* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-10779

Summary Calendar

STELLA LOUISE BURNS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SHANE TAYLOR GOODMAN ET AL.,

Defendants,

CITY OF GARLAND, TEXAS,

Defendant-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:99-CV-313-L

-------------------- January 16, 2002

Before DeMOSS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Stella Burns appeals the dist rict court’s summary judgment

dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint in favor of the City of

Garland, Texas (“the City”). She argues that the district court

erred in determining that she did not establish a genuine issue of

material fact whether the City’s poli cymakers had actual or

constructive knowledge of the policies and cu stoms which lead to

the violation of her constitutional rights.

We review a grant of summary judgment applying the same

standard as the court below. D eas v. River W., L.P.

, 152 F.3d 471,No. 01-10779

-2-

475 (5th Cir. 1998). "Summary judgment is properly granted if 'the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" C elotex Corp. v.

Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Rule 56(c)). If the

moving party meets the initial burden of showing that there is no

genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant

to set forth specific facts showing the existence of such an issue

for trial. Rule 56(e). In reviewing the district court's grant of

summary judgment, this court views the evidence in the light most

favorable to the opponent of the motion and determines whether any

genuine issue of material facts exi sts. B rock v. Republic

Airlines, Inc. , 776 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1985).

"To establish county/municipality liability under § 1983

. . .

a plaintiff must demonstrate a policy or custom which caused the

constitutional deprivation." Colle v. Brazos County, Tex

. , 981

F.2d 237, 244 (5th Cir. 1993). “Actual or constructive knowledge

o f such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the

municipality or to an official to whom that body has delegated

policymaking authority.” M atthias v. Bingley

, 906 F.2d 1047, 1054

(5th Cir. 1990). Unless officers or employees of a municipality

execute official policy, their ac tions do not render the

municipality liable under § 1983. I d

. The government entity

cannot be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior for the

acts of its non-policy-making employees. Colle , 981 F.2d at 244.

Burns bases her argument that policymakers had or should haveNo. 01-10779

-3-

had constructive knowledge on three grounds : (1) upper-jail

management knew that her rapist, Shane Goodman, had been left alone

on duty in the jail o n more than one occasion; (2) unnamed

sup ervisors were aware of sexual interaction between detention

officers and female arrestees; and (3) jail officials did not

conduct an investigation to determi ne how Goodman was able to

commit his crimes while on duty and no one on the night shift was

disciplined or reprimanded in the aftermath of her rape.

Although Burns presented evidence that upper-level jail

officials were aware that the detention officers were leaving their

shifts during the night shift, the district court correctly noted

that she presented no evi dence that these instances were ever

communicated to the City’s policymakers. Burns’s allegation that

unnamed supervisors condoned sexual relations between male

detention officers and female inmates is simply n ot supported by

the evidence. The evidence furthermore does not support Burns’s

allegation that no internal investigation was ever conducted. The

testimony of detention office rs Mark Lamb and Doyle Edwards that

they were unaware of whether such an investigation took place or

whether anyone was reprimanded or terminated as a result thereof is

insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on that

issue.

B urns has not demonstrated that the district court erred in

its summary-judgment decision.

AFFIRMED.