effectiveness and coherence across a diverse 

team of inspectors.” 

Action Taken

As noted in the Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan, the FAA’s AVS addressed 

this topic at its annual All-Managers Conference in 

August 2009. 

The theme of the conference was “Shades of Gray,” with a focus on the regulator’s role 

and responsibilities in a world of competing priorities and imperfect information. The 

conference included both a presentation on this topic and interactive, scenario-based 

workshops in which participants discussed complex regulatory situations that FAA’s 

aviation safety inspectors have encountered in their day-to-day work. 

Next Steps

The FAA considers this item to have been successfully completed, but the Agency will 

repeat and extend the scope and reach of this training as necessary. 

21 

12/31/09 
4.0 Summary of Findings 

The specific initiatives listed in the June 24, 2009, Airline Safety and Pilot Training 

Action Plan emerged from discussion among air carriers, pilot employee organizations, 

and the FAA during the June 15, 2009, Call to Action meeting in Washington, D.C. The 

FAA organized discussion in the 12 regional forums in a similar manner to the structure 

of the initial call to action meeting in Washington. The result of those discussions can 

most usefully be summarized under the headings of the principal action plan initiatives. 

Fatigue 

Concern about crew fatigue is universal. This topic arose repeatedly in the initial June 15 

meeting and in each of the regional safety forums. Fatigue is in many ways the linchpin 

issue of this initiative, because issues related to both its causes and its impacts arose in 

every discussion. Participants agreed that: 

• The air carrier management’s responsibility for crew education and support includes a 

duty to establish, communicate, and maintain a “just” safety culture that permits 

fatigued crew members to decline a flight without jeopardy. Many also stressed that 

payment of a “living wage” is another essential duty of air carrier management. 

• Adherence to professional standards and flight discipline includes both an individual 

duty and a peer responsibility to ensure that all crewmembers are fit to fly. 

Participants observed that being fit to fly includes responsible rest practices on the 

part of individual crewmembers. 

Training Issues (FAA’s Focused Inspection, Training Program Review Guidance, 

and Crew Training Requirements)

The single defining theme from the many discussions conducted around the country was 

that a focus on quality, not just quantity, of training and experience is essential to 

meaningful improvement. While participants generally agreed that experience (i.e., total 

flight time) can be an indicator of a pilot’s proficiency and suitability for part 121/135 

operations, they stressed that quality of training and quality of experience are far more 

important in determining an individual’s readiness to operate in the air carrier 

environment. 

Both in Washington and in cities around the country, participants in the Call to Action 

noted the various elements of a generational “paradigm shift” in the pilot population, 

which involves a fundamental shift in experience, expectations, and work practices. 

Participants stressed that it is critical to ensure that training is modified to address and 

accommodate these changes. There is, however, no consensus on what those changes 

should include. Some participants urged a back-to-basics focus on stick-and-rudder 

skills. Others argued that today’s focus on automation management, CRM, decisionmaking, and TEM is far more relevant to today’s part 121 and part 135 operational 

environment. 

22 

12/31/09 
Participants did agree that it is imperative for air carriers to identify the gap between the 

experience and skills new-hire pilots bring to the flight deck and the experience and skills 

needed for the range of elements in a specific air carrier’s operations (i.e., aircraft, routes, 

common meteorological conditions). Virtually everyone embraced the concept of using 

data from FOQA, ASAP, Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA), and other sources to 

define behaviors that are both “observable” and “trainable,” as well as to enhance the 

quality and relevance of a specific carrier’s scenario-based training in simulators, IOE, 

and LOFT. Another point of near-universal agreement was a disdain for “canned” 

scenarios and predictable training profiles, including some of the more traditional 

emergency-ridden “throw-the-book-at-‘em” approach to simulator sessions. 

With respect to questions on patterns of deficient performance, participants in the Call to 

Action on Airline Safety and Pilot Training sessions emphasized that training should be 

“non-punitive,” and that it is vital to avoid one-size-fits-all approaches to this issue. As 

many participants observed, training and checking deficiencies generally reflect 

inadequacies in the entire system; that is, everything from screening and hiring to initial 

training to operational experience and performance monitoring. For these reasons, none 

of the participants stated support for establishing numerically-based policies such as 

“zero-failures” and “three strikes.” 

Air Carrier Commitments

As described in Section 3.4, the positive and rapid overall response to the Administrator’s 

request for written commitments on pilot records, FOQA/ASAP, and contract provisions 

validates the premise that voluntary commitments can be more efficient, and more 

effective, than mandatory solutions. There was a strong consensus among safety forum 

participants that it would be a mistake to legislatively require programs such as ASAP, 

FOQA, and LOSA. Issues of trust—the foundation for success in these programs—are 

already problematic, and participants from all sectors (air carrier, pilot union, and the 

FAA) expressed concern that mandated disclosure would significantly reduce 

crewmembers’ willingness to provide information that would not otherwise be known 

and available to inform safety-related improvements. 

With respect to pilot records, air carrier representatives repeatedly expressed concern 

about the time it takes for FAA to process FOIA and PRIA requests. To address these 

issues, the FAA has streamlined processes for airlines to request records, such as notice 

of disapproval of applications; automated verification for certificate and rating 

information to improve response time; and developed a new form, which is available on 

the FAA website, for airlines to use when requesting pilot records. 

Labor Organization Commitments and Mentoring 

As described in Section 3.5, labor organizations (pilot employee unions) responded 

positively to the Administrator’s request for written commitments with respect to 

establishing a professional standards and ethics committee, a code of ethics, and safety 

risk management meetings. While these are important steps, discussion in Washington 

and in safety forums around the country revealed a profound and pervasive concern about 

professionalism. Participants gave example after example of how lack of professionalism 

23 

12/31/09 
is manifested. These examples included fatigue-related behaviors, disdain for the 

captain’s authority as pilot in command (PIC), and refusal to dress and groom in a 

professional manner. 

Some participants attribute these behaviors to generational differences. Others point to 

the fact that industry wages, especially in the entry-level jobs, are simply not sufficient to 

attract the best applicants or inspire the kind of professional attitudes and behaviors taken 

for granted in the industry’s past. 

There is certainly a consensus on the existence of problems with respect to pilot 

professionalism and discipline. However, the discussions in Washington, D.C., and 

around the country did not produce the concrete, specific, and actionable measures that 

Secretary LaHood and Administrator Babbitt hoped to obtain with respect to 

professionalism and the related topic of mentoring. 

As described in Section 3.6, however, participants did make progress in identifying some 

of the challenges involved in fostering professionalism, mentoring less experienced 

pilots, and other “transfer of experience” endeavors. The work completed thus far will 

serve as a foundation for continued improvement on the issues raised in the FAA’s 

Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan. 

24 

12/31/09 
5.0 Recommendations for Additional Action 

Fatigue (Section 3.1) FAA’s FDR rulemaking team should complete its work on the 

NPRM and the associated advisory circulars at the earliest possible date in 2010. 

Training Program Review Guidance (Section 3.3) Using information derived from the 

FAA’s focused inspection initiative and findings outlined in Section 4 and Appendix 8 

with respect to training issues, FAA has completed a draft SAFO and is developing a 

separate Notice to inspectors on comprehensive training program review guidance. After 

internal coordination, both documents should be ready for consultation with industry by 

the end of February 2010. The FAA should further consult with the industry by August 

2010 to evaluate the effectiveness of these documents and, based on feedback, draft any 

necessary revisions before incorporating the guidance permanently into FAA Order 

8900.1. 

Professionalism (Section 3.6) As they shared in their responses to the Administrator’s 

letter, air carrier employee organizations have already undertaken important steps to 

improve pilot professionalism. To take this effort to the next level, however, FAA will 

host a gathering of pilot employee organizations in early 2010. The goal of this meeting 

is to facilitate development of actionable guidelines on cockpit discipline and pilot 

professionalism. These guidelines should clearly articulate the aviation community’s 

expectations for professional behavior in the flight deck. 

Mentoring (Section 3.6): The FAA remains strongly committed to promoting the 

development of mechanisms for effective transfer of experience (mentoring) and is 

interested in some of the ideas brought forward during the Call to Action meetings 

around the country. The FAA will host a gathering of pilot employee organizations in 

early 2010, with a focus on developing actionable guidelines on cockpit discipline and 

pilot professionalism. Because transfer of experience (mentoring) is related to cockpit 

discipline and professionalism, the Agency will include this topic on the agenda. 

Crew Training Requirements (Section 3.8): With respect to the FAA’s Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking on Qualification, Service and Use of Crewmembers and Aircraft 

Dispatchers, the FAA will move expeditiously to develop and publish a supplemental 

NPRM early in 2010. 

25 

12/31/09 
Appendix 1 

Background Material 

Call to Action 

on 

Airline Safety and Pilot Training 
800 Independence Ave, SW 

Washington, DC 20591 

Dear Invitee: 

Working together we have been able to achieve one of the safest periods in aviation history. 

However, recent events highlight the need for us to always work to eliminate, mitigate and 

manage risks. 

I am issuing a “Call to Action” for the industry and Federal Aviation Administration to 

come together to identify a few key initiatives regarding pilot training, cockpit discipline 

and other areas that can be voluntarily incorporated by operators. History has shown that 

we implement safety improvements far more quickly and effectively when we work 

together on problems and their solutions. 

I am asking you to attend this all day session on Monday, Jun 15, 2009. We will begin at 

8:00 a.m. in the Bessie Coleman Center on the second floor at FAA Headquarters, located 

at 800 Independence Ave. SW, Washington DC, 20951. We need to bring industry 

decision-makers together to develop the proposed actions that will make the difference. It 

is my expectation we should be able to leave this meeting committed to implement these 

actions immediately. 

Enclosed please find the agenda for the meeting, types of data you should be prepared to 

discuss and questions to consider in preparation for the meeting. Please respond to 

Lirio.Liu@faa.gov and Monica.Nemecek@faa.gov by Friday, June 12, 2009, to confirm 

your attendance. 

Sincerely, 

J. Randolph Babbitt 

Administrator 

Enclosures 

Appendix 1 

1 
NAME Title/ Operator Address Email 

Basil Barimo 

Air Transport Association of America (ATA) Vice President of Operations and Safety, 

Air Transport Association 1301 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20004-1707 

BBarimo@airlines.org 

Mont Smith 

Air Transport Association of America (ATA) Director of Safety, 

Air Transport Association 1301 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20004-1707 

MSmith@airlines.org 

Al Madar American Airlines 

Director of Safety 

4333 Armon Carter Blvd Ft. Worth, TX 76155 Al.madar@aa.com 

Peter Bowler American Eagle 

President & CEO, 

4333 Armon Carter Blvd Ft. Worth, TX 76155 Peter.Bowler@aa.com 

Jim Winkley 

American Eagle Vice President of Flight Operations, 

4333 Armon Carter Blvd Ft. worth, TX 76155 Jim.Winkley@aa.com 

Don Gunther Continental Airlines Staff Vice President 

Safety, 

1600 Smith Street HQSSY Houston, TX 77002

Don.Gunther@coair.com 

Ken Hylander 

Delta Airlines Senior Vice President, Safety, Security, and Compliance, 

1020 Delta Blvd Dept. 725 Atlanta, GA 30354 

Ken.hylander@delta.com 

Jim Nides 

ExpressJet Vice President Operations & Maintenance, 

700 N. Sam Parkway Ste. 200 Houston, TX 77067 

James.Nides@expressjet.com 

George Semak 

ExpressJet Senior Director of Flight Operations, 

700 N. Sam Parkway Ste 200 Houston, TX 77067 

George.Semak@expressjet.com 

Mike Ferverda Mesa Air Group Senior Vice President 410 N. 44th St.suite 700 Phoenix, AZ 85008 Michael.ferverda@mesa-air.com 
Roger Cohen Regional Airline Association (RAA) 

President 

2025 M. St., NW Washington, DC 20036 cohan@raa.org 

Scott Foose Regional Airline Association (RAA) 

Vice President, 

2025 M. St. NW Washington, DC 20036 foose@raa.org 

Bryan 

Bedford 

Republic Airlines & Chautauqua Airlines Chairman, President & Chief Executive Officer 

8909 Purdue Rd Ste. 300 Indianapolis, IN 43268 

bbedford@rjet.com 

Wayne Heller 

Republic Airlines & Chautauqua Airlines Executive Vice President & Chief Operating Officer 

8909 Purdue Rd Ste. 300 Indianapolis, IN 43268 

wheller@rjet.com 

Chip Childs 

SkyWest Airlines President & Chief Operating Officer 

444 South River Rd St. George, UT 84790 rchilds@skywest.com 

Klen Brooks 

SkyWest Airlines Vice President - Flight Operations 

444 South River Rd St. George, UT 84790 kbrooks@skywest.com 

Dave Faddis 

SkyWest Airlines Director - Operations Safety & Compliance 

444 South River Rd St. George, UT 84790 dfaddis@skywest.com 

Michael Quiello 

United Airlines Vice President, Corporate Safety, Security, Quality & Environment, 

United Operation Center 1200 E. Algonquin Rd Elk Grove Village, IL 60007 

Michael.quiello@united.com 

Paul Morell 

US Airways Vice President, Safety & Regulatory Compliance, 

400 E. Sky Harbor Blvd Phoenix, AZ 85034 Paul.Morell@usairways.com 

Lloyd Hill APA President 

14600 Trinity Blvd Ste. 500 Ft. Worth, TX 76155 

President@alliedpilots.org 
Randy Davenport 

APA - Deputy Chairman for Operations, APA National Safety Committee. 

14600 Trinity Blvd Ste. 500 Ft. Worth, TX 76155 

DAVTNG@aol.com 

David Bourne 

International Brotherhood of Teamsters Director Airline Division 

bourne747@aol.com 

Dave Ross Local 747 dross@apa1224.org 

John Prater ALPA President 

1625 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 

John.Prater@alpa.org 

Rory Kay 

ALPA Executive Air Safety Chair 

535 Herndon Parkway Herndon, VA 20170 Rory.Kay@alpa.org 

Chuck Hogeman ALPA Human Factors/Training 

Group Chair 

535 Herndon Parkway Herndon, VA 20170 

Chuck.Hogeman@alpa.org 

Leja Noe Mesa Safety and Training Chair 

Mesa MEC 

535 Herndon Parkway Herndon, VA 20170 Leja.Noe@alpa.org 

Dennis Townsend AMR Eagle Training Chair American 

Eagle MEC 

1001 W. Euless Boulevard Suite 415 Euless, TX 76040 

Dennis.Townsend@alpa.org 

Edward Lowry 

(XJT) – Vice Chair, ExpressJet MEC 

15723 Berryfield St Huntersville, NC 28078-6706 Ed.Lowry@alpa.org 

Bern Hughes UAL 

Safety Chair UAL MEC 

9550 West Higgins Road Suite 1000 Rosemont, IL 60018 

Bern.Hughes@alpa.org 
Pete Frey DAL-ALPA Safety Committee 

member DAL MEC 

100 Hartsfield Centre Parkway Suite 200 Atlanta, GA 30354 

Pete.Frey@alpa.org 

Jerry McDermott 

CAL- ALPA Professional Standards Committee Vice Chair 

535 Herndon Parkway Herndon, VA 20170 Jerry.McDermott@alpa.org 

Jerry Wright 

ALPA Manager Safety and Security, 

535 Herndon Parkway Herndon, VA 20170 

Jerry.Wright@alpa.org 

Buddy Casey Colgan Air 

President and General Manager 

4470 Mount Gillespie Dr. Lakeland, TN 38002 buddycasey@colganair.com

Dan Morgan Colgan Air Vice President Safety and 

Regulatory Compliance 

danmorgan@colganair.com

Melissa Miller Chautauqua Airlines melmiller31@gmail.com 
FAA PARTICIPANTS 

NAME Operator/FAA Office Title Email 

Robert 

Talmadge 

American Airlines SW21 

Supervisory Principal Operations Inspector robert.e.talmadge@faa.gov 8

Richard Taylor Expressjet Airlines SW27 Principal Operations Inspector richard.a.taylor@faa.gov 2

Andrew Turner Continental Airlines SW27 Supervisory Principal Operations Inspector andrew.d.turner@faa.gov 2

Michael 

Chambers 

Chautauqua Airlines GL11 Principal Operations Inspector todd.chambers@faa.gov 3

John Weidner Mesa Airlines SW07 Principal Operations Inspector (POI) john.m.weidner@faa.gov 8

Douglas 

Lundgren 

Colgan Air EA27 Principal Operations Inspector douglas.lundgren@faa.gov 7

Mark Mulkey USAirways EA19 Supervisory Principal Operations Inspector mark.mulkey@faa.gov 4

Robert 

Downing 

American Eagle SW21 Principal Operations Inspector robert.l.downing@faa.gov 8

John Allen 

John McGraw 

John Duncan 

Mike 

Zenkovich 

Peggy Gilligan 

John Hickey 

Randy Babbitt 

Ray LaHood 

Lirio Liu 

Monica Nemecek 

Susan Parson 

Lance Gant 

Jay Pardee 

Linda Goodrich LGOODRICH@passnational.org
Appendix 2 

Federal Aviation Administration’s 

Action Plan on 

Airline Safety and Pilot Training 
FAA’s Airline Safety and Pilot Training Action Plan 

June 24, 2009 

Immediate and Short Term Action Items (June-July 2009) 

Fatigue Rulemaking: By July 15, FAA will charter an aviation rulemaking committee 

(ARC) consisting of representatives from FAA, industry and labor organizations. The 

ARC will have until September 1, 2009, to draft recommendations to the FAA which 

would inform a new, science-based notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on flight and 

rest limits. 

Focused Inspection Initiative: Recognizing the urgency of proposals in the Call to 

Action, FAA has reordered priorities contained in a prior June 16 Notice to FAA 

inspectors and is directing that a focused program review of air carrier flight 

crewmember training, qualification, and management be completed sooner. This notice 

will be published by June 24. 

The focused program review has two parts. 

• Meet with the carrier’s director of operations, director of safety, and company 

officials responsible for flight crewmember training and qualification programs. The 

purpose of these meetings is to determine the carrier’s ability to identify, track, and 

manage low-time flight crewmembers and those who have failed evaluation events or 

demonstrated a repetitive need for additional training. Inspectors will also determine 

at this meeting if the carrier adopted the suggestion in Safety Alert for Operators 

(SAFO) 06015, Remedial Training for Part 121 Pilots. The meetings are to occur as 

soon as possible, but no later than July 15, 2009. 

• Inspectors will conduct additional inspections to validate that the carrier’s training 

and qualification programs meet regulatory standards in accordance with FAA 

guidance materials, including, among other items: 

o Review the entire performance history of any pilot in question; 

o Provide remedial training as necessary; and 

o Provide additional oversight by the certificate holder to ensure that 

performance deficiencies are effectively addressed and corrected. 

Appendix 2

1
Training Program Review Guidance: Using results from initial elements of the 

focused inspection initiative, by July 31 FAA will develop a SAFO to provide guidance 

material on conducting a comprehensive training program review. This guidance will 

describe the training program review in the context of a safety management system and 

its role in a corporate safety culture. 

Obtain Air Carriers’ Commitment to Most Effective Practices: To solidify verbal 

commitments made at FAA’s June 15 Call to Action, by the end of June the 

Administrator will send a letter to all 100+ part 121 operators and their unions and 

request written commitments to adhere to the highest professional standards, with 

specific commitments on these key topics: 

• Pilot Records: While FAA works with Congress to pursue appropriate amendments 

to the Pilot Records Improvement Act of 1996 (PRIA), air carriers should implement 

a policy of asking pilot applicants for voluntary disclosure of FAA records, including 

notices of disapproval for evaluation events. FAA will also amend Advisory Circular 

120-68D, Pilot Records Improvement Act, to reflect FAA’s expectations in this 

regard. 

• FOQA and ASAP: While FAA works with Congress to assure proper protection of 

voluntarily-provided data, air carriers should establish flight operations quality 

assurance (FOQA) and Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) programs and 

develop data analysis processes to ensure effective use of this information. 

• Contract Provisions: DOT and FAA will develop the authority and processes to 

review agreements between air carriers and their regional partners. Major air carriers 

should seek specific and concrete ways to ensure that their smaller airline partner 

carriers adopt and implement the larger company’s most effective practices for safety, 

including periodic meetings to review, for example, FOQA and ASAP data and to 

constantly emphasize their shared safety philosophy. 

Labor Organizations: We are asking labor organizations for their commitment in the 

following areas: 

• Establish and support professional standards and ethics committees to develop peer 

audit and review procedures, and to elevate ethics and professional standards. 

• Establish and publish a code of ethics that includes expectations for professional 

behavior, standards of conduct for professional appearance, and overall fitness to fly. 

• Support periodic safety risk management meetings between FAA and mainline and 

regional carriers to promote the most effective practices, including periodic analysis 

of FOQA and ASAP data with an emphasis on identifying enhancements to the 

training program. 

2 

Appendix 2

2
Mentoring: To address issues in the professional standards and flight discipline area, by 

July 31 FAA will develop and seek industry comments with respect to creating a range of 

mentoring programs. These can include first officer to first officer, captain to captain; 

and captain “curing” programs. 

Regional Safety Forums: In July, FAA will conduct in the Washington, DC area the 

first of a series of at least 10 regional safety forums to discuss the Call to Action 

initiatives, listen to stakeholder comments, and seek ideas for and commitments to 

additional actions in the areas in which the FAA is already taking specific action. 

Locations for these events will be mainly where different types of operators (including 

part 135 operators) are based. 

Intermediate Term Actions (August-December 2009)

Crew Training Requirements: FAA currently has an NPRM open for comment that is 

intended to enhance traditional training programs by requiring the use of flight simulation 

training devices for flight crewmembers, and including additional training requirements 

in areas critical to safety. Upon the close of the public comment period on August 10, 

FAA will promptly review all submissions to the docket and develop a final rule that is 

consistent with the philosophy of enhancing the quality and effectiveness of training 

rather than focusing on traditional quantitative measures such as total flight time. 

FAA expects that the final rule will address the following elements: 

• Train and evaluate flight crewmembers in a complete flight crew environment. 

• Require Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) to be administered to flight 

crewmembers in a full flight simulator (FFS) during recurrent training. 

• Require the use of a qualified flight simulation training device (FSTD) for 

training, testing, and checking flight crewmembers. 

• Require special hazard training for flight crewmembers, such as loss of control 

and Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT). 

• Require additional training and practice in the use of Crew Resource Management 

(CRM) principles. 

• Establish requalification training for aircraft dispatchers and crewmembers. 

• Require a continuous analysis process (CAP) for certificate holders. 

3 

Appendix 2

3
4 

Guidance to Inspectors on Safety Oversight: Consistent with the report of the 

Independent Review Team on Managing Risks in Civil Aviation, FAA’s Aviation Safety 

organization will include scenario-based training in this area as part of the August AVS 

All-Managers Conference. This training is intended to address issues raised in the report, 

including: 

• Management of contrasting regulatory views within the workforce, 

• Methods for moderating extremes in regulatory style, and 

• Methods for optimizing the regulatory effectiveness and coherence across a 

diverse team of inspectors. 

Final Report: By December 31, FAA will finalize a report to FAA Administrator and 

DOT Secretary to summarize findings and recommend additional action items based on 

the Call to Action meeting, regional safety forums, results of focused inspection, and 

other actions. The report will include performance metrics for auditing and assessing 

progress. 

Appendix 2

4
FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591 

________________________________________________

For Immediate Release 

June 24, 2009 

Contact: Laura Brown 

Phone: (202) 267-3883 

FAA Administrator Calls For Commitment to Regional 

Airline Safety 

WASHINGTON, D.C. — Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator Randy 

Babbitt today announced an expedited review of flight and rest rules and called on U.S. 

airlines and unions to respond, by July 31, with specific commitments to strengthen 

safety at regional and major airlines by insisting that airlines obtain all available FAA 

pilot records, among other actions. 

On June 15, U.S. Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood and Babbitt met with airline 

safety executives and pilot unions to strategize on how best to reduce risk at regional 

airlines while promoting best practices from major airlines. 

"We know that the airline industry is committed to operate at the highest level of safety," 

Babbitt said. "Now is the time to push these initiatives forward." 

The FAA is making pilot fatigue a high priority and will work rapidly to develop and 

implement a new flight time and rest rule based on fatigue science and a review of 

international approaches to the issue. By July 15, the agency will establish an Aviation 

Rulemaking Committee (ARC) — including FAA, labor and industry representatives — 

that will be charged with developing recommendations for an FAA rule by September 1. 

Also by July 15, FAA inspectors will complete a focused review of airline procedures for 

identifying and tracking pilots who fail evaluations or demonstrate a repetitive need for 

additional training. Inspectors will conduct additional inspections to validate that the 

airline's training and qualification programs meet regulatory standards in accordance with 

FAA guidance materials. 

Appendix 2

5
In a letter dated June 24, Babbitt urged all air carriers to immediately adopt a policy to 

ensure that their pilot applicants release any records held by the FAA to the hiring air 

carrier while the agency works with Congress to update the current Pilot Records 

Improvement Act of 1996. Further, the FAA expects all carriers who do not currently 

have Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) and Aviation Safety Action Programs 

in place to do so. 

Beginning next month, the FAA and industry will hold at least 10 regional safety forums 

throughout the nation to open a dialogue with as many airlines as possible, solidifying 

commitments to the actions identified in the Call to Action meeting, and to discuss 

additional best practices. 

The FAA expects airlines that have contractual relationships with regional feeder 

companies to develop specific programs to share safety data and ensure that their partner 

airlines mirror their most effective safety practices. 

"We will work closely with Congress on all of these actions and will provide any 

necessary technical assistance," Babbitt said. 

Earlier this year, the FAA proposed upgraded training standards for pilots, flight 

attendants and dispatchers. The proposal is the most comprehensive upgrade in FAA 

training requirements in 20 years and incorporates best industry practices. The rule aims 

to enhance traditional training programs by requiring additional simulator recurrent 

training, special hazard training, and additional training and practice in the use of Crew 

Resource Management (CRM) principles, as examples. The comment period closes 

August 10 and the FAA expects to promptly develop a final rule. 

### 

Appendix 2

6
Appendix 3 

Fatigue Rulemaking 
Appendix 3

1
Appendix 3

2
Appendix 3

3
Appendix 4 

Focused Inspection Initiative 
NOTICE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION N 8900.78

National Policy 

Effective Date: 

06/24/2009 

Cancellation Date: 

12/31/2009

SUBJ: Focused Program Review of Air Carrier Flight Crewmember Training, 

Qualification and Management 

1. Purpose of This Notice. This notice cancels N 8900.77, Focused Program Review of Air 

Carrier Flight Crewmember Training, Qualification and Management. This notice changes the 

focus of the requirements of the previous notice and establishes a new deadline. The requirement 

to conduct a focused program review of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 

part 121 air carrier programs for training, checking and managing flight crewmembers with 

emphasis on low-time flight crewmembers and those who have failed evaluation events and/or 

demonstrated a repetitive need for additional training. 

2. Audience. The primary audience for this notice is principal operations inspectors (POI) 

responsible for the approval, review and surveillance of 14 CFR part 121 air carrier flight 

crewmember training and qualification programs. The secondary audience includes Flight 

Standards personnel in certificate-holding district offices (CHDO), branches and divisions in the 

regions and headquarters. 

3. Where You Can Find This Notice. Inspectors can access this notice through the Flight 

Standards Information Management System (FSIMS) at http://fsims.avs.faa.gov. Operators may 

find this notice on the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Web site at http://fsims.faa.gov/. 

4. Applicability. This notice applies to all 14 CFR part 121 air carriers with the exception of 

part 121 air carriers whose aircraft fleets have operation specification (OpSpec) A034 designated 

Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) curriculums. If OpSpec A034 does not cover all of an 

air carrier’s fleets, then this notice applies to those fleets not covered. 

5. Explanation of Cancellation and Deadline Changes. After reviewing the outcome of the 

Administrator’s Call to Action on June 15, 2009, Flight Standards realized the need to accelerate 

the accomplishment of certain provisions in N 8900.77 and to rearrange the priority of the 

actions required by the notice. Issues concerning pilot training have become highly publicized. 

FAA needs to demonstrate to Congress and to the public that we can move quickly and 

decisively to address critical safety issues. Flight Standards management opted to reorder the 

tasks required by N 8900.77. The requirements remain essentially the same. Because, per agency 

policy, we cannot issue a change to a notice, we opted to cancel N 8900.77 and to issue this 

notice with re-prioritized tasks. 

Distribution: Electronic Only - Initiated By: AFS-200 

Appendix 4

1
6/24/09 N 8900.78 

6. Background. Recent accidents have made it necessary to validate part 121 air carrier flight 

crewmember training and qualification programs. We need also to ensure that air carriers have 

the capability to identify, track, and manage low-time flight crewmembers, as well as those who 

have failed evaluation events and/or demonstrated a repetitive need for additional training. 

a. For the purpose of this notice, we define a low-time flight crewmember as meeting at 

least one of the following criteria: 

(1) One who has either fewer than 1,500 total flight hours in turbojet powered aircraft or 

fewer than 1,500 hours in 14 CFR parts 121, 135, or military operations; or 

(2) Fewer than 300 total flight hours in type with his or her current employer; or 

(3) Fewer than 13 months in his or her current crewmember position (not type specific) 

with their current employer. 

b. To determine whether a flight crewmember has demonstrated performance problems, 

consider his or her training and checking history for a period of five years before the date of the 

review conducted as per paragraph 7b below. 

7. Action. This focused program review has two parts to be implemented by the POIs. In Part I 

POIs will determine the capability of their carrier to identify, track, and manage low-time flight 

crewmembers and those who have failed evaluations and/or or have demonstrated a repetitive 

need for additional training. In Part II POIs will determine that their carriers’ training and 

qualification programs meet regulatory standards in accordance with FAA guidance. 

a. Part I. 

(1) Meet with the Director of Operations (DO), the Director of Safety (DOS), and the 

company official responsible for flight crewmember training and qualification programs to 

review the company’s procedures for identifying, tracking, and managing low-time flight 

crewmembers and those who have failed evaluation events and/or demonstrated a repetitive need 

for additional training. 

(a) Determine if the carrier is aware of and implemented a voluntary remedial 

training program, as described in SAFO 06015, Remedial Training for Part 121 Pilots. 

(b) Require company personnel to demonstrate that they use the company’s 

procedures to identify, track, and manage low-time flight crewmembers and those who have 

demonstrated performance problems. Producing company policy and records for a sample of 

both types of flight crewmembers will meet this requirement. 

(c) Examples of management procedures may include reducing the interval for a 

captain’s line checks, reducing the interval between proficiency checks or training events for any 

seat position, or adding line observations for first officers. 

(d) Complete this meeting as soon as possible but no later than July 15, 2009. 

Appendix 4

2
6/24/09 N 8900.78 

(2) If a carrier does not have procedures, or its procedures are ineffective, encourage 

company personnel to develop procedures to identify, track, and manage low-time flight 

crewmembers and those who have demonstrated performance problems. 

(3) Adjust oversight (e.g., performance assessments, Constructed Dynamic Observation 

Reports (ConDOR), risk management plan (RMP)) as needed to increase vigilance because of 

unmitigated risk if company personnel will not commit to develop or change procedures. 

(4) Document the results of Part I in a national ConDOR titled “Special Tracking of 

Certain Flight Crewmembers” which is currently available in ATOS automation. 

(5) Enter N8900.78-ST (exactly as shown) in the Local/Regional/Local Use field of the 

ConDOR if not auto filled. 

(6) Track corrective actions requested or required of the air carrier in the corrective 

action tracking tool (CATT). Enter N8900.78-ST (exactly as shown) in the description field. 

Note: If you have already created ConDORs with N8900.77-ST (-TRN for 7b) in the 

National/Regional/Local use field, you do not need to change them.

b. Part II. 

Note: Performance Assessments and ConDORs may be delegated to any operations 

certificate management team member with appropriate experience and qualifications. 

(1) Construct a ConDOR that shall include a minimum of the following questions: 

(a) Element Performance Inspection (EPI) 4.2.3, questions 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.9, 

and 5; 

(b) EPI 4.2.7, questions 1.3, 1.5, and 1.6 and; 

(c) If your carrier contracts for training, EPI 4.2.9, questions 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 1.6, 

1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, and 1.11. 

(2) Create a sufficient number of ConDORs to observe enough qualification and 

proficiency evaluations, including line checks, to determine that your carrier’s training and 

qualification programs achieve intended results. 

(a) The sample size will vary depending on the size of your carrier. If your carrier 

employs 25 or fewer flight crewmembers, observe 100 percent of the evaluation events 

scheduled before September 30, 2009, if practicable. If your carrier employs more than 25 flight 

crewmembers, observe a large enough sample of evaluation events for each make and model 

aircraft to determine that your carrier’s training and qualification programs are achieving 

intended results. Attempt to target low-time flight crewmembers in the sample you observe. 

(b) Consider supplementing the observations required by 7b(2) with additional 

cockpit en route inspections using the ConDOR described in 7b(1). 

Appendix 4

3
6/24/09 N 8900.78 

(c) Enter N8900.78-TNG (exactly as shown) in the National/Regional/Local Use 

field on each ConDOR. 

(d) Use the N/A (not applicable) response field in lieu of N/O (not observed) when 

you cannot answer a ConDOR question because of lack of opportunity to make a required 

observation. Enter “Not observed” in the comment field associated with the N/A response. 

Note: If you have already created ConDORs with N8900.77-ST (-TRN for 7b) in the 

National/Regional/Local use field, you do not need to change them.

(3) If flight crewmember performance indicates deficiencies in your carrier’s training 

and/or qualification programs, take one of the following actions: 

(a) Schedule a System Analysis Team (SAT), open a RMP, or schedule a performance 

assessment of elements 4.2.3, Training of Flight Crewmember, and/or 4.3.2, Appropriate 

Airman/Crewmember Checks and Qualifications, (and/or related elements, as appropriate) to 

gather additional evidence to determine whether observed deficiencies indicate systemic 

problems in the training and/or qualification programs. 

(b) Schedule a design assessment of elements 4.2.3 and/or 4.3.2 to identify systemic 

deficiencies and/or areas of noncompliance. 

(c) Require your carrier to take immediate corrective action for observed deficiencies 

in its flight crewmember training and/or qualification programs. 

(4) If deficiencies exist, track required corrective actions specified in 7b(3) in the CATT. 

Enter N8900.78-TNG (exactly as shown) in the description field. Enter the deficiencies and the 

choice of further action in the CATT. Continue to track follow-up actions in the CATT to 

resolution. 

(5) Begin the actions required by Part II immediately and complete them no later than 

September 30, 2009. 

Note: Corrective actions required of air carriers, SATs, RMPs and performance and 

design assessments may take longer than September 30, 2009, to complete. 

8. Additional References. Advisory Circular (AC) 120-54, Advanced Qualification Program, 

current edition, and SAFO 06015, Remedial Training for Part 121 Pilots. 

9. Disposition. This is a one-time focused program review. Therefore, Flight Standards will not 

incorporate the information in this notice into FSIMS. Direct questions concerning the 

completion of ConDORs to the Flight Standards Certification and Surveillance Division, 

AFS-900, (703) 509-7209. Direct questions concerning training activities to the Air 

Transportation Division, AFS-200, (202) 267-8166. 

ORIGINAL SIGNED by 

John M. Allen 

Director, Flight Standards Service 

Appendix 4

4
Completion of Part 1 of N 8900.78 by CMT - Data as of 08/19/09

Part 1

Region Designator Name Completed?

AL ERAA ERA AVIATION INC Y

AL FFSA FRONTIER FLYING SERVICE INC Y

AL FXGA TATONDUK OUTFITTERS LTD Y

AL LR7A LYNDEN AIR CARGO L L C Y

AL NACA NORTHERN AIR CARGO INC Y

AL PNSA PENINSULA AIRWAYS INC Y

CE FDEA FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP Y

CE IPXA UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO Y

CE N6WA GOJET AIRLINES LLC Y

CE RAIA TRANS STATES AIRLINES LLC Y

CE REXA PINNACLE AIRLINES INC Y

EA BJ6A NETJETS LARGE AIRCRAFT COMPANY LLC Y

EA C77A COMPASS AIRLINES INC AQP

EA HNAA PIEDMONT AIRLINES INC AQP

EA HYIA HYANNIS AIR SERVICE INC Y

EA JJBA CHAMPLAIN ENTERPRISES INC Y

EA MTNA MOUNTAIN AIR CARGO INC Y

EA NOCA NORTH AMERICAN AIRLINES Y

EA NSVA COLGAN AIR INC Y

EA P5CA POLAR AIR CARGO WORLDWIDE INC Y

EA PIDA PACE AIRLINES INC Y

EA Q2SA SOUTHERN AIR INC Y

EA U30A BRENDAN AIRWAYS LLC Y

EA UIEA ATLAS AIR INC Y

EA USAA US AIRWAYS INC AQP

EA WRNA SKY LEASE I INC Y

EA YENA JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION AQP

GL A6WA AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATION Y

GL ABXA ABX AIR INC Y

GL BUEA AERODYNAMICS INC Y

GL CHQA CHAUTAUQUA AIRLINES INC Y

GL DHLA ASTAR AIR CARGO INC Y

GL GTIA SPIRIT AIRLINES INC Y

GL JRAA RHOADES AVIATION INC Y

GL K11A KALITTA CHARTERS II LLC Y

GL KCSA KALITTA AIR LLC Y

GL MALA MESABA AVIATION INC Y

GL MWEA MIDWEST AIRLINES INC Y

GL R61A REPUBLIC AIRLINES INC Y

GL RYNA RYAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC Y

GL SCNA MN AIRLINES LLC Y

GL U2RA NATIONAL AIR CARGO GROUP INC Y

GL UHLA SHUTTLE AMERICA CORPORATION Y

GL VGCA GULF AND CARIBBEAN CARGO INC Y

GL VNAA PSA AIRLINES INC Y

GL Y2PA USA JET AIRLINES INC Y

NM 3LYA LYNX AVIATION INC Y

NM ASAA ALASKA AIRLINES INC AQP

Appendix 4

5
NM COEA EMPIRE AIRLINES INC Y

NM EIAA EVERGREEN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC Y

NM F3LA FRONTIER AIRLINES INC Y

NM GLBA GREAT LAKES AVIATION LTD Y

NM HSYA CORPORATE AIR Y

NM QXEA HORIZON AIR INDUSTRIES INC Y

NM SWIA SKYWEST AIRLINES INC Y

SO 22AA ARROW AIR INC Y

SO ASOA ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES INC Y

SO C8GA CAPITAL CARGO INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC Y

SO CBRA CARIBBEAN SUN AIRLINES INC Y

SO CLCA CENTURION AIR CARGO INC Y

SO COMA COMAIR INC AQP

SO DALA DELTA AIR LINES INC AQP

SO E93A MERIDIAN ASSOCIATES Y

SO FWTA FLORIDA WEST INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS INC Y

SO GUUA GULFSTREAM INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC Y

SO LNXA LYNX AIR INTERNATIONAL INC Y

SO MYWA MIAMI AIR INTERNATIONAL INC Y

SO NWAA NORTHWEST AIRLINES INC AQP

SO P0TA PRESCOTT SUPPORT CO Y

SO PCSA AMERIJET INTERNATIONAL INC Y

SO S9BA SEABORNE VIRGIN ISLAND INC Y

SO TRBA EXECUTIVE AIRLINES INC Y

SO WRLA WORLD AIRWAYS INC Y

SO YYFA FALCON AIR EXPRESS INC Y

SO ZZDA AIRTRAN AIRWAYS INC Y

SW AALA AMERICAN AIRLINES INC AQP

SW C2XA EXPRESSJET AIRLINES INC Y

SW CALA CONTINENTAL AIRLINES INC AQP

SW CNMA OMNI AIR INTERNATIONAL INC Y

SW FDKA FREEDOM AIRLINES INC Y

SW IXXA AIR TRANSPORT INTERNATIONAL LIMITED LIABILITY CO Y

SW MASA MESA AIRLINES INC Y

SW MJYA AMERISTAR AIR CARGO INC Y

SW MZZA CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA INC AQP

SW SIMA AMERICAN EAGLE AIRLINES INC Y

SW SWAA SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO Y

WP AVSA AVIATION SERVICES LTD Y

WP BJNA TEM ENTERPRISES INC Y

WP HALA HAWAIIAN AIRLINES INC AQP

WP I5EA SWIFT AIR L L C Y

WP I5PA AERO MICRONESIA INC Y

WP KNNA SKY KING INC Y

WP KPVA HAWAII ISLAND AIR INC Y

WP SPAA SIERRA PACIFIC AIRLINES INC Y

WP TSAA AEKO KULA INC AQP

WP UALA UNITED AIR LINES INC AQP

WP VQIA VIRGIN AMERICA INC Y

WP WX0A ALLEGIANT AIR LLC Y

WP XV6A VISION AIRLINES INC Y

Appendix 4

6
ConDOR Results for Part I of N 8900.78 - Data as of 08/19/09

Note: There are 99 active part 121 operators. Of those, 14 have AQP for all fleets and are therefore exempt from the notice requir The results below are for the remaining 85 operators.

Question Question Text Yes 

1 Does the operator define its criteria for a low-time flight crewmember? 55 2 Does the operator have procedures for identifying low-time flight crewmembers? 55 3 Does the operator have procedures for managing low-time flight crewmembers? 54 4 Does the operator have procedures for tracking low-time flight crewmembers? 56 5 Does the operator require adherence to standard operating procedures to develop positive 

patterns of behavior for low-time flight crewmembers?

78 

6 Does the operator define its criteria for identifying flight crewmembers with performance 

problems?

63 

7 Does the operator have procedures for identifying those flight crewmembers who have 

demonstrated substandard performance during a training event?

76 

8 Does the operator have procedures for managing those flight crewmembers who have 

demonstrated substandard performance during a training event?

71 

9 Does the operator have procedures for tracking those flight crewmembers who have 

demonstrated substandard performance during a training event?

60 

10 Does the operator have procedures for identifying those flight crewmembers who have 

demonstrated substandard performance during an evaluation event?

77 

11 Does the operator have procedures for managing those flight crewmembers who have 

demonstrated substandard performance during an evaluation event?

68 

12 Does the operator have procedures for tracking those flight crewmembers who have 

demonstrated substandard performance during an evaluation event?

63 

13 Does the operator analyze flight crewmembers' performance during training and evaluation events 

to identify systemic weaknesses in their normal, abnormal and emergency cockpit procedures?

69 

14 Does the operator analyze flight crewmembers' performance during training and evaluation events 

to identify systemic weaknesses in their training and evaluation programs?

68 

15 Does the operator require follow up actions that assure the flight crewmember's performance 

continues to meet applicable standards?

62 

16 Does the operator perform trend analysis for their training and evaluation programs? 53 17 Does the operator require adherence to standard operating procedures to develop positive 

patterns of behavior for those flight crewmembers who have demonstrated substandard performance during training or evaluation events?

78 

18 Does the operator track the time between failures by an individual flight crewmember? 50 19 Does the operator track which phase(s) of training or evaluation that the failure(s) occurred by an 

individual flight crewmember?

65 

20 Does the operator have policies and procedures describing how remedial action(s) will be taken to 

correct deficiencies?

69 

21 Does the operator have a closed loop process that assesses the effectiveness of its corrective 

actions?

55 

Re
Completion of Part II of N 8900.78 by CMT - Data as of 10/05/09

ConDORs

Region Designator Name Completed

AL ERAA ERA AVIATION INC 6

AL FFSA FRONTIER FLYING SERVICE INC 3

AL FXGA TATONDUK OUTFITTERS LTD 4

AL LR7A LYNDEN AIR CARGO L L C 16

AL NACA NORTHERN AIR CARGO INC 0

AL PNSA PENINSULA AIRWAYS INC 7

CE FDEA FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP 26

CE IPXA UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO 80

CE N6WA GOJET AIRLINES LLC 46

CE RAIA TRANS STATES AIRLINES LLC 110

CE REXA PINNACLE AIRLINES INC 47

EA BJ6A NETJETS LARGE AIRCRAFT COMPANY LLC 3

EA C77A COMPASS AIRLINES INC AQP

EA HNAA PIEDMONT AIRLINES INC AQP

EA HYIA HYANNIS AIR SERVICE INC 3

EA JJBA CHAMPLAIN ENTERPRISES INC 29

EA MTNA MOUNTAIN AIR CARGO INC 11

EA NOCA NORTH AMERICAN AIRLINES 33

EA NSVA COLGAN AIR INC 74

EA P5CA POLAR AIR CARGO WORLDWIDE INC 15

EA PIDA PACE AIRLINES INC 8

EA Q2SA SOUTHERN AIR INC 13

EA U30A BRENDAN AIRWAYS LLC 0

EA UIEA ATLAS AIR INC 39

EA USAA US AIRWAYS INC AQP

EA WRNA SKY LEASE I INC 1

EA YENA JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION AQP

GL A6WA AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATION 32

GL ABXA ABX AIR INC 5

GL BUEA AERODYNAMICS INC 8

GL CHQA CHAUTAUQUA AIRLINES INC 48

GL DHLA ASTAR AIR CARGO INC 2

GL GTIA SPIRIT AIRLINES INC 34

GL JRAA RHOADES AVIATION INC 1

GL K11A KALITTA CHARTERS II LLC 1

GL KCSA KALITTA AIR LLC 51

GL MALA MESABA AVIATION INC 72

GL MWEA MIDWEST AIRLINES INC 11

GL R61A REPUBLIC AIRLINES INC 86

GL RYNA RYAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC 6

GL SCNA MN AIRLINES LLC 26

GL U2RA NATIONAL AIR CARGO GROUP INC 27

GL UHLA SHUTTLE AMERICA CORPORATION 44

GL VGCA GULF AND CARIBBEAN CARGO INC 13

GL VNAA PSA AIRLINES INC 28

GL Y2PA USA JET AIRLINES INC 4

NM 3LYA LYNX AVIATION INC 32

NM ASAA ALASKA AIRLINES INC AQP

Appendix 4

8
NM COEA EMPIRE AIRLINES INC 34

NM EIAA EVERGREEN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC 10

NM F3LA FRONTIER AIRLINES INC 64

NM GLBA GREAT LAKES AVIATION LTD 71

NM HSYA CORPORATE AIR 1

NM QXEA HORIZON AIR INDUSTRIES INC 22

NM SWIA SKYWEST AIRLINES INC 439

SO 22AA ARROW AIR INC 25

SO ASOA ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES INC 138

SO C8GA CAPITAL CARGO INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC 16

SO CBRA CARIBBEAN SUN AIRLINES INC 0

SO CLCA CENTURION AIR CARGO INC 23

SO COMA COMAIR INC AQP

SO DALA DELTA AIR LINES INC AQP

SO E93A MERIDIAN ASSOCIATES 1

SO FWTA FLORIDA WEST INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS INC 13

SO GUUA GULFSTREAM INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC 107

SO MYWA MIAMI AIR INTERNATIONAL INC 15

SO NWAA NORTHWEST AIRLINES INC AQP

SO P0TA PRESCOTT SUPPORT CO 1

SO PCSA AMERIJET INTERNATIONAL INC 7

SO S9BA SEABORNE VIRGIN ISLAND INC 13

SO TRBA EXECUTIVE AIRLINES INC 57

SO WRLA WORLD AIRWAYS INC 10

SO YYFA FALCON AIR EXPRESS INC 13

SO ZZDA AIRTRAN AIRWAYS INC 74

SW AALA AMERICAN AIRLINES INC AQP

SW C2XA EXPRESSJET AIRLINES INC 6

SW CALA CONTINENTAL AIRLINES INC AQP

SW CNMA OMNI AIR INTERNATIONAL INC 22

SW FDKA FREEDOM AIRLINES INC 4

SW IXXA AIR TRANSPORT INTERNATIONAL LIMITED LIABILITY CO 0

SW MASA MESA AIRLINES INC 19

SW MJYA AMERISTAR AIR CARGO INC 5

SW MZZA CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA INC AQP

SW SIMA AMERICAN EAGLE AIRLINES INC 41

SW SWAA SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO 12

WP AVSA AVIATION SERVICES LTD 4

WP BJNA TEM ENTERPRISES INC 2

WP HALA HAWAIIAN AIRLINES INC AQP

WP I5EA SWIFT AIR L L C 3

WP I5PA AERO MICRONESIA INC 3

WP KNNA SKY KING INC 2

WP KPVA HAWAII ISLAND AIR INC 8

WP SPAA SIERRA PACIFIC AIRLINES INC 2

WP TSAA AEKO KULA INC AQP

WP UALA UNITED AIR LINES INC AQP

WP VQIA VIRGIN AMERICA INC 17

WP WX0A ALLEGIANT AIR LLC 3

WP XV6A VISION AIRLINES INC 7

Total 2,419

Appendix 4

9
ConDOR Results for Part II of N 8900.78 - Data as of 10/05/09

Element Question Question Text Yes 

4.2.3 1.1. Did the training meet regulatory requirements? 1,677 4.2.3 1.2. Was training accomplished in accordance with the certificate holder's approved training program? 1,593 4.2.3 1.5. Was emergency training adequate and realistic? 1,213 4.2.3 1.6. Was training properly documented? 1,545 4.2.3 1.7. Was there an adequate number of instructors and check airmen? 1,566 4.2.3 1.9. Were the instructors and check airmen trained and knowledgeable in the certificate holder's approved training program? 1,603 4.2.3 5 Were the process measurements for the Training of Flight Crewmembers process effective in identifying problems or potential problems and providing corrective action for them? 1,330 4.2.7 1.3. Were instructors and check airmen proficient in recognizing unexpected student induced emergency situations that may develop during training and checking in an airplane in flight? 683 4.2.7 1.5.

Were instructors and check airmen proficient in performing normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures while conducting airplane training and checks from the left and right pilot seats, as applicable?

630 

4.2.7 1.6. Were instructors and check airmen proficient in performing seat dependent tasks while conducting airplane training and checks from the left and right pilot seats, as applicable? 637 4.2.9 1.1. Was the training provider qualified to perform the contracted training? 96 4.2.9 1.2. Did the training provider meet the required standards? 98 4.2.9 1.3. Did the training provider have adequate qualified staff to provide the contracted training, testing, and checking? 92 

4.2.9 1.5. Was all training provided identical to the certificate holder's approved training program? 94 4.2.9 1.6. Did the training provider's check airmen/designated examiners/approved evaluators use approved testing standards in the conduct of flight checks? 77 

4.2.9 1.7. Were the training provider's records accurate and complete? 108 4.2.9 1.8. Were responsible management personnel made aware of audit results? 77 4.2.9 1.9. Did the certificate holder and the training provider each have a system to detect and report deficiencies in training programs? 104 4.2.9 1.10. Was there an effective interface between the certificate holder and training provider to identify and correct deficiencies in crewmember training procedures and requirements? 98 

4.2.9 1.11.

Did crewmembers (including pilots, flight engineers, and flight attendants) who received outsource training successfully complete all of the required components of the certificate holder's approved training program?

88 
ConDOR "No" Responses for Part II of N 8900.78 - Data as 10/05/09

Region Designator Name Question 

AL FXGA TATONDUK OUTFITTERS LTD Were the process measurements for the Training of Flight Crewmembers process effective in iden

problems or potential problems and providing corrective action for them? 

CE FDEA FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP Was training accomplished in accordance with the certificate holder's approved training program? CE FDEA FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP Did the training meet regulatory requirements? CE FDEA FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP Was emergency training adequate and realistic? CE FDEA FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP Was the proficiency of flight crewmembers evaluated through appropriate testing and checking? CE FDEA FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP Was training properly documented? CE FDEA FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP Were the process measurements for the Training of Flight Crewmembers process effective in iden

problems or potential problems and providing corrective action for them? 

CE RAIA TRANS STATES AIRLINES LLC Was training accomplished in accordance with the certificate holder's approved training program? CE RAIA TRANS STATES AIRLINES LLC Were the instructors and check airmen trained and knowledgeable in the certificate holder's appro

training program? 

CE RAIA TRANS STATES AIRLINES LLC Was training properly documented? CE RAIA TRANS STATES AIRLINES LLC Were instructors and check airmen proficient in performing normal, abnormal, and emergency pro

while conducting airplane training and checks from the left and right pilot seats, as applicable? 

CE RAIA TRANS STATES AIRLINES LLC Was emergency training adequate and realistic? CE RAIA TRANS STATES AIRLINES LLC Was the proficiency of flight crewmembers evaluated through appropriate testing and checking? 

EA NSVA COLGAN AIR INC Did the training meet regulatory requirements? EA NSVA COLGAN AIR INC Was training properly documented? 

EA NSVA COLGAN AIR INC Were instructors and check airmen proficient in performing normal, abnormal, and emergency pro

while conducting airplane training and checks from the left and right pilot seats, as applicable? 

EA NSVA COLGAN AIR INC Were instructors and check airmen proficient in performing seat dependent tasks while conducting airplane training and checks from the left and right pilot seats, as applicable? EA NSVA COLGAN AIR INC Were instructors and check airmen proficient in recognizing unexpected student induced emergen

situations that may develop during training and checking in an airplane in flight? 

EA HYIA HYANNIS AIR SERVICE INC Did the training meet regulatory requirements? EA BJ6A NETJETS LARGE AIRCRAFT COMPANY LLC Was emergency training adequate and realistic? EA NOCA NORTH AMERICAN AIRLINES Was emergency training adequate and realistic? EA NOCA NORTH AMERICAN AIRLINES Was training properly documented? EA NOCA NORTH AMERICAN AIRLINES Were the instructors and check airmen trained and knowledgeable in the certificate holder's appro

training program? 

GL CHQA CHAUTAUQUA AIRLINES INC Were the certificate holder's policies, procedures, instructions, and information for the Airman Duties/Flight Deck Procedures process followed? GL CHQA CHAUTAUQUA AIRLINES INC Were the process measurements for the Airman Duties/Flight Deck Procedures process effective 

identifying problems or potential problems and providing corrective action for them? 

GL CHQA CHAUTAUQUA AIRLINES INC Was the aircraft in an airworthy condition and properly equipped for the route flown? 
GL MALA MESABA AVIATION INC Were instructors and check airmen proficient in performing normal, abnormal, and emergency pro

while conducting airplane training and checks from the left and right pilot seats, as applicable? 

GL MALA MESABA AVIATION INC Were instructors and check airmen proficient in recognizing unexpected student induced emergen

situations that may develop during training and checking in an airplane in flight? 

GL MALA MESABA AVIATION INC Were the process measurements for the Training of Flight Crewmembers process effective in iden

problems or potential problems and providing corrective action for them? 

GL R61A REPUBLIC AIRLINES INC Were the certificate holder's policies, procedures, instructions, and information for the Airman Duties/Flight Deck Procedures process followed? GL R61A REPUBLIC AIRLINES INC

Did crewmembers (including pilots, flight engineers, and flight attendants) who received outsource successfully complete all of the required components of the certificate holder's approved training program?

GL R61A REPUBLIC AIRLINES INC Did the training provider's check airmen/designated examiners/approved evaluators use approved 

standards in the conduct of flight checks? 

GL UHLA SHUTTLE AMERICA CORPORATION Were instructors and check airmen proficient in performing seat dependent tasks while conducting airplane training and checks from the left and right pilot seats, as applicable? GL UHLA SHUTTLE AMERICA CORPORATION Were instructors and check airmen proficient in recognizing unexpected student induced emergen

situations that may develop during training and checking in an airplane in flight? 

GL UHLA SHUTTLE AMERICA CORPORATION Were the certificate holder's policies, procedures, instructions, and information for the Airman Duties/Flight Deck Procedures process followed? 

NM COEA EMPIRE AIRLINES INC Did the certificate holder and the training provider each have a system to detect and report deficie

training programs? 

NM COEA EMPIRE AIRLINES INC Was there an effective interface between the certificate holder and training provider to identify and 

deficiencies in crewmember training procedures and requirements? 

NM COEA EMPIRE AIRLINES INC Were the process measurements for the Training of Flight Crewmembers process effective in iden

problems or potential problems and providing corrective action for them? 

NM COEA EMPIRE AIRLINES INC Did the FO fly the aircraft to the proper touchdown point (centerline, touchdown zone)? NM COEA EMPIRE AIRLINES INC Did the training provider's check airmen/designated examiners/approved evaluators use approved 

standards in the conduct of flight checks? 

NM COEA EMPIRE AIRLINES INC Was all training provided identical to the certificate holder's approved training program? NM EIAA EVERGREEN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC Were instructors and check airmen proficient in performing normal, abnormal, and emergency pro

while conducting airplane training and checks from the left and right pilot seats, as applicable? 

NM 3LYA LYNX AVIATION INC Did the training meet regulatory requirements? NM 3LYA LYNX AVIATION INC Was training accomplished in accordance with the certificate holder's approved training program? NM 3LYA LYNX AVIATION INC Was training properly documented? NM 3LYA LYNX AVIATION INC Were the instructors and check airmen trained and knowledgeable in the certificate holder's appro

training program? 

NM 3LYA LYNX AVIATION INC Were the process measurements for the Training of Flight Crewmembers process effective in iden

problems or potential problems and providing corrective action for them? 

NM SWIA SKYWEST AIRLINES INC Were the process measurements for the Training of Flight Crewmembers process effective in iden

problems or potential problems and providing corrective action for them? 

NM SWIA SKYWEST AIRLINES INC Was training properly documented? NM SWIA SKYWEST AIRLINES INC Did the training meet regulatory requirements? 
NM SWIA SKYWEST AIRLINES INC Were instructors and check airmen proficient in performing normal, abnormal, and emergency pro

while conducting airplane training and checks from the left and right pilot seats, as applicable? 

NM SWIA SKYWEST AIRLINES INC Were instructors and check airmen proficient in performing seat dependent tasks while conducting airplane training and checks from the left and right pilot seats, as applicable? 

NM SWIA SKYWEST AIRLINES INC Were the instructors and check airmen trained and knowledgeable in the certificate holder's appro

training program? 

NM SWIA SKYWEST AIRLINES INC Was emergency training adequate and realistic? NM SWIA SKYWEST AIRLINES INC Was training accomplished in accordance with the certificate holder's approved training program? 

SO 22AA ARROW AIR INC Was there an effective interface between the certificate holder and training provider to identify and 

deficiencies in crewmember training procedures and requirements? 

SO ASOA ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES INC Were the process measurements for the Training of Flight Crewmembers process effective in iden

problems or potential problems and providing corrective action for them? 

SO ASOA ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES INC Was training accomplished in accordance with the certificate holder's approved training program? SO TRBA EXECUTIVE AIRLINES INC

Did crewmembers (including pilots, flight engineers, and flight attendants) who received outsource 

successfully complete all of the required components of the certificate holder's approved training program?

SO TRBA EXECUTIVE AIRLINES INC Did the training provider meet the required standards? SO GUUA GULFSTREAM INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC Was there an adequate number of instructors and check airmen? 

SO S9BA SEABORNE VIRGIN ISLAND INC Was emergency training adequate and realistic? SO S9BA SEABORNE VIRGIN ISLAND INC Were instructors and check airmen proficient in performing normal, abnormal, and emergency pro

while conducting airplane training and checks from the left and right pilot seats, as applicable? 

SW SIMA AMERICAN EAGLE AIRLINES INC Was the airplane properly configured and operated within all limitations of the AFM for each phas

flight? 

SW SIMA AMERICAN EAGLE AIRLINES INC Were the certificate holder's policies, procedures, instructions, and information for the Airman Duties/Flight Deck Procedures process followed? 

SW C2XA EXPRESSJET AIRLINES INC Was training accomplished in accordance with the certificate holder's approved training program? SW C2XA EXPRESSJET AIRLINES INC Were the instructors and check airmen trained and knowledgeable in the certificate holder's appro

training program? 

SW C2XA EXPRESSJET AIRLINES INC Was emergency training adequate and realistic? SW FDKA FREEDOM AIRLINES INC Was training accomplished in accordance with the certificate holder's approved training program? SW SWAA SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO Were the process measurements for the Training of Flight Crewmembers process effective in iden

problems or potential problems and providing corrective action for them? 

SW SWAA SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO Was training accomplished in accordance with the certificate holder's approved training program? WP XV6A VISION AIRLINES INC Was training accomplished in accordance with the certificate holder's approved training program? 
Corrective Action Tracking Tool (CATT) Records for Part II or N 8900.78 - Data as of 10/05/09

Corrective

Region Designator Name Actions

CE RAIA TRANS STATES AIRLINES LLC 2

SO ASOA ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES INC 3

SO GUUA GULFSTREAM INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC 30

Appendix 4

14
Corrective Action Tracking Tool (CATT) Records for Part II or N 8900.78 - Data as of 12/01/09

Corrective

Region Designator Name Actions

CE RAIA TRANS STATES AIRLINES LLC 2

NM 3LYA LYNX AVIATION INC 1

NM COEA EMPIRE AIRLINES INC 3

NM EIAA EVERGREEN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC 1

NM SWIA SKYWEST AIRLINES INC 2

SO ASOA ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES INC 3

SO GUUA GULFSTREAM INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC 30

SW C2XA EXPRESSJET AIRLINES INC 1

Appendix 4

15
Appendix 5 

Training Program Review Guidance 
Distributed by: AFS-200 -- OPR: AFS-210 

SAFO 

Safety Alert for Operators 

U.S. Department SAFO 09-xx 

of Transportation DATE 12-xx-09 

Federal Aviation Flight Standards Service 

Administration Washington, DC 

http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo 

A SAFO contains important safety information and may include recommended action. SAFO content 

should be especially valuable to air carriers in meeting their statutory duty to provide service with the 

highest possible degree of safety in the public interest. Besides the specific action recommended in a 

SAFO, an alternative action may be as effective in addressing the safety issue named in the SAFO. 

SUBJECT: This SAFO provides guidance for structuring 14 CFR part 121 training programs to 

incorporate the tracking of pilots who have low experience levels and pilots who demonstrate 

difficulty in either the training or operational environment. 

Background

Traditional part 121 air carrier training programs need to evolve from simple ground school and 

flight training curriculum segments to more robust scenario-based training. These new training 

programs will require crewmember cooperation and collaboration while managing a complex, 

changing set of situational challenges. The traditional system has been challenged in recent 

years by the entry of lower time flight crewmembers into the system. These new-entry 

crewmembers, along with those crewmembers who have demonstrated sub-standard 

performance, require identification, monitoring, tracking, and mentoring to ensure operations at 

the highest level of safety. 

Notice 8900.78 was published June 24, 2009. This Notice required principal inspectors to 

conduct a focused review of training programs to ensure that air carriers have the capability to 

identify, track, and manage low-time flight crewmembers, as well as those who have failed 

evaluation events and/or demonstrated a repetitive need for additional training 

Discussion

Safety Management Systems (SMS)

To help ensure air carriers maintain the highest possible degree of safety, it is recommended 

carriers employ the use of SMS principles as they build their training programs and systems to 

meet the need of today’s challenging environment. Training programs are an essential element 

of integrating people into system operations. Training is therefore an integral part of a carrier’s 

overall “system” and must be considered in safety management. 

Safety Management Systems (SMS) consist of four components; policy, safety risk management, 

safety assurance, and safety promotion. The policy component sets up the management 

framework, safety risk management and safety assurance are the two highly interactive 

functional processes, and safety promotion both shapes the organization’s culture and supports 

the operation of both safety management and operational functions. 

Appendix 5

1
Distributed by: AFS-200 -- OPR: AFS-210 

Policy. The policy component establishes management’s commitment to safety, 

acceptance of top level accountability and establishment of the accountabilities, 

responsibilities, and authority of other members of the organization, plans for safety 

management, and setting objectives. This is where a safety management system differs 

from a traditional “safety program.” An SMS is a manager’s tool that provides a 

framework for management’s decision making rather than a separate program. As such, 

top and line management decision makers must be personally and directly involved in 

managing safety in their organizations. 

Safety Risk Management (SRM). SRM considers aspects of the system, including 

people (including consideration of the characteristics of the pool of people in the 

organization), hardware (equipment and facilities), software (or “knowledgeware” – this 

may be electronic, print, or visual), and other aspects of the operating environment. This 

knowledge and understanding to identifying hazards in the environment and the things 

that could go wrong in operations and considering the risk involved. The last step in 

SRM is design of risk controls, including organizational processes and procedures. 

SRM consists of five steps: 

• Describe and analyze the systems and tasks 

• Identify hazards 

• Analyze the hazards to identify potential events and their consequences 

• Assess the risk for acceptability 

• Develop and implement risk controls 

Safety Assurance (SA). Safety assurance is the collection of processes that are used to 

gain confidence that the processes that that the organization has designed and put in place 

continue to meet their design standards and that they continue to meet the organization’s 

safety objectives. 

SA also consists of five steps: 

• Monitoring operations 

• Data acquisition (collection – e.g. audits, evaluations, employee reports, 

investigations) 

• System performance analysis 

• System performance assessment 

• Preventive/corrective action 

Safety Promotion (SP). 

The safety promotion component of an SMS has two major elements: 

• Competencies and Training. 

Appendix 5

2
Distributed by: AFS-200 -- OPR: AFS-210 

• Communication 

Each organization must determine the critical job tasks in their operations (this is part of 

the SRM processes) and what competencies are needed to attain and maintain the 

knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to meet those competency requirements. They 

also need to communicate the elements of their policies, their safety objectives, 

information on risk controls developed in the SRM process, and findings of safety the 

safety assurance process. 

Instructional Systems Design

Sophisticated training programs such as the Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) use formal 

Instructional Systems Design (ISD) principles to develop, implement, and validate their training 

programs. However, any size organization can apply ISD techniques to developing their 

organization’s training programs. Moreover, the principles of safety risk management discussed 

above can be applied to the ISD process to assure that risk management is designed into the 

training that is delivered to employees. Once designed, the safety assurance processes would be 

used to assure that training quality is maintained and that the training program continues to meet 

the organization’s needs in line operations. 

These processes are particularly important for managing change, such as growth of operations, 

acquisition of new aircraft makes and models, operating in new environments, changes in 

demographics of new hires, changes in procedures, or corporate reorganization. Assuring that 

employees’ training matches their capabilities, the characteristics of the organization’s 

equipment, and the way that the organization is run is crucial to safety. 

A commonly used ISD process, the “ADDIE” model, also has five steps: 

• Analyze: Use the safety critical job tasks, competencies and the target audience 

characteristics (education, certification, language, etc) to determine the training that will 

be necessary. 

• Design: Consider training tasks, qualification standards, courseware, etc. 

• Develop: Consider the Training Medium, Lessons, Exercises, Activities, Tests, 

Evaluations, etc. 

• Implement: This is the Safety Assurance (SA) component of the SMS. It should monitor 

the effectiveness of the training program, through things like training delivery 

(performance assessments), records, testing, qualification demonstrations, etc 

• Evaluate: This is also a Safety Assurance (SA) component of the SMS. It should assess 

the effectiveness of the training program, through things like Student evaluations & 

critiques, instructor critiques, On-the-Job-Training (OJT), performance observations of 

trained personnel, etc. 

The Training System

The training system is developed by matching ISD principles with the principles of SRM and 

SA, the two active components of safety management. 

Appendix 5

3
Distributed by: AFS-200 -- OPR: AFS-210 

ISD Component Related Safety Management Activities 

Analyze System/Task Design (SRM) 

• Identify characteristics of equipment and operational environment 

(SRM) 

• Identify and document needed employee competencies (SRM, SP) 

• Describe target audience characteristics (SP - e.g. existing 

knowledge, skill, experience level, language capability) 

Design Design training tasks 

• Match tasks to critical equipment, environment, and personnel 

characteristics (SRM – this may entail interaction or research with 

aircraft OEMs and/or experienced training agencies) 

• Develop qualification standards (SP – required level of competency) 

Develop Develop Courseware and Training Profiles (be sure to match training and 

evaluation events with criticality of tasks (SRM) and required competency 

levels (SP) as well as with expected existing employee knowledge, training, 

and experience levels. 

Implement Monitor the implementation of the program (SA). 

• Make sure that the program that’s being practiced is the one that was 

designed 

Evaluate Evaluate SA: 

• Trainee performance 

• Trainee acceptance of training events 

• Trainee on the job performance 

Both ISD and safety management are continuous, closed loop processes. Organizations should 

use the tools of SA (e.g. audits, employee reports, data sharing with OEMs, other operators, and 

training agencies) to continuously evaluate and improve the training program. Use the SA and 

SRM processes, as well as the SA process to continuously improve the training program and 

assure that it continues to be relevant and contributes to control of identified hazards. Neither 

ISD nor safety management are ever “done” as aviation is a dynamic industry and healthy 

organizations should always strive for growth in the maturity of their safety management 

processes, as well as their businesses. 

Advisory Circular 120-92, Introduction to Safety Management Systems for Air Operators, issued 

June 22, 2006, provides guidance for developing safety management systems in the air carrier 

environment. 

Recommended action: Chief Operating Officers, Directors of safety, directors of operations, 

directors of training, and chief pilots responsible for FAA approved flight crewmember training 

programs should be familiar with the content of this SAFO and AC 120-92. The FAA expects 

each carrier to carefully review its training programs to ensure that SMS principles are 

incorporated in their air carrier training programs. Pilot training programs must include a 

specific system for tracking the performance of low time/low experience pilots as well as those 

pilots who demonstrate sub-standard performance in the training or operational arena. Failure to 

include SMS principles in existing training programs constitutes a safety risk and will be 

considered in Flight Standards’ oversight planning. 

Appendix 5

4
Appendix 6 

Air Carrier Commitments 
800 Independence Ave, SW 

Washington, DC 20591 

Dear Air Carrier: 

At the June 15 Call to Action on Airline Safety and Pilot Training, the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) worked with major and regional carriers and pilots to seek 

common strategies for reducing risk. 

As a result of this meeting, the FAA has made the creation of a new flight and rest rule 

based on fatigue science a high priority, with an aggressive timeline. In addition, FAA 

will review pilot training requirements in light of the changes in airline pilot entry level 

demographics, with emphasis on scenario based training and operations beyond normal 

flight profiles. Principal operations inspectors for each carrier will conduct a special 

review of air carriers’ training and checking programs by the end of the fiscal year. This 

effort will also include a review of air carrier procedures for identifying and tracking 

pilots who fail often or who repeatedly require additional training. 

Another purpose of the meeting was to identify initiatives that operators can immediately 

and voluntarily incorporate into their operations. I am writing to outline the areas 

recommended by industry participants in the Call to Action meeting and to request that 

you affirm, in writing to me by July 31, your company’s commitment to adhere to the 

highest professional standards. I would like to hear from you with specific commitments 

on these key topics: 

• Pilot Records: While FAA pursues appropriate modifications to the Pilot Records 

Improvement Act of 1996 (PRIA), and amends Advisory Circular 120-68D, I ask that 

air carriers immediately implement a policy of asking pilot applicants for voluntary 

disclosure of FAA records, including notices of disapproval for evaluation events. 

You can find a copy of Advisory Circular 120-68D at 

http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.list

• FOQA and ASAP: I ask that air carriers who have not done so establish flight 

operations quality assurance (FOQA) and Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) 

programs, and develop data analysis processes to ensure effective use of this 

information. 

• Contract Provisions: I ask that those carriers who have contract provisions with 

regional, “feeder” partner companies seek specific and concrete ways to ensure that 

the partner carriers adopt and implement the most effective practices for safety. For 

Appendix 6

1
those regional carriers that implement FOQA and ASAP programs, we ask that major 

airlines have periodic meetings with their feeder airlines to review the data and to 

constantly emphasize their shared safety philosophy. 

As noted at the outset in our Call to Action meeting, cooperative efforts have enabled us to 

achieve one of the safest periods in aviation history. Indeed, history has shown that we 

implement safety improvements far more quickly and effectively when we work together to 

find solutions to the challenges we face in today’s aviation environment. 

I look forward to receiving your written commitment to implementing these voluntary 

measures at the earliest opportunity. 

Sincerely, 

J. Randolph Babbitt 

Administrator 

Enclosures 

Appendix 6

2
LIST OF NON RESPONDENTS: 22

AERO MICRONESIA INC 

AIR TRANSPORT INTERNATIONAL LIMITED LIABILITY CO 

AMERISTAR AIR CARGO INC 

AVIATION SERVICES LTD 

CAPITAL CARGO INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES INC 

CARIBBEAN SUN AIRLINES INC 

CENTURION AIR CARGO INC 

GEMINI AIR CARGO INC 

LYNDEN AIR CARGO L L C 

LYNX AIR INTERNATIONAL INC 

MERIDIAN ASSOCIATES 

NATIONAL AIR CARGO GROUP INC 

NETJETS LARGE AIRCRAFT COMPANY LLC 

PACE AIRLINES INC 

PRESCOTT SUPPORT CO 

PRIMARIS AIRLINES INC 

RHOADES AVIATION INC 

SKY KING INC 

SKY LEASE I INC 

SWIFT AIR L L C 

TATONDUK OUTFITTERS LTD 

TEM ENTERPRISES INC 

NOTE: 

1. Operators noted in red are those no longer holding a Part 121 operating 

certificate.

2. Operators noted in BOLD did not respond to the FAA's Call to Action letter, but 

have a FAA-approved ASAP program in place. 

Appendix 6

3
Appendix 7 

Pilot Employee Organization Commitments 
800 Independence Ave, SW 

Washington, DC 20591 

Dear Union Colleague: 

At the June 15 Call to Action on Airline Safety and Pilot Training, the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) worked with major and regional carriers, pilots from those 

carriers, and pilot unions representing those pilots to seek common strategies for reducing 

risk. 

As a result of this meeting, the FAA has made the creation of a new flight and rest rule 

based on fatigue science a high priority, with an aggressive timeline. In addition, FAA 

will review pilot training requirements in light of the changes in airline pilot entry level 

demographics, with emphasis on scenario based training and operations beyond normal 

flight profiles. Principal operations inspectors for each carrier will conduct a special 

review of every part 121 carrier’s training and checking program by the end of the fiscal 

year. This effort will also include a review of air carrier procedures for identifying and 

tracking pilots who fail often or who repeatedly require additional training. 

Another purpose of the meeting was to identify initiatives on areas that operators can 

voluntarily incorporate. I have written to all part 121 air carriers and asked them to 

submit, in writing to me, their commitment to adhere to the highest professional 

standards. I asked them for specific commitments as follows on these key topics: 

• Pilot Records: While FAA pursues appropriate modifications to the Pilot Records 

Improvement Act of 1996 (PRIA), and amends Advisory Circular 120-68D, I asked 

air carriers to implement a policy of asking pilot applicants for voluntary disclosure 

of FAA records, including notices of disapproval for evaluation events. 

• FOQA and ASAP: I asked air carriers who have not done so to establish flight 

operations quality assurance (FOQA) and Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) 

programs and develop data analysis processes to ensure effective use of this 

information. 

• Contract Provisions: I also encouraged air carriers who have contract provisions 

with regional, “feeder” partner companies to seek specific and concrete ways to 

ensure that the partner carriers adopt and implement the most effective practices for 

safety. For those regional carriers that implement FOQA and ASAP programs, we 

asked that major airlines have periodic meetings with their feeder airlines to review 

the data and to constantly emphasize their shared safety philosophy. 

Appendix 7

1
I am asking you to work with your local unions at all the airlines to achieve similar 

commitments. I ask that you affirm in writing by July 31 that they have committed to 

adhering to the highest professional standards. I would like to hear from you with 

specific commitments in these areas: 

• Establish and support professional standards and ethics committees to develop peer 

audit and review procedures, and to elevate ethics and professional standards. 

• Establish and publish a code of ethics that includes expectations for professional 

behavior, standards of conduct for professional appearance, and overall fitness to fly. 

• Support periodic safety risk management meetings between FAA and mainline and 

regional carriers to promote the most effective practices, including periodic analysis 

of FOQA and ASAP data with an emphasis on identifying enhancements to the 

training program. 

As noted at the outset in our Call to Action meeting, cooperative efforts have enabled us to 

achieve one of the safest periods in aviation history. Indeed, history has shown that we 

implement safety improvements far more quickly and effectively when we work together to 

find solutions to the challenges we face in today’s aviation environment. 

I ask you to join with operators and the FAA in cooperating on this unprecedented effort. 

Sincerely, 

J. Randolph Babbitt 

Administrator 

Enclosures 

Appendix 7

2
Pilot Union Responses 

ASSOCIATION Response 

US Airline Pilots Association Yes 

Teamsters Local Union No. 747 Yes 

Air Line Pilots Association, International Yes 

Southwest Airlines Pilots Association Yes 

Coalition of Air Line Pilot Associations Yes 

Allied Pilots Association Yes 

Independent Pilots Association Yes 

Appendix 7

3
Appendix 8 

Regional Safety Forums 
Appendix 8

1
Safety Forum 

on 

AIRLINE SAFETY AND PILOT TRAINING 

Cities and Dates 

Registration Website URL: 

www.faa.gov/news/conferences_events/2009_safety_forums_on_airline_safety_and_pilot_training/

Date City 

July 21 Washington DC 

July 30 Dallas / Fort Worth 

July 30 Chicago 

August 4 Seattle 

August 6 Minneapolis / St. Paul 

August 6 Atlanta 

August 6 Anchorage 

August 20 Miami / Fort Lauderdale 

August 20 Denver 

August 21 St. Louis 

August 27 Las Vegas 

August 27 Boston 

Feedback / Idea URL: https://partners.mitre.org/sites/CallToAction/default.aspx

Appendix 8

3
Safety Forum 

on 

AIRLINE SAFETY AND PILOT TRAINING 

July 21, 2009 

Location: Holiday Inn Capitol, Washington, DC 

8:30 WELCOME & INTRODUCTIONS 

John Allen, FAA 

Team Lead, Industry 

Team Lead, Union 

9:00 CALL TO ACTION 

• Genesis of Call to Action Meeting 

• Outcomes and Action Plan 

• Focus Areas + Any Additional Topics 

9:45 BREAK 

10:00 DISCUSSION – MOST EFFECTIVE PRACTICES 

10:00-10:30 • Air carrier management responsibilities for crew education & support 

10:30-11:00 • Training standards and performance 

11:00-12:00 • L U N C H 

12:00-12:30 • Professional standards and flight discipline 

12:30-13:00 • Mentoring 

13:00 SUMMARY & NEXT STEPS 

• Website URL for Feedback and Additional Ideas 

o https://partners.mitre.org/sites/CallToAction/default.aspx 

On June 15, the FAA hosted a "Call to Action" for industry and FAA to jointly 

identify a few key initiatives regarding pilot training, cockpit discipline and other 

areas that can be voluntarily incorporated by operators. We are holding 12 

regional meetings to share ideas developed at the Call to Action, discuss how to 

implement them, and seek additional ideas. This collaboration web site has been 

established to share key source material and to provide a way for the aviation 

community to submit additional comments, issues, and ideas that will move this 

topic forward. 

14:00 CLOSEOUT

Appendix 8

4
Safety Forum on Airline Safety and Pilot Training 

Brainstorming Questions 

Topic 1: Air Carrier Management Responsibilities for Crew Education & Support 

Screening & Hiring 

• How does management identify those who will become successful professionals? 

• Should we use aptitude or other testing to evaluate applicants? 

• What should be considered in performance assessments before you hire a pilot? 

Once the pilot is an employee? 

Training 

• What are some “best practices” for crew education and training programs? 

• Do training programs have the flexibility to address trainees with significant 

differences in initial levels of experience? 

• Do you provide leadership or command training to your flight crews? If so, how? 

Seasoning 

• What practices do you employ to facilitate the maturation of less experienced 

flight crew members? 

• What standards do you use to pair crewmembers? 

• Additional items/areas to address current pilot experience level as compared to 

the level of experience available in the past? 

Safety Culture 

• How do you promote corporate safety culture through training programs? 

• How do you keep safety issues separated from industrial issues? 

• Do management and labor groups work together? 

1 

Appendix 8

5
Safety Forum on Airline Safety and Pilot Training 

Brainstorming Questions 

Topic 2: Training Standards & Performance 

Initial training 

• How can pilot training be tailored to pilot experience? (Train to proficiency) 

• What items should be included in a training program to supplement practical 

experience? 

Performance monitoring 

• How is your pilot training and operational performance monitored to identify and 

correct potential deficiencies? 

Dealing with repeat failures 

• How are repeat training failures addressed in your training program? 

Topic 3: Professional Standards & Flight Discipline 

Corporate & labor expectations 

• Do you have clear corporate expectations for professional behavior? 

• What are critical items need to be taught might be overlooked, or difficult to 

quantify? 

Communicating & demonstrating expectations 

• Do you have a professional standards committee? If so, what makes it effective? 

• Do labor groups have programs in place to promote professionalism and 

accountability among their members? 

Oversight (beyond formal events) 

• How do you communicate “professional accountability” to your flight crews? 

• How do you demonstrate the importance of professional behavior? 

Topic 4: Mentoring 

• What are the key features of a mentoring program? 

• Is there a mentoring program between the mainline carrier and its partner airlines? 

• Is there a structured relationship between pilot groups of the mainline carrier and 

the partner airlines? 

2 

Appendix 8

6
Anchorage, Alaska 

August 6, 2009 

Topic 1: Air Carrier Management Responsibilities for Crew Education & Support 

Safety Culture

Create a strong safety program. The “Wife and baby rule” was shared as a way to 

improve personal safety. If you wouldn’t take the wife and baby on the flight, don’t go. 

Safety leaders, especially in the 135 segment, need to practice what they preach because 

everyone in the company is watching. One larger operator described its practice of 

weekly safety meetings where the appropriate managers always attend, but line pilots are 

rotated through so all have a change to participate. The operator detected some 1,100 

safety issues and tries to pace mitigation with the rate of new findings so they don’t get 

behind. Another participant noted that there is a need to shift the culture away from 

seeing the ace of the base as the guy who can get into the worst airport in the worst 

weather. A commenter noted that it is not helpful to point fingers at pilots after an 

accident without looking at management accountability for the safety culture. 

Communication. When one operator has an accident, all suffer. Sharing information is 

crucial. Several commenters noted that while they compete with each other, they are 

eager to share information from accidents and incidents. Everyone is a link in the chain. 

Sharing information with all employee groups across the company (pilot groups of 

different fleets, mechanics) even when the issue may not directly affect the group, keeps 

the safety message in front of employees. Sharing issues and solutions between mainline 

and partner carriers was suggested by both parties as an important safety initiative. 

The first winter. Several participants noted that getting new pilots through the first winter 

was a key to building safety. Good habits need to be reinforced during this time. 

ASAP. One commenter noted that while ASAP is seen as a helpful program, 

management needs to protect participants so the flow of information keeps coming. 

Graduated risks. One operator described their procedure for designating crews as red, 

yellow or green based on their experience and demonstrated skill. Airports served are 

also designated by these colors, so only a red crew (the most qualified) is assigned flights 

into red airports (the highest risk). 

Medallion Program. Throughout the discussion, participants noted benefits from the 

Medallion Program. These included access to lower cost insurance through higher safety 

standards, the Super Cub simulator available through the program, training opportunities 

available through other simulators and training devices and information sharing. 

Screening & Hiring

Screening. Objective evidence of experience is more important than a failed private pilot 

check ride. Having line pilots involved in the screening, or even a hiring board of senior 

captains, was suggested as a quality screen. 

ANC-1 

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Anchorage, Alaska 

August 6, 2009 

Employment recommendations. There was much discussion but no consensus about how 

to weight letters of recommendation into the hiring process. There was agreement that 

some filter should be present to preclude the use of a “buddy system” for a captain 

recommending for employment pilots who were simply friends. 

Use of first officers in single pilot operations. At least two operators of single engine 

turboprop aircraft described their success in assigning new pilots to a first officer role 

until they gained suitable experience. In one case, the operator required this assignment 

until the new pilot had acquired 1,000 hours of total time before the pilot would be 

considered for a more demanding assignment. 

Willingness to learn. This was seen as a key ingredient to success. 

Training

Stick and rudder skills. Stick and rudder skills were seen as of paramount importance in 

Alaska, even through large multiengine propeller and turbojet aircraft. One commenter 

stated that it was easier to turn a bush pilot into an airline pilot than the reverse. The 

Buffalo accident was seen as an elementary mistake in airmanship that shows the 

importance of basic skills. 

Professional Development 

Developing experience. Participants had strong opinions concerning the need for 

seasoning their crews. An approach used by several mid-sized operators was a structured 

progression from first officer in small equipment to captain in similar equipment, then 

back to first officer in more challenging equipment or conditions. The differences 

between flying in the lower 48 and Alaska were a common theme, along with the need to 

have significant Alaskan experience before tackling difficult weather or airports. 

Topic 2: Training Standards & Performance 

Initial training

Train as you fly, fly as you train. Participants stressed the need to train for the unique and 

changeable Alaskan weather and geographic conditions. One carrier stated its philosophy 

as, “Every approach is a miss, every miss is a hold and every hold is a divert.” Once 

pilots complete training, they should fly the line under training supervision to ensure they 

fly the way they were trained and don’t pick up bad habits. There is also a need to teach 

judgment, including when to turn around. Simulators are a good solution. 

Lack of simulators and simulator fidelity with Alaskan conditions. One participant noted 

that accessing simulators is difficult for Alaskan operators because of the need to travel to 

the lower 48. They also noted that simulators do not faithfully duplicate Alaskan weather 

and airports. Also noted were limitations placed by the FAA on training credit between 

flight training devices and simulators. 

ANC-2 

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Anchorage, Alaska 

August 6, 2009 

Competing demands. An operator asked how you balance between what you want and 

what you can afford. Also mentioned was the choice between hiring a pilot who will do 

anything to get a job versus the candidate who might need a little work on something, but 

brings more to the table. 

IOE. One commenter noted that no one ever completed IOE in the minimum time. 

While it was seen as easy to pass a type ride, getting through IOE was the real challenge. 

Performance monitoring 

Alaskan environment. Because lower 48 style flying, such as radar vectors to final which 

are rare in Alaska, is so different, new pilots in Alaska need increased support in their 

early months. One commenter felt this was an important FAA responsibility. 

Look for common traps. Operators should expect that when things get busy, CRM and 

procedures can be compromised. Captains should watch for FOs not following 

established procedures because it can show they’ve picked up bad habits from other 

captains. 

Dealing with repeat failures 

See failures in perspective. A good training program with high standards will have 

occasional failures. Good pilots will sometimes stub their toe on a bad day. A repeat 

failure doesn’t necessarily mean someone should be fired. 

HR law and practice. This can be a barrier to taking on problems. Guidelines may be 

needed from the FAA. 

Topic 3: Professional Standards & Flight Discipline 

Corporate & labor expectations

Personal ownership. Pilots are reluctant to complain about another pilot if it will cost the 

other pilot their job. Fitness for duty is a big issue. It’s the pilot’s responsibility to show 

up for work rested. Participants said that regulating rest during rest runs a risk if the 

burden is only on the company. Another commenter noted that if you require less flight 

time in a month, it will just provide more time for the second job. 

Drawing conclusions. When you see first officers deviate from company standards more 

than once or twice, it probably says much more about your captains and how they fly. 

Communicating, demonstrating, and ensuring appropriate behavior 

Consider new approaches. Are check airmen looking outside line checks and are they 

always evaluating, even when they’re on the line? 

ANC-3 

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Anchorage, Alaska 

August 6, 2009 

Cost. Directly or indirectly, the issue of how to pay for new rules was asked. Another 

concern was the negative effect on Alaskan operators of rules best suited to the lower 48. 

Management role. Management is responsible for ensuring appropriate behavior. Alaska 

was seen as different that the rest of the country in that in Alaska, operator management 

tends to come from the pilot ranks. 

FAA role. The FAA was seen as going after pilots and not management. Rules are made 

for the minority, the bad apples. Drug testing programs were used as an example. 

Crewmember role. Why do people say, “I knew this bad thing was going to happen” but 

not say anything beforehand. Crewmembers need to be accountable. A just culture 

would allow a junior FO to go directly to the violating pilot without fear of retribution. 

Ethics. Safety is linked to ethics. One commenter said that if we all had ethics, we 

wouldn’t need unions. Ethics was seen as doing the right thing without fear of 

retribution. When management uses FOQA data in disciplinary hearings, it hurts safety. 

Topic 4: Mentoring 

Mainline / Partner Relationships

Information sharing. The value of information sharing came up repeatedly during the 

forum. Two versions were shared; one is between mainline and partner carriers and the 

other is between competing carriers. In the later case, operators were very free about 

setting aside competitive concerns in favor of sharing information about bad conditions, 

airport issues and other hazards. Blogs and social networking were suggested as media 

for these exchanges. Hangar flying was also seen as helpful. 

Pilot-to-Pilot Relationships 

Accountability. Bad habits are easier to pick up than good ones. Pilots need to be 

accountable to their peers to show them their bad habits. We should expect high 

standards from our co-workers. 

Benchmarking 

No comments on this topic. 

Academic Program Contacts

Get the message out. Most requests from university programs for guest speakers on 

mentoring come to large operators. Universities should talk to the smaller operators too. 

ANC-4 

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Anchorage, Alaska 

August 6, 2009 

Ideas for Further Exploration (Not discussed in detail)

• Several comments were received suggesting the need for representatives of university 

flight programs and large training organizations to participate in the safety forums. 

• FAA should talk to DOT to disseminate information from other than part 139 airports 

for supplemental operations. The missing information limits dispatch. 

• One participant said that of the four elements of their business (safety, compliance, 

comfortable flights and making money), federal money is needed for unfunded 

mandates and unrealistic federal standards. An example given was that simply 

lengthening runways has an unintended safety affect, because of the increased cost of 

plowing the longer runway. A good 2,500 foot runway is better than a 3,300 foot 

runway that a village can’t maintain. 

• A few participants said the FAA should conduct a public image campaign to improve 

the public perception of the industry. 

• The mentoring discussion bridged into what was felt to be a need for industry to reach 

out beyond just the university programs. In Alaska, this means talking to kids at 

remote villages. An example from Australia was given as a model. 

• Fatigue was not an agenda item, but it did receive occasional comments, including 

that it is the biggest safety issue out there. Several commenters noted the small 

operator in Alaska should not be held to the same standards as an international 

carrier. Cutting a pilot’s hours from 1,000 month during the summer to 800 is not a 

solution. Don’t use one accident to create new problems. 

• Some commenters urged restoration of the Medallion Program funding. 

• If a similar call to action or safety forum is held in the future, there was a strong 

preference for a separate part 121 and part 135 meeting. 

ANC-5 

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Atlanta, Georgia 

August 6, 2009 

Topic 1: Air Carrier Management Responsibilities for Crew Education & Support 

Screening & Hiring

One participant noted that during his military career, mandatory Quarterly Safety 

Meetings included a “There I Was,” section that shared information and data with the rest 

of the organization. Lessons Learned sessions also shared various topics. There is not 

enough emphasis on circulating information; NTSB should be able to share information 

without the threat of being sued/enforced to death – protection like the ASAP Program. 

Lessons learned are viable – are you inviting your Central Flight Operations people to 

meetings? Need to invite Safety Ops to meetings. 

Another participant stated that he uses the NTSB Accident website, as well as the NTSB 

cases from legal – you can research a rule in FAA Rules, with legal documentation 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). There is a wealth of information out there, 

including in ASAP and ASIAS. 

Some expressed concern about better screening of new entrants and ensuring that quality 

people are hired, as well as ways to address issues arising from hiring the wrong person. 

The industry should justify a “livable wage.” Some of our young graduates are taking 

positions outside of aviation, based upon salary for IT positions, etc. Wage scales are not 

nominal for aviation, as they are for other fields. It takes years to achieve what they can 

receive upon entry at other occupations. Foreign carriers get young talent early on. 

Industry should increase training in large/small schools for younger people. Professional 

skills taught early on – seek the young talent early. 

Another participant observed that the industry needs the ability to achieve a more 

standardized way of training, and also to hire pilots who can make good decisions – not 

just fly airplanes. There is a need to bring back the notion of pilot “in command;” along 

with company support for the captain’s authority. 

Training 

Several participants supported the idea of teaching professional development in flight 

schools, and conducing simulator evaluations to ensure that potential pilots know the 

basics of aviation. In this connection, a participant expressed interest in having more 

input into aviation college curricula, and seeing industry representatives serve on aviation 

university boards. One company noted that it already has participation with flight 

schools, who are anxious to know the 135/121 world and to understand how we operate 

our aircraft. This participating and information sharing enhances the screening process, 

and the carrier has found that the school’s applicants are well prepared. 

Another point of discussion was the different generation of pilots, and how they differ 

from “legacy pilots.” 

ATL-1 

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Atlanta, Georgia 

August 6, 2009 

Safety Culture 

A carrier representative noted that each carrier has nuances/leadership style that can make 

it difficult to standardize all air carriers. The key may be to adapt/apply what you know; 

integrate where you are. You may have to adapt to a style. With respect to SMS, the 

leadership must understand what you’re trying to do. Another stressed the need for 

proactive safety goals, as opposed to “reactive” safety goals. 

Another participant suggested that check airmen must be more proactive in promoting 

ideas consistent with a good safety culture. In one of his experiences, the co-pilot did 

checks – crew change on the airline – 0000 on the transponder – meant that the clearance 

had not yet been received. 

A major carrier representative noted the importance of having people on call for major 

events, ensuring that management can meet with crew right after any event. There should 

be detailed ASAP Safety Reports to make crews aware of issues and help them learn 

from others. The carrier supports management training on safety culture, and promotes 

the concept of a Flight Operations Review Board and Training Committees to help 

distinguish between training and organizational problems. There should also be a review 

of manuals, bulletins, and the training program. The representative acknowledged that 

cost is an issue in a competitive environment; there are always financial challenges to 

safety of industry. 

A participant suggested requesting bulletins for pilots to review regarding an incident, 

and noted that air carrier management and labor leadership have a responsibility to make 

sure everyone is informed. If an employee demonstrates less than a professional attitude, 

that leadership must act in a responsible, professional manner, and push the message that 

every single pilot must be accountable. As another noted, safety culture is first in leading 

an airline, and it includes continuous improvement. The core idea is that every person 

has the ability to stop the airline to improve safety, and it is up to management to provide 

incentives for ideas and for people to come forward. There is often too much concern 

about litigation. 

Topic 2: Training Standards & Performance 

One carrier representative stressed the need to train pilots to a combination of factors, 

starting with the specific requirements of aircraft but also including route structure and 

other ways to ensure that pilots are trained to fit the operation. This goal means 

performing a gap analysis to determine what should be included in training, and how to 

create custom training programs that meet specific needs. Though it requires a 

significant initial outlay in time and money, AQP is very effective. As another 

participant noted, air carriers must bridge the training gap “or congress will do it for us.” 

ATL-2 

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Atlanta, Georgia 

August 6, 2009 

Another participant supported this idea, stressing that quality of flight time is more 

important than quantity: “brains are not issued with seniority,” and it can sometimes be 

better to have a 300 hour pilot than a senior pilot. 

Other training ideas included cross-training (mainline to regional), where the two carriers 

develop programs jointly as equals; more scenario-based training that includes experience 

and action in difficult environments, and the need to ensure that operational information 

gets reported and built into the carrier’s training program. Several promoted the 

importance of Training Review Boards to track pilot performance and help feed lessons 

learned into the ongoing training program. 

On AQP, some observed that there is a strong difference between an AQP initial program 

and a proven long-term AQP program. Those seeking to adopt AQP, or AQP practices, 

should look at a proven program and learn from it. Some carriers in the AQP program 

meet on a regular basis to share AQP experiences, which is an effective practice that 

helps fleet captains and line check airmen. 

With regard to leadership and upgrades, participants noted the need to incorporate 

leadership training at early stages of a pilot’s career. 

Another training topic was airmanship versus automation. Automation is great slave; but 

a lousy master. Need solid evaluation process. Training should be basic airmanship; 

participants supported the concept of “Aviation 101.” 

With respect to addressing pilot performance issues, “train to proficiency” with 

appropriate monitoring – especially for a pilot who has shown deficiencies – is critical. 

One carrier deals with repeat failures by having various members meet with the pilot and 

review his/her history in order to set boundaries and expectations. 

Participants stressed the need to focus on training that brings about a real behavioral 

change, and addresses the problem rather than the symptom. One carrier noted 

weaknesses in communication and planning skills, which are important in a crew 

environment. These problems can be addressed by training that includes line-oriented and 

situational training and incorporates most effective practices. Another effective practice 

is to require new hires – and, in some cases, new check airmen -- to ride the jump seat for 

10 hours to observe and learn. 

Topic 3: Professional Standards & Flight Discipline 

Professional standards need to look at the Code of Ethics. We need to be professional 

pilots, e.g., in the areas of alcohol abuse, appearance and conducting ones behavior. We 

need to police ourselves as leaders. Airline captains need to be captains. In the regional 

world, you don’t have a 10 year mentoring period; it depends on the hiring cycle. Most 

of the military pilots go directly to the bigger airlines. This is a disadvantage to the 

regional carriers. 

ATL-3 

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Atlanta, Georgia 

August 6, 2009 

Many participants stressed the need to include professional development skills/attributes 

early on, starting with aviation universities and flight schools. Professional development 

should demonstrate work ethic. Most believed that a strong Professional Standards 

Committee could have a great deal of influence. As a manager for 32 years, one 

participant dealt with many individuals who set bad practices. Committee was mostly a 

repair organization. With a proactive approach the committee could do a great deal with 

this. Code of Ethics should be placed in the forefront, and captains should help “enforce” 

by setting the example in terms of appearance, conduct. There must also be emphasis on 

communicating expectations and demanding proper behavior. 

Topic 4: Mentoring 

Participants observed that mentoring can be airline-to-airline, or crew member-to-crew 

member. It is important to recognize that it must be a two-way street, and to choose 

carefully who does the mentoring. Another idea of transfer of information / experience is 

to develop safety information pamphlets to ensure that great ideas get to line pilots. Jump 

seat riding and “cross-observation” are useful as well, and provide “benchmarking” 

opportunities. Some noted, however, that TSA restrictions on access to cockpits are a 

barrier to mentoring. 

Participants mentioned the need to start this process early on, as a means of evaluating, 

correcting, and (if necessary) eliminating some. There was also mention of university 

programs that could benefit from airline-to-university mentoring. 

With respect to pilot to pilot relationships, some participants lamented the level of 

“infighting,” especially with respect to a conception of big guys versus little guys. 

ALPA Professional Standards Committees could have a great deal of influence here, and 

help ensure that professionalism and Code of Ethics are key pieces in the process of 

mentoring. 

Miscellaneous 

There is one item that we are totally overlooking here today. Pilot pushing, fatigued, 

calls Chief Pilot, Chief Pilot concerned about fee for departure, asks, how tired are you? 

Go to log book, how many times can you deferred maintenance on a broken part until 

you say “I’m not taking that plane!” We want to get the passenger where they want to 

go. Pilot wants to do the safe thing. Instead of being asked how tired or you, how broke 

is the plane? Look at the pilot’s perception; it looks like putting pilot into a position 

where he is over his head, out of his element. 

ATL-4 

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Boston, MA 

August 27, 2009 

Screening and Training 

• PRIA information requests made to the FAA are time consuming, especially when an 

air carrier has a large volume of applicants. 

• Air carrier management should take responsibility for crewmember education and 

support. 

• Pilot training at a minimum is adequate training; however, there is a need for more 

enhanced training for inadvertent situations. For example, during unusual attitudes 

training pilots should be trained in a more aggressive, almost aerobatic, manner as a 

way to recover from this situation. At the present time the FAA regulations do not 

require this type of inadvertent situation (upset) training. 

• Suggestion was made to allow for the original training forms that instructors make 

notes and comments on, to be made available to allow for better monitoring of pilot 

training as it is being conducted. Would be especially helpful for low-time pilots but 

would probably require new FAA guidance. 

• Comment was made about wanting to see a system that would allow for the FAA, 

when requested, to provide an operator with information related to a pilot failing to 

pass a check ride (private, commercial, ATP). The present system the FAA has in 

place right now is not able to generate that kind of specific information to an operator. 

• The idea of requiring random CVR monitoring was discussed and dismissed due to 

privacy concerns. 

• Suggestion was put forward to require all pilots that demonstrate proficiency 

problems during training and checking to undergo more frequent surveillance by the 

operator and the FAA. 

• A captain stated that he is receiving from his company less training time now when 

he did nine years ago when he was hired. He felt this was because of the use of an 

AQP program at the company, which reduces the amount of sims he gets. He 

suggested that the same levels of training and safety should be applied to both majors 

and regionals. 

Fatigue 

• Thoughts on a “fatigue policy” were discussed and the idea that pilots with fatigue 

issues should be able to bypass the chief pilot and report directly to the company 

safety officer for resolution was suggested as a way to avoid the fear of potential 

disciplinary action against the pilot. Currently there is nothing to address fatigue 

before you begin the trip. 

BOS-1 

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Boston, MA 

August 27, 2009 

• It was noted that the way the regulation pertaining to rest requirements is written 

“stand up overnights” are within the guidelines of the regulation. The pilots would 

like to see some regulatory guidance that would make this practice illegal. 

• With regard to the meetings taking place to revise the present regulations relating to 

flight and duty time requirements the question was asked as to what sort of specific 

numbers are being proposed for the new regulation? The answer: cannot comment 

on the specifics of what is being discussed because it is a work in progress. Everyone 

will have an opportunity to comment once the NPRM is published. 

• The current regulations appear inadequate, but union represented pilots have a better 

chance to reject flights without reprisals. One solution brought up said that during the 

interim NPRM period we just go to 12 hours on and 12 hours off. 

• An air carrier representative suggested that a policy by pilots pertaining to rest and 

duty time requirements should be self imposing backed up with management support. 

• One suggestion was made to require a system that would monitor pilots that commute 

on a regular basis to and from work. It was felt that a pilot should be as rested on the 

first day of his trip schedule as on any other day of the trip. This could be determined 

by utilizing risk management principals. 

• When crew rest “begins” needs to be addressed in more specific detail than is 

available now within the guidelines of the regulations. Rest periods are cut into by 

hotel check-in, taxi rides, changing hotels, etc. 

• A management official commented that his carrier does not allow its pilots to 

commute. Pilots must live within 1 hour from there assigned crew base. The official 

stated that “management should not be penalized if a pilot does not want to live near 

where he/she works. 

• A pilot commented that company crew base closures were a problem with not 

allowing pilots to commute to and from work. One pilot said he lives where he wants 

to be and that commuting becomes a way of life. As he said, he was not going to 

“chase the airline” with constant moves. 

• A pilot noted that the idea of safety management system (SMS) is a culture shift and 

suggested that it should start with the student pilot. The student should be trained to 

recognize factors affecting fatigue and learn to be assertive in his/her responsibility to 

communicate fatigue to company officials. 

• Someone commented that pilot fatigue as a result of commuting is self induced. The 

pilot is responsible for arriving to work rested. We still rely on self-induced removal 

from the schedule by the individual pilot. 

BOS-2 

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Boston, MA 

August 27, 2009 

• ’Pilot pushing” issue was brought up by several pilots. At some companies pilots are 

“pushed” by pressure from management to fly when fatigued and if you refuse the 

consequence may be disciplinary action. 

Professionalism 

• How can you enforce professionalism? Although pilots are required by regulation to 

have line checks, the company should establish a culture that promotes 

professionalism from its employees. 

• A pilot made the comment that the PIC has been stripped of his authority due to all 

the restrictions and policies imposed on him by his company. 

• The question of whether or not there should be a number placed on the minimum time 

required to fly as a first officer or a captain was brought up and the overwhelming 

response was that training should be quality over quantity. But because it was the 

insurance companies that dictated the minimum hours the idea of quality over 

quantity becomes a moot point. 

Mentoring: 

• Captains should be mentors, keeping things standardized. Upgrades should be based 

on experience, not seniority number. In some cases a pilot’s experience should be 

considered over their actual flight hours. 

• Captains should ensure that FOs are doing their jobs. Captains should also be 

mentored to ensure they are being good mentors. It may require FOs to check their 

egos as they enter the cockpit in order to accept input from the captain. 

• A POI suggested looking at part 121.434 enhancing the role of check airman 

participation. 

• A pilot suggested adding director of safety as a required position in 14 CFR part 119. 

• An inspector commented that captains should be trained by their company as leaders. 

The culture of the company, he said, is important in order to make this a reality. Hire 

people that fit your culture as opposed to hiring people who don’t. 

• A pilot suggested that part 121 air carriers should be required by regulation to take 

more of a leadership role in training their regional partners. 

• It was suggested that mentoring should be initiated by the operator. The FAA, 

company management personnel, and labor, should interact with other operators to 

see how they are doing things to learn some best practices policies. 

BOS-3 

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Boston, MA 

August 27, 2009 

Training 

• Loft training is a more productive way of training pilots. 

• A director of operations expressed his concern with the multi pilot license concept. 

He doesn’t believe that it allows for the accumulation of experience needed to 

become an effective and safe captain. He instead encouraged looking at the 

“gateway” system as a way of filling pilot positions. 

• We should be training people to be captains. Give more professionalism and 

leadership training. Crew pairing is important so that captains can use their 

experiences to mentor FOs with the intent that they will be captains one day and have 

been prepared accordingly. 

• Someone suggested that pilot checks for part 135 should allow the “progressive 

check” method that is not allowed based on how the current regulations are written. 

AQP for 135 is cost prohibitive. They want everything done correctly, but can’t 

afford it – but a progressive checking system could be an answer. 

• Some pilots felt that AQP caused less training to occur and that more checks were 

needed in a 12 month period, especially for low time or new hire pilots. 

• One company’s management representatives commented that the AQP program is 

cost prohibited for their company. They asked the FAA to give them rules that help 

their training program, not impede it. 

• Simulators are a great tool but are not utilized to the best level. The checks become 

the same. Progressive training allows more sum time to be available to 

conduct/practice other more beneficial items (upset training, etc). 

Safety Culture 

• A chief pilot commented that safety policy at any company should equate to a report 

policy. Focus on the “what” not the “who.” 

• A pilot stated that PIC authority was governed by management at the regional air 

carrier level. Safety is generally only lip service. It is all about moving the most 

amount of people the least expensive way. Companies push to increase productivity. 

• It was also suggested that mainline operators initiate meetings to discuss what is 

going on with their regional partners. Need a reporting culture that lets people feel 

free/comfortable to talk to management (chief pilot). This requires the right person in 

the chief pilot position. This also requires a good working relationship between the 

chief pilot and the local FAA office. Majors owe the regionals a better safety culture 

BOS-4 

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Boston, MA 

August 27, 2009 

– not bleed them dry. There was a feeling that more regulations should be considered, 

otherwise the $ will play a larger role. 

Other Issues 

• Some 135 operators see a major cost issue in competing against illegal 135 operators. 

The FAA is on the right track with by looking at operational control and taking the 

illegal operators to task. The operators are ok competing on a level playing field and 

that helps keep costs in check. 

• Economic issues for the carriers do enter into the issues. Regulations are necessary to 

balance the carriers concerns over costs. Pervasive cultures in some carriers is to 

move people as cheaply as possible – period. 

• One regional management person stated that when the mainline carrier directs the 

revenue side, that effects the cost side for the regional carrier. This can lead to an 

unhealthy situation. Labor/management and corporate culture is hard to break. Cost 

management is a difficult dynamic. 

• A part 121 pilot commented that the MEL system needs to be revised. The current 

system in place is too complicated not only do the pilots get confused with it the 

maintenance personnel do as well. 

• A part 135 pilot suggested that the FAA conduct a similar safety forum specifically 

for part 135 and part 91 operators. 

BOS-5 

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Chicago, IL 

July 30, 2009 

There is a sea of knowledge in the room at least 12 airlines, 12 POIs, and may be more 

than that; 2 vice presidents of safety, a couple of union representatives. 

Success is when one person says something that another person had not considered 

before and that person takes some action that otherwise would not have happened that 

prevents a consequence. That is our goal today and all that is represented to day to create 

a dialogue and give you some things to think about. 

Hiring and Screening 

Screening should occur at every point of a pilot’s career, training, upgrades. Don’t 

believe every company doing this but should consider. 

Performance Gap – Analyses are currently being done but involve explicit ways of the 

pilot being interviewed to ensure that individuals know what they need to know and what 

is required; wouldn’t be just for new hires but every stage of a pilot’s career. 

Training – Overlaps with second broad topic area. Does everyone need same type of 

training; most have training programs that train for efficiency. Do you give credit for 

different types of experience. There was consensus that all types of training should 

include leadership and human factors skills; data driven trend analysis using appropriate 

systems (FOQA,); focus on dealing with trainable behaviors could include leadership and 

human factors skills but need to be trainable and observable behaviors. 

Repeat Failure - Colgan pilots had 5 failures – 3 FAA, and/2 other – is that too many? 

Some people felt that there should be an established number and there should be a safety 

alert that should have a way to identify people and have training/check and then track 

them to see if remedial training has worked. A system in the company and look at low 

time pilots with performance issues to ensure these individuals get the assistance they 

need. Finally, the repeat failures may be good to have a review board; and could involve 

the union as well and provide nice way to deal with tricky issues. 

Labor Expectations - How well do the boards work and how carefully are people 

adhering to those codes; how tightly knit is the relationship b/n management and union. 

Also, how do you communicate expectations on professionalism to individuals. 

Administrator made a point that perhaps what people demonstrate what they do is the 

most important thing we are dealing with good habit or bad habits from those people you 

model within the cockpit. 

Mentoring- Good thing to do but difficult to actually implement. Mentoring could exist 

company to company with main line carrier to its partners; and person to person. Also, 

benchmarking and FOQA data. Finally, is there some room to offer mentoring potentials 

for pilots that are in the academic phases of their career especially as companies rely 

more and more on students to work for you. – 

ORD-1 

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Chicago, IL 

July 30, 2009 

Pilot Records – 

One of the things was the ability to look back at pilot and determining factor in hiring. 

The standard’s different today from years ago. We are looking at the selection process 

for air carriers today. For an entry level position is it the same. How do you quantify 

that for the selection of a pilot? How do we define the gap? Was the Colgan accident 

systemic? To find the gap is to understand that thru data. We need to have a data stream 

into the companies into the FAA. Target our training to that training gap. Would have to 

do with all the training coming into the company. 

Anyone who says that the hiring practices of regionals measures up to standards used by 

mainline are fooling themselves because they are determined by economics. These past 

several years are driven by economics and typically by finance people. But if run by 

people actually do the work, would be run quite differently. The regionals and smaller 

airlines are put in a difficult position because being asked to do with the larger airlines 

did in the past. 

The rules not only have to work now, but will have to work 5 years from now. When a 

customer gets on a regional, they think they are getting on a United airliner. The 

difficulty with the regionals projects onto the FAA as well. They all have to deal with the 

same economic problem. Whatever standards we come up with are going to have work 

well with any pilot. The difference with 1000 hour general aviation pilot and 1000 hour 

air carrier pilot there is a large gap. The gap really needs to be identified and quantified. 

Needs to be done as time goes on. 

The regional training do a wonderful job given the money they have and unfortunately 

we could do a lot better. This difficulty projects onto the FAA as well. These individuals 

all have to deal with the same economic problem and this problem regardless of the 

standards will have to work well for any pilot. 

When comparing a military pilot and civilian pilot. Military pilot has technical skills. 

There is no mandatory select out. A private pilot has no records like a military pilot. Put 

some meat in the PRIA so we can look at it. Previously we had an abundance of military 

pilots that were feeding the airlines. Is an airline pilot a technical manager or is that just 

a given? Call to Action – how do we get a young person and truly turn them into a true 

pilot with all the skills. 

FOQA & ASAP 

What is the data and how do I understand with absentee workforce? Do you inspect in 

safety or build in safety? Too many operations and too many variables. It’s about the 

pilot, it’s about they system. There are operational benefits. 

The military pilot has strong edge of the envelope technical skills - “in the hot seat” 

compared to the GA. The military pilot is selected out through various parts of their 

ORD-2 

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training. Whereas on the civilian side there is no mandatory select out - and if it took me 

18 times to pass then no selection out from program; but if in a formalized training 

academy with a selection criteria/standards - then could prevent continued selections 

beyond establish standards. That‘s why we need to put teeth in the PRIA. In WWI & 

WWII and had an abundance of airline pilots to feed the commercial carriers - knew they 

had strong technical and leadership skills. When hiring a military pilot, a given in the 

level skills that assisted the pilot in becoming a commercial pilot. 

Don’t have production line to look at to determine what the problem is and then fix it on 

the line - like in a GM auto plant. The only way to know the quality of the product is 

using FOQA and ASAP and then can see variation and the train to the variation to close 

the gap. That maybe what we need to do but must determine whether that is what the 

data is showing us. Really pushing for FOQA and ASAP to see what the system is doing 

and want to take system approach to safety. There is an operational benefit. FOQA is 

expensive but tells you what the airplane is doing technically, but when connected with 

ASAP you have a bigger view of the world. 

Another thing is analyze the data and there is leading edge work and the information you 

have access to. We don’t do anything with data and I think there are some forums to help 

us understand the data instead of picking the best guess of what to do with the data. 

WITH the large carriers we do have the skill set. 

Ramp operations. Had all the discipline and put them on the team because of the ramp 

problems for a 2 month period. The data was interesting; the afternoon has different 

problems than morning. There are certain gates at O’Hare that had problems; so we bid 

by the senior employees’ big less intense gates while the junior employees got the intense 

gates. Not about the people was that this was cross division. We believe that anything 

that touches an airplane deals with aviation safety - In addition, the other disciplines 

learned the other people’s job. Very good approach but data driven and not emotional. 

Contractual relationships – We would love to see the bar raised on the same field when 

regarding to safety. Something that we will have to get to. On the oversight side, we as a 

carrier cannot take on the responsibility for a lot of reasons; trying to walk a fine line 

with the FAA and government versus our contractual rights. 

All airlines are driven by competitiveness which is based on the economy. The call to 

action is great so that all airlines are on the same level without any competition. Great 

opportunity for all the regionals; something very possible. 

Contract Provisions - A lot of discussion and wanted to know if we could contractually 

require certain things in place. We can and would love to see the bar raised, have active 

FOQA and ASAP program, but that is something we have to get there and will not 

happen tomorrow. On the oversight side, we as the carrier cannot take on the 

responsibility for the actual operating certificate - explained to Administrator did not 

want to blur line b/n oversight and being a partner to the carrier. 

ORD-3 

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There were concerns from union/airlines, expressed to be out but no one actually dropped 

out. Today we have 175 ASAP programs with 70 pilot programs, maintenance dispatch, 

flight attendance are the next largest programs. The ASAP programs are vital. The 

second thing that has occurred is that the data has always been there and there is a key 

interest on the focus on safety and that the information is vital and meaningful for the 

operations. 

Sharing of best practices. The sharing of information and we do share a great info share 

at the ATA info level. The proper forum to do that is with your regional partners. How 

do we share as to what we’ve learned and learn from our regional partners and maybe 

there’s something to share going up. Even the smaller operator that do not get the 

benefit of all this. Then we have are GA partners and how do we share the information 

with them. The CAST system was to take all this data and look at the top 10 and how 

does that get translated into the operation itself. What may be a concern to a large carrier 

may not be a concern to a small carrier. 

Professional Standards 

One of things to emphasize have very robust professional standards. I happen to serve on 

both committee and master and local committee. The reason I am on both because they 

go hand in hand. Everything is confidential, such as fatigue, issues that have produced 

problems in the pilot ranks and increased spike in behavior; however, I can take the data 

and relate it to safety. Now, I can come to the company or union and provide this 

information and give a third picture. Our company has been very proactive and I can’t 

speak highly enough of professional standards. 

Call to action – professional standards – heavy issue. Walking down the concourse, you 

get an opinion of that pilot; wearing hats is an example. Not about the hat, but not doing 

other things; like a walk-around. How to engage our pilots and say that you have 

responsibility for this machine, you are an example. How do you maintain high 

standards? Management needs to highly support. Nothing more powerful than peer 

pressure. It is the most effective and economic way. 

Mentoring – how do you do it? If you walk up to a regional pilot; a lot of difficulties 

with that. Working with older pilots and made sure that you were taught by someone 

who had been in ever seat at least 10 to 15 years. Growth had a rapid changing of seats. 

How do you present it in a way that you are not talking down to someone? The young 

and fresh can teach the old pilots as well. 

Take advantage of resources that are out there. Encouraged to write articles. Information 

to be put out there by peers. Within the airlines mentoring has to be discussed. Very 

important topic. 

Discussed ways of taking a senior pilot and how to get one out there and have a forum for 

those interested. 

ORD-4 

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How do you know what you don’t know? When you are talking to pilots that do not have 

the experience that you have how to you talk to them. While you don’t understand it, it 

plays into safety. Let us show you where you are now. This is where you are at and this 

is where you should be; let us show you how to get there. 

Asking Labor organizations to support risk management needs. Would like the unions to 

support FOQA. 

Comments – 135/general aviation problems – have resources and fabulous programs – 

regional folks should sit in on – 135/GA do not have the resources we have – information 

given to benefit them. 

Thoughts about air carrier mgmt responsibility/safety culture/screening/hiring, training, 

professional development? 

Every professional program has to have an continuing education program – we need a 

continuing education process – our profession is migrating. We are operating under 

things from 55 years ago. . we are flying these new aircrafts 787/Airbus under rules from 

the 50s – long time, rules have never changed – NextGen aircraft, NextGen pilots – how 

do we continue to change the rules as technology advances? That’s the discussion we 

need to have in industry. 

Need to partner with the industry on code of ethics we put out – professional articles on 

leadership, etc. it’s a good interface when there are issues we can work out the problems 

amongst ourselves and peers – leadership – everyone needs to be trained. May have 

some in the left seat who really don’t belong there – may be stronger in the right seat. 

Issues with professional standards – may mean something different to you or me from 

someone else – how do we – what are the standards for CRM? Benchmarks for what we 

are doing? Nothing really set as a standard for the industry as a whole what makes you a 

good team leader, etc. 

Airline did a voluntary survey of its FOs – there are very specific themes that were very 

specific – it was published in the union newspaper everyone reads. What were the 

attributes of a good captain? Follow the rules – makes a much easier environment both 

ways. Communication skills – what they were thinking. We’re here talking about hours, 

but not once has that come up – what attributes do we need to embed in the hiring 

process? What filters do we need to put in place? How do we continue to educate? The 

26 year old may be the best communicator – may have been a fighter pilot – some of 

them become great captains, some are horrible. Personality measures – very difficult to 

measure. We need programs to train people – formalize – what if the captain says I want 

to land – there’s a thunderstorm there and I don’t feel it’s safe to land – does the captain 

have the right to land? 

ORD-5 

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Personality conflicts – we offer other tools besides conflict resolution. How can we 

work together for safety reasons – taking all the politics out of it. Having a professional 

standard in place does not always mean it’s working. The pilots have to want to do it – 

they never want to ask for help – hard to get them talking. I would hate to see all these 

meetings across the country and the result being everyone needs a professional standard 

in place. Everyone has to work together as a crew – breed the professionalism with the 

flight attendants, ramp crew, etc. Have to work together as a team or there will be more 

accidents. 

Everyone here today – 135 operator, a very small 135 and do not have the resources. We 

don’t have an endless amount of money or personnel. What would like to do is challenge 

the other 135s locally to try to get an association or something and them let’s have the air 

carriers put their money where their mouth is – all talking about partnering. Why don’t 

we all participate in this and share information? We could work with them and they may 

get some ideas from those coming out of college. I would challenge the local 135s to 

work with partnering on safety issues. Flight Safety Foundation website. Neutral – gives 

you a turn key operation if you like for small operation. 

We are all products of the training environment we were brought up with – we don’t have 

any training providers – 135 outsource theirs – they are void here – need to be 

stakeholders in this process. Not many military pilots are coming out – that is going 

away. We are depending on our carriers/operators to take care of this. What are we 

doing to grow the pilots? Multi-crew pilots – FAA seems to be ignoring – 

comprehensive plan to grow some of our pilots – two areas we need to take away from 

the meeting today. 

Should we be required to have high altitude training? 2nd – URT training NASA is 

doing – how many people get exposed to be upside down pulling 2-3-4 Gs - just to 

expose them once to experience it. Those are the call to action – need to be part of the 

training requirements. Who pays for it? Who is going to do it? 

In the 142 world specifically with NetJets, part 135 operators should really be trained 

under part 121. Virtually all of this starts with training. The training profile that is being 

used today and what we think is important; there is very little coming back from industry 

in their training. Every 6 months that is a new cycle in training; what is the hot issue at 

the time? Another issue is the experience. There are not 142 requirements for someone 

to become an instructor. We don’t hire an educator at Flight Safety, we hire pilots and 

try to make them an educator. The system is not designed to make them great instructors. 

At Flight Safety we have a very different hiring process, we are not interested in your 

flight hours. Identifying who are the proper educators. 

Problem we have today is that our aircraft are very easy to fly. This is the challenge 

today we are teaching management skills and we need to go back to teaching the basics 

of a stick and rudder pilot. 

ORD-6 

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Airbus wanted a program developed – University of N Dakota working it – what do you 

want a pilot to be? What do you want them to be able to do when hired? They are doing 

what exactly you are all asking for. . they run checklists as crew – take CRM coursesaerobatics, tailwind, a university could provide that for you. The airline would actually 

take a freshman student and offer them a job at the end, mentor them, hold their hand 

through the course. . . universities can do this. Can take the students through the program 

successfully knowing there is going to be a pilot shortage. 

Air Force starts them young – move them into different airplanes – that kind of start is 

good whether it’s military or civilian. Young leader could very well fly better than the 

older pilot. CRM and TEM – developing new courses pair up with the 121 training – 

flight safety is ISO certified today – quality of the system is the way we do our business. 

We realize that CRM and TEM are the same things – everything in training has a CRM 

and TEM in it. It’s a challenge – not easy to do that. 

135 side who is going to pay for this? 25 airplanes with 20 different owners. What needs 

to happen is regulation or a law. We are all in business to make money and do it in a way 

that is economically feasible. We all have resources and need to share these resources. 

Economics is very important; a lot of cycles keep happening over and over and now it is 

totally different because of economics and the industry is going thru a large change. 

What is happening, inexperienced people and poorly funded organizations are being 

asked to do some important safety tasks. Working with industry to bring a better 

standards of safety. To bring all of this together and talk about all of this and bring 

everyone together to work with our resources. 

Report to managers on monthly basis – monitoring the culture of the company thru all the 

departments by communicating through one point. We look at all those aspects – SMS is 

the next step we are looking at – our FAA office – have to look at the lowest level where 

it intervenes – reward it thru recognition of them doing a good job – don’t get criticized. 

Several incidents involving fatigue. Is there management crew support in mitigating 

fatigue? Are we doing everything we can do to mitigate fatigue? ARC is looking to 

address fatigue. What is the pilot’s responsibility to ensure that shows up well rested to 

fly? When you build these rotations, various elements lead to fatigue on pilots. The 

personal responsibility to fatigue is the airline. Everyone has to work together; when you 

are fatigued you need to speak up and say that you are tired no matter what. The 

companies have to work together with the pilot on that. If we see a trend, we take those 

individuals and deal with them. Some companies are out there and you do not call in 

fatigued. We are going to talk to you about being a professional pilot and what is going 

on in your life. A lot more is being involved than just being tired. The bottom line is we 

are not going to put a fatigued pilot on a plane. 

Some carriers have fatigue risk management and fatigue analysis programs in place. Is 

there a process that some of us use to mitigate the risk –fatigue risk management – what 

is the pilots personal responsibility? A lot is on the corporations back, but we also have 

ORD-7 

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the personal responsibility. How do we work together as a group to get to the heart of 

that? Had an aircraft run off a runway – pilot had not slept in 30 hours. How do we work 

jointly/collaboratively where the pilots are holding up their end of the bargain? 

Everyone has to work together. If we see a trend where a pilot is fatigued continually, 

we have programs – EAP – does the national association have training programs, etc. 

Mentoring: So much overlap. Is mentoring a part of the solution? Always read I learn 

about Flying in Flying Magazine. Share hand in hand data. Individual mentoring and 

corporate mentoring. How do you set up a program that you set up these best practices 

back and forth? Personal mentoring – how do you mentor personally is that thru ALPA 

or something that the FAA sets up? LOE in sim and line check of the two when you 

collect the data if is not meaningful you really don’t get that much data from line 

operation. Have a safety committee – share data – they allow us to publish items – share 

lessons learned. There is individual and corporate mentoring – how do you set up a 

program where you share these best practices back and forth? We have a safety quarterly 

narratives read and learned by our own pilots – covered the whole publication with an 

invitation to all the captains to give me I learned about flying; that person gets an 

opportunity to share the story. 

ORD-8 

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July 30, 2009 

Topic 1: Air Carrier Management Responsibilities for Crew Education & Support 

Safety Culture – 

As a check airmen heading up a training department what you want is an atmosphere if 

you were weak in an area then let’s train you to proficiency...solve the problem. It all 

comes down to decision making...if feeling less than 100% you should be able to come 

forward and not worry about losing money or being chastised....or have to explain why 

sick on a holiday weekend. No risk fatigue policy. 

A lot of publicity...faced with punitive sick policy...pilot jobs are put in jeopardy for 

calling in sick and want to move to another airline...non punitive sick policy is extremely 

important...go further than fatigue policy 

One buzz word ‘safety management systems’ safety culture supported by CEO and down. 

SMS is a great idea but SMS when we come out with rules on it, the rules have to written 

in such a way that the SMS can be done by the American Airlines of the world as well as 

the 135s of the world. Going to fail from its own weight because it will be so large... 

Train to proficiency. If you look at guidance on 135, guidance that mandates x amount of 

hours ...that kind of policy fails to recognize condition of pilots coming in to get 

trained...there are other pilots that may need twice that amount of training...train to 

proficiency but recognize maybe 2 hours for 1 person or 20 hours for another person. 

We all have a corporate agenda...the biggest thing we need to do is share and incorporate 

data that we have so we all know what is going on out there that is safety related. If 

we’re not incorporating that in our training data, we are not equipping our pilots. 

Safety culture starts at bottom with the PIC. If I’m tired or sick, I know I shouldn’t 

accept this flight but if I don’t someone else who may be as equally tired or sick is going 

to pick it up. As far as training issues, need to look into aeronautical decision 

making...don’t think it’s given the emphasis it really needs. 

Fatigue is a loss of pay...pilots push themselves or call in sick...had guys flying when 

they shouldn’t have been because they were sick. On fatigue piece, studies have been 

done if a pilot is fatigued his judgment is impaired so how can he properly determine if 

he is fatigued. The elephant in the room is money. There are going to be costs 

anywhere...we are in business and need to spend money wisely. 

PIC authority and erosion of that authority...some decisions are taken away from 

captains when it comes to calling out fatigue for flight...financial 

implications...decisions are taken out of their hands...not given choice to use judgment 

as PIC...how are you going to take money out of their pocket by sending them back to 

the hotel. 

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Safety culture is all about leadership at macro and micro level. On macro level require 

recurrent training every nine months...on micro level...had a crew yesterday shut down 

engine don’t want to fly call chief pilot and the call is made you’re off the trip 

w/pay...that says a lot about safety culture...the leadership...and consequence of 

decisions 

One company has broad policy about that...it is clear if you are too sick or tired you need 

to beg off that trip. Some of that is crew education issue. 135 cargo business new pilots 

think they can do anything as to not appear as weak meat...really prefer that they not go 

but have to get the policy/support out to all the crew 

Safety culture varies by organization...we have to make the bottom line work...money 

effects how we assign resources...if we could get better guidance on how to use contract 

pilots that would really help us have access to reserve pilots so anytime someone calls in 

sick there is not the loss of revenue...have resources spread out...would like to see 

specific guidance to allow us to use pilots on a contract basis ...would relieve pressure on 

pilots...have been to 1 conference where use of melatonin was mentioned as a way to get 

rest/get back on track 

ASAP/ FOQA and voluntary disclosure programs strong; strengthen protections part 193 

provides...sometimes legal environment prevents us from sharing data for fear of 

something on paper or communicated w/pilot group in co. for fewer that coming back to 

haunt us. Requires open flow of communication and open disclosure of data...don’t 

make voluntary programs mandatory...help create environment where we treat the 

information we have appropriately. 

Crew scheduling – as pilots have very little contact w/chief pilots and director of 

operations...I’m not here to accuse of deliberate violations but scheduling identifies 

younger pilots and encouraged to do something unsafe...have had it with the attitude if 

it’s legal it’s safe. The FAA has abrogated leadership and moral authority re: saying 

certain duty days are safe –applause 

Best practice sand culture hi list...within program 4 year research program...developed 

cultural initiatives...thru 8 performance indicators....info available and free... 

Company that operates 20 business jets notes that we do SMS. We also do CRM. We do 

extensive training w/crew members...we do extensive oversight of our training...we go 

to the training schools where our pilots are at and make sure the schools are doing their 

jobs. A lot of operators will take paperwork and take their word for it. All our crew 

members are type rated. We are audited not only by principles but by auditing agencies. 

You have to have SMS to get platinum rating. We are embarking on FOQA. It has 

extensive cost but being mandated. 

DFW-2 

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Dallas, TX 

July 30, 2009 

Screening & Hiring 

We are hiring people in their first revenue flying job in order to get their foot in the 

door...we typically process hundreds of applications per year and hire about 90 a year 

and recycle them...biggest problem is people who can not do what it says on their 

certificate they can do...need help from FAA that people can do what the pilot certificate 

says they can do...especially people who don’t have good situational awareness 

Will be massive retirements in ATO for next 10 years...maybe 50 percent 

turnover...have people in their early 20s coming out of OKC (60% washout) and get 

turned out to LAX, DFW, CHI towers, wet behind the ears. Most haven’t even been in 

an airplane. With the TSA, you can’t get anyone in cockpit...bring back the FAN 

program and get controllers back in the cockpit so the tower, TRACON, or center person 

knows what the pilot is dealing with. It can be an eye opening experience for both 

parties...can be an exchange of knowledge. Need TSA on board. You can put 

controllers in the simulator. 

What made senators so upset at Colgan hearing why can’t they understand why they 

don’t understand what happened...dirty little secret is out...one way to move from one 

position to another is the right seat of regional airline...don’t worry you’re right next to 

an experienced? Didn’t have the moxy to question the PIC. 

For corporate people in FAA – individual applies with American Airlines and American 

says you don’t meet our standards so the individual goes to work for Reno. Five years 

later American buys Reno. How does corporation address that? What if that individual 

was in an accident and paper trail reveals American wouldn’t hire him? How do you 

protect the pilot? How do you protect corporations? 

Level of pay doesn’t let you attract level of professionalism in the cockpit. A lot of 

issues with hiring, professionalism, and training...and pay is below poverty level. I can 

make a lot more money doing something else. I’ve wanted to do this since I was 4 years 

old but gave myself 5 years to make it. First officer pay is $18,000 a year but some 

training programs cost upwards of $100,000. It’s not worth it. 

Training 

Always room for improvement ...how about training for analyst? One analyst may find 

something and lose sleep while another might think, “Nah, we do that all the time.” How 

do we know whether we are at risk? Not a no-cost thing but if use school in Orlando can 

be a low cost thing. Need to get on same page as analysts. 

Practical test standards and uselessness to part 142...need to focus on what is really 

important...stall training but end up teach to check rides. Would like to see removal of 

practical test standards book itself and require training we do for those items to be done 

per the training program the 135 POI writes up. 

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Emergency medical service provider – crew works 12 hour shifts ...pilot and medical 

staff...bottom line for our safety...it takes 3 to go and 1 to say no. That is not questioned 

and does not come under scrutiny. How do we train pilots in that environment? Why do 

3 check ride items to pass the test? Practical test standards do not apply to air carrier 

performance standards of pilots. Where is guidance that talks about helicopter 

simulators? There’s not any. 

PTS conversation is important ...not very practical...needs to be geared more towards a 

particular type of aircraft you are flying...conditioning guys to do something 

unsafe...need wiggle room with PTS and currently doesn’t allow for any...instructor may 

spend 3 or 4 ? with student...more time than I am just walking in a giving a check ride. 

Need more recommendations from instructors. 

Proposal of 1 failure and out of aviation accept that for in turn 1 failure of bar exam 

(haha)....have had 3 training failures in my career but got me launched into series of 

studies how a good pilot can be incomprehensible in simulator (situational anxiety). I am 

a breath holder...as a result simulator froze. Bad proficiency test does not necessarily 

mean a bad pilot. Some find it stressful to go into simulator and do things you don’t 

necessarily do everyday. Support realistic training scenarios in simulator...would like to 

train to ability not to the level of jeopardy. 

Last few people have been an advertisement for AQP. Under the umbrella of AQP your 

program is tailored to your operation. In concert with local FAA office you can build a 

program that meets the needs of your pilot. Makes training program incredibly dynamic. 

Committed to safety aspect. We have flight safety interface daily with FOQA and ASAP 

data. If needed, we can change data that afternoon, keeping all training material up to 

date. Don’t have to play stump the dummy. 

Entire training department pressured to cut costs. Computer learning initiatives...learn so 

much at flight academy...don’t know how to quantify that to executives...should be 

looking at overall product...on another issue...we have good relationship with the union 

...comes in with a substandard. 80% of the time there is stuff going on at home. We also 

have the EAP. We identify safety hazards through this program. If you don’t have this 

interaction, ask that you really look at it. 

Make call of action to FAA on subject of ARC. Have seen nothing for notices of 

proposed rulemaking. Industry spends couple of million in aviation rulemaking 

committee...for over 2 years with nothing to show for it. Encourage FAA to listen to 

ARCs and put it to use or quit going through the motions. 

Professional Development 

Who has had formal SMS training? 1/3 of the room. Definitely, sometimes decision 

makers don’t have full understanding of SMS. 

DFW-4 

Appendix 8

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Denver, CO 

August 20, 2009 

Topic 1: Air Carrier Management Responsibilities for Crew Education & Support 

Safety Culture

Safety doesn’t cost more. Safety and profitability complement each other. Accidents are 

costly, so safety saves resources. The challenge is to increase safety while managing the 

economics effectively. 

Communication. Pilots need safety information right in front of them. One major carrier 

has a web site that conveys safety trends to its crews. Commenters said that such a web 

site should be current, engaging, fresh, have relevant photographs, and include shareable 

trends from ASAP data. It could be the equivalent of the hangar flying opportunities lost 

in today’s large pilot groups. Another commenter compared this with the “I Learned 

about Flying from That” feature in a popular aviation magazine. The site should be 

accessible to all of the company’s crews. 

TEM Framework. Several commenters discussed using a common Threat and Error 

Management (TEM) framework to analyze safety data across all voluntary safety 

programs. Identifying common error scenarios within a corporate culture leads to 

proactive safety change. 

ASAP. Information sharing was noted several times during the day as a vital success 

element, including sharing information with other carriers. Sharing information from 

ASAP programs should have the objective of getting out in front of safety issues, not 

managing spin. If ASAP distribution needs conflict with corporate expectations, the 

conflict needs to be resolved. 

Mandating voluntary reporting programs. One commenter stated that legislatively 

mandating voluntary programs like ASAP and FOQA is a mistake. Another commenter 

suggested that there is a need for more pilot training with regards to these programs. 

Use of best practices. Several commenters noted the importance of quickly capturing 

best practices and moving them out to the line. Learning should happen all the time. 

“Safety Stand-down.” Exiting bankruptcy, a carrier sponsored a one day “Safety Standdown” for all flight crewmembers. One element was a presentation on recent ASAP 

trends. Another commenter with this carrier noted the stand-down brought out good 

information and illustrated that one person’s problems become everyone’s problems if 

not resolved. 

Quality of safety leaders. One commenter asked about the selection of formal safety 

leaders. Their observation was that captains who lose medicals seem to wind up in the 

safety organization. Formal safety training (such as the USC course) is greatly lacking. 

Another commenter urged the FAA to increase the qualifications for the Director of 

Safety position. One commenter said he had to “shame his company” into a review of 

the qualifications they used for placing employees into the safety department. 

DEN-1 

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Screening & Hiring

Screening. One commenter suggested raising standards of who we bring into the cockpit 

was needed. Another commenter felt that management has the responsibility to ensure 

“low-time” pilots don’t get on the line. Lack of access to military flight records as well 

as other pertinent past company and training records was seen as a potential issue in 

learning necessary background. New pilots come from many sources. If new hires have 

good computer and pilot skills but have never worked in a crew environment before, it’s 

important that there is training support for adding this skill. 

Training

Incorporate ASAP and FOQA trends. One carrier pointed out that when they learn of a 

negative safety trend in ASAP, they work with their training department to quickly 

implement changes. Another carrier shared an example where FOQA data showed an 

increase in ground proximity warnings at a mountainous airport was caused by a trend of 

maintaining speed later in the area arrival than was previously the case. This led to the 

ground proximity system “seeing” a more rapid closure rate with terrain, thereby setting 

off more alerts. Once identified, the issue was included in the appropriate training, 

resolving the issue. Another carrier shared their learning concerning issues with 

stabilized approaches at a particular airport. Study of causal factors revealed that ATC 

requests to maintain 180 knots to the outer marker were causing difficulty in establishing 

a stabilized approach. By sharing this info, the carrier also learned that two other major 

carriers flying into the hub were not experiencing the issue simply because their crews 

were rejecting the speed restriction. Working with ATC resolved the issue. Finally, one 

commenter observed that it was much harder to get training cadre to accept changed 

procedures than it was to get flight crews to accept them. Early facilitated involvement in 

proposed changes was urged to improve buy-in. 

“New Captain” courses. This topic was brought up several times throughout the 

discussion. A commenter suggested working with a cadre of human factors experts when 

designing these courses. Another commenter noted their carrier recently added this 

training, branded as a leadership course, and it is widely praised within the company for 

improving the effectiveness of their captains in crew relationships. This commenter 

noted that, “We won’t make progress unless we develop our leaders (captains) who in 

turn develop future leaders (first officers).” An air carrier representative gave his 

experience of sharing his carrier’s program with another carrier. When he shares his 

carrier’s program, he says, “Here’s what works. Make it better.” The sole “cost” to the 

other carrier is that when they improve the program, they have to send the change to the 

original carrier. Another carrier representative urged his colleagues to share their 

programs and offered to facilitate doing so. 

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Professional Development 

Developing experience. Participants suggested that carriers have a mechanism to provide 

enough time on the line just after completion of initial operating experience (IOE) to 

really anchor the new pilot’s performance. It was noted that new pilots are typically 

placed on reserve for some time, with little flying available after completion of IOE thus 

keeping them from quickly building a solid knowledge and experience base. 

Building relationships. One participant related his experience in the military, where he 

learned the importance of pilots building relationships with the squadron commander, 

operations officer, maintenance officer and crew chief/plane captain. This developed a 

sense of purpose and support. The recommendation was for flight crews to learn from 

the different stakeholders in their company (i.e. Dispatch, Maintenance, Ground Support, 

etc.) and identify specific concerns flight crews can address. 

Use of first officers in single pilot operations. A part 135 operator reported as a best 

practice its requirement to use two pilots for operations requiring only a single pilot. 

Topic 2: Training Standards & Performance 

Performance monitoring 

Human factors influences. Several commenters noted that pilots were committing errors 

not typically seen before, especially in training. In training and on the line, issues such as 

cuts in pay, involuntary aircraft moves, commuting and domicile shifting (with the 

resulting stresses) create human factors issues that bear watching. Aging and learning 

increasingly complex aircraft were also cited as adding to the stress. 

Learn to forgive mistakes. Organizations need to have the grace and mercy to accept 

mistakes made in training. Evaluating an individual’s ability as a pilot on a single 

training event does not warrant exclusion from the profession. It is an indicator of the 

lack of progression. Understanding the key to successful line flying is threat awareness, 

error mitigation and solid management skills. 

Dealing with repeat failures 

Cognitive testing. A commenter with experience in chemical dependency rehabilitation 

suggested the use of cognitive testing as a tool for identifying underlying issues that may 

cause formerly successful pilots to require retraining and retesting. 

Topic 3: Professional Standards & Flight Discipline 

Corporate & labor expectations

Professional Standards Committees. Comments were made that professional standards 

and personal ethics are particularly important in carriers with relatively low levels of 

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experience in their crews and smaller flight departments. Additional CRM training can 

offset some risk. Other commenters felt the committees received inadequate support 

from both management and labor. Committees were seen as too small and under funded, 

with “Pay loss support” needed to encourage participation. 

Suggestions were also made to collect trend as well as specific issue concerns from 

Professional Standards Committees across the industry. Currently, this information is 

stove piped within each carrier. One participant committed to initiating such an effort 

within the labor organization. Another participant asked that carriers take action when a 

captain gets to a certain level of concern, as indicated by comments on first officer “No 

fly” lists. 

Just culture. The application of a just culture was discussed at some length, particularly 

as it related to programs to allow crewmembers to be excused from duty for reasons other 

than physical illness. One example was a pilot who, while not physically sick, was not 

feeling well due to stress at home. They should be able to answer the question, “Do I 

belong in the cockpit?” with a “No” in this situation and not lose pay or suffer job 

consequences. Availability of “Employee Assistance Programs” was advocated. A 

related problem is that pilots, fearing calling in sick too many times when they’re 

struggling with personal issues, will fly when physically ill to conserve their sick leave. 

Use voluntary reporting programs. Use of ASAP and FOQA data was suggested as a 

tool for improving performance. 

Communicating, demonstrating, and ensuring appropriate behavior 

Raise individual standards. Repeat write-ups without resolution were seen as degrading 

efforts to improve the ability of a captain to properly exercise his or her authority. 

Cognitive testing. A commenter with experience in chemical dependency rehabilitation 

also suggested the use of cognitive testing as a tool for identifying underlying issues that 

may cause professional standards issues. 

Topic 4: Mentoring 

Mainline / Partner Relationships

One participant noted a positive relationship with the mainline partner, but did not go into 

further detail. Mentors can bring additional safety without additional costs. 

Pilot-to-Pilot Relationships 

Resources. Another commenter noted that good resources for pilot-to-pilot mentors are 

those captains who contribute best practices. They’re the ones who are interested in 

improving the safety culture. 

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Training. A suggestion for improving the quality of pilot-to-pilot mentoring was to 

provide training on how to be an effective mentor. 

Barriers. One commenter noted that riding the jump seat on a regional jet (RJ) makes it 

impossible to share experiences. This is due to the fact that RJ crews wear headsets that 

restrict inter-cockpit communication to the flight crew. Another commenter said that 

formal mentoring programs have timelines that interfere with effective mentoring. The 

commenter believes that some things are better “caught than taught” and contrasted the 

faster pace and workload of an RJ environment to longer haul operations. The 

commenter also felt that working informally provided the best results. Communication 

and relationship building, which are hard to measure, were his key points, Another 

commenter also preferred an open door approach and felt that informal contacts were 

preferable. 

Academic Program Contacts

An individual effort. One participant said his carrier had many pilots teaching at a 

university program. Some take students on tours of the airline’s operations center, while 

others help locate internship opportunities at the airline for their students. 

Ideas for Further Exploration (“Off-agenda” issues raised during the discussions)

• Access to ASAP data was a point of some discussion. One view was that ASAP data 

should be available publicly. Briefings were suggested so media representatives 

could understand the context of the information (e.g. A comparatively large number 

of reports do not necessarily mean a large number of problems. It could indicate a 

healthy reporting culture). It was acknowledged that balance was needed between 

sheltering information and openness with the possibility of misinterpretation. One 

comment was that “secrets don’t get fixed.” One view was that publicly releasing 

ASAP data would have a chilling effect on willingness of crews to report safety 

issues. These commenters stated that government must take a leadership role to 

ensure protection of this data. 

• Fatigue and Duty-time rules came up several times. A commenter stated that when 

you look for information on this issue in ASRS reports, it’s hard to find. Another 

commenter noted that safety is lessened when, “You can call in sick, but you can’t 

call in fatigued.” Another said that crew status is as important as aircraft status and 

better training of captains was needed to detect these issues. The already fatigued 

pilot is not always the best person to make a proper safety determination that they are 

indeed safe to fly. We may need better checks and balances. 

• Part 121 subpart N and O changes were discussed. One commenter felt that the 

innovative aspects of their carrier’s present program would be lost when transitioning 

to the new requirements. The commenter felt that changes based on data learned that 

were made earlier to the training program would be lost as well. Another commenter 

advocated requiring all carriers to adopt AQP. This commenter felt that equivalency 

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to an AQP program could be made in 18 months compared to the 5 years allowed for 

the changes in subpart N and 0. 

• One commenter urged cognitive screening as a requirement for obtaining an airman 

medical certificate. 

• One commenter asked if “safety” was now part of the ATP written test. 

• There was discussion concerning the differences between military selection and 

training programs and possible learning that might be applicable to similar air carrier 

programs. Another commenter disagreed with the usefulness of the comparison. 

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Topic 1: Air Carrier Management Responsibilities for Crew Education & Support 

Safety Culture

Create a strong culture and nurture it. A real safety culture flows from the top down as 

well as from the bottom up. Employees need to know they’re empowered and expected 

to report safety issues. Accountability needs to be built in. A participant noted his 

company uses a four-part “balanced scorecard” in measuring and setting corporate goals. 

Safety is the first element, with employee involvement supported and measured. 

Importance of voluntary reporting programs. Several participants commented on 

different aspects of these programs. One noted the negative impact on his carrier’s 

ASAP when it was unavailable for six months. He also pointed out the essential role 

trust plays in obtaining reports and extracting value. Accountability was also noted as an 

essential element, with a commenter suggesting rewarding ASAP report contributors. 

Another commenter noted these programs require adequate resources from the company 

and labor organizations. Data analysis efforts and training were also examples of needed 

resources. An additional comment noted the importance of full support by management 

in the success of any voluntary reporting program. The need to refocus his carrier’s 

ASAP from an “immunity program” into a safety program was noted by a participant. A 

commenter noted that ways should be found for programs like LOSA to minimize the 

tendency for crews to get past knowing someone is watching you. 

ASAP Event Review Committees (ERC). A participant noted the positive effect of people 

in the ERC knowing what they’re talking about. This was linked to their effectiveness in 

reviewing ASAP reports as well as the credibility of the program. Another participant 

described the importance of the ERC working together and suggested a metric that 

someone couldn’t tell which party an ERC member represented based on their statements 

in ERC recommendations. 

Improving the usefulness of ASAP products. One participant stated that useful feedback 

to the pilot group was lacking from their ASAP, with only numerical data available. He 

noted what he saw in a Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General report 

on ASAP regarding the wide variation in the programs. He also noted that he had been 

told his company was concerned that providing detailed ASAP derived information to 

pilots might result in media reaction. Another commenter said that any ASAP was 

ineffective without analysis and feedback to the pilot group. 

The need to quickly pass learning gained from ASAP reports on to the pilot group was 

discussed. One commenter suggested not waiting for developing a long-term trend based 

on extensive analysis before sharing information. Another described a safety gain 

resulting from distributing a particularly significant report with all company pilots before 

the report was even discussed at the ERC. 

Sharing ASAP results across the industry. One participant shared his favorable 

experience with an industry working group and their efforts to improve ASAP 

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effectiveness. As an example, he noted that the phrase “unstable approach” has several 

definitions and a useful tool in bridging these differences was through the Aviation 

Safety Information and Sharing (ASAIS) system. The participant considers ASIAS as an 

essential information leveler. 

Qualification of safety leaders. Attendance at the USC safety course was suggested for 

safety leaders and ERC members. Another commenter suggested that formal academic 

training be required for the Director of Safety and other important safety positions within 

an air carrier. Still another commenter suggested attendance at the ASAP course at the 

FAA Academy. A related issue described by a commenter was additional duties assigned 

to the Director of Safety, such as Director of Training and Director of Security. 

Best practices. A large part 135 air carrier conducting remote and hazardous 

international operations shared several practices. Although not required to do so, the 

operator developed their own safety oversight system, recognizing FAA limitations in 

some of their operating areas. They also sustain a Director of Safety position, with 

functions as required for part 121 carriers, and a Safety Committee that conducts 

quarterly self-audits at each base. 

Another best practice was the use of a formal risk assessment before every flight (the 

operator is not a helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS) provider). Depending 

on the risk “score,” progressively higher management level approvals are required before 

accepting the flight. Knowing this, crews self-limit themselves when the score for a 

given flight requires high level management approval. 

A different operator (again, not a HEMS provider) requires a formal risk assessment 

when operating late at night into a challenging airport or conditions. The assessment 

requires crew interaction and approval above the dispatcher level. 

Screening & Hiring

Screening. One participant asked for a show of hands from any operator that did not 

request voluntary disclosure of past performance issues by pilot applicants. No operators 

responded. Another participant noted the limited amount of information that could 

legally be requested of an applicant. A different commenter noted the difficulty in 

obtaining pilot logbooks and stated that the lack of a logbook is used as a screen for his 

carrier. A following commenter stated that logbooks were of little value to his carrier. 

This commenter valued talking to the applicant’s previous chief pilots. 

Another commenter stressed the importance of checking references thoroughly, calling 

each to ensure they were legitimate. The commenter found human resources departments 

as not helpful, willing to only provide the basics of “Did he work there, would you rehire 

him, did he fail a drug test?” 

Look-back limitations. One commenter noted that records cannot be obtained beyond a 5 

year look-back. The commenter wanted a longer period, perhaps 10 years, and noted 

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getting an applicant to admit to a violation earlier than the look-back period was 

impossible. The commenter also noted the difficulty in determining the honesty of 

applicants in their disclosures. 

Qualities to seek out. An operator reported they conduct a great deal of hiring because 

their pilots frequently move on to a large commuter based nearby. The operator 

emphasizes hiring pilots that are trainable when the pilot’s logged hours are low. 

Training

Incorporate “Threat and Error Management” (TEM) in the training environment. A 

commenter suggested adding TEM into the training cycle. Another commenter expanded 

on this point by describing their concept of TEM and going on to explain his carrier’s 

application during training. During post simulator session discussion, pilots are asked 

where they were in the TEM continuum (green/yellow/red) during a particular event. 

The instructor then gives their assessment of where the crew was. The carrier uses 

industry accidents and incidents as well as events noted in ASAP reports in constructing 

LOFT scenarios. The goal is to get the crews into the minds of the pilots in the events. 

This concept is supplemented during distance learning between training center visits. 

Professional Development 

Developing experience. An operator conducting international operations in difficult areas 

noted that even though they hire new employees as captains (with over 10.000 hours), the 

operator still assigns the pilot as a first officer to build experience in their operation. 

Only after completing this assignment, with demonstrated strong leadership in the 

cockpit, will the pilot advance to captain. As a new captain, they are paired with 

experienced first officers to complete their seasoning. 

A different challenge to developing experience was noted by another commenter who 

noted that new low seniority captains complete their training and initial operating 

experience only to sit on reserve for months. The commenter suggested finding a way to 

keep these pilots active by allowing them to claim some number of flights in a month. 

Topic 2: Training Standards & Performance 

Initial training

One participant’s experience. The pilot was in the top one quarter of his class with 500 

hours. 250 hours total time was common in the class, and many pilots wanted to quit 

when they realized they would have difficulty performing in training and on the line. The 

company tried hard to get these pilots through training, but it wasn’t enough to 

adequately prepare them. 

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Upgrade preparation. One participant suggested that pilots wanting to upgrade into new 

equipment should ride the jump seat in the equipment for a while to gain a better idea of 

what to expect. 

Performance monitoring 

Remedial training trigger. One commenter shared the approach at his carrier where 

failure of a given number of elements over a specific time places a pilot into a remedial 

training program. 

Tools to enable performance monitoring. An operator asked how you know that every 

crew is doing what you want them to. Their approach is to monitor performance through 

FOQA and LOSA as an approximation of quality assurance. They identify operational 

norms, compare them to actual performance and then apply a change process to gain the 

desired performance. 

Raising the safety bar. One operator prohibits night VFR, although it is permitted by 

their operating rule. Their crews know company management looks to see that IFR flight 

plans are filed for night operations, and this helps gain compliance. 

Dealing with repeat failures 

Use Training Review Boards. A commenter pointed out that historically, these boards 

were created in collective bargaining agreements to resolve disagreements over what 

caused a pilot to fail a check ride. He suggested going beyond labor-management issues 

and using these boards to look at all causal factors for failing a checkride at any point in a 

pilot’s career. 

Another commenter noted that as hiring standards decreased at his carrier, the number of 

appeals to training review boards increased substantially. 

Dealing with the occasional failure. In an advanced qualification program (AQP), if a 

pilot misses a V1 cut, you train to proficiency and move on. A commenter noted this 

shouldn’t be a career ending event, since in real life you’re unlikely to actually encounter 

a V1 cut, only seeing them in an annual simulator session. The AQP philosophy of 

training to proficiency should be retained. 

Topic 3: Professional Standards & Flight Discipline 

Corporate & labor expectations

Importance of a Just Culture. When a just culture is in place, employees are more 

comfortable in reporting safety issues. There are many definitions of a just culture, but 

the result should be evidenced by a “reporting culture.” 

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Common expectations. Labor and management shared common expectations. These 

included that the crew was rested and prepared for the flight with a professional attitude, 

a good aircraft was assigned to the flight, and the crew was flying a realistic schedule. 

The latter was described as not scheduling a 7 hour and 55 minute flight time when the 

average was closer to 8 hours and 30 minutes. One commenter noted that the carriers 

most in need of improving were the ones not in attendance at the forum. 

Professional Standards Committees. They should not be the police, but a community 

involvement effort. They should intervene before management does, and they need more 

teeth. 

Professionalism. Pilots want to be treated as professionals, and also want to be 

professional. Corporate expectations say a lot about what the company thinks of their 

pilots. Examples range from excellent programs for self-reporting fatigue to punitive 

ones. One participant noted that ethics and professionalism is more than just reporting 

for work each day in a clean, pressed shirt. It’s also reporting rested and ready to work. 

Communicating, demonstrating, and ensuring appropriate behavior 

Values. One commenter noted the importance of introducing employees to company 

values early in training, with the expectation that they will live up to them. Values were 

seen as the way to get a 24 year old 500 hour pilot “on your side.” Formally seeking 

employee commitment was suggested. 

Management expectations of management. One commenter said that he wasn’t hearing 

what management expected of management, and asked for a professional standards 

committee for managers. The commenter wanted to know where the accountability was 

for a manager who fires a pilot for writing up a maintenance issue. The commenter 

added that the pilot should be able to go to his FAA inspector for intervention. 

Crewmember role. A commenter said that professional operations are expected at all 

times. The company doesn’t always know what’s happening in their cockpits. Individual 

pilots need to be accountable through pilot-to-pilot discussion as well as professional 

standards committees. 

Topic 4: Mentoring 

Mainline / Partner Relationships

Information sharing. One participant shared the success of his organization’s 

relationship with their mainline partner, noting a monthly review held between them.

It’s more than mainline with partner. Several commenters noted that mentoring is more 

than just what was on the agenda. They pointed to successful mentoring relationships 

between peer organizations and between carriers and their FAA certificate management 

team. An example of the latter was a successful monthly meeting as safety collaborators. 

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Pilot-to-Pilot Relationships 

First officer to new captain feedback. One commenter reported that first officers 

provided feedback to a new captain that was shared at the new captain’s one year review. 

However, the commenter said that this review was a “show.” Another commenter 

described a feedback slip program at their carrier that required participation and was 

reviewed each year. An additional comment was that these types of evaluations are a 

popularity contest. 

Benchmarking 

Standardization. A commenter noted that total compliance with company SOPs was a 

key part of mentoring. Another commenter added that standardization was a key 

ingredient, especially on “the back side of the clock.” In that kind of scenario, pilots 

need to recognize that when you don’t hear an expected response, it’s a warning sign that 

standards may be slipping. Another commenter agreed that setting and holding to 

standards was an important element in mentoring. This commenter said that mentoring 

should not be used between two low time pilots. 

Ideas for Further Exploration (“Off agenda” issues raised during the discussions)

• Formal protection for voluntary reporting programs was seen as essential. One 

commenter noted the effect on an ASAP program in the wake of a judicial 

determination that reports were subject to legal discovery. 

• One commenter asked about the quality of an applicant with a “multi-crew license.” 

• One commented said that if carriers paid “a living wage,” there will be lots of 

applicants. Another commenter wondered who would pay for the higher wages. 

• A commenter said that the FAA was behind in best practices for 135 operators and 

needed a higher standard for part 119 required positions. 

• A commenter speaking on proposals for requiring higher flight time for air carrier 

pilots would raise the quality, but noted that just building time by flying skydivers or 

banner towing was not the right experience. 

• A commenter said that the FAA operates by “regulation by expectation.” He noted 

that the POI of a great carrier expects excellence while the POI of “Sloppy Air” 

regulates to a lower level. Another commenter stated that he believed POIs are 

supposed to keep their carriers successful instead of safe. Another commenter said he 

wants the FAA to be overseers, regulators and mentors. FAA used to be more 

regulator than overseer. POIs have limited tools for taking carrier’s managers to task. 

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Topic 1: Air Carrier Management Responsibilities for Crew Education & Support 

Safety Culture 

 

• What are the definitions of safety and success? These were the two questions 

discussed and the questions which need to be addressed. 

• Safety Culture has always been a fundamental part of the aviation world but it has 

been known by a different name, trust. Trust is something very fragile that we have 

worked towards. Industry, management, labor and the FAA have played an important 

role in building, capitalizing and maintaining this trust. 

• Management needs to work with the labor group and invite the employees to submit 

an ASAP report; this way red events can be noticed, reviewed and corrected. Also, 

the FAA and the Industry needs to look into employees submitting an ASAP report 

that is non-punitive. 

• FOQA and ASAP are crucial to the aviation industry but there is a breakdown in 

communication between the FAA, the labor group and management. 

• Safety needs to be addressed in the cabin; flight attendants need to ensure that they 

are performing their job functions (ensuring carry-on items are properly stowed). 

• Pressure should be put on CEOs to attend safety meetings. None of them were present 

during this forum. 

Screening & Hiring 

• The industry has tried utilizing the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to assist in 

screening pilots. This has proven to be very challenging because many of the records 

are either expunged after five years or it takes too long (eight weeks) for the FOIA 

request to be answered. Extending the disposition date on the records and expediting 

the FOIA request would be very helpful. 

• The industry is shrinking. The challenge is how to hire a high caliber person to earn a 

decent salary and have the life quality they are expecting? How do we communicate 

this to Washington and the public? Do you limit the selections by only accepting 

persons with a college degree or do you also accept persons without a degree but 

equivalent experience. 

• Fewer entry-level pilots are attracted to the industry. Washington believes entry-level 

qualifications should be increased, but this drives away entry-level pilots. Perhaps 

these qualifications need to be re-addressed; the Washington perspective is very 

different from the industry. 

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Training 

• Washington needs to provide a more detailed explanation about how a pilot’s 

qualifications are measured based on training and experience. Minor discrepancies 

should not disqualify pilots. There should be a system in place with proper 

documentation of what is considered a failure and that data should be carefully 

evaluated. Some pilots need to be re-trained in a non-punitive way. 

• There is a need to promote the industry to younger people so they can have a greater 

interest in aviation. This issue needs to be addressed by the FAA, because younger 

people who are interested are not getting the experience. Training centers and 

experienced persons need to mentor younger people. 

• A program should be created to standardize training for major and regional airlines. 

• Safety is affected by economics because training is very expensive. 

Professional Development 

• Major airlines should assist small feeder companies with training and professional 

development. 

• CFI renewals should be restored for part 121 captains; it is essential to enhance the 

crews’ learning experience on the line. 

Topic 2: Training standards & Performance 

Initial Training 

• Appendices E & F (Training & Testing) are adequate if applied properly; however 

this needs to be investigated to ensure those appendices are being administered 

properly by the industry and overseen by the FAA. 

• Younger pilots can work provided initial training is satisfactory. 

• Tailored training should be provided for diverse groups of people who are entering 

the industry. 

• Common areas that are frequently missed should be published and incorporated into 

the training program. 

• In an effort to lower accident rates, the ten most recent accidents added the existing 

the training syllabus. Recurring accidents need to be assessed, solutions formed and 

then implemented into the training program. 

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• A national archive for all the data (most common /reoccurring accidents) needs to be 

created. FAA should control this archive and facilitate instant access to the industry. 

Dealing with Repeat Failures 

• FOQA and ASAP contradict each other because they ask people to volunteer 

information but when a person does divulge information they are sometimes 

prosecuted. 

• The instructor needs to pay more attention to the airman. Some people need more 

training than others. Instead of sending an airman for a check ride (who isn’t ready) 

provide the airman more training. 

Topic 3: Professional Standards & Flight Discipline 

Corporate & Labor expectations 

 

• Corporate expectations are always results driven. The FAA needs to oversee more 

standardized programs. Industry wants a high level of safety, but cost is always a 

fundamental factor. 

• We can’t afford to lose professionalism. We need to incorporate and develop a 

respect for pilots. We are the largest unsupervised set of employees with a stellar 

safety record. 

• An individual failing a check ride is a reflection of not only the check airman, but 

also the instructor and training. A failed check ride is a reflection of the entire 

program. A more thorough look at the training programs needs to be made. Failure 

is not an option. 

• It is critical to ensure that check airman follows the industry training program. Check 

airman need to be monitored and evaluated annually. 

Topic 4: Mentoring 

Mainline/Partner Relationship- Pilot-to-Pilot Relationships 

• Industry, labor and the FAA have to work together to nurture an individual to become 

a professional. As a country we need to ask ourselves how do we make this 

profession more appealing? 

• Mentoring programs need to be established. Pilots need initiate conversation about 

the technical part of flying to each other. Competing airlines exchange safety 

training, but that exchange of information needs to be enhanced. The airlines need to 

facilitate this type of training. 

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• The industry has to be re-invigorated because pilot salaries are not competitive 

anymore. 

• Since deregulation the appeal to the industry has been reduced. 

Other Ideas 

• The Safety Management System (SMS) has components for upper management to 

take active roles in risk assessment, safety performance and development. 

• The SMS has to be implemented per ICAO by international carriers effective 2010. 

• Small carriers will not be able to implement SMS without assistance by the 

government. 

• The FAA, management and labor needs to engage in order to be a stronger unit. 

• Communicate to the public that safety even though thought to be fundamental and 

desired does cost money; economics play a vital role in safety. 

• The FAA should coordinate with airline users regarding the ASAP website. This 

program could be used as a catalyst to improve the future of the FAA AQP tools. 

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Pilot Qualifications and Training 

A pilot should not be condemned due to age. Pilots out of universities know how to 

learn. Very easy to blame pilot with low hours. Training program’s responsibility is to 

create learning. The process is important. Some mainline carriers do not have the quality 

of training programs of some regional carriers; training programs should result in the 

accomplishment of learning, not just the presentation of information. 

AQP customized pilot training is an effective way to deal with the problem of low time 

pilots. Get everyone committed to do what they want to accomplish and how can they do 

it in their environment. Different environments have to be managed differently. 

Take a look as data driven programs, safety culture assessments, gives benchmarks, 

concrete ideas to move forward. 

Go out and identify hazards in the work environment, bring them back, brainstorm 

solutions. Key is to measure the effectiveness of measures you have put in place and 

ensure continuous improvement. 

Pilot Experience: What should the standard be for a new-hire airline pilot? Some 1,500 

hour pilots are not as qualified or trainable as lower time pilots, quality of experience vs. 

quantity of experience; ability to manage a cockpit is necessary, ability to manage people 

and automation; adjust the training to meet the need of the experience level of the pilot. 

There are less qualified entry level pilots because airline industry problems, including 

low pay have made an airline career less desirable. 

Fatigue 

It’s going to cost money to improve safety. Now the pay is poor; flying is not a prestige 

job any more. Fatigue is a root cause of accidents, and wages are related – pilot doesn’t 

eat and rest properly because he/she is broke. Joint management/labor fatigue panel, 

discourage management intimidation of pilots. Company needs to build flight schedule 

not to over-burden pilots. Everyone must be accountable. This cut-throat competition 

has to stop. Safety costs money, and fares must increase. Bring executives together. 

Pilots have responsibility, accountability. Captain Sullenberger, US Airways flight 1549, 

“Miracle on the Hudson” lives on the West coast, works on the East coast and he reported 

to work prepared to do his job. 

Dr. Mark Rosekind-“Alertness-Solutions, scientific resource on aviation fatigue issues. 

Companies frequently change a pilot’s domicile resulting in pilots commuting to work 

which contributes to the fatigue issue. 

Pilots who receive current FAA minimum rest are still fatigued, legal is not always safe. 

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Data Analysis 

FOQA & ASAP: develop effective data analysis, air carriers should share data emphasize 

a shared safety philosophy, no competing for the best safety program, standard of shared 

information. 

Safety Culture 

Safety sometimes means standing up to management’s pressure and fear of consequences 

in order to do what is safe contrary to wishes of management. 

The pilot has to feel comfortable submitting to ASAP; pilot should not have to ask, 

should I file this ASAP? f the pilot believes it can be used against him the program is 

not going to work. Pilots should receive no disciplinary action from the company or 

FAA if ASAP information is provided according to guidelines. Key to success of ASAP: 

Mutual trust - need to get all 3 parties on board and evaluate the information you get out 

of ASAP. 

FOQA and ASAP both need effective data analysis, air carriers should share data, 

emphasize a shared safety philosophy, no competing for the best safety program, standard 

of shared information. 

Professionalism 

How do you hold the pilot personally accountable for his/her actions? 

Code of Ethics: ALPA put the passenger first, report for work as a prepared, rested, safe 

professional pilot. 

Mentoring 

A good safety culture should promote pilot mentoring, placing low time pilots with high 

time pilots. Put a pilot with 250 hours with a captain who is getting ready to retire. Not 

with a pilot with 2,500 hours. More senior pilot mentoring. Learned more flying the line 

than in the simulators. Experience in cockpit. 

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Topic 1: Air Carrier Management Responsibilities for Crew Education & Support 

Safety Culture

Create a strong safety program. Program goals have to be observable and measurable, 

not just a slogan on the wall. Participants suggested management prioritize the 

identification of problem areas and quickly make changes. The number of accidents is 

not the primary safety metric. Pilots should not remain in management permanently, but 

rather, periodically return to the line for at least a year. Only then can they really see 

“what’s going on.” Managers must lead by example, listen to the line pilots, and make 

the changes needed. Pilots should be on carrier’s internal “safety teams.” 

For part 135 operators, the challenge is managers flying and not having time to manage 

safety. Also, particularly in this segment, resources are tight, forcing multiple roles on 

managers. 

Communication. Foster communication between all employees. Ensure no topic is 

taboo.

Lead from the top. Safety has to be from the top down and be “efficient cost,” not “low 

cost.” You cannot have an inefficient company that is safe. It is incumbent upon 

management to ensure their pilots have a safety education. 

Fatigue. Policies need to be non-punitive. There should be “fitness leave” available if a 

pilot is not fit to fly. Participants said it was important to ensure pilots get the same rules 

across the industry for rest and duty time. Standards should be the same for mainline and 

feeder. Another way to say this is that pilots do not have “sick leave”, they have “fitness 

leave” 

New hires from university programs. Some participants had experience with these 

applicants coming in the door. They took less time than others coming in with industry 

background. The structure in the training provided by accredited university flight 

programs transitioned extremely well into the 121 environment. 

Resources. A team approach to the safety department was suggested, with three people 

in the safety department involved so the non-flying duties are balanced. Sometimes, 

when you have several people involved, the different perspectives allow a better solution. 

For smaller operators, it is difficult for one person to have time to work on the safety 

program when not flying. 

ASAP. It’s a three-legged stool, with input from all three legs getting back to the pilots. 

At some carriers, only one leg is shared with crews. 

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Screening & Hiring

Screening. Use standard operating procedures. We need to treat everyone with respect 

and dignity, but we need to address performance issues when required. Participants 

suggested carriers be aware of the mentality of many who apply to a carrier just to give 

an airline job a try. There’s no career commitment. There should be a threshold to attain 

to get hired so the level of professionalism is maintained. We should not lower the 

standards. Professionalism cannot be legislated. When different carriers have differing 

entry standards, a carrier with high hour requirements and a solid safety program is at a 

competitive disadvantage with a carrier that will accept a 300 hour pilot applicant. 

Several large carriers noted they prefer a mix of applicants, and screen for target 

percentages from major pilot sources such as university programs, the military, their 

feeders and small operators. Even though some of these sources typically require less 

training time, the carrier still prefers to seek a mix of applicant background. 

Setting Expectations. We have to be consistent in assessing where the firewalls are. 

Evaluations need to be made at consistent points with consistent standards. At one 

operator, labor meets with the new hires for an entire day to help set expectations. When 

new hires are provided this information, they seem to be better prepared to deal with the 

realities of a new hire’s life. The management expectation is that everyone hired wants to 

be a professional. How do we foster that in the individual that uses a small carrier for a 

stepping stone, but does not “get professional” until they reach the major airline? 

Participants felt we need to mentor new pilots and each other across the industry, which 

takes time and resources to make it happen. A benefit of separating industrial and 

operational issues is that issues can be discussed from an operational standpoint without 

creating another issue where you have to go to professional standards outside the cockpit. 

Graduate competition. The competition for graduates is unprecedented. An applicant 

may have 750 hours and have three offers from carriers, skewing the applicant’s 

expectations of life on the line. The pilot in this environment uses his ability of supply 

and demand by taking the position of, “What do you have to offer me?” Several 

participants noted what they believe to be a looming pilot shortage. 

Proficiency level. There is a wide range of proficiency levels in the hiring. Participants 

favored the train to proficiency approach as long as progress is normal and deficiencies 

are corrected. It is difficult to determine how far from the norm you can go and it is 

justifiable to provide extra training. 

H.R. 3371. Participants said a mandatory ATP gets us away from train to proficiency, 

and ab initio training benefits. If people are just building hours to meet a number, then 

they are just out flying around. Maybe the ATP is not the answer if you have a well 

structured program (such as a university program), but if you don’t, then it is may be 

desirable. 

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Training

Beyond train to proficiency. One participant emphasized that what is in place cannot be 

left in place Participants were encouraged by the H.R. 3371 emphasis on improving 

training programs and working with labor. They saw a need to set a bar for other carriers 

that have lower time pilots and what effect that has on the industry. Some carriers set a 

high bar, but then you get others that have not been in a quality program. There also 

needs to be consideration for who is doing the training and also the checking. Another 

comment was there is a need to close the loop and ensure there is feedback. One said 

there are two different philosophies: 1) the line perspective and 2) standardization of 

assessment, which is very difficult. 

Using training to promote the safety culture. It is our reason for being. It is easier said 

than done and is a work in progress. ASAP, LOSA, FOQA are all important inputs into 

training. Carriers must sift through data and use the data as one of the primary training 

drivers. This can also be a mechanism to encourage the pilots to participate in ASAP. It 

is not only limited to training. In reference to the ASAP program, a commenter said we 

deserve to give feedback/input back to the pilots when they put in reports to show that it 

does facilitate change from all three legs of the stool. 

Instructor qualifications. Participants shared their success with using qualified line 

holding pilots as instructors, because they can better impart the current realities of line 

flying. Others urged the periodic return to the line of permanent instructor pilots. All 

saw the need for new hires to be introduced to line flying by current line pilots. 

Accident review. A commenter said that one thing we don’t do enough of in training is 

accident review. If crews could stand back and look outside the cockpit using the 

accident transcript, they could gain a valuable perspective. 

Distance learning. A commenter said that carriers need to search for the balance 

depending on the subject matter. Not all topics can be done with distance learning. It 

can be an effective way to address individual needs. 

Professional Development 

Professional Standards Committees. A 121 carrier said they definitely have an interest in 

re-emphasizing their Professional Standards Committee and providing the resources to all 

stakeholders to make it successful. Another participant indicated that professional 

standards is confidential and needs the same access to records/information as the 

company has. Professional standards can be better if we can solve the issues with the 

carrier. Another participant said it needs to be at the same level as FOQA and ASAP, 

plus given resources. Per slide 41, all need to be involved. The current status is three 

legs; the fourth (Professional Standards Committees) has been left out. Professionalism 

all starts with individual responsibility. There needs to be loyalty to the stakeholder. The 

company, FAA, and labor unions can only do so much. We need to get the individuals to 

buy in and be more engaged. 

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Teaching professionalism. It is difficult to instill safety and professionalism into people. 

The only thing that keeps them safe is their individual discipline. They should be taught 

to be a professional no matter which seat they sit in and it should become part of the early 

stages of education. 

Topic 2: Training Standards & Performance 

Initial training

Instructors. Participants again noted the value in having line current instructors, 

especially in initial training. Watching for burn-out was suggested. 

Programmed hours. One major carrier noted they had taken a look forward to improving 

their training program and invested significantly with labor. The economic downturn 

wrecked their plans and agreements with labor representatives, at great cost to the 

company. To do it again will take a risk-sharing but cooperative approach with labor. 

Performance monitoring 

Poor preparation. If you see people coming into training and they are ill prepared, it 

needs to be addressed. 

Feedback. Feedback on performance from the line on newly graduated pilots is essential 

to identifying issues and resolving them. This was seen as more critical in smaller 

operations. Management has a role in that they hire the instructors. Instructors may need 

recurrent training in their job as an evaluator. The importance of catching bad habits 

early was noted by one commenter. 

First officer experience on small single-engine turboprops. For those operators with 

these aircraft, much value was reported in having initial experience in this manner. 

Dealing with repeat failures 

Most people with five or six failures have had them long after probation. The FAA has 

only addressed one part of this issue with the five year prior records retention. 

Missing piece. A commenter stated that once identified, we need to look at repeat 

failures harder before letting them back into the system. We need higher levels of 

scrutiny once repeat failures have occurred. 

Even when we go through a good process and screen, some get through the door. One 

failure: everyone stubs their toe. Second failure: what happened? Someone with two, 

three or four career failures can probably get through if given enough training, but do we 

want to keep them? Management and the FAA need to do more. Instead of hiring 

captains, we should hire pilots and not push them past their limits. They should be 

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encouraged to stay as a first officer and not be pushed to captain if they do a good job in 

their current position. A 121 carrier indicated that captains are not a problem as they can 

stay as first officers. The problem is with new hires. Management usually tries to keep 

those not meeting the standards or require a lot of additional training. 

There is a reluctance once you get a new hire to release them if they are not able to meet 

the standards or require a lot of additional training. Good definitions in the collective 

bargaining agreement regarding probationary pilot performance are a good tool according 

to a large operator. The threat of lawsuits from discharged pilots and knowing the 

professional black mark on a pilot’s career makes terminating poor performers that much 

more difficult. On the other hand, keeping a marginal pilot who then has an accident or 

incident creates equally sized issues. 

Trust. It has to translate to the solution. Management and labor must be able to separate 

industrial issues from flight operations issues. The trick is to create a level of trust 

between management and labor. With no trust, it is very difficult to resolve issues. 

When people are removed based on management dislike, or pilots are protected by labor 

when they should not be, it breaks the trust. The FAA needs to be involved as they are 

the people that know the requirements. One operator indicated that POI involvement 

with what is going on from an awareness stand point is working well. The commenter 

noted that the POI is not involved in decision making process. Another operator noted 

that 100% of terminations resulted in a grievance. How do we balance the responsibility 

that we have to keep the right people in the cockpit? 

One person indicated that he would expect representation by the union. One 121 carrier 

uses points that are assigned based on observation, discussion, and events. If a pilot 

exceeds a certain number of points within a given time period, they receive additional 

training based on the events with the high number of points. 

One carrier indicated it has a process that covers up to three failures. On the third failure 

the re-test will be conducted by the FAA. The operator stated this policy is hindered 

because there are not enough qualified FAA inspectors for the given type of aircraft. 

Topic 3: Professional Standards & Flight Discipline 

Corporate & labor expectations

Ownership. If the flight crewmembers feel they have ownership in the corporation, they 

will be professional. If they succeed, then the corporation will succeed. 

Current standards. There is a safety culture and a leadership culture needed for success. 

There are professional standards; what about leadership standards? 

Crews need to adhere to the standards that are out there now. Over repetitive routes, 

routine can set in and erode flight standards. Carriers and crews need to watch for this. 

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A commenter said that labor as professional standards needs to work with management. 

Labor and management need to collaborate and work together to get the best results. 

Collaboration shows the pilots that the organization is committed to working together. 

Professional Standards Committees. It takes a collaborative effort to integrate 

Professional Standards Committees into the corporate culture. A labor representative 

urged management to formalize the role of the union Professional Standards Committee 

into the carrier’s culture and expectations. A communication role with crews was also 

advocated for the committee. 

Communicating, demonstrating, and ensuring appropriate behavior 

Consider new approaches. A commenter said that standards and flight discipline is a 

peer group, not a peer pressure issue. Another commenter noted that they saw successful 

intervention when management worked collaboratively with labor. The company issued 

a bulletin jointly from the union and management regarding why a safety issue needed to 

be addressed. This gave greater impact to the issue. 

Topic 4: Mentoring 

Mainline / Partner Relationships - Pilot-to-Pilot Relationships

Professionalism. The participants defined professionalism as: Honor, following the 

SOPs, maintenance of knowledge and skill, discipline, behavior, integrity, leadership, 

ownership of professionalism, and maturity. 

A participant suggested mentoring people early. Another noted we have a significant 

resource in experience level that disappears every year based on retirements and asked 

what was being done to retain the experience level. 

Same standard. A commenter asked for an industry wide set of standards for technical 

issues. Another urged partner carriers start working together more closely with mainline 

carriers for clear expectations of the partner. 

One partner carrier indicated that they want to embrace what is going here, but they want 

to ensure they are headed in the right direction. They would like to have some of the 

same programs as the larger carriers have. 

Flow through. One partner indicated they wanted to ensure they are providing a well 

trained and qualified pilot to the mainline when hiring occurs (they do not have flow 

through). A mainline carrier indicated if the feeders have a structured and disciplined 

program with good SOPs, then it does not matter where they come from. One participant 

indicated that many carriers get people from various other carriers based on their needs 

which would not be possible in a flow through. 

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Benchmarking

A suggestion was made to have a baseline and create simple, easy to understand, and 

follow procedures to weed out problem people earlier. 

Participants suggested more data sharing among FAA, labor and the carriers. 

Academic Program Contacts

ALPA reported that it is working with university aviation programs to create professional 

development program university aviation programs. More work is needed in 

understanding university-based programs. 

The role of accrediting bodies was not well understood. 

Get the message out. A commenter said there is a need to share with the universities that 

there are layoffs and mergers so their students can see the full reality of the industry. 

When you enter a program at a university the assumption is you want to be there because 

you are really interested no matter what the job prospects are. It is a career decision. 

Ideas for Further Exploration (not discussed in detail during the discussions)

• Funding available for the carriers to help them implement FOQA would be very 

helpful, especially the smaller ones with less resources. 

• Policy and procedures in manuals and committees. 

• Use of the Multi-Crew License concept 

• More data sharing among FAA, labor and company. 

• Security – Having to take your shoes off and go through screening demeans the 

professional, as does drug testing. Name tags that have your first name only and 

being referred to by the cabin crew as “Captain Bob.” 

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Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood: 

Addressed safety concerns: 

• Pilot Rest Rules; an Aviation Rulemaking Committee has been chartered. 

• A method of tracking pilots with performance problems needs to be established 

• This could be addressed thru: 

o Pilot Records 

o Flight Data Recorders 

o Recording safety problems 

• The flying public depends on us to keep them safe; we should listen and learn what 

the issues are and bring forward potential solutions. 

• Safety is the reason we are here and he was proud to see how many people here. 

Questions to Secretary LaHood: 

Q. User Fees – can the FAA put an end to it? 

A. This is an issue to be resolved by Congress and not the DOT. 

Q. Statement: Aviation safety knowledge starts with General Aviation (GA) and works it 

way up to the Air Carriers. GA gets little attention. 

A. GA should be a part of the solution however Major Airlines drive the media. GA is 

appreciated. 

Comments from the Panel: 

• Airlines are under extreme pressure due to public perception of safety 

• Biggest job is to implement safety as a culture 

• Embrace FOQA and ASAP as part of a solution. 

• Funding for FOQA is an issue 

• ASAP is possible for all at a low expense 

• ASAP is a key to change in culture 

• Each Maintenance ASAP, Pilot ASAP, Dispatch ASAP has a distinct and 

separate culture. 

• Need a Code of Ethics for pilots 

Statements from the Participants 

• Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) must stay confidential and should not be 

used for disciplinary action by the company. 

• Focus should be given on why the event may be unsafe, not the pilot (maintenance or 

procedures) when the need is to fix the event. Don’t focus solely on the crew. 

• Are existing regulations good enough to maintain a safe flying environment lives? 

• Air carriers should have a way for a pilot to come forward in a non-punitive way to 

say he/she is fatigued. 

• ASAP and FOQA information must stay confidential. Not for public dissemination. 

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Pilot Experience/Training 

 

• 300 to 400 hour Pilots are green and the airlines should stop hiring them. 

• Raising the minimum for pilots has been a point with Congress. 

• 1000 hours of military flying compared to 1000 hours of GA flying is not the same. 

Training should be tailored for individual needs. 

• Air carriers have to look at the experience of the pilot at the front door and adjust 

their training program. 

• Air carriers want to hire pilots with more experience but where do pilots get their 

experience? 

• Pilots need more experience flying before being hired by the airlines. 

• Current licensing requirements do not meet the standards required today. Europe has 

a Multi-Pilot License to address this issue. The US needs a similar program. 

• Training hours have been reduced by many carriers. It’s possible; we may have cut 

back too far. Increase training requirements. 

• Seniority should not be the only qualifier for up-grading to captain. 

• There is a need for continuing education/training for all pilots. 

Mentoring 

• Crewmembers need structured mentoring and scenario based training. (Icing training 

in simulators) 

• Pilots with more years of experience need to mentor new pilots with less experience. 

• It was suggested that mentoring received be credited as experience. 

System Safety 

• Air carriers believe system safety is needed but state the FAA should mandate when 

system safety should be implemented. 

• Carriers also request that FAA not tell them how to implement system safety but let 

them do it on their own. 

• System safety training is not just for the safety department but for line pilots also. 

Information Sharing 

• Air carriers need a method of sharing safety related information. 

• Air carriers need to discuss and share “worst practices” and eliminate them. 

Safety Culture 

• Each carrier has its own specific culture. Some intimidate pilots. 

• Can’t legislate safety or common sense. 

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Topic 1: Air Carrier Management Responsibilities for Crew Education & Support 

Safety Culture

Establishing, nurturing, and maintaining a strong safety culture is air carrier 

management’s most fundamental and overarching responsibility. 

Screening & Hiring

Stress quality over quantity. Public and congressional perceptions on air carrier 

screening and hiring are “all about numbers.” This perception is inaccurate and 

misleading. As some observed, a military pilot with 1,000 hours may be significantly 

more qualified than a civilian pilot with 3,000 hours, because military pilot screening, 

selection, training, and operational processes provide accelerated ways to gain experience 

and judgment. Participants noted, however, that a military pilot may be less qualified for 

air carrier operations than a civilian pilot with the same number of flight hours if the 

civilian pilot has, for example, gained that experience flying in part 135 operations. The 

quality of a pilot’s experience is more important than the quantity, and some stated that 

the industry should jointly craft a message that will effectively communicate this reality. 

Train the screeners. Participants urged specific and specialized training for those who 

conduct air carrier screening and hiring. There is a tendency to allow human resources 

(HR) experts to conduct most of the screening and hiring processes. Although HR skills 

are essential, those who screen / hire potential air carrier pilots need an operational 

perspective as well. One company has recently instituted such training for its HR 

screeners. Another uses a “captain’s board.” In this approach, the final step in the hiring 

process is for a group of the carrier’s most experienced captains to review candidates 

from an operational standpoint. The purpose of the captain’s board is to evaluate the 

likelihood that a given candidate will be successful in the air carrier environment. 

Evaluate human factors. Screening and hiring practices should take the human element 

into account. Air carrier flying requires the ability to get along well with others, and 

including a scenario-based simulator session in the screening/hiring process provides one 

means of sampling the candidate’s ability in this critical area. A challenge is that human 

factors evaluations are inherently subjective, and at odds with HR “objective” processes. 

Training

Train to proficiency. Training to proficiency is key. Given the wide diversity in pilot 

backgrounds, training that relies on a handful of “canned” scenarios is not effective, or 

adequate, for everyone. As one participant phrased it, air carrier management needs to 

“make allowances for the fact that not all pilots are created equal.” Some pilots need 

more training time; others require less to reach the necessary level of proficiency. 

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Put “failures” in context. Congress and the public tend to equate evaluation event 

failures as “bad,” but they may in fact indicate that a pilot has been through a more 

challenging training program (i.e., one with tougher standards). 

Use flexible reserve practices. New hire pilots who successfully complete initial 

operating experience (IOE) usually go into reserve status. Lack of sufficient flying at this 

critical time can quickly degrade newly-acquired knowledge and skills. Also, there are 

some disadvantages to the typical practice of pairing newly-training first officers (FOs) 

with a wide range of captains. To address the first issue, some carriers have a system that 

lets newly-qualified pilots request placement at the top of the callout list. Some noted 

that this practice is impossible without an effective safety culture that lets pilots feel 

“safe” in making such requests. 

Professional Development 

Rethink leadership training. There was a consensus that stick-and-rudder skills are 

necessary, but not sufficient. No amount of flight time can compensate for a pilot’s lack 

of leadership skills and professionalism, but standard industry practice is to use flight 

time/experience as the metric for upgrade decisions. One company has developed a 

“captain’s leadership workshop” to help with leadership training. Run jointly by 

company and union, with both management and line pilots participating, the captain’s 

leadership workshop is required within one year of upgrading to captain. The idea is to 

teach pilots specifically to be not only captain/leaders, but also mentor/teachers. Another 

concept is to provide “leadership” and “followership” training not only before an 

upgrade, but also to offer it again at some interval after the upgrade has occurred. The 

pre-upgrade session introduces concepts, and the post-upgrade session reinforces them 

and puts them in the context of real-world experiences. 

Use CBT effectively. Training often tends to focus most on new hires, but there is also a 

need for professional development training beyond the schoolhouse. Some air carriers 

use computer-based-training (CBT) to meet this need, and require pilots to periodically 

complete a certain number of CBT courses or credits. In some cases, simulator scenarios 

in recurrent training draw from, or build on, the material introduced through CBT. Some 

companies, for example, use CBT to introduce concepts of Crew Resource Management 

(CRM) and Threat/Error Management (TEM), and later use recurrent training to reinforce 

those concepts in operational scenarios. The challenge is to ensure that CBT and 

simulator-based scenario-based training (SBT) are properly integrated. Also, air carriers 

must use ASAP data to keep CBT and SBT scenarios updated and relevant to real-world 

operations (i.e., avoid “stale scenarios”). 

Train the PM function. Air carriers should consider training and checking a pilot’s 

competence and proficiency not just in the “pilot flying” role, but also in the “pilot 

monitoring” function. AQP covers this concept, but it is too often overlooked in the nonAQP training environment. Even if a carrier does not use AQP, management should 

consider instituting a PM training element that includes appropriate assertiveness. 

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Teach ASIs to oversee training. Participants urged FAA to teach its inspector workforce 

to oversee training programs. ASIs don’t always know what to look for, or what 

constitutes a “good” or “effective” training program. 

Topic 2: Training Standards & Performance 

Initial training - (see discussion above) 

Performance monitoring 

Washington participants observed that performance monitoring is a “missing element” 

right now. Industry is still grappling with the issue of how to effectively monitor pilots 

with known training issues. 

Dealing with repeat failures 

Public and congressional interest in this topic tends to focus on misperceptions of what 

constitutes a “failure.” Participants generally agreed that check ride failures reflect not 

just the individual pilot, but also the overall training system. In this area, however, there 

is inherently an organizational tension between air carrier management and labor 

organization representatives, who stressed their obligation to ensure that every pilot has 

every opportunity to succeed. 

Topic 3: Professional Standards & Flight Discipline 

Corporate & labor expectations

Recognize that context and norms have changed. Changes driven by economic realities 

have significantly eroded morale in the pilot profession, and undermined both its appeal 

and its possibilities as a lifetime career. Another challenge is that “Generation X” 

employees have different values and work ethics – they tend to be loyal to individuals 

rather than to companies. In the words of one participant, these various factors have 

helped created a “fatigue of the profession itself” which, along with high turnover rates 

and diminished trust, complicates efforts to promote and sustain corporate/labor 

expectations for professionalism. They have also led to rigid contract provisions on use 

of sick leave and other quality-of-life elements. Lack of trust is a key problem: 

presumptions of ill-will not only lead to such multiple layers of protections, but they also 

engender mistrust and undermine a collective safety culture mentality. 

Strengthen professional standards committees. Professional standards committees (PSC) 

can play a vital role. They can stress adherence to established codes of ethics, offer an 

outlet for information sharing, and provide peer pressure for appropriate behaviors. 

Some suggested that PSCs should be an element in ASAP programs. The challenge – 

especially in light of the context described above – is to ensure appropriate representation 

on the PSC. Pilots who “moonlight” to make ends meet have little time or incentive to 

volunteer for PSC-type work. Though it could be logistically difficult to implement, 

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some suggested that management could free more experienced pilots to participate in the 

PSC by providing incentives. This approach could serve multiple goals if the “vacated” 

flying slots could then be directed to newly-qualified pilots on reserve who (per earlier 

discussion) need flying time to maintain their freshly acquired knowledge and skills. 

Communicating, demonstrating, and ensuring appropriate behavior 

Consider new approaches. One air carrier reported that it is instituting a required 

CRM/TEM training program for all of its employees, starting with management, and 

continuing with check airmen before moving to line pilots. The idea is to promote safety 

culture and concepts of professionalism at all levels, and convey the concept that it starts 

at the top but includes everyone. 

Topic 4: Mentoring 

Mainline / Partner Relationships - Pilot-to-Pilot Relationships

Joint Strategic Councils. One approach to mentoring is to establish JSCs within a 

“family” of carriers (mainline and regional partner(s)). This approach could lead to 

individual as well as corporate mentoring relationships. 

PSC Safety Conferences. These events also provide an opportunity for two-way 

mentoring. Washington participants agreed that it is vital to avoid behaviors that promote 

a “second-class” mentality, and to avoid promoting the notion of regional carriers as the 

“farm team” to traditional mainline carriers. 

Benchmarking

Washington participants suggested using data from ASAP, FOQA, and LOSA to improve 

AQP and other training programs. 

Academic Program Contacts

ALPA reported that it is restructuring its membership and education committee to be 

more interactive with university aviation programs. 

Ideas for Further Exploration (not discussed in detail on July 21)

• Make better use of Multi-Crew License concept 

• Harmonize US and European ATP certificate requirements 

• Include NTSB in safety forum 

• Upgrade technology for easier data-sharing (i.e., bridge from proprietary systems) 

Expand ASAP to include field services (e.g., MOU with ground crews) 

DCA-4 

Appendix 8

66
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action: 

Presentation to:

Name:

Date:

Safety Forum Participants

Joint Presentation Team

Summer 2009

Safety Forum on 

Airline Safety & Pilot Training

Federal Aviation

Administration

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Introductions

• Team Lead – FAA

• Team Lead – Air Carrier

• Team Lead – Labor

• Participants

Appendix 8

67
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Safety Forum Agenda

• Welcome & Introductions

• Safety Forum Structure

• Presentation

• Call to Action summary

• Commitments

• FAA, Air Carriers, Labor

• Group Discussion

• Focus Questions

• Summary & Wrap-up

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

How Can We Ignore These Facts?

03/22/09: FedEx MD-11 at Narita 

02/25/09: THY B737-800 at Amsterdam

O2/12/09: Colgan 3407, dba Continental Connection at Buffalo

01/27/09: Empire

01/15/09: USAirways 1549 at New York

12/20/08: Continental B737-500 at Denver

02/18/07: Shuttle America (Continental Connection) ERJ-170 Cleveland 

12/16/07: Air Wisconsin (US Airways Express) CRJ-200, Providence

08/27/06: Comair CRJ-2 at Lexington

Appendix 8

68
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

What the Public Remembers

• January 15, 2009 

• “Miracle on the Hudson”

• February 12, 2009

• Colgan 3407

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Safety in the Spotlight

• Rep. Peter A. DeFazio (D., Ore.) said the FAA has set a 

"low bar" for minimum safety standards. "We've got to 

stop the race to the bottom. It's time for action...We need 

to set a much, much higher minimum bar."

• Rep. Jerry F. Costello (D., Ill.), chairman of the aviation 

subcommittee of the House Transportation Committee.

• Mr. Costello opened a hearing on the crash by 

pledging to draft legislation as early as Thursday.

• "I am concerned these issues could be symptomatic of 

a larger trend driven by economic pressures." He 

added that Congress must ensure that smaller, 

regional airlines and major carriers are adhering to the 

same safety standards.

Appendix 8

69
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

What Are the Issues?

Experience

Training

Professionalism

Discipline

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action – June 15, 2009

• I am issuing a “Call to Action” for the 

industry and Federal Aviation 

Administration to come together to 

identify a few key initiatives regarding 

pilot training, cockpit discipline and 

other areas that can be voluntarily 

incorporated by operators. 

• History has shown that we implement safety improvements far 

more quickly and effectively when we work together on problems 

and their solutions.

Appendix 8

70
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action Topics

• Air Carrier Management 

Responsibilities for Crew 

Education & Support

• Training Standards & 

Performance

• Professional Standards & 

Flight Discipline

• Mentoring

Air Carrier Management 

Responsibilities for Crew 

Education & Support

Training Standards & 

Performance

Professional Standards & 

Flight Discipline

Mentoring

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action Topics

• Air Carrier Management Responsibilities for Crew 

Education & Support

• Safety Culture

• Hiring and Screening

• Training

• Professional Development

Appendix 8

71
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action Topics

• Air Carrier Management 

Responsibilities – Safety Culture

• Corporate safety culture

• Risk management meetings

• Training for key positions

• “Just” culture

• (including fatigue policies)

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action Topics

• Air Carrier Management Responsibilities –

Hiring and Screening

• Review entire process:

• Pre-hire

• Schoolhouse

• Probation & Post-probation

• Upgrade

• Make use of pilot histories (database)

• Perform “gap analysis”

• Hire for certain levels

Appendix 8

72
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action Topics

• Air Carrier Management 

Responsibilities – Training

• Role of “experience” in training

• Quantity (“high time”) vs. 

“quality” (train to proficiency)

• Leadership and human factors

• Data-driven trend analysis

• Observable/“trainable” behaviors

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action Topics

• Time and experience required 

before upgrade

• Crew pairing

• Multi-crew license

• Air Carrier Management Responsibilities –

Professional Development (“Seasoning”)

Appendix 8

73
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action Topics

• Initial training

• Performance monitoring

• Dealing with repeat failures

• Training standards & performance

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action Topics

• Training standards & performance

Initial training

• Training paradigm shift

• airmanship vs automation

• Training time

• Use of data / simulation

• CRM and TEM

Appendix 8

74
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action Topics

• Training standards & performance

Performance monitoring

• Data analysis & use

• FOQA, ASAP, LOSA

• Rapid feedback

• Training Review Board

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action Topics

• Training standards & performance

Repeat failures

• Maximum number of failures?

• SAFO 06015

• Focused Inspection

• Training Review Board

Appendix 8

75
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action Topics

• Corporate expectations

• Labor expectations

• Professional standards & flight discipline

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action Topics

• Professional standards & flight discipline

Corporate expectations

• PIC “versus” CRM

• University aviation programs

• Voluntary credentialing

• Leadership training

Appendix 8

76
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action Topics

• Professional standards & flight discipline

Labor expectations

• Professional standards 

committee

• Code of ethics

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action Topics

• Mentoring

• Mainline / Partner 

Relationships

• Pilot-to-Pilot Relationships

• Benchmarking

• Academic Program Contacts

Appendix 8

77
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action - Commitments

• ARC to make recommendations for 

science-based NPRM on flight & rest

• Current approaches in ICAO

• Fatigue education

• Fatigue prevention strategies

• Countermeasures

• Fatigue Review Board

• Duty day based on fatigue science

• Fatigue Rulemaking

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action - Commitments

• Meet with directors of operations & safety, 

and company officials responsible for flight 

crewmember training and qualification 

• Additional inspections to validate that 

carrier’s training and qualification programs 

meet standards.

• Focused Inspection Initiative:

Appendix 8

78
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action - Commitments

• Using results from initial elements of the 

focused inspection initiative, FAA will 

develop a SAFO to provide guidance on 

conducting a comprehensive training 

program review. 

• This guidance will describe the training 

program review in the context of a 

safety management system and its role 

in a corporate safety culture.

• Training Program Review Guidance

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action - Commitments

• To address issues in the professional 

standards and flight discipline area, 

FAA will develop and seek industry 

comments on draft guidance for 

creating a range of mentoring 

programs. 

• These can include first officer to 

first officer, captain to captain; and 

captain “curing” programs. 

• Mentoring

Appendix 8

79
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action - Commitments

• FAA will conduct a series of at least 

10 “road shows” to discuss Call to 

Action initiatives, listen to 

stakeholder comments, and seek 

additional ideas. 

• Road Shows (aka Safety Forum)

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action - Commitments

• Crew Training Requirements

• Subpart N & O revision

• NPRM on Qualification, Service, and Use 

of Crewmembers & Aircraft Dispatchers

• Intended to enhance traditional training 

programs by:

• Requiring use of flight simulation 

training devices for flight crewmembers

• Including additional training 

requirements in areas critical to safety. 

Appendix 8

80
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action – Commitments Requested

• Air carriers should 

implement a policy of 

asking pilot applicants for 

voluntary disclosure of 

FAA records, including 

notices of disapproval for 

evaluation events.

• Pilot Records

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

• Air carriers should:

• Establish flight operations 

quality assurance (FOQA) 

and Aviation Safety Action 

Program (ASAP) programs

• Develop data analysis 

processes to ensure 

effective use of this 

information.

• FOQA and ASAP

Call to Action – Commitments Requested

Appendix 8

81
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

• Contract Provisions

• Air carriers who have contractual 

relationships with partner carriers 

should seek specific ways to 

ensure that those carriers adopt 

and implement the most effective 

practices for safety. 

• Major airlines should hold periodic 

meetings with partner airlines to 

review data and emphasize shared 

safety philosophy.

Call to Action – Commitments Requested

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

• Labor organizations should: 

• Establish and support 

professional standards 

and ethics committees that 

will develop peer audit and 

review procedures

• Professional standards and ethics committees

Call to Action – Commitments Requested

Appendix 8

82
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

• Labor organizations should:

• Establish and publish a code of 

ethics that includes 

expectations for professional 

behavior, standards of conduct 

for professional appearance, 

and overall fitness to fly

• Code of Ethics

Call to Action – Commitments Requested

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

• Labor organizations should:

• Support periodic safety risk 

management meetings between 

FAA and mainline and regional 

carriers to promote the most 

effective practices, including:

• Periodic analysis of FOQA and 

ASAP data

• Emphasis on identifying 

enhancements to the training 

program

• Safety Meetings

Call to Action – Commitments Requested

Appendix 8

83
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action – Safety Forum

• Purposes

• Provide information

• Solicit ideas

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Ground Rules & Expectations

Candor 

Courtesy

Confidentiality

Other ideas?

Appendix 8

84
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action Topics

• Air Carrier Management Responsibilities for Crew 

Education & Support

• Safety Culture

• Screening & Hiring

• Training

• Professional Development

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action Topics

• Training standards & 

performance

• Initial training

• Performance monitoring

• Dealing with repeat failures

Appendix 8

85
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action Topics

• Professional standards & 

flight discipline

• Corporate expectations

• Labor expectations

• Communicating, demonstrating, 

and ensuring appropriate behavior

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Call to Action Topics

• Mentoring

• Mainline / Partner Relationships

• Pilot-to-Pilot Relationships

• Benchmarking

• Academic Program Contacts

Appendix 8

86
Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Safety Forum Focus Questions

• Other ideas?

Federal Aviation

Administration

Call to Action Safety Forum – Summer 2009

Summary & Next Steps

• Website – feedback

• https://partners.mitre.org/sites/CallToAction/default.aspx

• On June 15, the FAA hosted a "Call to Action" for industry and FAA to 

jointly identify a few key initiatives regarding pilot training, cockpit 

discipline and other areas that can be voluntarily incorporated by 

operators. Twelve regional meetings are being held to share the 

ideas developed at the Call to Action, discuss how to implement 

these, and seek additional ideas. This collaboration web site has 

been established to share key source material supporting those 

regional meetings and provide a capability for the aviation community 

to submit additional comments, issues, and ideas that will move this 

topic forward. 

• Final report

Appendix 8

87
Appendix 9 

Material Submitted by Air Line Pilots Association 
September 2009 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring 

Air Line Pilots Association, 

International

September 2009

Appendix 9 - 1
i Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot September 2009

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................... i

Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1

The Need to Improve Pilot Screening, Hiring, Training, and Mentoring ................................ 3

Training Providers .................................................................................................................... 10

Conclusions ................................................................................................................................ 13

Recommendations ..................................................................................................................... 16

Appendix 1, Typical Pilot Career Progression ......................................................................... 20

Appendix 2, Comparison of Licensing Requirements ............................................................. 21

Appendix 3, Examples of Accidents in Which Pilot Training and Performance 

Deficiencies Were Identified ..................................................................................................... 22

Executive Summary

Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, a number of factors have converged that 

challenge the assumptions underlying the current processes used for airline pilot screening, 

hiring, training, and mentoring. The purpose of this paper is to explore the status quo and offer 

recommendations on ways in which regulators and industry can work together to improve the 

way industry produces professional airline pilots.

The fallout from September 11 ⎯ consolidation, changes in consumer travel habits, and economic 

uncertainty ⎯ has altered the business models of the mainline airlines. These business models 

now include branded networks that include a greater level of flying being performed by their 

regional feed partners. Code sharing and fee-for-departure (FFD) agreements create a larger 

virtual network, and when passengers purchase tickets from a mainline airline, it is very 

likely, if not certain, that one of their flights will be on a code-share or FFD partner of that 

airline. Passengers deserve, but in many cases are not receiving, an equivalent level of safety 

when buying a mainline ticket and flying on code-share or FFD aircraft.

This same industry turmoil has had a negative effect on the desirability of the airline pilot 

career. Career quality and uncertainty combined with a markedly changed pilot-hiring pool 

has created additional challenges for airline-pilot hiring practices. In short, many pilots in 

the current pool of applicants lack the level of experience that generations of pilots ahead of 

them had when they came into the airlines. In many cases, airlines have not adjusted to hiring 

Appendix 9 - 2
September 2009 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot 1

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

less experienced pilots resulting in deficiencies in airline pilot applicant screening, as well as 

subsequent pilot training and mentoring and ultimately pilot performance. Pilot qualification 

requirements and regulator oversight of airline pilot training in the United States and Canada 

have not kept pace with these industry changes. 

Today’s archaic regulations allow airlines to hire low-experience pilots into the right seat of 

high-speed, complex, swept-wing jet aircraft in what amounts to on-the-job training with paying 

passengers on board. Investigations of recent accidents reveal that safety margins have been 

eroded at some carriers as a result. 

A complete overhaul of pilot selection and training methods is needed. A number of 

recommendations are made herein that can be effectively used to restore the use of pilotapplicant screening processes, institute enhanced training methods, procedures, and devices, 

as well as increase mentoring of pilots by their more experienced colleagues.

Introduction

The best and most important safety feature on any airplane is a well-trained, highly motivated 

and professional pilot. Despite great advances in aircraft technology that have immeasurably 

improved safety, the flight crew is still responsible for making hundreds of decisions on each 

and every flight to operate in the safest manner possible. When an aircraft system malfunctions, 

when severe weather threatens the flight, or when any of dozens of other internal or external 

influences impact the planned operation, the flight crew must quickly and accurately assess 

the situation and take appropriate corrective actions. This can only be safely and effectively 

accomplished by pilots trained to the highest standards.

The phrase “low-experience pilot” is used extensively in this paper. As used herein, it refers 

specifically to a pilot who is hired by an airline to operate the controls of an aircraft with 

limited or minimal operational knowledge, skills, 

professionalism, and/or proficiency to do so in a manner 

that does not compromise safety. It is a subjective 

definition by design. A high-time pilot may, for example, 

be a “low-experience” airline pilot if nearly all of his 

previous flight time has been accumulated in small, slow, 

single-engine aircraft. A low-time pilot may not meet the 

definition of a “low-experience” pilot if, for example, he or 

she has had sufficient education, training, and flight time 

in transport category aircraft or simulators, and brings 

a very professional approach to the flight deck. 

A distinction is also made between airline flying and 

all other types of flying, a distinction that the Federal 

Aviation Regulations do not consistently make. For 

example, a pilot who obtains a commercial pilot’s license 

Appendix 9 - 3
2 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot September 2009

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

by meeting just the barest minimum requirements may legally be employed by a banner tow 

company, a sightseeing operation, or as a first officer at an airline. However, the safety of 

the traveling public demands that airlines hold their pilots to the highest possible standards. 

Airline pilots should be held to a higher standard of competency, knowledge, and training 

than pilots in other flight operations.

Flying today’s complex airline aircraft in very congested and complicated airspace is a 

challenging undertaking by even experienced pilots. For reasons that will be discussed in 

this paper, low-experience pilots are hired by some airlines and expected to operate in these 

conditions without the benefit of learning the art of airmanship and gaining experience under 

the tutelage of veteran pilots over a protracted period as was historically the case. 

Not surprisingly, these pilots, who perform 

as well as their experience, knowledge, and 

skills will permit, often exhibit deficiencies in 

the following areas, which ultimately impact 

safety:

• The ability to resolve differences 

between a flight simulator, which 

may be used in a majority of flight 

training, and an actual aircraft 

carrying passengers.

• Ability to configure the aircraft in 

a timely manner and in accordance 

with company procedures under a 

variety of conditions and situations.

• Achieving a stabilized approach by maintaining strict airspeed and vertical path 

parameters when ATC gives a clearance to conduct a visual approach.

• Adapting to last-minute changes required by ATC, or rapid changes in weather 

conditions, especially near the airport in high-workload situations.

• Demonstrating situational awareness during line flight operations.

• Ability to efficiently and effectively communicate and understand ATC voice 

communications while operating the aircraft.

• Ability to prioritize and integrate company dispatch requirements and maintenance 

reporting tasks into the operation of the aircraft with passengers on board. 

• Acting in a professional manner at all times.

Deficiencies can place an extraordinary amount of pressure on the captain, who may not have 

a great deal of flight experience him/herself, to instruct and mentor while performing other 

requisite duties.

Appendix 9 - 4
September 2009 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot 3

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

The Need to Improve Pilot Screening, Hiring, Training, and Mentoring 

In order to improve pilot performance there must first be an understanding of the current 

challenges surrounding pilot workforce and training issues including regulatory shortcomings, 

and airline screening, hiring, training, and mentoring practices.

The Impact of the Mainline Airlines’ Business Model 

Mainline airlines are frequently faced with pressures on their marketing plan that result in 

the use of their regional feed code-share or FFD partners, whether it be economic, passenger 

demand, or essential air service. These code-share or FFD airlines provide this service and feed 

the mainline carriers through their hub cities. Before the practice of code-sharing or FFD with 

regional partners, virtually all flying was done by the pilots of that airline. The pilots of the 

airline were all trained to and met the same higher-than-minimum regulatory standards.

Code-share and FFD agreements typically result in the mainline carriers exerting a great 

deal of pressure on the regional airlines to provide their service at the lowest possible price. 

The mainline airlines grant these outsourcing code-share and FFD contracts to the regional 

carriers for short periods (e.g., two to seven years). As a result, the overriding concern by the 

regional carriers has become lowering costs to today’s substandard levels to prevent being 

replaced by another airline at the end of their contract. Most recently, some larger regional 

carriers have subcontracted with smaller regional airlines to operate these routes for them. 

This results in the mainline carrier’s brand name and paint scheme being used by a third 

party. In some extreme cases, airlines are outsourcing a majority of their routes to regional 

airlines and furloughing their own pilots. This in essence is replacing their experienced pilots 

with low-experience pilots flying for the low-paying regional operator, all under the livery of 

an established brand. This creates a very unstable career environment for pilots, resulting in 

cycles of furloughs and terminations, stress, and fatigue. 

Aircraft leasing and fuel costs are relatively fixed expenses, which leaves labor and training 

costs as variables in which the smaller carrier may have some ability to decrease its costs to 

service the route. 

It is not uncommon that training at such carriers is conducted only to FAA-required minimums. 

However, these low-experience pilots obviously need more training than more experienced 

airline pilots to gain equivalent knowledge of the operating environment, aircraft, and 

procedures before flying the line.

Regulators should require that airlines implement Safety Management Systems (SMS) 

to develop a safety culture that develops mitigations to the risks created by the main-line 

business model.

The Changed Airline Entry-Level Pilot Demographic

Entry-level pilots hired by the airlines over the past few years in the United States and Canada 

generally have less experience than the pilots that airlines hired in prior years. In some cases, 

Appendix 9 - 5
4 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot September 2009

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

pilots barely meet regulatory minimums as commercial pilots. As explained in this paper, 

unless significant changes are made, this trend of hiring pilots with less and less experience 

is expected to continue well into the future.

The number of people pursuing a career as an airline pilot has decreased significantly because 

of the high cost of training, low initial pay, and uncertain career prospects. The military, once 

a reliable source of highly experienced pilots, now trains considerably fewer pilots and retains 

more of its pilots who choose to remain in the service. 

Because there are fewer experienced pilots available for hire, many airlines have lowered their 

minimum hiring requirements. In some cases, the hiring requirements have been lowered to 

the minimum allowable to acquire a commercial pilot license (see Appendix 2). 

Historically, airlines have required thousands of hours of flight experience before they would 

consider hiring a pilot to serve as a first officer. Although even the major airlines have hired 

low-time pilots when the pool of experienced pilots was diminished (e.g., during Vietnam War), 

they were hired as flight engineers and they learned the trade by watching highly experienced 

pilots operate the controls. Once employed, the pilot progressed by system seniority, which 

offered the advantage of exposing the pilot to a variety of aircraft experiences, while being 

mentored by senior pilots, prior to being awarded a captain’s position. However, there are 

few flight engineer positions remaining, and the overall pilot progression has undergone a 

significant compression at many carriers (see Appendix 1). 

The regional airlines, and more recently some mainline carriers, are now accepting pilot 

candidates with much less flying experience than before. Some airlines are employing pilots who 

possess the bare minimum licenses and ratings to fill the right seat while carrying passengers 

on board. In addition, the rapid progression to captain at some airlines, due to pilot turnover, 

means that opportunities for mentoring by seasoned pilots have been significantly reduced. 

Although many airlines are presently furloughing pilots due to the recession, the long-term 

forecast is for greatly increased hiring to start soon and continue for many years. The airline 

industry is struggling with how it will find enough pilots to fill the needs. According to Boeing 

Training and Flight Services (previously called Alteon), airlines around the world will need 

to hire some 367,600 pilots, 17,000 per year, between 2005 and 2024 just to support new 

aircraft deliveries.1

 According to Boeing, no region of the world will need more pilots than 

North America over the next 20 years. The U.S. and Canada have about 64,000 jetliner pilots 

today, but will need more than 128,000 by 2025.2

Ultimately, working conditions, compensation, and benefits will need to improve significantly 

in order to draw a sufficient number of new pilots into the profession. New training methods 

alone will not be able to attract enough people to the profession to fill the projected pilot needs 

through 2025. 

1

Robert W. Moorman, “Express to the Sky,” Air Transport World, March 2007. 2

James Wallace, “Boeing Unit Tries to Speed Pilot Training to Fill High Demand,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, April 30, 2007.

Appendix 9 - 6
September 2009 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot 5

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

Weakened Pilot Applicant Screening 

Many airlines in the past had an extensive screening process that included background checks, 

psychological tests, academic knowledge tests, simulator flying skill evaluations and medical 

exams. Over the past several years, airlines have phased out many of these screening processes 

due to their associated costs, and because it has become increasingly more difficult to find an 

adequate number of qualified pilots.

However, those processes helped the airlines select only the individuals who were qualified and 

exhibited the qualities to be motivated, safe, and professional pilots. Pilots who did not possess 

these qualities were not hired. It is inappropriate to lower the hiring standards to compensate 

for the lack of individuals with those qualities. Airlines need to return to the practice of using 

appropriate and thorough screening processes to help ensure that their new-hires have the 

skills, knowledge, and professionalism necessary to fly scheduled operations. 

Inadequate First Officer Regulatory Requirements

The U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) and Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) 

are less rigorous than their European counterparts concerning certification requirements for 

pilots who may be hired as commercial airline pilots (see Appendix 2). The U.S. and Canadian 

regulations require minimal academic achievement and, depending on the training certification 

regulation used, only 250 and 200 hours respectively of total flight time, with none of it 

required in the type of aircraft or operating environment that today’s new-hire airline pilots 

will experience. When those regulations were written, which have not been significantly revised 

in decades, it was never envisioned that they would be used as minimum requirements for 

new-hire first officers on highly complex turbine-powered aircraft. 

U.S. FAR 121.437(b) requires that pilots acting as second-in-command (SIC) of aircraft 

requiring two pilots possess at least a commercial pilot certificate, an instrument rating, and 

an appropriate class rating such as a multiengine class rating but not a type rating. Until 

recently, this applied to both domestic and international operations. However, International 

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex I, Chapter 2, paragraph 2.1.3.2, establishes an 

aircraft type-rating standard for both the captain and SIC. The FAA elected not to follow this 

standard for many years under the requirements of FAR 121.437, which only required a type 

rating of the captain.

In 2004, the FAA, in an effort to conform to ICAO standards, began requiring that all pilots 

who fly internationally as a required crewmember have an SIC type rating. These “SIC type 

ratings” ensured that both captains and SICs held the appropriate certificates under ICAO 

standards when operating outside of the United States. For those who fly only domestically, 

the SIC has the option of not completing the full type-rating requirements and receive an “SIC 

Privileges Only” type-rating endorsement instead. There is no practical test required for the 

issuance of the “SIC Privileges Only” pilot type rating.

While ICAO-compliant, not all regulators require an equivalent amount of academic study 

and testing to qualify for a Commercial Pilot License (CPL). As already mentioned, the Joint 

Appendix 9 - 7
6 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot September 2009

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

Aviation Authority (JAA), now called the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), is an 

excellent example. The single biggest difference between EASA and FAA and Transport Canada 

(TC) standards for the CPL are their respective knowledge requirements (see Appendix 2). The 

FAA and Transport Canada theoretical knowledge requirements are simply not as demanding. 

For example, the FAA has no minimum number of hours for ground school; TC has 80 hours, 

whereas EASA requires 500 hours. In addition, EASA has multiple written exams, while 

FAA requires only one, which is a single multiple-choice exam that can be completed in a very 

short time. Sitting for the EASA written exams requires approximately 30−40 hours. The FAA 

actually publishes its written-exam questions, and vendors legally provide what they believe 

to be the correct answers. This allows a student to buy a book and memorize the questions and 

answers without ever actually studying the material from which the questions were drawn. 

EASA, conversely, does not provide its written exam questions in advance. 

Similar discrepancies exist for the Airline Transport Pilot License (ATP) (see Appendix 2). 

While the FAA and TC specify no minimum number of ground school hours, EASA requires 

750 hours. Again, there are multiple exams by EASA and only one by the FAA and TC, with 

the FAA once again publishing its exam questions and vendors providing the likely answers. 

In addition, because the FAA and TC require only a single written exam for each license, it 

is theoretically possible a pilot could miss all questions in a particular area (e.g., weight and 

balance) for a license and still pass and become an airline pilot. During the flight skills test, 

ICAO’s ATP standards require an applicant to perform as pilot-in-command (PIC) of a multipilot, multi-engine airplane with a copilot, and EASA’s ATP requires the applicant to show 

proficiency in operating as copilot on multi-pilot, multi-engine airplanes. Neither the FAA nor 

TC requires an ATP applicant to show proficiency in a multi-pilot airplane, either as a copilot 

or as the PIC with a copilot. 

It is clear that FAA and TC regulations governing the training and education of future 

airline pilots are inadequate. We believe that not only will more rigorous academic and skills 

instruction, testing, and evaluations increase pilot performance, they will also help to cultivate 

pilot professionalism. ALPA believes that the current training and testing required for a pilot 

to qualify as a first officer for a passenger or cargo airline operating under FAR Part 121 or 

CAR 705 should be more rigorous. In addition, the “SIC Privileges Only” type rating should 

be eliminated from the FARs.

The current FAA regulations put first officers’ recurrent training on a 12-month schedule 

whereas captains are on a six-month schedule. Compounding this disparity is the fact that 

some U.S. airlines forgo actual recurrent “training” in the simulator on every other recurrent 

cycle, or in some cases even more often. When the recurrent training is skipped, both captains 

and first officers are merely given a simulator flight test called a proficiency check (PC) without 

any warm-up practice time to get used to the differences between the simulator and the aircraft 

and more importantly without any actual training provided, only evaluation. 

With the first officers’ 12-month training cycle and alternate sessions being merely a PC, it 

could be two years before a first officer received any flight training in a simulator following his 

Appendix 9 - 8
September 2009 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot 7

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

or her initial training. The effective result, if every other recurrent training event is replaced 

with a PC, is that first officers receive one-fourth of the training that captains receive in that 

two-year cycle before a first officer receives additional flight training. Even if every recurrent 

training event included flight training in a simulator, the first officer still receives only half 

as much training due to his or her 12-month schedule. A good step toward providing better 

training for first officers is the FAA’s Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) published in 

January 2009, which proposes nine-month training intervals for both captains and first officers 

and requires pairing captains with first officers for training and evaluation. 

Airline Training Programs⎯Not All Created Equal

There is a growing realization based on what has been learned in a few more recent accident 

investigations (see Appendix 3) and also from our members’ experience, that some of the 

carriers’ training programs are insufficient to ensure that their pilots can perform all their 

duties proficiently before flying with paying passengers on board. Some airlines, rather than 

training to competency and proficiency, are training to FAA minimums, and safety issues are 

becoming apparent as a result. The traveling public deserves, but is not receiving, One Level 

of Safety among all airlines.

Few airlines tailor their training programs based on their new-hires’ past flying experience. 

The low-experience new-hire pilot’s background should be taken into account by the airlines 

and training adjusted accordingly. “One-size-fits-all” training is inadequate in today’s 

environment.

Some airlines⎯including both mainline and regional carriers⎯provide their pilots training 

that far exceeds the minimal requirements of the regulations. When pilot experience at the 

new-hire level dropped, these airlines extended their training programs and increased, by a 

factor of two or more over that required by regulations, the initial operating experience (IOE) 

program for these pilots to compensate. However, some carriers who hire low-experience pilots 

are not adjusting their training accordingly. 

The airlines hiring low-experience pilots typically do not offer compensation packages enabling 

them to attract experienced pilots. Such carriers often serve as the “training” grounds for 

new-entrant pilots who need to build time before applying to one of the mainline carriers. In 

addition to compensation, another aspect that can suffer at these carriers is the training that 

they provide to their pilots. This is of significant concern since the training for low-experience 

pilots should be more thorough than the training programs for experienced pilots. 

Airlines with very thin profit margins may have increased pressure to treat training as a cost 

item because they are unable to quantify the return on investment to train beyond regulatory 

minimums and pressure from competing airlines that have already cut their costs through 

reduced training. Given the high cost of training, airlines are motivated to provide it as 

quickly and cheaply as possible. It is an undesirable race to the bottom for minimum-required 

training.

Appendix 9 - 9
8 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot September 2009

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

Another factor complicating the effort to train pilots to proficiency is that over the past few 

decades, there has been a significant increase in the number of specific items that must be 

trained and/or checked with no change in the minimum hours required by regulation for the 

training. Simulator periods that were scheduled for four hours 40 years ago are still four hours 

in length, despite the fact that now there are many more topics that must be covered than 

before⎯such as Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT), Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance 

System (TCAS), Head-Up Displays (HUD), Category II/III operations, wind shear, area 

navigation (RNAV), upset recovery training, and more. This makes it difficult to find time to 

practice maneuvers that were performed marginally but to the required minimums. 

At one regional airline, initial CRJ training is comprised of nine Full Flight Simulator (FFS) 

periods in 36 hours of training. For purposes of comparison, in 1979 a major airline’s DC-9 

transition course was comprised of 19 FFS periods, or 76 hours, followed by an airborne element 

of three takeoffs and landings. 

It should be noted that the NPRM mentioned previously proposes that recurrent simulator 

training be increased from four hours to eight. If adopted, this will help ensure more thorough 

training and put airlines already training to well above minimum requirements on a more 

level playing field with those training to minimums. Some of the pressure to decrease training 

at airlines already providing more than the minimum required training may be relieved. 

This pressure is caused by competitors cutting their costs by training only to the minimum 

requirements and potentially allowing them to cut ticket prices, but at the expense of pilot 

training and ultimately safety.

Airlines should continually evaluate their training programs and make adjustments where 

appropriate. This continuous training program improvement effort should include collecting 

and examining de-identified safety data from the airline’s flight operations in a way that will 

spot deficiencies specific to pilot experience levels. This data should then be used to develop 

and implement appropriate training improvements in a proactive manner.

Command Training

An airline captain must have skills far beyond simply being able to operate the aircraft from 

the captain’s seat. The captain must be able to organize the efficient cooperative activity of 

all flight crew, cabin crew, and ground crew to ensure the safe planning and conduct of the 

flight from gate to gate. He or she must be able to maintain control of situations under adverse 

conditions and in the face of pressure to compromise standards in the interest of operational 

expediency. The need to maintain command authority has arguably increased due to the 

continuing decline in experience levels of other crewmembers. 

Airlines should be required to provide specific command training courses for new captains to 

instill in them the skills to lead on the flight deck. In addition to basic skills such as aeronautical 

decision making and crew resource management, new captains should receive training to 

reinforce effective communication, leadership, conflict resolution, and judgment necessary to 

properly lead a crew, exercise command authority, and maintain the highest levels of safety 

in the face of internal or external pressures.

Appendix 9 - 10
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Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

Mentoring

Mentoring is a form of instructing in which seasoned pilots share their experiences to help 

newer pilots increase their proficiency. In many cases, this mentoring takes the form of captains 

mentoring first officers, but could also be an experienced first officer providing counsel to a 

new-hire on company policies, piloting technique, aircraft systems, etc. Much of this mentoring 

can be informal if pilots have the opportunity to interact away from the actual flight, but 

can and should also be formalized in the interest of transferring the maximum amount of 

knowledge across experience levels. This training must go beyond just written statements in 

the airline’s manuals. 

Captains should be taught to be cognizant of the standardization and tempo of the flight deck. 

A first officer may be challenged not only by the complexity of the aircraft and operational 

environment, but also by flying with different captains who may not use similar operating 

procedures or set a rushed or fast tempo on the flight deck. As a first officer finds himself or 

herself operating outside of familiar operating procedures, they tend to lose confidence. Captains 

may incorrectly identify this situation as a lack of proficiency by the first officer. 

Airlines should consider as part of their mentoring program incorporating a process that 

includes a private, non-recorded critique by the captain of the first officer’s performance. This 

should not be used as a means to discipline or punish first officers, but as a way to enhance 

their training and ultimately their skills and professionalism.

Airline Instructor Training and Selection

Although regulations stipulate that airlines must train their instructors and evaluators, the 

training given them is often somewhat superficial. Regulators need to increase the ground 

school and testing requirements to qualify to be an airline instructor. Instructors of lowexperience pilots must be thoroughly familiar with flight operations and have considerable 

knowledge of instructional techniques and curriculum design. Since there is a growing trend 

toward a shorter period between the acquisition of aeronautical skills and the need to perform 

as an effective crewmember in airline operations, the instructors and evaluators at airlines 

also need to possess knowledge in primary training techniques. Future airline instructors may 

have to possess current flight instructor certificates, and airlines provide training to their 

instructors to ensure that they maintain the skill set necessary for primary flight training.

Motivated instructors and evaluators are central to preparing well-trained airline pilots. 

The airlines must staff their Training departments with individuals who have demonstrated 

abilities to instruct. 

Airline Management Structure 

Many accidents and incidents highlight pilot training as a contributing factor (reference 

Appendix 3 for examples). Currently the FAA requires airlines to have five management 

positions: director of Safety, director of Operations, director of Maintenance, a chief pilot, and 

a chief inspector. The agency should require another position, director of Pilot Training, to 

be specifically responsible for the functions, content, and direct oversight of the pilot training 

program. This function would help ensure that pilot training programs at each airline keep 

Appendix 9 - 11
10 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot September 2009

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

pace with the changes due to such factors as the experience levels of pilots being hired, new 

regulatory training requirements, industry recommendations, and other issues. 

Training Providers

A person interested in learning to fly has many available options. Most flight training in 

the United States and Canada is provided through four avenues: colleges/universities; flight 

training organizations (FTOs); Fixed Base Operators (FBOs); and the military. Each of these 

various pilot training providers have their 

own set of positive and negative attributes, 

but they can all produce well-qualified and 

experienced pilots.

Historically, pilots have followed one of 

two predominant paths to be hired by an 

airline: civilian or military. Both paths 

required significant commitments of time 

and sacrifice. 

If an aspiring airline pilot chooses the 

civilian route, he or she obtains a commercial 

pilot certificate⎯after earning the private 

pilot license⎯plus an instrument rating, 

multiengine rating, and often a flight instructor certificate, all of which can cost in excess of 

$50,000, typically at their own expense. Until recently, after getting these certificates and 

ratings, the individual might have been able to get a job flight instructing, flying a light twinengine aircraft for a charter company, freight company, or get a corporate flying position. Once 

turbojet experience could be placed on the resume, the prospective pilot became competitive 

enough to apply as first officer with a regional, national, or major airline. This process often 

took years to complete, with the pilot gaining a wide variety of experience in the process (see 

Appendix 1). However, in the last few years, this career path has been severely truncated due 

to a shrinking economy and fewer opportunities to build flight time. Because some airlines are 

reducing their hiring requirements to just the regulatory minimums, civilian pilots are being 

hired without the experience they used to get prior to flying for an airline.

Pilots who choose the military route undergo a disciplined flight training program in an 

environment that is essentially “immersion training” where pilot candidates do nothing but 

flight and academic training daily for periods often exceeding a year. Following that, they 

then gain valuable flight experience, oftentimes in high-performance jet aircraft, again in 

an atmosphere of constant training and at no out-of-pocket cost to the pilot. One significant 

difference between this process and the civilian process is that the military pilots’ salary is 

fixed regardless of the amount of flight time logged. Often due to limited military budgets 

or operational needs, a military pilot may log less flying time than his civilian counterpart. 

Additionally, every military flight has some element of training or evaluation involved, even in 

Appendix 9 - 12
September 2009 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot 11

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

combat. In order to maintain pilot proficiency with limited flying time, the military provides a 

significant amount of ground training when pilots are not actually flying. This takes the form 

of formal classroom sessions, structured simulator training, and, equally important, “hangar 

flying” sessions where pilots exchange experiences; that is, undergo mentoring, gaining from 

each other’s knowledge and each other’s mistakes as well. This produces highly competitive 

candidates for the airlines when the pilot’s military commitment is completed. Even though 

fewer actual flight hours may have been gained in the military, the industry has found that 

pilots from such a rigid training program are well prepared to join the ranks of airline pilots. 

However, as mentioned earlier, unlike in the past, the pool of available military pilots is 

smaller, and many of these pilots are choosing to remain in the military rather than leave to 

fly for the airlines. When one considers that a military pilot may be provided base housing, 

benefits, and a decent salary, it is certainly logical that those pilots would not leave the military 

to earn $16,000 to fly for an airline.

Another method of flight training successfully used by airlines in Europe for many years is 

called ab initio training. Under this scenario, an airline provides all the training required 

for someone with little or no flying experience to be qualified as an SIC for his or her airline. 

Essentially, the airline screens, hires, and trains their future pilots from a pool of very qualified 

individuals in exchange for a work commitment of multiple years. To date, this method has 

not been widely used by airlines in the United States or Canada. However, this may change 

as the demand for pilots increases and airlines find it increasingly difficult to find qualified 

pilot candidates.

Although most FTOs are reputable and produce very well trained pilots, there are some who 

have earned reputations as “pilot factories” for their propensity to churn out low-experience 

pilots in a matter of months who exhibit deficiencies such as those mentioned earlier. These 

training organizations meet current regulatory minimum training requirements, which 

highlights the inadequacy of current airline pilot qualification regulations. Advantages to 

these FTOs are that they typically provide the benefit of large training fleets of aircraft and 

simulators, permanent training facilities, and affiliations with airlines that help pilots progress 

to permanent employment after completing training. A problem not exclusive to these FTOs, 

but perhaps more pronounced, is that they typically have a high turnover of instructor pilots 

because the positions are not viewed as a feasible career. Therefore, instructor positions are 

just used as a stepping stone toward building the minimum experience requirements for 

being hired by an airline. This instructor retention problem is more pronounced at the larger 

academies versus other training providers because of the comparatively large number of 

students, resulting in instructors’ building time quickly and transitioning to the airlines as 

first officers in short order. Because of such high turnover, the quality of instruction suffers.

The most desirable benefit to students is preferential hiring offered by the airlines through 

these FTOs, which permits pilots to gain employment with less flight experience than has 

historically been required. For the flight schools, the financial incentive is to complete a 

student’s training in the shortest time and place them with an airline. Some airlines pay fees 

to the academies to help ensure a steady stream of applicants.

Appendix 9 - 13
12 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot September 2009

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

While large FTOs have produced many good pilots, they have also exposed weaknesses in the 

certification and evaluation process. Some academies lack a formal or adequate ground school. 

Typically, only pre- and post-flight briefings are conducted and minimal ground instruction 

is given to the students just prior to their certification checkride. 

Since some designated flight examiners who work for these large FTOs may make most, 

if not all, of their livelihood from testing student pilots from a single school, there may be 

an implicit incentive and/or pressure from the school or airline to pass students in spite of 

marginal or subpar performance. The FTO may also place some pressure on the examiner to 

pass marginally performing students. Examiners may be influenced by an FTO’s pressure to 

pass students, knowing that they can be replaced at any time. 

Competency-Based Training

In November 2006, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) amended Annex 

1 to include a new grade of pilot certificate called the Multi-crew Pilot License (MPL). The 

MPL is an alternative to traditional training and licensing methodologies and can train a 

candidate with no prior flight experience to be a competent flight crewmember. The MPL 

training program uses a competency-based approach in lieu of the “required-hours” approach 

found in traditional training methodologies and the FARs/CARs. 

The training necessary for a candidate to be issued an MPL or traditional certificates through 

a similar competency-based process may provide benefits when developed and implemented 

properly with adequate regulatory oversight. It may be possible to use these concepts and 

employ other innovative technologies to efficiently train competent flight crewmembers in 

commercial air operations through a focused and expedited training program. To ensure that 

adequate experience is received by the pilot through the MPL process, an airline should be 

linked with an FTO providing such training to pilots to ensure that their SOPs are taught 

and equipment trained on during the entire training process.

Use of Simulators in Training 

Flight simulation has been used for many years to successfully train pilots. Flight simulation 

has not only improved pilot training, it has also reduced the risk associated with learning in 

an aircraft while realizing a significant reduction in the expense of training flights. 

During the past 30 years, regulations have made allowances for training in flight-simulation 

training devices (FSTDs) and full-flight simulators (FFS) for training applied to obtaining pilot 

certificates and airline initial and recurrent training. These devices have improved students’ 

motor skills for learning flight by reference to instruments, automation training, monitoring and 

management, and the handling of irregular and emergency procedures training. FSTDs have 

also allowed for the integration of soft-skills training such as Threat and Error Management 

(TEM), and Crew Resource Management (CRM).

As training continues to move toward total reliance on FSTDs, the advantages of a realworld training environment for pilots will need to be maintained through simulation. This 

Appendix 9 - 14
September 2009 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot 13

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

can be achieved to an extent through FSTD technology advances that have improved sixaxes-of-motion capabilities, visual capabilities, flight control loading, and use of interactive 

ATC communications software. Unfortunately, the one element that cannot be created in a 

simulator is a healthy respect for the potential loss of life and limb that may result from poor 

decisions and/or airmanship.3

Pilot training via simulators is greatly enhanced through the use of motion because it is 

essential to recreate the actual flight environment as closely as possible. In a study conducted 

in 1978, J.R. Hall established that the pilot’s acceptance of a simulator for training in lieu of 

an actual aircraft was dependent on the presence of motion, even if a wide field-of-view visual 

display system was provided.His research concluded that motion was especially important for 

instrument flight, since it provides direct and immediate feedback. 4

 Training must be able to 

mimic the real world in order to determine if the trainee performance level is reduced while 

dealing with stress and distractions that occur on the line.5

A basic limitation of simulators is that they lack fidelity in regimes outside normal flight. 

Advances in simulator fidelity are necessary so that maneuvers such as recovery from full 

aerodynamic stalls can be practiced with greater realism. 

Conclusions

1. Entry-level pilots hired by the airlines over the past few years in the United States 

and Canada, as well as around the world, have less experience than did entry-level 

pilots in the past. 

2. One impact of the mainline’s business model on regional airline pilots is that it 

truncates their progression and allows them to become captains more quickly and 

with less experience than in the past.

3. In the past, low-experience pilots entering the industry would learn a great deal 

about airline flying by serving as a flight engineer. That position rarely exists on 

any aircraft in the United States or Canada anymore.

4. Many experienced pilots have left the profession and are unwilling to return because of the unstable career environment that currently exists. In addition, with 

the projected needs for large numbers of new airline pilots over the next decade 

or so, it is likely there will not be enough experienced/qualified pilots coming up 

through the general aviation and military ranks to meet the airlines’ demands. 

3

“The Need for Motion in Flight Simulation,” ALPA White Paper Statement of Position, September 2007.

4

J. R. Hall, “Motion Versus Visual Cues in Piloted Flight Simulation” (AGARD-CP-249). Paper presented at the 

Flight Mechanics Panel Specialists’ Meeting on Piloted Aircraft Environment Simulation Techniques, Brussels, 

Belgium., April 1978.

5

P. Tsang and M. Vidulich, Introduction, in P. Tsang and M. Vidulich (Eds.), Principles and Practice of Aviation Psychology (pp. 

1−18). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2003.

Appendix 9 - 15
14 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot September 2009

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

This situation, coupled with the cost of training and an insecure career path, makes 

it likely that fewer people will choose the profession. These factors will continue to 

greatly contribute to a sharply reduced pool of experienced pilots from which airlines may hire.

5. Because fewer experienced pilots are available, numerous airlines have chosen to 

lower their hiring requirements, in some cases to the regulatory minimums. 

6. Current regulatory minima were developed decades ago and were based on the 

expected career path and experience progression at that time. The environment 

has changed to where now minima-time pilots are being hired immediately into the 

pilot seat of swept-wing, high-performance jet aircraft.

7. Aviation forecasts indicate a huge demand for 

additional pilots in the industry through 2025, 

which will exacerbate the trend of airlines hiring 

pilots with very little experience. 

8. Low-experience, minima-time pilots struggle to 

perform their flight duties proficiently. These deficiencies can impact margins of safety and place 

an extraordinary amount of pressure on the captain, who may also have limited experience and 

find it difficult to instruct and mentor the first 

officer while performing other requisite duties.

9. New training methods alone will not be able to attract enough people and produce enough qualified 

pilots to the profession to fill the projected pilot 

position openings through 2025. Most airlines do 

not presently offer an attractive, well-compensated, and stable career path. The 

piloting career will need to become dramatically more desirable to attract sufficient 

pilots to the profession to fulfill the projected needs.

10. One-size-fits-all airline training programs are inadequate to address the varied 

experience levels and resultant needs of pilots being hired today. 

11. Airline training deficiencies have been found to be causal factors in several recent 

accidents. 

12. The FAA’s regulatory qualification requirements of a first officer are inadequate 

to ensure that they have the skills and knowledge needed before starting to fly for 

an airline. More rigorous academic and skills training, testing, and evaluation will 

improve pilot performance and help to cultivate pilot professionalism.

Appendix 9 - 16
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Producing a Professional 

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Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

13. The FAA’s recurrent training requirements for first officers can result in them receiving one-fourth the training that captains receive. 

14. Regulatory minimums for initial operating experience for new captains and first 

officers may be inadequate to address the pilot’s level of experience and proficiency.

15. Some airlines have reduced or eliminated many of the valuable screening processes 

used in the past to identify capable and professional pilot candidates.

16. Few airlines provide training on how to mentor less experienced pilots. 

17. Although regulations stipulate that airlines must train their instructors and evaluators, the training given them is somewhat superficial. Motivated instructors and 

evaluators at the airlines are central to preparing well-trained, proficient, and 

professional airline pilots.

18. A continuous training program improvement effort should include collecting and 

examining de-identified safety data from the airline’s flight operations to identify 

deficiencies specific to pilot experience levels.

19. Some Flight Training Organizations (FTOs), referred to as “pilot factories,” churn 

out new pilots after only a few months of training. These pilots are hired as SICs 

immediately upon training completion. The pressure to produce pilots quickly has 

resulted in low-experience pilots flying the line who demonstrate many deficiencies 

and compromise safety.

20. Training programs using a competency-based approach coupled with stringent 

academic curricula in lieu of the “required hours” approach in traditional training methodologies should be explored as a means to better train and qualify those 

pilots coming into the airlines with minimal flight time. 

21. As training continues to move toward greater reliance on FSTDs, the advantages of 

a real-world training environment for pilots will need to be maintained in the simulated environment. Motion appropriate to the task being trained and/or evaluated 

is required because it helps replicate real-world conditions and provides a more 

valuable training experience. In addition, the high-volume ATC communications 

and dense traffic environments that airline pilots encounter must be replicated in 

the simulator.

22. Simulators lack fidelity in regimes outside of normal flight. Simulator fidelity advances are needed so that maneuvers like aerodynamic stalls can be practiced in a 

realistic manner.

Appendix 9 - 17
16 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot September 2009

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

Recommendations

1. All airlines’ initial pilot training programs should provide sufficient training in the 

classroom and simulator to provide pilots with the knowledge and skills necessary 

to perform proficiently prior to initial operating experience (IOE). 

2. Airlines should replace one-size-fits-all training with individualized training that 

focuses on students’ weaknesses and compensates for their varied backgrounds.

3. Regulators should ensure that airlines are training their pilots to proficiency in the 

following areas, which have been identified as particularly problematic for lowexperience pilots:

a. The ability to receive and transmit radio communications with ATC at hightraffic-density airports.

b. The ability to maintain situational awareness of aircraft status and position, 

meteorological conditions, and proximity to other aircraft when accomplishing 

multiple tasks during high-workload environments and while performing irregular or emergency procedures.

c. The ability to achieve a stabilized approach by maintaining strict airspeed and 

vertical path limits when ATC gives a clearance to conduct a visual approach.

d. The ability to react and improvise within the limitations of the aircraft in order 

to accept changes from ATC or as dictated by meteorological conditions.

4. Regulators should implement more rigorous academic requirements, including 

multiple aeronautical knowledge exams to ensure adequate knowledge in all appropriate facets of aviation (e.g., weather, aerodynamics, weight and balance, etc.) for 

a pilot to qualify as a first officer under FAR Part 121 or CAR 705. 

5. FAA should eliminate the “SIC privileges only” rating.

6. First officers should be trained to the same standards and at the same intervals as 

captains.

7. Regulators should require airlines to develop and implement thorough screening 

processes to help ensure that those hired have the aptitude to maintain the highest 

levels of safety, professionalism, and performance. 

8. Airlines should provide aircraft training and practice in both manual mode and in 

varying levels of automated flight modes. An educational focus on remaining vigilant to monitor, track, and manage automation when it is engaged is required. 

Appendix 9 - 18
September 2009 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot 17

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

9. Airlines should provide specific command training courses for new captains to instill in them the skills to lead on the flight deck. In addition to basic skills such as 

aeronautical decision making and crew resource management, new captains should 

receive training to reinforce the skills, aptitudes, judgment, and professionalism 

necessary to properly lead a crew, exercise command authority, and maintain the 

highest levels of safety in the face of internal or external pressures.

10. Regulators should require airlines to develop formal programs to mentor and assist 

in the career development of pilots. 

11. More extensive initial airline indoctrination training programs, including additional IOE and more frequent line observations, are needed to mitigate the deficiencies 

that low-experience pilots exhibit. 

12. Airlines should collect and analyze operational safety data specific to pilot experience levels on an ongoing basis to develop and implement appropriate training 

improvements proactively. 

13. Regulators should increase the ground school and testing requirements to qualify 

to be an airline instructor. Airlines should develop and implement improved instructor screening processes and instructor training to ensure that motivated and 

highly skilled instructors are provided to train their line pilots.

14. Regulators should require that airlines employ a director of Pilot Training who is 

specifically responsible for the functions, content, and direct oversight of the pilot 

training program. 

15. Regulators should ensure that there is an adequate surveillance and audit program 

conducted by mainline carriers when they utilize regional airlines in a code-share 

agreement. This surveillance and audit system should ensure that pilot training by 

the regional code-share partner produces proficient, professional pilots.

16. Regulators should require airlines to incorporate Safety Management Systems 

(SMS) to help cultivate an appropriate safety culture that encourages quality pilot 

training.

17. Training providers that offer flight training programs designed for individuals pursuing a career as an airline pilot should incorporate the following into their curriculum: 

a. Multi-crew training, including crew resource management, in advanced aircraft 

with advanced avionics and other aircraft systems (e.g., FMS, turbine systems, 

aircraft controls, automation, etc.).

Appendix 9 - 19
18 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot September 2009

Producing a Professional 

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Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

b. Sufficient actual aircraft flight time to develop good communication skills with 

ATC and the ability to demonstrate good aviating skills in the real world.

c. Transition training from piston-aircraft to transport-category turbojet aircraft, 

as needed. 

d. A strong career track for instructors within their organizations resulting in the 

hiring and retention of skilled instructors.

18. Regulators, airlines, and training providers should, in consultation with official 

pilot representatives of pilot representative associations, develop training curriculums that focus on proficiency and academics rather than hour-based licensing 

minimums.

19. Regulators should require airlines to have a direct link with FTOs providing competency-based (e.g., MPL) training or its equivalent to pilots they plan to employ at 

the completion of the training program. This link must result in use of that airline’s 

operating procedures and aircraft equipment throughout the training.

20. When training relies primarily on flight simulators, regulators should require motion in the simulators when used for flight training credited toward a pilot certificate, rating or currency, as appropriate to the task. 

Simulator manufacturers and aircraft manufacturers should collaborate to enhance simulator 

fidelity in regimes outside normal flight so that maneuvers such as aerodynamic stalls can be 

trained, practiced, and evaluated in a realistic manner.

Appendix 9 - 20
September 2009 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot 19

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

REFERENCES

• ALPA. 2007. “The Need for Motion in Flight Simulation.” White Paper Statement of 

Position, September.

• ALPA. 2008. “Safety Committee Statement of Position: The Multi-Crew Pilot License,” 

April.

• International Air Transport Association. 2009. International Training and Quality 

Initiative, Spring 2009 Report.

• Moorman, Robert W. 2007. “Express to the Sky.” Air Transport World, March.

• “Multi-Crew Pilot License.” 2008. ALPA Administrative Policy Manual, Section 80, 

September.

• O’Hare, D. 2003. “Artificial Seasoning: Enhancing Experienced-Based Training for Aviation.” In G. 

Edkins and P. Pfister (Eds.), Innovation and Consolidation in Aviation (pp. 171−77). Burlington, VT: 

Ashgate Publishing.

• Tsang, P., and Vidulich, M. 2003. Introduction. In P. Tsang and M. Vidulich (Eds.), Principles and 

Practice of Aviation Psychology (pp. 1−18). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

• Wallace, James. 2007. “Boeing Unit Tries to Speed Pilot Training to Fill High Demand.” 

Seattle Post-Intelligence, April 30.

Appendix 9 - 21
20 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot September 2009

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

Appendix 1

Typical Pilot Career Progression

Appendix 9 - 22
September 2009 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot 21

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

Appendix 2

Comparison of Licensing Requirements

Following is a summary comparison of the training requirements contained in International 

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards and recommended practices, and regulations 

from FAA, Transport Canada, and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). The regulation 

summaries pertain to the Commercial Pilot License (CPL) and Air Transport Pilot (ATP) license. 

An ATP is required of all captains in both the United States and Canada; a first officer must 

hold at least the CPL in both countries.

CPL Elements

ICAO FAA Transport 

Canada

EASA/ 

NPA 200817b

Minimum Age 18 18 18 18 

Knowledge/ 

Ground School 

Instruction

No specifi ed minimum 

number of ground 

school hours

No specifi ed 

minimum number 

of hours

Minimum of 80 

hours

500 hours

Written Exam No reference is made 

to an exam(s), just 

demonstrate knowledge

> 70% on a single 

required exam

> 60% on a single 

required exam

Shall pass 

examinations

Experience/ 

Flight Time

200 hrs. total time 250 hrs. total time 200 hrs. total time 180 hrs. total time

Skill/Flight Test Required Required Required Required

ATP Elements

ICAO FAA Transport 

Canada

EASA

Minimum Age 21 23 21 21 

Knowledge/ 

Ground School 

Instruction

No minimum number of 

ground school hrs.

No minimum 

number of ground 

school hrs.

No minimum 

number of ground 

school hrs.

750 hrs. of ground 

school

Written Exam No reference is made 

to an exam(s), just 

demonstrate knowledge

> 70% on single 

required exam

> 70% on single 

required exam

Shall pass 

examinations

Experience/ 

Flight Time

1,500 hrs. total time 1,500 hrs. total 

time

1,500 hrs. total 

time

1,500 hrs. total 

time

Skill/Flight Test Required: Perform, as 

pilot-in-command of a 

multi-engined aeroplane 

with a copilot

Required. Single, 

multi-engine 

ATPs are offered

Required: Flight 

test in multiengine aircraft 

required

Required: 

Profi ciency to 

operate as copilot

on multi-pilot,

multi-engine

aeroplanes

Appendix 9 - 23
22 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot September 2009

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

Appendix 3

Examples of Accidents in Which Pilot Training and Performance Deficiencies 

Were Identified

Three notable accidents have occurred within the past five years that have brought scrutiny 

to the adequacy of airline hiring, training, and mentoring practices. 

Following is a brief summary of each accident and a portion of what was learned about their 

causation.

1. Pinnacle Flight 3701, Oct. 14, 2004, CRJ-200, near Jefferson City, MO⎯repositioning (FAR 

Part 91) flight crashed following high altitude stall, dual engine flameout, and no relight:

• No training on high-altitude stall recognition and recovery techniques

• Simulator fidelity not robust enough to properly simulate high-altitude stall avoidance 

and engine relight procedures.

• No emphasis in training on engine flameout and restart procedures nor was there any 

effort on the FAA’s part to ensure that this was included in training programs.

• Little training in place to account for crewmembers coming from turboprop aircraft in 

transitioning to higher performance regional jets.

• High altitude operations were not discussed or demonstrated during any ground or 

flight simulator training. Generally, high altitude operations were only discussed in 

the jet-upset module during initial training.

• Pinnacle training and guidance on climb procedures was very limited at the time of 

and prior to the accident. This lack of training created the erroneous impression among 

pilots that there is no performance limit that might become a factor in the climb. 

2. Comair Flight 5191, Aug. 27, 2006, CRJ-100, Lexington, KY⎯crashed on takeoff from the 

wrong runway:

• The investigation found that both pilots involved in the accident were trained as required 

by the Federal Aviation Regulations and Comair procedures in addition to receiving 

high marks from fellow pilots and evaluators. 

• In spite of that training, the NTSB found that the crew did not adhere to sterile cockpit 

procedures, nor did they accomplish any checks to ensure they were on the proper 

runway. 

• Review of their flight time showed that both pilots were highly experienced by total 

flight time and flight time in the Canadair Regional Jet, yet became confused by the 

airport marking and signage.

• The aviation industry and the FAA have not established standardized flight crew 

procedures to verify that their aircraft are on the proper runway.

Appendix 9 - 24
September 2009 Air Line Pilots Association White Paper: Producing a Professional Airline Pilot 23

Producing a Professional 

Airline Pilot

Candidate Screening, Hiring, 

Training, and Mentoring

3. Colgan Air (Continental Connection) Flight 3407, Feb. 12, 2009, Bombardier Dash 8 Q 

400, near Buffalo, NY⎯crashed on approach (Note: the investigation on this accident 

continues at the time this document is being published and therefore all comments below 

are facts uncovered in the investigation and publicly released. There are no conclusions 

or suggestions of accident causation expressed.)

• No training provided in full stall recovery

• No training provided in stick pusher operation and appropriate crew reaction

• The crew seems not to have noticed a significant, rapid airspeed decay, which suggests 

a lack, either in experience or training (or both), in basic airmanship. This leads to 

the concern that current training is based on certain presumptions of underlying basic 

skills that may not be accurate.

Appendix 9 - 25
STATEMENT OF 

CAPTAIN JOHN PRATER, PRESIDENT 

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ON 

“THE FAA’S CALL TO ACTION ON 

 AIRLINE SAFETY AND PILOT TRAINING” 

September 23, 2009 

Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Petri and members of the Committee. I 

am John Prater, president of the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA). 

ALPA is the world’s largest pilot union, representing nearly 54,000 pilots who fly for 36 

airlines in the U.S. and Canada. ALPA was founded in 1931 and our motto since its 

beginning is “Schedule with Safety.” For almost 80 years, ALPA has had a tremendous 

impact on improving aviation safety. ALPA is a founding member of the International 

Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations (IFALPA) and the U.S. and Canada 

representative to the Federation which joins the pilots of over 100 nations together in 

safety and security harmonization efforts. Today, ALPA continues to be the world’s 

leading aviation safety advocate, protecting the safety and security interests of our 

passengers, fellow crewmembers, and cargo around the world. ALPA has lived up to its 

mandate to the extent that many in the government and industry, including a former FAA 

administrator, have referred to us as the “conscience of the airline industry.” 

You will recall that we testified before this committee on June 11th and we are very 

pleased to testify once again with our observations and recommendations following the 

conclusion of FAA’s 12 Call to Action (CTA) meetings held around the country this 

summer. 

ALPA’s Promotion of Airline Safety and Pilot Training Measures

It was my honor and pleasure to lead a dozen ALPA representatives to the FAA’s 

industry summit on June 15th and to serve as the pilot union moderator at the inaugural 

CTA held in Washington, DC on July 21st and attended the St. Louis forum on August 

21st. Almost 70 ALPA pilots took time from their busy lives to attend one or more of the 

12 CTA events held around the country and we provided ALPA pilot moderators at six of 

the events. 

2

Appendix 9 - 26
To demonstrate our commitment to meeting the goals of enhancing airline safety and 

pilot training, I would like to share with the Committee some of the actions that ALPA 

has taken in recent months. 

Professionalism 

ALPA’s Professional Standards Committee acts as the guardian of the ALPA Code of 

Ethics and Canons, which was formally adopted by our Board of Directors in 1956. It 

provides expected standards of behavior and conduct for professional pilots and ALPA 

members. The Code, a copy of which is provided as part of this written statement, is 

posted on the ALPA website, contained in the ALPA Policy Manual, and is periodically 

published in Air Line Pilot magazine, which last occurred in our August 2009 issue. 

I directed our leadership at 36 airlines to work with their respective airlines to promote 

and use the document during pilot training. We made the Code available to the FAA at 

the first CTA and it generated a significant amount of interest. 

Because of our strong history of promoting professionalism, FAA has asked ALPA to 

assist the agency with the development of training materials that can be used by airlines 

for that purpose. Our professional standards and pilot training experts have begun work 

to develop those materials and their first action was developing the letter to our 

leadership about the Code as mentioned above. An Air Line Pilot magazine article about 

professionalism is planned for later this year along with a full-length version of the Code

as an insert. We anticipate providing completed training materials to the FAA next year. 

Virtually every one of the ALPA-represented airlines has its own Professional Standards 

Committee at the Master Executive Council (MEC) level. The purpose of the MEC 

Professional Standards Committee is to promote and maintain the highest degree of 

professional conduct among ALPA pilots. A successful Professional Standards program 

enhances the margins of safety in daily flight operations, which is the primary concern. It 

also protects and enhances the standing of the profession. More specifically, Professional 

Standards Committees: 

• Address problems of a professional or ethical nature involving pilots. 

• Resolve cases of pilot misconduct that affect flight deck safety and/or 

professionalism. 

• Resolve conflicts between pilots that may affect flight deck safety and/or 

professionalism. 

• Resolve conflicts between a pilot and a member of another employee 

group, or another individual, that may affect flight deck safety and/or 

professionalism. 

• Resolve conflicts arising out of conduct perceived as reflecting 

unfavorably upon the profession. 

• Promote the highest standards of professional conduct through regular 

communication with the pilot group. 

3

Appendix 9 - 27
ALPA International’s Professional Standards Committee provides training for the MEC 

committees annually at our Pilot Assistance Forum and other times as needed. The forum 

is so popular that numerous non-ALPA pilot and airline representatives frequently attend. 

Unfortunately, while many of our carriers’ managements fully support and fund this 

program, others have refused to allow ALPA safety representatives to attend these 

critically important functions. 

We are in the process of creating a new initiative, called the ALPA Professional 

Development Committee, which will focus on, among other things, education of future 

airline pilots. The committee leadership is actively working with the University Aviation 

Association and the Aviation Accreditation Board International on ways in which ALPA 

can play a more active and useful role in the promotion of the highest standards of 

professional development by all pilot candidates from university aviation programs. 

Training 

We have been very pleased to have had the opportunity to work with you and the 

Aviation Subcommittee’s staff as you developed what became HR 3371. The bill 

contains numerous, strong provisions which we are certain will enhance airline safety 

through better pilot training. Indeed, even before the bill has been signed into law, the 

FAA has seized on one of the key provisions, pilot fatigue, and is preparing to issue a 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to change the agency’s archaic flight and duty time rules. 

I am pleased to announce today that ALPA has recently published a new white paper on 

pilot screening, hiring, training and mentoring. This document – now available online at 

www.alpa.org – provides an in-depth examination of the current state of airline pilot 

screening practices, problems with what we refer to as “low-experience pilots,” 

inadequacies in training curricula, the need for greater education requirements for airline 

pilots than now exists, and the need for airline Safety Management Systems, among other 

things. The paper concludes that airline pilots should be held to a higher standard of 

competency, knowledge and training than pilots in non-commercial operations, which is 

not the case at present. 

Risk Management 

Nearly all of our member airlines have an Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) and 

about half have a Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) program. We are very 

strong proponents of such non-punitive safety reporting programs and have been 

instrumental in helping shape the FAA’s ASAP and FOQA guidance documents. ALPA 

is also an active participant in the industry/government Aviation Safety Information 

Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) program. ASIAS involves the sharing and analysis of 

safety information generated from ASAP and FOQA programs. ALPA has also 

expended considerable resources over the past several years in assisting the airlines with 

establishing ASAP and FOQA programs on their properties, and that work continues 

today. Sadly, we continue to encounter airline managements, and sometimes even FAA 

inspectors, who remain convinced that the way to deal with safety issues identified 

4

Appendix 9 - 28
through these programs is to punish pilots or other employees for mistakes made on the 

job. Let me reiterate – ASAP and FOQA programs will fail if used as a disciplinary tool 

instead of being used as intended to promote a safety culture. 

The FAA has established a new Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) which is 

charged with developing a rule for airline Safety Management Systems (SMS). One of 

our pilot members is a tri-chair of the ARC. ASAP and FOQA programs will be an 

integral part of a well-structured SMS. These reporting programs are vital to providing a 

factual basis for safety risk assessment and a gauge to how well safety mitigation 

strategies are working. 

Analysis of Call to Action (CTA) Events

Before commenting on the 12 CTA events held this summer, we would like to recall how 

FAA conducted another CTA – concerning the subject of runway safety – in 2007. FAA 

convened a high-level industry meeting on August 15 of that year with participation of 

airline, airport, pilot and air traffic control representatives to discuss ways to address the 

serious problem of runway incursions. That meeting resulted in specific action items to 

be completed within 60 days by airport managers, airline management and the FAA’s Air 

Traffic Organization. Airport operators committed to installing new pavement markings 

and enhancing vehicle driver training programs. Airlines committed to providing 

simulator training for all pilots with a focus on ground operations, revise cockpit 

procedures to reduce distractions and train ground employees on safe airport operations. 

The ATO committed to conducting a safety risk analysis of a new taxi clearance 

procedure and implementation of a voluntary safety reporting mechanism. The FAA 

followed up with all of those who committed to those action items to ensure that they 

were completed by the 60-day deadline. 

Unfortunately, in the case of this most recent CTA on pilot selection and training, the 

“action” expected of regulated parties and the agency itself was noticeably absent. 

Indeed, the FAA’s guidance to those facilitating the event addressed “commitments” but 

these were to be adopted on a strictly voluntary basis with no deadline and no follow up. 

The results of the 12 meetings, as described in meeting notes taken by the FAA, 

confirmed that this was the outcome. 

The stated purpose of the CTA events was to bring the industry and pilot communities 

together to discuss the following four major topics: 

1. Air carrier management responsibilities for crew education and support 

2. Professional standards and flight discipline 

3. Training standards and performance 

4. Mentoring 

The meetings were facilitated by three individuals: an FAA senior executive; an air 

carrier industry leader; and a pilot-union leader. Most of the events had very good 

5

Appendix 9 - 29
representation from a cross section of FAA personnel, airline, corporate and charter 

operators, in addition to airline pilots. 

We have examined the notes that the FAA prepared from each of the 12 sessions and 

would offer the following high-level synopsis of the discussions held around the country 

on each of the four focal areas. 

1. Air carrier management responsibilities for crew education and support 

• Safety must be “top down” and not “bottom up” 

• Safety program goals must be observable and measureable 

• Fatigue and sick-leave policies should be non-punitive in nature; 

implementation presents difficulties for management and labor 

• Safety information must be communicated well, which includes voluntary 

safety reporting programs 

• Screening and hiring practices at airlines varies widely; there is a need for 

better screening procedures than are commonly used today 

• Quality of flight experience is more important than quantity of experience 

• Need to improve training for new pilots and pilots in new positions; must 

train to proficiency 

• Mentoring of new pilots is essential, and inexperienced pilots need 

additional initial operating experience. Captain’s leadership training is 

needed for their own performance and to help them mentor others. 

Performance of mentoring pilots should be standardized with programs 

established for that purpose. 

• Professional standards committees serve valuable function in maintaining 

quality operation 

2. Training standards and performance 

• Tailored training should be provided for diverse groups of pilots entering 

the industry 

• Pilot performance should be monitored by the airline, with the 

participation of pilot unions, and additional training provided as required; 

FOQA and LOSA are good quality assurance tools 

• Problem with those pilots who repeatedly fail checks should be addressed; 

numerous difficulties are created by this situation for both the pilot and 

company 

• Make greater use of training review boards, with the participation of pilot 

unions, to assess pilot performance 

3. Professional standards and flight discipline 

• Airlines and labor share some expectations, such as the need for a wellrested crew and a well-maintained aircraft 

• The industry has professional standards, but could use leadership 

standards 

6

Appendix 9 - 30
• Need to strengthen professional standards committees 

• Economics and other factors have significantly eroded pilot morale and 

undermined the career 

• Management and labor should communicate better and demonstrate 

appropriate behavior to include CRM and Threat and Error Management 

• Pilots should adhere to strong code of ethics 

• Use of FOQA data for disciplinary purposes harms safety 

4. Mentoring 

• Industry, labor and FAA should work together to help individuals mature 

into professionals before flying for a commercial airline 

• Universities are creating professional development programs 

• Informal safety information sharing is desirable, between mainline and 

partner carriers and between competing carriers 

• The public should be informed that safe flying is not free or cheap 

• Mainline carriers need to provide greater oversight of regional carriers and 

ensure an equivalent level of safety 

• Disparity exists in training and experience of regional pilots due to 

extreme cost pressures placed on regional’s by majors 

• Regional carriers are much less likely than the majors to permit pilots to 

participate in safety training programs 

We asked our ALPA representatives at the CTA’s to provide us with their thoughts and 

observations on those events, a sampling of which follow. 

Minneapolis – I'm happy we had the opportunity to share our concerns, especially with 

national FAA people present. I don't think everyone was as forthcoming as they wanted 

to be. Some people were very honest, but many felt that if they spoke up they might be 

singled out later on. I did not like the format; we ended up with "open mic night" where 

people could comment at random and it was very disjointed that way. We didn't come up 

with very many solutions but I feel we could have if we had stuck to one issue at a time. 

My biggest complaint was the lack of participation by the FAA. At our meeting, the 

local and regional FAA inspectors filled up the back half of the room and not one of them 

made any comment at the meeting. I felt many of the industry (airline) managers there 

were putting too much of the fatigue onus on the pilots. More than once I heard the 

comment, "If you are too tired to fly it is up to you to call in and say that." While I agree 

accountability lies with the pilot, it is the responsibility of the company to make 

schedules that allow for rest. This is not just a problem for commuters -- you can live in 

domicile and still be plenty tired from poorly constructed trips and long days (a point 

made at the meeting by one of our pilots). I felt like the airline managers were making 

this more to be a problem of pilots allowing themselves to fly tired and not taking any of 

the responsibility themselves. 

 

Atlanta – The majority of the discussion centered around the quality, efficiency, and 

continued monitoring of the pilot training process. The primary focus was on young 

7

Appendix 9 - 31
pilots at their first position at a regional airline, though some thought was given to 

tracking the "marginal" crewmembers who have been on the job for many years, never 

busting enough checks to lose their jobs, but possessing a track record of significantly 

poorer performance than their peers. The regional airlines are concerned, because they 

know the FAA is serious about additional regulation, possibly including a massive 

additional requirement for initial hire experience requirements. Sadly, though a myriad of 

concerns and complaints were aired, none received any further discussion, debate, or 

prioritization. In other words, several folks talked for a few hours, but the leaders of the 

discussion never chose any suggestions or user input to examine further by the group. 

There were no conclusions, or resolutions, or even ideas labeled as worth a second look. 

Dallas – Who knows what will become of these conferences? If the future is anything 

like the past, I fear we may have participated in well-orchestrated window dressing. We 

spoke several times and made several points. They included: 

• We are done with the tired refrain of “if it’s legal, it’s safe!” 

• Responsibility for fatigue occurring in the industry must be laid at the feet of the 

FAA. 

• The reason why a crew scheduler feels comfortable with demanding a pilot to fly 

a fatiguing schedule is because the FAA allows them to! 

• The FAA has allowed a system to develop in which airline managements has too 

many opportunities and too much authority to interrupt rest and pressure pilots 

into accepting fatiguing schedules. 

• We need to license and bring accountability to Crew Scheduling. 

• Don’t call us together and ask our opinion and then ignore us like the FAA has 

done in the past! 

• If the FAA wants to interject more realistic scenarios into our simulator sessions, 

then they must do so as training events and not checking events. 

Conclusions on CTA Events 

Based on ALPA’s extensive participation in the CTA events, we conclude the following: 

• The topics that were selected are important to both management and labor and 

deserve to be addressed 

• A number of solid safety recommendations were made and management and labor 

agreed that they are worthy undertakings 

• Airline management did not publicly volunteer to undertake enhancements to 

safety as a result of hearing the discourse during the CTA meetings 

• Airlines will not advance aviation safety per the recommendations absent new 

FAA requirements 

To underscore the final conclusion, we would note with some irony that the media has 

recently reported on the onerous sick leave and fatigue policies at Colgan Airlines, 

Pinnacle Airlines and their parent company Pinnacle Corporation. Despite the NTSB 

hearings earlier this year which confirmed Colgan’s adverse behavior in this regard, our 

8

Appendix 9 - 32
members confirm that those companies continue to take a hard line with pilots who call 

in too sick or too fatigued to fly. In fact, approximately one-third of Pinnacle pilots are 

reprimanded for sick leave and fatigue-related absences annually. This demonstrates the 

fallacies in Colgan and Pinnacle staffing and scheduling practices and shows how archaic 

flight/duty regulations are which allow these unsafe practices to exist. Mainline 

management often refuses to intervene with the onerous practices of these so-called 

private vendors, despite the fact that they book their passengers on them and have their 

liveries painted on the regional airline’s aircraft. 

The Impact of the Mainline Airlines’ Business Model 

We would like to comment on one of the fundamental causes of the low-experience pilot 

problem, which is the mainline airlines’ business model. Mainline airlines are frequently 

faced with pressures on their marketing plans that result in the use of the regional feed 

code-share partners, whether they be economic, passenger demand or essential air 

service. These code-share or fee-for-departure (FFD) contracts with smaller or regional 

airlines provide this service and feed the mainline carriers through their hub cities. Before 

the practice of code-sharing or FFD with regional partners, all flying was done by the 

pilots of an airline on a single pilot-seniority list. The pilots of the airline were trained to 

and met the same higher-than-minimum regulatory standards. A safety benefit is derived 

from all flying being done from a single pilot-seniority list because it requires that first 

officers fly with many captains and learn from their experience and wisdom before 

becoming captains themselves. Several major airlines use multiple, regional “vendor” 

carriers to continually drive down their costs, but that practice harms safety because first 

officers can become captains within a year at the vendor airline and fail to gain the 

experience and judgment needed to safely act in that capacity. 

Code-share and FFD agreements typically result in the mainline carriers exerting a great 

deal of pressure on the regional airlines to provide their service at the lowest possible 

price. The mainline airlines grant these outsourcing code-share and FFD contracts to the 

regional carriers for short periods (e.g. 2-7 years). As a result, the overriding concern by 

the regional carriers has become lowering costs to today’s substandard levels to prevent 

being replaced by another airline at the end of their contract. Most recently, some larger 

regional carriers have subcontracted with smaller regional airlines to operate these routes 

for them. This results in the mainline carrier’s brand name and paint scheme being used 

by a third party. In some extreme cases, airlines have outsourced a majority of their 

routes to regional airlines with pilots having as little as 250 hours of experience while the 

mainline carrier furloughed its own pilots who possessed more than a decade of 

experience in the industry. This resulted in replacing experienced pilots with lowexperience pilots flying for the low-paying regional operator, all under the livery of an 

established brand. Another cost-cutting tactic used by regional vendor airlines is 

endemic short-staffing, which leads to pilot pushing, fewer pilots flying more and more 

hours per month, and a resultant reduction in safety margins. 

9

Appendix 9 - 33
Aircraft leasing and fuel costs are relatively fixed expenses, which leaves labor and 

training costs as areas in which the smaller carrier may have some ability to decrease its 

costs to service the route. Due to the economic pressures of conducting operations with 

such a small profit margin, some regional airlines actually want their more experienced 

pilots to quit, which enables them to hire lower-paid pilots as replacements. 

When a regional airline operates a route for a mainline carrier and offers subpar wages 

and benefits, only low-experience pilots, who cannot qualify for a job with a better 

paying airline, are typically willing to accept such employment. It is not uncommon that 

training at such carriers is conducted only to FAA-required minimums. However, these 

low-experience pilots obviously need more training than more experienced airline pilots 

to gain equivalent knowledge of the operating environment, aircraft, and procedures 

before flying the line. 

In these code-share and FFD agreements, the mainline carrier controls all aspects of 

ticket pricing and schedules, regularly moving flying between its regional partners. This 

creates a very unstable occupational environment for pilots which results in cycles of 

furloughs and terminations, stress, and fatigue. Regulators should require that airlines 

implement Safety Management Systems (SMS) to develop a safety culture which 

develops mitigations to the risks created by the mainline business model. 

Recommendations

While we commend the FAA for swift action in launching the Call to Action, we believe 

that many of the industry best practices must be mandated. As an industry, we have a 

tendency to work hard to identify issues and solutions but we are slow to implement 

those solutions voluntarily. As a result, we urge Congress to expeditiously pass this 

Committee’s bill, HR 3371, into law. The legislation was crafted in response to 

disturbing trends we have seen in the regional industry and with outsourced air carriers, 

and in light of concerns raised during the investigation of the tragic Colgan accident 

earlier this year. 

The bill contains numerous provisions which, if enacted, will make a profound difference 

in the selection, training, education and safety of future airline pilot professionals 

including: 

• The requirement for a final rule, not later than one year after enactment of HR 

3371, to mitigate pilot fatigue using the best available science 

• Implementation of Safety Management Systems at all Part 121 airlines 

• Measures to facilitate the employment of FOQA and ASAP programs at all Part 

121 carriers 

• A rulemaking to require stall avoidance and recognition training in Part 121 

operations 

• A requirement that each Part 121 airline create a flight crewmember mentoring 

program 

10

Appendix 9 - 34
• A rulemaking to require that all prospective flight crewmembers undergo 

comprehensive pre-employment screening, to include skills, aptitudes, and 

airmanship 

• A requirement that airlines access and evaluate pilot training records as part of the 

employment screening process 

• A requirement that prospective airline pilots meet higher licensing and hourly 

requirements 

• Requires studies to be performed on flight crew education and professionalism, 

flight schools, voluntary safety programs, flight crewmember pairing, and crew 

resource management (CRM) techniques 

We offer Congress our assistance in helping to promote this legislation to become law. 

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify today. I would be pleased to address any 

questions that you may have. 

 # # # 

11

Appendix 9 - 35
Appendix 10 

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Managements requirements to support a less stressful cockpit environment by providing the tools neccessary to

accomplish the schedule goals. This would include less use of increased mel items, more realistic schedulingpractices, appropriate training and environment (less hostile). Improving employee morale by not pitting

employee groups against each other. What pilot would want to mentor a pilot that works for a company that

provides outsourcing to his company thus in the end illiminating his Job. Other than your required simulator

training events you must depend on the Captain to foster a learning and knowledge sharing attitude during line

operations. That is if he is not to tired. Fred Medlock 8/11/

Below are my thoughts on the Call to Action meeting in Miami:

I attended the August meeting of the FAA’s Call to Action in Miami, during which there was much discussion on

how to lower the standards and requirements of the pilot profession. One of the ideas mentioned was that a

college degree was not required for this profession. Also, one airline stated that they use 250 hour pilots in the

right seat of A320s. Representative Peter A. DeFazio (D., ORE) said, “...we must stop the race to the bottom.” I

couldn’t agree more. One power point slide showed the “Miracle on the Hudson” on one side of the slide and

Colgan 3407 on the other side. In my opinion, the “Miracle on the Hudson” was no miracle but the result of hard

work and preparation.

Hiring pilots who have a college degree and have demonstrated the greatest potential for discipline and

perseverance is most desirable. At the Miami meeting, Bart Roberts (American Airlines) said it best, “...we need

to be hiring the best and the brightest.” This will not prevail in the future if we lower the standards and continue Daniel Kurt 9/9/

I attended the Washington DC safety forum.

Unfortunately the Airline Pilot industry has changed but the airline pilot training and hiring standards have not.

First: The Airline Pilot industry has gone from a traditional (pre airline industry bankruptcy) supply of qualified

and experienced pilots both from military and commuter pilot backgrounds. At one point in the early nineties

the new hire commuter pilot had to pay $10,000 to FlightSafety Intl. for their training. Today (post airline

bankruptcy) the industry has become less attractive for many pilots and with the growth, there is insufficient

trained and experienced pilots entering the industry.

Second: The airline pilot job has changed. When I was hired at what was then a "Commuter"/USAir Express

operation by Mesa Airlines. I was flying Beechcraft Turboprop airplanes at low altitudes mainly in and out of one

hub to support USAir. The pilots were all domiciled at the out stations where it was inexpensive to live. The new

hire today is entering the world of the Regionals which is very much like a Major airline. The new hire First

Officer will today be flying a Turbojet airplane, flying at Mach .73, Flight level 370, between Chicago O'hare and DePaul Ascoli 10/27/
Comments from Wendel C. Meier:

I am responding to your call for ideas to enhance aviation safety.

The trick is to identify the root cause of accidents, and target FAA’s resources accordingly. Fortunately, the root

cause identification for pilot errors has previously been accomplished. Not by me.

A Mr. Asaf Denagi, a NASA scientist, examined numerous high profile, fatal and hull loss accidents and drilled

down to find that improper application of procedures were the root cause in over 70 percent of the accidents

examined. He found that either a required procedure had been omitted, or the correct procedure had been

accomplished incorrectly, or an incorrect procedure had been done. Other studies confirmed his findings.

It appears to me that reducing procedural errors can greatly enhance aviation safety. But where to begin? I

believe we already have begun with the FAA response to wind shear.Several decades ago the aviation community discovered that large turbojet aircraft do not respond well during James M. Reed 9/9/

United States Code Title 49, section 40101 establishes the U.S Congress's intent for preventing deterioration in

established safety procedures including its dedication to further the highest degree for safety with regard to

commercial air transportation.

Safety considerations in the public interest include regulating air commerce in a way that best promotes its

development and safety, including encouraging efficient and well managed air carriers.

There is a hazard (flaw) in the design of management accountability for safety. Federal Aviation Regulation Part

119 created a risk for safety accountability when it was designed. Safety accountability was not designed

adequately in the regulation when the design failed to recognize the executive leadership (CEO/CFO) structure

impact on operational decisions of an air carrier. Executive leadership of an air carrier are virtually immune fromsafety accountability because they do not sign any document with the Department of Transportation or the

Federal Aviation Administration that assigns any level of safety accountability under their charge. Donald Brown 8/14/
Appendix 11 

Glossary of Terms 
List of Acronyms 

AC Advisory Circular 

ALPA Air Line Pilots Association 

ANPRM Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

AQP Advanced Qualification Program 

ARC Aviation Rulemaking Committee 

ASAP Aviation Safety Action Program 

ATA Air Transport Association 

AVS Aviation Safety 

CAP Continuous Analysis Process 

CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

CRM Crew Resource Management 

CVR Cockpit Voice Recorder 

DOT Department of Transportation 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

FDR ARC Flight & Duty Time Limitations and Rest Requirements 

 Aviation Rulemaking Committee 

FFS Full Flight Simulator 

FOIA Freedom of Information Act 

FOQA Flight Operations Quality Assurance 

FSTD Flight Simulation Training Device 

IOE Initial Operating Experience 

LOFT Line Oriented Flight Training 

LOSA Line Operations Safety Audit 

NATA National Air Transportation Association 

NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 

POI Principal Operations Inspector 

PRIA Pilot Records Improvement Act 

RAA Regional Airline Association 

SAFO Safety Alert for Operators 

SMS Safety Management System 

TEM Threat and Error Management 

USAPA US Airways Pilots Association 

Appendix 11

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