IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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State of Utah, in the interest of K.C., a

person under eighteen years of age.

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D.C.,

Appellant,

v.

State of Utah,

Appellee.

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PER CURIAM DECISION

Case No. 20120531‐CA

F I L E D

(September 13, 2012)

   2012 UT App 254

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Third District Juvenile, Salt Lake Department, 1048525

The Honorable C. Dane Nolan

Attorneys: Jessica T. Taylor, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

Mark L. Shurtleff and Carol L.C. Verdoia, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Salt Lake City, Guardian ad Litem

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Before Judges Orme, Davis, and Christiansen.

¶1 D.C. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights.  Mother asserts that

there was insufficient evidence to support the grounds for terminating her parental

rights as well as the juvenile court’s determination that it was in the best interest of the

child to terminate Mother’s parental rights.  We affirm.

¶2 “[I]n order to overturn the juvenile court’s decision [to terminate a person’s

parental rights] ‘the result must be against the clear weight of the evidence or leave the
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Pursuant to Utah Code section 78A‐6‐507, the finding of any single ground for

termination is sufficient to warrant termination of parental rights.  See Utah Code Ann.

§ 78A‐6‐507(1) (2008) (providing that the court may terminate all parental rights if it

(continued...)

20120531‐CA 2

appellate court with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.’”  In re

B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 (citation omitted).  We “review the juvenile court’s

factual findings based upon the clearly erroneous standard.”  In re E.R., 2001 UT App

66, ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680.  A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only when, in light of the

evidence supporting the finding, it is against the clear weight of the evidence.  See id.

Further, we give the juvenile court a “‘wide latitude of discretion as to the judgments

arrived at’ based upon not only the court’s opportunity to judge credibility firsthand,

but also based on the juvenile court judges’ ‘special training, experience and interest in

this field.’”  Id. (citations omitted).  Finally, “[w]hen a foundation for the court’s

decision exists in the evidence, an appellate court may not engage in a reweighing of the

evidence.”  In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12.

¶3 The juvenile court found that there was sufficient evidence to support several

statutory grounds justifying the terminations of Mother’s parental rights.  The record

supports the juvenile court’s determination that Mother was unfit.  When a caseworker

from the Division of Child and Family Services first went to Mother’s home, she found

the conditions to be “deplorable.”  The home was covered in trash, there were feces on

the walls, and Mother could not adequately care for her children due to an alleged

illness.  Thereafter, Mother admitted that she was aware that K.C. had been sexually

abused by Mother’s boyfriend, but Mother failed to inform authorities of the abuse.  She

also failed to make any substantive efforts to protect K.C. from the abuse or to obtain

counseling for K.C.  Furthermore, Mother was in need of significant individual

counseling and parenting classes to address Mother’s own mental health issues, as well

as the issues that led to the removal of K.C. and her two younger brothers in the first

place.  This is significant because Mother’s psychological assessment indicated that she

lacked insight into her deficiencies as a parent.  Furthermore, because of various

characteristics identified in the psychological testing, her long term prognosis for

change was “guarded.”  Mother failed to attend regular individual counseling sessions.

As a result, the juvenile court found that Mother had failed to demonstrate that she had

gained the skills to properly parent K.C.  Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to

support the juvenile court’s determination that Mother was an unfit parent.1
1

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finds any one of the grounds listed); In re F.C., 2003 UT App 397, ¶ 6, 81 P.3d 790

(noting that any single ground is sufficient to terminate parental rights).  Accordingly,

there is no reason to review the other grounds relied upon by the juvenile court to

support the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

20120531‐CA 3

¶4 Similarly, Mother fails to demonstrate that the juvenile court erred in finding that

the State provided sufficient services to Mother.  A caseworker was assigned to Mother

to coordinate the delivery of services and to oversee Mother’s progress.  The caseworker

provided assistance in obtaining Mother’s psychological assessment and provided

Mother with a referral to Workforce Services, which eventually led to Mother’s

employment.  The caseworker did not make referrals for housing and individual

counseling because Mother indicated that she would arrange for those services herself

through the Veterans Administration.  Mother fails to demonstrate what additional

services should have been offered to her.  Based upon these circumstances, Mother fails

to demonstrate that the juvenile court’s finding that the State provided sufficient

services was clearly erroneous.

¶5 Finally, Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the

juvenile court’s determination that it was in the best interest of K.C. to terminate

Mother’s parental rights.  The evidence demonstrated that Mother was unable or

unwilling to protect K.C. from abuse.  The evidence also demonstrated, that due in part

to Mother’s failure to pursue individual counseling and parenting classes, Mother was

not in a position to parent K.C.  Specifically, the juvenile court found that she “has

failed to demonstrate she has gained the skills necessary to properly parent [K.C.].”

There is nothing in the record that would indicate that this finding was clearly

erroneous. Furthermore, Mother made limited efforts to maintain a mother‐child bond

with K.C. after K.C. moved to Texas with her father, and Mother failed to make any

support payments to assist in K.C.’s care.  While Mother expressed a desire to make

such payments and to increase her contact with K.C., evidence indicated that Mother

was not making support payments for her other children that were no longer in her

care.

¶6 On the other hand, K.C.’s father (Father) and his wife are providing K.C. with a

loving and stable home.  Father and his wife provide for K.C.’s physical, economic, and

emotional needs.  Furthermore, Father’s wife has developed a parent‐child bond with
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K.C., and K.C. views her as a mother figure.  K.C.’s stepmother wishes to adopt her.

Both Father and his wife have large extended families in Texas and K.C. has bonded

with those families.  Based upon the totality of facts, we cannot say that the juvenile

court erred in finding that it was in K.C.’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental

rights.

¶7 Accordingly, because evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s

decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights and because the decision is not against

the clear weight of the evidence, the juvenile court’s determination is affirmed.  See In re

B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12.

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

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James Z. Davis, Judge

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Michele M. Christiansen, Judge