U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

69–010 

" ! SENATE 115TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

REPORT

2017

115–91 

Calendar No. 117 

SPOOFING PREVENTION ACT OF 2017 

R E P O R T 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND 

TRANSPORTATION 

ON

S. 134 

JUNE 6, 2017.—Ordered to be printed 


E:\Seals\Congress.#13
(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

MIKE LEE, Utah GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado MARGARET WOOD HASSAN, New Hampshire 

TODD C. YOUNG, Indiana CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada 

NICK ROSSI, Staff Director 

ADRIAN ARNAKIS, Deputy Staff Director 

JASON VAN BEEK, General Counsel 

KIM LIPSKY, Democratic Staff Director 

CHRISTOPHER DAY, Democratic Deputy Staff Director 

Calendar No. 17 

115TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! SENATE 1st Session 115–91 

SPOOFING PREVENTION ACT OF 2017 

JUNE 6, 2017.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. THUNE, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany S. 134] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, to 

which was referred the bill (S. 134) to expand the prohibition on 

misleading or inaccurate caller identification information, and for 

other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably 

thereon with an amendment (in the nature of a substitute) and recommends that the bill (as amended) do pass. 

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

S. 134 would provide the Federal Communications Commission 

(FCC or Commission) with updated authority to address ‘‘spoofing’’ 

in the United States. Specifically, the FCC would be empowered to 

combat spoofing originating from international locations, by text 

message and by other voice communications services. It also would 

direct the FCC, in conjunction with the Federal Trade Commission 

(FTC), to assess and make available resources and measures the 

public can use to protect themselves from spoofing. 

BACKGROUND AND NEEDS

As the FCC noted over 5 years ago, ‘‘[i]ncreasingly, bad actors 

are altering or manipulating caller ID information—known as caller ID spoofing—to further a wide variety of malicious schemes, 

from identity theft to placing false emergency calls to SWAT teams. 

Using spoofing services accessible through the web or prepaid 

cards, anyone can inexpensively mask the origin of a call with fake 

2 

1Federal Communications Commission (FCC), ‘‘Consumers Gain New Protections against 

Fraudulent Call ID ‘Spoofing,’’’ News Release, June 23, 2011, at https://www.fcc.gov/document/ 

consumers-gain-new-protections-against-fraudulent-caller-id-spoofing. 2 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Oversight of 

the Federal Communications Commission, 114th Congress, 2nd session, March 2, 2016, S.Hrg 

114-607. 3 Ibid. 

4Weisbaum, Herb, ‘‘Americans Lost $8.6 billion to Phone Fraud in last Year, Survey Suggests,’’ Today, August 27, 2014, at http://www.today.com/money/americans-lost-8-6-billion-phonefraud-last-year-survey-1D80108259. 5Drash, Wayne, ‘‘Driven to Death by Phone Scammers,’’ CNN, October 7, 2015, at http:// 

www.cnn.com/2015/10/07/us/jamaica-lottery-scam-suicide. 6Public Law 111–331; codified at 47 U.S.C. §227(e). 

7 47 U.S.C. §227(e)(4). 

8FCC Report: Caller Identification Information in Successor or Replacement Technologies, 

June 22, 2011, at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocslpublic/attachmatch/DA-11-1089A1.pdf. 

caller identification information.’’ 1 Although the FCC has promulgated rules to address spoofing, there has been increased spoofing 

coming from outside the United States. In testimony before the 

Committee, then-FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler noted that he had 

himself been spoofed by a party claiming to be the Internal Revenue Service: ‘‘This was a U.S. number, but it was coming from 

abroad.’’ 2 Former FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel stated, 

‘‘[t]hat fraud has moved offshore. It’s now coming from international locations.’’ 3

The increase in fraud committed through spoofing is not limited 

to calls originating from overseas. As communications technologies 

have evolved, so has spoofing activity. In recent years, spoofing 

scams in the United States have used text messaging services and 

other alternative voice communications services. One 2014 survey 

estimated that spoofing fraud affected 17.6 million Americans over 

the 12 months preceding the survey, with that fraudulent activity 

costing them $8.6 billion.4 That same survey indicated that the actual amount of fraud was likely higher than these numbers revealed given the reluctance of many to report that they were victims of fraud. One story last year recounted the experience of a 

Tennessee resident who committed suicide after losing thousands 

of dollars to a Jamaican lottery scam perpetrated using caller ID 

spoofing.5

Congress first addressed the practice of caller ID spoofing in the 

Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009 (Public Law 111–331; 124 Stat. 

3572).6 That Act directed the FCC to prepare a report making recommendations to Congress on whether additional legislation is necessary to prohibit the provision of inaccurate caller identification 

information in technologies that are successor or replacement technologies to telecommunications service or IP-enabled voice service.7

The FCC’s report recommended such additional legislation, in particular with respect to expanding the agency’s jurisdiction to pursue spoofing originating from overseas, as well as spoofing activity 

using text messaging services and other voice communications 

services not already covered by the law.8 Congress has yet to update the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) in response to those recommendations. 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

S. 134 was introduced on January 12, 2017, by Senators Nelson, 

Fischer, Klobuchar, and Blunt, and was referred to the Committee 

on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate. On JanuVerDate Sep 11 2014 06:00 Jun 07, 2017 Jkt 069010 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR091.XXX SR091
3 

ary 24, 2017, the Committee met in open Executive Session and, 

by voice vote, ordered S. 134 reported with an amendment (in the 

nature of a substitute). The Committee approved an amendment by 

Senator Nelson stating that, except as otherwise provided, a ‘‘text 

message’’ would not include a message sent over an IP-enabled 

messaging service to another user of the same messaging service. 

On January 10, 2017, Representatives Meng, Barton, and Lance 

introduced H.R. 423, the Anti-Spoofing Act of 2017, a bill substantially similar to S. 134. On January 23, 2017, the House of Representatives agreed to that Act by roll call vote, 398 to 5. On January 24, 2017, H.R. 423 was received by the Senate and referred to 

the Committee. 

S. 134 is substantially similar to legislation previously reported 

favorably by the Committee in 2016. In the 114th Congress, Senators Nelson and Fischer introduced S. 2558, the Spoofing Prevention Act of 2016. On April 27, 2016, the Committee held an Executive Session during which S. 2644, the FCC Reauthorization Act of 

2016, was considered. That bill, containing an amended version of 

S. 2558, was ordered reported favorably, by voice vote, with an 

amendment (in the nature of a substitute). 

A similar bill, H.R. 2669, the Anti-Spoofing Act of 2015, was introduced in the House of Representatives by Representatives Meng, 

Barton, and Lance on June 4, 2015. On November 14, 2016, 

H.R. 2669, as amended, was agreed to in the House of Representatives by a roll call vote, 382 to 5, and was received by the Senate 

on November 15, 2016. The House of Representatives-passed 

version of H.R. 2669 was substantially similar to the version of 

S. 2558 that was passed by the Committee as part of S. 2644. 

ESTIMATED COSTS

In accordance with paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate and section 403 of the Congressional Budget 

Act of 1974, the Committee provides the following cost estimate, 

prepared by the Congressional Budget Office: 

S. 134–Spoofing Prevention Act of 2017 

Under current law, the Federal Communications Commission 

(FCC) has the authority to levy penalties and criminal fines 

against individuals who use fake information about a caller’s identification to defraud or harm another. S. 134 would expand that authority to include the use of text messages and would apply the authority to violators outside of the United States if the recipient is 

within the United States. The bill also would direct the FCC to develop consumer education materials that provide information for 

consumers on identifying fraudulent caller activities. Finally, S. 

134 would direct the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to 

conduct a study on actions taken by the FCC to combat the provision of inaccurate caller information and to identify additional 

steps that could be taken by the agency. 

Based on an analysis of information from the FCC about the 

agency’s current enforcement capabilities, CBO estimates that implementing S. 134 would increase the agency’s costs by less than 

$500,000 to enforce the expanded prohibition and to update current 

consumer education materials However, the FCC is authorized to 

collect fees sufficient to offset the costs of its regulatory activities 

4 

each year; therefore, CBO estimates that the net effect on discretionary spending would be negligible, assuming appropriation actions consistent with that authority. Based on the costs of similar 

reports conducted by GAO, CBO estimates that the increased costs 

to conduct the required study would be insignificant. 

S. 134 would broaden the coverage of current laws relating to the 

use of misleading or inaccurate caller identification information. As 

a result, the government might be able to pursue cases that it otherwise would not be able to prosecute. Because those prosecuted 

and convicted under S. 134 could be subject to criminal fines, the 

federal collections might increase. Criminal fines are recorded as 

revenues, deposited in the Crime Victims Fund, and later spent 

without further appropriation action; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures apply. CBO expects that any additional revenues and subsequent direct spending would not be significant because the legislation would probably affect only a small number of cases. 

CBO estimates that enacting S. 134 would not increase net direct 

spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10- 

year periods beginning in 2028. 

S. 134 contains no intergovernmental or private sector mandates 

as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would not 

affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Stephen Rabent. The 

estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant 

Director for Budget Analysis. 

REGULATORY IMPACT

In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides the following evaluation of the regulatory impact of the legislation, as reported: 

NUMBER OF PERSONS COVERED

The bill would for the first time extend spoofing prohibitions to 

persons outside the United States. It also would expand the categories of services in the United States, namely text messaging and 

other voice services as defined by the bill, subject to spoofing prohibitions. The bill, though, is not expected to have a significant impact on the number of types of individuals and businesses regulated in the United States, as nearly all offerors of such services 

already are regulated under the Communications Act of 1934. 

ECONOMIC IMPACT

By reducing consumer harms related to misleading or inaccurate 

caller identification information, the bill is expected to have a positive economic impact. 

PRIVACY

The bill is not expected to have an adverse effect on the personal 

privacy of any individuals. 

PAPERWORK

The Committee does not anticipate an increased paperwork burden on regulated entities as a result of this bill. 

5 

CONGRESSIONALLY DIRECTED SPENDING

In compliance with paragraph 4(b) of rule XLIV of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides that no provisions 

contained in the bill, as reported, meet the definition of congressionally directed spending items under the rule. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 1. Short title. 

This section would provide that this Act may be cited as the 

‘‘Spoofing Prevention Act of 2017.’’ 

Section 2. Definition. 

This section would define ‘‘Commission’’ to mean the Federal 

Communications Commission. 

Section 3. Spoofing Prevention. 

Section 3(a) would amend section 227(e)(1) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 227(e)(1)) to extend the current prohibition of misleading or inaccurate caller identification information 

to include those acting from outside the United States if the recipient of the call or text is within the United States. This section also 

would provide new definitions of text messaging and voice services, 

and would include both under the prohibition against spoofing. The 

section would provide that, except as otherwise provided, a ‘‘text 

message’’ would not include a message sent over an IP-enabled 

messaging service to another user of the same messaging service. 

Section 3(a) also would provide a technical amendment to the 

heading of section 227(e) of that Act, inserting ‘‘misleading or’’ so 

that the heading would read, ‘‘prohibition on provision of misleading or inaccurate caller identification information.’’ This mirrors the language of the statute itself. 

Finally, section 3(a) would require the FCC to implement the 

amendments made by the section not later than 18 months after 

the date of enactment of the Act, and would provide that such regulations be effective 6 months after the Commission prescribes 

them. 

Section 3(b) would require the Commission, in collaboration with 

the FTC, to develop consumer educations materials that provide information about ways for consumers to identify scams and other 

fraudulent activities that rely on the use of misleading or inaccurate caller identification information; and existing technologies, if 

any, that consumers can use to protect against such scams and 

other fraudulent activities. The Commission would be required to 

include these consumer education materials on its website and to 

update the materials on a regular basis. 

Section 3(c) would require the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) to study FCC and FTC actions to combat spoofing and the 

additional measures that could be taken to combat such activity. 

GAO would be required to submit a report on this study that includes the following: (1) trends in spoofing activity; (2) previous 

and current FCC and FTC enforcement actions; (3) current efforts 

by industry groups to develop technical standards to deter or prevent spoofing and how those may help combat spoofing; and (4) 

whether there are additional actions the FCC, FTC, and Congress 

6 

9The amendments to this section would take effect on the date that is 6 months after the 

date on which the Federal Communications Commission presecribes regulations. 

should take to combat spoofing. The Committee is aware of the fact 

that in 2016 the FCC convened a Robocall Strike Force to address 

spoofing and related issues, and it intends for GAO to review the 

work done by that strike force in this report, including making recommendations based upon the strike force’s work. GAO would be 

required to submit this report on its findings and recommendations 

to the Committee and to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

of the House of Representatives not later than 18 months after the 

date of enactment of the Act. 

Section 3(d) would provide a rule of construction stating that 

nothing in the section shall affect or modify the Commission’s authority under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (Public Law 102–243; 105 Stat. 2394) or the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 (15 

U.S.C. 7701 et seq.). 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, as 

reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted 

is enclosed in black brackets, new material is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 

COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934 

[47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.] 

SEC. 227. RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF TELEPHONE EQUIPMENT.9

[47 U.S.C. 227] 

* * * * * * * 

(e) PROHIBITION ON PROVISION OF MISLEADING OR INACCURATE

CALLER IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—It shall be unlawful for any person within 

the United States, øin connection with any telecommunications 

service or IP-enabled voice service¿ or any person outside the 

United States if the recipient of the call is within the United 

States, in connection with any voice service or text messaging 

service, to cause any caller identification service to knowingly 

transmit misleading or inaccurate caller identification information with the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value, unless such transmission is exempted 

pursuant to paragraph (3)(B). 

(2) PROTECTION FOR BLOCKING CALLER IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION.—Nothing in this subsection may be construed to prevent or restrict any person from blocking the capability of any 

caller identification service to transmit caller identification information. 

(3) REGULATIONS.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—øNot later than 6 months after the 

date of enactment of the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, 

the Commission¿ The Commission shall prescribe regulations to implement this subsection. 

(B) CONTENT OF REGULATIONS.— 

7 

(i) IN GENERAL.—The regulations required under 

subparagraph (A) shall include such exemptions from 

the prohibition under paragraph (1) as the Commission determines is appropriate. 

(ii) SPECIFIC EXEMPTION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT

AGENCIES OR COURT ORDERS.—The regulations required under subparagraph (A) shall exempt from the 

prohibition under paragraph (1) transmissions in connection with— 

(I) any authorized activity of a law enforcement 

agency; or 

(II) a court order that specifically authorizes the 

use of caller identification manipulation. 

(4) REPORT.—Not later than 6 months after the enactment of 

the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, the Commission shall report to Congress whether additional legislation is necessary to 

prohibit the provision of inaccurate caller identification information in technologies that are successor or replacement technologies to telecommunications service or IP-enabled voice 

service. 

(5) PENALTIES.— (A) CIVIL FORFEITURE.— (i) IN GENERAL.—Any person that is determined by 

the Commission, in accordance with paragraphs (3) 

and (4) of section 503(b), to have violated this subsection shall be liable to the United States for a forfeiture penalty. A forfeiture penalty under this paragraph shall be in addition to any other penalty provided for by this Act. The amount of the forfeiture 

penalty determined under this paragraph shall not exceed $10,000 for each violation, or 3 times that 

amount for each day of a continuing violation, except 

that the amount assessed for any continuing violation 

shall not exceed a total of $1,000,000 for any single act 

or failure to act. 

(ii) RECOVERY.—Any forfeiture penalty determined 

under clause (i) shall be recoverable pursuant to section 504(a). 

(iii) PROCEDURE.—No forfeiture liability shall be determined under clause (i) against any person unless 

such person receives the notice required by section 

503(b)(3) or section 503(b)(4). 

(iv) 2-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.—No forfeiture 

penalty shall be determined or imposed against any 

person under clause (i) if the violation charged occurred more than 2 years prior to the date of issuance 

of the required notice or notice or apparent liability. 

(B) CRIMINAL FINE.—Any person who willfully and knowingly violates this subsection shall upon conviction thereof 

be fined not more than $10,000 for each violation, or 3 

times that amount for each day of a continuing violation, 

in lieu of the fine provided by section 501 for such a violation. This subparagraph does not supersede the provisions 

of section 501 relating to imprisonment or the imposition 

of a penalty of both fine and imprisonment. 

8 

(6) ENFORCEMENT BY STATES.— (A) IN GENERAL.—The chief legal officer of a State, or 

any other State officer authorized by law to bring actions 

on behalf of the residents of a State, may bring a civil action, as parens patriae, on behalf of the residents of that 

State in an appropriate district court of the United States 

to enforce this subsection or to impose the civil penalties 

for violation of this subsection, whenever the chief legal officer or other State officer has reason to believe that the 

interests of the residents of the State have been or are 

being threatened or adversely affected by a violation of 

this subsection or a regulation under this subsection. 

(B) NOTICE.—The chief legal officer or other State officer 

shall serve written notice on the Commission of any civil 

action under subparagraph (A) prior to initiating such civil 

action. The notice shall include a copy of the complaint to 

be filed to initiate such civil action, except that if it is not 

feasible for the State to provide such prior notice, the 

State shall provide such notice immediately upon instituting such civil action. 

(C) AUTHORITY TO INTERVENE.—Upon receiving the notice required by subparagraph (B), the Commission shall 

have the right— 

(i) to intervene in the action; 

(ii) upon so intervening, to be heard on all matters 

arising therein; and 

(iii) to file petitions for appeal. 

(D) CONSTRUCTION.—For purposes of bringing any civil 

action under subparagraph (A), nothing in this paragraph 

shall prevent the chief legal officer or other State officer 

from exercising the powers conferred on that officer by the 

laws of such State to conduct investigations or to administer oaths or affirmations or to compel the attendance of 

witnesses or the production of documentary and other evidence. 

(E) VENUE; SERVICE OR PROCESS.— (i) VENUE.—An action brought under subparagraph 

(A) shall be brought in a district court of the United 

States that meets applicable requirements relating to 

venue under section 1391 of title 28, United States 

Code. 

(ii) SERVICE OF PROCESS.—In an action brought 

under subparagraph (A)— 

(I) process may be served without regard to the 

territorial limits of the district or of the State in 

which the action is instituted; and 

(II) a person who participated in an alleged violation that is being litigated in the civil action 

may be joined in the civil action without regard to 

the residence of the person. 

(7) EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS.—This subsection does not prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of the United 

States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State, or of an 

intelligence agency of the United States. 

9 

(8) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this subsection: 

(A) CALLER IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION.—The term 

‘‘caller identification information’’ means information provided by a caller identification service regarding the telephone number of, or other information regarding the origination of, a call made using a øtelecommunications service 

or IP-enabled voice service¿ voice service or a text message 

sent using a text messaging service. 

(B) CALLER IDENTIFICATION SERVICE.—The term ‘‘caller 

identification service’’ means any service or device designed to provide the user of the service or device with the 

telephone number of, or other information regarding the 

origination of, a call made using a øtelecommunications 

service or IP-enabled voice service¿ voice service or a text 

message sent using a text messaging service. Such term includes automatic number identification services. 

ø(C) IP-ENABLED VOICE SERVICE.—The term ‘‘IP-enabled 

voice service’’ has the meaning given that term by section 

9.3 of the Commission’s regulations (47 C.F.R. 9.3), as 

those regulations may be amended by the Commission 

from time to time.¿ 

(C) TEXT MESSAGE.—The term ‘‘text message’’— 

(i) means a message consisting of text, images, 

sounds, or other information that is transmitted from 

or received by a device that is identified as the transmitting or receiving device by means of a 10-digit telephone number; 

(ii) includes a short message service (commonly referred to as ‘SMS’) message, and a multimedia message service (commonly referred to as ‘MMS’) message; 

and 

(iii) does not include— 

(I) a real-time, two-way voice or video communication; or 

(II) a message sent over an IP-enabled messaging service to another user of the same messaging service, except a message described in 

clause (ii). 

(D) TEXT MESSAGING SERVICE.—The term ‘‘text messaging 

service’’ means a service that enables the transmission or 

receipt of a text message, including a service provided as 

part of or in connection with a voice service. 

(E) VOICE SERVICE.—The term ‘‘voice service’’— 

(i) means any service that furnishes voice communications to an end user using resources from the 

North American Numbering Plan or any successor to 

the North American Numbering Plan adopted by the 

Commission under section 251(e)(1); and 

(ii) includes transmissions from a telephone facsimile 

machine, computer, or other device to a telephone facsimile machine. 

10 

(9) LIMITATION.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this 

section, subsection (f) shall not apply to this subsection or to 

the regulations under this subsection. 

* * * * * * * 

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