Opinion issued April 30, 2024

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-22-00720-CV

———————————

CG RANCH SERVICES, LLC, Appellant

V.

SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, Appellee

On Appeal from the 129th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2020-26175

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case arises from a contract dispute. CG Ranch Services, LLC sued 

Schlumberger Technology Corporation for breach of contract and fraud. The trial 

court granted Schlumberger’s motions for summary judgment and ordered that CG 

Ranch take nothing on its claims, and CG Ranch appealed. In four issues, CG Ranch 
2

argues that the trial court erred in granting Schlumberger’s motions for summary 

judgment and in sustaining Schlumberger’s objections to CG Ranch’s summary 

judgment evidence.

We affirm.

Background

CG Ranch and Schlumberger entered into an Agreement for Rental 

Equipment and Services, dated July 11, 2019, (“Agreement”), whereby 

Schlumberger would lease hunting equipment from CG Ranch. The Agreement 

consists of several parts that “shall be read as one document,” including the Form of 

Agreement and Exhibits A–I. The Agreement providesthat it was to be “an umbrella 

agreement which sets the terms and conditions under which Schlumberger 

may . . . rent Units . . . from [CG Ranch] and/or purchase associated services.” 

Under Exhibit A to the Agreement, the General Terms and Conditions for 

Rental Equipment and Services, Schlumberger was required to submit a purchase 

order describing the type, quantity, price, and required date of delivery of the rental 

equipment or products or the performance of services. 

On August 1, 2019, Schlumberger and CG Ranch entered into a service order,

under which Schlumberger leased various hunting equipment from CG Ranch for 

Schlumberger’s use on its King Ranch property for a 54-month term, beginning on 
3

September 1, 2019. A month later, the parties amended the service order to, among 

other things, extend the lease period for an additional year, through March 31, 2024.1

By letter dated March 31, 2020, Schlumberger informed CG Ranch that it was 

terminating the Agreement pursuant to Article 9.1(f) of the Agreement:

Please allow this correspondence to serve as thirty days’ written 

notice of the cancellation of the Agreement pursuant to Section 9.1(f)

of the Agreement. Such cancellation shall become effective April 30, 

2020. Pursuant to Section 9.2(b) of the Agreement, the Service Order 

shall terminate concurrently.

As per Section 9.5(b) Schlumberger shall pay rental on the 

equipment/units until the termination date. Additionally, Schlumberger 

will have the equipment listed in Exhibit 1 of the Service Order that is 

not currently in CG Ranch Services’ possession ready to be returned to 

CG Ranch Services on April 30, 2020. Please confirm receipt of this 

correspondence and advise of plans to retrieve the equipment. 

CG Ranch sued Schlumberger, alleging that Schlumberger’s termination 

breached the Agreement. Schlumberger moved for traditional summary judgment 

on CG Ranch’s breach-of-contract claim, arguing that its termination was expressly

authorized by the Agreement. CG Ranch filed a response and amended its petition 

to include a claim for fraud and a second breach-of-contract claim based on 

Schlumberger’s alleged misuse and abuse of the rental equipment. The trial court 

granted partial summary judgment in favor of Schlumberger on CG Ranch’s claim 

of breach of contract by termination. 

1 We refer to the August 1, 2019 service order and its September 9, 2019 amendment 

collectively as the Amended Service Order.
4

The trial court entered a docket control order on CG Ranch’s new claims and 

set the deadline to designate expert witnesses for April 10, 2022. CG Ranch did not 

designate any experts. 

Shortly before the close of discovery, Schlumberger moved for no evidence 

summary judgment on CG Ranch’s remaining breach of contract and fraud claims. 

In a separate motion filed the same day, Schlumberger also moved for traditional 

summary judgment on CG Ranch’s fraud claim. 

CG Ranch filed a combined response to both summary judgment motions and 

attached as evidence the affidavit of Robert Woodcock. Schlumberger objected to 

the Woodcock affidavit, arguing that it was conclusory, and that CG Ranch failed to 

timely designate Woodcock as an expert. The trial court sustained Schlumberger’s 

objections to the Woodcock affidavit and granted Schlumberger’s no evidence and 

traditional motions for summary judgment. CG Ranch now appeals from the trial 

court’s final summary judgment. 

Summary Judgment

In four issues, CG Ranch argues that the trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment in favor of Schlumberger on its breach of contract and fraud claims, and 

in sustaining Schlumberger’s objections to the Woodcock affidavit.
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A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment de 

novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). Under 

the traditional summary judgment standard, the movant has the burden to show that 

no genuine issues of material fact exist and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 

548 (Tex. 1985). To determine whether there are disputed issues of material fact, 

we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable 

inference in the nonmovant’s favor. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548–49.

To prevail on a no evidence motion for summary judgment, the movant must 

demonstrate that there is no evidence to support an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim on which the nonmovant would have the burden of proof at trial. 

TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 523–24 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to 

present some probative evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to each 

of the elements specified in the motion. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d

572, 582 (Tex. 2006).

“The trial court must grant the [no evidence] motion unless the nonmovant 

produces more than a scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on 

the challenged elements.” Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Carter, 371 S.W.3d 366, 376
6

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). More than a scintilla of 

evidence exists if the evidence “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and 

fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v.

Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997). However, “when the evidence offered 

to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or 

suspicion of its existence, the evidence is no more than a scintilla and, in legal effect, 

is no evidence.” Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004). 

When, as here, the trial court’s summary judgment does not state the basis for 

the court’s decision, we must uphold the summary judgment if any of the theories 

advanced in the motion are meritorious. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott,

128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003). 

When a party moves for both a traditional and no evidence summary 

judgment, we first review the trial court’s summary judgment under the no evidence 

standard of review. Ford Motor, 135 S.W.3d at 600. If the trial court properly 

granted the no evidence motion, we do not consider the arguments raised regarding 

the traditional summary-judgment motion. Id. 

B. Breach of Contract by Termination

In its first issue, CG Ranch argues that the trial court erred in granting 

Schlumberger’s partial traditional motion for summary judgment on its claim for
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breach of contract by termination.

2

 According to CG Ranch, the termination 

provisions in the Agreement and the Amended Service Order contain a latent 

ambiguity that create a fact issue and should have prevented the trial court from 

granting summary judgment as a matter of law. 

1. Contract Interpretation Principles

Absent ambiguity, contracts are construed as a matter of law. Moayedi v. 

Interstate 35/Chisam Rd., L.P., 438 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2014). In construing a written 

contract, our primary objective is to ascertain the parties’ true intentions as expressed 

in the language they chose. Id. “An unambiguous contract will be enforced as 

written, and parol evidence will not be received for the purpose of creating an 

ambiguity or to give the contract a meaning different from that which its language 

imports.” David J. Sacks, P.C. v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex. 2008). A court 

may “consider the parties’ interpretation of the contract and admit extrinsic evidence 

to determine the true meaning of its terms only after the court has determined that 

the contract is ambiguous.” Id. at 450–51 (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of 

Pittsburgh, Penn. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995) (per 

curiam)). 

2

“When a trial court renders a final judgment, the court’s interlocutory orders merge 

into that judgment and may be challenged by appealing the final judgment.”

Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex., 603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. 2020). 
8

A contract is not ambiguous if the contract’s language can be given a certain 

or definite meaning. El Paso Field Servs., L.P. v. MasTec N. Am., Inc., 389 S.W.3d 

802, 806 (Tex. 2012). When the controversy can be resolved by proper construction 

of an unambiguous document, rendition of summary judgment is appropriate. Lopez 

v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857, 862 (Tex. 2000). 

“On the other hand, if the contract is subject to two or more reasonable 

interpretations after applying the pertinent rules of construction, the contract is 

ambiguous, creating a fact issue on the parties’ intent.” J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. 

Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003) (citing Columbia Gas Transmission 

Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. 1996)). A contract is not 

ambiguous merely because the parties disagree about its meaning. URI, Inc. v. 

Kleberg Cnty., 543 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. 2018).

A “latent ambiguity arises when a contract which is unambiguous on its face 

is applied to the subject matter with which it deals and an ambiguity appears by 

reason of some collateral matter, such as the circumstances present when the contract 

was entered.” Id. But “the ambiguity must become evident when the contract is read 

in context of the surrounding circumstances, not after parol evidence of intent is 

admitted to create an ambiguity.” Id.
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2. Analysis

CG Ranch alleged that Schlumberger materially breached the terms of the 

Agreement when it terminated and “failed to pay [] under the terms of the 

Agreements.” Schlumberger moved for summary judgment arguing that its 

termination was unambiguously authorized by the Agreement, specifically Article 

9.1(f), therefore there was no breach, and it was entitled to summary judgment as a 

matter of law. To resolve this question, we turn to the language of the Agreement. 

Exhibit A to the Agreement contains an “order of precedence,” stating that the 

various parts of the Agreement

shall be read as one document, the contents of which, in the event of 

conflict or inconsistency, shall be given precedence in the following 

order listed in declining weight: (i) the Form of Agreement, (ii) Exhibit 

B, (iii) Exhibit A, and (iv) all other exhibits in the Form of Agreement 

in declining weight. 

Exhibit B to the Agreement is the Special Terms and Conditions for Rental 

Equipment and Services, and Exhibit A to the Agreement is the General Terms and 

Conditions for Rental Equipment and Services. Included in the “other exhibits in 

the Form of Agreement” is Exhibit I, which is the Form of Service Order. Exhibit I 

is representative of the Amended Service Order at issue in this case. 

Accordingly, to the extent there are conflicts between the provisions of the 

various documents, the Form of Agreement controls, followed by the Special Terms 
10

and Conditions, then the General Terms and Conditions, and so on, through the 

document of least weight, i.e., the service order.

As relevant to CG Ranch’s claim for breach of contract by termination, Article 

9 of Exhibit A relates to termination and suspension. Article 9 lists the ways in 

which the entire Agreement may be terminated—Article 9.1—and the ways in which 

an individual service order may be canceled or terminated—Article 9.3. 

With respect to the termination of the Agreement as a whole, Article 9.1(f) 

provides: “without prejudice to Article 9.2 Schlumberger may terminate the 

Agreement, in whole or in part, at its convenience by serving thirty (30) day prior 

written notice to [CG Ranch].” Article 9.2 then requires that if, at the time of 

termination of the Agreement, any order is being performed, said order shall either 

be completed or terminated concurrently with the Agreement. 

If the termination of the Agreement occurs pursuant to Article 9.1(f), Article 

9.2 provides that “the provisions of Article 9.5 shall apply.” Article 9.5 states: “If 

an Order is cancelled/terminated pursuant to Article 9.3(d) or as a result of the 

Agreement being terminated pursuant to Article 9.1(f) [and] . . . if the Order is 

terminated after shipment/delivery . . . [CG Ranch] shall be paid for the 

[equipment] . . . up to the date of termination, unless otherwise agreed to in the 

Order.” (Emphasis added). 
11

The Agreement also provides for termination or cancelation of an individual 

order, as opposed to the entire agreement. That article—specifically, Article 

9.3(d)—allows Schlumberger to “cancel/terminate for convenience, in whole or in 

part, an Order pursuant to the Agreement at any time after acceptance by [CG 

Ranch], and the provisions of Article 9.5 shall apply.” 

Thus, under the terms of the Agreement, Schlumberger had the ability to 

terminate at its convenience either: (1) the entire Agreement under Article 9.1(f), or 

(2) an individual service order under Article 9.3(d). Upon such termination for 

convenience, Schlumberger would be required to pay CG Ranch (per Article 9.5) 

the rental payments up to the date of termination, unless otherwise agreed to in the 

order.

Here, through its March 31, 2020 letter, Schlumberger chose to terminate the 

entire Agreement pursuant to Article 9.1(f)—not just the Amended Service Order. 

Because it terminated the entire Agreement under Article 9.1(f), Article 9.2 dictates 

that any pending service order, which would include the Amended Service Order, 

would terminate concurrently with the Agreement. And because termination 

occurred after delivery of the rental equipment, Schlumberger was required to pay 

CG Ranch the rental fees through the date of termination under Article 9.5, unless 

otherwise agreed to in the Order. 
12

It is this language—unless otherwise agreed to in the Order—that CG Ranch 

argues directs us to Section 6.3 of the Amended Service Order and required

Schlumberger to pay the remaining balance of the lease payments, not just the 

payments through the date of termination. We disagree.

Section 6.3 of the Amended Service Order provides:

In the event of termination of this Order by Schlumberger pursuant to 

Article 9.3(a) or (d) of the Agreement, Schlumberger shall pay a 

termination fee to [CG Ranch] based on the following criteria . . . [l]ess 

than 12 months after Oct 1st, 2019, the unpaid balance of the lease 

payments under the Order[.] 

(Emphasis added). Under the plain language of Section 6.3, this section applies only 

if Schlumberger elects to terminate the individual order under either Article 9.3(a) 

or (d). It does not apply when termination of the Agreement as a whole occurs under 

Article 9.1, or when termination of an individual order is triggered under Article 9.2 

by virtue of the termination under Article 9.1. Here, Schlumberger did not terminate 

the individual order pursuant to Article 9.3(a) or (d) of the Agreement, but rather 

terminated the entire Agreement pursuant to Article 9.1(f). By its plain and 

unambiguous terms, Section 6.3 does not apply. 

We also disagree that Section 6.3’s language creates a latent ambiguity. 

According to CG Ranch, the application of the termination provisions creates a latent 

ambiguity because termination pursuant to Article 9.1(f) and Article 9.3(d), both of 
13

which allow termination due to convenience with 30 days’ notice, “is a distinction 

without a difference.” 

To the contrary, there is a great distinction. While both provisions allow 

Schlumberger to terminate something at its convenience, only one provision—

Article 9.1(f)—allows Schlumberger to terminate the entire Agreement, including 

any pending orders, thus terminating the entire contractual relationship between the 

parties.

The other provision—Article 9.3(d)—allows Schlumberger to terminate an 

individual order, while keeping the overarching “umbrella” Agreement between the 

parties in place and allowing for future service orders to be entered into between the 

parties. This reading of the termination clauses does not render Section 6.3 of the 

Amended Service Order meaningless, nor does it create a latent ambiguity. Because 

the documents at issue in this dispute can be given a certain or definite meaning, we 

conclude that they are not ambiguous. See El Paso Field Servs., 389 S.W.3d at 806.

The Agreement between the parties clearly contemplated that Schlumberger 

would have the option and ability to terminate individual orders, without terminating 

the entire Agreement, or to terminate the entire Agreement and, concurrently 

therewith, any orders in progress. While Section 6.3 of the Amended Service Order 

does require Schlumberger to make graduated payments in the event of an early
14

termination of the Amended Service Order, if that termination occurred under either 

Article 9.3(a) or (d), that is not what happened here. 

Instead, Schlumberger elected to terminate the entire Agreement under Article 

9.1(f), provided the 30 days’ written notice required by the Agreement, and 

indisputably paid the lease payments due through the date of termination as required 

by Article 9.5. Interpreting the unambiguous language of the Agreement, we hold 

that Schlumberger did not breach the Agreement by terminating and that the trial 

court properly granted partial summary judgment in favor of Schlumberger on this 

breach of contract claim. See Lopez, 22 S.W.3d at 862.

We overrule CG Ranch’s first issue.

C. Breach of Contract for Misuse or Abuse of Equipment

With respect to CG Ranch’s claim for breach of contract based on the misuse 

or abuse of equipment, CG Ranch argues that Schlumberger’s no evidence motion 

for summary judgment should have been denied because Schlumberger damaged the 

rental equipment beyond normal wear and tear and caused CG Ranch to suffer 

damages in excess of $180,000. In connection with this argument, CG Ranch also 

argues that the trial court erred in sustaining Schlumberger’s objections to CG 

Ranch’s summary judgment evidence, i.e., the Woodcock affidavit. 
15

In response, Schlumberger argues that we must affirm because CG Ranch 

failed to challenge each independent ground for summary judgment on this claim. 

Because Schlumberger’s argument is dispositive, we address it first.

An appellate court may not reverse a trial court’s judgment without properly 

assigned error. Rosetta Res. Operating, LP v. Martin, 645 S.W.3d 212, 226–27 (Tex. 

2022. When a trial court’s order granting summary judgment does not specify the 

grounds on which its order is based, the appealing party must negate each ground 

upon which the judgment could have been based. Id.; Britton v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. 

Just., 95 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet).

A party may negate each ground by raising separate issues or asserting a 

general issue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, and within that 

issue providing argument negating all possible grounds upon which summary 

judgment could have been granted. Rosetta Res. Operating, 645 S.W.3d at 227.

3

A general statement that “the trial court erred by granting [the movant’s] 

motion for summary judgment” may be sufficient to allow argument on all possible 

grounds that the summary judgment motion was granted, but if a party does not brief 

those arguments, the court cannot properly reverse summary judgment on those 

3 See also Tweedell v. Hochheim Prairie Farm Mut. Ins. Ass’n, 1 S.W.3d 304, 309 

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1999, no pet.) (affirming trial court’s 

summary judgment on grounds not challenged “(1) by a separate [issue] or (2) by 

argument and citation to authority under” broader issue).
16

grounds. Id.; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The [appellant’s] brief must contain 

a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to 

authorities and to the record.”). “If summary judgment may have been rendered, 

properly or improperly, on a ground not challenged, the judgment must be affirmed.” 

Ellis v. Precision Engine Rebuilders, Inc., 68 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).4

Applying these principles here, we examine the grounds on which 

Schlumberger moved for summary judgment, and whether CG Ranch has attacked 

each of those grounds in its briefing here. 

Schlumberger moved for no evidence summary judgment on three specific 

grounds with respect to CG Ranch’s breach of contract for misuse or abuse of 

equipment: (1) there is no evidence that Schlumberger breached the Rental 

Agreement because there is no evidence that Schlumberger damaged any of the 

leased equipment beyond fair wear and tear and depreciation, (2) there is no evidence 

that CG Ranch sustained damages due to any alleged breach, and (3) there is no 

4 See also Jack v. Holiday World of Hous., 262 S.W.3d 42, 49–50 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“If an independent ground fully supports the 

complained-of ruling or judgment, but the appellant assigns no error to that 

independent ground, then (1) we must accept the validity of that unchallenged 

independent ground ... and thus (2) any error in the grounds challenged on appeal 

is harmless because the unchallenged independent ground fully supports the 

complained-of ruling or judgment.”).
17

evidence that CG Ranch satisfied the condition precedent required to recover

damages under the Agreement. 

With respect to the third argument, Schlumberger argued that Article 8.4(b) 

of the Agreement provided CG Ranch with two options if its equipment was not 

returned “at the same conditions they were rented out, fair wear and tear and 

depreciation excluded.”

CG Ranch could either (1) declare the equipment a total loss if it is incapable 

of economic repair; or (2) make the repairs that are necessary to put the equipment 

“into the same good order and repair as such [equipment] was at the beginning of 

the rental period, fair wear and tear and depreciation excluded.” Once CG Ranch 

made that election, Schlumberger argued that Article 8.4(c) permits CG Ranch to

recover from Schlumberger “all costs incurred with regard to the repair and 

restoration of the lost or damaged [equipment].” 

Because CG Ranch seeks to recover the cost to repair the equipment, 

Schlumberger argued that, as a condition precedent to recovering these costs, CG 

Ranch needed to actually perform the repairs. Schlumberger contended CG Ranch 

has no evidence that it performed the repairs, only that it received estimates for the 

repairs, and therefore CG Ranch failed to comply with the condition precedent to 

recovery, and Schlumberger was entitled to summary judgment. Without identifying 
18

the specific grounds, the trial court granted summary judgment for Schlumberger on 

this breach-of-contract claim. 

On appeal, CG Ranch presents a general issue that the trial court erred in 

granting Schlumberger’s no evidence motion. But its substantive arguments only 

challenge Schlumberger’s no evidence grounds related to breach and damages (and, 

relatedly, the trial court’s exclusion of CG Ranch’s summary-judgment evidence). 

CG Ranch does not challenge Schlumberger’s alternative argument that it was 

entitled to summary judgment based on CG Ranch’s failure to comply with the

condition precedent. In fact, neither the words “condition precedent” nor any 

reference to Article 8.4(b) or (c) appear anywhere in CG Ranch’s brief on appeal. 

Because performance of a condition precedent is an essential element of a 

plaintiff’s breach-of-contract case, summary judgment could have been rendered, 

properly or improperly, on that ground. See Lidawi v. Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. 

Co., 112 S.W.3d 725, 734 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.); see also 

Ellis, 68 S.W.3d at 898. Therefore, CG Ranch needed to challenge this ground 

separately on appeal. See Rosetta Res. Operating, 645 S.W.3d at 227–28. But, even 

construing its briefing liberally, CG Ranch does not challenge this alternative ground 

on which the trial court could have based its summary judgment ruling in favor of 

Schlumberger. 
19

As a result, we must affirm the summary judgment regarding CG Ranch’s 

claim for breach of contract for misuse or abuse of equipment. See id.

5

D. Fraud 

For similar reasons, we must affirm the trial court’s judgment on CG Ranch’s 

fraud claim against Schlumberger. On June 29, 2022, Schlumberger filed two 

separate motions—a no evidence motion for summary judgment and a traditional 

motion for summary judgment. 

In the no evidence motion, Schlumberger asserted that CG Ranch could not 

produce any evidence to establish each element of its fraud claim. In the traditional 

motion, Schlumberger asserted that CG Ranch expressly disclaimed any reliance on 

Schlumberger’s representations in Article 31.9 of the Agreement and accepted those 

terms again when it entered into the Amended Service Order. Schlumberger also 

argued that, even if CG Ranch did not disclaim reliance, any reliance by CG Ranch 

was not justified because the alleged representations directly contradicted the 

unambiguous terms of the Agreement. 

5 Because we conclude that CG Ranch has not challenged an independent ground 

supporting summary judgment, it is not necessary for us to consider CG Ranch’s 

remaining arguments raised in issues two and three related to the trial court’s 

sustaining of Schlumberger’s objections to the Woodcock affidavit. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 47.1; Sosa v. Auto Club Indem. Co., No. 01-21-00312-CV, 2022 WL 

3722396, at *7 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30, 2022, pet. denied) 

(mem. op.).
20

In two separate orders, the trial court granted both the no evidence and the 

traditional motions for summary judgment. The orders did not identify the specific 

grounds for granting judgment. 

As noted above, to obtain reversal on appeal, an appellant must challenge all 

possible grounds on which a summary judgment could have been granted, whether 

properly or improperly. Rosetta Res. Operating, 645 S.W.3d at 227; Ellis, 68 S.W.3d 

at 898. Consistent with that principle, when a defendant moves for both traditional 

and no evidence summary judgment, and the plaintiff fails to challenge both the 

traditional and no evidence grounds on appeal, an appellate court must affirm. See

Ursin v. Brand Energy Sols., Inc., No. 01-22-00651-CV, 2023 WL 3958375, at *3 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 13, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).6

Here, in three separate places in its brief, CG Ranch lists the four issues 

presented on appeal.7In its fourth issue, CG Ranch generally states that the trial 

6 See also Munguia v. Justrod, No. 14-18-01059-CV, 2021 WL 282569, at *1–2 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 28, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

7 CG Ranch’s four issues read as follows:

1. The Service Agreement and Purchase Order contain a latent 

ambiguity which prevents the trial court from ruling as a matter of 

law. Thus, the Trial Court committed revers[i]ble error in granting 

Schlumberger’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment [ordering] CG 

Ranch take nothing on its claim for breach of contract as set forth in 

the CG Ranch’s First Amended Petition under Section VII.A (Breach 

of Contract by Termination).
21

court committed reversible error in granting Schlumberger’s no evidence motion for 

summary judgment and dismissing CG Ranch’s breach of contract and fraud claims 

with prejudice.8 But CG Ranch does not assign error to the trial court’s grant of 

Schlumberger’s traditional motion for summary judgment. And in the argument 

section of its brief, CG Ranch addresses the fraud elements challenged in 

Schlumberger’s no evidence motion, but it does not address the separate grounds 

raised in Schlumberger’s traditional motion—specifically, Schlumberger’s 

disclaimer argument. We note that Schlumberger explicitly highlights this omission 

2. The Trial Court committed revers[i]ble error sustaining the 

Schlumberger’s objections to the affidavits of Robert Woodcock as 

conclusory.

3. The Court committed revers[i]ble error sustaining the Schlumberger’s 

objection to the affidavits of Robert Woodcock for failure to designate 

as an expert. Robert Woodcock should be allowed to offer lay witness 

testimony as to the condition and value of the equipment he designed, 

built, and maintained.

4. The Court committed revers[i]ble error in granting Schlumberger’s 

No Evidence Summary Judgment dismissing all CG Ranch’s claims 

with prejudice. 

8 We note that, in one place in its brief, CG Ranch includes a fifth issue presented—

that the trial court committed reversible error in denying its motion for new trial. 

Beyond this statement of the issue presented, CG Ranch presents no legal argument,

citations to the record, or legal authorities relating to the denial of its motion for new 

trial. Accordingly, to the extent CG Ranch intended to challenge the trial court’s 

denial of its motion for new trial on appeal, we hold that issue is waived for 

inadequate briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
22

in its brief and points out that judgment could be affirmed on this basis alone, but 

CG Ranch did not file a reply brief to address the omission. Id.

Even construing its briefing liberally, CG Ranch’s argument challenging the 

grant of the no evidence summary judgment on its fraud claim does not address the 

grounds, arguments, and evidence Schlumberger raised in its traditional motion for 

summary judgment.9 See id.; Munguia v. Justrod, No. 14-18-01059-CV, 2021 WL 

282569, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 28, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. 

op.). Accordingly, we must also affirm the trial court’s summary judgment on CG 

Ranch’s fraud claim against Schlumberger. 

We overrule CG Ranch’s fourth issue.

9 CG Ranch includes a singular mention of the traditional motion for summary 

judgment in the last sentence of its brief before the prayer for relief—“Therefore, 

Schlumberger’s Motion for Traditional and No Evidence Summary Judgment 

should be denied.” As stated, however, at no point does CG Ranch challenge the 

grant of traditional summary judgment, much less the specific grounds, arguments, 

and evidence presented in Schlumberger’s traditional motion. See Mungia, 2021 

WL 282569, at *2 n.3.
23

Conclusion

For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s final summary judgment in 

all things.

Terry Adams

Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Landau and Rivas-Molloy.