1 

Filed 11/27/13 P. v. Dorr CA3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

(Yolo) 

---- 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

RONALD JACK DORR, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

C072215 

(Super. Ct. No. CRF 11-3591) 

 A jury found defendant Ronald Jack Dorr guilty of one count of offering to sell a 

controlled substance (the parties stipulating that he had oxycodone in his possession). 

As instructed, the jury did not return a verdict on the alternate count that charged him 

with the lesser offense of possessing a controlled substance for sale. The trial court 

dismissed the second count sua sponte. It then sustained a recidivist allegation. (The 

court also found defendant in violation of probation in a different case that is not part of 

this appeal.) It sentenced him to state prison for eight years. 
2 

 On appeal, defendant argues the inclusion of the wrong statutory reference in the 

verdict form made it fatally ambiguous, requiring reversal of the judgment. Rejecting 

this argument, we shall affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Our resolution of defendant’s argument does not implicate the facts underlying his 

conviction. We therefore omit them. 

 The information charged defendant with offering to sell oxycodone and Oxycontin 

(we note the latter is simply a brand name of the former) in violation of Health and Safety 

Code section 11352, subdivision (a)1 and possessing it for sale in violation of section 

11351. The court clerk read the information to the jury at the outset of the trial. The 

written instructions correctly defined the elements of the two offenses, including the 

correct code section for each (along with code sections for other offenses that the pattern 

instructions embrace). The trial court did not make any reference to code sections in 

reading these instructions to the jury. As noted above, the court instructed the jury that 

count two (possession for sale) was a lesser included offense of count one (offering to 

sell), and it could return a verdict on count two only if it found that defendant was not 

guilty of count one; if the jury found unanimously that defendant was guilty of count one, 

it could not return a verdict on count two. The prosecutor highlighted the distinction 

between the offenses charged in the two counts without any reference to the code 

sections, emphasizing the presence of evidence of an attempt to sell. The verdicts 

correctly described the conduct involved in each offense and the count in the information 

to which it related, but transposed the code references: They included section 11351 in 

the verdict form for count one (offering to sell), and section 11352 in the verdict form in 

count two (possessing for sale). 

 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code. 
3 

DISCUSSION 

 Defendant asserts the error in the guilty verdict rendered it “ambiguous.” He 

contends this is a “structural” error that requires reversal per se, though he does not 

provide any authority to this effect in the context of erroneous statutory references in a 

verdict form. He also asserts “the blame lies with the prosecution, [which] must therefore 

bear the consequence,” though he fails to spell out exactly what consequence the People 

are to bear (since the concepts of invited error or forfeiture do not have any application to 

a respondent in the present context). 

 If defendant is asserting the latter point as a way of evading the consequences of 

his own failure to object to the defective verdicts form, he is incorrect. The case he cites, 

People v. Superior Court (Marks) (1991) 1 Cal.4th 56, 77, simply holds that the People 

are not deprived of due process in the reduction of the degree of an offense on appeal (for 

the failure of the verdict to specify the degree) because they had the opportunity to call 

the error to the attention of the trial court. The case does not remotely suggest that a 

defendant does not have any corresponding duty to correct a defective verdict. The 

principle of forfeiture generally applies in all proceedings, civil or criminal, even where a 

constitutional protection is involved; it is premised on the duty of parties to protect their 

rights, and it is designed to deter the gamesmanship of sitting on one’s hands and raising 

a defect only after an adverse outcome. (Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 

264-265.) Thus, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly held on this specific point (in cases 

both parties overlook), the failure to object to the form of a verdict either at the time the 

trial court proposes it or at the time the jury returns it forfeits the issue on appeal. 

(People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1259 [claim of ambiguity]; People v. Bolin

(1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 330 [claim of erroneous statutory reference]; People v. Webster

(1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 446 [claim of unauthorized special verdict].) Defendant has 

consequently forfeited the issue of the defect on appeal. 
4 

 To give an abbreviated rather than plenary analysis in light of defendant’s forfeiture, 

we simply note that there is a consistent body of law (that both parties entirely overlook) to 

the effect that the form of a verdict is immaterial if the intention to convict a defendant of a 

charged crime is manifest. All that is necessary in a guilty verdict is a reference to a specific 

count in the information; all else is surplusage that may be disregarded (such as an incorrect 

code section). (People v. Camacho (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1273-1274 [verdict had 

described offense as carjacking instead of robbery; immaterial because information charged 

count two as robbery, instructions on robbery referenced count two; arguments of counsel 

referenced count two as robbery]; People v. Reddick (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 806, 820 

[reference to nonexistent code section immaterial where verdict form refers to count in 

information charging conspiracy]; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) 

Criminal Judgment, § 81, p. 123 [“Erroneous surplusage will be disregarded. This may 

consist of an unnecessary and mistaken reference to the wrong statute”].) Here, too, the 

verdict referenced the count in the information that correctly alleged a violation of section 

11352 by offering to sell a controlled substance. Instructions and argument also made it 

manifestly clear that that was the conduct at issue in the verdict. As a result, the error in the 

verdict is immaterial and far from being a structural error. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. 

 BUTZ , J. 

We concur: 

 ROBIE , Acting P. J. 

 HOCH , J.