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S. Hrg. 111–964 

OVERSIGHT OF RECONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 

IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE ROLE OF THE 

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING 

OVERSIGHT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

NOVEMBER 18, 2010 

Available via http://www.fdsys.gov 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

JOYCE WARD, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MARGARET DAUM, Staff Director 

MOLLY WILKINSON, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 1 

Senator Brown .................................................................................................. 3 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2010 

Hon. Jon T. Rymer, Inspector General, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Chair, Audit Committee, Council of the Inspectors General on 

Integrity and Efficiency ....................................................................................... 5 

Hon. Richard W. Moore, Inspector General, Tennessee Valley Authority, and 

Chair, Investigation Committee, Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency ................................................................................................ 6 

Arnold Fields, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction ......... 14 

Hon. Gordon S. Heddell, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense ......... 32 

Hon. Harold W. Geisel, Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department of State .. 34 

Michael G. Carroll, Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International 

Development ......................................................................................................... 35 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction ......... 36 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Bowen, Stuart W. Jr.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 36 

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 192 

Carroll, Michael G.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 35 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 180 

Fields, Arnold: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 14 

Prepared statement with attachment ............................................................. 64 

Geisel, Hon. Harold W.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 34 

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 168 

Heddell, Hon. Gordon S.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 32 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 151 

Moore, Hon. Richard W.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 57 

Rymer, Hon. Jon T.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45 

APPENDIX 

Chart referenced by Senator Brown submitted by Senator Coburn .................... 212 

Questions and Responses for the Record from: 

Mr. Fields .......................................................................................................... 213 

Additional statement submitted for the record from Mr. Fields ......................... 218 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF RECONSTRUCTION 

CONTRACTS IN BILITY OF INSPECTORS 

AFGHANISTAN AND THE ROLE OF THE 

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2010 

U.S. SENATE,

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:35 p.m., in room 

SR–428A, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Claire McCaskill, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators McCaskill and Brown. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL 

Senator MCCASKILL. First, let me apologize to the witnesses and 

the people who are attending this hearing. This has been an incredibly busy week, and I got caught up in a meeting and could not 

get out, so I apologize for being a few minutes late. 

The Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight of the U.S. Senate 

Committee on Homeland Security will come to order, and I will 

briefly have an opening statement about the hearing today and 

then defer to my colleague Senator Brown for his opening statement, and then we will have three panels of witnesses to get at the 

issue that we want to cover this afternoon. 

This is a hearing on the role of the Special Inspector General 

(SIG) in oversight of contracts in Afghanistan. This Subcommittee 

was created at the beginning of the Congress to provide oversight 

of government contracting. Over the last 18 months, we have focused on two key areas: Improving the government’s oversight and 

reducing waste, fraud, and abuse. Four of the Subcommittee’s 15 

hearings, including today’s, have examined contracting in Afghanistan and how to ensure that the government is getting the best 

possible value for the billions of dollars we spend there. 

Today’s hearing on the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction (SIGAR), brings these issues together. The origin of 

this hearing began in March 2009 when I joined with Senator 

Lieberman, Senator Collins, Senator Coburn, and Senator Grassley 

to introduce legislation to give SIGAR better hiring authority. At 

that time, General Fields had been the SIGAR for more than 7 

months, and SIGAR had not yet completed any original audit or investigative work. This raised serious concerns about SIGAR’s effecVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:56 May 09, 2011 Jkt 063868 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\63868.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
2 

tiveness at protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse in Afghanistan. 

Even though SIGAR received additional money and new hiring 

authorities in the summer of 2009, the organization did not improve. SIGAR continued to have difficulties in recruiting adequate 

experienced staff. We learned that SIGAR performed only one contract audit prior to December 2009 while devoting time and resources to reviews of subjects outside of its mission, like a 2009 review of the role of women in the Afghan election. 

We were particularly concerned that SIGAR was failing to establish the right priorities for its work, and so in December 2009, Senator Collins, Senator Coburn, and I asked the President to conduct 

a thorough review of SIGAR. In July 2010, the Council of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), completed 

their review. This review confirmed many of the problems that my 

fellow Senators and I had been concerned about. SIGAR did not 

have a plan and was not doing risk assessment. They had not put 

the right investigative team in place. Their audits were more focused on quantity than quality. And their management and leadership had failed to create an efficient, effective organization. 

The focus of today’s hearing is how SIGAR, under the leadership 

of General Arnold Fields, whom I hold in high regard as a decorated retired general in the United States Marine Corps and one 

of our Nation’s heroes, has fallen so short of the mark. CIGIE 

found SIGAR’s Investigations Division failed to meet minimum 

standards and referred its findings to the Attorney General to consider revoking SIGAR’s law enforcement authority. CIGIE also 

found that SIGAR’s Audit Division had no less than five major deficiencies. Today we will ask General Fields how this happened on 

his watch. 

In the course of today’s hearing, we will also examine General Fields’ decision to award a $96,000 sole-source contract to Joseph 

Schmitz, the former Defense Department Inspector General, who 

did resign in 2005 and did have allegations made against him. 

General Fields hired Mr. Schmitz to act as a ‘‘independent monitor’’ 

of SIGAR’s compliance with the CIGIE review and to report 

SIGAR’s progress to the Department of Justice (DOJ). 

We have learned that SIGAR understood that by awarding the 

contract to Mr. Schmitz, they would also be obtaining the services 

of Louis Freeh, the former FBI Director, whom SIGAR thought 

would act as an advocate for them at the Justice Department. Interestingly, we have learned that Mr. Freeh’s organization spoke 

only briefly with Mr. Schmitz about this contract and quickly decided that they were not interested in participating. We will ask 

General Fields why he thought that this contract was in the best 

interests of the taxpayer. 

We will also be hearing from four experts on conducting oversight in a war zone: The Inspectors General for the Defense Department, the State Department, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction. They will share their lessons learned and 

what needs to happen going forward. 

The government’s record on contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan 

has not been pretty. That is why it is so important that we have 

3 

aggressive, independent, quality oversight. With hundreds of billions of dollars at stake, there is no room for error and no time to 

delay. 

We are having this hearing today because a frank, open, and onthe-record discussion is imperative to adequately oversight going 

forward and to make sure that we protect the men and women in 

uniform in the contingency theater and also protect the American 

taxpayer. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses today 

and providing General Fields the opportunity to address the Subcommittee’s concerns. And I will now defer to my colleague Senator 

Brown. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Well said. 

Today as Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, I would like to 

specifically thank you, Madam Chairman, for scheduling this afternoon’s hearing on this very important topic. And since I joined the 

Subcommittee, this is the second hearing I have participated in on 

this very important topic: The oversight of contracts in Afghanistan. 

As General Petraeus recently stated in his contracting guidance, 

‘‘The scale of our contracting efforts in Afghanistan represent both 

an opportunity and a danger. With proper oversight, contracting 

can spur economic development and support the Afghan Government’s and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAFs) campaign objectives. However, we spend large quantities of money on 

international contracting funds quickly, and with insufficient oversight it is likely that some of these funds will unintentionally fuel 

corruption, finance insurgent organizations, strengthen criminal activities and networks, and undermine our efforts in Afghanistan.’’ 

And, Madam Chairman, I agree with General Petraeus, his guidance that if our soldiers are willing to pay the ultimate sacrifice for 

the success of the mission, the least we can do in Congress is to 

ensure that the American taxpayers’ funds go to the right people 

for the right purpose. 

Since the United States and its coalition partners began operations in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, the United States has invested approximately $56 billion in Afghanistan, which is more 

than the $53.8 billion invested in Iraq. Despite this substantial 

commitment on the part of the American taxpayers, problems continue to persist, such as waste, fraud, and the fueling of corruption. 

By far, the most troubling finding is that American taxpayer 

money has been flowing to Taliban insurgents, which I find unconscionable. 

Today we will examine whether the oversight in Afghanistan is 

meeting the necessary level to accomplish the mission and protect 

the taxpayers and use it how our soldiers expect it to be used so 

they can be provided with the tools and resources to do the job. 

On January 28, 2008, Congress created SIGAR to provide leadership in preventing and detecting waste, fraud, and abuse of taxpayer funds used in the Afghanistan conflict. To date, Congress has 

appropriated $46.2 million for this mission. While I fully appreciate 

the difficult circumstances in which SIGAR must work, I am conVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:56 May 09, 2011 Jkt 063868 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\63868.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
4 

vinced that we are not receiving the necessary return on our investment in our oversight activities. As noted, we will soon, hopefully, find out more about those numbers. 

The recent council, noted as CIGIE, as you noted, Madam Chairman, report on SIGAR found that it did not have the robust, ongoing program of risk assessment and that it was not looking in the 

right places for fraud, waste, and abuse. The oversight army in Afghanistan includes the Department of Defense (DOD), State, Agency for International Development, Inspectors General (IG), and 

SIGAR. Yet the accountability of the American taxpayers funds in 

Afghanistan remains limited. 

In this hearing today, I plan to ask the Inspectors General how 

we can better strategically align these oversight resources to maximize the return on taxpayer investment and achieve the accountability our mission requires and our soldiers deserve. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Senator Brown. 

Let me introduce the first panel. Jon T. Rymer has served as the 

Inspector General for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

(FDIC) since July 2006. He is also the Chairman of the Audit Committee of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, which we have been referring to as CIGIE. Mr. Rymer has 

served for 30 years in the active and reserve components of the 

U.S. Army. Prior to his confirmation as Inspector General, Mr. 

Rymer served as a Director at KPMG LLP. 

Richard W. Moore has served as the Tennessee Valley 

Authority’s (TVA’s) Inspector General since May 2003. He is also 

the Chairman of the Investigations Committee of the Council of the 

Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, known as CIGIE. 

Prior to joining TVA, Mr. Moore served as an assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Alabama for 18 years. 

It is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses 

that appear before us, so if you do not mind, I would ask you to 

stand. Do you swear that the testimony that you will give before 

this Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 

but the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. RYMER. I do. 

Mr. MOORE. I do. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let the record reflect the witnesses have answered in the affirmative. 

We will be using a timing system today. We would ask that your 

oral testimony be no more than 5 minutes, especially since we have 

three panels today. Your written testimony will be printed in the 

record in its entirety. Mr. Rymer. 

5 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Rymer appears in the appendix on page 45. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. JON T. RYMER,1 INSPECTOR GENERAL, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, AND 

CHAIR, AUDIT COMMITTEE, COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS 

GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY 

Mr. RYMER. Thank you, Chairman McCaskill, Senator Brown. 

My name is Jon Rymer. I am the Inspector General of the FDIC. 

I am appearing today before you in my capacity as Chair of the 

CIGIE Audit Committee. 

You have asked me to address the recent CIGIE peer evaluation 

of SIGAR and specifically SIGAR’s conduct of audits. We thank you 

for including the peer evaluation report in the hearing record. 

In late February 2010, the CIGIE Chair received a letter from 

General Arnold Fields, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction, requesting a peer evaluation of his operations. The 

CIGIE Executive Council was convened to discuss SIGAR’s request 

and determined that conducting three separate, yet coordinated, 

standards-based reviews would provide SIGAR with the information it was requesting. 

I led a team to conduct a peer review of SIGAR’s audit organization, and I will speak on the results of that review in just a moment. Mr. Moore led a team to conduct a quality assessment of 

SIGAR’s investigative operations, and he will discuss the results of 

that review. Mr. Moore and I jointly led a team to review the other 

management support operations not covered by either of the two 

peer reviews. 

I will focus the remainder of my remarks on the external peer 

review of SIGAR’s audit organization and SIGAR’s request for a 

follow-up review. 

In the audit community, an external peer review is an independent, backward-looking review, requiring a peer to examine and 

opine on, at least once every 3 years, an audit organization’s system of quality control. A peer review is done in accordance with 

CIGIE’s Audit Peer Review Guide and is based upon GAO’s Yellow 

Book standards. 

The goal of a peer review is to provide reasonable assurance that 

the audit organization has: One, adopted audit processes that are 

properly designed to produce accurate and reliable information and 

reports, and, two, is following those processes in conducting its 

work. A peer review is not designed to assess the reliability of individual reports. 

On July 14th this year, we issued our report on the results of 

this review. We concluded that SIGAR’s system of quality controls 

was suitably designed, but its compliance with its policies and procedures was inconsistent and incomplete. 

We specifically identified five deficiencies in the audit organization’s practices that could generate situations in which SIGAR 

would have less than reasonable assurance of performing and reporting on audits, in conformity with the Yellow Book and its own 

policies. 

These deficiencies relate to quality assurance, audit planning, 

documentation and supervision, reporting, and independent referencing. We made eight recommendations for improvement. 

6 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Moore appears in the appendix on page 57. 

We believe the processes we followed, the procedures we performed, and the deficiencies we identified in SIGAR’s audit organization provide a reasonable basis for a pass with deficiencies opinion. In its response, SIGAR concurred with the results of our peer 

review and committed to implementing corrective actions to overcome the deficiencies. 

Last month, General Fields contacted the CIGIE Chair to request 

a follow-up review to address the extent to which his audit organization had implemented our recommendations. Earlier this week, 

my office began a focused, limited-scope review to do so. This review will not modify the opinion and conclusions reached in our 

July 2010 report, nor will it qualify as an external peer review of 

SIGAR’s audit organization. I have scheduled a full-scope peer review of SIGAR’s audit organization to commence next October. 

At this time I would like to make two concluding comments. 

First, SIGAR’s request for a peer evaluation was unprecedented 

and warranted a unique approach. Despite competing demands and 

challenges that our individual offices faced, we responded in a fair, 

professional manner, conducted a thorough review, and provided 

SIGAR with useful and meaningful information. 

Second, I would like to recognize the professionals who volunteered to participate in these reviews and the support of their respective IGs. I would also like to acknowledge the courtesy and cooperation extended to us by General Fields and his staff, and to acknowledge the assistance of those who facilitated our travel to and 

our work in Afghanistan. 

This concludes my testimony. I look forward to answering your 

questions. Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Rymer. Mr. Moore. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. RICHARD W. MOORE,1 INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, AND CHAIR, INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS 

GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY 

Mr. MOORE. Chairman McCaskill, Senator Brown, good afternoon. As you mentioned, I am Richard Moore, the Inspector General at TVA, and I am appearing before you today in my capacity 

as the Chair of the Investigations Committee for CIGIE. My colleague Mr. Rymer has ably laid out how we got here in terms of 

these peer reviews, and I will not restate that. 

I would like to make a few comments about the work that we 

did, however. The reviews, particularly, for example, the investigations peer review, was not the work of one IG or one office. It was 

a community-wide review. In the case of the investigations peer review, there were six IGs who participated—their offices participated, rather, in that review. For the peer evaluation or Silver 

Book, as we call it, there were seven IG offices that participated 

in that particular review. 

The investigations peer review resulted in a finding that SIGAR 

was not in compliance, as you mentioned, with our quality standards. There are only two possible outcomes in our investigation 

peer reviews, and that would be either you are in compliance or 

7 

you are not. The determination that SIGAR was not in compliance 

with our peer review standards was based on 10 specific findings 

which were attached to the report, and I will be happy to discuss 

that in detail, if you would like later. 

As you mentioned, Chairman McCaskill, we were required to 

alert the Attorney General of this finding, which I did. The Attorney General supervises all of the IGs who exercise statutory law 

enforcement powers, and it is conditioned—we exercise those powers based on our compliance with the Attorney General standards 

and the CIGIE peer review standards. And as Mr. Rymer mentioned, there will be an audit follow-on review, and there will be 

one on the investigation side as well. I would reiterate what Mr. 

Rymer said about the audit review for the investigation peer review. This is not a new peer review, and it will not change the finding or decision on the peer review, that is, noncompliance. This is 

merely to determine whether or not there has been remediation of 

the deficiencies that we found. 

As to the peer evaluation, that Silver Book review, as we call it, 

was done pursuant to standards that are called the Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General. The Silver Book sets 

forth the overall approach for managing, operating, and conducting 

the work of the Inspector General. There are nine categories in the 

Silver Book that we addressed with SIGAR, and in the end, the 

team found 22 different suggestions or recommendations for improvement of SIGAR. 

That concludes my testimony, and I look forward to answering 

any questions that you may have. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Moore. 

Let me first start by putting on the record how conservative peer 

reviews are. And let me just say that every 3 years, as the elected 

auditor of Missouri, we had a peer review. And I loaned some of 

my senior staff to the national peer review effort that goes on nationwide. So I am very intimately aware of what a peer review is 

and what it means. 

I also know that auditors by nature are extremely conservative, 

and the only time they become even more conservative is when 

they are passing judgment on their peers. 

How often does an organization, based on all of your experience 

in the Council of Inspectors General for Efficiency in operations, 

how often does an organization fail its peer review, especially in 

light of the failure of SIGAR? 

Mr. RYMER. Let me start, ma’am, by saying that the Audit Committee of CIGIE supervised or administered 58 peer reviews from 

2006 to 2010. Of those 58, 55 were pass, and there were three pass 

with deficiencies. So 3 out of 58. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And so we had three pass with deficiencies. 

Have there been any that have failed? 

Mr. RYMER. Not in that 3-year period, ma’am, that I know of. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. And what about on your end in terms 

of the Investigations Standards? 

Mr. MOORE. On the investigations side, in terms of the investigation peer reviews, I believe there has been one noncompliance since 

we have been conducting peer reviews in 2003. 

Senator MCCASKILL. How many have been done since 2003? 

8 

Mr. MOORE. Approximately 50. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So one time out of 50, and that would 

be this one? 

Mr. MOORE. Yes—well, no. 

Senator MCCASKILL. One other. 

Mr. MOORE. One other, other than this, yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So this would be the second time since 

2003. And could you share with us what the organization was that 

had these serious problems, the other organization that was evaluated? 

Mr. MOORE. I was not the Chair then. My recollection—and, Jon, 

you may recall. I believe it was OPM. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Office of Personnel Management? 

Mr. MOORE. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. How serious would you all characterize 

the failures that you documented in your review of SIGAR? 

Mr. RYMER. Well, I think what you have already pointed out and 

established, Senator, is the fact that it is very rare. The overall deficiencies that we noted, the five deficiencies on the audit side, 

were problems of noncompliance. We did positively note that 

SIGAR had established a policies and procedures manual and processes that we thought met the standards. However, we often found 

that they were not in compliance. And in most cases, we found situations where the compliance levels were in the two-thirds or so. 

Of the 12 reports we reviewed, we would often find that five, six, 

seven, or eight reports would be in compliance, and then three or 

four would not be. 

Mr. MOORE. And I would say on the investigations side, the seriousness is, of course, if you have special agents in an investigative 

component of an IG shop who have not been trained or confronted 

with the guidelines that they are required to adhere to. Use of 

deadly force and use of confidential informants, the surveillance 

techniques, those kind of things are in the Attorney General’s 

guidelines. You put at risk investigations that you are conducting, 

and you potentially put at risk all the Federal law enforcement 

simply because of the reputational damage that can occur if agents 

are not fully knowledgeable of the guidelines and adhering to them. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Which obviously could be exacerbated in a 

contingency theater where we are fighting a battle, and one of the 

battles we are fighting is, in fact, corruption. 

Mr. MOORE. I believe that is true. 

Senator MCCASKILL. One response that SIGAR had to these 

issues is that they were a new organization, and normally Inspectors General are not given a peer review for 3 years. Now, I understand that the reason this happened was because General Fields 

asked for the review. But is that a valid response, that the kinds 

of problems that you found could be attributable to the fact that 

they had not been in existence for 3 full years? 

Mr. RYMER. Ma’am, we took that perspective into consideration. 

I think it is valuable to note that, as I said in my statement, this 

review was unprecedented. No one else had asked for a peer review 

at this stage as a de novo IG, particularly none of the three special 

IGs that are now in existence. So I think that was positive. I think 

we noted that in terms of how we conducted the review. We were 

9 

concerned that, given its fairly short existence, 18 months or so 

when we began the review, there would not be sufficient evidence 

of how they were performing. So to accommodate that fact, I chose 

to do a 100-percent sample of every audit they did, frankly, to try 

to give the organization the opportunity to show improvement. 

Senator MCCASKILL. To give them the benefit of the doubt. 

Mr. RYMER. Yes, ma’am, to make sure that if there were opportunities to show improvement from Audit 1 to Audit 10 or 12, we 

could demonstrate that. But the results were mixed. We noted that 

some audits showed improvement on occasion, and then other audits did not show improvement. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So you did a 100-percent sample? 

Mr. RYMER. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And you do not need to tell me that is very, 

very unusual. 

Mr. RYMER. Yes, ma’am. 

Mr. MOORE. On the investigations side, again, as Mr. Rymer suggested, we have not looked at an organization this early in their 

development. We were surprised to see the absence of policies and 

procedures and the fact that agents that we interviewed—and we 

interviewed agents here in the United States and in Afghanistan, 

and they were not conversant with the guidelines that they had to 

adhere to or the standards. And as we reflected in our report, it 

appeared that there were no manuals or standards at SIGAR’s 

headquarters that were being taught to the agents and holding 

them accountable by when we went in, but there were block stamp 

policies at the time that we conducted the peer review. So it appeared that they were making good-faith efforts to adopt policies, 

but they had not been in existence before April of this year. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Senator Brown. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

First of all, thank you very much for your testimony. I am trying 

to get my hands around the fact that we have a group like SIGAR, 

and while I am appreciative that they said, ‘‘Hey, can you come in 

and, audit us and see what is up and report back—I certainly appreciate.’’ But the results in terms of actual numbers that we have 

actually expended in terms of providing them the resources and 

then the return—I know Senator Coburn has here the comparison 

of oversight in Afghanistan, the funds recovered by other entities, 

USAID IG, DOD IG, and SIGAR. 

Now if my numbers are correct, we have given approximately 

$46.2 million to SIGAR for this mission, yet they have only identified and collected $8.2 million. I know the value of a dollar, but 

that does not seem to be a good value for our taxpayer dollars. 

Do you have any comments as to whether you feel that we are 

getting the value for our dollars and/or why do you feel—if you 

could get into that. And then also, why do you feel the recovery is 

so low compared to these other entities? 

Mr. RYMER. I’ll start and attempt to answer that, Senator. The 

issue of funds put to better use is a direct function of the audits 

that the organization chooses to do. One of the observations we had 

in the peer review and in the capstone review was that we were 

concerned about the process that SIGAR went through in selecting 

the initial audits, the first 12 or so, in our sample. We were conVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:56 May 09, 2011 Jkt 063868 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\63868.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
10 

cerned that the audits perhaps were not as focused, and we heard 

this in some of our interviews, on either contract oversight, funds 

put to better use, or improper payments. 

Senator BROWN. Well, wasn’t that their mission, though, contract 

oversight? 

Mr. RYMER. Well, I think that would certainly be a large part of 

their mission. Let me explain a little bit and put it in greater context. 

We did not really see any audits that were specifically designed, 

where the principal objective was to recover funds. But the IG has 

a responsibility also to detect and comment on lapses of internal 

controls. We saw a few audits directed at internal controls, or preventive processes. Specifically, I think we saw three audits that 

were in my judgment, internal control-related audits. So of the 12 

we looked at, 3 addressed internal control and the other 9 were audits that, in my view, were audits examining or looking at either 

U.S. policy rules and regulations or at international policy rules 

and regulations. 

So in that continuum, we suggested—and SIGAR certainly 

agreed—that a more risk-based approach to identifying the audits 

that SIGAR should be focusing on was something they should do. 

Senator BROWN. Yes, but do you think—you have to give them 

$46-plus million—I mean, is it the fact that nobody gave them the 

proper guidance as to where to go and what to do? Or they just 

chose to ignore the guidance and do their own thing in those areas 

that you just commented upon? And let me just also ask, what is 

your independent professional opinion as to whether we are actually getting our money’s worth out of this particular group? 

Mr. RYMER. Well, Senator, I have to be a bit careful. As a professional auditor, I have to stick to the scope and approach of the review, and Senator McCaskill—— 

Senator BROWN. I am asking you your professional auditor opinion. 

Mr. RYMER [continuing]. Will agree to this, but the concern that 

I had, as I said, was that the sort of ‘‘tier one’’ auditing was not 

in the original plan. We suggested that it be in their plan. The 

other concern I have would be not paying as much attention in the 

early stages to the suggestions of the auditees, of folks that have 

responsibility for managing the programs. There was, in my view, 

a bit of top-down and not enough bottom-up audit planning. So I 

think the audit planning process was one that was not quite balanced and I think needs improvement. 

Senator BROWN. And I recognize—certainly I think everybody 

does—the difficult operating environment in Afghanistan. I have 

been there. I understand it. In your opinion, does SIGAR have the 

sufficient resources to overcome that lack of direction or obstacles 

or not? 

Mr. MOORE. Well, Senator, I would say that we looked at funding 

for SIGAR because that was raised to us by SIGAR staff, that there 

were funding issues early on, and we were particularly concerned 

about that on the investigative side, whether they had the proper 

funding to put agents in Afghanistan. We found that they did have 

appropriate funding levels. 

11 

And I would just say in terms of performance of the organization, 

which you have been asking us about here today, there are at least 

three things that handicapped the organization, in my opinion, and 

we cover this in the report. One is what we have mentioned before, 

the lack of risk assessment. Really what are the risks to the pot 

of money, if you will, that you are charge with overseeing? We typically in IG offices look at what are the likely frauds that are most 

likely to occur? What is the likelihood of that happening? And then 

we look at the severity if it does. We make heat maps that give us 

an indication about where we should put our dollars, where they 

would be most effective. That was not done at SIGAR. 

The second thing is strategic planning. Everybody, I think, appreciates the importance of having goals, making sure your priorities are understood, and, unfortunately, that was not done very 

well at SIGAR, at least in the period that we reviewed. 

And, finally, I would say in terms of performance, a handicap 

that we saw was the way that human resource issues were handled—that is, the hiring decisions. As we point out in the report, 

there was a decision to wait to hire the head of investigations, to 

pursue one particular candidate, and that cost them almost a year 

in terms of performance on the investigative side. They decided not 

to hire a deputy until recently. That is another human resource 

issue that made it more difficult for them to perform. 

Senator BROWN. So were the hiring delays, do you think, a lack 

of experience or knowledge in what the job at hand was? I mean, 

where do you see the breakdown? 

Mr. MOORE. I would say that it goes back to not having the kind 

of focus on risk and the plan. If you are not sure exactly what the 

strategic plan is, what your priorities should be, it can affect the 

hiring decisions that you make. 

Senator BROWN. Now, before I turn it back over to the Chair, I 

would think out of everything that we have been talking about 

here today that the number one priority of every independent 

group here is to try—well, obviously, dealing with Afghanistan specifically now—is to find out how much and where the monies are 

going, if they going at all to the Taliban and other groups that 

want to basically kill us. I am shocked that this is not like the 

number one priority, that we find out where that money is going 

and why it is going and who is delivering the funds, under what 

circumstances. Where is the breakdown? I am just flabbergasted as 

to—and I know that, I am going to be asking the questions to the 

next panel, but am I missing something? I mean, should not that 

be the priority of SIGAR and any other entity that is there independently finding where the waste, fraud, and abuse is? The biggest abuse is the fact that we are giving money to people that want 

to kill us, and they are not entitled to it. It is our money. I mean, 

I am sorry, folks. I know I am still semi-new here. We have a few 

new members now, but give me a break. 

Mr. RYMER. The one thing I would say, Senator, is the Special 

IG—to differentiate the Special IGs from the IGs that are assigned 

to or work in existing, standing Federal agencies—should be primarily focused, in my opinion, on contract oversight and management of dollars. The Special IGs exist because they are essentially 

12 

attached to an appropriation or a series of appropriations, meaning 

that financial oversight should be a primary responsibility. 

Take the case of my organization, my primary responsibility as 

an IG in a regulatory agency is to look for waste, fraud, and abuse 

in the programs of a regulator, but it does not give me the same 

opportunities to look at situations where appropriations are managed controls are established, and contracting dollars are spent. 

So I think there is a difference, and I think it speaks to all three 

of the Special IGs, that their principal mission should be, in my 

view at least, looking at controls associated with contracting and 

how cash is being used. 

Senator BROWN. And just to note, I wholeheartedly agree with 

you, so thank you for that independent statement and assessment, 

because the taxpayers are being hurt and the soldiers that are trying to defend us and do their jobs are being provided with—they 

have a disadvantage because some of our own monies are being potentially used to hurt or kill them, and I find that deeply troubling. 

So, Madam Chairman, I will turn it back over. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Senator Brown. 

In reading your reports, I was struck by how factual and—which 

I was not surprised. I knew that these would be very by-the-book, 

very factual recitations of compliance and noncompliance that you 

found in the Yellow Book and in the Silver Book. And I think that 

I just have really one area I would like to cover with you, and that 

is the management and oversight issue. 

The head of an audit agency, their responsibility is really to 

make the decision about how the resources of that agency are going 

to be used. I think you all will both agree that General Fields was 

never expected to do these audits or to do these investigations. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. MOORE. That is correct. 

Mr. RYMER. That is correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. But, rather, his entire responsibility of taking over in this position was to look at what was flowing into Afghanistan and figure out where there was a risk. That was his 

most important job: First, the risk assessment; and, second, the 

audit plan that would address the risks that were assessed within 

the scope of the work that he had the legal ability to audit or investigate. Would that be correct? 

Mr. RYMER. That is correct. Yes, ma’am. 

Mr. MOORE. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. All right. Now put, in this context that we 

have been informed by major problems in Iraq. I mean, my frustration with General Fields and his position is that, as a former auditor, his job—it was like shooting fish in a barrel. There was so 

much work to be done as an auditor. I mean, everywhere you 

looked there was a contract that needed another set of eyes. There 

was a flow of money that needed investigation. There is potential 

for corruption, waste, misuse of money in almost every single location this money was flowing. I mean, this is a free-for-all in terms 

of risk assessment. 

But yet in the first 16 months of his tenure, there was not one 

audit performed on one contract. Is that correct? 

Mr. RYMER. Yes, ma’am, I believe that is correct. 

13 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is hard for me to get around. 

Mr. RYMER. Ma’am, there were assessments of internal controls. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Mr. RYMER. Specifically a contract audit? I do not recall a contract audit. 

Senator MCCASKILL. There was assessment of controls, and there 

was also a study done on the participation of women in the Afghan 

election. And I do not mean to minimize—the participation of 

women in the Afghan election is an important policy problem, and 

it is an important part of the overall mission in Afghanistan because we want—obviously, the capabilities of that country in terms 

of keeping the Taliban at bay includes a healthy participation in 

a democracy. 

With all due respect, either one of you in your experience as 

auditors, would that study—would that have made your risk assessment if you had been given this job in the first 18 months? 

Mr. RYMER. The Afghan election? As I said, for a Special IG, I 

think the focus should be on the dollars. That should be the principal responsibility of any of the three Special IGs we have. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Moore. 

Mr. MOORE. I would agree, and I would just point out that, in 

addition to doing the risk assessment as to the pot of money, if you 

will, one of the things that we discussed with SIGAR staff and 

pointed out in our report was you have to do that internal office 

risk assessment so that you know what your limitations are, what 

your skill sets are, what your resources are, what your priorities 

are, what is likely to limit you from getting the mission accomplished. That was not done at SIGAR. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. That is all the questions I have for 

this panel. 

Senator BROWN. I am all set, too. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you both very much for your service, 

and CIGIE is a very, very important part of oversight in this government. It is unfortunate that most Americans have no idea that 

many, many professional Inspectors General in the Federal system 

give of their time in overseeing other Inspectors General in the system. But I certainly understand that we would not have the quality 

of Inspectors General that we have in the Federal Government 

were it not for the work of CIGIE. So thank you, and please convey 

our thanks to your entire organization that does these peer reviews. 

Mr. RYMER. Thank you, ma’am. 

Mr. MOORE. Thank you. [Pause.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. General Fields, welcome. Thank you for 

your attendance today. Let me introduce you to the hearing. 

General Fields has served as Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction since July 2008. General Fields previously served as Deputy Director of the Africa Center for Strategic 

Studies at the Department of Defense and is a member of the U.S. 

Department of State (DoS) assigned to the U.S. embassy in Iraq, 

where he performed duties as the Chief of Staff of the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office (IRMO). He retired as a Major 

General from the United States Marine Corps in January 2004 

after 34 years of active military service. 

14 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Fields appears in the appendix on page 64. 

Let me state for the record how much your record speaks of you 

as an American, as a patriot, and how much our country owes you 

a debt of gratitude for your many years of service on behalf of the 

United States of America. 

It is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses 

that appear before us, so if you do not mind, I would like you to 

stand. Do you swear that the testimony that you will give before 

this Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 

but the truth, so help you God? 

General FIELDS. I do. 

Senator MCCASKILL. We welcome your testimony, General Fields. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. ARNOLD FIELDS,1 SPECIAL 

INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION 

General FIELDS. Thank you, Chairman McCaskill and Ranking 

Member Senator Brown. I appreciate this opportunity to be here 

today. I would say it is a pleasure, but I would be telling a lie if 

I were to say so. But it is a privilege as well as an opportunity, 

and I wish to take full advantage of that opportunity. 

I have worked in support of SIGAR for the past basically year 

and a half. Funding we received in June 2009 fully funded this organization. I have built SIGAR from nothing to 123 very well informed and talented staff, of which 32 to date are assigned for 13 

months to a very dangerous place known as Afghanistan. 

This work is challenging. I have to find people who are willing 

to put their lives in harm’s way in Afghanistan conducting this 

work in the midst of a very competitive market of investigators and 

auditors. I am proud of the staff that we have. 

We have conducted work in 22 of 34 provinces in Afghanistan 

and 48 separate locations. We have produced 34 audits, over 100 

recommendations, 90 percent of which have been accepted by the 

institutions of this Federal Government that we have scrutinized. 

They are using our work. I could cite many cases, but I will not 

at this point. But our work is, in fact, making a difference. 

I did—and I appreciate that the Chairwoman acknowledged that 

I requested the CIGIE assessment. We would not normally have 

undergone such a thing until—the earliest would have been 2012. 

I wanted to make this organization what Senator McCaskill would 

wish that it be, and that assessment for which I individually and 

unilaterally made requests was intended to do just that. 

My leadership has been referred to as ‘‘inept.’’ That is the first 

time, Senator, that in all my life, a man of 64 years of age, who 

has supported this Federal Government for 41 straight years, of 

which 34 have been as a military officer. I do not even allow my 

own auditors to refer to the people in Afghanistan as ‘‘inept’’ because it is too general a statement for any human being. I have 

met with many people in Afghanistan, from the President of Afghanistan to the little children in the province of Ghor. And when 

I ask those little children what is it on which this reconstruction 

effort and $56 billion that the United States has invested in Afghanistan should be based, and I want you to know that those children, who were no higher than my knee, said to me the same 

15 

things that President Karzai said as well as his ministers. They 

want energy or electricity or light. They want agriculture. They 

want education. And what really broke my heart is when those little children told me that, ‘‘What we really want is a floor in our 

school.’’ That is what we are up against in Afghanistan. We have created by way of this $56 billion an opportunity for the 

children in Afghanistan, who I feel represent the future of Afghanistan, as well as the rest of the people. And I would be the last, Senator McCaskill and Senator Brown, to condone in any form or fashion any activity that leads to less than the full measure of that $56 

billion being used for the purposes for which it was made available. 

I want this Subcommittee to also note that I take this work very 

seriously. Why? Because I was raised up in South Carolina in a 

family not unlike that in Afghanistan, where the level of education 

for both my mother and father was less than fifth grade. But, nonetheless, the best training that I received in my life came from my 

mother who had less than a fifth grade education. I wish that 

someone had brought $56 billion to bear upon my life. But here I 

am in a very important position and trying to influence what is 

going on in Afghanistan to the best of my ability, using a very 

knowledgeable and competent staff by which to do so. 

I raised up hard, ladies and gentlemen, in poverty myself. I worked for less than $1.50 a day, about what the average Afghan 

makes today in the year 2010. On the day President Kennedy was 

buried, which was a no-school day for me, my brother and I shoveled stuff out of a local farmer’s septic tank with a shovel for 75 

cents per hour for the two of us. I know what it is to live in poverty, and I know what it is to have an opportunity, and my country 

has given me that, and by which I am pleased and very grateful. 

I will do my best, Senator McCaskill and Senator Brown, to 

measure up to your full expectations. I appreciate the emphasis 

that you have placed on contracting in Afghanistan, but I want also 

to say that the legislation that I am carrying out has three dimensions. Contracts is not the exclusive one, but I will agree with you 

that is where the money is, and we should focus more on that. But 

I am also tasked to look at the programs as well as the operations 

that support this tremendous reconstruction effort. And I promise 

you, Senators, that I will do so. Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, General Fields. 

General Fields, I certainly respect your life story and what you 

have accomplished, and no one—I can speak, I think, confidently 

for Senator Brown and every other U.S. Senator. No one questions 

your commitment to the United States of America. That is not the 

question here. The question here is whether or not the important 

work of the Inspector General in Afghanistan has been fulfilled and 

completed, especially within the time frames that we are working 

with because of the contingency operation. 

You submitted 12 pages of written testimony for this hearing. 

Less than one page of those 12 addressed the serious deficiencies 

found in your peer review by other Inspectors General trying to 

measure the work of your audit agency against the standards that 

are required in the Federal Government. You did say in your testimony that the findings have helped you strengthen your organization and that you have now made changes. 

16 

Let me talk about the law that you are operating under. The law 

that you are operating under, I am sure you are aware, requires 

a comprehensive audit plan. Are you aware of that, General Fields, 

that the law requires a comprehensive audit plan? 

General FIELDS. Yes, I am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And when did you begin work on a comprehensive audit plan? 

General FIELDS. We began work on a comprehensive work plan, 

Senator, when I published the very first quarterly report which 

contained how we planned to proceed with this very new organization and oversight entity. In that report delivered to this Congress 

on the—I am sorry. In that report delivered to this Congress at the 

end of October 2008, I laid out in general what we would pursue, 

and I am pleased to say that at the top of that list is, in fact, contracting. That was followed up with the hiring of Mr. John 

Brummet as my principal auditor, someone who—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. And when did that hire occur? 

General FIELDS. That hiring actually occurred the first week of 

January 2009. That is when Mr. Brummet actually reported 

aboard. But we commenced the process of bringing him aboard, of 

course, much earlier than that. And then we—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. And you had been at the agency how long 

when he actually joined the agency? 

General FIELDS. I had been at the agency—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Since July 2008, correct? 

General FIELDS. That is when I was sworn in, yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Now, in the audit plan that the law requires—and I am sure that—I hope the first thing you did was to 

look at Public Law 110–181 and look at the statutory requirements 

of your job. That plan that was required lays out that it must be 

consistent with the requirements of Section 842, subsection (h), 

which are the audit requirements that the Congress placed on 

SIGAR. Are you familiar with the audit requirements in subsection 

(h), General? 

General FIELDS. In general, yes, I am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Could you tell us what those requirements 

are? 

General FIELDS. That we would conduct thorough audits of the 

spending associated with our contribution to reconstruction in Afghanistan. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I am not trying to play ‘‘gotcha’’ here, General, but there are seven requirements in Section (h), and I am 

going to lay them out for the record, and after I do each one, I 

would like you to tell me if that has been completed and, if so, 

when. 

General FIELDS. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. The first one is—these are the things at a 

minimum you are required to examine as Special Inspector General. The first one is the manner in which contract requirements 

were developed and contracts or task and delivery orders were 

awarded. Has that been done by SIGAR? Have you examined contract requirements in Afghanistan and contracts or task and delivery orders, how they were awarded? Has you agency done that at 

this date? 

17 

General FIELDS. We have conducted several contract audits. Each 

of those audits has addressed matters associated with how contracts came about. 

Senator MCCASKILL. How many contract audits have you completed? 

General FIELDS. We have completed about four contract audits. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And how long—you have done four contract 

audits, but isn’t it true that all of those have occurred essentially 

in the last 12 months? 

General FIELDS. That is correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Number two, the manner in which the Federal agency exercised control over the performance of contractors. 

Have you done that audit work? 

General FIELDS. We have examined in each of our audits the extent to which controls have been in place to guard against waste, 

fraud, and abuse of the American taxpayer’s dollar. In so doing, 

yes, ma’am, we have looked at those matters as they related to contracts specifically in those areas in which we have conducted focused contract audits of specific initiatives for which funding is 

being available. 

Senator MCCASKILL. All right. So the first requirement dealt 

with contract requirements and task and delivery orders. The second requirement, the manner of control over contractors of the Federal Government. 

Number three, the extent to which operational field commanders 

were able to coordinate or direct the performance of contractors in 

the area of combat operations. Has that work been done? 

General FIELDS. Senator, the very first audit that we conducted 

was a contract being supervised by CSTC–A, which is responsible 

for the oversight of training and equipping the Afghanistan security forces. That contract is worth $404 million to the American 

taxpayer. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And how many audits have you done that 

address the oversight of contractors by field commanders? 

General FIELDS. Forty percent, Senator, of our audits have either 

been direct audits or focused contract audits or contract-related audits. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I thought you said you had done four audits 

on contracts. 

General FIELDS. I said four audits because I was referencing four 

focused contract audits, which were of multi-million-dollar infrastructure initiatives specifically associated with the stand-up of the 

Afghanistan security forces. But I am also saying we have audits 

that addressed contracts in general that relate to the stand-up of 

the Afghanistan security forces and other initiatives in Afghanistan. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Number four, the degree to which contractor 

employees were properly screened, selected, trained, and equipped 

for the functions to be performed. Is there a report that you could 

point me to where I could get reassurance that we are doing adequate selection, training, equipping, and screening of contract personnel in Afghanistan? 

General FIELDS. Senator, the very first audit, once again, that we 

published, the $404 million contract, we found in that audit the suVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:56 May 09, 2011 Jkt 063868 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\63868.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
18 

pervision of that particular contract was inadequate whereby the 

actual entity, the expert in contract was really living in Maryland 

and not physically located on a permanent basis in Afghanistan. 

Senator MCCASKILL. How many contracts are operational in Afghanistan right now? 

General FIELDS. I do not know, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Can you give me a ballpark? 

General FIELDS. I know that there are, based on our most recent 

audit, between 2007 and 2009 of all contracts for which we could 

find information at that point in time 6,900 contracts, among which 

I am confident are a number of the type that you just mentioned. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So I have asked several questions. In 

each one you referred to the same audit of one contract. So of the 

six thousand—what did you say the number was? 

General FIELDS. 6,900, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So we have almost 7,000 active operational 

contracts, and there have been four audits completed of those contracts? 

General FIELDS. The 6,900 is a roll-up of contracts in general regarding Afghanistan between the years 2007 and 2009. How many 

of those might be defined as operational contracts, I do not know. 

Senator MCCASKILL. But you do not have any reason to believe 

that has gone down, do you? 

General FIELDS. No, ma’am, I do not. 

Senator MCCASKILL. In fact, it has probably gone up. 

General FIELDS. Absolutely. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Absolutely. All right. The next one, the nature and extent of any incidents of misconduct or unlawful activity 

by contractor employees. How many audits have you done that 

would reassure the American people that you have, in fact, looked 

for, found, or are confident there is no unlawful activity by contractor employees? 

General FIELDS. Senator, I would say that in each of the 34 audits that we have conducted, those matters have been of concern. 

But each of those 34 audits may not necessarily have been directly 

related to a contract. 

Senator MCCASKILL. How many findings have you issued dealing 

with misconduct or unlawful activity by contractor employees? How 

many findings in these audits? 

General FIELDS. I do not think that we have identified misconduct per se. We have identified issues that we have given to our 

investigators for further follow-up. And I can specifically—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. I am sorry. Excuse me. 

General FIELDS. Well, I am sorry, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is OK. Go ahead. 

General FIELDS. I can specifically tell you of a specific audit that 

we have conducted which started out as a general audit of the 

Kabul Power Plant, an item worth $300 million to the American 

taxpayer. And during the course of that audit, we found anomalies 

that we felt were investigatory in nature, so we tailored and shortened the scope of our audit, and the rest of those matters were 

turned over to our investigators, and they are still being pursued. 

Senator MCCASKILL. The remaining two requirements in terms of 

audits that must be performed: The nature and extent of any activVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:56 May 09, 2011 Jkt 063868 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\63868.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
19 

ity by contractor employees that was inconsistent with the objections of operational field commanders. And, finally, number seven, 

the extent to which any incidents of misconduct or unlawful activity were reported, documented, investigated, and prosecuted. 

To what extent have you been able to produce a report as to how 

much unlawful activity has actually been investigated and prosecuted? 

General FIELDS. I do not have an answer for that question at this 

time, but I will assure the Senator that, as we conduct our audit 

work and as we conduct our investigations work, all of those matters are, in fact, taken into consideration. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, General. 

Senator Brown. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

General thank you once again. I mirror Senator McCaskill’s kind 

words about your service. As someone who is still serving, I greatly 

appreciate that service. And I noted in your testimony how you had 

great concern for the Afghan children and the needs of the people 

in Afghanistan, and I understand that. I also have, however, great 

concern about our soldiers, the men and women that are fighting, 

and also the taxpayers who are providing that $56 billion. It does 

not grow on trees. 

And that being said, I know you have been in the position since 

July 2008, and the last panel that you heard noted serious deficiencies, management deficiencies during their review. 

Now that you have held the office for over 2 years, what major 

course corrections are you currently taking to rectify these serious 

deficiencies? 

General FIELDS. Thank you, Senator. July 2008, that was the 

month during which I was privileged to be sworn into this position, 

but funding for SIGAR did not really come until much later. That 

is why I pointed out that we did not receive full funding for this 

organization until June 2009. 

Senator BROWN. So noted, and that is a good point. Thank you. 

General FIELDS. Thank you, Senator. But in reference to course 

corrections, one of the reasons I asked for the CIGIE to come in 

early, about 2 years in advance of the time which it normally would 

have as we anticipated, was to help me set the course correctly for 

this organization. And I am using the results of both the audit, the 

investigations, and the so-called capstone review of SIGAR to help 

chart the course. So I have put in place as of September 30 of this 

year the recommendations and are implementing the suggestions 

made by the review team. 

Senator BROWN. And how have you done that? What specifically 

as to—the biggest thing where I think Senator McCaskill and I are 

concerned about, which is the money. I know you have done some 

good reports and investigations on other things that you have commented on, which is policy issues relating to the ability for the Afghan people to, live and grow. But in terms of the things that many 

taxpayers right now are concerned about is the dollars. They are 

growing weary. They want to know where their money is going. 

What actions, based on the recommendations, do you have in place? 

General FIELDS. Thank you, Senator. I am a taxpayer as well, so 

I have as much interest, if not more in my particular case, as the 

20 

individual American taxpayer. We are doing a better job of risk assessment. We found that to be a weakness to which earlier attention in a much more pointed way should have been turned. So we 

are improving the means by which we determine where it is that 

we should focus our effort. 

Senator BROWN. And where is that leading you now? 

General FIELDS. Well, it is leading us to a greater focus on contracts, because that is, in fact, where the money is. But as the initial questioning by Madam Chairman, we have to also address the 

front end of this reconstruction effort. To what extent are the policies being put in place by those who are implementing this $56 billion? 

Senator BROWN. I understand that and I respect that approach. 

But right now, now that you have kind of been put on notice by 

everybody that, we understand the policies and all that stuff, but 

what specifically are you doing now based on the recommendations 

that you have been given? What are you specifically doing so I can 

tell the people back home in Massachusetts and all of our viewers—I do not know how many there are, but all the viewers we 

have—where are you focusing? Give me some specific examples so 

I can advocate and say, hey, he is kind of learning—he is learning 

and growing, he has taken a spot, he has the funding after a year 

of being sworn in. He has now been given an independent requested audit. So give me some specific examples as to what you— 

I do not want to beat a dead horse here, but I need to know where 

exactly you are focusing. Are you focusing, for example, on how the 

heck Taliban is allegedly getting money from us taxpayers? Are 

you focusing on that? Are you focusing on the bribes and payoffs? 

Are you focusing on the fact that the Afghan army is not—after the 

$6-plus billion we have spent, is still not up and running. I mean, 

where are you focusing exactly? 

General FIELDS. Sir, we are focusing on several broad areas, but 

at the top of that list happens to be contracting. 

Senator BROWN. What specifically in contracting? What area are 

you doing? Are you looking at bridges, roads, power? What are you 

doing specifically? I know contracting is so big. We heard we have 

7,000 contracts or more. 

General FIELDS. Yes, sir. 

Senator BROWN. Give me an area. Have you actually initiated 

some investigations already? 

General FIELDS. Sir, we have 89 investigations ongoing as we 

speak. 

Senator BROWN. And where are they being focused? 

General FIELDS. They are focused on fraud and theft. 

Senator BROWN. And based on that, what types of things are you 

investigating? What examples could you give to me and the American taxpayers of what you are seeing? What made you go to that 

particular area versus another area? 

General FIELDS. Because that is where we feel that the vulnerability is for the American taxpayer’s dollar. 

Senator BROWN. Based on what? Some tip-off? Some prior types 

of contracts? I mean, why did you specifically want to go for that 

area? 

General FIELDS. Based on all of the above, sir. 

21 

Senator BROWN. OK. Can you share your thoughts about how we 

can strategically deal with this very complex challenge that you 

stated in your testimony about your concern in the role and cost 

of private security contractors, specifically as it relates to fueling 

corruption and financing insurgents, as I said, or strengthening 

criminal networks? What tangible actions are required to try to 

defer this corruption? What can you tell me about that? 

General FIELDS. Sir, I believe that the fight against corruption 

must take place on several levels and many dimensions, the first 

of which is that we need to give consideration to what it is that 

we are doing in support of the reconstruction effort and the government of Afghanistan. We are conducting a reconstruction effort in 

three broad areas: Security, governance, and development. And 

each of those we feel needs to be addressed. 

We are devoting and have devoted $29 billion to security in Afghanistan itself, the stand-up of the Afghan security forces, the police and the army. We have devoted $16 billion to governance and 

development, and therein lies the vulnerability of the American 

taxpayer’s dollar. 

So we are pursuing audits and investigations that will help mitigate the potential for the American taxpayer dollar to be wasted, 

frauded, or abused. 

Senator BROWN. I know you are getting $46 million to complete 

your mission. That is a lot of money. And I noted here on the chart 

that Senator Coburn referenced, you have basically identified in 

terms of fraud, waste, and abuse of about $8 million. So 46 you 

have been given, $8 million in the time frame. Can you tell me why 

there has not been more of kind of a collection on that fraud, 

waste, and abuse up to this point? 

General FIELDS. Sir, a contributing factor is the slow start that 

this organization had in standing up, a part of which I am inclined 

to attribute to the lack of funding—— 

Senator BROWN. Listen, I am going to give you that one because 

that is something that I would note. You are sworn in, you get the 

funding, you get the funding, you got to get it up, you got to get 

it running. So let us just take in the last 9 months, for example, 

have you had any success that you want to share with us? 

General FIELDS. I feel that we have had some successes. We 

have—— 

Senator BROWN. Hard-dollar success? 

General FIELDS. Hard dollars, $6 million that we have reported 

in our most recent report. We have an ongoing forensic audit of $37 

billion looking at over 73,000 transactions from which we intend to 

be vectored towards crime or potential crime. And we are moving 

in that direction, so we are using forensics as a means by which 

to fairly quickly identify the vulnerabilities, and then we are structuring audits and our investigations accordingly. 

Senator BROWN. One final, and then I will turn it back. In your 

latest SIGAR quarterly report, on page 6, it mentions that Afghan 

private security contractor—I think it is Watan Risk Management—has been suspended and debarred after it was found funneling large sums of money to insurgents. 

22 

Now, I have met with General Petraeus on many occasions concerning our Afghan policy, and I agree with him that we must be 

better buyers and buy from better people. 

What oversight actions are you taking through your audits and 

investigations to prioritize General Petraeus’ directive that those 

funds will be given to better people and not to our enemies? 

General FIELDS. Well, first, I applaud General Petraeus and the 

initiatives that he has taken to address this issue of corruption. 

The stand-up of Task Force 2010 is one of those very significant 

initiatives. We are working very closely with Task Force 2010. We 

are also working with the International Contract Corruption Task 

Force in order to harness the investigatory initiatives of the Federal agencies so that we can bring our wherewithal very quickly to 

bear upon finding folks who are bilking the American taxpayer out 

of money. 

Senator BROWN. OK. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you, 

General. 

Senator MCCASKILL. General Fields, in your testimony to me a 

few minutes ago, you referred to the CSTC–A audit. The CSTC–A 

audit, the first audit you did. 

General FIELDS. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Is that correct? That was the first audit? 

General FIELDS. That is correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And do you recall how long that audit was, 

how many pages? 

General FIELDS. I do not recall how many pages, but I am pretty 

sure it was not a very large audit, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Does 12 pages sound right? 

General FIELDS. That may be about right, the summary of that 

audit, yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And how many pages in that audit actually 

contained the audit work? 

General FIELDS. I would have to review that audit because it—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Would four pages sound correct? 

General FIELDS. Maybe, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. And the other audit you referred to in 

the previous testimony was the audit on the Kabul Power Plant? 

General FIELDS. That is correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And had not a very similar audit been done 

by USAID exactly 1 year prior to the time that you did that audit? 

General FIELDS. That is correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And let us talk about the funding of your 

agency. USAID did a very similar audit to the one that you did 1 

year prior on the Kabul Power Plant. Do you know what the funding for USAID has been in terms of their Inspector General work 

in Afghanistan over the last—I do not know how many—5, 6 years? 

Do you know what their total funding has been? 

General FIELDS. Funding for USAID in terms of its operations in 

Afghanistan? I do not know. 

Senator MCCASKILL. $10 million. And do you see what they have recovered for a $10 million taxpayer investment? $149 million. And 

you have received $46 million. Is that correct, General? 

General FIELDS. $46.2 million, to be exact, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And you all have recovered $8.2 million? 

23 

General FIELDS. At this point in time, yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Can you understand as an auditor, as I look 

at those numbers, it is very hard for me to reconcile the notion that 

a lack of funding has been your problem? 

General FIELDS. Senator, the recoveries that we have thus far experienced are small, but the full measure of the outcome of audits 

and investigations that are underway are—that full measure has 

not thus far been determined, and our forthcoming numbers will be 

much larger than the numbers that we submitted to the CIGIE in 

their roll-up of work that the Federal IG community in general, 

had done for 2009. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let us talk about contracting. One of the 

things that is very important is how audit agencies contract because your job is to oversee contracts. And your job is to determine 

if there are contracts that are not needed, or could be put to better 

use. Out of the $46 million that you have received, how much 

money are you spending to Deloitte & Touche just to prepare your 

reports for Congress? 

General FIELDS. That contract, Senator, started out at $3.7 million at a time when we had a paucity of people to do the very specific type of work for which we have contracted Deloitte & Touche 

to help us. The intent of that arrangement was to facilitate the 

gaps in our own personnel and the skill sets that were needed at 

that point in time. And over a period of time, we would commensurately reduce that contract as we were able to bring that particular level of talent aboard in SIGAR. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

General FIELDS. And we are doing that, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. All right. You spent $3.7 million in the base 

year on Deloitte & Touche and $2.7 million this year for Deloitte 

& Touche, and their only function is to produce reports to Congress, correct? 

General FIELDS. Deloitte provides also assistance to us in database management. That is one aspect of it. But they principally assist SIGAR in putting together the reports that we do submit to 

Congress, which is a very detailed report, a very important report, 

and we feel that the extent to which we have gone to ensure that 

the report is put together correctly and is presentable to this Congress is commensurate with the money that we have invested in 

Deloitte & Touche to do so. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So just because I want to clarify this, because I will tell you, candidly, I do not want to lay out my fellow 

Members of Congress here, but an investment of that kind of 

money in a report to Congress when there is the kind of audit work 

that needs to be done, and when you are using the lack of funding 

as one of the rationales because of why more audit work has not 

been done and why it has taken so long for audits to really be performed or produced in a manner commensurate with the size of 

your agency, let us compare here. The contract total to Deloitte & 

Touche is $6.6 million, and the total amount of funding to AID IG 

is $10 million in Afghanistan. And for that $10 million, we got 

$149 million back. Meanwhile, with the $6.6 million to Deloitte & 

Touche, all we have is a shiny report and pretty pictures for Members of Congress, most of which will never see it. 

24 

Do you understand why that causes one pause about whether or 

not that is a strong leadership decision, General Fields? 

General FIELDS. Senator, we have been told by Members of this 

very Congress that they appreciate the report that we provide for 

them. Similarly, the Federal community elsewhere have told us 

that they appreciate the detail and the correctness of the reports 

that we produce. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And let us talk about the contract with Joseph Schmitz. Now, you have an audit, and it is completed, your 

peer review, and it is not good. And, in fact, for only the second 

time in 50 peer reviews you have been recommended to lose your 

law enforcement capability in an arena where desperately needed 

law enforcement capability is absolutely essential. You have had 

this audit, and after the audit is done, you hire someone, it is my 

understanding, to help you monitor compliance with the audit recommendations. Is that a fair characterization of what your contract 

with Joseph Schmitz was supposed to represent? 

General FIELDS. That is a fairly fair characterization, Senator. 

But we hired this independent monitor commensurate with a plan 

of action and milestones that I put in place in response to the results of the CIGIE in order to move SIGAR quickly along to putting 

in place the corrective action that had been identified for us. I set 

that date at September 30 of this year, and we are a better organization because we had this external agency to come in and provide 

us this particular expertise during that period. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And this was a no-bid contract. 

General FIELDS. It was a sole-source contract for which we made 

a request. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is a no-bid contract, sole-source. Correct. 

General FIELDS. That is correct? 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. And what you said is you needed the 

immediate establishment of an independent monitor to independently validate and verify agency actions and compliance in response 

to issues contained in the CIGIE letter of July 15, 2010, to the Attorney General of the United States. Is that correct? 

General FIELDS. Senator, we wanted to—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is the document that—the information 

in the document for the justification and approval of a no-bid contract. 

General FIELDS. Senator, we wanted to quickly correct the areas 

of concern pointed out by the peer evaluation. We did not wish to 

lose or put in jeopardy any further the authorities for criminal investigations that had been provided to me by way of the Department of Justice. And we felt that this entity would provide that 

independent look at us, and we felt that would help mitigate any 

concerns that this Congress and the overseers of SIGAR on Capitol 

Hill might have as well as to reassure anyone else who might be 

interested in the outcome of that peer evaluation. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, isn’t CIGIE back doing an independent review of whether or not you have complied with the audit 

now? 

General FIELDS. Please repeat the question, Senator. 

25 

Senator MCCASKILL. Isn’t CIGIE looking now to see if you have 

complied with the audit? Aren’t they the independent body you are 

looking for in terms of seeing if you have, in fact, corrected the deficiencies? 

General FIELDS. CIGIE is now looking at the audit piece, but the 

investigation piece has yet to get underway. But, nonetheless, I 

have made requests that they come back in. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. And so Army Contracting Command 

who awarded the contract on behalf of SIGAR said this contract 

was sole-source because there was only one person, Mr. Schmitz, 

who was available and qualified. Did you reach out to any other 

retired IGs if you were going to hire someone else to come in and 

tell you whether or not you were complying with the audit? 

General FIELDS. Not at that time, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Did you ask for suggestions from Mr. Rymer 

or, more importantly, Mr. Moore? 

General FIELDS. No, we did not. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And did you talk to them about using Mr. 

Schmitz? 

General FIELDS. Did I what? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Did you talk to Mr. Moore and his team, the 

group of independent peer review auditors that looked at your process and quality control in criminal investigations, did you discuss 

Mr. Schmitz with them, about hiring Mr. Schmitz? 

General FIELDS. No, I did not. 

Senator MCCASKILL. All right. 

General FIELDS. Someone may have done so on my behalf, but 

I did not personally. 

Senator MCCASKILL. When my staff spoke with your staff in September, your staff said they had expected Mr. Schmitz would be entering into a subcontract with Louis Freeh, the former Director of 

the FBI, who also works with Mr. Schmitz, on the independent 

monitor team for DaimlerChrysler. Or Daimler now, I guess. 

SIGAR officials stated they believed that Mr. Freeh would ‘‘be intimately involved’’ in the outreach to Attorney General Holder. Was 

that your understanding? 

General FIELDS. That is not necessarily my understanding, and 

I cannot account for what folks may have communicated to your 

staff or to anyone else. My intent, Senator, was to bring aboard an 

independent entity to provide the oversight of the plan of action 

that we were putting in place to move this effort quickly along so 

that we could come into compliance with the Department of Justice 

(DOJ) requirements. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Did you expect that Mr. Freeh was going to 

be working on this contract, General Fields? 

General FIELDS. I did at the onset, yes, ma’am. I had confidence—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. And what was Mr. Freeh’s function as it related to what you expected him to do? A reach-out to General Holder? 

General FIELDS. No, ma’am. I did not expect anyone to reach out 

per se. I expected the oversight being provided by this entity to 

help SIGAR and the Inspector General correct the issues that had 

been pointed out. 

26 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, your staff said to us that Mr. Freeh 

would be intimately involved in an outreach to General Holder. 

You understand what this looks like, don’t you? 

General FIELDS. I would ask that the Senator explain what you 

are referring to. 

Senator MCCASKILL. It looks like that you all went out and found 

somebody who could get to Louis Freeh, who could get to Attorney 

General Holder, and make sure you did not lose your ability to exercise law enforcement functions. It looked like you were trying to 

hire someone to help influence the Attorney General of the United 

States as opposed to fixing the problem and then having the same 

independent audit group come back and certify that you had fixed 

the problem. 

General FIELDS. Senator, I as Inspector General had confidence 

in Mr. Freeh because he is a former Director of the FBI, because 

he is a former judge, and because, as I learned along the way, Mr. 

Schmitz was associated with his firm, and in which I had confidence because of Mr. Freeh’s contribution already to this government and also Mr. Schmitz’s contribution to the government in a 

role that I was playing at that time. That was my line of thinking. 

It had nothing to do, Senator, with any other potential influence 

in reference to the Attorney General. I wanted to correct the issues 

that had been pointed out to me by the peer evaluation, and that 

was my only objective. 

Senator MCCASKILL. It is my understanding that Mr. Moore’s 

team—this contract was worth $100,000, correct, to Mr. Schmitz? 

He got a hundred grand? 

General FIELDS. No, Senator. The contract was worth $95,000. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Excuse me. The contract was worth $96,095. 

And how many days did Mr. Schmitz work on this for $96,095? 

General FIELDS. He was with SIGAR for approximately 2 

months. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So 60 days and he got $96,095. 

General FIELDS. That is correct, and—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. About $45,000 a month. 

General FIELDS. Senator, we followed the rules in engaging in 

this contract. We utilized the Contract Center of Excellence in 

Washington that many other entities use, and the $95,000 was the 

fair market value for the specific work that we were requesting 

that this—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. With all due respect, General, I got to tell 

you the truth. You are supposed to be finding ways to save the 

American taxpayers’ dollars, and, please, I do not think it is a good 

idea to say that it was fair market value to pay somebody $46,095 

a month to try to fix a problem in your investigations unit to the 

satisfaction of the Attorney General. Isn’t it true that Mr. Moore 

is going to complete the work in just a few days and it is not going 

to cost anything in terms of determining whether or not you now 

have the proper procedures in place to do law enforcement work as 

the Special Inspector General of Afghanistan? 

General FIELDS. Senator, I believe that the decision that I made 

at that point in time was a good decision. I did not anticipate all 

of the scrutiny that this particular initiative has received since that 

27 

decision. Had I had an opportunity to do it all over again, I probably would have made a different decision. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is good news. General. Senator Brown. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. I just have a couple of questions. In fiscal year 2011, General, you are slated to get $16.2 billion. 

If approved, how will that money be tracked and how will it be 

measured? And what expected return on the investment would you 

expect the taxpayer to get? 

General FIELDS. Senator, we would expect that the full measure of the $16.2 billion, which is primarily designed for training and 

equipping of the Afghanistan security forces, we expect that the 

full measure of the taxpayers’ investment in terms of a return will 

be achieved. To that end, we have asked for additional funding for 

SIGAR so that we can increase the numbers in our staff so that 

we can provide the coverage and oversight necessary to ensure the 

American taxpayer that the money is completely used for the purposes for which made available. 

Senator BROWN. So when you say ‘‘full measure,’’ what does that 

mean exactly in laymen’s terms, ‘‘full measure’’? 

General FIELDS. Well—— 

Senator BROWN. I know there is some military in there. I get it. 

So just tell—when you say you expect to get the ‘‘full measure,’’ 

what does that mean exactly? 

General FIELDS. Well, ‘‘full measure’’ means, sir, that the $16.2 

billion was requested for specific initiatives associated with the 

stand-up of the Afghanistan security forces. So the full measure 

means that $16.2 billion would be exclusively used for that purpose 

without waste, fraud, and abuse. That is what I am referring to, 

Senator. 

Senator BROWN. I see there is 25—if I am reading this correctly—well, how much are you going to spend in personnel compensation? Do you have any idea? 

General FIELDS. Personnel compensation, not unlike the rest of 

the Federal community, is high, and our personnel compensation 

is, I believe, commensurate with my SIGIR counterpart. Our staff 

who work in Afghanistan by way of a compensation package approved by this Congress receives 70 percent in addition to their 

regular pay for danger pay and location pay. We have to pay that, 

Senator. SIGAR is an independent agency. I must pay as we go for 

everything that we receive, personnel and otherwise. The cost is 

very high, but we are also a temporary organization, Senator, so 

when we bring people aboard, they know that. And we bring people 

aboard for 13 months. It is not like a standing and statutory Federal agency and the Inspectors General thereof. 

We are also competing in a market where 70 other Inspectors 

General in this city are looking for auditors and investigators, and 

we have to compete in that regard with their compensation in 

order to bring aboard the level of talent that we need. 

I wish it were cheaper, Senator. I certainly do. 

Senator BROWN. So, General, let me just finish with this. Then 

I am going to move on, either to turn it back or we are going to 

go on to the next panel. You know where I would like you to focus? 

I just want you to follow the money. I just want you to find out 

where the money is going and zero in on the Taliban issue, why 

28 

and how they are getting any of our monies, number one. I want 

to know if there are any bribes and payoffs and criminal activity 

going on where the money should not be going. If there are people 

that are doing it, then, what are we going to do to stop it and plug 

that leak? I understand—but not for you telling me, I would have 

overlooked the fact that you got appointed and then there was a 

transitional period. So I get that. But now that you have done all 

the—women in elections and all the policy stuff and you have focused there, I think the message from me and Senator McCaskill 

and the folks that did your independent audit—and I commend you 

for reaching out and doing that. Either it was a CYA situation or 

you seriously wanted to actually get there and get some guidance, 

because maybe it was new or maybe there was not any guidance. 

But they have given you the guidance. I think we are giving you 

some guidance. Please protect our money. Find a way to bring that 

number up so that we can feel confident that the millions we are 

giving you, we are getting millions in return. At least make it a 

wash. That is my only message. 

I have nothing further. Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me clean up a couple of things. I do not 

have a lot of other questions. But, in fact, Louis Freeh never was 

engaged or declined to participate in any way in this contract. Correct, General Fields? 

General FIELDS. That is correct, Senator, as far as I know. What 

assistance Mr. Freeh may have given Mr. Schmitz of which I am 

not aware, then I am not able to comment on that, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And I have not gone into any of the issues 

surrounding Mr. Schmitz in his previous tenure at the Department 

of Defense. But were you aware at the time that you hired him 

that there had been some controversy concerning his previous tenure as a Department of Defense Inspector General? 

General FIELDS. Senator, I was completely unaware of any—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. But that would have been a vet that you 

might have done, maybe just a basic Google search for his name 

that would have revealed that there was, in fact, some questions 

that were asked, so you would have had a chance to ask him before 

you hired him and be clear that there were not any problems associated with him? 

General FIELDS. Senator, our initial initiative really was to engage the Louis Freeh group of which Mr. Schmitz, to our understanding, was a part. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So now you have said that the reason for 

hiring him was to get to Louis Freeh, to engage Louis Freeh. 

General FIELDS. Not necessarily, Senator. The reason for hiring 

any of these entities was to help bring the talent and expertise that 

we needed at that point in time to address the issues in SIGAR, 

and we—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. You just said—I said, ‘‘Why didn’t you vet 

him,’’ and you said, ‘‘Because we were hiring him to get to Louis 

Freeh.’’ You just said that in your testimony. We can read it back. 

General FIELDS. No, Senator, I did not say that I was hiring anybody to get to Louis Freeh. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Then let us start again. Why did you 

not vet Mr. Schmitz before you hired him? 

29 

General FIELDS. I personally had no cause to do so. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

General FIELDS. And these matters, Senator, were being handled 

by way of my contracting officer and by way of the CCE. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So—— 

General FIELDS. I did not have any reason to doubt the integrity 

and so forth of Mr. Schmitz, and as I understand it, the issues of 

which he may have been accused during his tenure as Inspector 

General—and this is information I have found out subsequent to 

the Senator having raised questions about my decision in hiring 

this particular contractor. But as I understand it, the issues that 

were brought up concerning Mr. Schmitz were not corroborated in 

the final analysis. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You understand that the reason that this 

even has come up about Mr. Schmitz is in preparation for this 

hearing, we did basic investigatory work that SIGAR should be 

doing. And when we did basic investigatory work, we found that 

Senator Grassley had a lot of questions about Mr. Schmitz when 

he was Inspector General at DOD. And I am not saying whether 

Senator Grassley was right or wrong. I am saying it is very troubling that you would not be aware of those questions before paying 

someone the amount of $450,000 a year to do work for the Federal 

Government, General Fields. That is what I am getting at, that 

this—an audit agency is careful about who they hire and whether 

or not there is any appearance or problem. And I am not saying 

there is a problem, but the fact that you did not even know that 

there might be one is what I am trying to bring to your attention. 

Did Mr. Schmitz ever go to Afghanistan? 

General FIELDS. Not under the contract involving SIGAR, to my 

knowledge. There was—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. So the pay for him that you claim is market value, the $45,000 a month, did not involve any high risk on Mr. 

Schmitz’s part, other than calling Louis Freeh’s office? 

General FIELDS. Potentially—correct, as far as I know, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. All right. 

General FIELDS. But let me also say, Senator, begging the Senator’s pardon, that Mr. Schmitz is registered to contract with the 

government of the United States as far as I understand. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I understand, General, but I think the point 

I am trying to make here is your job is to oversee contracting. Your 

job is to set the gold standard on contracting. So you do a solesource contract, no bid; you immediately hire someone. Clearly 

there was not even a vet done that brought to your attention that 

there were questions you need to ask him about his previous service as an Inspector General. That is the point I am making, General Fields. That is the point I am making. 

Have you ever done or worked with an audit agency before you 

were given this job? Had you ever done any audit work or been 

around any auditors before you were given this job? 

General FIELDS. Yes, Senator, I have been. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Tell me in what capacity you had 

worked with auditors prior to taking this job. 

General FIELDS. I worked with auditors in conjunction with my 

support to the Iraq Management and Reconstruction Office 

30 

(IRMO). This was indirect work associated with reconstruction and 

support of Iraq. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And what audit agencies did you work with, 

General? 

General FIELDS. I did not specifically work with an audit agency 

per se, but as the Chief of Staff of IRMO, my work covered multiple 

dimensions of reconstruction in Iraq. Prior to that, Senator, I 

served as the Inspector General for United States Central Command. I did that work for 2 years, and that work involved some 

degree of oversight involving audit-type work, but not necessarily 

the professional auditors by which SIGAR is currently characterized. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. And, in fact, this is something that 

the public is not aware of, that there is a vast difference between 

Inspectors General within the active military and Inspectors General within the Federal Government. Correct, General Fields? 

General FIELDS. I would say that is correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Inspectors General in the active military report to the commander and are there as the eyes and ears of the 

commander. They have no duty whatsoever to report to the public 

or to the Congress or to perform an independent function in terms 

of monitoring taxpayer dollars. Correct? 

General FIELDS. Those Inspectors General are guided by the 

basic intent, no less, of the Inspector General Act of 1978 by which 

I and other Federal Inspectors General are guided as well, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I understand. I was just shocked when 

I went to Iraq on my first contract oversight trip, and I am sitting 

with Inspectors General, and I did not realize we had two varieties 

that were vastly different in the Federal Government. In fact, I 

wish they were not called the same thing. I wanted to rename the 

military Inspectors General another name, and then the military 

informed me they had the name first. So it got a little tricky. But 

these are not the same functions, and they do not do the same 

work. 

I guess the reason I ask this question, General, is, the first thing 

you do if you head an audit agency is to figure out where the risk 

is and do a risk assessment and do a tier analysis as to what tier 

is the top tier of work that you should do where the highest risk 

is. Then you go down and then you do your audit plan determining 

how much resources you have and how you can get to the most 

risk. 

General FIELDS. Yes, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. At what point in time was a risk assessment completed at SIGAR? 

General FIELDS. I will go back, Senator, to what I said earlier. 

We conducted a risk assessment which was published in our 2008 

report to Congress. That risk assessment was made up of several 

elements. It may not look like a risk assessment as the Senator 

might—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. It is not a Yellow Book risk assessment, is 

it, General Fields? 

General FIELDS. Say again, Senator? 

Senator MCCASKILL. It is not a Yellow Book risk assessment. 

31 

General FIELDS. It would not be a Yellow Book assessment per 

se, but it would certainly contain the elements relevant to any risk 

assessment when it comes to oversight of money. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Did the auditors working for you at that 

time tell you that was sufficient in terms of a Yellow Book risk assessment? 

General FIELDS. I had no auditors at that time, Senator, because 

we completed that assessment in conjunction with our October report to Congress before I was privileged to hire my first auditor. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So you are saying that you performed what 

you would consider a professional risk assessment of a major responsibility in terms of audit function without any auditors? 

General FIELDS. I performed that assessment, Senator, with intelligent folks, and I feel that—this is not—I do not feel that this 

is necessarily rocket science in order to determine what needs to 

be done, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I got to tell you the truth. Once again, 

I do not mean to be cruel. I do not mean to—this is not fun for me 

either. It is very uncomfortable to say that I do not think that you 

are the right person for this job, General Fields. But I do not think 

you are the right person for this job—— [Interruption by protester.] 

Please, no. That is very inappropriate. Please leave the room. 

Please. 

The risk assessment, the reason that you had the findings from 

peer review was because you fell short of the professional standards that are demanded in the world of auditing. And I am not saying the people that worked for you were not intelligent. I am not 

saying you are not intelligent. I am not saying that you are not a 

hero, sir. I am saying this is too important a government function 

to not have the very highest level of experience, qualifications, and 

expertise leading this kind of audit agency. 

I have no other questions for you. We will keep this record open. 

If there is anything that I have said in this hearing that you believe is unfair, if there is any information that you want to bring 

to our attention, we will keep the record of the hearing open. And 

I can assure you I will look at all of it with the eye of an auditor 

and examine it and make sure that our final record in this hearing 

is fair and balanced. And we are happy to include anything else 

that you would like to include, and I thank you very much for all 

of your service to America. 

Senator BROWN. Madam Chairman, if I may—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Oh, I am sorry. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, General. I want to thank you for 

your service as well, and I appreciate your forthright answers. 

Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, sir. 

General FIELDS. Thank you, Senators. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And we will now take the third panel. 

Thank you all for being here. Let me introduce this panel. 

Gordon Heddell has served as the Inspector General for the Department of Defense since July 2009. He was Acting Inspector General from 2008 to 2009. Prior to joining the DOD IG, Mr. Heddell 

served as the Inspector General for the Department of Labor 

(DOL). 

32 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Heddell appears in the appendix on page 151. 

Harold Geisel has served as the Deputy Inspector General for the 

State Department since June 2008. He has more than 25 years of 

experience with the State Department and previously served as the 

Acting Inspector General in 1994. 

Michael G. Carroll has served as the Deputy Inspector General 

for the U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID, since 

February 2006. Mr. Carroll is a member of the Senior Executive 

Service with more than 26 years of government service. Prior to his 

appointment, Mr. Carroll served as the Director of Administration 

for the Bureau of Industry and Security in the Department of Commerce. 

Stuart Bowen—and I understand you are not feeling well today, 

Mr. Bowen. Thank you for arriving and try not to breathe on Mr. 

Carroll. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Bowen has served as Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction since October 2004. Mr. Bowen served President 

George W. Bush as Deputy Assistant to the President, Deputy Staff 

Secretary, Special Assistant to the President, and Associate Counsel. Mr. Bowen also spent 4 years on active duty as an intelligence 

officer in the U.S. Air Force, achieving the rank of captain. 

Thank you all for your service to our government, and obviously 

this is a four-person panel and it is our third panel. I will stay here 

all night. You know this is what I enjoy; this is the stuff I enjoy. 

But I do not want to prolong the hearing for any of you any longer 

than necessary. So feel free to make any testimony you would like 

as long as it is less than 5 minutes. If you want to do less than 

that, that is fine. If you want to just stand for questions, that is 

fine, too. But I am anxious to hear from all of you. Mr. Heddell. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. GORDON S. HEDDELL,1 INSPECTOR 

GENERAL U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. HEDDELL. Thank you, Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Brown, and distinguished Members of this Subcommittee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon 

to discuss our oversight efforts in Afghanistan and throughout the 

region. 

Effective, meaningful, and timely oversight of U.S. contingency 

operations in Southwest Asia is critical to our success in Afghanistan. I would like to focus on one of the fundamental reasons behind our success: The effective and efficient coordination of the 

audit, inspection, and investigative assets of the many agencies in 

the region. This cooperation has not only maximized our ability to 

complete our mission, but has reduced the amount of impact our 

presence has had on the commands in theater to complete their 

mission. Due to the complexity of contingency operations and the 

involvement of multiple Federal agencies, interagency coordination 

is essential to identifying whether critical gaps exist in oversight 

efforts and recommending actions to address those gaps. 

I appointed Mickey McDermott as the Special Deputy Inspector 

General for Southwest Asia in November 2009. His role is to ensure effective coordination within the Defense and Federal oversight community. Mr. McDermott reports directly to me and coordiVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:56 May 09, 2011 Jkt 063868 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\63868.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
33 

nates and de-conflicts oversight efforts within Southwest Asia. He 

is forward-deployed on a 2-year assignment and over the past year 

has worked with the oversight community, Department of Defense 

leadership, and the supporting commands to improve communications and identify oversight requirements. 

Mr. McDermott also serves as the chairperson of the Southwest 

Asia Joint Planning Group, which develops the Comprehensive 

Oversight Plan for Southwest Asia. The Joint Planning Group is 

developing a comprehensive strategy for the oversight of the training, equipping, and mentoring of the Afghanistan National Security 

Forces and has plans to develop a comprehensive strategy for the 

oversight of contingency contracting in Afghanistan. In May 2009, 

the Joint Planning Group established a sub-group to coordinate 

audit and inspection work in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

In addition to the Joint Planning Group, we participate in the 

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan oversight Shura. This forum provides another opportunity for each of the oversight community in-country 

representatives to update the supporting commands on the status 

of their current and planned projects. We also collaborate on criminal investigations in Afghanistan. The Defense Criminal Investigative Service maintains a close working relationship with the International Contract Corruption Task Force and is a member of the 

Task Force 2010. We have learned from our experiences in Iraq 

that maintaining an in-theater presence is essential to providing 

effective oversight in an overseas contingency environment. 

Additionally, one of the most important lessons we have learned 

is the value of having the Special Deputy Inspector General as our 

single point of contact in the region for coordinating oversight efforts and to ensure effective communication with senior leaders in 

the theater. This is key for minimizing the impact on the daily operation of the activities we visit, and it provides those activities a 

single point of contact. 

Another important lesson learned is that contracting in a contingency environment presents many challenges. In May 2010, we 

summarized our experiences in the report—and I have it here—titled ‘‘Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform.’’ This report identifies key systemic contingency contracting issues as well 

as actions that need to be taken to correct these issues for future 

contracting. By compiling this data and summarizing our findings, 

we were able to provide a useful tool for operators on the ground 

to improve their operations by avoiding past mistakes. 

In closing, I would like to thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to discuss our work in Afghanistan, and I look forward to 

continuing our strong working relationship with the Congress, the 

Department, and with all oversight agencies in Southwest Asia. 

Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Geisel. 

34 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Geisel appears in the appendix on page 168. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. HAROLD W. GEISEL,1 DEPUTY 

INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. GEISEL. Thank you, Chairman McCaskill and Ranking Member Brown, for the opportunity to appear today. I have prepared remarks but ask that my written testimony also be made part of the 

record. 

Our oversight role in Afghanistan includes performing audits, 

evaluations, inspections, and investigations with respect to activities that are funded and managed by the Department of State. 

These funded and managed programs include activities such as 

worldwide protective services for diplomats, embassy security, 

counternarcotics, and police training programs, as well as construction and maintenance of U.S. embassies. 

Our Middle East Regional Office (MERO), has an office in Kabul 

with boots on the ground to provide quick and timely evaluations 

of high-risk, high-dollar programs. In addition, our Office of Investigations provides on-the-ground investigative support in Afghanistan. And our Offices of Audits and Inspections also perform work 

there. 

We have provided the Subcommittee with a list of audits, evaluations, and inspections related to Department of State operations in 

Afghanistan that have been issued by our office since 2004. We 

have used congressional resource increases since 2009 in both supplemental and the appropriations base to greatly increase the number of completed and planned audits, evaluations, and inspections 

in Afghanistan during 2009 and 2010. Approximately 25 percent of 

our ongoing or planned oversight for the Middle East and South 

Asia regions, which include 33 countries, will take place in or are 

otherwise related to Afghanistan. 

Madam Chairman, coordination occurs at several levels within 

the oversight community to reinforce the efficiency of oversight efforts. In Washington, D.C., coordination occurs first through the 

Southwest Asia Planning Group, which meets quarterly to plan ongoing activities to ensure minimum duplication of oversight and 

maximum cooperation. There is also a separate sub-group, the 

AFPAK Working Group, which meets to address oversight work in 

Pakistan and Afghanistan. This working group is where IG coordination, deconfliction, and agreement occur. OIG personnel from the 

Department of State, USAID, DOD, Government Accountability Office (GAO), and SIGAR are members of the AFPAK group. 

Informal coordination regarding oversight work in Afghanistan 

and elsewhere in the region also takes place between these same 

organizations as well as other OIGs. These groups will continue to 

play a vital role and serve as a model for new and flexible groups 

formed in response to future contingency operations, regardless of 

where they occur in the world. 

In Afghanistan, there are additional coordination groups. The IG 

Shura is facilitated in-country by U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and the 

DOD OIG. Participants meet monthly and include representatives 

from all OIG offices working in Afghanistan. 

Madam Chairman, Senator Brown, the novel concept of creating 

a permanent Inspector General—because that was one of the quesVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:56 May 09, 2011 Jkt 063868 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\63868.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
35 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Carroll appears in the appendix on page 180. 

tions we were asked in advance—to oversee contingency operations 

merits serious consideration. However, existing departmental OIGs 

have proven their ability to work well together and with the Special IGs over the past 2 years to provide effective, coordinated oversight in contingency operations. They have existing processes, organizational structures, and institutional knowledge of the programs 

within their departments that facilitate efficient oversight of those 

programs and eliminate the learning curve that would be required 

of a contingency IG. 

Moreover, in an era of fiscal restraint, creating a permanent IG 

to oversee contingency operations might not be prudent. Millions of 

start-up dollars would be required to establish and sustain a new 

bureaucracy. 

Current organizations already in existence, such as the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group and the International Contract 

Corruption Task Force, could be used for interagency coordination 

or as models for the fast creation of other coordination groups for 

new contingencies around the world as the need arises. These 

groups have the means, methodology, and practices in place to facilitate efficient, cost-effective oversight and through planning, coordination, and deconfliction. 

Once again, I thank you, Chairman McCaskill and Senator 

Brown, for the opportunity to appear today, and I am ready to answer any questions. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Geisel. Mr. Carroll. 

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL G. CARROLL,1 DEPUTY INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. CARROLL. Thank you, Chairwoman McCaskill, Senator 

Brown. Thanks for having me here today to brief the Subcommittee 

on our oversight activities in Afghanistan, our working relationship 

with SIGAR, and, finally, to share our views on the feasibility of 

a Special IG for contingency operations. 

I want to start by saying that from its inception almost 30 years 

ago, the USAID IG has operated in an overseas environment with 

foreign service auditors, investigators, and management analysts, 

providing audit and investigative coverage of USAID’s programs. 

And we think that gives us a unique comparative advantage in providing oversight in contingency operations. 

Our oversight in Afghanistan has really evolved over the past— 

well, since we had ‘‘boots on the ground’’ in November 2002. We 

started out covering it as a country in a regional portfolio out of 

our office in the Philippines, and it has morphed into what will 

soon be the largest country office that we have of our eight overseas offices with 14 auditors and investigators. 

On relationship with the SIGAR, Special IG for Afghan Reconstruction, I would have to draw a distinction between audit and investigations as I describe that relationship. On the audit side, I 

would characterize the relationship as cooperative and productive. 

It has taken some time to get to that point because obviously we 

have duplicative authorities, and we have the authority to look at 

the same programs. So it has taken some time, it has taken some 

36 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Bowen appears in the appendix on page 192. 

effort, but I can say now that through planning and deconfliction, 

we are not going to have any overlap in audits. 

I cannot characterize the relationship with the SIGAR investigations in the same way. We seem to not be able to come to terms 

with jurisdictions. Again, they have law enforcement jurisdiction 

over AID programs. So do we. But we feel that as the statutory IG 

for AID we should have primary law enforcement jurisdiction over 

any allegations of corruption in AID programs or against AID employees, and we should lead any investigation that has to do with 

AID programs and employees. And we are still trying to work 

through that relationship with the SIGAR folks on the investigation side. 

Also, if I could just share our views, as Mr. Geisel did, about the 

practicality or the feasibility of a statutory IG for contingency operations. I cannot imagine an entity that has a better comparative 

advantage than the statutory IGs for doing oversight work. And 

when you talk about contingency operations, I think we would all 

agree that the two best examples of that over the past 10 years are 

Iraq and Afghanistan. And you have before you today the three 

statutory IGs for the Department of Defense, Department of State, 

and AID. And I think that with our collective experience, our indepth knowledge and understanding of our agency’s programs, people, systems, policies, I think that, properly funded, with the same 

authorities that the special IGs have for personnel, working closely 

with the Government Accountability Office, I think we can, as a 

collective group, provide the same comprehensive oversight and reporting that a statutory IG for contingency operations could. 

I thank you for your time and look forward to any questions you 

might have. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Carroll. Mr. Bowen. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. STUART W. BOWEN,1 JR., SPECIAL 

INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Chairman McCaskill, for this opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee and testify on the critical issue of oversight in contingency operations. It is an issue that 

has been acutely with us for the last 8 years in Iraq, and indeed, 

almost exactly 7 years ago, the Congress created my office, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, because of weakness 

regarding oversight by the departmental IGs then in Iraq and the 

significant waste that occurred. 

To carry out this mission, I focused my organization on four critical operational principles. 

First, real-time auditing. We get our audits out quickly, averaging six a quarter, and that is essential in a war zone because the 

operators need to get answers fast. If you wait the typical 9 to 15 

months for an audit, the world has completely changed. It is not 

a useful audit. 

Second, in-country engagement. We have been as high as 50. We 

are at 22 now. That is the largest single contingent of oversight operators in-country in Iraq, and it is investigators, it is auditors, it 

is inspectors, it is evaluators, and that has given us the capacity, 

37 

the special capacity with our focused mission, to be highly productive. 

Third, unprecedented transparency. We operate I think fairly 

uniquely as an IG in that we meet every week with the subject of 

our oversight to inform them of what we are doing, the progress 

we are making, and what we are finding to promote improvement 

in the overall reconstruction program as the consultative component. That is the fourth mandate that I give my auditors and inspectors: Be consultative. 

Just a week ago, I was in Iraq at Camp Victory, meeting with 

General Austin, the commander of U.S. Forces-Iraq, on a critical 

SIGIR audit that is going to produce really tough findings in January. But he needed to know about those findings today because 

they affect an enormous contractor. That is the kind of work we are 

able to do by being heavily engaged on the ground with leadership. 

We have produced 27 quarterly reports and five Lessons Learned 

reports. They help strengthen performance, and they have been focused on accounting for taxpayer dollars, the dollars appropriated 

to four major funds which comprise about $46 billion of the money. 

The question that you have asked me to address particularly is: 

Does a Special Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations (SIGOCO), make sense? And differing from my fellow panel 

members, I say yes, absolutely, because of several reasons: First, 

the cross-cutting jurisdiction. I have a CAC card and a State badge. 

I can go to any door of any department with any funds, and a lot 

of these projects and programs are multi-funded from different 

sources—police training—for example, and I can get answers from 

any Department, and I do not have to operate in a stovepipe. 

Second, a singularly focused mission. I have a staff that is focused on one thing: Protecting taxpayer interest and improving 

mission performance in a contingency. That allows for aggressive 

oversight and gets you quick reporting. 

We have focused on coordination. We have talked about that a 

lot today. Well, the Iraq Inspectors General Council was something 

I formed within a couple of months of starting up 7 years ago, and 

we met every quarter, and now this quarter we are going to fold 

it into the Southwest Asia program. But it has facilitated really 

strong interaction with my fellow Inspector General auditors here 

at the table, in Iraq, and on this side of the world. 

Next, flexibility in hiring practices. We have unique authority, 

and thus we have been able to maintain high-quality staff throughout the life of our organization. We are highly independent, and we 

report quarterly to the Congress, not semiannually. So you get 

comprehensive, detailed analyses, and factual data about what is 

going on in Iraq every 3 months. 

A permanent Special IG would eliminate the inherent challenges 

that arise in starting up a Special IG in a contingency. Oversight 

has to be present there from the beginning. You know you would 

have that if you had a SIGOCO in existence. You would not need 

to have a departmental IG formulate and draw out of their own resources a capacity to deploy and execute that kind of oversight. 

SIGOCO would ensure it. 

A feasible SIGOCO standing operation could have a core staff of 

25 and cost about $5 million a year. If such an organization had 

38 

existed, say, at the beginning of the Iraq reconstruction program, 

the amount of waste it would have averted would pay for it for our 

lifetimes. There is no doubt that it would be cost-effective. Indeed, 

the return on investment in cost for SIGAR has been about 5:1. 

There will be other contingency operations no doubt. That is a 

new phase in modern national security reality, and we will have 

significant contingency relief and reconstruction operations. How 

do we avoid the kind of waste that we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan—significant, unacceptable, ridiculously high levels of 

waste—in the future? One way would be, as we have heard at the 

table, to provide more funds to the departmental IGs to allow them 

to hire more auditors and inspectors. But to ensure that you would 

have a capacity that is capable and ready to deploy, SIGOCO is a 

good answer. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I look forward to your questions. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you all. Let me start. How many people do you have on the ground in Afghanistan right now, Mr. 

Heddell. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Right now I have 15 auditors, 8 criminal investigators, 2 administrative staff, and in addition to that, I complement that with expeditionary forces that enter and exit on a 

regular basis. That is just in Afghanistan. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. And, Mr. Geisel, how about you in Afghanistan? 

Mr. GEISEL. We have five auditors and analysts in Kabul, and 

that will increase to eight by January. Our investigators are always on a TDY status, and I think at the moment we have two investigators actually in-country. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Mr. Carroll. 

Mr. CARROLL. Well, we have nine auditors, and hopefully very 

shortly we will have five investigators. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And what do you have currently in Iraq, 

Mr. Bowen. 

Mr. BOWEN. I was there just last week, and with 18 personnel, 

there were 10 auditors, 3 investigators, 3 evaluators, and a chief 

of staff, and support staff. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And what was the high point, high mark in 

Iraq in terms of how many auditors you had on ground? 

Mr. BOWEN. Total number of auditors? Not inspectors, just auditors? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Just auditors. 

Mr. BOWEN. We were up to 29. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Twenty-nine. How many times have the 

four of you been in the same room with General Fields? 

Mr. GEISEL. I reckon at least five times. 

Senator MCCASKILL. No, I mean all four of you together with 

General Fields. Have you ever been in the room with all four of you 

and General Fields at the same time? 

Mr. GEISEL. No. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, I think there may be times at the monthly 

CIGIE meetings. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Mr. HEDDELL. And General Fields frequently attended those. 

39 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. But I am not talking about at the 

CIGIE meeting, and, of course, the CIGIE meeting is a meeting 

where all the Inspectors General come together, I do not want to 

say it is like your Rotary Club, but it is your association where you 

come and network and talk to one another, and obviously that is 

the pool of people which the peer reviews come out of, correct? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Yes. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I am talking about how many times have 

the four of you sat down with General Fields and talked about contingency operation audits, writ large? 

Mr. BOWEN. Not as a group, but frequently individually. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Senator McCaskill, if I could add to that, however, 

I think the point you are getting at is how much we talk to each 

other, share information, and assess risk. And that is one of the 

reasons that the Department of Defense Inspector General created 

a Special Deputy Inspector General who also chairs the Joint Planning Group where all of our offices are represented. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Mr. HEDDELL. In fact, almost 25 agencies are represented. So 

that does happen. It is just not the same personalities that are sitting—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. I understand. I am not implying by the fact 

that the five of you have not been in the same room together that 

your agencies are not talking to one another and not trying to coordinate. 

How many independent contractors have you hired relating to 

the work in Afghanistan or relating to reports or anything that you 

need to produce for Congress? Can anyone think of any independent contractors that you have hired? 

Mr. CARROLL. As part our audit work, we hire both ourselves and 

we help the agency hire independent financial audit firms to conduct financial audits in Afghanistan. And also, since it is difficult 

for us to get out to do our field work in some of the more dangerous 

places, we have also hired local audit firms to go out and do site 

visits for us on performance audits. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. What about you, Mr. Bowen? When you 

prepare your—yours is not a pamphlet. Yours is a book on lessons 

learned, which I am a little embarrassed I have committed to memory. Was an independent contractor hired for that effort? 

Mr. BOWEN. For ‘‘Hard Lessons,’’ no. This was done by government staff and printed by GPO. 

Senator MCCASKILL. This is awkward because I do not want you 

all to comment on General Fields. I do not want to put you in what 

is an awkward position for a professional auditor. But I have a lot 

of concern that someone would think it was appropriate to do a 

risk assessment and call it a risk assessment without an auditor 

on staff. Does that cause you concern, Mr. Heddell? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Without an auditor on staff? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Correct 

Mr. HEDDELL. Yes, it would cause me concern. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Does it cause you concern, Mr. Geisel? 

Mr. GEISEL. Definitely. 

40 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Carroll. 

Mr. CARROLL. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Bowen. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I am curious. Has there been a sense that 

the leadership of SIGAR was not up to the professional standards 

that are required for this kind of very difficult and very important 

audit work? Are we the only ones that have an oversight capacity 

here? Do you all as auditors that are in a unique position to know 

whether or not the agency is standing up in a way that would reflect Yellow Book standards or Silver—and let me say for the 

record, the Yellow Book—I keep saying ‘‘Yellow Book.’’ For the 

record, I should explain that the Yellow Book is called that because 

it is yellow, but it is the book of standards for government auditors. 

And the Silver Book is the book of standards for government investigators. 

If you are working with another agency—and I do not know what 

the ethics are here, candidly. If you are working with another audit 

agency and you have a sense that professional the District are not 

being complied with, do you have a duty to report it to anyone? 

Mr. GEISEL. I am allegedly the diplomat here, so I will try and 

answer. [Laughter.] 

The simple answer is yes. Let me give you two examples where 

it worked very well. We did a joint audit with the DOD IG on one 

of the most important facets of our presence in Afghanistan, and 

that is police training. That activity was carried out—well, it was 

funded under State Department authority, and it is going over to 

DOD. And our joint audit found a lot of problems, and frankly—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Was it your audit that figured out they 

were not sighting the rifles? 

Mr. GEISEL. Yes, as a matter of fact. That was another audit, but 

that was our evaluation. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Go ahead. I am sorry to interrupt. I was 

just curious. 

Mr. GEISEL. That is right. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Good work, by the way. That is fairly important that we hire someone who train the police who knows how to 

sight the rifles. 

Mr. GEISEL. Yes. It is also important when we found that the 

dogs that were supposed to sniff for explosives were not trained to 

sniff the right explosives. But in our work with the DOD IG, there 

were slight differences of opinion, but we worked them out immediately. And I can tell you, without exception, there was mutual respect. I knew some of the DOD auditors, and I thought the world 

of them. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I guess what I am asking is: If you 

work with an audit agency where you do not think professional 

standards are being met, do you—— 

Mr. GEISEL. I would pull out. Pure and simple. I would not hesitate. I would try to do it nicely, but I would just say, ‘‘We seem 

to have different objectives and perhaps different standards, and 

we cannot work together.’’ I would do that in a heartbeat. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Anybody else? 

41 

Mr. CARROLL. Well, I would say that as SIGAR was standing 

up—and I think that—I cannot think of a case actually where we 

worked together with them on an audit. We have worked together 

with them on some investigations, and they have assisted us on 

some investigations. But we never worked with them together on 

an audit like State and DOD IG did on the police training. So we 

may have missed the boat there, but we were completely laser-focused on our work and not necessarily focused on what was happening at SIGAR. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Senator McCaskill, to correct the record, the Department of Defense Inspector General’s office to my knowledge 

has never worked with SIGAR on an audit. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

Mr. HEDDELL. We have worked with SIGAR in law enforcement 

task forces, however. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Before I turn it over to Senator Brown, 

do you have a comment on that? 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, we work very closely with a variety of permanent Inspectors General and other law enforcement agencies on investigations, and we have done joint audits as well. 

Senator MCCASKILL. With SIGAR? 

Mr. BOWEN. No. With State. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Have you ever done any work with SIGAR? 

Mr. BOWEN. No. Our jurisdictions do not overlap. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I understand. I just wanted to be sure. 

Mr. BOWEN. Other than—I mean, no audit work. We were very 

closely supportive of them in their first year in their stand-up, as 

evidenced in my submission. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Senator Brown. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I just have a 

couple of questions. I know we may be voting in a minute. 

As you heard from my previous line of questioning, I am greatly 

concerned, as I know the Chairwoman is, on the allegation that 

there is money going to the insurgents, the Taliban in particular. 

What roles do you collectively have in helping to determine whether, in fact, that is the case and how we can stop it, identify it, who 

is responsible? That whole line of questioning, if you could just 

maybe—whomever, one or both or all. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Senator Brown, one of our primary responsibilities 

and concerns is not just simply money. It is the life and safety of 

our men and women in Afghanistan who are doing the fighting for 

us. So we look at things much broader than money. The money is 

extremely important, but, for instance, a tremendous amount of our 

work is focused on the train and equip mission of the Afghan national army and the police and determining what the success is 

that we are having with weapons accountability, for instance. 

Senator BROWN. Yes, weapons, everything. I should not have said 

just money, but everything. The whole thing. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Yes, and that is something we do focus on. Are 

weapons getting to where they are supposed to go? Are they being 

put into the hands of the people that we want them to be placed 

in? 

We did a tremendous amount of work in Iraq in that respect. We 

are continuing to increase our focus in Afghanistan on those kinds 

42 

of areas. So we are concerned about the money, and we are concerned about the amount of money, the remaining $14.2 billion, for 

instance, that is going to go into Afghan national army and police 

training, and getting them to the capability levels that will enable 

the United States to achieve its goals in Afghanistan. So yes, we 

are very, very involved and focused on those kinds of issues. 

Senator BROWN. Having been there, I am greatly concerned as 

well, and I am concerned that a lot of the folks that are supposed 

to be doing the training are not fulfilling their obligations with our 

coalition forces, too. That is a whole different story. 

But when I said funds, I should also say obviously weapons and 

supplies and, communications, the whole nine yards. So thank you 

for that. 

Madam Chairman, I really have focused on where I wanted to go 

in the hearing. I want to just say thank you for, collecting the 

money and finding out where the waste, fraud, and abuse is, and 

I think it helps. It enables us to justify where those funds are 

going. So, drive on. 

I have nothing further. Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Senator. 

On SIGOCO, I have great respect for all of you who are here that 

work for State and DOD and AID. And I understand in some ways 

establishing SIGOCO in some ways feels a little bit like someone 

is permanently going to be on your turf. And I am not discounting 

your opinions about this because of that, but I do think that Mr. 

Bowen makes some points about—and I think that what we have 

heard today in the testimony about SIGAR is really in many ways 

to me depressing. Standing up an organization in a contingency is 

very difficult, and that is the one organization where speed is incredibly important. You all understand that your audit product has 

a very short shelf life in a contingency operation. It is very easy 

to waste a lot of money on an audit in a contingency operation if 

you cannot get it to the decisionmakers quickly enough. And so 

when you establish a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

and it takes 18 months to produce the first audit on a contract and 

the audit portion of that report is four pages, that makes me weep. 

I mean, something is terribly wrong there. 

Now, was there appropriate expertise in place? Clearly not. Did 

it take them too long to get appropriate expertise in place? Obviously. And if we had a permanent Inspector General on Overseas 

Contingency Operations, we would not have had that lag time. Can’t you all acknowledge that $5 million a year is a pretty good 

investment if we could keep a contingency operation Inspector General office, if we could stand one up and sustain one for the long 

haul? Because I got to tell you, the irony is—and some of you, I 

may have told you this before, that in speaking with somebody in 

the army who was involved in Bosnia, the lessons learned in Bosnia on contracting, they were not learned. We went back to the 

drawing board in Iraq, and by the time that Mr. Bowen arrived, 

we had a completely out-of-control Logistics Civil Augmentation 

Program (LOGCAP) contract with no oversight whatsoever. Nobody 

had any idea why it was so far over the estimate in its first year 

of operation, and it took a while. And I think that Cunningham is 

doing a much better job in Afghanistan than a lot of the folks were 

43 

doing in Iraq. And I think we have made improvement. But I am 

just worried. I mean, I do not have confidence in this agency after 

this hearing today. And I have a sense that if we had a permanent 

office I would not have this sinking sensation that we do not have 

the right leadership and we have missed a lot of audits that should 

have been done. 

Comments? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, I will, Senator McCaskill. I certainly have 

great respect for my colleague, Inspector General Bowen, and I 

never discount anything that he says. But I am not totally convinced—and this is not turf issues for me. I have more than enough 

work. Quite frankly, I would take any help I could get. But I am 

not convinced that a Special Inspector General for Contingency Operations is the most effective and efficient way. 

There is a difference, if I may say, between the way we have set 

up SIGIR, Mr. Bowen’s operation, and the way we set up SIGAR. 

When we set up SIGIR, the Department of Defense Inspector General provided 144 auditors and investigators, some full-time, some 

part-time, for a lengthy period of time. When the Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) was first set up as Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General (CPA IG), the DoD IG 

detailed 27 individuals on a full or part-time basis to SIGIR. In 

total 138 DoD IG staff members provided audit, investigative, Hotline, information technology, payroll, travel, and other administrative support (full and part-time to the CPA, CPA IG and SIGIR. I 

am not saying that is why Mr. Bowen was so successful, but I 

think it got SIGIR off on the right foot. 

But on the other side of that coin, that was not done with 

SIGAR. I am not saying it would have been better. I am not suggesting that there still would not have been hiring and performance problems with SIGAR. What we heard today goes far beyond 

that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. The problems we heard today go far beyond 

just the ability to stand up quickly. 

Mr. HEDDELL. That is correct. But I think what we are talking 

about right at this moment is what is best for the future, and I 

think that, for instance, the response by the Inspector General 

community to Hurricane Katrina, which was a contingency operation, by and large was relatively effective. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Mr. HEDDELL. I think we have the audit and law enforcement expertise in our community at large to respond to contingency operations very effectively. I think it is a little bit of a toss-up as to 

whether you go the Special IG route, but the inefficiency aspect of 

it is that if you do that, two things happen: No. 1, you do not have 

enough people in a Special Inspector General contingency operation 

on a full-time basis to be able to respond quickly; and, No. 2, the 

cost of maintaining a force waiting for a contingency to occur. 

So until we sit down and I guess figure it all out, to me it is not 

an efficient proposal. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I know all of you probably want to comment 

on that, and I have a vote that has been called, and I am not going 

to make you sit here while I go vote and come back, as much as 

I am tempted to, because I could go on a while. And I know—InVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:56 May 09, 2011 Jkt 063868 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\63868.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
44 

spector General Bowen and I have discussed this one on one before, 

and I am a little biased towards his opinion on this. But I certainly 

will go out of my way to have one-on-one conversation with you, 

Mr. Geisel, and you, Mr. Carroll, on this subject if we do not have 

time to get back to it. 

But I wanted to ask you, Mr. Carroll, you intimated that or referred to problems in working with the law enforcement end of 

SIGAR. Now, I find that fascinating since they have now had a 

CIGIE review of their law enforcement, and it was—as somebody 

who is a former prosecutor and former auditor, as I read the review 

of the law enforcement problems, I was really surprised that basics 

had not been done. Are they trying to assert primary jurisdiction 

even after CIGIE has said that they are so far our of compliance 

with the government standards of investigation? 

Mr. CARROLL. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is outrageous. That is outrageous. And 

I will follow up. I think our office needs to follow up and ask some 

significant questions. It takes a lot of nerve for an investigative 

agency to assert primary jurisdiction over AID after independent 

peer review has determined they are not in compliance with government investigative standards. And so I would be irritated, if I 

were you, if they were trying to step on you. I would really be irritated if they are trying to step on you after they are only one of 

51 agencies looked at—of 52 agencies looked at that were not in 

compliance with the government standards of investigations. So I 

am glad that you have indicated that to me. 

I have to make a vote by 6:15 p.m. Please, if there is anything 

that I have not asked that I should have, I implore you to give us 

that information as we look at this issue. You all are the front line 

of probably the most challenging audit environment that exists in 

the world in Afghanistan right now. The enemy we are fighting is, 

yes, it is Taliban, yes, it is al Qaeda, but it is, make no mistake 

about it, a culture of corruption. And the American people have no 

idea how much money is probably walking away from its intended 

purpose in Afghanistan. 

So please convey to the men and women who work for all of you, 

and we will probably have another opportunity at a hearing, Mr. 

Bowen, before the end of the line in Iraq, but please convey to all 

the people that have worked in Iraq what—we spend a lot of time 

praising the men and women in uniform, as we should. And I do 

not think enough people realize that there are men and women 

that are putting their lives in danger with very difficult work in 

a very challenging environment. So please convey to all of your 

staffs the appreciation of the American people for the work they 

are doing. It is essential. It is very important to the safety and security of this Nation. 

So thank you for your attendance today, and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 6:09 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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