(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

BNSF RAILWAY CO. v. TYRRELL, SPECIAL 

ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF TYRRELL,
 

DECEASED, ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MONTANA 

No. 16–405. Argued April 25, 2017—Decided May 30, 2017 

The Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U. S. C. §51 et seq., 

makes railroads liable in money damages to their employees for onthe-job injuries. Respondent Robert Nelson, a North Dakota resident, brought a FELA suit against petitioner BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) in a Montana state court, alleging that he had sustained 

injuries while working for BNSF. Respondent Kelli Tyrrell, appointed in South Dakota as the administrator of her husband Brent Tyrrell’s estate, also sued BNSF under FELA in a Montana state court, 

alleging that Brent had developed a fatal cancer from his exposure to

carcinogenic chemicals while working for BNSF. Neither worker was 

injured in Montana. Neither incorporated nor headquartered there,

BNSF maintains less than 5% of its work force and about 6% of its 

total track mileage in the State. Contending that it is not “at home”

in Montana, as required for the exercise of general personal jurisdiction under Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___, ___, BNSF moved 

to dismiss both suits. Its motion was granted in Nelson’s case and 

denied in Tyrrell’s. After consolidating the two cases, the Montana 

Supreme Court held that Montana courts could exercise general personal jurisdiction over BNSF because the railroad both “d[id] business” in the State within the meaning of 45 U. S. C. §56 and was

“found within” the State within the compass of Mont. Rule Civ. Proc.

4(b)(1). The due process limits articulated in Daimler, the court added, did not control because Daimler did not involve a FELA claim or a 

railroad defendant. 

Held: 

1. Section 56 does not address personal jurisdiction over railroads.

Pp. 4–9. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

2 BNSF R. CO. v. TYRRELL 

Syllabus 

(a) Section 56’s first relevant sentence provides that “an action 

may be brought in a district court of the United States,” in, among

other places, the district “in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action.” This Court has comprehended that sentence as a venue prescription, not as one governing personal jurisdiction. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 

U. S. 44, 52. Congress generally uses the expression, where suit 

“may be brought,” to indicate the federal districts in which venue is 

proper, see, e.g., 28 U. S. C. §1391(b), while it typically provides for 

the exercise of personal jurisdiction by authorizing service of process, 

see, e.g., 15 U. S. C. §22. Nelson and Tyrrell contend that the 1888

Judiciary Act provision that prompted §56’s enactment concerned 

both personal jurisdiction and venue, but this Court has long read

that Judiciary Act provision to concern venue only, see, e.g., Green v. 

Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 205 U. S. 530, 532–533. Pp. 5–7.

(b) The second relevant sentence of §56—that “[t]he jurisdiction

of the courts of the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States”—refers to concurrent subject-matter jurisdiction of state and federal courts over FELA 

actions. See Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 55–56. 

Congress added this clarification after the Connecticut Supreme 

Court held that Congress intended to confine FELA litigation to federal courts, and that state courts had no obligation to entertain FELA

claims. Pp. 7–8. 

(c) None of the cases featured by the Montana Supreme Court in

reaching its contrary conclusion resolved a question of personal jurisdiction. Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 345 U. S. 379; Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U. S. 698; Kepner, 314 U. S. 44; and Denver 

& Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284, distinguished. 

Moreover, all these cases, save Pope, were decided before this Court’s 

transformative decision on personal jurisdiction in International Shoe 

Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310. Pp. 8–9.

2. The Montana courts’ exercise of personal jurisdiction under

Montana law does not comport with the Fourteenth Amendment’s

Due Process Clause. Only the propriety of general personal jurisdiction is at issue here because neither Nelson nor Tyrrell alleges injury 

from work in or related to Montana. 

A state court may exercise general jurisdiction over out-of-state

corporations when their “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous 

and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum 

State.” Daimler, 571 U. S., at ___. The “paradigm” forums in which a 

corporate defendant is “at home” are the corporation’s place of incorporation and its principal place of business, e.g., id., at ___, but in an 

“exceptional case,” a corporate defendant’s operations in another fo-
 

 

 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Syllabus 

rum “may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State,” id., at ___, n. 19. Daimler involved 

no FELA claim or railroad defendant, but the due process constraint

described there applies to all state-court assertions of general jurisdiction over nonresident defendants; that constraint does not vary

with the type of claim asserted or business enterprise sued.

Here, BNSF is not incorporated or headquartered in Montana and 

its activity there is not “so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” Ibid. Pp. 9–12. 

383 Mont. 417, 373 P. 3d 1, reversed and remanded. 

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, BREYER, ALITO, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., 

joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 16–405 

BNSF RAILWAY CO., PETITIONER v. KELLI TYRRELL, 

SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF BRENT T.
 

TYRRELL, DECEASED, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 

MONTANA
 

[May 30, 2017]

 JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The two cases we decide today arise under the Federal

Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 

45 U. S. C. §51 et seq., which makes railroads liable in 

money damages to their employees for on-the-job injuries.

Both suits were pursued in Montana state courts although

the injured workers did not reside in Montana, nor were 

they injured there. The defendant railroad, BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), although “doing business” in Montana when the litigation commenced, was not incorporated

in Montana, nor did it maintain its principal place of

business in that State. To justify the exercise of personal

jurisdiction over BNSF, the Montana Supreme Court

relied on §56, which provides in relevant part: 

“Under this chapter an action may be brought in a 

district court of the United States, in the district of 

the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause 

of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action.

The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States un-
 

 

2 BNSF R. CO. v. TYRRELL 

Opinion of the Court 

der this chapter shall be concurrent with that of the 

courts of the several States.” 

We hold that §56 does not address personal jurisdiction

over railroads. Its first relevant sentence is a venue prescription governing proper locations for FELA suits filed

in federal court. The provision’s second relevant sentence,

using the term “concurrent” jurisdiction, refers to subjectmatter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction. It simply

clarifies that the federal courts do not have exclusive 

subject-matter jurisdiction over FELA suits; state courts

can hear them, too. 

Montana’s Supreme Court, in the alternative, relied on 

state law, under which personal jurisdiction could be

asserted over “persons found within . . . Montana.” Mont. 

Rule Civ. Proc. 4(b)(1) (2015). BNSF fit that bill, the court 

stated, because it has over 2,000 miles of railroad track 

and employs more than 2,000 workers in Montana. Our 

precedent, however, explains that the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not permit a State 

to hale an out-of-state corporation before its courts when

the corporation is not “at home” in the State and the 

episode-in-suit occurred elsewhere. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 8) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We therefore reverse the 

judgment of the Montana Supreme Court. 

I 

In March 2011, respondent Robert Nelson, a North

Dakota resident, brought a FELA suit against BNSF in a

Montana state court to recover damages for knee injuries

Nelson allegedly sustained while working for BNSF as a

fuel-truck driver. 383 Mont. 417, 419, 373 P. 3d 1, 3 

(2016). In May 2014, respondent Kelli Tyrrell, appointed 

in South Dakota as the administrator of her husband 

Brent Tyrrell’s estate, similarly sued BNSF under FELA

in a Montana state court. Id., at 419–420, 373 P. 3d, at 3. 
 

 

 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

Brent Tyrrell, his widow alleged, had developed a fatal

kidney cancer from his exposure to carcinogenic chemicals

while working for BNSF. Id., at 420, 373 P. 3d, at 3. 

Neither plaintiff alleged injuries arising from or related to

work performed in Montana; indeed, neither Nelson nor 

Brent Tyrrell appears ever to have worked for BNSF in 

Montana. Id., at 419–420, 373 P. 3d, at 3. 

BNSF is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal

place of business in Texas. Id., at 419, 373 P. 3d, at 3. It 

operates railroad lines in 28 States. No. DV 14–699 (13th 

Jud. Dist., Yellowstone Cty., Mont., Oct. 7, 2014), App. to

Pet. for Cert. 63a. BNSF has 2,061 miles of railroad track 

in Montana (about 6% of its total track mileage of 32,500), 

employs some 2,100 workers there (less than 5% of its 

total work force of 43,000), generates less than 10% of its 

total revenue in the State, and maintains only one of its 24

automotive facilities in Montana (4%). Ibid. Contending

that it is not “at home” in Montana, as required for the 

exercise of general personal jurisdiction under Daimler AG 

v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 8) (internal quotation marks omitted), BNSF moved to dismiss

both suits for lack of personal jurisdiction. Its motion was 

granted in Nelson’s case and denied in Tyrrell’s. 383 

Mont., at 419, 373 P. 3d, at 2. 

After consolidating the two cases, the Montana Supreme

Court held that Montana courts could exercise general 

personal jurisdiction over BNSF. Id., at 429, 373 P. 3d, at 

9. Section 56, the court determined, authorizes state 

courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over railroads 

“doing business” in the State. Id., at 426, 373 P. 3d, at 7 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the court 

observed, Montana law provides for the exercise of general

jurisdiction over “[a]ll persons found within” the State. 

Id., at 427, 373 P. 3d, at 8 (quoting Mont. Rule Civ. Proc.

4(b)(1) (2015)). In view of the railroad’s many employees

and miles of track in Montana, the court concluded, BNSF 
 

 

 

4 BNSF R. CO. v. TYRRELL 

Opinion of the Court 

is both “doing business” and “found within” the State, such

that both FELA and Montana law authorized the exercise 

of personal jurisdiction. 383 Mont., at 426, 428, 373 P. 3d, 

at 7–8 (internal quotation marks omitted). The due process limits articulated in Daimler, the court added, did not 

control, because Daimler did not involve a FELA claim or 

a railroad defendant. 383 Mont., at 424, 373 P. 3d, at 6. 

Justice McKinnon dissented. Section 56, she wrote, is a 

federal-court venue prescription, and also confers subjectmatter jurisdiction on state courts in FELA cases, concurrent with federal courts. Id., at 435–437, 373 P. 3d, at 13. 

But §56, she maintained, does not touch or concern personal jurisdiction. Ibid. Furthermore, she concluded, 

Daimler controls, rendering the Montana courts’ exercise 

of personal jurisdiction impermissible because BNSF is

not “at home” in Montana. 383 Mont., at 433–434, 373 

P. 3d, at 11–12. 

We granted certiorari, 580 U. S. ___ (2017), to resolve 

whether §56 authorizes state courts to exercise personal

jurisdiction over railroads doing business in their States 

but not incorporated or headquartered there, and whether 

the Montana courts’ exercise of personal jurisdiction in 

these cases comports with due process. 

II 

Nelson and Tyrrell contend that §56’s first relevant 

sentence confers personal jurisdiction on federal courts, and 

that the section’s second relevant sentence extends that 

grant of jurisdiction to state courts. Neither contention 

is tenable. Section 56’s first relevant sentence concerns 

venue; its next sentence speaks to subject-matter jurisdiction.1 

—————— 

1Section 56’s first sentence, which provides a time bar for FELA claims, 

is not relevant to the issue at hand. For ease of reference, we hereinafter 

refer to the first relevant sentence, describing where suit “may be brought,”

as the provision’s “first” sentence, and the sentence that immediately 

follows, referring to “concurrent” jurisdiction, as the “second.” 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

A 

The first sentence of §56 states that “an action may be

brought in a district court of the United States,” in, among 

other places, the district “in which the defendant shall be 

doing business at the time of commencing such action.” In 

Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44 (1941), we 

comprehended this clause as “establish[ing] venue” for a

federal-court action. Id., at 52. Congress, we explained,

designed §56 to expand venue beyond the limits of the

1888 Judiciary Act’s general venue provision, which allowed suit only “in districts of which the defendant was an

inhabitant.” Id., at 49; see Act of Aug. 13, 1888, §1, 25 

Stat. 434. Nowhere in Kepner or in any other decision did

we intimate that §56 might affect personal jurisdiction. 

Congress generally uses the expression, where suit “may 

be brought,” to indicate the federal districts in which

venue is proper. See, e.g., 28 U. S. C. §1391(b) (general 

venue statute specifying where “[a] civil action may be

brought”); J. Oakley, ALI, Fed. Judicial Code Rev. Project 

253–290 (2004) (listing special venue statutes, many with 

similar language). See also Kepner, 314 U. S., at 56 

(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The phrasing of [§56] follows the familiar pattern generally employed by Congress

in framing venue provisions.”).

In contrast, Congress’ typical mode of providing for the

exercise of personal jurisdiction has been to authorize

service of process. See, e.g., 15 U. S. C. §22 (Clayton Act 

provision stating that “all process in [cases against a 

corporation arising under federal antitrust laws] may be

served in the district of which [the defendant] is an inhabitant, or wherever [the defendant] may be found”); §53(a) 

(under Federal Trade Commission Act, “process may be 

served on any person, partnership, or corporation wherever 

it may be found”). See also Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. 

Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U. S. 97, 106–107 (1987) (discussing statutes that authorize (or fail to authorize) nation-
 

 

6 BNSF R. CO. v. TYRRELL 

Opinion of the Court 

wide service of process). But cf. Schlanger v. Seamans, 

401 U. S. 487, 490, n. 4 (1971) (though “Congress has

provided for nationwide service of process” in 28 U. S. C. 

§1391(e) (1964 ed., Supp. V), that statute was meant to

expand venue, not personal jurisdiction). Congress uses

this terminology because, absent consent, a basis for 

service of a summons on the defendant is prerequisite to

the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Omni Capital, 

484 U. S., at 104. 

Nelson and Tyrrell, however, argue that §56 relates to

personal jurisdiction. In their view, the 1888 Judiciary

Act provision that prompted §56’s enactment, 25 Stat. 434,

concerned both personal jurisdiction and venue. According

to House and Senate Reports, they contend, two cases had 

brought to Congress’ attention the problem with the prior

provision—namely, that in federal-question cases it authorized suit only in the district of the defendant’s residence. Brief for Respondents 16–18. See H. R. Rep. No. 

513, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1910) (citing Macon Grocery 

Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 215 U. S. 501 (1910); 

Cound v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 173 F. 527 (WD Tex.

1909)); S. Rep. No. 432, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1910) 

(same). In both cases, the courts had dismissed FELA 

suits for “want of jurisdiction.” Macon Grocery, 215 U. S., 

at 510; Cound, 173 F., at 534. To avert such jurisdictional

dismissals, they urge, Congress enacted §56. 

Legislative history “throws little light” here. Kepner, 

314 U. S., at 50.2 Driving today’s decision, we have long 

read the 1888 Judiciary Act provision to concern venue

only. See Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 205 U. S. 530, 

532–533 (1907) (analyzing personal jurisdiction separately, 

—————— 

2We note, moreover, that Nelson and Tyrrell overlooked the Senate

Report’s explicit reference to the first sentence of §56 as a venue provision, with no mention of personal jurisdiction. S. Rep. No. 432, 61st 

Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1910). 
 

 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

after concluding that venue was proper under 1888 Judiciary Act provision). See also Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. 

Co., 260 U. S. 653, 655 (1923) (noting that materially 

identical successor to 1888 Judiciary Act provision, Act of 

Mar. 3, 1911, §51, 36 Stat. 1101, “relates to the venue of 

suits”). Indeed, reading the 1888 Judiciary Act provision

to authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction would

have yielded an anomalous result: In diversity cases, the 

provision allowed for suit “in the district of the residence 

of either the plaintiff or the defendant.” 25 Stat. 434. 

Interpreting that clause to provide for jurisdiction would 

have allowed a plaintiff to hale a defendant into court 

in the plaintiff ’s home district, even if the district was 

one with which the defendant had no affiliation, and the 

episode-in-suit, no connection. 

B 

The second §56 sentence in point provides that “[t]he

jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this 

chapter shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the

several States.” Nelson and Tyrrell argue that this sentence extends to state courts the first sentence’s alleged

conferral of personal jurisdiction on federal courts. But, as 

just discussed, the first sentence concerns federal-court

venue and confers no personal jurisdiction on any court.

We have understood §56’s second sentence to provide for 

the concurrent subject-matter jurisdiction of state and

federal courts over actions under FELA. See Second 

Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 55–56 (1912). As 

Nelson and Tyrrell acknowledge, Congress added the

provision to confirm concurrent subject-matter jurisdiction

after the Connecticut Supreme Court held that Congress 

intended to confine FELA litigation to federal courts, and

that state courts had no obligation to entertain FELA

claims. See Brief for Respondents 23 (citing Hoxie v. New 

York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 82 Conn. 352, 73 A. 754 (1909)). 
 

8 BNSF R. CO. v. TYRRELL 

Opinion of the Court 

As Justice McKinnon recognized in her dissent from the

Montana Supreme Court’s decision in Nelson’s and Tyrrell’s cases, “[t]he phrase ‘concurrent jurisdiction’ is a wellknown term of art long employed by Congress and courts

to refer to subject-matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction.” 383 Mont., at 436, 373 P. 3d, at 13. See, e.g., 

Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 565 U. S. 368, 372 

(2012) (“federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over private suits arising under the [Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U. S. C. §227]”); Claflin 

v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 133–134 (1876) (State courts

retain “concurrent jurisdiction” over “suits in which a 

bankrupt” party is involved, notwithstanding exclusive 

federal jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters). 

C 

Pointing to a quartet of cases, the Montana Supreme

Court observed that this Court “consistently has interpreted [§]56 to allow state courts to hear cases brought 

under FELA even where the only basis for jurisdiction is

the railroad doing business in the forum [S]tate.” 383 

Mont., at 421–423, 425–426, 373 P. 3d, at 4–7 (citing Pope 

v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 345 U. S. 379 (1953); Miles v. 

Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U. S. 698 (1942); Kepner, 314 

U. S. 44; Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Terte, 284 

U. S. 284 (1932)).

None of the decisions featured by the Montana Supreme 

Court resolved a question of personal jurisdiction. Terte 

held that a FELA plaintiff, injured in Colorado, could 

bring suit in Missouri state court against a railroad incorporated elsewhere. 284 U. S., at 286–287. The dispute,

however, was over the Dormant Commerce Clause, not 

personal jurisdiction; the railroad defendants argued that

the suit would unduly burden interstate commerce, and

the decision rested on two Commerce Clause decisions, 

Michigan Central R. Co. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492 (1929), and 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

Hoffman v. Missouri ex rel. Foraker, 274 U. S. 21 (1927), 

not on an interpretation of §56. See Terte, 284 U. S., at 

285, 287. In Kepner and Miles, this Court held that a 

state court may not, based on inconvenience to a railroad 

defendant, enjoin its residents from bringing a FELA suit

in another State’s federal (Kepner) or state (Miles) courts. 

Kepner, 314 U. S., at 54; Miles, 315 U. S., at 699–700, 704. 

Pope held that 28 U. S. C. §1404(a)’s provision for transfer

from one federal court to another did not bear on the 

question decided in Miles: A state court still could not 

enjoin a FELA action brought in another State’s courts. 

345 U. S., at 383–384. 

Moreover, all these cases, save Pope, were decided before this Court’s transformative decision on personal

jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 

U. S. 310 (1945). See Daimler, 571 U. S., at ___, n. 18 (slip 

op., at 20, n. 18) (cautioning against reliance on cases 

“decided in the era dominated by” the “territorial thinking” of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878)). 

III 

Because FELA does not authorize state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a railroad solely on the 

ground that the railroad does some business in their 

States, the Montana courts’ assertion of personal jurisdiction over BNSF here must rest on Mont. Rule Civ. Proc. 

4(b)(1), the State’s provision for the exercise of personal

jurisdiction over “persons found” in Montana. See supra, 

at 2–3. BNSF does not contest that it is “found within” 

Montana as the State’s courts comprehend that rule. We 

therefore inquire whether the Montana courts’ exercise of

personal jurisdiction under Montana law comports with

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

In International Shoe, this Court explained that a state

court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-ofstate defendant who has “certain minimum contacts with 
 

 

10 BNSF R. CO. v. TYRRELL 

Opinion of the Court 

[the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not 

offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.’” 326 U. S., at 316. Elaborating on this guide, we

have distinguished between specific or case-linked jurisdiction and general or all-purpose jurisdiction. See, e.g., 

Daimler, 571 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8); Goodyear Dunlop 

Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U. S. 915, 919 

(2011); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 

466 U. S. 408, 414, nn. 8, 9 (1984). Because neither Nelson nor Tyrrell alleges any injury from work in or related 

to Montana, only the propriety of general jurisdiction is at 

issue here. 

Goodyear and Daimler clarified that “[a] court may 

assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or

foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims

against them when their affiliations with the State are so

‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially

at home in the forum State.” Daimler, 571 U. S., at ___ 

(slip op., at 8) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 919). The 

“paradigm” forums in which a corporate defendant is “at 

home,” we explained, are the corporation’s place of incorporation and its principal place of business. Daimler, 571 

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 18–19); Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 

924. The exercise of general jurisdiction is not limited to

these forums; in an “exceptional case,” a corporate defendant’s operations in another forum “may be so substantial 

and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home

in that State.” Daimler, 571 U. S., at ___, n. 19 (slip op., at 

20, n. 19). We suggested that Perkins v. Benguet Consol. 

Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437 (1952), exemplified such a case. 

Daimler, 571 U. S., at ___, n. 19 (slip op., at 20, n. 19). In 

Perkins, war had forced the defendant corporation’s owner 

to temporarily relocate the enterprise from the Philippines 

to Ohio. 342 U. S., at 447–448. Because Ohio then became “the center of the corporation’s wartime activities,” 

Daimler, 571 U. S., at ___, n. 8 (slip op., at 12, n. 8), suit 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

was proper there, Perkins, 342 U. S., at 448. 

The Montana Supreme Court distinguished Daimler on 

the ground that we did not there confront “a FELA claim 

or a railroad defendant.” 383 Mont., at 424, 373 P. 3d, at 

6. The Fourteenth Amendment due process constraint 

described in Daimler, however, applies to all state-court 

assertions of general jurisdiction over nonresident defendants; the constraint does not vary with the type of claim

asserted or business enterprise sued.3 

BNSF, we repeat, is not incorporated in Montana and 

does not maintain its principal place of business there. 

Nor is BNSF so heavily engaged in activity in Montana “as 

to render [it] essentially at home” in that State. See 

Daimler, 571 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (internal quotation marks omitted). As earlier noted, BNSF has over 

2,000 miles of railroad track and more than 2,000 employees in Montana. But, as we observed in Daimler, “the 

general jurisdiction inquiry does not focus solely on the

magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.” Id., at 

___, n. 20 (slip op., at 21, n. 20) (internal quotation marks 

and alterations omitted). Rather, the inquiry “calls for an

appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety”;

“[a] corporation that operates in many places can scarcely 

be deemed at home in all of them.” Ibid. In short, the 

business BNSF does in Montana is sufficient to subject the

railroad to specific personal jurisdiction in that State on

claims related to the business it does in Montana. But instate business, we clarified in Daimler and Goodyear, does 

not suffice to permit the assertion of general jurisdiction

over claims like Nelson’s and Tyrrell’s that are unrelated 

—————— 

3The Montana Supreme Court also erred in asserting that “Congress 

drafted the FELA to make a railroad ‘at home’ for jurisdictional purposes wherever it is ‘doing business.’ ” 383 Mont. 417, 425, 373 P. 3d 1, 

6 (2016). As discussed, supra, at 5–7, in §56’s first sentence, Congress

dealt with venue only, not personal jurisdiction. 
 

 

 

 

12 BNSF R. CO. v. TYRRELL 

Opinion of the Court 

to any activity occurring in Montana.4 

IV 

Nelson and Tyrrell present a further argument—that 

BNSF has consented to personal jurisdiction in Montana.

See Brief for Respondents 50–51. The Montana Supreme 

Court did not address this contention, see 383 Mont., at 

429, n. 3, 373 P. 3d, at 9, n. 3, so we do not reach it. See 

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005) (“[W]e

are a court of review, not of first view.”). 

* * * 

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Montana 

Supreme Court is reversed, and the cases are remanded 

—————— 

4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, dissenting in part, renews a debate comprehensively aired in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___ (2014). There, 

as again here, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR treats the assertion of jurisdiction

by the State of Washington courts in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), as an exercise of general, dispute-blind,

jurisdiction, post, at 3, thereby overlooking the fundamental difference 

between International Shoe and these cases. In International Shoe, the 

defendant corporation’s in-state activities had “not only been continuous and systematic, but also g[a]ve rise to the liabilities sued on.” 326 

U. S., at 317. The state courts there asserted jurisdiction not over 

claims that had nothing to do with the State; instead, they exercised

adjudicatory authority to hold the defendant corporation accountable 

for activity pursued within the State of Washington. Daimler, 571 

U. S., at ___, ___, n. 10 (slip op., at 7, 14, n. 10). This Court, therefore, 

had no occasion in International Shoe to “engage in a comparison

between International Shoe’s contacts within the State of Washington 

and the other States in which it operated.” Post, at 3. In marked 

contrast to International Shoe, Nelson’s and Tyrrell’s claims have no

relationship to anything that occurred or had its principal impact in

Montana. 

This Court’s opinion is not limited to §56 because the Montana 

Supreme Court went on to address and decide the question: Do “Montana courts have personal jurisdiction over BNSF under Montana law?” 

383 Mont., at 426, 373 P. 3d, at 7. See also id., at 429, 373 P. 3d, at 9 

(“Under Montana law, Montana courts have general personal jurisdiction over BNSF.”). 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
 

It is so ordered. 
Opinion of of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 16–405 

BNSF RAILWAY CO., PETITIONER v. KELLI TYRRELL, 

SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF BRENT T.
 

TYRRELL, DECEASED, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 

MONTANA
 

[May 30, 2017]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring in part and dissenting 

in part. 

I concur in the Court’s conclusion that the Federal 

Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U. S. C. §51 et seq., 

does not confer personal jurisdiction over railroads on 

state courts. I also agree that the Montana Supreme

Court erred when it concluded that the nature of the claim 

here—a FELA claim against a railroad—answers the 

question whether the Due Process Clause allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction over BNSF. But my agreement with the majority ends there. I continue to disagree

with the path the Court struck in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 

571 U. S. ___ (2014), which limits general jurisdiction over 

a corporate defendant only to those States where it is 

“‘essentially at home,’” id., at ___ (slip op., at 8). And even 

if the Court insists on adhering to that standard, I dissent

from its decision to apply it here in the first instance

rather than remanding to the Montana Supreme Court for 

it to conduct what should be a fact-intensive analysis

under the proper legal framework. Accordingly, I join

Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion, but dissent from Part 

III and the judgment. 

The Court would do well to adhere more faithfully to the

direction from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 

 

 

2 BNSF R. CO. v. TYRRELL 

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

U. S. 310 (1945), which instructed that general jurisdiction is proper when a corporation’s “continuous corporate 

operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a 

nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action

arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Id., at 318. Under International Shoe, in other 

words, courts were to ask whether the benefits a defendant attained in the forum State warranted the burdens 

associated with general personal jurisdiction. See id., at 

317–318. The majority itself acknowledges that International Shoe should govern, describing the question as 

whether a defendant’s affiliations with a State are sufficiently “‘continuous and systematic’” to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction there. Ante, at 10. If only its 

analysis today reflected that directive. Instead, the majority opinion goes on to reaffirm the restrictive “at home” 

test set out in Daimler—a test that, as I have explained, 

has no home in our precedents and creates serious inequities. See 571 U. S., at ___–___ (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

in judgment) (slip op., at 8–19).

The majority’s approach grants a jurisdictional windfall

to large multistate or multinational corporations that

operate across many jurisdictions. Under its reasoning, it

is virtually inconceivable that such corporations will ever 

be subject to general jurisdiction in any location other

than their principal places of business or of incorporation.

Foreign businesses with principal places of business outside the United States may never be subject to general

jurisdiction in this country even though they have continuous and systematic contacts within the United States.

See id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 17–18). What was once a 

holistic, nuanced contacts analysis backed by considerations of fairness and reasonableness has now effectively 

been replaced by the rote identification of a corporation’s 
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

principal place of business or place of incorporation.1 The 

result? It is individual plaintiffs, harmed by the actions 

of a farflung foreign corporation, who will bear the brunt 

of the majority’s approach and be forced to sue in distant jurisdictions with which they have no contacts or

connection. 

Moreover, the comparative contacts analysis invented in 

Daimler resurfaces here and proves all but dispositive.

The majority makes much of the fact that BNSF’s contacts

in Montana are only a percentage of its contacts with

other jurisdictions. Ante, at 3, 11. But International Shoe, 

which the majority agrees is the springboard for our modern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, ante, at 9, applied

no comparative contacts test. There the Court analyzed

whether the Delaware corporation had “by its activities in 

the State of Washington rendered itself amenable to proceedings” in the State. 326 U. S., at 311. The Court evaluated whether the corporation had offices in the forum

State, made contracts there, delivered goods there, or 

employed salesmen there. See id., at 313. Despite acknowledging that the corporation maintained places of 

business in several States, ibid., the Court did not engage

in a comparison between International Shoe’s contacts

within the State of Washington and the other States in 

which it operated.2 The Court noted that the corporation 

—————— 

1As many commentators have observed, lower courts adhered to the 

continuous-and-systematic standard for decades before Daimler, and its 

predecessor Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 

U. S. 915 (2011), wrought the present sea change. See, e.g., Cornett & 

Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction after Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 Ohio St. L. J. 101 (2015); Parry, 

Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction after Bauman and Walden, 19 Lewis 

& Clark L. Rev. 607 (2015); Doernberg, Resoling International Shoe, 2 

Tex. A&M L. Rev. 247 (2014); Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the 

Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S. C. L. Rev. 671

(2012). 2The majority responds that the language from International Shoe 
 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 

 

4 BNSF R. CO. v. TYRRELL 

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

employed 11 to 13 salesmen in Washington but did not 

query how that number compared to the number of salesmen in other States. Ibid. As well it should not have; the 

relative percentage of contacts is irrelevant. The focus 

should be on the quality and quantity of the defendant’s 

contacts in the forum State.3 

The majority does even Daimler itself a disservice, 

paying only lipservice to the question the Court purported

to reserve there—the possibility of an “exceptional case” in

which general jurisdiction would be proper in a forum

State that is neither a corporate defendant’s place of 

incorporation nor its principal place of business. See 571 

U. S., at ___, n. 19 (slip op., at 20, n. 19). Its opinion here

could be understood to limit that exception to the exact

facts of Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U. S. 

437 (1952). See ante, at 10–11. That reading is so narrow

as to read the exception out of existence entirely; certainly

a defendant with significant contacts with more than one 

State falls outside its ambit. And so it is inevitable under 

its own reasoning that the majority would conclude that

BNSF’s contacts with Montana are insufficient to justify 

the exercise of personal jurisdiction here. This result is 

perverse. Despite having reserved the possibility of an 

“exceptional case” in Daimler, the majority here has re-

—————— 

informs only a specific jurisdiction case. Ante, at 12, n. 4. But the 

majority’s view of International Shoe is overly restrictive. The terms 

“specific jurisdiction” and “general jurisdiction” are nowhere to be found

in that opinion. And I continue to believe, as I noted in Daimler, that 

there is no material difference between the “continuous and systematic” 

terminology International Shoe used for what we now call specific

jurisdiction and the “continuous” and “substantial” terminology it used

for what we now call general jurisdiction. See Daimler, 571 U. S., at 

___, n. 6 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 8, n. 6). 3 Indeed, in neither Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U. S. 

437 (1952), nor Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 

U. S. 408 (1984), did the Court engage in a comparative-contacts 

analysis. 
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 5 

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

jected that possibility out of hand. 

Worse, the majority reaches its conclusion only by departing from the Court’s normal practice.4 Had it remanded to the Montana Supreme Court to reevaluate the 

due process question under the correct legal standard,

that court could have examined whether this is such an 

“exceptional case.” Instead, with its ruling today, the 

Court unnecessarily sends a signal to the lower courts

that the exceptional-circumstances inquiry is all form, no

substance. 

I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. 

—————— 

4The Montana Supreme Court reached this question only by wrongly 

assuming that 45 U. S. C. §56 is a jurisdictional statute and that a

defendant’s unique status as a railroad company is dispositive of the 

jurisdictional question. A remand rather than an outright reversal is

this Court’s traditional practice where a lower court applies the incorrect legal standard; we have done it repeatedly just this Term. See, 

e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 580 U. S. ___ 

(2017); Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l 

Drilling Co., ante, p. ___; McLane Co. v. EEOC, ante, p. ___; Moore v. 

Texas, ante, p. ___.