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TRANSITION AT A CROSSROADS: TUNISIA THREE

YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 4, 2013

Serial No. 113–92

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Scott Mastic, regional director, Middle East and North Africa, International Republican Institute ............................................................................. 5

Mr. Leslie Campbell, senior associate and regional director, Middle East 

and North Africa, National Democratic Institute .............................................. 12

Mr. Bill Sweeney, president and chief executive officer, International Foundation for Electoral Systems ................................................................................... 21

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Scott Mastic: Prepared statement ................................................................... 7

Mr. Leslie Campbell: Prepared statement ............................................................. 14

Mr. Bill Sweeney: Prepared statement .................................................................. 23

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 40

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 41

(1)

TRANSITION AT A CROSSROADS: TUNISIA 

THREE YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in room 

2167 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. After 

recognizing myself, my good friend, the ranking member Ted 

Deutch of Florida for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, 

we will then break for votes and when we come back, I will recognize members of our subcommittee for 1-minute opening statements each. And then, we will hear from our panelists. And without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will be made a 

part of the record and members may have 5 legislative days to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to the length 

limitation of the rules. The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

Three years ago this month, the self-immolation of a Tunisian 

street vendor would set in motion a series of events that would fundamentally change the political landscape of the entire Middle East 

and North Africa region—a period we now call the Arab Spring. Finally fed up with autocratic rule, with corruption, with a lack of 

basic freedoms, thousands of Tunisians took to the streets calling 

for democratic and social reforms and an end to the maligned 23-

year rule of their leader. 

But though there has been some significant progress made since 

his ouster, there is still so much that needs to be done to meet the 

goals and the aspirations of the Tunisian people who began this 

process, as I said, 3 years ago. By most accounts, the Tunisians 

had a successful National Constituent Assembly election in October 

2011, which brought a party into power together with the Tunisian 

two leading secularist parties. 

However, the newly formed government quickly ran into obstacles that it could not overcome and Tunisia’s transition came to a 

grinding halt this summer when a prominent secular party member was assassinated. The assassination eventually led to the formation of a National Dialogue process to jump start the reconciliation process, to select a caretaker government, and get Tunisia 

back on track for a new round of elections. But the National DiaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:06 Jan 15, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\120413\85790 HFA PsN: SHIRL
2

logue has been met with its own set of obstacles and the negotiations over who will be the caretaker Prime Minister have caused 

an impasse. 

Now, as the political process has paused and the future of the 

Constitution and elections are in question, Tunisia finds itself at a 

crossroads as frustrations begin to set in and the rift between the 

secular and the Islamist ideologues continues to grow as both sides 

battle for legitimacy. Compounding these political problems are the 

economic and security challenges facing Tunisia as all three are 

undeniably linked and all three face an uphill battle. 

However, one of the most pressing issues from a U.S. perspective 

is the threat of Islamic extremism in Tunisia. Foreign fighters and 

home grown extremists have challenged the stability of Tunisia, 

and while the Tunisian security forces have thus far been able to 

combat al-Qaeda, AQIM, and its affiliates, these terrorist networks 

continue to pose a threat to Tunisia and to the region. 

Tunisia’s border with Algeria is known to be a training area for 

the terrorist groups, and the insecure border with Libya is a major 

area for concern as it is vulnerable to smugglers and others who 

wish to cross into Tunisia undetected. Terrorist attacks like the one 

on the U.S. Embassy in September 2012 as well as the assassination of two prominent secular politicians threaten to derail the political process. 

With Tunisia being the birthplace of the Arab Spring, we must 

continue to support the democratic aspirations in the hope that it 

can come through this transition successfully. For better or worse, 

the fate of Tunisia is tied to the reform movements throughout the 

rest of the region as it is viewed as the test-case for the democratic 

transitions in the Arab world. 

It is in the vital national security interests of the United States 

to see a secure, a stable and a democratic Tunisia, and I hope the 

administration does not overlook the importance of this strategic 

country. We must remain engaged throughout the National Dialogue process and beyond to ensure a successful transition to democracy in Tunisia and we must not allow the terrorist groups to 

derail the political transition nor gain any more influence in an already susceptible region. And we must work to find effective ways 

to assist Tunisia as it struggles to fight this rising threat of terrorism. 

This is a critical juncture for Tunisia, for the region and for 

United States strategic interests. We must support the people of 

Tunisia as they struggle to achieve real reforms and we must also 

support groups like IRI, NDI, IFES who are on the ground day 

after day promoting democracy in this vitally important region and 

working to find a consensus among all parties on a new Constitution and new electoral process. 

With that, I yield to my ranking member, my friend, Ted Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thanks to our 

witnesses for testifying today on the state of Tunisia’s transition. 

Thanks as well for your patience as we prepare to head off to vote. 

It has been 3 years since a Tunisian street vendor changed the 

course of Tunisia in the Middle East. As we all remember, 

Mohamed Bouazizi, an unlicensed vendor was being harassed by 

police and accused by local authorities of evading an arbitrary fine. 

3

The police confiscated six crates of his fruits and his electronic 

scale and denied him any appeal. In debt, tired of being harassed, 

without recourse and without economic opportunities, Bouazizi set 

himself on fire. His act became a catalyst for the Jasmine Revolution and the wider Arab Spring and it incited demonstrations and 

riots throughout Tunisia and the region in protest of social, political, and economic issues. 

In the months that followed, the world had great hopes about 

what Tunisia might become. In early 2011, Tunisia ended the authoritarian regime of then President Ben Ali and in October 2011, 

Tunisia held elections that were praised as free and fair. Political 

and civil liberties were expanded and it appeared that Tunisia 

would become a model for the rest of the Middle East. Unfortunately, Tunisia has fallen short of the lofty and perhaps unrealistic 

expectations that were set in 2011. Political squabbling is limited 

to structural reforms needed to guarantee democratic institutions 

and the summer’s assassination of a prominent secular leader has 

left many Tunisians not only disillusioned with their country’s 

growing political polarization, but also increasingly worried about 

their own safety. 

Under former President Ben Ali, the Tunisian people were used 

to the stability of a police state. However, violent extremist groups 

have exploited the region’s poorest borders with terrorist attacks on 

the U.S. Embassy and a popular tourist resort. Tunisians are increasingly frightened and seeking stability. Furthermore, many of 

the same economic challenges that contributed to the Jasmine Revolution still exist today. Youth unemployment among college graduates is over 30 percent. Tunisia’s international credit rating is 

poor and the increasingly unstable security situation has been particularly damaging for a country that employs 400,000 people in 

the tourism industry. 

Furthermore, according to press reports, not a single project from 

the 2012 budget has been fully implemented yet. In short, it’s not 

clear that the everyday life of Tunisians has improved since the 

ouster of Ben Ali. A young Tunisian protester was recently quoted 

as saying, ‘‘We live in desperate conditions because of unemployment, poverty, and misery. We are only asking to live in dignity.’’

My worry is that continued the political stalemate and instability 

that are plaguing Tunisia may make the country increasingly vulnerable to political actors who could set the country on a path back 

toward an authoritarian state. We all know that establishing a democracy is not easy, that political squabbling is by no means limited to Tunisia. This political conflict while damaging is not being 

fought with bullets. The Tunisian political parties have seen the 

devastating conflict in Syria. They have seen the errors or Morsi 

in Egypt. The parties have all publicly agreed that widespread violence and exclusionary governance that has plagued the region is 

not what they want for Tunisia’s future. The ruling Ennahda Party 

has shown that it can compromise on key issues and reign in those 

hard liners demanding conservative amendments to the Constitution. 

The party eventually agreed to step down to make way for a 

caretaker administration which is why the constituent assembly 

which is drafting the Constitution will remain in place and will 

4

hopefully produce a Constitution that establishes the structures 

and institutions that are necessary for a democratic Tunisia. 

The United States has made a pledge to the people of Tunisia in 

support of their transition to a democracy and although success has 

not been immediate, in many ways, Tunisia still has the best 

chance of turning into a consolidated democracy. And that is why 

despite the challenges, the success of Tunisia is key to our interests 

and our ideals. 

I want to thank NDI, IRI, and the International Foundation for 

Electoral Systems for your contributions in Tunisia, not only doing 

key work in strengthening political parties, civil society, and providing election support, but in many ways it is your organizations 

that are representing the American ideals of equal opportunity and 

dignity for all and we are grateful for that. Although the attention 

that Congress and the American people are paying to Tunisia is 

probably insufficient, I hope that today will provide an opportunity 

to remember how great the consequences are of Tunisia’s quest for 

democracy. 

As we saw in 2011, the future of Tunisia will be decided by the 

Tunisian people, but if democracy fails, there are no good alternatives. Therefore, I believe that the United States has a vital role 

to play in helping to assist the democratic, free, and stable Tunisia 

and I look to our witnesses to provide your perspectives on what 

is happening inside the country, your reactions to U.S. response so 

far and your recommendations for Congress and the United States 

Government. I thank you, Madam Chairman, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. Thank you for your 

excellent statement. I now would like to grant 1-minute opening 

statements to Mr. Schneider, followed by Ms. Meng, and then Mr. 

Vargas. Mr. Schneider is recognized. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. In the interest of time as votes have been called, 

I will yield my time back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. But we have got plenty of time. 

Don’t worry. Ms. Meng? 

Ms. MENG. I yield my time, too. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Vargas. 

Mr. VARGAS. I also yield my time back, but I do thank the people 

that we have here today and look forward to their testimony. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much and with that, I am 

going to introduce the panelists and then we will come back and 

hear from you. 

First, we welcome Mr. Scott Mastic, the Regional Director for 

Middle East and North Africa at the International Republican Institute. In this capacity, he has helped grow this division into the 

Institute’s largest regional division. Mr. Mastic has led various democracy assistance efforts in the region and served as an election 

observer in many countries, including Tunisia, Egypt, Afghanistan, 

and Pakistan. 

Next, we welcome Mr. Leslie Campbell, Senior Associate and Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa at the National Democratic Institute where he has directed programs in this 

region since ’96. Mr. Campbell has 25 years of experience in international development and parliamentary governance. Thank you, 

sir. 

5

And third, we welcome Mr. William Sweeney, who is the President of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Prior 

to this position, Mr. Sweeney served on the Board of Directors and 

is chairman of IFIS. Mr. Sweeney has observed elections in the 

Philippines, Russia, Nicaragua and Jamaica. We thank all of you 

for being here and when we come back, if there are any members 

who would like to make an opening statement, I will recognize 

them first and then we will hear from you, gentlemen. And with 

that the subcommittee is temporarily on vacation. 

[Off the record.] 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee has reconvened. Thank 

you so much. Mr. Mastic, we will begin with you for your remarks 

and as I said, all of your written statements will be made a part 

of the record. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. SCOTT MASTIC, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, 

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE 

Mr. MASTIC. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today on the important topic of Tunisia, a country that I remain 

guardedly optimistic about despite a number of challenges that 

continue to confront its transition. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If you could put the microphone a little bit 

closer. 

Mr. MASTIC. How is that? There. I offer this sense of optimism 

based on what we have seen during the past 3 years and especially 

as a result of the interactions among Tunisia’s many political 

stakeholders. Unlike Egypt with a troubling authoritarian behavior 

of the country’s Muslim Brotherhood, irrevocably polarized relations between the political forces, or like Libya where we see an absence of security making a successful transition incredibly fragile 

or like the horrific effects we see from Syria’s civil war, what we 

see today in Tunisia is a continued effort from political stakeholders to reach agreement through negotiation. 

This is not to say we can take for granted Tunisia will be successful and to the contrary, the country has reached its most pivotal make or break point yet and currently stands in an impasse. 

Today, I would like to briefly elaborate on what I see as three 

key factors to the transition either moving forward successfully or 

going in a different, less optimal, direction. First is the political 

track of national dialogue agreed to by the current government and 

opposition parties and moderated by the so-called quartet of civil 

society entities. Key actions related to the ultimate passage of a 

Constitution and electoral law and appointment of an electoral 

commission extend from the dialogue’s success, but ultimately 

these important benchmarks will not be achieved unless the political parties agree on a caretaker prime minister and government 

that can shepherd the country to elections. 

Recent public comments from UGTT, Tunisian trade union leaders which are mediating the dialogue, suggest the primary political 

parties remain committed to the process and that it may resume 

even this week or next. In the current state of negotiation, the key 

factor appears to be neither side believing it can leverage too much 

6

advantage or dig in for a better deal. The willingness of the main 

parties to reach agreement at the negotiating table is of paramount 

importance. 

Second is security, specifically the threat posed by Islamic extremists. We have seen the poisoning effect that acts of terrorism 

have had on Tunisia during the past 3 years. This has contributed 

to polarization between Islamists and secularists with the latter believing the Ennahda-led government has been too slow to recognize 

the threats posed by jihadists. Future acts of terror and especially 

at this critical moment could derail the national dialogue before a 

successful interim government is put into place. This would leave 

Tunisia in a free fall. Therefore, time is of the essence in avoiding 

a potential terrorist-induced crisis. 

Third, and perhaps most important, is the continued patience 

Tunisian citizens are willing to show toward their political leaders. 

My sense is that the patience of ordinary Tunisians directly relates 

to the state of the country’s economy and the belief that the transition offers at least the promise of economic betterment in the future. How long Tunisians will accept the current conditions is unclear, but Tunisia’s politicians should not assume limitless good 

will. And the indicators at present are not that good. A public opinion poll conducted by the International Republican Institute in October found that 79 percent of Tunisians say the country is going 

in the wrong direction, the highest yet recorded number. The economy and specifically jobs continues to count as the most important 

problem as Tunisians see it. Disturbingly in the October survey, an 

increasing number of respondents, 29 percent, say they are having 

a hard time feeding themselves and their family, while 48 percent 

say they are making just enough to get by. 

Future Tunisian Governments must prioritize economic issues. 

Addressing these issues, though, is not possible with the current 

political impasse. As with the other factors, it seems the longer this 

impasse continues between the major political forces, the more 

frustrated Tunisian citizens may become based on their desire for 

better life opportunity. 

With respect to our programming and democracy assistance, IRI 

was registered by the Tunisian Government in November 2011 and 

has been able to pursue active programming with all political 

stakeholders throughout the country. My continued optimism about 

Tunisia is linked to what we are experiencing through those interactions. Programs from the international community are widely 

welcomed which is always encouraging, but from our vantage point 

what distinguishes Tunisia is the seriousness shown by the political parties and civil society in developing their organizations. 

Tunisia’s civil society is playing an important role in advancing 

human rights, women’s rights, and transitional justice. And we see 

key civil society groups in a central mediation roles attempting to 

advance the transition. I cannot stress how important this point of 

wanting a democratic system to emerge is. The Arab world continues to lack a successful working model of elective democracy and 

when one looks across the region, we are hard pressed to see something with more promise emerging sooner elsewhere. 

7

Even as the current dynamic is uncertain, I believe Tunisia remains the best hope for a democratic political transition in this region. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mastic follows:]


85790a-1.eps

TESTIMONY OF SCOTT MASTIC 

REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 

INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 

DECEMBER 4, 2013 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, Members of the Committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify today on the important topic of Tunisia and its political 

transition, a country that I remain guardedly optimistic about three years following the 

departure of autocrat Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, despite numerous challenges that continue 

to confront its transition. 

TUNISIA'S TRANSITION 

I offer this sense of optimism based on what we have seen transpire during the past three 

years and especially as result of the interactions seen among Tunisia's many political 

stakeholders, ranging from Islamists to secular political opposition, to trade unionists, 

civil society and the Tunisian people. Unlike Egypt, where the troublingly authoritarian 

behavior of the country's Muslim Brotherhood so polarized relations between political 

forces during the short year Mohammed Morsi was in power, or like Libya where an 

absence of security makes a successful political transition incredibly fragile, or like the 

horrific effects we see from Syria's civil war, what we see today in Tunisia is a persistent 

and continued effort from all political stakeholders that have joined into the transition to 

reach agreement on the future nature of rule emerging from nearly six decades of 

undemocratic rule. 

This is no easy feat, building an inclusive and democratic process of transition that allows 

all relevant actors to be engaged, especially given the abrupt fall of the Ben Ali regimein only about six weeks - and the absence of democratic norms during the repressive 

decades Tunisia's police state lorded over its citizens. Yet even as moments of political 

crisis have challenged the transition, including two high profile political assassinations, a 

lumbering constitution writing process, suspension of National Constituent Assembly 

deliberations, and a volatile neighborhood where threats posed by Islamic extremists and 

political tunnoil in close-by countries loom large, despite all of these problems, what we 

continue to see is an attempt by Tunisian political forces to solve vexing questions 

through negotiation and dialogue. In this Tunisia is exceptional in both fonn and 

substance from the events we see unfolding elsewhere in the region. And, in the 

sometimes dysfunctional and most times ad hoc process of deciding Tunisia's political 

future, we can be encouraged that Tunisia's transition reveals the raw beginnings of an 

emerging democratic culture, one of bare knuckles negotiation, horse trading and 

brinksmanship and yet, a culture made ever stronger by each moment of crisis diverted. 

This is not to say we can take for granted Tunisia will be successful. To the contrary, the 

country has reached its most pivotal make or break point yet, and currently stands at an 
8


85790a-2.eps

impasse. Today, T will briefly elaborate on what T see as three key factors to the 

transition either moving forward successfully, or going a different, less-optimal direction. 

KEY FACTORS 

The first is the political track of National Dialogue agreed to by the current governing 

parties, including the Ennahda Islamist party, and the secular opposition parties, and 

moderated by the so-called Quartet of civil society entities, primary among them the 

Union Generale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) general trade union. Key actions related 

to the ultimate passage of a constitution, an electoral law and appointment of an electoral 

commission extend from the dialogue's success but ultimately none of these important 

benchmarks will be achieved unless the political parties agree on a caretaker prime 

minister and government that can shepherd the country to elections. 

The Ennahda party leading the government challenged by the Nida Tunis party, that has 

come to represent the largest share of more secular minded Tunisians, have been unable 

to agree on a prime minister in the most recent national dialogue talks Growing 

polarization between Islamists and secular Tunisians especially over the course of the 

past year have contributed to an atmosphere of increasing mistrust between these primary 

political players where each is reticent to agree on personalities for the interim 

government they respectively believe give the other party an upper hand. Notable in the 

process thus far is the government's agreement to ultimately accept the opposition's 

demands for a caretaker government, which constitutes recognition of their own 

leadership failures during the past three years. Irrespective of rhetoric, the acceptance of 

a caretaker government is a pragmatic attempt to avoid an Egypt-like moment of popular 

unrest. 

In the current state of negotiation, the key factor appears to be neither side believing it 

can leverage too much advantage or dig in for a better deal, and in this sense the 

continued willingness of Nida Tunis and other opposition parties to solve disagreement 

with the governing parties at the negotiating table is of paramount importance as opposed 

to some other mode like popular street actions. Directly related, is time. Tunisia has 

reached a critical point, and the transition is at an impasse. The longer that impasse 

continues, the greater the potential that other triggers I will discuss momentarily threaten 

the dialogue's key outcome, an interim government's composition. 

Second is security, specifically the threat posed by Islamic extremists. We have seen the 

poisoning effect acts of terrorism have had on Tunisia during the past three years. First 

was the assassination of secular politician Choukri Belaid in February 2013. This was 

followed by the July 25, 2013 assassination of Mohamed Brahmi which brought the 

country to a critical point of crisis and triggered the need for the dialogue process we see 

now. As well, the recent killing of six Tunisian security officials in Sidi Bouzid and most 

recently, and disturbingly, an attempt by terrorists to target hotels frequented by 

westerners. These acts of terror have produced a growing sense of unease among 

Tunisians and perhaps most damaging have contributed to polarization between Islamists 

- 2-
9


85790a-3.eps

and secularists with the latter believing the Ennahda-Ied government has been too slow to 

recognize the threats posed by jihadists. 

While Ennahda was slow in reacting to the threat posed by Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and 

by locally grown salafists, they ultimately have done the right thing in attempting to 

eliminate jihadists in the Chambi Mountains along the Algerian border and in declaring 

Ansar al-Sharia a terrorist organization. The threat now is that future acts of terror along 

the lines seen with last month's attempted hotel bombings, or another assassination of a 

high profile politician or public personality could derail the national dialogue before a 

successful government is put into place. This would leave Tunisia in a free fall As with 

the successful naming of a government, time is again of the essence with respect to 

avoiding a terrorist induced crisis. The longer the impasse, the greater the potential an 

unforeseen security crisis undermines a successful outcome to the dialogue. 

Third, and perhaps most important, is the continued patience Tunisian citizens are willing 

to show towards their political leaders and the transition path they have led the country 

down. The patience of ordinary Tunisians directly relates to the state of the country's 

economy and the sense that the transition offers at least the promise of economic 

betterment in the near term, which was a key driving force behind popular unrest seen in 

multiple Arab countries during the past three years. Tunisia's International Monetary 

Fund (lMF) loan secured this summer offers some help but in a recent visit lMF otlicials 

expressed concern over the country's budget deficit and delays in drafting and adopting a 

new investment law as part of the loan package. As well, some economic growth 

forecasts for the coming year have been scaled down to as low as 3 percent. The current 

government's most recent economic policy approach has failed to produce either the new 

enterprise or jobs desired by Tunisians, especially in the country's interior regions. This 

certainly does not meet public expectations in the areas where we now know 

dissatisfaction was highest pre-revolution. Failures in the economic sphere also do not 

give much hope to the young Tunisian university graduates unable to find a job, 

estimated by some to be at least 30 percent. 

How much longer Tunisians are willing to accept these conditions is unclear, but 

Tunisia's politicians should not assume limitless goodwill, and the indicators at present 

are not good. A public opinion poll conducted by the International Republican Institute 

(lRI) in October 2013 found that 79 percent of Tunisians say the country is going in the 

wrong direction, the highest yet recorded number and a trend that has been on the 

increase since lRl's first post-revolution poll in Tunisia in March 20 II. The economy 

and specifically jobs continues to count as the most important problem as Tunisians see 

it, which has been a consistent trend and makes economic factors the key driver behind 

public satisfaction. Disturbingly in the October survey, an increasing number of 

respondents (29 percent) say they are having a hard time feeding themselves and their 

family and buying even the most basic essentials for survival, while 48 percent say they 

are making just enough to get by. 

It goes without saying that future Tunisian governments whether interim or those 

emerging after elections must prioritize economic issues. But addressing economic 

- 3-
10


85790a-4.eps

issues is not possible within the current political impasse and even if and when an interim 

government is announced, it may be less bold in making diHicult economic policy 

decisions with a limited time mandate than a future government that has secured a 

popular mandate to lead. Whether Tunisians continue to show patience with the state of 

negotiations and for how long is a key determinate, but as with other factors, it seems the 

longer the impasse between the country's political forces drags on, the more frustrated 

Tunisian citizens may become with the transition's perceived impact on their desire for 

economic betterment and life opportunity Again, the time is now for the country's 

political leaders to move the process forward. 

DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE 

Tunisia is not unlike other Arab countries in transition where we see a multitude of 

assistance needs ranging from small, medium enterprise growth to security sector reform, 

to transitional justice. 

Like other democracy organizations, IRI was prevented from working in Tunisia during 

the Ben Ali regime. Post-Ben Ali regime in early 2011, lRl established a presence in 

Tunisia and began programs with emerging political parties and civil society groups 

across a broad range of issues important to democratic development. We were registered 

by the Tunisian government in November 2011 and have been able to pursue active 

programming with all political stakeholders throughout the country. One reason for my 

continued optimism about Tunisia is what we are experiencing through interactions with 

the country's political stakeholders, with political parties and civil society organizations 

actively engaged in building a democratic future 

The political parties have already begun to prepare strategies for the next elections, as 

they know an outcome to the dialogue will quickly trigger the campaign calendar. lRl is 

regularly approached by the campaign teams of presidential aspirants and responds to 

those technical assistance requests. We provide messaging and communications 

workshops for party spokespeople, and a significant part of our ongoing efforts relate to 

helping the parties think strategically about establishing organization in different parts of 

the country and growing their membership bases. Tunisia's vibrant civil society has 

likewise demonstrated an incredible thirst for knowledge and skills with active 

participation in dialogues with elected decision-makers that have been supported by lRl. 

We have seen this type of enthusiasm for democracy skills building irrespective of 

political trend or ideology. Taken collectively, it causes us to understand Tunisians of all 

stripes are serious about moving their country in a democratic direction. 

By this measurement, and across the various sectors of assistance provided by the United 

States, 1 cannot stress how important this point of wanting a democratic system to emerge 

is. This is because the Arab world continues to lack a successful working model of 

elective democracy and when one looks across the region we are hard pressed to see 

something with more promise emerging sooner, elsewhere. 

-4-
11


85790a-5.eps

CONCLUSION 

In the next decade, a democratic Tunisia can have an important positive effect on the 

North Africa region, can serve as an important partner to both the United States and our 

allies in Europe and can break the as of yet elusive hope for a functioning, Arab 

democracy. It is by no means certain that Tunisia will reach the point of consolidated 

democracy and we should not be naive about the considerable challenges that lie ahead. 

The country is at a pivotal moment presently and must successfully meet the key goals of 

the current national dialogue if it is to move ahead on achieving necessary electoral and 

governance milestones. Yet even as the current dynamic is uncertain, Tunisia is, after all, 

where the Arab Spring began I believe Tunisia remains the best hope for a democratic 

political transition in the Arab world. The country deserves our continued attention at 

this critical juncture 

Thank you. 

- 5-
12

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Campbell. 

STATEMENT OF MR. LESLIE CAMPBELL, SENIOR ASSOCIATE 

AND REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

today to testify in the state of Tunisia’s political transition. Since 

the toppling of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisia has made significant progress toward establishing democratic institutions. While 

Tunisia’s transition is today more vulnerable than at any point 

thus far, there’s reason to hope that the country’s experience can 

and will continue to serve as an inspiration to those beyond 

Tunisia’s border. 

Serving as part of the leadership of NDI’s international observation mission in October 2011, I witnessed firsthand the hopes that 

many Tunisians placed in the national constituent assembly elections that they would represent a solid step toward a more democratic future. Ennahda’s moderate Islamist leadership sought to 

form a broad coalition to share the responsibility of governing. The 

ruling ‘‘troika’’ coalition formed by Ennahda and two center left 

parties, took power in December 2011. In these 2 years, the coalition has struggled but remained intact, despite the often strained 

communication among its members and increasing pressure from 

opposition political parties. 

If there is an early lesson in the post-Arab Spring aftermath it 

is that coalitions and consensus building are far preferable to winner take all politics. Egypt went the route of winner take all and 

paid the price. Tunisia has chosen thus far to be more inclusive. 

Unfortunately, the ‘‘troika’’ government has struggled to address 

the growing economic and security challenges as the Tunisian economy has generally declined or stagnated. Last week, the Tunisian 

currency hit an all-time low. New figures show the unemployment 

rate hovering just around 16 percent with university graduate unemployment closer to 34 percent. Thus, the young Tunisians who 

are widely credited with bringing about the revolution are those 

being left behind. Some Tunisians have accused Ennahda of failing 

to crack down on violent extremism, a perception that was fueled 

by the assassination of two leftist politicians, but as the assassinations caused the political standoff between Ennahda and secular 

opposition, there were efforts to broker a settlement which led to 

the signing of a national dialogue process to address four fundamental issues. First, the composition of a new apolitical technocratic government; two, reaching agreement on the final sticking 

points in the Constitution; three, appointing the leadership of an 

independent election administration; and four, agreeing on the sequence and timeline for Presidential and parliamentary elections. 

Tunisian views about the dialogue are clear. To begin the process 

of restoring public confidence, all responsible political parties much 

return to the negotiation table immediately. They must work to 

complete the constitutional phase, making it possible to hold elections. There has finally been movement on the constitutional process and the naming of an interim prime minister. Yesterday, opposition members of the assembly returned to hash out remaining 

13

disagreements. There are also rumors that there is finally a compromised candidate for prime minister. 

Despite Tunisia’s numerous challenges, reasons for optimism remain. The transition has moved forward in fits and starts, but it 

does remain on track. The Tunisian value of consensus over expediency remains a strength. There is a growing perception though in 

Tunisia that the world has lost interest in this important democratic experiment. The international community should enhance its 

support of the Tunisian transition emphasizing that an immediate 

return to national dialogue negotiations is essential to demonstrate 

commitment to democratic principles and fundamental freedoms. 

The mediation team, in my opinion, should announce a definitive 

date for the dialogue to recommence and stress that any party that 

fails to participate will forfeit its right to contribute to decisions. 

Tunisian politicians must conclude their agreement to nominate 

a caretaker prime minister and that may happen soon. They must 

finalize the Constitution, appoint the election body and outline the 

steps, the next steps in the transitions. These steps are absolutely 

required to address pressing citizen priorities including salvaging 

the economy and ensuring safe and secure communities. While 

there is an urgent need for more international economic support 

and assistance and I hope this is addressed more in this hearing, 

the United States should also strongly and consistently support 

popular demands for transparency, accountability and freedom. 

This means a continued commitment to pluralism and civil society 

and speaking out very clearly with respect to the on-going threats 

to freedom of expression. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman, members of the committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Campbell follows:]

14


85790b-1.eps

Statement by Leslie Campbell 

Senior Associate and Regional Director, 

Middle East and North Africa Programs 

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) 

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa 

December 4, 2013 

Page 1 of7 

"Transition at a Crossroads: Tunisia Three Years After the Revolution" 

Mr. Chairman and Members ofthe Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportlmity to appear before you today to testify on the state of 

Tunisia's political transition three years after an uprising that toppled the 

authoritarian regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Protests against his legacy of 

corruption and nepotism, which began in December 20 I 0, quickly tranSfOTIlled into 

a citizen-led movement for dignity and liberty that resonated across the region in 

the days and months following. 

In the three years since popular protests began, Ttmisia has made significant 

progress toward establishing democratic institutions. This has included the 

successful administration of the country's first free election to seat diverse political 

representatives in a National Constituent Assembly that is now tasked with drafting 

a new constitution reflecting citizen aspirations. Initial steps toward democracy 

have not been easy. While Ttmisia's transition today is more vulnerable than at any 

other point to date, there is reason to be hopeful that the country's experience can 

and will continue to serve as an inspiration to others beyond Tunisia's borders. 

The intemational community should enhance its support of the Tunisian transition, 

making it clear to all political actors that an immediate return to the National 

Dialogue negotiations (more detail on the dialogue process appears below) is 

essential to demonstrate genuine commitment to democratic principles ami 

fundamental freedoms. The mediation tem11, led by the Tunisian General Labor 

Union (UGTT), should announce a definitive date for the dialogue to fe-commence 

mld stress that mly party that fails to pmiicipate will forfeit its right to contribute to 

decisions. Tunisian politicians must seek agreement to nominate a caretaker plime 

minister and cabinet that can gamer public tmst, finalize the constitution, appoint 

the election management body, and outline steps to conduct presidential and 

pm'limnentary elections. These steps are essential to adequately address pressing 
15


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Page 2 of7 

citizen priorities, including salvaging the economy and ensuring safe and secure 

corrummities. 

Serving as part of the leadership of NDT's intematiollal observation mission ill 

October 20ll, 1 witnessed firsthand the hope lllillly Tunisians placed in the 

National Constituent Assembly elections. This was their first opportunity to make 

free choices at the ballot box and to ensure that votes were counted as cast. As 1hey 

enthusiastically turned out to vote, many Ttmisians calculated that if electioll day 

proceeded smoothly, if competitors accepted the election results, and if the 

composition onhe Assembly represented public will, Tunisia would have taken a 

solid step toward a more democratic future and away from its authoritarian past. 

Election results confimled these hopes. While the anticipated frontrunner, 

Ennahda, won a plurality, taking 89 of the 217 contested seats in the assembly, 26 

other party, coalition and independent lists also received enough votes to win at 

least one seat. Tn keeping with Tunisia's progressive legacy on women's rights, the 

2011 election law also ensured the prominence of women in the Assembly. As a 

result, 27 percent of Assembly seats were filled by women. 

Making good on pre-election promises, Ennahda's moderate [slamist leadership 

sought to form a broad coalition to share the responsibility of governing. This was 

intended to mitigate fears of some Tunisians and the intemational community that 

the pmty might seek to dominate the tnUlsition, especially through the constitution 

drafting process. The ruling "troika" coalition f0n11ed by Ennahda and nyO center 

left parties, the Congress for the Republic (CPR) and Ett<lkalol, took power in 

December 2011. In these two years, the coalition has struggled but remained intact, 

despite the often strained communication among its members and increasing 

pressure from opposition political pmties. 

Soon after the election, the Assembly pledged to complete a new constitution and 

announce fresh elections -- all within one year. This deadline proved to be overly 

ambitious. The work of constitution drafting committees was often intermpted by 

political stand-of Is and the competing business of the general legislative standing 

cOl1mlittees. Despite the disorganization that has often characterized their work, 

Assembly members have frequently sought to build broad consensus, reaching out 

to local and international expel1s, and engaging citizens in the drafting process. 

The Assembly has negotimed and refined four successive constitution drafts and 

while some problems still exist, the current version is cohesive mld much 

improved. Only a few contentious points remain regarding the separation of 

powers. 
16


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Page 3 of7 

When the one-year deadline was not met in the winter of 2012, the Assembly 

attempted to engage the public by having members present a draft to invitees from 

civil society in all 24 Tunisian governorates and key constituencies outside the 

country. Despite these attempts at outreach, Tunisia's Assembly has grow11 

increasingly lIDpopular among average citizens. This is due in large part to its 

inability to communicate adequately the purpose and pace of its work, thereby 

failing to meet public expectations. 

While the Assembly has not met the one-year self-imposed dcadline, the 'troika' 

govemment has also struggled to address growing economic and security 

challenges. The Tunisian economy has generally declined or stagnated since the 

revolution. Tunisia's middle class, one of the most robust in the region, suffers 

growing economic pressure as the price ofnccessities such as milk, bread and fuel 

have steadily risen. Political uncertainties since 2011 have also negatively affected 

the cauntlY's economic driver, the tourism sector, and have stalled much-needed 

domestic and international investment. Two weeks ago, Tunisia's National 

Institute of Statistics published unemployment figures for the third quarter of 20 13. 

The government institution stated that while the overall unemployment rate hovers 

just WIder 16 percent, tUliversity gradtk'lte lmemp!oyment is closer to 34 percent. 

Thus the young Tunisians, who are widely credited as bringing about the 

revolution, are those being left behind. 

Growing fmstration and disillusionment with the pace of political change is also 

atlecting stability in the cOlmtry. Public opinion research, conducted by 1\TII since 

March of 2011, shows that Tunisians are experiencing deep aJl'Ciety since 

swapping the stability of a police state for the uncertainty of a transitional context 

in which state authority is fragmented. For Tunisians cOllcemed with transitional 

justice, change has been hard to see; basic institutions of day-to-day life, such as 

courts, police offices, and other public establishments, barely flllction under 

bureaucratic inetllciency and entrenched corruption. 

Many Tunisians, the most vocal of whom have been leftists and secularists, have 

accused Ennahda of deJegitimizing itsel f and the government as a whole by failing 

to crack down on violent lslmuic extremism in its various forms. These groups 

have presented a dilemma for Eunahda, particularly in the context of a weak, 

contested security apparatus mId judicial system. Though Enllahda initially 

accommodated Salafist groups in exchange for their supp011, it hardened its 

rhetoric in the wake of the attack on the U.S. Embassy and American School in 

September 2012. By the spring of 2013, Ennahda had significantly toughened its 

tone toward Salafists calling for violence, pmiicularly Ansar al-Sharia, which the 

3 
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Page 4 of7 

Ennahda prime minister eventually declared a ten-orist group. Despite Enllahda's 

change of tack, many Tlwisians continue to see the government as ineffcctual or 

unwilling to enforce the rule oflaw 

This perception has been further fueled by two assassinations of leftist politicians 

tins year. Both men wcre aligned with the Popular Front, a loose coalition of 

parties that fared poorly in the 2011 elections but that have risen in prominence 

due to their vocal stance against Ennahda. The first assassination in Februaty 

forced the govemment's hand, resulting in the resignation of Hamadi .febali from 

his post as prime minister and a government reshuffle to meet the demands of 

opposition parties. The second murder this time of a member of the Assembly -

happened on July 25, Republic Day, an annual celebration marking Tunisia's 

independence from French mle and establishment of an independent republic. The 

second assassination came as the Assembly was 011 the brink of completing its 

work on the constitution and finalizing the selection of nine experts who would 

constitute an indcpendent election admiInstration, an oversight body responsible 

fix plamling and setting the date for the next elections. 

In response to this second shock, and emboldened by what they saw unfolding in 

E6'Ypt, Ennahda's opponents were quick to act Leaders in Nidaa TOlIDes, the key 

opposition palty, stepped up attempts to label Ermahda not only a failure in 

government, but perhaps complicit in the murders. Beji Caid Essebsi, the savvy 87-

year-old leader of Nidaa Tounes, called for opposition members of parliament to 

boycott the Assembly lIDtil the government stepped down, and wcnt so far as to 

issue calls to dissolve the Assembly entirely. Essebsi has been praised for his 

efforts as interim prime minister, successfully shepherding Tunisia through the first 

phase of its transition in 201 L Today, however, his party is associated with old 

regime elements, which raises COllcem about a retUl1l to the pre-revolutionary 

approach to governance. 

A coalition of opposition parties led by Nidaa Tounes and the Popular Front, 

labelling themselves the '"National Salvation Front," organized a sit-in outside 

Tunisia's Assembly and held nightly rallies in the month follmving the July 

assassination. As the protests wore on, the ruling coalition attempted to make 

concessions to draw the lawrnakers back to the table. Ettakatol's Mustapha Ben 

Jaaiar, in his role as president of the Assembly, went so far as to temporarily 

suspend the work of tbe legislature in a move to iorce the two sides to sit down. 

While Ennahda capitulated to opposition demands for another govemment 

reshuffle, sacking the Assembly was a "red line" it was not willing to cross. 

4 
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Page 5 of7 

This political stand-off continued throughout August and September, with the 

opposition hardening its line and making attempts to enlarge the coalition to 

include power brokers such as the national workers union, UGTT. While these 

political alliances took shape in Tunis, popular SUppOlt for the boycott \vas waning 

and the Salvation Front was no longer able to turn out the numbers that it had 

earlier in the summer. With the end of Ramadan 2013, the summer hiatus and the 

return to regular schedules, concerns of daily life and daily economics have led 

Tunisians to pressure the politicians to move away from partisanship and toward 

an election. 

The UGTT, along with leadership of the chamber of commerce, the lavvyers 

syndicate and the Tunisian League for Human Rights, known as the Quartet, 

stepped in to try and broker a negotiation process that would allow both sides to 

save face and begin rebuilding tmst. Leaders of most p31ties represented in the 

Assembly eventually agreed to the QU31iet's 'National Dialogue' process, which 

would address four flmdamentai issues: 1) composition of a new apolitical 

teclmocrat government; 2) reaching agreement on t1nal sticking points in the draft 

constitution, 3) appointing leadership of an independent election administration 

who would be responsible tor drafting the election law, and 4) agreeing on the 

sequence and timeline for presidential and parliamentary elections. 

This 'package' of issues, which politicians agreed to in a public signing ceremony 

on October 25, was accompanied by an ambitious til11eli11e that should have seen 

completion of the process by late November. The optimism following the signing 

was dampened when parties could not reach agreement on an interim prime 

minister. Since mid-November, the stmctured dialogue process has ceased, and the 

Quartet has gone back to shuttle diplomacy between factions. Also assisting the 

process, diplomatic efforts by the U. S 311d European Union member states have 

encouraged a speedy return to dialogue, while respecting Tunisia's preference for a 

locally-managed negotiation. 

Tn the midst of the various rounds of political deliberations, NDT has provided 

Tunisia's p01itical leadership with advice and information on comparative 

experiences in managing complex negotiations as a means of considering 

appropriate models and encouraging constructive dialogue. Through the United 

States Agency for International Development (USAlD) and the State Department's 

Middle East Partnership Initiative (J'vlEPl), NDl received funding to establish 

programs in Tunisia within weeks of Ben Ali's departure. Since February 2011, 

NDT's activities have been designed to support and strengthen the democratic 

process by creating a space for inclusive political debate to inform citizens and 

5 
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Page 6of7 

expose them to various political options, NDT has worked to keep parties focused 

on building lasting structures and creating platforms that resonate with voters, 

Parties' investment in their intemal stmctures, recmitment of party activists and 

platfonn development also contribute to democratic stabilization. At the same 

time, NDl is supporting oppOliunities for citizen oversight and domestic election 

observation with the aim to increase accountability during the country's delicate 

transition, with a particular fOCllS on upcoming elections, 

The week after the official negotiatiol1s stalled, NDl organized focus groups to 

gauge citizens' perspectives on the National Dialogue process, their views on 

accomplishments since 2011, and priorities in their daily livcs. When asked about 

strides made since the revolution, Tunisian participants were resolute that freedom 

of expression remains the 0111y tangible accomplishment. However, fears over 

recent arrests of journalists and what citizens view as media bias raise concerns 

about even these Views about the National Dialogue are clear - in order to 

begin the long process of restoring public confIdence, all responsible political 

parties must return to the negotiation table immediately. They must work hard to 

complete the constitutional phase, making it possible to hold elections for a new 

president and parliament in the next six months. 

The calls from the United States and the international COlllillUnity during the 

uprising of 2011 demanding that the Tunisian government listen to pleas for 

dignity lent important legitimacy to citizen aspirations throughout the Arab world. 

Despite Tunisia's numerous challenges, reason for active engagement remains. 

Tunisia's transitioll, symbolized most powerfully by its constitutional drafting 

process, has moved forward in fits and starts, but it remains on track -- setting 

Tunisia apmi from stalled or reversed transitions in neighboring countties. 

Tunisians' value of consensus over expediency remains one of the strengths of this 

country"s transition. To ensure the current stalemate does not encourage 

undemocratic intervention in the process, it is important that the US. government 

continue to suppOli trust-building measures between the Ennahda-led govcming 

coalition and leading opposition pmties to conclude the ClUTent constitutional 

phase as quickly and responsibly as possible. 

In addition to directing assistance to economic and security reform, the United 

States should strongly and consistently support popular demands for transparency, 

accountability and freedom. This means a continued commitment to pluralism and 

civil society and speaking clearly with respect to ongoing threats to freedom of 

expression. The Adrninistmtion and US Congress should be steadfast in 

supporting ml enabling enviromnent for political parties and civil society to build a 

6 
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Page 7 of7 

democratic Tunisia, and in support ofthe aspirations of Tunisian citizens and those 

arOlmd the world who continue to look to Tunisia for inspiration. 

Thank YOll, Chairman and Members orille Subcommittee. 

7 
21

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Campbell. 

Mr. Sweeney. If you could push that button on the mike and hold 

it close to your mouth. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BILL SWEENEY, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR 

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 

Mr. SWEENEY. I thank you for the opportunity to testify in this 

hearing on Tunisia’s transition and democratic development. The 

International Foundation for Electoral Systems, IFES, has received 

grants from the U.S. Government and other international donors to 

conduct an on-the-ground assessment of the electoral environment 

and provide technical expertise to the Court of Accounts, civil society, various ministries and the country’s first independent election 

management body, the Independent High Commission for Elections, known as the ISIE. 

On October 23, 2011, Tunisians held their first democratic elections and elected a national constituent assembly called the NCA. 

The elections were administered by the ISIE. They were seen as inclusive and competitive. Public confidence was high in the electoral 

process. The ISIE received high praise for its independence, commitment, honesty, and successful delivery of elections in a short 

time frame and under difficult circumstances. Since those elections, 

frustration and disappointment have dominated. Progress in adopting a new Constitution for Tunisia and the institutional legal 

framework for elections has been slow. Parliamentarians elected in 

2011 have received most of the criticism. Opposition parties are 

now contesting the legitimacy of any legislation and calling for dissolution of the NCA. Two political assassinations of prominent 

leaders have adversely affected the potential for any political consensus. 

As a result, Tunisia has yet to adopt a new Constitution and develop a new legal framework for the upcoming elections. 

ISIE’s 2011 mandate ended in May 2012. This means no electoral 

preparations, no election law, no election commission, no budget, no 

plan. There remain enormous challenges and risks and the country 

is losing valuable time in the current political stalemate. While 

minor difficulties with the 2011 elections were largely accepted in 

stride by the population, the same tolerance may not be forthcoming for the next elections. Simply put, if the administration of 

the next election does not meet public expectations, a lack of trust 

in the results is possible. Internal stability and the nation’s transition will be threatened. 

For the 2011 elections, IFES provided technical expertise and 

guidance to the ISIE, trained election management staff, established the ISIE media center to announce results and election-related communications before, during, and after election day, assisted the ISIE in design and distribution of 10,000 posters and 2 

million fliers for voter education efforts throughout the country, 

partnered with the Ministry of Social Affairs to communicate with 

illiterate voters on the election and how to vote, and trained members of I Watch, a youth-led civil society organization to be the first 

independent organization to monitor campaign finance expenditures during the election. 

22

After the 2011 elections, IFES focused on ISIE’s performance and 

lessons learned. With funding from U.S. AID, IFES carried out a 

technical evaluation of the NCA elections and in-depth analyses of 

the legal framework for elections and campaign finance regulations. 

Thanks to support from the U.S. Government, IFES has remained in country and continues to play a role in helping 

Tunisians in their democratic transition. IFES meets regularly 

with legislators to advise them on electoral legal reforms; trains 

judges in charge of monitoring campaign finance expenditures; and 

works closely with local civil society organizations to help them all 

be advocates for inclusive democracy in expectation of the next 

round of elections in Tunisia under a new ISIE. With support from 

the European Union and the United Nations Development Programme, IFES sustains the dialogue and debate among Tunisian 

political stakeholders on voter registration, electoral system design, 

election management bodies, and campaign finance, a process 

which has been underway all year. 

Madam Chairman, the Arab Spring started in Tunisia. Tunisia 

is the furthest along in its transition, has the most engaged, robust, national conversation on democracy and has the greatest institutional capacity to succeed. Tunisia’s success will be a model for 

other transitioning countries in the region and in the world. Despite setbacks, Tunisians are highly engaged in the political dialogue, not violence. 

I was in Tunisia this past February. IFES conducted the largest 

attended forum in the region on voter registration and the value 

of a trusted voter registrar. The next few months are critical as Tunisia appoints a new government, selects new election commissioners, finalizes its Constitution and develops a new electoral law. 

Madam Chair, thank you for putting a spotlight on Tunisia 

today. This is a critical time in the history of the country. It is critical that there be a focus on the opportunity for democracy in this 

region as well as the threats. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sweeney follows:]

23


85790c-1.eps

Spoken Testimony of William R. Sweeney, Jr. 

Political and Electoral Status at Tunisia 

December 4, 2013 

Time: 5 minutes 

Mr. Chairman and Congressman Deutch, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the 

Subcommittee on Tunisia's transition and democratic development. 

IFES has received grants from the U.S. Government and other international donors to conduct an 

on-the-ground assessment of the electoral environment and provide technical expertise to the 

Court of Accounts, civil society, various ministries and the country's first independent election 

management body - the Independent High Commission for Elections - known as the ISlE (ee-zee). 

Introduction 

Almost two years ago, Tunisians held their first democratic elections - after the fall of President 

Ben Ali - and elected a National Constituent Assembly (called the NCA). The 2011 NCA elections 

were administered by the ISlE. They were seen as inclusive and competitive and public confidence 

was high in the electoral process. The ISlE received high praise for its independence, commitment, 

honesty, and successful delivery of elections in a short timeframe and under difficult circumstances. 

Since those elections, frustration and disappointment have dominated. The NCA was granted 

legislative powers and mandated to draft a new constitution. However, progress in adopting a new 

constitutional, institutional and legal framework for elections has been slow and limited. The 

parliamentarians elected in 2011 have received most of the criticism and blame. Opposition parties 

are contesting their legitimacy and calling for dissolution. As a result, Tunisia has yet to adopt a new 

constitution and develop a new legal framework for the upcoming elections. 

On top ofthis turmoil, the ISlE's 2011 mandate ended in May 2012. This means no electoral 

preparations have occurred since then. 

Tunisia did gain valuable experience in managing the 2011 elections. However, there are still 

enormous challenges and risks, and the country is losing valuable time in the current political 

stalemate. While minor difficulties with the 2011 elections were largely accepted in stride, the 

same tolerance may not be forthcoming for the next elections - particularly if competition is fierce. 

Simply put, if administration of the next elections does not meet public expectations, internal 

stability and the nationJs democratic transition will be threatened. 

Accomplishments 

To help the transition over the last few years, IFES has: 

Provided technical expertise and guidance to the ISlE 

Trained election management staff in charge of administering the NCA elections 

Led the design, management and funding of the lSI E Media Center that served as a platform for 

all election-related communications before/ during and after Election Day 

Assisted the ISlE in creating, printing and disseminating 10,000 posters and 2 million flyers for 

voter education efforts throughout the country 
24


85790c-2.eps

Partnered with the Ministry of Social Affairs to increase the level of information received by 

illiterate voters on election and political processes and 

Trained members of I Watch - a youth-led civil society organization - to be the first independent 

organization to monitor campaign finance expenditures during the next elections 

Mr. Chairman, IFES is very proud of its work in Tunisia for the 2011 NCA elections. We contributed to 

local efforts to increase access to information about the elections and helped create an environment 

where citizens had greater trust in their first, crucial step toward democracy. 

After the 2011 elections, IFES focused on lSI E's performance and lessons learned. With funding from the 

United States Agency for International Development, I FES carried out a technical evaluation of the NCA 

elections and in-depth analyses of the current legal framework for elections and campaign finance 

regulations. These reports were first-hand records of Tunisia's historic election, and went on to help 

shape IFES programming. 

Thanks to ongoing support from the u.s. Government, IFES has remained in country and continues to 

playa role in helping Tunisians in their democratic transition. IFES regularly meets with legislators to 

advise them on electoral legal reforms; trains judges in charge of monitoring campaign finance 

expenditures; and works closely with local civil society organizations to help them become advocates for 

an inclusive democracy. With support from the European Union and the United Nations Development 

Programme, IFES created a platform for sustained dialogue and debate among Tunisian stakeholders on 

electoral topics such as voter registration, electoral system design, election management bodies and 

campaign finance. 

Continued Support 

Mr. Chairman, although Tunisia is often forgotten among the other countries that rose up against their 

repressive governments during the Arab Spring; it is arguably the most important since it is key to the 

entire region's successful democratic transition. Not only did Tunisia initiate the Arab Spring, Tunisia is 

also the farthest along in its transition and has the greatest capacity to succeed. Tunisia's success will be 

a model for other transitioning countries in the region and around the world. 

Despite setbacks, Tunisians are highly engaged. I was in Tunisia this past February. IFES held the 

largest-attended forum in the region on voter registration and the importance of a reliable voter 

register. Tunisians know an accurate voter register is a crucial pillar of democracy. 

The next few months are critical, as Tunisia appoints a new government, selects new election 

commissioners, finalizes its constitution and develops a new electoral law. 

IFES is in an ideal position to provide continued support. We believe the United States should increase 

its engagement in Tunisia's transition process to ensure the nation's success. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your time and this concludes my remarks. 
25

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, all three of you for excellent testimony and I will begin with a round of questions and I have many 

of them, so if you could jot them down and address whichever one 

you would like. As we have discussed, the national dialogue process 

has stalled, but the dialogue between opposing parties continues. 

No party has walked away completely from the process and they 

remain engaged in an attempt to reconcile their differences. One 

major achievement would be if the parties would come together and 

agree on a caretaker prime minister and cabinet. This could stabilize the country, and guide it through its next round of elections. 

How far apart are the parties on deciding on a prime minister? 

And what are the main obstacles that have prevented them from 

coming to an agreement? 

Mr. Mastic, I had the opportunity to review IRI’s latest polling 

data from Tunisia from October and it states that 79 percent of 

Tunisians believe things are headed in the wrong direction. Only 

16 believe in the right direction. And when asked how much longer 

the national constituent assembly should take to complete its mandate, nearly two thirds of the respondents said less than 6 months 

and over three fourths said less than a year. And although we can 

agree that placing artificial timelines on such a delicate process is 

not the best practice, but giving the overarching trend of dissatisfaction how much longer do you think that this political stalemate can last before the political transition in Tunisia is permanently derailed? Time is clearly an issue for the Tunisian transition. And in this case we have economic, security, and political 

clocks all working against each other, all moving at different 

speeds. 

Do you gentlemen believe that the leadership can adequately address all three tracks at the same time? Or does it need more help 

from outside sources and if so, what does Tunisia need the most 

in order to ensure a successful transition? What programs do your 

institutions have in place to promote new elections to build local 

capacity? And finally, women’s rights. Tunisia has been touted as 

a leader when it comes to women’s rights in the Middle East and 

North Africa. Ever since Tunisia gained its independence as we discussed in ’56, women have had an even more prominent role in society compared to the counterparts in neighboring countries and 

this was illustrated by the elections in 2011 of the National Constituent Assembly, with 27 percent of the seats won by women. But 

there are many reports of gender inequality, and violence against 

women. What would you say is the current status of women’s 

rights in the country? Are women’s concerns being evenly represented in the national dialogue and in the drafting of the Constitution? 

We will begin with Mr. Mastic. 

Mr. MASTIC. Thank you. With respect to the process and how far 

apart the parties are, I think at this point really it has come down 

to who the prime minister will be. And the polarization that has 

grown in Tunisia over the last year between the major parties and 

specifically Ennahda, the Islamist party, has made the selection of 

that individual very difficult because one does not want to be in a 

position of having given advantage to the other. 

26

Based on the various iterations of governments, Tunisia has been 

through since the 2011 revolution, there are definitely personalities 

I think that both can agree to. Neither have walked away. The 

public statements of the mediating body right now suggests they 

are very close to identifying that individual. So I don’t think they 

are far apart and I think that you could see progress on this very 

soon. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Mr. Campbell? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, I would agree that rumors speaking to 

NDI’s office director in Tunisia today, there are very strong rumors 

on the street that a name has been put forward. I won’t mention 

the name now because who knows if it will happen, but a name is 

put forward. It has not been rejected. So there is clearly talking. 

I should also mention just as we were speaking, Sheikh Mourou, 

who is the vice president of the Ennahda Party, walked into this 

meeting room and I think it is significant in the sense that I met 

with him. He has been in Washington I think on a mission to say 

look, we are reasonable. We want this to work. We want this to be 

a model. And there is a recognition, I think, among most Tunisians 

that they do not want this to fail, that they want Tunisia to be 

seen as a democratic model. It would be the only one other than 

Israel and it is very important to Tunisia. So there is good will. 

I think the message though of Tunisians, certainly that come to 

Washington, the message that I would like to leave today is that 

without economic help and you addressed these different tracks, 

without people’s lives improving, all the election commissions and 

political parties and so on in the world won’t succeed. Of course, 

as organizations work heavily on the political process which important governance is vitally important, but I think we would be remiss if we didn’t say that politics will fail and again talking to 

leaders in Tunisia, they have said very clearly, the cupboard is 

bare. They don’t have the money in the budget to cover their expenses. They don’t have the prospects. The currency is at a low. 

The credit rating has dropped. Their borrowing costs have gone up. 

So I think if there is a track that is not being adequately addressed, it is the economic track. The political track, I think, will 

take care of itself. 

The question of women, my answer would be that on the surface, 

Tunisia continues to lead: 27 percent of the members of the constituent assembly are women. At the top level, at the elite level you 

will find many, many women in leadership, women leadership positions. But I think if you scratch below the surface and especially 

if you get away from the capital, in the interior you see a very, very 

different reality, much more typical, traditional Arab world type of 

situation. And I think redoubling the efforts on human rights, on 

women’s rights is absolutely important. I think we can’t be—we 

shouldn’t be too fooled by sort of the flash that you see in the capital. 

The one thing I would add at the end is that some of the statistics that were put forward under the rule of Ben Ali were blatantly 

false. There was a sense, maybe, that women had made greater 

achievements than they actually had in reality. They sort of inflated the statistics, for example, of literacy. Literacy among 

27

women is much, much higher than Ben Ali’s government had ever 

let on. So investing in that area I think is vitally important. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Sweeney? 

Mr. SWEENEY. Madam Chairman, the problem of being the third 

speaker on this panel to those questions is I am in violent agreement with everything my two colleagues have said. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Nobody has said it quite as eloquently as you 

are about to say it. 

Mr. SWEENEY. Thank you very much, I am going to give it my 

best shot. What I would say are two things. Number one is that 

if you look very closely at what happened in 2011, the decision 

makers seemed very, very far apart and because of the very robust 

engagement, when they came to agreement, they came to agreement, very, very quickly. And so they were able to conduct their 

election in October 2011. They were able to make decisions very 

quickly because much of the spade word, much of the discussions 

had already taken place and there was a consensus and you didn’t 

have to revisit every decision. So I do have great hope that when 

they come to consensus, they can come to consensus very quickly. 

Number two, the point I would make on women is in complete 

accord with my colleague. However, you should know that you have 

a colleague who is the chair of the election management process in 

the Parliament. And she is one of the most engaged legislators I 

have met over the course of the last year. She is very conservative. 

She is very traditional, but she also is very aware. I had a long dinner with her one night about the importance of more than 50 percent of the population having a political voice and more than 50 

percent of the population in Tunisia having their rights fully exercised. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Excellent answers. 

Thank you. I am pleased to yield to my friend, Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. For the last couple 

of years, the administration has proposed to implement a Middle 

East and North Africa incentive fund. And in addition to allotting 

money for contingencies, the fund was going to build on a model 

of centers for good governance. That would result in additional foreign assistance similar to the Millennium Challenge Corporation 

model. Presumably, that would be a big benefit to Tunisia. I support the idea. I like the idea of allocating significant and flexible 

resources to the region, but like others I have some questions about 

the details of the fund. I am curious to know from the three of you 

what your opinions, since you are really implementers here, what 

your opinions are of this fund. Is it something that you would support? How would it be used and ultimately how could it be beneficial to Tunisia? 

We will start with Mr. Sweeney, so he doesn’t have to go last this 

time. 

Mr. SWEENEY. Congressman, I am not particularly familiar with 

the details of the implementation of the fund. However, what I 

know is that if there is a reward for good governance that results 

in the type of institution building that the Tunisians are famous 

for, that the Tunisians ought to be able to meet the metrics and 

expectations and certainly it is a society which desperately needs 

28

continued investment and engagement and has shown over time 

that they can perform economic miracles within their own country. 

So I would be positive of both the metrics and very confident of the 

ability of the Tunisians to meet those metrics and use whatever 

foreign assistance from the United States or the European Union 

or any other donor to maximum advantage to solve what Les referred to as the more serious crisis, the crisis of unemployment and 

investment in the society. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you. Well, I would strongly support the 

idea of an incentive fund, but just to go backwards for a second, 

I should say first of all that the administration, congressional resources, congressional interest in Tunisia up until recently has 

been very, very strong. I think it is still strong from the funding 

side, certainly for what we do. None of us went into great detail 

of what we do, but the support has been strong for the process, for 

training political parties, working with the election commission, 

working with women, human rights organizations, domestic civil 

society organizations. That has ben quite strong. 

What is missing and I think this is germane to the incentive 

fund question is something in addition to that. So I think the idea 

that if the country, and I think there is tremendous willingness in 

the country, if the country is going to behave democratically, seek 

consensus as they have, govern itself well, as you said, Millennium 

Challenge style, a way of incentivizing that performance would be 

great. 

I know in our conversations, we are often dealing with very high 

level political leaders in Tunisia. Their comment back is we really 

appreciate what you do. Over the long term this is fantastic. But 

if we can’t provide evidence that people’s lives are improving, this 

is all going to go backwards. So I think the incentive fund is necessary. I think U.S. diplomats often feel a little hamstrung right 

now. They have a lot of talk. They don’t have a lot of scratch, basically, to use a colloquial term. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And Mr. Mastic, before you answer, Mr. Sweeney 

talked about donors and Mr. Campbell talked about scratch. We 

often have these discussions without acknowledging that there are 

other countries that would like to be involved, that would like to 

exert influence in a country in transition like Tunisia. Am I right? 

Is that the case here? And who are they and what role are they 

playing and trying to play? 

Mr. MASTIC. Definitely others are involved. So of course the IMF 

has given an important loan stabilization program to Tunisia, so 

that is a key actor right now. The European Union also is very 

much involved, invested in Tunisia. According to the EU’s neighborhood policy, they see Tunisia as a very important country in 

transition in the region. 

I will say though that I think from the Tunisians that we interact with, there is a perceived interest and value in an ongoing and 

robust U.S. engagement in their country. And as I think it holds 

the best promise among the transitions occurring, I think we benefit a lot from that engagement. 

Quickly, just with respect to the incentive fund, I don’t know that 

many details about the fund. I think one of the challenges with the 

idea of the fund is that the details about what, in fact, it would do 

29

have been a little bit murky. So that’s something to obviously take 

into consideration. But the idea of incentivizing good governance in 

Tunisia, of course, is something to be supported. I also would say 

that with whatever types of programming that will be supported 

through the fund, we have to have it be reflective of a transition 

process and support for democratic development as well. I will just 

put that in a very specific set of data. 

You know, in the initial revolution, we did a poll immediately 

after. And 79 percent of the people at that time said the country 

was going in the right direction. Okay, that number was never 

going to stay that high. And it slowly went down in the months 

that followed. At two points, the downward trend reversed itself. 

One was shortly before the NCA election when people were essentially 50–50 on whether the country was going in the right direction. And then immediately after that election, the number shot 

back up in a positive response rate. And the only time it shot back 

up in a positive response rate. So the political process is very much 

tied to the other challenges Tunisia faces and needs to be part of 

any type of fund or incentivation of good governance and behavior 

in the country. 

Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Deutch, if I could add one or two specific 

points. Swiss foreign assistance and British foreign assistance have 

been part of our program in Tunisia. We have worked very closely 

with a variety of elements within the European Union neighborhood program and some of their democracy assistance. We have 

also had a terrific partnership with the United States Development 

Fund on all of the aspects of voter registration, election management. That was one of the meetings that I referred to in my testimony. But the U.S. Government should be commended at this 

point because the U.S. Government has had staying power in terms 

of the programs that it has been supporting in Tunisia where some 

of these others have been very limited projects. But there are other 

organizations, other governments, other interests involved. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. Thank you, 

gentlemen. 

Mr. Cotton of Arkansas. 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you and thank you all for appearing today 

on this matter. So I believe that one reason that America has been 

so great and so prosperous for so long is that we are not merely 

a democracy, but a constitutional democracy. Too many other countries around the world sometimes with too much support from the 

West reduce good government to elections which are certainly very 

important and they are the principal way to hold the government 

accountable. But they underplay the significance of constitutional 

forums, both the structures of government that we have in place 

here like the separation of powers, unitary executive, an independent judiciary and prosecutor, as well as individual rights, 

rights of freedom of speech and religious and assembly and immunity from arbitrary and indefinite arrests and so forth. 

Mr. Sweeney, I will let you start off and then Mr. Campbell and 

Mr. Mastic, I will let you maybe respond. 

You had said in your testimony that Tunisia still does not have 

a Constitution. The assembly needs to adopt one. I would just like 

to get your perspective on the prospects for a Constitution that has 

30

both those kind of structurals and those individual rights, guarantees. 

Mr. SWEENEY. I am very positive that the Tunisians are going to 

adopt a Constitution. They have a long history of institutions and 

regard for those institutions. When I was in Tunisia, I met with 

representatives of the course that were engaged in reviewing campaign finance reform issues. I met with different ministries. I met 

with a great number of parliamentarians. In just about every meeting, there was great regard for individual rights and the need for 

the Constitution and the behavior of the institutions to reflect and 

open democratic society. So generally, sir, I am very, very positive 

that they are moving in the right direction. And more importantly, 

from a perspective of our history, many of these institutions are in 

place and have a robust history and have very committed public 

servants who are leading them right now. So the debate is fully engaged. We are not dealing with an artificial process. We are dealing 

with a country which has a great, robust, strong history and great 

institutions. 

Mr. COTTON. Would you care to venture a guess on a prospective 

timeline? 

Mr. SWEENEY. I would concur with my colleague, Mr. Campbell, 

that it is possible we are going to see the first step which will be 

the caretaker government put in place. There has been more than 

enough debate and dialogue within the society and reflecting back 

on 2011, they move very, very quickly once they come to consensus. 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you. Mr. Campbell? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Sure. Maybe I can, since you made a philosophical point, maybe I will respond with a bit of a philosophical 

point which is this idea of a concentration of elections. I think 

there is some truth to that, that in many organizations people have 

been guilty of that. And there are a few lessons I think of the Arab 

Spring thus far and one is that rushing into competitive, contested 

elections is a mistake. Why is that? Because as you say, in part, 

you don’t have the structures, you don’t have the bedrock to work 

from. But secondly, you have this big tumult in the country, an uprising. And then the first thing that happens in the case of Egypt 

within say a month or 2 months is that we throw political contestants with very little experience into what appears to be a winner 

take all process and you raise the stakes so high that the tension 

goes through the roof and I think that has been a big mistake. 

One thing that Tunisia has done well, among others, but has 

done very well is it has kind of let this process play out over time 

and I know that we sometimes become impatient with that, delays 

and so on. But I actually think the delays are okay. As long as the 

delays are not there to the benefit of one group, one partisan group 

or another. 

One thing that is——

Mr. COTTON. Can I take back my time for a moment? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Please. 

Mr. COTTON. Just to ask you to elaborate on that point, that is 

a happy side effect of the delays is that you have time for mediating institutions like political parties or a free press to come 

about. I was a soldier in Iraq. I saw that happen there as well over 

the years as they were preparing for round after round of election. 

31

Have you seen those kind of mediating institutions maturing in Tunisia in a way they didn’t have a chance to in Egypt? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Much more so. So you have a very strong opposition and one of the interesting side effects of the time is that the 

opposition which was very weak during the election is now very 

strong which has actually caused the standoff. Ennahda is unable 

to impose its will. That is worrying for the economy because you 

have got this stalemate. But in the long run it may be okay. 

Tunisians are serious about the Constitution maybe because of the 

French influence. They see a document like that as very important. 

I will just throw in a little comment about Egypt. Egypt has for 

the second time drafted a Constitution in 2 months and they are 

going to have a referendum 25 days later. That is not how it is 

done. I think Tunisia, as much as it is unsettling, probably are 

doing it in a much better manner, but it would be terrible if the 

economy in the meantime falters and fails. 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you all. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cotton. 

Mr. Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. I want to thank the witnesses for 

your insights as you have highlighted as an important issue for not 

just the region, but for the United States. 

Mr. Mastic, you enclosed in your submitted comments with a line 

and I will quote, ‘‘Tunisia remains the best hope for a democratic 

political transition in the Arab world.’’ You touched on this sense 

within Tunisia of declining confidence of direction, but plateauing. 

This may not be a fair question, but does the hope remain for the 

Tunisian people and what are their aspirations? What would the 

outcome that they want to see that would change that curve in an 

upward direction? 

Mr. MASTIC. Sure. Certainly, some of the economic aspirations 

that I think people have, expectations that they have are not 

achievable, not in short order. There is no question about that. 

However, with movement on the political track, we consistently see 

renewed confidence in the democratic process. And even as satisfaction with where the country is headed right now is at an all-time 

low. You still see a slight majority supporting a turbulent democratic system that is some other model. And so I do think that it 

is very much rooted in sort of a general sense of hope, but that 

could quickly turn when you see progress on the political track. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. The idea of hope springs eternal, but without 

hope, all things are lost is important. The future, and I am going 

to turn to Mr. Sweeney. The future depends so much on those institutions and you have mentioned a couple of times the strength of 

Tunisian institutions. What are some of the ones that you have the 

most confidence in? What are some of the institutions that we 

should be watching a little more closely and working to reinforce? 

Mr. SWEENEY. Most confidence is sort of hard to measure right 

now because the country is really at a stalemate in terms of making progress on a whole series of political decisions. So it is relatively difficult to give you an answer and say A is better than B. 

In our particular area of expertise, IFES, we are going to be 

starting all over again. Now the good news and one of the reasons 

why I say they will move relatively quickly is the Parliament alVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:06 Jan 15, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\120413\85790 HFA PsN: SHIRL
32

ready has all of its 36 candidates. Nine of them will be appointed 

to constitute the next election commission. That is part of the dialogue that is going on. However at the same time, all the investment that was made in 2011 in terms of the election commission 

has basically gone away. The staff that we trained has moved on 

to other jobs because the election commission’s mandate, budget, 

everything expired in May 2012. So we are going to be starting 

over again. And I think that is part of the frustration that is expressed at the political level that is also showing up at the economic level. Great progress was made. Aspirations, dreams, hopes 

got to 70 percent and then all of a sudden, the process got gridlocked. And that is where we are right now. I have great hope that 

once they get to consensus, they will again demonstrate the ability 

to move very, very quickly. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Campbell? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, the quick part of the answer is that we 

know which institutions Tunisians don’t trust and that don’t work 

and that is basically the security institutions and the police. It is 

partly not their fault in the sense that it has been difficult to restore order, but partly the trust is not there because there were 

decades of experience of the security services, interior security 

being used for repression. 

On the other hand, the military is still by far the most trusted 

institution. Unlike in Egypt, it has shown no inclination to get into 

politics. It really is genuinely above the fray. And so those are the 

sort of polar opposites in terms of institutions. But Tunisians do 

have trust in government. The ministries have traditionally operated reasonably well. There is a history actually of technocratic 

ministers. It is interesting that the ministers, immediately post 

transition, many of them were drawn from previous governments. 

They were seen as able figures. So I think the actual ministries are 

well regarded. The military is well regarded. But the security services are not, I think is the basic answer to the question. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I will close with this. I am almost out of time, 

but the need to reinforce those institutions to work with the military to try to establish a credible security infrastructure, what policy recommendations, and you can submit these later, what policy 

recommendations for us does that lead to? And what are the 

timelines that would be realistic? Because it is the time and space 

to build those institutions that I think are going to become critical 

going forward. 

I will close with Mr. Mastic’s remark to ensure that Tunisia is 

not just a hope for democracy, but an accomplishment of a democracy. Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. Collins is recognized. 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it. It is a 

normal Wednesday around here with markups and everything else 

going on, so I appreciate getting in here. 

I think the story in this arena is 3 years and it is amazing what 

has happened in these 3 years, not just in this location, but across 

the world. 

My question is fairly brief, but you can answer how you want to. 

It really deals with the economic issues. What is the likely course 

33

of Tunisia’s economy and what is the appropriate role of its international partners in helping Tunisia to promote economic growth 

and job creation and to address regional inequalities which I think 

is one of the issues. And then really what steps, if any, can or 

should the United States take to promote bilateral trade and investment. 

It started sort of as an economic in some way, and I think the 

future will be based on economic and how we go forward, so I 

would just love to hear what you think. 

Mr. MASTIC. Sure, I will respond briefly to that. IMF assistance 

is important for macroeconomic stability in Tunisia. That is happening. I think efforts to promote regional integration, regional economic integration are an important part of the solution to both the 

jobs and economic growth problems in Tunisia and elsewhere in the 

Maghreb. 

And then lastly, with respect to the United States, efforts encouraging U.S. investment by U.S. companies and to lower the barriers 

for U.S. companies in Tunisia are important. 

Mr. COLLINS. I want to follow up, but I want to get to you as 

well. You mentioned the regional aspect there, especially with the 

instability that is inherent right there, what can be done to overcome that? What can be done to encourage it even with Europe, 

what can we do there? Because you mentioned that and it is an interesting concept. 

Mr. MASTIC. Sure. The obvious factor here is with Libya you 

have a potential economic giant that can really help with respect 

to growth in the region, jobs creation. But the security challenges 

are a serious obstacle to that. So it is sort of like you can’t address 

something simply at the economic level. There has to be a redoubled effort on the security level as well. 

Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Sweeney or Mr. Campbell? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I was going to say that is a great answer because 

I was privileged to go shortly after the transition to Tunisia with 

Raj Shah from USAID and looking at economics, not normally my 

field. And one of the things that sort of struck me is just imagine 

Tunisia’s human resources and youth, educated youth, highly educated youth, 34 percent unemployment rate among college graduates. Marry that to Libya’s wealth, enormous wealth and Egypt’s 

population and sort of consumer possibility. It is not going to happen soon, but you can imagine a North Africa union and there are 

some talks about this, a North African union being a really strong 

economic force with Algeria and Libya’s wealth, Tunisia’s people, 

and Egypt’s population. 

In the immediate term, it is tourism and agriculture. Tourism 

was a driver of the economy, a main driver. In touring Tunisia with 

Raj Shah, we saw a lot of high-tech agriculture and science, but 

Tunisia is very, very fertile, can feed its own people, already or did 

export agricultural products. So I think short term is tourism and 

agriculture. Long term is opening the borders between the countries in North Africa. 

Mr. SWEENEY. Again, sir, I am going to concur with my colleagues. I will point out that tourism is a good 10 percent of all of 

the county’s economies and sources of foreign exchange that you 

referenced. Tourism directly goes to whether or not the local popuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:06 Jan 15, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\120413\85790 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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lation feels that they have a government that works and provides 

them with a modicum of security as well as a message to tourists 

as to whether or not they can travel there in safety which means 

that you have to double down on security and you have to double 

down on protection of infrastructure if you’re going to try and develop a regional economic framework in terms of either oil, natural 

gas, or any other major commodity. 

Mr. COLLINS. I think what is interesting there and you just said 

something and my background has a lot of counseling involved. 

And the very thing I tell the people who have a problem is the very 

thing you need to fix is the very thing that is broken. And in a relationship, whether it be husband and wife or anybody else, is 

trust. And if that trust is broken, it is the very thing that you need 

to rebuild the relationship, but it is broken and it is like trying to 

run a marathon on a broken leg. You are just going to have that 

issue. 

Great answers. I think maybe a time for another hearing is if 

there was a joining together there, that is an interesting power 

shift that could occur from a lot of different areas, especially from 

Israel on over from that side, so that’s another topic for another 

day, but I do appreciate you being here and those are answers that 

I think we need to continue the panel. And Madam Chair, thank 

you as always. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Vargas of California is recognized. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I just wanted 

to briefly say to Mr. Sweeney, you are very correct about being the 

most engaged and charismatic chair we have and certainly rival 

the election committee chair in Tunisia, I assure you. She does a 

fantastic job here. 

I wanted to continue to ask the questions on the issues of the 

economy. You mentioned Libya. Libya is about half the size and 

population as Tunisia, I believe, and it is smaller in GDP than Tunisia. So I was curious when you said that Libya is a powerhouse 

for Tunisia, could you further comment on that? It caught me off 

guard there. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I don’t know the exact figures, but just as an example, Libya has a budget surplus, a big budget surplus even without oil being refined and pumped at its previous levels. If Libya got 

its current capacity, and when I say current capacity, I don’t mean 

building new capacity, I just mean the capacity that is up to speed, 

it would have, and again, unfortunately I don’t know the exact figures, but it has a budget surplus of many billions of U.S. dollars. 

Whereas Tunisia, Tunisia has a big budget deficit. I believe it is 

something like $1/2 billion. I just heard this the other day so you’re 

looking at something with billions in surplus versus $1/2 billion in 

debt. And it is just oil wealth. It is that simple, small population 

oil wealth. But Libya had traditionally imported its labor. And they 

had bad relations with Tunisia. So you had the educated young 

people of Tunisia, highly technical. You have Libya that has always 

had labor shortages because of being a resource-based economy. 

And you have Libya with surplus cash. So there is a real potential 

combination there. And they are not enemies at all. But they don’t 

35

have any—right now, there is no structure of inter-country partnership. 

Mr. VARGAS. Again, the curiosity for me because again, Libya’s 

GDP is smaller than Tunisia’s GDP, so it is maybe the case that 

the government is doing better. But I guess the reason I would say 

that is because it seems like the Jasmine Resolution began because 

of issues of unemployment, the youth, and obviously self-immolation was a trigger, but all these problems, and the problems still 

seem to be there. And with growing unemployment, well, I don’t 

know if it is growing unemployment, but I saw that the growth 

rate did slow down this year compared to last year, so you do have 

the economy that is slowing down. I mean these problems are problematic. You have this tumultuous democratic system you are trying to fix, but underneath that, it is the economy. It is the old, it 

is the economy, stupid. So could you comment on that because I 

think that is the issue. 

Recently, we had the opportunity, a few of us, to go to the tribal 

areas in Pakistan. We saw that the roads were being built, dams 

were being built, and people seemed to have some hope for the future because things were getting done. And here it seems like, if 

I was a person there, it seems like, yes, we are going the wrong 

way, you know? I thought this was supposed to better. Could you 

comment? 

Mr. SWEENEY. I will take the opening opportunity. In Tunisia, 

you have a real country. It is not a country that has been cobbled 

together in different ways over time and now that a dictator is 

gone in the case of Libya, different identities are coming out. You 

do have a country with Tunisia. 

The other important thing to remember about Tunisia is that it 

is extraordinarily rich in agriculture. As Les said, it can feed itself. 

I has a population, it has an educated population, but that population has not been given opportunity in the last few years. So 

there is enormous opportunity there if there is investment, if there 

is confidence, if there is trust, if there is some stability. That is not 

as easy to say about Libya. That is not as easy to say about some 

other countries that are in transition right now. So you are hitting 

the central point and the central strength and the reason for optimism about Tunisia and why it needs and deserves the attention 

is because it really is a country. It is not just a collection of peoples 

that were put together in a colonial map. And it does have a Constitution. It does have strong institutions. It does have a very robust political process. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I will maybe just add that there are so many 

challenges in these countries, including Tunisia, but there is a real 

political debate about the type of economy Tunisia will have. You 

have got very strong leftist parties that would prefer to continue 

the system of subsidies and sort of a state-run or managed economy. The ruling party, Ennahda, is actually a little more free market oriented. And then you have the smaller liberal parties that are 

sort of radically free market. And there is a very, very strong debate. I don’t think there is any consensus on which direction they 

are going to go with their economy so that is another issue to think 

about. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

36

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Vargas. Mr. Connolly of Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Welcome to our 

panel. 

Mr. Campbell, would it be fair to describe Tunisia under the 

former President Ben Ali as a police state? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes, absolutely. I mean——

Mr. CONNOLLY. You would concur, Mr. Mastic? 

Mr. MASTIC. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Sweeney, in light of that, I assume you don’t 

dispute that. How vulnerably politically is Tunisia to a backlash in 

terms of opening up that an authoritarian figure comes along and 

says yes, but the price we are paying is a lack of order, chaotic politics, and we need to restore that order. What kind of appeal might 

such a figure have in Tunisia in your view? 

Mr. SWEENEY. I think over the course of the hearing today, each 

of us has highlighted the fact that there are threats to Tunisia and 

those threats are somewhat based on the economic situation, somewhat based on the security situation, somewhat based on the current political stalemate. While at the same time each of us, I believe, has pointed out there is great hope and optimism and there 

is the opportunity for the entire system to work. But would you, 

if you were doing a risk analysis, would you completely discount 

the potential of an authoritarian figure coming back into play? No. 

No. You couldn’t discount that. But I don’t believe that any of us 

or at least to my knowledge have that as a potential outcome. In 

the short term, we are all very optimistic that the current, very robust political dialogue that is under way will result in the opportunity for a new Constitution, a new election process, and the voice 

of the people being heard and acted upon and hopefully within the 

next year. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And obviously, part of the answer to what you’re 

saying is building enduring democratic institutions. 

Mr. SWEENEY. Absolutely, absolutely. And Tunisia has a history 

of institutions which gives us great hope. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. What are the implications in terms of the Tunisian evolution for the Arab Spring, the other Arab Spring countries? 

Mr. SWEENEY. I think all of us have great hope that Tunisia will 

become the working model of a democratic system and a working 

model for other countries, other judiciaries, other parliaments, 

other election commissions, other news media, other civil society 

groups to use as their model going forward. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Campbell, Mr. Mastic? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Just one point on the previous question, a great 

part about Tunisia is that during the last election 27 parties won 

at least one seat. The ruling party, Ennahda, or the plurality party 

I should say, won around 50 percent, but there are many, many 

other parties. So they didn’t have the pendulum swing of Egypt 

where you had this kind of Mubarak to Muslim Brotherhood back 

to the former regime. So I am optimistic that they won’t go back 

to a dictatorship. 

I think the best hopes in the Arab world right now in terms of 

models are Tunisia and Yemen. And even though they are very difVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:06 Jan 15, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\120413\85790 HFA PsN: SHIRL
37

ferent countries what brings them together is the idea of consensus 

and coalition building. And so both have coalition governments. 

Both have a dialogue process, a form of dialogue process and both 

are seeking consensus. I think we have to be careful not to rush 

them into further elections. Let them play this sort of political negotiation out a little bit, don’t rush, number one. But number two, 

both Yemen and Tunisia need this economic help and we, of course, 

were discussing that a lot here. It is not sort of in the cards, it 

seems in Yemen and Tunisia to get the economic help, but if we 

don’t rush them. If we allow them to play out this kind of coalition 

building negotiation and we support them economically, we can 

have two models. But Tunisia will be the more modern—it will be 

the one that we recognize in terms of its inclusivity, proximity to 

Europe, and so on. So it is probably more important. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Mastic? 

Mr. MASTIC. Yes, I would concur with that for the reasons Les 

points out with respect to Tunisia, Tunisia’s institutions and the 

proximity and the sort of cultural affinity that it would have with 

the West, more so than you would find in Yemen. 

At this point, I hesitate or I would caution against the positive 

effects or spillover effects of a successful transition in Tunisia and 

other transition countries. Definitely, Tunisia was the critical country to start the Arab Spring. However, we are not where we were 

in 2011 anymore and unfortunately, very different processes have 

played out in Egypt and Libya. 

Having said that and as I said in my statement, Tunisia is important because the region, the Arab world lacks a successful working model of democracy. And so for that reason I think it is incredibly important that there be strong engagement, continued engagement in Tunisia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you both and I do think this can work in 

Tunisia. It at least creates another model, especially for places like 

Egypt. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. And thank you to 

our panelists, to our members, to the audience. I feel greatly encouraged after hearing from our three specialists. And with that, 

the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 3:39 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(39)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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85790n.eps

SlJBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee ou the Middle East aud North Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman 

November 27,2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs to be held by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, to be held in Room 

2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

Vi,,,.I'! t;xeig;naffairs"house"gov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, December 4,2013 

2:00 p"m" 

Transition at a Crossroads: Tunisia Three Years After the 

Revolution 

ML Scott Mastic 

Regional Director 

Middle East and North Africa 

International Republican Institute 

ML Leslie Campbell 

Senior Associate and Regional Director 

Middle East and North Africa 

National Democratic Institute 

ML Bill Sweeney 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

International Foundation for Electoral Systems 

By Direction of the Chairman 
41


85790m-1.eps

COMMITTEE ON ~FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

lv1INUTES OF SUBCOMMlTTEE ON _______ J_1i_dd_le_·."_ .. a_'_"_m_d_N_o_rt_h~AJ'__'_ic_a __ . HEARING 

Starting Time _~2~'/I~5'-Jp~m~_Ending Time 3:39 R.m .. 

Recesses 'r-L: (1:17 to 2;4L}( __ to __ )(_~to .)( to~ .... J ~to __ ) ~to __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Chairman Ros .. Lehtilfl'Jl (Fl.) 

Check (Ill ~r Ihe following Ih,,! apply: 

Open Session [l] 

Exel'lltive (closed) Sessioll 0 Televised [l] 

l1TLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Recnnled (tapt'c1) [Z] 

Sterwg:t:,aj',hic Record [Z] 

Transitioll at a Crossroads: Tunisia Three Years After Ihe Revolution 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESEl\T: 

(See attached "lIenfiance sheel) 

NON-SVBCOMrttITTF:,E :vIEMBRRS PRESENT: (lYrark H!ith an '" U'they are "ot members offlf,ll commitJee.) 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes D No 0 

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TIME ADJOORNED 3:39p.m. 
42

Æ


85790m-2.eps

Hearing Attendance 

Hearing Title: Transition at a Crossroads: Tunisia Three Years After the Revolution 

Date: 12104113 

NOflcommi/lee Members 

Member Present Member Present 

Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana (FL) X Deutch, Ted (FL) X 

Chabot, Steve (OR) Connolly, Gerald (V A) X 

Wilson, Joe (SC) Higgins, Brian (N Y) 

Kinzinger, Adam (IL) Cicilline, David (RI) 

Cotton, Tom (AR) X 

Grayson, Alan (F L) 

Vargas, Juan (CA) X 

Weber, Randy (TX) 

Schneider, Bradley (IL) X 

Desantis, Ron (FL) Kennedy, Joseph (MA) 

Radel, Trey (FL) Meng, Grace (NY) X 

Collins, Doug (GA) X Frankel, Lois (FL) X 

Meadows, Mark (NC) 

Yoho, Ted (FL) 

Messer, Luke (IN)