1

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

Regional Security Cooperation in the 

Maghreb and Sahel: Algeria’s Pivotal 

Ambivalence

BY LAURENCE AÏDA AMMOUR

A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

◆ Efforts to counter al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) growing influence in both the Maghreb 

and the Sahel are fragmented because of the inability of neighbors to forge collaborative partnerships.

◆ Algeria faces inverse incentives to combat AQIM outside of Algiers as it gains much of its geostrategic 

leverage by maintaining overstated perceptions of a serious terrorism threat.

◆ The Algerian government’s limited legitimacy, primarily derived from its ability to deliver stability, constrains a more comprehensive regional strategy.

HIGHLIGHTS

NO. 18 / FEBRUARY 2012

ing the group more visibility, leverage, and revenue 

(estimated at $70 million in recent years). In the 

process, AQIM has reportedly stockpiled significant 

quantities of arms and cash. High-profile abductions, in turn, threaten vital tourism and economic 

investments, such as the Trans-Sahara Gas Pipeline 

intended to transport Nigerian gas across Niger and 

Algeria to Europe by 2015.

Risks of instability have been further heightened 

with the proliferation of weapons that have flowed 

into the region following the collapse of the Qadhafi regime in Libya. Looted arms and the return of 

experienced mercenaries threaten to bolster the capacity of AQIM, the violence of illicit trafficking, 

and the risk of insurgency in a number of Sahelian 

The growing virulence of al Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM) has heightened concerns of instability across the Maghreb and Sahel. In recent years, 

AQIM militias have conducted operations across 

wide swaths of northern Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and 

southern Algeria. Mixing abduction of foreigners, car 

and cigarette smuggling, drug trafficking, and arms 

dealing, many consider AQIM’s motivations more 

criminal than political or religious. This view was 

reinforced by a “summit” between Colombian drug 

traffickers and AQIM, represented by Abdelkarim 

Targui, known as “the Tuareg,” held in Guinea Bissau 

in late October 2010.1

Kidnappings of Westerners are prioritized for 

the sensational media coverage generated, provid-
2

countries. The reemergence of Tuareg rebel groups in 

northern Mali resulting in fierce clashes with government troops in the towns of Aguelhok and Tessalit 

in January 2012, including the reported downing of 

a MiG-21 fighter, underscores this concern.

There is also evidence of collaboration between 

AQIM and Boko Haram, the Nigeria-based radical 

Islamist organization that has been responsible for 

a growing number of violent attacks including the 

suicide bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja 

in August 2011 that killed 24 people and a spate of 

bombings in January 2012 that left more than 200 

dead in Kano, Nigeria’s second largest city. Nigerian 

intelligence services have reported that some members of Boko Haram were recruited by an Algerian, 

Khaled Bernaoui, and trained in a southern Algerian 

camp as far back as 2006.2

Despite the serious implications and transnational nature of these threats, regional security cooperation remains fragmented. Algeria is seemingly wellpositioned to play a leading role in such a cooperative 

security effort. The largest country in the Maghreb, 

Algeria lies at the crossroads of the Mediterranean, 

the Arab World, and Africa. It is a member of numerous regional and international organizations such 

as the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the 

Arab League, the African Union, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. With a $200 billion economy 

and sizable oil and gas reserves (which account for 97 

percent of exports), Algeria is the wealthiest country 

in the region, committing six-fold more resources to 

its military budget than all of its Sahelian neighbors 

combined (see table). In addition to being the largest, Algeria’s military is also considered the region’s 

best equipped and most battle-tested. Even with these 

assets, Algeria has been largely unsuccessful in filling the leadership gap in the region. This analysis 

examines why this is the case—and the implications 

it poses for regional security.

W H AT K I N D O F C O O P E R AT I O N TO 

COUNTER WHICH THREATS?

Despite its Algerian origins, Algerian authorities 

deny the existence of a connection between Algeria’s 

domestic terrorist groups and AQIM. Rather, they see 

AQIM as a new type of terrorist organization driven 

by its extremist ideology. Sahelian states, in contrast, 

stress the criminal nature of the group, with its heavy 

engagement in drug and arms trafficking, as the most 

dangerous aspect of this regional threat.

The inability to even define the enemy is at 

the root of the fragmented regional response. This 

divergence is punctuated by frequent disagreements 

and a major power imbalance that shapes how each 

side approaches the threat. With military capabilities superior to those of the Sahelian states, Algeria 

considers its approach, born from the experience of 

fighting extremists during its brutal 1990s civil war, 

to take precedence. The Sahelian states, however, 

oppose Algeria’s one-dimensional military focus 

that neglects the economic, social, and political 

considerations that Sahelian countries see as intertwined with stability in the region. They reason 

that if the Algerian army has been unable to eliminate terrorism on its own soil over the past two 

Laurence Aïda Ammour is an International Security 

and Defense Consultant at GéopoliSudconsultance and 

Research Fellow in Les Afriques dans le Monde at the 

Institute for Political Science in Bordeaux.

Country Military Expenditures in Millions ($) Military Forces

Algeria 5,300 147,000

Burkina Faso 110 11,200

Chad 436 23,350

Mali 174 7,750

Mauritania 115 15,870

Niger 53.1 5,300

TABLE. COMPARISON OF MILITARY ASSETS IN THE SAHEL (2009–2010)

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security (Stokholm: SIPRI, 2010); The Military Balance 2010 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010).
3

decades using force alone, then why would such 

an approach work regionally?3

Complicating the matter is the hybrid nature of 

AQIM itself. The group is split between a northern 

cell, which leads terrorist attacks in Kabylia and the 

Algiers hinterland, and two southern cells involved 

in abductions and organized crime in the Sahel (see 

map). The group’s dispersed geographic networks appear to act autonomously, or even in competition, 

rather than in coordination with one another. In 

some ways, AQIM remains fundamentally Algerian 

in character and leadership. In others, it is becoming 

a regional insurgency successfully integrated into local 

communities and cooperating with government and 

security officials as well as with local drug traffickers 

(among them Sahrawi from the disputed Western Sahara territory) and other criminal organizations.4

The result is that when faced with an upsurge 

of AQIM attacks and kidnappings, each country responds in accordance with its own perception of the 

threat, heavily influenced by their respective domestic policy interests, with disparate, largely uncoordinated operational undertakings.

As part of these disjointed efforts, Algiers has tried 

ceaselessly to centralize “the war against terror” in the 

Sahara and Sahel by making itself the pivotal actor. In 

April 2010, a Joint Military Command (JMC) comprised of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger was set up 

in Tamanrasset, Algeria. This committee was supposed 

to implement a new regional security plan with joint 

monitoring forces that were expected to total 75,000, 

though these forces have yet to be committed.

Such regional initiatives are frequently undermined by Algeria’s fear that its partners are operating independently—to the detriment of Algiers’ 

interests. For example, a series of Mauritanian 

counterterrorism operations from July 2010 through 

February 2011 (the latter of which foiled a plot to 

assassinate Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould 

Abdel Aziz) and a joint France-Niger operation in 

February 2011 against the kidnappers of two young 

French citizens were perceived by Algiers as deeply 

threatening. Rather than encourage such efforts, the 

Algerian government feared the creation of regional 

alliances from which it would be excluded, especially since relations between Mauritania and Morocco 
4

had improved since Aziz was elected in July 2009.5

On September 26, 2010, Algeria convened an emergency meeting of the defense chiefs of staff from the 

Sahelian countries in Tamanrasset in an attempt 

to regain control over regional planning and cooperation. This meeting led to the establishment of a 

Central Intelligence Cell to facilitate coordination 

among Saharan and Sahelian countries—based in 

the Algerian capital far from the attacks that took 

place in the Sahel.

When G8 security experts subsequently met in 

Bamako on October 13, 2010, with Morocco participating, Algeria was infuriated. It declined the 

invitation and reiterated its opposition to any joint 

decisionmaking involving Western countries. 

There have been some signs of cooperation, with 

the first meeting of the JMC in Bamako held on April 

29, 2011, and the establishment of a regional security 

agenda in May of that year. Moreover, motivated by 

the risk of instability spilling over from Libya, the 

defense chiefs from Algeria, Mali, Niger, and Mauritania recommitted themselves to the objectives of 

the JMC. 

At the operational level, on June 2, 2011, 

Special Forces from Algeria, Mali, and Niger conducted their first joint exercises in the border region between the three countries in anticipation 

of the risks coming from the crisis in Libya. On 

June 9, 2011, in Ségou, Mali, Mauritanian and Malian troops successfully coordinated a sophisticated 

attack in the Wagadou forest that neutralized an 

AQIM supply camp. And, in December 2011, Algeria for the first time sent military instructors to 

northern Mali. 

Nevertheless, these “successes” do not overcome 

fundamental differences over the nature of the threat 

in the Saharan/Sahelian region and the divergent approaches needed to eradicate these threats. 

LACK OF TRUST

Limited regional cooperation is also a result of 

limited trust. Algeria believes Mali to be the “weak 

link of the chain” and uncommitted to the fight 

against AQIM. Algiers questions the trustworthiness of the Malian government vis-à-vis the widening 

AQIM network and the Malians’ ability to share and 

protect intelligence needed for regional cooperation. 

Algeria particularly resents Mali’s willingness to facilitate ransom payments to AQIM to free European 

hostages, a practice that Algeria strongly opposes.

Meanwhile, security officials from Sahelian states 

view terrorism as an Algerian export—most of AQIM’s leaders are Algerian. This builds on widely held 

impressions that by infiltrating earlier Algerian-based 

terrorist groups the Algerian intelligence service, the 

Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité, effectively drove Algerian jihadists to the Sahel. 

Algeria’s complex relationship in the Sahel is 

also rooted in the role that Algiers is thought to have 

played in supporting rebellions of Tuaregs, both in 

Mali and Niger, as part of Algerian efforts to counter 

Libyan domination of the Sahara. Algeria later served 

as a mediator in the peace accords that ended the 

uprisings in Mali in 1991 and 2006.

In 2008, Malian President Amadou Toumani 

Touré accused the Algerian president of failing to 

maintain control of his intelligence services, which 

Mali said were acting on their own in the Sahel and 

fueling regional tensions. Sahelian governments also 

suspect that Algeria is seeking to dominate its neighbors by asserting control over counterterrorism operations, lucrative smuggling routes, and zones of the 

Sahel that may hold natural gas or mineral resources. 

Fearing a coup d’état in late December 2010, President Touré replaced military officers in northern Mali 

considered to be under Algerian influence.

Algeria’s regional credibility is further stymied 

by a series of paradoxes. Algeria is considered to 

have one of the Maghreb’s most capable militaries and takes pride in having crushed the violent 

Islamist extremist insurgency of the 1990s. Still, 

with 938 attacks since 2001, Algeria continues to 

be plagued by higher levels of terrorist violence 

than other countries in either the Maghreb or Sahel. (There have been 20 attacks in Mauritania, 35 

“if the Algerian army has been 

unable to eliminate terrorism on 

its own soil over the past two 

decades using force alone, then 

why would such an approach 

work regionally?”
5

“Algeria’s imbalanced focus on 

security and energy has prevented 

it from building on its strategic 

location as a gateway to the Sahel 

and Sub-Saharan Africa”

in Niger, and 41 in Mali during the same period). 

Algeria, accordingly, continues to be classified as 

facing an “extreme risk” of terrorism, in the same 

category as Colombia and Somalia.6

Algeria, similarly, faces mixed incentives to 

aggressively combat terrorism outside its borders. 

The government has built a reputation internationally as being the most hard-line state in the 

region against Islamist terrorism and extremism. 

This has greatly enhanced Algeria’s geostrategic 

importance and the advantages of maintaining perceptions of an ongoing threat, particularly one that 

is nearby but does not pose an immediate threat to 

the Algerian regime.

Despite its reputation for aggressively countering extremism, the Algerian army has rarely been 

involved in military engagements outside its borders 

and has been reticent to participate in joint operations with its neighbors against AQIM. For that matter, Algeria does not have a robust military presence 

in its own southern region. A June 30, 2011, attack 

by AQIM on Algerian security forces in Tamanrasset 

province that killed 11 gendarmes and border guards 

as well as a February 2011 kidnapping of an Italian 

tourist in nearby Djanet province point to Algeria’s 

exposure in the region. Rather, its counterterrorist 

operations are concentrated in its northern jurisdictions of Kabylia and Algiers. Like its Sahelian 

neighbors, the Algerian government is incapable of 

maintaining control over its entire territory. Thus, 

contrary to the government’s claims of military superiority and operational experience in desert zones, 

the reality on the ground is considerably different.

Algeria’s poorer Sahelian neighbors are also 

often the playing field for the ongoing competition 

between Maghrebian rivals. Yet, unlike Morocco and 

Libya, which have invested heavily in Sahelian and 

Sub-Saharan Africa, Algeria’s imbalanced focus on 

security and energy has prevented it from building 

on its strategic location as a gateway to the Sahel and 

Sub-Saharan Africa.

Illustratively, the Trans-Sahara Highway (“African Unity Highway”) was long touted as a symbol of 

Algeria’s links to the Sahel. This major North-South 

route designed in 1971 was to traverse the 3,000-kilometer length of Algeria through to marginalized 

northern Mali and the Tuareg regions. However, 

work on the highway stopped at Tamanrasset in 

1978 rather than continuing through to West Africa 

as originally planned.7

A MILITARY-DOMINATED STATE

To understand the Algerian government’s fixation on security, it is important to recognize the 

central role the army played in the construction of 

the Algerian state. The 7-year independence war 

(November 1954−July 1962) laid the foundation 

for violent clashes between militias and civilians 

within the Algerian resistance. Three years after 

independence, a June 1965 coup d’état by Houari 

Boumédienne marked the ascendancy of the military and the start of the one-party era. This resulted 

in the creation of a security state in which public 

order, coercion, and law enforcement measures prevailed over representative institutions. After the 

1992 coup d’état, which marked the end of Algeria’s 

first experience with democracy and set the stage 

for the civil war of the 1990s, a declaration of a 

state of emergency, which continued for 19 years 

without parliamentary approval before being officially rescinded in 2011, was one of the tools used 

to justify expansive mandates and authorities for the 

security sector.

The war economy generated by Islamist violence in the 1990s and the subsequent repression of 

civilians not only helped maintain the lack of transparency in Algerian governance but also expanded 

corruption networks (known as trabendo), thereby 

establishing a mafia-like “bazaar economy.”

The army’s apparent withdrawal from politics 

in the early 2000s shielded it from responsibility for 

abuses that the civilian government has subsequently committed. However, by ruling but not governing,8

 the military has maintained its prerogative to 

formulate and execute foreign and domestic policy. 
6

Accordingly, the “demilitarization of politics” in the 

2000s—which could have produced a clean break 

at the highest levels of government—actually only 

perpetuated the “bunker state.”9

This was reinforced by the surge in counterterrorism efforts globally after 2001, resulting in an 

unprecedented increase in Algeria’s military spending over the past 10 years. In just 3 years, its defense 

budget tripled, reaching $5.3 billion in 2009. U.S. 

military exports to Algeria nearly quadrupled in the 

decade following 2001, reaching $800 million.10 The 

country’s defense budget ranks ninth in the world, 

first in the Maghreb, and second on the African 

continent, after South Africa.11 Russia is Algeria’s 

largest arms supplier. In 2006, Algeria negotiated to 

purchase $7.5 billion in equipment from Moscow in 

exchange for the cancellation of Algeria’s estimated 

$4.7 billion debt, and in 2010 it signed an agreement 

to purchase 16 Sukhoi fighter planes.12

Having benefitted to such an extent from its 

strong posture on combating terrorism, Algeria is 

inclined to apply a wide terrorism lens to security 

threats in the Sahel.

At the domestic level, presenting terrorism as an 

indefinite, elusive threat that is extendable in time 

and space is a way to subject Algerian society to the 

security diktat, maintain a de-facto permanent state of 

emergency, and postpone indefinitely any transition 

to democracy. By blurring the lines between counterterrorism and stability and by equating Islamism with 

insecurity, the Algerian government has managed to 

perpetuate and consolidate its authoritarianism.

Herein lays the greatest paradox of the Algerian 

security discourse: by relying on the state’s coercive 

capacity, the government confirms its lack of legitimacy. As a result, the government must continually 

justify its actions both at home and abroad. For this 

reason, although Algeria appears stable and strong, 

it is actually a weak state struggling to control its territory, protect its borders, safeguard its citizens, and 

resolve social issues that have been manifest throughout the country during the past decade in the form 

of riots, demonstrations, strikes, and, more recently, 

self-immolations. According to the Algerian Minister 

of Interior, there were over 9,000 such incidents in 

2010 alone.13

S T E P S N E E D E D TO I M P R O V E S E C U R I T Y 

COOPERATION IN THE SAHEL

The fall of the Qadhafi regime and the resulting 

heightened risk of instability provide new impetus for 

greater security cooperation between the Maghreb 

and Sahel. All states across these regions recognize 

the substantial strains they face and the need for a 

fresh calculus moving forward. This includes Algeria, 

which, fearing the spread of extremism, feels more 

compelled to take action in the Sahel than at any 

time in the past decade. However, Algeria’s ambitions 

for leadership will only be credible and attainable 

once a shared Mediterranean and African strategic 

vision has been defined.

Diversify Regional Counterterrorism Effort.

Since the threat in the Sahel is best described as narcoterrorism, security forces alone are not enough to be 

effective or build sustainable alliances. A long-term, 

win-win neighborly policy is essential:

◆ With its abundant financial resources, Algeria is in a position to take advantage of 

the sub-regional economic vacuum created 

by the fall of Qadhafi by investing heavily 

in local development initiatives in the neglected areas of the Sahara-Sahel, i.e. Tuareg 

and Tubu territories, and other ungoverned 

cross-border areas. This would create jobs 

and opportunities for these populations—diminishing the economic attraction of criminal activities and extremist messages. Such 

investments would also help demonstrate 

genuine commitment and shared interests 

with its neighbors. 

◆ Deepening economic integration between 

Maghrebian, Sahelian, and Sub-Saharan 

“having benefitted to such an 

extent from its strong posture on 

combating terrorism, Algeria is 

inclined to apply a wide terrorism 

lens to security threats 

in the Sahel”
7

partners through joint infrastructural projects such as building roads, railways, and 

pipelines would also increase the accessibility of marginalized regions. The $69 

million Special Program for Peace Security 

and Development in northern Mali, which 

is part of the national security strategy Mali 

adopted in 2009 aimed at curbing extremism, is a model of such investment. So is 

Mauritania’s Program for the Prevention of 

Conflicts and the Consolidation of Social 

Cohesion led by black Mauritanian returnees, which is aimed at promoting the rights 

of marginalized populations.

Joint Commitments of Forces in Sahel. Intraregional battalions should be created urgently with 

the capacity to undertake joint transnational operations along border areas. Counterterrorism and 

transnational threats can no longer be understood 

on the basis of the inviolability of borders. Rather, 

stabilization efforts must be structured around integrated regional zones grappling with the same problems. Along these lines, the intra-regional force 

structure must develop a more efficient intelligencesharing capability since, given the nature of the 

threat, the monitoring of information is more crucial than it is in conventional military operations.

These joint security patrols should include the 

Tuaregs. AQIM’s violent tactics are not seducing 

the vast majority of people in the border regions. 

The group’s ability to mobilize significant popular 

support, however, is raising concerns among local 

leaders. Gaining Tuareg participation in the stabilization effort would tap their intimate knowledge 

of the terrain and population and would allow Tuaregs (including those who recently came back from 

Libya) to play an active role in the defense of their 

traditional nomadic territories. From an operational 

point of view, this would also enhance military readiness and precision against an enemy that is mobile, 

flexible, and proactive.

Meanwhile, recognizing the importance of drug 

trafficking to AQIM’s operations, the territory of action should be enlarged beyond the Sahel to involve 

Burkina Faso, Senegal, Morocco, Ghana, Guinea, 

Guinea Bissau, and Nigeria—all key actors in the 

transit of cocaine on the continent.

Reduce Role of Military in Algerian Politics. 

Algeria will not be able to indefinitely maintain its 

system of military-based governance. Still distrustful of political and military elites, Algerians are 

not convinced of the authenticity of reforms announced by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in April 

2011 in response to mounting domestic pressure 

from pro-democracy organizations. The coercion 

exerted by the armed forces and intelligence services coupled with the military’s control over economic and social activities has engendered deep 

resentment within Algerian society, heightening 

the risk of social unrest.

Following regime changes in Tunisia, Egypt, and 

Libya, such pressures can be expected to grow. Experience from military transitions in Latin America, 

South Korea, and Indonesia, moreover, indicates 

that it is in the interests of the military to lead the 

reform process rather than wait for the momentum 

for change to build on its own.14 While perceived as 

threatening, the shifting regional context actually 

provides the military government an opportunity for 

a respectful transfer of power and an end to the nearly 

constant de-facto state of emergency that has proved 

costly, limiting, and ultimately counterproductive. 

Three conditions are necessary for these reforms:

◆ Active-duty generals must withdraw from 

economic affairs in favor of a truly competitive private sector in order to build a more 

dynamic economy based on innovation, 

merit, and the rule of law, which will in turn 

attract international investment.

◆ The culture of political violence, justified as 

necessary to stamp out terrorist groups, must 

be abandoned.

◆ A greater share of the government’s extensive revenues must be invested in infrastructure and services that benefit the general 

population so as to demonstrate tangible 

improvements in levels of well-being and 

thereby augment domestic stability.
8

NOTES

1

 “Une réunion secrète des cartels de la drogue en Guinée 

Bissau, AQMI présente,” Sahel Intelligence, November 3, 2010.

2

 Laurence Aïda Ammour, Flux, Réseaux et Circuits de la 

criminalité organisée au Sahara-Sahel et en Afrique de l’Ouest, Cahier du Cerem No. 13 (Paris: IRSEM, December 2009), 72; Prince 

Ofori-Atta, “Nigeria: al-Qaeda Presence in Nigeria has been Kept 

Under Wraps,” Afrik-News, August 3, 2009.

3

 “Aqmi: pourquoi Bamako refuse d’y aller,” Jeune Afrique, 

September 24, 2010. 

4

 Cédric Jourde, Sifting Through the Layers of Insecurity in the 

Sahel: The Case of Mauritania, Africa Security Brief No. 15 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, September 2011).

5

 Laurence Aïda Ammour, La Mauritanie au carrefour des 

menaces régionales, Notes Internacionals No. 19, (Barcelona: Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, October 2009). Reflective 

of the ongoing juggling for influence among Maghrebian rivals, 

Aziz subsequently made a trip to Algiers in December 2011.

6

 2011 Terrorism Risk Index. British Maplecroft. August 

3, 2011, available at <http://maplecroft.com/about/news/terrorism_index_2011.html>.

7

 Back on the agenda 36 years later, 2 sections of the road 

toward the Malian border (Tamanrasset-Timiaouine and Tamanrasset-Tinzaouatine) are expected to be completed by 2014.

8

 Steven Cook, The Military and Political Development in 

Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 

Press, 2007).

9 Clement Moore Henry and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East (New York: 

Cambridge University Press, 2010). 

10 “Algeria Country Report,” Center for Defense Information, 2007.

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11SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security (Stokholm: SIPRI, 2010); The Military Balance 

2010 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010).

12 Antonio Sánchez Andrés, “Political-Economic Relations 

Between Russia and North Africa,” Real Instituto Elcano, November 7, 2006.

13 Idir Tazerout, ”Ce que nous réservent les 20 prochaines années,” L’Expression, July 24, 2011; Claire Spencer, “Algeria: North 

Africa’s Exception?” Chatham House, August 30, 2011, available 

at <www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/177887>.

14 Stephen Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political 

Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University 

Press, 1995).

ISSN 2164-4039