USSOCOM

Research Topics

2013

United States Special Operations Command • MacDill Air Force Base • Florida

Joint Special Operations 

University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB FL 33621

https://jsou.socom.mil

USSOCOM Research Topics 2013
Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the men 

and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint and 

interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where 

effort centers upon the USSOCOM and United States SOF missions: 

USSOCOM mission. Provide fully capable Special Operations Forces 

to defend the United States and its interests. Synchronize planning of 

global operations against terrorist networks.

USSOF mission. USSOF conduct special operations to prepare the 

operational environment, prevent crisis, and respond with speed, precision, and lethality to achieve tactical through strategic effect. 

The Strategic Studies Department also organizes and conducts strategic 

symposia, interagency curricula, international curricula, regional and cultural education senior level courses, and senior level professional military 

education. 

This publication is available on the JSOU public web page located at 

https://jsou.socom.mil.

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D., Strategic Studies Department Director

Juan Alvarez, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.; Dona Stewart, Ph.D., Geography;

William Knarr, Ed.D., Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. — Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro 

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret. 

JSOU Associate Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr. 

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Thomas Sass

Ph.D., International Relations

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Stephen Sloan

Ph.D., Comparative Politics

University of Central Florida and JSOU 

Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/

Southeast Asian Studies

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History, 

JSOU Senior Fellow

John B. Alexander

Ph.D., Education, The Apollinaire Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Roby C. Barrett 

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & 

South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

Professor of Strategy, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School and JSOU Senior 

Fellow

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior 

Fellow

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air 

and Space Studies, Air University and 

JSOU Associate Fellow 

William W. Mendel,

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow
On the cover: Left: A Special Forces medic from 7th Special Forces 

Group (Airborne) gives an Afghan boy a coloring book near Kandahar, Afghanistan. Photo by Steve Hebert.

Center: Members of Brazil’s special operations force, Grupamento 

de Mergulhadores de Combate and Colombia’s special operation 

force, Batallon de Fuerzas Especiales de Infanteria de Marina, form 

a perimeter after fast roping from a MH-47 Special Operations 

Aircraft operated by the Army 160th Special Operations Aviation 

Regiment as part of PANAMAX 2010. Photo by Petty Officer 2nd 

Class Joseph M. Clark.

Right: Two U.S. Navy SEALs navigate through murky waters during 

a Combat Swimmer Training dive. Photo by Senior Chief Petty 

Officer Andrew McKaskle.

USSOCOM 

Research Topics 

2013
This Research Topics List and other JSOU publications can be found online at 

https://jsou.socom.mil. Click on Publications. Comments about this publication are 

invited and should be forwarded to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint 

Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB FL 33621. 

*******

The JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information please 

contact the JSOU Research Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. Thank you for 

your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN: 978-1-933749-68-6
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria, May 2012, James 

J.F. Forest

Strategic Culture and Strategic Studies: An Alternative Framework for 

Assessing al-Qaeda and the Global Jihad Movement, May 2012, Richard 

Shultz

Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Insurgent 

and Terrorist Networks: The First Step in Effective Counternetwork 

Operations, April 2012, Derek Jones 

“We Will Find a Way”: Understanding the Legacy of Canadian Special 

Operations Forces, February 2012, Bernd Horn

Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan and Elsewhere, February 

2012, Thomas H. Henriksen

Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces: Necessity, Acceleration, and Potential Alternatives, November 2011, Russell D. 

Howard

Oman: The Present in the Context of a Fractured Past, August 2011, Roby 

Barrett

2011 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, July 2011

Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm in Context, May 2011, Roby Barrett

The Challenge of Nonterritorial and Virtual Conflicts: Rethinking Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism, March 2011, Stephen Sloan 

Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way 

SOF are, March 2011, Jessica Glicken Turnley

Innovate or Die: Innovation and Technology for Special Operations,

December 2010, Robert G. Spulak, Jr. 

Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking and Joint Special Operational Planning 

Doctrine and Procedures, September 2010, Laure Paquette 

Convergence: Special Operations Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement,

July 2010, John B. Alexander 

Hezbollah: Social Services as a Source of Power, June 2010, James B. Love

vii

Contents

Foreword ........................................................................ ix

Preface ........................................................................... xi

A. Priority Topics .............................................................1

B. Combating Terrorism ...................................................7

C. Irregular Warfare Strategy and Operations .................13

D. Interagency Issues .....................................................19

E. Regional and Cultural Issues .....................................23

F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues .......................................29

G. Topics Retained from Previous Years .........................35

ix

Foreword

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 2013 

Research Topics list is intended to guide research projects for Professional Military Education (PME) students, JSOU faculty, fellows, and others 

writing about special operations during this academic year. Research is one 

of the cornerstones of JSOU’s academic mission and focuses on publishing 

in areas that contribute to understanding policy and strategy issues affecting 

the operational and planning needs of the Special Operations Forces (SOF). 

Each year representatives from the USSOCOM headquarters and Interagency 

Task Force, the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), SOF chairs 

from the war colleges, and JSOU Senior Fellows develop a comprehensive 

list of issues and challenges of concern to the greater SOF community. The 

list is vetted through the USSOCOM components and TSOCs to confirm 

the research best advances SOF missions and supports SOF interests. The 

final recommendations for research topics are approved by the USSOCOM 

Commander.

The research that results from these topics is made available to the SOF 

community, members of the larger military profession, policymakers and 

strategists, and other members of the public either through JSOU Press 

publications, the publication opportunities available at the various service 

schools and colleges, or the Defense Technical Information Center and 

other online media. Ultimately, the research, study, and debate of these 

topics informs policymakers and better prepares the profession of arms for 

the challenges of winning the current conflicts and meeting the needs for 

the conflicts most likely to face us in the foreseeable future. If you have any 

questions about this document, JSOU Press in general, or how JSOU can 

assist you in your academic research, contact the Director of Research via 

e-mail at jsou_research@socom.mil.

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D.

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department

xi

Introduction

The USSOCOM Research Topics 2013 list represents an effort to identify, 

categorize, and list SOF-related research topics for research by PME 

students, JSOU Senior Fellows, and other SOF researchers who desire to 

make timely and meaningful contributions to SOF issues and challenges. 

This list is tailored to address the USSOCOM Commander’s four main 

focus areas:

•	 Win the Current Fight

•	 Expand the Global SOF Partnership

•	 Preserve the Force and Families

•	 Responsive Resourcing

The Commander places great emphasis and value on SOF PME students 

researching and writing on timely, relevant, SOF-related topics. Such activity 

develops the individual’s intellect and provides a professional and practical perspective that broadens and frames the insights of other analysts and 

researchers in regard to these topics. This list and the accompanying topic 

descriptions are a guide to stimulate interest and thinking; topics may be 

narrowed or otherwise modified as deemed necessary (e.g., to suit school 

writing requirements or maximize individual interests and experiences). 

Sections A through F contain new topic categories with major ideas/

concepts for 2013 from which topics can be derived, depending on the 

interest/experience of the researcher and the desired level of detail. Section 

A (Priority Topics) identifies those topics of particular importance that 

the USSOCOM Commander has identified for special emphasis. All of the 

topics seek to expand SOF understanding of specific challenges and issues 

and promote thinking in regard to understanding them and identifying 

doctrine, capabilities, techniques, and procedures to increase SOF efficacy in 

addressing them. At the same time, the research is also intended to inform 

policymakers, the larger military profession, and the public of the issues and 

challenges of concern to the SOF community and what might be undertaken 

in support of them. The topics reflect a consensus of those participating in 

the topics project and vetted through Theater Special Operations Commands 

and components—that is, the topics are deemed particularly worthwhile in 
xii

addressing immediate SOF needs and in building future capacity for emerging challenges. Topics are unique but share a focus on the following: 

•	 Combating Terrorism

•	 Implications of irregular warfare and strategies and operations to 

win

•	 SOF in whole-of-government and comprehensive operational 

environments

•	 Importance of regional and cultural emphases

•	 Interagency coordination

•	 Future SOF operating environments

•	 SOF missions and functions, organization, force structure, and professional development and training.

Section G is a list of selected topics retained from previous years.

Previous Years’ Research Topics Lists provide a repository of 

topics highlighted in the past. These topics lists may provide prospective researchers with additional ideas of relevant topics identified in this 

publication. The previous editions of the USSOCOM Research Topics 

(2009 through 2012 editions) are available on the JSOU public web site at 

https://jsou.socom.mil/Pages/Publications.aspx. 

Note that the topics lists are posted in the publication section for the 

year they were published (i.e. the Research Topics 2012 list is posted in the 

2011 publications section on the web site).

Limited travel funding may be available from JSOU for researchers (such 

as PME students) to support their projects (e.g., to conduct interviews or 

visit USSOCOM or component headquarters). These research “grants” are 

subject to approval by the Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department, 

contingent on the topic selected and the value added to the project.

Please share this reference with fellow researchers, thesis advisors, and 

other colleagues and feel free to submit additional topics for consideration. 

Visit our publications page on JSOU’s public website to see whether JSOU 

has a publication that relates to your topic of interest. 
1

A. Priority Topics

A. Priority Topics

Topic Titles

A1. Rebalancing SOF focus toward Asia-Pacific

A2. Cultural narratives: What is important and what is not? 

A3. Sustaining the SOF Warrior during an era of persistent conflict

A4. Civilian-Military teaming for post-Iraq/Afghanistan security 

cooperation

A5. Intelligence community and SOF cooperation

A6. Village Stability Operations: Is this a winning ticket for the war in 

Afghanistan?

A7. How does USSOCOM retain and maintain persistent interagency 

cooperation? 

A8. Strategic USSOCOM partnering with India

A9. We used to be commandos: Has SOF strayed too far from its 

traditional roles?

A10. SOF and continuous presence: Benefits of persistent engagement

Topic Descriptions

A1. Rebalancing SOF focus toward Asia-Pacific 

The Defense Strategic Guidance (2012) underscores the growing strategic significance of Asia and the Pacific. What are the implications 

for Special Operations Forces (SOF)? Which countries in the region 

should become SOF’s focus? How will transnational security issues 

such as the protection of vital shipping lanes and nodes be addressed? 

What current/traditional partner-nation SOF relationships should be 

relooked? What new relationships should be formed? Is a deeper focus 

on this region the best use of Special Operations Forces? Are there 

potential or proposed missions in this region that might necessitate 

modifications to SOF equipment requirements? How will different 

rebalancing efforts impact Special Operations Command Pacific’s 

(SOCPAC) operating tempo? Are there examples in other theaters, 

such as Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), for how 

SOCPAC might prepare for changes in their operational activity? 

Should resourcing SOCPAC become a priority? What is the best 
2

USSOCOM Research Topics 2013

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

way to prepare personnel for persistent engagement in Asia and the 

Pacific region? Should there be a similar program to AfPak Hands 

but focused on China and India, or other countries?

A2. Cultural narratives: What is important and what is not? 

Every culture and relevant population has many narratives through 

which they indoctrinate their members, institutionalize behavior and 

accommodate change. How can USSOCOM identify those narratives 

that are useful for the influence campaigns necessary for irregular 

warfare (IW)? How can SOF use and influence these narratives? 

What organizational barriers and perceptions must SOF overcome 

in order to more fully leverage such narratives? Who within SOCOM 

or the SOF community should be responsible for dissecting cultural 

narratives and leveraging those narratives to support command 

objectives?

A3. Sustaining the SOF Warrior during an era of persistent conflict 

All indications point toward a continued high operations tempo and 

forward global engagement by SOF after the conflicts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan are over. What are the lessons learned from more than 

10 years of increased operations tempo that can be carried forward to 

sustain SOF personnel and their families? USSOCOM has administered an innovative and aggressive initiative named the Care Coalition and its Care Coalition Recovery Program since 2005 to assist the 

most severely injured SOF warriors and their families. What have 

been the impacts of various programs to sustain SOF personnel and 

their families? How might these programs be impacted if forced to 

cope with more asynchronous deployment schedules (such as smaller 

numbers deployed simultaneously to the same location, greater dispersion in deployment offsets and locations)? Are there fiscal or other 

constraints or obstacles that might limit the indefinite employment 

of these programs and current or increased levels? Are results consistent across the physical and emotional realms or are there divergent 

impacts in these two areas? How is resiliency improving through 

preventative (pre-rehabilitative) and rehabilitative approaches? What 

additional measures should be taken? What has been the effect of 

such programs on recruiting and retention? 
3

A. Priority Topics

A4. Civilian-Military teaming for post Iraq/Afghanistan security 

cooperation 

The U.S. has employed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and 

District Stability Teams (DST) as models for sub-national civilianmilitary teaming in Iraq and Afghanistan. Village Stability Operations (VSO) have emerged as an additional model for extending 

security, governance and development to the local level. As we move 

beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, how will the U.S. conduct security 

cooperation activities abroad? What aspects, if any, of the PRT/DST/

VSO experience might transfer to a country team process? Will SOF 

revert to pre-2001 tools or are there alternative approaches? What are 

the potential models for civilian-military teaming during steady state 

security cooperation? What authorities and constraints impact these 

alternative approaches? How might new approaches vary between 

permissive environments and countries or regions in which the U.S. 

has limited freedom of movement? 

A5. Intelligence community and SOF cooperation 

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade have seen an 

unprecedented rise in the need for cooperation among the intelligence community and Special Operations Forces. This increased need 

for cooperation requires a closer look to determine what initiatives 

have been successful and what opportunities for improvement exist. 

How might the intelligence community and SOF better cooperate/

integrate in the future? What are the strengths and weaknesses of 

both communities? What are the implications of the specialized legal 

authorities each holds? 

A6. Village Stability Operations: Is this a winning ticket for the war 

in Afghanistan? 

Some propose that the conduct—and even increase in scope—of Village Stability Operations (VSO) in Afghanistan is the way to win the 

current conflict. How might we assess the effectiveness of the current scope of VSO in Afghanistan, and what might be gained (and 

required) by increasing the scope? What are the current constraints 

in implementing the VSO program in Afghanistan, and how might 

they be addressed? Is the VSO concept applicable to other countries 
4

USSOCOM Research Topics 2013

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

and theaters, and if so, how might it be adapted or generalized? How 

is funding for VSO influencing or corrupting operations within the 

VSO program? Should USSOCOM continue with this construct or 

is there another way? Is there a better way? What things could be 

changed or identified internally or externally from VSO that could 

better support the way ahead? What potential assessment methodologies—to include both quantitative and qualitative measures—might 

be used to evaluate the effectiveness of VSO in a particular location as 

it applies to a particular command decision, mission, or end state?

A7. How does USSOCOM retain persistent interagency cooperation: 

What did we do correctly the last 10 years? 

In the aftermath of 9/11 Congress passed multiple authorities to 

facilitate interagency cooperation. One such authorization is Section 1208 of the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act. Section 

1208 provides the Department of Defense (DOD) with an alternative, and more responsive, funding source for the conduct of training and assistance operations with foreign personnel compared to 

conventional Department of State programs (e.g., Foreign Military 

Assistance, Foreign Military Sales). How do different legal and/or 

funding programs (e.g., Section 1208) support and/or restrict interagency cooperation for SOF? What are the necessary or desired levels 

of interagency cooperation within SOF, and what endeavors or programs might support these levels?

A8. Strategic SOF partnering with India 

The Department of Defense Strategic Guidance (2012) states that the 

United States is investing in a long-term strategic partnership with 

India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor 

and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region. Where, 

and in what manner, should SOF change their focus in India and the 

Indian Ocean region? What short- or long-term presence changes 

should SOCPAC make in India, and what are the associated tradeoffs? What avenues for increased cooperation with India’s SOF should 

USSOCOM consider in the short- and long-term? What can SOF 

learn from the Indian SOF experience? Since India is a nuclear power, 

are there SOF-related counter-proliferation issues that should be 
5

A. Priority Topics

immediately addressed? Consider the impact of this study on U.S.-

Pakistan relationship. 

A9. We used to be commandos: Have SOF strayed too far from their 

traditional roles?

How have circumstances over the past decade shifted SOF away from 

its traditional roles such as foreign internal defense (FID), unconventional warfare (UW), direct action (DA), counterinsurgency operations (COIN) and special reconnaissance (SR)? What does this mean 

for the future? What impact does this have on SOF and USSOCOM? 

Should USSOCOM shed mission areas such as civil affairs and security force assistance? As conventional or general purpose forces (GPF) 

become increasingly “SOF-like,” should SOF fight to keep primacy 

in certain competencies such as CT and UW? What should the core 

competencies of SOF be? What are the implications or benefits of 

GPF overlap with SOF core operations and activities? These questions 

are essential to the notion of “SOF power” and the development of a 

coherent SOF theory. 

A10. SOF and continuous presence: Benefits of persistent engagement 

The Secretary of Defense’s FY13-17 Defense Planning Guidance does 

not address a long-standing strategy of SOF’s continuous presence. 

However, many of SOF’s core operations such as FID, UW, and COIN 

are also conducted during peacetime. How does USSOCOM better 

align its scarce resources with geographic command engagement 

strategy or Department of State (DOS) policies? Do geographic combatant commanders require SOF to maintain a continuous presence 

during peacetime within their assigned regions, with the specific task 

of cultivating relationships and identifying the capability, availability, and potential of indigenous assets? Does the future still require 

years of persistent engagement or has the information age made 

this method obsolete? Can SOF maintain this “presence” given the 

American people’s opposition to U.S. troops on foreign soil? If SOF 

continue a campaign of continuous presence, what regions should 

have priority and why? 

7

B. Combating Terrorism

B. Combating Terrorism

Topic Titles

B1. Arab Spring: Implications for passive and active support for 

extremists

B2. Using unconventional warfare against violent extremist 

organizations

B3. Use of SOF in countries undergoing revolutions

B4. What constitutes terrorism in cyberspace and how does it involve 

SOF?

B5. Beyond the accidental guerilla: Are U.S. policies making terrorists?

B6. Conducting a global counterterrorism campaign from offshore 

bases

B7. Terrorist networks and strategies to counter them 

B8. SOF partners in counterterrorism

B9. Al-Qaeda’s regeneration: Prospects in the Middle East 

B10. Resourcing counterterrorism: Why taking SOF global makes sense

B11. Violent radical extremists: Beyond psychopathy to positive 

psychology

B12. Policing and counterterrorism

Topic Descriptions

B1. Arab Spring: Implications for passive and active support for 

extremists

The Arab Spring ousted regimes that traditionally opposed Salafist 

groups such as al-Qaeda. Will the new administrations dominated 

by the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist political groups produce 

societies and governments which passively and/or actively aid groups 

like al-Qaeda? Will these administrations even go so far as to give 

military training and sanctuary to al-Qaeda and other militant 

Salafist groups? In many cases, these new regimes use our own ideas 

and rhetoric. How should the United States approach these forming and formed administrations? What roles can SOF play or advocate based on SOF understanding? What can SOF do to mitigate 

deleterious effects to U.S. interests? Do Strategic Communications/
8

USSOCOM Research Topics 2013

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

Information Operations/Military Information Support Operations 

activities apply? If so, where, when, and how can they be applied? At 

what point is direct action needed, as done in Afghanistan against 

al-Qaeda and the Taliban Government? Conversely, will the politicization of these organizations as actors in the legitimate international 

system actually lead to a divergence from non-state organizations 

such as al-Qaeda?

B2. Using unconventional warfare against violent extremist 

organizations

What are the possibilities of using unconventional warfare doctrine 

to guide actions against violent extremist organizations (VEOs)? Can 

activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to 

coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power (e.g., 

operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerilla 

force in a denied area) be adapted to disrupt non-state armed groups 

such as the Taliban or al-Qaeda that employ terrorism to subvert 

political systems? Can SOF build and support a network to combat 

VEOs? What are the advantages of establishing clandestine networks 

that employ indigenous forces to combat terrorism? How can all elements of national power be brought to support such efforts?

B3. Use of SOF in countries undergoing revolutions 

When popular uprisings result in the overthrow of a regime, the 

internal security situation often deteriorates, allowing non-state 

actors the opportunity to obtain weapons, financing, and an area in 

which to operate. How do we prevent non-state actors from taking 

advantage of loose or non-existent security conditions in a nation 

undergoing a revolution to obtain financing, weapons (to include 

weapons of mass destruction), and safe havens? Under what conditions is it appropriate to deploy SOF to counter a non-state actor’s 

efforts to utilize a popular uprising for their own agenda? Which 

countries are vulnerable to non-state actor takeover?
9

B. Combating Terrorism

B4. What constitutes terrorism in cyberspace and how does it 

involve SOF? 

What threshold should be established for terrorist acts in cyberspace? 

Presumably it’s a higher bar than online bullying or what’s usually 

thought of as cybercrime. Does significant physical destruction of 

critical infrastructure count? What about the targeted attacks on key 

leaders, such as character assassination by planting child pornography 

on their computers, zeroing family bank accounts, putting children 

at risk, and so on? Suppose people die from secondary effects, such 

as shutting down electrical grids and power generation systems that 

control hospital incubators? Are the criteria for a terrorist act the 

same as for a hostile act that would trigger, say, North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) Article 5 [briefly, “...an armed attack against 

one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered 

an attack against them all...”]? What special skills do SOF bring to 

the table in countering such threats? What skills should they bring?

B5. Beyond the accidental guerilla: Are U.S. policies making 

terrorists?

Analysis of the master narratives of many terrorist organizations 

shows a common thread of resistance to the status quo. The generalized concepts of capitalism, modernization, and imperialism are 

viewed as a challenge to the fundamental existence of the terrorist 

groups and the communities they purport to represent. The organizations mobilize their followers by magnifying these threats to a 

level that justifies radical action. Unfortunately, these concerns are 

often reinforced by the actions of counterterrorist programs and policies that appear to turn threat into reality. What U.S. military, and 

by extension, U.S. government policies are interpreted as the most 

threatening and polarizing for the purpose of mobilizing terrorists? 

Should these policies be re-examined and modified/discontinued 

in order to avoid development and mobilization of the accidental 

guerilla/terrorist? If so, how? 
10

USSOCOM Research Topics 2013

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

B6. Conducting a global counterterrorism campaign from offshore 

bases 

For a variety of reasons, the U.S. may be facing a future of having to 

disrupt global terrorist networks from fewer, forward-deployed land 

bases. This will affect our force employment options and detainee 

arrangements, as well as impact the posture of our naval assets. What 

capabilities does USSOCOM require of an offshore staging base? How 

will USSOCOM compete for limited naval assets to conduct counterterrorism (CT) missions? What seabasing initiatives are available/

developing that might support this alternative? What other options 

are available, such as contract vessels? 

B7. Terrorist networks and strategies to counter them 

The U.S. and its partners have made significant progress in countering 

terrorism. However, terrorist organizations have proven themselves 

adaptable and continue to pose a threat to national security and U.S. 

interests abroad. Additional research is needed to gain advantage 

inside the cycle of adaptability. How do terrorist organizations adapt? 

For example, Hezbollah and Hamas have changed their tactics after 

gaining legitimacy. How did this situation evolve and how has the 

threat to U.S. interests changed? How do organizations differ? The 

goals of Hezbollah and al-Qaeda are different, which suggests different motivations and different strategic centers of gravity. How do 

we define terrorist networks? What are effective strategies to counter 

networks? What economy of force solutions might exist to counter terrorist networks with a leaner force in a fiscally-constrained 

environment?

B8. SOF partners in counterterrorism 

Terrorism and counterterrorism have made for strange bedfellows 

for the SOF community over the past decade, and funds and efforts 

have been liberally expended among our partners. Some of these 

expenditures and their return on investment have been more effective 

than others. In a period of reduced funding, partnerships, and costsharing, how might SOF rethink and reorganize their partnership 

efforts and expenditures at home and abroad? How do we differentiate 

those who can really use our help and be real partners, from those 
11

B. Combating Terrorism

who are just trying to ingratiate themselves on the United States and 

are along for funding? 

B9. Al-Qaeda’s regeneration: Prospects in the Middle East 

Al-Qaeda’s old guard has been battered by 10 years of war in South 

Asia, but new al-Qaeda nodes/affiliates and adherents are developing 

in the Middle East and specifically on the Arabian Peninsula. Per the 

June 2011 National Security Strategy, the United States faces two major 

counterterrorism challenges in the Arabian Peninsula: al-Qaeda and 

al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This monograph would examine 

the threat posed to the Arabian Peninsula and in particular to Saudi 

Arabia. How do al-Qaeda affiliates and adherents form? How do their 

beliefs and doctrine drive their objectives? Who supports them and 

why? How can an understanding of these groups drive our strategy 

to defeat these groups? Additionally, what competition does al-Qaeda 

face in recruiting affiliates that want the renown as the premier terrorist group or mastermind in the extremist world? 

B10. Resourcing counterterrorism: Why taking SOF global makes 

sense 

The United States has spent approximately $2 trillion to prosecute the 

two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan since 9/11. The majority of these 

costs can be attributed to the large logistical tail necessary to support 

the conventional forces deployed to both countries. In these times of 

fiscal austerity and economic challenges, the American taxpayers still 

demand the same level of security at a significantly lower price tag. 

From an economic standpoint, is SOF the force of choice for eradicating terrorist networks and stabilizing failing states? This includes the 

use of information operations/military information support operations and civil affairs operations. Can we accurately assess the comparative advantage SOF has in fulfilling these missions? What is the 

return on investment? Additionally, there are costs beyond dollars. 

How will taking SOF globally affect joint warfare or service component roles and interests and subsequently other mission requirements 

other than SOF? Evaluate how taking SOF global decreases the overall 

DOD footprint and reduces the likelihood of a major conflict.
12

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Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

B11. Violent radical extremists: Beyond psychopathy to positive 

psychology 

Violent radical extremists, also known as terrorists, have been 

described in terms of their psychopathy—severe personality disorders marked by antisocial thought and behavior (push factors)—

or, by external social factors pulling them along the path of violent 

radicalization. It is often argued that the confluence of push and pull 

factors create the conditions from which radicalized individuals are 

spawned. Yet, it is also argued that as a percentage of the population, 

this group is quite small. Therefore, what is the current U.S. conceptualization of and response to these diminutive populations? Is that 

response adequate and appropriate? Is there a better way to approach 

the problem of radicalization? What factors, as they relate to push and 

pull, allow the majority of the populations to resist/reject becoming 

violently radicalized? 

B12. Policing and counterterrorism 

The past decade has seen a rise in “home grown” terrorism. This, in 

combination with the ubiquitous nature of the internet and social 

media, and their utility in fueling radicalization across state and 

national boundaries, has introduced new challenges to law enforcement and CT efforts. What role might SOF play, with regard to training and support (and keeping in mind constitutional limitations) 

in homeland security and law enforcement? What are the positive 

and/or potentially damaging consequences of the militarization of 

domestic homeland security? Can we/should we expand Joint Task 

Force-North interagency interoperability, or use that as a model for 

increased SOF integration? What policy changes need to be considered for posse comitatus in order to increase the role of SOF with 

homeland policing? How can SOF take advantage of policing officers who also serve as Reserve/National Guard SOF? Can we attract, 

recruit, or incentivize more “policing” officers into Reserve/National 

Guard SOF? How do we capitalize on this overlapping of cultures to 

increase interagency operability? 
13

C. Irregular Warfare Strategy and Operations

C. Irregular Warfare Strategy and Operations

Topic Titles

C1. Comparison of other nations’ counterinsurgency practices

C2. Understanding and exploiting social media to support irregular 

warfare campaigns 

C3. Building partnership capacity: Myth or reality?

C4. Counter-piracy, armed private security, International Maritime 

Organization policy, and the laws of the sea

C5. Seeing beyond red: What is the fate of “Fixing Intelligence” in 

irregular warfare? 

C6. Combating the influence of non-state organizations’ deep reach

C7. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and Qods Force: Purveyors of 

terrorism or a model for the future of irregular warfare?

C8. Cost-effective development and civil affairs

C9. Alternatives to state-centric security and stability operations

C10. Assessing success in irregular warfare

Topic Descriptions

C1. Comparison of other nations’ counterinsurgency practices 

It is useful to examine other countries’ counterinsurgency (COIN) 

operations. This can be historical such as case studies on British 

operations in Malaya or Northern Ireland. It can also include contemporary analyses of how other partner nations are operating in 

Afghanistan or even the Russian experience in the Caucasus, in 

particular with the use of SOF. What worked, what did not, and 

why? What types of projects were acceptable and advanced the COIN 

intent, and what did not? What defines success? What defines winning? Who actually won the conflict? For example, if the insurgents 

in El Salvador are now elected leaders, did they win? What are the 

long term effects of strategies? How are some strategies more enduring in comparison to others that result in a quick fix?
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Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

C2. Understanding and exploiting social media to support irregular 

warfare campaigns 

Social media played a crucial role in the recent Arab Spring uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East. However social media’s 

role, functions, cultural implications, and architecture are not widely 

understood or appreciated throughout the U.S. military. To be successful in IW operations, commanders, planners, and analysts must 

have a solid appreciation of the roles, functions, and characteristics 

social media exert within their area of responsibility. Specific questions that arise are: What is the cultural, security, and economic 

impact of social media in countries and regions of interest? What is 

the level of access and usage of social media within relevant countries and regions, and what do the architectures look like? Do the 

governments monitor or restrict social media access and usage, and 

how? How can the U.S. and partner governments or organizations 

best understand, utilize, and/or mitigate the impact of social media? 

What authorities or capabilities limitations might prevent that from 

occurring? 

C3. Building partnership capacity: Myth or reality?

The notion behind the concept of building partnership capacity 

revolves around the assumption that the U.S., as a benevolent (and 

concerned) third-party, can use military forces and expertise to fundamentally change or improve the capacity of other nations’ security 

organizations. Is the involvement of U.S. forces more beneficial or 

detrimental to the stability of the host nation? The threat that a local 

populace faces is going to somewhat dictate the answer to whether 

U.S. force presence is necessary. Have improvements occurred in 

spite of or because of U.S. involvement, or would the improvements 

have occurred through other mechanisms without the commitment 

of third-party military assistance? 

C4. Counter-piracy, armed private security, International Maritime 

Organization policy, and the laws of the sea 

The past decade of steadily increasing piracy off the coast of Somalia despite conventional naval operations has highlighted the difficulty of policing such an expanse of water. Additionally, a significant 
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C. Irregular Warfare Strategy and Operations

portion of the shipping industry continues to pay ransoms, and the 

International Maritime Organization (IMO) discourages the use of 

armed private security contractors. Will an analysis of piracy incidents over the past decade determine the utility of armed security 

over the IMO’s non-lethal practices for shipboard security? Should 

the U.S. lead an effort to renegotiate international treaties and laws 

of the sea? How do various port restrictions based on local laws and 

sovereignty apply? A primary objective of this research is to develop 

a more thorough understanding of the IMO’s concerns, the shipping 

industry’s concerns, and to promote international implementation of 

more efficient and cost-effective means of countering piracy off the 

coast of Somalia. What are the most effective counter-piracy strategies developed to date? Have non-kinetic weapons been effective 

in neutralizing pirates? How can SOF better support U.S. efforts in 

countering piracy? 

C5. Seeing beyond red: What is the fate of “Fixing Intelligence” in 

irregular warfare? 

Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though 

it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities in 

order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Within a 

given country or region, how does the military intelligence community identify what the population at risk perceives as either grievances or as measures of legitimacy? Major General Michael Flynn’s 

paper “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in 

Afghanistan” introduced and emphasized the importance of “white 

activity” (population-centric) and “green” (government-centric) 

information over “red activity” (enemy-centric). It was meant to 

support an overall population-centric approach for Afghanistan. 

Should Flynn’s approach be tried from the start in other contingencies? What changes are needed to enhance military access, appreciation and fusion of white and green intelligence? How does white 

information, especially when generated with the velocity and volume 

of social media, fit within a tasking, processing, exploitation, and 

dissemination analysis process? What structures and procedures are 

required for the fusion of white, green, and red intelligence?
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2013

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

C6. Combating the influence of non-state organizations’ deep reach 

Organizations such as Hezbollah have expanded and diversified over 

the years, and these organizations have become a model for future 

organizations seeking influence inside a nation-state (e.g., Muqtada 

al-Sadr’s Islamist national movement within Iraq). These organizations are often complex—with or without state sponsorship, containing everything from a well-equipped militia to providing services 

to the local populace. In some areas, the populace often depends 

solely upon these organizations for the basics (food, water, sanitation, and security). It can often be difficult to break their hold upon 

a population. What factors are associated with the rise of such an 

organization in a particular region, and how might it be interdicted 

before becoming established? How can we dismantle or even co-opt 

some of these organizations when they threaten U.S. interests? What 

methods are most effective in preventing the growth and diversification of a nascent organization whose beliefs run contrary to U.S. or 

the international community’s interests? How do we best prevent 

nation-states from using these organizations to their advantage to 

seek regional hegemony? How can we better help partner nations in 

countering these organizations? 

C7. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and Qods Force: Purveyors of terrorism or a model for the future of irregular warfare?

Iran’s Qods Force is equipped and organized to train, advise, and assist 

surrogate forces. They also have a long history of persistent engagement with their surrogates and a much less constrained approach 

to unconventional warfare than USSOF. Many of their efforts even 

become self-perpetuating with minimal residual support. What can 

be learned from a study of their successes and failures?

C8. Cost-effective development and civil affairs 

What has experience shown to be useful criteria for the selection and 

shaping of projects for development, and how might theses vary by 

localized conditions? What should those projects be? Roads, schools, 

dams, canals, district centers? What about ice manufacturing near 

fisheries, or bus stops instead of air terminals? After the past decade 

of civil affairs operations in Afghanistan, which projects have proven 
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C. Irregular Warfare Strategy and Operations

the most effective? A measure of performance and effects of civil 

affairs and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 

can be carried out through case studies or through analyses of Civil 

Military Operations Centers’ databases. Considering cost models, 

other recent case studies could be of value as well (such as the Philippines, African countries, et cetera). Could in-depth studies help civil 

affairs (CA) planners understand how certain local factors influence 

project effectiveness? Does the fusion of socio-cultural intelligence 

with outreach to village, tribal, or even regional leaders aide the selection of CA projects? 

C9. Alternatives to state-centric security and stability operations

Some believe that U.S. policy, doctrine, and practice assume that 

states must be built on the Westphalian model in order to be responsible members of the global order. That model presumes internal 

supremacy, administrative control, and responsibility within its 

borders. However, does establishing, sustaining, or expanding the 

authority of states along these lines ensure a more stable society, or 

other factors at play? What alternative instruments and models of 

state power may be more appropriate for certain political, social, 

and economic contexts? What are the implications for U.S. policy, 

strategy, and doctrine across the spectrum of IW, stabilization, and 

conflict prevention? Are there key institutions that are necessary for 

any form of state governance (Westphalian or otherwise)? How can 

these be built or encouraged?

C10. Assessing success in irregular warfare

The International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan Assessment Group (2010-2011), worked with a research agency to develop 

population-centric quantitative measures of performance and effects 

using various sensors and data. The data compiled measured population activity like road traffic, economic activity, communications 

volume, and tried to correlate them to levels of perceived normalcy 

verses levels of perceived instability. Currently there are efforts to 

develop crowd-sourcing methods of collecting measures of effects 

for COIN as well. However, effective assessments—whether at the 

strategic, operational, or tactical level—frequently require some 
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2013

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

combination of subjective and quantitative input. It is challenging 

to assess atmospherics in areas with limited to no observation assets. 

In some instances, other government agencies are also collecting data; 

however, this data is not available to other interested parties due to 

a lack of awareness, software compatibility, or collaboration. What 

are the effective techniques for identifying quantitative assessment 

criteria within an irregular warfare environment? What bias exists 

in assessments? How can SOF units collect data to drive measures 

of effectiveness? How does SOF best share information with other 

government agencies at the lowest levels? How can SOF optimize 

their assessments given constrained collection resources? 
19

D. Interagency Issues 

D. Interagency Issues 

Topic Titles

D1. Interoperability among international and United States’ Special 

Operations Forces

D2. Special Operations Support Teams and their role within the 

interagency 

D3. The SOF supporting role in whole-of-government approaches

D4. Intelligence agencies and SOF collaboration: Past, present, and 

future

D5. From the field to the beltway: Lessons on interagency reform

D6. Interagency cooperation against violent extremist organization 

sustainment via the black market and grey economies

Topic Descriptions 

D1. Interoperability among international and United States’ Special 

Operations Forces 

U.S. counterterrorism strategy focuses intensively on the development 

of partnerships with key nations in order to address transnational 

threats. As USSOF work alongside Special Operations Forces from 

partner nations, interoperability issues may arise, posing a potential 

risk to mission effectiveness and undermining the achievement of 

national security goals. What level of interoperability should USSOF 

have with international SOF, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special Operations Forces? This research would 

identify the limits of interoperability and seek to understand potential 

scenarios in which such interoperability would be a security asset as 

well as, potentially, a security risk.

D2. Special Operations Support Teams and their role within the 

interagency 

Special Operations Support Teams (SOSTs) are positioned at specific 

agencies. They are designed to be a direct liaison to USSOCOM as well 

as an outreach to theater special operations command (TSOC) and 

component commanders. While we have made significant progress 
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2013

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

adding new members to some of the interagency organizations and 

have leveraged better communications between the agencies and the 

DOD, we are still falling short with developing a better relationship and understanding of what the wants and needs are from each 

community. How can our SOSTs be better implemented/managed to 

support our SOF? How can SOSTs more effectively coordinate with 

the Interagency Task Force (IATF) and other USSOCOM personnel 

involved in interagency activities? How can we build on these teams 

to better build relations and add knowledge management amongst 

the interagency? What are the main issues they face from developing 

an open line of communication with the organization they are supporting? What internal and external factors are contributing or not 

contributing to a whole-of-government approach? 

D3. The SOF supporting role in whole-of-government approaches 

Under a national counterterrorism strategy that emphasizes a wholeof-government approach and robust use of indirect activities, SOF 

will often play a supporting role in activities led by other U.S. Government agencies, especially the Department of State (DOS). What 

can or should be done to prepare SOF and USSOCOM to operate 

effectively in an interagency and DOS-led environment? Similarly, 

how can the interagency be better prepared to work with USSOCOM/

SOF? Is there a need to develop an interagency operating concept, 

similar to the joint operating concept to more clearly articulate the 

processes and authorities of various interagency partners in order to 

increase integration? What role can/should professional development 

opportunities play in increasing integration?

D4. Intelligence agencies and SOF collaboration: Past, present, and 

future 

The intelligence services and the military have long worked together 

in past conflicts. But the partnership has drawn particularly close in 

the campaigns in Afghanistan and Yemen. The operational tempo 

of the last 10 years has made difficult any assessment of the evolution of this relationship, and its impact on both SOF and the intelligence agencies. Such an assessment could also suggest future areas 

of cooperation and ways to enhance the partnership, while raising 
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D. Interagency Issues 

any concerns that derive from the different legal authorities governing the organizations to their differing methods of operations. What 

legal authorities are affected by these changing and more cooperative 

relationships?

D5. From the field to the beltway: Lessons on interagency reform

A decade of conflict has forced greater cooperation among members 

of the interagency. Without deliberate changes that will effectively 

shift the institutional cultures and bureaucracies within interagency 

members this decade of cooperation will not lead to permanent effective institutional collaboration. Comparative analysis and evaluation 

across agencies could explain and clarify significant policy, operational, intelligence, and funding changes that have facilitated interagency cooperation. What institutional changes did cooperation drive 

within DOD, DOS, USAID, and the rest of the interagency? Which 

of these changes will be long lasting? Are there practices, policies, 

authorities, or structural changes that could further, or more effectively, shift key interagency institutions (DOS, USAID, Department 

of Homeland Security, DOD) to sustain better Interagency cooperation? Which examples of interagency cooperation are most at risk if 

institutional changes are not incorporated?

D6. Interagency cooperation against violent extremist organization 

sustainment via the black market and grey economies 

A wide array of transnational violent extremist organizations are 

financially sustained by black market and grey market activities. Such 

activities include the sale and distribution of illegal drugs, human 

trafficking, sale of counterfeit goods, and a range of black market 

and smuggling activities. These activities sit at the nexus of criminal 

and terrorism activities and require a robust interagency response 

that often includes the Departments of Commerce and Treasury and 

the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). How can SOF improve collaboration with and shape their relationship with the Departments 

of Commerce and Treasury, the DEA and other government agencies 

in support of U.S. counterterrorism strategy?

23

E. Regional and Cultural Issues 

E. Regional and Cultural Issues

Topic Titles

E1. If we do not wage peace, we will be waging war: Prioritizing and 

preparing for SOF activities to shape the environment

E2. Promoting language and cultural expertise

E3. Programmatic approaches to building current and future regional 

capability

E4. Cultural vampires: Why don’t we see our own reflection?

E5. China’s SOF professionalization and regional implications

E6. Countering insurgency in Pakistan

E7. Building persistent cultural expertise and population engagement

E8. Female Engagement Teams: Assessing the capability

E9. The application and acquisition of cultural knowledge

E10. Foreign professional military education institutions: Are they 

important for SOF diplomacy in future operations?

Topic Discussions

E1. If we do not wage peace, we will be waging war: Prioritizing and 

preparing for SOF activities to shape the environment 

Throughout the last 10 years almost all the prioritization lists that 

guide Special Operations Forces have been based on the threat present 

within nation-states. While threat-oriented approaches will remain 

important, there is an increasing recognition of the need to identify and potentially mitigate underlying conditions that may lead to 

conflict. Is this ounce of prevention really worth a pound of cure? Is 

it possible to implement this concept within a fiscally-constrained 

environment, and is SOF currently capable (i.e., trained, equipped, 

manned, and financed) to support such an endeavor? What measurements can be used to assess this effectiveness? What are the sociocultural indicators of potential future conflict? What characteristics 

and trends, perhaps linked to continued globalization, may make 

some cultures and regions more likely to be the scene of conflict as 

globalization progresses? How might the intelligence community 

work in concert with other government agencies, academia, partner 
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2013

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

nations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to produce supporting and predictive analysis for shaping an environment? What 

potential shaping efforts might SOF undertake to mitigate the potential for full-scale conflict in under/ungoverned areas and safe havens, 

and what analytical products might best support their efforts?

E2. Promoting language and cultural expertise 

The current key and development job requirements for SOF operators 

leave little time for the acquisition of language and cultural expertise. Language and cultural expertise programs, including advanced 

degrees in regional studies, often involve a three to five year commitment. Yet completion of the programs offers marginal career 

advancement opportunities in traditional SOF career paths. How can 

SOF promote and incentivize language/cultural expertise programs 

without degrading the operator’s competitiveness for rank and command assignments? What alternate command career pathways can 

SOF establish to keep these individuals within the organization? How 

could the manning and personnel management be modified to allow 

SOF operators to specialize in language and cultural expertise and 

be well positioned for future advancement and promotion? What are 

the factors associated with the current disconnect between the stated 

importance of language and cultural expertise for SOF missions and 

the negative impacts such training has on SOF career paths, and how 

might these factors be mitigated?

E3. Programmatic approaches to building current and future 

regional capability 

The Services traditionally had a reactionary posture toward regional 

expertise. Vietnamese, Russian, and Romance language speakers may 

be in demand one decade, then less so the next when new threats 

emerge. After 9/11 the Services scrambled to develop Arabic, Pashto, 

Dari (and Farsi) and Urdu skills—how will they (and the AfPak 

Hands cadre) be treated by 2020? Despite the diversity within the 

United States, the Services are woefully short specialists for many 

key regions or countries. This is particularly true for Asian languages 

and the less commonly taught languages such as Yoruba, Swahili, and 

other African languages. What set of force (personnel) management 
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E. Regional and Cultural Issues 

priorities makes sense over the long run to let us engage quickly and 

effectively with populations in regions that are not yet a national 

priority? 

E4. Cultural vampires: Why don’t we see our own reflection? 

The U.S. national security community, which includes Special Operations Forces, often fails to understand how our own established narratives and cognitive frameworks prevent us from taking a critical view 

of ourselves. Despite a strong emphasis on learning about the cultural 

and social issues of other countries there is often little understanding 

of how other cultures see the United States and how they interpret 

U.S. actions. How have policies and operations been influenced by 

this failure to see how the U.S., U.S. forces, and SOF personnel are 

perceived? How can the development of the ability to see ourselves as 

others see us lead to more successful engagement with other cultures? 

How do SOF educate and encourage leaders, planners, and operators 

to critically analyze the U.S. and SOF from an outsider’s perspective? 

Are formal Red Teams the only way to achieve this goal? What other 

actions could result in development of this ability?

E5. China’s SOF professionalization and regional implications 

China is moving from a large military traditionally composed of conscripts to smaller and more professionalized armed forces. What is 

the reason behind this transformation and its goals? How is this military transition and modernization affecting China’s SOF and their 

capabilities? What are the implications of China’s military transition 

for Taiwan’s security? What potential SOF missions might China 

be preparing to conduct in Asia, and how might the United States 

counter their efforts?

E6. Countering insurgency in Pakistan 

Because of its status as a nuclear power, the threat from insurgency 

and/or terrorism in Pakistan has significant regional and global 

implications. What approaches can be used to develop improved 

military to military and other diplomatic relations with Pakistan in 

order to counter the threat from insurgents and terrorists? How can 

geographical areas inside Pakistan that may serve as safe havens for 
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Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

terrorists be identified? What measures can be taken to counter the 

threat of weapons of mass destruction falling into terrorist hands? 

How do terrorist organizations and insurgencies interact with, fight 

against, or gain support from Pakistan’s government (or elements 

within it)? Which of these actions should be countered, and how? 

E7. Building persistent cultural expertise and population 

engagement

In many different types of operations, relationships with the local 

population—both civilian and military—are central to mission success. In recognition of this, efforts toward building cultural awareness 

and ‘cultural intelligence’ capabilities within SOF have increased. 

Though the need to build personal relationships with the local population is recognized, there seems to be little continuity in retaining 

these relationships between rotations. This lack of continuity can 

lead to increasing disenchantment by the population as the benefits 

of relationship building never come to fruition. It can also lead to 

indifference and unwillingness to engage. What can be done to maximize the retention of socio-cultural information and relationships 

with locals between rotations? One suggestion is to have “practical” 

regional guidebooks that are based on interviews from the team 

in place and available for the next team before it arrives. Another 

possibility is to have overlap between the rotations. What are other 

potential solutions, and what are their pros and cons (i.e. practicality, 

cost, availability of resources, impact)? 

E8. Female Engagement Teams: Assessing the capability 

What are the roles, limits, and effectiveness of female SOF personnel 

employed in Cultural Support Teams (CSTs), or Female Engagement 

Teams (FETs) as part of Village Stability Operations in Afghanistan? 

Do these soldiers receive adequate training prior to deployment? 

Are there “common threads” of concern expressed by the personnel experienced in these activities that would suggest opportunities for improvement of this program (i.e. cultural, social, medical, 

or counseling training; equipment; funding; et cetera)? What has 

been the impact of these teams on the Afghan women? Are they 

adequately equipped and resourced to handle the challenges posed 
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E. Regional and Cultural Issues 

by Afghan women (health, mental, social problems)? Are the impacts 

being made by these CSTs/FETs indicative of requisite U.S. military 

doctrinal changes? Should such teams be established earlier in future 

U.S. operations in foreign lands? 

E9. The application and acquisition of cultural knowledge 

When Western militaries think of cultural knowledge (or crosscultural competencies), which is the ability to recognize the shared 

beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviors of a group of people and, most 

importantly, apply this knowledge toward a specific goal, they tend 

to focus this analysis on the “enemy” and “host nation” domains. 

One of the problems with this approach is that the population is a 

key center of gravity in COIN and other operations. Should cultural 

intelligence be applied in this domain as well? How can cultural intelligence be utilized when working with other government agencies, 

nongovernment organizations, and key partner nations? Are there 

other areas where cultural intelligence becomes important? How are 

these domains/areas related to each other? What is more beneficial 

to teach: culture general or culture specific knowledge? How should 

this subject be taught? 

E10. Foreign professional military education institutions: Are they 

important for SOF diplomacy in future operations? 

Foreign professional military education (FPME) institutions have 

been viewed as a venue for SOF to promote our way of life and facilitate relationship building in countries and regions of interest. These 

institutions are also thought of as a direct way to enhance our SOF 

community’s regional and cultural expertise and create a better “SOF 

Diplomat.” What are the actual connections these FPME institutions 

have on our diplomacy in foreign countries? Is there a direct correlation with SOF attending one of these institutions and being viewed 

more positively or negatively to that particular country’s interest over 

time? 

29

F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues 

F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues 

Topic Titles

F1. Thickening the force: General purpose force roles and preparation 

for supporting SOF 

F2. Does USSOCOM need global authorities in order to effectively 

fight the global combating terrorism mission?

F3. Persistent engagement in noncombat theaters 

F4. What should USSOCOM’s role be in security cooperation? 

F5. Talent management: Global assignments for SOF

F6. SOF personnel advancement, retention, and career development

F7. Maritime SOF operations

F8. Force structure balance 

F9. SOF and technology

F10. Stopping the unauthorized transfer of SOF tactics, techniques, and 

procedures

F11. Afghanistan: 2014 and beyond

Topic Descriptions

F1. Thickening the force: General purpose force roles and preparation for supporting SOF 

The drawdown of conventional forces in Iraq and Afghanistan combined with an expansion of SOF globally is likely to increase in operations tempo for SOF rather than decrease it. To help mitigate the 

increased pressure on SOF, what are appropriate and feasible roles 

for GPF support to SOF? What specialized training or equipment is 

required for GPF to support or augment SOF, and how can the SOF 

Force Generation initiative introduced in SOF doctrine be advanced? 

How will GPF be selected, trained, and resourced to support SOF? 

What organization will conduct the training? Are there legal and 

funding constraints associated with GPF support to SOF? Research 

can be approached from a philosophical or functional perspective 

rather than a force-centric perspective. 
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Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

F2. Does USSOCOM need global authorities in order to effectively 

fight the global combating terrorism mission? 

Since 9/11, under Title 10, USSOCOM has provided SOF to the theater 

geographic combatant commanders for them to employ in military 

operations and security cooperation missions within their areas of 

responsibility, yet USSOCOM maintains responsibility for synchronizing the global effort against terrorist organizations. As we move 

away from active theaters of major combat and into smaller more 

spread out IW engagements, is this the most efficient use of SOF? 

How does USSOCOM coordinate a global counterterrorism campaign plan? USSOCOM’s experience as a force provider in the war on 

terror provides a unique opportunity to examine the adequacy of the 

Title 10 service-like responsibilities and authorities of the command. 

What issues and problems have emerged? What has worked well? 

Where have responsibilities and authorities not been adequate for 

the demands placed on SOF? What additional service-like authorities should or should not be given to USSOCOM? Should USSOCOM 

become a separate, fifth Service with responsibilities and authority 

for assignment of personnel, promotion, all training and education, 

and special pay entitlements? Is a change to the Unified Campaign 

Plan the answer? Why or why not? Should the Secretary of Defense 

support legislative changes in order to consolidate and streamline 

authorities and funding for SOF? If so, which ones?

F3. Persistent engagement in noncombat theaters 

How can SOF develop persistent engagement or presence in noncombat theaters? What is the appropriate footprint for SOF to have 

in these environments? Will a large overt footprint hinder the legitimacy of the host nation government, or will a small footprint be too 

risky? How can SOF tailor packages to specific regional areas with 

respect for resourcing and cultural sensitivities? What is the best way 

to develop “left of zero” awareness in emerging threat environments? 

Unlike current episodic theater security cooperation plan events, 

could persistent presence truly develop regional or country specific expertise (to include language and cultural familiarity)? Could 

SOF conduct episodic engagement through accompanied deployments? What would the implications be of moving operators and 
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F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues 

their families to noncombat theaters for extended periods? Instead 

of episodic 30-120 day deployments, would deploying operators and 

their families to regionally focused areas for two to three years be 

more advantageous? Would this also reduce stress on the force and 

their families?

F4. What should USSOCOM’s role be in security cooperation? 

Providing capabilities to enable partner nations the ability to conduct the wide spectrum of special operations requires a disciplined 

approach to research, development, fielding, and sustainment. 

Should USSOCOM restructure its security cooperation role? Should 

USSOCOM manage and execute its own security cooperation budget 

in tandem with Theater Combatant Command budgets? Should a 

USSOCOM security cooperation officer be placed in embassies 

alongside component security cooperation officers? As USSOCOM 

extends its engagement with Four and Five Eye countries and continues to mature relationships with NATO SOF Headquarters member 

nations as well as other focus countries, what should USSOCOM’s 

long range strategy of end goals and objectives be for each of these 

relationships? 

F5. Talent management: Global assignments for SOF 

In taking SOF global by expanding interagency and foreign assignments for SOF personnel, how do these assignments affect personnel 

advancement and career development? Are SOF career paths able to 

properly accommodate for multiple interagency and exchange tours 

in ways that don’t negatively impact advancement or even retention? 

Do SOF career paths allow for the time to educate personnel properly 

for these assignments? Will these tours diminish or enhance operator skills? Should USSOCOM pursue multiple-track career options 

for SOF such as a SOF liaison or a SOF-specific foreign area officer 

program? Should this apply to both the noncommissioned and officer 

corps?

F6. SOF personnel advancement, retention, and career development 

What are the effects of service professional military education 

(PME) requirements dwell time and non-traditional tours on the 
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2013

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

advancement, retention, education, and further development of SOF 

personnel? Can this be measured properly to capture effects? If not, 

what policy, legislation, or even service doctrine need to change to 

accommodate an appropriate measurement? Dependent on the priorities for SOF, how can individual services capture these requirements in advancement, command, and milestone selection? How can 

USSOCOM better influence services to capture these requirements 

and influence the services to implement? Human resource policies 

vary widely between the services, and DOD incentives have not been 

implemented equally across the services, so while one service requires 

schooling for advancement, another service penalizes service members for leaving the tactical or operational fight. The administration 

of PME is service specific. As the Services manage a reduction of endforce strength, PME slots will become even more difficult to acquire 

for some service members. Should USSOCOM have a larger say in 

service-sponsored PME for SOF? 

F7. Maritime SOF operations 

Examine the future of full-spectrum SOF operations conducted from 

the sea. What types of operations can be optimized for sea-basing? 

In what operations can we expect SOF to be in the supporting or 

supported role? What revised relationship does USSOCOM need 

with the Department of the Navy? What operational relationships 

are required between each Combined Force Maritime Component 

Command and respective TSOC? Does the U.S. Navy have the proper 

inventory (ships, submarines, even aviation units) to support these 

operations? What capabilities does this inventory currently have, and 

what else is needed? Which Navy and Marine units should habitually support maritime SOF operations? How do we maintain this 

habitual support in the current budget environment? Who should 

budget these units that provide habitual support?

F8. Force structure balance 

Given the challenges of the 21st century and recent policy and strategy decisions, how well structured are SOF? What are the strengths 

and shortfalls of current and proposed force structures? Are there 

vulnerabilities and risks? What is the best way forward? 
33

F. USSOCOM and SOF Issues 

F9. SOF and technology 

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated that technology 

has both helped and hurt the outcome. What is the role of technology 

for Special Operations? When does it become counter-productive to 

the outcome? Can an analysis of USSOCOM and SOF component 

acquisition mechanisms against strategic needs determine whether 

there is a disconnect? Is there a gap between what we say and what 

we do? What potential mismatches exist between the introduction of 

U.S. weapon systems to foreign countries by SOF, and the ability of 

those countries to take full advantage of and sustain those systems? 

Can USSOCOM partner with U.S. industry to deliver inexpensive 

solutions for partner nations to self sustain? Should the U.S. and 

SOF continue acquisition of foreign systems such as Russian built 

weapons and aircraft for partner nation use? What changes in USSOCOM’s strategic planning and technology development and exploration programs need to be implemented to ensure game changing or 

revolutionary technologies can be realized? What types of human 

performance driven research should be explored? Are there other 

options to develop host nation industry solutions for defense?

F10. Stopping the unauthorized transfer of SOF tactics, techniques, 

and procedures 

The unauthorized and sometimes intentional illicit transfer of SOFspecific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) is a concern for 

USSOCOM. Private military companies hire former SOF personnel to teach, train, advise, and even assist foreign nations’ SOF on 

the intricacies of executing various SOF missions. Some of the TTPs 

transferred are sensitive and unique, and in some cases, were the 

deciding factor between mission success and failure. SOF TTPs are a 

target for exploitation by domestic commercial interests in addition 

to hostile foreign governments. What types of counter-exploitation 

policies/programs are in place to mitigate the unauthorized transfer 

of these TTPs? What organizations and resources are available to 

oversee this type of program? Who is responsible for oversight, and 

what are the sanctions and penalties for the unauthorized release of 

sensitive TTPs? 
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2013

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

F11. Afghanistan: 2014 and beyond 

As the U.S. military draws down in Afghanistan, what national security challenges will remain? What organizations will pose the greatest 

threat to U.S. interests as the drawdown is executed? Should the drawdown occur in phases, or what actions can SOF take now to prepare 

for success as the conventional forces prepare to depart? 
35

G. Topics Retained from Previous Years 

G. Topics Retained from Previous Years 

Topic Titles

G1. National cost threshold when defeating terrorist networks 

G2. Comprehensive approaches: Sharing the security burden globally 

G3. Comprehensive approaches: Developing better national strategies 

G4. Embedding full-time Special Operations Liaison Officers in select 

embassies

G5. Importance of socio-cultural understanding in combating 

terrorism 

G6. Influencing public attitudes in different cultures and societies 

G7. Preempting and preventing insurgencies 

G8. SOF roles and missions in an unstable Middle East 

G9. Bridging the DOD-nongovernmental organization divide 

G10. SOF aviation: Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

G11. What are the appropriate metrics for DOD to assess irregular 

warfare operations? 

G12. Leveraging academic support for Special Operations 

Topic Descriptions

G1. National cost threshold when defeating terrorist networks 

One of the objectives attributable to al-Qaeda is the desire to economically bankrupt the United States. If this is true, it is an objective 

that has not yet been achieved. Nonetheless, the United States and its 

allies have suffered losses of blood and treasure and have made vast 

expenditures in security precautions and counterterrorism activities 

to defeat the terrorism network. Expenditures have been made by 

both the public and private sectors. Various estimates of a “true cost” 

have been postulated in terms of actual dollar and opportunity costs, 

but single analysis has brought together the qualitative and quantitative metrics to provide a basis for judging a cost threshold of where 

the objective might be realized. Moreover, national will is another 

cost threshold; it is not just about dollars. What are the costs currently 

attributed to the current level of efforts in counterterrorism security 

and operations worldwide? How is or should this burden be shared? 
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2013

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

What does the U.S. spend? Which of these costs are sunk costs—that 

is, would be expended anyway as a part of any security paradigm? 

How much effort and money can the United States afford to expend 

over what timeframe for successful counterterrorism? How are U.S. 

funds and efforts best used? What should the U.S. spend to support 

partner nations in establishing/improving their counterterrorism 

organizations and efforts?

G2. Comprehensive approaches: Sharing the security burden 

globally

Iraq and Afghanistan, threats of potential conflicts, and increased 

instability exceed the costs of what American taxpayers can reasonably be expected to support. Contributions of friends and allies in 

Afghanistan in a comprehensive approach have helped. Nonetheless, 

United States security capacity is strained by increasing commitments. Is a new global security paradigm possible based on a comprehensive approach? What is a comprehensive approach, and what 

are the scenarios it may support? For example, from a U.S. perspective, can we delegate more of the counterterrorism, nation building/

peace-keeping/FID operations to others? Can the North Atlantic 

treaty Organization and the United Nations take more of the security 

burden in various regions/states? If so, what are the plausible scenario 

implications for SOF? What are the measures of capability on the host 

nation to assume the responsibility? 

G3. Comprehensive approaches: Developing better national 

strategies

Many countries struggle in the development of their national strategies. Yet, legitimate state actors that have evolved good processes for 

strategic appraisals and strategy formulation invariably pursue strategies that complement U.S. interests rather that oppose them. How can 

the SOF community help other nations understand strategy formulation better and gain a better appreciation for whole of government 

and comprehensive approaches to local, regional, and global security 

and stability issues? Do SOF warriors understand national strategy 

and strategy development? Do SOF warriors know and understand 

the concepts of Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)? Where 
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G. Topics Retained from Previous Years 

does SOF teach our Captains how to appreciate and develop strategy? 

Does the interagency and military leadership (not just SOF) understand IDAD? Should there be a national executive agent for IDAD? 

Where does SOF fit best as a tool to support IDAD?

G4. Embedding full-time Special Operations Liaison Officers in 

select embassies

SOCOM is developing Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLOs) 

for assignment with partner nation SOF headquarters overseas. 

Should SOCOM have full-time SOLOs embedded in the country 

teams at U.S. embassies in countries with critical SOF operations? 

What would be the purpose and role of such SOLOs? What role justifies placement of a full-time SOLO at an embassy as opposed to what 

military attaches or security cooperation officers do currently? What 

would be the specific duties of a SOLO, and how would they differ 

from other U.S. military personnel assigned to an embassy? What 

are the diplomatic, legal, and bureaucratic requirements? Are there 

professional development implications? Should SOF heavily participate in respective Service Foreign Area Officer programs or develop a 

parallel SOF-specific career track? Should there be language, country 

experience, and rank requirements? Do we have the resources/manpower to execute this idea?

G5. Importance of socio-cultural understanding in combating 

terrorism

Understanding culture has been an area of training and tactical 

emphasis for SOF warrior-diplomats since the beginning of Special 

Forces. Improvements in cultural understanding at the tactical and 

interpersonal level have been useful, but insufficient. Success requires 

an understanding of both culture and society and how they interrelate. Individual cultures, tribes, civil and religious structure and 

organizations, economic structure and activities, and governance 

structure and practices are all part of the tapestry of a nation. How 

do we need to think holistically and strategically about societies 

and cultures? What disciplines are available to aid SOF in thinking 

about cultures and societies, and how can they inform us? What 

paradigms are available to help us understand the complexity and 
38

USSOCOM Research Topics 2013

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

nature of intercultural interactions? What are the implications of 

what is known and what is not known at this time? How can SOF 

use this knowledge or improve on it? How does enhanced cultural 

awareness impact SOF operations? What is the linkage between the 

U.S. and Host Nation End State and cultural understanding?

G6. Influencing public attitudes in different cultures and societies

The U.S. military effort to assist earthquake victims in Pakistan 

changed public attitudes in regard to the United States favorably, if 

only briefly. How foreign public attitudes shift and change is poorly 

understood or responded to by United States agencies. What research 

has been done in regard to foreign public attitudes and how they are 

shaped and changed? What are the dynamics of these shifts, and why 

does the U.S. fail to anticipate, avoid, or gain advantage from them? 

What insights can SOF gain from this research? Does it confirm or 

conflict with what SOF now believes or acts on?

G7. Preempting and preventing insurgencies

The Iraq and Afghanistan experience reinforces the old adage that an 

ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Explore the possibility 

that through strategic assessment, U.S. assets could identify where 

insurgencies might occur and take preemptive actions or preventive 

measures to preclude them or mitigate their consequences. What are 

the metrics for an assessment and the decision to act? What types 

of missions might be used? What are the metrics for success? What 

risks are involved? Considering all this, how would SOF assets be 

used in these circumstances? How do you convince the host nation it 

has a problem, and then how does the Embassy/SOF team approach 

the problem?

G8. SOF roles and missions in an unstable Middle East

Recent instability in numerous Middle Eastern countries presents 

challenges and opportunities to the U.S. in the global order. However, these opportunities do not promise to be easy, and failure will 

create more challenges to the world community. U.S. interests are best 

served if modernity occurs and arrives in the least painful way for the 

populations involved. Where on the spectrum of conflict might these 
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G. Topics Retained from Previous Years 

transitions occur? How can they be moved closer to stability? What 

are the likely SOF roles and missions as this process unfolds. How 

can SOF contribute to the reshaping of these societies in ways that are 

not contrary to the interests of the United States and the indigenous 

populations? How does Special Operation Forces collaborate with 

its European allies to have a positive impact on these nations? What 

risks are involved? Who leads the effort?

G9. Bridging the DOD-nongovernmental organization divide

There is an existing history of NGO aversion to cooperation and 

identification with U.S. military forces. Yet, military professionals 

and NGO professionals share much in common in regard to values 

and commitment. And, increasingly they share the same operational 

space. More recently, some members of the NGO community have 

begun to question their aversion, and the military has developed 

a new appreciation for what NGOs can do to help in fragile states. 

Should we further bridge the DOD-NGO divide, and if so, how? What 

are the reasons for the divide? What are the advantages and disadvantages of greater cooperation? Where does it make sense, and where 

is it not appropriate? Are there ways to facilitate shared operational 

space issues? Are there doctrinal precepts? What are they? What are 

the mechanisms of bridging—for example, doctrine, education, and 

structural? Are there unique SOCOM roles and responsibilities in 

regard to NGOs? What are possibilities and the pros and cons of SOF 

working with NGOs?

G10. SOF aviation: Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) have provided enhanced capabilities to address a variety of operational requirements. The purpose 

of this study is to explore the utility of employing UAS assets to support irregular warfare operations. How can multi-mission UASs assist 

in nontraditional environments? What specific capabilities can UASs 

bring to irregular warfare activities? Which irregular warfare strategies and tasks are appropriate for UASs? Identify specific employment profiles for using UASs in irregular warfare situations. Consider 

such missions as humanitarian relief operations, civil affairs, disaster 
40

USSOCOM Research Topics 2013

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Strategic Studies Department.

response and the resulting hybrid threats they may impose on COIN 

and irregular warfare operations. 

G11. What are the appropriate metrics for DOD to assess irregular 

warfare operations?

The measurement of success in irregular warfare operations is 

extremely difficult because of the absence of “cookie-cutter” solutions to address any given situation and the need to develop specific metrics on a case-by-case basis. This study tackles the challenge 

of determining how irregular warfare operations can be viewed as 

effects-based when existing measurements of success are so rudimentary. Active engagement with academia and the application of assessment and analysis tools already used by social scientists can greatly 

assist in irregular warfare evaluation efforts. Contrast the need for 

an “inside out” assessment model that considers people, adversaries, 

and environmental perspectives with the traditional U.S. “outside in” 

approach. How do we arrive at data baselines against which to measure effectiveness? How do we measure the impact of irregular warfare activities (beyond killing the terrorists) in achieving geographic 

combatant command, DOD, and national strategic goals? What is the 

measurement of effect(s) for FID in terms of partner preparedness 

vs. SOF relationship building? What are the lines of operation for 

other SOF activities, and how can those measurements be captured? 

How do we define success, and how do we measure it? How do we 

measure “good enough?” How do we assess when no action is better 

than action that, though successful, may result in huge strategic costs? 

What are the time horizons across which we should measure?

G12. Leveraging academic support for Special Operations

The SOF community, in the form of Office of Strategic Services, was 

an innovator in the recruiting and use of academic specialists—

for example, anthropologists, political scientists, historians, and 

linguists—to advance irregular warfare initiatives. Support in the 

early days was typically enthusiastic. While productive relationships 

have continued to some extent, recent years have seen far less enthusiasm in academia for defense and security interaction. Sometimes 

the response is outright rejection and hostility. In a 2008 effort to 
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G. Topics Retained from Previous Years 

reinvigorate what decades earlier had been productive relationships, 

former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates oversaw the development of what was called the Minerva Consortia. This initiative 

included academic outreach and a number of programs that included 

the creation and deployment of Human Terrain Teams, document 

exploitation for key areas of interest to both scholars and military 

planners, religious and ideological studies, and other applications of 

history, anthropology, sociology, and evolutionary psychology expertise residing in U.S. universities. Some of these programs, however, 

particularly the Human Terrain Teams under U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command management, have proven controversial in 

academia and in reviews of implementation and effectiveness. While 

SOF has its own priorities and approaches, concepts for leveraging 

academic support for special operations should be considered in light 

of such controversies and problem areas. This study addresses how 

SOF can most productively use expertise found in U.S. universities 

and academic research centers to advance SOF knowledge, skills, initiatives, and operations. It will consider concepts, approaches, specific 

activities and programs, and the overall nature, appropriateness, and 

potential of academic/university relationships.