Filed 9/17/21 Idleman v. Christodoro CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

LUCIE IDLEMAN,

Petitioner and Respondent,

v.

JONATHAN CHRISTODORO,

Respondent and Appellant.

B284734

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. YQ026096)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Hector F. Guzman. Dismissed.

Ferguson Case Orr Paterson, Wendy Cole Lascher; and 

Greg May for Respondent and Appellant.

No appearance for Petitioner and Respondent.

___________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Jonathan Christodoro appeals from a domestic violence 

restraining order issued pursuant to the Domestic Violence 

Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.)1 and an order denying 

his motion to set aside and vacate the restraining order. Because 

the restraining order expired while this appeal was pending, and 

Christodoro has not shown any discretionary exception to the 

rules regarding mootness applies, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Christodoro and Lucie Idleman have a litigious history. In 

a separate action between them, the court ordered an inspection 

of property in Rancho Palos Verdes that Christodoro claimed he 

owned but Idleman stole from him. The court set the inspection 

for April 7, 2017 and ordered “all . . . interested parties” to have 

“full access to the property.” 

Despite a stop work order issued by the city of Rancho 

Palos Verdes on the property, Christodoro arrived on April 7, 

2017 and saw Idleman and several people she had hired working

on the house. According to Idleman, Christodoro “was irate, 

screaming, yelling throughout the house, saying ‘Everybody get 

the F out. Everyone get the F out. Get the F out of my house.’ 

[He was] yelling at the workers, ‘Put that down. You’re not 

working on my house. Get out. Everybody get out.’. . . He was 

charging everybody; he charged everyone . . . .” Idleman 

explained that, by “charging,” she meant Christodoro “moved 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
3

forward in a forceful and impactful manner, in an aggressive 

manner, like when you lunge at somebody.”

A paralegal working for Idleman’s attorney said 

Christodoro was “ranting and raving and yelling profanities,” 

“badger[ed]” her, made her feel “threatened,” and invaded her 

“personal space.” The paralegal said Idleman was “shaking like a 

leaf.” Idleman called the 911 emergency operator because the 

situation “was scary,” but the police made no arrests.

On April 10, 2017 Idleman filed a petition for a temporary 

restraining order and a domestic violence restraining order 

against Christodoro. She identified Christodoro as her “ex 

boyfriend” and checked a box stating she and Christodoro “[we]re 

dating or used to date, or . . . are or used to be engaged to be 

married.” The court issued a temporary restraining order and set 

a hearing on the domestic violence restraining order for May 24, 

2017.

Following the hearing, the court issued a domestic violence 

restraining order for three months, expiring August 23, 2017. On 

June 19, 2017 Christodoro filed motions to set aside and vacate 

the order under Code of Civil Procedure section 663 and for a new 

trial. On July 24, 2017 the court denied Christodoro’s motions, 

and on August 9, 2017 Christodoro timely filed a notice of 

appeal.2

2 The notice of appeal stated Christodoro was appealing from 

a judgment entered July 24, 2017, which was the date the court 

denied Christodoro’s postjudgment motions, not the date the 

court issued the restraining order. We liberally construe 

Christodoro’s notice of appeal to be from the order issuing the 

restraining order and from the order denying his motion to set 

aside and vacate the order.

*

 (See K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified 
4

DISCUSSION

Christodoro argues the trial court erred in granting 

Idleman’s request for a domestic violence restraining order

because he and Idleman did not have a “dating relationship” 

within the meaning of section 6211, subdivision (c), and because 

substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s finding 

Christodoro subjected Idleman to “abuse” under section 6203. 

The restraining order, however, expired over four years ago, and 

we cannot grant Christodoro any effective relief. Therefore, the 

appeal is moot.

A. Christodoro’s Appeal Is Moot

An appeal is moot if events render it impossible for the 

appellate court to grant the appellant any effective relief.

(Newsom v. Superior Court (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1109; see 

Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach (2012) 

203 Cal.App.4th 852, 866 [“‘a live appeal may be rendered moot 

by events occurring after the notice of appeal was filed’”].) “‘“If 

relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief 

granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by 

School Dist. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 875, 882-883 [courts should liberally 

construe a notice of appeal “‘“to protect the right of appeal if it is 

reasonably clear what [the] appellant was trying to appeal from, 

and where the respondent could not possibly have been misled or 

prejudiced”’”]; Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818, 

819, fn. 1 [construing a notice of appeal from an order denying a 

motion for a new trial as from the underlying domestic violence 

restraining order].)

* Which is appealable. (Ryan v. Rosenfeld (2017) 3 Cal.5th 124, 

127.)
5

the adverse party is moot.”’” (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 

248 Cal.App.4th 484, 495 [expired civil harassment restraining 

order]; see Covina Union High School v. California 

Interscholastic Federation (1934) 136 Cal.App. 588, 589-590

[appeal from an injunction issued for a particular high school 

athletic season was moot where the athletic season ended while

the appeal was pending].) Because the restraining order against 

Christodoro expired on August 23, 2017, his appeal is moot. 

B. None of the Discretionary Exceptions to the Mootness 

Rules Applies

“‘“[T]here are three discretionary exceptions to the rules 

regarding mootness: (1) when the case presents an issue of broad 

public interest that is likely to recur [citation]; (2) when there 

may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties 

[citation]; and (3) when a material question remains for the 

court’s determination [citation].”’” (Harris v. Stampolis, supra,

248 Cal.App.4th at p. 495; see City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba

(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1079; Epstein v. Superior Court

(2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1411.) As for the first exception, 

Christodoro does not identify any issue of broad public interest 

that is likely to recur and evade appellate review. Christodoro

suggests the second and third exceptions apply, though he does 

not specifically identify them. 

For example, Christodoro cites ongoing litigation with

Idleman and asserts “Idleman will apply for yet another 

unwarranted restraining order,”

3 which might suggest the 

3 We grant Christodoro’s motion for judicial notice of certain 

court documents reflecting other litigation between Christodoro 
6

recurrence of the controversy between the parties. But 

Christodoro does not explain how or why the same controversy—

the issuance of a domestic violence restraining order under the

unusual circumstances of April 7, 2017—will arise again between 

the parties. Suggesting Idleman might make another request for 

a restraining order under another set of circumstances is not 

enough to show the original controversy may recur. (Cf. Rudick 

v. State Bd. of Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 89 [appeal 

was not moot because the “particular statutory interpretation 

issue may recur in a future dispute among the parties”]; City of 

Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles Employee Relations Bd. (2016) 

7 Cal.App.5th 150, 158 [temporary agreement between a city and 

a union on a particular negotiating point did not moot an appeal 

where it seemed “likely the controversy will arise between the 

parties in the future, and the issue is of continuing public 

interest”].) 

Christodoro also suggests a material question remains for 

the court’s determination (the third mootness exception) because 

“the expired restraining order would work against him.” In the 

civil context, a material question remains when “‘the judgment, if 

left unreversed, would preclude a party from litigating . . . an 

issue still in controversy.’” (Hensley v. San Diego Gas & Electric 

Co. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1337, 1346, fn. 4; see Viejo Bancorp, Inc. 

v. Wood (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 200, 205.) This typically occurs 

when a party appeals from an order or judgment and, although 

the relief granted by the trial court has expired, the trial court’s 

order or judgment could serve as the basis for an adverse finding 

on a different issue that is still in controversy. (See, e.g., Hensley, 

(or affiliated entities) and Idleman (or affiliated persons). (See 

Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.) 
7

at p. 1345 [the parties’ settlement was partially conditioned on 

the outcome of the appeal regarding damages].)

Christodoro contends the existence of the May 24, 2017 

restraining order could prejudice him in the event a court 

considers whether to issue another restraining order against him. 

Christodoro cites section 6306, subdivision (b)(1), which indeed 

states, “Prior to deciding whether to issue [a domestic violence 

restraining] order under this part or when determining 

appropriate temporary custody and visitation orders, the court 

shall consider the following information . . . : any conviction for a 

violent felony specified in Section 667.5 of the Penal Code or a 

serious felony specified in Section 1192.7 of the Penal Code; any 

misdemeanor conviction involving domestic violence, weapons, or 

other violence; any outstanding warrant; parole or probation 

status; any prior restraining order; and any violation of a prior 

restraining order.” (Italics added.)

But section 6306, subdivision (b)(2), gives the italicized “or” 

in subdivision (b)(1) special significance. Subdivision (b)(2) 

prohibits a court from considering the mere existence of a prior 

restraining order in determining whether to issue another 

domestic violence restraining order. That provision states: 

“Information . . . that does not involve a conviction described in 

this subdivision shall not be considered by the court in making a 

determination regarding the issuance of a[ ] [domestic violence 

restraining] order . . . .” (Italics added.) Instead, a prior 

restraining order may only be considered “when determining 

appropriate temporary custody and visitation orders,” as 

specified in section 6306, subdivision (b)(1). Christodoro has not 

identified any proceeding involving custody or visitation where a 

court might consider the prior restraining order.
8

In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, cited by 

Christodoro, is distinguishable for similar reasons. The court in 

Cassandra B. found a material question remained in an appeal 

from an expired temporary restraining order against a mother in 

a dependency proceeding because the restraining order could 

have negative consequences for the mother in future juvenile

court proceedings. (Id. at pp. 209-210.) The court cited Welfare 

and Institutions Code section 213.5, subdivision (j)(2), which 

requires the juvenile court to consider a prior restraining order in 

any proceeding to issue another restraining order. (Id. at p. 210, 

fn. 5.) Christodoro does not identify any dependency or other 

proceeding where the expired restraining order could have

adverse consequences. 

Christodoro suggests other ways the expired restraining 

order could negatively impact him, including by creating 

“negative social and economic consequences” and by giving 

litigants in other cases “a club to smear” him. Though the 

restraining order expired over four years ago,4 however, 

Christodoro has not cited anything suggesting the restraining 

order has harmed him in any way.5 And while seeking to clear 

4 The long period of time between the restraining order and 

resolution of this appeal is due to a stay issued during Idleman’s 

bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter 7 of the United States 

Bankruptcy Code.

5 Christodoro did not present in the trial court or timely ask 

this court to consider any evidence to demonstrate his appeal is

not moot. (Cf. In re K.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 450, 456

[“Postjudgment evidence may . . . be used to show that the 

appeal, or an issue involved, is moot.”]; Long v. Hultberg (1972) 
9

one’s name or record can be an exception to application of the 

mootness doctrine in a criminal case, there is no such exception 

in the civil context. (See People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 

646, fn. 2 [a criminal defendant can “demonstrate sufficiently 

concrete consequences to avoid a finding of mootness, even if the 

term of imprisonment has already concluded”]; People v. Succop

(1967) 67 Cal.2d 785, 790 [a “defendant is entitled to the 

opportunity to clear his name of the adjudication that he is a 

probable mentally disordered sex offender”]; People v. Ellison

(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1368-1369 [“[a] criminal case 

should not be considered moot where a defendant has completed 

a sentence where . . . the sentence may have ‘disadvantageous 

collateral consequences’”]; People v. Delong (2002) 

101 Cal.App.4th 482, 484 [criminal defendant’s appeal was not 

moot where she complied with the terms of her probation and 

was “entitled to an opportunity to clear her name and rid herself 

of the stigma of criminality”].) 

27 Cal.App.3d 606, 608 [appellate courts may consider evidence 

“when it shows that events occurring after judgment and notice of 

appeal have rendered the appeal moot”].)
10

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

IBARRA, J.

*

* Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.