IRAQ

DOD Needs to 

Improve Visibility and 

Accountability Over 

Equipment Provided 

to Iraq’s Security 

Forces

Report to Congressional Requesters

May 2017

GAO-17-433

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-433, a report to 

congressional requesters

May 2017

IRAQ

DOD Needs to Improve Visibility and 

Accountability Over Equipment Provided to 

Iraq’s Security Forces

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains limited visibility and accountability 

over equipment funded by the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF). Specifically, 

DOD is not ensuring that the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) is 

consistently capturing key transportation dates of ITEF-funded equipment. DOD 

guidance states that DOD components should use SCIP to identify the status 

and track the transportation of all building partner capacity materiel, such as

ITEF. DOD also issued an order in October 2016 requiring DOD components to 

ensure that equipment transfer dates are recorded in SCIP. The process for 

providing the equipment to Iraq’s security forces generally falls into three phases: 

(1) acquisition and shipment, (2) staging in Kuwait and Iraq, and (3) transfer to 

the government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government. However, for the 

566 ITEF-funded requisitions marked as complete in SCIP’s management 

reporting system as of February 2017, GAO found that the system captured one 

of two key transportation dates for 256 of the requisitions in phase 1, and none of 

the transportation dates for these requisitions in phase 2 or phase 3 (see figure).

Key Transportation Dates for Completed Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF)–Funded Equipment 

Requisitions Captured in the Security Cooperation Information Portal’s Management 

Reporting System, by Equipping Phase

DOD officials attributed the lack of key transportation dates in SCIP’s 

management reporting system to potential interoperability and data reporting 

issues in all three equipping phases. 

• Interoperability issues. DOD officials said that SCIP’s management reporting 

system may not be importing transportation data correctly from other DOD 

data systems or from another shipment tracking system feature in SCIP. 

• Data reporting issues. DOD officials said they are not reporting the arrival 

dates of equipment to Kuwait or Iraq because they rely on other DOD data 

systems and are not required to do so. DOD officials said they have had 

difficulty ensuring that SCIP has captured equipment transfer dates. 

In addition, DOD cannot fully account for ITEF-funded equipment transfers 

because of missing or incomplete transfer documentation. Without timely and 

accurate transit information, DOD cannot ensure that the equipment has reached 

its intended destination, nor can program managers conduct effective oversight 

of ITEF-funded equipment. 

View GAO-17-433. For more information, 

contact Jessica Farb at (202) 512-6991 or 

farbj@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

In 2014, Congress authorized the 

creation of ITEF to provide equipment 

and other assistance to Iraq’s security 

forces, including the Kurdistan 

Regional Government forces, to 

counter the expansion of the Islamic 

State of Iraq and Syria. As of 

December 2016, DOD had disbursed 

about $2 billion of the $2.3 billion 

Congress appropriated for ITEF in 

fiscal years 2015 and 2016 to 

purchase, for example, personal 

protective equipment, weapons, and 

vehicles for these forces. DOD’s webbased SCIP provides U.S. government 

personnel and others transportation 

information on DOD equipment

imported from other DOD data systems 

or reported by SCIP users.

GAO was asked to review DOD’s

accountability of ITEF-funded 

equipment. This report assesses the 

extent to which DOD maintains 

visibility and accountability of ITEFfunded equipment from acquisition 

through transfer to the government of 

Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional 

Government. GAO analyzed DOD 

guidance, procedures, SCIP data, and 

transfer documentation and

interviewed officials from DOD 

agencies with a role in the ITEF 

equipping process in the United States, 

Kuwait, and Iraq.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making four recommendations

that include identifying the root causes 

for addressing why DOD is not 

capturing ITEF-funded equipment 

transportation dates in SCIP and 

developing an action plan to address 

these issues. DOD generally concurred 

with GAO’s recommendations and

stated that it would develop a plan.
Page i GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

Letter 1

Background 4

DOD Maintains Limited Visibility and Accountability of ITEFfunded Equipment Using SCIP 10

Conclusions 20

Recommendations for Executive Action 20

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 21

Appendix I Objectives, Scope & Methodology 23

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 27

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 30

Related GAO Products 31

Figures

Figure 1: Examples of Equipment DOD Purchased with the Fiscal 

Year 2015 Iraq Train and Equip Fund 5

Figure 2: The Iraq Train and Equip Fund Equipping Process 6

Figure 3: Relationship between the Enhanced Freight Tracking 

System and the Security Cooperation Management Suite 

in the Security Cooperation Information Portal 9

Figure 4: Key Transportation Dates for Completed Iraq Train and 

Equip Fund (ITEF)-Funded Equipment Requisitions 

Captured in the Security Cooperation Information Portal’s 

Security Cooperation Management Suite, Phase 1, as of 

February 2017 11

Figure 5: Arrival Date of Equipment to Kuwait or Iraq for 

Completed Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF)-Funded 

Equipment Requisitions Captured in the Security 

Cooperation Information Portal’s Security Cooperation 

Management Suite, Phase 2, as of February 2017 13

Contents
Page ii GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

Figure 6: Transfer Dates for Completed Iraq Train and Equip Fund 

(ITEF)-Funded Equipment Requisitions Captured in the 

Security Cooperation Information Portal’s Security 

Cooperation Management Suite, Phase 3, as of February 

2017 15

Figure 7: GAO Analysis of U.S. Transfer and Receipt Forms 

between March 2015 and April 2016 Documenting the 

Transfer of ITEF-Funded Equipment 18

Abbreviations

CJTF-OIR Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent

Resolve

DOD Department of Defense

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency

EFTS Enhanced Freight Tracking System

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

ITEF Iraq Train and Equip Fund

OSC-I Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq

SAMM Security Assistance Management Manual

SCMS Security Cooperation Management Suite

SCIP Security Cooperation Information Portal

1st TSC 1st Theater Sustainment Command

USASAC U.S. Army Security Assistance Command

USCENTCOM U.S. Central Command

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

May 25, 2017

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Bob Corker

Chairman

The Honorable Benjamin L. Cardin

Ranking Member

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

The Honorable Robert Menendez

United States Senate

In 2013 and 2014, the self-declared Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 

seized control of large areas of territory in Iraq and Syria, emerging as a 

major threat to both countries and to U.S. interests in the region.1 In fiscal 

years 2015 and 2016, Congress appropriated $2.3 billion to the 

Department of Defense (DOD) for the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) 

to provide assistance, including equipment, to military and other security 

forces of or associated with the government of Iraq.2 These forces 

included the government of Iraq’s Army, Counter Terrorism Service, and 

Tribal Security Forces and the Kurdistan Regional Government’s 

Peshmerga.3 The Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent 

 1

ISIS is also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, Daesh, and the Islamic 

State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), among other names.

2

Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, Div. 

C, Title IX (2014); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, Div. C, 

Title IX (2015). ITEF funds are available for obligation for 2 fiscal years.

3

The Kurdistan Regional Government administers an autonomous region consisting of 

three provinces in northern Iraq and has de facto control over portions of three other 

provinces in that area. The Kurdistan Regional Government maintains its own internal 

security forces for this region, called the Peshmerga. According to DOD officials, ITEFfunded equipment for the Peshmerga is provided directly to the Kurdistan Regional 

Government.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

Resolve (CJTF-OIR), located in Kuwait and Iraq, manages and executes 

ITEF-funded assistance in coordination with the Department of State’s 

Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I).4 Multiple other DOD 

components, such as the 1st Theater Sustainment Command (1st TSC), 

are responsible for providing information on the status of the equipment at 

different phases of the ITEF equipping process from acquisition through 

its transfer to government of Iraq or Kurdistan Regional Government 

officials.5 The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) maintains a 

secure web-based Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) to, 

among other things, provide U.S. government personnel and others 

transportation information on DOD-purchased equipment for foreign 

governments.

You asked us to review DOD’s ability to account for ITEF-funded 

equipment intended for Iraq’s security forces. This report examines the 

extent to which DOD maintains visibility and accountability over ITEFfunded equipment from acquisition through transfer to the government of 

Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government. According to DOD’s Strategy 

for Improving Asset Visibility, asset visibility provides commanders and 

planners with “one stop shopping” for timely and accurate information on 

the location, movement, and status of equipment and supplies, among 

other things.6 We have previously reported that limitations in DOD’s 

visibility of equipment and supplies in transit, such as incomplete delivery 

data for many surface shipments and inadequate radio-frequency 

identification information to track cargo movements, have made it difficult 

for DOD to obtain timely and accurate information on these assets.7

 4

OSC-I is the Department of State’s security cooperation organization in Iraq.

5

1st TSC is a supporting command to CJTF-OIR. Supporting commands provide 

additional forces or other support to the supported command. According to DOD 

guidance, a Transfer and Receipt document (or comparable form) is used to record the 

title transfer. For the purposes of this report, we use the term transfer to refer to this 

transaction.

6

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, Department of 

Defense Strategy for Improving DOD Asset Visibility, January 2014.

7

GAO, Defense Logistics: DOD Has Addressed Most Reporting Requirements and 

Continues to Refine Its Asset Visibility Strategy, GAO-16-88 (Washington, D.C.: 

December 2015); GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-15-290 (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 11, 2015); GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-13-283 (Washington, D.C.: 

February 2013).
Page 3 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

To determine the extent to which DOD maintains visibility and 

accountability over ITEF-funded equipment, we reviewed DOD guidance. 

We also interviewed DOD officials from DOD components responsible for 

tracking ITEF-funded equipment during different phases of the equipping 

process in the United States, Kuwait, and Iraq, and the Department of 

State’s OSC-I. We reviewed ITEF-funded equipment tracking reports from 

the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), the U.S. Army 

TACOM Life Cycle Management Command, and the U.S. Army Joint 

Munitions Command. We examined ITEF-funded equipment requisitions 

marked as “supply/services complete” in SCIP to determine whether key 

transportation dates of these requisitions were captured in SCIP.8 DOD 

considers “supply/services complete” when all items and services have 

been delivered and performed. It was beyond the scope of this review to 

determine the extent to which the ITEF-funded equipment requisitions 

had been correctly marked as complete for supply and services. 

However, we did report where ITEF-funded equipment requisitions 

marked as complete for supply and services were lacking key information. 

In the body of this report, we detail how the lack of complete key 

information means that these data cannot be used to maintain visibility 

and accountability of ITEF-funded equipment. We determined the extent 

to which DOD accounts for ITEF-funded equipment transferred to the 

government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government by reviewing 

the 1st TSC’s standard operating procedures for ensuring the 

accountability of the ITEF-funded equipment and transfer documentation 

provided by the 1st TSC between March 2015 and April 2016. We also 

interviewed 1st TSC officials. For more information on our objectives, 

scope, and methodology, see appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2016 to May 2017 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 8

A requisition is an order for materiel, such as equipment, initiated by an established and 

authorized DOD or non-DOD organization. DOD officials designate a requisition as 

complete in SCIP when all items and services have been delivered or performed.
Page 4 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

Congress authorized ITEF in December 2014 to provide assistance, 

including training and equipment, to military and other security forces of, 

or associated with, the government of Iraq, including Kurdish and Tribal 

Security Forces or other local security forces with a national security 

mission.9 As of December 31, 2016, DOD had obligated about $2.2 billion 

of the $2.3 billion Congress appropriated for ITEF in fiscal years 2015 and 

2016 and had disbursed about $2 billion. See figure 1 for examples of 

equipment that DOD purchased with these funds, according to DOD 

documents.

 9

Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2015 (Pub. L. No. 113-291, §1236 (2014)) as amended. These military and other 

security forces include the Iraqi Army, Counter-Terrorism Service, federal and local police 

forces, and Peshmerga. 

Background

ITEF Equipment-Related 

Authorization and Funding
Page 5 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

Figure 1: Examples of Equipment DOD Purchased with the Fiscal Year 2015 Iraq 

Train and Equip Fund

The process for providing ITEF-funded equipment to Iraq’s security forces 

generally falls into three phases: (1) acquisition and shipment, (2) staging 

in Kuwait and Iraq, and (3) transfer to the government of Iraq or the 

Kurdistan Regional Government (see fig. 2).10

 10These phases do not encompass all steps of the ITEF equipping process and omit, for 

example, how ITEF-funded equipment cases are developed. 

ITEF Equipping Process 

and Responsibilities of 

DOD Components
Page 6 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

Figure 2: The Iraq Train and Equip Fund Equipping Process

Notes: According to DOD officials, a limited number of ITEF-funded equipment items, such as small 

arms, ammunition, and some types of bridging equipment, are shipped directly from the United States 

to Iraq. In addition, DOD officials said that a small portion of ITEF-funded equipment items, such as 

spares and support parts, are sourced from U.S. pre-positioned stocks in the region or locally.

Multiple DOD components are responsible for ensuring the visibility and 

accountability of ITEF-funded equipment throughout the ITEF equipping 

process up until U.S. personnel in Iraq transfer the equipment to vetted 
Page 7 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

officials from the government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional 

Government. For example:

• In addition to maintaining SCIP, DSCA oversees program 

administration for the ITEF program and provides overall guidance to 

DOD components through its Security Assistance Management 

Manual (SAMM) and associated policy memos.11

• CJTF-OIR manages the ITEF program for the U.S. Central Command 

(USCENTCOM) and maintains overall responsibility for providing 

ITEF assistance to Iraq’s security forces.

• DOD’s primary implementing agency, USASAC—supported by other 

DOD agencies—maintains overall responsibility for case 

development, execution, and closure.12

• The Department of State’s OSC-I supports CJTF-OIR through each 

phase of the ITEF equipping process. It is also responsible for 

communicating ITEF program objectives to government of Iraq or 

Kurdistan Regional Government officials.

• The 1st TSC, in coordination with CJTF-OIR and OSC-I, receives, 

stages, and transports ITEF-funded equipment in Kuwait and Iraq and 

oversees the transfer of the equipment to vetted government of Iraq or 

Kurdistan Regional Government officials in Iraq.

 11In January 2015 and 2016, DSCA issued two memorandums stating that the 

management and execution of the fiscal year 2015 and 2016 Iraq Train and Equip Fund 

would comply with guidance provided in the SAMM, Chapter 15. 

12USASAC functions as the implementing agency on behalf of the U.S. Department of the 

Army, which is the U.S. military department primarily responsible for implementing, 

administering, and managing ITEF-funded equipment cases. USASAC is supported by 

other DOD agencies including the U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command, 

U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command, U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command, 

U.S. Army Medical Command, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management 

Command, U.S. Army Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, United 

States Transportation Command, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
Page 8 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

DOD generally administers ITEF-funded equipment purchases as 

individual building partnership capacity cases within the U.S. 

government’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) infrastructure.13 An individual 

case may have multiple—sometimes thousands—of requisitions or 

procurement actions. DOD assigns a unique case identification number 

for each case so that DOD entities can track the case throughout the 

equipping process.

According to DSCA documents, SCIP is designed to provide end-to-end 

transit visibility, including the status of defense articles and services, of 

FMS and building partner capacity cases to designated U.S. government 

personnel and representatives of foreign countries. It consolidates case 

data, including transportation information, into one place so that 

customers and program managers can have readily available information 

on the status of their cases. The portal imports case-related data from 

other DOD data systems containing logistics and transportation 

information, and SCIP users can also report data directly in SCIP. It is 

accessible over the Internet to authorized users anywhere in the world.14

SCIP includes a variety of different features for tracking defense articles 

and services, including equipment, which are organized into 13 different 

groups. Two of these 13 groups are the Security Cooperation 

Management Suite (SCMS) group and the Case Execution group (see fig. 

3).

• The SCMS group—SCIP’s management reporting system—provides

program managers and participants for Iraq and other countries with 

customizable and ad hoc management reports on the status of FMS 

and building partnership capacity cases. SCMS is populated with data 

from other groups within SCIP, DOD external data systems, and SCIP 

users.

• The Case Execution group contains the Enhanced Freight Tracking 

System (EFTS), a tracking system within SCIP containing building 

 13Under FMS, the U.S. government administers the acquisition of materiel, including 

equipment and services purchased by foreign governments on their behalf. According to

the SAMM, building partnership capacity programs encompass security cooperation and 

security assistance activities funded with U.S. government appropriations and executed 

through existing security assistance systems.

14According to DSCA officials, the approximate cost to maintain SCIP worldwide in fiscal 

year 2016 was about $3.3 million.

ITEF Case Management

Use of Security 

Cooperation Information 

Portal
Page 9 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

partner capacity and FMS shipment information. DSCA designed 

EFTS to serve as the single, authoritative tracking system for FMS 

and building partner capacity shipments. EFTS supplements and pulls 

shipment information from external DOD data systems. DOD 

personnel can also report shipment information, including transfer 

dates of equipment to the foreign government, directly in EFTS.

According to a DSCA official, EFTS data should be captured in 

SCMS.

Figure 3 below shows the relationship between EFTS and SCMS, 

including how each is populated.

Figure 3: Relationship between the Enhanced Freight Tracking System and the 

Security Cooperation Management Suite in the Security Cooperation Information 

Portal
Page 10 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

a

Other Department of Defense data systems include logistics and transportation information.

b

SCMS is also populated with data from other groups of features within SCIP.

DOD components do not ensure that SCIP consistently captures key 

transportation dates of equipment funded by ITEF during each of the 

three phases of the ITEF equipping process. According to the DSCA 

SAMM, DOD components should use SCIP to identify the status and 

track the transportation of all building partner capacity materiel, such as 

ITEF. Furthermore, USCENTCOM ordered the 1st TSC, in coordination 

with a USASAC program manager, to ensure that ITEF-funded equipment 

transfer information is properly recorded in SCIP. Our analysis of 

completed ITEF-funded requisitions in SCMS, SCIP’s management 

reporting system, found that SCMS captured about 11 percent of 2,264 

key transportation dates in all three equipping phases. DOD officials said 

that SCMS is not capturing such dates because of potential 

interoperability and data reporting issues in SCIP and other DOD data 

systems. Although DOD officials in Kuwait stated that they had begun to 

report some ITEF-funded equipment transfer dates in SCIP, DOD officials 

and contractors have had difficulty locating these dates in SCIP. DOD 

also could not fully account for ITEF-funded equipment transferred to the 

government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government because of 

missing or incomplete transfer documentation.

Our analysis of 566 completed ITEF-funded equipment requisitions 

recorded in SCIP’s SCMS found that DOD components are not following 

the SAMM to consistently capture key transportation dates of ITEFfunded equipment in phase 1 of the ITEF equipping process in SCIP.15

For example, we found that only 256 of the 1,132 key transportation dates 

in phase 1 (about 23 percent) were captured in SCIP’s SCMS as of 

February 10, 2017. Specifically, 256 of the 566 requisitions included the 

date the equipment arrived at the last point of departure in the United 

 15According to the SAMM, SCMS should be referenced during case planning to identify 

the status of already programmed building partner capacity cases by country. It states that 

SCMS provides U.S. officials with a common operating picture of the security cooperation 

process, including building partner capacity programs. In addition, the SAMM states that 

the implementing agency and the security cooperation organization should use EFTS 

within SCIP to track the transportation of all building partner capacity materiel. 

Transportation information captured in EFTS should be captured in SCMS, according to a 

DSCA official responsible for SCMS and a DSCA contractor responsible for EFTS.

DOD Maintains 

Limited Visibility and 

Accountability of 

ITEF-funded 

Equipment Using 

SCIP

DOD Does Not 

Consistently Capture in 

SCIP Key Transportation 

Dates of ITEF-Funded 

Equipment in Phase 1 of 

the ITEF Equipping

Process
Page 11 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

States, and none of the 566 requisitions included the date the equipment 

was shipped from the United States to Kuwait or Iraq (see fig. 4). 16

Figure 4: Key Transportation Dates for Completed Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF)-

Funded Equipment Requisitions Captured in the Security Cooperation Information 

Portal’s Security Cooperation Management Suite, Phase 1, as of February 2017

DSCA officials responsible for the management of SCIP’s SCMS 

attributed this lack of data to three potential issues related to 

interoperability in SCIP and external DOD data systems and data 

reporting in SCIP. First, SCMS may not be importing data correctly from 

other DOD data systems used by DOD components to track ITEF-funded 

equipment in phase 1. Second, SCMS may not be importing 

 16We examined all ITEF-funded equipment lines of requisitions, which we refer to as 

“requisitions,” marked as “supply/services complete” in SCMS as of February 10, 2017. 

DOD considers supply and services complete when all items and services have been 

delivered and performed. For the purposes of this report, we use the term “complete” to 

refer to these requisitions. For more information on our scope and methodology for 

selecting these requisitions, see app. I. 
Page 12 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

transportation data correctly from EFTS within SCIP as intended. Third, 

DOD components may not be reporting key transportation dates in EFTS 

or SCMS. For example, according to USASAC officials, USASAC does 

not report any ITEF-funded transportation dates in EFTS or SCMS 

because they rely on other DOD data systems for this information which 

officials said should be captured in SCIP. While USASAC provides some 

visibility on the transportation of ITEF-funded equipment to Kuwait or Iraq 

by case in daily tracking reports it produces based on information from 

other DOD data systems, these reports do not provide end-to-end transit 

visibility of the equipment from acquisition to transfer to the government of 

Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government.17 We did not independently 

determine the root cause for why these key transportation dates were not 

consistently captured in SCMS. By not ensuring that these key 

transportation dates in phase 1 are captured in SCIP’s SCMS, DOD 

components do not have readily available information to maintain visibility 

over and account for all ITEF-funded equipment.

Our analysis of 566 completed ITEF-funded requisitions recorded in 

SCIP’s SCMS as of February 10, 2017 found that DOD components are 

not following the SAMM to capture the arrival dates of ITEF-funded 

equipment to Kuwait or Iraq in phase 2 of the ITEF equipping process in 

SCIP. Specifically, none of the 566 requisitions included the date the 

equipment arrived at U.S. staging facilities in Kuwait or Iraq (see fig. 5).

 17To update the tracking report, USASAC officials said they rely on a contractor to analyze 

information from over half a dozen DOD transportation systems, websites, and tracking 

reports of other DOD agencies. 

DOD Is Not Capturing in 

SCIP Arrival Dates of 

ITEF-Funded Equipment 

to Kuwait and Iraq in 

Phase 2 of the ITEF 

Equipping Process
Page 13 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

Figure 5: Arrival Date of Equipment to Kuwait or Iraq for Completed Iraq Train and

Equip Fund (ITEF)-Funded Equipment Requisitions Captured in the Security 

Cooperation Information Portal’s Security Cooperation Management Suite, Phase 2, 

as of February 2017

DSCA officials responsible for managing SCIP’s SCMS said that they did 

not know why the arrival dates of ITEF-funded equipment were not being 

captured in SCMS and cited the same potential interoperability and data 

reporting issues for the lack of data in phase 2 as they did in phase 1. 

Also, USASAC officials responsible for overseeing the delivery of ITEFfunded equipment to Kuwait or Iraq said that they do not report the arrival 

dates of the equipment in SCIP, as they rely on other DOD data systems 

for this information, which they said should feed into SCIP. USASAC’s 

daily tracking reports contain some information on the arrival dates of 

ITEF-funded equipment that officials said they obtain from other DOD 

data systems, but this information is not captured in SCMS and therefore 

is not readily accessible to DOD program managers. USASAC officials 

said that they do not track ITEF-funded equipment beyond its arrival to 

Kuwait or Iraq as they consider shipment complete once it arrives in 
Page 14 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

Kuwait or Iraq and the 1st TSC, in coordination with CJTF-OIR, receives 

the equipment.

According to 1st TSC officials responsible for the receiving, storing, and 

transporting of ITEF-funded equipment in Kuwait and Iraq, the 1st TSC 

does not report in SCIP and has no plans to report the arrival dates of 

ITEF-funded equipment to Kuwait or Iraq because it is not required to do 

so. These officials said that guidance in the SAMM does not assign 

specific responsibilities to the 1st TSC, and that the 1st TSC has not been 

directed by USCENTCOM to implement any policies or procedures 

outlined in the SAMM. 1st TSC officials said that they use their own 

internal spreadsheets to account for on-hand quantities of equipment at 

U.S. staging facilities in Kuwait and Iraq. In March 2017, 1st TSC officials 

said that they implemented the U.S. Army’s automated Global Combat 

Support System—a logistics and financial management system that does 

not feed into SCIP, according to 1st TSC officials—to account for the onhand quantities of ITEF-funded equipment in Kuwait and Iraq. A 

September 2016 DOD Inspector General report found that DOD did not 

have accurate, up-to-date records on the quantity and location of ITEFfunded equipment in Kuwait and Iraq and lacked effective controls for 

maintaining visibility and accountability of ITEF-funded equipment in 

Kuwait and Iraq. The DOD Inspector General recommended that the 1st 

TSC use automated systems to account for and provide complete 

visibility of ITEF-funded equipment.18 We did not independently determine 

the root cause for why the arrival dates of ITEF-funded equipment to 

Kuwait or Iraq were not consistently captured in SCMS. Without up-todate information in SCIP’s SCMS on the arrival dates of ITEF-funded 

equipment, DOD components will not have access to timely and relevant 

management information at a key stage of the ITEF equipping process.

 18U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General, The Army Did Not Implement Effective 

Controls to Maintain Visibility and Accountability of Iraq Train and Equip Fund Equipment, 

DODIG-2016-134 (Alexandria, VA: Sept. 14, 2016). In December 2016, the DOD 

Inspector General also found that U.S. units lacked visibility of U.S.-transported equipment 

provided to the Kurdistan Regional Government because, among other things, each U.S. 

military command tracked equipment differently. U.S. Department of Defense Inspector 

General, Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the 

Kurdish Security Forces in Iraq, DODIG-2017-033 (Alexandria, VA: Dec. 14, 2016).
Page 15 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

Our analysis of 566 completed ITEF-funded requisitions recorded in 

SCIP’s SCMS as of February 10, 2017 found that DOD components had 

not consistently followed the SAMM or a USCENTCOM order to capture 

the transfer dates of ITEF-funded equipment to the government of Iraq or 

the Kurdistan Regional Government in phase 3 of the ITEF equipping 

process in SCIP. Specifically, none of the 566 requisitions included the 

transfer date of the equipment to the government of Iraq or the Kurdistan 

Regional Government (see fig. 6).

Figure 6: Transfer Dates for Completed Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF)-Funded 

Equipment Requisitions Captured in the Security Cooperation Information Portal’s 

Security Cooperation Management Suite, Phase 3, as of February 2017

Between August 2016 and April 2017, DOD took steps to report the 

transfer dates of some ITEF-funded equipment in EFTS as required by 

the DSCA SAMM; however, DOD officials and contractors have had 

difficulty locating these dates in EFTS because of a lack of clear 

procedures for reporting these dates. In August 2016, after we informed 

OSC-I officials of a reporting requirement in the DSCA SAMM, 1st TSC 

officials said that they began reporting ITEF-funded equipment transfer 

DOD Is Not Consistently 

Capturing in SCIP ITEFFunded Equipment 

Transfer Dates to the 

Government of Iraq or the 

Kurdistan Regional 

Government in Phase 3 of 

the ITEF Equipping 

Process
Page 16 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

dates to the government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government of 

previously transferred equipment in EFTS within SCIP.19 Soon thereafter, 

in October 2016, USCENTCOM issued an order requiring the 1st TSC, in 

coordination with a USASAC program manager, to ensure that ITEFfunded equipment transfer information is properly recorded in EFTS.

According to 1st TSC officials, in late December 2016, 1st TSC began 

reporting the transfer dates of any new equipment transfers in EFTS as 

they occurred, in addition to continuing to report the transfer dates of 

previously transferred equipment in EFTS. 

In February 2017, however, when we asked the DSCA contractor 

responsible for the management of EFTS to provide us with the transfer 

dates of ITEF-funded equipment that 1st TSC officials said they had 

reported in EFTS, the contractor could not locate the transfer dates.20 The 

DSCA contractor said that EFTS does not contain a dedicated data field 

for capturing the transfer dates of building partnership capacity materiel, 

including ITEF-funded equipment, and DSCA has not provided guidance 

on what data field should be used to capture these dates. As a result, he 

did not know which data field the 1st TSC had used to report the transfer 

dates. In addition, our review of the 1st TSC’s written procedures for 

ensuring the accountability and transferring of ITEF-funded equipment 

found that they did not specify under which data field ITEF-funded 

equipment transfer dates should be reported. 21 In April 2017, 1st TSC 

 19The DSCA SAMM states that security cooperation organizations must report the delivery 

of building partner capacity materiel, such as ITEF, within 30 days in EFTS within SCIP or 

to DSCA. According to the SAMM, materiel is considered delivered when transferred to a 

representative of the foreign government. We informed OSC-I of this requirement in June 

2016 while conducting work for another GAO review that examined U.S. efforts to train 

and equip Iraq’s security forces. See GAO, Iraq: Status of DOD Efforts to Train and Equip 

Iraq’s Security Forces, GAO-17-32C (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7, 2017). Upon being 

informed of this requirement, OSC-I officials recommended delegating this responsibility to 

the 1st TSC and ensuring the command be granted access to SCIP to enter these dates. 

20In February 2017, the contractor provided us with evidence that the 1st TSC had 

reported additional information in EFTS for about 1,000 ITEF-funded requisitions between 

September 2016 and December 2016 but could not locate the transfer dates. In extracting 

the 1,000 1st TSC reports of data from EFTS, the contractor said he found evidence that 

the 1st TSC had attempted and failed to report data to EFTS in January 2017 and 

February 2017. The 1st TSC changed personnel in December 2016 and, according to the 

contractor, the new personnel were not able to properly report the data in EFTS. The 

contractor said he worked with the 1st TSC personnel to resolve this issue and as of late 

February 2017, the 1st TSC had successfully reported data to EFTS.

211st TSC. ISF Property Accountability Standard Operating Procedure & Policies (Camp 

Arifjan, Kuwait: Nov. 14, 2016); 1st TSC. ITEF Divestiture Process (Camp Arifjan, Kuwait: 

Nov. 4, 2016).
Page 17 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

officials identified the data field in EFTS that they were using to report the 

transfer dates of ITEF-funded equipment and provided evidence that they 

had reported transfer dates for about 5,000 ITEF-funded equipment 

requisitions in EFTS as of March 2017. 22 According to DSCA officials, 

SCMS should automatically capture all transfer dates of equipment 

reported in EFTS. DSCA officials responsible for the management of 

SCMS said that SCMS may not importing the transfer dates from EFTS 

as intended because of interoperability issues with EFTS. By not 

capturing the transfer dates of ITEF-funded equipment in SCMS or EFTS, 

DOD components’ visibility over the amount of ITEF-funded equipment 

transferred to the government of Iraq is limited.

Furthermore, DSCA officials said that SCIP users may need additional 

guidance for reporting all key transportation dates in SCIP. These officials 

said that they held a symposium in January 2017 to discuss general 

interoperability and reporting issues within SCIP and planned to provide 

additional guidance on the roles of DOD components for reporting data to 

EFTS and SCMS but did not specify a time frame for doing so. 

The 1st TSC cannot fully account for ITEF-funded equipment transferred 

to the government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional Government because 

of missing or incomplete transfer documentation. 1st TSC officials said 

that they are missing an unknown number of hand-completed U.S. 

transfer and receipt forms used to document the transfer of ITEF-funded 

equipment. According to the 1st TSC’s standard operating procedures for 

ensuring the accountability of ITEF-funded equipment, 1st TSC officials 

are required to complete a U.S. transfer and receipt form to document the 

transfer of ITEF-funded equipment to a government of Iraq or Kurdistan 

Regional Government official. The command developed these procedures 

in November 2015—about 6 months after ITEF-funded equipment began 

arriving in Kuwait and Iraq, according to 1st TSC officials—and updated 

the procedures in April 2016 and November 2016. In January 2017, 1st 

TSC officials said that they were missing the required U.S. transfer and 

receipt forms for some equipment transfers, based on their review of the 

transfer documentation. 1st TSC officials said that they would not know 

the amount of equipment with missing transfer and receipt forms until 

they completed their analysis of the documents, which 1st TSC officials 

 22Our analysis of SCMS data showed that SCMS contained about 13,700 requisitions for 

which ITEF-funds had been obligated.

DOD Cannot Fully 

Account for ITEF-Funded 

Equipment Transferred to 

the Government of Iraq or 

the Kurdistan Regional 

Government
Page 18 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

and a USASAC program manager located in Kuwait estimated could take 

until the summer of 2017.

Moreover, we found that the majority of the U.S. transfer and receipt 

forms the 1st TSC had on hand as of April 2016 were not complete.23 We 

reviewed all of the U.S. transfer and receipt forms documenting ITEFfunded equipment transfers that the 1st TSC had on hand as of April 

2016. Of the 284 U.S. transfer and receipt forms dated between March 

2015 and April 2016 that we reviewed, we found that almost all of the 

forms were signed by a government of Iraq or Kurdistan Regional 

Government official but more than half of the forms did not contain the 

date of transfer of the equipment (see fig. 7).

Figure 7: GAO Analysis of U.S. Transfer and Receipt Forms between March 2015 and April 2016 Documenting the Transfer of 

ITEF-Funded Equipment

 23We collected these forms as part of a prior GAO review examining U.S. efforts to train 

and equip Iraq’s security forces. 
Page 19 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

The 1st TSC also provided 48 internal memos dated between October 

2015 and February 2016 from a 1st TSC official seeking to reconcile 

discrepancies he found in the documentation, such as missing serial 

numbers for weapons. In one memo, the official said that the required 

U.S. transfer and receipt form documenting the transfer of ammunition 

was missing. 1st TSC officials acknowledged that they did not know 

whether these forms represented the total number of ITEF-funded 

equipment items transferred to the government of Iraq or the Kurdistan 

Regional Government as of April 2016. Without complete transfer 

documentation, 1st TSC officials cannot accurately determine how much 

ITEF-funded equipment has been transferred to the government of Iraq or 

the Kurdistan Regional Government, nor can they ensure that this 

equipment was transferred to the appropriate foreign official.

In addition, we found that most of the transfer documentation lacked case 

identifier information, which would help ensure that DOD personnel are 

able to track ITEF-funded equipment throughout the equipment process. 

Of the 284 U.S. transfer and receipt forms we reviewed, only 95 

contained unique case identifier information. The director of the 1st TSC’s 

equipping team said that the lack of case identifier information on the 

transfer documentation has significantly slowed his team’s progress in 

reporting the transfer dates of previously transferred ITEF-funded 

equipment to EFTS. As a result, the director said that he issued a verbal 

order in August 2016 requiring 1st TSC personnel to include case 

identifier information on the transfer and receipt forms documenting the 

transfer of equipment as well as on DOD orders to move ITEF-funded 

equipment within Kuwait and Iraq. He said that including the case 

identifier information would help ensure that 1st TSC personnel could link 

equipment items with their case information in SCIP.

The 1st TSC’s Standard Operating Procedures for ensuring the 

accountability of ITEF-funded equipment, however, do not include this 

requirement. The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government require management to complete timely reviews of 

significant changes to an entity’s process and procedures and ensure that 

the entity’s policies and procedures achieve its objectives.24 1st TSC 

 24GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: September 2014).
Page 20 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

officials said in March 2017 that they would begin the process of updating 

their Standard Operating Procedures to reflect their recent 

implementation of the U.S. Army’s Global Combat Support System for 

accounting for ITEF-funded equipment in late April 2017. 1st TSC 

personnel rotate in and out of Kuwait and Iraq about every 9 months with 

the last rotation of 1st TSC personnel having occurred in December 2016, 

according to 1st TSC officials. Without accurate and up-to-date written 

procedures, new personnel may not be aware of the verbal order, thus 

increasing the risk that they will not follow the order and limiting the 1st 

TSC’s ability to account for the equipment.

ISIS continues to be a major threat to both Iraq and Syria and to U.S. 

interests in the region. The congressional appropriation of $2.3 billion for 

ITEF in fiscal years 2015 and 2016 has enabled DOD to provide critical 

equipment to Iraq’s security forces for their counter-ISIS efforts. However, 

DOD’s ability to maintain visibility and accountability over ITEF-funded 

equipment remains limited. DOD designed SCIP to help DOD 

components maintain end-to-end visibility of DOD equipment, including 

ITEF-funded equipment, but DOD components do not use SCIP as 

intended because of potential interoperability and data reporting issues 

within SCIP and other DOD data systems. In addition, missing and 

incomplete ITEF-funded equipment transfer documentation further affects 

DOD’s ability to maintain complete visibility and accountability over ITEFfunded equipment. Since 1st TSC personnel rotate about every 9 months, 

it is essential that the 1st TSC maintain updated standard operating 

procedures that reflect significant changes to its processes for ensuring 

the accountability of ITEF-funded equipment, including documenting a 

verbal order that unique case identifiers be included on transfer 

documentation so that 1st TSC personnel are able to properly record 

ITEF-funded transfer dates in SCIP. Without timely and accurate transit 

information on the status of ITEF-funded equipment, DOD cannot ensure 

that the equipment has reached its intended destination, nor can DOD 

program managers conduct effective oversight of the ITEF program.

To ensure that DOD program managers have the necessary information 

to maintain complete visibility and accountability of ITEF-funded 

equipment in SCIP, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take 

the following four actions:

Conclusions

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
Page 21 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

1. Identify the root causes, such as potential interoperability and data

reporting issues within SCIP and other DOD data systems, for why 

DOD components are not ensuring that ITEF-funded equipment 

transportation dates are captured in SCIP.

2. Develop an action plan with associated milestones and time frames 

for addressing the root causes for why DOD components are not 

ensuring that ITEF-funded equipment transportation dates are 

captured in SCIP.

3. Develop written procedures that specify under which data field ITEFfunded equipment transfer dates should be captured in EFTS in SCIP.

4. Update the 1st TSC’s written standard operating procedures to 

include the 1st TSC commander’s verbal order requiring the inclusion 

of unique equipment case identifier information for ITEF-funded 

equipment on transfer documentation.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its 

written comments, reproduced in appendix II, DOD concurred with three 

recommendations and partially concurred with a fourth recommendation. 

DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 

appropriate. DOD concurred with our first two recommendations, to 

identify why DOD components are not ensuring that ITEF-funded 

equipment transportation dates are captured in SCIP and to develop an 

action plan for addressing these issues. The department commented that 

it had begun identifying the root causes of the data reporting issues in 

SCIP and would provide GAO the reasons for these issues within 30 days 

of the issuance of GAO’s report. The department also commented that it 

would develop an action plan with a timeline to measure progress in 

addressing the root causes and would notify GAO when these were 

addressed. DOD also concurred with the recommendation that the 1st 

TSC update its written standard operating procedures to include a verbal 

order requiring the inclusion of unique equipment case identifier 

information for ITEF-funded equipment transfer documentation. The 

department said that the 1st TSC planned to update its written 

procedures to include this verbal order by May 31, 2017.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that DOD develop 

written procedures for reporting ITEF-funded equipment transfer dates in 

EFTS in SCIP. The department commented that the relevant 

organizations have most, if not all, of the written procedures that are 

necessary for reporting these dates in EFTS. However, the department 

said it would coordinate with all interested parties to ensure that the 

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Page 22 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

required written procedures exist and to update those documents if 

needed. GAO continues to believe that additional written procedures are 

needed and modified the language of our recommendation to specify that 

DOD include in its written procedures the EFTS data field in which ITEFfunded equipment transfer dates should be captured. Although the 1st 

TSC has written procedures on how personnel can upload some transfer 

information into SCIP, the procedures do not clearly state which data field 

in EFTS should be used to capture the transfer dates of ITEF-funded 

equipment to the government of Iraq or the Kurdistan Regional 

Government. As a result, DOD personnel and contractors have had 

difficulty locating these dates, which 1st TSC officials said they have 

uploaded to EFTS. Providing clear procedures on the data field to be 

used to capture ITEF-funded equipment transfer dates would help ensure 

that DOD personnel responsible for managing ITEF are able to locate 

these dates in EFTS as needed.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees and to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. 

In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-6991 or farbj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff members who made key 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Jessica Farb, Director

International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope & Methodology

Page 23 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

This review examines the extent to which the Department of Defense 

(DOD) maintains visibility and accountability over Iraq Train and Equip 

(ITEF)-funded equipment from acquisition through transfer to the 

government of Iraq or Kurdistan Regional Government.

To examine the extent to which DOD maintains visibility and 

accountability of ITEF-funded equipment, we reviewed DOD guidance in 

the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)’s Security Assistance 

Management Manual (SAMM), including a requirement to report the 

transfer dates of building partner capacity materiel in the Enhanced 

Freight Tracking System (EFTS) within the Security Cooperation 

Information Portal (SCIP) or to DSCA. We interviewed DOD officials from 

DOD components responsible for managing or tracking ITEF-funded 

equipment through different phases of the equipping process to 

understand their processes for providing visibility over ITEF-funded 

equipment. These components included the Combined Joint Task ForceOperation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), U.S. Army Security Assistance 

Command (USASAC), U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management 

Command, and the 1st Theater Sustainment Command (1st TSC). We 

reviewed USASAC, U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management 

Command, and U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command’s status reports on 

ITEF-funded equipment. We also interviewed officials from the 

Department of State’s Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq to understand 

their role in providing visibility of ITEF-funded equipment.

In addition, to determine the extent to which DOD components ensured 

that SCIP captured key transportation dates of ITEF-funded equipment, 

we analyzed data from SCIP’s Security Cooperation Management Suite 

(SCMS) by running two reports from SCMS on February 10, 2017. 1

• First, we ran a report to determine the total universe of cases and 

their corresponding requisitions for which ITEF funds had been 

obligated. We determined that this universe consisted of 13,674 ITEFfunded equipment requisitions.

• Second, we ran a report to determine how many of the 13,674 ITEFfunded equipment requisitions had all items and services delivered 

and performed. Specifically, we ran a report of cases and their 

 1

By capturing key transportation dates, we mean that these dates were entered directly 

into SCIP or transferred from other related systems in a way that allowed them to be 

meaningfully analyzed and reported for management purposes. Congress authorized and 

appropriated funds to ITEF in December 2014. 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope & 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope & Methodology

Page 24 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

corresponding requisitions that DOD had marked in SCMS as 

“supply/services complete” because DOD considered all of the items 

and services delivered and performed for these requisitions. Using 

this designation, we determined that 566 ITEF-funded equipment 

requisitions were marked as “supply/services complete.”

In using the term requisitions, we mean lines of data entries in SCMS by 

case that contain a unique combination of requisition numbers and/or 

transportation control numbers. In our analysis, we noted some 

requisition numbers that applied to multiple lines of entries as well as 

some transportation control numbers that applied to multiple lines of 

entries; however, we found no exact duplicates by entry. Our analysis 

focused on completeness of these records, which is where we found the 

deficiencies noted in the body of this report. It was beyond the scope of 

this review to assess the accuracy of the requisition numbers, 

transportation control numbers, and any dates entered into SCMS. In 

addition, we were not able to determine the extent to which ITEF-funded 

equipment cases and their corresponding requisitions were properly 

marked as “supply/services complete” in SCMS. One reason why DOD 

only marked 566 of the 13,674 ITEF-funded equipment lines of 

requisitions as “supply/services complete” could be that DOD had one or 

more requisitions on a case that had not yet been delivered or performed, 

which prevented DOD from closing the case and marking all of the 

requisitions associated with the case as “supply/services complete.” Also, 

DOD may have had some ITEF-funded equipment cases and 

corresponding requisitions that should have been marked as 

“supply/services complete” but were not. We determined that we could 

proceed with assessing the extent to which the 566 ITEF-funded 

equipment requisitions that had been marked as “supply/services 

complete” in SCMS had recorded key transportation dates of equipment 

in SCMS for each of the three phases of the ITEF equipping process 

because DOD considered all of the items and services delivered and 

performed for these requisitions.2 We selected data fields in SCMS for 

each requisition that would capture key transportation dates of ITEFfunded equipment in each of the three phases of the ITEF equipping 

process. These included:

 2

The three phases of the ITEF equipping process are Phase 1: Acquisition and Shipment, 

Phase 2: Staging in Kuwait and Iraq, and Phase 3: Transfer to the government of Iraq or 

the Kurdistan Regional Government.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope & Methodology

Page 25 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

• “Arrive Port of Embarkation” data field to determine whether SCMS 

captured the arrival date of equipment at the last point of departure in 

the United States in phase 1 of the ITEF equipping process,

• “Depart Port of Embarkation” data field to determine whether SCMS 

captured the departure date for equipment shipped from the United 

States in phase 1 of the ITEF equipping process,

• “Arrive Country” data field to determine whether SCMS captured the 

arrival date of equipment in Kuwait or Iraq, and

• “Customer Receipt” data field to determine whether SCMS captured 

the transfer date of equipment to the government of Iraq or the 

Kurdistan Regional Government.

We verified that our selection and interpretation of these data fields were 

correct by reviewing DSCA-issued guidance on SCIP and consulting with 

DSCA officials. In addition, we probed the 1st TSC officials’ assertion that 

they had reported about 2,000 ITEF-funded equipment requisition transfer 

dates in SCIP between August 2016 and January 2017 by interviewing 

the contractor responsible for SCIP’s EFTS, in which these dates would 

have been reported. We also reviewed additional data from him. It was 

beyond the scope of this review to determine the extent to which the 

13,674 ITEF-funded equipment requisitions had been correctly marked as 

complete for supply and services, as such an analysis would have 

required a reconciliation of SCIP computerized records against source 

documents and other supporting materials. However, we did determine 

that the 566 requisitions marked as complete for supply and services 

were lacking key information, which we reported. In the body of this 

report, we detail how the lack of complete key information means that 

these data cannot be used to maintain visibility and accountability of 

ITEF-funded equipment.

To determine the extent to which DOD accounts for ITEF-funded 

equipment transferred to the government of Iraq or the Kurdistan 

Regional Government, we reviewed 1st TSC transfer documentation. We 

requested all U.S. transfer and receipt forms that the 1st TSC used to 

document ITEF-funded equipment transfers to the government of Iraq or 

the Kurdistan Regional Government and were provided with 284 forms 

dated between March 2015 and April 2016.3 We reviewed these 284 

forms to check whether they contained key information, such as 

 3

DOD provided an additional six forms, which we removed from our analysis because they 

were either duplicate forms or were completely illegible. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope & Methodology

Page 26 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

signatures and unique case identifiers. When determining whether the 

forms contained transfer dates, we created a decision rule of only 

counting those dates that were legible because the purpose of this review 

was to assess DOD’s accountability over the equipment transferred. We 

were unable to determine whether we were provided with all the 

equipment transfer and receipt forms for this period because DOD does 

not maintain the information that would have allowed us to do this. 

Specifically, the data problems that we have noted in SCIP, in particular 

the problem of missing entries, prevented us from making that 

determination. We also reviewed the 1st TSC’s November 2015, April 

2016, and November 2016 standard operating procedures for ensuring 

the accountability of ITEF-funded equipment as well as CJTF-OIR’s June 

2016 standard operating procedures for the management of ITEF. In 

addition, we traveled to Kuwait and Iraq to interview DOD officials from 

the 1st TSC and CJTF-OIR to understand their roles, responsibilities, and 

processes for ensuring the accountability of ITEF-funded equipment.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2016 to May 2017 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 27 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 28 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 29 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 30 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

Jessica Farb, (202) 512-6991 or farbj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Judy McCloskey (Assistant 

Director), Kira Self (Analyst in Charge), Ashley Alley, Martin De Alteriis, 

Lynn Cothern, Neil Doherty, Mattias Fenton, B. Patrick Hickey, and Jeff 

Isaacs made key contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 31 GAO-17-433 Iraq Equipment Accountability

Iraq: Status of DOD Efforts to Train and Equip Iraq’s Security Forces. 

GAO-17-32C. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2017.

Combating Terrorism: U.S. Footprint Poses Challenges for the Advise 

and Assist Mission in Iraq. GAO-17-220C. Washington, D.C.: November 

22, 2016.

Iraq: State and DOD Need to Improve Documentation and Record 

Keeping for Vetting of Iraq’s Security Forces. GAO-16-658C. Washington, 

D.C.: September 30, 2016.

Countering ISIS: DOD Should Develop Plans for Responding to Risks 

and for Using Stockpiled Equipment No Longer Intended for Syria Train 

and Equip Program. GAO-16-670C. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 

2016.

Defense Logistics: DOD Has Addressed Most Reporting Requirements 

and Continues to Refine Its Asset Visibility Strategy. GAO-16-88. 

Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2015.

Yemen: DOD Should Improve Accuracy of Its Data on Congressional 

Clearance of Projects as it Reevaluates Counterterrorism Assistance. 

GAO-15-493. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2015.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-15-290. Washington, D.C.: February 

11, 2015.

Countering Overseas Threats: DOD and State Need to Address Gaps in 

Monitoring of Security Equipment Transferred to Lebanon. GAO-14-161. 

Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2014.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-13-283. Washington, D.C.: February 

2013.

Security Assistance: DOD’s Ongoing Reforms Address Some 

Challenges, but Additional Information is Needed to Further Enhance 

Program Management. GAO-13-84. Washington, D.C.: November 16, 

2012.

Related GAO Products

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