U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

86–350 PDF 2014

S. HRG. 113–151

WHERE IS TURKEY HEADED? GEZI PARK, TAKSIM

SQUARE, AND THE FUTURE OF THE TURKISH

MODEL

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 31, 2013

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut, Chairman

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Jeffrey, Hon. James F., Philip Solodz Distinguished Visiting Fellow, The 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC .......................... 8

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9

Johnson, Hon. Ron, U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, opening statement ............... 2

Murphy, Hon. Christopher, U.S. Senator from Connecticut, opening statement ...................................................................................................................... 1

Volker, Hon. Kurt, executive director, McCain Institute for International 

Leadership at Arizona State University, Washington, DC ............................... 14

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15

Wexler, Hon. Robert, president, S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East 

Peace, Washington, DC ....................................................................................... 11

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13

White, Jenny B., professor, Boston University, Boston, MA ................................ 3

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Prepared Statement of Kilic Bug ̆ra Kanat, assistant professor of Political 

Science, Penn State, Erie and Research Fellow at the SETA Foundation, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 33

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1)

WHERE IS TURKEY HEADED? GEZI PARK, 

TAKSIM SQUARE, AND THE FUTURE OF THE 

TURKISH MODEL 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 31, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:08 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher Murphy 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Murphy, Shaheen, Johnson, and Risch. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER MURPHY,

U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT 

Senator MURPHY. Good afternoon, everyone. We will have this 

hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe 

and Eurasian Affairs come to order. 

I would like to welcome everyone to this hearing on the topic of 

United States/Turkish relations in the wake of the widespread 

antigovernment protests in Turkey. I would especially like to welcome our witnesses today: The Honorable Kurt Volker, The Honorable James Jeffrey, The Honorable Robert Wexler, and Dr. Jenny 

White. Thank you, all four, for being here today. We look forward 

to your testimony. 

For the United States, it does not get much more important than 

the United States/Turkey relationship. Over the last 8 years, I 

have traveled to Turkey three times, and I have had the chance to 

watch with awe as Prime Minister Erdogan and the AKP Party 

have led Turkey to the global forefront as an economic and political 

powerhouse in the region; in part, thanks to years of engagement 

with Europe and the United States. 

At the same time, the ruling party has used its narrow majority 

to pass controversial legislation and, at times, to suppress journalistic and, recently, political freedom. We are here today to assess 

the current state of political affairs in Turkey, because the direction that Turkey takes, particularly on the question of the quality 

of its democracy, matters greatly to the United States and our 

interests in Turkey’s neighborhood. 

Turkey offers inspiration to emerging democracies and aspiring 

democrats, and it is crucial to the United States that the light of 

this example grows brighter instead of dimming. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2

For people throughout the region, Turkey’s economic achievement and the relative freedoms enjoyed by its citizens have proven 

very attractive, enabling Turkey to generate a significant amount 

of influence with their neighbors in the Middle East, in the Balkans, in the Caucasus. These countries have, for the most part, 

actively pursued increased engagement with Turkey, and they

hope to benefit from Turkey’s role as a relatively wealthy regional 

power broker. The deterioration of the Turkey/Israeli relationship 

threaten one of the most important pillars of stability in the Middle 

East, and we are now hopeful that recent rapprochement will deepen ties between these two important United States allies. 

The regional dynamic has undoubtedly changed since the events 

of the Arab Spring, and not, frankly, in Turkey’s favor. Some of the 

governments with whom Turkey was holding high-level meetings 

and signing trade agreements have fallen, with uncertainty taking 

the place of much more stable relationships that Prime Minister 

Erdogan had worked very hard to solidify. The region, and therefore much of Turkey’s foreign policy, is now in a period of transition. 

And, much like their foreign policy, Turkey’s internal political 

situation has now become more fluid, as well. Erdogan’s moderate 

Muslim political party brought in many people to the political system who had not been part of that process before, and he has created a very effective political bloc that continues to win elections. 

But, his government’s response to the protest movement appeared 

more in line with the response of a defensive dictator than the 

popular democratically elected leader that he actually is. The continued arrests and harsh treatment of protesters, and lashing

out at Twitter and Facebook, and the subtle, and, frankly, not so 

subtle, accusations against the Jewish diaspora and Western governments—well, it has confounded Turkey’s friends as well as its 

critics. 

Turkey faces a challenge now of how to balance their secular traditions and religious freedoms, between pursuing their interests in 

the region while also standing for democratic Turkish values. How 

Turkey manages this balancing act is of great interest to the 

United States. And, in the wake of recent political developments 

there, we look forward to hearing from our panel as we examine 

answers to these questions. 

I will now recognize Senator Johnson for opening remarks. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RON JOHNSON,

U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I think you have really laid out a pretty good summary of the 

situation. Obviously, Turkey is—you know, from its position, strategically, as well as location, is incredibly important for us and for 

NATO. 

I certainly want to welcome the witnesses. I want to thank them 

for coming. 

And, really, I would—let us hop into the testimony and then get 

into our questions. 

Senator MURPHY. Great. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3

Senator MURPHY. Let me introduce our guests. I will give quick 

introductions, all at once, and then we will go down the line, starting with you, Dr. White, to Mr. Volker. 

So, first, our witness, Jenny White, is a professor of anthropology 

at Boston University and is an expert on Turkey. She has authored 

numerous books and articles on topics ranging from political Islam 

in civil society to ethnic identity and gender issues. 

Dr. White, we are very pleased to have you with us today. 

We are also very pleased to have Ambassador James Jeffrey, the 

Philip Solodz Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Washington 

Institute for Near East Policy. Ambassador Jeffrey is a former U.S. 

Ambassador to Turkey, Deputy National Security Advisor, and 

former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and Albania, among many other 

positions that he has held during a career in the Foreign Service. 

Earlier in his life, Ambassador Jeffrey was a U.S. Army infantry 

officer, serving in Germany and Vietnam, and we thank you for 

that service, as well. 

Particularly like to welcome my former colleague and friend, 

Robert Wexler, who is the president of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace. Representative Wexler served in the 

House of Representatives for 14 years, where he was one of the 

leaders on the issues related to U.S. policy in the Middle East and 

Europe. As chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee 

on Europe, Representative Wexler worked to strengthen the transatlantic alliance, as well as our relationship with Turkey. 

And it is great to have you here, as well. 

And then, finally, Kurt Volker, who is currently the executive 

director of the McCain Institute for International Leadership and 

a senior advisor to the Atlanta Council and a Fellow with the 

Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins School of 

Advanced International Studies. Ambassador Volker served as our 

U.S. Ambassador to NATO, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 

for European and Eurasian Affairs, and Acting Senior Director for 

European Affairs at the National Security Council, in addition, as 

well, to many other positions that he has held in a lifetime of work 

on national security and foreign policy issues. 

We welcome you all, and we now invite Dr. White to begin your 

testimony. Your full statements will be submitted for the record. 

We ask you to keep your verbal remarks to about 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JENNY B. WHITE, PROFESSOR,

BOSTON UNIVERSITY, BOSTON, MA 

Dr. WHITE. Thank you, Senator Murphy. 

I just want to start with making the point that I do not think 

the protests in Turkey are about Islam or about secularism. I think 

that Gezi Park is emblematic of a much broader discontent with 

the ruling party and with issues that actually cross religious and 

secular lines. 

The AKP government, like those before it, has a majoritarian 

understanding of democracy. Democracy means whichever party 

gets the most votes has won the right to impose the values of its 

community on society. This has been the case whether the government in power banned the headscarf or banned alcohol. And, not 

coincidentally, this view is widely accepted by the Turkish public. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4

The AKP sees the public will as a mandate to make unilateral 

decisions without input by citizens, experts, or sometimes even 

Parliament. The judiciary and other key institutions are often also 

blatantly partisan. So, laws protecting the environment and requiring consultation have been weakened, grandiose development 

schemes are despoiling the environment and erasing entire historic 

neighborhoods and displacing populations. These projects have provoked accusations of corruption, that the networks around AKP are 

reaping profit from private development of public land. 

And just as pious Turks once were incensed by restrictions by 

previous secular governments on Islamic expression, Turks today 

are enraged by government intrusions into their private lives—

what they should wear, what they should drink, what they should 

do with their bodies—and the increasing arrogance of AKP supporters on the street demanding that only their norms be represented in society—so, confronting men and women kissing in 

public, for instance. Statistics show an increase in violence against 

women, yet the government has shut down women’s shelters. 

Another issue that crosses pious/secular lines is anger at the 

AKP government for supporting al-Nusra and other jihadis who are 

allowed to enter Turkey and cross into Syria at will. Their presence 

has begun to polarize Turkey, as well, turning Sunni Turks against 

their fellow Alevi citizens. And Prime Minister Erdogan has helped, 

with some of his statements about the Alevi, to polarize the issue. 

Furthermore, the Prime Minister is attempting to change the 

constitution to give the Presidency much greater power and that 

would, in essence, remove the checks and balances on that power. 

The press has been bought off—and also, it is clear that the Prime 

Minister, himself, would like to occupy that position—the press has 

been bought off or intimidated by the government. Since May 59 

journalists have been fired, most for covering the protests. Turkey 

now has more journalists in jail than any other country in the 

world, as well as a large variety and number of people behind bars 

for offenses that, in most countries, would be considered freedomof-speech issues. 

The paradox is that the AKP received more than half the vote 

in the last election. One reason is the party’s success in improving 

the country’s economy and infrastructure and increasing economic 

and political stability and visibility abroad. The AKP revived and 

largely reinvented Turkey’s past as a former world empire, which 

gave it national pride and the ability to deal with the world without always looking over its shoulder. Throughout the 20th century, 

Turkey saw itself as a potential victim of outside powers aiming to 

undermine it. Turkey’s non-Muslim minorities were treated with 

suspicion as potential cat’s paws of those outside powers. Kurds 

and other nonconforming groups were banned, and worse. The military had no compunction about staging coups to remove elected 

governments that it saw as representing dissonant views. 

When AKP was first elected, in 2002, it attracted voters from 

across the political spectrum who believed that the party would 

blend the country’s widespread conservatism with liberal changes 

and improved rights. And indeed, AKP reinvigorated the EU accession process, it passed a new penal code that improved women’s 

rights. As a result of new EU-aligned laws, the government 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5

stripped the military of the power to interfere in politics. AKP also 

reached out to non-Muslim minorities and Kurds, returning confiscated properties, restoring Kurdish place names. 

But, like a rubberband, after several years of liberal opening, 

AKP has snapped back to exhibiting the Turkish status quo of 

strongman autocracy, authoritarianism, patriarchy, and intolerance. A recent poll puts AKP support at 44 percent now, down 6 

percent, but still enough to win local elections. 

So, what is the result of Gezi? The most important outcome of 

the protests is that a sizable new constituency has emerged. It is 

the first time in Turkish history that such masses of people have 

come together without any ideological or party organization. They 

cross class boundaries, they bridge left/right, conservative/liberal, 

pious and secular. And, despite government claims that there is an 

international cabal steering them, the protesters do not desire to 

overthrow the government. Their central demand is that an elected 

government must also protect the rights of the people who did not 

vote for them, and protect the rights of minorities, although, actually, a lot of protesters were AKP voters, as well. 

However, youth and women have little to say in Turkey’s political life. Taking to the streets was really the only venue available 

to make themselves heard. To change the institutions that reproduced this flawed system, they will need to find a way to get into 

the system, perhaps as a new party, although that is difficult, 

given Turkey’s restrictive election rules. 

So, this is a pivotal moment in Turkey. I see two possible outcomes. 

One is that the Prime Minister makes real concessions. But, he 

seems to be unable to move out of the 20th-century definition of 

statesman as singlehanded ruler of his people to statesman as 

skillful manager of diverse interests and lifestyles. 

The second possibility is that he further polarizes society. And 

even though the Turkish system is quite stable, there is always an 

undercurrent of violence, and the fear is that he implicitly encourages his followers to enforce his rule with street violence. And 

there have been some incidents of that. 

So, the United States has an opportunity right now to put its 

thumb on the scale by acknowledging this new constituency and by 

making the repression more costly. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. White follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JENNY WHITE

The good news: Turkey’s GDP growth and banks are solid; it has the 16th-largest 

economy in the world. As a result of the European Union accession process, Turkey 

has changed hundreds of its laws and institutions to align them with Europe. Parliament is writing a new constitution to replace the one written under military oversight after the 1980 coup, and many hope it will enshrine liberal individual rights. 

The government has initiated a peace deal with the PKK to end decades of war. 

So why have tens of thousands of Turks across the country risen up and taken 

to the streets? The protest was ignited by the uprooting of sycamore trees in Gezi 

Park, the only remaining green space in Istanbul’s central Taksim area, to make 

room for yet another mall. Polls showed that the majority of protesters that flooded 

the streets in dozens of cities across the country were initially motivated by the brutality of the police who shot teargas canisters and rubber bullets directly at peaceful 

protesters, causing severe injuries and deaths. Hundreds of protesters have been 

arrested and will likely be arraigned under draconian terrorism statutes. This was 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6

not the first incidence of police brutality, but the country had come to a tipping 

point. 

The protest is not about Islam versus secularism; the issues cross those lines. 

Gezi Park has become emblematic of a much larger malaise and discontent with the 

increasing autocracy and authoritarianism of the ruling party, and its disregard for 

the wishes of the population on many issues. The AKP government, like those before 

it, has a majoritarian understanding of democracy that polls show is shared by 

many citizens—that democracy means that whichever party gets the most votes has 

won the right to impose the values of its community on society. This has been the 

case whether the government in power banned the headscarf or banned alcohol. The 

AKP sees ‘‘the public will’’ as a mandate to make unilateral decisions without input 

by citizens, experts, or sometimes even Parliament. 

Laws protecting the environment and requiring consultation have been weakened. 

Grandiose urban development schemes are despoiling the environment and erasing 

entire historic neighborhoods, often ethnically and religiously mixed, replacing them 

with middle-class housing for the Muslim bourgeoisie. Government schemes include 

building the world’s largest mosque and airport, a third Bosphorus bridge, and a 

canal between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara that will dissect the European 

half of Istanbul. Such construction projects have provoked accusations of corruption, 

that the networks around AKP are reaping profit from private development of public 

land. 

Just as pious Turks once were incensed by restrictions by previous secular governments on Islamic expression and wearing of headscarves in certain public places, 

Turks today are enraged by government intrusions into their private lives, what 

they should wear, what they should drink (restrictions on alcohol), and what they 

should do with their bodies (for instance, the government urging that women should 

have three children and stay at home, attempts to restrict abortions and Caesarian 

section) and the increasing arrogance of AKP supporters in demanding that only 

their norms be represented in society (confronting men and women kissing in public 

or strolling in a park together). Statistics show an increase in violence against 

women, which is higher in Turkey than in the EU or the U.S., yet the government 

has shut down women’s shelters and shown little interest in dealing with the problem. These are issues that concern both pious and secular citizens. 

Another issue that crosses pious/secular lines is anger at the AKP government for 

supporting Qaeda-linked and other radical jihadis who are allowed to enter Turkey 

and cross into Syria at will. Their presence has begun to polarize Turkey as well, 

turning Sunni Turks against their fellow Alevi citizens, although Alevis differ from 

Syria’s Alawites and have nothing to do with the Syrian conflict. Even Turkish 

Sunnis on the border are afraid of the armed strangers in their midst. 

Furthermore, Prime Minister Erdogan is attempting to change the constitution to 

make Turkey’s parliamentary system into one that gives the President much greater 

powers and that would, in essence, remove the checks and balances on that power. 

And it is clear that he himself, like Putin in Russia, would like to occupy that 

position. 

The press, led by media barons bought off or intimidated by the government, has 

not done a good job of reporting on these issues. Since May, 59 journalists have been 

fired, mostly for covering the protests. Turkey now has more journalists in jail than 

any country in the world. Academics, authors, publishers, trade union members, 

speakers at Kurdish events, grandmothers and children attending protests, students 

demonstrating about school fees, and cartoonists are behind bars for ‘‘offenses’’ that 

in most countries would be considered freedom of speech issues. 

The paradox is that the AKP received more than half the vote in the last election. 

One reason is the party’s spectacular success in improving the country’s economy 

and infrastructure (trains, buses, roads, and so on) and increasing economic and 

political visibility abroad. The AKP government revived (and largely reinvented) 

Turkey’s past as a former world empire, the Ottoman empire, which gave it national 

pride and the ability to deal with the world politically and economically without 

always looking over its shoulder. Throughout the 20th century, Turkey saw itself 

as a potential victim of outside powers aiming to undermine it, a repeat of WWI 

when Europeans dismantled the Ottoman Empire. Turkey’s non-Muslim minorities 

were treated with suspicion as potential cat’s paws of those outside powers. The culture, language, and presence of Kurds and other nonconforming groups and individuals were banned and worse. The military saw itself as a guarantor of a culturally 

and politically unitary Turkey and had no compunction about staging coups to 

remove elected governments that it saw as representing dissonant views. 

After the AKP was first elected in 2002, it attracted voters from across the political spectrum who believed that the party would blend the country’s widespread conservatism with liberal changes and improved rights, especially freedom of religious 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

7

expression (headscarves had been banned from universities) and freedom of speech. 

Indeed, AKP initially reinvigorated the EU accession process and passed a new 

penal code long desired by pious and secular feminists that improved women’s 

rights. As a result of new EU-aligned laws, the government stripped the military 

of the power to interfere in politics. AKP also reached out to non-Muslim minorities 

and Kurds, returning some confiscated properties and restoring changed Kurdish 

place names. 

But like a rubber band, after several years of liberal opening, AKP has snapped 

back to exhibiting what has long been the Turkish status quo of strongman autocracy, authoritarianism, patriarchy, and intolerance. All of these are characteristics 

that polls show are reflected by the population at large and are characteristic of the 

still highly valued traditional family structure. PM Erdogan’s projected stance as 

the authoritarian father punishing disobedient citizen children and protecting the 

national family against outsiders is familiar and laudable to many Turks. 

What next? Turkey’s Government has been freely elected and no one, not even 

the protesters, disputes that. There is no desire to overturn the system or even kick 

out the elected AKP. There is dissatisfaction that PM Erdogan is not acting democratically and people would like to see his party remove him as Prime Minister 

(although realistically no one believes this would happen, even though he has to 

some extent become a liability to his party). A recent poll puts AKP support at 44 

percent now (down 6 percent), still enough to win local elections next March. 

The most important outcome of Gezi is that a sizable new constituency has 

emerged, as yet with no name, no platform, no leader. It is the first time in Turkish 

history that such masses of people—many with contradictory or competing interests—have come together without any ideological or party organization. They cross 

class boundaries and bridge left/right, conservative/liberal, pious/secular. Despite 

government claims that there is an international cabal steering them, the protesters 

are out there to air a wide variety of complaints, but central is their demand that 

an elected government must also protect the rights of the people who did NOT vote 

for them, the rights of minorities, the rights of people whose ideas or lifestyle the 

electoral winners might not agree with. 

However, youth (and women) have little say in Turkey’s political life. Taking to 

the streets was really the only venue available to make themselves heard. To 

change the institutions that reproduce this flawed system, they will need to find a 

way to get into the system, perhaps as a new party, although that is difficult given 

Turkey’s restrictive election rules. 

Nevertheless, the protests have reframed debates in Turkey away from Islamism/

Kemalism as an explanatory framework and instead put the focus on shared rights 

and tolerance of difference. Pushback in the street, amplified by the PM’s belief that 

the protests mean to topple him, could lead to a more cautious approach to development (although the evidence is against this as uprooting of trees and construction 

continue apace). The PM’s aggressive recent response to the Kurds might make 

them unwilling partners in rewriting the constitution for a more powerful Presidency, although their interest in signing the peace deal might win out. 

PM Erdogan’s approval of the brutality against peaceful protesters has galvanized 

a not insignificant part of the population against him and has dislodged his halo 

in international eyes. It is a steep fall. After his recent success in arranging a peace 

deal with the PKK after decades of fighting, people had been speaking about him 

as perhaps the greatest Turkish statesman since Ataturk. But he seems unable to 

move out of the 20th-century definition of statesman as single-handed ruler of his 

people to statesman as skillful manager of diverse interests and lifestyles. His party 

and some of his followers are uncomfortable with the organized chaos that is social 

media and they are unable to envision a society composed of freely interacting individuals. They are always looking for the leader that defines them, the person or 

organization or country to blame. 

U.S. Response: President Obama’s 2009 speech to the Muslim world promised 

moral leadership, but the United States as well seems to be captured by 20thcentury strategies that define conflicts in crude terms of Islam versus secularism. 

We turn a blind eye to human rights violations in return for stability and security, 

while abandoning the 21st-century liberal and moderate constituencies that most 

resemble our own ideals (but that would include moderate Islamists as well). The 

youth of Tahrir Square toppled Mubarak and were then pushed aside. The Gezi constituency should at least be recognized. Appeasement is a slippery slope. The U.S. 

said nothing about the Turkish Government’s deadly repression of peaceful protests, 

and now has said nothing about live bullets in Cairo. What is needed is an acupuncture-like approach, knowing exactly where to apply pressure to exact change (for 

instance, liberalizing Turkish election laws), rather than wholesale support of problematic regimes or, worse, silence.

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

8

Senator MURPHY. Ambassador Jeffrey. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES F. JEFFREY, PHILIP SOLODZ DISTINGUISHED VISITING FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for 

the invitation today. Senator Johnson. It is a delight to be here. 

First of all, in terms of the situation, I would associate myself 

with what Dr. White has just said, and will make just two points 

on the internal situation before taking a look at what the United 

States can do and what this means for us. 

First of all, I do not think that the AKP rule is in serious danger 

at this time. I think that it is a very powerful and very effective 

political force in the country. I am less certain, however, that the 

ambitious plans to reform the constitution into a more Presidential 

system, given what we have seen and what Dr. White just 

described as a major fissure in the society, will be easily carried 

out. So, that is something to look at. 

The second thing is to pick up on her point about majoritarian 

government. The problem that you have with a government where 

whoever the majority is rules—and this goes back to the very roots 

of our own history, with Hamilton and Jefferson on opposite 

sides—if you ignore the minority, if the minority feels that they are 

not part of the society, that they are not at least listened to and 

that some of their key interests are not protected, you can still pass 

laws, and you can still sort of rule, but you are going to be in an 

unstable situation. That is not good for a Turkey, whose economy 

is very modern and integrated into the international market and 

financial systems of the world. And this is something also to watch. 

Now, in terms of the impact on the United States, Turkey cannot, I think, any more than, let us say, China in East Asia, be 

instrumentalized, in a formal sense, as a model for other countries 

to follow. But, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, Turkey has demonstrated that a Muslim-majority country anchored, in part, in the 

broader Middle East could adopt Western political, economic, and 

security systems. And this does inspire other populations in the 

region. It does have a role throughout the Middle East. 

More importantly, a Turkey confident of its internal situation 

and economic progress is more likely to play an active and positive 

role in the region, in close coordination with the United States. 

Although such United States-Turkish coordination has been particularly close in the Obama administration, continued unrest will 

make this coordination more difficult at a time when regional stability makes exactly our need for such coordination with Turkey 

particularly pressing. 

But here, another caution. Many analysts extend the model idea 

to project a Turkey that is little more than a faithful follower of 

United States values and specific interests. Thus, when Turkey 

inevitably deviates in some way from our, ‘‘expectations,’’ incomprehension, indignation, and even anger arise on our part. This all 

flows, I believe, from a misunderstanding of Turkey’s role in the 

world and in relations with the United States. 

Turkey is a independent actor in a way that many of our other 

allies are not. If you look at Western Europe, the other NATO 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

9

states, Japan, Korea—in those countries, there is a fundamental, 

almost eternal, belief that goes beyond governments—all governments—deep into the population, that a security relationship with 

us and wedding itself to Western values, as we see them, is inherently a final decision taken by the society. Turkey is more of an 

independent actor. I would compare it to India and Brazil, with 

several specific characteristics. 

First of all, as every poll I have seen shows, America is not popular in Turkey among the population at large. Governments are 

able to deal with that, and it does not have a major impact on our 

daily policies, but it is something we have to keep in mind. 

Secondly, however, Turkey is a major consumer of Western, 

NATO, and American security. It is a security partner. It has 

grown used to working closely with us throughout the world in 

areas such as Afghanistan and often in the Middle East. The 

NATO radar in Turkey, for example, is one of many signs that the 

Turks generally will go along with us. But, this is on a case-by-case 

basis, and we need to keep that in mind. 

The Turks have their own mind, particularly in what they would 

call their ‘‘near abroad,’’ and they will expect the United States, in 

many cases, to follow them rather than the Turks following us. 

So, what, in the end, should we do about this situation, which 

is quite significant and serious, as you have said? First of all, the 

United States has been restrained, all in all, in our public statements. I think that is wise, because, first of all, if we are faithful 

to the concept of democracy, we have to let the Turkish people 

decide how they want to be governed, as long as they are a democratic system. And they are one. 

Secondly, public condemnation of Turkey and Prime Minister 

Erdogan would be strongly counterproductive, as I have seen 

repeatedly in past crises, at least on the part of the United States 

administration. 

Our goal, thus, should be to do whatever is in our power, reaching out to all who will listen, privately—to some degree, publicly—

to ensure that an honest debate takes place in Turkey to resolve 

the serious splits that we have just heard about in detail in the 

society in a democratic, peaceful manner. Resolution of these societal splits, again, is essential to work effectively with Turkey on 

the huge range of problems we face together in the broader Middle 

East. 

These problems, ranging from Syria to Iran, are the most serious 

we have encountered in three decades, and regional stability, the 

survival of regimes, the security of the oil trade, and even the overall structure of United States-led international security are all at 

risk. We need Turkey by our side, and Turkey needs us. But, from 

America to Anatolia, we all need a stable, democratic Turkey. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Jeffrey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES F. JEFFREY

When Barack Obama made his 2009 trip to Turkey, his first bilateral visit as 

President, he did not single out Turkey as a model per se. Rather, he made the 

point that Turkey ‘‘is not where East and West divide—this is where they come 

together.’’ Along with this, he stressed America’s willingness to work with Turkey 

and, above all, paid homage to Turkey’s status as a successful democracy. Today, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

10

many inside and outside Turkey question whether it will remain the same successful democracy, open economy, and reliable security partner we have seen in recent 

decades. There is cause for concern, but there is also time for the Turks, and it is 

in the first instance their job to sort out the issues behind the Gezi Park demonstrations and tailor their political process as they see fit. 

The demonstrations that broke out in Gezi Park and Taksim Square in Istanbul 

in late May represent the biggest challenge to Prime Minister Erdogan’s AK Party 

rule in the 11 years the party has been in power. The government has survived the 

turmoil and is now on the offensive with a campaign of rhetorical abuse—and judicial action—against those participating in or supporting the demonstrations. I see 

no risk of the government falling over its handling of this whole issue. But the government, particularly Erdogan, will now face serious opposition if he attempts to put 

in place his ambitious program to consolidate Turkey’s Presidential system through 

constitutional change and to have himself elected the first President under this new 

system. While that outcome is still possible, such an ambitious reordering of the 

Turkish political landscape, which would be the most momentous since Ataturk and 

Inonu, looks less and less certain given the supermajorities Erdogan is looking for 

in the 2014 Presidential elections and constitutional referendum. 

Turkey, and Erdogan—were he to find a way to reverse his commitment not to 

run for another term as Prime Minister—can survive without problem within the 

current constitutional political framework. But what was shown by the demonstrations and the government’s reaction to them is that Turkey is increasingly split into 

two quite different political groupings and that the government itself is contributing 

to further polarization of the society. This is the situation of greatest concern to 

those of us who follow Turkey closely. What in particular has troubled observers, 

including me, and the U.S. Government, is the attitude of some, but not all, of the 

government leaders. These leaders, including the Prime Minister, have generally 

demonized all of the demonstrators and are increasingly criminalizing peaceful protest and even free speech if supportive of the demonstrators. This calls into question 

the government’s commitment to free speech and assembly, to the principle of proportionality, and, at bottom, to the democratic principle that minorities cannot simply be ignored. This ‘‘majoritarian’’ approach to democratic rule, which we have alas 

seen elsewhere in the region, ignores a key component of democracy: that it cannot 

encompass just the rule of the majority, but must mobilize at least the willingness 

of the minority to accept that rule and to feel itself part of the larger political society. That feeling, and willingness, are in play now, and as long as that is so, Turkey’s stability and chances for further political, economic, and social progress are 

at risk. 

IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES

How does this affect U.S. interests? Turkey cannot, any more than the United 

States globally, or China in East Asia, be instrumentalized as a ‘‘model’’ for other 

societies to follow. With few unique exceptions—such as the United States immediately after World War II—international relations usually does not work in so 

direct a fashion. Nevertheless, Turkey has demonstrated that a Muslim-majority 

country anchored in part in the broader Middle East could adopt Western political, 

economic, and security systems, prosper under all of them, and become a partner 

to the United States and European Union. Turkey’s relative success or failure in 

this regard does have some effect on the populations of other countries in the region. 

But, more directly, a Turkey confident of its internal situation and economic 

progress is more likely to play an active and positive role in the region, to the extent 

feasible in close coordination with the United States. Although such U.S.-Turkish 

coordination has been particularly close in the Obama administration, continued 

social unrest and resulting questions about the nature of Turkish democracy will 

make this coordination more difficult. A distracted Turkish Government could well 

ally itself further with anti-Western elements that support its hardline policies. The 

United States would then be obliged to speak out on violations of democratic principles, rendering cooperation and coordination even more problematic. Nonetheless, 

assuming that Turkey remains reasonably stable under a democratic system, continued partnership will be possible. Under the chaotic circumstances that reign in the 

region, this partnership will, in fact, remain essential in dealing with Syria, Iran, 

Iraq, and Israel’s role in the region. 

But here, another caution. Many analysts not only overstress the ‘‘model’’ concept 

but also project a Turkey that is little more than a faithful follower of Western, 

especially U.S., values and specific interests. Thus, when Turkey inevitably deviates 

in some way from our ‘‘expectations,’’ incomprehension, indignation, and even anger 

arise on our part. This all flows from a misunderstanding of Turkey’s role in the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

11

world, and with us. In my view, Turkey is not in the same category as the EU 

states, Japan, South Korea, and a number of other close allies. In these countries, 

eternal bonds with, and security subordination to, the United States are political 

givens for the leaderships and populations. But this is not the case with Turkey: 

it is an independent international operator, similar to India or Brazil, but with 

extraordinarily high popular skepticism of the United States and the EU. Likewise, 

it generally shares the same political and economic values as the West and is integrated into various Western institutions. Unlike India or Brazil, however, Turkey 

has a longstanding security relationship with us, shared security interests, and 

strong institutional security arrangements—from NATO membership to massive 

U.S. arms purchases—that are central to its security and its regional role. This produces a strong tendency to consider and if possible go along with U.S. initiatives, 

as seen in Afghanistan. But Turkey will act independently, particularly in its ‘‘near 

abroad,’’ and expect us to back it, rather than Turkey automatically backing us. 

This was true before the Erdogan government, and remains true today. In this 

regard, we need to remember that with its huge burden of Syrian refugees and the 

actions of the PKK-offshoot PYD along the Turkish border,Turkey’s regional security is at stake in a way that ours is not, 

WHAT SHOULD WE DO?

The United States, though speaking out repeatedly about Turkey’s actions and 

statements being at variance from our view of democratic norms, has nonetheless 

been restrained in its reaction. That is a wise decision. First, if we are faithful to 

the concept of democracy, then we recognize that only the people of a given state, 

not outsiders, have the right to pass judgment on the government and the demonstrators. Second, publicly condemnation of Turkey and Erdogan would be strongly 

counterproductive. It would not push the Turkish Government to tailor its response, 

but, as I have seen repeatedly in the past, would make us the central problem, lessening any chance of a more compromising government position. 

Our goal thus should be to do whatever is in our power, mainly privately and 

without antagonizing, to ensure that a complete and honest debate takes place in 

Turkey and to encourage the Turks to resolve the serious splits in their society in 

a democratic, peaceful manner. This is not only an end in itself for a more successful, more stable Turkey, but is also essential if we want to continue to work effectively with Turkey on the huge range of problems we face together in the broader 

Middle East and more widely in Eurasia. These problems are the most serious we 

have encountered in the Middle East in three decades, and regional stability, the 

survival of regimes, the security of the oil trade, and even the overall structure of 

U.S.-led international security are all at risk. We need Turkey by our side, and 

Turkey needs us. But from America to Anatolia, we all need a stable, democratic 

Turkey.

Senator MURPHY. Congressman Wexler. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT WEXLER, PRESIDENT, S. DANIEL ABRAHAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member 

Johnson. It is a special honor for me to testify with two of our 

Nation’s finest diplomats, in every which way, and an esteemed 

professor and academic, as well. 

In 2001, I joined with Congresswoman Kay Granger and Congressman Ed Whitfield to establish the Congressional Caucus on 

Turkey, because we recognized the need for a deeper strategic alliance with Turkey. More than a decade later, our—meaning America—our increased engagement with Turkey has proved indispensable in advancing American interests across the globe. 

While the recent protests in Turkey reflect a schism within Turkish society, no doubt, there is no reasonable comparison between 

these protests and the Arab Spring. Prime Minister Erdogan has 

won three fair-and-free elections in the past decade, each by increasing margins. The protesters’ frustration with the Prime Minister’s administration, both in terms of style and substance, bears 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

12

no relationship to the uprisings against authoritarian dictators 

elsewhere in the region. That there was never even a possibility of 

the military intervening is a testament to just how far Turkey’s democracy has come. 

Still, the United States must encourage Prime Minister Erdogan 

to choose the wisest path. Rather than restricting freedom of the 

press and attempting to sideline its critics, the government should 

point to its impressive record. In a decade, Prime Minister 

Erdogan’s administration has fundamentally strengthened Turkish 

democracy. Perhaps most significantly, Prime Minister Erdogan 

established civilian authority over a military that previously exerted its influence in all facets of society. 

Turkey’s recent economic progress is nothing short of remarkable. Last month, a World Bank report described Turkey’s development over the past decade as one of the success stories of the 

global economy. The Prime Minister’s ambition for Turkey to 

become one of the world’s 10-largest economies by 2023 is a laudable goal. Per capita income has tripled, and poverty has decreased 

from 28 percent in 2003 to 18 percent in 2013. And in May, Turkey 

finally paid off its last loan to the IMF, which prevented a near 

catastrophe, just a decade ago. 

Additionally, Prime Minister Erdogan has taken dramatic steps 

toward enlarging Turkey’s pluralistic democracy. After years of 

bloodshed, the Prime Minister has courageously signaled his intent 

to engage in a peace process with Turkey’s Kurdish community in 

an open and democratic manner. 

Considering these accomplishments, the Prime Minister should 

communicate confidence in his vision for the country. But, the government’s recent statements casting the protests in terms of international conspiracies, interest-rate lobbies, and unfortunate antiSemitic references do not reflect a Turkey commensurate with its 

substantial achievements and aspirations of joining the European 

Union. Rather than attempting to delegitimize voices of dissent, 

the leadership should embrace responsible calls for reform and take 

pride in the depth of Turkey’s personal liberties and democratic 

institutions. 

In dealing with Turkey, I would respectfully suggest that it is 

critical to appreciate that the country is rife with conflicting truths. 

Attempts to label segments of society will inevitably lead to 

misperceptions of the political landscape. A so-called Islamist in 

Turkey is markedly different from an Islamist elsewhere in the 

region. In my own experience, members of the Prime Minister’s 

Justice and Development Party are often more pro-American, market-driven, and pragmatic than the so-called secular parties. Even 

during the recent diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Israel, for 

example, the commercial ties between the countries increased. 

Senators Murphy and Johnson, thank you for holding this hearing. Recent developments in the Middle East demand that the 

United States work with Turkey toward a more stable, peaceful, 

and democratic region. In Syria, Iran, Egypt, Afghanistan, and 

Iraq, our national interests are better served through close cooperation with Turkey. And as we restart negotiations between Israel 

and the Palestinians, it is essential that Turkey and Israel restore 

normal relations so that Turkey can effectively engage both sides 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

13

and fully participate in the diplomatic and economic initiatives 

launched by Secretary Kerry. 

Prime Minister Erdogan is poised to be the most consequential 

Turkish leader since Ataturk. If he can, in fact, harness the protests to broaden Turkey’s democratic tent, he will ensure Turkey’s 

rise as a global power and fortify Turkey’s alliance with both the 

United States and Europe. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT WEXLER

Good afternoon Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Johnson, and members of 

the committee. It is an honor to testify at this critical moment in Turkish-American 

relations. 

In 2001, I joined with Congresswoman Kay Granger and Congressman Ed 

Whitfield to establish the Congressional Caucus on Turkey because we recognized 

the need for a deeper strategic alliance with Turkey. More than a decade later, our 

increased engagement with Turkey has proved indispensible in advancing American 

interests across the globe. 

While the recent protests in Turkey reflect a schism within Turkish society, there 

is no reasonable comparison between these protests and the Arab Spring. Prime 

Minister Erdogan has won three fair and free elections in the past decade, each by 

increasing margins. The protesters’ frustration with the Prime Minister’s administration, both in terms of style and substance, bears no relation to the uprisings 

against authoritarian dictators elsewhere in the region. That there was never even 

a possibility of the military intervening is a testament to just how far Turkey’s 

democracy has come. 

Still, the United States must encourage Prime Minister Erdogan to choose the 

wisest path. Rather than restricting the freedom of the press and attempting to 

sideline its critics, the government should point to its impressive record. In a decade, Prime Minister Erdogan’s administration has fundamentally strengthened 

Turkish democracy. Perhaps most significantly, Prime Minister Erdogan established 

civilian authority over a military that previously exerted its influence in all facets 

of society. 

Turkey’s recent economic progress is remarkable—last month, a World Bank 

report described Turkey’s development over the past decade as ‘‘one of the success 

stories of the global economy.’’ The Prime Minister’s ambition for Turkey to become 

one of the world’s 10 largest economies by 2023 is a laudable goal. Per capita income 

has tripled and poverty has decreased from 28 percent in 2003 to 18 percent in 

2013. And in May, Turkey finally paid off its last loan to the IMF, which prevented 

a near-catastrophe a decade ago. 

Additionally, Prime Minister Erdogan has taken dramatic steps toward enlarging 

Turkey’s pluralistic democracy. After years of bloodshed, the Prime Minister has 

courageously signaled his intent to engage in a peace process with Turkey’s Kurdish 

community in an open and democratic manner. 

Considering these accomplishments, the Prime Minister should communicate confidence in his vision for the country. But the government’s recent statements, casting the protests in terms of international conspiracies, ‘‘interest rate lobbies’’ and 

unfortunate anti-Semitic references do not reflect a Turkey commensurate with its 

substantial achievements and aspirations of joining the European Union. Rather 

than attempting to delegitimize voices of dissent, the leadership should embrace 

responsible calls for reform and take pride in the depth of Turkey’s personal liberties and democratic institutions. 

In dealing with Turkey, it is critical to appreciate that the country is rife with 

conflicting truths. Attempts to label segments of society will inevitably lead to 

misperceptions of the political landscape. A so-called Islamist in Turkey is markedly 

different from an Islamist elsewhere in the region. In my own experience, members 

of the Prime Minister’s Justice and Development Party are often more pro-American, market-driven and international than the so-called secular parties. Even during the recent diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Israel, the commercial ties 

between the countries increased. 

Senators Murphy and Johnson, thank you for holding this hearing. Recent developments in the Middle East demand that the United States work with Turkey 

toward a more stable, peaceful, and democratic region. In Syria, Iran, Egypt, 

Afghanistan, and Iraq, our national interests are better served through close coFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

14

operation with Turkey. And, as we restart direct negotiations between Israel and 

the Palestinians, it is essential that Turkey and Israel restore normal relations so 

that Turkey can effectively engage both sides. 

Prime Minister Erdogan holds the potential to be the most consequential Turkish 

leader since Ataturk. If he can, in fact, harness the protests to broaden Turkey’s 

democratic tent, he will fortify Turkey’s standing with both the United States and 

Europe, and permanently cement his legacy.

Senator MURPHY. Ambassador Volker. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KURT VOLKER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

McCAIN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP AT 

ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador VOLKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator 

Johnson, for the opportunity to appear here. It is really an honor 

and it is also, I should say, an honor to be here next to the former 

chairman of the House Subcommittee on Europe, who is as much 

expert on Turkey as anybody, along with our other distinguished 

panelists. 

When I was at NATO, the joke, when you were waiting for 28 

nations to finish speaking in turn, was that, ‘‘Well, everything’s 

been said, but not everybody has said it.’’ So, I could repeat a lot 

of what has been said here, and I will try to avoid that. Let me, 

instead, try to string together three aspects that I think came out. 

There is the strategic environment around Turkey, which is critically important, including the war in Syria. There is Turkey’s role 

in addressing these things. And there—including partnership with 

the United States, an alliance with the United States—and there 

are the domestic developments inside Turkey. And they have an 

interplay with one another that I think is tremendously important. 

First, Turkey’s own strategic importance. Turkey has the ability 

to enfranchise Islam within a vibrant democracy. In so doing, it 

has the ability to prosper economically and politically for its own 

people and as a inspiration to others in the region. And, given its 

geographic situation, it has the potential to play a meaningful and 

positive role in addressing many of these crises in the neighboring 

area. 

And, of course, the United States is committed to the defense of 

Turkey as a NATO ally, and Turkey has contributed to our shared 

efforts in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. 

So, secondly, Turkey is, therefore, enormously potentially important for the United States. I emphasize ‘‘potentially,’’ because that 

depends upon us knowing what we are doing. What do we want to 

achieve in Syria, in the escalation of violence in Iraq, in the 

Caucasus, in Central Asia? When we know what—with Egypt—

when we know what we are trying to do, we will find that Turkey 

is an invaluable partner in helping us get there. But, at the 

moment, I think our strategic partnership is really underdeveloped 

with Turkey. And, as a result, our influence on events in Turkey 

is somewhat diminished. 

The third is something that came up in all of the testimony, is 

that, recently, there has been a degradation in the quality of the 

democratic or liberal performance of the Erdogan government. We 

have seen two things. We have seen an insertion of Islam into public life in ways that are distressing to large segments of a more secular population. And we have seen authoritarian tendencies in 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

15

response to opposition and protests inside the country. These are 

things that matter a lot. They have echos in the region. The whole 

reason the conversation started about Turkey as a potential model 

or an inspiration is because the AK Party was being successful in 

carving out a path between military dictatorship and Islamist dictatorship. As a party with Islamic roots, but functioning well and 

governing well in a democratic society, they were trailblazing. For 

that model to be reversed in any way would devastating for 

Turkey, but also send terrible signals throughout the region. That 

really is part of the heart of where the Syria conflict began and 

what we are seeing going on now in Egypt. 

I think, therefore, there are two pointers for U.S. policy in this, 

and that you have heard them from other panelists, as well. 

The first one is that U.S. engagement is critical, first off, with 

respect to the crises in the region. The domestic development inside 

Turkey are not yet a crisis, but the conflict in Syria, the escalation 

of violence in Iraq, the risk of that spilling over into Lebanon, the 

risk of destabilizing Jordan, the great uncertainty now which we 

see with Egypt, and our allies with Israel potentially being dramatically affected over these are all critically important. And our 

ability to tackle these depends upon working the strategy for dealing those together with Turkey. I think we have a lot more investment to do in that. 

The second one is connected, which is the domestic developments 

inside Turkey. I think that—and I take the point about not condemning Prime Minister Erdogan. We should not condemn him, 

but we should speak up firmly on behalf of the democratic values 

that we believe in and that most of Turkish society wishes to see 

fully realized in their own society. I do not think it is a choice 

between strategic engagement with Turkey and discussion of 

democracy and values that we share. Instead, by engaging strategically, it gives us the credibility, the skin in the game, also to be 

able to speak up on behalf of democratic values, not in a form of 

condemning or supporting one side against the other, but trying to 

uphold those values so that Turkey emerges stable, prosperous, 

secure, and a partner for us in dealing with some very difficult 

challenges in the region. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Volker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KURT VOLKER

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Senator Johnson, and all the distinguished Senators 

here today, for the opportunity to testify about Turkey—where it is headed—as well 

as United States-Turkish relations and the situation in the wider Middle East 

around Turkey. It is an honor to be here. 

Let me start with three basic observations, and then I will expand on some specific issues in more depth. 

First, Turkey is of enormous strategic importance, for several reasons. Turkey has 

the ability to enfranchise Islam within a vibrant democratic system. In so doing, it 

has the ability to prosper economically and politically, delivering for its own people 

and serving as an inspiration to others. It is a major emerging economy. Given its 

critical geographic position at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, 

it has the potential to play a meaningful and positive role in addressing issues in 

its neighborhood, including Syria, Iraq, Iran, the Caucasus, and more. And, of 

course, the United States is committed to the defense of Turkey as a NATO ally, 

and Turkey has contributed to shared efforts in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

16

Second, Turkey is therefore a potentially invaluable strategic partner for the 

United States in addressing regional challenges. Unfortunately, this partnership has 

been largely unrealized, not least of all because the United States does not at the 

moment have clear goals and strategies for what it would like to achieve—in Iraq, 

in Syria, in the Caucasus, in Central Asia, and in the Eastern Mediterranean and 

North Africa generally. If we knew what we wanted to achieve and were prepared 

to invest serious effort in getting it, Turkey could be an essential ally in doing so. 

As it stands, Turkey feels that the U.S. is not sufficiently engaged on key issues, 

such as Syria, which are of critical interest to Turkey. 

Third, Turkey is facing serious challenges within its democracy—challenges that 

are deeply troubling. If they are not addressed squarely through Turkey’s own 

democratic institutions, all of the positive potential I have just described could 

become a negative, adding fuel to the fire of a Middle East region already in crisis, 

and further stressing an already stressed Europe. 

Taken together, these challenges are related to a lingering question of whether 

Turkey still sees itself as a member of the transatlantic community with a foot in 

the broader Middle East, or a ‘‘post-Ottoman,’’ non-Atlanticist, power. From a U.S. 

perspective, the former is far more desirable. 

All this argues for a much more proactive United States policy with respect to 

Turkey:

• On the one hand, to work with Turkey strategically to address challenges in the 

region, which are of great concern to Turkey and should be of great concern to 

the United States as well; and • On the other hand, to be clear, candid, and public about our deep commitment 

to democratic values and institutions, and our concern that Turkey should 

reverse its drift away from these values, both for its own stability, as well as 

for its ability to play a constructive role in the region.

Some might say that these policies are in conflict—How can one work with Turkey and offer criticism at the same time? I believe the opposite is true. Our ability 

to be taken seriously, and for our concerns to be viewed as constructive support from 

a friend and ally, depends on the degree to which we indeed treat Turkey as a strategic ally, demonstrate our own reliability, and tackle challenges together. 

DOMESTIC SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES

So ‘‘Where is Turkey Headed?’’ Let me start with some context. 

After decades of a strong military role in politics, enshrined in the law governing 

the military and enforced through a number of coups, democratically elected civilian 

rule has become embedded. 

In the early 2000s, through its efforts to escape from financial crisis and integrate 

with the European Union (though that is now largely a side issue), Turkey introduced a series of key reforms and established robust trading relationships that have 

led to vastly improved national prosperity and a growing global economic role. 

Through its role in governing Turkey successfully for many years, the Justice and 

Development Party (the AK Party) had demonstrated the potential for a party with 

Islamic roots to exercise power responsibly and tolerantly within a democratic 

system. 

This growing Turkish strength has helped give Turkey the confidence to address 

a number of regional issues. For example, despite the history of PKK terrorism, the 

current Turkish Government has said it is open to a peace process for the PKK. It 

has developed a constructive relationship with the Kurdish Regional Government of 

Iraq, and Turkish businesses play a leading role in that region’s economic development. Turkey had forged a strong partnership with Israel which—while interrupted 

because of the loss of life on the ill-fated direct aid shipments to Palestinian territory—may gradually be rebuilt. 

In the past 10 years, Turkey has emerged as a major growing economy and a respected actor in key regions: the Middle East, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Iraq, and North Africa. 

At the same time, two major domestic trends have begun to emerge in parallel 

with these positive accomplishments. 

First, under AK Party leadership, there has been a growing effort to push Islam 

into public life in ways that are distressing to the more secular segments of Turkey’s 

population—everything from the government’s attitudes toward women to restricting sales of alcohol to proposing construction of a massive mosque on Camlica Hill 

and another at Taksim square. 

Second, as a governing style, we have repeatedly seen heavy-handed tactics 

applied by the government—for example, in its own rhetoric, in its extraordinary 

pressure on the media, in the use of tax authorities to pressure businesses, includFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

17

ing mediaowners, and in extended detentions without trial of senior military officers 

based on allegations of coup-plotting, or failure to block coup-plotters. The Prime 

Minister’s interest in increasing the powers of the President, and then running for 

President himself, only exacerbate the concerns felt more widely. This all has a 

Putin-esque ring to it. 

In this context, the recent protests that sprang up over the government’s plan to 

uproot trees and build an edifice at Gezi Park reflected far more deep-rooted public 

concern than just over the park itself. The government-dictated plan—and then the 

harsh government crackdown on peaceful protests—reinforced in large segments of 

the population their worst fears about creeping authoritarianism under Prime Minister Erdogan’s leadership. The initial rejection of protester complaints, and call for 

mass demonstrations to support the government, stoked fears of demagoguery and 

a ‘‘tyranny of the majority.’’ 

In recent weeks, the situation has cooled somewhat. But the protests and the government crackdown highlight the fact that a new risk to stability in Turkey that 

has opened up. 

The AK Party’s legitimacy comes not from its expression of Islam in public life, 

but from its obtaining power and then governing through democratic means. As 

fears of over-reach have grown, the government urgently needs to reassure the public by reinforcing its commitment to using democratic means and instruments to 

govern. It needs to show greater respect for opposition and for those who have different political views, rather than simply attempting to overwhelm and defeat them. 

CRITICAL TO A WIDER REGION—EGYPT, SYRIA, AND THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST

The democratic performance of the AK Party is vital not only to Turkey’s future 

and that party’s continued leadership of Turkey. It is also vital in a wider regional 

context. 

We have seen in Egypt how a Muslim Brotherhood government over-reached in 

imposing its will on the population by nondemocratic means, only to be overthrown 

in an increasingly troubling military coup. This has caused the Muslim Brotherhood 

to take more extreme measures, and has given rise to growing violence and political 

instability in Egypt, with the military now responsible for dozens upon dozens of 

deaths. There needs to be a democratic middle ground between Islamist and military dictatorships. 

The very notion of Turkey as a model or inspiration for the region rose from the 

need to identify such a middle ground. Now, if the most successful case of a governing party with Islamic roots, the AK Party, were also to succumb to overreach 

in imposing its will on the entire population through undemocratic means, it would 

give fuel to the argument that political Islam itself is fundamentally undemocratic. 

This would be a tragedy for millions of Muslims throughout the broader Middle 

East, who deserve democratically elected governments that are generally reflective 

of society’s religious values, while at the same time are democratic in the way they 

govern, ensuring that individual rights, fairness, justice, tolerance and pluralism are 

protected. 

Syria is even more critical. The war in Syria has left over 100,000 people dead, 

and created over 1.6 million refugees, and over 4 million internally displaced persons. Outside forces have intervened, including Iran, Hezbollah, Russia, al-Qaeda, 

and other Sunni extremists. The Assad regime has made clear it intends to fight 

its way back to control of the country, likely producing millions more refugees and 

tens of thousands of further deaths. Attacks have already spilled across the border 

into Turkey on a number of occasions. The conflict has also stoked increased violence in Iraq, has threatened stability in Jordan, and is placing enormous pressure 

on Lebanon, where one in six adults is now a Syrian refugee. 

In this environment, the lack of engagement by responsible members of the international community, including the United States, has enabled radical elements to 

increase their influence among the Syrian rebels, caused Syrian Kurds, including 

some who are anti-Turkish, to consider establishing an autonomous zone (perhaps 

partially modeled on the Kurdish region in Iraq), and created conditions where the 

further escalation of the conflict is likely. All of this can jeopardize Turkish security 

interests and possibly drag Turkey directly in the conflict. 

A Turkey that is democratically stable, prosperous, and closely aligning its policies with the United States and Europe can best weather these challenges. But a 

Turkey that is internally divided, while perceiving itself to be isolated and under 

threat from abroad, could end up getting dragged into the conflict in Syria as the 

least bad of a series of undesirable choices. 

How Turkey handles its internal democratic struggles can have a major impact 

on the way the crises in the broader region play out. Turkey can be a capable 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

18

regional player and a force for solutions if it is producing solutions at home. But 

a distracted, less stable Turkey divided along religious and democratic lines will be 

less effective abroad and could even reinforce the predilections of warring parties. 

Indeed, such a Turkey would be in danger of drifting from its two-generations-old 

Atlanticist orientation to something quite different. 

U.S. LEADERSHIP REQUIRED

U.S. leadership is absolutely critical—in seeking to stop the killing in Syria, in 

seeking to prevent the continued expansion of that conflict throughout the region, 

in promoting the creation of a middle ground between military and Islamist dictators in Egypt and the Middle East more broadly, and in encouraging a strong Turkey, as a strategic ally, to remain faithful to its own remarkable accomplishments 

as a democracy and an emerging global economy. 

Turkey’s own orientation—as a NATO ally, as a European nation, and as a vital 

part of a transatlantic community—is at stake. Does Turkey remain part of

this transatlantic community, or does it seek to go it alone as a power broker in 

a broader Middle East region, unhinged from Western political structures? 

It is tempting to think that the United States can let others handle these challenges, while we tackle our own financial and economic challenges as home. It is 

tempting to steer clear of foreign conflicts and bring our soldiers home. The reality, 

however, is that when the United States does not lead, no one else can—and instead, other nefarious forces fill the vacuum we leave in our wake. 

The crises in Syria and Egypt and the deteriorating stability in Iraq were not 

caused by the United States; but lack of U.S. strategic engagement has arguably 

created conditions that have enabled them to become much worse. 

Turkey’s future trajectory still looks positive, but the pressures both internally 

and externally are mounting. A more active U.S. role in addressing challenges in 

the region together with Turkey as a strategic ally—while urging it to live up to 

its democratic traditions—would help make sure that these challenges do not grow 

to such an extent that Turkey itself is at risk. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, that concludes my statement. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify at this hearing.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Ambassador Volker. 

We will now go to a round of 7-minute questions, followed by a 

second round. 

Let me start with you, Dr. White. Everyone spent time talking 

about what our response should be. And you referenced the fact 

that we should put our finger on the scale, here. Can you talk a 

little bit more specifically about what you think our response 

should be? Are you speaking about something more than just some 

rather gentle admonitions, which has, so far, been our policy with 

respect to the political uprisings and the response from the AKP? 

Dr. WHITE. In fact, I very much agree with Mr. Volker, that we 

do have to do something. I mean, the option of doing nothing 

because it is to our strategic advantage, it may be—it may not be 

to our strategic advantage. Depending on which of those two paths 

Turkey goes down, the solution may no longer lie with the AKP; 

you know, the solution of an actual liberal democracy may no 

longer come out of the AKP camp. It may come out of this new constituency that has emerged, but which we seem to have kind of 

ignored. You know, they are just young people, sort of like occupy 

Wall Street, you know, the—gone in a flash. But, in Turkey, it is 

actually a very revolutionary thing. I think it is a pivot point and 

that we do not want to miss that by just glossing over it and saying, ‘‘Well, you know, they have all these other good qualities. We 

should just, you know, gloss over this.’’ Because this is the generation that will then move into positions of power later——

Senator MURPHY. So, then, what are you recommending? 

Dr. WHITE. Well, I think——

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

19

Senator MURPHY. If it is something more than just general admonition——

Dr. WHITE. There are——

Senator MURPHY [continuing]. What is it? 

Dr. WHITE. Specific things that I think can be done, specific 

areas that the government can be pressured on. One of them, for 

instance, is the law that does not allow political parties to be funded. So, you can go and register a political party, but you cannot, 

then, go and find funding for it. So, that, in itself, is a blockage in 

the democratic system. Parties that can get over the 10-percent 

hurdle and get into Parliament get state funding. You can start a 

party by taking a bit of another party and running with it, which 

is what the AKP did. But, if you are a constituency like the Gezi 

protesters, you do not have a chance to start a political party to 

represent your interests. 

And the worst part of that is, when I go around talking to people 

about this and asking about it, everyone knows about this, but 

nobody thinks it is a problem, because, as several CEOs told me, 

‘‘We give lots of money to political parties all the time. We know 

it is illegal, but they just put it in a different drawer.’’ You know, 

it is a semantic game. So, basically, what is happening in Turkey 

is that, yes, it is free elections, but the whole thing is rigged in a 

way that allows special interests to determine who gets to stay in 

Parliament, who gets to stay in power. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you. 

Ambassador Jeffrey, you cannot solve a problem that you do not 

understand, so I might ask that you talk a little bit about the motivations that may underlie the recent downward trend in treatment 

of civil society, but specifically the response to the protests, 

whether or not this was just a total misread on Erdogan’s part as 

to the strength of the protesters, whether, as some suggest, it was 

just part of his personality which took offense to the fact that people were rising up and objecting to decisions he was making. We 

cannot really condition a response unless we really understand why 

we have seen this slide. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I would refer back to something that Dr. 

White said when she was talking very eloquently about majoritarian rule. And I tried to pick up on it a little bit. She said that 

this attitude has a lot of supporters, adherents, in Turkey. That is 

part of the problem. Certainly, Prime Minister Erdogan, another 

democratically elected friend of mine, Prime Minister Maliki, in 

Iraq, both, I believe, ironically, in a majoritarian attitude. It is not 

uncommon in Turkey or throughout the region. And the idea is 

that if the people vote and they put you in power, you basically 

decide on everything from the customs and role of religion in society to whether a park can be turned into a shopping mall or a artillery museum. And if you challenge that, this is seen as not a public 

protest, but as a threat to the claim the regime has to direct Turkey in a direction that, for most Turks, has been a huge improvement over what they went through even under a democratic system 

from the 1980s forward. And so, I think that there is a reaction of 

betrayal. 

Again, it is the wrong reaction. It is going to get this country into 

trouble, because, as I said, you cannot have a stable—you cannot 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

20

have an effective actor in the region and a strong economy in the 

long run if you have a majority that feels themselves abused and 

is not part of the system. So, it is important that we recognize it. 

A majoritarian attitude toward democracy means a democracy in 

some danger. But, a democracy in danger is not a democracy dead. 

So, at the end of the day, the Turkish people are looking at this 

thing, and I think that, for the moment, we have to trust them. 

They have taken good decisions in the past. All in all, as my friend, 

Congressman Wexler, pointed out, Erdogan has been good for Turkey. Turgot Ozal, who was also elected against the views of the 

military in 1983, was good for the country for a decade. 

And so, for the moment, I think that the Turkish people need a 

chance to decide how they are going to react to this. We have our 

positions, and we should talk to people privately about them, and 

state them publicly. But, when we ask—when we are asked, ‘‘Well, 

what do we do about it?’’—to me, as an operator, ‘‘do about it’’ 

means, ‘‘What do we put on the table? What do we stop doing what 

they want, or what do we start doing that they do not want?’’ And 

I am not there yet, sir. 

Senator MURPHY. OK. 

We will have time for a second round. But, Congressman Wexler, 

you referenced Erdogan’s relationship with the military. That is, of 

course, a subject of great consternation in Turkey today; in part, 

because of the sledge hammer trials. And when you visit there, you 

cannot help but hear stories of great demoralization within the 

military. It strikes me that we, sort of, always walk a fine line 

when trying to talk about the state of the Turkish military. We do 

not want it to be strong enough that it can essentially pull the 

strings of the political infrastructure, but, frankly, because we rely 

on the Turkish military to lend some regional stability, in partnership with the United States, we want it to be strong enough to be 

able to respond to threats. And right now, there are some people 

who think that the pendulum has swung a little bit too far away 

from a military that’s strong enough to do what it needs to do. 

Can you talk a little bit about that concern? 

Mr. WEXLER. Yes. And I think it is a very important point. And 

that is, I think we would all agree that our advice to Prime Minister Erdogan essentially would be, ‘‘Mr. Prime Minister, most 

democratically elected heads of state would give their right arm to 

have your economic record. They would give their right arm to 

have the achievements in office that you have had. So, think big, 

be confident, do not be small, do not actually revert to a type of 

leadership that not only diminishes you but also jeopardizes the 

progress in your country.’’

Now let me flip that to us. We have to be careful—we have to 

be very careful, particularly in light of some of the apparent—not 

necessarily disagreements, but different points of view between us 

and the Turks. And you raise one. We run our country with civilian 

control of the military. And just because the military has been a 

great pro-American group of patriots for many decades does not 

mean that civilian control in Turkey is not as good for the Turks 

as it is for us here in America. 

So, yes, we should pay enormous respect to the incredible allegiance and alliance and friendship between Turkey and its miliFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21

tary, and our military in our countries. But, we should 100 percent 

support the efforts to make certain that there is civilian control 

over the military in Turkey. 

And we run this kind of discrepancy on a number of issues. I 

support our administration’s policy in Egypt 110 percent. I think 

what we have done is the right thing. But, if you read Prime Minister Erdogan’s statement regarding Egypt, or his first two statements, they are great statements of Jeffersonian democracy. 

So, while, yes, I agree with our position, and I think we are 

right, it does not—we have to be careful, I think, in terms of how 

we distinguish our principled position versus their principled position. And they may have different interests and, more importantly, 

a different history. 

He is afraid of a coup, he has spent time—Prime Minister 

Erdogan—in prison. We need to understand those things. 

Senator MURPHY. No, and, listen, I do not think—I am certainly 

not questioning the civilian control of the military. It is more a 

question of the quality of the civilian control of the military. 

Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to try and reconcile a couple of statements. 

Congressman Wexler, you mentioned that Erdogan has strengthened democracy. Dr. White, you mentioned that he has increased 

women’s rights. But, then we are seeing the reaction of the population. Congressman Wexler, you said he is afraid of a coup. So, if 

democracy is strengthening, if women’s rights are also strengthened, what has happened? I mean, can anybody explain that 

difference? 

We will start with you, Dr. White. 

Dr. WHITE. Well, you have to understand that Turkey can only 

be understood as ‘‘two steps forward, one step back.’’ So, for all the 

steps forward that have happened, in terms of the penal code and 

so on, there have been steps backward, as well: attempts to roll 

back abortion, the disinterest in dealing with the increasing violence against women, the whole notion of the—well, I will just give 

you a silly example, but it captures it. Just a few days ago, a 

speaker on the government television station said that women in 

the late stages of pregnancy should stay at home, because they are 

obscene and unaesthetic. 

So, you know, Prime Minister Erdogan saying women should all 

have three children and stay at home—so, at the same time that 

this discourse is going on, you also have an increase in the number 

of girls going to school. And, in fact, there was a government program to pay mothers—because if you pay the fathers, they just 

spend the money, but if you pay mothers, they actually get their 

girls into school, and keep them there. 

So, all these things are going on at the same time. It is just that 

the tendency has reversed, now, so that there is more and more 

pressure on individuals. And when I say ‘‘pressure on individuals,’’ 

and particularly women, I do not mean just secular urban women. 

One of the things that has come up, here, that I want to disagree 

with is that there is a split between more religious and less 

religious people in Turkey. In fact, if you look at those populations, 

they are—this is the way it is usually talked about, that the popuFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

22

lations are very similar; in part, because the pious population has 

become wealthy, it has become educated, it has become globalized. 

And so, they live very similar lifestyles and they have very similar 

desires for upward mobility and so on, especially the young people. 

And so, I have met a lot of very pious conservative young people, 

some of them in the Naksibendi order, who are some of the more 

liberal people that I have met, even though they live conservative 

lifestyles. So, they are also not happy with being told that they 

have to have three children and stay at home. Right? So, this is 

not something that just affects the secular part of the population. 

Senator JOHNSON. But, again, the conflict that I am seeing is, I 

am hearing ‘‘strengthening democracy,’’ and it looks like the problem—the reaction is a limitation of minority rights. You know, 

Ambassador Jeffrey, you talked about, really, more of a majoritarian-rule society. So, which is it? I mean, did they start out 

strengthening democracy, and now they are actually limiting minority rights over time? I mean, what exactly is happening? 

Ambassador JEFFREY My take—but, everybody here knows the 

situation pretty well from one or another standpoint—is that they 

have done all of the above. It is not a happy or simple answer, but 

it is the one that, from my experience in 9 years in Turkey, that 

I have seen. This is a country that is moving, I believe, generally 

toward its own understanding of democracy. It will differ, in some 

ways, from ours, as do European parliamentary systems. In other 

ways, it will disagree considerably with ours—again, the greater 

tolerance for a majoritarian system. 

But, at the end of the day, as long as it is a democracy, the final 

arbiter of how the Turkish people think about what Prime Minister 

Erdogan has done and what the Gezi Park demonstrations mean 

for the country will be in the next elections. And I would be cautious about us doing anything before see how the people react to 

this. 

Senator JOHNSON. I mean, it seems to me that Prime Minister 

Erdogan has been consolidating his power, but yet he is concerned 

about a coup? I mean, Ambassador Volker, can you explain that? 

Ambassador VOLKER Sure, thank you. Let me try to put it in a 

slightly different way than the other panelists did. 

I think that, for a long period of time, you could say that the 

glass was more than half full, that Turkey was progressing with 

civilian leadership, democratically elected, ending military dominance of politics, performing economically, protecting rights of citizens. It was a positive trajectory. I think, lately, you have to say 

it has gone the other way, that there has been an effort to put 

more imposition of Islam into public life rather than letting expression of Islam. There’s a difference. And I think you have seen 

authoritarian reactions and tendencies in the Prime Minister. 

And just to give you one example, the pressure on the media in 

Turkey right now is extraordinary. As Dr. White said, you have 

more journalists in jail in Turkey than any other country. They 

have the tax authorities camped out at some of these media outlets, or the owners are so afraid of publishing things, there is an 

enormous amount of self-censorship. This is a bad tendency that 

has grown over the past few years. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

23

I think that the demonstrations that we saw over the Gezi Park 

protests—the original protests were small, but the demonstrations, 

after the government cracked down, were enormous. And this has 

a lot to do with the growing perceptions in the society itself that 

the government is now overreaching and going too far. And that is 

where I think we now stand. 

Senator JOHNSON. Congressman Wexler, you had an interesting 

comment. You said, ‘‘A Turkish Islamist is different from other 

Islamists.’’ Are they becoming a little more similar over time? 

Mr. WEXLER. No, I do not think so. 

Senator JOHNSON. Can you describe exactly what you mean, 

then? 

Mr. WEXLER. Yes. I think the best example might be Prime

Minister Erdogan’s trip to Egypt when President Morsi was first 

elected. And here it was, everybody perceived that Prime Minister 

Erdogan, in effect, was going to go to Egypt and congratulate the 

Muslim Brotherhood on their extraordinary electoral achievement. 

And what was his message? His message to the Muslim Brotherhood was, ‘‘Remember, you can be a pious Muslim, but be a patriot 

and a democrat, with a small D. You can be a pious Muslim and 

enhance democracy and equality and women’s rights and things of 

that nature in your country.’’ He came as a hero, and, if I understand it correctly, the Muslim Brotherhood could not wait until he 

left the country. 

Now, this is the dichotomy that we are often presented with. On 

the one hand, Prime Minister Erdogan utters things at time toward 

the Israelis that are utterly offensive, historically inaccurate. And 

yet, at the other hand, when there was a bombing in Istanbul, 

some years ago, that, in part, focused on the Jewish community, 

his reaction about the Jewish community in Turkey was perfect, 

basically saying, ‘‘You attack our Jewish community in Turkey, you 

attack all of us.’’ So, it is a conflict, which is what you started with. 

And that is Turkey. 

The challenge for us is to use that conflict in a way that furthers 

our interests, to the degree possible. And I think Ambassador 

Jeffrey was perfectly accurate when he said, ‘‘Public confrontation, 

as enticing as it might seem, gets us very little.’’

Senator JOHNSON. OK. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I am going to have to go to another 

meeting. 

But, I really want to thank the witnesses’ very interesting, very 

thoughtful testimony, and answers to our questions. Thank you. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Senator Johnson. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you all for being here. I am sorry I missed your opening 

remarks. 

I had the opportunity to visit Turkey for the first time last fall, 

and I was very impressed with the economic prosperity in the country, with the openness that I heard from the people that I spoke 

with. But, one of the things that I found very interesting—I had 

a roundtable discussion at a university in Istanbul, and one of the 

things that a number of the academics there were talking about 

was concern about what was happening with the crackdown on the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

24

media and the press, concern, as you all have pointed out, about 

the increasing role of religion and what they viewed as one of the 

hallmarks of the country, as secularism. And, you know, to what 

extent have those elements fueled the recent demonstrations and 

rioting in Turkey? And to what extent do you see Erdogan responding to what are very real concerns that are being expressed by certain elements of the population? 

And I do not know who wants to start first. 

Mr. WEXLER. I am happy to try. 

I think we all in agreement that there is no excuse for rolling 

back any freedoms of the press. And there have been unfortunate 

examples, most recently, where that has occurred and Prime Minister Erdogan and his administration would be wise to change 

course and to reverse course. 

As to the aspect of religion, I think, here again, we need to be 

very careful, because what appears to be so in Turkey is not always 

exactly so. And I will try to say this, I hope, eloquently enough not 

to get myself in trouble. But, for instance, one of the historic 

debates in Turkey has been the use of headscarves by women in 

public bodies. Now, that is cast in Turkey as a religious debate. In 

our own country, I think most of us would be deeply offended if our 

government had a rule that said a woman could or could not wear 

a headscarf at a university, or could or could not wear a headscarf 

anywhere. 

So, Prime Minister Erdogan, I believe, has the position that that 

rule should be relaxed. That is cast as a religious position. And, no 

doubt, I suspect, it is based, in part, on a religious position. But, 

the inclination in our country, given the region, is that we then 

assume that this type of religious advocacy results in some type of 

extremism. And I think we need to be very careful about that, 

because clearly in our own set of dynamics, advocating for a woman’s right to wear a headscarf, or not, would probably be cast in 

terms of privacy or freedom. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I do not disagree with that. I guess I was trying to relay what I heard from people that I met with in Turkey 

about what their concerns were, rather than what my concerns 

were. 

Ambassador JEFFREY In that sense, Senator, there is a—I would 

say, a divide in Turkey. I am not so sure it is the divide that we 

see in Gezi Square, for all the reasons that Dr. White has 

explained, that I agree with. But, there is a strong minority in Turkey that are very, very prominent in the circles that we have the 

most contact with in the major cities, among the better educated, 

that takes almost a French view of laicite, a very dominant state 

role in, basically, pushing religion, in any way, shape, or form, out 

of the public view. And the bulk of the population—there I agree 

with a comment that Congressman Wexler made earlier, that 

Turks have—and I hate the word, but there is no other way to 

express it—a somewhat moderate view of religion, and there is a 

fair amount of tolerance that, in living in other countries that I do 

not want to name, I have not found among the population who are 

practicing Muslims. That is a good thing, and it is something we 

need to preserve. We do not want to accentuate this split in society. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

25

But, I think you are on to something very accurately when you 

talk about putting journalists in jail, because these journalists 

come from the left, they come from the right, and there is an 

authoritarian aura that the country had before the Prime Minister—it has, independent of him, today—but he has not done 

enough to pull it apart, and it needs to be pulled apart. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And so, what extent do you think he has 

responded to the demonstrations? And is there anything positive 

that is coming out from that experience, in terms of Prime Minister 

Erdogan’s response? 

Ambassador Volker and then Dr. White. 

Ambassador VOLKER Thank you, Senator. Nice to see you. 

Two thoughts. One of them is that, on your direct question, his 

initial response to the demonstrations was to call out bigger progovernment demonstrations. And that left a lot of people worried 

that, ‘‘OK, this is really about majoritarianism and imposing a view 

rather than about listening to different voices.’’

Since then, because of the counterdemonstrations and a little bit 

of violence that took place, he has backed off a little bit, and there 

has been a little bit more sense of this calming down. But, under 

the surface, there is still a great deal of concern about what are 

the tendencies of this government now? 

To your point on headscarves, I agree with what Congressman 

Wexler said. We would view this through a freedom lens, about 

‘‘this is a personal right.’’ In the context of the region, though, you 

have extremist Islamist groups that do try to exercise influence 

through universities and do try to radicalize society. Tunisia’s a 

great example, where salafists in university have been doing that. 

That is quite worrying, and I think that gets to the worry that 

some of the more secular-minded people in Turkey are concerned 

about. Allowing headscarves may seem like a small step, but, to 

them, it opens up the window to that kind of Islamistization of 

society that they would be concerned about. Does not mean that we 

should take a strong view, one way or the other. I think individual 

freedom is important, but that is where the concern is coming from. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Dr. White, did you want to add to that? 

Dr. WHITE. Yes, thank you. 

I do not think it is at all wrong to talk about Islam and Turkey 

as ‘‘moderate.’’ I know it has sort of political overtones nowadays, 

but, in fact, Turkish Islam is quite different from Islam in the rest 

of the region, because it has no central luma, it has no central 

school, other than, you know, this government office that, you 

know, runs the mosques and the prayer—the imam schools. But, 

it has a Sufi background, which tends to be more tolerant, to begin 

with. So, it does—it is not centralized, like Islam in other societies. 

And also, there is a real tendency to dislike outsiders who are 

not Turks. And so, that comes in handy. And also that you do not 

speak Arabic. So, when—unless things are translated, you do not 

really have access to them. 

So, they are kind of insulated, or they were until recently, insulated from a lot of the transnational Islamic movements that were 

going on. They had total control over the school system, for 

instance—no madrases bringing up—but, having said that, I think 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

26

it is not a good idea to see any of these issues in Turkey in terms 

of secular and Islamic, because—I mean, depending on which part 

of the population you talk to, you will get that rhetoric, but that 

rhetoric is that—the rhetoric that defines the ‘‘in’’ group as opposed 

to the ‘‘other’’ group—those who are against us and those who are 

with us. And they will use language, like ‘‘Islamists’’—‘‘those 

Islamists’’ versus, you know, ‘‘us, the white Turks,’’ as they call 

themselves. 

But, that does not mean, as Ambassador Wexler said—but, that 

is really what is going on—right?—that that is just the way people 

talk about it to, you know, position themselves. 

And I do think that one of the things that came out of Gezi that 

is very important that can easily be overlooked if you keep focusing 

on Islam, headscarves, secularism, and think of it in those terms, 

is the fact that that huge mass of people that came out defied those 

categories. And that represents, to me, where Turkey has gone. It 

is almost like the AKP has created its own monster. You know, I 

mean, the middle class has tripled, the economy has taken off, all 

those—you know, they are all over the globe now. So, this is a new 

generation. And there are also quite a few people who are older, 

some of whom voted for AKP—who are out there, who just feel like 

they do not want ideological Islam, they do not want ideological 

secularism anymore. They want to move democracy forward. And 

that’s where that impetus is going to come from. 

And so, I think that that is a very, very good and important 

thing. And this is the first time that such a constituency has come 

forward in Turkey. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. 

I will take my second round and give Senator Risch a chance to 

catch his breath. 

Ambassador Jeffrey, you talked a little bit about constitutional 

reform. There is a very important conversation happening right 

now in Turkey about change to the constitution, which could perhaps create a strong Presidency that could perhaps be a landing 

spot for Erdogan. And I guess my simple question is, How much 

should we care about the issue of constitutional reform from a perspective of United States interests? 

Ambassador JEFFREY The decision of which kind of a country to 

have, or which kind of a democracy, is something that has to be 

left up to the population. A good example is France, after many 

years of a weak and ineffective parliamentary system, did go to a 

Presidential system in the Fifth Republic, under Charles de Gaulle, 

and has been considerably more successful in most of the 50 years 

since then. 

But, in the case of Turkey, this—I mean, from the standpoint of 

a friend of Turkey’s, first of all, you approach any suggestions with 

trepidation, because the Turks are sensitive to outsiders, particularly Americans, giving them advice. On the other hand, we have 

a lot at stake in Turkey; we are close friends; and the important 

thing would be to take a look at what those constitutional changes 

might, in fact, be, and our views on whether this would be good for 

Turkey and for Turkey’s democratic development, or not. They are 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

27

only opinions, but there is nothing wrong with us giving them. 

Again, we would have to see what they are going to be. 

It is a very dynamic process, the changing of the constitution in 

Turkey. The population has a big role, because there are plebiscites, and they get a chance to choose various things. 

And so, I think that there is a lot of opportunity for us to make 

suggestions—quietly to make suggestions, if we feel strongly, publicly. In the end, they will decide. But, as friends, we can certainly 

give them our views. 

Senator MURPHY. Congressman Wexler. 

Mr. WEXLER. May I just quickly——

Senator MURPHY. Sure. 

Mr. WEXLER [continuing]. Just add one thing to that? 

If I were to make one recommendation to our Turkish friends, in 

the context of their constitution, I would respectfully suggest to 

them that the separation of powers that has been implemented in 

our country has served our Nation very well over a period of time, 

and particularly given the history of Turkey, both far away and 

present, that it would be prudent for them to adopt a system that 

incorporated into their constitution separation of powers in an 

institutional way. 

Senator MURPHY. Ambassador Volker, I will ask this to you, but 

anybody is welcome to answer. You have talked a lot about the just 

really unbelievable economic growth in Turkey under Erdogan, 

something that he is rightfully proud of, and could be a fulcrum 

point with which to influence some of the decisions that he may be 

making on the treatment of political opposition, journalists, and 

generals. Has there been any evidence, so far, that foreign investment, for instance, has been affected by the response to the protests, or are we too close, at this moment, to know whether that 

is ultimately going to be any lever with which to further conversations with Erdogan and his government? 

Ambassador VOLKER. OK, I will certainly say maybe some of my 

colleagues around the panel even have more depth on that than I 

would, but the thing I would say about that is: If you are looking 

at foreign investment, you are going to be looking at the numbers 

in Turkey, which have been quite good, and you are going to be 

looking at the stability of the government, which still looks quite 

good——

Senator MURPHY. Right. 

Ambassador VOLKER [continuing]. Because of the popularity. So, 

even though we have had these demonstrations and pushback, I 

think, as an investment perspective, Turkey’s going to look pretty 

good. 

The incentive for Erdogan, really, is his own interests. I just 

think it is a matter of our being willing to contribute to the communication of how we see things. He is going to have a more stable 

Turkey, and he is going to have a longer run of rule in Turkey, to 

the degree that he seems responsive to the needs of all the population. 

Senator MURPHY. Any other thoughts on, sort of, the direction of 

the economy and how it may affect his decisionmaking? 

Ambassador JEFFREY We have seen a whole series of negative 

economic reports out of Turkey in the last couple of months. Some 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

28

of them are based upon the reaction to the Federal Reserve’s decision to stop its actions in support of the American economy, which, 

of course, reverberates around the entire globe. But, some of them 

may have been a reaction to Gezi Park. Inflation is up. There was 

a significant drop in the exchange markets in—trade is also down 

somewhat. They are a little bit worried about that, their current 

account basis. But, basically, it was the stock market that took the 

sharpest hit and leading to another round of accusations that 

somebody is behind this. Well, what is behind it is people, again, 

look not only at the democracy in Turkey, which is quite strong, 

and the economic underpinnings of the society, which are also quite 

strong, but, rather, Will the place stay stable? And to stay stable, 

you need to pull in everybody. As we have seen in societies that 

have opened the door for women in the workplace, this strengthens 

the society, not only with more productive workers, but it makes 

the social contract better and more widely accepted. It is the same 

thing in Turkey. These people who are protesting are Turks. They 

are productive members of the society. They can contribute a

lot. They are not going to contribute to their potential if they are 

treated the way they are being treated. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you. 

All right. One final question. Our understanding in relationship 

with Turkey has certainly been defined by Erdogan, a strong political figure who has transformed that country in so many different 

ways. If there is not a constitutional change that allows him to stay 

in power fairly soon, we will be dealing with post-Erdogan Turkey. 

And an open-ended question, What does that look like? What are 

the political forces that are likely to take his place or occupy some 

partial vacuum that is going to be created by an incredibly strong, 

incredibly charismatic, incredibly powerful leader perhaps stepping 

aside? I will, maybe, ask that to the two former Ambassadors first. 

So, maybe start with you, Ambassador Jeffrey, and then ask 

Ambassador Volker. 

Ambassador JEFFREY The Prime Minister has said that he will 

not run for another term as Prime Minister. He could always 

decide that, after a term being out, he would come back. He can 

also be the head of the party and not be the Prime Minister. There 

are various scenarios that he could see for himself. 

I think that the AKP, while it is associated with him, has many 

other very strong leaders. Deputy Prime Minister Arinc and President Gul are only two of the many. They have a very effective economic team. They have roots throughout the society. So, I think 

that party is going to be a real contender for a long time. 

Again, you could see the President—or, rather, the Presidency 

going to Erdogan without a change to a Presidential system. The 

President in Turkey has teeth, constitutionally, in ways that most 

Presidencies in Western Europe do not have. It is not like the 

French Fifth Republic, but it is also not like, say, Italy. The 

President has considerable power and a great deal of prestige, and 

Prime Minister Erdogan could use that as a bully pulpit, as well. 

So, there are various scenarios there, but I think most of the scenarios, in my mind, begin with the AKP holding a decisive role in 

Turkish society in the future. 

Senator MURPHY. Ambassador Volker. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

29

Ambassador VOLKER Very quickly. I agree with all that. 

First off, the AK Party, no doubt, will remain the dominant party 

for some time. Without Erdogan as its titular leader, I think maybe 

some of the authoritarian tendencies that we have seen lately may 

dissipate. I do not know that those are reflected as much in the 

party. 

I think Prime Minister Erdogan’s first choice would be to 

enhance the powers of the President and become the President. If 

that does not work out, I think that we would see a phenomenon 

of an extremely powerful person with a great deal of influence in 

Turkey, through businesses and through the AK Party, outside of 

political power. And that would be a very different phenomenon. 

We would have to figure out what that really means. 

Senator MURPHY. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

One of the other meetings I had a chance to do last fall when 

I was in Turkey was to visit with the ecumenical patriarch of the 

Orthodox Church, His All Holiness Bartholomew. And we discussed 

some of the concerns that he and the church have had in opening 

up the Halki Seminary in Turkey. And His All Holiness pointed out 

that he continues to talk with the Turkish Government about how 

to reopen that theological school; and certainly, the return of some 

of the land around it has been a very good sign. 

But, can any of you comment on what the current status of that 

issue is? 

Dr. WHITE. As far as I understand, the opening of the seminary 

has been balked by the question of the curriculum and whose 

authority the curriculum would be under, because the Turkish 

Government expects it to be, basically, like any other school in Turkey, that the curriculum would be under its authority and that is 

a base of contention. 

But, there are also other issues, of course. You know, as I said 

before, it is two steps forward, one step back. Properties have been 

returned, but not all of it. There have been corrupt practices, where 

the state has held back some of the property or some of the money. 

So, there are lots of wheelings and dealings around these that are 

not always visible. 

I would like to add that I am one of the people who expect the 

AK Party to split once Erdogan is—assuming the Prime Minister 

is no longer Prime Minister. So, I think that—I know, privately, 

that there is a lot of dissatisfaction, within the party, with the 

Prime Minister’s policies. Some of those, I mentioned before, primarily the Syria policy, which has disturbed a lot of Sunnis, as 

well, not just the Alevis. And I think that there are people who 

would like to just move away. And that might be a good thing, 

because that might be a home for this next step in completing the 

democratization process that I think Turkey has embarked on. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Ambassador Wexler—Congressman Wexler. 

Mr. WEXLER. May I just add? In my experience, there is maybe 

nothing more important, quite frankly, than Senators and Representatives advocating on behalf of the Greek Church there. We are 

not ignored, you are not ignored. And my understanding is, while 

we are way, way, far away from being successful, that progress is 

potentially in order, but that the role of very interested people, like 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

30

yourself, is essential. And the fact that you did that, and I would 

say, respectfully, as you deem fit to follow up, it is a very legitimate issue that would serve Turkey’s interests to open up. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you. I did have the opportunity to 

raise the issue with President Gul and also with the Foreign Minister while I was there, and I agree, it is something that is important for them to hear, that this is an issue that we and many in 

the world are watching very carefully and hope that it can get 

resolved. 

Dr. White, since you raised the issue of Syria—and you all may 

have addressed this before I got here, so forgive me if I raise it 

again—but, to what extent is Turkey’s role in what is happening 

in Syria—the number of refugees that are now in the country—how 

is that affecting internal politics in Turkey? 

Dr. WHITE. It is absolutely crucial to internal politics, in myriad 

ways. One of them is just this increasing polarization that is 

fanned, for reasons that remain obscure to me, by Prime Minister 

Erdogan, who recently named a bridge after—he was going to 

name the Third Bridge after Sultan Selim, who is famous for massacring Alevis. So, why he would do that, in this present context, 

is beyond me. 

The presence of al-Nusra and the jihadis, at the invitation of the 

Erdogan government—you know, the presence of these people on 

the Turkish side of the border, where they are basically living and 

then going back and forth to Syria, is destabilizing. In addition to 

the destabilization caused by the refugees and the munitions coming over the border, there are these jihadis living there who are 

frightening the local Sunni villagers and causing friction between 

Sunnis and Alevis, who really—the Turkish Alevis really have not 

that much to do with what is going on in Syria, but that is spilling 

over, and they are fleeing the border—I heard this from an MP—

a CHP MP from Hatti—who goes back and forth, and from several 

other people who were there. But, it is an enormous problem. And, 

you know, that is spilling over into Turkish society. 

It is a puzzle, because Prime Minister Erdogan, several years 

ago, was very conciliatory toward the Alevis. You know, so, again, 

what—in the last 2 years, something has happened, and that is the 

million-dollar question; nobody really knows what has happened to 

cause him to backtrack to such an extent that he is undermining 

his own positions of—that he has—like, for instance, there is—

again, with Syria, there is the Kurdish issue. Right? So, the PKK 

and Prime Minister Erdogan have settled on a cease-fire that may 

actually lead to an end to this decades-old war between the PKK 

and the Turkish military. And this is what led lots of people to say, 

‘‘Well, maybe he is such a great statesman.’’ But, in the meantime, 

after the Gezi protest began, he then called his interlocutor in this 

peace deal a terrorist. He then said, in public, ‘‘Well, we’re not 

going to do X, Y, and Z,’’ which was part of the agreement. And 

so, why would he do that? 

And so, after these statements, the Kurds, who had not participated in the protest initially, because they were, you know, afraid 

of doing damage to the peace deal, they joined the protesters. It is 

like this snowball, getting bigger and bigger, rolling downhill. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

31

But, why would he do that? I do not understand—I do not think 

anyone does—what exactly is going on there. That is sort of, like 

I said, the million-dollar question. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Congressman Wexler. 

Mr. WEXLER. May I just offer, maybe, a little bit different perspective? And not disagreeing with any of the facts that Dr. White 

presented—and surely I would not condone the naming of infrastructure, and things like that, after nefarious people—but, what 

is the basis of Prime Minister Erdogan’s policy? The basis of his 

policy was objecting to the humanitarian treatment of President 

Assad to his people. 

So, I think it is important for us, again, to contextualize what is 

occurring. Prime Minister Erdogan, in Turkey, hosted the original 

opposition to President Assad. Now, we can agree or disagree, 

debate our own policy, but Prime Minister Erdogan’s initial policy 

in Syria was in contrast to what he thought was the improper violence being imposed by President Assad on his own people. I do not 

think we would ever criticize that. 

Now, his policy may have gotten a bit distorted as things have 

gotten much muddier in Syria, but I think, as Americans, quite 

frankly, we should be very careful before we start criticizing other 

world leaders who have taken a fairly principled position in opposition to a whole lot of killing that’s occurring in Syria. I just think 

we need to be careful. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Is it your belief that there has been a lot of 

criticism of Prime Minister Erdogan because of his being willing to 

accept the refugees into Turkey and to be critical of what is happening in Syria? 

Mr. WEXLER. Well, I think it is evident, from my understanding, 

that it is a controversial position that Prime Minister Erdogan has 

taken within his own Turkish nation regarding the policy toward 

Syria. Some will view his policy as being confrontational, some will 

view his policy as having, in essence, enticed the Syrian Government to create violence in Turkey and then causing death and 

destruction on the Turkish border, and maybe even exasperating 

the number of refugees that are now there. 

I would not dare make a judgment whether it is right or wrong. 

Surely, I think we probably would all agree it is controversial. But, 

I also think we would be mistaken not to understand the somewhat 

admirable position, principally, that Prime Minister Erdogan took 

from the inception. 

Ambassador JEFFREY I would like to defend Erdogan on that 

point, as well. There is a general consensus, everywhere but Moscow, Tehran, and Hezbollah land in southern Lebanon, that Assad 

should go, but there is absolutely no consensus on how the hell to 

do that. And the result is, everybody is sort of pointing fingers at 

each other. Those of you who can remember the 1990s, in Bosnia 

we had a very similar situation until the United States actually 

took a very firm, very courageous leading position, and then everybody sort of fell into line. 

Prime Minister Erdogan, I believe, would be a very effective 

interlocutor and partner if we had a policy that we could clarify to 

him and he could believe in. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

32

Senator SHAHEEN. Just to be clear, I was not being critical of the 

Prime Minister. 

Dr. WHITE. May I just add something there? That I do not think 

that I was being critical of the Prime Minister in that regard. He 

has spoken up against the Syrian regime’s depravities, despite the 

fact that his population is against any kind of activity—you know, 

Turkish activity in the region. So, he has taken a principled stand, 

but I do not think that is quite the same as his statements about 

Alevis within his own country. And I think that we need to separate those. 

The Kurds are also important, because they are now—the PKK 

is now operating together, or joining together, with the Kurds in 

Syria to—it appears that they are about to declare an independent 

entity, or a semi-independent entity, at least join together with 

them. And so, it is in their interest right now to have a peace deal 

with Turkey, because they cannot be bothered with that distraction, at the moment, when all these goods things are happening for 

them across the border. 

And Erdogan also has a very good reason for wanting peace, 

because that region on the Iraqi border, that part of Turkey is very 

important for future economic development. The oil is going to 

come out through there, and so on. 

So, everybody has everything to gain from this peace deal. So, 

again, the question is why he would be undermining it at this 

moment. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen. 

Thank you very much to our witnesses. We could, frankly, spend 

about 2 days—we have only touched on all of the topics that are 

of importance to this relationship. 

I thank Senator Shaheen, in particular, for bringing up the issue 

of Syria. During my last trip to Turkey, which was just a few 

months ago, I actually got the chance to go down and visit the refugee camp in Kilis province, visit with the governor. And you 

understand very quickly, when you spend a little bit of time down 

along the border, what sacrifice Turkey is making. We certainly 

have put up some of the money to build these camps, but the Turks 

are doing this at great risk and at great expense. It is something 

that we should be very, very thankful for. 

And just another reminder of how important this relationship is. 

I spoke to Ambassador Tan several times about this hearing, and 

what I tried to convey to him, who is a great friend of mine and 

of this committee, is that with the success of the Turkish model 

comes high expectations. We would, frankly, wish for the problems 

we have in Turkey on Syria or Egypt or Iraq. This is a problem, 

at some level, that we welcome, because we see the potential of a 

trend line toward a more democratic and more inclusive Turkey. 

To that end, the Ambassador has asked that we place into the 

record a statement that he has provided the committee from 

Professor Kanat at Penn State University, which, without objection, we will happily do. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, again, to our panel for being here 

today. 

And, with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

33

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KILIC BUG ̆ RA KANAT, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL

SCIENCE, PENN STATE, ERIE AND RESEARCH FELLOW AT THE SETA FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC 

WHERE IS TURKEY HEADED? GEZI PARK, TAKSIM SQUARE, AND THE FUTURE OF THE TURKISH MODEL

For the last 2 months, Turkey has received increased attention due to the protests 

that took place in Gezi Park at Taksim Square. The protests, with their origins, 

duration, and forms are unprecedented in Turkish political history. They created a 

paradoxical situation in the sense that the original Gezi Park protesters were 

mostly middle-class citizens who grew in number and were empowered during the 

AK Party decade, due to a stable and high economic growth rate that this party has 

achieved in the last 10 years. The demonstrations also took place with the help of 

democratic reforms and the opportunities that these reforms provided during the 

same years. The Turkish Government—which for many analysts had an impressive 

record of political and legal reforms, including eliminating the practice of torture, 

achieving active civilian control of the military, and being in the process of solving 

the most significant problem of Turkish democracy, the Kurdish question—was seriously tested by these protests. It was difficult for the Turkish Government to control 

the events because the protestors were not a homogenous group of people with a 

specific set of goals and the rapid development of events in a short period of time 

made the protests difficult to contain and manage. More importantly, these protests 

represented a new form of participatory political citizenship that has exhibited itself 

not only in Turkey but in other countries like Brazil. This new street politics can 

pave the way for a more inclusive and participatory form of democracy. However, 

it will only succeed in doing so if the government can handle the aftermath of these 

protests by successfully distinguishing those who have some legitimate demands 

from the political opportunists, and addressing and accommodating some of these 

demands within the framework of a deliberative democracy. 

Gezi Park Protests 

The Gezi Park protests started in late May as a result of the reaction of some 

local groups and environmental activists to the relocation of trees in one of the central squares of Istanbul. The protests attracted widespread international attention 

and have been debated among the policy and scholarly circles for the last 2 months. 

However, in order to understand the true nature of the events, its origins and its 

motives, one needs to focus on how the events unfolded and how they evolved 

throughout June. This evolution will show different layers of protesters with different motivations and a transformation from a local environmental protest, to fullscale antigovernment demonstrations. 

The project that led to the protests was part of the Taksim urban development 

plan that entailed the reorganization of traffic in this heavily jammed square of 

Istanbul, as well as the reconstruction of several historical buildings, which were 

destroyed in the 1940s. When it was first announced, this project in its entirety, 

gained popular support. However, the fact that the rebuilding of Topc ̧u Kis ̧lasi, an 

Ottoman era military barracks, necessitated the relocation of some of the trees in 

Gezi Park, created dissatisfaction among different local groups. 

Days before the relocation of the trees in Gezi Park, a small crowd of environmentalists and local residents of the Taksim neighborhood started a protest campaign by organizing sit-ins and camping in the park. The construction activity 

stopped due to the occupation of the park by protesters. Early in the morning on 

May 30, police launched a raid in order to empty the park of the protestors. The 

heavy handed reaction by police toward the protesters, in particular the use of pepper spray, excessive use of force, and the burning of the tents in the camp created 

a huge public reaction. A call by online activists to support the protestors at Gezi 

Park turned out to be effective and brought large crowds to Gezi Park in a short 

period of time. 

During the next 2 days, the number of protestors coming to Taksim Square grew 

exponentially. Neither police nor protestors were expecting such a vast turnout at 

Taksim Square. The use of water cannons and excessive amount of tear gas by a 

limited number of police officers added to the anger of demonstrators. As some of 

the media outlets started to ignore the events in their broadcasts, online activists 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

34

took the stage. Although some of these online activists provided information from 

the field, they also contributed to the increasing level of misinformation. For example, in several instances, online activists claimed misleading information about the 

casualties and police brutality; this increased the level of anger and caused more 

people to take to the streets. 

As the number of protestors grew, the message and the motivation of the protests 

began to differ. The core group of protestors, whose main goal was the protection 

of trees in Gezi Park, began to lose their voice within the greater number of 

protestors. This original group of Gezi Park protestors was made up of mostly middle-upper class, well-educated urbanites who were predominantly in their youth—

the majority of the protesters were university students. After launching their protests, the initial small group of people was endorsed and joined by another group 

who had similar grievances. The main concerns of this first group of protestors were 

some policies that the Justice and Development Party (JDP) enacted, such as the 

regulation of alcohol sales and the government’s policies of urban development. In 

conversations with the participants of the protests it became clear that most of 

these individuals wanted to be included in the decisionmaking process regarding 

urban development projects. The creative nature of their protests and the use of 

popular culture and humor in their messages helped them gain more support from 

different segments of society. Their ability to use social media effectively spread 

their message around the world and got the attention of the international media. 

When Gezi Park was emptied, the members of this group launched a new form 

of protest although for a shorter period of time. However, this did not help them 

to develop a coherent strategy. In the absence of a clear message and strategy, 

international media attention created a sense of triumph for the protestors. This 

attention led to tactical and operational victories to shape the strategy of the Gezi 

Park protesters. This lack of unifying message was obvious from the slogans of protesters; the most prominent of these slogans was ‘‘Kahrolsun Bagzi Seyler’’ (Damn 

to Certain Things). Excitement, which came as a result of the empowerment the 

protesters felt and confusion regarding an overall message, caused these groups not 

to realize when they had gained a limited victory by making the Prime Minister of 

the country meet with protesters, listen to their demands and offer a referendum 

for a solution to the problem. Instead of enjoying their achievement, they continued 

an endless political confrontation with the government. 

Later, some other groups with similar characteristics joined the protests within 

the ranks of this first group. For example, groups which suffered from excessive use 

of police force in separate occasions began to demonstrate solidarity with the Gezi 

Park protesters. In particular, soccer fans of the Bes ̧iktas ̧ Sports Club, which had 

clashed with the police forces a month ago, also joined the demonstrations. The support of these additional groups also served to expand the location of the protests and 

extended the protests from Taksim towards Bes ̧iktas ̧. Because this first group 

lacked organization, leadership and thus a nonviolent discipline, there were some 

violent incidents in the first few days of protests such as damage to public property 

and burning down public busses. 

The second group of protestors, was made up of members and sympathizers of the 

Republican Peoples’ Party (RPP), the main opposition party in the country. In addition, some other ultrasecular and ultranationalist groups who were increasingly disenchanted by the political system joined the demonstrations in the next few days. 

In particular, the RPP decided to cancel a previously planned political rally in Istanbul, encouraging their followers to support the Gezi Park demonstrations, resulting 

in a transformation in the makeup of protesters. In terms of numbers, these groups 

started to dominate the demonstrations not only in Istanbul but also helped to 

spread it to different cities around Turkey through their local organizations and 

branches. The impact that a small number of protestors in Gezi Park provided an 

opportunity for the RPP, who has been paralyzed by internal divisions and ideological clashes in the last few years, to gain visibility in the public sphere. 

The main motivations of this second group of demonstrators were twofold. Some 

of these demonstrators had grievances related to democratic reforms of the government in recent years. These reforms caused some old guards of the state establishment to lose their privilege, power, and status. Especially the end of military tutelage made some members of these groups disenchanted. In addition, some of these 

ultranationalist groups were against recent attempts by the Turkish Government to 

resolve the Kurdish question through reconciliation. Secondly, there was an increasing amount of despair and hopelessness among the members of the RPP and other 

opposition groups. In the last five elections, the ruling Justice and Development 

Party (JDP) won landslide victories, and public opinion polls demonstrated the continuation of this trend in the coming local and general elections. In the absence of 

any hope to defeat the ruling party at the ballot box, some members of this second 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

35

group started to shift their attention to the streets rather than the democratic process as a way of gaining supporters and creating mobilization at the grassroots level. 

With the involvement of these groups, the sheer number of demonstrators in the 

RPP and ultrasecular groups transformed the nature of demonstrations. A more heterogeneous group of demonstrators emerged and the nature of the protests evolved 

from environmentalism and protesting urban development plans to antigovernment 

rallies. The creative opposition of the first group of Gezi Park protestors was soon 

hijacked by this second group of ultrasecular and ultranationalists groups. The size 

and organizational strength of the second group overshadowed the earlier, more inclusive nature of the original protesters. This situation also led to some discontent 

among the first group of protestors and even some skirmishes among different 

groups emerged during the protests. For instance, when ultrasecular groups and the 

members of the RPP chanted slogans such as, ‘‘We are the soldiers of Mustafa 

Kemal,’’ the first group protested and ridiculed the militaristic and ultrasecular slogans by chanting, ‘‘We are the soldiers of Mustafa Keser,’’ a well-known folk music 

singer. 

In addition to difference in ideology, the first two groups of protesters were in 

direct confrontation regarding their attitude toward others. For example, the antiWestern and Euro-skeptic attitude of the RPP and ultrasecularists were in contradiction with the more globalized groups in Gezi Park whose most important 

source of legitimacy was the universality of their message and demands. Later, during conversations with some members that supported Gezi Park’s original protesters, they expressed anger toward the infiltration by ultrasecular and ultranationalist groups to their movement. After the addition of these groups to the protesters, 

the government’s reaction became more severe. While the messages of the first 

group were lost in translation, the communication between the government and the 

first group was interrupted by the addition of the second group. With no formal 

organization, no leadership and no spokesperson to express the limited goals that 

the members of the first group endorsed, the messages and protests of Gezi Park 

started to be represented and even owned by the main opposition party. 

During this period the government started to handle the crisis by responding to 

the RPP, which further mobilized members and supporters of the RPP and created 

further anger among the original Gezi Park protestors. This situation created a trilateral tension in which, the JDP reflected its reaction to RPP, whereas the RPP 

was channeling the political dynamism from the first group to criticize the JDP. 

Meanwhile, Gezi Park protestors reacted both to the JDP government for dismissing 

their demands and the RPP for trying to own the movement. This created lack of 

dialogue between the ruling party and protestors for the first few days of the demonstration during which it could have been contained. In fact, although at the beginning, the lack of formal organization and leadership in the first group was depicted 

as the strength of the movement, in a short period of time with the inclusion of the 

RPP, the absence of any organizational skills and enterprise turned out to be a 

weakness of the movement. 

The most destructive groups among this heterogeneous group of protesters were 

the third group of marginal leftists who tried to use the movement and protests for 

their own narrow and radical goals. These groups were mostly responsible for the 

destruction and looting of some of the stores around Taksim and Bes ̧iktas ̧. They not 

only started to throw rocks at the police but also attempted to break in Dolmabahc ̧e 

Palace, the location of the Prime Minister’s Istanbul office. The members of these 

groups who were seasoned in clashes with police and manipulating the crowds, 

started to occupy Taksim Square adjacent to Gezi Park. In most of the instances 

these marginal leftist groups used peaceful protesters as human shields, making 

them difficult to locate. As the level of violence and provocation of these groups increased, the police reaction. Especially during the last days of the demonstrations, 

while Gezi Park was still occupied, these groups started to use rocks, knives, and 

Molotov cocktails in their clashes with police. 

After the initial mishandling of the crisis, the Turkish Government tried to make 

a distinction between these groups, promising to listen to legitimate demands about 

Gezi Park. However, in most instances it was difficult to distinguish these groups 

from the Gezi Park protestors. These groups also added to the already existing disruption of communication between the Turkish Government and the first group of 

protesters. The obvious goal of these groups was to overthrow the democratically 

elected government through illegal means and violence. Although there was not a 

unifying ideology or goal among these groups, and although there were sporadic 

clashes among different cliques, the belief for a possibility to overthrow the government unified them at Taksim Square. These individuals had different motivations 

than the first two groups of protesters. They were upset with the government mostly 

for ideological reasons, blaming the Turkish Government to be a puppet of the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

36

United States and imperialist forces. Around Taksim square it was possible to see 

the posters of Mao Zedong, Stalin, and Lenin. Some of these groups were also reactive to Turkish policy toward Syria since the beginning of the uprising in this country. They were critical of the Turkish Government for taking a position against 

Bashar al-Assad’s brutal crackdown of the opposition alongside the United States. 

They were also angered by the increasing strength of the market economy in Turkey 

and in their slogans and flags it was possible to see their praises for socialism and 

communism. 

The spread of the movement to multiple cities and the emergence of different layers of groups made it difficult for the Turkish Government to diagnose the events. 

The rapid development of events, its unexpected nature, and the short timeframe 

created every condition for having problems managing a crisis situation. After the 

initial analysis of the events, the Turkish Government attempted to distinguish 

these groups by trying to communicate with the first group of protestors. President 

Abdullah Gu ̈l and Vice Prime Minister Bu ̈lent Arinc ̧ both stated that the demands 

and messages of the demonstrators have been heard and would be considered. There 

was even an apology to the Gezi Park protestors by Vice Prime Minister Arinc ̧, who 

met representatives of the first group of protesters. Later, when he returned from 

his trip to Northern Africa, Prime Minister Erdogˇan also met with the protestors 

in person for a 4.5-hour-long meeting. However, this did not help the resolution of 

the problem and repair the damage of relations between the government and the 

first group of protesters. 

After one of these meetings, Prime Minister Erdogˇan announced that the government would respect the court injunction blocking the redevelopment project. If the 

court decided to remove the injunction, the government promised that it would hold 

a plebiscite, which proved insufficient to allay the concerns of the protestors. Dissatisfied, protestors announced that they would continue to occupy the park and hold 

demonstrations, which resulted in further police action to clear the park and Taksim 

Square. 

The Political Consequences of the Protests 

The protests demonstrate several issues regarding the state of Turkish democracy 

and politics. First of all, the most significant lesson of these events for Turkish 

democracy was the necessity of a viable opposition for a functioning democratic system within a country. While this has long been a topic of debate in Turkey, the Gezi 

Park incidents demonstrated the dramatic consequences of the lack of a strong opposition party. During the Gezi Park events, especially within the first group of demonstrators, the main reason behind going out into the streets was not only their 

anger toward the ruling party, but also their frustration with the incapability of the 

opposition parties to represent them and voice their concern through democratic 

channels. Since the rise of the JDP, there has been a debate in the political spectrum regarding the absence of an alternative to the JDP. The economic and political 

success of the party, combined with the failure of the opposition parties to become 

a viable alternative for the ruling party, created a hopelessness and sense of frustration among some segments of the Turkish society. Under these circumstances, the 

crowds went to the streets to express their political demands and grievances. However, if not contained and managed successfully, these events could be the precedent 

to a problematic situation for democratic institutions in countries, such as Turkey. 

The belief that taking to the streets can be an alternative to the electoral ballot can 

result in dire consequences for the functioning of democracy in a country as well 

as for social relations among members of different factions. 

Secondly, the protests demonstrated the emergence of a new form of political citizenship that demands a more participatory political structure. Part of this demand 

comes from lack of trust and confidence in political parties that are supposed to represent the political views of these citizens. Just like the Occupy Wall Street movements, some segments of the society were increasingly disenchanted with the political process and political parties. However, the other more important cause is the 

development of social media and increased opportunity for individuals to politically 

express themselves. The spread of demand for a more direct form of participatory 

democracy is becoming more universal. The increase of street politics in different 

countries as well as transnational movements will be significant drives in the politics of democratic countries in the coming decades. This situation has demonstrated 

itself in street protests in Brazil and Turkey in recent days. 

While both are examples of protest in the name of democratic representation, it 

is imperative to draw a distinction between this push toward a more participatory 

citizenship from the people’s movements in more authoritarian countries, such as 

the Arab revolutions that have taken place since 2011. Unlike the Arab revolutions, 

these demonstrations took place in democratic countries against the ruling parties 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

37

who are democratically elected and have democratic legitimacy. Whereas the Arab 

revolutions stood against authoritarian regimes with no popular mandate, the first 

group of Gezi Park protesters advocated a qualitative transformation in the nature 

of democracy, from a majoritarian one to a pluralist democracy. The street protests 

and this new type of political citizenship will likely broaden its scope in the coming 

years. The universal language, transnational networks and the contagious nature of 

these protests demonstrate that other democracies may also face similar movements 

in the future. Governments in power need to be responsive to the demands of these 

groups and adjust to this new language of politics. 

Thirdly, the protests also demonstrated a sociological reality in the context of Turkey. Gezi Park showed that the most significant force behind the protests is the rise 

of a new middle class in Turkey. Significant economic growth in the last 10 years 

contributed to the empowerment of a new middle class and an increase in their 

numbers and stature among different segments of the society. This phenomenon is 

especially apparent among the youth which had grown up within these middle-class 

families; they have proved to be more educated, economically better off, and increasingly globalized. Because of the lack of political organizations, these groups are having difficulty finding representation in the mainstream political framework. This 

middle-class mobilization will be almost inevitable in countries with stable and high 

economic growth in the coming years. 

Finally, regarding the democratization in Turkey, the events demonstrated that 

democratization is a moving target and the increasing demands and expectations of 

the people make a new set of adjustments and recalibrations in democratic reforms 

necessary. The Gezi Park events launched a new wave of debates among policymakers and scholars regarding state-society relations and a more participatory form 

of democracy. Gezi Park was unique in Turkish political history in regards to its 

causes, development, and will also be unique in terms of its consequences. The debates during its aftermath will contribute to the advancement of the level of democracy in Turkey and will be taken into consideration during the creation of a new 

constitution. 

The Impact of Gezi Park for the ‘‘Turkish Model’’

Before deliberating on the impact of Gezi Park on what we call the ‘‘Turkish 

model,’’ it is imperative to discuss the origin of the model debates. Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, Turkey has often been presented as a model for 

Islamic countries around the world. The last batch of this model debate took place 

when the Central Asian Republics declared their independence. Many scholars in 

the United States and European countries depicted Turkey as a model for these 

countries. In these discussions, the concept of being a model was composed of Turkey’s democratic system, secular character, and pro-Western orientation. 

The model state debate was revived after the start of the people’s movements in 

the Middle East in December 2010. Although it was never pronounced by the Turkish state, the debate on the Turkish model was developed by Western scholars during the Arab revolutions. The democratization experience in Turkey can be a source 

of inspiration, and if needed, a motivation for the democratic movements of Middle 

Eastern countries. Otherwise, every country should have their own democratization 

experience and needs to develop its own unique path toward that goal by considering different variables related to politics, culture, economy, and society. 

This debate on the Turkish model fails to account for several nuances between 

the Turkish case and revolutions in the Arab countries. First of all, the proponents 

of this model indicated several pillars of the Turkish model, including the development in the field of democratization, stable economic growth, and independent foreign policy in the last 10 years of the Justice and Development Party. However, 

Turkish democracy reached this level after 50 years of experience with parliamentary democracy which had been interrupted every decade by the military at least 

once. The last one of these military interventions, though indirectly, took place in 

2007 when the Turkish military declared an ultimatum in regards to the Presidential elections. It would be unfair to compare the first years of the democratization of Middle Eastern countries with the latest years of the 60-year-long democratization experience of Turkey. 

Secondly, the argument itself has a problem due to the state of Turkish democracy. The active civilian control of the military was achieved in Turkey only a few 

years ago. Several coup plans that have been unearthed in recent years show that 

until recently, some segments of the Turkish military were planning another coup 

against the democratically elected Government of Turkey. Moreover, the ruling 

party of Turkey was about to be closed down by the Constitutional Court in 2009, 

and actually failed to do so because of a single vote. If this decision was taken, the 

party would be closed down and the prominent leaders of the JDP would be banned 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

38

from running for public office. Furthermore, there are some serious issues of human 

rights and liberties that need to be addressed, including the ban for women with 

headscarves to become government employees and the restrictions that antiterrorism laws and regulations brought, which have become important impediments of the 

freedom of expression and the press in Turkey. 

However, these problems do not mean that Turkey is, or is becoming, an authoritarian country; rather it is on the path toward a more advanced level of democratization. The solution of the Kurdish problem through reconciliation and a new civilian constitution would contribute to this advancement. By taking into consideration 

some legitimate demands of the Gezi Park protests, the government would move toward a better place in terms of basic rights and liberties. This would not only create 

a better democracy in Turkey, but also make Turkey a better source of inspiration 

for countries in the Middle East. In particular, for countries such as Egypt, which 

has been experiencing a reverse wave of democratization in the last month, the 

Turkish experience provides a lot of important lessons on how to deal with a tutelage system. In the future, all of the new and mature democracies in the region need 

to learn a sense of respect for democratic institutions and processes, and for more 

inclusive forms of democracy. In return, the Gezi Park protesters and those who are 

disenchanted from the political parties in Turkey have to find a way to express 

themselves within the legitimate channels of democratic processes. The streets are 

not an alternative to the ballot box and power transitions are only meaningful and 

peaceful when they occur through democratic means. If Turkey can handle this crisis by reaching a more advanced level of democratization, it will be an example of 

how other countries can handle the problems of this new street politics.

Æ

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER