[J-11-2014] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFER Y, STEVENS, JJ.

FRIENDS OF PENNSYLVANIA LEADERSHIP CHARTER SCHOOL, Appellant

v.

CHESTER COUNTY BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS , Appellee

WEST CHESTER AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Intervenor : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 66 MAP 2013 Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court dated January 16, 2013, at No. 790 CD 2012 affirming the order of the Chester County Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, entered March 30, 2012 at No. 2011-09438-AB

61 A.3d 354

ARGUED : March 12, 2014

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE BAER DECIDED: September 24, 2014 Friends of Pennsylvania Leadership Charter School (Appellant) appeals from the order of the Commonwealth Court which held that the retroactive real estate tax exemption provided in Section 1722-A(e)(3) of the P ublic School Code, 24 P.S. 17- 1722-A(e)(3), was unconstitutional. We affirm the Commonwealth Court, albeit employing different reasoning, concluding that retr oactive application of the real estate[J-11-2014] - 2

tax exemption of Section 1722-A(e)(3) is unconstitu tional under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it violates the separation of powers doctrine. Appellant is a Pennsylvania domestic nonprofit corp oration affiliated with the Pennsylvania Leadership Charter School (PALCS), a p ublic cyber charter school, 1 which, according to its articles of incorporation, operates exclusively for the support and benefit of PALCS and its affiliated organizations. Appellant owns property in West Chester, Pennsylvania (Property), which is located within Chester County (County) and the West Chester Area School District (School Distr ict), and which it leases to PALCS for use as a public cyber charter school. On August 6, 2007, Appellant appealed the tax asses sment for the Property to the Chester County Board of Assessment Appeals (Boa rd) and sought a real estate tax exemption from its 2008 taxes by asserting that it qualified as a purely public charity and was therefore exempt from all local real estate tax es pursuant to Article VIII, Section 2(a)(v) of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the In stitutions of Purely Public Charity Act, 10 P.S. § 371 et seq . See In Re: Appeal of Friends of Pennsylvania Lea dership Charter School, Chester County Docket No. 2007-12078. The Board denied the exemption. In March 2009, the trial court affirmed, finding th at Appellant was not a purely public charity and therefore was not exempt from lo cal real estate taxes. The Commonwealth Court affirmed in an unpublished memor andum. In Re: Appeal of Friends of Pennsylvania Leadership Charter School v . County of Chester Board of Assessment Appeals, 987 A.2d 231 (Table) (Pa.Cmwlth ., January 7, 2010, 808 CD 2009); for text see In Re: Appeal of Friends of Pen nsylvania Leadership Charter School, 808 C.D. 2009, 2010 WL 9519256 (Friends I). No fur ther appeals were taken; thus, the

1 Both Appellant and PALCS are recognized as nonpro fit corporations under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).[J-11-2014] - 3

Commonwealth Court’s judgment in Friends I became f inal. Faced with this final judgment against it, Appellant paid real estate tax es to the County and the School District for the years 2008 and 2009. Appellant ad ditionally paid County real estate taxes for 2010, and was billed for 2010 real estate taxes by the School District. Following the final judgment in Friends I, the Gene ral Assembly amended the Public School Code effective January 15, 2011, to p rovide for prospective and retroactive real estate tax exemptions for charter schools and certain affiliated entities as follows:

(e)(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 20 4 of the act of May 22, 1933 (P.L. 853, No. 155), known as The General Coun ty Assessment Law, all school property, real and personal, owned by any charter school, cyber charter school or an associated nonprofit fou ndation, or owned by a nonprofit corporation or nonprofit foundation and l eased to a charter school, cyber charter school or associated nonprofi t foundation at or below fair market value, that is occupied and used by any charter school or cyber charter school for public school, recreation or any other purposes provided for by this act, shall be made exempt from every ki nd of State, county, city, borough, township or other real estate tax . . . .

* * * (3) This subsection shall apply retroactively to al l charter schools, cyber charter schools and associated nonprofit foundation s that filed an appeal from an assessment, as provided in Article V of The General County Assessment Law, prior to the effective date of this subsection.

24 P.S. § 17-1722-A(e) (footnotes omitted). In March 2011, Appellant filed an application for p rospective real estate tax exemption for the Property pursuant to Section 1722 -A(e)(1), asserting that it was an associated nonprofit foundation that leased the Pro perty to PALCS for use as a cyber charter school, which the Board granted on May 5, 2 011, commencing with the 2011 tax

year.[J-11-2014] - 4

On June 16, 2011, Appellant filed a request for a r efund of real estate taxes paid to the County for tax years 2008 through 2010, seek ing retroactive relief, asserting that its unsuccessful assessment appeal in 2007 qualifie d as “an appeal from an assessment.” See 24 P.S. § 17-1722-A(e)(3). The B oard denied the refund request on July 27, 2011. On August 22, 2011, Appellant also sought a refund for real estate taxes paid to the School District for 2008-09, and the wi thdrawal of the School District’s tax bill for 2010. The Board denied this refund request on September 7, 2011. Appellant appealed the Board’s denial of its refund request for County real estate taxes to the trial court, but apparently did not ap peal the Board’s denial of its refund request for real estate taxes paid to the School Di strict. Nevertheless, Appellant attempted to argue in its appeal to the trial court that it was entitled to a refund from both entities for real estate taxes paid in 2008 an d thereafter and the withdrawal of any unpaid tax bills. It based its claimed exemption o n its status as an associated nonprofit foundation that filed an assessment appeal prior to the effective date of Section 1722- A(e)(3), premised on its unsuccessful 2007 appeal t hat resulted in the final judgment of

Friends I.

The Board and the School District filed an answer a nd, after the pleadings were closed, moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguin g that Appellant was not entitled to a refund under a statutory analysis of Section 1722 -A(e)(3), and that the retroactive tax exemption contemplated by Section 1722-A(e)(3) was unconstitutional because it[J-11-2014] - 5

violated the separation of powers doctrine 2 and the Uniformity Clause 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 4 The trial court first observed that Appellant’s cla im for tax exemption requested only a refund of County real estate taxes from 2008 -2010, not school taxes paid during these years, and that the appeal further did not en compass a determination of its obligation to pay school taxes in 2010 or County ta xes in 2011. To the extent it perceived that Appellant was attempting to expand t he scope of its appeal, the trial court held it would only review those issues includ ed in the verified claim for a real estate tax refund and ruled upon by the Board in th e July 27, 2011 denial.

2 We explained the separation of powers doctrine in Pennsylvania Co. v. Scott, 29 A.2d 328, 329 (Pa. 1942) as follows: “It is elemen tary that the legislature may not, under the guise of an act affecting remedies, destr oy or impair final judgments obtained before the passage of the act, and this principle p rohibits not only a statutory re-opening of cases previously decided by the court but also l egislation affecting the inherent attributes of judgments . . .” See also Commonweal th v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 783-84 (Pa. 1977) (providing that “judicial judgments and decrees entered pursuant to those laws [promulgated by the legislature] may not be af fected by subsequent legislative changes after those judgments and decrees have beco me final.”)

3 The Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constit ution provides: “All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws.” Pa. Const. art. VIII, § 1.

4 Although the Board and the School District appare ntly did not argue that the legislation also violated the Remedies Clause, whic h, as discussed below, was the basis of the Commonwealth Court’s disposition of th is case, as appellees before the trial court they did not bear the burden of issue preserv ation, and, thus, are free to raise this argument to this Court herein. See, e.g., Heim v. Med. Care Availability & Reduction of Error Fund, 23 A.3d 506, 511 (Pa. 2011) (providing that the appellee did not bear the burden of issue preservation); Commonwealth v. Moor e, 937 A.2d 1062, 1073 (Pa. 2007) (explaining that “an appellate court may affi rm a valid judgment based on any reason appearing as of record, regardless of whethe r it is raised by the appellee”).[J-11-2014] - 6

Addressing whether Appellant qualified for the retr oactive exemption provided in Section 1722-A(e)(3), the trial court resolved the appeal on the statutory language. Specifically, the trial court observed that Section 1722-A(e)(1) and (3) expressly differentiates between “nonprofit corporations” and “associated nonprofit foundations,” and provides for retroactive tax relief in (e)(3) o nly to “associated nonprofit foundations.” According to the trial court, although Appellant pr emised its argument on an assertion that it was an “associated nonprofit foundation,” w hich would entitle it to retroactive relief, it had demonstrated in its pleadings only t hat it was a nonprofit corporation; it did not plead, or support by exhibits, that it was an a ssociated nonprofit foundation. The court then held that Appellant’s failure to substan tiate its assertion that it fell within the nomenclature of Section 1722-A(e)(3) (that it was a n “an associated nonprofit foundation”) doomed its request for retroactive rel ief, and it was not, therefore, entitled

to a refund of taxes collected on behalf of the Cou nty in 2008, 2009, and 2010. The trial court also dismissed without prejudice other issues relating to school taxes paid by Appellant during those years, reasoning that those issues were not properly before the

trial court. Although it resolved the motion for judgment on the pleadings on the statutory language, the trial court indicated that had it rea ched the constitutionality of the statute, it would have found it unconstitutional based upon the Remedies Clause and the separation of powers doctrine. In this respect, th e trial court examined an unpublished non-precedential memorandum opinion of the Commonwe alth Court, In Re: Appeal of Collegium Charter School, 23 A.3d 1132 (Table) (Pa. Cmwlth., July 26, 2011, No. 2354[J-11-2014] - 7

CD 2010), which addressed an identical issue, and f ound the Commonwealth Court’s legal analysis therein persuasive. 5 In Collegium Charter School, a nonprofit corporatio n created to support the charter school leased property to the charter schoo l and, prior to the enactment of Section 1722-A, was assessed real estate taxes on t his property. The nonprofit corporation appealed the assessment, arguing its pr operty was exempt because it was being used by a public charter school as a purely p ublic charity. The local assessment appeals board denied the exemption, and the trial c ourt affirmed. The nonprofit corporation appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and while this appeal was pending, the General Assembly enacted Section 1722-A. The nonprofit corporation argued to

the Commonwealth Court that it was entitled to the retroactive exemption provided in Section 1722-A(e)(3). The Commonwealth Court rejec ted this argument and affirmed the trial court, holding that the retroactive tax e xemption of Section 1722-A(e)(3) violated the Remedies Clause of Article I, § 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (providing for a remedy by due course of law) becau se the legislation impaired a vested right, specifically holding that the taxing authori ties had a right to the remedy (the collection of real estate taxes) provided by the fi nal judgment in their favor. 6

5 As the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Collegium Charter School was unpublished, it is not of precedential value, and t he lower courts herein relied on it solely for its persuasive value. See Commonwealth Court I .O.P. § 414(a) (“An unreported opinion of this court may be cited and relied upon when it is relevant under the doctrine of law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel. Parties may also cite an unreported panel decision of this court issued afte r January 15, 2008, for its persuasive value, but not as binding precedent.”). While we e xplore the holding of Collegium Charter School, we do so only to provide relevant b ackground.

6 The Remedies Clause provides: (Kcontinued)[J-11-2014] - 8

In addition to finding that the legislation impaire d a vested right in accord with Collegium Charter School, the trial court sub judice also held that it violated the separation of powers doctrine because it interfered with a final judgment entered by the judiciary, specifically, Friends I, which was the C ommonwealth Court’s 2010 decision holding that Appellant was not exempt from local re al estate taxes as a purely public charity. See Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780 (Pa. 1977) (opining that retroactive legislation directing that defendants p reviously convicted of marijuana possession be resentenced and subject to more lenie nt penalties was unconstitutional because it undermined and thus fatally interfered w ith final judgments of the judiciary, thereby violating the concept of separation of powe rs). Accordingly, the trial court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings fi led by the Board and the School

District. Appellant appealed to the Commonwealth Court, argui ng that the trial court erred in limiting its determination to the refund of taxe s paid to the County; concluding that Appellant did not qualify for the retroactive tax e xemption because it did not plead that it was an associated nonprofit foundation; and finding that the retroactive application of

(continuedK)

All courts shall be open; and every man for an inju ry done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by du e course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct. Pa. Const. art. I, § 11. We have held that legisla tion will be declared unconstitutional as a violation of the Remedies Clause where its retroa ctive application will extinguish vested rights. Ieropoli v. AC&S Corp., 842 A.2d 91 9 (Pa. 2004).[J-11-2014] - 9

Section 1722-A(e)(3) was unconstitutional. The Sch ool District and the Board argued

that the trial court’s order should be affirmed bec ause the retroactive application of Section 1722-A(e)(3) violated, inter alia , the separation of powers doctrine and the Remedies Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Commonwealth Court agreed with the Board and th e School District and affirmed the trial court, basing its holding on the Remedies Clause analysis in Collegium Charter School. Friends of Pennsylvania Leadership Charter School v. Chester County Board of Assessment Appeals, 61 A.3d 354 (Pa.Cmwlth . 2013). Consistent with Collegium Charter School, the Commonwealth Court ex amined the Remedies Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides that individuals are entitled to receive a remedy by due course of law. Pa. Const. art. I, § 11. The Commonwealth Court held that pursuant to Friends I, the Board and the Schoo l District had a final judgment requiring Appellant to pay real estate taxes on the Property. The court considered this final judgment and the entitlement to tax monies it guaranteed to be a vested right which could be impaired by the retroactive application of Section 1722-A(e)(3). Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court found Section 1722-A(e)(3) v iolated Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because it eliminated the Board’s and the School District’s vested right in the judgment awarding th em property taxes. 7 We granted allowance of appeal to determine whether the retroactive tax exemption provided in Section 1722-A(e)(3) is const itutional, and whether Appellant is entitled to a refund of taxes paid prior to the ena ctment of this Section. The

7 The Commonwealth Court did not address the trial court’s conclusion that the retroactive application of Section 1722-A(e)(3) vio lated the separation of powers doctrine.[J-11-2014] - 10

constitutional validity of Section 1722-A(e)(3) pre sents a pure question of law and, as with any question of law, our review of the lower c ourt's decision is plenary and de novo

. Robinson Twp., Washington Cnty. v. Com., 83 A.3d 90 1, 943 (Pa. 2013); West Mifflin Area Sch. Dist. v. Zahorchak, 4 A.3d 1042, 1048 (Pa . 2010). “In our review, we are not constrained by the Commonwealth Court's reasoning a nd may affirm on any grounds, as long as the record supports the judgment.” Robi nson Twp., 83 A.3d at 943. Appellant argues that it plainly falls within the c lass of entities which are entitled to the retroactive tax exemption contained in Secti on 1722-A(e)(3) because it is an “associated nonprofit foundation” and, by virtue of its pre-enactment tax assessment appeal of 2007, it “filed an appeal from an assessm ent. . . prior to the effective date of this subsection.” 24 P.S. § 17-1722-A(e)(3). 8 Addressing the Commonwealth Court’s holding that Section 1722-A(e)(3) is unconstitution al because it impairs vested rights, Appellant argues that the collection of real estate taxes is an expectancy, not a vested right, and that a statute affecting a mere expectat ion does not run afoul of the Remedies Clause. Appellant also broadly argues that the Rem edies Clause and its protection of vested rights only pertains to individual rights, n ot the rights of governmental taxing authorities. See, e.g., Ieropoli v. AC&S Corp., 84 2 A.2d 919 (Pa. 2004) (applying the Remedies Clause to legislation having a retroactive effect on disputes between private parties).

8 Indeed, Appellant’s position at oral argument was that any charter school, cyber charter school, or associated nonprofit foundation that has ever filed an appeal from a property tax assessment, at any time and for any re ason, qualifies for the retroactive tax exemption contained in Section 1722-(A)(e)(3).[J-11-2014] - 11

Turning to whether Section 1722-A(e)(3) violates th e separation of powers doctrine, as argued by the School District and the Board and considered by the trial court, Appellant argues that it does not because it does not interfere with a final judgment obtained through litigation. Appellant co nsiders the entry of the final judgment

in Friends I to be irrelevant to the constitutional ity of Section 1722-A(e)(3) because the final judgment of Friends I held nothing more than that Appellant was not entitled to an exemption as a purely public charity. The Board, as appellee, and the School District, as intervenor, argue that Section 1722-A(e)(3) is unconstitutional for several reason s. First, they assert that the retroactive tax exemption violates the Remedies Cla use because it would extinguish the taxing authorities’ vested rights in real estate ta xes which they received in accord with a final judgment in their favor and against Appellant . Second, they rely on Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780 (Pa. 1977), to argue that a tax refund would violate the separation of powers doctrine, which ba rs the legislature from changing or interfering with final judgments of the courts. In this regard, they argue that to permit Appellant to obtain a refund of taxes paid followin g a judicial determination that the Property was taxable would leave all final judgment s open to question. 9

9 The School District also argues, as it has throug hout this case, that Section 1722-A(e)(3) violates the constitutional guarantee of uniform taxation by distinguishing between similarly situated nonprofit landlords leas ing property to a charter school which are not “associated nonprofit foundations,” and, fu rther, for excluding from the retroactive exemption those charter schools, cyber charter schools, and associated nonprofit foundations that failed to file an assess ment appeal prior to the effective date of the statute. Premised on our analysis of the se paration of powers doctrine below, it is unnecessary for us to expound on this argument.[J-11-2014] - 12

There is no dispute in this case that Appellant is entitled to prospective tax relief in accord with Section 1722-A(e)(1). The question we must resolve is whether Appellant is further entitled to the retroactive ta x relief provided in Section 1722-A(e)(3). Assuming Appellant is included within the statutory nomenclature as “an associated nonprofit foundation,” then by its plain terms, Sec tion 1722-A(e)(3) applies a retroactive tax exemption to such associated nonprofit foundati ons that filed an assessment appeal prior to the amendment’s effective date. 24 P.S. § 17-1722A(e)(3) (“This subsection shall apply retroactively to all charter schools, c yber charter schools and associated nonprofit foundations that filed an appeal from an assessment . . . prior to the effective date of this subsection.”). Because the language o f this section is plain and unambiguous, we need not turn to tools of statutory construction to discern legislative intent. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b) (“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disreg arded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”). “Relatedly, it is well established that resort to the rules of statutory construction is to be made only when there is an ambiguity in th e provision.” Oliver v. City of Pittsburgh, 11 A.3d 960, 965 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted). This does not end our analysis, however, as the Boa rd and the School District have attacked the statute as unconstitutional, and the Commonwealth Court agreed. We observe that Section 1722-A(e)(3), like any legi slative enactment, enjoys a presumption of constitutionality, and the School Di strict and the Board bear a heavy burden to prove it unconstitutional. Ieropoli, 842 A.2d at 928. “A statute will only be declared unconstitutional if it clearly, palpably a nd plainly violates the constitution.” Id;[J-11-2014] - 13

Erfer v. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325, 331 (Pa. 2002) (citation omitted); see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(3). It is to the constitutional arguments t hat we now turn. Although the Board and the School District have att acked the constitutionality of the statute on three separate grounds, we find the argument premised on the separation of powers doctrine to be persuasive and dispositive , and conclude that the Board and

the School District have sustained their burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of Section 1722-A(e)(3). The legislation, as discu ssed below, is, in operation and effect, a legislative command to open a final judgment and to have the rights and obligations resolved in that final judgment reassessed in accor d with the subsequently expressed legislative will. See Sutley, 378 A.2d at 782 (det ermining that legislation violated the separation of powers doctrine where it was “in oper ation and effect, a legislative command to the courts to open a judgment previously made final, and to substitute for that judgment a disposition of the matter in accord ance with the subsequently expressed legislative will.”). As we explained in Sutley, the doctrine of the sep aration of governmental powers among the three coequal branches of government -- l egislative, executive, and judicial - - has been inherent in the structure of our governm ent since its inception. Sutley, 378 A.2d at 782-83; Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tat e, 274 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1971); Pennsylvania Company v. Scott, 29 A.2d 328 (Pa. 194 3); Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, 195 A. 90 (Pa. 1937); Commonwealth v. Mat hues, 59 A. 961 (Pa. 1904); De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18 (1850); Greenoug h v. Greenough, 11 Pa. 489 (1849). Any encroachment upon one branch of government by a nother is offensive to the fundamental scheme envisioned by our founding fathe rs. Sutley, 378 A.2d at 783.[J-11-2014] - 14

Paramount to the separation of powers doctrine, and to the protection of the judicial branch as a coequal, distinct, and indepen dent branch of government, is the “recognition that final judgments of the judicial b ranch are not to be interfered with by legislative fiat in this Commonwealth.” Sutley, 37 8 A.2d at 783. Such respect for final judgments has long been established and is not open to serious question. Leahey v. Farrell, 66 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1949) (reaffirming the pr oposition that a legislative attempt to alter the effect of final judicial action imposed u nder prior law is a direct assault upon the power of the judicial branch); Pennsylvania Co. v. Scott, 29 A.2d 328, 329 (Pa. 1942) (“It is elementary that the legislature may not, un der the guise of an act affecting remedies, destroy or impair final judgments obtaine d before the passage of the act, and this principle prohibits not only a statutory re-op ening of cases previously decided by the court but also legislation affecting the inherent a ttributes of judgments . . . “); Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495, 498-9 (Pa. 1859) (“. . . a law that is enacted after the case has arisen can be no part of the case. . . . When. . . the constitution declares that it is the exclusive function of the courts to try private cas es of disputed right, and that they shall administer justice ‘by the law of the land,’ and ‘b y due course of law;’ it means to say, that the law relating to the transaction in controv ersy, at the time when it is complete, shall be an inherent element of the case, and shall guide the decision; and that the case shall not be altered, in its substance, by any subs equent law.”). In Leahey, we detailed the inability of the legislature to interfere with final judgments as follows: The legislature cannot, by an act of assembly, over rule a judicial decision: Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. 489; it may not dire ct a statute to be construed in a certain way: In re East Grant Street , 121 Pa. 596, 16 A. 366; Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. 627, 15 A. 917; it cannot grant a new trial: De Chastellux v. Fairchil d, 15 Pa. 18; or order an illegitimate child to be regarded as legitimate und er terms of prior deed:[J-11-2014] - 15

Appeal of Edwards, 108 Pa. 283; it may not change t he effect of judgments or decrees previously rendered: Pennsylva nia Company, etc., v. Scott, 346 Pa. 13, 29 A.2d 328.

Id. at 579. We applied these principals in Sutley to invalidat e retroactive legislation that impaired existing final legal judgments. In that c ase, the defendants were sentenced for felony possession of marijuana, and the General Ass embly subsequently reclassified possession of marijuana as a misdemeanor and reduce d the applicable penalties. Sutley, 378 A.2d at 781. A further amendment to th e legislation provided for the resentencing of individuals such as the defendants who were convicted of felony possession of marijuana under the prior law. We he ld that because the legislative amendment undermined and fatally interfered with fi nal judgments of the judiciary, it was unconstitutional. Id., at 782. The same consequence results herein. Although the legislature possesses the power to enact substantive law, it may not affect j udicial judgments and decrees already entered by subsequent legislative changes to the go verning law. Sutley, 378 A.2d at 784. Following Appellant’s 2007 tax assessment app eal, the trial court and the Commonwealth Court, in Friends I, determined under then-existing law that Appellant was not exempt from real estate taxation. The dete rmination in Friends I was an inviolable final judgment of the judiciary that may not be usurped by the legislative process or reversed by legislative action. The tax ing authorities rightfully relied on the final judgment to collect real estate taxes from Ap pellant Section 1722-A(e)(3) was not in effect at the time the Commonwealth Court determined the taxable status of Appellant in Frien ds I. We therefore agree with the[J-11-2014] - 16

Board and the School District that permitting Appel lant to open the final judgment of Friends I on the basis of subsequently enacted legi slation would leave all final judgments open to question, fatally undermining jud icial authority in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. As we have already held in Sutley, “[t]he vesting in the legislature of the power to alter final judgments w ould be repugnant to our concept of the separation of the three branches of government. ” 378 A.2d at 782. By retroactively exempting the Property from real estate taxes when the final judgment of Friends I held the Property was taxable, Section 1722-A(e)(3) viol ates the separation of powers and is, therefore, unconstitutional. In affirming the Commonwealth Court, we are not lim ited to the specific grounds invoked by that court and may affirm for any valid reason of record. See Scampone v. Highland Park Care Ctr., LLC, 57 A.3d 582, 596 (Pa. 2012); Pennsylvania Dep't of Banking v. NCAS of Delaware, L.L.C., 948 A.2d 752, 761 (Pa. 2008). Accordingly, we

need not address the Commonwealth Court’s discussio n and analysis of the Remedies Clause. Based on our foregoing analysis and conclu sion that Section 1722-A(e)(3) violates the separation of powers, the order of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed.

Mr. Chief Justice Castille and Messrs. Justice McCa ffery and Stevens join the opinion. Mr. Justice Saylor files a concurring opinion in wh ich Madame Justice Todd joins. Mr. Justice Eakin files a concurring opinion in whi ch Mr. Chief Justice Castille joins.