2020 CENSUS

Sustained Attention to 

Innovations, IT Systems, 

and Cost Estimation Is 

Needed

Statement of Robert Goldenkoff, Director, Strategic 

Issues 

David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology

Accessible Version

Testimony before the Subcommittee on 

Commerce, Justice, Science and 

Related Agencies, Committee on 

Appropriations, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:30 a.m. ET

Wednesday, May 3, 2017

GAO-17-584T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-584T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Commerce, 

Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, 

Committee on Appropriations, House of 

Representatives

May 3, 2017

2020 CENSUS

Sustained Attention to Innovations, IT Systems, and 

Cost Estimation Is Needed

What GAO Found

The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) is planning many innovations for the 2020 

Census, including re-engineering field operations, using administrative records to 

supplement census data, verifying addresses in-office using on screen imagery, 

and allowing the public to respond using the Internet. These innovations show 

promise for controlling costs, but they also introduce new risks, in part because 

they include new procedures and technologies that have not been used 

extensively in earlier decennials, if at all. It will be important for the Bureau to 

fully test these activities under census-like conditions during the 2018 End-toEnd Test scheduled to begin August 2017 and make appropriate modifications.

Average Cost of Counting Each Housing Unit Rose While Mail Response Rates Declined

Data Table for Highlights figure, Average Cost of Counting Each Housing Unit Rose While Mail 

Response Rates Declined

Year Cost Per Housing Unit Mail Response Rate

1970 $16 78%

1980 $34 75%

1990 $45 66%

2000 $80 66%

2010 $92 63%

The Bureau continues to face challenges in managing and overseeing the

information technology (IT) programs, systems, and contracts supporting the 

decennial census. These challenges include managing internal coordination and 

governance, contracts, schedule, scope, and IT costs. For example, GAO

expects that the IT costs will rise due to increases in the scope of work for the 

integration contract. In addition, the Bureau needs to address several security 

risks and challenges to secure its systems and data, including ensuring that 

security assessments are completed in a timely manner. Given that the 2018 

End-to-End test begins in August 2017, it will be important that the agency work 

to address these challenges quickly. GAO has ongoing work that is reviewing 

each of these challenges.

View GAO-17-584T. For more information, 

contact Robert Goldenkoff at (202) 512-2725 

or goldenkoffr@gao.gov or David A. Powner at 

(202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

One of the most important functions of 

the Bureau is conducting a complete 

and accurate decennial census of the 

U.S. population, which is mandated by 

the Constitution and provides vital data 

for the nation. A complete count of the 

nation's population is an enormous 

challenge as the Bureau seeks to 

control the cost of the census,

implement operational innovations, and 

use new and modified IT systems. In 

recent years, GAO has identified 

challenges that raise serious concerns 

about the Bureau's ability to conduct a 

cost-effective enumeration. For these 

reasons, GAO added the 2020 Census 

to the High-Risk List in February 2017.

In this statement, GAO discusses three 

challenges: (1) implementing new 

innovations, (2) implementing and 

securing critical IT systems (3) and 

ensuring the reliability of the Bureau’s 

cost estimate for the 2020 Census. 

The information in this testimony is 

based primarily on GAO’s previous 

reports on the Bureau’s planning 

efforts for 2020. GAO also collected 

and reviewed new information on the 

following Bureau activities: (1) recent 

decisions on preparations for the 2020 

Census, (2) IT security testing leading 

up to the 2017 Census Test, (3) 

progress on key systems to be used 

for the 2018 Census Test, and (4) 

efforts to update its life-cycle cost 

estimate.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has previously made a number of 

recommendations to address issues 

raised in this testimony, many of which

have not yet been implemented.
The Bureau’s October 2015 cost estimate for the 2020 Census does not fully 

reflect characteristics of a high-quality estimate and cannot be considered 

reliable. Overall, GAO found that the cost estimate partially met the 

characteristics of two best practices (comprehensive and accurate) and minimally 

met the other two (well-documented and credible). Additionally, the Bureau has 

not published an update to its October 2015 cost estimate, yet several events 

since then including changes to the census design suggest that the cost of the 

current design (around $12.5 billion in 2020 constant dollars) could be higher

than planned.
Letter

Page 1 GAO-17-584T 

Letter

Chairman Culberson, Ranking Member Serrano, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the U.S. Census Bureau’s 

(Bureau) progress in preparing for the 2020 Decennial Census. One of 

the most important functions of the Bureau is conducting the decennial 

census of the U.S. population, which is mandated by the Constitution and 

provides vital data for the nation. The information that the census collects 

is used to apportion the seats of the U.S. House of Representatives; 

redraw congressional districts; allocate billions of dollars each year in 

federal financial assistance; and provide a social, demographic, and 

economic profile of the nation’s people to guide policy decisions at each 

level of government. Further, businesses use census data to market new 

services and products and to tailor existing ones to demographic 

changes.

For 2020, a complete count of the nation’s population is an enormous 

challenge as the Bureau seeks to control the cost of the census while it 

implements several innovations and manages the processes of acquiring 

and developing new and modified information technology (IT) systems. In 

recent years, we have identified challenges that raise serious concerns 

about the Bureau’s ability to conduct a cost-effective count of the nation. 

For these reasons we added the 2020 Decennial Census to the High-Risk 

List in February 2017.1 Our testimony today focuses on three challenges: 

(1) implementing new innovations, (2) implementing and securing critical 

IT systems, and (3) and ensuring the reliability of the Bureau’s cost 

estimate for the 2020 Census.

The information in this testimony is based primarily on our previous 

reports on the Bureau’s planning efforts for 2020. For this work, we, 

among other things, reviewed relevant Bureau documentation, including 

operational plans, and cost information and interviewed knowledgeable 

Bureau staff. We also collected and reviewed new information on the 

following Bureau activities: (1) recent decisions on preparations for the 

2020 Census, (2) IT security testing leading up to the 2017 Census Test, 

(3) progress on key systems to be used for the 2018 Census Test, and 

(4) efforts to update its life-cycle cost estimate. We provided a copy of the 

new information we are reporting in this testimony to the Bureau for 

 

1GAO, High Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts 

Needed on Others, GAO-17-317 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2017).
Letter

comment on April 21, 2017. The Bureau provided technical comments, 

which we addressed as appropriate. More detail on our scope and 

methodology is provided in each published report on which this testimony 

is based. We conducted our work in support of this testimony during April

and May 2017.

We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives.

Background

Page 2 GAO-17-584T 

The cost of the census has been escalating over the last several 

decennials. The 2010 decennial was the costliest U.S. Census in history 

at about $12.3 billion, and was about 31 percent more costly than the 

$9.4 billion 2000 Census (in 2020 dollars).2 The average cost for counting 

a housing unit increased from about $16 in 1970 to around $92 in 2010 

(in 2020 dollars). According to the Bureau, the total estimated cost of the 

2020 Census is approximately $12.5 billion dollars (in 2020 dollars). 

Meanwhile, the return of census questionnaires by mail (the primary 

mode of data collection) declined over this period from 78 percent in 1970 

to 63 percent in 2010 (see figure 1).

Declining mail response rates—a key indicator of a cost-effective 

census—are significant and lead to higher costs. This is because the 

Bureau sends temporary workers to each non-responding household to 

obtain census data. As a result, non-response follow-up is the Bureau’s 

largest and most costly field operation. In many ways, the Bureau has 

had to invest substantially more resources each decade to match the 

results of prior enumerations.

 

2The fiscal year 2020 constant dollar factors the Bureau used are derived from the 

Chained Price Index from “Gross Domestic Product and Deflators Used in the Historical 

Tables: 1940–2020” table from the Fiscal Year 2016 Budget of the United States 

Government.
Letter

Figure 1: The Average Cost of Counting Each Housing Unit (in 2020 Dollars) Has 

Page 3 GAO-17-584T 

Escalated Each Decade, While Mail Response Rates Have Declined

Data Table for Figure 1: The Average Cost of Counting Each Housing Unit (in 2020 

Dollars) Has Escalated Each Decade, While Mail Response Rates Have Declined

Year Cost Per Housing Unit Mail Response Rate

1970 $16 78%

1980 $34 75%

1990 $45 66%

2000 $80 66%

2010 $92 63%

The 2020 Decennial Census is not the first decennial census to be on 

GAO’s High- Risk-List. Both the 2000 and the 2010 Decennial Censuses 

were also high-risk areas. All three of these censuses have had issues 

related to technology and design changes.

Achieving a complete and accurate census is becoming an increasingly 

daunting task, in part because the nation’s population is growing larger, 

more diverse, and more reluctant to participate. When the census misses 

a person who should have been included, it results in an undercount; an 
Letter

overcount occurs when an individual is counted more than once. Such 

errors are particularly problematic because of their differential impact on 

various subgroups. Minorities, renters, and children, for example, are 

more likely to be undercounted by the census.

Page 4 GAO-17-584T 

3

The Bureau faces an additional challenge of locating unconventional and 

hidden housing units, such as converted basements and attics. For 

example, as shown in figure 2, what appears to be a small, single-family 

house could contain an apartment, as suggested by its two doorbells. If 

an address is not in the Bureau’s address file, its residents are less likely 

to be included in the census.4 The Bureau estimated a net undercount of 

790,000 housing units in 2010.

Figure 2: Single or Multi-unit Housing?

 

3GAO, 2010 Census: Key Efforts to Include Hard-to-Count Populations Went Generally as 

Planned; Improvements Could Make the Efforts More Effective for Next Census, GAO-11-

45 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 2010).

4GAO, 2010 Census: Key Efforts to Include Hard-to-Count Populations Went Generally as 

Planned; Improvements Could Make the Efforts More Effective for Next Census, GAO-11-

45 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 2010).
Letter

The Bureau Has Redesigned the 2020 Census to Help 

Page 5 GAO-17-584T 

Control Costs

The basic design of the enumeration—mail out and mail back of the 

census questionnaire with in-person follow-up for non-respondents—has 

been in use since 1970. A key lesson learned from 2010 and earlier 

enumerations is that this “traditional” design is no longer capable of costeffectively counting the population. In response to its own assessments, 

our recommendations, and studies by other organizations, the Bureau 

has fundamentally reexamined its approach for conducting the 2020 

Census. Its plan for 2020 includes four broad innovation areas (reengineered field operations, administrative records, verifying addresses 

in-office, and the Internet self-response option). The Bureau believes 

these innovations will save it over $5 billion (2020 dollars) when 

compared to what it estimates conducting the census with traditional 

methods would cost. However, in June 2016, we reported that the 

Bureau’s life-cycle cost estimate of $12.5 billion cost was not reliable and 

did not adequately account for risk.5

To help drive these innovations, the Bureau plans to rely on about 50 IT 

systems that are being developed or are already in production. Eleven of 

these systems are expected to be provided by an enterprise-wide 

initiative called Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing 

(CEDCaP), 6 which is managed within the Bureau’s IT Directorate. This 

initiative is a large and complex modernization program intended to 

deliver a system-of-systems to support all the Bureau’s survey data 

collection and processing functions, rather than continuing to rely on 

unique, survey-specific systems with redundant capabilities.7 According to 

Bureau officials, the 39 other systems (referred to as non-CEDCaP 

systems) are to be provided by the 2020 Census Directorate or other 

Bureau divisions.

 

5GAO, 2020 Census: Census Bureau Needs to Improve Its Life-Cycle Cost Estimating 

Process, GAO-16-628 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2016).

6The Bureau is pursuing enterprise-wide technology solutions intended to support other 

major surveys the Bureau conducts as well, such as the American Community Survey and 

the Economic Census.

7

Importantly, as a result of the Bureau's challenges in key IT internal controls and its 

rapidly approaching deadline, we identified CEDCaP as an IT investment in need of 

attention in the February 2015 High-Risk Report. 
Letter

The Bureau Needs to Manage Risks of 

Page 6 GAO-17-584T 

Implementing Innovations

The Bureau Is Planning Many Previously Unused 

Innovations for the 2020 Census

The four innovation areas the Bureau plans for 2020 show promise for a 

more cost-effective head count (see table 1). However, they also 

introduce new risks, in part because they include new procedures and 

technology that have not been used extensively in earlier decennials, if at 

all. As a result, it will be imperative that the Bureau conduct a robust 

testing program culminating in the 2018 End-to-End Test that is to 

demonstrate the systems and operations that will be used for 2020 under 

operational conditions.

Table 1: The Census Bureau Is Introducing Four Innovation Areas for the 2020 Census

Innovation area Description Cost savings as estimated 

by the Bureau (2020 dollars)

Re-engineered field operations The Bureau intends to automate data collection methods, 

including its case management system.

$2.5 billion

Administrative records In certain instances, the Bureau will replace enumerator 

collection of data with administrative records (information 

already provided to federal and state governments as they 

administer other programs).

$1.4 billion

Verifying addresses in-office To ensure the accuracy of its address list, the Bureau will 

use “in-office” procedures and on-screen imagery to verify 

addresses and reduce street-by-street field canvassing.

$900 million

Internet self-response option The Bureau will offer households the option of responding 

to the survey through the Internet. The Bureau has not 

previously offered such an option on a large scale. 

$400 million

Source: GAO analysis of Census Bureau data | GAO-17-584T

On October 18, 2016, the Bureau decided to stop two field test operations 

planned for fiscal year 2017 in order to mitigate risks from funding 

uncertainty. Specifically, the Bureau said it would stop all planned field 

activity, including local outreach and hiring, at its test sites in Puerto Rico, 

North and South Dakota, and Washington State. The Bureau is not 

carrying out the planned field tests of its mail-out strategy and follow up 

for non-response in Puerto Rico or its door-to-door enumeration. 

However, the Bureau is continuing with other planned testing in fiscal 

year 2017, such as tests focusing on systems readiness and Internet 
Letter

response. One of these tests, which began in March 2017, included 28 of 

the roughly 50 systems to be used in 2020 operations. Further, the 

Bureau said it would consider incorporating the canceled field activities 

elements within the 2018 End-to-End Test, which is expected to begin in 

August 2017. The Bureau maintains that stopping the 2017 Field Test will 

help prioritize readiness for the 2018 End-to-End Test and mitigate risk. 

Nevertheless, as we reported in November 2016, it also represents a lost 

opportunity to test, refine, and integrate operations and systems, and it 

puts more pressure on the 2018 test to demonstrate that enumeration 

activities will function as needed for 2020.

Page 7 GAO-17-584T 

8

New Uses of Administrative Records Are Promising but 

Introduce Challenges

Administrative records—information already provided to the government 

as it administers other programs, such as mail collection by the U.S. 

Postal Service—have been discussed and used for the decennial census 

since the 1970s, but the Bureau plans a more significant role for them for 

2020 to reduce fieldwork and control costs. For example, the Bureau 

plans to use administrative records to help determine vacant and 

occupied housing units and thus improve the efficiency of following-up 

with non-respondents. The Bureau has estimated that using these 

records could save up to $1.4 billion compared to traditional census 

methods. In 2015, we found that the Bureau has already demonstrated 

the feasibility of using administrative records.9 However, it still faces 

challenges with using them for the 2020 Census. For example, although 

the Bureau has no control over the accuracy of data provided to it by 

other agencies, it is responsible for ensuring that data it uses for the 2020 

Census are of sufficient quality for their planned uses.

Another challenge we identified is the extent to which the public will 

accept government agencies sharing personal data for the purposes of 

the census. Related concerns involve trust in the government and 

perceptions about burden on respondents as well the social benefits of 

agencies sharing data. Moreover, in addition to using administrative 

records to reduce fieldwork, the Bureau is considering several additional 

opportunities to leverage administrative records to help improve the cost 

 

8GAO-17-238T.

9GAO, 2020 Census: Additional Actions Would Help the Bureau Realize Potential 

Administrative Records Cost Savings, GAO-16-48 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 20, 2015).
Letter

and quality of the 2020 Census. It will be important for the Bureau to set 

deadlines for deciding which records it will use and for which purposes for 

those records. In this way, the Bureau can monitor its progress and 

prioritize which activities—or records—to continue pursuing, or to 

abandon, if time becomes a constraint.

The Bureau Needs to Identify and Analyze Root Causes 

Page 8 GAO-17-584T 

of Non-interviews During Testing

When households do not respond to the census and when the Bureau 

does not obtain information about the household while knocking on doors 

during its non-response follow-up operation, the Bureau may have to 

impute attributes of the household based on the demographic 

characteristics of surrounding housing units as well as on administrative 

records. We reported in 2016 that during the Bureau’s 2016 Census Site 

Test, the Bureau experienced about 20 and 30 percent of its test 

workload as non-interviews at its two test sites in Harris County, Texas, 

and Los Angeles County, California, respectively.10 According to the 

Bureau, non-interviews are cases where no data or insufficient data are 

collected, either because enumerators make six attempted visits without 

success (the maximum number the Bureau allows), or interviews are not 

completed due to, for example, language barriers or dangerous 

situations.11 Identifying root causes of problems is something we look for 

when determining progress within a high-risk area. Accordingly, while the 

2016 Census Test non-interview rate is not necessarily a precursor to the 

2020 non-interview rate, because of its relationship to the cost and quality 

of the census, it will be important for the Bureau to better understand the 

factors contributing to it.

 

10GAO-17-238T .

11According to the Bureau, it needs to collect a number of predefined specific 

combinations of data elements during field interviews in order to consider the interview 

complete.
Letter

The Bureau Is Not Fully Prepared to Implement 

Page 9 GAO-17-584T 

Key IT Capabilities

The Bureau Continues to Face Challenges in Managing 

and Overseeing IT Programs, Systems, and Contractors 

Supporting the Decennial

The Bureau is managing the acquisition and development of new and 

modified IT systems, which adds complexity to the design of the census. 

We have previously reported that the Bureau has faced challenges in 

managing internal coordination and governance, contracts, schedule, 

scope, and costs for its IT systems, and we have ongoing work reviewing 

each of these challenges:

· Internal coordination and governance. Different divisions are 

responsible for acquiring and developing different systems and 

technology supporting the 2020 Decennial Census. Eleven of the 

roughly 50 systems planned to be used in the 2018 End-to-End test 

are being delivered by the Chief Information Officer’s (CIO) IT 

Directorate through the CEDCaP program, with the other 39 being 

managed and developed within the 2020 Census Directorate or other 

Bureau divisions. We have reported the Bureau has had challenges in 

coordinating and governing between these divisions. In August 2016 

we reported that the two programs lacked effective processes for 

managing their schedule, risk, and requirements interdependencies.12

We stated that until the two programs establish schedules that are 

completely aligned, develop an integrated list of all interdependent 

risks, and finalize processes for managing requirements, both 

programs are at risk of not delivering their programs as expected.

Effective IT governance can drive change, provide oversight, and 

ensure accountability for results. Further, effective IT governance was 

what Congress had in mind when it enacted the provisions known as 

the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act 

 

12GAO, Information Technology: Better Management of Interdependencies between 

Programs Supporting 2020 Census Is Needed, GAO-16-623 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 9, 

2016).
Letter

(FITARA),

Page 10 GAO-17-584T 

13 which reinforced the role of the agency CIO. To ensure 

executive-level oversight of the key systems and technology, the 

Bureau’s CIO (or a representative) is a member of governance boards 

that oversee all of the operations and technology for the 2020 

Census. Moving forward, it will be important that the CIO and other

agency executives continue to use a collaborative governance 

approach to effectively manage risks and ensure that the IT solutions 

meet the needs of the agency within cost and schedule.

· Contract management. The Bureau is relying on contractor support 

in many key areas of the 2020 Census, including for integrating all of 

the key systems and infrastructure and developing many of the key 

data collection systems. In August 2016, the Bureau hired a 

contractor to integrate the 2020 Census systems and infrastructure. 

The contractor’s work was to include evaluating the systems and 

infrastructure and acquiring the infrastructure (e.g., cloud or data 

center) to meet the Bureau’s scalability and performance needs. It 

was also to include integrating all of the systems, supporting technical 

testing activities, and developing plans for ensuring the continuity of 

operations. Since the contract was awarded, the scope has grown to 

also include assisting with operational testing activities, conducting 

performance testing for two Internet self-response systems, and 

technical support for the implementation of the paper data capture 

system.

In addition, the Bureau is relying on contractors to develop a number 

of key systems and components of the IT infrastructure. These 

activities include (1) developing the IT platform that is to be used to 

collect data from a majority of respondents—those using the Internet, 

telephone, and non-response follow-up activities; (2) procuring the 

mobile devices and cellular service to be used for non-response 

follow-up;14 and (3) developing the IT infrastructure in the field offices. 

As we reported in November 2016, a greater reliance on contractors 

for these key components of the 2020 Census requires the Bureau to 

 

13Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform provisions of the Carl Levin and 

Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. 

L. No. 113-291, div. A, title VIII, subtitle D, 128 Stat. 3292, 3438-3450 (Dec. 19, 2014).

14In non-response follow-up, if a household does not respond to the census by a certain 

date, the Bureau will send out employees to visit the home. These enumerators will use a 

census application, on a mobile device provided by the Bureau, to capture the information 

given to them by the in-person interviews.
Letter

focus on sound management and oversight of the key contracts, 

projects, and systems.

Page 11 GAO-17-584T 

15

· Schedule management. In November 2016, we noted that a great 

deal of development work remained to be completed for the roughly 

50 systems and that the Bureau was still developing the plans and 

schedules for the integration and testing of these systems leading up 

to the 2018 End-to-End test. This is still the case. In addition, the 

Bureau has delayed key milestone dates by about 2 months due to 

issues with developing the systems. This delay reduces the time 

available for the integration and security testing activities leading up to 

the 2018 End-to-End test. The Bureau is evaluating options to 

decrease the impact on those testing activities, and we have ongoing 

work reviewing the Bureau’s schedule changes and the impacts of 

those changes.

· Scope and requirements management. The Bureau is still in the 

midst of determining the full complement of systems to be used for the 

2018 End-to-End Test (beginning in August 2017) as well as the 2020 

Census. For example, the Bureau is evaluating whether to remove 

several systems from the End-to-End Test. In addition, the agency is 

evaluating whether to change direction on certain systems and 

capabilities for the 2018 End-to-End Test. For example, it is 

evaluating whether to use the newly developed internet self-response 

system or a legacy prototype. Time is running out before the 2018 

End-to-End Test begins, so it will be important for the Bureau to make 

these decisions with enough time to implement the chosen solutions.

· IT cost growth. The Bureau has identified at least $2 billion in IT 

costs for the 2020 program. These costs are associated with (among 

other things) contracts for the integration of 50 systems into a “system 

of systems,” the infrastructure on which these systems reside, the call 

centers for phone responses, the mobile devices and cellular service 

for field staff who conduct the door-to-door enumeration, and a portion 

of the costs for the CEDCaP program.

However, our ongoing work suggests that IT costs are likely to rise. 

For example, the scope of work for the integration contract has 

increased since the contract was awarded in August 2016, and the 

corresponding costs are likely to rise as well. Also, the Bureau 

recently reported that the overall costs for the CEDCaP program are 

 

15GAO, Information Technology: Uncertainty Remains about the Bureau’s Readiness for a 

Key Decennial Census Test, GAO-17-221T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2016).
Letter

expected to increase by at least 10 percent.

Page 12 GAO-17-584T 

16 In addition, the program 

is still trying to determine the full complement of systems for the 2018 

test and 2020 operations, so these costs may also change. Bureau 

officials reported that the agency is developing a new cost estimate 

for the entire 2020 Census program, which they expect to publish later 

in the spring of 2017.

The Bureau’s Information Security Challenges Have Been 

Exacerbated by Short Time Frames

In November 2016, we described the significant challenges that the 

Bureau faced in securing systems and data, and we noted that tight time 

frames could exacerbate these challenges. One such challenge was 

making certain that security assessments were completed in a timely 

manner and that risks were at an acceptable level.17

To determine the level of risk present in a system, guidance from the 

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) states that,18 as 

part of their information security programs, agencies should develop 

security plans, assess security controls, and develop plans of action and 

milestones to address any deficiencies.19 The security plans, assessment 

results, and plans to address deficiencies are key artifacts that 

authorizing officials use to determine if the risks are acceptable. By 

issuing an authorization to operate, the authorizing official accepts both 

the plans to reduce identified deficiencies and any residual risk (e.g., 

unaddressed vulnerabilities) remaining from unaddressed deficiencies. 

Each of the systems that the 2020 Census IT architecture plans to rely on 

will need to develop security plans that identify controls to be 

 

16In 2013, the CEDCaP program office estimated the program would cost about $548 

million. An independent cost estimate for CEDCaP (completed in 2015) projected the cost 

to be about $1.14 billion. 

17GAO-17-221T.

18NIST, Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information 

Systems: A Security Life Cycle Approach, Special Publication (SP) 800-37 Revision 1 

(Gaithersburg, Md.: February 2010). 

19Programs are to obtain security authorization approval in order to operate. Resolving 

weaknesses and vulnerabilities identified during testing is an important step leading up to 

achieving such an authorization. Programs are to establish plans of action and milestones 

to plan, implement, and document remedial actions to address any deficiencies in 

information security policies, procedures, and practices.
Letter

implemented, undergo a full security assessment, remediate critical 

deficiencies, and obtain authorization to operate before being used for the 

2020 Census.

However, development and acquisition delays compressed the time to 

conduct the security reviews and approvals for the 28 systems being 

used in the 2017 test. For 2 of the 28 systems in the test, the authorizing 

officials (the CIO and the Associate Director for Decennial Census 

Programs) accepted security risks and uncertainty due to these 

compressed time frames. For one of the systems, Bureau officials noted 

that they did not have time to thoroughly assess the low-impact 

components. The officials stated that, as a result, they had low 

confidence in the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of these 

components. To mitigate the risk, Bureau officials stated that they 

secured these components in a private network with limited user access. 

In another case, the Bureau did not have the time to complete penetration 

testing prior to the 2017 test.

Page 13 GAO-17-584T 

20 According to Bureau officials, the 

authorizing officials accepted these risks because they wanted to meet 

the deadline of March 20, 2017, to begin the test in order to meet the 

Census Day of April 1, 2017.21 Bureau officials noted that they were 

informed of the security situation and were comfortable with the approach 

and mitigations proposed to authorize these systems for the 2017 test.

Because many of the systems that will be a part of the 2018 End-to-End 

test are not yet fully developed, the Bureau has not finalized all of the 

controls to be implemented; assessed those controls; developed plans to 

remediate control weaknesses; and determined whether there is time to 

fully remediate any deficiencies before the system test. As we previously 

reported, while the large-scale technological changes (such as Internet 

self-response) introduce great potential for efficiency and effectiveness 

gains, they also introduce many information security challenges. Thus, it 

will be important that these security assessments are completed in a 

timely manner and that risks are at an acceptable level before the 

systems are deployed.

 

20NIST defined “penetration testing” as security testing in which evaluators mimic realworld attacks in an attempt to identify ways to circumvent the security features of an 

application, system, or network. Penetration testing often involves issuing real attacks on 

real systems and data, using the same tools and techniques used by actual attackers. 

21April 1 is Census Day for the Decennial Census and the Bureau wanted to be able to 

reinforce the importance of that date in its early tests.
Letter

The Bureau Needs to Improve the Reliability of 

Page 14 GAO-17-584T 

Its 2020 Cost Estimate

Estimation Does Not Conform to Best Practices

In June 2016, we reported that the Bureau’s October 2015 update of the 

life-cycle cost estimate for the 2020 Census did not conform to the four 

characteristics that constitute best practices, and, as a result, the 

estimate was unreliable.22 Cost estimates that appropriately account for 

risks facing an agency can help an agency manage large, complex 

activities like the 2020 Census, as well as help Congress make funding 

decisions and provide oversight. Cost estimates are also necessary to 

inform decisions to fund one program over another, to develop annual 

budget requests, to determine what resources are needed, and to 

develop baselines for measuring performance.

In 2016, we reported that although the Bureau had taken significant steps 

to improve its capacity to carry out an effective cost estimate, such as 

establishing an independent cost estimation office, its October 2015 

version of the estimate for the 2020 Census only partially met the 

characteristics of two best practices (comprehensive and accurate) and 

minimally met the other two (well-documented and credible). All four 

characteristics need to be substantially met in order for an estimate to be 

deemed high-quality.

For example, to be comprehensive an estimate should have enough 

detail to ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor doublecounted, and all cost-influencing assumptions are detailed in the 

estimate’s documentation, among other things, according to best 

practices.23 In June 2016, we reported that while Bureau officials were 

able to provide us with several documents that included projections and 

assumptions that were used in the cost estimate, we found the estimate 

to be partially comprehensive because it is unclear if all life-cycle costs 

 

22GAO, 2020 Census: Census Bureau Needs to Improve Its Life-Cycle Cost Estimating 

Process, GAO-16-628 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2016).

23GAO, Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs (Supersedes GAO-07-1134SP), GAO-09-3SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009).
Letter

are included in the estimate or if the cost estimate completely defines the 

program.

Accurate estimates are unbiased and contain few mathematical mistakes. 

We reported that the estimate partially met best practices for this 

characteristic, in part because we could not independently verify the 

calculations the Bureau used within its cost model, which the Bureau did 

not have documented or explained outside its cost model. The Bureau’s 

cost-estimate was also not well-documented. Cost estimates are 

considered valid if they are well-documented to the point they can be 

easily repeated or updated and can be traced to original sources through 

auditing, according to best practices. In 2016, we reported that while the 

Bureau provided some documentation of supporting data, it did not 

describe how the source data were incorporated.

Finally, credible cost estimates must clearly identify limitations due to 

uncertainty or bias surrounding the data or assumptions, according to 

best practices. In June 2016 we reported that the estimate minimally met 

best practices for this characteristic in part because the Bureau carried 

out its risk and uncertainty analysis only for about $4.6 billion (37 percent) 

of the $12.5 billion total estimated life-cycle cost, excluding, for example, 

consideration of uncertainty over what the decennial census’s estimated 

part will be of the total cost of CEDCaP. In June 2016, we also reported 

that risks were not properly accounted for in the cost estimate and 

recommended that the Bureau properly account for risk.to ensure there 

are appropriate levels for budgeted contingencies and those 

recommendations have not yet been implemented. In April 2017, Bureau 

officials told us they were making progress toward implementing our 

recommendations and would provide us with that documentation when it 

is finalized.

Several Events Indicate That the Cost of Some Elements 

Page 15 GAO-17-584T 

of the 2020 Census Design Are Increasing

The Bureau has not published an update to its October 2015 cost 

estimate, yet several events since then suggest that the cost of the 

current design could be higher. We believe that recent Bureau actions 

indicate that the current design will have more expensive cost elements 

that include the following:

· According to Bureau official, in August an $886 million IT integration 

contract was awarded. According to Bureau officials, there was no 
Letter

reference to this contract in the documentation for the planned 

contract costs supporting the October 2015 life-cycle cost estimate.

· In January 2017, the Bureau suspended part of how it is verifying 

addresses “in-office” procedures using on-screen imagery—one of its 

four key design innovations intended to control the cost of the 2020 

Census. According to Bureau officials, the suspension of the one part 

of in-office canvassing will increase the workload of the more 

expensive in-field (door-to door address identification) by at least five 

percentage points over what had been assumed as part of the earlier 

cost estimate. 

· In April 2017, Bureau officials informed us that they are preparing 

additional reporting to the Department of Commerce and Office of 

Management and Budget because the CEDCaP program is now 

expected to exceed the original total contract by more than 10 

percent.

According to Bureau officials these changes will be reflected in the next 

life-cycle cost estimate.

It is critical for the Bureau to have better oversight and control of its cost 

estimation process, particularly as the design of key cost elements 

continues to evolve, and we have recommended that the Bureau ensure 

its cost estimate is consistent with our best practices. The Bureau agreed 

with our recommendations and has told us it is making progress towards 

addressing them. Moreover, Bureau officials told us that they are 

finalizing an update to the life-cycle cost estimate that should be released 

this spring. However, until we are able to review the life-cycle cost 

estimate along with supporting documentation we are unable to 

determine whether the Bureau is fully addressing our recommendations, 

meeting best practices, and properly accounting for all costs associated 

with the 2020 Census.

In summary, while the Bureau has made substantial progress in 

revamping its approach to the census and testing the new design, 

considerable challenges and uncertainties remain in (1) implementing the 

cost-saving innovations; (2) managing key IT systems, including ensuring 

their security, to support the census; and (3) developing a quality cost 

estimate for the 2020 Census. For these reasons the 2020 Census is a 

GAO high-risk area. Continued management attention and congressional 

oversight will be important for ensuring risks are mitigated, the Bureau’s 

preparations stay on track, and Bureau officials are held accountable for 

implementing the enumeration as planned. We will continue to assess the 

Page 16 GAO-17-584T 
Letter

Bureau’s efforts to conduct a cost-effective enumeration and look forward 

to keeping Congress informed of the Bureau’s progress.

Chairman Culberson, Ranking Member Serrano, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this completes our prepared statement. We would be 

pleased to respond to any questions that you may have.

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 17 GAO-17-584T 

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this statement, please 

contact Robert Goldenkoff at (202) 512-2757 or by e-mail at 

goldenkoffr@gao.gov or David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail 

at pownerd@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this testimony include Ty 

Mitchell, Assistant Director; Colleen Phillips, Assistant Director; Justine 

Augeri; Brian Bothwell, Robert Gebhart; Jason Lee, Lisa Pearson; Kayla 

Robinson, Robert Robinson; Kathleen Sharkey; Andrea Starosciak;

Umesh Thakkar; and Katherine Wulff.

(101981)
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
GAO’s Mission

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and investigative 

arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 

responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the 

federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public 

funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, 

recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed 

oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government 

is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is 

through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, GAO 

posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products, go to http://www.gao.gov

and select “E-mail Updates.”

Order by Phone

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of production and

distribution and depends on the number of pages in the publication and whether 

the publication is printed in color or black and white. Pricing and ordering 

information is posted on GAO’s website, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537.

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, MasterCard, 

Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, LinkedIn, Twitter, and YouTube.

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov and read The Watchblog.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal 

Programs

Contact:
Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Congressional Relations

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125, 

Washington, DC 20548

Public Affairs

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

Strategic Planning and External Liaison

James-Christian Blockwood, Managing Director, spel@gao.gov, (202) 512-4707

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7814, 

Washington, DC 20548

PleasrintoRecyldPapr.