[Cite as In re J.N., 2022-Ohio-4373.]

COURT OF APPEALS

LICKING COUNTY, OHIO

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

IN THE MATTER OF: J.N.

JUDGES:

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.

: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.

: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.

:

:

: Case No. 2022 CA 00033

:

:

: OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Licking County Court of 

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case 

No. F2018-0424

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: December 6, 2022

APPEARANCES:

For - Appellee For - Appellant

WILLIAM C. HAYES ROBIN LYN GREEN

Licking County Prosecutor Box 157

J. BRANDON PIGG Newark, OH 43058

Assistant Prosecutor

20 South Second Street, 4th Floor

Newark, OH 43055
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 2

Gwin, P.J.

{¶1} Mother S.N. appeals the May 9, 2022 Judgment Entry entered by the 

Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which overruled her objections 

to the magistrate’s February 2, 2021 decision, and approved and adopted said decision

granting permanent custody of the minor child J.N.1to the appellee Licking County Jobs 

and Family services [ “LCJFS”] as the order of the court.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} Mother is the biological mother of J.N. (b. Jan 23, 2014). 1T. at 14.

2 She

has three other children. Id. The case was commenced by the filing of a complaint by 

LCJFS alleging dependency on June 27, 2018. On August 29, 2018, the juvenile court 

found J.N. to be a dependent child and placed the child into the temporary custody of

LCJFS. [Docket Entry No. 31]. The allegations of the complaint concerned Mother’s

substance abuse, domestic violence, financial and housing instability, and mental health 

concerns. A case plan was developed which called for substance abuse treatment, drug 

and alcohol testing, maintaining a stable home and employment, mental health 

counseling, and visitation. 1T. at 66; State’s Exhibit A. Referrals were made by the 

agency to facilitate achievement of case plan objectives. The objectives identified for 

Mother to address the concerns included, completing a drug and alcohol assessment and 

mental health assessment, as well as following all recommendations; submitting to 

random drug screens; addressing concerns of anger and domestic violence; and 

1 See, OH ST Supp. R. 44(H) and 45(D) concerning the use of personal identifiers.

2 For clarity, the permanent custody hearing transcript will be referred to as, “__T.__,” signifying the 

volume and the page number.
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 3

obtaining safe and stable housing and income sufficient to meet the needs of the child. 

1T. at 68.

{¶3} Semi-annual review hearings were conducted by the court. On May 21, 

2019, LCJFS filed a motion to extend temporary custody. [Docket Entry No. 44]. By 

Judgment Entry filed July 29, 2019, the juvenile court granted the request. [Docket Entry 

No. 40].

{¶4} On November 26, 2019, LCJFS filed a motion for permanent custody. The 

magistrate conducted a hearing on LCJFS’s motion for permanent custody on January 8, 

2021, and January 27, 2012.

Permanent Custody Hearing

Mother’s history of substance abuse

{¶5} Mother testified that she is "definitely an addict 100 percent". 1T. at 9. 

Mother testified to a lengthy history of abuse with alcohol, methamphetamine, heroin, 

marijuana, and unspecified painkillers prescribed for a broken back. 1T. at 9-11, 156; 

160-161. Mother testified that she had been prescribed Suboxone for eleven years at the 

time of her testimony. Id. Mother hadbeen seeingadoctorby thename of Dr. Masone until

approximately August of 2017. 1T. at 159. She originally received her Suboxone 

prescription through Dr. Masone. 1T. at 160. Her present physician and substance abuse 

counselor, Dr. Milroy Samuel of Complete HealthCare for Women has continued the 

prescription for Suboxone. Dr. Samuel testified that Mother tested positive for marijuana 

and amphetamine on January 7, 2021, the day before the permanent custody hearing. 

1T. at 38.
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 4

{¶6} Mother testified that she has used heroin several years ago and has more 

recently used methamphetamine, with her last use being sometime in August 2020. 1T. 

at 10-11. She also acknowledged that, if tested, she believes she would be positive for 

marijuana. 1T. at 10. Mother testified, she has "fallen off the wagon a lot," and, for the 

last two years since the kids had been taken, fell off "hard core." 1T. at 11.

{¶7} Mother testified that she also attends AA meetings. 1T. at 15. Due to 

COVID-19 the meetings are on-line and called “In This Room.” 1T. at 164-165. Mother

only attended these a few times. 1T. at 165. She has not received any other substance 

abuse treatment. 1T. at 16.

{¶8} Bridget Lorenz-Lemberg, the lab director and toxicologist for Forensic 

Fluids Laboratories, identified State's Exhibits E 1-3 as lab results for drug screens. 1T. 

at 48, 54. A drug screen from February 24, 2020, was collected by the ongoing 

caseworker Amy Cline. 1T. at 54-55. This screen was negative for illegal drugs, but was 

positive for alcohol. Id. at 55. Another drug screen was collected on November 19, 2019. 

Id. at 55-56. Mother was positive for methamphetamine, marijuana, and buprenorphine 

on this date. Id. at 56. The third drug screen was collected on August 6, 2020. 1T. at 

57. Mother was positive for methamphetamine and alcohol on this date. Id. at 57-58. 

Drug screens were also collected on December 6, 2019; September 6, 2019; and July

17, 2019, and all of those were negative for drugs. 1T. at 61-62. Andrew Elsworth, 

Mother’s boyfriend, had a drug screen on August 6, 2020. 1T. at 58. Elsworth was 

positive for methamphetamine and alcohol on this screen. Id. at 59.

{¶9} In order to address Mother’s substance abuse problems, LCJFS provided 

Mother with information on the Licking County Alcohol Abuse Program [“LAPP”]. 1T. at 
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 5

77; 79. Mother did attempt to go to LAPP, but was discharged unsuccessfully in 

December 2018. 1T. at 77-78. 

Mother’s housing

{¶10} Mother resides with her grandmother, adult daughter, and sometimes

boyfriend/ accountability partner Andrew Ellsworth. 1T. at 149; 175-176. Mother and

Mr. Ellsworth have an on-again, off-again relationship, and they at times fight after

drinking together. Mother lives in a basement apartment of the home. 1T. at 151. Mother 

does chores in lieu of paying cash rent. 1T. at 21; 155-156. She described the house as 

having four bedrooms upstairs, and indicated that the basement is a finished apartment 

with a kitchen, living room, bedrooms, and bathrooms. 1T. at 150.

{¶11} In November of 2020, Mother was found guilty of domestic violence 

stemming from an event with her adult daughter. 1T. at 19. Due to these concerns, the 

Agency has made referrals for Mother to obtain independent housing.

Mother’s criminal history

{¶12} Mother admitted that she received a prison sentence as a result of her 

conviction for aggravated menacing in 2008. 1T. at 20-21. Mother admitted to prior 

convictions for domestic violence, criminal damaging, and drug paraphernalia in 2011; 

disorderly conduct in 2010; and violating a protection order and telecommunications

harassment in 2008. 1T. at 20. In November of 2020, Mother was found guilty of 

domestic violence stemming from an event with her adult daughter. 1T. at 19. 

{¶13} J.N. was born while Mother was incarcerated. 1T. at 177. J.N. was taken 

in by the maternal grandmother while Mother was still in prison. 1T. at 178. 
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 6

Mother’s employment history

{¶14} Mother did obtain employment for over six months with S&J Painting, but 

has been inconsistent since then. 1T. at 22-23. Mother did report working for Taco Bell 

on call in June of 2020, but has reported being unemployed since December 2020. 1T. 

at 24; 76; 156-157. Mother admitted that she is currently unemployed. 1T. at 23-24; 156.

Mother’s visitation

{¶15} Mother does have supervised visits at the agency with J.N. 1T. at 80. Over 

the last two years, Mother has missed six visits and has canceled a few more. Id. at 86. 

Overall, visitation between Mother and J.N. go well. 1T. at 92. However, in a visit in 

February 2020, the ongoing caseworker was called to a visit and spoke to Mother. 1T. at 

81. The caseworker testified that Mother was obviously intoxicated - she had glassy eyes 

and was slurring her words. 1T. at 81-82. When questioned outside the presence of the 

children, Mother admitted that she had been drinking prior to the visit and was drunk. Id. 

at 83. Mother was allowed to re-enter the visit but had to be removed a short time later 

when she started yelling and screaming. Id.

Relative placement

{¶16} S.F., Mother's step-father, testified he was married to the maternal 

grandmother for 28 years and considers Mother to be a daughter. Id. at 5-6. He has had 

custody of one of Mother's other daughters, for approximately five to six years. This 

occurred while Mother was incarcerated. That child is now 11 years old. 2T. at 8. 

{¶17} S.F. testified that he works at High Tech Material Handling, where he travels 

throughout the state and repairs forklifts. 2T. at 10. He testified that he had contacted 

the agency about custody of J.N. Id. at 11-12. He believes J.N. knows him, as she lived 
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 7

with them for approximately three years. Id. at 15. He did visit J.N. two or three times at 

the agency in 2018. Id. He further testified that Mother just recently made him aware 

there was a guardian ad litem [“GAL”] assigned to the case, but never provided him with 

the name or phone number of the GAL. When asked, he stated that he does not see 

Mother as a threat to J.N. despite his knowledge of her substance abuse issues. S.F. 

also testified that he was aware of Mother's history of domestic violence and convictions 

for the offense. S.F. indicated that his current girlfriend and her daughter also live with 

him. They have been in the home since November or December 2018 and do not know 

J.N. Id. He admitted that he does have a DUI from November 2017, and a domestic 

violence conviction from the early 1990's. He does not know if his girlfriend has any 

criminal convictions. 

{¶18} The magistrate found that,

However, when [Mother] made unconfirmed allegations against

[ S . F . ] the Agency did not pursue any further investigation into his

potential for placement. While this is of concern to the Court, it must be

noted that no motion for custody was filed on behalf of [S.F.].

Magistrate’s Decision, Feb 2, 2021 at p. 3.

Magistrate’s decision

{¶19} After analyzing the applicable law, the magistrate ordered Mother’s 

residual parental rights be terminated and permanent custody of J.N. be granted to 

LCJFS. The magistrate found J.N. had been in the temporary custody of LCJFS for more 

than twelve months of a consecutive 22-month period, and J.N. could not be placed with 
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 8

Mother within a reasonable period of time and should not be placed with Mother. The 

magistrate also found it was in J.N.’s best interest to grant permanent custody to LCJFS.

{¶20} Mother filed objections to the magistrate’s decision on February 16, 2021. 

[Docket Entry No. 155].

{¶21} On April 2, 2021, Mother’s attorney filed a Notice of Withdraw of Objection 

on behalf of Mother and a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. Said requests were granted 

by Judgment Entry filed on April 8, 2021.

{¶22} Mother subsequently obtained alternative counsel. On May 10, 2021, 

counsel on behalf of Mother requested that the Notice of Withdraw filed April 2, 2021 be 

set aside and that Mother be permitted to proceed with her objection. The juvenile court 

granted the motion and gave Mother fourteen days to file supplemental objections as the 

transcript had been filed on March 19, 2021. On June 2, 2021, Mother timely filed a 

supplemental objection. On June 7, 2021, the state timely filed a response to Mother’s 

supplemental objections. 

Trial court’s decision

{¶23} Via Judgment Entry filed May 9, 2022, the juvenile court overruled Mother’s 

objections. The court found,

The Magistrate's Decision, filed February 2, 2021, was not against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. The Magistrate did not err in finding 

that [J.N.] could not be placed with [Mother] or [Father] within a reasonable 

time or should not be placed with [Mother]. Clear and convincing evidence 

was presented that the Agency made reasonable case planning and diligent 

efforts to assist [Mother] to remedy the problems that initially caused [J.N.]
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 9

to be placed outside the child's home and that [Mother] failed continuously 

and repeatedly to substantially remedy said conditions.

* * *

Clear and convincing evidence was presented that at the time of the 

filing of the Motion for Permanent Custody [J.N.] had been in the temporary 

custody of the Agency for twelve (12) or more months of a consecutive 

twenty-two (22)-month period. Clear and convincing evidence was also 

presented that a grant of permanent custody of [J.N.] to the Agency is in the 

child's best interest. Thus, permanent custody should be granted for both 

reasons.

Opinion/Judgment Entry, May 9, 2022 at 16-17.

Assignment of Error

{¶24} Mother raises one Assignment of Error:

{¶25} “I. THE TRIAL COURT'S ENTRY GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY 

TO THE AGENCY IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”

Law and Analysis

{¶26} Initially we note a deficiency in Mother’s appellate brief; it does not comply 

with App.R. (A)(7), which provides,

The appellant shall include in its brief, under the headings and in the 

order indicated, all of the following: * * * An argument containing the 

contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error 

presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with 
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 10

citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which 

appellant relies. The argument may be preceded by a summary.

* * *

(D) References in Briefs to the Record. References in the briefs to 

parts of the record shall be to the pages of the parts of the record involved; 

e.g., Answer p. 7, Motion for Judgment p. 2, Transcript p. 231. Intelligible 

abbreviations may be used. If reference is made to evidence, the 

admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the 

pages of the transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered, and 

received or rejected.

Emphasis added.

{¶27} Because Mother fails to properly reference portions of the transcript

supporting her claims, Mother cannot demonstrate the claimed error. See Daniels v. 

Santic, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2004-G-2570, 2005-Ohio-1101, ¶13-15. See, also, App.R. 

12(A)(2) and 16(A)(7); Graham v. City of Findlay Police Dept. 3

rd Dist. Hancock No. 5-01-

32, 2002-Ohio-1215 at *4 (stating, "[t]his court is not obliged to search the record for some 

evidence of claimed error. * * * Rather, an appellant must tell the appellate court 

specifically where the trial court's alleged errors may be located in the transcript"); State 

ex rel. Petro v. Gold, 166 Ohio App.3d 371, 2006-Ohio-943 (10th Dist.), ¶ 94, appeal not 

allowed, 110 Ohio St.3d 1439, 2006-Ohio-3862, reconsideration denied, 111 Ohio St.3d 

1418, 2006- Ohio-5083; Porter v. Keefe, 6

th Dist. Erie No. E-02-018, 2003-Ohio-7267, 

¶ 109-113. 
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 11

{¶28} According to App. R. 12(A)(2), "The court may disregard an assignment of 

error presented for review if the party raising it fails to identify in the record the error on 

which the assignment of error is based or fails to argue the assignment separately in the 

brief, as required under App. R. 16(A).” An appellate court may rely upon App.R. 12(A) in 

overruling or disregarding an assignment of error because of "the lack of briefing" on the 

assignment of error. Hawley v. Ritley, 35 Ohio St.3d 157, 159, 519 N.E.2d 390, 392-

393(1988); Abon, Ltd. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 5th Dist. Richland No. 2004-CA-0029, 

¶100; State v. Miller, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 04-COA-003, 2004-Ohio-4636, ¶41. "Errors 

not treated in the brief will be regarded as having been abandoned by the party who gave 

them birth.” Uncapher v. Baltimore & Ohio Rd. Co., 127 Ohio St. 351, 356, 188 N.E. 553, 

555(1933).

{¶29} In addition, this Court has held that our district will no longer allow Anders

briefs to be filed in cases involving termination of parental rights. In the matter of K.M., 

5

th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2019 AP 08 033, 2020-Ohio-350, ¶17. See also, In re: N.C. and 

A.C., 2

nd Dist. Montgomery Nos. 28105, 28117, 2019-Ohio-567, ¶80-89. (Discussing the 

use of Anders briefs in permanent custody cases).

{¶30} In the interest of justice, we shall attempt to address Mother’s assignment 

of error.

Standard of Appellate Review

{¶31} “[T]he right to raise a child is an ‘essential’ and ‘basic’ civil right.” In re 

Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169(1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 

U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551(1972). A parent's interest in the care, custody, 

and management of his or her child is “fundamental.” Id.; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 12

745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599(1982). The permanent termination of a parent's 

rights has been described as, “* * * the family law equivalent to the death penalty in a 

criminal case.” In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16, 601 N.E.2d 45(6th Dist. 1991). 

Therefore, parents “must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law 

allows.” Id. An award of permanent custody must be based upon clear and convincing 

evidence. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). 

{¶32} The Ohio Supreme Court has delineated our standard of review as follows,

“clear and convincing evidence” is “[t]he measures or degree of proof that will produce in 

the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be 

established. It is intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the 

extent of such certainty as required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It 

does not mean clear and unequivocal.” In re Estate of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 101, 103-

104, 495 N.E.2d 23 (1986). In Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477, 120 N.E. 2d 118 

(1954), the Supreme Court further cautioned,

The mere number of witnesses, who may support a claim of one or 

the other of the parties to an action, is not to be taken as a basis for resolving 

disputed facts. The degree of proof required is determined by the 

impression, which the testimony of the witnesses makes upon the trier of 

facts, and the character of the testimony itself. Credibility, intelligence, 

freedom from bias or prejudice, opportunity to be informed, the disposition 

to tell the truth or otherwise, and the probability or improbability of the 

statements made, are all tests of testimonial value. Where the evidence is 

in conflict, the trier of facts may determine what should be accepted as the 
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 13

truth and what should be rejected as false. See Rice v. City of Cleveland, 

114 Ohio St. 299, 58 N.E.2d 768.

161 Ohio St. at 477-478. (Emphasis added). A court of appeals will affirm the trial court's 

findings “if the record contains competent, credible evidence by which the court could 

have formed a firm belief or conviction that the essential statutory elements for a 

termination of parental rights have been established.” In re Adkins, 5th Dist. Nos. 

2005AP06–0044 and 2005AP07–0049, 2006-Ohio-431, 2006 WL 242557, ¶17.

Requirements for Permanent Custody Awards

{¶33} R.C. 2151.414 sets forth the guidelines a trial court must follow when 

deciding a motion for permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) mandates the trial court 

schedule a hearing and provide notice upon filing of a motion for permanent custody of a 

child by a public children services agency or private child placing agency that has 

temporary custody of the child or has placed the child in long-term foster care.

{¶34} Following the hearing, R.C. 2151.414(B) authorizes the juvenile court to 

grant permanent custody of the child to the public or private agency if the court 

determines, by clear and convincing evidence, it is in the best interest of the child to grant 

permanent custody to the agency, and that any of the following apply:

(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the 

temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or 

private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive 

twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the temporary custody of one 

or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies 

for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as 
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 14

described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the 

child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in 

another state, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's 

parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's 

parents; 

(b) the child is abandoned; 

(c) the child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who 

are able to take permanent custody; or 

(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public 

children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or 

more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has 

been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services 

agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a 

consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of 

section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the 

temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state.

{¶35} Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial 

court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial 

court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding 

the best interest of the child.
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 15

Temporary Custody for at least 12 out of a consecutive 22-month 

period-R.C. 2151.414(B) (1) (d).

{¶36} The “12 of 22” provisions set forth in R.C. 2151.413(D)(1) and R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(d) balance the importance of reuniting a child with the child’s parents 

against the importance of a speedy resolution of the custody of a child. In re C.W., 104 

Ohio St.3d 163, 2004–Ohio–6411, 818 N.E.2d 1176, ¶22. Through the “12 of 22” 

provisions in the permanent-custody statutes, the legislature provides parents with 12 

months to work toward reunification before an agency can institute a permanent-custody 

action asserting R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) grounds. Id.

{¶37} “Before a public children-services agency or private child-placing agency 

can move for permanent custody of a child on R.C. 2151.414(B) (1) (d) grounds, the child 

must have been in the temporary custody of an agency for at least 12 months of a 

consecutive 22-month period.” In re: C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163, 2004-Ohio-6411, 818 

N.E.2d 1176 at paragraph one of the syllabus. When calculating this time period, the 

Court in C.W. cautioned, “the time that passes between the filing of a motion for 

permanent custody and the permanent-custody hearing does not count toward the 12-

month period set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).” Id. at 167, 2004-Ohio-6411, 818 

N.E.2d at 1180, ¶26.

{¶38} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e) states that, “[f]or the purposes of division (B)(1) of 

this section, a child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an 

agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 of 

the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from home.” 
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 16

{¶39} J.N. was removed from Mother’s home June 26, 2018. Pursuant to R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(e) sixty days from June 26, 2018 would be Saturday, August 25, 2018. 

The juvenile court adjudicated J.N. a dependent child by Judgment Entry filed August 29, 

2018. [Docket Entry No. 31]. 

{¶40} Accordingly, the “earlier date” that J.N. will be deemed to have enter the 

temporary custody of LCJFS for purposes of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is August 25, 2018. 

LCJFS filed the Motion for Permanent custody on November 26, 2019, 1 year, 3 months

and 1 day after J.N. is considered to have entered the temporary custody of LCJFS. 

{¶41} Accordingly, the trial court correctly found that J.N. had been in the 

temporary custody of the LCJFS for over twelve months of a consecutive 22-month 

period.

{¶42} As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are 

alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion 

for permanent custody. In re Daltoni, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2007 AP 0041, 2007-

Ohio-5805. This finding alone, in conjunction with a best interest finding, is sufficient to 

support the grant of permanent custody. In re Calhoun, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008CA00118, 

2008-Ohio-5458.

{¶43} Because Mother has not challenged the twelve of twenty-two-month finding 

as to the child, we would not need to address the merits of Mother’s assignment of error. 

However, even if we consider Mother’s arguments the trial court did not err in determining 

the child cannot be placed with Mother at this time or within a reasonable period of time.
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 17

Parental Placement within a Reasonable Time– R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a).

{¶44} The court must consider all relevant evidence before determining the child 

cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with 

the parents. R.C. 2151.414(E). The statute also indicates that if the court makes a finding 

under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1)-(15), the court shall determine the children cannot or should 

not be placed with the parent. A trial court may base its decision that a child cannot be 

placed with a parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with a parent upon 

the existence of any one of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors. The existence of one factor 

alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a 

reasonable time. See In re William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 1996–Ohio–182, 661 N.E.2d 

738; In re Hurlow, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 98 CA 6, 1997 WL 701328 (Sept. 21, 1998); In re 

Butcher, 4th Dist. Athens No. 1470, 1991 WL 62145(Apr. 10, 1991).

{¶45} R.C. 2151.414(E) sets forth factors a trial court is to consider in determining 

whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or 

should not be placed with the parents. Specifically, Section (E) provides, in pertinent part, 

as follows:

(E) In determining at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this 

section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the 

Revised Code whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a 

reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents, the court 

shall consider all relevant evidence. If the court determines, by clear and 

convincing evidence, at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this 

section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the 
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 18

Revised Code that one or more of the following exist as to each of the child’s 

parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with 

either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either 

parent:

(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and 

notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency 

to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child 

to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and 

repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be 

placed outside the child’s home. In determining whether the parents have 

substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental 

utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and 

rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to 

the parents for changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and 

maintain parental duties.

* * *

(16) Any other factor the court considers relevant.

{¶46} As set forth above, the trial court’s findings are based upon competent 

credible evidence. The record includes the recommendation of the guardian ad litem for 

the child, and the testimony of the witnesses at trial. The magistrate was in the best 

position to determine the credibility of the witnesses.

{¶47} The juvenile court found that LCJFS had made reasonable efforts to prevent 

the removal, to eliminate the continued removal, or to make it possible for J.N. to return 
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 19

home safely to Mother’s home. In the instant case the trial court cited R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(d) (“12 of 22”); R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) (reasonable efforts) and R.C. 

2151.414(E)(4) (failure to remedy conditions).

{¶48} The record supports the juvenile court’s finding that Mother has not shown 

consistent sustained progress to have the child returned to her custody. She continues to

suffer with alcohol and illegal drug abuse. It does not appear that Mother has been able 

to apply any behavioral changes that she has attempted to learn. Despite offering 

numerous services, Mother was unable or unwilling to mitigate the concerns that led to 

the child’s removal. As set forth in our Statement of the Facts and Case, supra, we find 

there was sufficient and substantial competent evidence Mother failed to remedy the 

problems which initially caused the removal of J.N. from her home. The case plan 

developed by the Agency also identified the need for Mother to engage in mental health 

treatment. 1T. at 10. Aside from the unsuccessful termination in LAPP in 2018, Mother

did not seek any mental health programming as recommended by the Agency. Id.

{¶49} A parent’s successful completion of the terms of a case plan is not 

dispositive on the issue of reunification. The ultimate question under R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) 

is whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child’s 

removal. In re Shchigelski, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 99–G–2241, 2000 WL 1568388 (Oct. 

20, 2000); In re McKenzie, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 95CA0015, 1995 WL 608285(Oct. 18, 

1995). A parent can successfully complete the terms of a case plan yet not substantially 

remedy the conditions that caused the children to be removed—the case plan is simply a 

means to a goal, but not the goal itself. Hence, the courts have held that the successful 

completion of case plan requirements does not preclude a grant of permanent custody to 
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 20

a social services agency. In re J.L., 8th Dist. No. 84368, 2004–Ohio–6024, ¶ 20; In re 

Mraz, 12th Dist. Nos. CA2002–05–011, CA2002–07–014, 2002–Ohio–7278. In the case 

of In re: Summerfield, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2005CA00139, 2005-Ohio-5523, this Court 

found where, despite marginal compliance with some aspects of the case plan, the exact 

problems that led to the initial removal remained in existence, a court does not err in 

finding the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

{¶50} Mother loves and is bonded with her child. However, the evidence 

demonstrated the very little successful efforts Mother had made on the case plan. On 

that point, the evidence demonstrates that any improvement that Mother has made in her 

life is tentative and, perhaps, temporary, and that she is at risk of relapse. The trial court 

found that, regardless of Mother’s compliance with aspects of her case plan, she was still 

not able to be a successful parent to the child. 

{¶51} We find there is competent and credible evidence to support the trial court’s 

determination that J.N. cannot be placed with Mother within a reasonable time or should 

not be placed with Mother.

Reasonable Efforts

{¶52} Mother further contends the finding that LCJFS made reasonable efforts to 

reunify the child with Mother is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶53} The Supreme Court of Ohio in In re C.F., 113 Ohio St. 3d 73, 78, 862 N.E. 

2d 816, 821(2007) noted,

[N]o one section of the Revised Code addresses the concept of 

reasonable efforts. Overall, Ohio’s child-welfare laws are designed to care 

for and protect children, ‘whenever possible, in a family environment, 
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 21

separating the child from the child’s parents only when necessary for the 

child’s welfare or in the interests of public safety.’ R.C. 2151. 01(A). To 

that end, various sections of the Revised Code refer to the agency’s duty to 

make reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify the family unit. For example, 

R.C. 2151. 412 requires the agency to prepare and maintain a case plan for 

children in temporary custody with the goal ‘to eliminate with all due speed 

the need for the out-of-home placement so that the child can safely return 

home.’ Under R.C. 2151.413(D)(3)(b), an agency may not file for 

permanent custody under R.C. 2151. 413(D) - the ‘12 months out of 22 rule’-

‘[i]f reasonable efforts to return the child to the child’s home are required 

under section 2151. 419’ and the agency has not provided the services 

required by the case plan.

{¶54} A “reasonable effort” is “* * * an honest, purposeful effort, free of malice and 

the design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.” In re Weaver, 79 Ohio 

App.3d 59, 63, 606 N.E.2d 1011(12th Dist. 1992). The issue is not whether there was 

anything more the agency could have done, but whether the agency’s case planning and 

efforts were reasonable and diligent under the circumstances of the case. In re J.D., 3rd 

Dist. Hancock Nos. 5-10-34, 2011-Ohio-1458. The child’s health and safety is paramount 

in determining whether reasonable efforts were made. In re R.P., 5th Dist. Tuscarawas 

No. 2011-Ohio-5378.

{¶55} R.C. 2151.419 requires the trial court to determine whether the agency filing 

the complaint for custody “has made reasonable efforts * * * to eliminate the continued 

removal of the child from his home, or to make it possible for the child to return home.” 
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 22

Subsection (B)(1) mandates the trial court to issue written findings of fact setting forth the 

reasonable efforts made by the agency, including a brief description of “the relevant 

services provided by the agency to the family of the child and why those services did not 

prevent the removal of the child from his home or enable the child to return home.” 

{¶56} However, even where a trial court has failed to include in its judgment entry, 

the findings contemplated by R.C. 2151.419(B)(1) we have found that the ultimate issue 

is the reasonableness of the Department’s efforts, and have concluded those efforts may 

be determined from the record. In the matter of Kell/Bess Children, 5th Dist. No. 

97CA0278, 1998 WL 401767(Mar. 23, 1998); Hunt v. Ickes, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 

2014 AP 08 0032, 2015-Ohio-309, ¶19.

{¶57} We find there is competent and credible evidence to support the trial court’s 

determination that LCJFS efforts were reasonable and diligent under the circumstances 

of the case. We find that the record supports that LCJFS was working toward the goal 

of reunification. We find no evidence of dishonest purpose, conscious wrongdoing, or 

breach of duty on the part of LCJFS. 

{¶58} Having reviewed the record, we find that LCJFS made a good faith effort 

to reunify Mother and her child. Furthermore, the record contains clear and convincing 

evidence to support the court’s determination that the child could not be placed with 

Mother.

The Best Interest of the Child

{¶59} An agency that seeks permanent custody of a child bears the burden of 

proving by clear and convincing evidence that the grant of permanent custody is in the 
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 23

child’s best interest. In re B.C., 141 Ohio St.3d 55, 2014-Ohio-4558, 21 N.E.3d 308, ¶ 

26. 

{¶60} R.C. 2151.414(D) requires the trial court to consider all relevant factors in 

determining whether the child’s best interests would be served by granting the permanent 

custody motion. These factors include but are not limited to: (1) the interrelationship of 

the child with others; (2) the wishes of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child; (4) 

the child’s need for a legally secure placement and whether such a placement can be 

achieved without permanent custody; and (5) whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) 

to (11) apply. 

{¶61} The factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through (11), which are referred to in 

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e), involve a parent’s having been convicted of or pleaded guilty to 

specific criminal offenses against the child, the child’s sibling or another child who lived 

in the parent’s household; a parent’s withholding medical treatment or food from the child; 

a parent’s repeatedly placing the child at substantial risk of harm because of alcohol or 

drug abuse; a parent’s abandoning the child; and a parent’s having had parental rights 

as to the child’s sibling involuntarily terminated.

{¶62} No one element is given greater weight or heightened significance. In re 

C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does 

not require a juvenile court to make specific findings regarding each best-interest factor 

listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) or to include in its decision or judgment entry a written 

discussion of each of those factors. In re: A.M., 166 Ohio St.3d 127, 2020-Ohio-5102, 

184 N.E.3d 1, ¶33.
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 24

{¶63} A child’s best interests are served by the child being placed in a permanent 

situation that fosters growth, stability, and security. We have frequently noted, “[t]he 

discretion which the juvenile court enjoys in determining whether an order of permanent 

custody is in the best interest of a child should be accorded the utmost respect, given the 

nature of the proceeding and the impact the court’s determination will have on the lives 

of the parties concerned.” In re Mauzy Children, 5th Dist. No. 2000CA00244, 2000 WL 

1700073 (Nov. 13, 2000), citing In re Awkal, 85 Ohio App.3d 309, 316, 642 N.E.2d 424 

(8th Dist. 1994). 

{¶64} No evidence was presented that J.N. has a relationship with any extended 

family members. J.N. has been placed with the same foster family since her removal and 

all of her needs are being met. 1T. at 88-90. J.N.’s foster family is interested in pursuing 

her adoption Id. The only relative to be mentioned by either parent for her placement 

was Mother’s sister who was contacted and did not demonstrate an interest in pursuing 

the placement of J.N. 1T. at 87-88. S.F. did not file a motion requesting legal custody of 

J.N. No other person has filed a motion for legal custody of the child. J.N.’s need for a 

legally secure permanent placement is immense and cannot be achieved without a grant 

of permanent custody. Finally, the Guardian ad Litem recommended that the permanent 

custody of the child be granted to the Agency. 2T. at 235-238. Nothing in the record 

demonstrates that the child would benefit from giving Mother more time to work on her 

case plan. Nothing in the record indicates that a grant of additional time to Mother would 

result in a different outcome.
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00033 25

{¶65} In short, the juvenile court’s judgment entry demonstrates that the court 

satisfied its statutory duty to consider the best interest factors set out in R.C. 

2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e).

Conclusion

{¶66} For these reasons, we find that the trial court’s determination that Mother 

had failed to remedy the issues that caused the initial removal and therefore J.N. could 

not be placed with her within a reasonable time or should not be placed with her was 

based upon competent credible evidence and is not against the manifest weight or 

sufficiency of the evidence. We further find that the trial court’s decision that permanent 

custody to LCJFS was in J.N.’s best interest was based upon competent, credible 

evidence and is not against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence.

{¶67} Because the evidence in the record supports the trial court’s judgment, we 

overrule Appellant-Mother’s sole assignment of error, and affirm the decision of the 

Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Court Division.

By Gwin, P.J.,

Delaney, J., and

Baldwin, J., concur