alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 1.665(c)-1 Accumulation distributions of certain foreign trusts; in general. ( a ) In the case of a foreign trust created by a U.S. person, the term *accumulation distribution* for any taxable year means an amount by which the amounts properly paid, credited, or required to be distributed within the meaning of section 661(a)(2) for that year exceed the distributable net income (determined under section 643(a)) of the trust, reduced (but not below zero) by the amount of income required to be distributed currently. (In computing the amount of an accumulation distribution pursuant to the preceding sentence, there is taken into account amounts applied or distributed for the support of a dependent under circumstances specified in section 677(b) and section 678(c) out of corpus or out of other than income for the taxable year and amounts used to discharge or satisfy any person's legal obligation as that term is used in § 1.662(a)-4.)
( b ) Although amounts properly paid, credited, or required to be distributed under section 661(a)(2) do not exceed the income of the trust during the taxable year, an accumulation distribution may result if such amounts exceed distributable net income reduced (but not below zero) by the amount required to be distributed currently. This may result from the fact that expenses allocable to corpus are taken into account in determining taxable income and hence distributable net income. However, the provisions of subpart D will not apply unless there is undistributed net income in at least one of the preceding taxable years which began after December 31, 1953, and ended after August 16, 1954. See section 666 and the regulations thereunder.
( c ) The provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section may be illustrated by the examples provided in paragraph (c) of § 1.665(b)-1.
[T.D. 6989, 34 FR 735, Jan. 17, 1969]
III

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. RES. 97

To commend the Tar Heels of the University of North Carolina at Chapel

Hill for winning the 1993 National Collegiate Athletic Association Men’s

Basketball Championship.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 19, 1993

Mr. HELMS (for himself and Mr. FAIRCLOTH) submitted the following

resolution; which was considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

To commend the Tar Heels of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill for winning the 1993 National Collegiate Athletic Association Men’s Basketball Championship.

Whereas the men’s basketball team of the University of

North Carolina at Chapel Hill has had another outstanding season;

Whereas the men’s college basketball program at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill has in the history

of college basketball won more games than has the program of any other college or university in the Nation;

Whereas North Carolina coach Dean Smith has amassed 774

victories in his career, the second-highest total in NCAA

history;
2

SRES 97 ATS

Whereas the 1993 North Carolina Tar Heels compiled a

record of 35–4 and won the Atlantic Coast Conference

regular season championship;

Whereas the North Carolina Tar Heels reached the NCAA’s

Final Four for the second time in three years; and

Whereas the North Carolina Tar Heels won the 1993 NCAA

men’s basketball championship: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That the Senate commends the Tar Heels

2 of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill for hav3 ing won the 1993 National Collegiate Athletic Association

4 Men’s Basketball Championship.

Æ
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED DECEMBER 10, 2014

NO. 03-13-00728-CR

The State of Texas, Appellant

v.

Daniel Misiaszek, Appellee

APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF HAYS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, GOODWIN, AND FIELD

REVERSED AND REMANDED -- OPINION BY JUSTICE PURYEAR

This is an appeal from the order entered by the district court. Having reviewed the record and 

the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was reversible error in the district court’s order.

Therefore, the Court reverses the trial court’s order and remands the case for further proceedings.

The appellant shall pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and the court below.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED DE CEMBER 10, 2014

NO. 03

- 13

- 00728

- CR

The State of Texas, Appellant

v.

Daniel Misiaszek, Appellee

APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF HAYS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, G OODWIN, AND FIELD

REVERSED AND REMANDED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE PURYEAR

This is an appeal from the order entered by the district court

. Having reviewed the record and

the parties’ argum ents, the Court holds that there was reversible error in the district court’s order

.

Therefore, the Court reverses the trial court’s order and remands t he case for further proceedings.

The appellant shall pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and the court below.
**Exhibit 32.1**

​

**Certification of Chief Executive OfficerPursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)**

In connection with the annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2021 (the “Report”) of Runway Growth Finance Corp. (the “Registrant”), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, R. David Spreng, the Chief Executive Officer of the Registrant, hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge, that:
|  | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and |
|--|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant. |
|--|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

​

| 1       | ​             | ​         |
|---------|---------------------|-----------------|
| ​ | /s/ R. David Spreng |
| ​ | **Name:**           | R. David Spreng |
| ​ | **Date:**           | March 3, 2022   |

​

----
39281.

#### CRAIG v. THE STATE.

Nichols, Presiding Judge.

The defendant was tried and convicted under an indictment charging him with the offense of burglary. Thereafter, his amended motion for new trial was denied and he now excepts to such adverse judgment. Held:

1. “A ground of a motion for new trial which, in order to be understood requires a consideration of the evidence, must either set forth the evidence relied upon, or point out where in the record such evidence may be found.” *Valdosta Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Montgomery,*102 Ga. App. 440 (2) (116 SE2d 675). Accordingly, the special ground of the motion for new trial, which merely complains that the testimony of a named witness should be stricken is incomplete and cannot be considered.

2. *“*'To constitute a witness an accomplice such as shall prevent his testimony from being sufficient to support a conviction of an accused without its being corroborated, his part in the commission of the crime must be such as was the result of his free will, and not the result of duress or coercion such as would destroy his free will. If the witness himself could not be convicted because of his participation in the commission of the crime, because he acted under duress or because of threats, he is not an accomplice.’ *Perryman v. State,*63 Ga. App. 819 (1) (12 SE2d 388).” *Fortner v. State,*96 Ga. App. 855 (2) (101 SE2d 908).

3. The witness, who the defendant contends was an accomplice by his own admission, was a seventeen-year-old boy who participated (according to such witness’s testimony), only because he was threatened with physical violence by the *245defendant, a grown man, and applying the principles of law quoted above to such facts it cannot be said that the verdict was unauthorized, for 'as pointed out above, one who participates in a crime because of duress is not an accomplice and such testimony need not be corroborated in order for a conviction to be authorized. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for new trial as amended.

Decided January 18, 1962

Rehearing denied January 29, 1962.

*W. P. Wilbanks, Jr.,*for plaintiff in error.

*Jack Holland, Solicitor-General,*contra.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Frankxm and Jordan, JJ., concur.*
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED June 13, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-41433 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus LUCIOS LIMONES-ALVARADO, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 1:05-CR-96-ALL

-------------------- Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Lucios Limones-Alvarado (Limones) pleaded guilty to one count of attempting to reenter the United States without permission after having been deported. Limones contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b), under which he was convicted, is unconstitutional.

Limones’s constitutional challenge to 8 U.S.C.No. 05-41433 -2- § 1326(b) is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). Although Limones contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez , 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 298 (2005). Limones properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review. Limones also asserts that this court should remand for correction of a clerical error in the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. We remand for the limited purpose of correcting the judgment to reflect that the offense of conviction was attempted illegal reentry rather than Limones having been “found in” the United States illegally. See United States v. Angeles-Mascote , 206 F.3d 529, 531 (5th Cir. 2000). AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF CORRECTING CLERICAL ERROR IN JUDGMENT.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack

, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh

Elizabeth M. Welch,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

February 2, 2021

a0125 

# Order

Clerk February 2, 2021

161090(49)

MATTHEW MIGDALEWICZ,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v SC: 161090

COA: 343981

Oakland CC: 2017

- 157163

- NI

PERRY D. HOLLIE,

Defendant

- Appellee,

and

FORD MOTOR COMPANY and THE

AMERICAN ROAD INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s November 4,

2020 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that

reconsideration of our previous order is warranted. MCR 7.311(G).
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8110 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8110

  To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to make permanent the 
 State option to extend protection against spousal impoverishment for 
    recipients of home and community-based services under Medicaid.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 23, 2024

Mrs. Dingell (for herself and Mr. James) introduced the following bill; 
       which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to make permanent the 
 State option to extend protection against spousal impoverishment for 
    recipients of home and community-based services under Medicaid.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Married Seniors from 
Impoverishment Act of 2024''.

SEC. 2. MAKING PERMANENT THE STATE OPTION TO EXTEND PROTECTION AGAINST 
              SPOUSAL IMPOVERISHMENT FOR RECIPIENTS OF HOME AND 
              COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES UNDER MEDICAID.

    (a) In General.--Section 1924(h)(1)(A) of the Social Security Act 
(42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(h)(1)(A)) is amended by striking ``(at the option of 
the State) is described in section 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(VI)'' and 
inserting the following: ``is eligible for medical assistance for home 
and community-based services provided under subsection (c), (d), or (i) 
of section 1915, under a waiver approved under section 1115, or who is 
eligible for such medical assistance by reason of being determined 
eligible under section 1902(a)(10)(C) or by reason of section 1902(f) 
or otherwise on the basis of a reduction of income based on costs 
incurred for medical or other remedial care, or who is eligible for 
medical assistance for home and community-based attendant services and 
supports under section 1915(k)''.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 2404 of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (42 U.S.C. 1396r-5 note) is amended by striking 
``September 30, 2027'' and inserting ``the date of enactment of the 
Protecting Married Seniors from Impoverishment Act of 2024''.
                                 <all>
```
III

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. RES. 292

Tendering the thanks of the Senate to the President pro tempore for the

courteous, dignified, and impartial manner in which he has presided

over deliberations of the Senate.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 1 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 12), 1994

Mr. MITCHELL (for himself and Mr. DOLE) submitted the following resolution;

which was considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

Tendering the thanks of the Senate to the President pro

tempore for the courteous, dignified, and impartial manner in which he has presided over deliberations of the

Senate.

1 Resolved, That the thanks of the Senate are hereby

2 tendered to the Honorable Robert C. Byrd, President pro

3 tempore of the Senate, for the courteous, dignified, and

4 impartial manner in which he has presided over its delib5 erations during the second session of the One Hundred

6 Third Congress.

Æ
#### American Mutual Liability Insurance Company et al. *v.*Alfred N. Premo, Insurance Commissioner, et al.

*Joseph P. Cooney,*for the appellants (defendants Aetna Casualty Company et al.).

*Louis Weinstein,*assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was *Harold M. Mulvey,*attorney general, for the appellant (named defendant).

*Frank E. Callahan,*with whom, on the brief, was *John D. Fassett,*for the appellees (plaintiffs).

Argued November 5

decided November 12, 1963

The motion by the defendants for a ruling on the question whether the appeal from the Superior Court in Hartford County has become moot is denied.
Editorial Note on Part 886
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 886 appear at 73 FR 35341, June 23, 2008.

§ 886.1780 Retinoscope. ( a ) *Identification.* A retinoscope is an AC-powered or battery-powered device intended to measure the refraction of the eye by illuminating the retina and noting the direction of movement of the light on the retinal surface and of the refraction by the eye of the emergent rays.
( b ) *Classification.* ( 1 ) Class II (special controls) for the AC-powered device. The device is exempt from the premarket notification procedures in subpart E of part 807 of this chapter subject to the limitations in § 886.9.
( 2 ) Class I (general controls) for the battery-powered device. The class I battery-powered device is exempt from the premarket notification procedures in subpart E of part 807 of this chapter subject to § 886.9. The battery-powered device is exempt from the current good manufacturing practice requirements of the quality system regulation in part 820 of this chapter, with the exception of § 820.180 of this chapter, with respect to general requirements concerning records, and § 820.198 of this chapter, with respect to complaint files.
[55 FR 48442, Nov. 20, 1990; 55 FR 51799, Dec. 17, 1990, as amended at 65 FR 2320, Jan. 14, 2000; 84 FR 71817, Dec. 30, 2019]
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                   MAY-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                      JUN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                        NOV-30-1997
<CASH>                                   17,819
<SECURITIES>                                  0
<RECEIVABLES>                            18,231
<ALLOWANCES>                             (7,700)
<INVENTORY>                              15,800
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                         55,499
<PP&E>                                3,632,072
<DEPRECIATION>                       (3,632,072)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                           58,064
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                 2,365,843
<BONDS>                                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                         0
<PREFERRED>                                   0
<COMMON>                                 19,333
<OTHER-SE>                           (2,327,112)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>             58,064
<SALES>                                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                         225,480
<CGS>                                         0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                            257,733
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                              0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                         (32,253)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                     (32,253)
<DISCONTINUED>                                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                               0
<CHANGES>                                     0
<NET-INCOME>                            (32,253)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                             (0.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                 0
        


</TABLE>
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

D.V., a child,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D2022-3017

[May 2, 2024]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Carlos S. Rebollo, Judge; L.T. Case No. 22001373DLA.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Nancy B. Jack, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Lindsay A. Warner, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

WARNER, CONNER and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
# C_2014235EN.01002201.xml

| 21.7.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 235/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.7.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 235/22

---

Action brought on 17 April 2014 — Meica v OHIM — Salumificio Fratelli Beretta (MINIMINI)

(Case T-247/14)

2014/C 235/30

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Meica Ammerländische Fleischwarenfabrik Fritz Meinen GmbH & Co. KG (Edewecht, Germany) (represented by: S. Labesius, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Salumificio Fratelli Beretta SpA (Barzanò, Italy)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | Annul the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 14 February 2014 given in Case R 1159/2013-4; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 14 February 2014 given in Case R 1159/2013-4;

| — | Order the defendant to pay the costs of proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the defendant to pay the costs of proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

Applicant for a Community trade mark: The other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Applicant for a Community trade mark:

Community trade mark concerned: The figurative mark containing the verbal elements ‘STICK MINIMINI Fratelli Beretta 1812 GLI ORIGINALI’ for goods and services in Classes 29 and 43 — Community trade mark application No 1 0 0 67  031

Community trade mark concerned:

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: The applicant

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings:

Mark or sign cited in opposition: The word mark ‘Mini Wini’ for goods and services in Classes 29 and 38 — Community trade mark registration No 3 2 97  835

Mark or sign cited in opposition:

Decision of the Opposition Division: Upheld the opposition in part

Decision of the Opposition Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Annulled the contested decision and rejected the opposition in its entirety

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) CTMR

Pleas in law:

---