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NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 22, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

APRIL 22, 2010

Page 

Miller, Hon. James N., Principal Under Secretary of Defense for Policy ........... 4 

Chilton, Gen. Kevin P., USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command .............. 9 

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 

International Security ......................................................................................... 13 

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy .................................................................. 17 

The Nuclear Posture Review Report ...................................................................... 62 

(III) 

(1) 

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW 

THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SD– 

G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Bill Nelson, Ben Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Burris, Bingaman, Kaufman, McCain, Sessions, Chambliss, Thune, Wicker, LeMieux, and 

Collins. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; 

and Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant. 

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican 

staff director; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; Michael V. Kostiw, professional staff member; and Daniel A. Lerner, 

professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Jennifer R. Knowles, 

and Christine G. Lang. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Greta Lundeberg, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann 

Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant 

to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; 

Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Jonathan Epstein, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Halie Soifer, assistant to Senator Kaufman; Rob Soofer, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum 

and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor 

IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek, assistant to 

Senator Thune; Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker; 

and Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. 

Today, the Armed Services Committee will hear from James Miller, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; General Kevin 

Chilton, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM); Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms 

Control and International Security; and Thomas D’Agostino, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration 

2 

(NNSA). The topic this morning is the recently released Nuclear 

Posture Review (NPR). 

This is the third NPR since 1994, and the first to be completely 

unclassified. I commend each of our witnesses this morning for 

working to achieve that result. An unclassified NPR should allow 

discussions on the role and the future of nuclear weapons to be 

held publicly, which will help to demystify an often technically 

complex subject. 

As the Senate considers the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), an open discussion on nuclear weapons policy will help 

assure the American people that ratification of this new treaty will 

strengthen U.S. national security and enhance U.S. nonproliferation goals. 

There are five key objectives of the new NPR: first, preventing 

nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; second, reducing the 

role of U.S. nuclear weapons and U.S. national security strategy; 

third, maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; fourth, strengthening regional deterrence, and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and fifth, sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. 

This new NPR allows for continued reductions in deployed nuclear weapons, and also lays the foundation for substantial future 

reductions in the total nuclear weapons stockpile. Having fewer nuclear weapons reduces the danger that these weapons and nuclear 

materials might fall into the wrong hands. Preventing proliferation 

and nuclear terrorism, and maintaining a strong deterrent are all 

important parts of nuclear policy and this NPR. 

In addition to the commitment for modern nuclear weapons complex needed to maintain an even smaller total stockpile, this NPR 

makes other significant decisions. It will eliminate nuclear Tomahawks and would finally implement a decision from the 1994 NPR, 

to remove multiple warheads from land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). This NPR will also change the way the 

United States thinks about nuclear weapons, by reducing their role 

in U.S. policy. It will strengthen nonproliferation and take a broader, more balanced approach to deterrence. It affirms that the 

United States will not return to nuclear testing, in that there is no 

technical need and no military requirement for a new nuclear 

weapon. It also recognizes that supporting our non-nuclear allies 

and partners is an important element of regional security, and 

strengthens the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). 

Some think that this NPR does not go far enough down the road 

to zero, while others think the reductions are too dramatic, and the 

policies are unrealistic. 

These are the topics that we’ll discuss and debate in the coming 

months as the Senate considers the New START treaty and, hopefully, at some not-too-distant point, the Comprehensive Test Ban 

Treaty. 

Just last week, this committee held a hearing on Iran, where we 

discussed that government’s refusal to give up its nuclear program, 

in defiance of its international obligations. North Korea withdrew 

from the NPT, demonstrated its nuclear weapons capability, and 

fails to live up to its commitments in the Six-Party Talks. 

3 

Intelligence assessments tell us that terrorists continue to seek 

nuclear materials and technologies, and would most likely use a 

nuclear device if they had one. But, with 90 percent of the world’s 

nuclear weapons, the United States and Russia must lead the 

world in the direction of zero. This NPR is the roadmap for the 

United States to move in that direction, which is not only sound 

policy, but one required by the NPT, to which we’re a party. 

Senator McCain. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank our witnesses for their service to our country and for 

joining us today to discuss this very important issue. 

This month has seen some significant changes to our Nation’s 

nuclear policy. Today’s hearing on the 2010 NPR is the first of a 

number of important upcoming opportunities to assess and review 

the current and future role of our nuclear deterrent. I look forward 

to engaging with our witnesses today and addressing some of the 

concerns that appear to arise from this NPR. 

This year’s review appropriately reiterates the widely acknowledged need to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, to pursue a 

sound stockpile management program, to modernize our aging nuclear facilities, and to invest in human capital. Unfortunately, the 

NPR seems to limit, inappropriately, the ability of our nuclear complex to ensure the highest level of safety, security, and reliability. 

In their analysis of the stockpile, the bipartisan Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission recommended that a full spectrum of options be available for stockpile modernization. The Commission recommended that life-extension programs be ‘‘guided by 

the principle of finding the optimum approach for each unique 

weapon.’’ The NPR appears to constrain the ability of our scientists 

to utilize the full range of options by asserting that refurbishment 

and reuse techniques are the methods of choice for life extension. 

Instead, we should not rule out any stockpile modernization options that are achievable, including replacement, which may be the 

best option in some cases. 

Another concern raised by this NPR is its change to our Nation’s 

longstanding nuclear declaratory policy of calculated ambiguity, 

which has been embraced by past administrations on a bipartisan 

basis. This declaratory policy has successfully and effectively deterred aggressors by preserving the use of all options in response 

to an attack on the United States or our allies. The Perry-Schlesinger Commission advocated maintaining this declaratory policy as 

a ‘‘critical element for reinforcing restraint and caution on the part 

of a potential aggressor.’’ This administration has now overturned 

that policy, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on 

why they believe that less ambiguity, as proposed by the President, 

will be as, or more, effective than the previous policy, and how this 

makes us safer. 

Another concern stems from the assumption made in the NPR 

that the development of conventional capabilities, such as Prompt 

Global Strike, will lead to the reduction of the role that nuclear 

weapons play in our deterrence posture. To be sure, conventional 

weapons can augment or support our deterrence posture, but they 

4 

are no substitute for nuclear weapons. Again, I look forward to the 

witnesses’ explanation for why this planning assumption was made 

and why it’s effective. 

I’m also significantly concerned that no one has yet addressed 

the overall affordability of the course set out in this NPR. The cost, 

alone, for modernizing both the nuclear weapons complex and the 

triad is substantial; and as we move to reduce our nuclear stockpile, this modernization effort becomes all the more important. 

Factoring in the cost of missile defense and Prompt Global 

Strike, both essential and critical, but also costly programs, the 

overall budget outlook becomes daunting. I look forward to discussing the notion of affordability, both in the near-term and the 

long-term, and further exploring how committed this administration is to resourcing these costly, albeit essential, modernization 

and development efforts. 

Finally, I would just reiterate that the key test of our Nation’s 

credibility on nuclear issues is not whether, or how much, we reduce our nuclear arsenal, but whether we meet the nuclear proliferation threats posed by regimes like Iran and North Korea. 

I agree with the NPR’s conclusion that the two primary threats 

to international security are nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Unfortunately, when it comes to Iran and North Korea, 

this administration has little to show for 15 months of effort. Meeting the proliferation threats posed by rogue states like these must 

be our top priority as we determine our nuclear posture and work 

to shore up the global nonproliferation regime. Otherwise, all of our 

efforts to reduce our nuclear arsenal, as well as our reliance on it, 

will be for naught. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. 

We’ll start with Secretary Miller. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, PRINCIPAL UNDER 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 

Dr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the 

committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It’s a 

pleasure to join my esteemed colleagues in discussing the U.S. nuclear policy and capabilities, and to have worked with them closely 

throughout the NPR. 

The 2010 NPR provides a roadmap for implementing the President’s Prague agenda of reducing the role and numbers of nuclear 

weapons, with the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. 

Because we recognize that this goal will not be reached quickly, 

perhaps not in our lifetimes, the NPR outlines specific steps needed 

to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent as long as 

nuclear weapons exist. The fiscal year 2011 budget requests from 

the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), 

and Department of State (DOS) are important installments in this 

long-term effort. 

The 2010 NPR identified the most urgent nuclear dangers today 

as nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and has outlined a 

comprehensive approach to deal with these challenges that includes 

policy initiatives and increased investments in a number of areas. 

5 

As the chairman noted, more broadly, the NPR identified five key 

areas and five key objectives for U.S. nuclear policy. First, it is a 

top priority, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. 

Second, reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in our national 

security strategy. Third, maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels. Fourth, strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners. Fifth, 

sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. 

Given that the committee has received the NPR report, I will not 

summarize all of its conclusions, but will focus my remarks on declaratory policy and on the plans for nuclear and conventional 

forces. 

The 2010 NPR aims to make clear to other countries the benefits 

of complying with the NPT, and the potential consequences of not 

doing so. It strengthens the U.S. Negative Security Assurance associated with the NPT by stating that: ‘‘The United States will not 

use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their 

nuclear nonproliferation obligations.’’ 

A bit of historical context is useful here. The United States first 

offered a Negative Security Assurance associated with the NPT not 

to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons states in 

1978. This pledge was reiterated by subsequent administrations in 

1995 and in 2002. This NPR includes a critical change in this assurance. Unlike previous pledges, the revised assurance stipulates 

that a state must not only be party to the NPT, but that it must 

be in compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. This 

is a determination that will be made by the United States. 

For non-nuclear-weapon states that are in compliance with their 

nuclear nonproliferation obligations, which include the vast majority of countries in the world, the United States is reiterating and 

clarifying its longstanding pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. 

At the same time, the NPR is clear that if any such non-nuclearweapon states were to make the grave error of attacking the 

United States or allies and partners with chemical or biological 

weapons, it would face a devastating conventional military response and their leadership would be held fully accountable. This 

pledge is backed by the most formidable military in the world, and 

the administration is committed to not only sustaining, but 

strengthening, our conventional military power. 

The NPR also makes clear that states that do not meet their 

nonproliferation obligations, such as North Korea and Iran, are not 

covered by this Negative Security Assurance. For these noncompliant states, and for nuclear-weapon states such as Russia and 

China, U.S. nuclear weapons still play a role in deterring, not only 

nuclear attack, but also conventional chemical and biological attack 

against the United States, our allies, and partners. 

These clear declaratory statements strengthen our nonproliferation efforts and reinforce our ability to deter potential adversaries 

with precise and credible statements, backed by the full strength 

of the U.S. military. 

One of the first tasks of the NPR, which continued throughout 

the review, was to define positions for the New START treaty negoVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:22 Jan 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63689.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
6 

tiations, including appropriate limits on delivery vehicles and on 

nuclear warheads, and the DOD NPR team reached the following 

conclusions: 

First, the United States should retain a nuclear triad of ICBMs, 

submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and dual-capable 

heavy bombers under New START treaty. 

Second, as the chairman noted, all U.S. ICBMs should be 

deMIRVed to a single warhead each, in order to reinforce strategic 

stability. 

Third, an ability to upload nondeployed nuclear weapons on delivery vehicles should be retained as a hedge against technical or 

geopolitical surprise, and preference should be given to bombers 

and strategic submarines over ICBMs for upload. 

The administration will provide additional details on plans for 

U.S. Strategic Forces under the New START treaty soon, when we 

submit a report required by Congress, under section 1251 of the 

2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), associated with 

submission of the treaty for advice and consent of the Senate. 

The NPR also concluded that the United States should retain the 

ability to provide extended deterrence to allies and partners. 

First, we’ll retain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear 

weapons on tactical fighter bombers and dual-capable heavy bombers. 

Second, we propose to proceed with full scope life-extension study 

and follow-on activities for the B–61 bomb, to ensure that first production can occur in 2017. 

Third, we will retire the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, or 

Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear, as a redundant capability. 

Fourth, we’ll continue our extensive consultations with allies and 

partners to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. extended deterrence. 

Fifth, decisions about the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear weapons will be made through the 

NATO processes, and not unilateral decisions. That consultative 

process is now underway. 

I’d like to say just a couple of words about long-range strike capabilities, and then conclude. 

Today, the United States has a wide range of non-nuclear longrange strike capabilities, including conventional-only and dual-capable heavy bombers in both sea-launched and air-launched conventional cruise missiles. Of these systems, only dual-capable 

heavy bombers are accountable under the New START treaty. The 

NPR concluded that the United States should also develop non-nuclear Prompt Global Strike capabilities, and should focus such capabilities on regional threats, while not undermining strategic stability, vis-a`-vis Russia and China. Conventional Prompt Global 

Strike capabilities are allowed under the New START treaty. 

In closing, a key premise of the 2010 NPR was that reducing nuclear dangers to the United States, including sustaining effective 

deterrence, is a long-term challenge that will require support from 

a long succession of U.S. administrations and Congress. Laying the 

groundwork for a sustainable bipartisan consensus was, and is, a 

central purpose of this NPR. 

7 

I’d ask that my prepared statement be entered into the record, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. JAMES N. MILLER

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify today. It is a pleasure to join Commander of U.S. 

Strategic Command, General Kevin Chilton, National Nuclear Security Administrator Thomas D’Agostino, and Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher in discussing U.S. nuclear policy and capabilities. I will focus my remarks on the recently 

completed Congressionally-mandated Nuclear Posture Review ( NPR). 

The 2010 NPR provides a roadmap for implementing the President’s Prague agenda of reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of 

a world free of nuclear weapons. Because this goal will not be reached quickly, perhaps not in our lifetimes, the NPR outlines the specific steps needed to sustain a 

safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. The 

fiscal year 2011 budget requests from the Departments of Defense and Energy demonstrate our commitment to this essential effort. 

The 2010 NPR identifies the most urgent nuclear dangers today as proliferation 

and the potential for nuclear terrorism, and outlines a comprehensive approach to 

cope with these challenges that includes policy initiatives and increased investment 

in a number of areas. More broadly, the NPR identifies five key objectives for U.S. 

nuclear policy and posture: 

1. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; 

2. Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy; 

3. Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; 

4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and 

5. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. 

Given that the committee has received the NPR report, I will not summarize all 

of its conclusions. I will focus my remarks on preventing proliferation and nuclear 

terrorism, declaratory policy, and force structure issues. 

PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM

The 2010 NPR places the prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism at the top of the administration’s policy agenda. The recent Nuclear Security 

Summit in Washington, DC, the upcoming Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review 

Conference in New York, and our continued efforts to reverse the nuclear ambitions 

of North Korea and Iran are critical to this effort and to U.S. national security. The 

administration has proposed significantly increased funding in fiscal year 2011 to 

reduce proliferation risks, and to improve our capabilities to detect and interdict 

smuggled nuclear materials or weapons. Examples include: 

• Expanding funding for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, including an increase of $75 million in fiscal year 2011 to address nuclear security efforts worldwide; 

• Increasing funding in fiscal year 2011 for the National Nuclear Security 

Administration’s nuclear nonproliferation programs to $2.7 billion, an increase of more than 25 percent; 

• Enhancing U.S. Special Operations Command’s ability to conduct 

counter-WMD operations by increasing funding by $60 million in fiscal year 

2011; and 

• Improving capabilities for national technical nuclear forensics technologies and the fielding of new capabilities for ground and air collection. 

This includes increased funding requests for DOD and DOE. 

U.S. DECLARATORY POLICY

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review makes clear the benefits to other states of complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—and the potential consequences of not doing so. It strengthens the U.S. ‘‘negative security assurance’’ associated with the NPT, by stating that: 

The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons 

against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. 

8 

1 In 1978, at the first U.N. special session on disarmament, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 

stated: ‘‘The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state 

party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear 

explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed 

forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to a nuclear weapon state, or associated with a nuclear-weapon state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.’’ Similar public statements were 

made by subsequent U.S. administrations in 1995 and 2002. 

The United States first offered a ‘‘negative security assurance’’ associated with the 

NPT in 1978, which was reiterated by subsequent administrations in 1995 and 

2002. This NPR provides a critical change. The previous U.S. negative security assurance had a caveat focused on the Warsaw Pact, stipulating that the assurance 

would not apply to non-nuclear weapons states allied with a nuclear weapons state.1

With the Warsaw Pact long gone, this caveat is no longer needed. In its place, the 

revised assurance provided in the NPR stipulates that a state must not only be a 

party to the NPT, but also that it must be in compliance with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations—a determination that will be made by the United States. This 

new policy makes clear that signing the NPT is necessary but not sufficient: states 

that do not meet their nonproliferation obligations, such as North Korea and Iran 

today, are not covered by the U.S. negative security assurance. 

Recognizing that effective deterrence is based on both credibility and capability, 

the NPR makes clear that any use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) by 

non-nuclear weapons states in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations face a highly credible and extremely capable U.S. conventional response. It 

affirms that: 

. . . any state eligible for the assurance that uses chemical or biological 

weapons against the United States or its allies and partners would face the 

prospect of a devastating conventional military response—and that any individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military 

commanders, would be held fully accountable. 

This pledge is backed by the most formidable military in the world, and the administration is committed to not only sustaining but strengthening our conventional 

military power. In addition to ongoing investments, DOD is currently studying potential additional improvements to long-range strike capabilities, with specific proposals planned in the fiscal year 2012 budget request. 

Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of biotechnology development, the NPR notes that the United States reserves the right 

to make any future adjustment in declaratory policy that may be warranted by the 

evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to 

counter that threat. 

For nuclear weapons states, and states not in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations, the NPR makes clear that U.S. nuclear weapons still play a role 

in deterring not only nuclear attack, but also conventional or CBW attack against 

the United States or its allies and partners. As Secretary of Gates noted recently, 

for states such as North Korea and Iran, ‘‘all options are on the table.’’ 

Finally, to address the potential nexus of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, the NPR renews the U.S. commitment: 

. . . to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state 

actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of 

mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise 

or safe haven for such efforts. 

Nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since 1945, and it is strongly in 

the interests of the United States that this nearly 65-year record of nuclear nonuse continue forever. This NPR acknowledges the reality that the United States 

would use nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances to protect our vital interests or those of our allies and partners. 

These changes in U.S. declaratory policy reinforce our nonproliferation efforts at 

a critical juncture, while simultaneously maintaining and indeed strengthening deterrence of attacks on ourselves or our allies and partners. 

STRATEGIC FORCE STRUCTURE

One of the first tasks of the NPR, which continued throughout the review, was 

to define positions for the New START treaty negotiations. The DOD-led NPR team 

reached the following conclusions about U.S. strategic nuclear force structure: 

• The United States should retain a nuclear Triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and 

dual-capable heavy bombers under New START treaty, in order to preserve 

strategic stability and hedge against any unexpected technical problems or 

9 

operational vulnerabilities in one leg of the Triad. The fiscal year 2011 

budget request includes funding for each leg of the triad. 

• All U.S. ICBMs should be ‘‘deMIRVed’’ to a single warhead each, in order 

to reinforce strategic stability. 

• An ability to ‘‘upload’’ non-deployed nuclear weapons on delivery vehicles 

should be retained as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise. 

Preference will be given to upload capacity for bombers and strategic submarines. 

The Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Chilton supported 

New START treaty reductions in deployed warheads, and limits on deployed as well 

as non-deployed strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs). New START treaty limits were 

validated by rigorous analysis in the NPR. 

The administration intends to provide additional details for strategic forces under 

New START treaty in the report required by section 1251 of the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). This report will include a 10-year estimate of 

budgetary requirements for sustaining delivery platforms, the nuclear weapons 

stockpile, and the nuclear weapons complex. 

NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The NPR concluded that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States 

should retain the capability to ‘‘extend’’ nuclear deterrence to allies and security 

partners. Its recommendations: 

• Retain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical 

fighter-bombers and dual-capable heavy bombers. 

• Proceed with full scope life extension study and follow-on activities for 

the B–61 bomb to ensure first production begins in fiscal year 2017. 

• Retire the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM–N), as a redundant 

capability. 

• Continue and expand consultations with allies and partners to address 

how to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. extended deterrent. 

• Decisions about the future of NATO nuclear weapons should be made 

through NATO processes, and not unilateral decisions. 

NON-NUCLEAR LONG-RANGE STRIKE CAPABILITIES

The administration is currently examining the appropriate mix of non-nuclear 

long-range strike capabilities over the long-term. Today, these capabilities include 

conventional-only and dual-capable heavy bombers, and both sea-launched and airlaunched conventional cruise missiles. Of these systems, only dual-capable bombers 

are accountable under New START treaty. NPR analysis concluded the United 

States should develop non-nuclear Prompt Global Strike capabilities, which are allowed under the New START treaty—and should focus such capabilities on regional 

threats while not undermining strategic stability with Russia or China. 

TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE LONG-TERM APPROACH

A key premise of the 2010 NPR was that an effective national strategy for reducing nuclear dangers and sustaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent are long-term challenges that will require support from a long succession of U.S. administrations and 

Congresses. Laying the groundwork for a sustainable bipartisan consensus is a central purpose of this NPR. 

Chairman LEVIN. All these statements will be made part of the 

record. 

Next, General Chilton. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, COMMANDER, 

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member 

McCain, and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today. It’s a pleasure to join my distinguished colleagues here, in this panel. 

10 

STRATCOM was closely consulted throughout the development 

of the NPR and during negotiations on the New START treaty, and 

I look forward to discussing them with you today. 

I would like to note at the outset how proud I am of the extraordinary work that STRATCOM performed in support of both of 

these efforts. We have an amazing team in Omaha, and their diligence, expertise, and tireless work continue to ensure our ability to 

deliver global security for America. 

The NPR reflects a current assessment of the global security environment, one which is markedly, but not entirely, different from 

the one we faced in the Cold War. It recognizes the need to confront global threats, including nuclear dangers, through the twin 

prongs of deterrence and nonproliferation. The NPR includes several key recommendations that will serve to both sustain and 

strengthen STRATCOM’s ability to conduct our deterrence mission. 

Specifically, the NPR recommends moving forward with a number of nuclear enterprise sustainment projects, including strengthening our nuclear command-and-control structure; continuing development and deployment of our triad of delivery systems; maintaining a safe, secure, and effective stockpile; and revitalizing the 

NNSA’s aging infrastructure. 

America’s triad of diverse and complementary delivery system 

provides unique synergies that make our deterrent highly credible 

and resilient in the face of a variety of potential technological and 

geopolitical developments. The NPR endorses DOD’s efforts to explore future triad systems, specifically to extend the Minuteman III 

ICBM through 2030 and conduct studies now to inform decisions 

on a follow-on ICBM; to replace the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine at the existing ships’ end of life; and to study future longrange bomber capabilities. 

It also supports moving forward with full-rate production for the 

W76–1 warhead for our submarine leg of the triad; full-scope nonnuclear, and, importantly, nuclear, life extension of the B–61 bomb 

to sustain its strategic deterrence and extended deterrence roles; 

and initiating studies to develop life-extension options for the

W–78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of also adapting the 

resulting warhead for SLBMs, and thereby reducing the number of 

warhead types. 

Additionally, the NPR and the President’s budget recognize the 

need to improve the Nation’s nuclear infrastructure and address 

the challenges of human capital recruitment, development, and 

sustainment. These investments are required in order to confidently reduce the overall U.S. stockpile while sustaining the 

credibility of our nuclear stockpile, which is absolutely fundamental to nuclear deterrence. 

Investments that revitalize the NNSA’s aging infrastructure and 

intellectual capital strengthen our security with the facilities and 

the people needed to address technological surprises, geopolitical 

changes, and a range of cutting-edge national security challenges. 

The administration’s request for a 13 percent increase in NNSA 

funding for fiscal year 2011 is an essential first step in this process. 

With regard to the New START treaty, the nuclear enterprise remains, today and for the foreseeable future, the foundation of U.S. 

11 

deterrence strategy and defense posture. As the combatant command responsible for executing strategic deterrence operations, 

planning for nuclear operations, and advocating for nuclear capabilities, at STRATCOM we are keenly aware of how force posture 

and readiness changes can affect deterrence, assurance, and overall 

strategic stability. The New START treaty agreement, in my view, 

retains the military flexibility necessary to ensure each of these for 

the period of the treaty. 

In support of the New START treaty negotiation effort, 

STRATCOM analyzed the required nuclear weapons and delivery 

vehicle force structure and posture to meet current guidance, and 

provided options for considerations by DOD. This rigorous approach, rooted in both deterrence strategy and assessment of potential adversary capabilities, supports both the agreed-upon reductions in the New START treaty and recommendations in the NPR. 

In closing, every day STRATCOM remains focused on providing 

the President, and future presidents, with the options and flexibility needed for deterrence. Today, our deterrent is safe, secure, 

and effective; our forces are trained and ready; and STRATCOM is 

faithfully and fully carrying out its mission, each and every day. 

I am confident that the NPR and New START treaty outline an approach that continues to enable the men and women of 

STRATCOM to deliver global security for America, today and in 

the future. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before this committee, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Chilton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to meet with you today. U.S. Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM) was closely consulted throughout the development of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and during negotiations on the New Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty (START), and I look forward to discussing them with you today. I would like 

to note at the outset how proud I am of the extraordinary work the Command performed in support of these efforts. We have an amazing team, and their diligence, 

expertise, and tireless work continue to ensure our ability to deliver global security 

for America. 

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

The NPR reflects a current assessment of the global security environment, one 

which is markedly, but not entirely, different than the one we faced in the Cold 

War. It recognizes the need to confront global threats, including nuclear dangers, 

through the twin prongs of deterrence and nonproliferation. The NPR includes several key recommendations that will serve to both sustain and strengthen 

STRATCOM’s ability to conduct our deterrence mission 

Specifically, the NPR recommends moving forward with a number of nuclear enterprise sustainment projects, including strengthening our nuclear command and 

control structure; continuing development and deployment of our triad of delivery 

systems; maintaining a safe, secure, and effective stockpile; and revitalizing the National Nuclear Security Administration’s aging infrastructure. America’s triad of diverse and complementary delivery systems provides unique synergies that make our 

deterrent highly credible and resilient in the face of a variety of potential technological and geopolitical developments. The NPR endorses DOD efforts to explore future triad systems, specifically to extend the Minuteman III ICBM through 2030 

and conduct studies now to inform decisions on a follow-on ICBM; to replace the 

Ohio-class SSBN at the existing ships’ end of life; and to study future long-range 

bomber capabilities. It also supports moving forward with full-rate production for 

12 

the W76–1 warhead for our submarine leg of the triad; full-scope (nuclear and nonnuclear) life extension of the B61 bomb to sustain its strategic deterrence and extended deterrence roles; and initiating studies to develop life extension options for 

the W78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of also adapting the resulting 

warhead for sea launched ballistic missiles and thereby reducing the number of warhead types. 

Additionally, the NPR and the President’s Budget recognize the need to improve 

the Nation’s nuclear infrastructure and address the challenges of human capital recruitment, development, and sustainment. These investments are required in order 

to confidently reduce the overall U.S. stockpile while sustaining the credibility of 

our nuclear stockpile, which is fundamental to effective deterrence. Investments 

that revitalize NNSA’s aging infrastructure and intellectual capital strengthen our 

security with the facilities and people needed to address technological surprises, geopolitical change, and a range of cutting-edge national security challenges. The administration’s request for a 13 percent increase in NNSA funding for fiscal year 

2011 is an important first step in this process. 

NEW START TREATY

The nuclear enterprise remains, today and for the foreseeable future, the foundation of U.S. deterrence strategy and defense posture. As the combatant command 

responsible for executing strategic deterrence operations, planning for nuclear operations, and advocating for nuclear capabilities, we are keenly aware of how force 

posture and readiness changes can affect deterrence, assurance, and overall strategic stability. The New START treaty agreement, in my view, retains the military 

flexibility necessary to ensure each of these for the period of the treaty. 

In support of the New START treaty negotiation effort, STRATCOM analyzed the 

required nuclear weapons and delivery vehicle force structure and posture to meet 

current guidance, and provided options for consideration by DOD. This rigorous approach, rooted in both deterrence strategy and assessment of potential adversary capabilities, supports both the agreed-upon reductions in New START treaty and recommendations in the NPR. 

ASSESSMENT

In Prague last year, President Obama emphasized that, ‘‘As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to 

deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies . . . ‘‘ Meeting these 

demanding goals means that a strong and enduring deterrence enterprise remains 

indispensable to U.S. and international security. Accordingly, STRATCOM’s contributions to both the NPR and New START treaty focused on ensuring America’s 

ability to continue to deter potential adversaries, assure our allies, and sustain strategic stability for as long as nuclear weapons exist. Based on our analysis and 

through continued discussions with Department of Defense leadership, my view is 

that these documents and associated budgetary investments continue to support 

these deterrence requirements, and that the New START treaty agreement warhead 

and platform numbers provide appropriate military flexibility. 

Finally, to ensure all necessary elements of a safe, secure, and reliable deterrence 

enterprise, including weapons, delivery systems, warning and communications capabilities, and their supporting human capital and technological infrastructures, we 

must make sustained investments to adequately preserve our capabilities for the 

foreseeable future. In order to sustain the deterrent and implement the NPR, we 

must make long-term investments that begin with several increases outlined in the 

President’s fiscal year 2011 budget. These investments are not only important—they 

are essential. 

CLOSING

Every day, STRATCOM remains focused on providing the President and future 

presidents with the options and flexibility needed to deter and respond to threats 

to our Nation and its allies. Today, our deterrent is safe, secure, and effective; our 

forces are trained and ready; and the Command is faithfully and fully carrying out 

its mission each and every day. I am confident that the NPR and New START treaty outline an approach that continues to enable the men and women of STRATCOM 

to deliver global security for America today and in the future. Thank you again for 

the opportunity to testify before this committee. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, General Chilton. 

13 

Secretary Tauscher, it’s always great to see you back in a congressional setting. It just warms my heart to see you here, and we 

hope you’re happy in your relatively new home. I suppose it’s not 

so new anymore to you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, it’s been almost a year, Senator. But, thank 

you very much, Chairman Levin. It’s an honor to be back here. 

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary Tauscher. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and 

distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to discuss DOS’s role in protecting 

the United States and our allies from today’s most pressing 

threats. I am honored to appear today with my distinguished colleagues. 

Last year, President Obama outlined several steps to strengthen 

our national security by reducing the role and numbers of nuclear 

weapons. In the past months we have advanced that agenda by releasing the NPR, signing the New START treaty, and hosting the 

Nuclear Security Summit. Let me say a few words about the New 

START treaty and missile defenses. 

I spent much of March in Geneva, to help conclude the New 

START treaty. It will enhance our security by reducing and limiting the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces. Those limits 

were guided by rigorous analysis in the NPR. 

The new treaty will promote strategic stability by ensuring 

transparency and predictability. It will advance our nonproliferation agenda by demonstrating that we are meeting our NPT obligations. 

The New START treaty does not constrain U.S. missile defense 

programs. The United States will continue to improve our missile 

defenses, as needed, to defend the U.S. Homeland, our deployed 

forces, and our allies and partners. 

Russia’s unilateral statement on missile defense is not legally 

binding. It won’t constrain U.S. missile defense programs. As the 

administration’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Review and our 

budget plans make clear, we will deploy the most effective missile 

defense systems possible, and the New START treaty does not impose any additional cost or inconvenience to those efforts. 

At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would ask permission to submit, 

for the record, the U.S. and Russian unilateral statements on missile defenses associated with the New START treaty. 

Chairman LEVIN. That will be made part of the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

14 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, sir. 

In addition to reaffirming our commitment to missile defenses, 

the NPR also supports the goal of bolstering nonproliferation. We 

want to give more incentive to non-nuclear states not to seek or acquire nuclear weapons. So, we updated our Negative Security Assurance to make it clear that non-nuclear-weapon state parties to 

the NPT who comply with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations, do not have to fear a U.S. nuclear attack. 

I want to clarify what this new Negative Security Assurance 

does, and does not, do. For non-nuclear-weapon states to the NPT, 

in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation commitments, we 

are removing only the possibility of nuclear retaliation. For such 


422ful65.eps 422ful66.eps
15 

states, we retain the prospect of using devastating conventional 

force to deter and respond to any aggression, especially if they were 

to use chemical or biological weapons. No one should doubt our resolve to hold accountable those responsible for such aggression, 

whether those giving the orders or carrying them out. 

Deterrence depends on the credibility of response. A massive and 

potential conventional response to non-nuclear aggression is highly 

credible. We also reserve the right to readjust the Negative Security Assurance, if warranted, by the evolution and proliferation of 

biological weapons and their threat. The updated Negative Security 

Assurance does not alter our current policy on the use of nuclear 

weapons toward nuclear-armed states or non-nuclear-weapon 

states not in compliance with the NPT and their nuclear nonproliferation obligations, such as North Korea and Iran. In other 

words, for this group of states, we have retained calculated ambiguity. 

But, I want to stress that the NPR states that the United States 

would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its 

allies and partners. 

Nuclear weapons have not been used in nearly 65 years. The bar 

for their use is high, and this NPR recognizes that fact. It is in the 

U.S. interest, and that of all other nations, that the long record of 

nuclear non-use be extended forever. 

Let me close by noting that former Secretaries of Defense William Perry and Jim Schlesinger, the leaders of the Bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission, wrote, recently, that the NPR approach 

on declaratory policy was sensible. They concluded that the NPR 

provides a comprehensive and pragmatic plan for reducing nuclear 

risk to the United States. 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member McCain, I look forward to 

working with this committee and the Senate on these important 

matters, and I look forward to answering any questions you might 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tauscher follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of the 

Senate Armed Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the 

State Department’s shared role in protecting the United States and our allies from 

today’s most pressing threats. I am honored to appear with my colleagues Jim Miller, Tom D’Agostino, and General Chilton. 

President Obama outlined several concrete steps last year in a speech in Prague 

to strengthen our national security by reducing the role and numbers of nuclear 

weapons. 

In the past few weeks, the Obama administration has advanced some of those 

goals even as we reaffirm our commitment to maintain a safe, secure, and effective 

deterrent to protect the United States and our allies so long as nuclear weapons 

exist. 

Last week, the President brought together 46 world leaders to advance his goal 

of securing all vulnerable nuclear material over the next 4 years. At the Nuclear 

Security Summit, President Obama worked with allies and partners to help secure 

vulnerable nuclear material and prevent nuclear smuggling. 

Earlier this month, President Obama and President Medvedev signed the New 

START treaty, which upon entry into force will make verifiable and mutual cuts in 

the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals. 

Finally, the Obama administration issued the Nuclear Posture Review, which we 

are going to discuss today. 

16 

This review constitutes a clear break from past reviews, both in terms of process 

and scope. The administration took a broad, whole-of-government approach to addressing our nuclear policy and identifying concrete steps to enhance our national 

security. 

The Department of Defense led the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), but for the 

first time the Department of State fully participated in discussing the issues and 

making recommendations to the President. 

For the first time, the NPR is an unclassified document. There is no classified 

version. 

I want to address the diplomatic implications of the Nuclear Posture Review as 

well as the rationale behind some of the most discussed issues, including the updated Negative Security Assurance. But I first want to say a few words about the 

New START treaty and how it relates to the NPR. 

The United States and Russia can safely reduce our nuclear forces because the 

threat environment has changed. The relationship between the United States and 

Russia has improved and today’s most pressing nuclear threats come from terrorists 

and additional countries seeking nuclear weapons. A large-scale nuclear attack is 

no longer the most pressing threat. The conclusions of our recent NPR reflect that 

reality. 

I spent much of March at the table in Geneva to help conclude the New START 

treaty. It will improve U.S. and international security by reducing and limiting U.S. 

and Russian strategic nuclear forces. It will promote strategic stability by ensuring 

transparency and predictability regarding U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces 

over the life of the Treaty. It will advance our nuclear nonproliferation agenda. 

The U.S. push for meaningful, lower limits on deployed warheads and their delivery vehicles and launchers was guided by rigorous analysis in the early months of 

the NPR. The Treaty’s verification regime will provide each side confidence that the 

other is upholding its obligations. The new Treaty gives our military the flexibility 

to structure, deploy, and maintain our forces in ways that best meet U.S. national 

security interests. 

The Treaty does not constrain U.S. missile defense programs or long-range conventional strike capabilities. 

The United States will continue to improve our missile defenses, as needed, to defend the U.S. homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. Russia’s 

unilateral statement on missile defense is not an integral part of the New START 

treaty. It’s not legally binding. It won’t constrain U.S. missile defense programs. As 

the administration’s Ballistic Missile Defense Review and our budget plans make 

clear, we will deploy the most effective missile defenses possible, and the New 

START treaty does not impose any additional cost or inconvenience to those efforts. 

Of course, under the new Treaty, the United States will continue to maintain a 

safe, secure, and effective strategic nuclear force to protect ourselves and our allies 

and partners. 

The President also set forth a goal to bolster our nonproliferation efforts and the 

NPR identifies many of the steps this administration is taking and will pursue to 

achieve that objective. One of the ways to do that is to show non-nuclear weapon 

states that there are security benefits to complying with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and other nonproliferation obligations. 

We want to reinforce and enhance the global nonproliferation regime and to give 

greater incentives to non-nuclear states not to seek or acquire nuclear weapons. To 

do this, we have updated our Negative Security Assurance to make it clear that 

non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT who abide by their nuclear nonproliferation obligations do not have to fear a nuclear attack from the United States. 

Some have suggested that the new policy might lead some states to be less fearful 

of the consequences of using chemical and biological weapons against us. 

Others have alleged that the new policy takes options off of the table to deal with 

states like Iran or North Korea, as well as nuclear-armed states. 

Let me address both starting with the first critique. For non-nuclear-weapon 

states-parties to the NPT in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation commitments, we are removing only the possibility of nuclear retaliation. We retain the option and willingness to use devastating conventional force to deter and respond to 

any aggression, especially with chemical or biological weapons, against the United 

States, our forces, or our allies and partners by such states. 

No one should doubt the resolve and conventional military capabilities of the 

United States to respond to such aggression with devastating effect and to hold accountable those responsible whether national leaders giving the orders or military 

officers carrying them out. Deterrence depends on the credibility of a possible response. A massive and potent U.S. conventional response to such non-nuclear aggression is highly credible. By reducing unnecessary ambiguity in our declaratory 

17 

policy, we lose little if nothing in terms of our capabilities or our deterrent posture, 

and gain a critical tool in pursuing a more robust and effective nonproliferation system. 

Furthermore, we prudently reserve the right to readjust the Negative Security Assurance if warranted by the future evolution and proliferation of the biological 

weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat. 

Second, the updated Negative Security Assurance does not alter our current policy 

on the use of nuclear weapons toward nuclear-armed states or states not party to 

the NPT or not in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations, such 

as North Korea and Iran. In other words, for this group of states, we have left all 

options on the table. 

I want to stress that our updated assurance does not suggest an increased threat 

of using nuclear weapons against countries not covered by this pledge. In the NPR, 

we state the United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies 

and partners. 

Nevertheless, there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional, chemical, or biological attack against the United States or its allies and partners. We therefore are not 

prepared to adopt a policy declaring that the ‘‘sole purpose’’ of nuclear weapons is 

to deter nuclear attack. But we will work toward creating the conditions that would 

enable such a policy to be safely adopted. There is no timetable for such a step and, 

as President Obama has said, while we move forward on our vision of a world without nuclear weapons, we must confront the world as it is. 

Nuclear weapons have not been used in nearly 65 years. The bar for their use 

is high and this NPR recognizes and seeks to reinforce that fact. It is in the U.S. 

interest and that of all other nations that the long record of nuclear non-use be extended forever. 

Let me close on this issue of declaratory policy by noting that former Secretaries 

of Defense William Perry and Jim Schlesinger, the leaders of the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission, said the NPR approach was ‘‘a sensible variation on a 

theme that the United States should support nonproliferation while preserving deterrence for itself and its allies.’’ 

In general, they noted that the NPR was ‘‘compatible’’ with their commission’s recommendations and that the review provides a ‘‘comprehensive and pragmatic plan 

for reducing nuclear risks to the United States.’’ 

Our commitment to defend our national security interests and our allies and partners in Europe, the Pacific and elsewhere has never been stronger. 

In this regard, the NPR reaffirms the principle of close cooperation with our allies 

around the world and maintains our firm commitment to mutual security. 

We will work with our partners to reinforce regional security architectures, such 

as missile defenses and other conventional military capabilities. 

I want to repeat what I said earlier, the United States will continue to maintain 

a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for ourselves and our allies so long 

as these weapons exist anywhere in the world. 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member McCain, I look forward to working with this 

committee and the Senate on these important matters. 

Thank you for holding this important hearing and I look forward to any questions 

you might have for me. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Secretary Tauscher. 

Now, Administrator D’Agostino. 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the 

committee. 

I’m very pleased to appear before you today with such a distinguished panel as my colleagues here, General Chilton, the Honorable Ellen Tauscher, and Dr. Jim Miller. My remarks will focus on 

the DOE’s equities included in the NPR. 

NNSA is actively engaged in direct support of the first NPR objective, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. The 

most important steps we can take to keep terrorists from develVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:22 Jan 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63689.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
18 

oping and using an improvised nuclear device or radiological ‘‘dirty 

bomb’’ is to prevent them from acquiring nuclear material. This job 

is not new to the NNSA. We have led this effort, over several 

years, and now we are accelerating and broadening the scope of 

these efforts. 

Current NNSA programs include securing nuclear materials, 

technology, and expertise, including the most vulnerable nuclear 

materials worldwide within 4 years; disposing of excess U.S. and 

international fissile materials; strengthening the international 

safeguard system by developing new safeguards, technologies, expertise, policies, concepts, and partnerships; developing an active 

nuclear and radiological security dialogue and cooperation with key 

domestic and international partners; and developing highly sensitive and wide-area nuclear material detection technologies. 

The NNSA is also actively engaged in direct support of the fifth 

NPR objective: sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. For more than 65 years, our program has been able to do just 

that; assure the Nation that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, 

secure, and effective, and meeting the nuclear deterrent needs of 

the United States. 

To that end, the United States will not conduct underground nuclear testing; we will not develop new nuclear warheads for new 

missions; we will study options for ensuring the safety, security, 

and effectiveness of the nuclear warheads, on a case-by-case basis. 

Applying these principles, the NNSA will fully fund the ongoing 

life-extension program for the W76 submarine-based warhead, and 

the full-scope life-extension study and follow-on activities for the 

B–61 bomb. We will participate with the Nuclear Weapons Council, 

as well, on a new study of life-extension options for the W–78 

ICBM warhead. 

The NPR also concluded that the NNSA needed to recapitalize 

the aging infrastructure and to renew our human capital: the critical cadre of scientific, technical, and engineering experts who carry 

out our stockpile management work and support other vital nuclear 

security missions. To that end, the NNSA will strengthen the 

science, technology, and engineering base, including supporting 

computational and experimental capabilities needed for weaponsystem life extensions, the weapon surety work, certification without nuclear testing, and providing annual stockpile weapon surveillance. 

The NNSA will also fund two key research—or, two key facility 

projects, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 

Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory, for work on plutonium 

to replace the existing 58-year-old facility, and a Uranium Processing Facility at the Y–12 Plant in Oak Ridge, TN. 

The NPR also sustains the strategic triad. This drives the recent 

DOD decision to recapitalize the sea-based strategic deterrent. The 

Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, the most survivable leg of 

our Nation’s deterrent, are reaching the end of their operational 

life. In support of the NPR, the Naval Reactors Program will continue reactor plant design and development efforts for the procurement of long-lead reactor plant components, in support of Navy 

procurement of the first Ohio-class submarine replacement. 

19 

Responsible stockpile management requires not only the supporting infrastructure, but also a highly capable workforce with the 

specialized skills needed to sustain the deterrent and to support 

the President’s nuclear security agenda. 

The NPR noted the importance of recruiting and retaining the 

human capital needed in the NNSA for the nuclear security missions. In order to succeed in these missions, we need to be able to 

recruit and retain the next generation of nuclear security professionals, because our highly specialized workforce is our greatest 

asset. 

The President has now clearly outlined the importance of nuclear 

issues for our national security and of keeping the U.S. nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and effective for the foreseeable future. The 

administration’s commitment to a clear and long-term plan for 

managing the stockpile, and its comprehensive nuclear security 

agenda, ensures the scientists and engineers of tomorrow will have 

the opportunity to engage in challenging research and development 

activities. 

I want to share with the committee a statement from our national laboratory directors that provides their view on the NPR. 

The directors universally state that: 

‘‘We believe the approach outlined in the NPR, which excludes further nuclear testing and includes the consideration of the full range of life-extension options, provides 

the necessary technical flexibility to manage the nuclear 

stockpile into the future with an acceptable level of risk. 

We are reassured that a key component of the NPR is the 

recognition of the importance of supporting a modern physical infrastructure comprised of the national security laboratories, and a complex of supporting facilities, and a 

highly capable workforce.’’ 

This NPR is an important step towards adopting a 21st century 

approach to nuclear weapons and a broader array of nuclear security issues. This path forward will require a long-term commitment 

to provide the support and the resources necessary to sustain our 

deterrent and enable future arms reductions. 

Finally, our approach towards maintaining the stockpile described in the NPR is wholly consistent with, and was informed by, 

the Stockpile Management Program principles passed into law 

through the 2010 NDAA. 

With the committee’s endorsement, the nuclear security enterprise will have the science, technology, and engineering expertise 

to manage the stockpile and to also carry out the full range of nuclear security missions, which include nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear counterterrorism, and nuclear forensics, among other activities. 

Secretary Chu recently stated that DOE must discover and deliver those solutions to advance our national priorities. The NNSA 

and our nuclear security enterprise are poised to provide these solutions. 

I’ll be pleased to respond to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. D’Agostino follows:] 

20 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO

Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am pleased to appear 

before you to discuss the Department of Energy’s (DOE) key elements included in 

the administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, released on April 6, 2010. 

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reaffirms President Obama’s commitment to 

providing DOE and its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) the resources required to support the President’s nuclear security agenda and maintain 

the safety, security and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without underground testing. The NPR reflects the fact that protecting our Nation’s nuclear security is an enduring Government-wide responsibility. I am proud of the role the DOE 

played in what was the first, truly interagency NPR in our Nation’s history. 

The NPR lays out five key objectives that provide a comprehensive path forward 

for implementing the President’s nuclear security agenda for reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. The 

five objectives are: 

1. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; 

2. Reducing the role of nuclear weapons; 

3. Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; 

4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassurance of U.S. allies and partners; 

and, 

5. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. 

PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM

DOE and the NNSA are actively engaged in direct support of the first objective, 

‘‘preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.’’ The Department’s fiscal 

year 2011 budget request includes a nearly 26 percent increase in funding for 

NNSA’s nuclear nonproliferation programs. These programs encompass the first line 

of defense, second line of defense, and additional programs aimed at securing vulnerable nuclear materials within 4 years and providing key technical support to prevent proliferation in other nuclear arenas. The most important thing that can be 

done to keep terrorists from developing and using an improvised nuclear device or 

a radiological dispersion device (an RDD or a so-called ‘‘dirty bomb’’) is to prevent 

them from acquiring nuclear material. The NNSA is accelerating and broadening 

the scope of its efforts to improve the security of nuclear materials in the United 

States and globally to achieve the President’s priorities first articulated in Prague. 

Current NNSA programs include: 

• Securing nuclear materials, technology, and expertise, including the most 

vulnerable nuclear materials, worldwide within 4 years and disposition of 

excess U.S. and international fissile materials; 

• Working with the Office of Nuclear Energy to support the development 

of a new framework for peaceful nuclear energy to promote civil nuclear 

power and nonproliferation objectives; 

• Strengthening the international safeguards system by developing new 

safeguards technologies, expertise, policies, concepts, and partnerships; 

• Developing an active nuclear and radiological security dialog and cooperation with key domestic and international partners; and, 

• Developing highly sensitive and wide-area nuclear materials detection 

technology. 

NNSA programs are also supporting the President’s arms control and nonproliferation agenda by using the technical capabilities within the Nuclear Security 

Enterprise to demonstrate the technical ability to support, monitor, and comply with 

the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Fissile Material Cutoff 

Treaty, and any follow-on arms control requirements. 

MANAGING THE U.S. NUCLEAR STOCKPILE

DOE and NNSA are also actively engaged in direct support of the fifth NPR objective, ‘‘sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.’’ 

The need to maintain the safety, security and effectiveness of an aging stockpile 

without resuming nuclear testing has been a bipartisan national policy for nearly 

20 years under both Democratic and Republican administrations. As the President 

said in Prague, we will sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal as long 

as nuclear weapons exist. 

This NPR reflects that commitment and our budget request, if approved, would 

provide the resources required to make that possible. The NPR is based on several 

key principles that will guide future U.S. decisions on stockpile management. 

21 

• The United States will not conduct nuclear testing, and will seek ratification and entry into force of the CTBT. 

• The United States will not develop new nuclear warheads. The NPR 

makes clear that the United States will only use nuclear components based 

on previously tested designs, and will not pursue new military missions or 

provide for new military capabilities for our stockpile. 

• The United States will study options for ensuring the safety, security, 

and effectiveness of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis, consistent 

with the congressionally-mandated Stockpile Management Program. The 

full range of life extension program (LEP) approaches will be considered: 

refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components. 

• Finally, in any decision to proceed to engineering development for warhead LEPs, the United States will give strong preference to options for refurbishment or reuse. The NPR makes clear that replacement of nuclear 

components would be undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management 

Program goals could not otherwise be met, and if specifically authorized by 

the President and approved by Congress. 

Using these principles, the United States will extend the life of nuclear warheads 

required for the smaller force structure identified under the follow-on START agreement. Consistent with this approach, the NPR recommended that: 

• The administration fully fund the ongoing LEP for the W76 submarinebased warhead for a 2017 completion, and the full scope LEP study and follow-on activities for the B61 bomb to ensure first production begins in 2017. 

• The Nuclear Weapons Council initiate a study in 2010 of LEP options for 

the W78 ICBM warhead to be conducted jointly by the NNSA and the Department of Defense (DOD). This study will consider, as all future LEP 

studies will, the possibility of using the resulting warhead also on multiple 

platforms in order to reduce the number of warhead types. 

The NNSA, in close coordination with the DoD, will provide a new stockpile stewardship and management plan to Congress, consistent with the increases in infrastructure investment requested in the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request. 

A more robust and modernized infrastructure will enable the United States to shift 

away from retaining large numbers of nondeployed warheads as a technical hedge, 

allowing additional reductions in the U.S. stockpile of nondeployed nuclear weapons. 

This consolidated approach will ensure high confidence in the technical performance of warheads retained in the stockpile. It will guarantee that their safety and 

security are aligned with 21st century requirements (and technical capabilities). 

This approach sets a high standard for the safety and security of U.S. nuclear weapons and, in support of nonproliferation goals, positions the United States to encourage other nations to maintain the highest levels of surety for their nuclear stockpiles. 

These activities are also consistent with the principles of the Stockpile Management Program outlined by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2010. 

RECAPITALIZING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND RENEWING HUMAN CAPITAL

The NPR concluded that DOE needed increased funding to recapitalize the aging 

infrastructure used to support the stockpile and conduct a full range of nuclear security missions, and to renew our human capital—the critical cadre of scientific, 

technical, and engineering experts who underpin our stockpile management work 

and support our nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism missions. 

In order to sustain a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear stockpile as long as 

nuclear weapons exist, the United States must possess a modern physical infrastructure—comprised of the national security laboratories and a complex of supporting facilities. 

The NPR concluded that the following key investments were required to sustain 

a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal: 

• Strengthening the science, technology, and engineering base needed for 

conducting weapon system LEPs, maturing advanced technologies to increase weapons surety, qualification of weapon components and certifying 

weapons without nuclear testing, and providing annual stockpile assessments through weapons surveillance. This includes developing and sustaining high quality scientific staff and supporting computational and experimental capabilities. 

22 

• Funding the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project at 

Los Alamos National Laboratory to replace the existing 50-year old Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility by 2021. 

• Developing a new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y–12 Plant in Oak 

Ridge, TN, to come on line for production operations by 2021. Without an 

ability to produce uranium components, any plan to sustain the stockpile, 

as well as support for our naval nuclear propulsion programs, will come to 

a halt. 

More broadly, the administration supports the needed recapitalization of the nuclear infrastructure through fully funding the NNSA. These nuclear security facilities will be sized to support the requirements of the Stockpile Stewardship Program 

mandated by Congress and to meet the multiple requirements of dismantling warheads and eliminating material no longer needed for defense purposes, conducting 

technical surveillance, implementing life extension plans, and supporting naval propulsion requirements. Increased investments in the nuclear security enterprise are 

needed to ensure the long-term safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal and to support the full range of nuclear security work to include nonproliferation, nuclear forensics, nuclear counterterrorism, emergency management, intelligence analysis, and treaty verification. 

Responsible stockpile management requires not only infrastructure, but also a 

highly capable workforce with the specialized skills needed to sustain the nuclear 

deterrent and to support the President’s overall nuclear security agenda. Like our 

physical infrastructure, over the last decade our human capital base has been underfunded and underdeveloped. The decrease in funding for the science and engineering basis of stockpile assessment and management meant that technical issues 

might remain unresolved and the best and brightest scientists were therefore less 

attracted to the endeavor. A number of leaders noted that a national consensus on 

the approach to sustaining warheads, and adequate funding of those challenges, was 

essential to sustaining our nuclear technical capabilities. The cumulative loss of 

focus, expertise, and excellence on nuclear matters in the United States remains a 

significant challenge, but one that we can now address. 

The President has now clearly outlined the importance of nuclear issues for our 

national security, and the importance of keeping the U.S. nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and effective at the minimum numbers required. Further, the administration’s 

commitment to a clear and long-term plan for managing the stockpile ensures the 

scientists and engineers of tomorrow will have the opportunity to engage in challenging research and development activities that are essential to their recruitment 

and retention. 

A modern nuclear security infrastructure and highly skilled workforce are also essential to arms control and nonproliferation objectives. For example, by certifying 

the reliability of each weapon type we retain, the United States can credibly assure 

non-nuclear allies and partners they need not build their own, while we seek greater 

stockpile reductions than otherwise possible. We also enhance our ability to assess 

and render safe potential terrorist nuclear devices and support other national security initiatives, such as nuclear forensics and attribution, and to understand the 

technical challenges associated with verifying ever deeper arms control reductions, 

which is critical for managing risks on the path to zero. 

RECAPITALIZING THE SEA-BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENT

The NPR sustains the Strategic Triad. This drives the recent DOD decision to recapitalize the sea-based strategic deterrent. The Ohio-class ballistic submarines, the 

most survivable leg of the Nation’s strategic deterrent, are reaching the end of their 

operational life. In support of the NPR, the Naval Reactors program will continue 

reactor plant design and development efforts begun in 2010 for procurement of longlead reactor plant components in 2017, in support of Navy procurement of the first 

Ohio-class submarine replacement in 2019. 

CONCLUSION

We are already implementing the principles in the NPR. For example, the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request for NNSA includes $11.2 billion (a 13 percent 

increase from 2010) to manage the stockpile, recapitalize the NNSA infrastructure, 

and support the full range of nuclear security missions—including NNSA’s role in 

preventing nuclear proliferation, powering the nuclear navy, and promoting effective 

nuclear counterterrorism capabilities. 

This NPR is an important step toward ending Cold War thinking and adopting 

a 21st century approach to nuclear weapons and nuclear security issues. The administration’s substantial fiscal year 2011 budget request begins the turnaround to this 

23 

NPR path. With the committee’s help, we can sustain our nuclear deterrent and enable future arms reductions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. D’Agostino. 

Let’s try an 8-minute first round. 

I want to thank Senator Ben Nelson, by the way, for taking over 

at around 10:30 a.m., when I have to leave. I very much appreciate 

that, Senator Nelson. 

General, let me start with you. You indicated in your testimony 

that STRATCOM was a full participant in the NPR process, and 

that you’re satisfied with the outcome. When STRATCOM performed the analysis to support the NPR, you also said that the 

force structure decisions were based on existing nuclear guidance, 

which has existed since 2008. If I understand that statement correctly, you’re implying that the force structure in the NPR is more 

than enough to meet future requirements, because, in part, it 

meets current requirements. Is that correct? Do I have that 

straight? 

General CHILTON. Senator, as we got into the last-year time period and realized with the NPR being due, the Quadrennial Defense Review being due, START expiring, we knew we needed to 

fix the playing field on how we could proceed forward on this. Dr. 

Miller can add to this, as well. So, one of the things that we decided we needed to fix, as we went forward with START negotiations, in particular, was what we were going to base our negotiating strategy on. What guidance should we assume is applicable 

to this? It was decided, rather than work through, which is normally a year-long process to develop new strategies and guidance, 

we would just fix that for our analysis of the force structure for the 

START negotiations. That’s how we moved forward. 

That is the context of my statement, there, is that, it was more 

about how we went forward. Yes, I am comfortable with the force 

structure we have. I believe it is adequate for the mission that 

we’ve been given, and is consistent with NPR. 

The only assumptions we had to make with regard to the new 

NPR, which was, of course, in development at the time, was that 

there would be no request for an increase in forces. There was also 

an assumption that I think is valid, that the Russians, in the postnegotiation time period, would be compliant with the treaty, should 

they ratify that, and that we would, too. Those were really our 

going-in positions. 

Chairman LEVIN. During the Cold War, the force structure was 

based largely on the number of targets and the certainty required 

to hold those targets at risk, and to eliminate the targets. Without 

a specific adversary, I understand that the philosophy has changed 

so that the force structure is based on the capabilities to address 

types of targets rather than specific targets. If that is accurate, 

does the change in philosophy provide you with the confidence that 

you can go to lower levels and still meet any new nuclear guidance 

policy? 

General CHILTON. Mr. Chairman, a couple of points. One, parity 

was a driving factor at one point during the Cold War, which is 

why we still had continuous growth in stockpiles back and forth between the Soviet Union and the United States, at the time. It 

24 

wasn’t so much driven by specific targets as it was how big your 

force structure was. We’ve steered away from that, for sure. 

One thing that is similar is that what STRATCOM—then Strategic Air Command, in the Cold War—was told to plan against, 

was types of categories of targets, and then the Command would 

plan against and present the results of those efforts up for approval. That process is pretty much still in place. Again, we’re not 

told specifically what to do. We’re told categories, as you described, 

for our deterrence, we develop a plan, and then push that forward 

for Secretary of Defense approval. 

Chairman LEVIN. Let me ask both Dr. Miller and you, General 

Chilton, the NPR does not identify how the 800 strategic nuclear 

systems are going to be allocated amongst the legs of the triad— 

the 800 coming from the New START treaty. What’s the process for 

determining how many nuclear-capable bombers, how many 

SLBMs, and how many land-based ICBMs are going to be in the 

force structure? Let me start with you, Dr. Miller, when’s this process going to be completed? 

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, this process began during the NPR, 

and we looked at a wide range of alternative force structures. It 

will be completed shortly, as we provide the Section 1251 report to 

Congress. Along with that, we’ll provide a recommended baseline 

force structure. 

Chairman LEVIN. When is that? 

Dr. MILLER. It will be provided, sir, with the submission of the 

New START treaty, hopefully in the next several weeks. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

Dr. MILLER. If I could add, the treaty provides and allows the 

freedom to mix, for both sides, their strategic forces, under these 

limits. Our intention would be to provide a baseline plan, understanding that it could be modified later, if there were a challenge 

with one leg of the triad or another. 

Mr. Chairman, if I could add very briefly, with respect to the 

question of guidance, during the NPR we looked at a very wide 

range of possible nuclear scenarios and found that the force structure and the numbers that had become part of the New START 

treaty, provided a very robust capability across that wide range. 

We are in the process of reviewing and revising classified guidance, 

and are confident that this force structure will provide more than 

enough capability for that revised guidance. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree with that, General? 

General CHILTON. I do, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

Secretary Tauscher, one of the key objectives of the NPR is to 

strengthen the NPT regime. Now, the review conference for that 

treaty is going to be held in May, with a commitment to support 

the regional allies and partners, as this NPR does, with the reductions in deployed nuclear forces, and increased emphasis on nonproliferation. Do you believe that the NPR will have a positive effect on the review conference? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we do. The President has 

made the NPT a central pillar in his nonproliferation agenda, and 

strengthening the NPT, both through the review conference and 

ongoing efforts, is a very important opportunity. Both the Negative 

25 

Security Assurance in the NPR, which makes very clear the exemption for non-nuclear-weapon states that are in compliance with the 

NPT obligations. This, once again, not only makes clear what our 

position is on the exemption, but it also strengthens the NPT and 

countries’ acsession to it and adherence to it. What it says is that, 

if you are a member of the NPT, and are clearly in compliance, 

then you have this exemption. 

I think that the President’s agenda, when it comes to the NPT 

review, is one—because it’s a consensus-driven exercise, for over a 

month in New York at the U.N., with hundreds of countries coming, there are many different parts of this that we want to work 

collaboratively. But, at the same time, it’s not just the review conference, but an ongoing effort, working with key partners, to make 

sure that the NPT is strengthened, and that there is great adherence to it. 

Chairman LEVIN. There are also commitments, are there not, in 

the NPT for the nuclear powers to reduce their nuclear inventories? 

Is that not correct? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Yes, sir. That’s Article 6 of the NPT. 

There are three pillars to the NPT: peaceful uses, disarmament, 

and nonproliferation. We believe, in the United States, certainly 

with the New START treaty and other efforts that we have made 

unilaterally, that we have made a strong commitment to Article 6 

of the NPT. You won’t be surprised to find out that not everyone 

believes that, but we strongly assert that we, certainly with Russia, 

because we have 90 percent of the weapons in the world are reducing those numbers, and we are working very seriously to maintain 

a very strong, safe, and effective stockpile. 

Chairman LEVIN. If we expect others to maintain their commitments to the NPT, it is important, won’t you agree, that we keep 

our commitments, as well, relative to reductions? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. As usual, Mr. Chairman, there are issues like 

Iran, which are a significant challenge for us, and have been for 

various administrations. The Iranians’ lack of commitment to the 

NPT and their abuse of U.N. Security Council resolutions cause us 

to look for arrows in our quiver that will remind people of these 

obligations. Certainly, the NPT is the best example we have of Iranian noncompliance. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, thank you. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Miller, a lot of us have been very unhappy about the fact 

that there is no cohesive—or, coherent policy towards the Iranian 

nuclear buildup and their inexorable movement towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability, which is the view of all intelligence agencies throughout the world. At last week’s hearing on 

Iran, Secretary Flournoy and General Cartwright said, in direct response to questions, that all options regarding Iran were on the 

table. 

Yesterday, in Singapore, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 

Secretary Miche ́le Flournoy said during a press briefing, ‘‘Military 

force is an option of last resort;’’ Miche ́le Flournoy said, ‘‘it’s off the 

table in the near term.’’ Now, which is it? Which is it, Dr. Miller? 

Is it off the table for the near-term, as Secretary Flournoy says, in 

26 

direct contradiction to her testimony before this committee? What 

is the near-term, if it’s off the table in the near-term? Do you think 

the American people have a right to know that? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator McCain, I had the opportunity to talk to 

Under Secretary Flournoy yesterday, and I have not seen a transcript, nor has she, to confirm which is the case. But, she was either misquoted or misspoke; the administration’s policy, as Under 

Secretary Flournoy said before, is that all options are on the table. 

The administration has also made clear that the strong preference is to work through diplomatic channels, and now as we 

move to the so-called ‘‘pressure track,’’ to apply sanctions to Iran 

so that they will change their policy. 

But I will, again, state for the record, and on behalf of the administration, that all options are on the table, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. So, now we’re treated to our Under Secretary 

of Defense for Policy going to Singapore and saying ‘‘It’s off the 

table in the near term.’’ No wonder our friends are dispirited and 

our enemies are encouraged. 

Secretary Tauscher, why did the decision made concerning the 

elimination of the nuclear option in cases of nations that are in 

compliance with the NPT? What was the rationale behind that reversal of what has been a national policy of deliberate ambiguity 

since the beginning of the Cold War? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Senator McCain, I don’t think it’s a reversal. I 

think what it is, is an articulation of the reality of the 21st century. 

What we have—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Excuse me, it’s not a reversal of the previous 

policy of ambiguity concerning what the U.S. action would be, in 

case of attacks on the United States and our allies? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. With all due respect, Senator, I don’t know how 

you reverse ambiguity. Ambiguity is what it is, it means that you 

were not specific—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Oh no, ambiguity was clearly a policy, Madam 

Secretary. It was clearly a policy so that our enemies would not be 

clear as to what actions we would take in case of attacks. That—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Senator, you’re making my point. 

Senator McCain:—that is a policy, Secretary Tauscher. If you allege that it’s not, then we might as well move on to the next question. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Senator, you’re making my point for me. 

Senator MCCAIN. Pardon me? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. You’re making my point for me; we were not 

clear. We were not clear to countries, that—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Now we are clear. 

Ms. TAUSCHER.—we would never use nuclear weapons against, 

that we would not use nuclear weapons against them. That’s what 

this policy says. This policy says that, for non-nuclear-weapon 

states that are in compliance with their NPT obligations, we’re not 

going to either threaten or use nuclear weapons against them. 

Senator MCCAIN. That’s not a change in our policy. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. It is an articulation of our policy. It is moving our 

policy to a more clear point of view. It is more clear than ambiguity. Yes, that’s right. 

Dr. MILLER. Senator, could I perhaps add, briefly—— 

27 

Senator MCCAIN. I’ll be glad to. 

That’s one of the more bizarre statements I’ve ever heard made 

before this committee. 

Go ahead. 

Dr. MILLER. Senator McCain, the United States first made a 

Negative Security Assurance associated with the NPT in 1978, and 

that’s by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The statement said that 

the United States would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that were party to the NPT. 

Same pledge was made in 1995, and again in 2002 by subsequent 

administrations, so this Negative Security Assurance is not new. 

What the change is, in the NPR, is that we’ve added the condition 

that a state must also be compliant with its NPT obligations. So, 

we’ve added a condition. In order to get into that group, that is provided an assurance that the United States will not use nuclear 

weapons, we’ve added a condition. Under the old assurance, that 

Iran, today, would be provided that assurance and under the new 

assurance it is not. 

Sir, the other part of that, I think you were refering to it as calculated ambiguity, at various points in time in the past, the United 

States has hinted that nuclear weapons might be used in response 

to chemical or biological weapons, even if by a non-nuclear-weapon 

states. Our view was that the credibility and capability of our deterrence posture is the determinative factor, in that—both with respect to non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon states or 

noncompliant states, that a clear posture that distinguishes between those two was likely to be more effective for deterrence. 

Senator MCCAIN. I guess that’s in the eye of the beholder, Dr. 

Miller. 

So, let’s have this scenario. There’s a biological and chemical attack on the United States of America, inflicting a great deal of devastation on the United States of America, and we know who did it. 

So, then the decision is made as to whether we consider the use 

of nuclear weapons to be directly guided by and dictated by whether that nation is in compliance with the NPT? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, the policy would be that the use of nuclear 

weapons would be contemplated if that state were either a nuclearweapon state, or a state that was not compliant with its nuclear 

nonproliferation obligations. 

Senator MCCAIN. So, if there is a massive attack on the United 

States, we decide whether nuclear weapons are used, or will not be 

used, not because that might be the best way to respond or not, but 

whether that nation is in compliance with the NPT? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator McCain, the—— 

Senator MCCAIN. That is really remarkable. 

So, we are telling the American people, now, that if there’s a 

chemical or biological attack on the United States of America, and 

it is of devastating consequences, we will rule out the option of 

using a nuclear weapon, even though that may be the most effective course of action, if that country is in compliance or noncompliance with the NPT. 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, if you look at the countries today that have any 

significant capacity to develop chemical and biological weapons, 

you will find that those are states that are either nuclear-weapon 

28 

states or that are not in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations, such as—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Today. 

Dr. MILLER.—North Korea and—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Today, that’s the case. Maybe not a year or 5 

years from now. But, if they are in compliance with the NPT, they 

are free to launch attacks on the United States of America, and be 

assured that there will not be a response with nuclear weapons, 

even though that may be, in the view of our military leaders, the 

best way to respond to it. 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, if you look at the experience of, to take one example of Saddam Hussein, I think you can see that the conventional capabilities of the United States ought to be sufficient to provide a very significant deterrent. We’ve made it clear, in this NPR, 

that both political and military leaders would be held accountable 

for the use, or the transfer, of weapons of mass destruction. 

Might I very briefly add, with respect to your point, that conditions could change. I absolutely agree. That’s specifically why the 

NPR stated that the United States reserves the right to modify this 

assurance if, in the future, the threat posed by biological weapons 

proliferation and technology advancement would make that appropriate. 

Senator MCCAIN. Of course, I got a non-answer from Secretary 

Tauscher. Why we even got into this is beyond me . . . is beyond me. 

But, the fact is that we have now sent a message: Stay in compliance with the NPT, and you will be immune from the response, if 

necessary, of a nuclear weapon, in order to save and minimize 

losses or most effectively respond to a chemical or biological attack 

on the United States of America. It’s a remarkable circumstance. 

My time has expired. 

Senator BEN NELSON [presiding]. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Tauscher, I think you were leaning forward to the 

microphone. I wanted to give you another chance to answer the 

question from Senator McCain, because it’s an important question, 

which is, why is this section in here? In other words, before I give 

you the chance, I’ll just say, really briefly, it does seem to me that 

this provision in the NPR takes the previous calculated ambiguity, 

removes a lot of the ambiguity, but, frankly, then restores some of 

the ambiguity, in the language that Mr. Miller just quoted. Dr. Miller, which is that we reserve the right to review this at any time. 

So, it’s a curious part of this, of the review, which I, overall, think 

is a very constructive and significant document. So, why is it there? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Senator Lieberman, it’s there because the decision, I think rightly, was made that the great balance of countries, 

many of whom are our allies that don’t have nuclear weapons and 

that are in compliance with their NPT obligations, are not targets 

of the United States to use nuclear weapons. The bar for using nuclear weapons is extremely high. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. The deterrence of nuclear weapons is extremely 

successful. We have not used a nuclear weapon in 65 years. We 

have used conventional weapons, with great success, great force, 

and great devastation, in the recent decade. 

29 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. So, we have decided that we would deter activities by non-nuclear-weapon states in good compliance with the 

NPT, with conventional weapons. Knowing that, we believe, since 

we have the finest military in the world and the most significant 

conventional weapons, that that deterrence suits the kind of threat 

that they pose to us. 

We have added the caveat that, if those states should use chemical or biological weapons, that we would make very clear to them, 

we specifically say that we would use a devastating conventional 

force, and that we would hold all of those accountable. That makes 

it very clear, to any leadership in those countries, what the consequences of these kinds of aggressions would be. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay, so that helps to clarify this, Dr. Miller, you said earlier that this was ‘‘explicitly not intended’’ as a removal of ambiguity, in the case, for instance, of Iran and North 

Korea. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. That’s right, because what we did—— 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Because they’re not in compliance with—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. That’s right. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Or they’re not signatories. So, this is a reassurance to our allies. 

Okay, I’d just ask one last question. Maybe you’ve answered it, 

but just to give you a real-life example, as I recall it. 

In 1991, during the lead-up or the beginning of the Gulf War, I 

can’t remember the exact timeframe, but Secretary of State Baker 

issued a public warning to Saddam Hussein that, if the Iraqis used 

chemical weapons on our troops, they would suffer, I believe he 

said something like devastating consequences. That was widely interpreted to include nuclear weapons. 

In the aftermath of the NPR, would you say that a current Secretary of State or President, in a similar circumstance, could issue 

the same warning? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Lieberman, the answer to that is yes. Iraq, 

at the time, was not in compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation 

obligations, in precisely the same words, and an associated calculated ambiguity would be applicable. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Very good. I appreciate that. 

Let me go on to another point, which was the main concern I had 

about the NPR, as I said; and most of it, I think, is really constructive and important. I was surprised by the statement that, when 

weighing options for the life-extension programs for our nuclear arsenal, which become more important as we go forward with the 

New START treaty, because we’re going to have fewer nuclear 

weapons. This is a quote from the NPR: ‘‘There’s a strong preference for the refurbishment or reuse of nuclear components, rather than their replacement.’’ The NPR continues to state, ‘‘replacement of nuclear components would be undertaken only if critical 

stockpile management program goals could otherwise not be met.’’ 

I was surprised by that, because I think the overall goal is, what 

you’ve said and we all agree with, that we wanted to maintain a 

safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile. That was the goal of 

the nuclear stockpile program, the goal of setting up of the NNSA. 

It’s consistent with—I’m looking at a document that reported, the 

30 

2009 Jason Advisory Report to the NNSA, it describes reuse and 

replacement. Frankly, the language of the replacement seems most 

forward-leaning. This is actually a quote from their report of, what 

they said, the definitions given to them by NNSA. I’ll quote from 

the definition of warhead replacement. ‘‘Some, or all, of the components of a warhead are replaced with modern design that are more 

easily manufacturable, provide increased warhead margins, forego 

no-longer-available or hazardous materials, improve safety, security, and use control, and offer the potential for future overall 

stockpile reductions.’’ 

So, here’s my concern, I’m puzzled about why that language is 

in there, because I fear that it will send, both to NNSA and, most 

important, to the extraordinary scientists who are working for us, 

a kind of discouragement to use replacement, when, to me, it 

should be equal with reuse and refurbishment. The choice would 

be, which one helps us most to have a safe, secure, and effective, 

reliable nuclear stockpile? 

Dr. Miller and Mr. D’Agostino, or maybe both? 

So, can you reassure us that replacement is equal, as an alternative, to keep our stockpile as we want it to be? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Lieberman, I’ll answer very briefly, and 

then turn it over to Mr. D’Agostino. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. 

Dr. MILLER. The NPR stipulates that, in considering life-extension programs, that the full range will be considered and studied, 

from refurbishment, to reuse, to replacement, and that only at the 

point of moving forward to engineering development would a preference be given, or first consideration be given, to refurbishment or 

reuse. 

It does note that the presidential authorization would be required to go forward with replacement. Senator, speaking from my 

perspective, one of the reasons for this provision is that the administration noticed that the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) 

Program had been canceled by Congress, and understood there 

would be an important threshold involved with moving forward 

with a replacement option. I wanted the President to have a specific look at that and to understand the case for it, when it should 

occur. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. 

Mr. D’Agostino? To me, it creates some confusion. I hope, perhaps in the 1251 report that you’re going to submit, you can clarify 

this. 

I’ll ask you first; you’re the expert. The RRW Program doesn’t 

mean building a big, new warhead. Not necessarily. It mostly 

means replacing component parts, doesn’t it? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. It means replacing component parts, sir. The 

most important thing, from our standpoint, because we have a commitment to maintain our stockpile and our deterrent without underground testing, is it’s based on previously tested designs. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That’s very important, I appreciate your 

mentioning that, right. Not a big, new design. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. It’s based on previously tested designs. 

We have a tremendous test history, test database that we want to 

exploit and use all that information in order to move forward. 

31 

The principles of the Stockpile Management Program have really 

guided us here, as I said in my oral statement. We want to increase stockpile safety, security, and reliability. We obviously want 

to reduce the likelihood of conducting an underground test and we 

want to enable reductions in future stockpile sizes. The approach 

outlined in the NPR, as Dr. Miller said, allows that full study. 

There’s actually no confusion, I’ve talked to the lab directors. 

They are very comfortable with the language here, that it will 

allow them to study all options and provide to us the decisionmakers, policymakers, and ultimately, as it proceeds through authorization and appropriation to Congress, provides us the opportunity to make sure that we have full insight into that best combination of safety, security, reliability, cost, use of that test history 

and database, all together in one package. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. Okay, I appreciate the clarification 

from both of you. I’m interested in what you described as a potential reason this was in here, Dr. Miller, because of the history that 

Congress canceled the RRW. But, this is a different kind of replacement. I think, as you said, it’s based on existing design. 

At this moment—not that I or former Congresswoman Tauscher 

would ever say that Congress might alter its opinions on matters, 

or need clarification, but I think it might help to define ‘‘replacement’’ and assure us, and those working with you, that this kind 

of replacement is on equal footing with ‘‘reuse and refurbishment.’’ 

I thank you, my time is up. 

Dr. MILLER. Senator, if I could just add one thing, to just clarify 

my comment. It’s based on existing component design; components 

that we’ve tested. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Understood. 

Dr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I, too, want to thank the members of our panel today for being 

here, and for their service to our country, and especially want to 

welcome my former colleague from the House of Representatives, 

Secretary Tauscher. Very nice to have you with us today, as well. 

I would like to associate myself with some of the comments that 

Senator McCain made with regard to the calculated ambiguity. I, 

too, think that our military leadership would want to have all elements of national power available to them in the event of attack 

by an enemy of the United States. I won’t belabor the point, because I think he covered it pretty well, let me also add that I’m 

not satisfied with the response to that question. 

Dr. Miller and Secretary Tauscher, 9 months ago, General Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former 

head of STRATCOM, testified before this committee that he would 

be very concerned about endangering the triad if the number of 

strategic delivery vehicles dropped below 800. Yet, the newly 

signed START treaty limits the number of delivery of vehicles to 

only 700. 

32 

What is the rationale for the agreement on only 700 delivery vehicles included in the New START treaty? What justifications and 

analysis did you rely on to come to that, to arrive at that number? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Thune, I’ll give the first answer, and General Chilton may wish to join in, as well as Secretary Tauscher. 

We conducted extensive analysis during the NPR of various force 

structures, including combinations of different balance with each 

leg of the triad, ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. We found 

that there were a range of possible outcomes that would be satisfactory and that would meet the requirements for STRATCOM. 

As the negotiations proceeded, we continued that analysis, and 

looked at the combination of the limit of 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles or launchers, and a cap of 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers, and determined that that combination allowed 

us to do virtually everything that would have been possible under 

a single limit of 800 strategic delivery vehicles. 

We will provide a specific force structure; I think you’ll see it’s 

a balanced force structure, associated with the New START treaty 

when we submit the section 1251 report as the treaty is provided 

for advice and consent of the Senate. 

General CHILTON. Senator, I would only add that, of course, time 

has passed since General Cartwright testified, and we had the opportunity to do a lot more analysis during this time period. As we 

looked at it, it not only made sense strategically, but it certainly 

is doable, to continue to sustain the triad at these current numbers 

and, I believe, at lower numbers. The triad will still be a viable and 

important area, even if there are future considerations for that, 

should they come up. The flexibility provided by those three legs 

are still important to us today. 

Senator THUNE. Will the Russians have to cut their number of 

delivery vehicles to get to 700? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Thune, relative to their current accountable 

levels under START, it will be a slight reduction. We would expect 

them to be going down in any case over time, however. 

Senator THUNE. Okay, my understanding is that they’re already 

going to be at or below that level. For us to drop down to that level, 

I guess my next question would be, what, if anything, do we get 

in return for that concession? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Senator Thune, I wouldn’t call it a concession. In 

the negotiations for the New START treaty agreement, as you can 

imagine there are many, many different variables and many, many 

different things. The NPR, which was congressionally mandated in 

this administration, began early last year, was actually designed to 

deal with the guidance for the New START treaty negotiations, 

first and primarily. So, all of the guidance that went into the 

START negotiations came out of what was the beginning of the 

NPR. Those limits were limits that the entire interagency agreed 

to. 

So, I wouldn’t call it a concession. These were decisions that we 

made, that we believe were the right numbers for our side and the 

Russians made the same decisions on their own side. 

Senator THUNE. You answered this, General Chilton, and go 

ahead and respond to that question, if you’d like, but I also want 

to know if you could elaborate a little bit on what the implications 

33 

are for each leg of the nuclear triad under these reductions. How 

many bombers, land-based missiles, or submarines will we have to 

cut in order to be compliant with the treaty? 

General CHILTON. Right. Those numbers, and the decisions on 

that, will come forward in the next couple of weeks, as Dr. Miller 

said, and there’s still some work to be done by the Services on how 

to balance that out. 

But, back to your other point, Senator, one thing I was pleased 

to see in the treaty were these limits. Although Russia may be 

close to, or slightly below them, already, when you look to the future, we certainly don’t want them to grow. They would have been 

unrestricted, otherwise, without these types of limits articulated in 

the treaty. So, having that limit there, and with the knowledge 

that what we negotiated to is absolutely acceptable to the 

STRATCOM for what we need to do to provide the deterrent for 

the country, made me comfortable with that approach. 

Dr. MILLER. Senator, if I could add, very briefly, that the New 

START treaty has provisions that should allow us to do three 

things that will reduce the requirement for the number of strategic 

delivery vehicles while still keeping the same force structure. 

The first one is, it eliminates what we’ve called the ‘‘phantom’’ 

strategic delivery vehicles, those that are accountable under the old 

START treaty, but that are no longer associated with the nuclear 

mission. That includes the strategic submarines that were converted to conventional-only and it includes our B–1 bombers that 

have been converted to conventional-only. Those changes allow us 

to take a number of delivery vehicles off the books. 

Second, the treaty also allows further conversion of current dualcapable bombers to a conventional-only role that would take them 

off the books, as well. We are looking at that possibility for some 

B–52Hs. 

Finally, the treaty allows the elimination of launchers from accountability for submarines, through a variety of means, including 

the simple removal of the gas generator that would eject the 

SLBM. As we look at the overall requirement, we determined that 

we wanted to keep 14 strategic submarines in the nuclear mission, 

at least for the near-term, as we see how they do as they get toward the later part of their lives. But, there’s not the same requirement for all the tubes associated with those. So, we are looking at 

the possibility of removing some of those, through a relatively simple operation. 

Senator THUNE. The NPR emphasizes the development of conventional Prompt Global Strike capabilities. Will these Prompt 

Global Strike systems count against the New START treaty limits 

and require further nuclear cuts to accommodate them? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Thune, that is a two-part answer. The first 

part is that, if we were to put a conventional warhead on an ICBM 

with a traditional ballistic missile trajectory, or on an SLBM with 

a traditional ballistic missile trajectory, then it would be accountable. When the DOD previously proposed the conventional Trident 

modification, that system had this sort of trajectory, and would 

have been accountable. The numbers associated with that were 2 

missiles per boat times 14 boats; it would be 28. The NPR explicitly 

looked at the, as it did force structure analysis, potential for furVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:22 Jan 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63689.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
34 

ther reductions, under the 700 and 800 combined limit. That would 

leave room for that, and indeed, would leave room for a small number of conventional ICBMs, if that were the determination made 

than that was desirable. That would be a very small number. That 

analysis is underway as part of our broader long-range strike 

study, we expect to conclude that in the coming months, and provide any recommendations in the fiscal year 2012 budget. 

There are a wide range of conventional systems that would be 

considered Prompt Global Strike that will not be accountable under 

the New START treaty, including, for example, the work that’s ongoing now on hypersonic-boost glide vehicles, longer-term work on 

hypersonic cruise missiles, and so forth. 

Senator THUNE. My time is up, if I could get General Chilton to 

respond to—as the nuclear weapons are reduced, and conventional 

Prompt Global Strike capabilities are developed, to what degree 

can those conventional capabilities substitute for nuclear capabilities when it comes to providing deterrence? 

General CHILTON. Senator, I consider the Prompt Global Strike 

capability as a niche capability, another weapon in the quiver, if 

you will, of the United States to address warfighting concerns. I do 

not see it as a replacement for the nuclear deterrent in that role, 

specifically. Not to say that all of our conventional capabilities have 

some deterrent role. But, you don’t replace the nuclear deterrent 

with that, 1 for 1; or, not even 10 for 1. 

Senator THUNE. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Senator. I guess it’s my turn. 

Mr. D’Agostino, the new treaty between the Russian Government 

and ours to further reduce the number of strategic nuclear forces 

places a premium on our ability to maintain an infrastructure in 

the technical capacity to provide for that stockpile that’s safe, secure, and effective into the foreseeable future. Do you have adequate funding? Are you asking for adequate funding to make certain that the weapons programs, the facilities, and the improvements to the facilities and workforce are funded? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Senator Nelson, absolutely. I do have adequate 

funding. The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request picks a 

total 5-year stream that provides the funding for this first 5-year 

slice of the program. 

As Dr. Miller described, the 1251 report will describe a full 10- 

year period. This funding stream, and the support by future administrations and future Congresses, will be required over multiple 

years, because the work that we have will happen over many years. 

Senator BEN NELSON. As I asked you in our subcommittee hearing, is the budget backloaded? In other words, are we anticipating 

higher costs in the out years, therefore, underfunding for the current and the foreseeable years? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Absolutely not. The budget is not backloaded. 

The budget that we have for the first 5 years represents exactly 

what we need to do, what the NRP has asked us to do. It also recognizes the reality that, in the early stages, particularly for large 

construction projects, and of which we have two in this proposal, 

that the early years of those construction projects, we spend time 

doing the design work. Then, after a few years of making sure we 

35 

know exactly what we want to build, we’ll shift into the construction effort. We won’t have those baselines established until about 

the year 2012, 2013. Though I do expect some adjustments but, 

this is natural, in a fairly complicated, long-range plan. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

General Chilton, you’ve stated that you fully support the NPR 

and the New START treaty. Is that accurate? 

General CHILTON. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator BEN NELSON. As the combatant commander of 

STRATCOM, perhaps it would be helpful if you could discuss the 

role that you had in the development of the NPR. 

General CHILTON. Senator, both with the NPR and with the 

START negotiations, STRATCOM was closely consulted and part of 

the team that was working in the background to support the dialogue and the preparation for negotiators, going forward. So, we 

were always asked for our input. We stood up a team almost a year 

and a half ago, anticipating this work, back at STRATCOM headquarters, of some very great Americans, with exceptional talent, 

who studied and prepared for this, and put the models in place to 

be able to answer questions quickly to support negotiations and 

also support the dialogue we had with policy folks, with Dr. Miller’s 

staff, along the way. We certainly appreciate the close cooperation 

we were offered. 

Senator BEN NELSON. There have been criticisms raised regarding whether or not the verification aspects of ‘‘trust but verify,’’ to 

use some very famous words, is inadequate in this treaty. Could 

both you and Dr. Miller tell us what your belief is about what the 

verification requirements, or lack of requirements, in this treaty 

really mean? Then, has anybody from the Intelligence Community 

(IC) been consulted in connection with these verification issues? 

General CHILTON. Senator, you bring up a good point at the end. 

Really the question on whether verification regimes are adequate 

or not is a question for the Director of National Intelligence and 

his staffs, because, they’re going to be the ones that we will turn 

to throughout the treaty regime to say, ‘‘Are the Russians compliant?’’ 

A couple of points I’d make, though, is, one, throughout our participation at STRATCOM, in support of START, these types of 

questions were asked frequently and, I believe, addressed throughout that time period. But, again, the question, I think, is more appropriate for the IC. 

One final point. There were no verification opportunities for us, 

given the expiring of the previous START agreement, back in December. Of course, the Moscow Treaty did not allow for any 

verification. What we were faced with was going forward with no 

verification, no insight into what the Russians would be doing with 

their strategic force structures. So, I’m encouraged by the fact that 

we do have that now included in this treaty. 

Senator BEN NELSON. You believe it’s adequate at this point in 

time? 

General CHILTON. All indications, from what I’ve been told, and 

my observations throughout the development were that they were 

adequate for the period of the treaty. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Dr. Miller? 

36 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Nelson, I would, first, just reiterate that 

this is, ultimately, an IC judgment, and that we expect to have a 

National Intelligence Estimate provided to the Senate right about 

the same time that the treaty is. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence and different elements of the community were 

very much involved as we went forward with the negotiations. As 

the negotiators considered steps to take, in terms of the priorities 

for U.S. negotiating positions, the IC played a very important role. 

I’ll just say, on a couple of items in particular, I think we have 

very strong provisions. There is a provision for 18 onsite inspections per year that will be able to cover both deployed and nondeployed systems. We have a robust data exchange process in place 

that along with a number of other provisions, are quite detailed, 

help support our ability to collect intelligence through national 

technical means that also support verification. 

Again, it’s an IC assessment, but I share with General Chilton 

the view that, based on everything that I’ve seen to date, I have 

great confidence that this treaty will be verifiable. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Do you have any reason to believe that the 

intelligence position will be any different than what you’ve just 

stated, right now? In fact, they were included in the discussions 

and negotiations, so I’m assuming that you don’t believe that they 

would have a different opinion than yours, right now. 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, I don’t believe that, but I won’t speak for the 

IC. That’ll be their judgment. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Yes. I intend to talk to them about it, as 

well. But, thank you. 

Secretary Tauscher, the criticism I’ve seen from time to time is 

that, if this treaty doesn’t really require us to do certain things, it’s 

more of a statement that this is what we intend to do, as long as 

it’s in our national interest. If it ceases to be in our national interest, we reserve the right to either withdraw from the treaty or 

change our actions. The same thing would be true of our counterparts. 

Perhaps in a few words, you could give us, then, the value of entering into an agreement of that kind, that is not really binding per 

se, because either party may change its behavior or withdraw from 

the treaty. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Senator Nelson, that’s true of all treaties. Most 

treaties have a national-interest exit clause. In fact, the United 

States decided to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in the 

last administration. 

Senator BEN NELSON. That’s true. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Because we wanted to build limited regional missile defenses. 

I think the important parts about this New START treaty agreement that are salient and specific to the timing is that we had the 

unfortunate circumstance of the previous START treaty expiring 

last December. While both parties agreed to move forward while we 

were negotiating, to keep the spirit of the previous treaty, what we 

ended up having was a treaty that expired. Frankly, in the Moscow 

Treaty, there was no verification at all. 

So, we have verification that is specific. It is robust in many different areas; certainly, onsite inspections and a number of the eleVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:22 Jan 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63689.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
37 

ments that we had in the previous START agreement. There are 

fewer inspections, but there are also fewer places to inspect. During the Soviet time, we had many, many different facilities, including other countries, other than Russia. A lot of those facilities have 

been closed down over time, and there are fewer weapons and 

fewer places to go to inspect them. 

I think the amalgam of what we have here is a strong treaty on 

disarmament. We have a strong treaty on verification. We have 

better technical means now than we’ve ever had. We have a smaller footprint to visit. But, I think that, in the end, this is a treaty 

that will serve the American people and add to our national security interests. 

Senator BEN NELSON. It can serve as an example for others for 

nonproliferation. Is that fair, too? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. It serves significantly for nonproliferation. That’s 

one of the reasons why the combination of our Negative Security 

Assurance, which makes clear that we’re putting a lot of onus on 

belonging to the NPT, and being in compliance to it. As Dr. Miller 

said, up until we changed this policy, in the previous policy, Iran 

and North Korea may have qualified, under certain readings of a 

Negative Security Assurance. What we have said is that we will 

not use nuclear weapons against countries that are in compliance 

with their NPT obligations. That is an important difference, and it 

certainly carves out countries like Iran and North Korea, who are 

clearly not in compliance. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. 

Let me begin by following up on an area that Senator McCain 

touched on. 

Dr. Miller, this statement in Singapore yesterday by Secretary 

Flournoy stated: ‘‘Military force is an option of last resort. It is off 

the table in the near term.’’ I understand you spoke to Secretary 

Flournoy yesterday, and her position is that she was either misquoted or that she misspoke. Is that correct? 

Dr. MILLER. That is correct. I have known the Under Secretary 

for some time, and I would lay money that she was misquoted. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. Well I hope—— 

Dr. MILLER. It is, sir, if I could, Senator, very quickly. It is fair 

and appropriate to say that the use of military force should be a 

last resort. But, this administration has also made clear that it is 

on the table. 

Senator WICKER. That we don’t take options off the table. I think 

that’s a problem you get into when you start answering questions 

of this type. I hope it’s a misquote. Alex Kennedy is the Associated 

Press reporter. Perhaps there’s a transcript of that. Reporters are 

human, and so are public officials, people do make mistakes and 

do misspeak occasionally. 

But, Secretary Tauscher, do you agree that this needs to be clarified, and if, indeed, Secretary Flournoy did say this, that she 

should issue a statement, retracting that? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I think, once again, we have to get to the bottom 

of exactly what happened. But, what is clear is this administration’s policy. This administration’s policy, regardless of who says it 

or when it is said, the President has made very clear that all opVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:22 Jan 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63689.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
38 

tions are on the table. While the military option may be the one 

of last resort, it is certainly on the table when it comes to Iran. 

Senator WICKER. If she said otherwise, which she’s quoted as 

doing, then she should clarify that and retract that statement. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Under Secretary Flournoy is one of the most respected members of DOD, and I’m sure that she will take the responsibility seriously. 

Senator WICKER. All right. 

I’ll just say this, Mr. Chairman. I would hope that this could be 

clarified. I view it as a serious matter, as did Senator McCain. If 

she said it, we’re all human, but she should retract it. 

Now, let me ask, then, with regard to this replacement and reuse 

and refurbishment issue, clearly we have made it harder. The NPR 

makes it more difficult to go to the replacement option, by saying 

that that would be a last resort and that it should be specifically 

authorized by the President and approved by Congress. 

Mr. D’Agostino, does this make it more difficult for us to recruit 

the top scientists to work on a nuclear stockpile, if they know that 

the replacement option faces these additional hurdles, or there’s 

confusion for their professional career? If you could, give us an example of what is off the table at this point, unless we have specific 

presidential authorization and specific approval by Congress. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Senator Wicker, it does not make it more difficult to recruit scientists. The scientists at our laboratories now, 

the lab directors at our laboratories now, understand the policy. 

They understand that they have a free rein to study all options associated with extending the life of the stockpile. That’s the most 

important thing. This NPR is very clear on that. 

Senator WICKER. They’re studying all options, and they’re equally studying the replacement option at the same time. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, Senator, they are equally studying the replacement option. The key is to make sure that, in the studies of 

how do we approach extending the life of a particular warhead that 

we understand the benefits associated with each of the particular 

options. The most important thing, as the NPR makes clear, is that 

our desire is to do so in a way that maximizes the safety, security, 

and effectiveness of the deterrent without underground testing. 

The replacement option, the policies that put forward here allow 

us, specifically, to be able to do that. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. We’re limited in time today. I’m going to 

ask you to provide an example of what we’re talking about on the 

record, as a response. Will you do that? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Senator, I’d be glad to provide that for the 

record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

During the Cold War, designers at the national laboratories optimized each nuclear weapon system for military utility and minimized cost by designing small, 

light systems. As the threat environment has evolved, the emphasis has shifted. 

Now our designers are working to maintain military capabilities while optimizing 

the safety, security, and reliability features in the system. Replacement and reuse 

life extensions provide the greatest opportunity to modify previously tested designs 

to include modern safety and security components, and to increase our confidence 

in the reliability of the system. 

The use of reuse and replacement to extend the life of a weapon and to improve 

surety and safety will also challenge future designers. The full suite of Stockpile 

Stewardship Program tools will be required to design, develop, and certify changes 

39 

based on existing tested designs. This will help maintain the most important part 

of our deterrent, the skilled scientist, engineers, and technicians that design, build, 

and sustain the stockpile. This is also the same skill set needed for nuclear forensic 

and counterterrorism. 

A replacement life extension would replace either the pit or secondary with a design based on previously tested designs but not used previously in the stockpile. 

This would require specific presidential authorization and funding approved by Congress. An example of a replacement life extension is a design that adds advanced 

safety, security, or reliability features and requires greater modifications to either 

the pit or secondary than reuse designs. 

Examples of new warhead or military missions off the table for the life extension 

options of replacement, reuse, and refurbishment include enhanced radiation weapons, electromagnetic pulse weapons, or nuclear explosive-driven x-ray weapons. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. Because I think it would take all of our 

time. 

Let me ask the panel this, with regard to missile defense and 

Russia. I asked this question to Secretary Gates in January 2009. 

What about a possible missile defense program with Russia and 

the United States partnering up? The idea would be a joint missile 

defense system. Secretary Gates said there’s nothing in writing. 

But there have been some inferences and some discussions, and 

maybe if we got political baggage out of the way, that might be a 

possibility. 

I had a conversation with a leading Russian legislator just this 

week. I can tell you that he was open to this possibility. As a matter of fact, he brought it up before I did. 

Starting with Dr. Miller, others might be able to interject, what 

about this? Is there a place for Russia in this issue? Has there been 

any work with Russia on any of our missile defense concepts? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Wicker, the answer is most emphatically 

yes. I had the opportunity to meet with, I expect, the same delegation that you did with Senator Margelov from the Russian Federation—pardon my butchering of the pronunciation—and had a similar conversation. 

Senator WICKER. Senator Nelson taught me how to pronounce 

that word: ‘‘Mar GAY’ luv.’’ 

Dr. MILLER. Thank you very much. 

We’ve had an ongoing conversation with the Russian Federation 

for some time on the possibility of cooperation in missile defense, 

and have begun a joint threat assessment of missiles that could affect both Russia and the United States. Secretary Gates and DOD 

believe there’s a tremendous amount of possibility for significant 

cooperation moving forward. 

If I could, Secretary Tauscher has led some of our discussions 

with the Russian Federation on this topic. I think it would be helpful to hear from her, both about what’s been accomplished and 

about plans which I think are going to continue in the very near 

term. 

Senator WICKER. That would be great. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Dr. Miller. 

Senator Wicker, you’re absolutely right. Obviously, while there 

are concerns that we address very often about the phased adaptive 

approach and what exactly it means to the Russian Federation, 

and we have constantly asserted that the phased adaptive approach is neither targeted toward the Russian Federation nor, 

frankly, capable to deter its many, many offensive weapons. We 

40 

have had ongoing strategic dialogue with the Russians. I began it 

last summer, and we actually are having a meeting again next 

month. 

There is interest on the part of the Russians. There are many 

threats and many opportunities, where we view the world in the 

same way. We have a warming relationship with the Russians. We 

don’t have a close relationship yet, but it certainly is one where we 

are establishing much more of a dialogue, especially when it comes 

to threats and trying to assume that we can look at threats the 

same way. 

So, as Dr. Miller said, we’re looking at a joint threat analysis. 

We’re looking at common platforms like radars, things that the 

Russians have that are strategically located that could be part of 

a larger network that we would have. 

I think that there is the possibility for and certainly, we are 

going to have ongoing conversations. The idea of working cooperatively on missile defense is an agenda item of President Obama. He 

has talked to President Medvedev about it. I think that we will 

continue to see how we can work together and find those common 

areas of common agreement where we can come together. 

Senator WICKER. I hope so. I hope that our relationship with 

Russia is, indeed, warming. This is a concept that goes back all the 

way to President Ronald Reagan, who very famously and publicly 

announced, ‘‘If we can learn a way to defend ourselves against a 

missile attack by a rogue nation, we would certainly be willing to 

share that and let others defend themselves.’’ I’m encouraged by 

this and I hope we can get further reports. 

Thank you, ma’am. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. 

It’s always wonderful to see my former colleague from the House, 

Secretary Tauscher. Thank you for what you’re doing. 

Secretary Miller, you’re making an appearance here almost every 

day. Look forward to seeing you again next week, I’m sure. 

Secretary Miller, you talked about tactical nukes and the fact 

that they’re not included in the limitations addressed in both the 

New START treaty and in the NPR. Could you address the quantities of these tactical, or nonstrategic, as some might call them, 

nuclear weapons that we possess, that Russia possesses, the function of these weapons, and why they weren’t limited in START and 

the NPR. Then, General Chilton and Secretary Tauscher, if you’d 

care to comment as well after Secretary Miller does, I’d appreciate 

it. 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Udall, I will not get into precise numbers, 

because they’re classified. But, I’ll say, in general terms, that we 

have some, and the Russians have a lot more tactical nuclear 

weapons. As we note in the NPR, we’d like to see them move their 

tactical nuclear weapons deeper back into Russia, and to continue 

the steps that they’ve taken over the past couple of decades, since 

the end of the Cold War, to continue to improve the security associated with them. 

These weapons were not included in the New START treaty negotiations, quite simply because, at this point in time, Russia was 

not interested in including them. We believed it was appropriate 

41 

and important to move forward with significant reductions in our 

strategic nuclear forces on both sides, and that this would have an 

important effect on strategic stability and also help move the relationship forward, as well. 

We have proposed, and noted in the NPR as well, that after ratification and entry into force of the New START treaty, assuming 

Senate advice and consent for ratification, that we would intend to 

pursue further reductions that would include both strategic and 

nonstrategic weapons, and both deployed and nondeployed weapons, so that we really get after the overall number of nuclear weapons on both sides. 

As Under Secretary Tauscher said, even after the New START 

treaty comes into place, the United States and Russia will, together, have approximately 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons. So, we think it’s appropriate to take another bilateral step 

after the New START treaty. 

Senator UDALL. Secretary Tauscher, would you care to comment? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Senator. It’s always good to see you, 

too. 

Dr. Miller’s right, first things first. START was aptly named a 

long time ago. But, it is the start, not only as Senator Wicker mentioned, of the warming of the relationship, but it is the start of a 

bigger opportunity to move not just on strategic offensive weapons, 

which is all that the START treaty encompasses, but on to tactical 

weapons. There is a larger agenda, too, of conventional forces in 

Europe and many other things that are intertwined with the 21st 

century force structure and perception of threats and the evolution 

of threats. So, there are many opportunities here, once the Senate 

gives it’s advice and consent on the New START treaty, to move 

forward on a bilateral basis with the Russians, but then move into 

a multilateral opportunity on many of these different elements. I 

think that first things first. 

Senator UDALL. Sure. It has to be expensive for the Russians to 

maintain all of those tactical nukes. You’d think that there might 

be a sweet spot where they’re amenable to these future conversations. Is that a fair assumption? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. That may be a stretch, Senator, but I think, certainly, one of the reasons why the President’s Nuclear Security 

Summit, I believe, was such a success for having 47 heads of state 

here in Washington, talking about nuclear terrorism and the importance of nonproliferation. This issue of having weapons that are 

out there that are not only difficult to secure, but that are the targets of organized crime and, certainly, terrorism. So, smaller number of weapons, easier to secure, while we are still, obviously, 

maintaining our stockpile at the highest levels. So, I think that 

there will be increased interest, and perhaps some pressure from 

the world community, for the nuclear powers to look at, specifically, 

tactical substrategic nuclear weapons, and to get the numbers 

down to a more controllable number. 

Senator UDALL. General Chilton, did you want to add anything 

to the conversation? 

General CHILTON. I think that adequately covers it, Senator. I’d 

agree that the next topic of discussion ought to be the large disparity and the large Russian stockpile of what we would call tacVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:22 Jan 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63689.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
42 

tical weapons. There will be a dialogue that needs to start as soon 

as both sides are ready to come together on it. It will be, as mentioned, one that will be a complicated one that will take time. But, 

we won’t get there if we don’t start talking about it. 

Senator UDALL. I’m not a lawyer, so I can ask questions I don’t 

know the answer to. I’m curious, the size of a tactical nuke, would 

it be much bigger than those two desks that you’re sitting at there? 

General CHILTON. Physically in size? 

Senator UDALL. Yes, physical size. 

General CHILTON. They can be much smaller than this desk. 

Senator UDALL. It can be much smaller. I’m mindful of that very 

powerful documentary that the Nunn-Lugar group put together 

and the couple at the Canadian border with what they said was a 

statue in a desk-sized box, and, instead, it was a tactical nuke inside that box. 

Let me turn to China. I know their arsenal is much smaller than 

ours in the States here, but they also have a lack of transparency, 

and so, you could raise questions about their strategic intentions. 

Secretary Miller, Secretary Tauscher, could you talk about your 

analysis of their intentions, and what are we doing in the realm 

of more military-to-military discussions that might create more 

transparency and a better relationship? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. You’re right, Senator, I think that confidencebuilding and a sense of transparency and the kind of visibility that 

we’re looking for, not only among the nuclear powers, but generally 

to strengthen the NPT, is an area of conversation that we have 

with the Chinese. 

Once again, we are mindful of the fact that China is a signatory 

to the NPT. But, at the same time, I think there are concerns 

about their force posture and the way that they manage their 

weapons that would cause concern, not necessarily significant concern, certainly. But people want to have a sense of confidence and 

more of a visibility into the Chinese program. More of a sense of 

confidence-building would be welcome. 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Udall, I would just add that the Chinese 

have indicated that they’re not seeking numerical parity with the 

United States or with Russia. At the same time that, as Secretary 

Tauscher has indicated, they’ve had a lack of transparency about 

their plans and programs for nuclear weapons and delivery systems. We would hope to engage with them in a discussion on strategic stability that includes increased transparency, not just on 

numbers of weapons, but on their thoughts about both plans and 

policies associated with them. 

Senator UDALL. The NPR calls for bilateral talks, I believe, with 

both Russia and China, with an emphasis on more stable and resilient, transparent strategic relationships. When would you anticipate those talks might start? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. President Obama put together a strategic dialogue between both China and the United States, and Russia and 

the United States. There are 13 or 14 subgroups. All of them have 

met in both the Chinese and the Russian engagements. These are 

talks that are meant to, once again, assert what our positions and 

our principles are on many issues, but at the same time, to listen 

and to work together and develop relationships. So, I think we’re 

43 

well on our way to developing those kinds of relationships. But, 

once again, the Chinese will make their own decisions as to the 

kinds of transparency they will have. I think that we and many 

others are on notice that the lack of transparency causes us to ask 

for more confidence-building. We are very interested in having conversations that would create that kind of confidence. 

Senator UDALL. I’m confident, as I finish my questioning here, 

that, Secretary Tauscher, you will lead the effort ably, as you have. 

Congratulations on the New START treaty. I look forward, as one 

Senator, to supporting it when it comes to the floor of the Senate. 

I see no reason that we shouldn’t be able to find, easily, the 67 

votes to ratify the treaty. 

So, thank you for your hard and important work. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Senator. Thank you very much. 

Senator UDALL. Thanks. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Chairman Nelson. 

It’s great to see each of you. We thank you for your service to 

the country and look forward to working with you on some very important issues that we’ll be dealing with in the months to come. 

Secretary Tauscher, we worked together on funding a lot of defense issues over the years, and I hope that relationship can continue. 

I’ll ask Secretary Miller and Secretary Tauscher this question. It 

seems to me that the President has stated an improvident policy. 

That is that we would eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. I say it’s 

improvident because it’s not going to happen. Sometimes bad goals 

can get you in trouble. Second, the administration seems to be committed to the view that if America leads in reducing our weapons 

significantly, that this will cause others to want to follow. 

What evidence do you have, and what facts can you cite, that 

this so-called moral leadership argument will actually impact countries that present the greatest immediate threat, it seems, to us, 

Iran and North Korea, from pursuing nuclear weapon systems? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Sessions, I’ll answer first, and then turn it 

to Secretary Tauscher. 

The goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons from the Earth has 

been a goal of U.S. administrations, starting with the Truman administration, and has been embraced by every one—every administration but one since then, including, very famously, President 

Reagan. 

What the President said as he announced this objective for the 

United States, or reiterated this objective for the United States, 

was that this is an important objective and that he, at the same 

time, realized that it was something that may not occur during his 

lifetime, or during our lifetimes. The fact that we are pursuing this 

objective and taking steps in this direction, consistent with our 

NPT obligations, but, at the same time, sustaining a safe, secure, 

and effective nuclear deterrent for ourselves, our allies, and partners, is a fundamental part of the policy. 

With respect to the reduction of nuclear weapons, we didn’t assume that if we reduced it, others would. Indeed, that’s why we 

had a bilateral negotiation with Russia to reduce their nuclear 

weapons as we reduced ours. We believe that while exact parity in 

44 

numbers of nuclear weapons is not as important as it was, perhaps, 

during the Cold War, it’s still important to have approximate parity on both sides, so that neither side has any confusion about the 

intent of the other. 

Finally, with respect to the question of the impact on nonproliferation of our statements, including our declaratory policy, 

the intent is to make very clear that there are benefits to states 

that will adhere to the NPT—not just join, but fulfill their nuclear 

nonproliferation obligations and there are potential risks to states, 

such as Iran, that do not. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Senator Sessions, as Dr. Miller says, the idea of 

eliminating nuclear weapons has been a goal and an aspiration of 

American administrations for over 50 years. It is also a key pillar 

of the NPT, something that we are not only a depository state but 

a signatory to, that is for nuclear-weapon states to disarm. 

But, the President has balanced those commitments and those 

ambitions with a very sanguine set of national security priorities, 

which include increasing budgets, in both the NNSA and in the 

nonproliferation budget, to make sure that until that time, as the 

President has said may not happen in his lifetime, that will take 

patience and persistence. The United States will have the strongest, most effective, and the safest nuclear stockpile in the world, 

and that our deterrent that we use to protect ourselves and, certainly, our allies is extended deterrence which is as strong as ever. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

I’m just not sure that this kind of political leadership is going to 

work in the way that it’s projected. I do worry that if we draw our 

numbers too low, a lot of nations might well consider that they 

could, with a little investment and a period of years, be a peer-competitor of us with nuclear weapons and alter the balance of power 

in the world. We do have problems with that. 

Secretary Tauscher, I believe you were asked about Secretary 

Flournoy’s comments recently, that need to be backed off on. But, 

it was reported in the Information Telegraph Agency of RussiaTelegrafonyc Agentstvo Svazii Soobshchenyu, February 15, that 

you told journalists in Russia that the United States had no plans 

to deploy missile defense elements in the Black Sea, to include 

Aegis ships and sea-based missile defense components. The Aegis 

BMD capability is currently installed on 4 cruisers and 16 destroyers, all Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, and 9 Ticonderoga-class 

cruisers are planned to receive the capability. A significant portion 

of our fleet. Aegis-class ships have sailed into the Black Sea seven 

times over the past 5 years. The last such deployment was, however, in July 2009. Your comments are disturbing, because it would 

seem to indicate a new policy on deployments in the Black Sea. 

Certainly, we received Russian demands on missile defense that I 

think go beyond anything we should acquiesce in. 

So, are there any restrictions on the deployment in the Black 

Sea? Are you aware of any changes in the policy? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. No, Senator. There are no restrictions, and I was 

very clear. The question asked me if there was any permanent deployment of Aegis ships in the Black Sea, and I said, ‘‘There are 

no—there isn’t.’’ There is not a policy to do that. I was very clear 

that we have had deployments of Aegis ships, most recently last 

45 

summer, and that this is a decision that is going to go forward with 

cooperation. I think it’s the Montreux Treaty. 

Senator SESSIONS. Are there any—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. But, there are no constraints. 

Senator SESSIONS. Including Aegis ships with missile defense 

systems. 

Secretary Miller? Dr. Miller? DOD, what’s your understanding? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Sessions, that’s correct. We have no plans 

to permanently deploy Aegis cruisers in the Black Sea but we have 

the option to position ships there, as consistent with the Montreux 

Convention. 

Senator SESSIONS. I certainly can understand that you don’t always get well-quoted in foreign press, not even in American press. 

Sometimes you can be misquoted. It’s important that we maintain 

that right. But, I have to say that we also were told that there 

would be no connection on missile defense deployment to the 

START negotiations. Before they even started, we, basically, undermined our ability to work with the Poles and Czechs and have 

been, from my perspective, on a very uncertain course, with regard 

to that. 

Maybe, Dr. Miller, first, you’ve also indicated that we are committed to ‘‘the long-term goal of a world free of nuclear weapons,’’ 

and that’s in the NPR, and that the President has ‘‘directed a review of potential future reductions in—below the New START treaty levels,’’ even further down. Can you assure us that an objective 

and careful analysis will be made before such decisions are made? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Sessions, yes. To reiterate what is stated in 

the NPR, the intention would be to conduct this analysis, have a 

hard look at deterrence requirements and a number of other factors, to consider any future reductions only after ratification and 

entry into force of the New START treaty. 

Senator SESSIONS. My understanding is that the Russians have 

absolutely no vision that nuclear weapons will be eliminated from 

the world. This is not something on their radar screen. So, we’re 

not going to influence them, I think, by unilateral actions. 

With regard to our huge disparity in tactical weapons, and they 

are not covered at all in this treaty, it seems to me that proliferation the danger of a terrorist obtaining a nuclear weapon would be 

at least as great, if not greater, with regard to a tactical weapon 

than one that’s in a strategic situation. Would you agree? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Sessions, in general, I would agree. We do 

think it’s still important to move forward with the New START 

treaty and to strengthen strategic stability. At the same time, we 

would look forward not just to further reductions in tactical nuclear 

weapons, as you suggested, but also would look forward to Russia 

taking further steps to improve the security of its tactical nuclear 

weapons, including their movement deeper back into the interior of 

the country. 

Senator SESSIONS. These are very serious matters, and I want to 

be sure that our minds are clear that the agreements and treatysignings, and happy days that those produce, don’t color our view 

of the reality of the dangerous world that we live in. In my view, 

one of the certain ways to expand nuclear proliferation to a host 

of nations in the world, if they lose confidence in the willingness 

46 

of the United States to utilize a nuclear umbrella to protect them. 

We have allies and friends who could build nuclear weapons easily. 

If they feel, at any point, that we’ve lost our will to maintain sufficient numbers or to use them in their defense, they will have no 

choice, probably, but to decide to build systems of their own. So, 

the danger is that the risk we could have is that policies hoping 

to reduce weapons and reduce proliferation could actually create 

the other. 

I guess you’ve thought about that? Dr. Miller? Ms. Tauscher? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Sessions, yes, we certainly have. We consulted extensively with allies and partners during the conduct of 

the NPR, as well as during the New START treaty negotiations. 

We have expressions of support for both the NPR and New START 

treaty from allies and partners across the world. I’d be happy to 

provide some of those for the record, if you’d like. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think there are some that are nervous. I’m 

aware of that. Would you not agree? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, we certainly have allies and partners who are 

nervous about the security situation in which they find themselves. 

I believe that the expressions that we’ve heard from both allies and 

partners, from multiple regions, have been to increase their confidence in the U.S. commitment to their security, including the U.S. 

nuclear umbrella. 

Senator SESSIONS. I understand that some are nervous. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Bingaman. 

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you very much. 

I appreciate all of your being here. 

Let me just revisit one issue that General Chilton talked about 

earlier. My understanding is that when President Bush entered 

into the Moscow Treaty, you referred it, back in 2003, there were 

no verification measures contained there. The thinking was that 

the verification measures in the START treaty would apply or 

would meet the need. Now START has expired, so we have no 

verification measures, at the current time, with regard to the Moscow Treaty. Am I right in that? 

General CHILTON. That’s correct, Senator. That’s my understanding. 

Senator BINGAMAN. Yes. So, one of the necessities that we need 

to think about, in regard to the New START treaty, is the need to 

put back in place these verification measures, or a new set of 

verification measures, and that’s what I understood Under Secretary Miller to talk about, in your comments earlier. 

Let me just go to another issue. I think one of the goals in the 

NPR is to increase the decision time for launch that the President 

would have. I would ask, Dr. Miller, if you could explain what reviews are underway or what actions might be possible to accomplish that. Is there really something happening to increase the decision time the President would have before he would have to decide whether to launch or not? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Bingaman, there are two elements to thinking about increasing decision time and thinking about how to imVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:22 Jan 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63689.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
47 

prove the quality of information available, whatever the decision 

time. 

The first is that we are looking at improvements at our nuclear 

command-and-control system. We are making some investments 

now that were decided during the NPR, and are considering additional steps that it would be more appropriate to discuss in a classified setting. 

The second is that as we move forward with a possible ICBM follow-on, we will look at options that have the possibility of survivability without requiring launch-under-attack or launch-on-warning, as would be the case with our current silo-based ICBMs. We 

think the current ICBMs are extremely stable and stabilizing, particularly as we deMIRV to one warhead each. But, we will look at 

concepts that would make them even more survivable over time, 

which would allow them to be part of a Reserve Force. 

Senator BINGAMAN. Okay. 

Dr. MILLER. Those are really the two principal areas that we 

have—that we’ve looked at. 

Senator BINGAMAN. Dr. Miller, my understanding is that NATO 

is currently debating whether or not the deployment of this B–61 

gravity bomb, how will decisions by NATO affect the life-extension 

program that NNSA is engaged in with regard to that? How will 

it affect NNSA’s budget going forward? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Bingaman, you are correct that NATO is 

currently discussing the future of the NATO nuclear deterrent. Irrespective of the decisions that are taken at NATO, the United 

States will continue to have a requirement for the B–61, both for 

our heavy bombers associated with the strategic deterrent, also for 

the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) that is moving forward now, 

and we’re planning on a dual-capability for that aircraft that would 

be available in the 2017 timeframe. 

General CHILTON. Senator, if I could add to that. There has been 

a lot of, I think, misunderstanding here. We need the B–61, as Dr. 

Miller said, both for the B–2 bomber and for our current dual-capable aircraft. Folks have tried to make a linkage between the B–61 

life-extension program and NATO decisions and F–35 JSF schedule. They are not linked. We need to move out on the B–61 lifeextension program. That includes current year fiscal year 2010 reprogramming that will be required to get us on schedule so that 

we can complete the B–61 in time to then, in 2017, move on to the 

next problem we know we will have to address, which will be the 

W–78 warhead. We are up at a tipping point here, a critical time— 

and I’ll defer to Mr. D’Agostino on this schedule-wise, infrastructure-wise, and funding-wise, and it’s time for action on the B– 

61. 

I would close by saying it will be the first real opportunity to add 

the enhanced security and safety features, as well as increasing the 

effectiveness of the warhead, that are in line with the President’s 

statements that we’ve seen here in the NPR. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. If I could just add. 

Senator BINGAMAN. Mr. D’Agostino, did you have a comment? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Absolutely. To back up what the General said, 

the B–61 requirement still exists for me to maintain and take care 

of this warhead, as you’ve heard, from a requirements standpoint. 

48 

It is one of our oldest warheads in the stockpile. It’s the mainstay 

of our bomber leg of the deterrent. We know we have components 

that are aging out, and they have to be addressed. 

The sequencing, as the General described, is very important. The 

plan is clear: finish the production work on the W–76, look at what 

we need to do at the B–61 concurrently. That’s why we need to 

start now on that. When the production work on the W–76 warhead tails off, the sequencing is perfect for taking care of our aging 

issues and concerns on the B–61. That’ll pick up in 2017. 

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me ask, on this W–78, I gathered from 

Dr. Miller’s comments that one of the things being considered is developing that as a common warhead for the ICBM and the SLBMs. 

How much more complicated is that than just a straight life extension of the W–78? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Why don’t I start, and then if General Chilton 

would like to add, that’d be fine. 

It clearly is going to be more technical work than just doing one 

life-extension. But, we do know, in the aggregate, it’s better for us 

to look at this opportunity to consolidate, because there are, potentially, some very significant savings associated with costs of only 

doing one life-extension to take care of two warheads. Real opportunities to reduce the numbers and types of warheads, when we 

look at commonality and the cost piece, and the real opportunity, 

frankly, to put the types of safety and security pieces in. It’s going 

to be a little bit more challenging technically, but absolutely worth 

the study. In fact, that’s what our 2011 budget proposes to do, is 

start that effort to study options that we have to do with the

W–78. 

General CHILTON. I would just echo the point that the study is 

very important and the promise of the study, with an adaptabletype warhead like this, is that, if we can successfully do this, that 

I would be comfortable, and I’m sure future STRATCOM commanders would be comfortable, with reducing the number of warheads we retain in the nondeployed hedged status. So this is proceeding forward. Being able to look across the spectrum of refurbish, reuse, and replace is what enables this type of study to go forward. 

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you very much. 

My time is up. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Bingaman. 

Senator Bill Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Good morning. 

General Chilton, after having some conversations with General 

Cartwright, the Vice Chairman, and General Kehler, the head of 

Air Force Space Command, they are quite concerned about the recent decision by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) budget, which originated with the science advisor having not consulted DOD. They suddenly proposed the elimination of 

the testing of the solid rocket motor, known as the Ares 1–X. It is 

a derivative of the solid rocket motor of the Space Shuttle, which 

has four segments. It adds a fifth segment. There has been one 

flight test. There is another rocket that is prepared for test. The 

question before us is whether or not to continue the testing 

49 

through fiscal year 2011 of the Ares 1–X, instead of canceling it, 

as the President’s budget proposes. 

The concern, as expressed by General Cartwright and General 

Kehler, is that by shutting down a major part of solid rocket production, it then exponentially increases the cost of the remaining 

solid rocket motors that DOD has to acquire for the SLBMs and 

other ballistic missiles that we have in silos. 

Since you’re the STRATCOM commander, I’d like for you to give 

your opinion. 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Senator Nelson, 

as you are well aware, the solid rocket motor—large solid rocket 

motors, are very complicated devices. They appear to work quite 

simply, but, indeed, they give us a great advantage, having the 

technology and industrial base that we have today, to be able to 

produce them. As the STRATCOM commander, my concern, that I 

know acquisition, technology, and logistics is taking a close look at 

in DOD, is what impact this decision might have on the industrial 

base as we look to the future. 

We’re committed to look at a follow-on to the land-based strategic 

deterrent, the Minuteman III. Although the Navy right now has 

decided to continue with the D–5 missile during the transition to 

the follow-on Ohio-class, I would anticipate in the future there will 

be requirements for a follow-on to that missile at some point, as 

well. 

Are we postured correctly, from an industrial-base standpoint, to 

sustain this technology that I believe will be important for the strategic deterrent for many years to come. That’s a question that I 

think we need to take a hard look at, Senator. 

It goes beyond just cost, in my view, though. Although cost would 

certainly, I would imagine, transfer over towards those other programs. But, it is really bigger than cost, in my view. 

Senator BILL NELSON. In response to your answer about industrial base as well as cost, help me understand someone who might 

say that the diameter of the continued testing on Ares 1, since it’s 

a big rocket, is not the same as the diameter on a D–5 or a followon to a Minuteman III. Does that have any bearing? Because, 

would it not still affect the same industrial base that you’re talking 

about? 

General CHILTON. Senator, I guess I don’t understand the argument. Again, a large solid rocket motor has the issues of getting 

the chemistry right and the production of a solid propellant. It has 

issues with liners, it has issues with inhibitors, it has issues with 

guidance and control. Thrust-vectoring systems with the solid rocket motor are not simple to do, casing issues, et cetera. All of these 

are very complicated components of any large solid rocket motor, 

whether it be the D–5, the Minuteman III, the Shuttle SRBs, or 

any follow-on to that. This is what I’m worried about, that we don’t 

lose that formula and expertise for being able to address all the engineering challenges associated with all of those things, not to mention the joints between segments, as we go forward. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I think the overall DOD has been taken 

by surprise in this NASA announcement to cancel. I have clearly 

let it be known my displeasure. Here it comes back to one hand of 

50 

the Government not knowing what the other hand of the Government is doing. There should have been this kind of consultation. 

I would encourage you, as one of the major commanders, to 

weigh in your feelings about this, because there’s going to have to 

be a decision made very soon, with regard to whether or not this 

industrial base is going to continue. When I say very soon, I have 

put additional money in the budget resolution, that we are in committee today on, to give some flexibility for the future that NASA 

could continue this testing. But, decisions are going to be made 

come June in our authorizing committee. They’re going to be made 

come July in the Appropriations Committee. So, this is upon us. I 

urge you, use all deliberate dispatch. 

Madam Secretary, I just want to say that, for any one of our colleagues to ascend to the heights of power and prestige that you 

have, my compliments to you. I want to ask you about what 

progress you thought was made, in this recent Nuclear Security 

Summit, on the goal of a nuclear lockdown on the proliferation. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much, Senator. It’s good to see 

you. I’m honored to be here. 

I think that, first of all, this was an historic summit. It was the 

first time in decades that we’ve had so many heads of state come. 

This is an issue that, when your former colleague, President 

Obama, was in the Senate, was something that he believed to be 

a primary threat to the American people and the stabilization of 

the world community. The idea that there were more states acquiring nuclear weapons than ever before, and that nuclear security 

has become an issue that we all have to deal with. It’s not just the 

responsibility of the P5 nuclear-weapon states, but it’s everyone’s 

responsibility, because everyone has to patrol their borders, everyone has to deal with export controls, everyone has to deal with the 

ambitions of terrorists and others that are around the world. 

I think that the deliverables at the summit were very significant. 

There were two big baskets of deliverables. The first one was, the 

United States and Russia, after 10 years, signed the Plutonium 

Disposition Agreement, which commits both countries to moving toward elimination of plutonium, enough plutonium to make 17,000 

nuclear weapons. So, this is a sizable commitment, to eliminate 

this plutonium. 

The second was a basket of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) offerings from countries like Chile, Canada, Mexico, and Ukraine, 

where they will eliminate their HEU and actually have both the 

United States and Russia work to eliminate that HEU. 

I think that it was significant, from a policy standpoint. It was 

significant, from the fact that there were real deliverables, of lessening significantly both plutonium and HEU that is in the world. 

I think, probably most significantly, it added to the debate and 

heightened the sense of awareness, to average Americans and people all over the world, that this is, indeed, a 21st century problem 

that is going to take lots of people and, frankly, a lot of political 

will to abate. But, these ambitions of states to get nuclear weapons, 

and making sure that we have secured both the know-how, the material, and the weapons themselves, significantly, both by diminishing their numbers but also by making investments in keeping 

51 

them secure, is a priority of the President and, certainly, those 

heads of state were there and many others. 

I think it was a very big success. The Republic of Korea has 

agreed to host the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. This was originally an idea that was meant to be a one-time thing. But, it was 

such a big success and, I think, accrued to the American people 

such big national security gains, that we’re very happy to see the 

Republic of Korea host the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. 

You don’t have any additional questions, I don’t either. 

We are very grateful to this panel for your terrific work in this 

area. You have proposed a number of documents here and important treaties and reviews, which will set the direction of this country for decades, in an area that is of critical importance to the 

world, to world security, to the fight against terrorism. Your involvement, all of you, is a major contribution to our security, and 

we’re grateful for it. We’re grateful for your being here today. 

We will stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROLAND W. BURRIS

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY

1. Senator BURRIS. Secretary Tauscher, Dr. Miller, General Chilton, and Mr. 

D’Agostino, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreement addresses the nuclear stockpile levels and the number of weapons each nation can maintain. Does the new START agreement address the enforcement of this agreement? 

Secretary TAUSCHER and Dr. MILLER. The New START treaty limits numbers of 

deployed warheads and their delivery vehicles. The treaty contains a comprehensive 

verification regime to monitor compliance with its requirements. The New START 

treaty created the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) to support implementation of the treaty provisions. The BCC will provide a forum for discussion and resolution of compliance issues, implementation questions, and continued strategic dialogue. Ultimately, a party may withdraw from the treaty if extraordinary events 

jeopardize its supreme interests. This could include a material breach by the other 

party’s noncompliance with obligations imposed by the treaty. 

General CHILTON. Yes. The New START treaty establishes the BCC as a compliance and implementation body that will meet at least twice each year, unless otherwise agreed. Compliance and implementation questions may be raised by either 

party in the BCC. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, the New START treaty establishes central limits for strategic offensive arms that must be met within 7 years after entry into force, and provides a comprehensive regime to verify each party’s compliance with these limits 

and with the other provisions of the treaty. The central limits are: 1,550 for deployed strategic warheads; 700 for deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles 

(ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and heavy bombers 

equipped for nuclear armaments; and 800 for deployed and nondeployed ICBM 

launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers. The verification regime to assess 

compliance is based in part on the experiences gained by the United States and 

Russia through the implementation of the 1991 START treaty, and includes elements that are specifically tailored to verify the limitations and provisions of the 

new treaty. Any concern identified regarding a party’s compliance with its treaty obligations can be raised by the other party through the treaty’s BCC, which is the 

compliance and implementation body that will meet at least twice each year, unless 

otherwise agreed. 

2. Senator BURRIS. Secretary Tauscher, Dr. Miller, General Chilton, and Mr. 

D’Agostino, has there been any discussion about how nations who are party to the 

agreement will ensure all parties are meeting their obligations? 

Secretary TAUSCHER and Dr. MILLER. The New START treaty contains detailed 

monitoring and transparency provisions that supplement National Technical Means 

52 

(NTMs) to form an effective verification regime. There are provisions for data exchanges and notifications regarding strategic offensive systems and facilities covered 

by the treaty, up to 18 onsite inspections each year, and exhibitions of new systems 

entering treaty accountability. The Protocol to the treaty further elaborates the 

rights and obligations associated with the verification measures set forth in the 

treaty, while annexes to the treaty lay out key details of how each of the verification 

measures is to be implemented. 

The New START treaty created the BCC to promote the objectives and implementation of the treaty provisions. The BCC will provide a forum for discussion and resolution of compliance issues, implementation questions, and continued strategic dialogue. Issues that are not resolved in the BCC can be escalated to diplomatic channels and if necessary to the highest levels of government. If there were a material 

breach by the other party arising from noncompliance with obligations imposed by 

the treaty, international law provides that a party can suspend its obligations in 

whole or in part. Ultimately, a party may withdraw from the treaty if extraordinary 

events jeopardize its supreme interests. 

General CHILTON. Yes. Verification measures have been built into the New 

START treaty to monitor compliance. The treaty contains a verification regime that 

builds on lessons learned from 15 years of implementing START. This regime includes unencumbered use of NTMs, data exchanges and notifications regarding strategic systems and facilities, two types of onsite inspections, exhibitions, and, as a 

transparency measure, telemetry exchanges. Specifically: 

• NTM - The treaty provides for the use of and non-interference with NTM of 

verification (e.g., satellites). There are explicit provisions that prohibit interference with NTM and the use of concealment measures than may impede monitoring by NTM. 

• Data Exchanges and Notifications - The United States and Russia will exchange data on numbers, locations, and technical characteristics of strategic 

weapon systems and facilities that are subject to the treaty. Additionally, each 

side will provide regular notifications and data updates. 

• Onsite Inspections - There are two types of inspections. 

• Type One inspections focus on ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air 

bases; that is sites containing both deployed and nondeployed strategic systems. 

• Type Two inspections focus on sites with only nondeployed strategic systems. 

• Inspections include: 

• confirming the number of reentry vehicles on deployed ICBMs and 

deployed SLBMs, 

• confirming numbers related to nondeployed launcher limits, 

• counting nuclear weapons onboard or attached to deployed heavy 

bombers, 

• confirming weapon system conversions or eliminations as well as facility eliminations. 

• Each side is allowed to conduct 18 inspections annually: 10 Type One and 

8 Type Two. 

• Unique Identifiers - Each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber will be assigned 

a unique identifier (alphanumeric number), which will be included in the applicable notifications and database which may be confirmed during inspections. 

• Telemetric Information - During ICBM and SLBM flight tests, measurements 

of various technical parameters are made to monitor missile performance. To 

enhance transparency and supplement verification provisions, the parties have 

agreed to an annual exchange of telemetric information on a parity basis, for 

up to five ICBM and SLBM launches per year. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, the verification regime developed for the New START treaty 

provides the United States and Russia the means to verify each other’s compliance 

with their treaty obligations. The verification regime includes data exchanges and 

notifications regarding strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the treaty, 

two types of onsite inspections, exhibitions, and provisions to facilitate the use of 

NTMs for verifying compliance with provisions of the treaty. Either party may raise 

questions relating to treaty compliance through the BCC, which is the treaty’s compliance and implementation body that will meet at least twice each year, unless otherwise agreed. 

53 

IRAN AND NORTH KOREA

3. Senator BURRIS. Secretary Tauscher, Iran and North Korea have been pursuing 

technology for nuclear weapons. Was there any discussion about the fact that Iran 

and North Korea are trying to develop nuclear weapons? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. While the United States and Russia frequently discuss the 

problems of Iran and North Korea pursuing development of nuclear weapons, this 

was not a topic of discussion in the negotiation of the bilateral New START treaty. 

4. Senator BURRIS. Secretary Tauscher, will the New START agreement change 

if Iran and North Korea manage to develop nuclear weapons? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. No. The New START treaty is a bilateral agreement designed to stabilize the strategic balance between the United States and the Russian 

Federation at lower levels of nuclear forces. It is not linked to development of nuclear weapons by other countries, including Iran or North Korea. The United States 

will sustain safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces to deter any potential adversary as long as nuclear weapons exist. 

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

5. Senator BURRIS. Mr. D’Agostino, you mentioned that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) intends to coordinate with the Department of Defense 

(DOD) in order to develop a new Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

(SSMP) to Congress. When do you anticipate being able to present this plan, and 

what key points will it address? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The NNSA SSMP was delivered to Congress on June 16, 2010. 

This plan details our approach for modernizing the infrastructure, managing the 

stockpile, and sustaining the science and technology base that underpins the nuclear security enterprise. The SSMP is aligned with the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report, the congressionally mandated Stockpile Management Program, 

and U.S. nonproliferation goals, and is the NNSA plan for maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile without a need to resume nuclear testing. 

As identified in the NPR and detailed in the SSMP, our long-term strategy is to 

manage our aging stockpile through infrastructure modernization, warhead life extensions, and a world-class science and technology base. Two major production facilities are essential to the infrastructure modernization effort: the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement nuclear facility at Los Alamos for plutonium research 

and development and the Uranium Processing Facility at Y–12 in Tennessee where 

we carry out HEU operations. Warhead life extensions will be carried out on a caseby-case basis, seeking to increase stockpile safety, security, and effectiveness. This 

plan does not pursue new military capabilities or missions for our warheads, nor 

will we perform nuclear tests. Finally, accomplishing these SSMPs requires a highly 

capable Federal and contractor workforce with the specialized skills needed to sustain the nuclear deterrent and support-related national security goals. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

AFFORDABILITY OF IMPLEMENTING THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

6. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Miller, General Chilton, and Mr. D’Agostino, the NPR 

sets forth a broad vision that must not be viewed outside of the realm of affordability. As I mentioned earlier, the cost alone for modernizing, both the nuclear 

weapons complex and the triad, is substantial. As we move to reduce our nuclear 

stockpile, this modernization effort becomes all the more important. Factoring in the 

cost of a missile defense and a prompt global strike—both essential and critical, but 

also costly, programs—the overall budget outlook seems to suggest steady increases 

for the foreseeable future. What is the near-term and long-term affordability of implementing the NPR? 

Dr. MILLER. The cost of implementing the NPR is affordable. Current best-estimates are provided in the administration’s report prepared in response to section 

1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010. 

General CHILTON. The NPR clearly articulates the enduring value of the triad in 

our nuclear posture. At the same time, we are facing a significant period of recapitalization of the nuclear enterprise. It will take the commitment of the administration and Congress to ensure a safe, secure, and effective (albeit smaller) deterrent 

force. We are working very hard to carefully study the requirements and tradespace 

54 

to make the most cost-effective investments, while looking for leveraging opportunities and innovative ways to meet our national security commitments. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The President’s budget request for fiscal year 2011 provides the 

resources for NNSA to accomplish its mission in fiscal years 2011–2015. This funding is both essential and necessary for regaining key NNSA nuclear weapons capabilities and sustaining the core workforce and infrastructure that underwrite the 

nuclear mission. The President’s submittal demonstrates a long-term, executable 

commitment to a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. I recommend the 

long-term program outlined in the SSMP be adopted by Congress; it will put NNSA 

on the path to delivering a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. 

7. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Miller, General Chilton, and Mr. D’Agostino, does the administration intend to upgrade or modernize each leg of the triad? 

Dr. MILLER. DOD plans to invest in each leg of the triad to ensure that existing 

capabilities are adequately sustained with essential upgrades and modifications. Additionally, DOD will seek to modernize systems, as needed, to ensure continuing deterrent capability over the long-term. 

General CHILTON. The Services are making investments to maintain a credible 

nuclear force. Specific actions will be reported to Congress as directed by section 

1251 of the 2010 NDAA. U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), with the assigned 

mission of nuclear deterrence, participates in the process of identifying requirements and advocating for funding for modernization and sustainment of triad forces 

and weapons. The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget provides adequate initial 

funding to address our Nation’s most critical needs to update and modernize our deterrent and global strike capabilities. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Over the next 3 decades every nuclear warhead now in the 

stockpile will require some level of technical attention in order to ensure their continued safety, security, and effectiveness. The technical attention required for each 

warhead type will vary. Some will require a full life extension while others will only 

involve the exchange of limited life components. The NNSA will sustain the warheads for every leg of the nuclear triad through a comprehensive process of life extension programs. For each of these life extensions the full spectrum of options will 

be studied on a case-by-case basis, and the national laboratories will offer their best 

technical advice for extending the life of a warhead and improving it’s safety, security, and effectiveness without adding any new military capabilities, as outlined in 

the NPR. 

FUTURE OF THE TRIAD

8. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, the NPR states that the 

United States should retain a smaller nuclear triad. With the exception of the next 

generation ballistic missile submarine, the NPR says very little about long-term 

modernization efforts. It recognizes that decisions need to be made on the next generation ICBM and the next generation bomber, but cites little urgency in making 

those decisions. Given the guidance set forth in the NPR, do you believe our nuclear 

force structure will include bombers, ICBMs, and ballistic missile submarines 25 

years from now? If so, when must a decision be made on pursuing a follow-on ICBM 

and a follow-on bomber? 

Dr. MILLER. U.S. nuclear force structure 25 years from now will depend greatly 

on any changes to the geopolitical situation, and any future arms control agreements. That said, a diverse force structure has significant advantages for hedging 

against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities. The Air Force plans to sustain the Minuteman III through 2030 as directed by Section 139 of the John Warner 

NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, and will initiate studies of possible ICBM follow-on systems in fiscal years 2011–2013. Similarly, the Air Force will retain the B–52 for nuclear mission requirements through 2035 and will provide plans for a follow-on 

bomber along with the President’s budget submission for fiscal year 2012. The Navy 

has already initiated research and development for the next generation ballistic missile submarine, funding for which began in fiscal year 2010. 

General CHILTON. The NPR validates the enduring value of the triad and its complementary capabilities in securing the peace and preventing major conflicts. As we 

sustain and modernize the triad, our Nation will continue to require a nuclear-capable bomber leg’s inherent flexibility to address a wide variety of possible adversaries 

and contingencies. We are participating in the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 

(OSD) Long-Range Strike study to identify and assess necessary attributes and capabilities for the next long-range bomber that will meet combatant commanders’ 

needs and ensure no gap in capabilities. We anticipate that the long-range strike 

55 

study will be completed in time to inform decisions for the upcoming fiscal year 

2012 budget submission. Regarding an ICBM follow-on system, we anticipate initial 

studies will begin in fiscal year 2011 and an analysis of alternatives will follow 

shortly thereafter. We are working to ensure life extension upgrades and technology 

development efforts required to support the Minuteman III from 2020 through 2030 

will leverage into a follow-on system. 

F–35

9. Senator MCCAIN. General Chilton, the NPR confirms that the Air Force will 

retain a dual, nuclear and conventional, capable fighter as it replaces the F–16s 

with the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter. How critical is the timely delivery of the dualcapable F–35 to the extended deterrence mission? 

General CHILTON. It is important to preclude a gap in our extended deterrent capabilities. I support Service efforts to field the dual-capable version of the F–35 before end-of-life for the current dual-capable version of the F–16. This is a top priority for both STRATCOM and U.S. European Command. I also support Service efforts to move forward with a limited life extension program of the F–16 fleet, which 

will provide options to mitigate F–35 schedule risk. The NPR clearly articulates that 

nuclear-capable fighter aircraft forward-based in Europe are enduring, visible manifestations of our Nation’s extended deterrence commitment to NATO, and a key 

component of a broader strategy to accomplish U.S. nonproliferation and deterrence 

goals. 

NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY LIMITS AND FORCE STRUCTURE

10. Senator MCCAIN. General Chilton, when will Congress be provided the details 

of the new nuclear force structure as it relates to the New START? 

General CHILTON. Force structure details were provided to Congress as part of the 

NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 1251 report and as part of the submission package when 

New START was presented for ratification. 

11. Senator MCCAIN. General Chilton, has the analysis been done to support this 

new force structure and can the committee be provided such analysis? 

General CHILTON. Analysis was done throughout the NPR and New START process. I defer to OSD for release of the analysis. 

12. Senator MCCAIN. General Chilton, in order to meet the force structure levels 

for the New START, I assume DOD will need to adjust levels within one or more 

legs of the triad. If so, which aspects and why? 

General CHILTON. Yes, some changes in each leg of the triad will be necessary. 

We need to continue the conversions of the B–1B to conventional use only and then 

exhibit those changes and conduct exhibitions of the SSGNs and missile defense 

silos at Vandenberg to remove from New START accountability. We must also eliminate other delivery vehicles (e.g., 50 Peacekeeper silos, 50 MMIII silos at 

Malmstrom and B52G and B52H at Davis Monthan) which have been previously removed from the nuclear forces but which were accountable under START I. Beyond 

these issues, minor force modifications maybe required. This information was provided to Congress as part of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 1251 report and as part 

of the submission package when New START was presented for ratification. 

CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES

13. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller, please describe the consultation that we had with our allies and friends before determining our nuclear 

posture, force reductions, and extended deterrence. 

Secretary TAUSCHER and Dr. MILLER. International perspectives on U.S. nuclear 

policy and posture were significant components in the NPR analysis and are reflected in the final document. The NPR’s International Dimensions Working Group 

was created to engage with our allies and partners regarding their perceptions of 

the U.S. nuclear policy and posture. The NPR team held more than 60 consultations 

with more than 38 individual countries as well as the North Atlantic Council of the 

NATO alliance, and 11 other countries provided written input. Allies and partners 

were engaged frequently during the NPR process. 

56 

14. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller, did any of our friends 

and allies raise any concerns about our new nuclear posture and proposed cuts to 

our nuclear arsenal? 

Secretary TAUSCHER and Dr. MILLER. Allies and partners were engaged frequently 

during the NPR. International reactions to the NPR since its publication have been 

very positive, and the administration has received broad support for the recommendations of the NPR as well as proposed reductions under the New START 

treaty. 

15. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller, please describe how and 

in what way the NPR was shaped by the ideas and concerns of our allies who depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for their own security. 

Secretary TAUSCHER and Dr. MILLER. In terms of process, international perspectives on U.S. nuclear policy and posture were significant components in the NPR’s 

analysis and are reflected in the final document. The NPR ’s International Dimensions Working Group was created to engage with our allies and partners regarding 

their perceptions of U.S. nuclear policy and posture. The NPR team held more than 

60 consultations with more than 38 individual countries as well as the North Atlantic Council of the NATO alliance, and 11 other countries provided written input. 

In terms of product, the NPR report reflects a strong commitment to the U.S. nuclear umbrella. ‘‘Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and 

partners’’ is one of the NPR’s five pillars, and two of the NPR’s key recommendations are retaining the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical 

fighter-bombers and heavy bombers, and to proceed with full-scope life extension for 

the B–61 bomb. 

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION REVIEW AND NEW WEAPON DESIGN

16. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. D’Agostino, the NNSA’s British counterpart, the Atomic 

Weapons Establishment, cites maintaining a capability to design a new weapon as 

a cornerstone of its mission. Why do you suspect the British view that maintaining 

the capability to design a new warhead is critical? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The known capability to design a workable nuclear weapon is 

an essential aspect which underpins the credibility of both U.S. and the U.K. nuclear deterrence. Our position on this topic is the same as the United Kingdom’s: 

we will unambiguously retain this ability. Instead of honing and demonstrating 

these skills through an ongoing program to design, develop, and test new nuclear 

weapon designs, such as was done during the Cold War, the NNSA and the United 

Kingdom have both invested in strengthening our science, technology, and engineering (ST&E) capabilities to sustain these core skills. 

As the stockpile decreases in size, the deterrence role of ST&E increases in importance. Our credibility relies on the active engagement of scientists and engineers to 

understand the aging stockpile in all its complexities, and their ability to respond 

to future technical and global events. The vigorous engagement of ST&E enables us 

to annually assess the stockpile, resolve significant finding investigations (discovered departures from design and/or manufacturing specifications), extend nuclear 

weapon lifetimes, assess other Nations’ nuclear capabilities, and dismantle retired 

weapons. This very challenging technical program and the modern facilities that are 

supported in the President’s budget will serve to attract and maintain the highlytrained and motivated workforce needed to sustain nuclear deterrence, as well as 

other nuclear and energy security missions. 

17. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. D’Agostino, in contrast to the British, the recently released NPR states that the ‘‘United States will not develop new nuclear warheads.’’ 

Do you believe that this statement would foreclose all future considerations to design a new weapon if the need arose? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The United States has made the decision not to design and 

produce new warheads; however, we will preserve our capability for doing so. The 

capabilities needed to design a new warhead include knowledgeable designers, along 

with a responsive, capable research and development and manufacturing infrastructure. These are the same capabilities and skill sets utilized when completing weapon life extensions. The NPR recognized the need for increased investment in the Nuclear Security Enterprise stockpile, infrastructure, and ST&E. The decision not to 

design new warheads should not imply the United States would be unable to do so 

should national security require it in the future. 

57 

18. Senator MCCAIN. Mr. D’Agostino, are there any concerns that as a result of 

this declaration that we will no longer maintain the ability to design a new weapon? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. See response to question 17. I am confident that the Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management path upon which we have embarked sustains our capabilities to respond to future world events if necessary. 

19. Senator MCCAIN. General Chilton, in your best military judgment and advice, 

do you believe that it is prudent to advocate for eliminating the capability to design 

a new weapon? 

General CHILTON. In the context of sustaining a safe, secure, and effective stockpile, I believe all options should be validated during concept, design, and cost studies. Both the NPR and the congressionally-directed Strategic Posture Review support considering the full range of life extension approaches to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of our stockpile. I believe we must preserve sufficient flexibility to meet mandated stockpile management goals. Ultimately, replacement with 

a new design that uses previously tested components might be necessary to maintain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile. As the United States continues to reduce 

its nuclear arsenal, we must maintain effective capabilities to support nuclear weapons nonproliferation activities, and provide expert assessment of other nations’ nuclear weapons programs in support of non-proliferation goals. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRIBUTION

20. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Miller and Mr. D’Agostino, with the release of the NPR, 

the Secretary of Defense announced that DOD will be transferring $5 billion over 

the next 5 years to the Department of Energy (DOE) to address infrastructure modernization needs. This increase is both welcome and absolutely necessary to supplement significant long-term increases in DOE’s own budget. How will DOD funding 

be utilized by the NNSA? 

Dr. MILLER. The DOD transfered $4.6 billion of its topline to the NNSA’s Weapons Activities appropriation over the period of fiscal years 2011–2015. By mutual 

agreement, this transfer will support funding for the following: 

• Design and initial construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility at Los Alamos and the Uranium Processing Facility at Oak Ridge; 

• Increased plutonium manufacturing capacity at the PF–4 facility at Los 

Alamos; 

• Restoration of production rates for the W76 SLBM warhead to meet Navy 

requirements; 

• A B61 bomb life extension program that meets safety, security, and reliability requirements on DOD timelines; 

• Initiation of a life extension program for the W78 ICBM and warheads; 

and 

• A revitalized warhead surveillance effort and associated science and technology support. 

In addition, the DOD transferred another nearly $1.1 billion of its top-line over 

fiscal year 2011–2015 for Naval Reactors, to support reactor design and development. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The DOD transferred almost $4.6 billion in top-line over the period fiscal years 2011–2015 to the NNSA’s Weapons Activities for infrastructure enhancement, life extension programs, and enhanced stockpile stewardship. The DOD 

also transferred almost $1.1 billion to Naval Reactors to support reactor design and 

development for the next generation ballistic missile submarine. 

The President’s budget request, if appropriated, will fund: 

• Design and initial construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility at Los Alamos; 

• Design and initial construction of the Uranium Processing Facility at Oak 

Ridge; 

• A sustainable plutonium pit manufacturing capacity at the PF–4 facility 

at Los Alamos; 

• Restoration of full production rates for the W76 SLBM warhead by the 

end of fiscal year 2013 to meet Navy requirements; 

• A life extension program study and follow-on activities for the B61 bomb 

that meet safety, security, and reliability requirements and DOD timelines; 

• Initiation of a study of life extension program options for the W78 ICBM 

warhead; and 

58 

• A revitalized warhead surveillance effort and associated science and technology support. 

21. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Miller and Mr. D’Agostino, can you confirm that DOE 

will not reduce its future years spending requests for the NNSA as a result of the 

DOD contribution? 

Dr. MILLER. The administration, including both DOE and DOD, is committed to 

sustaining full funding for the NNSA. Our plan, described in the report submitted 

in response to the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, section 1251, calls for sustained investments at higher levels so that over the next decade the United States will have 

invested about $80 billion in the NNSA nuclear weapons activities. This plan shows 

investments for NNSA continuing to grow above the fiscal year 2011 request; DOE 

is committed to continuing to make spending requests that represent full and adequate funding. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The DOD funding contribution to NNSA is not expected to be 

an annual practice. The NNSA will submit budget requests in the future that reflect 

NNSA needs. The NNSA will not rely on supplementary funding from other agencies to execute its mission. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

DETERRENCE

22. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Chilton, you comment in your written statement 

that, ‘‘The nuclear enterprise remains, today and for the foreseeable future, the 

foundation of U.S. deterrence strategy and defense posture.’’ I am pleased to hear 

you say that because, with all the talk about nuclear weapons over the last several 

months, the overwhelming emphasis has been on reducing their number, and perhaps rightfully so. However, the fact remains that our nuclear weapons have served 

an extremely valuable purpose for decades, and that purpose is to guarantee the security of the United States and our allies, and no other weapon in our arsenal provides that security the way nuclear weapons do. I hope your perspective is not lost 

on those in the administration making these recommendations. What are your comments on this issue? 

General CHILTON. I am confident that this perspective has not been lost. The NPR 

delineates this perspective well and if the concepts articulated in it are carried out, 

especially regarding the nuclear infrastructure, I believe our nuclear enterprise and 

the associated deterrence and assurance it provides will remain strong and credible. 

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

23. Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller, under the declaratory 

policy outlined in the new NPR, would the United States have been able to make 

the same threats directed against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq with regards to their potential employment of chemical and biological weapons against Israel or Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War, given that Iraq was a signatory to the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty (NNPT) and that we believed, at that time, that Iraq was 

in compliance with their NNPT obligations? 

Secretary TAUSCHER and Dr. MILLER. Yes, the United States would have been 

able to threaten possible use of nuclear weapons against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq at 

the time of the Gulf War. The revised Negative Security Assurance described in the 

NPR is applicable to non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in 

compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. This was not the case for 

Iraq. The joint resolution passed by the U.S. Congress on January 1991 authorizing 

the use of military force against Iraq specifically noted Iraq’s nuclear weapons program as a grave threat. 

24. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Chilton, in your responses to advanced policy 

questions for your nomination to be Commander of STRATCOM in 2007, you stated 

the following: ‘‘A credible U.S. nuclear deterrent . . . assures allies that the United 

States will deter, prevent, or limit damage to them from adversary attacks. This removes incentives for many of them to develop and deploy their own nuclear forces, 

thereby encouraging nonproliferation.’’ Do you still agree with your statement of 

2007 and, in your opinion, does our most recent NPR continue to assure allies that 

the United States will deter, prevent, or limit damage to them from adversary attacks? 

59 

General CHILTON. Yes, I still agree with that statement and that the most recent 

NPR supports it. If the concepts articulated in the NPR are carried out, especially 

regarding the nuclear infrastructure, I believe our nuclear enterprise and the associated deterrence and assurance it provides will remain strong and credible. 

U.S. AND RUSSIAN INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES

25. Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller, how does de-MIRVing 

of the U.S. ICBMs increase stability if, in turn, the Russians do not do the same? 

Secretary TAUSCHER and Dr. MILLER. The increased stability achieved by removing Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle capability (de-MIRVing) from 

U.S. ICBMs is not dependent on Russia de-MIRVing its nuclear force. Stability is 

increased because single warhead ICBMs in geographically dispersed hardened silos 

require an adversary contemplating attack to use more warheads in attacking 

ICBMs than the number of U.S. warheads they would destroy. 

B–52 UNDER STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY

26. Senator CHAMBLISS. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, the NPR recommends 

modifying some of our B–52s into conventional only platforms. How many B–52s 

does DOD plan to modify and to what extent might it be necessary to disable bombers at the Air Force boneyard at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base to ensure they are 

not deployable and do not count under the New START? 

Dr. MILLER. Force structure plans under the New START treaty call for up to 60 

deployed nuclear-capable heavy bombers, including 18 deployable B–2s for the nuclear mission. The Air Force currently has 76 operational B–52Hs in the strategic 

nuclear force structure. The Air Force will study options for the number of B–52s 

to convert to a conventional only role. The Department plans to eliminate 51

B–52Gs, 12 B–1Bs, and 13 B–52Hs currently stored at Davis-Monthan Air Force 

Base once the New START treaty enters into force. 

General CHILTON. NPR guidance is to retain both the B–2 and B–52, and convert 

some of the latter to a conventional-only role to meet the New START treaty central 

limits for deployed and non-deployed strategic delivery systems. No final decision 

has been made on force structure. We are working with OSD, the Joint Staff, and 

the Services to identify options and will report at the earliest opportunity. It is likely that some number of the platforms previously accountable under START I (e.g. 

bombers at the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group facility at DavisMonthan AFB, AZ) will be eliminated. The conversion of a portion of the B–52 force 

to conventional-only will allow the Air Force to retain sufficient dual-capable B–52s 

to support conventional requirements while providing extended nuclear deterrence 

to our allies, deter our adversaries, and maintain a hedge against future uncertainty. 

NEW NUCLEAR WARHEADS

27. Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller, the NPR states clearly that the United States will not develop any new nuclear warheads. If developing 

a new nuclear warhead could offer a means of making our nuclear weapons more 

secure, reliable, effective, and safe, and doing so did not create a warhead with any 

new military capabilities, why would the administration not consider doing so? 

Secretary TAUSCHER and Dr. MILLER. We are confident that the full range of life 

extension programs—refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components—will allow 

the United States to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. This policy 

to not develop new nuclear warheads means that life extension programs will only 

use nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and the laboratory directors have stated: ‘‘We believe that the approach outlined in the NPR, which excludes further nuclear testing and includes the consideration of the full range of life 

extension options (refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components 

from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components based on previously tested designs), provides the necessary technical flexibility to manage the 

nuclear stockpile into the future with an acceptable level of risk.’’ 

60 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE SUSTAINMENT PROJECTS

28. Senator VITTER. General Chilton, you mentioned the need to move forward 

with nuclear enterprise sustainment projects. Among these you specifically mention 

the need to maintain a safe, effective stockpile, which I take to mean, not just the 

nuclear warheads but the missiles as well, and extend production of the Minuteman 

III and begin studies to develop a replacement ICBM for the Minuteman III. In your 

opinion, does the President’s decision to cancel National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Constellation Program and move to reliance on commercial 

providers for launch vehicles for manned space flight, which effectively removes 

NASA as a customer for large rockets and solid rocket motors, have a negative impact on our Nation’s ability to move forward with one or all of those nuclear enterprise sustainment projects you mentioned? 

General CHILTON. NASA has always been a very large part of the solid rocket 

motor industrial base. We anticipate the Constellation program cancellation will impact the cost to recapitalize our Air Force and Navy ballistic missile forces in the 

future; however, the extent of this impact is unknown at this time. We look forward 

to the results of Secretary Carter’s Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L)- 

led task force study on this issue. 

29. Senator VITTER. General Chilton, it is my understanding that the President’s 

plans to remove NASA as a primary customer for large rockets and solid rocket motors would lead to an increase in costs for DOD missiles and solid rocket motors, 

jeopardize the viability of single-source suppliers for certain components used on 

both space launch vehicles and ICBMs, and also put us in great risk of losing the 

remainder of our Nation’s already greatly-reduced large rocket and solid rocket 

motor workforce, leaving us with few, if any, of the engineers who know how to 

build and maintain these complex machines. Do you agree with those assessments? 

If so, could you elaborate on them in detail? 

General CHILTON. Until the OSD/AT&L study is complete, it is premature to speculate on the extent of the impact to our industrial base and intellectual capital as 

the solid rocket motor industry adjusts to the Constellation program cancellation. 

We look forward to the results of Secretary Carter’s AT&L-led task force study on 

this important issue. I do think it is important that prudent investments are made 

in propulsion to ensure we can meet our Nation’s strategic needs. 

30. Senator VITTER. General Chilton, in your estimation, do the President’s plans 

for NASA present a direct challenge to and potentially jeopardize the viability of our 

Nation’s nuclear deterrent, specifically to our ICBM fleet? 

General CHILTON. We do not believe the President’s decision to terminate the 

Constellation program presents a direct challenge to the viability of our ICBM force. 

The Air Force is completing a series of programs to sustain the ICBM force and we 

are confident Minuteman III is viable and sustainable through 2030. Looking ahead, 

we anticipate new challenges across the entire industrial base which will impact 

both the capacity and costs associated with supporting the Minuteman III in the future. A viable solid rocket motor industrial base is a critical part of the broader industrial base needed to maintain a safe, secure, and effective ICBM force and we 

look forward to the results of Secretary Carter’s AT&L-led task force study on this 

important issue. 

U.S. AND CHINESE STOCKPILES

31. Senator VITTER. Secretary Tauscher, Dr. Miller, General Chilton, and Mr. 

D’Agostino, the NPR expresses the intention to further reduce our nuclear deterrent 

below the START follow-on levels. The NPR also highlights the lack of transparency 

of China’s nuclear program. Is there a concern that further U.S. reductions could 

prompt China to increase their nuclear stockpile? 

Secretary TAUSCHER and Dr. MILLER. China’s military modernization programs, 

including its nuclear modernization, are a significant concern which we watch closely. However, China presently does not appear to be seeking parity with either the 

United States or Russia, and its nuclear arsenal remains much smaller than the 

U.S. and Russian arsenals. As a declared nuclear weapon state under the NPT, China’s restraint in its nuclear modernization is important to the nuclear disarmament 

and global nonproliferation efforts. We look to China to be more transparent about 

its strategic programs and to show restraint in them. 

61 

As the United States and Russia conduct bilateral negotiations to reduce nuclear 

arsenals further, the United States will seek greater transparency and assurances 

from China that it will restrain its nuclear modernization. 

General CHILTON. Until the scope of the ‘‘further reductions’’ is understood, it is 

difficult to speculate on how China would view further reductions. However, I believe that whether or not China chooses to increase their arsenal is dependent upon 

a much broader geopolitical context than just the size of the U.S. and Russian arsenals. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The NPR states, 

‘‘The United States and China are increasingly interdependent and their 

shared responsibilities for addressing global security threats, such as WMD 

proliferation and terrorism, are growing. The United States welcomes a 

strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater global role in 

supporting international rules, norms, and institutions. 

‘‘At the same time, the United States and China’s Asian neighbors remain 

concerned about the pace and scope of China’s current military modernization efforts, including its quantitative and qualitative modernization of its 

nuclear capabilities. China’s nuclear arsenal remains much smaller than 

the arsenal of Russia and the United States. But the lack of transparency 

surrounding its programs—their pace and scope as well as the strategy and 

doctrine guiding them—raises questions about China’s future strategic intentions.’’ 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

32. Senator COLLINS. Secretary Tauscher, the proposed Negative Security Assurance policy states that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries which have signed the NNPT and are in compliance with the 

NNPT. Who decides if a country is in compliance with the NNPT? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. As part of the NPR, the United States strengthened its longstanding Negative Security Assurance by declaring that the United States will not 

use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are 

party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their 

nuclear nonproliferation obligations, which would include, inter alia, a state’s obligations under its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA). 

The United States renders its own independent compliance judgments. In this regard, we note that, pursuant to section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament 

Act, as amended, the administration submits a detailed annual assessment of other 

nations’ adherence to their NPT obligations and other nuclear nonproliferation 

agreements or commitments to which the United States is a participating state. 

33. Senator COLLINS. Secretary Tauscher, is the administration prepared to make 

assessments of each country’s compliance with the NNPT separately from the IAEA, 

or will we rely on the judgments of the IAEA Board of Governors, which currently 

includes Russia, China, Venezuela, and Cuba in its membership, to determine which 

countries are in compliance with the NNPT? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. The Board of Governors of the IAEA plays a role in determining noncompliance with safeguards agreements, but not regarding the NPT 

itself. Although our compliance findings may be informed by information from other 

entities, such as the IAEA, the United States renders its own compliance judgments. 

In this regard, we note that, pursuant to section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, the administration submits a detailed annual assessment 

of other nations’ adherence to their NPT obligations and other nuclear nonproliferation agreements or commitments to which the United States is a participating state. 

34. Senator COLLINS. Secretary Tauscher, if the United States relies on the assessment of the IAEA, are we putting the countries which sit on the IAEA Board 

of Governors in a position to dictate how we can respond to certain attacks? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Although our compliance findings may be informed by information from other entities such as the IAEA, the United States renders its own 

independent compliance judgments, including with respect to compliance with IAEA 

safeguards agreements. 

62 

35. Senator COLLINS. Secretary Tauscher, if the United States will establish its 

own assessment of each country’s compliance with the NNPT, does this undermine 

U.S. credibility in working with our allies and other nations in reducing nuclear proliferation? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. No. The United States has been assessing other nations’ 

compliance for as long as the NPT has been in force. That practice has in no way 

undermined our credibility in working with our allies and other nations in reducing 

nuclear proliferation. 

[The Nuclear Posture Review Report follows:] 


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[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

Æ 


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