U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

24–445PDF 2017

ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 28, 2017

Serial No. 115–23

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ms. Sally Yearwood, executive director, Caribbean-Central American Action ... 7

Mr. Joseph M. Humire, executive director, Center for a Secure Free Society ... 16

Mr. Jose Cardenas (former Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Latin 

America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development) .... 30

Mr. Peter Quilter, non-resident senior fellow, Ash Center for Democratic 

Governance and Innovation, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University .................................................................................................... 41

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ms. Sally Yearwood: Prepared statement .............................................................. 10

Mr. Joseph M. Humire: Prepared statement ......................................................... 19

Mr. Jose Cardenas: Prepared statement ............................................................... 32

Mr. Peter Quilter: Prepared statement .................................................................. 43

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 62

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 63

(1)

ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. DUNCAN. A quorum being present, the subcommittee will 

come to order. I would now like to recognize myself for an opening 

statement. 

I would like to begin by extending a warm welcome to the returning members on the subcommittee. Over the years this subcommittee has been fortunate to operate in a bipartisan fashion 

and I look forward to continuing the work that we have done and 

working hand in hand with my good friend, the gentleman from 

New Jersey, our ranking member, Albio Sires, and all the members 

of the subcommittee, as the new Trump administration begins to 

lay out their policy priorities for the Western Hemisphere. I look 

forward to seeing what those priorities are. 

I’d now like to introduce the new members. They are not here 

but I’ll go ahead and read their names and hopefully they will 

trickle in after votes, this is the way it goes sometimes. 

We have got Mr. Mo Brooks from Alabama, Mr. Francis Rooney 

of Florida, Ms. Norma Torres of California and Mr. Adriano 

Espaillat of New York. 

They each have their own unique background and experiences 

and we look forward to them being strong contributors to our work 

during this 115th Congress. 

Today’s hearing should provide subcommittee members with a 

comprehensive look at the lay of the land in the Western Hemisphere, give us some food for thought as the new Trump administration begins to reveal their priorities for 2017. 

I am particularly interested in what our witnesses think that 

policy priorities should be in Cuba and Venezuela, and in places 

that continue to receive large amounts of U.S. taxpayer funding 

like Colombia, Haiti, and the Northern Triangle in Central America. 

Clearly, the administration will need to work on a bilateral relationship with Mexico, but the United States is certainly right to 

seek to enforce our borders and protect our precious sovereignty. I 

2

thank today’s distinguished panel of witnesses for being here and 

sharing their thoughts and insights with us. Many of them have 

testified before our committee before and I welcome them back. 

In my opinion, the prior administration did little to advance U.S. 

interests in this hemisphere, and, in fact, did harm to traditional 

U.S. policies of standing up for human rights, and the rule of law 

under repressive regimes that currently plague countries like Cuba 

and Venezuela. 

In Cuba, the Obama administration gave the Castros pretty 

much everything they wanted without asking Congress to remove 

the embargo as required by U.S. law. 

Furthermore, the Obama administration didn’t even insist upon 

the most basic human rights protections as political dissidents 

were rounded up, beaten, and jailed in record numbers. And in 

their Cuba policy shift, the all-important issue of resolving the 

thousands of property rights claims were barely even mentioned. 

The pain and suffering that the Chavez-Maduro regime inflicted 

upon Venezuela has been well documented, and our hearts go out 

to the Venezuelan people who deserve so much more than hyperinflation, rolling blackouts, widespread shortages of medicine and, 

literally, scrounging for food every day just to survive. Recent reports of canines and flamingoes and other animals being slaughtered for food is disheartening and our thoughts and prayers go out 

to the folks in Venezuela. 

I was encouraged by early signs from the new administration 

last week, including the decision to slap sanctions on the new Venezuelan Vice President for his participation in drug trafficking, and 

President Trump’s taking of an impromptu meeting with Lilian 

Lopez, the wife of wrongfully jailed opposition leader Leopoldo 

Lopez. 

We also had the opportunity to meet with her as well and 

Leopoldo Lopez remains in our thoughts and prayers. 

Under my chairmanship this subcommittee has traveled extensively in the region. I intend to continue to do my part in this session of Congress to advance our interests in the hemisphere. 

It has been said that our region does not get the attention that 

it deserves. In fact, when Secretary Kerry made his famous speech 

at the OAS in November 2013 that the era of the Monroe Doctrine 

is over, the administration admitted as much. 

But I would maintain that because of our region being largely 

peaceful, the lack of major wars for several years, a healthy flow 

of trade and commerce, and an abundance of common heritage and 

religious beliefs, these are things to be celebrated and built upon 

rather than overlooked. 

Of course, that is not to say that we don’t have much work to 

do. The important task of finishing Plan Colombia by making Peace 

Colombia work going forward will surely present many challenges 

to U.S and Colombian policy makers, but is work in which both our 

countries have invested much blood and treasure so as to successfully turn that country around. As a result, they remain our best 

ally in the hemisphere. 

In Haiti, it has now been more than 7 years since the devastating earthquake that resulted in so much damage and loss of 

life. Much progress has been made thanks to the generosity of U.S. 

3

taxpayers and many other international donors, but there is still 

much work to be done there. It certainly didn’t help that they were 

hit by Hurricane Matthew last fall and experienced another uptick 

in cases of cholera. 

Like many regional observers, nearly 14 months after the elections began, I was hopeful when Haiti finally democratically elected a new President and a Congress. We at least now have a government partner to work with going forward, and I plan to do my 

part in keeping a healthy dialogue open when I meet with the new 

President sometime later this year. 

Obviously, all this is not to say the hemisphere doesn’t still suffer from the seemingly intractable problems of drug trafficking, 

transnational gains in criminal organizations, corruption, poverty, 

and lack of opportunity for many. 

We have been experiencing the results of these problems first 

hand with the continual wave of illegal immigration, especially of 

unaccompanied minors from the Northern Triangle in Central 

America coming to our southern border every day. I support the 

Trump administration and stand with those who believe we must 

enforce our borders and protect our sovereignty. As Ronald Reagan 

said, ‘‘If we do not we are not a country at all.’’ We are a kind and 

generous nation but we cannot become the orphanage to the world. 

When I assumed the chairmanship of this subcommittee I pointed out in our first hearing that I have three simple priorities and 

I’ll restate those for this Congress: Create jobs for the American 

people, promote U.S. energy security and U.S. exports, and return 

to the wisdom of our Founding Fathers. That’s an acronym—jobs, 

energy, Founding Fathers—that spell JEFF and I think JEFF is a 

winning message. 

It is through that prism that I’ll continue to view the issues and 

priorities that we will focus on going forward. The Western Hemisphere presents abundant opportunities for success in all of these 

areas for the United States as well as for our allies here in the 

hemisphere. 

With that, I will turn to the ranking member, Mr. Sires, for his 

opening statement, and I will restate again that I have enjoyed our 

work together and I look forward to working with you again and 

so I yield with you. 

Mr. SIRES. I just want to start by saying thank you, and I had 

nothing to do with Mr. Meeks going down below. 

[Laughter.] 

Good afternoon and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 

hearing. I’d like to start by welcoming everyone to our first hearing 

of the 115th Congress and give a special welcome to the new members of our subcommittee. 

I look forward to working with all of you in the new Congress. 

I am grateful to be back as ranking member of this subcommittee 

once again and serving alongside our chairman and my friend from 

South Carolina, Jeff Duncan. 

Many countries in the Western Hemisphere are at a crossroad. 

Throughout the region, the anti-corruption wave has taken hold 

and we have seen indictments, arrests, and resignations as a result. While these revelations have caused a stir in the region, they 

4

have also created the opportunities to bring real and lasting change 

to these institutions long in need of reform. 

In the Northern Triangle, efforts are underway to strengthen to 

rule of law and address human rights concerns. Though Brazilian 

officials are facing accusations of bribery, Brazilian people are insisting their government uses democratic institutions to hold them 

accountable. 

Partners like Argentina are taking steps to reform their economies and play a larger role addressing regional challenges. That is 

why I am proud to sponsor H. Res. 54, reaffirming our strong relation with the Argentine people and commending the government of 

President Macri for his economic reform and commitment to holding the perpetrators of the 1994 AMIA bombing accountable. 

Additionally, our friends in Colombia signed a peace agreement 

with the FARC, taking the first steps in ending a 52-year-long war 

that has claimed the lives of over 200,000 people. 

We must remember that this agreement is just the beginning of 

the peace, not the end result. It is now more important than ever 

to continue our bipartisan backing of Colombia as they work to implement the peace deal, fight back against criminal groups, work 

to take over the FARC’s territory, and deter further coca cultivation. 

Despite these opportunities for growth, challenges still abound. 

The repression of the Cuban people is only escalating, with innocent women continuing to regularly be beaten in the streets while 

peacefully marching. 

The Venezuelan people are, unfortunately, continuing to languish 

at the hands of Maduro, who continues to stifle democracy and violently fight back against pro-democracy advocates. 

My experience with the Western Hemisphere has taught me that 

any approach to Latin America needs to be a regional one. Piecemeal approaches will not tackle the region’s most pressing challenges such as strengthening the rule of law and respect for human 

rights, increasing transparency and combating drug trafficking. 

That is why I am concerned about the rhetoric that is already 

coming out of the Trump administration with regards to our allies 

like Mexico, who has been a strong partner of the U.S. under both 

Republican and Democratic administrations. I hope that President 

Trump soon realizes how much these relationships have enhanced 

the security and prosperity of the United States, and that the only 

way to make the region stronger is by working together. 

I thank the witnesses for their testimony. I look forward to discussing how we can improve relations in the coming year. Thank 

you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. 

This being our first subcommittee meeting, I am going to kind 

of step out of the norm and recognize the former chairwoman of the 

subcommittee—of the full committee and now the subcommittee 

chairman of the Middle East and North Africa, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, 

for a brief opening statement. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you to the ranking member for this timely hearing. I’ll be 

traveling to the region with Ranking Member Sires. We are going 

to Honduras and Guatemala this weekend. 

5

We have seen those countries make significant progress in fighting corruption, but the attorneys general of these countries need 

our support. They face tremendous propaganda campaigns to undermine the progress they’ve been making. In Nicaragua we see 

the Ortega regime immersed in corruption, denying human rights 

to its people, and undermining our interests in the region by placating the Russians. 

So much work needs to be done in Venezuela, as you pointed out, 

Mr. Chairman. Thank goodness we have got new sanctions against 

these human rights violators. 

We have seen the dialogue in Venezuela is not working and the 

U.S. position must be that Josh Holt and all the political prisoners 

including Leopoldo Lopez and Antonio Ledezma must be released 

immediately and unconditionally. 

And in my native homeland of Cuba we need to prioritize our 

focus to the Communist island and be on the side of human rights, 

on the side of return of fugitives like Joanne Chesimard, on the 

side of U.S. citizens whose properties were confiscated. 

There is so much going on, but hopeful signals too. We have got 

a new election cycle in Ecuador, Mr. Chairman, in April. That’s 

going to, hopefully, bring back election democratic norms to that 

country. And in Haiti, lastly, after years of stalling elections finally 

occurred and we have a new President. 

So good things can happen. Thank you for your leadership, Mr. 

Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the lady, and I want to go now to Mr. 

Meeks, who is probably the senior member of the subcommittee, for 

a brief opening statement. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and 

the ranking member for holding this very important hearing on 

issues and opportunities in the Western Hemisphere. 

Our relationship with our neighbors, partners and friends must 

be a high priority for the United States. I am hopeful, you know, 

that the cuts that we are seeing through the State Department 

that the President is proposing do not jeopardize some of the things 

that we do. 

I am very concerned about that and maybe some of the other 

statements that he has made, particularly in regards to Mexico 

where we have spent decades investing in a relationship that 

works collaboratively on all fronts. 

And the question or not—the question is now whether or not all 

of that is in jeopardy following inflammatory and audacious statements regarding Mexican migrants, orders to increase deportations 

that would tear families apart, and efforts to build a border wall 

at Mexico’s expense. 

You know, Mexico is a big important country for us and there is 

no question that NAFTA should be updated to meet the needs and 

changes of the 21st century. However, it has enabled a strong trade 

relationship between our countries and the subject of withdrawal 

by any of the three countries should not be used and taken lightly 

or used as a political tool. 

It is, unfortunate, as I have heard both you, Mr. Chairman, and 

the ranking member say, that the political situation in Venezuela 

has become detrimental to the Venezuelan people. 

6

The Venezuelan people are deserving of safety, security and prosperity and their well-being must take center stage. Positive 

changes across the hemisphere are welcoming, including in the 

Caribbean where we are encouraged by Haiti’s commitment to the 

peaceful transfer of power to a new President. 

The Haitian people have endured countless natural and manmade disasters and it is their resilience that will restore and rejuvenate a democratic Haiti. Changes to the hemisphere are constant. 

But I also wanted to say I am pleased that we have enacted last 

year the U.S.-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act, which I think 

helps a stronger engagement with the Caribbean. It is critical to 

our national security. 

And also I could not stop without talking about—and I think I 

have heard everyone mention this—the ratified peace agreement 

between the Colombian Government and the FARC which showcased to the world what Colombia’s perseverance looks like, and 

serves as the model to others that getting to the table and talking 

through legitimate concerns and next steps is possible for our support for Peace Colombia and that should be as strong as it was for 

Plan Colombia. 

And, you know, I am a big trade guy but I have got to end—I 

want to conclude by highlighting an issue that is near and dear to 

me: The social inclusion of persons of African descent in indigenous 

and marginalized communities. It’s crucial to the advancement of 

our hemisphere. I would like to spotlight Brazil and Colombia as 

leaders in their respective efforts to dissolve barriers of race discrimination. 

Our joint action plans with Brazil and Colombia to eliminate racial and ethnic discrimination, and to promote equality highlight 

our mutual commitment to the issues. 

I fear that if we fail to acknowledge the necessity of social inclusion across the hemisphere it will be to the detriment of all of us 

in the hemisphere including the United States. As Dr. King said, 

‘‘Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.’’

So the political, economic, social, and environmental advancement of our hemisphere requires earnest and genuine social inclusion to combat systemic discrimination and injustice. And if any 

government in the hemisphere including the United States fails to 

address this it will do so at its own peril. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, again, for giving me this opportunity. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. 

I am going to go ahead and recognize the witnesses. The rest of 

the committee members, if you would like to make a brief opening 

statement during the question period I will allow a little leniency 

on our time and not adhere to the strict 5 minutes. But keep those 

statements brief when we get into the question time. I just want 

to try to make it fair with this being our first subcommittee meeting. But I would like to go ahead and start hearing from the witnesses in the time allotted. So we will now proceed with that. 

Each witness will be given 5 minutes to present testimony. There 

is no lighting system in here so I will give a brief indication when 

you’re time is getting close, if you can wrap it up at that point. 

7

Members have been given the bios of all the witnesses and that’s 

how we will run this committee. We will not introduce each witness 

by their bio and long lengthy introduction. 

I will just recognize them to go ahead with their testimony. You 

can read about them beforehand. We should provide that beforehand. 

So Ms. Sally Yearwood, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Welcome back. 

STATEMENT OF MS. SALLY YEARWOOD, EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, CARIBBEAN-CENTRAL AMERICAN ACTION 

Ms. YEARWOOD. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Duncan, 

Ranking Member Sires and members of the subcommittee. Thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

The countries of the Caribbean and Central America are America’s third border, and while they do not always figure front and 

center in discussions on hemispheric policy, they include 22 of the 

hemisphere’s 35 independent nations and are therefore of significant strategic importance. 

With limited exceptions, the countries of the region have strong 

and longstanding relationships with the U.S. and share common 

values, intertwined histories, and often common challenges. 

The important thing about challenges, however, is that solutions 

and opportunities for all partners are found in collaboration, clear 

priorities and shared commitment. 

At the end of 2016, the bipartisan bill, the United States-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of 2016 was passed into law. I 

would like to go on the record thanking Congressman Engel and 

Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen for their co-sponsorship of the bill 

and ongoing support to the region. Its passage has immediately afforded an opportunity for Caribbean stakeholders to dialogue with 

counterparts in the United States on areas of mutual importance. 

Where Central America figures in the United States foreign policy and what this means for tackling such areas as crime and corruption in a volatile environment is particularly important and ongoing commitment and partnership is necessary. 

There is a lot at stake, particularly for the countries of the 

Northern Triangle where uncertainty could have repercussions 

across the social, political, and economic fronts including the vibrant trade relationship. 

The U.S. has consistently had a surplus with both subregions for 

the trade of goods, while the balance of trade with the hemisphere 

overall shows the U.S. running a deficit of $36.9 billion in 2014. 

The balance of trade with CBI countries recorded a surplus of $3.6 

billion that year and in 2015 the U.S. had a trade surplus of $5 

billion with DR-CAFTA countries. This trade supports hundreds of 

thousands of jobs here and has a correlated effect of creating and 

supporting hundreds of thousands of jobs in the region. 

There are a number of issues today that have broad implications 

for growth in the region. The weight of each factor varies by country. But I will point to some areas that have general resonance and 

are often relate. 

One—crime is one of the most pervasive issues that governments 

and societies are confronting. The tentacles of drugs, gangs, and viVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:27 Jun 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_WH\022817\24445 SHIRL
8

olence bleed into politics and the economies in ways that many of 

the countries are unable to address in isolation. 

Related to the ability to manage crime in many of the countries 

is the weak nature of the judicial process. The court systems are 

often bogged down and people who are arrested are held without 

trial for extended periods of time, not to mention those who are in 

and out of the system after payoffs. 

Collaborative and security programs in the region can have a 

positive impact on the cost of managing border security in the 

United States. As an example, customs and immigration pre-clearance facilities are an instruments for building mutually beneficial 

partnerships for protecting borders. 

Two—corruption has different implications, depending on the 

type and scale of the problem. But it is important to note that 

there are significant efforts being undertaken throughout the region to combat it and to increase transparency and accountability. 

These are yielding important results and ongoing support from 

international partners including the United States will serve to 

strengthen political will and will have lasting results. 

Three—reforms that can drive for more productive policy environment for trade and investment are necessary. Indeed, institutional inertia in both the Caribbean and Central America has been 

a barrier to more dynamic business communities. 

A strong business climate with clear rules and with rule of law 

has implications for job creation and economic growth and is an 

area that will impact competitiveness and productivity for the better. 

Four—there are strong legal migrant communities from Central 

America and the Caribbean throughout the United States and as 

U.S. policy evolves, there will be concerns about the possible effects 

on the region. 

One would be about the general economic impact which could be 

triggered by a drop in remittances, and second is the absorptive capacity if there is a wave of returning migrants and/or deportees. 

This could put extreme socioeconomic pressure on nations unless 

national or international resources are directed toward managing 

this influx. 

Five—the correspondent banking crisis in the Caribbean is considered a threat to stability. Small markets and high costs of compliance with global regulations have led to the derisking phenomenon, which is an outflow of foreign banks that manage crossborder transactions. 

The U.S., together with other bilateral partners and multilateral 

institutions, is working with the region to address compliance 

issues and the related unintended consequences. 

This cooperation must continue as a matter of national and regional security. 

Six—the entire region is vulnerable to natural disasters and the 

cost of a disaster can reach up to 30 percent of GDP. Linked to this 

vulnerability is the impact of rising sea levels that are threatening 

the coastlines. Resilient infrastructure development is a key to an 

economically sound and secure region. 

Seven—it is difficult to capture the importance of regional energy 

security in a paragraph. Venezuela’s relationship with many in the 

9

region and the influence of Petrocaribe is its own book. Some highlights on progress in the region include the important work on the 

Central American electrical interconnection system, Guyana being 

on the brink of becoming a regional and global energy leader, and 

the deployment of technology for transportation and delivery of 

natural gas, which is making this fuel a more accessible and costefficient option for small islands. The U.S. and other partners have 

been working with the region with a focus on sustainable energy 

development. This has had positive results for economies where the 

high cost of energy can negatively impact economic activity. 

And finally, a few words on Haiti, where the new President was 

recently inaugurated. Haiti’s social and economic development will 

require substantial public and private sector investment. Haiti’s 

stability needs to be secured and it will take well planned domestic 

strategies coupled with targeted thoughtful international involvement to achieve this. 

In conclusion, fragile states are unreliable neighbors. So it is valuable to underscore the importance of a strong collaborative relationship with the countries of our third border. 

This subcommittee has been very mindful of this fact and I appreciate the attention it has given to the smaller nations of the 

hemisphere and to the issues impacting the systemic challenges to 

their economic growth. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to be here. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Yearwood follows:]

10


24445a-1.eps

CARIBBEAN-CENTRAL AMERICAN ACTION 

1625 K Street N.\V., SuiLe 200 · 

Testimony of Sally Yearwood 

Executive Director of Caribbean Central American Action (CCAA) 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on the Westem Hemisphere 

Tuesday, February 28, 2017 

Issues and Opportunities in the Western Hemisphere 

Chainnan Dm1can, Ranking Member Sires, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today in this hearing on "Issues and Opportunities 

in the Westem Hemisphere''. 

The countries of the Caribbean and Central American region make up the United States' 

''Third Border", and while they do not always figure front and center in discussions on 

hemispheric policy, they include twenty-two of the hemisphere's thirty-five independent 

nations and are therefore of significant strategic importance to the United States. With 

limited exceptions, the countries of the region have strong and long-standing relationships 

with the U.S., and share common values, intertwined histories, and, often, common 

challenges. The impmtant tiring about challenges, however, is that solutions and 

opportunities for all partners are found in collaboration, clear priorities. and shared 

commitment. 

It is important to note that in covering multiple nations in two sub-regions, it is easy to 

generalize and ultimately not provide meaningful insight to the real issues that are at stake 

in individual countries. 

First of all, T consider the Caribbean fortunate. At the end of 2016, the bi-partisan bill, the 

"'United States-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of 20161

" was passed into law. I 

1 H.R.4939 is directed at the fifteen nations of CARl COM and the Dominican Republic. 

1 I C C /'l. ;:, W e <; l :! r n 11 ,~ :n , '> p h P r c: S u b c G r~: r11 1 l :_ ,, n , F [' b r u <:1 r '! ) 3 1 0 1 7 
11


24445a-2.eps

would like to go on the record thanking Congressman Engel and Congresswoman RosLehtinen for their co-sponsorship of this bill and ongoing support to the region. H.R.4939 

calls on the State Department and USAID to develop a strategy to strengthen engagement 

with the Caribbean, and has immediately afforded an opportunity for regional stakeholders 

to dialogue with counterparts in the United States on areas of mutual impmiance. 

Where Central America figures in the United States' foreign policy, and what this means 

for tackling areas such as crime and conuption in a volatile environment, is particularly 

important, and ongoing connnitment and partnership is necessmy. There is a lot at stake in 

Central America, particularly for the countries of the Northern Triangle2 where unce11ainty 

could have repercussions across the social, political, and economic fronts, including the 

vibrant trade relationship that must be nurtured. 

For both sub-regions, however. many of the issues being confronted are (perhaps not 

surprisingly) similar. And. as noted earlier, many of the challenges in the region reflect 

some of the same priorities playing out here in the United States: those of the economy, 

security, and migration. 

CCAA' s focus is on trade and investment, so the majority of my remarks will stay in that 

lane, but I will touch on the more politically fraught areas of crime and migration, as these 

have profound implications for the regional economies. 

Tt would be remiss not to establish immediately that the United States has consistently had 

a trade surplus with both sub-regions for the trade of goods. While the balance of trade in 

goods with the hemisphere overall shows the United States nnnring a deficit of $36.9 

billion in 2014', the balance of trade with CBI com1tries recorded a surplus of $3.6 billion4

, 

and a surplus of $5 billion with DR-CAFTA countries in 20155. This trade supports 

hundreds of tlwusands of jobs here in t11e United States, atld has a conelated effect of 

creating and supporting hundreds of thousands of jobs in the region. The trade relationship 

has deep rooted economic and social benefits. 

There has been mixed performance atnong regional economies over the past year, with 

some of the most striking contractions occmTing in t11e commodities-expm1ing countries. 

ECLAC has forecast some growth for the region in 2017, linked to overall global growth, 

with Central America, t11e Spanish-speaking Caribbean, atld Haiti forecast to grow by about 

z The Northern Triangle countries are El Salvador1 Guatemala1 and Honduras 

Eleventh Report to Congress on the Operation of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act December 30, 

2015. Prepared by the Office of the United States Trade Representative. 

5 .!:Jl;Qfdf u str ,gov Ltra de-agreem ents/fre>e-tra :Je-Jgreem ents/cafta-dr ·dam i nic~ n-r~.t:.!db! ic -centra! america- ft~ 

2 I C C ~~A \N f' '~ t e r n f-1 0 :n ' p h c• r e> '> u b c D '11 i t 1 0 0, F 2 b r u CJ ' v 2 2 .:_; l 7 
12


24445a-3.eps

3.7% and the English-speaking Caribbean growth projected at around 1.7%/'. It should be 

noted, and as was previously presented to this Subcommittee in July, 20167

, the debt burden 

in some of the Caribbean countries is an impediment to sustainable economic growth. 

The strength of the U.S. economy, of course, has a significant effect on the region. In the 

area of tourism for example, in 2016 14.6 million visitors moved by air from the United 

States to the Caribbean8 Strong U.S. trade, specifically in shipping, drives revenue in the 

Panama Canal region. Therefore, the performance of the economy and related policies 

here, will be an important factor in regional growth. 

Observers in both Central America and the Caribbean point to a number of issues today 

that have broad implications for growth in the region. The weight of each factor varies by 

country, but I will point to some areas that have general resonance, and are often related: 

1. Crime and insecurity: In both sub-regions, crime is one of the most pervasive issues 

that governments and society are confronting. The tentacles of drugs, gangs, and 

violence bleed into politics and the economies in ways that many of the countries 

are unable to address in isolation. A timely study by the Inter-American 

Development Bank measures the economic and social costs of crime in Latin 

America and the Caribbean9 In the hemisphere, Central America registers the 

highest costs, with an average of approximately 4.2% of GDP, with the Caribbean 

average at approximately 3. 7% of GDP. Related to the ability to manage crime in 

many of the countries is the weak nature of the judicial process. The comt systems 

are often bogged down, and people who are arrested are often held without trial for 

extended periods of time; not to mention those who are in and out of the system 

after pay-offs. Strengthening the judicial system is often pointed to as a priority for 

addressing insecurity. 

Collaboration on security programs in the region can have a positive impact on the 

cost of managing border security in the United States. The last time I was before 

this Subcommittee10, I spoke about customs and immigration pre-clearance 

facilities, where justified by volume of traffic, as an instrument for building 

mutually beneficial partnerships for protecting borders. 

2. Corruption: Transparency International recently released their "Corruption 

Perceptions Index 2016'' 11 and only seven oftl1e nineteen regional com1tries covered 

6 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Preliminary Overview of the Economies 

of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2016 (LC/G.2698-P), Santiago, 2016 

'b~~ms~~g~.~~£fl~t~u2Mill.U±~~Willill2~Uc!~~:~~lliill~~MillU±.P~ 

Source: Caribbean Tourism Organization (};Y_\:Y.::~_QD._eCar~Q~_G.Q!g) 

9 The costs of crime and violence: new evidence and insights in Latin America and the Caribbean I editor, 

Laura Jaitman. 2017. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank 

10 lli12.Jl.1Qf5~.ll9lli~9:d.ro_~~!Jo&rJ£?df.P:Q]j_49J§071_1/LQ52.Zlit11JB.9_:J11:f~07 -.l.~t?.J::t:Y.?~Y_Q.odS-
13


24445a-4.eps

in the survey are in the top half of the perception index 12 This has different 

implications, depending on the type and scale of the conuption, but it is important 

to note that there are significant efforts being undertaken throughout the region to 

combat cmruption and increase transparency and accomttability. These are yielding 

important results, and ongoing support from international partners, including the 

United States, will serve to strengthen political will and have lasting results. 

3. Institutional inertia: Refmms that can drive a more productive policy environment 

for trade and investment are necessary. ln a recent publication by the Inter-American 

Development Bank13, it says: "The Caribbean private sector is falling behind 

because its policy environment hinders rather than promotes dynamic, innovative, 

and export-oriented businesses." In both Central America and the Caribbean, a 

strong business climate, with clear rules (and with rule oflaw) has implications for 

job creation and economic growth, and is an area that will impact competitiveness 

and productivity for the better. 

4. Migration: While this is not my area of specialization, I would like to make a few 

observations: First, there are strong, legal migrant communities from Central 

America and the Caribbean throughout the United States, and as U.S. policy 

evolves. there will be concerns about the effects on the region. and one would be 

about the general economic impact which could be triggered by a drop in 

retnittances. In2016, Latin America received almost $70 billion in remittances. Of 

this. the primary recipient nations in Central America and the Caribbean received 

approximately $30 billion 14. Mechanisms to continue the transparent flows of 

support, often in small amounts from parties in the United States to this important 

regional market, need to be identified and strengthened. 

Second is the absorptive capacity. If there is a wave of returning migrants and/or 

depmtees, this could put extreme socio-economic pressure on regional nations 

mtless national or intemational resources are directed towards managing this influx. 

5. Financial sector threats: The conespondent banking crisis in the Caribbean is 

considered one of the greatest threats to that sub-region's stability today. Small 

markets and high costs of compliance with global regulations have led to the derisking phenomenon: an outflow of foreign banks that manage cross-border 

transactions. This is a multi-dimensional problem, but fundamentally, the fight to 

thwart global tenmism and illegal movement of money, is setting some jmisdictions 

up for a situation where the high cost of banking could eventually lead to a collapse 

of the formal banking sector. This sets the stage for the creation of shadow markets, 

Iz For the ran kings, this would mean a score of more than 50, where "100" is a total absence of corruption, and "0'' 

is totally corrupt. 

13 Ruprah, I. and Sierra, R. 2016 "Engine of Growth? The Caribbean Private Sector Needs More than an Oil Change" 

Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank 

14 Orozco, M. 2017 Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean in 2016, Washington, DC: The Dialogue 

'' s t r n H (~ ;n 1 " p h '' r e' .':. u h c "J n~ 1 l i ~, 1-' F C! b r u ;1 r v .:' 8 0 1 
14


24445a-5.eps

where transactions go underground or through infonnal cha:rmels. The United 

States, together with other bilateral pminers and multilateral institutions, is working 

with the region to address compliance issues. and the related unintended 

consequences. This cooperation must continue as a matter of national and regional 

security. 

6. Disaster vulnerability and resilience: The entire region is vulnerable to natmal 

disasters, a:tld the cost of a disaster Ca:tl reach up to 30% of GDP. Linked to tlris 

vulnerability is tile impact of rising sea-levels that are threatening the coastlines; in 

tl1e Caribbean, it is estimated tl1at 90% of economic activity takes place within one 

mile of the coastline, and 60% of residents live in coastal zones. Resilient 

infrastructure development is a key to an economically sound and secure region. 

7. Energy: It is difficult to captme the importance of regional energy security in a 

paragraph; Venezuela's relationship with many in tile region and tile influence of 

Petroca:r·ibe is its own book 15 The countries of the region, individually or 

collectively, must have a strategy for their future energy security. Some current 

highlights are: 

• the important work on the Central Ame1ican Electrical Interconnection System; 

• support by the United States and other donor pminers for the development of the 

Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap; 

• Guyana being on the b1ink of becoming a regional (and global) energy leader; 

and. 

• the deployment of technology for transportation and delivery systems for natural 

gas are making this fuel a more accessible and cost-efficient option for small 

islands. 

The United States, along witl1 bilateral a:tld multilateral partners, has been working 

with the region on multiple fronts, and has hosted the U.S.-Caribbean and Central 

American Energy Sununit, a signature event in the Caribbea:tl Energy Security 

Initiative. This is an important initiative that would benefit from continuation. A 

focus on sustainable energy development has had positive results for small 

econonries where tile high cost of energy can negatively impact econonric activity. 

8. Finally, a few words on Haiti: the good news is that the President, Jovenel Moise, 

was inaugurated on February 7. There is still no ratified P1ime Minister or Cabinet, 

but we hope that the process will move forward quickly. Haiti's social and 

econonric development will require substantial public and private sector investment 

into education, health, energy, infrastructure, and the productive sectors (agriculture 

and manufactming). The bottom line is tllat Haiti's stability needs to be secured, 

15 For more information, a good source is: Goldwyn, D. and Gill, C. 2016 "The Waning of Petrocaribe? Central 

America and Caribbean Energy in Transition" Washington, DC. The Atlantic Council 

'' s t r n H (~ ;n 1 " p h '' r e' .':. u h c "J n~ 1 l i ~, 1-' F C! b r u ;1 r v .:' 8 0 1 
15


24445a-6.eps

and it will take well-planned domestic strategies, coupled with targeted, thoughtful 

international involvement, to achieve this. 

Conclusion: 

Fragile states are unreliable neighbors, so it is valuable to underscore the importance of a 

strong, collaborative relationship with the countries of our Third Border. This 

Subcommittee has been very mindful of this fact, and I appreciate the attention that is given 

to the smaller nations of this hemisphere, and to the issues impacting the systemic 

challenges to their economic growth. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the oppmiunity to be with you today. 

'' s t r n H (~ ;n 1 " p h '' r e' .':. u h c "J n~ 1 l i ~, 1-' F C! b r u ;1 r v .:' 8 0 1 
16

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Ms. Yearwood. 

I now will recognize Joseph Humire for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOSEPH M. HUMIRE, EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR A SECURE FREE SOCIETY 

Mr. HUMIRE. Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Sires, distinguished members of the subcommittee, good afternoon. I thank you 

once again for inviting me to testify before you today and thank 

you for your leadership on a region that is near and dear to my 

heart and where I spend a lot of time through my work. 

We are in an important period of transition, both in the world 

but, more particularly, in the Western Hemisphere. The rise of proU.S. governments in Argentina, Peru, Brazil, Guatemala and, potentially, other nations in the region very soon, combined with 

what appears to be a renewed focus from the White House with the 

appointment of General John Kelly. Along with the leadership of 

this Congress, I believe there are ample opportunities to increase 

our engagement throughout the Americas. 

Capitalizing on these opportunities, however, is going to require 

a strategic approach that’s informed by our partners in the Latin 

America and Caribbean area. 

Through my work, I primarily focus on national security issues, 

but I spend a lot of time on the ground. I travel to the region probably more than I want. 

I spend a lot of time dealing with different actors and different 

partners that are—express different challenges that they are experiencing in their respective countries. With that, I can say that any 

regional strategy must take into account the growing transnational 

threats that are active in both Central, South America, and the 

Caribbean, along with the regional and extra regional actors that 

are exacerbating these challenges, many of which are identified in 

my written testimony. 

In my written remarks, I provide a series of recommendations, 

five recommendations in particular that I believe are areas where 

the Congress and the new administration can collaborate to further 

U.S. interests in the hemisphere. I’d like to highlight three of them. 

The first is immigration security. Border security begins beyond 

the border. There is a series of networks that are permeating all 

throughout Latin America from the southern tip of Argentina all 

the way up north through Mexico, passing through countries like 

Venezuela and Central America. 

The ability to capitalize on our immigration security is encompassed in our ability to strengthen our human intelligence collection. 

It is no longer sufficient to simply rely on law enforcement or immigration officials to wait until they get to the border or to the airport to be able to identify what is a threat. We must be able to augment our Embassies and consulates abroad who are literally our 

first line of defense when it comes to immigration security and I 

believe with the prioritization of the administration on this issue 

this provides a tremendous opportunity for the Congress to collaborate on this and Latin America. 

17

The second is counterterrorism. We are—in about less than a 

month we are about to embark upon a historic legal precedent in 

Latin America, both in Brazil and in Peru. 

For the first time in the region there is a strong potential that 

we will have the first conviction of a member of an Islamic terrorist 

organization, both a Sunni Salaafist organization and that of ISIS 

as well as a Shi’a extremist organization and that of Hezbollah. 

The case in Peru is set to be adjudicated before the end of March. 

The case in Brazil of 12 sympathizers to ISIS that plotted to blow 

up several sites before the summer Olympics this past—this past 

year is set to adjudicate even sooner. 

If these cases are convicted and sentenced, this is the first time 

in Latin America’s history that a member of an Islamist terrorist 

organization is convicted for being a member of an Islamic terrorist 

organization. 

That creates a legal precedent, because in Latin America there 

is a legal vacuum in that about half the countries have anti-terrorism legislation but even the countries that have this legislation 

they never took into account foreign terrorist organizations. It was 

mostly domestic terrorism threats that they were dealing with 

when they addressed this problem. 

The influx of foreign terrorist organizations into the region creates a different challenge for these countries and being able to convict these individuals are de facto designations. I believe that will 

create a tremendous opportunity for the United States to cooperate 

with these countries to provide technical assistance, legal assistance and other so that they can create a bigger robust counter terrorism coalition. 

The final recommendation—not the final recommendation in my 

written remarks but the one I’d like to address in my opening 

statement is looking at a particular phenomenon in Latin America 

that goes beyond corruption. Many countries in Latin America are 

facing informal markets, illicit markets that override a lot of times 

the formal markets, free enterprise oftentimes being overrun by 

criminal enterprise. 

However, there are select few countries that have gone beyond 

that to essentially use criminalization as a way to empower state 

policy and to project their influence both within their country and 

abroad. 

A colleague of mine, regional security expert Douglas Farah, has 

called these countries criminalized states. I believe that’s a concept 

that we need to develop, and we need to discuss all countries using 

transnational organized crime, terrorism, and proliferation of illicit 

products as a method to empower their governments, control their 

people, and eventually promote their influence regionally. 

I believe if we can assess that and determine that we need to establish a strategy to deter it and neutralize it because that can essentially become a bigger threat if you combine it with the component of extraregional actors. 

With that, I will just conclude by saying that, you know, I agree 

with your assessment, Mr. Chairman, that Latin America is largely 

a zone of peace, if you want to call it that. 

18

My colleagues in the defense community often tell me that while 

we have headaches in Latin America we have migraines in the 

Middle East. 

But what I would like to couch the committee to think about is 

that those headaches can turn into migraines if we don’t anticipate 

the problems that are coming our way. Warfare—war is nothing 

more than compulsion, and there are many ways to compel your 

adversaries. And I believe in Latin America we are in a asymmetric war for legitimacy in the region, and that we have not yet 

begun to fight. 

In my written testimony I have identified these recommendations 

about how to advance these interests but it has to be couched 

among the concept that if we lose in our hemisphere we are going 

to lose everywhere. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Humire follows:]

19


24445b-1.eps

WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF 

JOSEPH M. HUMIRE 

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 

CENTER FOR A SECURE FREE SOCIETY (SFS) 

BEFORE THE 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE (WHEM) 

HEARING ON 

"ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE" 

Tuesday, February 28, 2017 

2200 Rayburn House Ofticc Building 

Washington D. C. 

* S'J<S seniorfellmr.'J· and researcher JJedro ,Souza helpf'd compile researchflw this lestimon.v 
20


24445b-2.eps

Joseph M. Humire 

Center for a Secure Free Society (SFS) February 28, 201 7 

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Sires, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. 

Good afternoon, and thank you for your leadership and for inviting me to appear before you today 

to address the challenges and opportunities in the Western Hemisphere. 

We are in an important period of transition within the world and the Western Hemisphere. The rise 

of pro-U.S. governments in Argentina, Peru, Brazil, Guatemala, and potentially other nations in 

the region soon, combined with what appears to be a renewed focus tram the White House with 

the appointment of General John Kelly. Along with the work of this Congress, I believe there are 

ample opportunities to increase our engagement throughout the Americas. Capitalizing on these 

opportunities requires a strategic approach informed by our partners in Latin America and the 

Caribbean (LAC). 

As part of my field research, I spend a considerable amount of time on-the-ground in LAC studying 

issues of concern for U.S. national security. Most of my testimony, therefore, provides an 

assessment of the transnational threats active in Central and South America. In my experience 

getting the threat assessment right is key, prior to any U.S. engagement. Towards the end of my 

testimony, I provide five recommendations identifying timely opportunities that can advance US 

regional interests. 

To accomplish this, and before all else, I hope that Congress will work with the new administration 

to acknowledge and overtly identify those in the Western Hemisphere who are working against 

U.S. interests and establish a strategy to negate their efforts. There is a clear convergence in LAC 

of state and non-state actors, criminal and terrorist franchises, and regional and extra-regional 

regimes who are working together to undermine the United States and Western intluence, writ 

large. These anti-American elements use all available methods of asymmetric warfare to 

undermine the United States and its allies in the West. Their aim is a region friendlier to their illicit 

enterprises and less under the aegis of American intluence. 

To be blunt: We are in an asymmetric war for legitimacy in Latin America and we have not yet 

begun to fight. 

An Asymmetric Zone of Conflict 

Latin America, for far too long, has been downplayed as a foreign policy backwater for the United 

States and characterized as a zone of peace and prosperity that does not merit the immediate 

attention of our U.S. national security community. As many of my colleagues remind me, while 

we have "headaches" in Latin America there are "migraines" in the Middle East. In no way, do I 

want to diminish the extremely difficult challenges we face on the other side of the world, but the 

fact remains that many of the transnational threats we face worldwide, including in the Middle 

East, are becoming increasingly active in the Americas. And although this is an added threat in our 

proximity, it presents an opportunity for greater leverage in the asymmetric contest against larger 

threats in the Middle East. 

To highlight the problem here is one statistic that summarizes the seriousness of the situation we 

are facing in the region. The Western Hemisphere accounts for approximately 13.4 percent of the 

world's population but almost 40 percent of its homicides. If we limit this to the LAC region the 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

-2-
21


24445b-3.eps

Joseph M. Humire 

Center for a Secure Free Society (SFS) February 28, 201 7 

situation is more concerning; total LAC population accounts for only 9 percent of the world and 

33 percent of the homicides, as depicted in figure 1 below. 

Figure 1: Global Homicides vs. Population 

Total r.urniw.r>Ofhomieides. by region (:2012 

or latest yeaT) Population by Region 

Source: United Nations Office ofDrugs and Crime and World Data Bank 

Per the latest report of the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, LAC countries compose 

nine of the top ten countries on homicides worldwide. Honduras, El Salvador, and Venezuela top 

the charts with astonishingly high homicide rates above 60 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, 

making these three countries the murder capitals of the world. Much of this is attributed to the 

violence associated with drug trafficking and the rise of gangs and organized crime in the region. 

Other indicators also show the level of violent conflict in the region. 

Analogous to the increase in homicides in LAC is the recent uptick in refugees tram the region, as 

depicted in figure 2, below. 

Figure 2: Refugees in Selected LAC Countries (excluding Colombia) 

Rl!fugee population by country of uri gin 

Source: .Higralion Po/i(~V lnslilule 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

-EI 

S.afvadoT 

-Guatc-mollllia 

V''BIW:ttwot<ll 

-C>tJba 

- Hom:iur-as 

-3-
22


24445b-4.eps

Joseph M. Humire 

Center for a Secure Free Society (SFS) February 28, 201 7 

Since 2010, there has been a sharp increase in refugees from LAC countries, namely from 

Venezuela and the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) 2014 was a critical 

year in this upward trend provoked by the Central American crisis of unaccompanied minors that 

summer, and the Venezuelan government crackdown on student-led protests earlier that year. This 

trend can be correlated, at least somewhat, to the policies adopted by the last administration 

towards LAC. Prior to 2008, except for Venezuela, the trend of refugee outflows in LAC was 

declining, most notably in Cuba. Since then, a gradual increase in refugee outflows is taking place 

in these four LAC countries, surging in 2012 and again in 2014. 

The upward trend in refugees from LAC is concerning, however, it is still well below the outflows 

in other parts of the world, namely from the Middle East. Yet, combined with other trends such as 

Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), of which Colombia still leads the world at close to 7 million 

IDP, it shows the region is far from a zone of peace. Historically Colombians atTected by the over 

half-century war with the F ARC have found refuge in neighboring Venezuela. More recently, 

however, a greater number of Venezuelans are crossing into Colombia than vice versa. IDP t!gures 

in Venezuela are difficult to determine due to the lack of statistics in the country. Nevertheless, 

examining the spike in U.S. asylum applications tram Venezuela, increased over six times since 

2014, provides perspective into the humanitarian crisis taking place in that country. 

By 2014, we also witnessed an increase in the military and police presence within several LAC 

countries, with notable (more than 30 percent) rate increases in El Salvador, Uruguay, and Chile. 

The latter two countries are considered among the more peaceful in the region, however, they still 

have a 39 percent and 47 percent rate increase, respectively, in their military and police force. This 

combines with the growth of prison populations throughout LAC that is also increasing, most 

notably in Brazil, which now has the 4'" largest prison population in the world with over a half 

million of its people incarcerated. 

The upshot of all this data is that LAC has trends and tendencies more closely associated with 

zones of conflict than a zone of peace. 

What is driving these trends and are they related? There are some isolated economic and sociocultural drivers to these conflicts, however, we could also correlate these trends to the rise of a 

bloc of regional govermnents that foster instability and insecurity in the region to attack the 

legitimacy of the United States and its ability to cooperate with peaceful and prospering allies in 

the region. 

This form of asymmetric engagement is not centered around the use of military force against the 

United States, but it focuses instead on incessantly driving public opinion against U.S. interests 

while delegitimizing any U.S. presence, particularly military and law enforcement presence, in the 

region. It can be argued that recent political outcomes in LAC (as of late 2015) have begun to shift 

the region toward a political trajectory more favorable to the United States. I agree with this 

assessment, however, to capitalize on this trajectory, we must not underestimate this bloc of 

nations that continue to consolidate power in their countries and persist in their anti-US efforts. A 

more prudent and cautious approach is required so that lessons from the past serve as policy 

guidance for the future in the hemisphere. 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

-4-
23


24445b-5.eps

Joseph M. Humire 

Center for a Secure Free Society (SFS) February 28, 201 7 

The ALBA Effect 

In Washington, it has become somewhat taboo to talk about the Bolivarian Alliance of the 

Americas (ALBA in their Spanish acronym). The death of Hugo Chavez in 2013 and Fidel Castro 

last year, have prompted several regional experts to declare that this anti-American alliance that 

dominated regional politics for almost a decade, is now defeated. Many of these same experts 

erroneously characterized the ALBA bloc as a collection of weaker and smaller countries that do 

not pose a serious threat to U.S. national security. This analytical failure enabled Venezuela to 

become close to a failed state, and allowed Cuba to gain prominence throughout the region. More 

to the point, this failure allowed anti-American extra-regional actors to gain an unprecedented 

amount of strategic influence in our hemisphere, along with an increasing convergence of criminal 

and terrorist networks. 

For those unfamiliar with the ALBA, a short summary is in order. The Bolivarian alliance was 

launched in 2004 as a political power project by the Castro brothers in Cuba and the late Hugo 

Chitvez of Venezuela. Arguably, its high-water mark was in 2014 after it consolidated thirteen 

governments in the region under one banner. This includes Bolivia (in 2006), Nicaragua (in 2007), 

Dominica (in 2008), Antigua and Barbuda, St Vincent and the Grenadines (in 2009), Ecuador 

(also in 2009), Santi Lucia (in 20 13), and Grenada, and Saint Kitts and Nevis (in 20 14) El Salvador 

flirted with joining this alliance in 2014 after Salvador Sanchez Ceren became president Suriname, 

Haiti, Iran, and Syria are observing members. Combined this alliance has a population over 70 

million, a GDP over $700 billion, and territory spanning across 2.5 million square kilometers. The 

ALBA has its own trade system (the SUCRE), its own bank (based in Caracas), a regional 

television network (Telesur), and an international NGO network managed through the Bolivarian 

Continental Coordinator (CCB in its Spanish acronym). None of this is cause for concern in and 

of itself, but the ALBA's success is the sum of its individual parts driving a narrative against "U.S. 

imperialism" and undermining U.S. influence. 

Since the death of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez in 2013 and the subsequent collapse of the country's 

economy under "21 '

1 Century Socialism," the ALBA has become visibly less cohesive without a 

strong caudillo at the helm. Nevertheless, the member countries are still under autocratic rule and 

their governments have replaced ideological implementation with increased criminalization of the 

State. While one could argue that the ALBA is significantly weaker than before, it is equally true 

to state that the anti-imperialism sentiments that brought the Bolivarian alliance to prominenceare stronger than ever before. The previous U.S. administration's rekindled relationship with the 

Cuban regime and support for the Colombian government's peace deal with the F ARC brought a 

breath of new life into this alliance and its anti-American narrative. 

Twelve years since its founding, the ALBA's largest success has been manipulating public opinion. 

Latinobar6meter, a Chilean polling firm measuring public opinion throughout Latin America, 

depicts data showing a negative trend in the positive opinion of the United States within the ALBA 

countries. Likewise, the same data shows an increase in the negative opinion of the U.S. in these 

same countries, as depicted in figure 3 below. The risk of having this trend continue is losing 

access in a handful of countries in the Western Hemisphere that maintain an anti-US posture. This 

alliance also continues to remove the U.S. from regional discussions and forums, citing "antiimperialism" as their casus belli. 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

- 5-
24


24445b-6.eps

Joseph M. Humire 

Center for a Secure Free Society (SFS) February 28, 201 7 

Figure 3: Negative 011inion of the United States in ALBA countries 

Negative Opinion of the U.S. 

45% 

40% 

35% 

30% 

25% 

20% 

15% 

10% 

5% 

0% 

2009 2010 2011 2013 2015 

-ALBA Average 

Today, the ALBA is less ideological and more of a collection of "criminalized states" -a term 

coined by regional security expert Douglas Farah. Their strength no longer lies in their ideological 

momentum, but in their ties to transnational organized crime. The sharp decline in oil prices over 

the last few years has made these mostly oil-producing countries more reliant on illicit activity to 

maintain their power. Rather than surrender power, however, most of the ALBA countries are 

turning to transnational organized crime and using authoritarian tactics to repress and silence 

opposition while consolidating control in their country. 

The U.S. Congress and Trump administration should not assume that the ALBA governments will 

simply fade away. Several recent developments in these countries suggest otherwise. Special 

attention should be paid to Nicaragua and Bolivia as each country's respective head of state has 

cemented their positions of power until at least 2019. 

I call this the "wounded dog syndrome," whereas, analogous to a wounded dog, when an ALBA 

regime perceives that its back is against the wall, their leaders will become more apt to demonstrate 

their totalitarian nature by increasing political repression. I believe we will begin to see heightened 

civil cont1ict and increased chaos throughout the hemisphere as the first of the main ALBA leaders 

in Ecuador and Venezuela are threatened by rejection tram a citizenry weary of socialist-induced 

scarcity. These regimes still have control over their militaries and are strengthening civilian 

militias. We should not assume they will not act violently in a last-ditch etl'ort to maintain power. 

The new administration and Congress should pay special attention to the extra-regional forces that 

are propping up these regimes. 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

-6-
25


24445b-7.eps

Joseph M. Humire 

Center for a Secure Free Society (SFS) February 28, 201 7 

The Convergence of Extra-Regional State and Non-State Actors 

The convergence of criminal and terrorist networks in LAC are enabled by the support of extraregional state actors, whose leadership has been complicit in criminal and terrorist activity. Joining 

forces with regional anti-American actors, namely the ALBA countries, these regimes use state 

power to yield billions of dollars in illicit revenue, move a myriad of illicit products, and establish 

military and intelligence networks throughout the Americas. 

The level to which geopolitical forces such as Iran, Russia, and China cooperate on a global level 

is debated among national security and foreign policy experts. In LAC, these three extra-regional 

state actors have benefitted, at least to some degree, from the ALBA's destabilization efforts in 

the region. Operating at the strategic level, these extra-regional actors have vested interests in 

stimulating a new multipolar system in LAC that favors their interests and investments. Whether 

it's Russia's response to Crimea, China's political ploys to isolate Taiwan, or Iran's skirting of 

international sanctions-the United States' "soft underbelly" has increasingly become 

advantageous to the global ambitions of these three extra-regional actors. 

Russia is resurging in the region, by some accounts exceeding its previous presence during the 

Soviet era. Iran is increasing its regional military and intelligence footprint, while China is 

surpassing the U.S. as the largest trade partner in select LAC countries. Tf one examines this 

phenomenon closely, a visible pattern is discernable in specific countries aligned with these extraregional actors. 

The convergence is taking place in the ALBA nations. Approximately 75 percent of Russian arms 

sales to the region are with ALBA members, namely Venezuela and Nicaragua. Around 75 percent 

of Iran's military and intelligence footprint is with these same countries, notably Venezuela and 

Bolivia. Lastly, close to 75 percent of China's credit and loans to LAC are geared towards the 

ALBA, propping up failed economies and buying increased regional influence. This pattern can 

be called the three-fourths standard of extra-regional activity in LAC, and the fact they are in the 

same countries suggest that more strategic cooperation is taking place in the region among Russia, 

Iran, and China than competition. 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

3/4 

-7-
26


24445b-8.eps

Joseph M. Humire 

Center for a Secure Free Society (SFS) February 28, 201 7 

In many instances, the commercial or economic activity of these three extra-regional actors in 

LAC constitute "non-market" interventions that serve more political and military purposes, while 

neglecting poor S&P creditworthiness and high systemic risk of many of these countries. Both 

Venezuela and Ecuador share the dubious honor of 10 foreign debt defaults each. To legitimate 

market actors, these countries have proven to be high-yield risks that warrant enhanced duediligence, but China, Russia, and Iran continue to bail them out by offering "sweetened" business 

deals with heavily subsidized, long-term financing for large contracts and energy-related 

concesswns. 

The net effect is a growing element of Russian and Chinese organized crime, an increase in radical 

and violentjihadists, a maze of foreign state-owned enterprises engaged in dual-use activity, and 

regional alternative governance structures that play by a different set of rules while maintaining a 

Westphalian facade. This constitutes increased awareness and vigilance from the U.S. foreign 

policy and national security community. Tslamist terrorism, transnational organized crime, the 

proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction-are all tier one national security threats, and all 

are active in Latin America and the Caribbean. The growing strategic influence of Russia, China, 

Iran, and increasingly North Korea, in Latin America add another layer of complexity to this 

challenge. 

This assessment presents the most pressing issues in LAC, meriting prioritized attention by the 

U.S. foreign policy and national security community. The following are five recommendations as 

to how the Congress and the new administration can work together to advance U.S. interests and 

ensure peace and prosperity in the hemisphere. 

Recommendation 1: Strengthening Hnman Intelligence Beyond the Border 

Last month the Associated Press reported that, in 2016, "Venezuelans for the first time led asylum 

requests to United States as the country's middle class fled the crashing, oil-dependent economy." 

Derived from data of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the largest spike comes after 

2014 with an additional 168 percent jump in U.S. asylum applications from Venezuelans since 

October 2015. Moreover, Venezuela is among the top 10 countries whose citizens had overstayed 

their visas in the United States in 2015. 

Earlier this month, CNN and CNN en FspaTiol aired a year-long investigation revealing a potential 

immigration scheme by the Venezuelan government. Government officials are reportedly selling 

passports to suspected members of foreign terrorist organizations, namely Lebanese Hezbollah. 

The CNN documentary provided eyewitness testimony from former Venezuelan officials living in 

exile, with first-hand knowledge about this alleged immigration scheme. The potential terrorism 

risk of the Venezuelan government providing identification documents that conceal the identities 

of members of Islamist terrorist organizations presents a global security challenge. 

This is one example of the threat mentioned by the new Secretary of Homeland Security, General 

John Kelly, who noted that the threat from these networks beyond the border require a multilayered approach to immigration security. It is clear that the Trump administration is prioritizing 

immigration security. My recommendation to this committee is that it should take the opportunity 

that is being provided by the tighter immigration vetting proposed by the new administration to 

strengthen human intelligence networks in LAC. Securing our border begins with enhanced and 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

- 8-
27


24445b-9.eps

Joseph M. Humire 

Center for a Secure Free Society (SFS) February 28, 201 7 

robust intelligence collection at U.S. embassies and consulates abroad, as far south as Argentina, 

up through Venezuela, and into Mexico. 

Recommendation 2: Establishing a Regional Counterterrorism Coalition 

By mid-year, if not sooner, a historic antiterrorism legal precedent will take place in the region. 

Members of lslamist terrorist networks, for the first time in LAC, may be convicted on terrorismrelated charges. One, if not both, of two ongoing terrorism trials in LAC could lead to the 

conviction of either a member of Lebanese Hezbollah or local sympathizers of lSlS. 

In October 2014, a Lebanese national, Mohamad Ghaleb Ham dar, was arrested in Lima, Peru for 

potentially plotting a terrorist attack in the country. Two years later, in October 2016, 1 served as 

an expert witness in this trial. A verdict is expected in March. Given that Hamdar is charged with 

membership in a terrorist organization, a potential conviction could serve as a de-facto designation 

ofHezbollah as a terrorist organization in Peru. This would be the first designation of its kind in 

Latin America. 

In July 2016, at least twelve Brazilian jihadists were arrested in Rio de Janeiro, for engaging in a 

terrorist plot to launch small arms attacks throughout various sites of the Summer Olympic Games. 

These jihadists pledged allegiance to ISIS through an encrypted messaging app, where they 

coordinated across various Brazilian cities to arrange the potential shipment of weapons to carry 

out the terrorist attack The trial on these Brazilian jihadists is also set to conclude in March, and 

a conviction is likely. 

For several years, lslamist terrorist networks have operated in a state of legal grace in Latin 

America. More than half the countries in the region lack any form of antiterrorism legal 

framework And for the countries that have antiterrorism laws-all of them exclude foreign 

terrorist organizations. The ability to reform or establish antiterrorism laws in LAC to designate 

foreign terrorist organizations !Tom the Middle East, is a timely opportunity for the Congress to 

work with the new administration to deter further terrorist activity worldwide, and to establish a 

long-sought legal framework in LAC to do so. 

Currently, Panama is the only LAC country in the global anti-ISIS coalition. Peru, Argentina, and 

Brazil, are potential additional members ofthis coalition, and could easily help the U.S. expand a 

counterterrorism coalition in Latin America. 

Recommendation 3: Working with U.S. Treasury to Sanction Illicit Networks 

Filled with low-capacity countries and cash-intensive economies, LAC is an attractive target for 

illicit elements !Tom opposite ends of the globe. What was once most prevalent in gray areas has 

moved with astonishing speed to subvert and co-opt state and non-state financial institutions all 

throughout the Western Hemisphere. This new model operates under broad state protection in the 

region that undermines commercial markets and international trade, moving several hundred tons 

of narcotics, laundering millions (if not billions) of dollars, and smuggling a growing number of 

radical and violent Jihadists throughout the Western Hemisphere. Consequently, illicit finance is 

the lifeblood of this crime-terror nexus in LAC and the associated criminalized states. 

Illicit markets are key to the criminal-terrorist pipelines that move a variety of illicit products in 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

-9-
28


24445b-10.eps

Joseph M. Humire 

Center for a Secure Free Society (SFS) February 28, 201 7 

and out of the Western Hemisphere. The billions of dollars in illicit funds are key enablers of new 

military, economic, and political institutions and extra-regional alliances designed to eradicate 

U.S. influence from the region. These illicit markets are used to build parallel structures that are 

not accountable to the democratic process and help enrich anti-American regimes that use illicit 

funding for corruption and alliance with TOC groups as a matter of state policy. 

For instance, in Central America, the revenues of ALBA Petr6leos is equal to 22 percent of the 

Salvadoran budget. In Nicaragua, Albanisa comprises 20 percent of Nicaragua's budget. Both 

state-owned enterprises are blended with TOC groups allowing fictitious mega-projects on 

infrastructure development to legitimize illicit funds. 

Dismantling these illicit financial networks is key to any strategy aimed at neutralizing criminal 

and terrorist networks in LAC. I recommend the Congress work with the new administration to 

strictly enforce current U.S. anti-money laundering laws and policies in the Western Hemisphere 

and vigorously apply and enforce the Transnational Drug Trafilcking Act of2015. Working with 

the US Department of Treasury's Ofilce of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence a bipartisan 

effort to sanction violators of this law and other policies designed to protect the integrity of the 

US. financial system-is critical to advancing US. regional interests. 

Recommendation 4: Moving Toward More Bilateral Free Trade Agreements in LAC 

Another area or conflict in Latin America is trade. Trade, which by definition is a peaceful activity, 

has been politicized and used as an instrument of war in LAC. With the rise of the ALBA bloc, 

multilateral trade pacts such as UNASUR and MERCOSUR originally intended as regional 

integration and commercial systems, were turned into political and ideological blocs. Instead of 

promoting genuine free trade with the goal of promoting mutual prosperity, they served as 

protective barriers to imports. Based on the erroneous model of import substitution 

industrialization the new multilateral trade pacts made it prohibitively expensive to secure cheaper 

inputs and imports, with the state picking and choosing winners to be subsidized by local 

consumers. 

Event NAFTA, for instance, struggles with the wage differential between Canadian and America 

workers, on the one hand, and Mexican workers on the other is substantial and has adverse 

consequences for investment and other factors. Likewise, the environmental standards expected of 

Canadian and American industries impose a heavy burden on and raise costs on Mexico's 

comparative advantages. The inherent inequalities and differences might be easier to stipulate and 

to contend within a bilateral agreement than in a multilateral agreement intent on achieving some 

unreachable equilibrium. 

Bilateral trade agreements may prove more e±l'ecti ve due to the limitation of parties. Multilateral 

trade deals often superimpose geopolitical considerations over and above the direct national 

interests of the parties involved. Rules and regulations may fit awkwardly on the capacity of some 

of the parties to comply with the full details of a pact. Political considerations and circumstances 

may vary greatly ±rom country to country and these may have tremendous impact on the 

implementation of a multilateral agreement. In short, one size may not fit all parties to a single 

agreement. 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

- 10-
29


24445b-11.eps

Joseph M. Humire 

Center for a Secure Free Society (SFS) February 28, 201 7 

Two countries who could benefit immediately from a bilateral free trade agreement with the United 

States are Argentina and Guatemala. 

Recently, Argentina's president Mauricio Macri struck down tariffs that had made computer, 

notebook and tablet prices in his country the highest in the Americas. In a "knowledge society," 

Macri pointed out that pricing out computers had a devastating effect on the country's education, 

business, industry, science and innovative entrepreneurs. Working with the Macri government, 

US suppliers ranging from Apple to high and low end PC manufacturers could make a significant 

contribution to economic prosperity. Bilateral trade between the U.S. and Argentina has enormous 

possibilities and should be pursued to build economic and other critical bonds between our l\vo 

nations. After twelve years of reckless spending and depleted currency reserves, the Argentines 

seem poised to trade and to restock their reserves with dollars with which to buy from American 

suppliers. The Congress and new administration should welcome such a posture by negotiating 

win-win deals with the Argentines. 

Similarly, in Central America, the Guatemalan government of Jimmy Morales, a maverick political 

figure, is prepared to broker bilateral agreements providing favorable investment opportunities in 

that country. Opportunities which would generate badly needed employment and help to stem the 

tide of low-skilled, low-wage migration. A bold bilateral approach could engender a stable, 

prosperous Guatemala potentially reversing the path of the region without the U.S. attempting to 

take on too much through a multilateral agreement consisting of highly diverse entities in Central 

America (Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and even Nicaragua) with ditTerent political, social, 

and economic particularities and circumstances. 

Recommendation 5: Appropriate $5 Billion Annnal to Countering Criminalized States 

All the recommendations provided are strategic initiatives aimed to advance U.S. regional 

interests. None of these recommendations, however, will be successful if Congress and the new 

administration does not develop a campaign to counter the rise of "Criminalized States" in LAC 

whose primary strategic goal is to harm the United States. 

For a relatively small investment of $5 billion annually (approximate! y two weeks in Afghanistan) 

the Congress can make a significant ditTerence in securing our southern border, dismantling 

criminal and terrorist networks, strengthening our allies, and reasserting U.S. int1uence in Latin 

America, at a time when the region sorely needs our assistance. 

At the heart of this effort is countering the bloc of nations identified in this testimony and their 

extra-regional allies that are working to undermine U.S. presence and int1uence in the Western 

Hemisphere. It is essential to spend additional funds on prevention now, then be forced into a 

potential future intervention down the road. 

Thank you again Mr. Chairman and subcommittee members for the privilege of testifying. 1 would 

be happy to answer any questions and provide more detail as requested. 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

-11-
30

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Humire. 

Now the chair will recognize Jose Cardenas. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOSE CARDENAS (FORMER ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA 

AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT) 

Mr. CARDENAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Sires, distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is both an 

honor and a privilege to appear before you today to discuss U.S. 

policy in the Western Hemisphere. 

As my colleague, Joseph Humire, mentioned, after more than a 

decade after the rise of populist governments in the region uninterested in productive relations with the United States, the political 

pendulum has begun to swing the other way with the election of 

a number of pragmatic governments open to reestablishing normal 

relations. This creates significant opportunities to pursue new initiatives for the benefit of our and our neighbors’ security and prosperity. 

To begin with, I suggest that the new administration and the 

new Congress focus on four issues, out of the gate—Mexico, Venezuela, Cuba and Central America, plus two longer-term plays, if 

you will. 

Mr. Chairman, the U.S.-Mexico relationship is one of the most 

important bilateral relationships the United States has in the 

world. It is equally true that President Trump has a mandate to 

make border security and reviewing NAFTA priorities. 

These, however, should be carried out in a collaborative way that 

encourages vital cooperation. It doesn’t have to be confrontational. 

Smoothing over some of the rough edges from the 2016 campaign 

is key to wider progress in the Americas without compromising on 

U.S.—core U.S. interests. Such an approach will likely deliver the 

stronger border security and a modern NAFTA that better serves 

U.S. interests. 

Secondly, on Venezuela, President Trump will encounter a different hemisphere, which creates opportunities for more diplomatic 

engagement to hold Venezuela accountable for its anti-democratic 

behavior. The President has already demonstrated an interest in 

defending democracy by meeting with the wives of two high-profile 

political prisoners, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman. President 

Trump has also sanctioned senior Venezuelan officials implicated 

in narcotics trafficking in the United States. 

This two-track approach of working multilaterally, specifically 

through the Organization of American States, while increasing 

pressure by continuing to expose the crimes of Venezuelan officials, 

would be a welcome change to U.S. policy. 

On Cuba, Mr. Chairman, the Trump administration should seize 

the opportunity to bring energy and creativity to truly empowering 

the Cuban people to decide their own destiny, which President 

Obama articulated as the goal of his policy. 

First off, however, we need to immediately reestablish common 

cause with Cuba’s persecuted dissidents and human rights activists. Secondly, the administration should review all executive orders and commercial deals signed under the previous administraVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:27 Jun 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_WH\022817\24445 SHIRL
31

tion and judge them by a single standard—do they help the Cuban 

people or do they empower the Castro regime. I suggest that any 

activity found to be more sustaining of the regime’s control rather 

than directly benefiting the Cuban people should be ended. 

On Central America, President Trump can bring a new commitment and funding for our beleaguered neighbors attempting to cope 

with the transnational crime and gang activity. 

To that end, Mr. Chairman, we have to be guided by several assumptions. Number one, in Central America, as we try to placate 

and stabilize these societies, preventing their—the push factor from 

sending people to our borders, we have to recognize there are no 

silver bullets. It is not a question of the hard side or the soft side. 

It is going to take all sides. 

Secondly, Mr. Chairman, we cannot want it more than they do. 

We can only help if they are truly committed to helping themselves 

and that means tackling the twin evils of corruption and impunity. 

Three, we must be clear on sequencing. Security doesn’t follow 

from resolving social and economic problems. You have to create security first before anything else. 

And lastly, a strong commitment to human rights is not a hindrance. It is essential. It creates legitimacy and trust among the 

very people we are trying to help. 

Beyond those imperatives, the longer-term play is realigning U.S. 

relations with two of the most important countries in the Western 

Hemisphere—Brazil and Argentina. 

Both are undergoing profound course corrections and we need to 

take advantage of the situation. Both of those countries can be essential partners after many years of less than cordial relations in 

support of consolidating democratic and free market development 

in the region, enhancing both U.S. security and prosperity. 

The table is set. All it requires is political will. Mr. Chairman, 

despite the myriad challenges, I remain optimistic about U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean in the next 4 years. 

It will not be all smooth sailing. It never is. But the key is to 

move past the 2016 Presidential campaign by pursuing serious initiatives with tangible benefits to both the United States and those 

who want to work with us. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cardenas follows:]

32


24445c-1.eps

Submitted Testimony by 

Jose R. Cardenas 

Former lJSAID Acting Assistant Administrator 

for Latin America & the Caribbean, 

Former National Security Council Official 

Before the House Foreign Mfairs Subcommittee 

on the Western Hemisphere 

"Issues and Opportunities in the Western Hemisphere." 

February 28, 2017 

Mr. Chainnan, Ranking Member Sires, distinguished members of the conmrittee, it 

is an honor and privilege to appear before you today to discuss U.S. policy in the 

Western Hemisphere. 

It goes without saying that the United States has important interests in the 

Americas, related to security, commerce, and the consolidation of democratic 

institutions. On the one hand, we are forttmate that the region is basically stable 

and at peace. On the other, it seems that too often the absence of war, 

humanitarian disasters, or widespread human rights atrocities, makes it ditlicult for 

our neighborhood to capture the attention of official Washington, given the 

existence of so many other serious strategic threats to U.S. national security and 

the world order that beset us today. 

The good news in the Americas today is that after more than a decade after the rise 

of populist governments uninterested in productive relations with the United 

States, the political pendulum has begun swinging back to the center, with the 

election of pragmatic governments in a number of those countries that possess no 

ideological hang-ups about the United States and are open to re-establishing 

normal, productive relations. 
33


24445c-2.eps

That creates significant opportunities for U.S. policy and the Trump administration 

to regain lost ground and accomplish new things for the benefit of our and our 

neighbors' security and prosperity. 

To begin with, I suggest the United States would do well to focus on four issues 

right out of the gate: Mexico, Venezuela, Cuba, and Central America, that is, the 

fight against transnational criminal organizations. 

A Mexican Reset 

During the recent presidential campaign, Mexico became a target for voters' 

concems about a U.S. immigration policy run amok, even though Mexicans 

crossing the border contribute little to an inunigration crisis fueled more by Central 

Americans and by visa overstays. Still, "The Wall" resonated, but it is more a 

metaphor for lackluster enforcement of U.S. immigration laws and Washint,>ton's 

indifference to their impact on Americans' way of life. 

Yet the U.S.-Mexico relationship is one of the most important bilateral 

relationships tl1e United States has in the world. Mexico is the United States' 

second-largest export market after Canada, and its third-largest trading partner 

atler Canada and China, with a two-way trade that amounts to $530 billion (more 

than Japan, Germany, and South Korea combined). Six million U.S. jobs depend 

on trade with Mexico; 14 million depend on the North American Free Trade 

Agreement, or NAFT A. Moreover, U.S.-Mexico trade encompasses "production 

sharing," in which 40 cents of every dollar spent on imports from Mexico come 

back to the United States. 

President Trump has a mandate to make border security or a NAFTA review 

priority issues. One hopes, however, that they are carried out in a collaborative 

way that encourages vital cooperation with our neighbors. As with any border 

relationship, there is an array of issues in which respective interests coincide and 

others where they differ. We need to approach them as statesmen, find common 

grmmd, and work together to promote security and prosperity. For example, 

Mexico has its own security issues on its southem frontier and counts on the 

c011m1erce on its border with the United States. Why not create a presidential 

2 
34


24445c-3.eps

binational working group with a mandate to identify gaps and weaknesses, 

recommend specific measures, and ensure accountability? 

The 2016 campaign has left a lot of bmised feelings on both sides of the border. 

The challenge is to pursue very real U.S. interests on a plane of mutual respect and 

goodwill. Such an approach will likely deliver the stronger border security and a 

NAFTA that better serves U.S. interests as President Tmmp sees them. 

The Venezuelan Tinderbox 

A social implosion in Venezuela could well be one of the first international crises 

Trump faces. The socialist regime of Nicolas Madura has presided over an 

m1precedented economic debacle while systematically gutting the country's 

democratic institutions. Last October, Madura eliminated the last option for a 

peaceful transition when he cancelled a recall referendum the opposition had been 

pursuing. Meanwhile, pervasive food and medicine shortages are making life 

intolerable for millions of Venezuelans. 

It may not, however, come to a social implosion- at least not yet. Again, the 

good news is that President Tnm1p will be engaging a hemisphere that is changing 

politically. In contrast to the previous decade, when goverrunents sympathetic to 

chavismo dominated regional fonll11s, more pragmatic leaders are coming to power 

in important countries. That creates opportunities for more diplomatic engagement 

behind the scenes to hold Venezuela accountable for its depredations against 

democracy. 

Encouragingly, President Tnll11p has already demonstrated an early interest in 

defending democracy in Venezuela by meeting with the wives of two high-profile 

political prisoners, Leopolda Lopez and Antonio Ledezma. He has also moved 

already against senior Venezuelan officials who have been implicated in narcotics 

trafficking to the United States by sanctioning Venezuela Vice President Tareck El 

Aissami. 

That is a sharp break from the Obama administration, which was reluctant to 

sanction high-ranking Venezuelans. They feared that any moves would help the 

3 
35


24445c-4.eps

Caracas government play up the specter of U.S. aggression. But not acting in 

response to crimes against the United States is an abdication of a president's 

responsibility. While pursuing a multilateral diplomatic solution in defense of 

democracy and htm1m1 rights, Trump's temn cm1 gain leverage on the Venezuelan 

regime by continuing to expose and punish the crimes of its officials. 

Reviewing the Opening to Cuba 

Last December, a Tnm1p spokesman said that Cuba "has been an important issue, 

and it will continue to be one. Our priorities are the release of political prisoners, 

return of fugitives from American law, and also political and religious freedoms 

for all Cubans living in oppression." In late November, President-elect Trump 

tweeted, "If Cuba is unwilling to make a better deal for the Cubm1 people, the 

Cuban/American people and the U.S. as a whole, I will tern1inate deal." In 

October, Vice President-elect Mike Pence said, ''When Donald Tnm1p and I take to 

the White House, we will reverse Barack Obama's executive orders on Cuba." 

Challenging current Cuban President Raul Castro to implement democratic refom1s 

as a basis for reversing Obama's policy is smart. The regime will of course refuse, 

while supporters of President Obanm's opening to Cuba will be hard-pressed to 

explain why the Castro government doesn't need to chm1ge in exchange for 

warmer relations with the United States. Of course, Obmna policy proponents will 

continue to argue for engagement and will continue to receive a sympathetic airing 

in the press. Even so, Trump cannot go wrong by standing with 11 million 

Cubans. 

A review of U.S. -Cuba policy should not necessarily mean a retmn to the status 

quo ante. Instead, the Trump administration should seize the opportunity to bring 

energy and creativity to truly empowering the Cuban people to reclaim their right 

to decide their own destiny. 

First off, the Tnm1p administration should immediately re-establish common cause 

with Cuba's persecuted dissidents and hwnan rights activists. Perhaps the worst 

aspect ofObama's Cuba rapprochement was to relegate these groups to a 

peripheral policy concern. In particular, U.S. assistm1ce tor dissidents was 

4 
36


24445c-5.eps

redirected to other activities on the island seen to be less provocative to the Castro 

regime. That program should be retumed to its original purpose, and additional 

support should be sought from the new Congress. 

Secondly, the administration should review all executive orders issued by Obama 

and commercial deals struck under the Obama administration. They all ought to be 

judged according to a single standard: Do they help the Cuban people or do they 

buttress the Castro regime? Any activity found to be sustaining the regime's 

control rather than directly benefiting the Cuban people should be scrapped. For 

example, cruise ships that tlll military-owned hotels are hard to justitY. The 

t,'llidelines could be: Does the activity promote and strent,>then human rights such 

as freedom of speech and assembly? Does it improve ordinary Cubans access to 

the intemet and infom1ation, breaking down the Castro regime's wall of censorship 

placed between the Cuban people and the outside world, and between Cubans 

themselves? Does it help to lessen Cubans' dependence on the regime? Does it 

allow for reputable nongovemmental organizations to freely operate on the island'~ 

Moreover, simply ending such Obama initiatives as tourist travel -combined 

with the downtum in Venezuelan aid to Cuba- will increase pressure on the 

Castro regime to undertake real reforms. 

Central America and Transnational Crime 

The most under-reported story of the decade in the Westem Hemisphere has been 

the expansion and growing sophistication of transnational criminal networks that 

undermine security and economic growth in the region, particularly in Central 

America. Secretary of Homeland Secmity John Kelly, former commander at 

Southcom, has repeatedly attempted to wam Washington officials and insiders 

about the threat. In a 2015 congressional testimony, Kelly said that: 

The drug trade- which is exacerbated by U.S. drug consumption- has 

wrought devastating consequences in many of om partner nations, degrading 

their civilian police and justice systems, corrupting their institutions, and 

contributing to a breakdown in citizen safety. The tentacles of global 

networks involved in narcotics and arms trafficking, human smuggling, 

5 
37


24445c-6.eps

illicit finance, and other types of illegal activity reach across Latin America 

and the Caribbean and into the United States, yet we continue to 

underestimate the threat of transnational organized crime at significant and 

direct risk to our national security and that of our partner nations. 

It is simply impossible to secure our southern border without addressing the "push 

factor" causing people to flee their homes. Two years after the crisis on the 

southwest border that saw thousands of unaccompanied minors attempting the 

dangerous crossing, very little has been accomplished to deal with the push factor, 

and Central Americans are still crossing in record munbers. The Obarna 

administration's response has been tepid, for fear of being accused by left-wing 

non-governmental organizations of militarizing U.S. policy in the hemisphere. But 

people fleeing violence and criminality are not worried about what the United 

States did or did not do back in the 1970s or 1980s; they want safe and secure 

homes today. 

The Trump administration can bring new energy, commitment, and funding to 

security assistance and training for our beleaguered neighbors to the south 

attempting to cope with transnational crime, insecurity, and gang activity. Unless 

we help them help themselves it will not matter how high or intimidating the wall; 

even if we build it, they will come. 

To that end, Mr. Chairman, please allow me to outline several lapidary 

assumptions that must- must- serve as the foundation of any U.S. approach to 

the security problems plaguing Central America in particular: 

1. There is no way this will be neat and tidy. Taking down drug networks and 

gangs is a messy business. We have to remain focused and co11l11litted. 

2. There are no silver bullets. It is not a question ofthe hard side or the soft side 

of assistance. It's going to take all sides; 

3. We cannot want it more than they do, Mr. Chairman. We can only help them if 

they are truly committed to helping themselves- and that means, first and 

foremost, Mr. Chainnan, tackling the t\vin evils of corruption and impunity. 

6 
38


24445c-7.eps

4. We must be clear on sequencing: that is, security doesn't follow from resolving 

social and economic problems. Rather, it is only by first creating effective 

security that social and economic problems can be addressed. 

5. A strong commitment to human rights is not a hindrance, it is essential. It 

creates legitimacy and trust among the very people we are trying to help. 

Brazil and Argentina 

Beyond these four imperatives, Mr. Chairman, there are longer-term plays, such as 

realigning U.S. relations with two of the largest and most important countries in 

the Westem Hemisphere: Brazil and Argentina. 

Besides being the largest and third-largest economies in Latin America, 

respectively, Brazil and Argentina carry great weight politically in the region and 

could help the United States- after many years ofless-than-cordial relations- in 

support of consolidating democratic and free-market development in the region, 

enhancing both U.S. security and prosperity. 

It so happens that presently both countries are attempting to shake off the legacies 

of statist economics that cratered both economies. More market-friendly 

presidents are now in power- in Brazil, Michel Temer, and in Argentina, 

Mauricio Macri -and they are desperate to generate economic growth and less 

willing to carry water diplomatically for the neo-populist authoritarianism of the 

late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez and his successors. 

With two important cmmtries in our hemisphere with whom we have been 

estranged in recent years undergoing profound course corrections, we ought to take 

advantage of the situation. Brazil and Argentina are countries with populations of 

200 million and 40 million, and GDPs of $1.6 trillion and $550 billion, 

respectively. Both are sophisticated markets and have vast natural resources in 

energy and agriculture. 

7 
39


24445c-8.eps

While U.S. relations with Brazil have always been tricky (its Foreign Ministry has 

always seen relations as a zero-sum game), in Argentina, the path will likely be 

smoother. First and foremost, President Macri already has a personal relationship 

with Donald Trmnp, dating back to the 1980s and a major New Y ark real estate 

deal between the Macri family and Tnunp. In short, they are entrepreneurs and 

negotiators, risk-takers and deal-makers. 

Indeed, there is an array of earlier U.S. initiatives launched with either Brazil and 

Argentina that can be invigorated with renewed political will to take advantage of 

the situation for the benefit of all: for example, Conunercial Dialogues, CEO 

Fonuns, Trade & Investment Councils, Defense Industry Dialot,'Ues, and Strategic 

Energy Dialogues. Counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics cooperation (including 

illicit finance and the troublesome Tti-Border area) can always be improved. 

In seeking to escape the economic wilderness of its populist years, Argentina has 

petitioned the U.S. to re-designate it as a beneficiary developing country for the 

Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program, from which it was suspended 

in 2012. Tt also wants to accede to the Paris-based Organization of for Economic 

Co-operation and Development (OECD), in which Chile and Mexico are the only 

representatives from Latin America. 

But the big economic play is in energy. Cutting across grain of"resource 

nationalism," Brazil and Argentina are eager for private investment to boost gas 

and oil production. In Brazil, recent discoveries of oil in deep-sea areas off the 

coast- estimated at more than 50 billion barrels- are said to be one of the 

world's most important in the past decade. And with the cmmtry scrapping the 

niles requiring the state-oil company Petro bras to have at at least 30% ownership 

of all projects and to be the sole operator, it will clearly draw the interest of foreign 

investors and large oil companies. 

Meanwhile, Argentina has some of the largest shale oil and gas reserves in the 

world, much of it tmexploited. The huge ±ormation known as Vaca Muerte, about 

the size of Belgium, has already attracted international interest, and the Macri 

govemment is desperate to entice more investment to boost domestic production of 

gas. As ExxonMobil's CEO, before becoming Donald Trump's Secretary of State, 

8 
40


24445c-9.eps

Rex Tillerson said last year, "I'm optimistic about the changes that have happened 

in Argentina with the new govermnent." 

Conclusion 

Mr. Chaimmn, despite the myriad challenges, Tremain optimistic on U.S. relations 

with Latin America and the Caribbean in the next four years. It will not be all 

smooth sailing; it never is. But the key is to move past the 2016 presidential 

campaign by pursuing serious initiatives with tangible benefits to both and those 

who want to work with us. Granted, to some, there may re111ain an air of 

uncertainty regarding President Tmmp's intentions on foreign policy and trade, but 

what is clear is that the President is looking for relationships that produce tangible 

results for the United States- and, for that, he need look no further than our own 

neighborhood. 

9 
41

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

And the chair will recognize Mr. Quilter for 5 minutes. Thank 

you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. PETER QUILTER, NON-RESIDENT SENIOR 

FELLOW, ASH CENTER FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 

AND INNOVATION, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 

Mr. QUILTER. Thank you very much, Chairman Duncan, Ranking 

Member Sires, for the opportunity to testify today. Good to see you, 

Mr. Meeks. 

I will summarize my statement. I ask that the full statement be 

made part of the record. 

I would like to concentrate on three different issues which I 

think are intimately connected—Mexico, Venezuela and the Organization of American States. 

Mexico—what we have seen in the past week—the takeaway 

from what we have seen in the past week is that the dynamic that 

we are now seeing between Mexico and the U.S. is not business as 

usual. 

In 30 years of looking at this relationship I have never seen it 

this messy. The Tillerson-Kelly visit, which was intended to smooth 

things over, I think, in fact laid bare that 1 year away from Mexican elections we have a lot on the table between us, Mexico and 

the United States. 

We have a big agenda. But the maneuvering room is constricting. 

It is getting smaller rather than widening. That’s not good. 

What can be lost? A lot. I am not going to talk about the trade 

issue because we know that between Canada and Mexico the trade 

relationship is huge. I am going to talk about security, drugs and 

migration. 

What if Mexico were to look the other way on Central American 

migration going north? What would it look like if Mexico loosened 

its resolve on the drugs issue with us? What would it look like if 

Mexico stopped cooperating on terrorism intel with us? And I am 

talking about Middle Eastern countries. Lots of intel but I am talking specifically about that. 

Number two—there is a winner out of the past couple of weeks 

and that’s Lopez Obrador, the perennial Leftist Presidential candidate in Mexico. His stock is going through the roof. He is a year 

away from the election, the front runner. This is not the consummation devoutly to be wished for the United States. 

Number three, this dynamic we are seeing right now with Mexico 

is the canary in the coal mine for our relationship with the rest of 

the hemisphere. 

We need to fix this because we have serious problems in the region, case in point, Venezuela. Venezuela remains the ulcerating 

sore of the region. 

In my statement I talk about two scenarios—a soft landing 

where Maduro basically limps his way to elections next year, which 

may or may not occur. He is good at buying time. That could happen. 

The second one is a hard landing. A hard landing will certainly 

involve bloodshed, will involve the Venezuelan military, will be a 

42

security nightmare for Venezuela’s neighbors and will very likely 

unleash a refugee crisis. 

What to do? We need both these things. We need Venezuelans 

to lead the solution and we need the international community to 

accompany. 

Maduro does care about his international reputation. He doesn’t 

care so much about what the U.S. says but he cares very much 

about what happens in the rest of the international community. We 

got to go there. 

Sanctions on individuals such as we just had with the Vice President work. They work. We should do more of those. What not to 

do? Bristly rhetoric. We have tried that before. 

Didn’t work. We are not doing it now but we shouldn’t do it. Second, and most critically, the U.S. can’t do Venezuela alone and it 

can’t lead on Venezuela. 

The lesson now from the Mexican dynamic is that U.S. needs 

partners. Unfortunately, trust in our partnerships is eroding. 

Maduro is exploiting that erosion. We need tools to galvanize those 

partnerships. The main one we have is the Organization of American States—the OAS. 

Let me quickly move to the OAS. The OAS is very weak. It’s actually close to a breaking point. This is not an accident. This is a 

campaign that Venezuela and its friends have waged since Chavez. 

Unfortunately, I think the U.S. has let this happen. 

It has allowed a foreign policy asset to weaken that now we need 

more than ever. The good news is the OAS is worth saving. The 

time is fix it is now. 

Latin America in the past 15 years has been a good news story. 

It is less poor and more middle class than it has been. 2017 and 

2018 we will have eight different Presidential elections. 

This dynamic with Mexico bodes ill. The regional problems such 

as Venezuela require concerted effort, which now looks more difficult than ever, and the tools to do it, such as the OAS, are in 

trouble. 

There are significant U.S. policy equities that hang in the balance. Without a serious course correction from the Trump administration, I hope it comes in time. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Quilter follows:]

43


24445d-1.eps

COMMITIEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

SUBCOMMITEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

February 24, 2017 

Hearing Title: Issues and Opportunities in the Western Hemisphere 

Statement of Peter Quilter 

Non-Resident Senior Fellow 

Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation 

John F. Kennedy School of Government 

Harvard University 

The Roy and Lila Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard Kennedy School 

strives to make the world a better place by advancing excellence and innovation in governance and 

public policy through research, education, and public discussion. By training the very best leaders, 

developing powerful new ideas, and disseminating innovative solutions and institutional reforms, the 

Center's goal is to meet the profound challenges facing the world's citizens. 

The opinions in this statement are the author's alone. 

Begin Statement 

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Sires, members of the distinguished subcommittee, and 

subcommittee staff, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

There are many stories to tell about the Americas today and how U.S. policy options fit into those 

stories. Colombia has begun the difficult process of implementing its peace deal with the guerilla 

organization FARC, and has embarked on a separate peace deal with another, the ELN. The U.S. is 

significantly scaling up its assistance to Central America. The Venezuelan government is plumbing 

depths heretofore unseen, with the Venezuelan people bearing the consequences. Mexico is locked in a 

dance of political posturing with the Trump administration. 

One narrative has the "pink tide" of leftist governments receding, largely in lock step with the fortunes 

of the Venezuelan government. Another sees voter behavior in the region more as a "throw the bums 
44


24445d-2.eps

out" sentiment, reacting like voters anywhere to the paucity of solutions provided by those 

governments. The result of the Ecuadoran election, in play right now, will add a new data point to this 

analysis. To be sure, the region's social and economic problems are legion, and at least two external 

factors figure prominently in the region's immediate future. The countries of the Americas sell 

commodities and China's rapacious demand for them is ebbing as the process of urbanizing that country 

winds down. Then there is the price of oil. Venezuela is probably the most famous country in the region 

feeling the sting of low oil prices, but it is not the only one. But it is unique in that low oil prices have 

starkly put the lie to the sustainability of the policy answers the Madura government is selling to his 

people. 

The future lies in strengthening the rule of law and undergirding the institutions that protect it. 

Historically, neither the left nor the right in Latin America has shown itself to be terribly concerned with 

that. In this recent cycle, the populist left has shown that it cares little about political checks and 

balances, about press and speech freedom, about corruption. And they are exiting, or being forced to 

exit, the stage. We used to talk about the 1990s as the decade of democratic consolidation in the 

Americas. Apparently1 our expectations were dramatically off. Consolidation takes much more time 

than we thought, and it is not a linear process. If the emerging political forces ---from the right or the 

left--- fail to provide answers, they will be forced out as well. This is as it should be. 

Below I have chosen several issues and countries to highlight in this statement. It is by no means 

comprehensive, and I hope we can widen the discussion in the context of the hearing itself. 

The Trump Effect and Mexico 

There is little doubt that the Trump presidency has shaken up this region as it has others. At this early 

stage, however, it is a waiting game in terms of actual policies. I do not believe it is useful to divine 

policy directions from snippets of statements, or from past actions of persons apparently tapped to be 

part of the Trump team. 

That said, Mexico is already in the crossfire and has been since the campaign. Between the wall, 

immigration changes and trade, Mexico has had to marshal all of its considerable experience dealing 

with the US to weather the short term. I believe it will fall to Mexico to react in a way that mitigates the 

harm to the relationship. This will not be easy, as the Pena-Nieto government is already playing defense 

at home with historically low approval ratings. Even if this Mexican government were riding high, it has 

one more year left in office, and few good cards to play. 

As of this writing, Homeland Security Secretary John F. Kelly and Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson are 

in Mexico City. While they were still on the ground, President Trump spoke of his plan to increase 

deportations as a "military operation". Students of U.S.-Mexican relations know that to mention our 

border with Mexico and the U.S. military in the same sentence is about as provocative a statement as 

anyone can make, let alone a US president. It pushes every negative button that exists in the Mexico-
45


24445d-3.eps

U.S. history. We will have to wait to see if Secretary Kelly's attempts to walk that back are reassuring to 

Mexico and to our hemispheric neighbors. 

It is difficult to predict where this will go. But one consequence is already revealing itself. The political 

left in Mexico is already benefitting significantly. Perpetual leftist presidential candidate Andres Manuel 

Lopez Obrador has seen his stock rise stratospherically, and he is the front-runner in next year's 

elections. Should he emerge as Mexico's President in 2018, expect a significant hardening of the 

rhetoric surrounding the relationship with the US. What hangs in the balance is the hard-won 

cooperation the US and Mexico have developed on drug trafficking, immigration, and security (both 

crime and terrorism)- to say nothing of the enormous trade relationship developed over decades with 

both Democratic and Republican U.S. administrations. 

Mexico is our biggest purchaser of agricultural products, but it has other sources for those products, 

even in our own hemisphere. The U.S. has had a messy trade relationship with both Argentina and 

Brazil on agricultural products precisely because we sell similar things. 

And perhaps most sobering, Mexico could simply choose to reconsider its cooperation on security, drugs 

and migration. It is difficult to overstate the negative impact on the U.S. if Mexico were to look the 

other way on Central American migrations flowing north, loosen its resolve on drugs coming into the US, 

or become less cooperative on terrorism intelligence sharing. 

The relationship is quite simply at its lowest point in decades. And it could get worse. 

Venezuela remains the ulcerating sore of the region, with astonishing suffering being visited on the 

Venezuelan people by the Maduro government. The latter is authoritarian, incompetent and morally 

bankrupt, seeming to delight in political repression. It is also willing to accept degrees of suffering for its 

people that make negotiations very difficult indeed. It clearly has dismantled democracy in Venezuela. 

The paradox is that we have stopped being horrified by this because far more severe and urgent social 

ills have befallen the Venezuelan people, including appalling levels of poverty, scarcity and even 

starvation. Venezuela has an 82% poverty rate after the largest oil bonanza in the history of Venezuela, 

and 93% of Venezuelans state that they cannot afford to buy food that they need with their salary. 

To date, several negotiation initiatives with Madura have gone nowhere, and in fact ended up providing 

time and space for Maduro to regroup. The social and political situation is so catastrophic that two 

scenarios appear likely. Neither is good. 

The first is a drawn out soft-landing, where Venezuelans continue their downward spiral of suffering and 

economic despair. It is difficult to imagine, but unfortunately the situation in Venezuela could get much 

worse. Oil prices are likely to remain stable, providing just enough breathing room for the government 

to eke out its own survival at the expense of all else, while it claims it is limping toward presidential 

elections in April, 2018 that may or may not be held. 

3 
46


24445d-4.eps

The second is a hard-landing for the Maduro government. This would be calamitous and would likely 

include significant bloodshed. The Venezuelan military would certainly be involved. It would severely 

impact Venezuela's neighbors from a security perspective, and likely unleash a substantial refugee crisis. 

The international community has expended significant effort to ensure this does not happen, and 

Maduro and his cronies have used the latter to distract and survive. 

What to do? 

I believe that any durable solution to these woes will ultimately fall to the Venezuelans 

themselves. The international community must accompany that process, but Venezuelans 

must lead it. 

It seems counterintuitive, but the Maduro government does care about its international 

reputation and standing. It is for this reason that Venezuela has dedicated so much blood 

and treasure ensuring the OAS does not formally impugn its government. 

The international community must speak with one voice in condemning Madura's antidemocratic actions. Much diplomatic work needs to be done in the OAS to keep up that 

pressure. A sanction under the Democratic Charter is difficult but attainable. 

There are 108 political prisoners languishing in Madura's jails. They must be a part of any 

negotiated solution. 

It is similarly counterintuitive that Venezuelan's would care about personal sanctions 

imposed by the US on individual members of the Madura government. But they do. The 

Treasury Department's sanctions on Venezuela's vice president for drug trafficking was spot 

on. As long as they are well justified and transparently rolled out, those should continue. 

What about the Trump administration? 

There are things the U.S.should definitely NOT do, such as trying to openly attempt to hasten the 

demise of the Madura government, or trying to rhetorically match Madura's bristly public rhetoric. 

Both of these are counter-productive. 

A note of caution here: Perhaps most critical, the US should not try to solve this alone. Helping 

Venezuelans overcome their political and economic nightmare will require the kind of needle-threading 

skills our State Department considers its stock in trade. But judging by the confusion and abrasiveness 

that have characterized current dealings with Mexico, the U.S. should not be seen as leading any 

Venezuela effort. There is already evidence that the Mexico-U.S. spat is playing in Madura's favor, and 

he will exploit it as best he can. At the end of the day, the U.S. should be seen as advancing a policy that 

helps the Venezuelan people, rather than one that reacts to the increasingly unstable and reckless 

Venezuelan government. 

4 
47


24445d-5.eps

The OAS has historically been an important arrow in the quiver of US foreign policy. But that is less so 

today than at any time in the OAS's long history. Why? 

Opinions about the OAS are usually strong, and often negative. We can probably all agree that the OAS 

does some things very well- mostly related to elections, special political missions and human rightsand that it does some things less well, such as development work. 

We likely also agree that today the OASis weak, institutionally as well as politically. 

This weakness is not accidental. I would lay the blame squarely on an intentional campaign waged by 

Venezuela that began in the Hugo Chavez years and continues unabated today under Madura. The 

effort to weaken the OAS on the part of Venezuela has been systematic, relentless, and ultimately---

and painfully-- successful. 

Why and how has it done this? The why is clear: the Chavez government figured out early on that an 

organization which stands for democracy and the rule of law is a direct threat to its existence. The how 

has been multifaceted. It has seeded competing multilateral organizations, such as UNASUR and CELAC, 

which are ineffectual, toothless and of course exclude the U.S. and Canada. It has systematically steered 

the organization away from its democracy and human rights mission, and further into expensive work 

the OAS does poorly- such as development. It has intentionally larded the Organization with myriad, 

duplicative mandates it cannot possible fulfill. It has used its petrodollars to rally votes. It has turned 

the OAS's Permanent Council into a place that is mostly and embarrassingly all talk and no action. It has 

stymied any efforts at meaningful reform of the OAS itself, trapping it in a downward spiral of underperformance. Finally, it has successfully disconnected the OAS from the most important and significant 

political and policy compass of the hemisphere: the Presidential Summit of the Americas process. 

This, of course, begs an important question. Where has the US been as the region's premier venue to 

discuss and safeguard democracy and human rights has been whittled down to the point of 

ineffectiveness? Sadly, the answer is the US has been quite simply outmaneuvered by Venezuela. The 

US took far too long to figure out Venezuela's game, and has not devoted the resources to counter-act 

that effort. 

The good news is the battle is not lost. 

5 

It starts with a recognition that the OAS is worth saving. This is no easy feat, considering the 

impoverished state of the OAS's institutional credibility and capacity. But the US needs to see 

that by allowing the OAS to weaken, it has lost a valuable foreign policy asset. 

The US needs to openly rally its allies in the OAS to bolster the Organization's institutional 

foundations. This is boring but essential. The OASis literally falling apart. The resource 

weaknesses of the OAS are structural. There is no penalty for countries who pay their dues late 

or not at all, and the OAS has no reserve fund to weather that resource volatility. As a result, in 

terms of resources, the OASis always playing defense. After decades of a zero nominal growth 

budget, the OAS has shrunk itself into ineffectiveness. The US needs to commit resources and 

use the implementation of US Pub.L. 113-41, The Organization of American States 
48


24445d-6.eps

Revitalization and Reform Act of 2013, passed by among others, this subcommittee, as an 

opportunity to press for solutions to these problems. 

The OAS needs to spin out of the organization the tasks that weigh it down, primarily 

development work. The IDB and the World Bank do it better, and the OAS has no comparative 

advantage in this segment. 

The OAS should reconsider its governance structure. The Permanent Council is an operational 

board with absolutely no ability or expertise to manage. The member states should look to a 

non-operational role for the Permanent Council, perhaps by having it meet quarterly, and only 

to set policy guidance or as important hemispheric events require. 

The OAS's work should be directly tied to the Summit process, which should be its guiding light 

at the Presidential level. 

What is clear is that the OAS cannot fix itself. There are too many spoilers, led by Venezuela, and the 

current eroded state of the Organization has called into question the very notion that it is worth saving. 

It is time for the U.S. to grasp this nettle. 

The solution needs to come from outside the OAS. Here I believe this subcommittee could play a 

significant role. It could push for the development of recommendations on the issue with US and nonUS NGOs, with an eye to suggesting solutions for the State Department to pitch to the subset of member 

states that understand the importance of the Organization's future. It should not be constrained by the 

OAS's founding documents, as these can and need to be updated. 

It used to be said that if we were to close the OAS tomorrow, we would have to re-create it the next 

day. I no longer believe that is true. To leave things as they are is to watch the inevitable descent of the 

OAS into irrelevance and to countenance permanently shuttering its doors. This would be a grave 

defeat for the US. 

Conclusion 

Latin America has changed dramatically in the past 15 years. It is less poor and more middle class than it 

has ever been. And it is searching for integration, both with its neighbors and with the rest of the world. 

This is, ultimately, a good news story. Despite the complexities, baggage and sometimes missteps in our 

relationship with the region historically, the countries of the Americas look to us for so many things. 

They have modelled their constitutional systems on ours, and they use the U.S. as a barometer for social 

and political change for their own societies. This is no less true regarding the state of U.S. democracy. 

Whatever happens to our democracy, including to our institutions and certainly to our freedoms, will 

likely be reflected and even amplified in the region as a whole. We have all heard that when the U.S. 

catches a cold, the region catches something far worse. As U.S. democracy is tested, the Americas will 

be watching closely. 

Thank you. 

6 
49

Mr. DUNCAN. I want to thank the witnesses, and I am pleased 

that there are several regional Ambassadors in attendance today. 

If you’re an Ambassador from a Latin American country, if you 

could raise your hand and be recognized. 

All right. Thank you. Thank you all for attending. 

So I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes and then we will 

go through the order between majority and minority side. And so 

I will put the same clock on me as I did you guys but I may not 

adhere as strongly to it as I did you. 

Ms. Yearwood, since Congress passed the Caribbean strategy legislation late last year, and given our continued focus on the best 

way forward in dealing with the thorny issues of corruption, lawlessness, and migration in the Northern Triangle countries—El 

Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras—what do you see as the best 

strategies for engagement in the hemisphere? Kind of elaborate on 

some of your opening statement as well. 

Ms. YEARWOOD. Thank you for the opportunity to talk a little bit 

more about 4939. Forty-nine thirty-nine is kind of a little bit 

unique insofar as there is no money attached to the bill but what 

it does is it creates a vehicle for regional engagement with the 

United States and I think, according to some of the other statements from the—from the witnesses, the need for having this engagement, particularly, as I mentioned, 22 of the 35 countries—

independent nations in the region are in that—in the Caribbean 

and Central America—having the ability to dialogue with them and 

taking advantage of 4939 to create stakeholder dialogue where the 

U.S. is a partner with the region on these critical issues of corruption, economic development, diplomatic engagement, energy, being 

able to help pull away the influence of Petrocaribe, which I think 

is going to be important going forward, and finding ways for the 

region to advance as self-reliant and self-sustaining nations is 

going to be important. 

So I think having vehicles both within the Caribbean and within 

Central America where the U.S. is engaging productively will be an 

excellent way to make that vehicle work with the region. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. Shift gears a little bit. 

Mr. Humire, I know you are an expert on security in the region 

and you have written extensively on the Iranian activity in the 

hemisphere. I have been engaged in that since I came. 

A story broke this week in the Argentine press that exposed 

some of the tape recordings of Argentine prosecutor Alberto 

Nisman before his death where he seemed sure of the guilt of 

former Foreign Minister Timmerman and other top government officials in covering up the AMIA bombing. 

And he is quoted as saying, ‘‘Although they want to kill me and 

take me out of the picture, that won’t be a setback. Many/some of 

the involved already know and are pleading for their lives but all 

of them know what they did, what they said, and it is their problem.’’

So that was the words of Albert Nisman. Can you expand on this 

revelation and give us a sense of the status of the investigation 

into his death and also what he was working on with regard to 

AMIA? 

50

Mr. HUMIRE. Mr. Chairman, in Argentina, related to the case of 

Alberto Nisman, there’s actually three separate cases that are connected. 

There is, obviously, the case of the AMIA bombing from 1994 

that is still active. It is still around. It needs to be pursued in advance. 

There is the case that he presented at the—Alberto Nisman presented before the Argentine courts about the criminal conspiracy 

between the former President, Christina Kirchner, and her 

complicitness with the Iranian Government to grant impunity to 

those accused of the AMIA bombing. 

And, finally, there is the case on his death. Those three cases are 

currently active in the Argentine judiciary and I believe the most 

important case of the three is the middle one—the case that he presented before the court a week before his death to say that the Argentine Government was colluding with the Iranian Government to 

grant impunity. 

That court—that case was all but thrown out of the courtroom 

in Argentina. Repeatedly it went through various appeal processes 

and we have an opportune moment in that some of the obstacles—

the judicial obstacles that were presented in that court—in that 

case have been removed. 

So that case is now active. The DAIA—the Jewish community—

the sister of the AMIA has become a part of that case and so they 

can now present additional evidence. 

I actually participated in examining a lot of the evidence that 

was involved in that case—the wiretaps that Nisman had presented as part of the evidence of making that accusation, and there 

is a lot more than what he was able to present. 

Obviously, he was never able to present that because he was 

killed. Having that case open suggests that he was killed in the 

line of duty—that he was actively pursuing a judicial matter and 

then was found dead in his apartment shortly after. 

The case on his death is also an opportune moment because now 

it has been graduated to a Federal court because of the preceding 

actions on the other case. 

This presents a tremendous opportunity in advancement on the 

Macri administration to be able to help and lend support as needed 

and as requested to be able to come to a conclusion in either one 

of those two cases. 

Having a conclusive judicial action in either one of those two 

cases can help us advance the AMIA, and at the end of the day 

that is what Alberto Nisman was trying to do. 

He was trying to seek closure for the victims of the AMIA attack 

and to—and to pursue those that he believed that were behind that 

attack. 

I think that’s there is advancements on that. I think there are 

a lot of opportunities for the U.S. to help. But it is still—it is still 

in process. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Do you have any sort of time line idea of when they 

may come to some conclusion on that? 

Mr. HUMIRE. I would like to say that it would happen this year. 

I couldn’t say that with any certainty, Mr. Chairman. But what I 

51

will say is that there—if there is a time to advance the case it is 

now. 

Last year, obviously, Macri was his first year as President. There 

was a lot of struggles and challenges to get one of those cases open 

and to get the other case moved to the Federal court. That was a 

very difficult obstacle. They’ve overcome those obstacles so now is 

the—now is the time to lend whatever support, whatever assistance is needed so that they can adjudicate these properly. There 

is still a lot of adversarial forces in the country that don’t want to 

see these cases ever see the light of day, which is why you are seeing those wiretaps come and be leaked. 

Mr. DUNCAN. But in your opinion, is the Macri government being 

very accommodating with the prosecutor? 

Mr. HUMIRE. I believe that they are—the Macri administration 

is supportive to these cases. However, I believe there’s more that 

could be done. I believe that if the U.S. Government——

Mr. DUNCAN. President Macri, I would say, campaigned on it—

that it was part of his promise to get——

Mr. HUMIRE. Correct. 

Mr. DUNCAN [continuing]. To the bottom of it, from what I understood. 

Mr. HUMIRE. Correct. But I believe with the change of the administrations in the U.S.—I think in the past he might not have 

got a clear signal from the U.S. that they were very cooperative on 

this particular issue. It’s not an issue that the U.S. would say that 

we were involved or had any stake in seeing the outcome or the 

resolution. 

That might change, and if that were to change I think you would 

see a much more rapid advancement and the Macri administration 

would be—I think would welcome that change. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. We went a little further into that than 

I anticipated. Let me just finish up with Mr. Cardenas. 

You know, your role with the Bush administration—you have 

had a lot of experience. What are some of the other diplomatic tools 

other than the sanctions that we just recently saw with the Trump 

administration? What are the other diplomatic tools you might recommend that the Trump administration use toward Venezuela? 

Mr. CARDENAS. Mr. Chairman, I believe that we need to take a 

good look at the energy relationship, and that is, of course, Venezuelan oil shipments to the United States. 

I think that what I am talking about, of course, is really an expansion of targeted sanctions. Nobody is arguing for the type of 

wide application of economic sanctions that would only make the 

lives of individual Venezuelans even worse. But I think that within 

the realm of authorities that both Treasury and State Department 

have that we can do a lot more in terms of sending signals and creating disarray within the leadership of the Venezuelan Government, I can’t imagine who wants to be the last Venezuelan sanctioned by the United States on behalf of a government that most 

Venezuelans have long ago lost any faith in. 

I think that the diplomatic route is key, as my colleague, Mr. 

Quilter, stated within the Organization of American States. I think 

that the changed environment in the region presents some opportuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:27 Jun 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_WH\022817\24445 SHIRL
52

nities that didn’t exist before for other countries to get active on 

the Venezuela issue within the context of the—of the OAS. 

Of course, we have a very spirited Secretary General, Luis 

Almagro, who is looking for diplomatic support. We, of course, as 

the United States, don’t want to be out there bearhugging him with 

love. But we can, through our offices, our good offices around the 

region and here in Washington, work with these other governments 

to support Mr. Almagro in what he wants to accomplish on Venezuela. 

So I guess the most fruitful avenues, I believe, that exist out 

there are continuing on the diplomatic regional approach—multilateral approach and then let us start looking at very, very—specifically at pressure points in the Venezuelan Government’s economic wherewithal to start upping the pressure. Pressure, combined with the multilateral diplomacy, I believe, is the way to go 

and, frankly, we just did not see that for many years, including 

both administrations. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I appreciate your frankness and I hope our subcommittee will bear with me because I am going to make Venezuela a focus of this subcommittee on what we can do for the people of Venezuela and end the oppression. And so we will have multiple hearings, I am sure, in this Congress on this. 

With that, I will yield to the gentleman, Ranking Member, Mr. 

Sires, for as much time as he wants. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There is a newspaper report out today that the new budget looks 

to cut 37 percent of the State Department’s budget. This is the—

it just came out. 

I was just wondering what you think the impact is going to do 

with our relationship to the region if this were to come to fruition. 

Ms. YEARWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Sires. 

I think Mr. Humire said it very well, in terms of working with 

the State Department and U.S. agencies in countries goes a long 

way toward helping identify and deal with threats as they occur 

and I think the State Department is the front line in the region 

when it comes to dealing with problems, when it comes to nurturing the relationships. 

I think taking the State Department out of the equation creates 

a void. It means other countries would be able to step in and nurture relationships that the U.S. should be leading on, and so I 

would—I would strongly advocate against it. 

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Humire. 

Mr. HUMIRE. Yes, Mr. Sires. I believe, obviously, it will have a 

detrimental effect and any cuts—any budget cuts in a particular 

part of the world where the U.S. Government, particularly U.S. 

State Department, still struggles to have the level of engagement 

that they think they would wish to have, it will hurt. 

But I think—and I lived also through the cuts in the Defense Department during the sequester that, obviously, then-General John 

Kelly, commander of SOUTHCOM, obviously complained a lot 

about because he didn’t feel like he had the adequate resources to 

go after the threats. 

But I think both of these cuts—there is a reality—a fiscal reality 

that as legislators you know very well. However, it is also a conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:27 Jun 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_WH\022817\24445 SHIRL
53

sequence of priorities or lack of priorities and this is a point I just 

want to emphasize. 

A lot of challenges we are addressing throughout the world are 

converging in Latin America, be it the aggressions or resurgence of 

Russia, the expansions and aggression of China, or the belligerence 

of Iran. 

Those challenges are becoming closer to our shores in Latin 

America in places like Venezuela, and if our policy makers don’t 

prioritize the region that’s going to become a bigger problem. 

That is going to become a bigger threat. Dealing with that requires money. It requires appropriations. It requires us to give our 

authorities the capabilities that they need to address it. 

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Cardenas. 

Mr. CARDENAS. Thank you, Mr. Sires. 

As the chairman noted—Mr. Duncan noted, I did serve in the 

Bush 43 administration and both at the State Department and 

USAID. 

So I have been in the belly of the beast and I have—I recall it 

was very, very shocking or, certainly, sobering to compare the resources that we had at our disposal with those that our colleagues 

in DoD had at their disposal. So that was—is an ongoing challenge. 

But it—at the same time, there is waste, fraud, and abuse in any 

Federal bureaucracy that can be—that can be addressed, that more 

efficiency and better prioritization of objectives can be achieved. I 

think it has to be an effort, I think, whereby one has to be cognizant of a new environment whereby we have to be leaner and 

meaner. 

Maybe it will not wind up where the President’s opening bid established and the figure could result in a higher number. But I 

think that the bureaucracies involved need to be prepared for—to 

participate in leaner, meaner operations. 

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Quilter. 

Mr. QUILTER. The American people, apparently, believe that 25 

percent of our budget goes to foreign aid. The number is less than 

1 percent, as you know. 

I think this would be penny-wise and pound foolish. Any cuts to 

the 150 account would be more expensive in the long run. 

General Mattis himself said that if you—if you don’t fully fund 

the State Department I think he said, I have to buy more ammunition, and I think that is absolutely right. Buying ammunition is 

much more expensive than fully funding the State Department. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SIRES. And my topic that I always raise, you know, partners 

in the region long maligned the United States for its treatment of 

Cuba and used it as an excuse to stay silent. 

Now that we have this opening and we have all this counter back 

and forth, what is the principal reason that these countries don’t 

speak up about the human—the abuses in Cuba? I mean, it is well 

documented—human rights abuses, people getting beat up. Why is 

it that they don’t speak up? I mean, they don’t have to now worry 

about us. Mr. Cardenas. 

Mr. CARDENAS. Mr. Sires, I have—as a long time student of U.S.-

Cuba relations I do have some impressions, if I could share with 

you. 

54

I think that in most cases in many of these countries they are 

afraid, domestically, of their own left. The left in Latin America is 

not like the left in this country. 

The left movements, many of them having been widely infiltrated 

by Cuba, can be violent. They can be disruptive. And to push 

against Cuba, to speak out for the most humane topics that any 

American wouldn’t think twice about, they remain reluctant for 

fear—for fear of the trouble that Cuba can cause in their own countries. 

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Humire, would you agree with that? 

Mr. HUMIRE. I do agree. Let me just add to that, it is also not 

a accident that you have seen this in particular countries because 

what the Cubans are very good at is working with host governments to be able to influence public opinion, and it is that center 

of gravity—public opinion—that we need to tackle to be able to get 

it more on the side of U.S. influence or U.S. activity. 

In my written testimony, I examine public opinion polls through 

Latino Barometer, a respected Chilean polling firm, and what you 

see is a negative trend in favorable U.S. public opinion in 10 countries throughout the hemisphere. 

Now, I am not going to say that Cubans are behind all of that, 

but they are definitely pushing that narrative. It is the ability to 

get a narrative, to grab a narrative, that helps solidify our ability 

to sell the U.S. as a legitimate partner in the region. 

We don’t have the narrative. The U.S. does a lot of good actions. 

The Defense Department does a lot of good. Whenever there’s a humanitarian crisis they are some of the first people to respond. But 

that action isn’t all of a sudden—that action isn’t accompanied by 

a story, and it is those stories that need to be told to be able to 

push back against what the Cubans have done throughout the region. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the ranking member. 

Now going back and forth, we are going to go to Mr. Rooney from 

Florida for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROONEY. This testimony has been a very thorough overview 

of what’s going on in Latin America right now and I appreciate it. 

I have spent a fair amount of time down there myself over the 

years. So I am trying to find a couple of things that haven’t been 

mentioned yet to be productive. 

So, Mr. Humire, if you could comment—the chairman commented 

on the role of Iran in the Nisman case in Argentina. If you could 

comment on the current activities of Iran in Venezuela and Nicaragua. 

Mr. HUMIRE. Thank you, Mr. Rooney. 

Iran—let me just start by saying that Iran, along with their 

proxy, Hezbollah, is present in every country in Latin America. In 

some cases they are more subterranean. 

They are working out of an informal network. In other cases, 

such as Venezuela, they have a full seat at the table with the current government. The recent appointment of the current Venezuelan Vice President, Tareck El Aissami, to me was a clear indicator of the level of control and influence that Iran has in that 

country. 

55

I have studied the Iranian presence in Venezuela for several 

years and it has graduated. It started as cultural presence, moved 

over to become a diplomatic presence with more economic engagement. It has now fully graduated into a military presence. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards, along with their subordinate elements 

through the Ministry of Defense and armed forces logistics, has 

complete presence and activities within Venezuela including territories that are not within control of the Venezuelan Government. 

Tareck El Aissami was one of the individuals that controlled a 

lot of that network or at least was one of the—the man on the 

ground partners for Tehran in that activity. My understanding is 

that as the executive Vice President he’s been granted executive 

powers that are essentially Presidential powers that can be used by 

Iran to foment more instability and conflict. 

What I worry about with Venezuela—and think of this within 

the context of Syria—what are we dealing with Syria? We are dealing with a proxy conflict with many parties where the Iranians, the 

Russians, and other actors are essentially fomenting instability and 

violence so that they can engage the United States. 

If you take that lens, that optic, and you apply that to Venezuela, 

you have the same actors. Obviously, not to the level that you see 

them in Syria, but the potential for that is there, especially with 

an individual like Tareck El Aissami at the helm. His connections 

with Damascus, with Russia, with Tehran could potentially create 

a conflict where the military gets into a war with the militias and 

that only benefits the folks in the Middle East. 

Mr. ROONEY. I am glad you brought up about that because you 

know we know how from they fly in and out of there what kind 

of aircraft they use. 

Similar to that, assuming that we don’t get into a Cold War-Guatemala situation, Venezuela finally—we are in the final innings of 

an opportunity to put the 15 years of the Chavez-Maduro behind 

us—could you comment on what the impact to the smaller Caribbean countries is going to be with the end of Petrocaribe? 

I don’t know who would be the best for that. Maybe Ms. 

Yearwood would because she is the Central American expert. 

Ms. YEARWOOD. Well, I mean, Venezuela, because of everything 

that is going on in Venezuela, obviously, Petrocaribe—the influence 

of Petrocaribe is waning and what we are seeing is the push toward greater energy diversity and sustainability in the region. 

The U.S. is engaging in various programs throughout the Caribbean and Central America and basically the hope is that 

Petrocaribe will become a—not as influential at the—at the—at the 

end of the day. I think, given everything that’s going on in Venezuela, we can expect to see the Petrocaribe program come to an 

end at some point in the not too distant future. 

From a Caribbean perspective, for the countries that are a part 

of the Petrocaribe program, the important thing is that they are 

ready to deal with the move away from Petrocaribe, which I think 

opens a lot of opportunities for collaboration with the United 

States, and I referenced earlier the discovery of oil in Guyana, and 

the cooperation between Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago in terms 

of exploiting that opportunity. So——

Mr. ROONEY. Time for one more, Mr. Chairman? 

56

Mr. DUNCAN. We have got time for one more. 

Mr. ROONEY. One brief, and I’d like to ask Mr. Quilter and perhaps Mr. Cardenas about the Pacific Alliance. That is one thing 

that hadn’t been mentioned here. And, you know, we have got four 

very important countries working together and looking west while 

we don’t know sometimes where we are looking, right, and you 

both touched on some of those. 

So maybe you could give us some comment on the negative aspects of that for the United States, and the positive aspects of that 

for Chile, Mexico, Colombia, and Peru vis-a-vis China and Asia. 

Mr. QUILTER. The Pacific Alliance is an amazingly effective integration mechanism. Right now, trade is a bad word. We are sort 

of falling over ourselves trying to understand how it fits into our 

bigger picture. But that is precisely the kind of integration mechanism that we would need to work with. We need to work with it 

in some manner. The fact that the TPP is now off the table means 

that we need a new way to engage with that group because they 

are going to move without us. There is no doubt that they are going 

to move without us. And another thing we have to think about are 

opportunity costs of all these things. 

So are we creating a strategic opportunity for China as we step 

back from these relationships? The same question really applies to 

Russia, although not as urgently, I believe. 

Another opportunity cost, which was mentioned by the chairman 

which I would like to flag, is what we really should be talking 

about right now with Mexico is energy integration in this region. 

We can do it. That is the next item on the agenda. We are just 

not getting to that item because we are talking about a bunch of 

other things that I think we should have left behind. 

Mr. CARDENAS. Ambassador Rooney, if I could just add to Peter’s 

comments. The Pacific Alliance is something that was an achievement of U.S. foreign policy, an objective policy that has spanned 

Democratic and Republican administrations that is advocating on 

behalf of trade integration, open economies, free trade, and now 

that we have this entity that is borne of itself—it wasn’t like the 

United States came and put them together. They, unilaterally, 

came together. But it was after many years of things that we had 

pushed for, bipartisan support in the region. 

So I think that we have to quickly figure out what our approach 

is going to be. President Trump has been very clear on his points 

about multilateral agreements. But he is for bilateral agreements. 

So we have to figure out how this all fits together. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. Just I hope—you know, 5 

weeks into this I hope energy is a part of the conversation as 

NAFTA is renegotiated. 

We do know with natural gas pipelines, with constitutional 

changes in Mexico with regard to nationalization—denationalization of the energy sector, there’s a lot of opportunity with Mexico 

that I think ought to be on the table, and I can promise you I will 

be conversing with the Trump administration on energy policy and 

with regard to Western Hemisphere countries because I think there 

is—I used to talk about American energy independence and I 

broadened that to North American energy independence. 

57

Now I broaden that to hemispheric energy independence where 

we can work with our allies here that are hungry for energy, hungry for American technology. There is just a heck of a lot of opportunity here—bilateral opportunity in so many ways. 

So with that, I will go to the gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Kelly, 

and for 5 minutes. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

At the community of Latin American and Caribbean states summoned on January 25th, President Castro expressed Cuba’s willingness to continue negotiating a bilateral agreement with the U.S. 

President Trump has continually repeated his America first 

mantra about creating jobs and increasing exports. Lifting the embargo would open up a new market for American companies and 

the potential to add $366 million annually in U.S. exports. 

In Illinois alone, which I represent, the removal of U.S. travel 

and financial restrictions would increase Illinois agricultural exports to Cuba by $6.6 million annually. 

In my opinion, expanding trade opportunities for American farmers is putting America first. Given the economic benefits and regional support for lifting the outdated Cuban embargo, what are 

the next steps that Congress and the Trump administration should 

consider? 

And also, how should we balance trying to bring opportunity to 

the Cuban people without emboldening the Castro regime? 

And if we could start with Mr. Cardenas and Mr. Quilter. 

Mr. CARDENAS. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

I would say that opportunities—unfortunately, what I have seen 

over the last 2 years is the Cuban Government taking advantage 

of the very generous outreach of the Obama administration to put 

the past history behind us, and to move forward in a cooperative 

manner for the benefit of the Cuban people, has resulted in the 

Castro regime manipulating and using those overtures to solidify 

its own control over the people. 

And specifically, I would say that the Cuban military takeover of 

the Cuban tourism industry—the hotels, the restaurants and other 

institutions—means that this has translated into a windfall—a financial windfall for the government at the expense of the people. 

I have seen very little true market openings whereby Cubans 

truly have the freedom to open businesses, to conduct them as they 

see fit without fear of the government deciding that they are making too much money. 

So I would find ways to review the relationship with more stipulations, more conditionality on benefits for the Cuban people, rather than simply this open-ended new path that was opened up by 

President Obama that doesn’t account, or doesn’t demand or expect 

any reciprocal action from the Cuban Government. 

Mr. QUILTER. I would agree that a metric here is benefit to the 

Cuban people. I think that is absolutely correct. I don’t think lifting 

the embargo is on the table. I don’t think there are votes for it 

right now. 

I do not believe we need to go any farther than what President 

Obama has done for now. My take on the changes that President 

Obama made are a little bit different and I see them as things inherent to us as Americans and that is a part of it that sometimes 

58

gets lost in the discussion. It is not only a foreign policy move to 

give Americans back their rights to travel, to engage in commerce, 

to help their families in Cuba if they have them, et cetera. But all 

through this we must keep our compass true. This is about democracy. This is about human rights. It is about fugitives from justice, 

as Mr. Sires knows well—something very close to his heart. That 

should still be the north of our relationship with Cuba. That should 

not change. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Gentlelady’s time has expired. 

I am going to go ahead to Ms. Torres and I am going to ask if 

you could just limit your to maybe one good question because they 

have called votes. And then I will move on to your colleague and 

just allow the new members to ask. Ms. Torres. 

Ms. TORRES. Great. Thank you so much for the opportunity to 

participate. It has been quite interesting hearing all the different 

perspectives. 

I am new to the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, new to Foreign Affairs Committee. But the work in, certainly, the Northern 

Triangle is not new to me. 

I am very, very involved in addressing the issues, specifically the 

issues of government corruption and ensuring that the U.S. is not 

just throwing good money after, you know, good money—it is all 

our taxpayers’ dollars—but ensuring that once our work there is 

done we leave a government, you know, that—with a traditional 

process that actually works for the people. 

You know, my goal is that the next Norma Torres will have an 

opportunity to be a Member of Congress in Guatemala and not 

have to be sent to live with a, you know, a relative in the U.S. because it was too dangerous for her to grow up there. 

On the issue of Mexico, I am from California. Mexico is our number-one trading partner. Mr. Quilter, I really appreciate your comments. Diplomatic engagement, I absolutely agree, is the key to 

solving some of our problems. A lot of the problems have been created with this new administration, I believe, in my opinion. 

Some of the very loose comments that have been stated by this 

administration have certainly hurt us there. We don’t have an Ambassador to help clean up some of the mess that we have created 

there and that poses a problem, not just to all of the states that 

trade, you know, with Mexico. 

On the issue of weapons, I am curious to know as to what 

more—what policies could be effective to help stem the tide of guns 

across the border into Mexico. 

I have to go back to some of the comments. I think it was your 

comment that stated that Mexico has fortified their borders and 

even within Central America. They used to have sort of a brotherhood. There were no borders. You know, people from the region can 

travel across. That is no longer, you know, what is happening 

there. People are stopped. 

Ninety-seven percent of the migrants that are—that cross to the 

Mexico border are sent right back to their home countries without 

refugee status. So what more can we do to ensure that we don’t destabilize Mexico as we have done in some of the areas—other areas 

where we have no business conducting ourselves the way we have 

been in the past? 

59

Mr. QUILTER. Very quickly—thank you very much for your letter 

of February 27th on Mexico. I think it is a wonderful letter. It was 

great to see it. 

On guns, lost a little bit in the—in the trip right now of Secretary Tillerson was that he brought up the issue of guns and bulk 

cash, which is, of course, what the Mexicans want out of the other 

side of the drug equation—just that specific item. 

This has been on the table for a long time. We have just never—

we have just never really gone there. We need a strategy. We have 

the smarts to do it. We have State. We have ICE. We have ATF 

and we have ONDCP, which is really good on the numbers. We 

need to engage them all on that. To do it, we need better information. We need better reporting. We need better transparency about 

the guns. 

We need a very good record of what guns are eventually found 

down in Mexico, where do they end up, where are they recovered 

and what for. Those are the kinds of things we need. 

Ms. TORRES. Is it true 70 percent of those weapons found in Mexico are—you know, have a U.S. point of origin? 

Mr. QUILTER. Yes, and we need to make sure our numbers are 

really good because we have these discussions about whether it is 

really 70 percent or some number that is smaller. 

Honestly, it doesn’t matter. These numbers are way too big. So 

we need—but we need good numbers. 

Ms. TORRES. On the issue of Central America, congratulations, 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. I think, you know, you have 

been around for a while and the work they have done with Plan 

Colombia has been wonderful. 

But what lessons learned from Plan Colombia can we apply to 

the Northern Triangle? I truly believe that we have sort of done 

such a great job in Colombia that a lot of the drug cartels have 

moved north to the region and are the cause—part of the cause of 

what has happened in the Northern Triangle specifically. 

Mr. CARDENAS. I would just, very quickly, think that—say that 

the essential lesson is political leadership in the region. 

We have to find, frankly, three or four President Uribes among 

the Northern Triangle countries—somebody who is willing to go 

against vested interests. 

As you noted, Congresswoman, the narcos and the gangs have so 

permeated these societies that you don’t know who is dirty and 

who is clean. But you can find out and there are ways to find out. 

We need to help them expose the insidious infiltration of the narco 

traffickers and they need to be rounded up and we need to, as I 

briefly stated in my testimony, the twin evils of corruption and impunity—we need to push and stand behind and help those administrations counter those evils within those societies in order to make 

real progress against the narco traffickers. 

Ms. TORRES. I agree with that. I just—I disagree that security 

should be our only point of business there. I also believe that ensuring that we are supportive of CSIG or MOXI continues to be a 

priority for us and ensuring that educational opportunities for the 

future leaders of these countries, that there is an investment outside of military training or police training in the region. 

Mr. HUMIRE. Mr. Chairman, if I can just really quickly address. 

60

Mr. DUNCAN. Quickly, please. 

Mr. HUMIRE. Congresswoman, just to—just to encapsulate Central America so you understand, to deal with the insecurity situation there—and I do a lot with the Department of Defense on countering transnational organized crime—there has to be an economic 

solution as well. The idea of doing security measures without doing 

any type of economic empowerment or economic trade is not going 

to work. 

If you look at the crisis in El Salvador, if you overlay—just a 

small anecdote—if you overlay where all the gangs have greater 

control or were given territories in El Salvador and you overlay 

that with where they have lack of property rights, it is the same 

territories. 

So essentially what I am saying is we have to understand what 

are the drivers of economic growth and if you look at the drivers 

of economic growth they are mostly economic freedom, and I think 

that’s where we have to go. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I hate to do it. There is less than 5 minutes on the 

clock for votes that they have called. 

Members of the subcommittee can submit their questions for the 

record. We would ask that you respond to those so that members 

can have their question asked. 

I apologize, I don’t have the vote schedule. But I want to appreciate the participation and, Mr. Espaillat, I will make it up to you 

in a future committee hearing. 

Before we adjourn, I want to give a special thanks to James 

Randaccio, our current Western Hemisphere Subcommittee intern. 

James has been a real asset to the subcommittee. We’ve been 

happy to have his significant contributions to our team. 

We have got a great staff on the minority and majority sides. 

Look forward to working with you. I thank the witnesses and with 

that we will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(61)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

62

f


24445n.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US HOUSE OF REPRESENT A TTVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

Jeff Duncan (R-SC), Chairman 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to 

be held by the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere in Room 2200 of the House Office 

Building (and available live on the Committee website 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Tuesday, February 28, 2017 

2:00p.m. 

Issues and Opportunities in the Western Hemisphere 

Ms. Sally Yearwood 

Executive Director 

Caribbean-Central American Action 

Mr. Joseph M. Humire 

Executive Director 

Center for a Secure Free Society 

Mr. Jose Cardenas 

(harmer Acting Assistant Administrator, Hureaufor ratin America and the 

Caribbean, US. A~Jencyfor Intemational Development) 

Mr. Peter Quilter 

Non-Resident Senior Fellow 

Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation 

John F. Kennedy School of Government 

Harvard University 

By Direction of the Chairman 
63

Æ


24445m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ________ w_e_st_a_n_H_er_m_:'sp_h_er_e _______ HEARING 

Day_---'T'-'t-=tec=sccd"'ay.__Date Februmy 211, 2017 Room ___ .=2=-2'-00'-----

Starting Time 2:00p.m. Ending Time 3:54 /J,m, 

Recesses ~--~ ( __ to __ ) ( __ to __ ) (_to __ ) (_to __ ) (_to __ ) ( __ to __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Clwlrman .Jeff Duncan 

Check all of the following that apply: 

Open Session G'J Executive ~sed) Session D Televised G'J 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Record!lli..(taped) G'J 

Stenographic Record lLJ 

"Issues and Opportunitie.\' in the Western Hemisphere" 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Ranking Member Albio Sires, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lelttinen, Rep. Francis Rooney, Rep. Norma Torres, Rep. 

Adriano Espaillat, Rep. Gregmy Meeks 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: {Mark with an * ifthey are not members offitl! committee.) 

nla 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes[] NoD 

(If "no", please list below and include lille, agency, departrnent, or orftanization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.) 

Questions for the Record for all witnesses fi·om Rep. Meeks 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED 3:54p.m.