JSOU Report 11-5 Oman: The Present in the Context of a Fractured Past Barrett

Oman: 

The Present in the Context 

of a Fractured Past

Roby C. Barrett

JSOU Report 11-5 August 2011

Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB FL 33621

https://jsou.socom.mil
Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

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JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where 

effort centers upon the USSOCOM and United States SOF missions: 

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SOF to defend the nation’s interests in an environment characterized by 

irregular warfare. 

USSOF mission. USSOF conducts special operations to prepare the operational environment, prevent crisis, and respond with speed, aggression, 

and lethality to achieve tactical through strategic effect. 

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum 

support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff colleges and 

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The JSOU public Web page is located at https://jsou.socom.mil. 

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D., Strategic Studies Department Director

Jeffrey W. Nelson, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Juan Alvarez, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.; 

William C. Jones, GS-15, CIA, Ret.—Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, Tufts 

University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Stephen Sloan

Ph.D., Comparative Politics

University of Central Florida

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Ph.D., History, Courage Services, Inc. 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/

Southeast Asian Studies

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow 

John B. Alexander

Ph.D., Education, The Apollinaire Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Roby C. Barrett, Ph.D., Middle 

Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

Professor of Strategy, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School and JSOU Senior Fellow

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Adjunct Faculty, Defense Critical Language 

Culture Program, Mansfield Center, University 

of Montana and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Air University and JSOU 

Associate Fellow 

William W. Mendel,

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow
On the cover: Muscat, Oman showing the walled city of Muscat, Mirani 

Fort, and government buildings. Photo by Walter Bibikow, used by permission of Newscom. 

JSOU Report 11-5

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2011

Oman: 

The Present in the Context 

of a Fractured Past

Roby C. Barrett
This monograph and other JSOU publications can be found at https://jsou.socom.

mil. Click on Publications. Comments about this publication are invited and should 

be forwarded to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations 

University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB FL 33621. 

*******

The JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant 

to special operations for potential publication. For more information please contact 

the JSOU Research Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. Thank you for your 

interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 978-1-933749-61-7
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of the United 

States Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University. 
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

2011 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays , July 2011

Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm in Context , May 2011, Roby Barrett

Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference 

Manual, Second Edition , April 2011

Report of Proceedings, 6th Sovereign Challenge Conference (7–10 

November 2010)

The Challenge of Nonterritorial and Virtual Conflicts: Rethinking Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism , March 2011, Stephen Sloan 

Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way 

SOF are , March 2011, Jessica Glicken Turnley

Innovate or Die: Innovation and Technology for Special Operations , 

December 2010, Robert G. Spulak, Jr. 

Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking and Joint Special Operational Planning 

Doctrine and Procedures , September 2010, Laure Paquette 

Convergence: Special Operations Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement , 

July 2010, John B. Alexander

Hezbollah: Social Services as a Source of Power , June 2010, James B. Love

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency, and the Indirect Approach , April 2010, 

Thomas H. Henriksen 

U.S. Military Engagement with Mexico: Uneasy Past and Challenging 

Future , March 2010, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Report of Proceedings, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) and 

Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Society Symposium, Irregular Warfare 

and the OSS Model (2–4 November 2009) 

Hunter-Killer Teams: Attacking Enemy Safe Havens , January 2010 , 

Joseph D. Celeski 
vii

Contents

Foreword ............................................................................... ix

About the Author ................................................................... xi

Oman: The Present in the Context of a Fractured Past.............. 1

Introduction ........................................................................... 3

1. The Origins of the Omani Exceptionalism 

 and the Early Al Bu Sa’id .................................................. 11

2. The Struggle for Supremacy in the Twentieth Century ........ 27

3. The Dhofar Insurgency ..................................................... 45

4. Conclusion: Oman, Counterinsurgency, 

 Legitimacy, and the Future ................................................ 63

Endnotes .............................................................................. 75

ix

Foreword

Dr. Roby Barrett’s examination and study of some 200 years of the Sultanate of Oman’s dynastic history is an excellent companion piece to his 

earlier work, Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm in Context. His Oman 

study puts into context the last four decades of the Sultanate’s history to 

answer the question of whether Oman has changed fundamentally from 

a nation fraught with instability and conflict to one of peace and stability. 

Dr. Barrett’s research focuses on the current rule of Sultan Qaboos and his 

approach to change, development, and modernity in a centuries-old culture 

that has experienced political, economic, and social upheaval throughout 

most of its early existence. 

Dr. Barrett’s analysis of Sultan Qaboos and his understanding of the roles 

central authority, tribalism, succession problems, religious fundamentalism, and competing internal political centers have played in Oman’s history 

will aid today’s reader in understanding the impact of fundamental change 

and progress along with the external trappings of modernity from a strictly 

Middle Eastern vantage point rather than in the Western context. Dr. Barrett 

writes that “Sultan Qaboos’ rule is not about liberalization and democracy. 

In fact, authority is probably more centralized in Oman than in any other 

state in the Arabian Gulf and for very good reason.” Barrett’s analysis of 

modern-day Oman will help the reader avoid the pitfalls of misinterpreting 

the present condition on the basis of Oman’s largely tumultuous past, which 

often featured conflict and competition for wealth and power.

Dr. Barrett puts forth a set of conclusions about the Omani experience 

that focuses on Sultan Qaboos’ understanding of the instability of the past 

and difficulties of succession. Although the Sultan has no heir, he has generated a plan to avoid the succession problems of the past. Barrett points out 

the role of Oman’s economy and the increasing stresses governments in the 

Gulf region now face, particularly with the prospect of declining oil revenues, 

increasing populations, and rapidly increasing expectations. These challenges 

must be considered when planning for the future. Finally, Dr. Barrett’s review 

of the lessons to be learned from Oman’s counterinsurgency experiences of 

the 1950s to 1980 suggest that for reasons unique to Oman these lessons are 
x

less about military operations than they are about the role of regional politics 

and economics.

Dr. Barrett ends by emphasizing the British “less is more” approach to 

counterinsurgency, coupled with a “perfect alternative leader” in Sultan 

Qaboos, has resulted in a successful outcome for Oman. In contrast, the U.S. 

with its large commitment of conventional military force has taken ownership of its wars this past decade and has become a focal point of resistance. 

The insights provided in Dr. Barrett’s Oman study suggest that a return to 

a smaller special operations war might have better results for the U.S. In a 

solemn ending to his study, Dr. Barrett writes “in a situation where successful nation building or a conventional military victory is unlikely; a reversion to a special operations war might in fact prevent our adversaries from 

winning—perhaps the best result that can be achieved.”

Dr. Barrett’s most recent monographs, this work on Oman and his earlier 

study on Yemen, are bookends that will provide the SOF reader with a deep 

understanding of the present and historical context which has resulted in the 

southern Arabian region of today. 

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D.

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department 
xi

About the Author

Dr. Roby C. Barrett is a senior fellow 

with the JSOU Strategic Studies 

Department. He has over 30 years of government, business, and academic experience in 

the Middle East and Africa. Dr. Barrett is 

the president of a consulting firm, specializing in technology applications and systems 

for national defense and security. He has 

extensive experience in space systems, 

nuclear issues, police and security systems, 

command and control, technology development, and weapons acquisition as they 

relate to both U.S. and foreign governments. 

The current focus of his research is strategic 

security issues in the Persian/Arabian Gulf, including Iran and the Arabian 

Peninsula. He is a former Foreign Service officer in the Middle East with a 

strong background in the cultural and political dynamics of historical Islamic 

and political development. His posting and other assignments included 

Tunisia, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Arabian Gulf.

As a founder of the National History Center within the American Historical Association, Dr. Barrett specializes in the application of broad historical 

and conceptual paradigms to issues of ongoing political and military conflict 

and the projection of future trends. He is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East 

Institute (MEI) in Washington, D.C. He provides domestic and international 

media commentary on a range of issues from the Palestinian territories to 

nuclear proliferation and the challenges of Russian policy in the Middle East 

and North Africa. Initially trained as a Soviet and Russian specialist, Dr. 

Barrett brings unique insights to the regenerated competition between Russia, 

China, and the United States in the Middle East and Africa. 

He also serves as the senior advisor to the Board of Directors of the Bilateral Arab-U.S. Chamber of Commerce, an organization whose members 

include major foreign and domestic petroleum companies. He is the lead 

panelist on Middle East and South Asian Policy. He also participates in the 
xii

Congressional Fellowship Program, American Political Science Association, 

and Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. He has been a featured panelist for the German Council on Foreign 

Relations on Middle East and Gulf Affairs. Dr. Barrett also serves as a lecturer 

on Gulf affairs, Iraq, and U.S. foreign policy for the Air Force Special Operations Command and in response to special requirements. 

Dr. Barrett was an Eisenhower-Roberts fellow of the Eisenhower Institute in Washington D.C., a Rotary International fellow at the Russian and 

East European Institute at the University of Munich, and a Scottish Rite 

Research fellow at Oxford University. He holds a B.A. in History and Political Science from East Texas State University and an M.A. in Political Science 

and Russian History from Baylor University. He is a graduate of the Foreign 

Service Institute’s intensive 2-year Arab Language and Middle East Area 

Studies program and the Counterterrorism Tactics course and took part in the 

Special Operations course. He has a Ph.D. in Middle Eastern and South Asian 

History from the University of Texas (UT)–Austin. Other honors include the 

Guittard Fellowship (Baylor), the Dora Bonham Graduate Research Grant 

(UT-Austin), the David Bruton Graduate Fellowship (UT-Austin), the Russian 

Language Scholarship (Munich), and the Falcon Award from the U.S. Air 

Force Academy. 

As an author, Dr. Barrett’s works range from books to articles on the Arab 

League and digital research techniques: 

a. The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: U.S. Foreign Policy under 

Eisenhower and Kennedy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)

b. “Intervention in Iraq, 1958-1959” in MEI Policy Briefs, 2008

c. The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy: The Past as Present, the Present 

as Future (JSOU Press, 2009)

d. “The Aftermath of the 1958 Revolution in Iraq” in Ultimate Adventures 

with Britannia (I. B. Tauris, 2009)

e. “Gulf Security: Policies without Context” in MEI Bulletin, 2010

f. Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm in Context (JSOU Press, 2011).

His next book, The Ministry of Interior (MOI)/SOF Interface in the Transnational Environment: SOF’s Shifting Reality, is slated to be published in 2012.

Dr. Barrett was a guest speaker at the Bahrain MOI Gulf Security Forum 

(2008), the SOF Conference at the opening of the King Abdullah Special 

Operations Training Center (Amman 2009), and the Bahrain SOF Conference 
xiii

(2010). Through deployment briefings and other forums, Dr. Barrett supported 

numerous military units; five examples are the 5th Special Forces Group, 101st 

Airborne both in the U.S. and Iraq, Naval Special Warfare Command both 

in the U.S. and the Arabian Gulf, 4th Psychological Warfare Group, and 19th 

Special Forces Group. 

His commentary has also appeared in the U.S., Latin American, European, 

and Middle East Press—for example, Voice of America English and Pakistan 

Services, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service, Canadian 

National Broadcasting System, BBC Arabic Service, Gulf News, and The 

National Abu Dhabi. 
BATINAH COAST

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Shinas

Suhar

Al Khabura

Barka Muscat

Qualhat

Rustaq

Jabal

al-Akhdar

Buraimi

Oasis

Izki Nizwa

Barkah

Hilif

Sur Masirah

Thumrayt

JABAL DHOFAR

(Mountains)

JABAL DHOFAR

(Mountains) Mirbat

Salalah

Rakhyut

Sarfayt

Hawf

Harbut

SAUDI

ARABIA

UAE

YEMEN

GULF OF MASIRA

STRAIT OF HORMUZ

Abu Dhabi

Dubai

Sharja

Ras al-Khaimah

OMAN

OMAN

Figure 1. Oman (Created by U.S. Special Operations Command Graphics)
1

The Sultanate of Oman is a key member of the Gulf Cooperation Council and ally of the West located on the strategically critical Straits of Hormuz 

at the entrance to the Arabian Gulf. Contrasting sharply with its tumultuous 

past, its political experience of the last 40 years is often offered as a model of 

successful social, economic, and political development and stability. Oman 

is an example of how lines on a map emerge as a stable, unified nation. In 

addition, the ultimate success of Sultan Qaboos bin Taimur al-Sa’id (1970–

present) in defeating the Dhofar insurgency in the 1970s is widely regarded 

as a model for counterinsurgency operations. The subsequent infrastructure 

and economic investment in Oman in general and in Dhofar in particular are 

cited as successful examples of using development as a compliment to military 

operations, thus removing the oxygen on which the insurgency thrived. These 

views are absolutely correct with regard to the last 40 years, but as recent 

Middle East events have demonstrated, political and cultural myopia can result 

in distorted analysis, which in turn can lead to unpleasant surprises. Placing 

too much weight on contemporary events, in this case the last 50 years, in a 

region where that is a historical blink of the eye can be problematic. From 

a policy perspective, the contemporary period, the exception, becomes the 

rule on which planning and strategy are based, often putting both at risk. 

This short-term Western view of the past and “progress” is in sharp 

contrast to that of Middle Eastern cultures that define themselves based on 

interpretations of events that happened millennia in the past. It is difficult for 

outsiders to fully comprehend that the principal tie in a society is to family, 

clan, tribe, and region above all else and that political, economic, social, and 

cultural development underlie these ties.1 A few decades of development 

and stability usually only provide a superficial façade behind which the old 

Oman: 

The Present in the Context

of a Fractured Past
2

JSOU Report 11-5

attitudes and culture are still alive and well. As a result, in the critical caldron 

that is the contemporary Middle East, policy at times focuses on the façade 

without a proper appreciation for the extremely complex political, economic, 

and cultural milieu behind it. The principal focus of this study is to ask that 

very question—in the case of a critical ally in the Arabian Gulf community: 

are Oman’s Western allies focused on the façade or the more complex reality 

behind it? Is it possible that there could be a series of unpleasant surprises 

in store and might a more in-depth look enable the West to anticipate the 

unexpected and support an ally better while protecting its own interests at 

the same time? This study is designed to provide a snapshot of one of the 

more complex states of the Arabian Gulf—Oman, an introduction to the 

complexities that must first be understood before any other strategies and 

contingencies can possibly be developed. In the Middle East, there is no such 

thing as a one-size-fits-all strategy, plan, or operations concept—at least not 

an effective one. 
3

Barrett: Oman

Introduction

To attempt to explain contemporary Oman in a narrow framework outside of its deeper context is to invite, or perhaps to guarantee the lack 

of cultural knowledge from which to adequately address the present as well 

as developments in the future. This is true not only of general foreign policy 

but also with regard to military assistance and operational planning. In the 

military realm, this is more pointedly the case for Special Operations given 

the goal of creating operators with a detailed knowledge and understanding 

of the human terrain. In the Middle East, the context cannot be measured in 

decades and to take that view handicaps planning, operations, and strategy. A 

shallower perspective also tends to breed a level of complacency concerning 

issues that will impact the long-term stability of U.S. strategic interests and 

in the case of Oman that of a strategically critical U.S. ally at the entrance to 

the Arabian Gulf. In short, the longer view of security and stability and the 

coming challenges that the Sultanate will likely face must take into consideration particularly where the contemporary state resides within a far deeper 

historical context. In the Middle East, “the past is not dead, it is not even past.” 2

The first months of 2011 witnessed the first sustained unrest that Oman 

has seen in 25 years, resulting in the dismissal of several government officials and a cabinet shake-up ordered by Sultan Qaboos.3

 Is it a harbinger of 

things to come? In the next 15 years, Oman will likely face a transition of 

power from Sultan Qaboos (who rules without a direct patrilineal heir), the 

potential significant reduction of oil revenues to support the development, 

and a growing bubble of young people whose aspirations and ambitions will 

be ever more difficult to meet. These issues do not take into consideration that 

potential challenge presented by likely further fragmentation in Yemen—the 

same area of Yemen that fueled the Dhofar insurgency 40 years ago. Over the 

last 40 years, Oman’s ruler has demonstrated sophistication and foresight that 

has produced stability, growth, and unprecedented unity, but similar periods 

of stability in the past driven by unusually capable rulers have later given way 

to instability and even chaos. 

Oman may well in fact weather all of the coming challenges, but the potential exists that the stresses of the next two decades could create a situation 

that will require a more sophisticated, in-depth understanding of the Omani 

context to guide a greater level of political, economic, or military assistance 

than anyone at the present time anticipates. Already Saudi Arabia has offered 
4

JSOU Report 11-5

$10 billion in aid to boost the Omani economy. In the case of such a critical 

ally, it is always prudent to consider the potential for a set of less-than-optimal 

scenarios for the future, all of which requires a thorough understanding of 

the present and the historical context from which the present sprang. That is 

the purpose of this study; it is a bookend, if you will, to an earlier study on 

Yemen. In the Arabian Gulf, two states can claim unique development experiences: Yemen and Oman. Historically, with the exception of the last 40 years 

of stability and development in Oman, Yemen and Oman have comprised 

the most unstable and volatile regions in the Arabian Gulf. Sultan Qaboos’ 

rule began in 1970, and the period of stability, development, and “progress” 

which has come to be associated with Oman, is usually dated from that 

point—hence 40 years. In reality, as we will see, the first five years of Qaboos’ 

rule saw a military struggle coupled with a nascent program of development 

to gain control of Dhofar. The second five years witnessed ongoing sporadic 

outbreaks of anti-Sultanate activities that did not end until the withdrawal of 

support from the insurgency by the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Yemen 

(PDRY) in the early 1980s. There is a fine but important point here; Sultan 

Qaboos’ accession in 1970 marks the beginning of Omani development, but 

the peace, stability, and development associated with Oman today more accurately dates from the late 1970s or early 1980s—thus 30 years from a policy 

point of view. To assume that 30, or even 40 years of stability has become the 

rule within a historical context of several millennia of conflict and instability is as naïve as it is dangerous. Yemen, which analysts and “policy experts” 

viewed as increasingly stable during the 1990s, has subsequently descended 

into internal conflict and near chaos and is a cautionary tale about superficial 

Western views of progress and stability in very complex and historically strife 

ridden societies. Oman is by no means Yemen, but a better appreciation for 

the complexities and problems that Oman has faced in the past and might 

face in different forms in the future is timely. 

The competence and foresight with which Sultan Qaboos has ruled 

Oman—moving it from the list of underdeveloped crisis states in the 1970s 

to that of a success story in the first decade of the 21st century—does not 

change the fact that his rule has been the dramatic exception to the Omani 

norm. Additionally, in few instances has the stability and progress of a state 

been so closely associated with a single person, thus raising the question of 

what happens in Oman after Sultan Qaboos.4 Viewed within the Omani 

historical context, the transition and its aftermath will almost certainly be 
5

Barrett: Oman

far more difficult than anyone anticipates—with the exception of perhaps 

the Omanis themselves. As a result, this study focuses on what policymakers 

in general and the military in particular need to know about Oman, as basis 

for planning, in the event that a greater degree of involvement or level of 

assistance is required in the future. This study provides an essential building 

block for knowledgeable, sophisticated interaction with Oman and Omanis no 

matter what the future may bring; sophisticated interaction, operation planning, long-term strategy, stability analysis, and counterinsurgency require it. 

For example: Why does the succession law in Oman require that the ruler be 

an Ibadi from a specific branch of Al Bu Sa’id family? What are the familial 

implications of that requirement? What is an Ibadi? How has Ibadi Islam 

developed in contrast to other forms? What have been the internal forces that 

have fractured Oman in the past? What was the Imamate in contrast to the 

Sultanate? What is the relationship of Dhofar to Muscat or for that matter 

to the Hadramut in Yemen? The list can go on forever. This study focuses 

on providing the fundamentals for understanding the Omani present and 

considering the future.

Focusing on the last 40 years provides a woefully inadequate understanding 

of Oman. In recognition of this absolute fact, this paper begins in 7th century 

with a unique political, social, economic, religious, and cultural development 

that even today sets Oman apart from the rest of the Arab Gulf. Oman is 

an Arab Gulf State whose historical and cultural context and experience is 

fundamentally different from the other states of the Arabian Gulf, and a basic 

knowledge of those differences is critically fundamental to anyone whose 

responsibilities include the contemporary Sultanate. Oman’s development 

and the conflicts that emerged from its political and social structure created 

an environment of almost perpetual insurrection and insurgency. As previously noted, periods of peace, stability, and prosperity as typified by the last 

30 years have been few and far between. They are not the rule but are rather 

the exception. It is important that those charged with the responsibilities in 

the Gulf and planning for the what ifs of regional security understand and 

appreciate the historical fragility of the Sultanate’s stability. 

The multiple insurgencies in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, are all outgrowths 

of the deep historical context. They provide useful lessons on counterinsurgency operations but more importantly, they underscore the relationship 

between diplomacy, development, and effective military operations as the sine 

qua non of any successful counterinsurgency effort. From the 1950s through 
6

JSOU Report 11-5

the 1970s, Oman experienced multiple insurrections and insurgencies, all of 

which were difficult to suppress. The Dhofar insurgency is the best known 

but, in reality, the struggle between the Imamate of Oman and the Sultanate 

during the 1950s probably constituted the greatest immediate threat to the 

survival of the Muscat Sultanate. This study examines those insurgencies 

from the historical political and cultural contexts from which they sprang as 

well as the political and operational challenges and strategic difficulties that 

they presented. To understand and accurately place those events within the 

proper context, the story begins in the distant past. 

“Historically, politically, and geographically, Oman has always been 

the most isolated part of Arabia.” Sir Arnold Wilson went on to say, “Only 

Maskat [sic] has its eye open to the wide world.” 5 Although its attributes have 

changed, it is this tension in politics, economics, society, and even culture 

that has driven the Omani paradigm and a history of competing centers of 

power. It is through Oman’s unique history that it must be viewed and understood. Given its location on the Straits of Hormuz astride that energy lifeline 

from the Arabian Gulf, Oman’s importance cannot be exaggerated. Oman 

provides multiple lessons in not only the political and military imperatives of 

counterinsurgency operations but also lessons in the pitfalls and challenges of 

providing the elusive security required for a functioning state beset by tribalism and impaired by a severely lagging social and economic development. 

Oman’s importance to the national security of the United States requires a 

better understanding of its political, social, cultural, and religious experience. 

This study repeatedly uses the term “legitimacy.” Legitimacy, always a 

complicated and subject specific term, is exponentially more so when applied 

to Oman. Any discussion of such a complex topic in such a limited space is 

always an oversimplification, but a few simple guideposts can assist in framing 

a more sophisticated understanding. There are three basic elements to legitimacy that can best be understood by looking at Oman geographically—the 

Sultanate, the Imamate, and Dhofar. While separately identifiable, these 

elements at the same time overlap. The Sultanate is a cosmopolitan coastal 

society that has derived its livelihood and prosperity from participation in the 

Indian Ocean and global commerce for centuries. Cosmopolitanism and the 

British influence created a relatively tolerant, culturally inclusive society where 

legitimacy flowed primarily from economic prosperity and political stability. 

In the isolated, conservative Imamate, political legitimacy was far more closely 

tied to the stricter tenets of Ibadi Islam and the conservative traditions of a 
7

Barrett: Oman

fractious tribal culture. Part and parcel to political legitimacy in the Imamate 

was the language and appearances of a much more conservative Ibadi Islamic 

legitimacy—the ultimate ideological weapon repeatedly used by the Imamate against the cosmopolitan sultanate. In more than 250 years, only one of 

the Al Bu Sa’id sultans was viewed by supporters of the traditional Imamate 

as worthy of becoming the Ibadi “imam al-muslimiin.” In a largely Sunni, 

ethnically African Dhofar, the situation was even more complicated—Ibadi 

Omanis from the North were viewed as little more than occupiers. Like the 

Sultanate, the culture focused on Indian Ocean trade, but historically and 

culturally, the Dhofaris are far closer related to the Hadramutis than to the 

Ibadis to the North. For the last 40 years, Sultan Qaboos has managed the 

“hat-trick.” Through birth,born of a Dhofari mother in Salalah; outlook,the 

cosmopolitan progressive blending of the sultanate’s view toward the sea and 

a progressive Western education; and predisposition, enlightened but absolute authoritarianism, he embodies legitimacy in two realms and commands 

legitimacy by suppressing challenges in the third. He has in effect become the 

irreplaceable monarch who one day will have to be replaced.

The study also provides a snapshot of policy requirements. The British 

and the Sultanate since the 1960s largely kept their eyes on the strategic 

goals while pursuing tactical objectives. There was far more commonality 

of policy formulation between the Foreign Office and the British Middle 

East Command than has been seen in recent U.S. adventures in Arabia, and 

this communality was driven by a significantly greater breadth and depth of 

knowledge. This can be in part attributed to over 200 years of the experience 

in the region and specifically in Oman, which undermined temptations to 

attempt the fundamental transformation of traditional societies. There was 

a minimalist approach to expectations, policy formulation, and operational 

execution. London supported the Sultanate, particularly in the post-World 

War II period, because of its interests. The Sultanate used the British in the 

same manner—it was a symbiotic relationship. London carefully followed 

the policy maxim that “less is more.” In other words, the smaller the official 

British footprint, the better. Military intervention was kept at an absolute 

minimum to limit political repercussions and expenditures as well. The Dhofar 

rebellion subsided because London and Sultan Qaboos marshaled significant 

regional political, economic, and military support to deny oxygen to the rebels 

and remove their safe havens. The peace and stability of the last 30 years have 

been as much the result of diplomatic efforts, perpetual security operations 
8

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and vigilance, and economic and development policies as successful military 

operations. Success also emanated from the Sultan’s grasp of the underlying 

Omani historical and cultural context and an appreciation for its volatile 

potential. It is there that any study of Oman must begin. 

The monograph has four chapters. The first provides an introduction to 

Omani exceptionalism—Oman’s historical experience and Ibadi Islamic 

heritage and interpretation of the Islamic revelation are different from that 

of the rest of the Arabian Gulf. Perhaps, only Zaydi Yemen has a unique 

cultural and political experience that rivals that of Oman. “The Ibadi movement stabilized in the interior of Oman toward the latter part of the eighth 

century and Oman has had a unique political personality ever since.”6 Ibadi 

religious thought and practice served to ideologically isolate Omani cultural 

development.7 This fact requires that anyone seeking an understanding of 

present day Oman must grasp the fundamentals of its Ibadi heritage. It also 

examines the rise of the Al Bu Sa’id and the interaction between the Sultanate 

and the Imamate from the mid-18th century to the near demise of the Sultanate in 1913. It chronicles the increasing cultural and political estrangement 

between the Sultanate and the Imamate, the rise of the Zanzibar Sultanate, 

and the increasingly assertive policy role that British India began to play in 

the Sultanate. 

Chapter two focuses on the emergence of ‘neo-Ibadism’ in the early 

20th century and the challenge posed by the Imamate to the legitimacy and 

survival of the Sultanate. It also outlines the British struggle to prop up the 

Sultanate through the Treaty of Sib in 1920, and its implications for the initial 

insurgencies of the 1950s. The study then examines the role of oil, the British Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), Saudi Arabia, and Arab American Oil 

Company (Aramco) in the tribal insurgencies of the early 1950s. This chapter 

reinforces the view that stability in Oman has been highly dependent on the 

individual ruler. 

The third chapter describes the Dhofar rebellion of 1965 to 1982. It is a 

narrative of local grievance imbedded in an ancient past that took on the 

ideological colorings of the Cold War. It attempts to show the conflict in its 

broader context. It was far more than small Special Air Service (SAS) cadres 

operating against an elusive enemy. Jordanian Special Forces and Iranian 

Special Forces, plus air and naval forces, tipped the manpower scales in the 

Sultanate’s favor; Saudi Arabia’s decision to shift political, economic, and 
9

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diplomatic support to the Sultanate ultimately undermined external support 

for the insurgency; and finally, the British and Qaboos removed Sultan Sa’id 

bin Taimur al-Sa’id at the eleventh hour to avert political collapse. All of 

these elements were critically important. With a broad regional consensus, 

substantial external support, and a sophisticated leadership from Sultan 

Qaboos, it took five years to subdue a region with a population of only a few 

hundred thousand inhabitants. An extrapolation to the current experiences 

in Iraq and Afghanistan is sobering.

The conclusion examines the Sultan Qaboos era within the broader context 

of Oman’s history. Modernity and development has obscured the continuing 

traditional factional structure of Omani society. In Omani history, as Sultan 

Qaboos knows, periods of stability and prosperity often precede spectacular 

disintegration. As a result, the Sultan has maintained tight political and 

security control. Despite this, the Arab Spring of 2011 has brought the first 

sustained protests of the Qaboos period albeit directed not against the Sultan 

but against unspecified corruption in the government. Fundamental divisions still exist, exacerbated by a lack of economic opportunity. Modernity, 

development, and the stability of the last 30 years aside, Oman continues to 

be a diverse political, economic, and cultural landscape masked behind the 

capabilities and competence of a strong ruler—this has implications for the 

not too distant future. 

11

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1. The Origins of the Omani Exceptionalism and 

the Early Al Bu Sa’id

What makes Oman different from the rest of the Arabian Gulf? A map reveals the obvious connection with the monsoonal trading culture 

of the Indian Ocean and an interior isolated by desert and mountains insulating it from its Arab neighbors. In addition, the split between mountain 

and shore created a dichotomy in Oman’s historical, economic, and cultural 

development. The Muscat tradition saw “Oman as a commercial maritime 

power, whose merchants traded from one end of the monsoon world to the 

other.”8 The mountain or “interior tradition” was a “closed, isolated selfsufficient community, tribal in its organization and governed by an elected 

Imam” according to the Ibadi Islamic tradition. Some scholars argue that the 

Imamate, which collapsed in the 1950s, could become a symbol of “the Gold 

Age of the original Muslim state” with the “mystique” of legitimacy, which 

if manipulated by Islamic fundamentalists could threaten Omani stability 

in the future.9 Given the potency of contemporary Salafist movements, any 

potential for imagined purist Islamic past in Oman is worth understanding 

particularly if it might affect the future of a critically important area like the 

entrance to the Arabian Gulf. 

Arab Oman and the Arrival of Islam

Oman’s strategic position was particularly important to the ancient empires 

of Persia. Cyrus the Great, the Parthians, and later the Sassanians occupied 

the coastal regions. In 1st century CE, tribes from the Marib area in Yemen, 

under the leadership of Malik bin Fahm, migrated into Oman. While there 

is some debate about the exact timing, according to Hisham ibn al-Kalibi, 

an 8th century Arab historian, Malik defeated the Persians and established 

himself at Nizwa.10 These Yemeni tribes saw themselves as Qahtani Arabs, or 

“pure” Arabs from southern Arabia as opposed to later arrivals, the Adnani 

groups from the Nejd desert in Arabia.11 Eventually, these tribes adopted a 

symbiotic relationship with the Sassanian Persians through the julanda system 

by which they ruled on behalf of the Persians.12 In the 7th century, Sassanian 

King Chosroes II’s campaign to reconquer not only Oman but also Bahrain 

and Hadramut indicates some form of early Omani independence.13 The Sassanian revival was short lived. Around 630 CE, the Prophet Muhammad sent 
12

JSOU Report 11-5

a messenger, perhaps ‘Amr Ibn al-‘As, to Oman with a letter to the julanda, 

Abdul and Jayfar al-Julanda, instructing them to submit to Islam. They submitted.14 In 632 when the Prophet died, they apparently recanted and found 

themselves the focus of the al-Ridda campaigns of both Abu Bakr and Caliph 

Omar.15 Some credit this lapse to the Persian and Zoroastrian influence among 

the population, another factor setting Oman apart from its Arab neighbors.16

Following the death of the Prophet, disputes arose over the succession. 

The followers of Ali—the Shi’a or party of Ali—believed that head of the 

community of believers, the umma, should pass down to the most senior 

blood relative of the Prophet. Others in the community, most notably those 

of the Quraysh tribe objected and supported the more traditional consensus 

approach. The Muslim leadership ultimately opted for the latter approach 

appointing Abu Bakr as the first Caliph. He was followed in turn by Caliphs 

Umar and Uthman, both of whom were murdered. In 656, on the death of 

Uthman, Ali finally became Caliph. He faced immediate opposition from 

Uthman’s supporters the Umayyads. At this point a third group, the Kharijites 

(from the Arab word haraj, to go out) arose. The Kharijites opposed familial 

succession and the Umayyads’ attempts to establish their own dynasty. Initial 

support for Ali ended abruptly when Ali in an armed confrontation with the 

Umayyads submitted to Koranic arbitration. Phillips argued, “The nub of the 

Kharijite case was that the Quran could not be used to settle the dispute since 

this would involve submitting it to various interpretations, whereas “Judgement [sic] belongs to none save God; no arbitration in the religion of God.” 

In retaliation, Caliph Ali attempted to destroy the Kharijites.17 Unfortunately 

for Caliph Ali, the Kharijites managed to assassinate him. That event and the 

subsequent massacre of Ali’s son Hussein and his followers at Karbala in 681 

became the driving impetus behind the emergence of the Shi’a in Islam—but 

what of the Kharijites? 

The Kharijite movement split. One group violently opposed Umayyad rule 

and another took a quietist approach.18 Crushed by the Umayyads (661–750) 

and persecuted by the Abbasids (750–1258), the Kharijites fled to remote 

areas of North Africa and established small Kharijite states in Libya, Tunisia, 

and Morocco.19 The “quietists” under Abdullah ibn Ibad al-Murri al-Tamimi 

emerged as a new community.20 Taking their name from al-Tamimi, the 

Ibadis rejected Shi’a and Sunni orthodoxy and refused to tie the origins of 

their sect to any historical event.21 For them belief was “not limited to time 

and place.” They saw themselves as “an ancient community rooted in Quranic 
13

Barrett: Oman

revelation.” 22 Migrating to Oman, they made common cause with tribal 

elements against Umayyad attempts to expand Damascus’ control.23 The 

isolation of Oman provided sanctuary.24 This combination of tribal resistance 

to foreign Umayyad rule and an alternate Islamic theology proved a potent 

combination. The Umayyads were never able to completely subdue Oman with 

the unconquered resistance centered on Jabal al-Akhdar—jabal meaning 

mountain in Arabic—an area key to the revolt of the 1950s.

25 Then, in 750, 

the Abbasids destroyed the Umayyad Caliphate in Damascus and founded a 

new Caliphate centered on Baghdad. 

Taking advantage of the chaos, the Ibadis exploited Omani dynastic 

and tribal rivalries.26 They elected their first Imam, al-Julanda bin Masud. 

Initially, the Omani Imamate functioned independently. However, once in 

control the Abbasids captured and executed the first Ibadi Imam. As Abbasid 

power ebbed, the Omani tribes elected and also removed imams who did not 

meet the standards set by the community.27 In 793, the Yamadi, or second 

Imamate (793–893), was founded on a narrow tribal base and adopted the 

authoritarian Rustamid Ibadi School. Many of the ideas and propensities of 

this authoritarian, radical school of Ibadi Islamic thought arguably morphed 

into the neo-Ibadism of the 1950s—underscoring the potential for ideas from 

a distant past to resurrect themselves in a contemporary form. During this 

early period, the Rustamid School almost destroyed Ibadi Islam.28 Coastal 

invasions by the Abbasids, the Persians, the Carmathians, and even a dynasty 

based in the islands off Hormuz forced the Ibadi core to remain isolated in 

the interior fractured by tribal wars and feuding.29 The political and cultural 

development of the interior was isolated and thus different from that of the 

rest of Arabia. This isolation encouraged Omani exceptionalism—a unique 

view of themselves and their role in Islamic and Arabian Gulf politics and 

culture, and Oman’s place in the greater Indian Ocean community.

Seafaring also set Oman apart. Centered on Sohar, north of present day 

Muscat, a true Indian Ocean culture developed focused more on China, 

India, Madagascar, and Africa than on Arabia. Omanis understood the 

importance of the monsoonal winds and how to use them.30 Thus, two very 

different Omans developed, isolated from Arabia but linked to each other.31 In 

915, Abu al-Hasan Ali al-Masudi, the Arab historian and geographer, on his 

return from India and China, described his journey from Sohar to Zanzibar 

with a group of Omani ship owners testifying to the presence and influence 

of Omanis in East Africa.32 Trade in gold and slaves also brought Ibadi Islam 
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JSOU Report 11-5

to places like Zanzibar and Kilwa, which as early as 975 became the trading 

center for East Africa.33 By the 12th century, Omani traders flourished on the 

coast from Kilwa to Mogadishu, Mombasa, Malindi, Pemba, and Zanzibar.34

This Omani trading empire roughly paralleled the growth of the Rasulid 

dynasty (1229–1454) that brought South Yemen under its control.35 Like the 

Rasulids, the Omanis benefited from the Mongol subjugation of Iran and the 

Abbasid Caliphate because it shifted trade from the northern routes to the 

Indian Ocean.36 Rasulid Yemen and Oman competed for trade on the African, 

Indian, and Southeast Asian coasts.37

In the 15th century, the arrival of the Portuguese devastated the prosperity 

of the Indian Ocean trading communities. In 1487, Vasco da Gama rounded 

the Cape of Good Hope. Procuring the assistance of Ahmed bin Majid, the 

foremost Arab navigator of the period, da Gama laid claim to much of the 

African coast for Portugal. In 1502, he returned with a fleet and plundered the 

entire coast. Portuguese tactics wrecked Omani commerce and the Muslim 

city-states of East Africa.38 In 1515, Alfonso de Albuquerque occupied the 

Hormuz and established forts at Muscat, Qalhat, and Sohar subjugating coastal 

Oman.39 The slaughter that accompanied the sack of Muscat left no room for 

future accommodation between the Omanis and Portuguese as the Portuguese 

described it, “Joao da Nova (a Portuguese commander) killed many [Omanis] 

well as women and children...without sparing any.”40 The Portuguese goal was 

total dominance in the African coast and Indian Ocean.41 In 1538, Suleiman 

the Magnificent (1520–1566) sent a Red Sea expedition under Hadum Suleiman Pasha, the governor of Egypt, to secure coastal Yemen and contested the 

trade route to India.42 In 1550, the Ottomans sacked Muscat and slaughtered 

the Portuguese garrison. Two years later, the Portuguese took it back.43

Political Developments in Oman

In 1620, Nasir bin Murshid of the Banu Ya’rub tribe became the first Imam 

of the Ya’ruba Dynasty (1620–1743). Tribally, he was a Ghafiri ‘Azd. Called 

the Upright Ibadhi, Nasir led an aggressive campaign against the weakened 

Portuguese and his Omani tribal opponents. Attesting to the volatility of his 

26-year rule, it was said, “no Omani ‘great or small’ died a natural death.” In 

1649, Portuguese Muscat fell to Imam Sultan bin Sayf I (1640–1680), Nasir’s 

cousin and successor. Sultan bin Sayf II (1712–1718) turned his attention to 

driving the Portuguese from the African coast. He eventually cleared the Portuguese from the entire African coast north of the Mozambique Channel.44
15

Barrett: Oman

Figure 2. The extent of Omani influence and its trading empire in Africa and 

the Indian Ocean (Created by U.S. Special Operations Command Graphics)

IRAN IRAQ

QATAR

KUWAIT

UAE

SAUDI

ARABIA

YEMEN

ERITREA

SOMALIA

ETHIOPIA

NORTH SUDAN

SOUTH SUDAN

KENYA

TANZANIA

MOZMBIQUE

MADAGASCAR

EGYPT

JORDAN

SYRIA

ISRAEL

LEBANON

ZANZIBAR

MOZMBIQUE CHANNEL

GULF OF ADEN

RED SEA

ARABIAN SEA

DJIBOUTI

Pemba

Kilwa

Mombasa

Malindi

Mogadishu

Aden

Ras al-Khaimah

PERSIAN

GULF

GULF OF OMAN

Hormuz Bandar Abbas

Sharja

Muscat

Salalah

OMAN
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JSOU Report 11-5

Sayf II transformed Oman into a real naval power with a fleet that included 

one 74-gun, two 50-gun, and eighteen 12- to 32-gun ships with which he 

controlled the entire coast to the entrance of the Red Sea, raided Portuguese 

settlements in India, and in 1717 captured Bahrain from the Persian Safavids.45 The success of the 17th and early 18th centuries represented a golden 

age of wealth and power. Despite all its accomplishment, the Ya’ruba Imamate collapsed because succession eventually led to a minor being next in line 

to rule and the political and tribal instability that ensued.46 This was not the 

first time that Omani stability appeared sustainable only to have it suddenly 

collapse, nor would it be the last.

Between 1719 and 1727, there were five imams and even more rival candidates supported by rival ulema (religious scholar) and tribal factions. These 

rivalries became a fixture of Omani politics. In 1722, a dispute between 

Imam Sayf bin Sultan II and Muhammad bin Nasir al-Ghafiri erupted into 

a tribal feud that divided Oman’s tribes into two groups, the Banu Ghafir 

or Ghafiris, and the Banu Hina or Hinawis.47 Roughly speaking the Hinawi 

were the more conservative Ibadis of Yemeni (Ghatani) origin. The Ghafiri 

consisted of Ibadi and Sunni tribes of northern (Adnani) origin. Muhammad 

bin Nasir’s rebellion succeeded and he declared himself Imam in 1725. Upon 

Muhammad bin Nasir’s death in 1727, Sayf bin Sultan II once again became 

Imam. In 1743, still unable to control the tribes, he asked Nadir Shah, the new 

ruler of Persia, for help. Nadir Shah attempted another Persian occupation of 

Oman. Ultimately, Nadir Shah’s failure provided an opportunity for the rise 

of a new dynasty, the Al Bu Sa’id.48

The Emergence of the Al Bu Sa’id

Following the Ya’ruba dynasty collapse, the chaos of the Ghafiri-Hinawi Civil 

War, and the Persian invasion, a new leader emerged, Ahmad bin Sa’id bin 

Muhammad Al-Sa’id. Ahmad bin Sa’id was an Omani commander from 

the Hinawi faction who built his reputation and legitimacy on opposition to 

the Persians and Nadir Shah. Imam Sayf bin Sultan II’s temporary alliance 

with Nadir Shah in 1737 became a permanent occupation.49 Nadir Shah’s 

commander, the Beglerbeg or governor of the Fars region in Persia, Taqi 

Khan, captured Muscat, but his attack on Sohar where Ahmad bin Sa’id was 

commander faltered. When Nadir Shah sent overwhelming reinforcements, 

Ahmad bin Sa’id wisely negotiated an agreement whereby he remained as the 
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Barrett: Oman

Persian governor. In 1744, he revolted and finally drove the remaining Persians 

from Muscat. Stories of his starving Persian prisoners at Sohar, slaughtering 

Persian commanders invited to feast, or putting others on ships ostensibly to 

return to Persia then burning the ships enhanced his reputation as someone 

not to be trifled with. Ahmad bin Sa’id’s ferocious opposition to Persian rule 

enhanced his political legitimacy.50

In 1748, another opportunity to expand Sa’id control presented itself. The 

Ghafiris became disaffected with the Ya’ruba Imam and imprisoned him.51

Ahmad bin Sa’id sent a trusted family member, Sheikh Khalfan bin Muhammad Al-Sa’id, to capture Nizwa, the traditional seat of the Imamate, and 

establish Al Bu Sa’id control. By defeating the Persians and eliminating the 

Ya’ruba Imamate, Ahmad gave the ulema little choice but to elect him Imam, 

the first of the Al Bu Sa’id dynasty.52 The Al Bu Sa’id were relative unknowns 

before the Persian conflict and opponents used this obscurity to question the 

legitimacy of the family’s rule. The opposition questioned Ahmad’s election 

claiming that the opposition had been eliminated prior to the election. Later, 

opponents questioned the legitimacy of the electors, arguing that the title 

imam had been used as an honorific and not a legal Ibadi designation.53 The 

Governor of Mombasa, Muhammad bin Uthman declared his independence 

Figure 3. Historic Nizwa Fort located at the traditional seat of the Imamate. 

Used by permission of Newscom. 
18

JSOU Report 11-5

allegedly proclaiming, “The imam has usurped Oman—I have usurped 

Mombasa.” Agents sent by Ahmad assassinated the governor for his temerity.54

Ahmad bin Sa’id then took the title and energetically defended his prerogatives as Imam from his capital at al-Rustaq.55 Oman reasserted its naval power 

in the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean challenging the naval power of the 

Persians and the Banu Qawasim of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. As the Imam 

aged, he appeared to be less decisive in protecting Omani Gulf mercantile 

interests.56 The actual disruption in trade may have been more perceived 

than real; Gulf and to some extent Indian Ocean trade were affected by the 

situation at Basra and Bandar Abbas, but shifting trade patterns likely made 

up the difference. Increased coffee trade through Mocha in Yemen and that 

in Javanese sugar and spices with western India through Cochin more than 

compensated for the disruptions in the Gulf.57 Nevertheless, the view that 

Imam Ahmad was not doing enough persisted.

In 1781, Sayf bin Ahmad and Sultan bin Ahmad, two of his sons, revolted. 

In part tribal jealousy and the fact that their mother was from the Bani Jabir, 

an important Ghafiri tribe more prestigious than the Al Bu Sa’id, played a role. 

Angered that Ahmad had given control of al-Rustaq and Nizwa and much 

of the interior to his anointed successor Sa’id bin Ahmad, Sayf and Sultan 

captured the forts at Muscat and their half-brother Sa’id. Sa’id escaped and 

without a hostage, Sayf and Sultan had to flee Oman to the Baluchi coast.58

Upon Ahmad’s death in 1783, Sa’id bin Ahmad became Imam but immediately 

faced strong opposition. First the Ibadi ulema met in 1785 and elected Qays 

bin Ahmad imam. Sa’id was unable to establish his authority in the interior 

and focused his attention on foreign trade. He increased the share of Omani 

trade in the Indian Ocean and added a profitable trade in African slaves. To 

consolidate the slave trade, he reasserted Omani control over the Swahili 

Coast of East Africa and expanded trade with the French.59

In 1793, Sultan bin Ahmad returned to Oman and forced a family realignment that strongly favored his branch of the Al Bu Sa’id. Influence was 

divided among Sa’id, Qays, and Sultan. Sultan gained control of Muscat 

and used it to expand the trading empire from which he received sufficient 

revenues to maintain his fleet, his mercenary army, and the primacy of his 

political influence. Competing centers of power would become the norm for 

Al Bu Sai’d rule.60 With the demise of the Sa’id branch, the Sultan and Qays 

branches emerged as the two dominant. Generally speaking, the Sultan branch 

controlled the “maritime state” and claiming “nominal suzerainty over the 
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whole country.” The Qays branch controlled the interior and allied with the 

ulema in an attempt to reassert the legitimacy of the Imamate.61

Despite the rough division of influence between interior and coast, Sultan 

bin Ahmad maintained some influence in the interior as well. In 1800, he 

confronted the first Wahhabi occupation of Buraimi Oasis. Defeated, he 

concluded a three-year truce with the Saudis. Sultan’s support for the Hashemites in the Hejaz brought another Wahhabi invasion in combination with 

the ‘Utbi of Bahrain and Kuwait and the Qawasim. Unable to counter this 

coalition, Sultan accepted another truce and the assignment of a Wahhabi 

political agent in Muscat. Yet when another Saudi offensive followed and at a 

unity council in Barkah, the Omanis pledged to “continue to struggle against 

the invaders.”62 The Wahhabis withdrew before hostilities commenced in 

earnest because of a succession crisis. An Iraqi Shi’a assassinated Amir Abdal-Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn Saud (1765–1803) in the Saudi capital of Dir’iyah 

in retaliation for the sack of Karbala in 1801.63 Sultan then attempted to deal 

with the Wahhabi’s allies, particularly the Qawasim of Ras al-Khaymah and 

Sharjah; he was killed in 1803 in an attack upon a Qawasim warship.64

Converging Interests: The British and the Sultanate

The 18th century brought rising European influence on the coast and a new 

threatening Islamic challenge in the interior. The twin challenges put new 

strains on the Ibadi identity. The British victory in the Seven Years’ War 

(1756–1763) altered their security priorities. India displaced the British East 

India Company (BEIC) entrepôts in the Gulf at Basra and Bandar Abbas in 

importance. Problems in the Gulf trade and a downturn in the coffee trade 

in Mocha shifted the return-on-investment equation eastward. The situation was similar for the Sultanate. Wahhabi “pirates,” the emergence of the 

‘Utbi maritime states of Kuwait and Bahrain, Persian threats to Basra, and 

the activities of the Qawasim in Sharjah and Ras al-Khaymah made doing 

business in the Gulf less profitable. 

Both Oman and the British sought to contain Gulf problems in the Gulf 

and stabilize the Indian Ocean trade. The French and Dutch found themselves 

at an increasing disadvantage to London.65 British, and to a lesser extent Dutch, 

influence was further enhanced by the collapse of the Persian Safavid Empire 

in 1722, Nadir Shah’s rule in 1747, and finally the increasing weakness in the 

Indian Mughal Empire. At the same time, the Sultanate’s substantial trade 

with India and Africa while damaging to private British interests did not 
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significantly conflict with the BEIC.

66 From the 1770s, the BEIC also received 

a percentage of the coffee trade routed through Muscat, and thus a direct 

interest in the continued safety and prosperity of Muscat. Trade also shifted 

away from Bandar Abbas and Basra to Muscat.67 Rising British power caused 

the rulers in Muscat to attempt to balance London’s influence.

In 1798 following Admiral Nelson’s victory over the French at the Battle 

of the Nile, the BEIC, concerned that Sultan bin Ahmed was pro-French, 

dictated a treaty that excluded the French and Dutch from Muscat and Oman. 

It was the first British treaty with any Arab state and “represented England’s 

first intervention and entrenchment in the affairs of Oman.” The treaty was 

ratified again in 1800 and extended. Given Napoleon’s attempt to enlist the 

Sultan in undermining British interests in the Indian Ocean, BEIC concern 

was understandable. The British made it clear that a failure to sign would 

mean that all of India would be closed to Omani commerce. Sultan not only 

rejected the French overture and the posting of a permanent French representative in Muscat, but he accepted a British officer as permanent resident 

and as his personal advisor.68 In return, the ports and trade of India were 

open to Muscat and Sultan. London got what it wanted, the exclusion of the 

French, and Sultan got what he wanted, sanctioned access to the Indian trade. 

Perhaps more importantly, he gained an ally who could ensure his survival 

against Wahhabi, Persian, Utbi, and Qawasim aggression.

Oman and the Early Wahhabi Threat

For Omani rulers, Ibadi traditions provided them an ideological defense 

against both the Sunni Wahhabis and the Persian Shi’a. They equated the 

former to the radical Kharijites of the 7th century “who believed they had 

the right and obligation to kill all who disagreed with them” and absolutely 

rejected the latter’s belief in the Alid Imamate. The Omanis referred to the 

Persians as “a people who are under the wrath of God.” Because the core 

of Ibadi beliefs came from the interior, the same very conservative outlook 

created pronounced cleavage with the coast. The arrival of the Europeans 

heightened the differences. People of the interior simply could not accept 

the cultural menagerie of the coastal ports. Muscat was open to Europeans, 

Africans, and Hindus all of whom were allowed to follow their own religious 

practices—it was good for trade and commerce.69 In addition, the security of 

Muscat and the Sultan often depended on a standing military, which tended 
21

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to be African or Baluchi and more reliable than the tribal levies of the interior. Peoples of the coast and interior tend to develop antipathetically in any 

circumstance.70 As the interests of Muscat and the interior diverged, Ibadi 

Islam became the ideological tool through which issues of legitimacy and 

identity were challenged, pitting the ulema and tribal interior against the 

commercial and “secular” interests of the coast.71

Following Sultan bin Ahmad’s death, from 1804 to 1806, Badr bin Sayf 

bin Ahmed ruled as regent in Muscat for Sa’id bin Sultan bin Ahmad. At the 

time the Saudi Wahhabis had found allies in disaffected tribes within the 

Ghafiri confederation and menaced Oman from the Buraimi Oasis and the 

sea. In 1806, Sa’id bin Sultan assassinated Badr.72 In 1807, Sa’id took over Sohar 

on the death of Qays, his uncle, putting him at odds with Qays’ son Azzan. 

Simultaneously, the Wahhabis threatened Sa’id’s regime, but were held off by 

some astute maneuvering and fence mending with the Ghafiri tribes. In 1813, 

the Saudi threat was eliminated by the Ottomans’ independent Viceroy in 

Egypt, Muhammad Ali, whose son Ibrahim Pasha destroyed the first Saudi 

state.73 Sa’id bin Sultan, also known as Sa’id the Great, ruled in his own right 

for 50 years as a “temporal” ruler, first adopting the title Sultan.74

Sa’id understood two things well: prosperity creates stability and proper 

management of the relationship with the British meant security. Sa’id allied 

himself with the British first against the Qawasim in Ras al-Khaymah and 

Sharjah and then against the remaining Wahhabi Emirs of the Gulf and 

interior.75 Using the British as a screen for his own ambitions, he occupied 

Dhofar, a move that would have significant implications for Muscat in the 

20th century.76 An anonymous report in the Asiatic Journal of 1825 summed 

up Sultan Sa’id’s use of the British:

His government is despotic in the extreme and nothing but the 

protection he is supposed to receive from the British Government 

prevents frequent revolts. The greater part of the inland territories 

merely acknowledge his sovereignty, but pay no tribute; neither has he 

means of enforcing it. The British expedition to Beni Boo Ally, 1821, 

very considerably strengthened his power, and he has fully availed 

himself of the impression then made, to keep up a belief among his 

subjects, of the British Government being always ready to aid him 

in bringing any rebels to their duty.77
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The ulema of the interior saw him as an illegitimate ruler, but he managed 

to use his relationship with the British and his political and commercial successes in East Africa to maintain his position and influence.78

The Sultanate and East Africa in the 19th Century 

In 1828, Sa’id set out to reassert the Sultanate’s control in East Africa. Leaving 

his son, Thuwayni as regent in Oman, he used his fleet to capture Mombasa, 

and in 1832, moved his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar. The British actually 

“encouraged” Sa’id to do this because they believed that their longer-term goals 

in the Indian Ocean were better served by Arab rulers than by the expense 

of direct British administration. As Robert Cogan, one of Prime Minister 

Palmerton’s representatives suggested, the Sultan of Zanzibar could be “not 

only as a powerful political engine as regards our Eastern Possession [India] 

but [a source] through whose means education and morality might be introduced to an unlimited extent in...Africa.”79 From Zanzibar, Omani trade 

penetrated deep into Africa.80 Like his predecessors in other dynasties, he 

failed to institutionalize his rule; it was totally dependent on the person of the 

Sultan.81 When Sa’id died, a major conflict arose between his sons over who 

should rule in Zanzibar and Muscat. The British sought to avoid a fratricidal 

war between Sa’id’s sons at all cost. The primary issue was Thuwayni and any 

attempt on his part to forcefully regain control of Zanzibar and undermine 

its efforts in the Gulf to end the slave trade, piracy, and maritime warfare.82

The Government of India under Viceroy John Charles Canning (1856–1858) 

pressured Sa’id’s sons to accept arbitration. From the beginning, Canning and 

his advisors favored a split that left Zanzibar to Majid bin Sa’id and Muscat 

to Thuwayni. The British India government felt that an independent Majid 

would be more likely to follow their wishes regarding suppression of the slave 

trade than if he were subordinate to Muscat. Zanzibar was far wealthier than 

Muscat, and Thuwayni bitterly resented Canning’s decision: “The man who is 

given a bone can only suck it, but he who gets the flesh eats it. I am the elder 

brother and I have the bone in Muscat. Majid, my junior, has the flesh in 

Zanzibar.”83 The actual decision was even more convoluted. Captain Robert 

Coghlan of the Indian Navy stated that on “legal right alone” Thuwayni was 

entitled to rule both Muscat and Zanzibar—exactly Thuwayni’s position. 

However, the good Captain then concluded that “expediency” required that 

the two be separated because Zanzibar constituted the only center for potential 

political control in East Africa and because the separation of Zanzibar and 
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Muscat would likely do more to undermine the slave trade. Thuwayni was 

to receive 40,000 pounds per annum assuming he did not attempt to retake 

Zanzibar. On 2 April 1861, Canning awarded Zanzibar to Majid and Thuwayni 

was recognized as Sultan of Muscat.84

British lack of foresight was stunning. “Al Bu Sa’id rule in Oman in the 

10 years following the Canning Award suffered more setbacks than in any 

period since the Wahhabis descended upon the Sultanate in the first decade 

of the century.” After the Canning Award, if the British did not ensure Al 

Bu Sa’id rule then someone else would. This was not immediately apparent 

to the inexperienced British residents who refused support for Thuwayni 

against the intrigues of Qays branch, the Wahhabis at Buraimi Oasis, or from 

Hinawi and Ghafiri tribes. By early 1865, it appeared to the British that Faisal 

ibn Turki al-Saud, the Wahhabi Emir at Buraimi, intended to use an alliance 

with the Azzan ibn Qays to destroy both Thuwayni and Muscat. Having 

fought the Wahhabi threat for over 50 years, the British moved to eject the 

Saudis from Buraimi Oasis where they “overawed the littoral Arabs from 

Rass-ool-Khaimeh [Ras al-Khaimah] to Aboothabee [Abu Dhabi]” in addition to threatening the “friend and ally” of the British, the “Imam of Muscat.” 

Colonel Lewis Pelly, the Resident for the Gulf, summed up the British position: “These Wahabees [Wahhabis] want a blow right between the eyes and 

they shall have it.” Unfortunately for Pelly, the sultan’s son Salim murdered 

Thuwayni. Fearing more unrest, the British found themselves supporting 

Salim who they considered unsavory and unreliable. Salim was overthrown 

in 1868 by Azzan bin Qays, who became Sultan and the elected Ibadi Imam.85

Azzan became in the eyes of the Ibadi ulema, the only legitimate ruler of 

Oman in the 19th century.86

Legitimacy and the Al Bu Sa’id in the Late 19th Century

Perhaps the most surprising issue related to British intervention and influence 

in Muscat and Oman was how little the Government of India or the India 

Office in London actually knew about the interior of Oman. In 1872 in the 

preface to his translation of Ibn Ruzik’s History of the Imams and Seyyids 

of Oman, Percy Badger wrote, “It is remarkable and by no means creditable 

that the British Government in India, that notwithstanding our intimate 

political and commercial relationship with Oman for the last century, we 

know actually less of that country, beyond the coast, than we do of the Lake 

districts of Central Africa.”87 The British did not understand the difference 
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in ideology between the Wahhabis and the Ibadis. “To bunch the ulema of 

Oman with the mutawwi’ simply shows total incomprehension of the Ibadis 

as well, indeed, as of the Wahhabi movement...But for the refusal of British 

recognition, the consequent loss of the Zanzibar subsidy, and the release by 

the India Government of his dangerous rival Turki, it is possible that Azzan 

might nevertheless have surmounted all his difficulties and reduced Oman, 

for a time at least to the semblance of a well-ordered monarchy.”88 Robert 

Landon pointed out that Azzan suppressed a Ghafiri rebellion in which 

much of the tribe was Wahhabi.89 “The significance of the revival of the Ibadi 

Imamate eluded (the British).”90 The practical outcome was that Turki found 

himself besieged on the coast by the tribes of the interior and survived only 

with British support.91 In 1887, the American Consul reported, “The Sultan is 

completely in the hand of the British representative here and generally does 

as he is told by that official.”92 When Faisal bin Turki al-Sa’id formally took 

the office of Sultan in 1888, the Al Bu Sa’id dependency on the British had 

become a matter of survival.93 

To make the situation crystal clear, the British forced Sultan Faisal (1888–

1913) to agree to a secret bond: “[Faisal]...does pledge and bind himself, his 

heirs and successors never to cede, to sell, to mortgage or otherwise give for 

occupation save to the British government, the dominions of Muscat and 

Oman or any of their dependencies.” The British position now consisted of 

a preeminent trade position, extraterritorial privileges, exclusion of foreign 

powers, the power of recognition, and subsidy control through the British 

agency located there and reporting to the British Government of India.94 The 

Ibadi ulema considered Faisal to be “little better than a kafir, an infidel.” In 

many respects, he was no longer viewed as Arab.95 In the Revolution of 1895, 

the tribes swept into Muscat and the other coastal areas.96 Faisal sought refuge 

in one of the nearby forts. Much to the chagrin of the people of Muscat and 

the Sultan, the British refused to intervene because it would have breached 

their agreement with the French.97

Angered by the British and looking for more reliable support, Sultan Faisal 

allowed the French to establish a fleet coaling station near Muscat and included 

French flagging of Omani vessels. The British were prohibited from searching French vessels, and behind the tricolor the Omani slave trade resumed. 

As one writer from the period stated, “There is no record of any slave having 

been set free by a French gunboat. The greatest power they exercise is by 

lending their flag to slaving dhows, so that it covers that nefarious traffic.”98
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Behind the French flag, the Sultan also resumed the arms trade. Afghan and 

Baluchi tribes were becoming better armed and as one British Resident put 

it, “the blood of our poor fellows lies at the door of those who have carried on 

this traffic.”99 The slave and the arms trade together might not have spurred 

the British to act but the French coaling station and Russian intrigues with 

the Sultan were simply too much. In 1899, the British ordered the Sultan to 

present himself to the commander of a British naval squadron in the harbor 

and sign a new treaty giving them more influence. The alternative was that 

he could watch the bombardment of Muscat. Faisal complied. Compromised 

and humiliated, in 1903, he requested permission to abdicate but was turned 

down by Lord George Curzon, the viceroy of India.100 Although “personally 

courageous,” Faisal was described as “barely literate,” “apathetic,” and “unbalanced” with an “unrealistic belief in his own strength and ability, intermixed 

with carelessness and fits of productive energy.”101 The Sultanate now thoroughly under the control of British India limped into the 20th century in a 

thoroughly weakened state. 

Summary

In its earliest historical and cultural development, Oman was unique. Externally isolated and internally divided, periods of stability and power were often 

followed by precipitous descents into instability and decline. Oman’s isolation 

and unique historical experience contributed to adoption of the Ibadi Islam 

and contributed to a separate political experience that pitted the Imamate 

against the existing centers of temporal power and religious orthodoxy—the 

Umayyads and the Abbasids. Thus, part of the “unique political personality” 

created by the “Ibadi movement” was an ongoing struggle against attempts 

by other Arabs to dominate the Imamate.102 The threat from other Arabs gave 

Omanis a different perspective on inter-Arab relations as well. This would 

be another issue that would carry into the contemporary era. The Omani 

role in the monsoonal commerce of the Indian Ocean and the African coast 

and the epoch after the collapse of the Yamadi dynasty in which the Ibadis 

retreated into the hinterland and various foreign powers occupied the coast 

further enhanced the division between the coastal areas and the interior. In 

the 16th century, Omani commercial dominance in the Indian Ocean disappeared in the face of Portuguese pressure. The revival of the late 17th century 

collapsed in a succession crisis that in turn brought the great schism of 1722. 

The struggle between Qahtani and Adnani represented by the Hinawi and 
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Ghafiri tribal groupings carried forward into the contemporary era and provide additional fuel for internal political and social conflict. Omani rulers 

were nothing if not pragmatic—they willingly invited foreign intervention 

or assistance, as in the case of Nadir Shah, even when that intervention itself 

posed a risk. Stability was fragile.

The emergence of the Al Bu Sa’id as the defenders of Oman against the 

Persians was a promising beginning, but during the early period, the lack of 

stable rule robbed the dynasty of legitimacy. The Sultan branch reinforced the 

divide between the Omani interior and seaborne Muscat. These differences 

might well have been less pronounced had it not been for increasing British 

intervention. After 1861 and the Canning Award, the British were responsible 

for the outcome of political events in Muscat. Stripped of Zanzibar, gunrunning, and the slave trade, the Sultan of Muscat had become a British dependency. In 1871, to undermine the Qays branch in the form of Imam Azzan, 

the British merely confirmed their ownership of Muscat’s political future 

and demolished the Ibadi legitimacy of Sultanate rulers. It ensured that two 

Omans, the Imamate and Sultanate, would legally exist into the 1950s and that 

a de facto social, cultural, and political split would survive well beyond that. 

This divide in society also begs the question of whether 30 years of stability 

can erase centuries of separate political and cultural development. 
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2. The Struggle for Supremacy 

in the Twentieth Century

In 1913, the Ghafiri and Hinawi tribes united and elected a new imam, Salim bin Rashid al-Kharusi, who declared the thoroughly discredited 

Sultan Faisal deposed.103 On the surface, the issue appeared to be a straightforward internal Omani issue. A puppet of the British, Faisal’s rule had been 

corrupt and incompetent. In reality, there was a new ideological component 

described by Wilkinson as neo-Ibadism. In the late 19th century, new ideas 

about Arab nationalism and Islam swept the Middle East. The small Ibadi 

communities in francophone North Africa were influenced by the writings 

of late 19th century Islamic reformers like Muhammad Abdu and Jamal 

al-Din al-Afghani in Paris, two of the leading Muslim thinkers of the age. In 

Oman, the “inspiration” to elect an al-Kharusi, as opposed to an Al Bu Sa’id 

Imam came from Abdullah bin Humaid al-Salimi, who had been influenced 

by the puritanical North African Ibadi reformers. “The views of Ibadism he 

built up fostered the ideal of the true Imamate of the orthodox community 

living according to the basic principles of Islam. He was also a fanatic and 

had no scruples about the end justifying the means.” In other words, because 

of the political and cultural crosscurrents and ferment of the period, Ibadi 

Islam took a sharp fundamentalist turn, the focus of which was the end of 

the Sultanate and the call for a pure Islamic society. 

Conservative Islamic Ideology, the Sultanate, and the British

From 1906 to 1913, al-Kharusi used the arguments of the Ibadi nadha (renaissance) and pressed for the overthrow of the Al Bu Sa’id sultanate. “Ideology 

and pragmatism confounded to create the last Imamate of Oman, to elect the 

descendant of an Imam from the Golden Age of the First destruction.”104 As 

Wilkinson put it, the imagery was priceless—the Al Bu Sa’id, corrupt puppets 

of Western infidels, replaced by the purity of the First Imamate.105 Sheikh Isa 

bin Salih al-Harithi of the Bani Hina pledged his support uniting the Ghafiri 

and Hinawi against the British and the Sultanate. The surprised British Resident cabled New Delhi for more troops. In October 1913, Sultan Faisal died 

and was succeeded by his son, Taimur bin Faisal al-Sa’id, but negotiations 

went nowhere. Then, in January 1915, the Imam assembled a force of 3,000 

for the assault on Muscat; British and Indian Army troops slaughtered them 
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at Matrah. The assessment by the British Resident, Major L.B.H. Hayworth 

was bleak: “[Taimur’s] government is so bad that to continue to support it 

in its existing condition is nothing short of immoral.” Luckily, in July 1920, 

Imam al-Kharusi was assassinated. The new Imam, Muhammad bin Abdullah 

al-Khalili, was more amenable to a compromise as was Sheikh al-Harithi.106

 On 25 September, the Treaty of Sib divided Oman between the Imamate 

and the Sultanate. It promised free trade, travel, and non-interference in the 

other’s affairs.107 The British refused to declare the Imamate independent, but 

the agreement promised that the Sultan “would not interfere in the internal 

affairs of the Imamate.” The British argued, “the Sultan maintained de jure 

sovereignty over the whole of Oman,” while acknowledging “the Omanis 

may regard the phrase [about non-interference] as granting them complete 

independence.”108 Two weeks after the signing of the treaty, the British Political 

Agent in Muscat, R.E.L. Wingate reported on 14 October 1920: 

Our interest has been entirely self-interested, has paid no regard 

to the peculiar political and social conditions of the country and 

its rulers, and by bribing Sultans to enforce unpalatable measures 

which benefitted none but ourselves and permitting them to misrule without protest has done more to alienate the interior and to 

prevent the Sultans from re-establishing their authority than all the 

rest put together.109

The British took over the Sultanate’s administration and finance. In 1922, 

the British Resident for the Persian Gulf stated, “We have gradually but 

imperceptibly usurped the functions and authority of the State.” The British created the Muscat Levy Corps, a force of 200–300 Baluchi soldiers with 

British officers under the Permanent Agent Muscat (PAM) and the British 

Government of India.110

In 1932, the British finally allowed Taimur to abdicate. Sa’id bin Taimur 

became the new Sultan. “After a succession of three weak Sultans, Sa’id 

appeared to be the dynamic and intelligent leader that the country needed.”111

In 1932, New Delhi forced Sultan Sa’id to acquiesce to British control. The 

PAM wrote to the British Viceroy: “He should, I think be given every chance 

to administer his State on Arab lines, and every effort should be made to free 

him from those relics of the past which are galling to him, while we should 

try, at the same time, to build up a façade of independence in the eyes of 
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Barrett: Oman

the world.” There was a fundamental contradiction in making him “free to 

administer” behind a “façade of independence.”112

Saudi Arabia, Oil and the Question of Frontiers

In 1938, Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) reported that the potential for 

oil in the Imamate did not look promising. Needing funds, Sultan Taimur 

contacted Standard Oil of California and the British quickly countered with 

a concession from the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company.113 Simultaneously another festering issue arose. By 1932, Abd-al-Aziz ibn Rahman 

al-Saud (Ibn Saud) had consolidated his position in Arabia and declared the 

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He had negotiated some boundary agreements 

with the British. In 1933, Ibn Saud granted the California-Arabian Standard 

Oil Company (CASCO) a concession that included “the eastern part of our 

Saudi Arab Kingdom, within its frontiers.” At CASCO’s request, the U.S. State 

Department attempted to determine what exactly that included. 

The British claimed that the boundary was the “Blue” and “Violet” lines 

established in the Anglo-Turkish treaties of 1913 and 1914. These lines were of 

dubious legality. First, the treaties were never ratified; second they were pure 

colonial agreements between the British and Ottomans defining “spheres of 

influence” and thus arguably could not legally devolve to Ibn Saud; and lastly 

the lines were just that—straight lines drawn on a map without reference 

to anything else. The Foreign Office legal department more or less advised 

against using the Turkish agreements as the basis for claims. The Foreign Office 

persisted. Fundamentally, Saudi Arabia argued that there “never had been a 

frontier.”114 Saudi claims were based on the fact that tribes in the Hadramut, 

Buraimi, Dhofar, Oman, and Qatar paid the zakat and furnished tribal levies 

to Saudi Arabia. Percy Cox, the British Resident in the Gulf warned in 1926:

Practically he (Ibn Saud) thinks that he is justified, in principle, in 

regaining any territory that his forefathers had a century ago, whether 

as territory or as a “sphere of influence.” Oman was in their sphere of 

influence....I have little doubt but that in the course of time he will 

seek to extend his authority over the interior of “Oman.”

Saudi legal arguments 30 years later quoted Cox. In 1939, the British could have 

negotiated the boundaries with greater leverage, but shortsightedness in both 

the India Office and the Foreign Office prevented anything from being done. 115
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The Buraimi Crisis

The end of the World War II ushered in a new era. In 1949, Saudi Arabia and 

the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) launched expeditions into 

Qatar and the Trucial States, the present day United Arab Emirates (UAE).116

British officials complained, “Aramco at this time was more Saudi than the 

Saudis.” Buraimi Oasis became important not because anyone believed that 

there was significant oil there but because the new Saudi claims included not 

only the tribes but also any areas where they migrated. Riyadh also argued 

that since Abu Dhabi and Oman were independent states and not British 

colonies, the matter should be negotiated between Saudi Arabia and the particular emirates with the British having no role in it. The Buraimi claim also 

affected Oman. In 1949, the Saudis made it clear exactly what was at issue:

The position is that Bureimi, and the lands of Imam Khalili and 

their dependencies, are populated by Saudi Arabian tribes, and are 

not under the jurisdiction of the Sultan of Maskat, nor under the 

Shaikh of Abu Dhabi; nor is there any treaty between it [sic: read 

them] and the British Government and it is therefore unreasonable 

to proceed with conversations with the British Government for the 

delimitation of frontiers between the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and 

there Shaikhdoms.117

Because of Aramco, the British protested to the State Department, which suggested arbitration in 1950. The British “could not be certain of succeeding in 

a court of international law” and refused.118

In August 1952, Saudi Arabia occupied the Buraimi Oasis citing their 

former control. A British officer seconded to the Trucial Oman Levies (TOL), 

which was formed in 1951 by the British, described it as “blitzkrieg” stating, 

“A motorized column came incredibly out of the west, where there was nothing but waves of sand for six or seven hundred miles,” and “before anyone 

knew what was happening the leader, a man named Turki bin Abdullah bin 

Ataishan, announced to the astonished people that he was their governor.”119

To quote member of one of the tribes whose father and grandfather had 

supported the Saudis: “The Saudis were very smart and had most of the tribes 

of the area on their side before either the British, the Sultan in Muscat or the 

Emir in Abu Dhabi knew what had happened.”120 The Saudis acted because 

Aramco appeared to have the backing of the U.S. government and secondly, 
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Barrett: Oman

the British were no longer the feared empire.121 Surprised and cautious the 

British opted to blockade the Saudis at Hamsa and accept the “Stand Still 

Agreement” suggested by the U.S. Embassy in Jidda.122

Neither the Trucial States nor the Muscat government in Oman were in a 

position to protest; it was still left to Her Majesty’s Government to protest on 

behalf of Oman and the Trucial States and back it up.123 Saudi largess went 

beyond just Buraimi Oasis as they garnered favor with the tribes of the Omani 

interior as well.124 Obviously concerned, the British reported, “The language 

used in communication from the Saudi Foreign Ministry suggested that their 

claims continued to advance; King Ibn Saud was said to own the allegiance 

of “all the people of Oman.”125 Ibn Saud encouraged Turki’s “propaganda,” 

“bribes,” and “intimidation” activities. Wary of the U.S. role, on 6 January 1953, 

the British government laid out its Buraimi plan. While offering arbitration, 

the British backed Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate with new military deployments and a commitment “to build up the Trucial Oman Levies sufficiently 

to withstand Saudi infiltration and maintain our position in the long term.”126

With the Saudis contained at Hamsa, the British then began a thorough 

assessment of their position and that of their allies on the Trucial Coast and 

in Muscat. Initially the Imam agreed to provide tribal levies to support the 

Sultan. He was even happier when he learned that their services would not 

be required because the “British Government are negotiating this matter.”127

The British were still concerned because former advisors and ministers in 

the Imam’s government were travelling to Riyadh with “letters” from the 

Imam to King Saud but no Imamate shift to support the Saudis. At Hamsa, 

the Saudis were also busy improving their houses, collecting taxes, distributing subsidies, and equally important arranging marriages between the 

Saudi contingent and local families.128 The British then assessed the position 

of the tribes. The list was long and detailed but provided the British a strong 

point of reference for understanding allegiances and splits with the tribes. 

The British knew who had taken Saudi identity papers and money. Turki bin 

Abdullah bin Ataishan, the Saudi point man in Hamsa, was very busy and 

effective to the point that when Riyadh called for a plebiscite in the region, 

the British refused because it would “confirm a situation which the Saudis 

had falsely and improperly created.” In other words, Saudi patronage would 

have carried the day.129

With the Saudi move on Buraimi, the “live and let live” arrangement 

between the Sultan and the Imam became an immediate problem. The 
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JSOU Report 11-5

arrangement since 1920 prevented the effective extension of sultanate control 

into much of the interior, and the Saudis were now exploiting the situation. In 

an effort to elevate concern, the Eastern Department of the Foreign Ministry 

produced a classified assessment of the situation; they listed four reasons for 

this “backwater of the world” having its “tranquility...disturbed:” 

The growth of the power and wealth of Saudi Arabia and the extension of Saudi territorial ambitions to Central Oman;

The discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf and the 

impact of new wealth on local tribal societies; and 

The rumored existence of oil in Central Oman.

It is also alleged by the Sultan among others that there are signs of a 

change in attitude towards foreigners on the part of the Oman tribes, 

which may lead to a much more forthcoming policy and a disregard 

of the ailing Imam. The religious extremists, as personified by the 

Imam, have hitherto been a barrier to Saudi penetration and to the 

exploitation of oil by Western companies.

The British assessment went on to say: 

H.M.G.’s basic interest in the Sultan of Muscat arises from the possibility of oil exploitation in his territory. His territory has little strategic interest apart from this, though it affords staging posts of some 

value to the R.A.F., and is not geographically or climatically suitable 

as an alternative site for British forces in the Middle East.

After the Standstill agreement, Sultan Sa’id bin Taimur, who been prepared to 

fight, now refused “to take positive steps to assert his authority.”Undermined 

once more by the British, the Sultan retired to his palace to let the British 

work out the problem.130 Some believed that the Sultan never forgave the 

British for intervening.131 London had once again intervened to protect its 

broader interests at the expense of the Sultan’s prestige and independence. 

To underscore this, the Sultan pointedly complained to the British Resident 

in Muscat that the Standstill agreement created a situation in which he was 

losing prestige and that the Saudis should be removed during the arbitration 

process.132 “The Saudis sat in Buraimi for three years, bribing and intriguing, 

before they were finally evicted.” The Sultanate lost influence as even loyal 
33

Barrett: Oman

interior tribes began to waver and go their own way, a situation that would 

later take years to correct.133

The Recapture of Buraimi and Overthrow of the Imamate

With the Saudis occupying Buraimi and rumors of new aggressive moves 

on the part of Saudi sympathizers and the Americans, British oil companies 

became concerned that the Sultan might attempt to undermine the Huqf 

exploration project. The British Resident believed that success with Huqf 

would provide some compensation for what was going on at Buraimi.134 The 

Sultan in fact raised concerns about the adequacy of the Huqf force to reassert Sultanate control in the central region.135 In 1953, the PDO recruited the 

Muscat and Oman Field Force to provide protection and, on 15 February 1954, 

the Field Force and the PDO exploration teams moved into the Janaba and 

Harasis region. The Imam protested to the British and Sheikh Yasir of the 

Janaba ordered that the white flag of the Imamate be raised in all their towns 

and villages. Then in May 1954, Imam Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Khalili 

died.136 Sultan Sa’id bin Taimur believed that he would be the last imam, but 

the situation in the interior had already spun out of control. The rules in the 

Omani interior had changed: “the game was no longer that of Imamate against 

Sultanate but of the old conservative political system against the secular ambitions of leaders who sniffed the heady odor of oil politics. The old men had 

lost their grip and it was now the turn of the young to make their moves.”137

On 4 May 1954, Ghalib bin ‘Ali Al-Hinai (1912–2009) was elected Imam 

and immediately began to incite tribes to rebel. The Imam picked up more 

support from new tribal sheikhs. In September 1954, sheikhs loyal to the 

Sultan were forced to flee to British protection in Sharjah. At this point, 

the oil company organized an expedition with troops from the Muscat and 

Oman Field Force (MOFF) to reestablish Sultanate control over the promising exploration area of Fahud.138 At this point, the new Imam declared the 

Imamate independent and applied for membership in the Arab League. Both 

the Saudis and the Egyptians, now under the open leadership of Gamal Abdul 

Nasser, saw this as the perfect opportunity to undermine the British and 

one of their puppets—the Sultan of Muscat.139 The Imam also submitted the 

question of “British Acts of Aggression” to the Arab League with the Saudis 

and Egyptians supporting “assistance” to the Imam.140 Both the Egyptians 

and the Saudis had increased the flow of money and guns to dissident tribes 

and the Imam so the situation was still serious.141
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At this point, the British concluded that a solution had to be found to the 

situation at Buraimi. The British concern was not so much the Saudis, but 

rather the U.S. reaction. Washington was putting an enormous amount of 

pressure on the British to withdraw its troops from Suez, a situation characterized by Eisenhower as the “most dangerous” situation in the Middle East.142

John Foster Dulles reported, “If unsolved the situation [between Britain 

and Egypt] will find Arab world in open and united hostility to West and 

in some cases receptive to Soviet aid.”143 Now, the U.S. pressured the British 

over Buraimi. The Foreign Office refused to compromise arguing that such 

a move could “prejudice” good relations with Abu Dhabi and Muscat.144 The 

British would not compromise with the Saudis on Omani oil exploration.145

Britain had too many issues of importance with the U.S. to sacrifice that 

relationship over the problems in Oman. As events developed in 1955, the 

British Resident for the Gulf in Bahrain, Bernard Burrowes, became concerned 

that Imam Ghalib’s efforts with the Saudis and the Egyptians might result 

in international recognition for the Oman Imamate. Burrowes pointed out 

that “time may not be on his [the Sultan’s] side.”146 In reply, the Foreign Office

was cautious but discussed the pros and cons of taking action both in the 

North at Buraimi and in the central region around Nizwa.147 British officials 

fretted that Sultan “was more a spectator than initiator of events” and that he 

“did not like to make decisions.” Of course, there was another issue. When 

pressed about support, the British were exceedingly vague about the degree 

to which they were willing to support a move against either Buraimi or the 

Imamate itself. The Sultan was cautious because if an offensive failed it would 

undermine his entire position.148

In September 1955, the arbitration commission convened in Geneva and 

began to consider the issues related to the Saudi’s Buraimi claim. Almost 

immediately, the Saudi representative began to lobby fellow commission 

members and offer bribes for support. The commission dissolved. Now, the 

British pointed to their good faith effort to negotiate at exactly the same time 

that the U.S. was scrambling trying to assess the implications of the Czech 

deal for Russian arms in Cairo and King Saud bin Abd-al-Aziz’s cooperation 

with Nasser.149 The overall situation blunted U.S. objections about Buraimi, 

and the British moved quickly. On 26 October, they used the Trucial Oman 

Levies to overpower the Saudis and besieged their local allies at Hamsa.150 By 

nightfall, the TOL commander reported that the Saudi in charge had been 

wounded and 14 others captured. They were put on a British ship from Sharjah 
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to Bahrain.151 The next morning the TOL reported that resistance had ceased 

and more prisoners had been taken.152

On 26 October, Prime Minister Anthony Eden explained to Parliament 

that “hopes” for an arbitrated settlement had been “disappointed” due to 

“bribery and intimidation on a wide scale” by Saudi Arabia. As a result, the 

British government acted “to exercise its duty, which is to protect the legitimate 

interests of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat” by restoring 

“their previous control of the Buraimi Oasis.”153 Saudi Arabia responded stating that it had advised the President of the United Nations’ Security Council 

that a request would be forthcoming to discuss the Buraimi matter. Riyadh 

also informed the British Embassy in Jidda, “The Saudi Arabian Government 

do not consider that there is any difference between them and the Sultan of 

Muscat and Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, but the difference is between them and the 

British Government who have imposed their will upon these rulers in order to 

achieve their own private aims.” The Saudis added that they rejected charges 

that they had “not observed the terms of the arbitration agreement” and had 

used “bribery and intimidation” at Buraimi. Finally, the Saudis stated that 

they did not accept the British version of the border.154

Emboldened, Sultan Sa’id immediately moved to recapture Nizwa, the 

spiritual if not political center of the Imamate. The plan called for a joint 

TOL-MOFF operation to capture Nizwa and Adam. The oil company agreed 

to provide aircraft and transport and support with reconnaissance. By 14 

December, the MOFF had occupied both Adam and Firq with only token 

resistance. From Muscat, the Sultan issued a communiqué stating:

Forces of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman are today taking action 

to suppress a treasonable conspiracy against the sovereignty of the 

Sultan Sa’id bin Taymur. Indisputable written proofs have been found 

that certain disaffected Shaykhs have been plotting for some time to 

disrupt the Sultanate with the aid of foreign gold, arms and propaganda. To restore confidence and answer the petitions of loyal subjects 

and to preserve the peace such intrigues can no longer be tolerated.

In December, the Sultanate occupied Nizwa and al-Rustaq. Imam Ghalib 

bin ‘Ali resigned and his brother Talib bin ‘Ali vanished only to reappear weeks 

later in Saudi Arabia. Salih bin ‘Isa al-Harithi also fled to Saudi Arabia.155 On 

24 December 1955, the Sultan left his palace at Salalah and traveled to Nizwa. 

He had finally brought the interior under the control of the Sultanate and 
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JSOU Report 11-5

was the first Sultan to visit the interior in over a century. In the immediate 

euphoria following the eviction of the Saudis and the collapse of the Imamate, 

most were reluctant to point out that Sultan Sa’id appeared to have no real 

plan to develop the country or improve the life of the people.156 The appearance of stability in 1955 was deceiving and short lived. The internal conflicts 

and rivalries that had driven the revolt were still present waiting re-ignition. 

The 1957 Rebellion and Saudi Arabia

In Oman, the turmoil of 1955 gave way to the peace and calm of 1956.157 With 

the exception of tribal incidents that were contained, it appeared that the 

integration of the interior had occurred with remarkably little friction. The 

appearances were misleading. Imam Ghalib’s brother had escaped to Saudi 

Arabia from whence he gained money and support to create a political movement and insurgency aimed at toppling the Sultanate. The Saudis supported 

the creation of the Oman Liberation Army (OLA), a force of 500 men headquartered outside Dammam.158 They also formed a “government in exile” 

and opened Imamate offices in Riyadh, Damascus, Beirut, and Cairo where 

Sawt al-Arab radio lambasted the Sultanate and its British backers.159 The 

close relationship between Nasser and the Movement for Arab Nationalists 

(MAN) attracted a cadre of more ideologically motivated opponents of the 

Sultanate and the British.160 The calm before the storm was 1956.

By 1957, Talib bin ‘Ali had completed a complex plan to raise a broad 

rebellion against the Sultanate. The OLA would infiltrate into the interior of 

Oman and link up with various tribal leaders including the venerable Saudi 

supporter Suleiman bin Himyar al-Nabhani and his brother Imam Ghalib. 

In March, the operation began. An OLA diversion along the coast brought 

clashes with the MOFF while the main force under Talib eventually landed 

on the al-Batinah Coast and made its way to the interior. Using mines and 

machine guns, they blocked several of the roads to the interior and gained 

the assistance of local tribes. He then joined up with his brother who once 

again took the title of Imam and declared a rebellion.161

The Sultan faced a real dilemma. A head-on approach seemed like a certain 

loser so he ordered the British officers of the Omani Regiment (OR) to take 

and destroy Bilad Sayt to force the Bani Riyam tribes in the area to destroy 

Talib’s force. On 10 July, the OR was ambushed, as were reinforcements on 

the road behind them. Mounting casualties brought more reinforcements but 

no progress was made and the road ambushes in the rear were increasing in 
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frequency and ferocity. At this point, the British tactical commander decided 

to abandon the Bilad Sayt operation and withdraw to Raddah. The withdrawal 

was difficult even before the regiment ran into multiple ambushes at Tanuf, 

Kamah and Nizwa. During the panicked withdrawal, an entire OR company 

became separated without transport and was “shattered” by point blank fire 

as “it passed beneath the garden walls of Nizwa.” The remnants finally made 

it back to Raddah.162

The Bani Riyam had destroyed the Sultan’s first line units. Considering 

the circumstances casualties were relatively light, a dozen dead and wounded, 

but more than half of the soldiers then deserted. In addition, an OR platoon 

holding Nizwa Fort quickly surrendered to the Imam’s forces. Fearing an 

attack on ‘Ibri, the British attempted to piece together a defense force consisting of a Northern Frontier Regiment (NFR) company, an OR platoon, and the 

remnants of retreating Company A of the OR. When the latter arrived, Major 

Malcolm Dennison, the commanding officer sent them back immediately 

to avoid infecting the other troops with their demoralized state. The British 

commander was replaced, but his replacement, who had just arrived, surveyed 

the mess, resigned on the spot and left Oman.163 It was a disaster.

Appearances can be deceiving. The situation had gone from peaceful to a 

full-blown crisis in a matter of weeks underscoring the volatility of Oman’s 

human terrain. On 16 July, the Sultan made a formal request for assistance 

to the British consul-general saying among other things:

You have full knowledge of the situation which has developed at 

Nizwa and I feel that the time has now come when I must request 

for the maximum military and air support which our friend HBM’s 

Government can give in these circumstances, as on those past occasions which have so cemented our friendship and which I bear lasting gratitude.164

The events of the summer of 1957 clearly demonstrated that the Sultan’s 

sovereignty and control of the Oman interior was an illusion. On 18 July, in 

London the British chiefs of staff ordered the commander of British Forces in 

the Arabian Peninsula to secure Buraimi and forestall another Saudi surprise 

like 1952. They then ordered the Royal Air Force (RAF) to launch rocket and 

machine-gun attacks on a couple of the occupied forts to gain breathing space 

for a further buildup of forces. By 1 August, fresh ground forces were arriving. During the buildup, Imam Ghalib sent a message to the Sultan stating 
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JSOU Report 11-5

that he had only restored the historical situation between the Imamate and 

the Sultanate and that both he and the British needed to keep their forces 

out of his territory. In the meantime, the Sultan had gained the support of 

several of the tribes, which added more than 1,000 irregulars to the Muscat 

Regiment’s planned advance through the Sama’il Gap in Hajjar Mountains, 

a key passage into the interior.165

The operational plan was straightforward. The Carter Force under Lieutenant Colonel Stewart Carter of the TOS (formerly the TOL) would advance 

from Fahud and take Nizwa. A second column, the Haugh Force commanded 

by Lieutenant Colonel Frank Haugh, was to move through the Hajjar Mountains at the Sama’il Gap into the interior. The entire operation was under the 

command of a regular British officer, Brigadier J.A.R. Robertson. On 5 August, 

the Carter force began pushing their way toward Nizwa. ‘Izz and Raddah fell 

almost without a shot being fired. Resistance at Firq was stiff but overcome 

with air support by attacking rebels in the open and destroying the Tanuf fort. 

During the operation, British units were used for the more difficult maneuvers 

like a night climb to high ground on Jabal Firq to outflank the rebels below. 

Then, TOS units were moved forward with air support to take positions. By 

12 August, the British and Sultan were once again in control of Nizwa. The 

fort at Birkat al-Mawz was the last to fall. The Sultan then ordered that all of 

the forts and towers in the area be destroyed, particularly those strong points 

belonging to Suleiman bin Himyar. On 15 August, Sayyid Ahmad bin Ibrahim, 

the Sultan’s Minister of the Interior, arrived in Nizwa and began the arrest 

of key rebels and the reorganization of local government and oil exploration 

parties moved back into the area.166

Jabal al-Akhdar

The restoration of Sultan Sa’id’s control had been relatively straightforward, 

but the insurgency was not over. The British and the Sultan had hoped to 

capture the leaders of the rebellion, but by 30 August it had become apparent 

that Imam Ghalib, Talib, Suleiman bin Himyar, and others had managed to 

escape to the Jabal al-Akhdar region. Jabal al-Akhdar (the Green Mountain) 

was a serious military challenge.167 It was a “sheer limestone massif between 

forty and fifty miles in length and twenty miles wide.” Honeycombed with 

caves, the mountain consisted of a plateau at 6,000 feet surrounded by peaks 

that reached 10,000 feet. The only approaches were through narrow mountain 

trails with steep, easily-defended sides, the perfect defensive position. 
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For the remainder of 1957, the Sultan’s forces and their British officers 

probed at the mountain. The lack of casualties among the Sultan’s forces 

indicated a real lack of enthusiasm for the task at hand but, in their defense, 

it was a daunting assignment.168 Blockading the mountain was totally ineffective. The rebels received supplies on a regular basis and mounted operations 

against the British and the Sultan’s forces. There was “non-stop road-mining” 

initially using small American and eventually graduating to large anti-tank 

mines. The weapons were smuggled via the Batinah Coast into the mountains. 

At one point, Sheikh Salih bin ‘Isa managed to smuggle an entire truckload 

of mortars, anti-aircraft machine guns, mines, radios, and ammunition to 

the top of the mountain.169

The current political situation was unacceptable. In December 1957, the 

British concluded that neither massive bombing nor the introduction of 

British troops was a viable approach. They decided that only a top-to-bottom 

reorganization of the military and civil administration of the Sultanate could 

prevent a reoccurrence of the unhappy events of past year. Lastly, London 

pressured the Sultan to come to an agreement with Suleiman bin Himyar 

and the Bani Riyam tribe allowing them to remain at Jabal al-Akhdar if 

they expelled both the Imam and his brother Talib. The problem was that 

the British did not really have control of their client, the Sultan. In a familiar 

counterinsurgency dilemma, the Sultan countered that a deal with Himyar 

was only possible if the pressure on the insurgents was such that they would 

acquiesce to terms acceptable to the government. The Sultan told the British 

Permanent Representative for the Persian Gulf (PRPG) that the pressure had 

not reached that point.170

With the two large Bani Riyam and Bani Hani tribes supporting the insurrection, other tribes in the region refused to commit decisively before they 

knew the winner. In early 1958, word arrived that a large force of Omanis and 

others, perhaps as many as 2,000, were training under Egyptian officers at 

Dammam in Saudi Arabia and that they were equipped with vehicles capable 

of crossing the Rub al-Khali. It now became imperative that the Sultan’s force 

be reorganized and made capable of dealing with the Jabal al-Akhdar situation before this new force could be brought into action. Following a visit in 

January 1958, Julian Amery, the Under-Secretary for War, reported that the 

Sultan’s forces could not drive the rebels from Jabal al-Akhdar, the blockade 

was ineffective, negotiations were not going anywhere, and the government’s 

authority was weakening.171
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JSOU Report 11-5

Still wanting a “painless solution,” the British resorted to long-range 

shelling, more persistent rocket and bombing attacks, and a propaganda 

campaign. Nothing worked. Interdiction became more difficult as the people 

in the countryside concluded that the rebels would ultimately win. The toll 

on British officers and non-British enlisted men continued to rise. In retaliation for mortar attacks, the British had authorized attacks on livestock and 

canals in an attempt to make the mountain uninhabitable.172 The British now 

believed that they were up against 100 Saudi-trained Omanis and about 600 

fighters from the Bani Riyam tribe. They believed that Saudis were handling 

the mortars and radios with Egyptian trained operators.173 Rather than getting 

weaker, the insurgent attacks were becoming bolder. On 3 August, a Foreign 

Office assessment showed alarm and growing frustration with the Sultan: 

“The Political Resident in Bahrain confirms recent reports that the situation 

in Oman is far worse than had been supposed and suggests some means of 

dealing with it....The political resident...urged on him [The Sultan] the 

need for some political action to supplement our and his military efforts. 

The Sultan tended to pooh-pooh the whole story. If he cannot even now be 

convinced of the existence of an emergency, there will be a major crisis in 

our relations with him.”174

As for the Sultanate, the British concluded a treaty of support in early 1958. 

Colonel Waterfield became the equivalent of the Sultan’s minister of defense 

and Colonel David Smiley became Commander, Sultan’s Armed Forces (CSAF). 

Smiley’s initial assessment was “gloomy.” The insurgents had more money to 

buy tribal support, heavy mines, and mortars, and reinforcements continued 

to arrive despite the blockade. In addition, most of the tribal leaders were 

sitting on the fence awaiting a decisive outcome. Negotiations failed and by 

November 1958, a British working group recommended that a total program 

of reconciliation, economic investment and training for the SAF be the core 

of a new program to retake the interior. The British position had hardened. 

Events around the region, including the Baghdad coup of July 1958, required 

the British to show resolve or risk losing their interests in the Gulf. Reluctantly, 

the British concluded that Jabal al-Akhdar had to be captured or that H.M.G 

had to completely reconsider its position in Oman.175

At this point, Special Air Service (SAS) units returning from Malaysia were diverted for a reconnaissance of the mountain. For the SAS, the 

Jabal al-Akhdar problem was a great opportunity to prove their continuing 

value. After discarding various plans, SAS concluded that they needed a new 
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Barrett: Oman

approach up the mountain. The four main routes, Wadi Halfayn, Wadi Tanuf, 

Wadi Kamah, and Wadi Bani Kharus, were well known and well guarded. A 

new route could not be scouted to the top because the rebels would learn of 

it and block it. Patrolling and air attacks kept the pressure on the rebels and 

the rebels’ attention focused on the known avenues of advance.176 Masked 

by diversionary attacks, on 26 January, the real assault began with a climb 

over a series of peaks to the “bridge” on the cliff and then to the high ground 

above the Imamate forces. Rebel units resisted then melted away. Other 

regular British troops and SAF units quickly joined the SAS. They located 

the abandoned cave that served as the Imam’s headquarters. On 30 January, 

Colonel Smiley traveled by helicopter to the mountain to inspect the captured 

equipment and stores, but none of the rebel leaders or hardcore combatants 

were captured. They apparently slipped down the Wadi Halfayn and bribed 

or intimidated local leaders who allowed them to escape.177 In the 10 weeks 

of operations in Oman, the SAS had three killed and four wounded. They 

claimed 52 insurgents killed. Most important, they ended the stalemate at 

Jabal al-Akhdar that threatened to undermine Sultan Sa’id and the British 

position in the region.178

Figure 4. Wadi Bani, Jabal al-Akhdar in the western Hajar Mountains of 

Oman. The extremely rugged terrain provided a last stronghold for the Imamate in the 1950s. Used by permission of Newscom. 
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JSOU Report 11-5

The events of 1957–1959 also assisted the Sultanate. Many of the devout 

ulema, who had supported the Imamate, were troubled by the compromises 

of Imam Ghalib with the absolute ideological enemies of Ibadi Islam. As the 

spiritual and temporal leader of his people, his prime duties were to guide 

the community rightly and defend it against its enemies. He was the imam 

al-muslimiin who could not recognize a higher authority or compromise with 

other beliefs and ideologies, and yet, Ghalib had appealed to the UN, portrayed 

interior Oman as an instrument of revolutionary nationalism, declared 

his faith in “Arab socialism,” and talked about “solidarity” with regimes 

as removed from Oman as Communist China. Imam Ghalib’s actions had 

undermined the institution.179 The rebels continued to receive support from 

radical Arab states and they continued their subversive activities including 

road mining and acts of sabotage after 1959. By 1960, the British had concluded 

that there was only a very low probability that the OLA or Oman Revolutionary Movement (ORM) could mount any campaign at all in Oman.180

Summary

Among the lessons learned from the British and Omani experience between 

1910 and 1960 is that of client dependency. During the 19th century, British 

intervention and insistence on control in Oman created a situation in which 

London in the 20th century simply could not extricate itself either politically 

or militarily, nor could the Sultanate develop its own indigenous capabilities. 

The British always sought the solution that required the least investment no 

matter the longer-term implications. The Treaty of Sib in 1920 turned out to 

be a bargain. It created a de facto, dual-state solution for Oman that was recognized both by the Sultan and the Imam for over three decades. However, 

when oil exploration and Saudi claims changed the equation, another period 

of instability ensued. In the 1950s, nothing had changed; the Sultanate could 

not survive without direct British support. Virtually any threat, no matter how 

small quickly became a threat to the survival of the Sultanate, a testament to 

the volatility of Omani society and the cleavages that had existed for millennia. Apparently quiescent revolts and opposition to Muscat simmered just 

below the surface awaiting a catalyst or an opportunity to reappear. Perhaps 

the most significant indicator of the fundamental weakness of the Sultanate 

was the experience of 1957. After what appeared to be a total victory in 1955, 

Talib bin ‘Ali returned, reclaiming the Imamate for his brother Ghalib and 

crushing the Sultanate’s armed forces in the process. At any of these junctures 
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Barrett: Oman

had the British not been present the Sultanate would have collapsed. Groups 

were always willing to revolt if the moment appeared right. The situation in 

1960 underscores this; even as traditional Ibadi Oman continued its simmering struggle, the third Oman—Dhofar—an area distinct from the other two 

would erupt in revolt. 

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Barrett: Oman

3. The Dhofar Insurgency

This chapter examines the Dhofar rebellion from three perspectives: Dhofar itself and Sultanate policies; Dhofar as a continuation in another 

form of the Buraimi issue and earlier Imamate struggles; and finally, the transition of the rebellion into a Cold War proxy-struggle. The Dhofar rebellion 

grew out of the fundamental political, social, and sectarian differences between 

Dhofar, the southwestern-most province in Oman, and the rest of Oman and 

the Sultanate. The Dhofaris tend to be Sunni as opposed to Ibadi and speak 

a local language that is closer to highland versions of the ancient Semitic 

languages spoken in Yemen than to Omani Arabic.181 The demographics of 

Dhofar are extremely complex but tribally, they can be loosely divided into 

two main groups, the al-Kathir tribes who occupy the plains and the al-Qara 

tribes who like their upland Yemeni cousins are fundamentally a warrior, 

mountain people.182 Culturally and historically, Dhofar and the Hadramut 

have had more in common with each other than either have with Sana’a or 

Muscat. In addition, Dhofar was a relatively late addition to the Sultanate; 

conquered by Said the Great in the early 19th century, it was only formally 

added to the Sultanate in 1876.183 Despite that fact that Sultan Sa’id bin Taimur 

designated Salalah on the Dhofari coast as his capital, he treated Dhofar as 

a personal fief. Administratively it was totally separate from Oman proper, 

and the Sultan ruled it capriciously through its traditional tribal leaders. This 

transformed Dhofar into a tinder box awaiting the spark. 

Rebuffed at Buraimi by the British and Jabal al-Akhdar, the Saudis looked 

for another opportunity to undermine the Sultan and the British. Crown 

Prince Feisal, as Minister of Foreign Affairs and later King, had taken the 

occupation of Buraimi personally.184 The Dhofar insurgency formed a bridge 

between the traditional dynastic and tribal rivalries to conflicts clothed in the 

ideological trappings of pan-Arab socialism, Nasserism, and the Cold War. 

Local and regional issues drove the conflict but, the insurgency was ultimately 

sustained by the support of radical Arab nationalist states and eventually the 

emergence of a Chinese and Soviet client state in southern Yemen. As long 

as states bordering Oman provided support for the insurgency, it could be 

suppressed but not defeated. The Imamate was a case in point. Defeated in 

1955 and 1958, Imamate attacks and diplomatic maneuvering continued for 

almost a decade because of Riyadh’s support and willingness to serve as a 

conduit for others like Egypt, Iraq, and even Kuwait to provide support. Once 
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JSOU Report 11-5

the conflict in Oman became a Cold War struggle between the Soviets and 

the Chinese, the traditional regimes withdrew their support and shifted it to 

the Sultanate, providing Muscat a less complicated regional situation and an 

improved chance of defeating it. 

Oman, Dhofar, and the Regional Political Context 1958–1967

Because of the British, Oman and the Aden Protectorate were two things on 

which Nasser and Feisal agreed. Saudi Arabia’s territorial ambitions vis-à-vis 

Buraimi and the Omani interior and its anti-British policies merged into a 

cooperative venture with those of Nasser, the secular Arab nationalist who 

wanted to expand Egypt’s influence in the Arabian Gulf. At this point another 

opportunity arose to undermine the Sultan and British. The Sultan’s policies 

in Dhofar created a crisis.185 After Jabal al-Akhdar, Sultan Sa’id retreated to his 

palace at Salalah. The Sultan had unified Oman but ironically like the Imams 

he had no intention of instituting reforms and modernizing the country. He 

wanted to keep Oman. This policy was particularly oppressive with regard 

to the policies in Dhofar, his personal fiefdom. 

The people of Dhofar, the [UN] Committee was told, were treated 

by the Sultan as slaves. He was cruel and imposed many arbitrary 

restrictions on the people. They could not travel outside; they were 

not permitted to build houses; food could only be bought in one 

walled market where the quantity that could be bought was fixed; 

and they were not allowed to import or export goods. Further, there 

was no work in Dhofar, no schools, no hospital, no economic life, no 

equality and no right to participate in politics.

The Sultan was “impermeable” to outside advice, taking the position “if 

Oman’s little rulers [tribal sheikhs who maintained order] were all right then 

so is Oman.”186 The Sultan was totally out of touch.

Dhofaris, who wanted to better themselves, left Dhofar for jobs in the 

Gulf and Saudi Arabia and joined the Trucial Omani Scouts (TOS). Those 

who left returned with new ideas around which opposition began to coalesce. 

There were six basic groups: The Arab Nationalist’ Movement (ANM), the 

Dhofar Benevolent Society (DBS), the Dhofar Soldiers’ Organization (DSO), 

the Hizb al-Zhaf (Party of the Advance), al-Kaff al Aswad (The Black Palm), 

and finally Musallim bin Nufal and the Bayt Kathir tribal grouping. Dhofaris 

became associated with the ANM while living in Cairo and Iraq or through 
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Barrett: Oman

their Ba’thist contacts in Kuwait. The DBS was a charitable organization that 

eventually morphed into a cover organization for ANM members in Kuwait. 

Disaffected Dhofari soldiers composed most of the DSO. The Hizb al-Zhaf 

was associated with Dhofaris in the TOS. The Black Palm was a khuddam

(Dhofaris of African decent) organization that melded into the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF). Musallim bin Nufal bin Sharfan al-Kathari was the driving 

force that unified the disparate opposition groups into the DLF.

187 Musallim, 

a jabili (tribal person from the mountains), had served in the small Dhofar 

Force (DF), the only pre-1960 defense force in Dhofar. After his dismissal, 

he was arrested several times for causing trouble. By early 1963, he had been 

involved in several attacks on oil exploration, military, and Sultanate personnel. Around 1964, on a trip to Saudi Arabia, he met Talib bin ‘Ali al-Hinai, the 

younger brother of Imam Ghalib and the leader of the 1957 to 1959 campaign 

that culminated at Jabal al-Akhdar. Talib bin ‘Ali provided Musallim with 

arms, ammunition, and perhaps some training for his Dhofari recruits. In 

1964, the Saudi al-Murrah tribe provided vehicles and support to cross the 

Rub al-Khali. Musallim opened an expanded campaign of mine laying, 

sniping, and even mortar attacks. Sultanate Armed Forces (SAF) units had 

no luck in locating him. Then more reports of Dhofari insurgents transiting 

the Rub al-Khali in Saudi-supplied Dodge Power Wagons was followed by 

more ominous news that Iranian naval units had intercepted a dhow loaded 

with 50 Dhofaris and weapons in route from their training facilities in Iraq 

to Oman.188 Eventually the Iranians turned the Dhofaris over to the British 

and the Sultan who questioned them further and, in June 1965, 40 jabilis and 

townspeople in Salalah were arrested. The threat was real—a replay of 1957?189

On 1 June 1965, at Hamarin in the Wadi al-Kabir in central Dhofar, the 

opposition groups met and created an 18-man executive committee to coordinate an armed struggle against the Sultanate. The Dhofar Liberation Front 

(DLF) issued a communiqué on 9 June.190 The “political manifesto” called for:

a. The poor classes, farmers, workers, soldiers and revolutionary intellectuals will form the backbone of the organization.

b. The imperialist presence will be destroyed in all its forms—military, 

economic, and political.

c. The hireline [sic] regime under its ruler, Said bin Taymour will be 

destroyed.191
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For credibility, the committee ordered three immediate strikes against the 

British and the Sultan targeting an oil company truck, an RAF vehicle, and 

a military camp at al-Raysut was attacked.192

In 1965, the SAF estimated that approximately 300 insurgents were operating in three groups. Muhammad bin Suhayl bin Sayrat al-‘Amri’s group 

operated around Mirbat and Taqah; Salim Amr bin Ghanim bin Shams Bayt 

Samhan were in the area around Wadi Jardum; and finally, Salim bin Bakhi 

bin Zaydan al-Bar’ami focused on the Wadi Nahiz. Dhofar Liberation Army 

(DLA) reinforcements continued to arrive. It was not clear that the Sultan 

grasped the seriousness of the situation, but the British officers did. They 

feared a Dhofar Force mutiny and a major propaganda victory for the rebels.193

During the early period, relations between their Arab sponsors constituted the biggest problem. By early 1966, Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser degree 

Kuwait, were rethinking their cooperation with Egypt and Iraq. Then, in late 

1966, Riyadh blocked the movement of 120 Dhofaris trained in Iraq through 

the Rub al-Khali. With the Yemen Civil War now at its height and Egyptian 

aircraft bombing Saudi border towns, King Feisal refused the DLF assistance as 

long as it received support from Nasser. Because of decreasing British control, 

far eastern Yemen had become the new focal point for transit and aid to the 

DLF.

194 The National Front (NF) in Yemen had become an Egyptian client. 

By early 1967, Saudi funding for the DLF had ceased and, in December the 

Peoples’ Republic of South Yemen (PRSY) emerged under the control of the 

Egyptian-backed NF.

195

Other realignments brewed as well. The British frustration with the 

Sultan was growing. Sultan Sa’id was outliving his usefulness. In January 

1966, writing to the PRPG William Luce, the British Consul in Muscat, Bill 

Carden stated: “The next five years will be a contest with the rebels and their 

friends trying to oust the Sultan and us before he can consolidate his position 

by expenditure of oil revenues.” In fact, it became a race between the rebels 

and the British to see who could oust the Sultan first.196 In 1966 a stalemate 

arose and the British, if not the Sultan Sa’id, realized that something decisive 

must be done or Dhofar would be lost with unpredictable results for the rest of 

Oman. In April, a DLF assassination attempt almost succeeded. At a military 

camp in Salalah, a staff sergeant and a soldier fired, missing the Sultan. The 

British immediately brought in an NFR company and regained control, but 

not before jabili and Bayt al-Kathir soldiers deserted taking their rifles with 

them. The subsequent investigation revealed that the DF had been thoroughly 
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penetrated by the rebels since 1962. The Sultan now recognized that security 

concerns about the DF were justified. Despite harassing attacks by the DLF

and a lack of men, equipment, and supplies for the SAF, the SAF made what 

appeared to be significant progress in 1967.197 This appearance of progress 

by the SAF and its British officers would shortly vanish in another round of 

regional political shifts that would invigorate the insurgency.

The Insurgency Begins in Ernest 1967–1970

In December 1967, the Yemeni National Front came to power as the British 

withdrew from Aden and the Protectorates. The border areas of southern 

Yemen had provided a haven for the rebels but British control subjected the 

area to raids and retaliation. With the NF, the DLF now had a safe-haven from 

which they could recruit, arm, and resupply. In addition, powerful transmitters of Radio Aden and the Sawt al-Arab in Cairo intensified the propaganda 

campaign: “Throw off the harness of British Imperialism. Take the wealth 

that is yours but is stolen by the Sultan.”198 More importantly, the PRSY and 

the DLF became Arabian proxies in the global struggle between the West and 

the Communist Bloc. They were the only game on the Arabian Peninsula for 

Beijing and Moscow receiving more attention and support than their size or 

potential probably warranted.

In September 1968, the DLF held its second Congress and adopted the 

language of the class struggle; they called for the pursuit of “scientific socialism” and “organized revolutionary violence.” It was an “attempt to escalate the 

local tribal revolt into an ideological movement with mass popular support 

throughout the Gulf.” The movement also needed a new more ambitious, 

politically correct name; it became the Popular Front for the Liberation of 

the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). Because of the unwieldy acronym, it 

became the Front or jabha.

199 The military wing became the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) following the Chinese model.200 The members of the old 

DLF including Musallim bin Nufal of the Dhofar Arab Youth Organization 

and Yousef al-Alawi of the Dhofar Charitable Association left. The new 

General Secretary was Muhammad Ahmed al-Ghassani. He headed a General 

Command Council with 25 members of which only three were previous 

members of the DLF command structure. Just as the National Liberation 

Front (NLF), the former Yemen NF, attempted to undermine tribal culture 

and politics in South Yemen, the PFLOAG sought to crush tribal influence 

by collectivization through “committees for agriculture” and “model farms.” 
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JSOU Report 11-5

Those who resisted these programs or the edicts of the “Committee for the 

Solution of Popular Problems” (tribal disputes) faced “economic sanctions” or 

were simply shot by “PFLOAG Commissars.” Military and economic support 

came from the PRSY, the Peoples’ Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 

China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union. Oman entered the Cold War.201

The PRSY had an immediate impact on the battlefield. The Sultanate’s 

relative control in 1967 quickly turned into a full-blown insurrection in 

1968. Complicating matters, the British announcement that they intended to 

withdraw from their military commitments “east of Suez” by 1971 brought 

consternation to the Arab Gulf emirates. Given Dhofar and continuing 

problems in the Jabal al-Akhdar region, the British withdrawal appeared to 

be a harbinger of disaster for the Sultanate. The Soviet Union and other radical groups reinvigorated their support for liberation movements in the Gulf 

expecting that the end of a British presence coupled with the emirates lacking 

capabilities for defense and basic government administration constituted a 

real opportunity to “liberate” the Gulf. 

As the firefights and ambushes increased in 1968, so did the evidence of 

significantly increased aid via the PRSY. In April in the western area near 

Wadi Sayq, two PRSY soldiers were captured. By May, firefights with insurgents increasingly involved men in khakis as opposed to tribal garb. In June, 

NFR units killed an insurgent in Wadi Janin who was carrying a Chinese 

version of a Kalashnikov replete with a Mao Zedong badge and another badge 

carrying the seal of the Dhofar Liberation Front in Arabic. SAF resupply had 

become a nightmare. Operations simply grounded to a halt because of the 

lack of logistical and transport capabilities. While the SAF struggled, tribal 

irregulars loyal to Sultan attempted to maintain security in the villages and 

to keep roads open with mixed success. Even the RAF base at Salalah came 

under mortar attack.202

Numbers varied but the SAF assessment placed the number of Maoist, 

“hardcore regulars” at 200–300 with another 1,000 irregulars. However, wellinformed independent sources put the number at 2,000 PFLOAG fighters in 

organized units and another 3,000 irregulars who could be called upon for 

operations. In 1970, Dhofar’s entire population was only 60,000—approximately half of that population lived in and around Salalah. Thus, in the area 

of operation, PFLOAG forces likely equaled 15–20 percent of the population. 

The Front headquarters in Hawf, PRSY divided Dhofar into four sectors 

(wahdah) containing two or three paramilitary units (firqah). Each unit had a 
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Barrett: Oman

commander, a deputy commander, and a political officer. The latter managed 

non-military issues and could remove a commander and order executions. 

The units were intentionally mixed and rotated to remove tribal allegiances 

and replace them with ideological ones. Hardcore units were equipped with 

mortars, machine guns, howitzers, and recoilless rifles. By 1970, the weapons 

were increasingly Chinese copies of Soviet weapons. The Front’s build up 

during the late 1960s outstripped that of the SAF forcing the Sultan’s military and its British officers into increasingly defensive postures. The Front 

outnumbered the SAF and was better armed.203

By 1969, Front units were able to harass SAF positions almost at will and, 

by focusing on transportation bottlenecks in the wadis and mountains, 

they severely hindered both troop movements and resupply. By July 1970, 

the government was on its heels. Salalah was a fortified armed camp and 

everything outside the wire was hostile territory. The Front controlled Jabal 

Dhofar and the border areas back 24 kilometers to Salalah itself. Lack of 

water and the problems in evacuating casualties turned most SAF operations 

into operational nightmares. Many of the population centers could only be 

reached by air because the Front controlled the roads, day or night. The new 

CSAF, Brigadier John Graham, cited the total lack of any political, economic, 

or intelligence plan to undermine the Front’s control in the countryside. 204

The Front was effectively in control of about two thirds of Dhofar and rebel 

activities were about to spread.205

In the North, the Popular Revolutionary Movement of Oman and the Arab 

Gulf, the Revolutionary Vanguard of the Students of Oman and the Arab 

Gulf, and the organization of Arab Soldiers of Oman (former TOS soldiers) 

merged into the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and 

the Arabian Gulf (NDFLOAG). This organization targeted northern Oman, 

Jabal al-Akhdar, and al-Sharqiyah region, none of which had been totally 

pacified. The new revolutionary government in Baghdad headed by the Iraqi 

Ba’ath Party supported it.206 This was an Iraqi attempt to assert its leadership in the Arab Gulf. Just as the government’s fortunes were reaching their 

nadir in Dhofar, the NDFLOAG launched an “urban campaign” in June 1970. 

Hoping to bring a quick government collapse, the NDFLOAG targeted Izki and 

Nizwa, former centers of resistance to the Sultan’s government. Due to poor 

planning, several of the NDFLOAG insurgents were captured including four 

members of the Central Committee. The NDFLOAG then resorted to desperate 

tactics including forced collectivization and the routine use of torture and 
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JSOU Report 11-5

execution. In turn, this resulted in a counter-revolutionary movement in the 

North largely driven by the tribes and resulting in a significant number of 

defections from the NDFLOAG.

207 Despite the failure, the offensive underscored 

the dire position in which the government now found itself facing multiple 

threats with insufficient resources. 

The attacks in the North were the last straw for both the British and for 

those in the government that believed Sultan Sa’id bin Taymur’s policies 

would prove the undoing of the Sultanate. Some members of the Al Bu Sa’id 

had been calling for the removal of the Sultan for some time. Sayyid Tariq 

bin Taymur Al-Sa’id had had contacts within the Peoples’ Organization for 

the Liberation of Oman (POLO) in Iraq and had formed an alliance with the 

Imam’s brother, Talib bin ‘Ali. Tariq clearly believed that only the removal of 

Sultan Sa’id and his own accession to the throne could save the Sultanate.208

Qaboos bin Sa’id, the Sultan’s only son, had concluded the same thing with 

regard to himself, “cooped up in his father’s palace like a medieval prisoner.”209

Fearing any outside influence, Sultan Sa’id placed Qaboos under virtual house 

arrest in Salalah after his return from abroad.210 The NDFLOAG operation in 

the North brought the issue of Sultan Sa’id to a head. 

In Muscat, all the key British officers knew about the plan to tell the local 

Salalah commander to support Qaboos. On 23 July, in Salalah, Qaboos and 

a group of armed askaris surrounded the palace and cut its communications. 

Some local sheikhs entered the palace to arrest Sultan Sa’id while Qaboos 

informed the local SAF commander who then drove 10 askaris to the palace. 

With an Arab Lieutenant in charge, the detachment cornered the Sultan in the 

palace. Fearing execution, the Sultan insisted on surrendering to Lieutenant 

Colonel Turnill. In the confusion, Sultan Sa’id had managed to shoot himself 

in the foot, literally and metaphorically. With the palace secure, Qaboos’ 

personal secretary arrived, presented Sa’id with a document of abdication, and 

the Sultan signed.211 The Sultan was treated for his wound and put on a RAF

plane to London. Those involved kept the news of the coup secret for three 

days in order to make certain that Sa’id was safely under wraps in London 

and to inform Sayyid Tariq bin Taymur that Qaboos was now Sultan.212

Qaboos’ Accession and a Reinvigorated Sultanate

On 25 July, a general announcement was made. Four days later, the new 

Sultan arrived in Muscat to participate in a formal accession ceremony. 

On 2 August, the exiled former Sultan’s brother, Sayyid Tariq bin Taymur, 
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Barrett: Oman

returned to Oman after eight years of exile. Qaboos immediately toured the 

country beginning with Nizwa, PDO facilities, al-Rustaq, al-Sib and various 

SAF sites. The new sultan did not receive all with open arms. Sheikh Ahmad 

bin Muhammad al-Harithi, the paramount sheikh (tamima) of the al-Hirth 

tribe and the single most powerful tribal figure in Oman, was detained and 

then sent to India for medical treatment. When he returned in April 1971, he 

was kept in isolation at Salalah as a political prisoner.213 At the time, Major 

General Tony Jeapes was an SAS lieutenant colonel teaching at the army staff 

college at Chamberley. He was very much involved in the British military’s 

counterinsurgency thinking and strategy formulation. He stated: 

It was quite evident that Qaboos had seized power in the nick of time, 

but the question was whether or not he would be allowed time for 

his plans to mature. Two things were clear: first, that the answer to 

the insurgency lay in civil development, and second, that the answer 

had to be found by the Omanis themselves. Vietnam had shown that 

there is no future for a foreign army of intervention in a national 

revolutionary war. None the less, the new Sultan needed all the friends 

that he had.214

The British were focused on maintaining the smallest military footprint possible and winning the war through the use of proxies. In a xenophobic land, 

less was more—a good point to remember. 

With the new Sultan, the counterinsurgency strategy shifted dramatically. “The adoo’s ideological strength had been founded on the grievances 

that the Dhofaris had endured under Qaboos’ father. Qaboos removed those 

grievances and this was not lost on the people of Dhofar.”215 Qaboos granted 

amnesty to many political prisoners and ended Dhofar’s isolation. The DF

was incorporated into the regular SAF and Dhofar’s status was elevated to a 

province. Next came a new military strategy. Over time, the military would 

establish a line from the sea to the Rub al-Khali to interdict the Front’s main 

supply route and strong points on the escarpment overlooking the PRSY

border. The SAF took Simba (Sarfayt) and fortified the position so that the 

Baluchi soldiers could defend it from any conceivable assault. It also became 

the hard point against which the Front would unsuccessfully expend much 

of their resources. The SAF also began a psychological operations campaign. 

Defections jumped from one in September 1970 to 100 in March 1971. Musallim bin Nufal al-Kathiri, the original rebel, argued that there was no longer 
54

JSOU Report 11-5

a justification for rebellion since the new Sultan was willing to provide more 

than Dhofaris had originally sought. The government’s propaganda campaign 

played heavily on Islamic themes and contrasted them with anti-religious 

tenets of the Front.216

The change at the palace prompted the British to make an offer of greater 

assistance and a new SAS plan calling for them to: (1) create an intelligence 

system; (2) encourage defectors and use them against the Front; (3) drill water 

wells and provide veterinary assistance to the jabilis; (4) provide medical 

assistance to the jabilis and towns; and (5) institute a psychological operations campaign. The new plan would incorporate all of these elements and the 

SAS would take responsibility for recruiting, training, and leading firqahs of 

former Front fighters against their former comrades. Although the Front was 

very active, the SAF was invigorated by the new Sultan in Muscat and a real 

strategy. Phase I had succeeded—the Front had not won. Phase II called for 

the preparation of solid offensive operations. Phase III was to take the fight 

onto the Jabal, and the last phase was to consolidate the ground gained by 

extending the control of the government to the reclaimed areas.217

Initially, the Front viewed Qaboos in the same light as his father; however, 

they soon began to realize that this was an entirely different breed of leader. 

First, the primary original motivation for revolt, the rule of Sultan Sa’id, had 

been removed, undermining the allegiance of many fighters. Second, the 

doctrinaire Marxist approach alienated even more. Then there was the simple 

fact that the morale, arms, and aggressiveness of the SAF meant they were 

much more likely to be killed or captured. The Front had made progress on 

the Jabal. Tribal feuding was significantly reduced; women actually played 

a role as fighters; there was more equality among groups and for the first 

time intermarriage between groups was not only allowed but encouraged; 

however, the insecurity created by the new policies of the government caused 

the more doctrinaire hardcore elements to overreact. Severe punishments and 

executions became more frequent. “In later years, the Front’s terrorist tactics 

against its own population were cited as a major factor in why it was unable to 

win the war at a time when nearly everything seemed to be in its favour.” The 

Front was also grappling with new problems. It had moved from small unit 

operations to almost conventional efforts with large units. The larger units 

drew much more attention from the Sultanate of Oman Air Force’s (SOAF) 

strike aircraft and created logistics issues.218
55

Barrett: Oman

At its third Congress held in Rakhyut in western Dhofar, the PFLOAG

issued a new 29-point plan that endorsed “other means of struggle in urban 

and rural areas” in addition to its previous stance that a “protracted, stubborn peoples’ struggle is the only way to liberate the Gulf.”219 In December 

1971, NDFLOAG merged into the PFLOAG.

220 The movement also shifted its 

objectives and changed its name to the Front for the Liberation of Oman 

and the Arabian Gulf, the challenging acronym was the same. Attempting 

to broaden its base, the new goal became a “national democratic revolution” 

as opposed to a “socialist revolution.” It called for an end to illiteracy, slavery, 

tribalism, and oppression of women. The party once again opened its ranks to 

non-Marxist members.221 Under Sultan Qaboos, the government had regained 

the political initiative. 

The SAF regained the military initiative as well. In October 1971, Operation Jaguar gained control of the eastern part of the Jabal from which future 

offensives would be launched. Perhaps most important, support had improved. 

There was more artillery, the training programs improved SAF capabilities, 

and helicopters were introduced. With helicopters, resupply on the mountain 

was simple and operations that were previously limited to a few days could 

go on for months. The SAF was no longer in fixed predictable positions but 

could move and strike at will.222 From the perspective of the insurgents, something had to be done to change the momentum; perhaps the most difficult 

task of all in insurgency or counterinsurgency operations is to entertain and 

to implement shifts in tactics and policies in anticipation of future changes 

when current tactics seem to be working. In effect, the PFLOAG with the upper 

hand in 1970 missed the significance of the change at the top and lacked a 

contingency plan for changed circumstances. 

The Front Attempts to Regain the Initiative—1972

1972 began with a series of aggressive SAF operations in both Dhofar and 

Oman proper. In Dhofar, Operation Leopard was intended to seal the border. 

Recognizing the threat, the Front and its PDRY allies made a series of diversionary attacks across central and eastern Dhofar in an attempt to draw 

troops and support away from Leopard. In the border areas, the PDRY initiated a troop build up particularly at Harbut, while SAF deployed in depth 

to prevent the Front from outflanking their border efforts through the Rub 

al-Khali. In an attempt to regain the initiative, the Front and PDRY went on 
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JSOU Report 11-5

the offensive launching a full-scale attack on the fort opposite Harbut. Reinforcements and SOAF airstrikes extricated the small garrison, but the fort 

had become a symbol of the Sultan’s authority. At this point, British advisors 

disagreed on strategy. The Front had utterly destroyed the fort using satchel 

charges. The Sultan’s Defense Secretary, Colonel Hugh Oldman, advised the 

Sultan to abandon it; he then departed on a trip to Pakistan. When asked his 

opinion, the Commander of the SAF, Brigadier Graham tactfully suggested 

that reoccupation of the fort and retaliation against the PDRY positions 

might be more productive. The Sultan ordered 48 hours of operations by the 

SOAF against PDRY and Front personnel on the other side of the border that 

destroyed supply warehouses and troop positions around Hawf the PFLOAG

headquarters. There was some fear of PDRY retaliation with Mig-17s but that 

never occurred. When the PDRY complained to the Arab League and the 

UN, the Sultan replied that he welcomed UN and Arab League observers on 

the border and would pay for them to actually witness what was going on. 

The offer was never acted upon resulting in a further loss of broader Arab 

support for the PDRY.

223

To get relief on the border in early 1972, the Front attempted to escalate 

the war in the North; it failed. In addition, Dhofar’s monsoonal season, 

rain, fog, and low clouds, no longer forced SAF to abandon the mountains. 

Helicopters made the difference. Now the Front lost its seasonal respite from 

SAF operations. SAF’s new year-round capability in the mountains brought a 

strategy crisis for the Front.224 The Front decided on another offensive operation modeled on the Tet Offensive that had so demoralized the Americans 

in Vietnam—a military disaster for the Viet Cong—it had turned into a 

political triumph for Hanoi. The Front plan planned an attack on Mirbat. The 

idea was to penetrate the town, execute local leaders, tribal sheikhs, and other 

government supporters, and then disappear. The Front would demonstrate 

to the population that the Sultanate could not protect them. 

At Mirbat, the Front faced a mix of Dhofar Gendarmerie (DG), Firqah 

Salahadin, and local tribal irregulars. The Firqah Salahadin was commanded 

by the former deputy commander of the Front’s eastern sector, Salim Mubarak, 

and was a hardcore unit of Front defectors.225 The Mirbat defense had a 22SAS

British Army Training Team of nine men, in total around 100 men, one piece 

of artillery (a WWII vintage 25-pounder) with an assortment of rifles and 

light machine guns. The rebels massed about 250 men armed with recoilless 

rifles, mortars, and heavy and light machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, 
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Barrett: Oman

and Kalashnikovs. Their plan was to overrun two small outlying positions 

and then launch a surprise attack on the Mirbat fort with two columns while 

two other columns attacked the town itself from different directions. The 

insurgents believed that surprise coupled with lack of air support due to low 

monsoonal clouds would provide the edge that they needed to overwhelm 

the defenders.226

Tony Jeapes in SAS Secret War muses about the “what ifs” that must have 

been in the mind of the Front commander as they waited in the early hours 

of 19 July to launch their attack. The decoy had worked and other SAF units in 

the area were chasing diversions. “With luck,” Mirbat would be an easy nut to 

crack.227 A sudden thunderstorm that made the wadis impassable and delayed 

the attack for several hours was a harbinger of things to come. There were two 

outposts on Jebel Ali, a hill that guarded the approach to Mirbat. Nine DG

officers manned them, four in one and five in the other. The Front’s guides 

overwhelmed the first position quickly but resistance from the second position 

alerted the defenders, who from the Mirbat fort held off the attackers with 

machine guns, mortars and, in a separate position, the vintage 25-pounder 

Figure 5. The Historic Fort at Mirbat is the site of the stand by Sultanate forces 

and the SAS that put the National Front insurgents on the defensive in the war 

in Dhofar. Used by permission of Newscom. 
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JSOU Report 11-5

firing over open sights. Other units repelled the assault group approaching 

the town along the beach. The last rebel column was ambushed by one of the 

local firqah commanders, Muhammad Sa’id al-Amri, who decoyed them 

into the open by waving a Kalashnikov over his head and then opened fire at 

close range driving them back. Having depended on the monsoon to provide 

protection from air attack, the British Strikemasters diving through the cloud 

cover at dangerously low-levels to attack their positions was a shock.228 There 

was more bad news for the attackers. A new SAS squadron had just arrived 

in Salalah and was preparing to test fire their weapons on the range prior to 

deployment on the border with the PDRY. The squadron was in battle dress, 

fully armed, and loaded with ammunition. SOAF helicopters went to the 

range, picked them up and flew them to Mirbat, adding two 10-man SAS teams 

to the defense force. Already reeling from the unexpectedly stiff defense, the 

Front assault columns were now caught between the “anvil” of SAS units and 

the “hammer” of the government firqah defenders. Smashed, the Front force 

now focused on just survival.229

Mirbat shattered the confidence of the Front’s young fighters. To restore 

discipline, Front commissars resorted to executions, which in turn led to 

fighting between insurgent groups and more defections. “Apart from boosting 

Sultanate morale and seriously depleting insurgent ranks, the defeat gave the 

front a crushing psychological blow. It was never again able to mount such a 

large-scale attack.” With the central region secure, it allowed more government and SAS resources to deploy in the mountains and western sector facing 

the PDRY.

230

Consolidation of Control and Foreign Assistance 1972–1975

The ability of the SAF to operate in mountains during the monsoon of 1972 

and Mirbat allowed for the consolidation of control. The Midway or Thumrayt 

roads were opened and SAF control on the jabal expanded. Reinforcements 

from Jordan, Iran, and Britain allowed the SAF to become more aggressive 

along the border including an unauthorized raid 80 miles inside the PDRY

border. Desperate, the Front once again attempted to shift the fight into the 

North. Solid security work led to the arrests of dozens of Front members in 

al-Rustaq, al-Batinah, and Nizwa. In addition, United Arab Emirate (UAE) 

security units arrested additional Front members on their side of the border 

and turned them over to the government in Muscat. Of 76 arrested, a dozen 

were executed and the remainder imprisoned.231
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Barrett: Oman

In late 1972, the new SAF commander, Major General Tim Creasey had 

significant advantages over the past. There were Iranian and Jordanian Special 

Forces and support units in the field with the SAF. In addition, the spike in 

oil prices following the 1973 oil embargo had provided Sultan Qaboos with 

financial resources heretofore unseen. Creasey streamlined the Ministry 

of Defense and supported the formation of a National Defense Council 

headed by Qaboos. The Council under Sultan Qaboos’ leadership continued 

to push for expanded military operations and the political effort to “isolate 

the insurgents” and “win the hearts and minds.” For the first time since the 

insurrection began, the SAF dominated the mountains for the entire 1973 

monsoon season. In addition, deployment of the Imperial Iranian Task Force 

opened Thumrayt road and allowed Civil Action Teams to expand government development projects.232

Despite government successes, hardcore Front units continued to be a 

threat with Aden taking a more direct role. Abd-al-Aziz al-Qadi, the secretary general, made all the major decisions from Aden. The PFLOAG’s fourth 

National Congress in January 1974 decided to target the western sectors and 

Sarfayt and requested more direct support from the PDRY. In addition to 

weapons and safe haven, the PDRY began to provide direct tactical support, 

medical care, security for staging areas, additional training, and even flew 

cross-border bombing missions periodically. By 1975, there were indications 

that the PDRY had as many as 500 of its own troops operating in western 

Dhofar and the Soviets, Iraq, Libya, and Palestinian organizations had 

supplanted the Chinese and Egyptians as the major Front supporters.233 To 

combat this, the Sultanate now had 500 British military personnel. The Jordanians provided a battalion of Jordanian Special Forces to support offensive 

operations and the Shah of Iran eventually introduced Iranian SOF units in 

1973, C-130 transports, interceptor aircraft, and antiaircraft units in late 1974. 

Operationally Iranian results were mixed, but the manpower and equipment 

freed SAF units for offensive operations. 

The Iranian presence also created a beneficial byproduct. The presence of 

Iranian/Persian Shi’a troops and air units in Oman alarmed Riyadh. Now, 

the Saudis also began to provide equipment and financial, and perhaps most 

importantly, diplomatic support to the Sultanate.234 Riyadh worked to induce 

Aden to stop supporting the rebels. The Iranian presence in Oman alarmed the 

Saudis as much or more than that of the leftists in South Yemen. From 1972 to 
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JSOU Report 11-5

1979, the Saudis tried to convince Sultan Qaboos to remove the Shah’s troops. 

The last Iranian soldiers did not leave Oman until after the 1979 revolution.235

By December 1974, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) 

could claim control only in the Shirshitti area of caves northeast of Rakhyut. 

The SAF now believed that it had the resources necessary to expel them from 

this base of operations and destroy their logistical structure in the area. The 

original plan had called for the Iranians to capture the caves, but resistance 

proved too strong. In January 1975, the two Iranian battalions managed to 

capture Rakhyut and effectively isolate the cave complex. The final push 

began in late October 1975. A helicopter assault placed Iranian SOF on the 

ridge above the caves, which were heavily bombarded by Iranian warships. In 

November 1975, the remaining Front commanders withdrew to the PDRY.

236

Although the western sector was clear of insurgents, small hit-and-run 

attacks continued in the central region with occasional artillery attacks along 

the border; nonetheless, the situation allowed Sultan Qaboos to declare the 

Dhofar rebellion suppressed.

In reality, the Sultan’s declaration did not end the conflict, but the PFLO

now faced a difficult situation. There were recriminations about their failure. 

The PDRY also came under considerable pressure. Saudi Arabia was offering 

inducements including aid and recognition in return for ending support to 

rebels in Oman and the Yemen Arab Republic. On 9 March 1976, the day 

that Saudi Arabia established relations with the PDRY, the Aden government 

ordered an end to cross border activities. Frustrations within the Front sparked 

internal disputes in which the PDRY army had to intervene. Small scale incidents continued in the interior and occasional border incidents continued for 

years, but the end of aggressive PDRY support for the Front effectively ended 

the Dhofar rebellion.237

Summary

The Dhofar rebellion was as much a political as a military victory. The fact 

remains that but for a series of political events, some totally fortuitous and 

unpredictable, the insurgency might have succeeded or at least forced a 

compromise solution that left the Sultanate, Oman, and Dhofar truncated. 

What were those political events? Foremost, the coup against Sultan Sa’id bin 

Taymur Al-Sa’id and the immediate availability of a first-rate replacement 

in the person of Sultan Qaboos was the absolute key to ultimate success. No 

amount of military effort could have legitimized or propped up Sultan Sa’id. 
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Barrett: Oman

If the political leadership is corrupt and unstable, the chances for success are 

virtually nil. Each for their own reasons, the British and Qaboos decided that 

if the Sultanate and the gains of the 1950s were to be preserved, then Sultan 

Sa’id had to go. After much delay, the British acted to support Qaboos and 

lance the political boil of leadership. That event alone split the Front between 

the traditionalists and the ideological radicals and reduced its effectiveness 

by an order of magnitude.

The second issue is that of an insurgent safe haven. Counterinsurgency has 

little chance of success as long as the rebels can operate with impunity from a 

safe haven. In the case of Oman, first the Saudis and then the PDRY provided 

a base of support and operations from which the rebellions could have continued indefinitely. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, radical Arab nationalism 

provided the Kingdom with a smokescreen and allies behind which they could 

pursue their frustrated territorial ambitions vis-à-vis the British and their 

clients in the region. The collapse of Saudi relations with Nasser’s Egypt in 

the late 1950s and then the Yemen civil war brought a growing awareness in 

Riyadh that radical secular movements no matter what their ideology were 

a threat to the Kingdom. Frustrated territorial issues with Buraimi and the 

Omani Imamate aside, King Feisal recognized that historical disputes and 

ambitions notwithstanding, the Sultanate was preferable to the potential 

existential threat of the radical regimes, and finally Iranian involvement in 

Oman sealed the issue. Strategically, hardly anything could be worse in Saudi 

Arabia’s view than a Gulf Arab state seeking security through a relationship 

with Iran and the presence of Iranian troops on the Peninsula. The Kingdom 

shifted from an adversary to significant supporter of the Sultanate. In the end, 

Saudi pressure deprived the Front of its safe haven. 

From a military point of view, the British always sought the minimalist 

approach. The British were obsessed with economically supporting the war 

effort. Contract officers were hired by the Sultan and the involvement of the 

regular British army peaked at around 500. London and the Sultan found 

proxies. The Jordanians supplied trainers and combat troops. The Iranians 

in 1975 and 1976 had between 5,000 to 8,000 troops on the ground plus a 

large Imperial Iranian Air Force contingent. The Sultan, the British and the 

United States encouraged the Shah’s view that Oman was the perfect opportunity for him to play his role as the “Policeman of the Persian Gulf.” The 

Front complained that they were defeated not by Omanis but by a Sultanate 

army composed of British, Baluchis, Pakistanis, and Indians and by large 
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JSOU Report 11-5

contingents of Iranians and Jordanians.238 There is some truth to that argument but it was the Sultan of Oman with his British advisors that engineered 

that situation and defeated the Front and its backers. In addition, the British 

presence was never large enough 

that they became the issue as has 

often been the case as other Western powers attempted to defeat 

insurgencies. Then of course, the 

Front also had impressive backers 

but did not succeed. 

Figure 6. A propaganda leaflet 

used by the Sultanate and the 

British to undermine the Communist Dhofar insurgents in 

the minds of Muslims. “God’s 

hand destroys communism,” 

British Library, London.

This raises the final issue. The communist and socialist ideology of the 

insurgents coupled with the tactics that they employed—executions and 

torture—to maintain loyalty and extract information left them vulnerable 

to the Sultanate’s pro-Islamic propaganda campaign. Unlike the struggle 

with the Imamate where the Sultanate often found itself at an ideological 

disadvantage, the Dhofar rebellion allowed the Muscat government to use 

the politically potent ideological weapon of Islam against its communist and 

socialist enemies. In effect, the government was riding the social and cultural 

mainstream of the region and the insurgents were the kafirs or infidels. Sultan 

Qaboos convincingly painted the Front as foreign and anti-Islamic using 

culture and ideology to undermine his opponents. It is difficult to conduct a 

successful counterinsurgency campaign from the wrong side of culture and 

ideology and the bigger the footprint, the more difficult the task of staying 

on the right side of both. 
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Barrett: Oman

4. Conclusion: Oman, Counterinsurgency, 

Legitimacy, and the Future

As opposed to focusing on the last 40 years, this study places the Sultanate of Oman within a deeper more complex context by examining the 

last two centuries, the period of Al Bu Sa’id rule and the unique identity 

provided by the Ibadi Islamic tradition. It is through that deeper more 

complex context that the implications of contemporary period, the last 50 

years or so, can be accurately assessed and projections for the future made. 

Developments—political, economic, social, and military/security—since 1980 

have been predicated on Sultan Qaboos and his close advisors understanding 

the role that unique features in Oman’s historical and cultural experience 

contributed to the insurgencies of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. The Omani 

policies of the last 40 years reflect a fundamental grasp of the political, social, 

economic, and cultural frictions that have comprised the Omani landscape 

since the 18th century. That appreciation for the deeper context, as much as 

anything else, explains how 250 years of conflict and instability have in the 

last four decades been ameliorated or suppressed—but in all likelihood not 

eliminated. 

This history of instability raises a series of important questions about 

change, development, and modernity. First, and perhaps foremost, is the 

question of whether or not the last 40 years fundamentally changed Oman. 

Do potential cultural and societal conflicts exist? What does the immediate 

political landscape look like in terms of the deeper historical context? To what 

degree have security and stability been associated with the person of the ruler 

as opposed to long-term political and social institutions? How concerned is 

the current ruler and the security establishment with stability and control 

issues? After 30 years of peace and stability in Oman, there is a tendency to 

forget what the previous 12 centuries looked like. In fact, many analysts probably have a sketchy knowledge of the past and would be hard put to explain 

the relationships between critical events even in the immediate past. A hazy 

understanding could be further complicated by a tendency to view political 

and global developments in superficial Western terms of progress. In the 

Middle East, fundamental change or progress and the external trappings of 

modernity are completely separate things. In the case of Oman, confusing the 
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two begs a misinterpretation of the present and potentially grossly inaccurate 

projections about the future.

If the discussion is limited to only the Al Bu Sa’id period, a unified Oman 

has only existed best case since 1920 and worst case since 1975. For the previous 

200 years or so the Sultanate often hung by a thread to the coast with only 

London or British India protecting its existence. The norm has been conflicted 

between competing centers of power in a fundamentally tribal culture where 

rule and influence depended on the ability and resources that a ruler could 

bring to bear to co-opt or intimidate different competing societal elements. 

This was true even within the ruling Sultan branch of the Al Bu Sa’id itself. 

Conflict and competition was rife from almost the beginning. With the 

exception of the brief rule of Imam Azzan bin Qays (1868–1871), no ruler had 

the potential to unify the country until Sultan Qaboos. This accomplishment 

would have been most problematic without oil wealth and significant outside 

support. In fact, the oil wealth was the driver that led to British support for 

the unification policies of Sultan Sa’id bin Taymur (1932–1970) in first place. 

Until it was apparent that the Imamate had oil, unification was simply not 

worth it. In the aftermath of the insurgencies of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, 

Sultan Qaboos used his limited oil wealth adroitly to push modernization and 

development and political peace and stability, but the fundamental structure 

of society did not change. Modernity overlaid a traditional society and culture. 

The underlying political, economic, social, and cultural differences are likely 

alive and well, and require constant monitoring as evidenced by the vigilance 

and quick reaction by security forces to any perceived threat. 

In practical terms, this historical experience suggests a set of conclusions 

about the Omani experience. First, the Sultan’s understanding of the instability of the past and difficulties of succession, under the best of circumstances, 

has generated a plan for avoiding the problems of the past. Second, the role 

of the economy and the increasing stresses that governments in the region 

now face particularly with the prospect of declining oil revenues, increasing 

population, and more rapidly increasing expectations are challenges that no 

one should underestimate. Finally, there are the lessons to be learned from 

the counterinsurgency experiences of 1950 to 1980—for reasons unique to 

Oman these lessons are less about military operations than they are about 

the role of regional politics and economics. 
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Stability, Succession, and the Centrifugal Forces

First and perhaps foremost, the Sultan Qaboos understands the role central 

authority, tribalism, succession problems, religious fundamentalism, and 

competing internal political centers played in the history of the Sultanate. His 

development programs and reforms of the last 40 years represent an attempt to 

neutralize the political, cultural, and ideological tendencies of the past twelve 

centuries. Sultan Qaboos’ rule is not about liberalization and democracy. In 

fact, authority is probably more centralized in Oman than in any other state 

in the Arabian Gulf and for very good reason. Institutionalized stability, unity, 

and continuity are three commodities that have been sorely lacking in the 

historical development of the Sultanate. In their assessment of Oman, Allen 

and Rigsbee argued that “Sultan Qaboos should be viewed as much more of 

a status quo ruler whose actions have derived much more from reaction to 

internal forces than to proactive progressivism on his part.”239 The fact that 

the Sultan retains absolute power and that the government functions within 

the parameters established by Qaboos supports this interpretation; however, 

when viewed from within the context of Oman’s historical experience, Sultan 

Qaboos’ efforts are consistent with those of a ruler focused on the strategic 

security of the state. Oman’s present simply cannot be divorced from its past 

where centrifugal forces proved to be the greatest long-term threats to the 

Sultanate. Even when external threats emerged, those threats found fertile 

ground in the political, religious, tribal, and cultural fissures in Omanis to 

their advantage. Sultan Qaboos’ rule reflects an acute awareness of this issue. 

The central issue has been securing institutional and political stability and 

continuity and an orderly succession.

Security issues dominated the first 10 years of Sultan Qaboos’ rule, but 

the development of political institutions was not entirely ignored. In 1981, 

the Sultan presented the creation of the Majlis al-Istishari li al-Dawla (state 

consultative council or SCC) as his “fulfillment of our promise and in pursuance of our policy which aims at allowing a larger measure of participation for 

the citizens in the economic and social plans.” The operation of the SCC was 

carefully circumscribed by a series of limitations and procedures related to 

its conduct. Ultimately the SCC won the right to review social and economic 

legislation before it went to the Sultan for approval. In 1991, Sultan Qaboos 

announced the formation of Majlis al-Shura (consultative council); this 

replaced the SCC. The Majlis was proportioned on the basis of population and 
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there was an expectation that it would eventually lead to direct elections.240 It 

has not. There is a high degree of tribal representation in the Majlis even in 

areas that are fundamentally urban. The tribes continue to play a critical role 

and are described as “an essential element to promote national unity and political legitimacy.”241 This carefully monitored and controlled process of expanded 

political participation is designed to vent political pressure without bowing 

to it. Real political liberalization could, and most likely would threaten the 

political stability of the state. Although economically driven, recent sustained 

demonstrations tend to lend weight to this judgment. The Sultan knows, and 

is well advised, to ignore those well-meaning friends who would promote 

naïve ideas about liberalization and democracy at the expense of stability. 

The new succession laws also clearly reflect a prudent awareness of this 

past. The new Basic Law passed in October 1996 came as a result of the Sultan 

being seriously injured in an automobile crash. Article Five states: “The system 

of government is a hereditary Sultanate in which succession passes to a male 

descendant of Sayyid Turki bin Sa’id bin Sultan.” The new Sultan also must 

Figure 7. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates is greeted by Omani Sultan 

Qaboos at the Bait Al Baraka Palace in Muscat, Oman, on 5 December 2010. 

DoD photo by Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison, U.S. Air Force. (Released)
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be an Ibadi Muslim. The article goes on to state that the Sultan must be an 

adult, born of legitimate Muslim parents and be of “sound mind.”242 The 

fact that the law limits succession to the Sultan branch of the Al Bu Sa’id is 

understandable; however, it contains the seeds of discord that have affected 

competing branches of the Al Bu Sa’id for generations and potentially opens 

the door for an Ibadi Islamic fundamentalist argument like those that legitimized the various opposition movements and plagued the Sultanate in the 

19th century and most of the 20th century. Depending on the next Sultan, the 

succession also has the potential to ignite opposition among Sunnis as well 

who are excluded from consideration. The Sultan is undoubtedly correct in 

his judgment that this approach offers the best chance for a smooth transition and stability; however, he is just as undoubtedly aware of the potential 

problems that may arise. 

The process of choosing a new Sultan outlined in Article Six further underscores the complexity of succession. Sultan Qaboos has no heirs; therefore, 

the Basic Law states that the Ruling Family Council (RFC) shall pick a new 

Sultan within three days. If the RFC cannot come to an agreement, then “the 

Defense Council will confirm the appointment of the person designated by 

the Sultan in his letter to the Ruling Family Council.” The Defense Council 

is composed of senior government and military officials appointed by Sultan 

Qaboos.243 In an interview, Sultan Qaboos explained that he had written 

down two names in descending order and placed them in two envelopes that 

for security reasons are held in different regions of the country. The Defense 

Council is to open the envelopes and make their decision.244 The assumption 

is that one of the two people on the Defense Council list will be chosen, but 

according to government officials, the RFC is not obligated to accept Sultan 

Qaboos’ nominee to replace him. If they believe that another individual is 

more suitable then they may select him and the Defense Council is constitutionally obligated to accept him.245 There is enormous speculation about who 

the Sultan has designated as his replacement. Even assuming that all goes as 

planned, it will be very difficult to fill Sultan Qaboos’ shoes. Internal rivalries 

and power struggles could emerge well after the actual succession takes place. 

Because the Sultan has granted the constitution, he can take it away. It is a 

“law-based state” and the Sultan is the ultimate authority—“inviolable.”246

The Sultan’s throne is a prize that ambitious individuals and factions might 

go to great lengths to possess.
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The ultimate guarantor of the stability and, for that matter of the succession 

itself, will be the military and security services. In many respects, the Omani 

military and security organizations continue to reflect the historical Omani 

reality. Important regiments in the SAF continue to be made up of Baluchis 

while the command structure and the Omani units, of necessity, favor the 

northern tribes “with long military ties to the sultanate.”247 The military itself 

retains its highly British flavor with British officers still serving under contract. 

The military is strongly tied to the Sultanate through the tribal elements and 

families that dominate the command structure. The security services also 

reflect similar tribal and family ties and are critical to the ongoing stability 

of the government. As we have seen, the history of the Sultanate is replete 

with examples of rebellions that came as total surprise to the government in 

Muscat. Buraimi, Jabal al-Akhdar, and Dhofar fall, to one degree or another, 

into this category. The security services under Qaboos have been pervasive 

and hypersensitive to the potential for an internal threat. During the last 20 

years, there have been periodic arrests of individuals believed to be plotting 

against the government, most notably in 1994, 2002, and 2005. Then there 

have been the recent demonstrations on the heels of the Arab Spring. This 

aggressive vigilance is another strong indication of the Sultan’s awareness that 

the underlying fissures in Omani society still exist and that if the unity of the 

state is to be maintained then the regime must take seriously any indication 

that active opposition could coalesce and grow. Actions against potential 

opposition groups while not officially publicized have been very public; a 

warning that opposition to the government will not be tolerated.248 In that 

regard, some Western officials who have represented the plan as “fool proof” 

should take into consideration the recent and the more distant past.249 The 

unity and cohesion that Sultan Qaboos’ rule has brought over the last 40 years 

tends to obscure the historical norm, namely centuries of internal conflict 

and division. Qaboos’ rule by virtually any parameter has been exceptional 

in every sense of the word and should not blind Oman’s allies to a far more 

complicated and unstable historical context. 

Oman and Economic Development

The economy is the second dominant consideration for continued stability 

and the most important elements were a small population and petroleum. At 

the time of the insurgencies, the Omani population was around 600,000 simplifying both the counterinsurgency task and economic development issues. 
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Post-1970, Omani oil production while modest by Gulf standards was sufficient to support a program of infrastructure development aimed not only at 

improving the lives of Omanis but also tying the country together and making 

governance and control less of a challenge. Roads, airports, and communication improved life in the countryside. It improved the internal cohesion and 

security of the state. Virtually all that has been accomplished since 1970 has 

been directly or indirectly funded by oil production. The promise of oil drove 

Sultan Sa’id bin Taymur and the British to move against the Imamate in 1955, 

and it was the revenue from that oil that allowed Sultan Qaboos to modernize 

and expand the SAF to combat the Dhofar insurgency. 

Now production is declining and a 2004 survey revised the estimates of 

Omani reserves downward by 40 percent. If new reserves are not discovered, 

Oman could exhaust its current reserves within 15 years. While there is talk 

of gas production and the discovery of new reserves, the fact remains that 

the drop in oil production has come at a time when there is an inverse rise in 

the population. Oil is directly connected to employment. By some estimates 

only about 10 percent of private sector jobs are held by Omanis; this could 

result in a demand for even greater funding outlays from a government that 

is increasingly strapped for cash. “It appears that the sultanate will face a 

serious economic crisis in the next 10 to 15 years, or even sooner if oil prices 

plummet.”250 It is entirely conceivable that this potential economic crisis could 

occur at about the same time as the succession is taking place. This could put 

an enormous amount of strain on the government in Muscat.

The Sultan and Omani officials are well aware of these issues and have 

plans to diversify the economy including linking themselves to the petroleum 

security needs of other Gulf states. There are plans for pipelines to provide 

the emirates of the Gulf with access to the Indian Ocean. New oil and gas 

exploration is underway. Nevertheless, the Al Bu Sa’id could become the 

focus of widespread discontent should the economy falter under the pressure 

of declining petroleum revenues. Unless projections change, succession and 

sharply reduced petroleum revenues might well intersect. Given the history 

of instability, it would appear that a sober assessment of a worst-case scenario 

that links Omani economic, succession, and security issues appears to be in 

order. In this regard there is an additional potential aggravation; Oman and 

Yemen, the bookends of southern Arabia, could be simultaneously looking 

at sharply reduced oil revenues. Yemen is unstable enough in its own right, 

and the potential that unrest could spill across the border into Oman and 
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that reduced financial security might make it difficult to counter deserves 

some consideration. Given the importance of Oman, it behooves the West to 

think in terms of what could happen as opposed to what they think or hope 

will happen over the next 15 years in Oman. 

Counterinsurgency and Oman

In terms of counterinsurgency, Dhofar and the Omani experience is less a 

model than a cautionary tale. By almost any standard, the Omani insurgencies 

were small. The populations affected were small allowing for a much easier 

application of military operations to defeat insurgent forces and “soft” power 

initiatives to deprive the insurgencies of the oxygen of indigenous support. 

In addition, the presence of non-Muslim troops was small. This allowed the 

counterinsurgency effort to stay on the right side of the ideological divide—the 

Sultanate could readily use Islam to discredit the late Imamate through its 

association with secularist Egypt and later the Front and its socialist and 

communist ideology. The presence of large numbers of foreign non-Muslim 

troops is always a counterinsurgency complication in the Middle East and 

Southwest Asia. Where populations are large and the presence of foreign troops 

invasive, the counterinsurgency forces themselves are an issue against which 

the indigenous population can be rallied. In addition, in a smaller war, one 

piece of operational luck can have a far greater impact than any amount of 

luck in a larger conflict. In Dhofar, Mirbat is a prime example. Taking nothing 

away from the heroic performance of its defenders, fortune smiled on them 

and the Front never really recovered from the defeat.

There is also the issue of insurgency in a chronically conflicted political, economic, social, and cultural environment. External opponents of the 

Sultanate found a heterogeneous society and culture that always seemed to 

provide a resource for the resiliency of the insurgencies. The 1955 move by 

the British and the Sultanate to eject the Saudis from Buraimi and to end the 

Imamate appeared to have unified the country. Then, in 1957, to everyone’s 

astonishment Talib bin ‘Ali’s arrival with Saudi and Egyptian support would 

have toppled or driven the Sultanate back to the coast had it not been for British intervention. The Jabal al-Akhdar campaign of 1958 and 1959 appeared 

to have ended the Saudi-Egyptian threat only to have plotting and insurgent 

activities continue into the early 1960s. When the Dhofar rebellion erupted, 

focus shifted to the South; nevertheless, when a diversion was needed, the 
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Front, the Egyptians, or the Iraqis could find enough followers to force the 

continued presence in the North of SAF units that were needed in Dhofar. 

Sultan Qaboos declared the Dhofar rebellion ended but problems with the 

Front and the PDRY persisted well into the 1980s.

There is a broader lesson to be learned here. In the tribal societies of the 

Middle East and Southwest Asia insurgencies arguably do not end—they 

mutate. Groups shift allegiances; ideology changes; outside supporters shift; 

but in virtually every case, underlying instability and armed resistance or the 

threat of it continues in one form or another. Conflict is a fundamental part of 

the political and social landscape of the region. There are simply not enough 

resources and opportunity to give all of the major groups an extended stake in 

society; therefore, conflicts erupt over what resources and opportunities exist. 

There is another important political lesson as well. Regional political shifts 

and initiatives deprived the insurgencies of critical outside support and safe 

havens. During the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, the successes of the 

Sultanate and British at Buraimi and at Jabal al-Akhdar in 1959 were insufficient to end the insurgency as long as Saudi Arabia supported it. Egypt and 

Iraq also played roles but Saudi support was the key. Initially, Riyadh also 

contributed to the Dhofar insurrection. The success of Front operations in 

Dhofar—and ultimately the very survival of the Front—was dependent on 

the safe haven provided by the PDRY. Even after Sultan Qaboos declared 

victory in 1975, the Front lingered on with PDRY support. The Saudis played 

a significant, if not key, role with the PDRY by trading recognition and aid in 

return for Aden ending support to the Omani insurgency. The shift in Saudi 

policies contributed significantly toward improving the security situation for 

Oman. In Dhofar, the Rub al-Khali no longer offered a route for supporting 

the insurgents; instead, the Sultanate and its allies could focus on a far more 

finite problem—the PDRY border. When the Kingdom convinced the PDRY

to withdraw support from the Front, the insurrection totally collapsed.

Saudi Arabia’s support ended for two reasons. First, strong Saudi antipathy to communism and concern over the danger posed by radical secular 

Arab nationalism caused King Feisal to realize that the Sultanate was by far 

the lesser of evils. Second, the Iranian military presence in Oman became a 

critical issue. During the 1970s, the primary focus of Riyadh’s policy toward 

the Omani Sultanate was to create a situation in which the Sultanate would 

feel secure enough to ask Iran to remove its troops and air force units. The 
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introduction of Iranian forces on the Arabian Peninsula was a pragmatic 

military necessity that contributed toward a decisive change in Saudi policy. 

This is particularly sobering when looking at the current insurgencies facing 

the U.S. Although in Oman the number of insurgents was relatively small and 

the counterinsurgency campaigns were militarily successful, the insurgencies 

were only eradicated when the external political environment changed and 

the rebels lost their safe havens. Without the changed political environment, 

the insurgencies could well have sputtered on almost indefinitely.

Finally, there is the role of ideology. From the beginning of Al Bu Sa’id rule 

in the mid-18th century, there was an ideological component to Sultanate and 

Imamate politics that divided the competing centers of power. Throughout 

most of the 250 years, the Imamate held the upper hand ideologically. This 

was particularly true in the aftermath of the Canning Award and the overthrow of Imam Azzan bin Qays. As discussed, Imam Qays was probably the 

only Al Bu Sa’id ruler judged to be worthy of both the titles of Sultan and 

Imam. The rebellion of 1913 and the near collapse of the Sultanate followed 

by the Treaty of Sib in 1920 constituted a de facto recognition of the social 

and cultural differences of the Sultanate and the Imamate. The rise of radical 

neo-Ibadi practice during those years merely served to confirm to its detractors the relative lack of ideological legitimacy associated with the Sultanate. 

In challenging Sultan Sa’id bin Taymur, the opposition always played the 

Islamic ideological trump card.

Initially this was true in Dhofar as well, and then the ideological paradigm 

shifted. In the beginning, the revolt had strong support among many religious 

conservatives of the principally Sunni region. Sultan Sa’id ruled as a northern 

Ibadi who was oppressing the Sunni Dhofari population. Two things changed 

this situation. First, the National Liberation Front founded the PRSY (later 

PDRY). They and their communist supporters began to drive the Omani 

Front’s policies. Issues like women’s rights and other socially unacceptable 

programs in conservative Dhofari society began to alienate the more conservative members of the Front causing many of the old-line Front members to 

abandon the organization. The Front’s increasing dependence on China and 

other communist and radical Arab countries pushed policy in Dhofar even 

further left creating an ideological divide between much of Dhofari tribal 

society. Then the Front compounded the problem by using draconian enforcement tactics that included the removal of children and executions for those 
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who refused to adhere to the new socialist dogma. These policies provided 

the Al Bu Sa’id with the Islamic ideological high ground. Whether or not 

they were “upright Ibadis,” the Sultans were obviously not as odious to the 

local population as the leftists and their supporters. Second, Sultan Qaboos’ 

succession placed a Sultan on the throne who had been born in Dhofar and 

whose mother was Dhofari. Qaboos shrewdly played his Dhofari heritage. 

Islam was a trump card in the propaganda campaign that placed the Front 

squarely on the defensive. In tribal societies in the Middle East and Southwest 

Asia, it is difficult if not impossible for anyone to win the propaganda war if 

they find themselves on the wrong side of that Islamic ideological trump card. 

As we ended the first decade of the 21st century, a decade marked by two 

wars in which—as the social, cultural and thus ideological outsiders—the 

West finds itself clearly losing the ideological war. No matter the intentions, 

opponents easily portray the Western powers as foreign intruders attempting 

to impose un-Islamic values on traditional societies. In fact, U.S. success in 

the Middle East during the Cold War was to a significant degree predicated on 

our support for conservative Islamic political groups against the communist 

or secularist non-believers. The insurgencies that are now underway are in 

countries with populations that number in the tens of millions as opposed to 

a few hundred thousand like that of Oman during its insurgency period. The 

insurgents also have the advantage of safe havens. As opposed to the British 

“less is more,” the United States, with its large commitment of military force, 

has taken ownership of the wars and become the focal point of resistance. 

Oman and the British also had the perfect alternative leader in the person 

of Sultan Qaboos. Facing similar issues, the U.S. and its Western allies lack 

that alternative. If Oman is the example of a successful counterinsurgency 

effort, then the comparison with the obstacles that the U.S. now faces is not 

encouraging. Perhaps a return to a smaller special operations war might have 

better results. In a situation where successful nation building or a conventional 

military victory is unlikely; a reversion to a special operations war might in 

fact prevent our adversaries from winning—perhaps the best result that can 

be achieved. 

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Endnotes 

1. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso Books, 2006), 160. 

Anderson’s work is a challenging look at modern nationalism and its effect on global 

communities. He views it as selling a myth unity to communities whose interests 

are fundamentally different—the creation of imagined communities and argues 

that the real surprising issue is not that adherents to these imagined communities 

are willing to kill for a myth but that millions have been willing to die for one. 

This book is a challenging work but a most interesting look at nationalism. It also 

provides some thoughts for practitioners of nation building. 

2. William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun.

3. Eleanor Gillespie, “Arab Revolt: Could Oman turn into the next Egypt?” British 

Broadcasting Corporation (2 March 201—http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/

world-middle-east-12616457).

4. Senior Arabian Gulf military officer knowledgeable about Gulf security affairs. 

When the question: “What happens after Qaboos was posed at the Sultan 

Qaboos Cultural Center and the Elliott School of International Affairs’ Middle 

East Policy Forum, Washington, D.C.: “Oman 2010: 40 Years—Building the 

Future,” a conference for the 40th anniversary of the accession of His Majesty 

Sultan Qaboos bin Said on September 30, 2010, the almost uniform response 

from panelists who would comment was: “That is the big question.”

5. Sir Arnold Wilson, The Persian Gulf: An Historical Sketch from the Earliest times 

to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century (London: George Allen &Unwin, Ltd., 

1954): 77.

6. Fuad I. Khuri, Imams and Emirs: State, Religion and Sects in Islam (London: Saqi 

Books, 1990): 57. Khuri pointed out that the “same could be said” of the relationship 

between the “political personality” of Yemen and the emergence of the Zaydis in 

the ninth century. Despite similarities, both arose out of opposition to the Sunni 

dominance, both emerged in southern Iraq, and both in theory had elected imams, 

they come from different traditions—Kharijite and Shi’a. The Ibadi absolutely 

rejected the belief that the Imamate was limited to the Alid line—descendants of 

the fourth Caliph Ali. There are other doctrinal differences as well. 

7. P.M. Holt, editor, Cambridge History of Islam, Volume 2B (Cambridge: The 

Cambridge University Press, 1970): 592.

8. John C. Wilkinson, The Imamate tradition of Oman (Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 2009): 1.

9. Ibid., 9.

10. Wendell Phillips, Oman: A History (London: William Morrow & Company, 1962): 

4-7. Phillips believes that something happened to challenge the dominance of 

the Persians in Oman during the first century but his skeptical of the details of 

the account provided by al-Kalibi. It is a skepticism that is well justified because 

al-Kalibi’s account contains literary forms that are almost standard to any early 

Islamic history. In this case, the most pronounced is the Persian use of war elephants 
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and the account that Malik’s sons personally killed the largest. In Isam al-Rawas’s 

Oman in Early Islamic History (London: Ithaca Press, 2000): 28-29, the author takes 

the story accepts the story of the migration as true but dates it in the 2nd century 

CE with the Sassanian Persians as the occupiers of Oman and Malik’s opponents. 

11. Phillips, 7. Southern Arabs viewed themselves as descendants of al-Qahtan or Hud. 

Al-Qahtan was a semi-mythical ancestor who was ethically purer than northern 

Arabs who descended from Ishmael through Adnan. In the 20th century, the 

distinction remained important and at times contributed to feuds and political 

disputes. There is a tendency to downplay these differences in both Yemen and 

Oman particularly by those against whom it has been used to undermine their 

political or social legitimacy. Even among those who have historically claimed 

descent from one of the lines, the claim is often inconsistent with other genealogical 

claims. Nevertheless, in southern Arabia, most notably Yemen and Oman, various groups have used this distinction to bolster their claims to legitimacy and to 

undermine their opponents. It reinforces the idea of an exceptionalist identity. See 

also Manfred W. Wenner, Modern Yemen 1918-1966 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 1967): 30 and the Encyclopedia Britannica Online.

12. Malcolm C. Peck, Historical Dictionary of the Gulf Arab States (Toronto: The 

Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2008), 215.

13. Phillips, 7.

14. Al-Rawas, 38. If indeed, al-Rawas is correct about ‘Amr Ibn al-‘As, the future 

conqueror of Egypt, then all likelihood his presence was more persuasive than the 

letter. While there is some dispute, it makes sense that the Prophet would have 

sent a competent senior commander. See also, Michael Isaac, A Historical Atlas of 

Oman (New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, Inc., 2004): 18, who also states 

that al-‘As was the messenger.

15. The Ridda Wars or wars of apostasy were fought in the immediate aftermath of 

the death of the Prophet in 632. Many tribes confused the pledge of allegiance to 

Islam with a personal pledge to Muhammad. They felt absolved of any obligation 

to maintain their loyalty after the Prophets death. Abu Bakr refused to compromise 

with the “apostates” and systematically subjugated them. Abu Bakr dispatched 

Hudhaifa bin Mihsan to quell the revolt in Oman.

16. Phillips, 9. While not on a par with Christianity and Judaism as people of the 

book, Zoroastrians were often tolerated as intermediate step between the people 

of the book and paganism.

17. Phillips, 9.

18. Al-Rawas, 111.

19. John Esposito, The Oxford History of Islam (London: The Oxford Press, 1999): 35. 

The Umayyad Caliphate (661-750) dated from the death of the last Rashiduun Caliph 

Ali. Centered in Damascus, its practices created significant opposition particularly 

in Mesopotamia and Persia. Later another Umayyad Caliphate emerged in Spain. 

It was overthrown in 750 and replaced by the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258). The 
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Sunni Abbasids ruled from Baghdad often under the control of various other 

political groupings including the Shi’a Buyid family, the Seljuk Turks and others.

20. Patricia Rizzo, Oman and Muscat: an early modern history (London: Croom Helm 

Limited, 1986): 5.

21. Ibadi is a term used by other Muslims to differentiate or label this group. As a rule, 

Ibadi Muslims reject the label arguing that they represent the true form of Islam 

and therefore should be referred to as simply the Muslims. This view is reflected 

in their designation of their imam as the “imam al-muslimiin” i.e. the Imam of the 

Muslims—the implication being obvious. The author is this paper is well aware 

of both this theological premise and cultural preference, but to provide clarity and 

simplify writing will refer to the sect as Ibadi, Ibadi Muslims, or Ibadi Islam.

22. Khuri, 107. In simplified form, the Ibadis are that verse Quran 4/100 which states, 

“He who emigrates in the cause of God in the earth finds many a refuge, wide 

and spacious. And he who parts off (yakhruj) from his home (emigrating) to God 

and His Messenger, and then dies, his reward becomes due surely to God. God is 

oft-forgiving and most merciful.” The Ibadis argue that by “parting off ... to God” 

they are by no means departing the Islamic umma but instead are merely “rebelling 

against tyranny.”

23. Richard F. Nyrop, Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States (Washington: Foreign 

Area Studies—The American University, 1977):342.

24. Al-Rawas, 76-77.

25. Al-Rawas, 64.

26. Wilkinson, 205.

27. Phillips, 11. The author explains the issue of tenure for an Imam with the example 

of the second Imam Sheikh Muhammad bin Abu Affan al Yamadi (793-795). 

Apparently Abu Affan was “arrogant, tactless and imprudent;” therefore, after two 

years, the tribal leaders met and elected a new more suitable imam, al-Warith Bin 

Kaab al-Kharusi 795-808). 

28. Wilkinson, 10.

29. Ibid., 11.

30. Ahmed H. Al-Maamiry, Omani-Portuguese History (New Delhi: Lancers Publishers, 1982): 1-3. Al-Maamiry states, “Possibly other Arabs such as Yemeni’s were 

also involved in this trade, and if we understand that Omanis came from Yemen, 

then they were the same Arabs whether referred to as Yemeni or Omani.”This is 

something of an oversimplification. See footnote 18.

31. In many respects, Oman and Yemen shared some interesting developmental similarities. There was the fundamental dichotomy between people of the shore and those 

of the mountains. On the shore of the Arabian Sea, there was constant interaction 

and rivalry between groups located in what is now Yemen and Oman. Despite the 

fact that the Yemeni Imamate was Shi’a and emerged roughly 200 years after that of 

the Ibadis in Oman, both shared some interesting attributes—namely the idea that 

the imam was to be chosen by the community based on the best available candidate 
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and not heredity or some other political criteria. Both were moderate forms of Islam 

and both Imamates were for the most part centered in the mountainous hinterland. 

As a result, both were afflicted by the frictions and mutual suspicions that tend to 

separate shore and mountain people. There were differences as well. In Yemen, 

agricultural production of the highlands could support a much larger population; 

thus the demographic center of gravity was in the upland areas of the country. In 

addition, the Yemen highlands were very much a part of the Hejaz community of 

commerce and intercourse. The ancient spice routes ran through the highlands 

and what is now Saudi Arabia into the Levant and Egypt. The case of Oman is 

significantly different. First, the highlands lacked the agricultural capabilities to 

support a population that was anything like that of upland Yemen. This meant 

that the demographic center of gravity was much nearer the coast. Second, with 

the exception of parts of Dhofar that were tied to the spice trade routes running 

through Yemen, the mountains of Oman served as a barrier disconnected from 

the rest of Arabia. When coupled with the Rub al-Khali (Empty Quarter) it served 

to further isolate Oman from the rest of Arabia.

32. Phillips, 24-27.

33. Al-Maamiry, Omani-Portuguese History, 5.

34. Nyrop, 342.

35. Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, (London: Cambridge University Press, 

1988): 669.

36. R.J. Gavin, Aden under British Rule (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1996): 11. In 

1280, the Rasulids took control of Dhofar and most of the ports along the Arabian 

Sea littoral.

37. Patricia Risso, Merchants and Faith: Muslim Commerce and Culture in the Indian 

Ocean (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995): 45-47.

38. Phillips, 31-34. Chroniclers from the period relate stories of atrocity after atrocity 

including the massacre of Africans Christians who had converted from Islam.

39. John Duke Anthony, Historical and Cultural Dictionary of the Sultanate of Oman 

and the Emirates of eastern Arabia (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1976): 81.

40. Phillips, 39.

41. Al-Maamiry, Oman-Portuguese History, 30-33.

42. Ibid. 100.

43. Phillips, 40.

44. Ibid., 46-47.

45. Ibid., 51.

46. Wilkinson, 12.

47. Ibid., 53. 

48. Phillips, 56, 60.

49. Anthony, Sultanate of Oman, 6.
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Barrett: Oman

50. Salil Ibn Razik, History of the Imams and Seyyids of ‘Omanfrom A.D. 661 to 1856, 

translated by George Percy Badger, FRGS (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1872): 

145-155. See also, Rizzo, 41. When Ahmad bin Sa’id made is final move against the 

Persian forces in Oman, Nadir Shah had withdrawn most of the troops including 

his commander Taqi Khan. Faced with a far more potent foe, the Ottomans, Nadir 

Shah needed his forces to confront the threat from the West. As a result, the Persians 

in Oman became more reliant on their local governors to maintain control and 

authority and Ahmad bin Sa’id took advantage of the situation.

51. Rizzo, 41.

52. Wilkinson, 13.

53. Rizzo, 44.

54. Phillips, 65.

55. Anthony, 6.

56. Rizzo, 53-65.

57. Ibid., 77.

58. Ibid., 96.

59. Ibid., 101.

60. Ibid., 107.

61. Wilkinson, 13.

62. “Minute from the Foreign Officer Department of Research to the Eastern Department, 24 December 1954,” Public Records Office (PRO), FO 371/114578.

63. Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (London: Cambridge University 

Press, 2002): 21-22.

64. “Minute, 24 December 1954,” PRO, FO 371/114578.

65. Rizzo, 55. 

66. Ibid., 75. See also Christopher Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and 

the World 1780-1830 (London: Longman, 1989): 55. Bayly discusses in detail the 

collapse of the decline if not collapse of the great Muslim empires, the Ottoman, the 

Safavid, and the Mughal and the impact that this had on the rise of British influence 

and the “peripheral” states of the region of which Oman should be counted as one. 

He also commented that after the demise of Nadir Shah in 1747 trade with Persia 

resumed but it was the Dutch who benefited the most.

67. Ibid., 78, 83-84.

68. Phillips, 70-72.

69. Rizzo, 31-33.

70. Wilkinson, 15-16.

71. Rizzo, 33.

72. Phillips, 86.

73. Wilkinson, 228.
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74. Phillips, 86, 88.

75. Wilkinson, 228.

76. Nyrop, 242.

77. Wilkinson, 228.

78. Ibid., 229.

79. Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: the Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1961): 43. Omani rule 

also turned Zanzibar into a lucrative entrepôt for Indian commerce. It represented 

a new market and Omani familiarity with the British Indian system allowed for an 

almost seamless transition of Indian merchants in the Zanzibar trade.

80. Ahmed Hamud al-Maamiry, Oman and East Africa (New Delhi: Lancers Books, 

1979): 63-68.

81. Wilkinson, 229.

82. J.B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968): 

538.

83. Ibid., 541.

84. Ibid., 546-551.

85. Ibid., 551, 553, 638, 648, 665.

86. Wilkinson, 13.

87. Ruzayq, “Editor’s Preface,” 3.

88. Wilkinson, 237-238.

89. Robert GeranLanden, Oman since 1856: Disruptive Modernization in a Traditional 

Arab Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967): 306.

90. Kelly, 710.

91. Helen Chapin Metz, editor, Persian Gulf States—Country Studies (Washington, 

D.C.: Federal Research Division Library of Congress, 1994): 298. There is a counterinterpretation of Azzan’s rule that is more sympathetic to the Sultan branch of the 

Al Bu Said and the British. The argument is that that the Qays branch of the Al Bu 

Said in the periodic alliances with Ibadi ulema managed in 1868 to place Azzan 

bin Qays al-Sa’id in a position where he became the “self-declared imam.” While 

Hinawi tribes supported him, the “public” (whoever that was) “neither elected him 

nor acclaimed him” as imam. The British viewed his attempt to centralize control 

over both the coast and interior as a threat to “their established order,” and they 

supported Turki bin Sa’id and the overthrow of Azzan. This version of events lacks 

the more comprehensive explanations of Kelly and Wilkinson who buttress their 

arguments about ignorance driving policy with tomes of research.

92. Briton Cooper Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf 1894-1914 (Berkeley: University 

of California Press, 1967): 18. Quote is from: “Report from Consult Mackirdy to 

Department of State, August 24, 1887, National Archives College Park, Maryland 

(NACPM), 59, T-638/1.
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Barrett: Oman

93. Metz, 298.

94. Busch, 20.

95. J.B. Kelly Arabia, the Gulf, & the West (London: George Weidenfield and Nicolson 

Limited, 1980): 110. According to Kelly, Sultan Faisal could not speak, read or write 

Arabic. He usually conversed in Gujarati. Judicially his rule was anything but sharia 

based. The strict Ibadis were incensed that he permitted alcohol and tobacco and 

allowed Jews, Christians, and Hindus to live in Muscat.

96. Busch, 56.

97. Ibid., 57.

98. H.J. Whigham, The Persian Problem: An Examination of the Rival Positions of Russia 

and Great Britain in Persia with Some Account of the Persian Gulf (London: Isbistor, 

1903): 21.

99. Busch, 271-303.

100. Metz, 299.

101. Phillips, 149. Faisal had a pet lion as confirmed by Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of 

India, and there were reports that he starved it and then used it to execute people. 

Members of the Sultan’s family denied that the lion was the palace executioner. It 

is difficult to say whether this was an attempt to protect Faisal’s reputation or that 

of the lion; nevertheless, the story illustrates the degree of British involvement 

because “the lion eventually dies and at a gentle suggestion from the British was 

not replaced.” Faisal was apparently not allowed to choose either his pets or his 

executioners. 

102. Khuri, 57.

103. J.E. Peterson, Oman in the Twentieth Century (London: Croom Helm, 1978): 30.

104. Wilkinson, 249.

105. Fred Scholz, Entwicklungstendenzen in Beduinentum der KleinenStaaten am 

Persischen/Arabischen Golf –Oman alsBeispiel (Vienna: Mitteilungen der OsterreichischenGeographischenGesellschaft, 118, 1, 1976): 89.

106. Wilkinson, 249, 251. Imam al-Khalili was the grandson of Sa’id bin Khalfan 

al-Khalili, the principal advisor to Sultan and Imam Azzan bin Qays, who had 

been murdered by Sultan Turki bin Sa’id in 1871. Despite a promise of safe passage 

and amnesty from Turki’s British backers, Turki buried al-Khalili alive. Also see 

“Report from Major L.B.H. Hayworth, 9 May 1917 and 24 July 1918, British Library 

Collection, India Office Files, L/P &S/10/427 1913/4684, Parts 3 and 4.

107. Francis Owtram, A Modern History of Oman: Formation of the State since 1920

(London: I.B. Tauris, 2004): 50. 

108. “Minute from Department of Research to the Eastern Department, 24 December 

1954,” PRO, FO 371/114578: 15-16.

109. Wilkinson, 251. Taken from “Report No. 2052 from Wingate,” British Library, IO 

L/P & S/10/427.

110. Owtram, 62-65.
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JSOU Report 11-5

111. Peterson, Oman in the Twentieth Century, 31. Peterson goes on to state, “In many 

ways, Sa’id was considered by the British as the brightest hope for the Sultanate 

since Sa’id bin Sultan. Yet it was to be with great relief that they eventually saw him 

deposed in 1970.”

112. Owtram, 79. 

113. Ibid. 77, 80.

114. Wilkinson, 287. As Wilkinson commented, “When an exasperated British negotiator 

exclaimed, ‘If the Saudi government always claimed as a Murra [al-Murrah] well 

the next well beyond the last well we had conceded, there would be no reason why 

they should not eventually claim Muscat town,’ he was stating not more than the 

reality.” 

115. Ibid., 289.

116. The coast of the present day UAE was dominated by the al-Qawasim tribal states 

of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah in the 18th century. The Qawasim earned a living 

from trade, pearling and piracy. The British referred to the coast as the “Pirate 

Coast.” In 1819, the British crushed the Qawasim and in 1853, forced the emirates 

of the southern Gulf to sign a “treaty of permanent truce” hence the name Trucial 

States. Between 1971 and 1972, the Trucial States became the UAE.

117. Ibid., 292.

118. “Brief on the Saudi Arabian Frontier Dispute for the United Kingdom Delegation 

to the United Nations, 18 April 1953,” PRO, FO371/104294, EA1081/518.

119. P.S. Allfree, Warlords of Oman (London: Robert Hale, 1967): 14-17. Allfree provided 

the following description of the potential opposition to the Saudi incursion: “The 

only forces at the disposal of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi were his own armed tribesmen; those at the fingertips of the British Government, which was supposed to 

be the Protector of the areas, were a small local military police force of some fifty 

men stationed in Sharjah under a British gentlemen commander; the representative of Oman had a handful of bellicose but ineffective ceremonial guards.” Allfree 

described the TOL as “gangs of discharged soldiers from Aden were dug out of 

the back streets and freighted up to Sharjah...there was more than a fair share of 

criminals...[and] they had not the slightest interest in whether Turki or the Sultan 

of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi lived or died, and they owed no allegiance whatever to 

the Political Agent. There was not a great deal ... of legitimate loot. They had one 

commodity which they could sell for good cash to their supposed enemies ... their 

ammunition.” Stories about the TOL in the early days of the Buraimi problem rarely 

surfaced because they did not generally fit with the heroic view offered later. See 

also, Peter Clayton, Two Alpha Lima (London: Janus Publishing Company, 1994): 

16. Clayton explains that the TOL was entirely a British creation formed for “the 

maintenance of peace and good order in the Trucial States and providing an escort 

for the British Political representatives.” Michael Mann in The Trucial Oman Scouts 

(London: Michael Russell, 1994): 19, states that the Trucial Omani Scouts, the later 

name for the TOL, tended to be bedu and were paid for and trained by the British 

and therefore at the beck and call.
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Barrett: Oman

120. Senior Arab military officer knowledgeable about tribal issues. He stated that the 

credit for healing the breach between the tribes and the Emirates following the 

British expulsion of the Saudis from Buraimi was due to intelligence of Sheikh Zaid 

bin Sultan al-Nahayan (1918-2004) of Abu Dhabi and the respect with which he 

was viewed by the interior tribes.

121. J.E. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies: The Sultanate’s Struggle for Supremacy (London: 

SAQI, 2007): 54-55.

122. “Brief, 18 April 1953,” PRO, FO371/104294, EA1081/518.

123. AvrahamSela, The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East (New York: 

Continuum International Publishing Group, 2002): 659.

124. Allfree, 15.

125. “Brief, 18 April 1953,” PRO, FO371/104294, EA1081/518.

126. “Brief, 18 April 1953,” PRO, FO371/104294, EA1081/518.

127. Ibid.

128. “Brief, 18 April 1953,” PRO, FO371/104294, EA1081/518. Apparently there was 

some disagreement in Riyadh among the Omanis. When the Omani group returned 

via Bahrain to Oman, Suleiman bin Himyar stayed behind for further talks. The 

returning group had two requests of the British in Bahrain: “(i) to arrange to have 

Suliman bin Hamyar [sic], who was in Riyadh at the time, poisoned on his way 

home. (ii) to recognize travel documents issued by the Imam who, they claimed, 

was independent.” No doubt the British in Bahrain would have liked to comply with 

the former and were troubled by the latter. The Saudis were obviously supporting 

the old claim of independence on the part of the Imamate vis-à-vis the sultanate. 

129. Ibid.

130. “Briefing Paper from the Eastern Department/Arabia: The Sultan of Muscat and 

the Interior of Oman, 1 May 1953,” PRO, FO371-104294, EA1081/519/G.

131. Allfree, 15.

132. “Minute to the FO from A.D.M. Rose (Muscat) on Conversation with Sultan Sa’id, 

9 March 1953,” PRO, FO371/104278, EA1081/206. The Sultan was also concerned 

with the defection of Suleiman bin Himyar who was in Riyadh and stated that he 

had ordered him to be killed as soon as possible.

133. Wilkinson, 295.

134. “Minute Discussing the Sultan’s attitude toward the HUQF Project, 26 January 

1954,” PRO, FO371/109829, EA1081/49. See also, “Telegram from FO to the British 

Residency Bahrain, No. 91, 27 January 1954,” PRO, FO371/109829.

135. “Dispatch on Meeting with Sultan Sa’id from Bahrain to FO (Eden), No. 14, 4 

February 1954,” PRO FO371/109829, 10815/51/54.

136. Wilkinson, 298.

137. Ibid., 304, 308.

138. Owtram, 91.
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JSOU Report 11-5

139. “Dispatch from the British Residency Bahrain to the FO/Eastern Department (Fry) 

on Saudi Activities, 26 October 1954,” PRO, FO371/114613, EA1081/603.

140. “Dispatch from the British Residency Bahrain to the FO on Oman and the Arab 

League, 1 April 1955,” PRO, FO371/114578, EA1015/S. The dispatch or letter was 

a suggestion that Sultan Sa’id offer his own views to the Arab League but the Sultan 

refused. In “Telegram from Bahrain to the FO on the Arab League Issue, No. 2, 18 

January 1955,” PRO FO371/114578, EA1015/8, the Sultan pointed out that he had 

made is position clear. First he did not recognize the Arab League and second any 

outcome in Cairo was be prejudiced from the start; therefore as he had said before 

he was not going to respond.

141. Wilkinson, 315.

142. Macmillan’s Diary, May 6, 1953, Macmillan Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford 

University. Also quoted in Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, 1945-1955 (New 

York:Harper & Row, Publishers, 1969): 502-503. On the eve of the Dulles trip, 

Harold Macmillan groused that in addition to Jefferson Caffery, the U.S. Ambassador in Cairo giving “aid and comfort” to the Egyptians, London would now 

have to contend with Dulles. “In Egypt, there is to be an interval [in the AngloEgyptian negotiations] for a fortnight. No doubt the Egyptians (who already 

rely on the American Ambassador Caffery)... are hoping to get something out 

of Dulles, who is due to arrive in a day or two. ... Dulles is sure to make a ‘gaffe’ 

if it is possible to do so.” It is interesting that Dulles first major trip through 

the Middle East and South Asia coincided with a “crisis” in Anglo-American 

relations. See also, “Who Likes Dulles—Who Doesn’t,” Newsweek (27 January 

1958): 28. The British disliked and distrusted Dulles intensely. They believed 

that he was responsible for excluding them from the ANZUS Treaty. They saw 

him as “too rigid” and detested his moralizing. Dulles and Churchill liked the 

limelight. Bridling at the competition, Churchill allegedly stated, “I am told 

that on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, Mr. Dulles makes a speech. And 

that on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, he holds a press conference. And 

that on Sundays he is a lay preacher. With such a regimen, there is bound to 

be a certain attenuation of thought.” 

143. “Telegram from Dulles in Baghdad to Eisenhower, May 17, 1953,” Dwight David 

Eisenhower Library (DDEL), Presidential Papers of DDE (PPDDE), Anne Whitman File (AWF), Dulles-Herter Series, Box 1: 1. An Interview with William C. 

Lakeland, Berkeley, California, 23-24 September 2003 sheds additional light on 

British frustration with the situation in Cairo. Much to the chagrin of the British, 

the American embassy in Cairo had already interposed itself as the “go-between” 

for Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. American Ambassador Jefferson Caffery used 

his relationship with British Ambassador Sir Roger Stevens and the relationships 

between Caffery’s political officer William Lakeland, Muhammad Heikal, and Nasser 

himself to gain a bird’s eye view of the negotiations. Lakeland became the intermediary carrying versions of the agreement back and forth between the Egyptians and 

the British. See also, Roby C. Barrett, The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: 

US Foreign Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy, 1958-1963 (London: IB Tauris, 
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Barrett: Oman

2007), where the Introduction contains a discussion of the Anglo-American rivalry 

and the difficulty that London had in adjusting to the new reality of global power.

144. “Telegram from FO to Berlin on Saudi Arabia Frontier Dispute, No. 179, 11 February 1954,” PRO, FO371/109829, EA1087/80.

145. “Telegram from FO to Berlin on Saudi Frontier Dispute, No. 180, 11 February 

1954,” PRO, FO371/109829, EA1087/80.

146. “Letter from British Residency Bahrain to FO on Muscat and Oman issues, 23 April 

1955,” PRO, FO371/114578, EA1013/1/101/55.

147. “Letter from the FO to the British Residency in Bahrain on Muscat and Oman 

issues, 11 May 1955,” PRO, FO371/114578, EA1015/21.

148. Majid Al-Khalili, Oman’s Foreign Policy: Foundation and Practice (Westport, 

Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2009): 24.

149. Ibid., 25.

150. Allfree, 21-25. Because of a mutiny and other mayhem caused by the TOL recruits 

from Aden, the decision was made to replace all the Adenis with local loyal tribal 

levies so that by the time of the action against the Saudis and their allies at Hamsa, 

the TOL consisted of local troops and British officers.

151. “Telegram from Bahrain to the FO on Buraimi situation at nightfall, No. 765, 26 

October 1955,” PRO, FO371/114623, EA1081/336.

152. “Telegram from Bahrain to the FO on Buraimi situation, No. 766, 27 October 1955,” 

PRO, FO371/114623, EA1081/336.

153. “Telegram from the Commonwealth Relations Office Prime Minister Eden’s speech, 

No. 270, 26 October 1955, PRO, FO371/114623.

154. “Telegram British Embassy Jidda to the FO Saudi position on Buraimi, No. 290, 28 

October 1955,” PRO FO371/114578, EA1081/357.

155. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 77. See also, Clayton, Two Alpha Lima, 178, in 

which he states that three Buraimi sheikhs were captured and deported by the 

British85—Sheikh Sagar bin Sultan, Sheikh Bin Hamad, and the son of Sheikh 

Abid bin Jammah.

156. Al-Khalili, 25-26.

157. The so-called calm in Oman during 1956 probably had as much to do with the Suez 

Crisis and the turmoil over the contrived Israeli, British, and French attack on Egypt 

as any other factor. In fact, there are indications that the extremely negative reaction 

of the United States and the Eisenhower administration to the tripartite attack on 

Egypt was due at least in part to Washington’s unhappiness over British actions 

at Buraimi against Saudi Arabia the year before. Eisenhower basically demanded 

a British, French and Israeli withdrawal from Suez and began to undermine the 

British and French currencies to obtain it.

158. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 78-80.

159. Peterson, Twentieth Century, 185.
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160. Youssef Choueiri, Arab Nationalism: A History –National and State in the Arab 

World (London: Blackwell Publishing, 2001): 204.

161. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 81.

162. Ibid., 82-83. 

163. Ibid., 84.

164. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 85. Al-Khalili in Oman’s Foreign Policy, 29, states 

that the British hesitated to provide support because of the tide of rising Arab 

nationalism, the debacle over Suez the year before, and Washington’s continuing 

displeasure, as related by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, with “the rather 

belligerent attitude of the British along the Arabian Sea, particularly in relation 

to Oman.” The British under the new government of Harold MacMillan certainly 

attempted to coordinate better with Washington but, in matters of the Gulf, both 

London and Washington agreed that was an area of British responsibility. During 

the period, 1956-1958, the British made it clear that they believed the debacle at 

Suez was the fault of Dulles who had once again misled them. The British reaction 

in Oman in 1957 was a foregone conclusion and the request for assistance from 

the Sultan was orchestrated by them in the sense that they told the Sultan that he 

had to make a formal request to get the assistance that he needed. The opening 

line of the Sultan’s request, “You have full knowledge of the situation,” points to 

the fact that the British officers in the OR and other Omani commands including 

the Chief of Staff had already made it clear that direct British intervention would 

be required to rectify the situation. Al-Khalili does an excellent job describing the 

frustrations and frictions between the U.S. and Britain from 1953 to 1958. 

165. Ibid., 85-86.

166. Ibid., 87-90. The surrender of Birkat al-Mawz caused a problem among the British. 

Apparently Major Dennison of the MAF and Peter Chubb of the TOS inadvertently 

entered the town ahead of Lieutenant Colonel Carter’s column. The town offered its 

surrender and they accepted. Carter was livid because he had arranged an elaborate 

filming of his entry and the surrender as a capstone to the campaign and Dennison 

and Chubb ruined it.

167. Ibid., 89.

168. Al-Khalili, 29.

169. Suzanne St. Albans, Duchess of St. Albans, Where Time Stood Still: A Portrait of 

Oman (London: Quartet Books: 1980): 91. Al-Khalili in Oman’s Foreign Policy, 

31, quoted Colonel Smiley reporting from Muscat on the use of U.S. mines: “The 

ideal answer, of course, would have been for us to stop the mines at source, in 

other words to persuade the Americans either to stop supplying them to the Saudi 

Army or to exercise some control over their use. ... the Americans were brutally 

unsympathetic. Their reply was that they supplied the mines to Saudi Arabia under 

their military Aid Program, and it was not their concern how the Saudis chose to 

employ them.” 

170. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies., 95.
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Barrett: Oman

171. Ibid., 96. See also reporting on the March Plan in “Telegram Situation Report 

from HQ/MEAF to the Ministry of Defense London, 24 March 1958,” PRO, PREM 

11/2402.

172. “Minute from the FO Eastern Department to Prime Minister Macmillan, 28 April 

1958,” PRO, PREM 11/2402.

173. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 100.

174. “Minute on Operation Dermot in Oman from Eastern Department, 11 August 

1958,” PRO, FO371/132524, BA1015/93.

175. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 110-112. See also Al-Khalili, Oman’s Foreign Policy, 

48-51. The author discusses another element that could be attributed to the hardening of British resolve namely the Omani enclave of Gwadar on the Pakistani coast. 

The Sultanate had held Gwadar since the late 18th century. Pakistani independence 

brought repeated requested for negotiations aimed at removing Sultanate control. 

At the height of Talib bin ‘Ali’s incursion and the Jabal al-Akhdar crisis with the 

Imamate, the British told Sultan Sa’id that if he did not sell Gwadar to Pakistan 

that in all likelihood Pakistan would just take it and the Sultan would get no 

compensation at all. London also informed Sa’id that in the event of a Pakistani 

move on Gwadar, he could expect no help from H.M.G. This incident underscored 

the increasing British frustration with Sa’id’s seeming inability to adjust to the new 

realities around him. In this case, the Sultan finally acquiesced and sold Gwadar to 

the Pakistani government. 110-113.

176. Ibid., 121, 126.

177. Ibid., 135. The British mounted a real effort to discover some Soviet weapons or 

munitions on the mountain top “as this might have a tremendous effect on public 

opinion in the United States.”

178. Ibid., 139. Most of the munitions and heavy weapons were of U.S. manufacture 

although there were a few Soviet mines. The U.S. weapons came to Oman via Saudi 

Arabia.

179. Kelly, Arabia, 118.

180. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 187. In The Making of the Modern Gulf States (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998), 130, Rosemary Said Zahlan stated, “The Sultan, desperate 

to maintain the new unity of Oman, appealed to Britain for further assistance. In 

so doing, he lost sight of his earlier objective to make Oman independent.” It is 

far more likely that Sultan Sa’id never lost sight of that goal however he put the 

survival of his regime first. Neither Sa’id nor Imam Ghalib were capable of creating anything that approached a modern functioning state both wanted a Sultanate 

or Imamate as the case may have been isolated from the rest of world and frozen 

in time. Neither vision had any real chance of surviving; only the Sultanate had 

any hope of bridging from a pre-modern tribal society and political construct to a 

paradigm that could survive in the late 20th century and has a chance of surviving 

in the 21st. 

181. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 185.
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182. Maamiry, Oman and East Africa, 114.

183. DilipHiro, TheEssential Middle East: A Comprehensive Guide (New York: Carroll 

& Graf Publishers, 2003): 389.

184. Al-Khalili, 55-56.

185. “Text of the broadcast propaganda from the Sawt al-Arab in Cairo on Oman, 26 

August 1958,” PRO, FO371/132524, BA1015/106, in which Mahmud Id, a member 

of the Association for Political Science, stated, “The period we live in is marked 

by a gigantic struggle against this imperialist tyranny [the British]. ... The period 

we live in is marked by the spread of the spirit of Arab nationalism in the area. 

There is a strong tendency moving the Arab people in the Gulf and South [Aden] 

to join up with their brethren in the other Arab countries. ... After imperialism 

has tried to incapacitate them by depriving them of their resources and draining 

their blood, but the free people have raised the siege, stepped out of the cordon 

of isolation imposed by the imperialists and come out to the head of the sacred 

march. ... Examples of these free rulers are the Imam of Oman ... [and] Sultan 

Ali Bin Abd al-Karim, the Sultan of Lahj.” The Sultan of Lahj was a tribal leader in 

what was then an area of the British Western Protectorate in South Yemen and is 

now the Lahj province of Yemen. In 1958, he defected with his British-armed tribal 

forces to the cause of Imam Ahmed in Yemen. It was a major embarrassment to 

the British. It should also be noted that Lahj is one of the centers for the southern 

separatist movement in Yemen today and also an area of operation for Al-Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This is a good case in point for the idea of a never 

ending insurgency.

186. Owtram, 121-122.

187. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 187.

188. Ibid., 188-193. The term jabili pronounced gabili in Yemen and Oman comes from 

the word jabal or mountain—literally meaning a person from the mountains. It 

can be used in a very pejorative way much like the term “hill billy” in English.

189. Maamiry, 115.

190. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 193.

191. Maamiry, 115.

192. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 193.

193. Ibid., 196.

194. Ibid., 197. The Saudi-Egyptian honeymoon had cooled in 1961 when the 

Syrians staged a coup and abruptly withdrew from the UAR, and turned to 

open hostility when Egyptian trained and supported Yemeni officers staged a 

coup in September 1962 and created the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). Given 

that the Saudis were furnishing the Yemeni Royalists with weapons and funds 

to kill Egyptian soldiers in Yemen and Sawt al-Arab was once again labeling 

the Kingdom a feudal state, Saudi-Egyptian cooperation on Oman had virtually 

ceased. With Nasser now a pariah, the Saudis turned to Iraq and its violently 

anti-Nasserist leader, Abd-al-Karim al-Qasim. This also problematic because 
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when Kuwait achieved its independence in 1961 Qasim claimed it as the 19th 

province of Iraq and threatened to invade. In 1963, a coup destroyed Qasim’s 

government and cost the Iraqi leader his life. He was replaced by Abd-al-Salaam 

al-Aref, an Iraqi nationalist, in a coalition with the Ba’athists. Aref had originally 

be jailed for being too pro-Nasserist. The upshot of all this external turmoil 

was that there was a singular lack of trust and coordination on the part of the 

DLF’s supporters that made the life in the DLF much more complicated. 

195. Barrett, Roby, Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm in Context, (Tampa: JSOU 

Press, 2011). In the 1970s, the government in South Yemen changed its name from 

the PRSY to the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Yemen, the PDRY.

196. “Report from Muscat (Carden) to British Residency Bahrain (Luce), 15 January 

1966,” PRO, FO371/185363. Quoted in Al-Khalili, 123.

197. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 202-203, 211.

198. Peter Thwaites, Muscat Command (London: Leo Cooper, 1995): 74.

199. Maamiry, Oman and East Africa, 116-117.

200. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 218.

201. Maamiry, Oman and East Africa, 116-117.

202. Ibid., 215-217.

203. Ibid., 218-225.

204. Ibid., 229.

205. Hiro, 389.

206. Maamiry, Oman and East Africa, 117-118. The Ba’th Party had partnered with 

Abd-al-Salaam al-Aref in his overthrow of the Qasim government in Baghdad in 

February 1963. One of the core groups supporting Qasim had been the Communist 

Party of Iraq (CPI) which the al-Aref ’s nationalist, Nasserist and Ba’thist supporters 

utterly destroyed. Thus, the name may have been the Arab Ba’th Socialist Party but 

they were anything but pro-communist, and the new Iraqi Ba’th hoped to exploit the 

British withdrawal from the Gulf without being subsumed in a broader movement 

dominated by the Chinese and Soviets and their clients. As a result, they supported 

this independent movement in the north that sought a repeat of 1957.

207. Ibid., 119.

208. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 233-234.

209. Ian Skeet, Muscat and Oman, the end of an era (London: Faber and Faber, 1974), 

201. 

210. Calvin Allen, Jr. and W. Lynn Rigsbee II, Oman under Qaboos: From Coup to 

Constitution, 1970-1996 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002): 28.

211. Ibid., 238-241. A search of the palace revealed large stocks of weapons and ammunition including tear gas grenades put aside for this very eventuality. Apparently 

the Sultan who was not in his private apartments could not get access to them.

212. Allen, Oman under Qaboos, 29. See also Ian Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan: 

A First Hand Account of the Dhofar Insurgency (London: Pen & Sword Military, ): 
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23 in which the author points out that Sultan Sa’id had displaced his own father in 

a coup and suggests that “it may have been a relief for the old man.”

213. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 243. Al-Hirthi’s code name was “Ashtray.”

214. Major General Tony Jeapes, BD, OBE, MC, SAS Secret War: Codename Operation 

Storm (London: Harper Collins Publisher, 1996): 30.

215. Ian Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan: A first-hand account of the Dhofar insurgency (Barnsley, England: Pen & Sword Military Books, Limited, 2006): 74. In most 

of the accounts written by SAS officers, the term “adoo” or “adu” is used to describe 

the insurgents or Front fighters.“Adoo” (adu) simply means an enemy in Arabic.

216. Ibid., 246.

217. Ibid., 229, 249.

218. Ibid., 253, 267.

219. Maamiry, 119.

220. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 267. The move to consolidate is most interesting 

because Peterson credits Ali Salim al-Bayd, the supervisor of the conference and a 

leader in the PRSY’s NLF, as the key driver behind the strategy. Ironically, al-Baid 

emerged as the leader of the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), the 

new name for the PRSY, when it eventually unified with the Yemen Arab Republic in 1990 to from the new unified Republic of Yemen. He then led a revolt and 

separatist movement against the Yemeni government dominated by northerners. 

He lost and had to flee to Oman where for a period of time he was given asylum. 

So eventually he returned to Oman but not in the role that he had envisioned in 

1971.

221. Hiro, 390.

222. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 278-280.

223. Ibid., 288-294.

224. Ibid., 296.

225. Peter Radcliffe, Eye of the Storm: Twenty-Five Years in Action with the SAS (London: 

Michael O’Mara Books Limited, 2000): 81.

226. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 298.

227. Jeapes, SAS Secret War, 145.

228. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 300.

229. Jeapes, SAS Secret War, 156.

230. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 301-302.

231. Ibid., 308.

232. Ibid., 319.

233. Ibid., 325.

234. Ibid., 333. 
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235. F. Gregory Gause III, Saudi-Yemen Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence (New York: Columbia Press, 1990): 128. Gause stated that Iranian troops in 

Oman ignited Saudi paranoia on multiple fronts -- ideological, ethnic, sectarian, 

and regional geopolitics. In the context of the times, Pahlavi Iran was a focus of 

suspicion and competition.

236. Ibid., 356-357, 380-381.

237. Ibid., 391. 

238. The Revolution is Alive in Oman: The Liberation Struggle in Oman (Denmark: 

KROAG, 1979): 46-52. 

239. Allen, Oman under Qaboos, 63.

240. Allen, Oman under Qaboos, 48-56.

241. R. HrairDekmejian, “Forging Institutions in the Gulf Arab States,” Iran, Iraq and the 

Gulf Arab States, edited by Joseph A Kechichian (New York: Palgrave Publishers, 

2001): 308. 

242. Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id Al Sa’id, Basic Law 1996, Article 5.

243. Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id Al Sa’id, Basic Law 1996, Article 6.

244. Judith Miller, “Creating Modern Oman,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 1997): 17.

245. Allen, Oman under Qaboos, 220.

246. Ibid., 225-226.

247. Ibid., 217.

248. Ibid., 61.

249. A western military officer knowledgeable about Omani affairs.

250. Mark N. Katz, “Assessing the Political Stability of Oman,” Middle East Review of 

International Affairs, 8, No. 3 (September 2004): 3.