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CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY 

THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2016 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

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(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Vice Chairman 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

DANIEL COATS, Indiana 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio 

CHRIS JOYNER, Staff Director 

MICHAEL CASEY, Minority Staff Director 

DESIREE THOMPSON SAYLE, Chief Clerk 

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(III) 

CONTENTS 

FEBRUARY 9, 2016 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina ................ 1 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California .......... 2 

WITNESS 

Clapper, James R., Director of National Intelligence, Accompanied by: John 

Brennan, Director, Central Intelligence Agency; LtGen Vincent Stewart, 

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; James Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Adm Michael Rogers, Director, National Security 

Agency ................................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

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(1) 

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL 

SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:38 p.m. in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Burr, Feinstein, Coats, 

Collins, Blunt, Lankford, Cotton, Wyden, Warner, Heinrich, King, 

and Hirono. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA 

Chairman BURR. I’d like to call the hearing to order, and I’d like 

to welcome our witnesses today: Director of National Intelligence 

James Clapper; Director of Central Intelligence Agency John Brennan; Director of Defense Intelligence Agency General Vincent Stewart; Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Jim Comey; 

and Director of the National Security Agency Admiral Rogers. To 

each of you, welcome. 

I’d note that Director Clapper and General Stewart have already 

appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee this morning and I appreciate you both suffering through a very long day of 

testimony. I also thank our other witnesses for their attendance 

and participation. 

Today’s hearing presents an opportunity for both the witnesses 

and the members of the committee. It’s my sincere hope that our 

discussion will shed some light on the dedicated and tireless work 

of our intelligence community professionals, the men and women 

represented by our witnesses. Their efforts to keep America safe 

often go unrecognized, but that does not mean it goes unnoticed. 

I’ve spent the better part of 20 years as a member of the Congressional intelligence committees and have seen the scale, scope, 

and type of threats to our Nation evolve greatly. We no longer live 

in a world defined by a few distinct and well-defined threats. Our 

intelligence professionals are faced with collecting against and analyzing the threat posed by a range of actors from nation-states on 

down to home-grown violent extremists. 

Director Clapper, in your statement you’ve pulled together the 

collective expertise of the intelligence community’s extraordinary 

men and women. We value your laying out for our benefit the diverse and evolving and decentralized system of threats that imperil 

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this Nation and its interests across the globe. I ask that everyone 

take a moment to reflect on the range of expertise required to 

make sense of this information. 

I note in your statement that cyber and, more broadly, technology headline your global threats. I agree with the assessment 

that innovation and increased reliance on information technology in 

the next few years will have significant consequences on society’s 

way of life and, more specifically, how your officers perform their 

mission. 

I look forward to your highlighting some of the challenges and 

consequences as you see them. I also remain concerned by the technological reach of ISIL and the danger of their using the information technology, social media, online unlimited research capabilities 

we use every day to propagate their barbaric message. Jim, I do 

hope you’ll dedicate some time to laying out that particular threat, 

and I thank you again for being here today. 

I’d like to also highlight for my colleagues that the Committee 

will be holding a classified hearing on worldwide threats later this 

week. To the degree it needs saying, please reserve any questions 

that you think might not be appropriate for an open session until 

the Thursday hearing. 

With that, again I welcome our witnesses here today and I turn 

to the Vice Chairman for any comments she might have. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. I 

join you in welcoming our witnesses and also thanking the intelligence community for its service to this country. I also share your 

sentiment that this annual open hearing is important to help explain to the American people the threats that face this Nation and 

the efforts of the dedicated men and women of the intelligence community to keep us safe. 

I want to open my comments by recognizing the significant contributions made by you, Director Clapper, as the leader of this community. You’re the longest serving Director of National Intelligence 

to date and I think both the Chairman and I remember when this, 

the DNI, was developed and put into effect. Your capable stewardship of the community has driven it to be a more integrated and 

capable organization than at any time in history. So I want to personally thank you for the contributions you have made to this country’s security. 

But, as you know, there is no rest for the weary. The threats that 

face this Nation and our allies seem only to grow. The Syrian war 

is approaching its fifth year. Yet Bashar Al-Assad is still in power 

and a refugee crisis is destroying the lives of millions of innocent 

families and wreaking havoc across Europe. 

We are witnessing the resurgence of an unpredictable Russia in 

Eastern Europe and Syria. North Korea last month conducted its 

fourth nuclear bomb test and two days ago conducted what it called 

a space launch. Of course, this is actually a thinly veiled test to develop missiles that could deliver weapons of mass destruction 

against a number of countries, including the United States. 

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While these threats are significant and troubling, we are all 

deeply concerned about the threat from ISIL, the Islamic State of 

Iraq and the Levant, and other terrorist groups. To us, ISIL is 

much more than a regional threat within the Syrian and Iraqi borders. It’s a terrorist army, a global exporter of terrorism, with a 

presence in a number of countries. The official count is 11, including ISIL affiliates. But some of our friends, like the King of Jordan, 

have said they’re in as many as 17 countries. And ISIL has the 

ability to spread its message of hate and violence around the world 

using social media in a very sophisticated way. 

Director Clapper, I’ve read your written comments and am very 

much interested in your assessment of these global threats, their 

status today, and the outlook for the future. 

I’d also ask you to comment on how the intelligence community 

is positioned to address these threats. Is it better today than it 

was, let’s say, five years ago? For instance, while the coalition’s air 

campaign is helping to deny ISIL some territorial safe havens and 

financial resources, how do we degrade it and destroy it if all they 

need to carry out an attack on the West is an Internet connection 

and an encrypted message application? 

I’d like to hear your assessments of how the rise of end-to-end 

encryption has impacted our Nation’s ability to identify and track 

individuals who seek to do us harm. Director Comey has spoken of 

this concern often. Director Rogers recently highlighted it as well. 

I’m interested in your views today about its impact and how you 

recommend we tackle this problem of terrorists and criminals communicating via these encrypted message applications. 

The U.S. Freedom Act that passed last year eliminated the bulk 

collection of telephone communications metadata, and the new law 

now requires specific queries, with FISA Court approval, to individual telecommunication companies. Has this change affected your 

ability to discover new threats and relationships? 

I’ll save the rest of my comments for questions. But, gentlemen, 

thank you very much for being here. We look forward to discussion. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Vice Chairman. 

Before I recognize Director Clapper, let me say to members it’s 

my intent—hopefully it’s been conveyed to all members—you will 

be recognized for five minutes in the order that you appeared, with 

one exception. If there is no objection, when Director Clapper’s testimony is over I would like to recognize Senator Lankford for a first 

set of questions, for the simple reason that on Tuesdays he has to 

preside over the Senate, and he has to preside at 3:20 today and 

I’d like to let him get a set of questions in. So, Jim, James, you 

will be recognized. 

With that, the floor is yours, Director Clapper. 

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STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ACCOMPANIED BY: JOHN BRENNAN, 

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; LtGen VINCENT STEWART, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; JAMES COMEY, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; AND ADM MICHAEL ROGERS, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

Director CLAPPER. Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Feinstein, 

members of the committee: First, Chairman Burr, thanks very 

much for the acknowledgment particularly of the great men and of 

women of the U.S. intelligence community whom we represent here 

today. It’s very appropriate that you do that for the great work that 

they do. And, Madam Vice Chairman, thanks very much for acknowledging my long service. It’s very gracious of you. 

We’re here today to update you on some, but certainly not all, of 

the pressing intelligence and national security issues facing our 

Nation, many of which you both alluded to, and so there will be 

a certain amount of echo here, I guess. In the interest of time and 

to get to your questions, we’ll cover just some of the wavetops, and 

mine will be the only opening statement so we can go to your questions. 

I apologize in advance to the crossover members who were 

present this morning at the Senate Armed Services Committee. 

But in the highest traditions of that’s our story, we’re sticking to 

it, it’ll be the same statement. 

As I said last year, unpredictable instability has become the new 

normal and this trend will continue for the foreseeable future. Violent extremists are operationally active in about 40 countries. 

Seven countries are experiencing a collapse of central government 

authority and 14 others face regime-threatening or violent instability or both. Another 59 countries face a significant risk of instability through 2016. 

The record level of migrants, more than one million arriving in 

Europe, is likely to grow further this year. Migration and displacement will strain countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas. There are some 60 million people worldwide considered displaced. Extreme weather, climate change, environmental degradation, rising demand for food and water, poor policy decisions, and 

inadequate infrastructure will magnify this instability. 

Infectious diseases and vulnerabilities in the global supply chain 

for medical countermeasures will continue to pose threats. For example, the Zika virus, first detected in the Western Hemisphere in 

2014, has reached the U.S. and is projected to cause up to four million cases in this hemisphere. 

With that preface, I want to briefly comment on both technology 

and cyber specifically. Technological innovation during the next few 

years will have an even more significant impact on our way of life. 

This innovation is central to our economic prosperity, but it will 

bring new security vulnerabilities. The Internet of Things will connect tens of billions of physical devices that could be exploited. Artificial intelligence will enable computers to make autonomous decisions about data and physical systems and potentially disrupt labor 

markets. 

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Russia and China continue to have the most sophisticated cyber 

programs. China continues cyber espionage against the United 

States. Whether China’s commitment of last September moderates 

its economic espionage remains to be seen. 

Iran and North Korea continue to conduct cyber espionage as 

they enhance their attack capabilities. Non-state actors also pose 

cyber threats. ISIL has used cyber to its great advantage, not only 

for recruitment and propaganda, but also to hack and release sensitive information about U.S. military personnel. As a non-state 

actor, ISIL displays unprecedented online proficiency. 

Cyber criminals remain the most pervasive cyber threat to the 

U.S. financial sector. They use cyber to conduct theft, extortion, 

and other criminal activities. 

Turning to terrorism, there are now more Sunni violent extremist groups, members, and safe havens than at any time in history. 

The rate of foreign fighters traveling to the conflict zones in Syria 

and Iraq in the past few years is without precedent. At least 38,200 

foreign fighters, including at least 6,900 from western countries, 

have traveled to Syria from at least 120 countries since the beginning of the conflict in 2012. As we saw in the November Paris attacks, returning foreign fighters with firsthand battlefield experience pose a dangerous operational threat. 

ISIL has demonstrated sophisticated attack tactics and 

tradecraft. ISIL, including its eight established and several more 

emerging branches, has become the preeminent global terrorist 

threat. ISIL has attempted or conducted scores of attacks outside 

of Syria and Iraq in the last 15 months, and ISIL’s estimated 

strength globally now exceeds that of Al-Qaeda. 

ISIL’s leaders are determined to strike the U.S. homeland beyond inspiring home-grown violent extremist attacks. Although the 

U.S. is a harder target than Europe, ISIL external operations remain a critical factor in our threat assessment for 2016. 

Al-Qaeda’s affiliates also have proven resilient. Despite counterterrorism pressure that’s largely decimated the core leadership in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, Al-Qaeda affiliates are positioned to 

make gains in 2016. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the 

Al-Nusra Front, the Al-Qaeda chapter in Syria, are the two most 

capable Al-Qaeda branches. 

The increased use by violent extremists of encrypted and secure 

Internet and mobile-based technologies enables terrorist actors to 

go dark and serves to undercut intelligence and law enforcement 

efforts. 

Iran continues to be the foremost state sponsor of terrorism and 

exerts its influence in regional crises in the Middle East through 

the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, its terrorist 

partner Lebanese Hezbollah, and proxy groups. Iran and Hezbollah 

remain a continuing terrorist threat to U.S. interests and partners 

worldwide. 

We saw firsthand the threat posed to the United States by homegrown violent extremists in the July attack in Chattanooga and the 

attack in December in San Bernardino. In 2014 the FBI arrested 

nine ISIL supporters and in 2015 that number increased over fivefold. 

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Turning to weapons of mass destruction, North Korea continues 

to conduct test activities of concern to the United States. On Saturday evening Pyongyang conducted a satellite launch and subsequently claimed that the satellite was successfully placed in orbit. 

Additionally, last month North Korea carried out its fourth nuclear 

test, claiming it was a hydrogen bomb. But the yield was too low 

for it to have been a successful test of a thermonuclear device. 

Pyongyang continues to produce fissile material and develop a 

submarine-launched ballistic missile. It is also committed to developing a long-range nuclear-armed missile that’s capable of posing 

a direct threat to the United States, although the system has not 

been flight tested. 

Despite its economic challenges, Russia continues its aggressive 

military modernization program. It has the largest and most capable foreign nuclear-armed ballistic missile force. It has developed a 

cruise missile that violates the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, 

or INF, Treaty. 

China continues to modernize its nuclear missile force and is 

striving for a secure second strike capability. It continues to profess 

a ‘‘no first use’’ doctrine. 

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, provides us 

much greater transparency into Iran’s fissile material production. 

It increases the time the Iranians would need to produce enough 

highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon from a few months 

to about a year. Iran probably views the JCPOA as a means to remove sanctions while preserving some nuclear capability. Iran’s 

perception of how the JCPOA helps it achieve its overall strategic 

goals will dictate its level of adherence or compliance to the agreement over time. 

Chemical weapons continue to pose a threat in Syria and Iraq. 

Damascus has used chemicals against the opposition on multiple 

occasions since Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention. 

ISIL has also used toxic chemicals in Iraq and Syria, including the 

blister agent sulfur mustard—the first time an extremist group has 

produced and used a chemical warfare agent in an attack since 

Aum Shinrikyo used sarin in Japan in 1995. 

Turning to space and counter-space, there are about 80 countries 

that are now engaged in the space domain. Russia and China well 

understand how our military fights and how heavily we rely on 

space. They’re each pursuing destructive and disruptive anti-satellite systems. China continues to make progress on its anti-satellite missile program. 

Moving to counter-intelligence, the threat from foreign intelligence entities, both state and non-state, is persistent, complex, 

and evolving. Targeting collection of U.S. political, military, economic, and technical information by foreign intelligence services 

continues unabated. Russia and China pose the greatest threat, followed by Iran and Cuba on a lesser scale. As well, the threat from 

insiders taking advantage of their access to collect and remove sensitive national security information will remain a persistent challenge for us. 

With respect to trans-national organized crime, I do want to 

touch on one crime issue, specifically drug trafficking. Southwest 

border seizures of heroin in the United States have doubled since 

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2010. Over 10,000 people died of heroin overdoses in the United 

States in 2014, much of it laced with fentanyl, which is 30 to 50 

times more potent than heroin. In that same year, more than 

28,000 died from opiate overdoses. And cocaine production in Colombia, from which most U.S. supplies originate, has increased significantly. 

Now let me quickly move through a few regional issues. In East 

Asia, China’s leaders are pursuing an active foreign policy while 

dealing with much slower economic growth. Chinese leaders have 

also embarked on the most ambitious military reforms in China’s 

history. Regional tension will continue as China pursues construction at its outposts in the South China Sea. 

Russia has demonstrated its military capabilities to project itself 

as a global power, command respect from the West, maintain domestic support for the regime, and advance Russian interests globally. Moscow’s objectives in the Ukraine will probably remain unchanged, including maintaining long-term influence over Kiev and 

frustrating its attempts to integrate into western institutions. 

Putin is the first leader since Stalin to expand Russia’s territory. 

Moscow’s military venture into Syria marks its first use since its 

foray into Afghanistan of significant expeditionary combat power 

outside of the post-Soviet space. Its interventions demonstrate the 

improvements in Russian military capabilities and the Kremlin’s 

confidence in using them. 

Moscow faces the reality, however, of economic recession, driven 

in large part by falling oil prices as well as sanctions. Russia’s 

nearly 4 percent GDP contraction last year will probably extend 

well into 2016. 

In the Mideast and South Asia, there are more cross-border military operations under way in the Mideast region than at any time 

since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In Iraq, anti-ISIL forces in Iraq 

will probably make incremental gains through this spring similar 

to those made in Baiji and Ramadi in the past few months. ISIL 

is now somewhat on the defensive and its territory and manpower 

are shrinking, but it remains a formidable threat. 

In Syria, pro-regime forces have the initiative, having made some 

strategic gains near Aleppo and Latakia in the north, as well as 

in southern Syria. Manpower shortages, however, will continue to 

undermine the Syrian regime’s ability to accomplish its strategic 

battlefield objectives. The opposition has less equipment and firepower and its groups lack unity. They sometimes have competing 

battlefield interests and fight among themselves. 

Meanwhile, some 250,000 people have been killed as this war 

has dragged on. The humanitarian situation in Syria continues to 

deteriorate. As of last month, there were approximately 4.4 million 

Syrian refugees and another 6.5 million internally displaced persons, which together represent about one-half of Syria’s population. 

In Libya, despite the December agreement to form a new government of national accord, establishing authority and security across 

the country will be difficult at best, with hundreds of militia groups 

operating throughout the country. ISIL has established its most developed branch outside of Syria in Libya—outside of Syria and 

Iraq, in Libya, and maintains a presence in Sirte, Benghazi, Tripoli, and other areas of the country. 

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In Yemen, the conflict will probably remain stalemated through 

at least mid-2016. Meanwhile, AQAP and ISIL’s affiliates in Yemen 

have exploited the conflict and the collapse of government authority to recruit and expand territorial control. The country’s economic 

and humanitarian situation also continues to deteriorate. 

Iran deepened its involvement in the Syria, Iraqi and Yemeni 

conflicts in 2015. It also increased military cooperation with Russia, highlighted by its battlefield alliance in Syria in support of the 

regime. Iran’s supreme leader continues to view the United States 

as a major threat. We assess his views will not change, despite the 

implementation of the JCPOA deal, the exchange of detainees, and 

the release of the 10 U.S. sailors. 

In South Asia, Afghanistan is at serious risk of a political breakdown during 2016, occasioned by mounting political, economic, and 

security challenges. Waning political cohesion, increasingly assertive local power brokers, financial shortfalls, and sustained countrywide Taliban attacks are eroding stability. 

Needless to say there are many more threats to U.S. interests 

worldwide that we can address, most of which are covered in our 

statement for the record. But I’ll stop this litany of doom and open 

to your questions. 

Before I do that, I do want to answer one question that Madam 

Vice Chairman asked about the state of the community now vs. five 

years ago. I would like to think that we are better as a community 

just from the simple proposition of the sum being greater than the 

parts, because we operate as an integrated enterprise. Others may 

have a comment on that. None of them are unwilling to disagree 

with me, but that’s my view. 

So I’ll stop there and open to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Director Clapper follows.] 

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Intelligence 
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STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD 

WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT 

of the 

US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 

February 9, 2016 

INTRODUCTION 

Chairman Burr, VJCe Chairman Feinstein, Members of the Committee,-'thank you fpr the invitation to offer 

the United States lnteUigence community's 2016 assessment of threats to US national security. My 

statement reflects the collective insights of the lntenigence community's extraordinary men and women, 

whom ·I am privileged and honored to lead. We in the Intelligence Community are committed every day to 

provide the nuanced, multidisciplinary intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law 

enforcement personnel need to protect American lives end America's interests anywhere in the world. 

The order of the topics presented in this statement does not necessarily Indicate the relative importance 

or magnitude of the threat in the view of the Intelligence community. 

Information available as of February 3, 2016 was used in the preparation of this assessment. 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

GLOBAL THREATS 

Cyber and Technology 

Terrorism 

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation 

Space and Counterspace 

Counterintelligence 

Transnational Organized Crime 

Economics and Natural Resources 

Human Security 

REGIONAL THREATS 

East Asia 

China 

Southeast Asia 

North Korea 

Russia and Eurasia 

Russia 

Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova 

The Caucasus and Central Asia 

Europe 

Key Partners 

TheBalkana 

Turkey 

Middle East and North Africa 

Iraq 

Syria 

Libya 

Yemen 

Iran 

ii 

Pa 

4 

6 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

16 

16 

17 

17 

17 

17 

19 

19 

20 

20 

20 

21 

21 

21 

22 

23 

23 

24 
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Lebanon 25 

Egypt 25 

Tunisia 25 

South Asia 26 

Afghanistan 26 

Bangladesh 27 

Pakistan and India 27 

Sub-Saharan Africa 27 

Central Africa 27 

Somalia 28 

South Sudan 28 

Sudan 28 

Nigeria 28 

Latin America and Caribbean 28 

Central America 28 

Cuba 29 

Venezuela 29 

Brazil 29 

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GLOBAL THREATS 

CYBER AND TECHNOLOGY 

Strategic Outlook 

The consequences of innovation and increased reliance on infonnatlon technology In the next few years 

on both our society's way of life in general and how we in the Intelligence Community specifically perform 

our mission Will probably be far greater in scope and impact than ever. Devices, designed and fielded 

with minimal security requirements and testing, and an ever-increasing complexity of networks could lead 

to widespread vulnerabilities in civilian infrastructures and US Government systems. These 

developments will pose challenges to our cyber defenses and operational tradecraft but also create new 

opportunities for our own intelfigence collectors. 

Internet of Things (loT). •smart" devices incorporated into the electric grid, vehicles-including 

autonomous vehiele&-and household appliances are improving effiCiency, energy conservation, and 

convenience. However, security industry analysts have demonstrated that many of these new s~ 

can threaten data privacy, data integritY. or continuity of services. In the future, intelligence services 

might use the loT for identification, surveillance, monitoring, location tracking, and targeting for 

recruitment, or to gain acosss to network~ or user credentials. 

Artlflclallnte/llgem:e (AI). AI ranges from "Narrow AI" systems, which seek to execute specialized 

tasks, such as speech recognition, to "General AI" systems-perhaps still decades away-which aim to 

replicate many aspects of human cognition. Implications of broader AI deployment include increased 

vulnerability to cyberattack, difficulty in ascertaining 'attribution, facifltation of advances in foreign weapon 

and intelligence systems, the risk of accidents and reiSted liability issues, and unemployment. Although 

the United States leads AI research globally, foreign state research in AI is growing. 

The increased reliance on AI for autonomous decisionmaking is creating new viJinerabilities to 

cyberattacks and influence operations. As we have already seen, false data and unanticipated algorithm 

behaviors have caused significilnt fluctuations in the stock market because of the reliance on automated 

tredlng of financial instruments. Efficiency and perfonnance benefitS can be derived from Increased 

reliance on AI systems in both civilian industries and national security, as well as potential gains to 

cyberaecurity from automated computer network defense. However, AI systems are susceptible to a 

range of disruptive and deceptive tectics that might be difficult to anticipate or quickly underatend. Efforts 

to mislead or compromise automated systems might create or enable further opportunities to disrupt or 

damage critical infrastructure or national security networks. 

Foreign Data Science. This field is becoming increasingly mature. Foreign countries are openly 

purchasing acosss to published US research through aggregated publication indices, and they are 

collecting social media and patent data to develop their own indices. 

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Augmented Reellty (AR} end VIrtual Reality (VRJ. AR and VR systems with three-dimensional imagery 

and audio, user-friendly software, end low price points are already on the market; their aqoption will 

probably accelerate in 2016. AR provides users with additional communications scenarios (e.g. by using 

virtual avatars) as weD as acquisition of new data (e.g. from facial recognition) overlaid onto reality. VR 

gives users experiences in man-made environments wholly sepereta from reality. 

Protactlng lnfonnatlon Resources 

Integrity. Future cyber operations will almost certainly Include an increased emphasis on changing or 

manipulating data to compromise its Integrity (i.e., accuracy and reliability) to affect decisionmaking, 

raduce trust in systems, or cause adverse physical effects. Broader adoption of loT devices and Al-in 

settings such as pubUc utilities and health care-will only exacerbate these potential effects. Russian 

cyber actors, who post disinfonnatlon on commercial website&, might seek to alter online media as a 

means to influence public discourse and create confusion. Chinese military doctrine outlines the use of 

cyber deception operations to conceal intentions, modify storad data, transmit false data, manipulate the 

flow of information, or influence·public sentiments-aU to induce aiTOI'll and miscalculation in 

decision making. 

lnfrastnlctum. Countries are becoming increasingly aware of both their own weaknesses and the 

asYmmetric offensive opportunities presented by systemic and persistent wlnerebilities In key 

infrastructure sectors including health care, energy, fmance, telecommunications, transportation, and 

wetar. For example, the US health care sector is rapidly evolving in weys never before imagined, and the 

cross-networking of personal data devices, electronic health records, medical devices, and hospital 

networks might play unanticipated roles in patient outcomes. Such risks are only halghtenad by largescale theft of health care data and the internationalization of critical US supply chains and service 

infrastructure. 

A major US network equipment manufacturer acknowledged last December that someone repeatedly 

gained access to its network to change source code in order to make its products' default encryption 

breakable. The intruders also introduced a default password to enable undetected access to some target 

networks worldwide. 

lnteropenrbllity. Most governments are exploring weys to exert sovereign control over information 

accessible to and used by their citizens and are placing additional legal requirements on companies as 

they seek to balance security, privacy, and economic concerns. We assess that many countries will 

implement new laws and technologies to c:enSor Information, decrease online anonymity, and localize 

data within their national borders. Although these regulations will restrict freedoms online and Increase 

the operating costs for US companies abroad, they will probably not introduce obstacies that threaten the 

functionality of the Internet. 

Identity. Advances In the capabilities of many countries to exploit large data sets almost certainly 

increase the lntalllgence value of collecting bulk data and have probably contributed to Increased 

targeting of personally Identifiable Information. Commercial vendors, who aggregate the bulk of digitized 

information about persons, wiD Increasingly collect,· analyze, and seD it to both foreign and domestic 

customers. We assess that countries are exploiting personal data to inform a variety of 

counterintelligence operations. 

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Accountability. lnfonnation security professionals will continue to make progress in attnbuting cyber 

operetioris and tying events to previously identifl8d infrastructure or tools that might enable rapid 

attribution in some cases. However, improving offensive tredecraft, the use of proxies, and the creation 

of cover organizations will hinder timely, high-confidence attribution of responsibility for state-sponsored 

cyber operations. 

Resttaint. Many actors remain undeterred from conducting reconnaissance, espionage, and even 

attacks in cyberspace because of the relatively low costa of entry, the perceived payoff, and the lack of 

significant consequences. Moscow and Beijing, among others, view offensive cyber capabilities es an 

important geoatrategic tool and will almost certainly continue developing them while simultaneously 

discussing normative fram~rks to restrict such use. Diplomatic efforts in the past three years heve 

created the foundation for establishing limits on cyber operations, and the norma articulated in a 2015 

report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts suggest that countries are more likely to commit to 

Hmltations on what cyber operations can target than to support bans on the development of offensive 

capabilities or on specific means of cyber intervention. For example, in 2015, followlllQ a US-Chinese 

bilateral agreement, G-20 leaders agreed that that no country should conduct or sponsor cyber 

espionage for the purpose of commercial gain. 

Leading Threat Actors 

Russia. Russia is assuming a more assertive cyber posture baaed on its willingness to target critical 

infrastructure systems and conduct espionage operations even when detected and under increased 

public scrutiny. Russian eyber operations are likely to target US interests to support several strategic 

Objectives: intelligence gathering to support Russian decisionmaking in the Ukraine and Syrian crises, 

influence operations to support military and political objectives, and continuing preparation of the cyber 

environment for future contingencies. 

China. China continues to heve sucoess in cyber espionage against the US Government, our allies, and 

US companies. Beijing also selectively uses cyberattacks against targets it believes threaten Chinese 

domestic stability or regime legitimacy. We will monitor compliance with China's September 2015 

commitment to refrain from conducting or knowingly supporting cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property 

with the intent of providing competitive advanli!ge to companies or commercial sectors. Private-sector 

security eXPBrts have Identified limited ongoing cyber activity from China but heve not verified state 

sponsorship or the use of exfiltrated date for commercial gain. 

Iran. Iran used cyber espionage, propaganda, and attacks in 2015 to support Its security priorities, 

influence events, and counter threats-including against US allies in the region. 

NOifh Korea. North Korea probably remains capable and willing to launch disruptive or destructive 

cyberattacks to support Its political objectives. South Korean officials heve concluded that North Korea 

was probably responsible for the compromise and disclosure of data from a South Korean nuclear plant. 

Nonstate Acto/3. Terrorists continue to use the Internet to organize, recruit, spread propaganda, collect 

intelligance, raise funds, and coordinate operations. In a new tactic, ISIL actors targeted and raieased 

sensitive information about US mirltary personnel in 2015 in an effort to spur "lone-wolf' attacks. 

Criminals develop and use sophisticated cyber tools for a variety of purposes such as theft, extortion, and 

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facDitation of other criminal activities such as drug traffiCking. "Ransomware' designed to block user 

access to their own data, sometimes by encrypting it, is becoming a particularly effective and popular tool 

for extortion for which few options for recovery are available. Criminal tools and malware are increasingly 

being discovered on state and local government networks. 

TERRORISM 

The United States and its allies are facing a challenging threat environment in 2016. Sunni violent 

extremism has been on an upward trajectory sinca the late 1970s end has more groups, members, and 

safa havens than at any other point in history. At the same time, Shia violent extremists will probably 

deepen sectarian tensions in response to real and perceived threats from Sunni violent extremists and to 

advance Iranian influence. 

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has become the preeminent terrorist threat because of its 

self-described caliphate in Syria and Iraq, its branches and emerging branches in other countries, and Its 

increasing ability to direct and Inspire attacks against a wide range of targets around the world. ISIL's 

narrative supports jihadlst recruiting, attracts others to travel to Iraq and Syria, draws individuals and 

groups to declare allegiance to ISIL, and justifies attacks across the globe. The ISIL-directed November 

2015 attacks in Paris and ISIL-Sinai's claim of responsibility for the late October downing of a Russian 

airliner in the Sinai underscore these dynamics. 

Al-Qa'ida's affifiates have proven resilient and are positioned to make gains in 2016, despite 

counterterrorism pressure that has largely degraded the network's leadership in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. They will continue to pose a threat to local, regional, and even possibly global interests as 

demonstrated by the January 2015 attack on French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo by individuats 

linked to ai-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Other Sunni terrorist groups relain the ability to 

attract recruits and resources. 

The United States will almost certainly remain at least a rhetorically important enemy for most violent 

extremists in part due to past and ongoing US military, political, and economic engagement overseas. 

Sunni violent extremists will probably continually plot against US Interests oversees. A smaller number 

will attempt to overcome the logistical challenges associated with conducting attacks on the US 

homeland. The July 2015 attack against military facilities in Chattanooga and December 2015 attack in 

San Bernardino demonstrate the threat that homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) also pose to the 

homeland. In 2014, the FBI arrested approximately one dozen US-based ISIL supporters. In 2015, that 

number increased to approximately five dozen anrests. These individuals were amssted for a variety of 

reasons, predominantly for attempting to provide material support to ISIL. 

US-based HVEs will probably continue to pose the most significant Sunni terrorist threat to the US 

homeland in 2018. The perceived success of attacks by HVEs In Europe and North America, such as 

those in Chattanooga and San Bernardino, might motivate others to replicate opportunistic attacks with 

little or no wsming, diminishing our ability to detect terrorist operational planning and readiness. ISIL 

involvement in homeland attack activity will probably continue to involve those who draw inspiration from 

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the group's highly sophisticated media without direct guidance from ISIL leadership and individuals in the 

United states or abroad who receive direct guidance and specific direction from ISIL members or leaders. 

ISIL's global appeal continues to inspire indMduals in countries outside Iraq and Syria to travel to join the 

group. More than 36,500 foreign fighters-including at least 6,600 from Western countries--have 

traveled to Syria from more than1 00 countries since the conflict began in 2012. Foreign fighters who 

have trained in Iraq and Syria might potentially leverage skills and experience to plan and execute attacks 

in the West Involvement of returned foreign fighters in terrorist plotting increeses the .effectiveness and 

lethality of terrorist attacks, according to academic studies. A prominent example is the November 2015 

attacks in Paris in which the plotters included European foreign fighters returning from Syria 

ISlL's branches continue to build a strong global network that alms to advance the group's goals and 

often works to exacerbate existing sectarian tensions In their locelities. Some of these branches will also 

plan to stn'ke at Western targets, such as the downing of a Russian airliner in October by ISIL's selfproclaimed province In Egypt. In Libya, the group is entrenched in Surt and along the coastal areas, has 

varying degrees of presence across the country, and is well positioned to expand territory under its 

control in 2016. ISIL will seek to influence previously established groups, such as Boko Harem in Nigeria, 

to emphasize the group's ISIL Identity and fulfiU its religious obligations to the ISIL 'caliphate. • 

Other tarrorists and insurgent groups will continue to exploit week governance, insecurity, and economic 

and political fragiHty in an effort to expand their areas of influence and provide safe havens for violent 

extremists, particularly in conflict zones. Sunnl violent extremist groups ara increasingly joining or 

Initiating insurgencies to advance their local and transnational objectives. Many of these groups are 

increasingly capable of conducting effective insurgent campaigns, given their membership growth and 

accumulation of large financial and materiel caches. This trend increasingly blurs the lines between 

insurgent and terrorist groups as both aid locel fighters, leverage safe havens, and pursue attacks against 

US and other Western Interests. 

No single paradigm explains how terrorists become Involved In lnsurgancies. Some groups like ISIL In 

Syria and ai-Qa'ida In the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mall have worked with 1ocat militants to Incite 

insurgencies. Others, like Boko Haram, are the sole Instigators and represent the primary threat to their 

respective homeland's security. SliD others, Including ai-Shabaab, are the primary beneficiaries of an 

lnsurgeney started by others. Finally, other groups, such as core ai-Qa'ida, have taken advantage of the 

relative safe haven in areas controlled by insurgent groups to build capabilities and alliances without 

taking on a primary leadership role in the local conflict. 

Although ai-Qa'ida's presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been significantly degraded, it aspires to 

attack the US and its allias. In Yemen, the proven capability of AQAP to advance external plots during 

periods of instability suggests that leadership losses and challenges from the Iranian-backed Huthi 

lnsurgeney will not deter its efforts to strike the West. Amid this conflict, AQAP has made territorial gains 

In Yemen including the seizure of military bases in the country's largest province. AI-Qa'ida nodes in 

Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkey are also dedicating resources to planning attacks. AI-Shabaab, 

ai-Qaida's affiliate in East Africa, continues its violent insurgeney in southern and central Somalia despite 

losses of territory and influence and conflict among senior leaders. 

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Iran-the foremost state sponsor of terrorism-continues to exert its influence in regional crises in the 

Middle East through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force ORGC-QF), Its terrorist partner 

Lebanese Hizballah, and proxy groups. It also provides military and economic aid to its allies in the 

region. Iran and Hlzballah remain a continuing terrorist threat to US interests and partners worldwide. 

Terrorists will almost certainly continue to benefit in 2016 from a new generation of recruits proficient in 

infonnatlon technology, social media, and online research. Some terrorists will look to use these 

technologies to increase the speed of their communications, the availability of their propaganda, and 

ability to collaborate with new partners. They will easily take advantage of widely available, free 

encryption technology, mobile-messaging applicstions, the dark web, and virtual environments to pursue 

their objectives. 

Long-tenn economic, political, and social problems, as well as technological changes, will contribute to 

the terrorist threat worldwide. A record..attlng 60 miUion Internally displaced persons (lOPs) and 

refugees as of 2014-one half of whom are children, according to the United Nations-will stress the 

cspacity of host nations already dealing with problems relating to assimilation and possibly make 

displaced populations targets for recruitment by violent extremists. Among Sunni violent extremist 

groups, ISIL Is probably most proficient at harnessing social media to disseminate propaganda and solicit 

recruits among a broad audience. It is likely to continue these activities in 2016 by using videos, photos, 

and other propaganda glorifying life under ISIL rule and promoting the group's military successes. In 

addition, violent extremist supporters will probably continue to pubfiCize their use of encrypted massaging 

applications on social media to let aspiring violent extremists know that secure avenues are available by 

which they csn communicate. 

The acute and enduring nature of demographic, economic, political: social, and technological factors 

contribute to the motivation of Individuals and groups and their participation in violent extremist activities. 

These factors ensure that terrorism will remain one of several primary national security challenges for the 

United States In 2016. 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND PROLIFERATION 

Nation-state efforts to deveiap or acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMO), their delivery systems, or 

their underlying technologies constitute a major threat to the security of the United States, its deployed 

troops, and allies. Use of chemical weapons in Syria by both state and nonstate actors demonstrates that 

the threat of WMD is real. Biological and chemical materials and technOlogies, almost always dual usa, 

mova easily in the globalized economy, as do personnel with the scientific expertise to design and use 

them. The latest discoveries in the life sciences also diffuse rapidly around the globe. 

North Konsa Developing WMD-Appllcsble Capabilities 

North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs will continue to pose a serious threat to US 

interests and to the security environment in East Asia in 2016. North Korea's export of ballistic missiles 

and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria's 

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construction of a nuclear reactor, destroyed in 2007, illustrate its wiltingness to proliferate dangerous 

technologies. 

We judge that North Korea conducted a nuclear test on 6 January 2016 that It claimed was a successful 

test of a 'hydrogen bomb. • Although wa are continuing to evaluate this event, the low yield of the test is 

not consistent with a successful test of a thermonuclear device. In 2013, following North Korea's third 

nuclear test, Pyongyang announced its intention to 'refurbish and restart" Its nuclear facilities, to include 

the uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon and its. graphite-moderated plutonium production reactor, 

which was shut down in 2007. We assess that North Korea hes followed through on Its announcement by 

expanding Its Yongbyon enrichment faciflly and restarting the plutonium production reactor. We further 

assess that North Korea has been operating the reactor long enough so that It could begin to recover 

plutonium from the reactor's spent fuel within a matter of weeks to months. 

North Korea has also expanded the size and sophistication of Its ballistic missile forces-from closerange ballistic missiles to intercontinental ballistic missilea QCBMs)-and continues to conduct test 

launches. In May 2015, North Korea claimed that it succassfully tested a ballistic missile from a 

submarine. Pyongyang is also committed to developing a long-range, nuclear-armed missile that is 

capable of posing a direct threat to the United States; It has publicly displayed Its KN08 road-mobile ICBM 

on muftlple occasions. We assess that North Korea has already taken initial steps toward fielding this 

system, although the system has not been flight-tasted. 

Although North Kof'!tB issues officlef statements that include Its justification for building nuclear waapons 

and threats to use them as a defensive or retaliatory measure, wa do not know the details of Pyongyang's 

nuclear doctrine or employment concapts. We have long assessed that Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities 

are intended for daterrenca, International prestige, and coercive diplomacy. 

China Modernizing Nuclear Forces 

The Chinese People's Liberation Army's (PLA's) has established a Rocket Force-replacing the 

longstanding Second Artillery Corps-and continues to modernize Its nuclear missile force by adding 

more survivable roed-mobile systems and enhancing Its silo-based systems. This new generation of 

missiles is intended to ensure the viability of China's strategic deterrent by providing a second-strik8 

capability. In addition, the PLA Navy continues to develop the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile 

(SLBM) and might produca additional JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. The JINclass submarinee-armad with JL-2 SLBMs-will give the PLA Navy Its first long-range, sea-based 

nuclear capability. 

Ruaslan Cruise Missile VIolates the INF Treaty 

Russia has developed a ground-launched cruise missile that the United States has declared is in violation 

of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forcas (INF) Treaty. Russia has denied it is violating the INF Treaty. 

In 2013, a senior Russian administration official stated publicly that tha world had changed sinca the INF 

Treaty was signed 1987 and noted that Russia was 'developing appropriate waapons systems' In light of 

the proliferation of Intermediate- and shorter-range ballistic missile t19chnologles around the world, and 

Russian officials have mede statements In the past regarding the unfairness of a Treaty that prohibits 

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Russia, but not some of its neighbors, from developing and processing ground-launched missiles with 

ranges between 500 to 5,500 kilometers. 

Chemical Weapons in Syria and Iraq 

We assess that Syria has not declared all the elements of its chemical weapons program to the Chemical 

Weapons Convention (CWC). Despite the creation of a speciaflzed team and months of work by the 

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to eddress gaps and inconsistencies in 

Syria's declaratipn, numerous issues remain unresolved. Moreover, we continue to judge that the Syrian 

regime has used chemicals as a means of warfare since accession to the ewe in 2013. The OPCW 

Fact-Finding Mission has concluded that chlorine had been used on Syrian opposition forces in multiple 

incidents in 2014 and 2015. Helicopters-which only the Syrian regime possesses"""'l.tere used in several 

of these attacks. 

We assess that nonstate actors in the region are also using chemicals as a means of warfare. The 

OPCW investigation into an alleged ISIL atteck in Syria in August led it to conclude that at least two 

people were exposed to sulfur musterd. We continue to track numerous allegations of ISIL's use of 

chemicals in attacks in Iraq and Syria, suggesting that attacks might be widespreed. 

Iran Adhering to Deal To Preserve Capabilities and Gain Sanctions Relief 

lren probably views the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a means to remove sanctions 

while preserving some of its nuclear capabilities, as well as the option to eventually expand its nuclear 

infrastructure. We continue to assess that Iran's overarching strategic goals of enhancing its security, 

prestige, and regional influence have led it to pursue capabilities to meet its nuclear energy and 

technotogy goals and give it the ability to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, If It chooses to do so. 

Its pursuit of thase goals will dictate its level of adherence to the JCPOA over time. We do not know 

whether lren will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons. · 

We also continue to assess that Iran does not face any insurmountable technical barriers to producing a 

nuclear weapon, making Iran's political will the central issue. Iran's implementation of the JCPOA, 

however, has extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce fissile material for a nuclear 

weapon from a few months to about a year. The JCPOA has also enhanced the transparency of Iran's 

nuclear actMties, mainly through Improved access by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 

investigative authorities under the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement. 

As a result, the international community is well postured to quickly detect changes to Iran's declared 

nuclear facilities designed to shorten the time Iran would need to produce fissile material. Further, the 

JCPOA provides tools for the IAEA to investigate possible breaches of prohibitions on specific R&D 

activities that could contribute to the development of a nuclear weapon. 

We judge that Tehran would choose ballistic missiles as its preferred method of delivering nuclear 

weapons, If it buUds them. Iran's ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD, and Tehran 

already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Iran's prog~ on space launch 

vehicles-along with its desire to deter the United States and lts allies-provides Tehran with the means 

and motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including ICBMs. 

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Genome Editing 

·Research In genome editing conducted by countries with different regulatory or ethical standards than 

those of Westem countries probably increases the risk of the creation of potentially harmful biological 

agents or products. Given the broad distribution, low cost, and accelereted pace of development of this 

dual-use technology, its deliberate or unintentional misuse might lead to far-reaching economic and 

national security impHcations. Advances in genome editing in 2015 have compelled groups of high-profile 

US and European biologists to question unregulated editing of the human gennfine (cells that are relevant 

for reproduction), which might creete inheritable genetic changes. Nevertheless, researchers will 

probably continue to encounter challenges to achieve the desired outcome of their genome modifications, 

in pert because of the technical limitations that are Inherent in available genome editing systems. 

SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE 

Space 

Global T18nds. Changes in the space sector will evolve more quickly in the next few years as innovation 

becomes more ubiquitous, driven primarily by increased availability of technology and growing private 

company investment. The number of space actors is proliferating, with so countries participating in space 

activities and more expected in the next few years. New entrants from the private space sectorleversging lowering costs in aerospace technology and innovations in other technoiOI!JY sectors, such as 

big data analytics, social media, automation, and additive manufacturing-will increase global access to 

spSCIHlllabled applications, such as imaging, maritime automatic identification system (AIS), weather, 

lntemet, and C011Jmunications. 

Military and Intelligence. Foreign govemments will expand their use of space services-to include 

reconnaissance, communications, and position, navigation, and timing (PNT)-for military and 

intelligence purposes, beginning to rival the advantages space-enabled services provide the United 

States. Russia and China continue to improve the capabilities of their military and intelligence satellites 

and grow more sophisticated in their operations. Russian military officials publicly tout their use of 

imaging and electronic-reconnaissance satellites to support military operations In Syria-revealing some 

of their sophisticated military uses of space services. 

Countenlpace 

Threats to our use of military, civil, and commercial space systems will increase in the next few years as 

Russia and China progress in developing counterspace weapon systems to deny, degrade, or disrupt US 

space systems. Foreign military leaders understand the unique advantages that space-based systems 

provide to the United States. Russia senior leadership probably views countering the US space 

advantage as a critical component of warfighting. Its 2014 Military Doctrine highlights at least three 

spece-enabled capabilities-"global strike, • the "intention to station weapons in space, • and "strategic 

non-nuclear precision weapons" -as main extemal military threats to the Russian Federation. Russia 

and China are also employing more saphisticeted satellite operations and are probably testing dual-use 

technologies in space that could be applied to counterspace missions. 

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Deny and Disrupt We already face a global threat from electronic warfare systems capable of jamming 

satellite communications systems and global navigation space systems. We assess that this technology 

will continue to proliferate to new acton! and that our more advanced adversaries will continue to develop 

more sophisticated systems in the next few years. Russian defanse officials acknowledge that they have 

deployed radar-imagery jammers and are developing laser weapons designed to blind US intelligence 

and ballistic missile defense satellites. 

Destroy. Russia and China continue to pursue weapons systems capable of destroying satellites on 

orbit, placing US satellites at greater risk in the next few years. China has probably made progress on 

the antisatellite missile system that it tested in July 2014. The Russian Duma officially recommended in 

2013 that Russia resume research and development of an airborne antisatellite missile to 'be able to 

intercept absolutely everything that flies from space.' 

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 

The United States will continue to face a complex foreign intelligence threat environment in 2016. We 

assess that the leading state intelligence threate to US interests will continue·to be Russia and China, 

based on their capabilities, intent, and broed operational scope. Other states in South Asia, the Near 

East, East Asia, and latin America will pose local and regional intelligence threats to US interests. For 

example, Iranian and Cuban intelligence and security services continue to view the United States as a 

primary threat. 

Penetrating and influencing the US national declsionmaking apparatus and Intelligence Community will 

remain primary objectives for numerous foreign intelligence entities. Additionally, the targeting of national 

security information and proprietary information from US companies and research institutions involved 

with defense, energy, finance, dual-use technology, and 'other sensitive areas will remain a persistent 

threat to US interests. 

Insiders who-disclose sensitive US Government information without authorization will remain a significant 

threat in 2016. The sophistication and availability of information technology that can be used for 

nefarious purposes exacerbate this threat both in terms of speed and scope of Impact. 

Nonstate entities, including international terrorist groups and transnational organized crime organizations, 

will continue to employ and potentially improve their intelligence capabilities, which include human, cyber, 

and technical means. Like state intelligence services, these nonstate entities recruit human sources and 

condUct physical and technical surveillance to facilitate their activities and avoid detection and capture. 

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TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 

Some US Drug Threats Are Growing 

Transnational drug trafficking poses a strong and in many cases growing threat to the United States at 

home and to US security interests abroad. Suppiies of some foreign-produced drugs in the United Stetes 

are rising, and some criminals who market them are growing more sophistiCated. 

• Mexican drug traffickers, capitalizing on the strong US demand for heroin, have increesed heroin 

production significantly since 2007. US border seizures nearly doubled between 2010 and 2014. 

Some Mexican trafficking groups-which collectively supply most of the heroin consumed in· the 

United stetes-:-nave mastered production of the white heroin preferred in eestem US cities and have 

been boosting overall drug potency by adding fentanyl. Fentanyl, which is 30 to 50 times more potent 

than heroin, is sometimes used as an edulterent and mixed with lower-grade heroin to increase its 

effects or mixed with diluents and sold as "synthetic heroin" with or without the buyers' knowledge. 

• Mexican traffickers have probably increased their production of the stimulant methamphetamine for 

the US market. US border seizures of the drug rose by nearly half bf!!ween 2013 and 2014. 

• Traffickers in the Andean countries have increased their manufacture of cocaine. Producers in 

Colombia-from which most US cocaine origina~ncreesed output by nearly a third in 2014 over 

the prior year. Cocaine output will probably rise again in 2016 as previously planted coca crops fully 

mature. 

• US availability of some new psychoactive substences--eo-caUed "designer drugs" typically produced 

in Asia-has been increasing; UN scientists have identified more then 500 unique substances. 

Transnational Organized Crime Groups Target Vulnerable States 

Transnational organized crime groups will pose a persistent end at limes sophisticated threat to the 

wealth, health, and security of people around the globe. Criminal groups' untaxed and unregulated 

enterprises drain state resources, crowd out legitimate commerce, increasa official corruption, and 

impede economic competitiveness and fair trade. On occasion, transnational organized crime groups 

threaten countries' security, spur increases in social violence, or otherwise reduce govemability. 

• Profit-minded criminals generally do not seek the reins of political power but rather to suborn, co-opt, 

or bully government officials in order to create environments in which criminal enterprise can thrive. 

• Foreign-based transnational criminals are increasingly using online information systems to breach 

sovereign borders virtually, without the need to send criminal operatives abroad to advance illlcit 

businesses. 

• Organized crime and rebel groups in Africa end elsewhere are likely to increasa their involvement in 

wildlife trafficking to fund political ectivitles, enhance political influence, and purchase weapons. Illicit 

trade in wildlife, timber, and marine resources endangers the environment, threatens good 

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governance and border security in fragile regions, and destabilizes communities whose economic 

. well-being depends on wildlife for biodiversity and ecotourism. Increased demand for ivory and mino 

hom in East Asia has triggered unprecedented increases in· poaching in Sub-Saharan Africa. 

Human traffiCking exploits and abused individuals and challenges international security. Human 

~kers leverage corrupt officials, porous borders, and lax enforcement to orchestrate their Ulicit trade. 

This exploitation of human lives for profit continues to occur in every country in the world-undermining 

the rule of law and corroding legitimate institutions of government and commerce. Trafficking in persons 

hes become a lucrative source of revenue for transnational organized crime groups and terrorist 

organizations and is estimated to produce tens of billions of dollars annually. For axampla, terrorist or 

aimed groups-such es ISIL, the Lord's Resistance Army, and Boko Haram-engage In kidnapping for 

the purpose of sexual slavery, sexual exploitation: and forced labor. These activities might also 

contribute to the funding and sustainment of such groups. 

We assess that the ongoing global migration crlses-e post-WWII record 60 million refugees and 

internally displaced persons-will fuel an Increase in the global volume of human traffiCking victims es 

men, women, and children undertake risky migration ventures and fall prey to sex trafficking, forced labor, 

debt bondage and other trafficking crimes. This continuing rise in global displacement and dangerous 

migration, both forced and opportunistic movements within countries and across national borders, will 

probably allow criminal groups and terrorist organiZations to exploit vulnerable populations. 

ECONOMICS AND NATURAL RESOURCES 

Global economic growth wUI probably ramain subdued, in pert because of the decelaration of China's 

economy. During 2015, preliminary figures indicate that worldwide GOP growth slipped to 3.1 percent, 

down from 3.4 percent the previous year, afthough advanced economies es a group enjoyed their 

strongest GOP growth since 2010 at nearly 2 percent. However, developing economies, which were 

already dealing with breed and sharp commodity-price declines that began in 2014, saw the first nat 

capital outflows to developed countries since the late 1980s. 

GOP growth for these economies was 4 percent in 2015, the lowest since 2009. The International 

Monetary Fund (IMF) is forecasting a slight growth uptum in 2016 but downgraded its forecast in January 

for both develop&d·and developing economies. Adverse shocks such as financial instability in emerging 

markets, a steeper-than-expected slowdown in China's growth, or renewed uncertainty about Greece's 

economic situation, might prevent the predicted gradual increase in global growth. · 

' 

Macroeconomic Stability 

Continued solid performance by the United States and the resumPtion of growth for many European 

states, even es the region continues to wreStie with the Greek debt crisis, will probably help boost growth 

rates for developed economies. However, increasing signs of a sustained deceleration of Chinese 

economic growtlr-particularly in sectors that !Ira the most raw-material intensive-contributed to a 

continued decline in energy and commodity prices worldwide In 2015. Emerging markets and developing 

countries' difficulties were compounded by the declines In foreign investment inflows and increases in 

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resident capital outflows. The prospect of higher growth and interest rates in the United States is spurring 

net capital outflows from these countries, estimated to be more than $700 billion in 2015, compared· to an 

average yearty inflow of more than $400 billion from 2009 to 2014. The globe! slowdown in trede is also 

contributing to a more difficult 4[10011omic environment for many developing economies and might worsen if 

efforts to advance trede liberalization through the Wortd Trade Organization (WTO) and regional trede 

deals stall. 

Energy and Commodities 

Weak energy and commodity prices have bean particularty hard on key exporters in Latin America; 

Argentina and Brazil experienced negative growth and their weakened currencies contributed to domestic 

inflation. A steeply declining economy in Venezuela-the result of the oil-price decline and years of poor 

economic policy and profligate government spending-will leave caracas struggling to avoid default in 

2016. Similarty, in Africa, declining oil revenues and past mismanegement have contributed to Angolan 

and Nigerian fiscal problems, currency strains, and deteriorating external belances. Falling prices have 

also forced commodity-dependent exporters, such as Ghana, Liberia, and zambia, to make sharp budget 

cuts to conteln defiCits. Persian Guif oil exporters, which generally have more substantial financial 

reserves, have nonetheless seen a sharp increase in budget deficits. 

Declining energy prices and substantial increases in North American production have also discouraged 

initiatives to develop new resources and expand existing projects---including in Brazil, Canada, Iraq, and 

Saudi Arabia. They typically take YEI!I!S to complete, potentially setting the stege for shorttalls in coming 

years when demand recovers. 

Arctic 

Diminishing sea ice is creating increased economic opportunities in the region and simultaneously raising 

Arctic nations' concerns about safety and the environment Harsh weather and longer-term economic 

stakes have encouraged cooperation among the countries bordering the Arctic. As polar ice recedes and 

resource extraction technology improves, however, economic and security concerns will raise the risk of 

increased competition between Arctic and non-Arctic nations over eocess to sea routes and resources. 

Sustained low oil prices would reduce the attractiveness of potential Arctic energy resources. Russia will 

almost certainly continue to bolster its military presence along its northern coastline to improve its 

perimatar defanse and control over its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). It will also almost certainly 

continue to seek lntemationel support for Its extended continental shelf claim and its right to manage ship 

traffic within its EEZ. Moscow might become more willing to disavow established international processes 

or organizations concerning Arctic governance and act unilaterally to protect these interests if RussianWestern relations deteriorate further. 

HUMAN SECURITY 

Environmental Rlaks and Climate Change 

Extreme weather, climate change, environmental degradation, related rising demand for food and water, 

poor policy responses, and inadequate criticellnfrastructure will probebly exacelbate--end potentially 

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spark-i)Oiitical instability, adverSe health conditions, and humanitarian crises in 2016. Several of these 

developments, especially those in the Middle East, suggest that environmental degradation might 

become a more common source for Interstate tensions. We assess that almost all of the 194 countries 

that adopted the global climate agreement at the UN climate conference in Paris in December 2015 view 

it as an ambitious and long-lasting framework. 

The UN World Meieorologlcal Organization (WMO) report attributes extreme weather events In the 

tropics and sub-tropical zones in 20151o both climate change and an exceptionally strong El Nillo 

that will probably peniiat through spring 2016. An Increase in extreme weather events is likely to 

occur throughout this period, based on WMO reporting. Human activities, such as the generation of 

greenhouse gas emissions and land use, have contributed to extreme weather events including more 

frequent and severe tropical cyclones, heavy rainfall, droughts, and heat waves, according to a 

November 2015 academic report with contributions from scientists at the National Oceanic and 

Atmcispheric Administration (NOAA). Scientists have more robust evidence to identify the influence 

of human activity on temperature extremes than on precipitation extremes. 

• The Paris climate change agreement establishes a political expectation for the first time that all 

countries will address climate change. The response to the deal hes been largely positive among 

government officials and nongovernmental groups, probably because the agreement acknowledges 

the need for unlverssl action to combat climate change along with the development needs of lowerincome countries. However, an independent team of climate analysts and the Executive Secretary of 

the UN climate forum have stated that countries' existing national plans to address climate change 

will only limit temperature rise to 2.7 degrees Celsius by 2100. 

Health 

Infectious d'ISeases and vulnerabilities in the global supply chain for medical cauntenneasures will 

continue to pose a danger to US national security in 2016. Land-use changes will increase animal-tohuman interections and globalization will raise the potential for rapid cross-regional spread of disease, 

while the international community remains ill prepared to collectively coordinate and respond to disease 

threats. Influenza viruses, coronaviruses such as the one causing Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome 

(MERS), and hemorrhagic fever viruses such as Ebola are examples of Infectious disease agents that are 

passed from animals to humans and can quickly pose regional or global threats. Zlka virus, an emerging 

infectious disease threat first detected in the Western Hemisphere in 2014, is projected to cause up to 4 

milrron cases in 2016; It will probably spread to virtually every country in the hemisphere. Although the 

virus is predominantly a mild illness, and no vaccine or treatment is available, the Zlka virus might be 

Hnked to devastating birth defects in children whose mothers were infected during pregnancy. Many 

developed and developing nations remain unable to implement coordinated plans of action to prevent 

infectious disease outbreaks, strengthen global disease surveillance and response, rapidly share 

information, develop diagnostic tools and countanneasures, or maintain the safe transit of personnel and 

materials. 

• Human encroachment into animal habitats, Including clearing land for fenn use and urbanization, is 

recognized as a contributing factor in the emergence of new infectious diseases. The populations of 

Asia and Africa are urbanizing and growing faster than those of any other region, according to the 

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UN. Emerging diseases against which humans have no preexisting Immunity or effective therapies 

pose significant risks of becoming pandemics. 

Atrocities and Instability 

Risks of atrocities, large-scale violence, and regime-threatening instability will remain elevated in 2016. A 

vicious cycle of conflict resulting from weak govemance, the rise of violent non-stele actors, insufficient 

international capacity to respond to these complex challenges, and an increese in global migration all 

contribute to global sacurity risks. Weak global growth, particularly resulting from the cesceding effect of 

slower Chinese growth that will hurt commodity exporters, will also exacerbate risk. 

• Regional spillover will probably spraad. For example, the long-term impact of civil war in Syria is 

nsinforcing secterien diffensnces in Iraq, and the flight of Syrians to Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, and 

then.onward to Europe is sowing regional tensions and straining national governments. 

• As of 2015, the central goverriments of seven states ans unable to project authority and provide 

goods and services throughout at least 50 percent of their nsspective territory; this number is the 

largest at any point in the past 60 years. 

• The risk of waning support for universal human rights norms is increasing as authoritarian regimes 

push back against human rights. in practice and in principle. 

Global Displacement 

Europe will almost certainly continue to face nscord levels of arriving refugees and other migrants in 2016 

unless the drivers causing this historic movement toward the continent change significantly in 2016, which 

we judge is unlikely. Migration and displacement will also probably be en issue within Asia and Africe as 

well as the Americas. In total, about 60 million people are displaced worldwide, according to the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). These 60 million consist of approximately 20 million nsfugees, 38 

million internally displaced persons (lOPs), and approximstely 2 million stateless persons, also according 

to UNHCR statistics. 

• Wars, weak border controls, and nslatively easy and affordable access to routes and Information ens 

driving this historic increase in mobility and displacement 

The growing scope and scele of human displacement will probably continue to strain the nssponse 

capacity of the international community and drive a nscord level of humanitarian requests. At the same 

time, host and transit countries will struggle to develop effective responses and, in some cases, manage 

domestic fears of terrorists exploiting migrant flowa after the Paris attacks In November 2015. 

In 2015, the UN nscelved less than half of its requested funding for global assistance, suggesting that 

the UN's 2016 request is also likely to be underfunded. 

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REGIONAL THREATS 

Emerging trends suggest that geopolitical competition among the major powers is increasing in ways that 

challenge intemational norms and institutions. Russia, in particular, but also China seek greater influence 

over their respective neighboring regions and want the United States to refrain from actions they perceive 

as Interfering with their interests-which will perpetuate the ongoing geopolitical and security competition 

around the peripheries of Russia and China, to include the major sea lanes. They will almost certainly 

eschew direct military conflict with the United States in favor of contests at lower levels of competition-to 

include the use of diplomatic and economic coercion, propaganda, cyber intrusions, proxies, and other 

indirect applications of military power-that intentionally blur the distinction between peace and wartime 

operations. 

Although major power competition is increasing, the geopolitical environment continues to offer 

opportunities for US cooperation. In addition, despite the prospect for increased competition, the major 

powers, including Russia and China, wiR have Incentives to continue to cooperate wi!h the United States 

on issues of shered interest that cannot be solved unilaterally. A Mure lntemational environment defined 

by a mix of competition and cooperetion among major powers, however, will probably encourage ad-hoc 

approaches to global challenges that undennlne existing lntemational institutions. 

EAST ASIA 

China 

China wiR continue to pursue an active foreign policy-especially within the Asia Pacific-highlighted by a 

finn stance on competing territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, relations with Taiwan, and 

its pursuit of economic engagement across East Asia. Regional tension will continue as China pursues 

construction at its expanded outposts in the South China Sea and because competing claimants might 

pursue actions that others perceive as infringing on their sovereignty. Despite the meating between 

China's and Taiwan's Presidents in November 2015, Chinese leaders will deal with a new president from 

a different party in Taiwan following elections in January. China wiR also pursue efforts atmed at fulfilling 

its ·one Belt, One Road" initiative to expand China's economic role and outreach across Asia. 

China will continue to incrementally Increase its global presence. Mileposts have included symbolic and 

substantive developments, such as the IMF's decision in November 2016 to Incorporate the renmlnbl into 

its Special Drawing Rights currency basket and China's opening of the Asian Infrastructure Investment 

Bank in early 2016. China will increasingly be a factor in global responaes to emerging problems, as 

Dlustreted by China's participation in UN peacekeeping operations, WHO's Ebola response, and 

infrastructure construclion in Africe and Pakistan. 

Amid new economic challenges, Chinese leaders are pursuing an ambitious agenda of economic, legal, 

and military refonns aimed at bolstering the country's long-tenn economic growth potential, improving 

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government efficiency and accountability, and strengthening the control of the Communist Party. The 

scope and scale of the refonn agem:ta--<:oupled with an ongoing anti-corruption campaign-might 

increase the potential for internal friction within China's ruling Communist Party. Additionally, China's 

leaders, who have declared slower economic growth to be the 'new nonnal,' will nonethaless face 

pressure to stabilize growth at levels that still support strong job creation. 

Southeast Asia 

Regional integration via the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) made gains in 2015 with 

the establishment of the ASEAN Community. However, ASEAN cohesion on economic and security 

issues will continue to face challenges stemming from differing development levels among ASEAN 

members and their wrying threat perceptions of China's regional ambitions and assertiveness in the 

South China Sea. ' 

Democracy in many Southeast Asian nations remains fragile. ElitEIS-f'ather than the populace-retain a 

significant level of control and often shape govemanca reforms to benefit their Individual interests rather 

than to promote democratic velues. Corruption and cronyism continua to be rampant in the region, and 

the rising threat of ISIL might provide some governments with a new rationale to not only address the 

terrorist threat but also curb opposition movements, like some leaders in the region did in the post 9/11 

environment. The new National League for Democracy-led government in Burma is poisad to continue 

the country's democratic transition procass, but given its lack of governing experienca, the Ieeming curve 

will be steep. The Burmese' constitution also ensures that the mUitary will retain a significant level of 

power in the government, hampering the NLD to put its own stamp on the ongoing peaca procass. In 

Thailand, the military-led regime is positioned to remain in power through 2017. 

North Korea 

· Sinca taking the helm of North Korea In December 2011, Kim Jong Un has further solidified his position 

es the unitary leader and final decision authority through purges, executions, and leedershlp shuffles. 

Kim and the regime have publicly emphasized-and codified-North Korea's focus on advancing its 

nuclear weapons program, developing the country's troubled economy, end improving the livelihood of 

the North Korean people, while maintaining the tenets of a command economy. Despite efforts at 

diplomatic outreach, Kim continues to challenge the international community with provocative and 

threatening behavior in pursuit of his goals, as prominently demonstrated in the November 2014 

cyberattack on Sony, the August 2015 inter-Korean confrontation spurred by the North's placament of 

landmines that injured two South Korean soldiers, and the fourth nuclear test in January 2016. 

RUSSIA AND EURASIA 

Russia 

Moscow's more assertive foreign policy approach, evident in Ukraina and Syria, will have far-reaching 

effects on Russia's domestic politics, economic development, and military modernization efforts. 

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President Vladimir Putin has sustained his popular approval at or naar record highs for nearly two years 

after illegally annexing Crimea. Nevertheless, the Kremtin's fears of mess demonstration remain high, 

and the government will continue to rely on repressive tactics to defuse what it sees as potential catalysts 

for protests in Russia. The Kreinlin's fear of instability and its effo!ts to contain it will probably be 

especially acute before the September 2016 Duma election. 

The Russian economy will continue to shrink as a result of longstanding structural problems-made 

worse by low energy prices and economic sanctions-and entered into recession in 2015. A consensus 

forecast projects that GOP will contract by 3.8 percent in 2015 and will probably decline between 2-3 

percent In 2016 if oil prices remain around $40 per barrel or only 0.6 percent if oil returns to $50 per 

barrel. Real wages declined throughout most of 2015 and the poverty rate and inflation have also 

worsened. 

We assess that Putin will continue to try to use the Syrian conflict and calls for cooperation egainst ISIL to 

promote Russia's Great Power status and end its international isolation. Moscow's growing concern 

about ISIL and other extremists has led to direct intervention on the side of Bashar ai-Asad's regime and 

efforts to achieve a political resolution to the Syrian conflict on Russia's terms. Since the terrorist attacks 

in Paris and over the Sinai, Russia has redoubled Its calls for a broader anti-terrorism coalition. 

Meanwhila, growing Turldsh-Russlan tensions since Turkey's shootdown of a Russian jet in November 

2015 raise the specter of miscalculation and escalation. 

Despite Russia's economic slowdown, the Kremlin remains intent on pursuing an assertive foreign policy 

in 2016. Russia's willingness to covertly use military and paramilitary forces in a neighboring state 

continues to cause anxieties in states along Russia's periphery, to include NATO allies. Levels of 

violence in eastern Ukraine have decreased, but Moscow's objectives In Ukram-rtleinteining long-term 

Influence over Kylv and frustrating Ukraine's attempts to integrate into Western institutions-will probably 

remain unchanged in 2016. 

Since the crisis began in Ukraine in 2014, Moscow has redoubled Its efforts to reinforce Its influence in 

Eurasia. Events in Ukraine raised Moscow's perceived stakes for increasing its presence in the region to 

prevent future regime change in the former Soviet republics and for accalarating a shift to a mulitpolar 

world in which Russia is the uncontested regional hegemon In Eurasia. Moscow will therefore continue to 

push for greater regional integration, raising pressure on neighboring slates to follow the example of 

Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan and join the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union. 

Moscow's military foray into Syria marks Its first use of significant expeditionary combat power outside the 

post-soviet space·in decades. Its intervention underscores both the ongoing and substantial 

improvements in Rusalan military capabilities and the Kremtin's confidence in usfng them as a tool to 

advance foreign policy goals. Despite its economic difficulties, Moscow remains committed to 

modernizing its mirltary. 

Russia continues to take information warfare to a new level, working to fan anti-US and anti-Western 

sentiment both within Russia and globally. Moscow will continue to publish false and misleading 

information in an effort to discredit the West, confuse or distort events that threaten Russia's image, 

undercut consensus on Russia, and defend Russia's role as a responsible and indispensable global 

power. 

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Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova 

The implementation tlmeline for the Minsk agreements has been extended through 2016, although 

opposition from Ukraine, Russia, and the separatists on key remaining Minsk obligations might make 

progress slow and difficult in 2016. Sustained violence along the Line of Contact delineating the 

separatist-held areas will probably continue to complicate a political settlement, and the potential for 

escalation remains. 

Ukraine has made progress in its reform efforts and its moves to bolster tias to Western institutions. 

Ukraine will continue to face serious challenges, however, including sustaining progress on key reforms 

2nd passing constitutional amendments-required under the Minsk agreements to devolve political powar 

and fiscal authority to the regions. 

Belarus continues its geopolitical balancing act, attempting to curry favor with the Wast without 

antagonizing Russia. President Lukashenko released several high-profile political prisoners in August 

2015 and secured reelection to a fifth term in October 2015 without cracking down on the opposition as 

he has in previous elections. These developments prompted the EU and the United States to implement 

temporary sanctions relief, providing a boost to a Belarusian economy. 

Moldova facas a turbulent year In 2016. Popular discontent over government corruption and misrule 

continues to reverberate after a banking scandal sparked large public protests, and political infighting 

brought down a government coalition of pro-Europaan parties in October 2015. Continued unrest Is 

likely. The breakawey pro-Russian region is also struggling economically and will remain dependent on 

Russian support 

The Caucasus and Central Asia 

Even as Georgia progresses with reforms, Georgian politics will almost carlainly be volatile as political 

competition increases. Economic challenges are also likely to become a key political vulnerability for the 

government before the 2016 elections. Rising· frustration among Georgia's elites and the public with the 

slow pace of Western integration and increasingly effective Russian propaganda raise the prospect that 

Tbilisi might slow or suspend efforts toward greater Euro-Atlantlc integration. Tensions with Russia will 

remain high, and we assess that Moscow will raise the pressure on Tbilisi to abandon closer EU and 

NATO lias. 

Tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the separatist region of Nagomo-Karabakh remained 

high in 2015. Baku's sustained military buildup coupled with declining economic conditions In Azerbaijan 

are raising the potential that the conflict will escalate in 2016. Azerbaijan's aversion to publicly 

relinquishing its ciaim to Nagomo-Karabakh proper and Armenia's reluctance to give up territory it 

controls will continue to complicele a peaceful resolution. 

Central Asian states remain concerned about the rising threat of extremism to the stability of their 

countries, particularly in light of a reduced Coalition presence in Afghanistan. Russia. shares these 

concerns and is likelY to use the threat of instability in Afghanistan to increase its Involvement in Central 

Asian security affairs. However, economic challenges stemming from official mismanagement, low 

commodity prices, declining trade and remitlances associated with Russia's weakening economy, and 

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ethnic tensions and political repression, are likely to present the most significant instability threat to these 

countries. · 

EUROPE 

Key Partners 

European govemments'will face continued political, economic, and security challeng" deriving from 

mass migration to Europe, terrorist threats, a more assertive Russia, and slow economic 

recovery. Differences among national leaders over how best to confront the challenges are eroding 

support for deeper EU integration and will bolster backing for populist leaders who favor national 

prerogatives over Eu-wide remedial strategies. 

The European Commission expects 1.5 million migrants to arrive in Europe in 2016--en influx that is 

prompting European officials to focus on improving border security, particularly at the Schengen Zone's 

external borders, and putting the free movement of people within the EU at risk. Several European 

governments are using military forces il1 domestic security roles. 

The European Commission has warned against drawing a link between terrorists and refugees, but 

populist and far-right leaders throughout Europe are preying on voters' security fears by highlighting the 

potential dangers of accepting migrants fieaing war end poverty. Some EU leaders are citing the 

November 2015 terrorist attecks in Paris to justify erecting fences to stem the flow of people. 

European countries will remain active and steadfast allies on the range of national security threats that 

face both the United Stetes end Europ&-from energy and climate change to countering violent 

extremism and promoting democracy. Although the majority of NATO allies have successfully halted 

further declines in defense spending, European mil~ary modernization efforts will take several years 

before marked improvement begins to show. 

Europe also continues to insist on full implementation of the Minsk agreement to stop violence in Ukraine. 

However, European governments differ on the proper extent of engagement with Moscow. 

Europe's economic growth, which the EU projects will be moderate, could falter if emerging market 

economies slow further, which would decrease the demand for European exports. The EU continues to 

struggle to shake off the extended effects of Its economic recession, with lingering worries over high 

unemployment, wesk demand, and lagging productivity. Greece also remains a concern for the EU. The 

agreement betwesn Greece and Its creditors is an important step forward for restoring trust among the 

partias and creating the conditions for a path forward for Greece within the Eurozone. Developing the 

details of the agreement and Its full implementation remain challenges. 

The Balkans 

Ethnic nationariSITl and wesk Institutions in the Balkans remain enduring threats to stability. Twenty years 

after the end of the Bosnian War and the signing of the Dayton Agreement, Bosnle and Herzegovina 

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remains cuHuraily and administratively divided, weighed down by a barely functional and inefficient 

bureaucracy. The country, one of Europe's poorest, has endured negative GOP growth since the 2008 

international financial crisis and is raiiant on the support of international institutions including the IMF. 

Youth unamployment, estimated at 60 percent, is the world's highest. 

Kosovo has made progress toward full, muKiathnic democracy, aKhough tensions between Kosovo 

Albanians and Kosovo Serbs remain. In Macedonia, an ongoing political crisis and concerns about 

redicaiization among ethnic Albanian Muslims threatens to aggravate already-tense relations between 

ethnic majority Macadonians and the country's minority Albanians, fifteen years after a violent interethnic 

conflict between the two groups ended. Social tensions in the region might also be exacerbated if the 

Western Balkans becomes an unwilling host to significant migrant populations. 

Turkey 

Turkey remains a partner in countering ISIL and minimizing foreign fighter flows. Ankara will continue to 

see the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) as its number one security threat and will maintain military and 

political pressure on the PKK, as well as on the Damocretic Union Party (PYD) and its armed affiliate 

People's Protection Units (YPG), which Turkey equates with the PKK. Turkey is extremely concernad 

about the increasing influence of the PYD and the YPG along its borders, seeing them as a threat to its 

territorial security and its efforts to control Kurdish separatism within its borders. 

Turkey is concerned about Russia's involvement In the region iii support of Asad, tha removal of whom 

Turkey sees as essential to any pesce settlement. Turkey is also wary of increased Russian cooperation 

with the Kurds and greater Russian influence in the region that could counter Turkey's leadership role. 

The Russian-Iranian partnership and Iran's attempts to expand Shiite influence In the region are also 

security concerns for Turkey. 

The refugee flow puts signlfrcant strain on Turkey's economy, which has amounted to $9 billion according 

to·a statement by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Refugees have also created infrestruclure 

and social strains, particularly regarding access to education and employment. Turkey tightened its 

borders in 2015 and is working to stench the flow of migrants to Europe and address refugee needs. 

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 

Iraq 

In Iraq, anti-ISIL forces will probably make incremerital battlefleld gains through spring 2016. Shla militias 

and Kurdish forces in northern Iraq have recaptured Bayji and Sinjar, respectively, from the ll!lamic State 

of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In western Iraq, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) heva retaken most of the 

greater Ramadi araa from ISIL and will probably clear ISIL fighters from the city's urban core In the 

coming month. 

ISIL's governance of areas it controls is probably faltering as alrstrikes take a toll on the group's sources 

of income, hurting ISIL's ability to provide services, and causing economic opportunities for the population 

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to dwindle. Even so, the Iraqi Sunni population remains fearful of the Shla-dominated government In 

Baghdad. This fear has bean heightened as Iranian-backed Shia militias play a lead role in retaking 

Sunni-majority areas, suggesting Iraq's Sunnis will remain willing to endure some deprivation under ISIL 

rule. 

Prime Minister Haydar ai-Abadi will probably continue to struggle to advance his refonns-whlch aim to 

combat corruption and streamline government-because of resistance from Iraqi elites who view the 

refonns as threatening to their entrenched political interests. Meanwhile, the drop In oil prices Is placing 

strain on both Baghdad's and lrbil's budgets, constraining their ability to finance counter-ISIL operations 

and limiting options to address potential economically driven unrest 

Syria 

We assess that foreign support will allow· Damascus to make gains in some key areas against the 

opposition and avoid further losses, but it will be unable to fundamentally alter the battlespace. Increased 

Russian involvement, particularly airstn"kes, will probably help the regime regain key terrain in high priority 

areas in western Syria, such as Aleppo and near the coast, where it suffered losses to the opposition In 

summer 2015. ISIL is under threat on several fronts in Syria and Iraq from incressed Coalition and 

government operations. 

Manpower shortages will continue to undennine the Syrian regime's ability to accompUsh strategic 

battlefield objectives. The regime still lacks the personnel neaded to capture and hold key areas and 

strategically defeat the opposition or ISIL. Damascus increasingly relies on militias, reservists, and 

foreign supportei'S-6uch as lren and Lebanese Hizballah-to generate manpower, according to press 

reporting. 

The Syrian regime and most of the opposition are participating in UN-medlated talks that started in early 

February in Geneva. Both sides probably have low expectations for the negotiations, with the opposition 

calling for ceasefires and humanitarian assistance as a precondition. The negotiations, without a 

ceasefire agreement, will not alter the battlefield situation. 

The humanitarian situation in Syria continues to deteriorate. In December 2015 and January 2016, the 

number of Syrian refugees registered or in the process of registering in the Middle East and North Africa 

rose by nearly 102,000 from 4.3 million to 4.4 million, according to UN data. The refugees are putting 

significant streln on countries surrounding Syria as well as on Europe. Turkey hosts more than 2.2 million 

refugees; Lebanon has about 1.1 million; Jordan has more than 630,000; Iraq has 245,000. 

Approximately 500,000 have fled to Europe, according to the UN. The more than 4 million refugees and 

6.5 million estimated internally displaced persons (lOPs) account for 49 percent of Syria's preconflict 

populetion. 

Estimates of fatalities In Syria since the start of the civil wer vary, but most observers calculate that at 

least 250,000 men, women, and children on all sides of the conflict have lost their lives since 2011. 

On 22 December, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2258, which renews the 

UN's authority to utilize cross-border deliveries for humanitarian assistance to Syria through 1 0 

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January 2017. Since July 2014, the UN hes provided food to 2.4 million people, water end sanitation 

to 1.3 million people, and medical supplies to 4.1 million people through its cross-border deliveries. 

• Separately, the Syrian Government began requiring in mid-November that aid agencies get 

humanitarian assistance notarized by the Syrian embassies in the country of product origin. This 

requirement previously applied only to commercial goods and might delay future UN food deliveries 

within Syria, according to the UN. 

Libya 

We assess lhet insecurity and conflict in Libya will persist in 2016, posing a continuing threat to regional 

stability. The country has been locked in civil war betWeen two rival governments end affiliated armed 

groups. The 17 December signing of a UN-brokered agreemeot to form a Government of National Accord 

(GNA) resulted from a year-long political dialogue that sought to end the ongoing civil war and reconcile 

Libya's rival governments. However, the GNA will face a number of obstacles In estabHshing its authority 

and security across the country. The GNA still faces the difficult task of forming a capable, centralized 

security force. It will also be challenged to confront terrorist groups such as ISIL, which has exploited the 

conflict and political instability in the country to expand its presance. 

• The rival governments-the internationally recognized Tobruk-based House of Represantetives 

(House) and the Tripoli-based General National Congreas (GNC) have participated in UN-brokered 

peace talks since fall2014. Reaction to the deal and the proposed GNA has bean mixed, and 

hardliners on both sides have opposed the agreement. 

• (U) On 25 January, the House voted to approve the UN-brokered deal with conditions but rejected a 

controversial article granting the GNA's Presidency Council interim control of the 'military. The House 

also rejected the GNA's proposed cabinet and demanded a smaHer ministerial slate. 

• Libya's economy has deteriorated because of the conflict Oil exports-the primary source of 

government revenue-have fallen signifiC&n!ly from the pre-revolution level of 1.6 billion berrels per 

day. Libya's on sector also faces continued threats from terrorist groups; ISIL attacked oil production 

and export facilities In February 2015, September 2015, and January 2016. · 

Meanwhile, extremists and terrorists have exploited the security vacuum to plan and launch attacks in 

Libya and throughout the region. The permissive security environment has enabled ISIL to establish one 

of its most developed branches outside of Syria and Iraq. As of lela 2015, ISIL's branch in Libya 

maintained a presence in Surt, Benghazi, Tripoli, Ajdabiya, and other areas of the country, according to 

press reports. Members of ISIL in Libya continue to stage attacks throughout the country. 

Yemen 

The Yemen conflict will probably remain in a strategic stalemate through mld-2016. Negotiations between 

the Saudi-led coalition and the Hulhl-aligned forces remain stalled, but neither side is able to achieve 

decisive results through mirltary force. Hulhi-alignad forces almost certainly remain committed to fighting 

following battlefield setbacks in the Aden and Marlb Governorates In 2015 and probably Intend to retake 

lost territory in those areas. 

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Nonetheless, regional stakeholders on both sides of Yemen's conflict, including Iran, which continues to 

back the Huthls, are signaling willingness to participate in peace talks. Even a cease-lira of a few days or 

weeks would facilitate the entry and distribution of commercial and humanitarian goods inside Yemen, 

where at least 21 mHiion paople-80 percent of the population-require assiatance, according to the UN. 

AOAP and ISIL's affiliates in Yemen have exploitad the conflict and the collapse of government authority 

to gain new recruits and allies and expand their territorial control. In Dacember, AOAP seized the 

southern city of Zinjiber, adding to its capture of the coastal city of Mukalla to the east. 

Iran 

Since January, Tehran met the demands for Implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Pian of Action 

(JCPOA), exchanged detainees, and released 10 US sailors. Despitethesa developments, the Islamic 

Republic of Iran presents an enduring threat to US national interests because of its support to regional 

terrorist and militant groups and the Asad regime, as well as its development of advanced mHitary 

capabilities. Tehran views itself as leading the 'axis of resistance'-which Includes the Asad regime and 

subnational groups aligned with Iran, especially Lebanese Hizballah and Iraqi Shia militants. Their intant 

is to thwart US, Seudi, and Isreal! influence, bolster its allies, and fight ISIL's expansion. Tehran might 

even use American citizens detained when entering Iranian territories as bargaining pieces to achlave 

financial or political concessions in line with their strategic intentions. 

Iran's Involvement in the Syrian, Iraqi, ·and Yemeni conflicts deapaned in 2015. In Syria, Iran more opanly 

acknowledged the deaths of Iranian 'marlyrs, • increased Iranian troop levels, and took mora of a frontline 

rola ageinst 'terrorists.' In Iraq, Iranian combat forces employed rockets, artillery, and drones against 

ISIL. Iran also supported Huthi rebels in Yemen by attempting to ship lathal aid to the Huthis. Tehran will 

almost certainly remain active throughout the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East in 2016 to support its 

regional partners and extend its regional influence. Iranian officials believe that engaging adversaries 

away from its borders will help prevent Instability from spilling into Iran and reduce ISIL's threat to Iran 

and its regional partners. Iran has also increased cooparation with Russia in the region. 

Supreme Leader Khemanel continues to view the Unitad States as a major threat to Iran, and we assess 

that his views will not change, despite implementation of the JCPOA deal. In October 2015, Khamenei 

publicly claimed the United States was using the JCPOA to 'infiltrate and penetrate' Iran. His statement 

prompted the Iranian hardliner-dominated security services to crack down on journansts and 

businessmen with suspected ties to the West. The crackdown was intended by hardliners to demonstrate 

to President Ruhani and to Washington that a broader opening to the West following JCPOA would not 

be tolerated. Iran released several US citizens In January 2016 who were'being held in Iran; however, it 

might attempt to use any additional US citizens as bargaining chips for US concessions. 

Iran's mintary and security services are kean to demonstrate that their regional power ambitions have not 

been altered by the JCPOA deal. One week prior to JCPOA Adoption Day, Iran publicized the launch of 

its new 'long-range• and mora accurate baUistic missile celled the 'Emad." Iran also publicizes 

development of its domestically produced weapons systems, submarines and surface combatants, 

artillery, and UAVs to deter potential adversaries and strengthen its regional influence and prestige. 

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Iran's involvement in the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts has enabled its forces to gain valuable on-the-ground 

experience in counterinsurgency operations. · 

Lebanon 

Lebanon wiH continue to struggle with the fallout from the civil war in neighboring Syria end faces a range 

of interlocking political, security, humanitarian, and economic challenges. The spillover from the Syrian 

conflict has had negative consequences on almost all aspects of fife in Lebanon, frorr! rising sectarianism 

to major strains on int'rimructure and public services, further straining the country's delicate political 

balance. 

• Lebanon's most immediate security threat is from Syrian-based extremists on its northeastern border. 

The Lebanese army has carried out multiple operations against Nusrah Front and ISIL to secure the 

border and prevent against the flow of terrorists into the country. Beirut also faces threats from Sunnl 

extremists in the country who are retaliating against Lebanese Hizballeh's military invotvement in the 

Syrian civil war. 

• The influx of about 1.1 milfron Sunni Syrian refugees to Lebanon has alterad the country's sectarian 

demographics and is badly straining public services and burdening the economy. The Lebanese 

economy will probably remain stegnant throughout 2016, as protracted regional instability and 

poliHcal gridlock at home continue to erode the country's competiHveness. 

Egypt 

Egypt faces a persistent threat of terrorist and militant activity directed primarily at state security forces In 

both the Sinai Peninsula and in mainland Egypt. The security services have in !Hated a counterlerrorism 

campaign to disrupt and detain Sinal-based militants; however, terrorist groups still retain the ability to 

conduct attacks. 

• ISIL's branch in Sinai (JSIL-5inaQ has conducted dozens of lethal attacks on military and security 

personnel, some of which suggest sophisHcated and coordinated attack planning, according to press 

reports. 

• ISIL·Sinai clelmed responsibility for the downing of a Russian aircraft in the Sinai in October 2015, 

which, if true, would demonstrate the expanding threat from ISIL and its regional branches. 

• The continued threat of terrorism places further strain on Egypt's economy by harming Egypfs 

tourism industry, a key source of revenue. The country is also grappling with high poverty and 

unemployment rates. 

Tunisia 

Tunisia's first post-transiHonel democraHc government since the 2011 Arab Spring revolution is marking 

its first year in office. Since the revolution, the country has overcome deep political divisions to reach 

consensus on key political issues, develop a new consHtution, and elect a new government, according to 
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press and academic. reports. Despite the government's significant strides in its democratic transition, 

Tunisia faces challenges in consolidating these achievements. 

• Tunisia is confronting a threat from terrorist groups exploiting Ubya's pennissive environment to plan 

and launch attacks, as well as from groups operating within Tunisia's borders, according to press 

reports. The perpetrators of the terrorist attack on the Bardo Museum in Tunis in March 2015 and 

hotels in Soussa in June-both claimed by ISIL-trained at a terrorist camp in Ubya, according to 

press reports. 

• The government inherited high unemployment, particularly among youth, and a high budget deficit 

according to press reports. The Bardo and Soussa terrorist attacks have disrupted tourism, a critical 

source of revenues anctjobs. 

SOUTH ASIA 

Afghanistan 

The Kabul Government will continue to face persistent hurdles to political stability In 2016, including 

eroding political cohesion, assertions of authority by local powerbrokers, recurring financial shortfalls, and 

countrywide, sustained attacks by the Taliban. Political cohesion will remain a challenge for Kabul es the 

National Unity Government will confront larger and more divisive issues later in 2016, including the 

Implementation of election refonns, long-delayed parliamentary elections, and a potential change by a 

Loya Jirga that might fundamentally alter Afghanistan's constitutional order. Kabul will be unable to 

effectively address its dire economic situation or begin to c1,1rb its dependence on foreign aid until it first 

contains the insurgency, which is steadily chipping away at Afghanistan's security. In this environment, 

international financial aid will remain the most important external detenninant of the Kabul govemmenrs 

strength. We assess that fighting in 2016 will be more intense than 2015, continuing a decade-long trend 

of deteriorating security that will compound these challenges. The fighting will continue to threaten US 

personnel, our Allies, and international partners-including Afghans-particularlY in Kabul and other 

urban population centers. The Afghan National Security Forces {ANSF), with the help of anti-Taliban 

powerbrokers and international funding, will probably maintain control of most major population centers. 

However, the forces will very likely cede control of some rural areas. Without international funding, the 

ANSF will probably not remain a cohesive or viable force. 

The Taliban has largely coalesced and is relatively cohesive under the leadership of new Taliben Senior 

Leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansur despite some early opposition. The Taliban's two-week 

seizure of the provincial capital of Kunduz provided an important boost to Mansur's leadership. The 

Taliben will continue to test the overstretched ANSF faced with problematic logistics, low morale, and 

weak leadership. 

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) announced in January 2015 the fonnatlon of Its Khoresan 

branch in South Asia, an amalgamation of primarily disaffected and rebranded fanner Afghan Taliban and 

Tehrik-e Taliben Pakistan (TTP) members. Despite quick early growth in 2015, ISIL'$ Khorasen branch 

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will probably remain a low-level threat to Afghan stability as well as to US and Western interests in the 

region in 2016. 

Bangladesh 

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's continuing efforts to undermine the political opposition In Bangladesh will 

probably provide openings for transnational terrorist groups to expand their prasanca in the country. 

Hasina and other government officials have insisted publlcally that the killings of foreigners are the work 

of the Bangladash Nationalist Party and the Bangladesh Jamaat-e lslami political parties and are 

intended to disCredit the government However,ISIL claimed rasponsibility for 11 high-profile attacks on 

foreigners and religious minorities. other extremists in Bangladesh-including Ansarullah Bangia Team 

and ai-Qa'ida In the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)-have claimed rasponslbility for killing at least 11 

progressive writers and bloggers In Bangladesh sinca 2013. 

Pakistan and India 

Relations between Pakistan and India remain tense daspite the rasumptlon of a bilateral dialogue in 

December. Following a terrorist attack In early January on Pathankot Air Force base In India, which New 

Delhi blames on a Pakistani-based group, India's engagement with Pakistan will probably hinge In 2016 

on Islamabad's w!Dingness to take action against those in Pakistan linked to the attack. 

SUB.SAHARAN AFRICA 

Central Africa 

Prospects for delayed eleCtions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, originally scheduled for 

2016, increase the risk of political tensions and perhaps violence. Violence might also break out in the 

Republic of Congo where a controversial October 2015 constitutional referendum paved the wey for 

long-serving Prasldant Denis Sassou-Nguesso to run for a new term in 2016 elections. Both 

governments have resorted to heavy-handed tactics to stifle opposition and subdue or prevent electionrelated protests. 

In Burundi, violence related to Prasident Pierre Nkurunzlza's controversial reelection in July 2015 will 

almost certainly continue as a simmering crisis. The conflict might expand and Intensify if increased 

attacks between the govemmant and armed opposition provoke a magnified rasponse from either side or 

if the security services fracture Into divided loyeltlas. 

The Central African Republic held peaceful prasidenti&l and parliamentary elections in late December, 

although they were marred by logistical issues. A run-off will probably take place in mid-February 

between the two top candidates, and we do not know how the armed spoilers and losing candidatas will 

react. The risk of continued ethno-rellgious clashes between Christians and Muslims throughout the 

country remains high despite the pi-esence of international peacekeeping forces, which are increasingly 

targets of violence. 

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Somalia 

The Somali Federal Govemmenfs authority will probably remain largely confined to the capital in 2016, 

and Mogadishu will continue to rely on the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as a security 

guarantor against ai-Shabaab as it prepares for elections in 2016. 

South Sudan 

Implementation of the peeca agreement between Juba and opposition eiements will be slow as spoilers 

from both sides seek to stall progreas. The ratum of fanner opposition members to Juba will almost 

certainly causa jockeying for positions of power. Localized fighting wiD continue and probably spread to 

previously unaffected araas, causing the humanitarian situation to worsen Economic conditions will 

probably deteriorate further as inflation remains high and pricas for staple goods rise, fueling 

dissatisfaction with the government. 

Sudan 

President Bashirconsolidated power following his reelection in April2015, but the ragimewill continue 

attempts at a national dialogue, which will probably not placate a divided political opposition. The regime 

will almost certainly confront a range of challenges, including public dissatisfaction over a ~kened 

economy. Divisions among anned opponents will almost certainly inhibit their ability to make signltlcant 

gains against Khartoum. However, elements of the opposition will continue to wage insurgencies in the 

Southern Kordoftin and Blue Nile states and Darfur. Sudan, listed as e state sponsor of terror since 

1993, cut diplomatic ties with Iran in January following an attack on the saudi Embassy in Tehran. Since 

2014, Sudan's relations with Iran have cooled as Khartoum has grown closer to Riyadh. 

Nigeria 

President Muhammadu Buhari and the Nigerian government will confront a wide range of challenges in 

2016, many of which are deeply rooted and have no •quick fixes." His tasks include reviving a struggling 

economy -Africa's largest - diversifying sources of government revenue beyond oil, raining In corruption, 

addressing mounting state debts, rafonning redundant parastatai organizations, and developing the 

power, agriculture, and transportation sectors. Nigeria will continue to face internal threats from Boko 

Haram, which pledged loyalty to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Lavent (ISIL) in March 2015. Despite 

losing territory In 2015, Boko Harem will probably remain a threat to Nigeria throughout 2016 and will 

continue its terror campaign within the country and in neighboring cameroon, Niger, and Chad. 

LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN 

Central America 

Strong family ties to the United States-es well as gang violence, a lack of jobs1 and a worsening drought 

in Central America's northern tier-'ll sustain high rates of migration to the United States in 2016. Weak 

institutions, divided legislatures, low levels of tax collection, and high debts will eonstrain efforts to 

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improve rule of law, tackle conuption, and alleviate poverty. Homicide rates in the region remain among 

the highest in the world and spiked in El salvador to levels not seen since the country's civil war from 

1979 to 1992. The people hardest hit by the drought include most of the region's subsistence farmeni, 

who constitute 25 to 40 percent of the population in Guatemala and HondUras. The prolonged drought 

will probably affect 3.5 miHion people in the region in 2016 . 

. Cuba 

Cuban leaders will remain focused on preserving political control as they prepare for a probable 

presidential transition in 2018. Economic reforms to reduce the state role in the economy and promote 

private economic activity will continue at a slow pace, in part because Of probable resistance from senior 

leaders and government officials concerned that rapid changes might provoke popular unrest Living 

standards will remain poor. Along with fears among the Cuban population that the United Stetes will 

repeal the 1966 Cuban Adjuatment Act, the statute allowing Cuban nationals to apply to become lawful 

permanent US residents, these trends sustain the increasing migration of undocumented Cubans. 

Migration Is particularly acute across the US southwest border where 31,000 Cubans crossed In FY2015, 

a 76-percent increase over the prior yesr. 

Venezuela 

The opposition alliance won a much-coveted majority in the December 2015 national assembly elections, 

setting the stage for a political showdown in 2016 between the legislative and executive branches. The 

opposition will seek to implement its policy agenda, which might Include pursuing a presidential racail 

referendum. Economic issues will also figure prominently on the domestic agenda for 2016. Caracas will 

probably encounter fiscal pressures as it seeks to avoid a default on its soveralgn dabt in 2016; the 

economy is suffering from a severe recession that the lMF projects will cause It to contract by at least 8 

percent in 2016. Venezuela's government has declined to release complete official figures on 

macroeconomic indicators, such as inflation and growth. 

Brazil 

Brazil's investigation into corruption at state-controlled oil company Petrobras will probably continue 

through 2016. Scores of Petrobras officials, construction firm executives, and politicians have been jailed 

since the probe was launched In March 2014. Brazil lost its investment-grade rating in December 2015 

after the second credit agency in three months downgraded the country's debt to junk status. Further 

damaging revelations from the probe might prolong political gridlock. In Brazil. Meanwhile, preparations 

are underway in Brazil to address Infrastructure, logistics, and security Issues involvad in hosting the 

2016 Summar Olympics in Rio. Organizers are using past Olympics as models, cooperating with foreign 

govem!'11ants, and building upon Brezirs experience organizing a large and sustained security posture · 

such as when it hosted the World Cup in 2014. 

29 
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Chairman BURR. Director Clapper, thank you for that testimony. 

I remind all members that everybody at the witness table is 

available for questions directed at them. With that, I’d recognize 

Senator Lankford for five minutes. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To all of you, thank you. I do remind people back home, because 

in Oklahoma we’re extremely grateful for many folks in the armed 

services that serve us every single day. We recognize them, see 

them, recognize them by their uniforms. But I remind them also 

that there are a lot of people in the intelligence community that 

they won’t recognize at all and they’ll never see and they’ll never 

be able to thank personally. 

So would you pass on gratitude to them, and we are incredibly 

grateful for the very difficult work that they do every single day. 

Director Clapper, you said this morning in your 50 years in the 

intelligence business you can’t recall a more diverse array of challenges. And you graced us with a long list of doom as you listed 

it just now, whether that be space, whether that be proliferation, 

whether that be radical Islamic terrorism and such. 

I want to focus on one of the areas that you talked about specifically and that’s narcotics and the movement into our country and 

what we deal with on a day to day basis as a challenge. Again, this 

morning you had mentioned you thought the focus should be more 

on the interdiction. So my challenge is for this group and my interest: What are we doing on the intel gathering to be able to find out 

what’s happening, the pathways that some of these narcotics are 

moving into the United States and the interdiction, and how we’re 

cooperating among agencies, how’s that communication going? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, sir, the challenge, as I indicated this 

morning—and I hark back to a series of testimonies by General 

Kelly, the former commander of the Southern Command, in which 

he made the point that we did have a great deal of intelligence on 

drug flow into the United States—our challenge has been the lack 

of resources sometimes to react to it, to actually interdict it. 

So in one sense I think that’s a plea or a commercial for more 

operational assets to respond. I’m a big fan of the Coast Guard and 

I think the Coast Guard has done some great work. The deployment of these new Coast Guard cutters, which has a national security component to it, has had a dramatic impact when they’ve been 

able to be employed. So to me the big thing here is the operational 

resource to respond. I think the community works very well together on the issue of drug intelligence and facilitating interdiction. 

Senator LANKFORD. Any comments on that from any of the other 

leaders? 

[No response.] 

Let me move on then as well, because there’s been a lot of conversation about Libya and ISIL and their movement into other 

areas they call provinces and moving all around the world. Libya 

has been especially large in that. What do you think is ISIL’s intention in Libya? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I think not unlike what they’ve done 

with Syria and Iraq. What’s unique about ISIL, of course, is its 

possession and control over territory, and that’s been the case in 

Syria and Iraq, and of course that presents certain vulnerabilities 

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43 

when they assume the accoutrements or the traits of a nationstate. 

I think it’s similarly their goal in Libya. It’s essentially an 

ungoverned space and also access to substantial oil resources, just 

as they’ve had in Syria. So I think there is some commonality. 

They’re right now kind of centered or headquartered in Sirte, 

which is kind of in the center of the coast of Libya, and they’re trying to spread out along the coast and take over more and more 

areas. They are present, as I indicated in my statement, in the 

major cities, notably Benghazi and Tripoli. 

Senator LANKFORD. You mentioned as well about Iran still being 

the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world. How have you 

seen that role and that direction towards terrorism and support of 

terrorism since the signing of the JCPOA? Since that has occurred, 

have you seen a change in Iran’s behavior towards sponsoring terrorism? 

Director CLAPPER. Have not seen a change in the behavior of the 

Quds Force. They are right now kind of consumed with the situation in Iraq and Syria, and as well in supporting the Houthis in 

Yemen. So that has been the focus predominantly. That’s not to say 

they’re not interested elsewhere, but that’s where the focus of their 

efforts has been. 

Senator LANKFORD. Again, you had mentioned this morning that 

there have been about 140 missiles launched by Iran in violation 

of UN agreements, and then two additional just in the last few 

months. Any change in behavior you’ve seen in their testing of ballistic missiles? 

Director CLAPPER. No. You’re exactly right, Senator Lankford, 

that’s what I said. Since 2010 and the promulgation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1929, they’ve fired about 140 missiles. 

About half of that took place during the negotiations. They 

launched two, one in October and one in November, which I personally think was a message that they are still going to continue 

to develop what is already a very robust missile force. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator Lankford. 

The Chair would recognize himself for a couple of questions. 

Director Comey, what’s the risk to law enforcement and to prosecution if, when presented a legal court order, a company refuses 

to provide the communications that the court has ordered them to? 

Director COMEY. The risk is that we won’t be able to make a case 

and a really bad guy will go free. 

Chairman BURR. Can you for the American people set a percentage of how much of that is terrorism and how much of this fear 

is law enforcement and prosecutions that take place in every town 

in America every day? 

Director COMEY. I’d say this problem we call ‘‘Going Dark,’’ which 

as Director Clapper mentioned is the growing use of encryption 

both to lock devices when they sit there and to cover communications as they move over fiber optic cables, is actually overwhelmingly affecting law enforcement, because it affects cops and prosecutors and sheriffs and detectives trying to make murder cases, 

car accident cases, kidnapping cases, drug cases. It has an impact 

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44 

on our national security work, but overwhelmingly this is a problem that local law enforcement sees. 

Chairman BURR. This would include pornography, and the list 

goes on and on and on, which I think there would be consensus in 

America that if that’s carried out, that if a court certifies that the 

reason is there, that a company ought to then produce that information. Is that logical? 

Director COMEY. Yes, especially with respect to devices, phones, 

that default lock. That is the overwhelming concern of state and 

local law enforcement, because all of our lives are becoming increasingly digital. Those devices are going to hold the evidence of 

child pornography, communications that someone made before they 

were killed, before they went missing, the evidence that will be 

necessary to solve a crime, and including things like car accidents. 

So it is a big problem for law enforcement, armed with a search 

warrant, when you find a device that can’t be opened even though 

the judge said there’s probable cause to open it. As I said, it affects 

our counterterrorism work. San Bernardino, a very important investigation to us; we still have one of those killers’ phones that we 

have not been able to open. It’s been over two months now. We’re 

still working on it. 

But this also occurred on the criminal side. A woman was murdered in Louisiana last summer, eight months pregnant, killed. No 

clues to who did it, except her phone was there when she’s found, 

killed. They couldn’t open it, still can’t open it. So the case remains 

unsolved. 

So this is something I hear about all over the country from my 

partners in state and local law enforcement. 

Chairman BURR. Is it safe to say that if companies were required 

to honor that court order, that law enforcement and the prosecution element isn’t concerned at all at how they access that—that 

can be proprietary and within each company—but supplying the information is absolutely crucial to the continuation of that investigation and prosecution? 

Director COMEY. That’s one of the aspects of the conversation, 

which is healthy. There’s a robust debate going on and there ought 

to be because these are important issues. But a part that gets confusing to me is when folks talk like we want access to companies’ 

servers, we want access to their source code. What we would like 

is a world where people are able to comply with court orders. 

Lots of companies do. Both people who make phones are able to 

unlock them when judges order it and people who provide communication services are able to comply with judges’ orders. Others 

can’t and therein lies the problem. But it’s not about us trying to 

get a back door, a term that confuses me, frankly. I don’t want a 

door, I don’t want a window, I don’t want a sliding glass door. I 

would like people to comply with court orders, and that’s the conversation we’re trying to have. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Director Comey. 

Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Brennan, I’d like to ask you a question if I may, subject 

Libya. How does the CIA assess ISIL’s intrusions into Libya? 

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45 

Director BRENNAN. We see Libya as the most important theater 

for ISIL outside of the Syria-Iraq theater. They have several thousand members there. They have absorbed some of the groups inside 

of Libya, including Ansar Al-Sharia, that was very active prior to 

ISIL’s rise. 

Libya has been a place where this form of extremism and terrorism has grown up over the years. As the borders of the SyriaIraq area were being tightened down, we know that some of those 

foreign fighters started to divert into Libya. So Libya has become 

a magnet for individuals not only inside of Libya, but from the African continent as well as from outside. So it is a real issue, a real 

problem. But we see ISIL in Libya as a very, very important hub 

for ISIL activities. 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. Second question: Assessment on 

North Korea. We know they possess anywhere from 10 to 20 both 

uranium and plutonium weapons. We now have seen the recent 

launch of the Taepodong 2, which my understanding is is capable 

of reaching the United States. And then there’s the KN08. 

How do you assess the Korean leader’s intentions with what he 

is doing with respect to these tests and the development of both a 

plutonium and uranium stream of weapons? 

Director BRENNAN. I think it’s very obvious that Kim Jong Un is 

trying to demonstrate to the world that he has capability both in 

terms of the nuclear test as well as ballistic missile, an intercontinental ballistic missile capability, that he wants to showcase as a 

way to demonstrate his strength, but also as a way to market some 

of his proliferation capabilities. So it is something that is obviously 

a key concern to the intelligence community as a whole. It is a priority collection area for us. But the assessment, at least from my 

perspective, is that he has developed both the nuclear capability as 

well as developing this ballistic missile capability, mating them together, so that he can demonstrate that he has reach far beyond 

the Korean Peninsula. 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. Third question, a little bit more time: 

How do you assess the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan? How 

much of the territory of Afghanistan today is controlled by the 

Taliban? 

Director BRENNAN. It’s a difficult question to address because a 

lot of times the Taliban control of certain areas is dynamic and 

fluid. So they’ll go in and take various government and military 

outposts, seize it, and then pull back. There’s large parts of that 

country that fall under Taliban influence, and we’ve been working 

very closely with the Afghan military and security services, intelligence services, to try to concentrate their focus on areas that need 

to be protected, whether it be critical infrastructure, cities, transit 

and transportation routes. 

But, as you well know, the Taliban control a lot of terrain outside 

of the central government’s reach. And Al-Qaeda continues to have 

a presence, typically inside of the eastern part of Afghanistan. 

They continue to work with the Taliban as well as with the 

Haqqanis. Collectively, they present a serious threat to the stability of the Afghan government, as well as to our personnel, U.S. 

personnel, inside of Afghanistan. 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

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That’s it for now. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you very much. 

Gentlemen, my view is you couldn’t have passionate debates in 

this room without the great work that the men and women of the 

intelligence community do to preserve our freedom. I just want to 

start by saying we’re very grateful for that. 

Director Brennan, in 2014 the CIA conducted an unauthorized 

search of Senate files, including the emails of Senate staff investigating the CIA’s use of torture. The CIA Inspector General later 

stated that the search involved improper agency access to Senate 

files, and a review board that you appointed concluded that the 

search resulted in inappropriate access to the committee’s work 

product. 

You initially denied that search took place, but the reports of 

both your inspector general and the review board show that this 

denial was at odds with the facts. After the facts were publicly exposed, the CIA even wrote an apology letter that you did not send. 

Now, senior officials from the NSA, the FBI, and the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence have all testified that it would be 

inappropriate for their agencies to secretly search Senate files 

without external authorization. But we still have not gotten an acknowledgment from you. 

So I think it would be important—I’d like to hear from you. I’d 

like to set the record straight that this would never happen again. 

Would you agree that the CIA’s 2014 search of Senate files was improper? 

Director BRENNAN. This is the annual threat assessment, is it 

not? Yes. 

I think, Senator, as you well know, there were very unique circumstances associated with this whole affair. These were CIA computers, at a CIA-leased facility. It was a CIA network that was 

shared between Senate staffers conducting that investigation for 

your report, as well as CIA personnel. When it became quite obvious to CIA personnel that Senate staffers had unauthorized access 

to an internal draft document of CIA, there was an obligation on 

the part of CIA officers who had responsibility for the security of 

that network to investigate to see what might have been the reason 

for that access that the Senate staffers had to that document. 

They conducted that investigation. I spoke to the Chairman and 

Vice Chairman about it. I tried to make sure they understood exactly what the challenge was that we had. We conducted that investigation. I then subsequently referred the matter to the IG when 

the Senate leadership was concerned about the actions of CIA officers. I also subsequently convened an accountability board. And I 

think if you were to read those reports, including the accountability 

board, you would see that it determined that the actions of the CIA 

were reasonable, given the very unclear and unwritten or 

unspecific understanding between the committee and CIA at the 

time in terms of—— 

Senator WYDEN. Mr. Director, my time is short, but that’s not 

what the inspector general or the—— 

Director BRENNAN. I respectfully disagree. 

Senator WYDEN [continuing]. Or the review board—— 

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47 

Director BRENNAN. I respectfully disagree with you, Senator. 

Senator WYDEN. I’d like to read the exact words. The exact words 

of the review board were: ‘‘It resulted in inappropriate access to 

SSCI work product.’’ And your inspector general reached the same 

conclusion. 

So the question here is when you’re talking about spying on a 

committee responsible for overseeing your agency, in my view that 

undermines the very checks and balances that protect our democracy, and it’s unacceptable in a free society. And your compatriots 

in all of the sister agencies agreed with that. Now, you disagree? 

Director BRENNAN. Yes. I think you mischaracterized both their 

comments as well as what’s in those reports. And I apologized to 

the Chairman and the Vice Chairman about the de minimis access 

and inappropriate access that CIA officers made to five emails or 

so of Senate staffers during that investigation, and I apologized to 

them for that very specific inappropriate action that was taken as 

part of a very reasonable investigative action. 

But do not say that we spied on Senate computers or your files. 

We did not do that. We were fulfilling our responsibilities. 

Senator WYDEN. I read the exact words of the inspector general 

and exact words of the review board. You appointed the review 

board. They said nobody ought to be punished, but they said there 

was improper access. 

My point is, in our system of government we have responsibilities to do vigorous oversight and we can’t do vigorous oversight if 

there are improper procedures used to access our files. 

My time is up, Mr. Chairman. 

Director BRENNAN. Senator, I would say, do you not agree that 

there was improper access that Senate staffers had to CIA internal 

deliberative documents? Was that not inappropriate, unauthorized? 

Senator WYDEN. I can tell you, having talked at length to our 

staff, everything that we determined they did was appropriate. But 

I asked about CIA conduct and two reviews, the inspector general 

and your review board, said it was improper. 

Director BRENNAN. Yes, and I’m still awaiting the review that 

was done by the Senate to take a look at what the staffers’ actions 

were. Separation of powers between the Executive and Legislative 

Branches, Senator, goes both ways. As I said, I apologized to the 

Chairman and the Vice Chairman for the very specific inappropriate access that agency officers who were investigating this incident made to those emails, very limited inappropriate actions. 

Overall, that investigation was done consistent with our obligations, consistent with the law, consistent with our responsibilities. 

And I do think that you’re mischaracterizing the full tenor of 

both the accountability board and the inspector general’s report. 

Senator WYDEN. It’s pretty hard to mischaracterize word for 

word quotes. They used the words ‘‘improper access.’’ 

Chairman BURR. I’ll exercise something here and recognize Senator Heinrich. 

Senator HEINRICH. I want to start by thanking our panelists for 

being here and for the continued excellent work that their respective agencies do every day in providing world-class strategic analysis and in keeping our country safe in a world of growing and 

complex threats that Director Clapper so eloquently laid out twice 

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today. The work done by your agencies is critical and I want to 

thank the men and women of those agencies who continue to do excellent work. 

I also want to thank Chairman Burr for holding this hearing. It’s 

been two years since we’ve had one of these and I hope we don’t 

wait that long next time. I think it’s important that the American 

people have a chance to hear from these officials directly, especially 

since so many of our actions with these Directors take place behind 

closed doors. While that’s certainly appropriate in most circumstances, a public debate I believe benefits tremendously from 

transparency, and I appreciate the opportunity today. 

I want to start with Admiral Rogers. Admiral, as you know, the 

world has seen a truly alarming increase in attacks on critical infrastructure. For example, in December DHS reported a 20 percent 

increase in cyber incidents between fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 

2015. While critical manufacturing was the most targeted sector in 

that, energy ranked second in the number of incidents, with water 

and waste water systems coming in third. 

On top of that, we’ve seen recent attacks against Turkish banks, 

Ukrainian and Israeli electricity providers, and it was recently revealed that Iranian hackers infiltrated a dam just north of New 

York City in 2013. 

So my question for you is this: Does the IC, particularly NSA, 

have sufficient insight into the sorts of cyber threats to U.S. critical 

infrastructure that we’re seeing by foreign actors, and what can we 

do to better position ourselves against those threats specifically to 

critical infrastructure? 

Admiral ROGERS. You never have all the insight that you would 

like. I don’t think you’re going to hear an intel professional tell you, 

hey, look, I couldn’t use more insight. 

I think the biggest challenge in some ways is not so much the 

level of insight, but it’s how do we generate, take that insight and 

generate action, and make the changes that I think we all believe 

are necessary, given the dynamics of the world that you’ve outlined, that I don’t think are short-term trends. I don’t see this 

changing in the near term. I see this as the nature of the world 

we’re living in and we’re likely to be living in for some period of 

time. So the challenge I think is how do we take those insights and 

generate action. That’s the biggest challenge to me. 

Senator HEINRICH. Have you thought about, particularly given 

the focus of those on things like electrical generation and water 

and waste water systems, the ramifications of some of the changes 

within those fields, of distributed approaches and resiliency, as opposed to the very traditional approaches of sort of one-way generation and large-scale transmission? 

Admiral ROGERS. Right. And we’re watching most of the sectors 

in the area trying to go that approach. How can you build redundancy and resiliency, look at fragmentation and duplication? I’ve 

talked to several elements in power and water over the course of 

the last year, and you can see elements within the sectors trying 

to go that way. But I’d be the first to acknowledge, just given the 

breadth of infrastructure within our Nation, the amount of time it’s 

going to take to do that across the entire breadth of our Nation, 

that is not an insignificant challenge. 

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Senator HEINRICH. Clearly. Would you agree that some of the 

movement towards more distributed purchase, particularly within 

electrical generation, things like microgrids, islandable microgrids, 

distributed storage, distributed generation, are helpful in mitigating the potential impact of a large-scale attack? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes. I think that’s part of, that should be a fundamental element of, a broader strategy. I just try to remind people, there’s no silver bullet, if that makes sense. 

Senator HEINRICH. As a smart Senator said, sometimes there’s 

silver buckshot when you don’t have a silver bullet. 

Director Brennan, while the United States is obviously not addressing the ISIL issue alone in Syria and Iraq, the reality is that 

many of our foreign partners in the region are at times heavily distracted by unrelated conflicts that are sometimes counterproductive 

to that fight. For example, as you’re well aware, Turkey is targeting the very Kurds who’ve been some of the most engaged fighters in the battle against ISIS. We have Saudi Arabia pouring 

money and equipment into the fight in Yemen instead of focusing 

on ISIL in Syria. 

You’ve spent a lot of time in the Middle East over the years. 

What has the CIA done and what else might be done to get our 

regional partners more focused on confronting the threat posed by 

ISIL? 

Director BRENNAN. As you point out, Senator, the Middle East 

right now I think is racked by more instability and violence and 

inter-state conflict than we have seen certainly in the past 50 

years. The amount of bloodshed and the humanitarian suffering is 

I think unprecedented. 

We, CIA, work very closely with our partners throughout the region trying to make sure that those intelligence and security services are fulfilling their responsibilities professionally as far as making sure that we can share information with them about the flow 

of foreign fighters in particular, given that there is such transit between and among these countries of individuals who might go to 

Syria, Iraq, and then down to Libya or Egypt. We’re trying to make 

sure we give them the intelligence they need, give them the training they need, but also give them the professional training that is 

required, because there are tremendous obligations on them to 

make sure that they are able to carry out their responsibilities 

while at the same time respect the human rights obligations that 

they have as security services. 

So what we’re trying to do is to serve as an interlocutor with 

many of them and to see whether or not we can enhance their relationships. Sometimes not only do we have inter-state conflicts, but 

we have sort of intramural conflicts among some of these countries, 

which then extends to the services. 

So I think building up these intelligence and security services, 

giving them the wherewithal to address the problems, but again 

making sure that they carry out their responsibilities professionally, is very important. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator Heinrich. 

The Chair would also make a note that the Senator is correct, 

we didn’t have an open threats hearing last year. We had a closed 

one. But last year we had open hearings with Admiral Rogers from 

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the NSA, Director Rasmussen from the NCTC, Director Comey 

from the FBI. And we had an open hearing scheduled for Director 

Brennan and were blitzed by a snowstorm. Maybe had we had him 

in he wouldn’t have fallen and wrecked his knee. 

It is the intent of the Chair to continue to allow every agency the 

opportunity, not just to be here for a worldwide threat hearing, but 

to come in and share with the American people what it is they do, 

why they do it, but, more importantly, why the American people 

should care about their success. Today is drinking out of a fire 

hose, trying to address the entire globe at one time. The rest of it 

I think is going to be more constructive. So I think the committee 

has attempted to try to increase the amount of open exposure with 

a degree of specificity that we haven’t had in the past. 

With that, Senator Coats. 

Senator COATS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director, I note here on the very first page of the statement for 

the record you say: ‘‘The order of topics presented in this statement 

does not necessarily indicate the relative importance or magnitude 

of the threat in the view of the intelligence community.’’ My question is, is this because we are dealing with such a complex and 

ever-expanding level of threats and it’s difficult to prioritize, or is 

it because maybe we ought to be talking about this in Thursday’s 

closed session? If that’s the case, please tell me. 

But if you had to prioritize—you know, we have to make decisions here. We have limitations. You have budget limitations. We 

want to try to address all these threats equally, but that’s not possible. So it seems to me that as a committee member and as a 

member of Congress we need to know how to best allocate our 

budgets toward what you need. I know that this can be ever-changing, but what’s your response to that and how should we best address this? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, the more time I’ve spent doing this, I 

think the more loath I’ve become to try to rank-order threats, because any of them can leap up and bite us. So we don’t have the 

luxury of—I don’t like to mislead people that, well, this one threat 

is the one that we’re going to focus on at the expense of others. 

So that’s why the statement there. What does that mean from a 

resource standpoint in terms of what funding and resources we’re 

given to do our job? I think the approach that we’ve taken, at least 

what I’ve tried to champion in the five and a half years I’ve been 

the DNI, is those resources that enable resilience and agility, so 

that we can respond and, hopefully, anticipate and then respond to 

a variety of threats. 

That’s one thing—I said this before in answer to a question this 

morning. Again, in my time in the intelligence business I don’t recall a time when we have been confronted with a more diverse 

array of threats, whether it’s the nation-state threat posed by Russia and China, and particularly their substantial nuclear capabilities, or non-nation-states of the likes of ISIL, Al-Qaeda, etc. 

So all these threats are serious, be it terrorism, be it weapons 

of mass destruction, or be it cyber. Others may have a view here. 

John. 

Director BRENNAN. As it was pointed out, we’re facing this array 

of threats. The one area that I’m very concerned about is the inDeShaun on LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

51 

creasing concerns about vulnerabilities in that digital domain and 

cyber. I do think we as a country need to make sure that we understand what those vulnerabilities are. Then, I think to Jim Comey’s 

and others’ points, making sure that we understand that the intelligence and security services and law enforcement services of this 

country have a role to help protect that environment, because our 

way of life, our future, really depends on making sure that that is 

strong. And we have adversaries overseas, both nation-states as 

well as sub-national actors, that have the potential and the capability to carry out attacks. 

Director CLAPPER. The other part of this, if I may, just a thought 

that John keyed here, is the admixture, the combination of the 

threats posed to us in the cyber domain and the connection of that 

with terrorism. That makes ranking these discrete threats kind of 

difficult. 

Senator COATS. Maybe that’s why you have cyber technology as 

number one. I just assume that, and I appreciate the response on 

that. 

Admiral Rogers, I’d like you to comment on that also, because 

this is your domain. Where do we stand on that? 

Admiral ROGERS. For me, like my counterparts on the panel, I 

tell our team I am always leery about this hierarchical approach 

to doing business, because I’ve watched it encourage a workforce to 

think very linearly, so we focus on number one, then we think 

about number two, then we think about number three. And the 

world around us just doesn’t work that way. 

For me, the way I try to bin it with our team is protection of U.S. 

persons and U.S. infrastructure is priority number one. And I look 

at this and I see cyber- and the counterterrorism world in particular bringing those together in a very concerning way, as you 

heard from Director Clapper in his opening statement, and cyber 

remains so foundational to every aspect of our daily lives, just in 

a way that we haven’t necessarily seen as much in the past. It represents both great opportunity for us as a society, but great vulnerability, with the potential for great impact. That’s what’s of concern. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator Coats. 

Senator King. 

Senator KING. To follow up that, on that point, I was a governor 

during September 11th, and shortly afterwards we tasked our state 

police to go to all of what we thought were the vulnerable pieces 

of infrastructure in our state, electrical, chemical plants, and those 

kind of things, and assess their level of vulnerability and to in effect red team them about how they could the attacked. 

Do we do that with our critical infrastructure? There’s a lot of 

talk here about legislation, but it seems to me you could create a 

team to go to our power grid, to go to our water and gas utilities, 

financial services, and say: Look, this is what could happen to you; 

have you thought about this? You don’t really need legislation to 

do this. In other words, more proactive, trying to alert them to the 

risks and to alert them to some of the protections that may be 

available. 

Admiral ROGERS. Now you’re really talking outside my lane as 

the Director of NSA and more in the lane of the Department of 

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52 

Homeland Security, so I will not speak for Secretary Johnson. I 

share your concern. It’s one reason why, speaking within my lane 

within DOD, for example, we do just that. We aggressively attempt 

to make sure we understand our structures, their importance to 

our ability to execute their mission, our mission, and then their 

vulnerability. 

So we do penetration testing. We do red teams. We do no-notice 

inspections, for example, as a way to make sure—— 

Senator KING. It seems to me we ought—and perhaps we ought 

to have Jeh Johnson here. But we need to be talking about being 

more active and not just wait and hope they are doing the proper 

defensive measures, but to alert them to where they’re vulnerable 

and to help them figure out the defensive measures. 

Let me change the subject for a moment to heroin, which is an 

absolute epidemic. 10 or 12,000 people a year now dying. The number’s accelerating just astoundingly and tragically. 

Director Clapper talked about Mexico and that’s where it seems 

to be coming from. A specific question. One of the problems with 

heroin that we’re now seeing is it’s often laced with fentanyl, which 

makes it more potent and more dangerous. Where does that come 

from? Do we know? Do we have intelligence on where the fentanyl 

is coming from, where it’s being manufactured, how it gets into this 

unfortunate stream? Director Comey. 

Director COMEY. Senator, I know there’s a lot of work being done 

on that. We have a pretty good sense that a fair amount of it is 

being manufactured in China, but it’s also being manufactured in 

other places in the developing world. So I know DEA and FBI and 

the rest of the intelligence community is spending a lot of time trying to understand where those sources are. 

Senator KING. Well, I think we should know that and it should 

be publicity and we should name and shame those companies— 

those countries, because this is entirely unacceptable. It’s a trade 

in death. I would hope that there would be further analysis of that, 

and also analysis of the trade stream that allows it to get to Mexico 

or Central America. 

Second question: Do we have adequate resources in terms of intelligence, but also in terms of interdiction, in Mexico and Central 

America? My understanding is we have a pretty small number of 

people in some of those Central American countries which also are 

contributing to this. Do you feel as the intelligence community that 

you have adequate resources to this trade, where it comes from, 

who’s behind it? Then of course that leads into interdiction. I’ll follow up with that. 

Mr. Comey, your thoughts? 

Director COMEY. Surely not, given the size of the tidal wave of 

heroin that’s washing over from Mexico. And there’s two waves. We 

talk a lot about the heroin wave, for good reason. There’s another 

wave washing over the western United States that’s methamphetamine from Mexico, and the two waves are actually now crashing 

together in the middle of the United States. 

So surely not is the honest answer. We have built, I think as Director Clapper said, much more effective relationships among ourselves in focusing on that problem and with our partners in Mexico 

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and Central America. But honestly, it’s not good enough, given the 

size of the threat. 

Senator KING. Another question is, how’s it getting in? Do we 

know how much by land and how much by water? My understanding is a great deal of this is coming by water and one of the 

problems is a lack of adequate interdiction resources, both in terms 

of the military and the Coast Guard. 

Director COMEY. A large amount of it comes by water, and it 

tends to switch from both sides of the Central American land mass, 

Pacific or Atlantic side. But to pick up on what General Clapper 

said, what I’ve heard from the Coast Guard especially is they have 

a lack of resources to interdict. 

But also a lot of it comes by land, tunnels, smugglers, trucks. Because it’s a tidal wave, it’s washing in a lot of different ways. 

Senator KING. A tidal wave of death is what we’re talking about. 

I appreciate your efforts, but I think we have to realize that this 

is something that’s really exploded almost literally in the last three 

or four years and we have to react to it proportionate to the threat 

to our people. This is killing people right now in the United States, 

in every state. It’s not an abstract concern. It’s not a possible virus. 

It’s something that’s happening right now. 

So I commend you for your efforts, but I hope that this is something where the community can work together to develop the information necessary, but then we can also—it’s got to be all of government to react to take the information and act upon it. 

Thank you very much for your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Clapper, I suspect that this may be your last public 

global threat hearing before our committee. So let me join with our 

colleagues in thanking you for your decades of service. You and I 

first met in 2004 when Joe Lieberman and I wrote the law that 

created the DNI Office and I take special pride in the work that 

you’re doing and want to thank you for all of your years of service. 

Director CLAPPER. Thank you very much, Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Let me follow up on the questions that my colleague from Maine just posed. Is there actionable intelligence that 

would allow us to disrupt and interdict more of the heroin and 

fentanyl-laced heroin that is coming in from Mexico than we are 

able to act on because of operational constraints? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I just discussed this morning before the 

Senate Armed Services Committee the testimony that General 

Kelly, former, recently retired as the commander of Southern Command. I heard him say on more than one occasion that they had 

a lot of good intelligence on drug flow into the United States and 

he was limited because of his lack of operational resources to react. 

Now, that is getting better. Again, a plug for the Coast Guard: 

They do magnificent work. These new cutters that they’re building 

and deploying are a fantastic capability, ideally suited for this 

interdiction mission, particularly with the seaborne and specifically 

the semi-submersible vehicles that the druggies are using to ship 

large quantities. When those are caught at sea, you take a lot of 

drugs off the street. 

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Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Director Comey, you talked earlier about encryption and how difficult it is making the job of both law enforcement and our efforts 

to prevent and detect terrorist plots. In fact, you have been quoted 

as saying that encryption is at the center of the terrorist tradecraft. 

Yet the administration has not submitted to date any legislative 

proposal to deal with encryption. 

I would like to know whether you—and I’m going to ask General 

Clapper and Director Brennan the same question—have any of the 

three made recommendations to the President that he submit legislation dealing with the encryption problem to Congress for our consideration? 

Director COMEY. I’ll go first. Thank you, Senator. I would never— 

I don’t think it would be appropriate for me to share recommendations that I might have made within the Executive Branch. But I 

will tell you this. Encryption is a problem in our investigations. It 

is also a great thing. And therein lies the challenge, which is why 

this is such a hard problem. That’s why the administration and the 

private sector have been struggling so much. 

I am optimistic that we’ll make progress through our conversations, but I don’t know whether that’ll get us far enough. So I can’t 

quite clearly see what the future looks like from here, but I’m just 

not comfortable talking about the deliberations inside. 

Senator COLLINS. Well, let me change the question then. Do you 

believe that we should pass legislation that deals with encryption? 

Director COMEY. I’m going to have to dodge that because that’s 

not the FBI’s job, to make recommendations. I do think that Congress and the American people have to grapple with this, because 

there’s a collision between something that is great, encryption, and 

something that’s also great, which is public safety. 

Senator COLLINS. General Clapper, you’re retiring at the end of 

the year, so you don’t have to be careful in answering this question 

in any way. 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I’m not sure we’ve exhausted all the possibilities here technologically. I’m not an IT expert by any means. 

I would hope that we have not yet exhausted what could be done 

voluntarily. As Director Comey indicated, encryption is a good 

thing for all kinds of reasons, for security and privacy and all that. 

But at the same time, it enables—it is enabling nefarious activity 

of all sorts, whether it’s law enforcement or in the national security 

arena, to go on, and we’re losing information because of it. 

So my hope is that the technological solution, we haven’t fully explored the potential there. 

I’d also ask Admiral Rogers to comment as well. 

Admiral ROGERS. Encryption is foundational to the future. Anyone who thinks we’re just going to walk away from that I think is 

totally unrealistic. The challenge becomes to me, given that 

premise that encryption is foundational to the future, what’s the 

best way for us to meet both of these imperatives, to ensure the 

privacy and the rights of our citizens and to ensure their protection 

and safety? Both are incredibly important to us as a Nation. 

The challenge that I’ve seen in the discussion to date is, from 

Mike Rogers’ perspective, we’re spending a lot of time talking about 

what we can’t do, and I keep thinking to myself: We are the most 

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innovative, technologically advanced Nation in the world; let’s start 

thinking about what can we do. Let’s start trying to figure out how 

are we going to make this work. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Hirono. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Clapper, thank you very much for noting—well, first of 

all for your service, and to all of you on the panel. Thank you for 

noting that the drug threat is ever growing in our country and 

that, while interdiction and enforcement are very important challenges to us, I suspect that we are not putting very many resources 

into the prevention side of the drug equation. That’s just a comment. 

Moving on, as North Korea continues its nuclear weapons and 

missile programs, do you assess that locating missile defense systems closer to North Korea or locating another carrier, say in 

Yokosuka, Japan, could provide greater deterrence against North 

Korean aggression? And I welcome comments also from Lieutenant 

General—General Stewart, and anyone else on the panel who’d like 

to comment. 

Director CLAPPER. Well, that’s a policy call. But, having said 

that, I think it would. I think even the discussion about missile defense certainly gets the Chinese’ attention. They would prefer that 

THAAD, for example, not be deployed. But the North Koreans are 

making it hard, I think, for the Chinese to sustain that position. 

So to the extent that there are force displays, force presence, missile defense, I think that could possibly have a deterrent effect on 

the North Koreans, but it could also incite them to do more. 

Senator HIRONO. And with Kim Jong Un it’s hard to tell which 

way he would go. That’s just an editorial comment. 

In your statement of record you note that we will monitor compliance with China’s September 2015 commitment to refrain from 

conducting or knowingly supporting cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property with the intent of providing competitive advantage to 

companies or commercial sectors. Private security experts have 

identified limited ongoing cyber activity from China, but have not 

verified state sponsorship or the use of exfiltrated data for commercial gain. 

So, Director Clapper and Admiral Rogers, I understand that 

there’s much that we can’t discuss in this open forum, but can you 

help me understand how the September 15th U.S.-China cyber 

agreement is helpful when we can’t effectively monitor compliance? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I think I’ll ask Admiral Rogers to back 

me up here, but I think that there has been a decline, but I think 

we’re going to have to have some more time to assess whether this 

is a case where these state sponsors, those elements, cyber actors, 

that are under the control of the state, have actually reduced their 

activity or they were told: Don’t get caught. I think we’re going to 

need some more time to assess that. 

Of course, there’s also the challenge of determining whether, per 

the agreement, that any information that is purloined is actually 

used for economic advantage or not. 

Mike, do you want to add to that? 

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Admiral ROGERS. No, I would agree, and I don’t think there’s any 

doubt that we have been able to show in the past cases where that 

was the case. I think that’s in part what led to the desire to be very 

direct with our Chinese counterparts to say this behavior is unacceptable and we have to work our way through this, because the 

status quo, the use of the powers of the state to generate economic 

advantage through cyber as a tool, is not acceptable to us. I think 

that’s what drove the discussions in September and, as the DNI 

has said, our view to date is we have seen some lessening in activity, but we’re not yet prepared to say that’s as a result of a systematic policy choice on the part of our Chinese counterparts. 

Senator HIRONO. Because it’s so hard to determine attribution in 

the cyber threat arena, do you believe that we’ll ever be able to resolve this dilemma? I’d ask you two gentlemen to respond. 

Then, General Stewart, would you care to comment on my first 

question regarding the assessment question that I had? 

General STEWART. I think North Korea has a number of objectives, one of which is demonstrating strength against the U.S. and 

its allies. The second objective is to deter U.S. actions if they take 

unilateral actions on the Korean Peninsula. And third among the 

objectives is to separate the U.S. from its South Korean ally. 

So the things that we can do that will show that we still have 

strength, that we will not be deterred, that we will not be separated from our ally, will be very beneficial. However, Kim Jong Un 

is unpredictable, and therefore I think we should do all those 

things to maintain our relationship, show strength, show that we 

cannot be deterred from taking action, but he is still an unpredictable wild card that none of us know how he will react. 

Senator HIRONO. Some of our force structure decisions, though, 

would also have an impact on China, which is a more I think reasonable actor. 

I’m sorry, Mr. Chairman, but could the other two gentlemen answer briefly the question? 

Chairman BURR. They can, briefly. 

Admiral ROGERS. You never have perfect knowledge. We historically have been able to put together a fairly good picture. I’m not 

going to argue that it’s perfect. I’m the first to acknowledge it’s getting harder, not easier, because we’re watching opponents spending 

a lot of time trying to hurt or diminish our ability to attribute specific activity to specific actors. 

Senator HIRONO. Did you want to add to that? 

Director CLAPPER. No. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. It’s going to be a challenge. 

Chairman BURR. The correct answer. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me start with thanking again all of you for your service and, 

equally important, the literally thousands of men and women who 

work to keep our country safe. Let me say at the outset, as a Virginia Senator, the fact that we have the offices of ODNI, CIA, 

NRO, NGO, NGA, and a series of other entities, and, Director 

Comey, if GSA makes the right decision, maybe the FBI as well— 

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and Senator Mikulski’s not here—I hope you will relay that message that we give you the credit, and obviously the men and 

women, the professionals, don’t get the credit that they appropriately deserve. 

Director Clapper, I’m going to—a couple questions for you. First 

of all, I want to commend you in terms of your testimony today, 

the fact that you’ve listed cyber and what I would call digital security first, and the recognition that, while we’re talking somewhat 

about encryption today, and I’m going to come back to that in a 

moment, that we need forward-leaning thinking about the Internet 

of Things and artificial intelligence and virtual reality, and the fact 

of the matter that foreign data science is moving ahead very rapidly and tools and challenges around issues like encryption and 

going dark—this genie’s out of the bottle. 

I particularly commend both Admiral Rogers and Director 

Comey’s comments. People who want to relitigate the origination of 

encryption, that issue is behind us. I think it’s appropriate to point 

out that when our national security is threatened also in terms of 

intellectual capital, personal information, other kinds of intrusions, 

encryption—and I particularly appreciate, Director Comey, your 

comments as well—is both an asset and potentially a liability. 

I fear that sometimes we have focused just on this piece rather 

than the whole encompassing issue around digital security. Admiral Rogers, again I want to give you kudos for this notion around 

innovation. 

Director Clapper, I guess what my concern is is that sometimes, 

with all of these competing interests, with national security interests, with intellectual capital security interests, with civil liberties 

security, with American business security, that I’m not sure all of 

these competing interests, while there have been efforts, have actually all come together in a thoughtful, reflective way to try to challenge folks around American innovation about how we get this 

back. 

I think there needs to be a real debate between all of these communities—the tech community, American business, information security specialists, law enforcement, intel, advocates for privacy and 

civil liberties. Director Clapper, I’d like to see, if we had such kind 

of a thoughtful approach would that be of value to this debate, 

which has already proved to be quite contentious? 

Director CLAPPER. It certainly would. I think—and I think you’ve 

named most of the key constituencies here. There are many countervailing interests. There is the pull of the needs for national security and law enforcement that you’ve heard. There are the privacy 

and civil liberties concerns and our own security. 

So there are a myriad or a welter of countervailing interests here 

that are at play. We certainly, we try to sort our way through all 

those competing equities. It’s a very, very complex issue, as I think 

you’ve heard from the discussion that’s transpired so far. 

Senator WARNER. Well, I just would say that, as somebody who 

spent 20-plus years, 25-plus years, in the telecom industry, I don’t 

think it is totally equivalent. And the notion of a kind of top-down 

solution, which might give us a static solution for a short period 

of time, but this is going to be a constantly evolving challenge and 

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the response is going to need to be flexible and constantly 

transitioning. 

Again, as you lay out some of the challenges, we’re talking about 

a piece here on encryption, but digital security is a much broader 

issue. I think you’ve appropriately laid out some of the buckets that 

have to be part of this, this conversation. 

My time is running out. I just want to add a subject that the 

Chair and the Vice Chair have been very helpful on as we think 

about on overhead, on our satellite issues. I recently was out at 

NGA, had a very good session there on commercial satellites. Right 

now the United States, not governmental, has about 50 commercial 

satellites. One company alone is going to go to 250 this year. I 

guess, Director Clapper—I know your background here—would you 

spend a moment in terms of how commercial is going to fit in with 

our overall overhead needs? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I think commercial imagery, I have been 

a huge proponent of it since I served as the Director of NIMA–NGA 

right after 9–11 as a crucial part of our overall architecture. It’s 

also important, though, I think, that these commercial entities remain commercially viable. If they have a product or service that we 

can use, we should take advantage of that from the standpoint of 

additional coverage, what is it we can unload from our NTM complex, which I think we’ll always have a need for; and also importantly, for resiliency. 

But what I don’t think is a good thing is if they become completely dependent on the government. So we have to find the balance there, and that’s why I would like to make a change in the 

architectural responsibility so that that is accounted for in the totality of our overhead reconnaissance constellation. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator Warner. 

Senator Blunt. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Chairman. 

General Clapper, all of you who represent the IC community and 

the people you work with and the people that work for us, thank 

you for what you do. 

I’m going to mention a couple of questions I’m not going to ask, 

one for the record. But you just mentioned your leadership at NGA, 

the geospatial efforts we have. I’ve been spending a lot of time lately with Director Cardillo and in those discussions we’ve been talking a lot about sort of the workforce of the future. So one thing I’m 

going to ask in a question for all of you that we don’t have time 

to ask today is: With engineering, with technology, with science, 

with math, are we doing the kinds of things we need to do and 

what can we do earlier to identify people we want to get on that 

track of being able to do these jobs in the IC community generally, 

Admiral Rogers, in your field specifically? Some information on 

that would be helpful. 

I’m also going to not ask a question—I will ask that question for 

the record. 

With regard to science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) disciplines, what are we doing to identify and nurture STEM talent earlier and attract those people to the IC in general, and to the NSA in particular? 

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I won’t ask today about Robert Levinson. I think that’s probably 

more appropriately asked in a closed setting, and I’ll be doing that 

later. But in that regard, I am concerned that the transfer of 

money occurred when it did. A supposed $400 million from a past 

military sale that we had had happened to be given back just coincidentally the same time that those three hostages, as I see them, 

were released. 

Now, this is money, by the way, that the Congress in 2000 said 

had to go to victims of Iranian-backed terror and it all did. So this 

is clearly giving the money away twice, sort of like the meeting of 

the church business meeting where they say: We’ve got a real problem. We’ve got a $1,000 deficit. What should we do? And somebody 

says: Well, let’s give half of it to the PTA and half of it to the Girl 

Scouts. 

This money was gone, but it was an excuse, a coincidental excuse 

I think, to do the right thing in the wrong way. 

But what I want to ask you is, you said, Secretary Kerry said, 

just in the last few days that undoubtedly some of the money returned to Iran would go to terrorist groups. You verified again 

today that you see no real change in behavior in this number one 

sponsor, state sponsor of terror in the world. Are we doing any 

analysis? And anybody that wants to answer this can. What do we 

think happens when suddenly Iran gets $100 million, $100 billion, 

or maybe they get half of that? Maybe they get $50 billion. What 

do we think happens in places where not very much money can 

drive a lot of bad activity? $400 million in Yemen can make lots 

of bad things happen. 

Are we evaluating what happens when Hezbollah, when the 

Taliban, when the Houthi get this new infusion of money that I 

think everybody understands they are about to get? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, Senator Blunt, I’m a little constrained 

here in what can be said about this publicly. But we are watching 

to the best of our ability the insight we have on actually where this 

money is going. Most of it so far has been taken up with what I 

would call encumbrances, in other words do-outs, loans, and other 

needs that Iran has. Those fall mainly in the economic arena. They 

need to recapitalize their whole oil infrastructure, which has deteriorated, if they’re going to do something with that. They have a 

lot of obligations in debts that they need to pay. 

So the actual—we can go into this in more detail in a classified 

setting, but what has actually flowed to the Quds Force, let’s say, 

has not been very much. And bear in mind that even during the 

period of heavy sanctions the Quds Force, the IRGC, the Republican Guards, and the Quds Force specifically, were—they were 

funded and the Iranians found a way to sustain them. And of 

course, they themselves have business interests by which they generate their own income. 

Senator BLUNT. I think that last point is the best point. Even 

when Iran didn’t have whatever amount of this money they get— 

say they get a tenth of the purported $100 billion. Even when they 

didn’t have money, they were able to fund terrorism. I think whatever percentage of that money comes back to them, the argument 

we sometimes hear that, well, they’ll build schools and hospitals 

and pay debts—they could have done all those things before they 

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got this money as well, and they still found money to finance terror 

efforts all over the neighborhood that they’re in and outside that 

neighborhood. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator Blunt. 

Senator Cotton. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing here. We 

frequently get to talk in private, not often in public. So let me associate myself with the comments of so many other members of this 

committee in thanking you, not only for your service—Director 

Clapper in particular for your many years of long service—for the 

service of the men and women that you represent. 

Director Brennan, you stated earlier, in response to Senator 

Heinrich, we have not seen as much violence, instability, and interstate conflict in the Middle East in, I believe the time period was, 

your lifetime? 

Director BRENNAN. I think I said 50 years, which is less than my 

lifetime. 

Senator COTTON. Why do you think that is? What are the key 

drivers that’s causing all that? 

Director BRENNAN. Well, I think it’s been five years now since 

the Arab Spring started to take root, which had a very traumatic 

impact on governments throughout the region, and the street became alive. And Al-Qaeda and terrorist organizations did not trigger that, but they have taken full advantage of it. So the instability 

that we see in Libya and Yemen and Syria certainly was an outgrowth of the Arab Spring and the turnover in governments in 

Libya and Yemen. 

So this is pitting individuals from different areas of the country, 

of ethnic backgrounds that might be different than the government’s. There are sectarian tensions that are playing out. All these 

things that were repressed because of the authoritarian governments that were in power for many years, and once their control 

was shaken I think it then loosed this popular reaction that now 

is finding expression in basically civil war, sectarian conflict, and 

challenges against the government. 

A lot of these governments do not have the political institutions, 

nor the ability to address the many, many challenges, political, economic, and social in the region. 

Finally, as you well know, a lot of these countries were carved 

out of previous colonial realms and therefore were almost 

patchworks of people of various backgrounds, that now are finding 

ways to fight among themselves. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

Director Comey, I want to address electronic communication 

transaction records. I’ve introduced legislation to rectify a problem 

commonly known as the ‘‘ECTR fix.’’ The legislation would clarify 

the government can obtain specified sets of electronic communication transaction records and fix an oversight made in an earlier 

law. What’s your position and what is the position of the FBI on 

the need for this fix? 

Director COMEY. We need it very much, and it’s actually quite an 

ordinary fix. It’s necessary because of what I believe is a typo in 

the 1993 statute that has led to some companies interpreting it in 

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a way I don’t believe Congress ever intended. So it is ordinary, but 

it affects our work in a very, very big and practical way. 

Senator COTTON. Would you characterize that as a top legislative 

priority for the FBI? 

Director COMEY. Yes. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

General Stewart, I want to turn to North Korea’s recent nuclear 

test. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization has not reported any collection of xenon or other nuclear particulates. Are 

you aware of any nuclear particulates collected from the test? 

General STEWART. Thank you for letting me participate. 

[Laughter.] 

I have 10 questions I’d like to answer and that’s not one of them. 

But I appreciate the opportunity. 

We have not at this point detected any particulates that would 

characterize this device. 

Senator COTTON. What does that tell us then about North Korean containment vessels and technology? 

General STEWART. Very robust capability to deceive, contain, hide 

their full capability and capacity. And I’d like to talk about this 

some more in closed hearing about both our capability and what 

we’re seeing that they’re doing. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. I believe we’ll have a chance to do 

that soon. 

Director Brennan, I want to return in closing here to your exchange with Senator Wyden. You mentioned the removal of a CIA 

document from the shared space in violation of a memorandum of 

understanding with this committee. Has any of this committee or 

staffer ever apologized to you for the removal of that document? 

Director BRENNAN. No, Senator. 

Senator COTTON. Do you believe that that was a violation of the 

MOU that the agency and this committee had? 

Director BRENNAN. I believe it was inconsistent with the understanding that we had, the common understanding, yes. 

Senator COTTON. Has that document been returned to you? 

Director BRENNAN. I will have to check on that, Senator. 

Senator COTTON. Handling of classified information is a very serious matter, right? 

Director BRENNAN. Yes. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. I thank all Senators. We’re going to have a second round. It’s going to start in the same order as the first one. 

The second round will consist of one question or two minutes, 

whichever happens fastest. And it’s my intent that we will be out 

of here shortly. Again, I thank our witnesses. 

General Stewart, you were recognized too soon, because I have 

a question for you. I’m not sure it’s in the 10 questions that you 

would like to answer. Assessing where we are today in Iraq: Share 

with me what Iraq looks like at the end of this year as it relates 

to being different, if at all? 

General STEWART. The Kurds in northern Iraq solidify their positions. They probably won’t move any further south because it’s not 

in their interest to move south. The Shia militia retains control 

over the central part of Iraq, moving out west just a bit. We conDeShaun on LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

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solidate our gains in Ramadi. The Sunni forces and Iraqi forces 

consolidate their gains in Ramadi, begin to move in to secure the 

corridors moving from Hit up to Haditha, possibly isolating, beginning the isolation effort around Mosul. But in the western part of 

Iraq I’m not optimistic that we will have done much to move ISIL 

forces out of that region. 

Chairman BURR. And doubtful that Mosul will change hands in 

this calendar year? 

General STEWART. I am not betting on that, Senator. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, General. 

General STEWART. I think it’ll be very difficult to both isolate and 

conduct a clearing operation that would look like the securing of 

Mosul this year. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, General Stewart. 

Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. Director Comey, I want to thank you. 

You really are a man of principle and you stand up for what you 

believe, and it’s very much appreciated. 

Last year, I think some of us received a report from the FBI in 

March of 2015 that showed that individuals on the FBI terrorist 

watch list attempted over a 10-year period to buy a gun or explosive over 2,000 times and they were successful 91 percent of the 

time. Could you describe the standard used by the FBI to make 

sure that only individuals who pose a threat to national security 

are placed on the FBI’s terrorist screening database? 

Director COMEY. Thank you, Senator. I’ll try and do it briefly. 

There’s an extensive process to vet the information around an individual to see if they meet our threshold, which I think is reason 

to believe—reasonable basis to believe they’re involved in terrorist 

activity, to then put them on the watch list. 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. Can you describe here the safeguards 

to ensure that the FBI minimizes false positives? That means making sure that innocent Americans aren’t placed on the terrorist 

screening database? 

Director COMEY. Probably in two directions. One from our own 

direction is a constant effort to make sure our records are accurate, 

because false positives simply waste our resources. Then from the 

other direction, in the last year the Department of Justice has driven the creation of a redress procedure. So if anyone thinks they 

were wrongly placed on the list, there’s a process through which 

they can challenge that. 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Brennan, I want to go back to Afghanistan for a minute. 

Talk a little bit about Al-Qaeda’s presence in the country and 

whether it’s increasing or not, and ISIL’s influence in the country. 

And how probable is the emergence of an ISIL stronghold in Afghanistan? 

Director BRENNAN. Al-Qaeda, there’s probably about maybe 100 

or so, somewhere in that area, of Al-Qaeda members in the eastern 

part of Afghanistan. The leader there is an individual by the name 

of Farouq Al-Qatari, and they have married up, as I said, with 

some of the other militant organizations in the area, including the 

Taliban. So they continue to ply their trade on the ground inside 

of Afghanistan. 

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But we’re concerned they can regenerate in that Afghan-Pak border region, which is why we need to maintain the intelligence collection, as well as working with our Afghan and Pak partners. 

ISIL has been able to take advantage of some elements within 

the Taliban that have been disenchanted with the organization. So 

ISIL is seen as a threat, certainly by Afghan officials. When I traveled over to Afghanistan just two months ago, it was one of the real 

concerns they had that ISIL is planting the flag in different parts 

of Afghanistan and they are now seen as a competer, a competitor, 

to some of the existing militant and terrorist organizations there. 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. Stop there. How do you assess that? 

Director BRENNAN. We assess it based on our—— 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. No, no, not the methodology. But in 

the vernacular, how big a deal is that? 

Director BRENNAN. It’s a concern. ISIL probably has several hundred members or so inside of Afghanistan, I would estimate. And 

it is distributed. They have had some setbacks there as they have 

gone up against some of the other militant organizations. But it is 

a concern. Just like we see these various franchises growing in 

places like Indonesia or Nigeria, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, we see the 

same thing in South Asia. 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. Some time ago we did a four-corners 

intelligence trip that went to Afghanistan and I had the privilege 

of spending some time with women parliamentarians. I was 

amazed at their strength and the fact that they were going to survive and the Taliban was not going to come back. 

Now, as I watch the developments happening there, the worry 

goes up and up and up, and you see these terrible things being 

done to women again, and also school children who happen to be 

girls. 

I wonder whether we can make sufficient progress in the next 

decade or so. Do you have any assessment on that? 

Director BRENNAN. As you point out, I think the Afghan people 

are a very resilient people. There have been thousands of Afghans 

who have given their lives for the future of that country. That’s 

why we want to continue to work very closely with them, their intelligence, security, military organizations that are there. They face 

a host of challenges. Foreign assistance is critically important both 

on the military front as well as on the economic side. 

But President Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah, they need to 

make sure that their government is able to address the concerns 

of the Afghan people across the broad range of areas. But as you 

point out, the Afghan people are some of the bravest people that 

we have—— 

Chairman BURR. As the Vice Chair has worked five questions 

into the one-question round, I don’t question the strength of 

women. I can assure you of that. 

Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will not incur the 

wrath of the Chairman. I will stick to one. 

Director Clapper, I wanted to ask you a question about 

encryption. I’m not sure you’re familiar with the report. Maybe already got it. It’s brand new, written by an independent group. It’s 

on encryption and the title of it is ‘‘Don’t Panic.’’ Matt Olsen, who 

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we all have enormous respect for, was very involved, the former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. 

I’m struck by this because I think when you get into the nuts 

and bolts of it, obviously encryption is available all around the 

world, often very cheaply. The basic thesis in this report is that, 

with wireless connectivity and sensors and the like, there are going 

to be more opportunities to prevent our country from going dark. 

My question to you would be: Because of Matt Olsen’s involvement and the experts involved in this, I would like to have your 

team take a look at this report and give us an analysis within an 

agreed-upon time, maybe 60 days. I would ideally like an unclassified version. Maybe if it has a classified annex that would be fine. 

Would that be something you could agree today? I think this is 

really a breakthrough report in my view, given the cross section of 

experts involved. Is that something that you could do for us? 

Director CLAPPER. Sure, we’ll do that. 

Senator WYDEN. Great. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you. I have one quick comment and one 

question. 

Director Clapper, there’s been a lot of praise heaped upon you 

today. I’d like to join in that. In my study of American history, the 

more I read the more I appreciate Washington, not for necessarily 

the war and the presiding over the Constitutional Convention, but 

his role as the first President, establishing precedents and sort of 

how this whole enterprise would function. 

I realize you’re not the first Director of National Intelligence, but 

I think by your tenure and your character and your intelligence 

and your experience you have served a similar function in really 

establishing how this entity should operate and will operate in the 

future. For that I want to profoundly compliment and thank you. 

I think you’ve helped to create an institution that will serve this 

country well for some period of time. That’s my comment. 

My question is a very broad one and I don’t think it’s one that 

we can answer here today. You comment in your report that Sunni 

violent extremism has been on an upward trajectory since the seventies. More groups have more safe havens than in any other time 

in history. We’ve killed 20,000 members of ISIS and yet we now 

know that more than 36,000 foreign fighters have gone to join ISIS. 

The point is we’re dealing with a hydra here, where we cut off 

one head and two grow back. I wonder if it isn’t time to stop and 

say, do we need a new strategy other than trying to just kill our 

enemies as they arise? I’m thinking of George Kennan and the 

strategy of containment, not saying that that’s the right strategy, 

but that there was a sort of comprehensive strategy rather than an 

ad hoc dealing with each individual attack or crisis. 

I would just suggest that it seems to me this would be a role 

maybe at the end of this administration or the beginning of the 

next administration, to think about how do we deal with Sunni extremism and how do we develop a strategy that involves other 

countries, particularly Sunni countries, that can try to get at the 

roots of this instead of just the tactics. 

Your thoughts? 

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Director CLAPPER. Senator King, I think you’ve hit on a very important, very crucial point. By the time you get into our business, 

where we’re trying to track down terrorists who are bent on doing 

harm to us, it’s way late. What really needs to be focused on are 

what are the fundamental systemic conditions that give rise to 

this? 

You can kind of rattle off: large ungoverned spaces, a place 

awash in weapons, the population bulge of young, unemployed and 

frustrated males to whom such propaganda appeals. What has to 

be gotten at fundamentally while we’re doing our thing of collecting 

intelligence and taking people off the battlefield is what are the 

root causes that give rise to this phenomenon of extreme jihadism. 

Senator KING. Thank you. I hope this discussion can continue. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator King. 

Senator Cotton. 

Senator COTTON. Is it one question or two minutes, whichever is 

longer? 

Chairman BURR. Whichever comes first. 

Senator COTTON. Can I take the Vice Chair? 

Vice Chairman FEINSTEIN. Oh, you get no sympathy from me. 

Senator COTTON. I had a long series of adversarial, prosecutorial 

questions for each of you that I now can’t ask since I’ll be stopped 

after the first one. 

Admiral Rogers, I will address briefly Section 702 of FISA, which 

expires, if I’m not mistaken, at the end of next year. Section 702 

authorizes the government to target non-U.S. persons reasonably 

believed to be outside the U.S. for purposes of acquiring foreign intelligence information. I believe that Section 702 is a vital national 

security tool. It’s constitutional. It has multiple layers of oversight. 

In 2012 DNI Clapper wrote to Congress requesting a straight reauthorization of Title 7, which would include 702. Do you believe 

that Congress should pass a straight reauthorization of Section 

702? 

Admiral ROGERS. I do believe we need to continue 702. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. I converted a long series of adversarial questions into a speech and then asked if you agreed with 

my speech. 

Chairman BURR. I will follow up the line of questioning just to 

say this, that the committee will take up 702 very quickly, not from 

the standpoint of the legislation, but from the standpoint of the 

preparation that we need to do in educating and having Admiral 

Rogers and others bring us up to speed on the usefulness and any 

tweaks that might have to be made. But I daresay this is something that I think Director Clapper has said before. We cannot do 

without this. This is absolutely crucial. It’s been at the centerpiece 

of a lot of things. 

If I could before we end go back to encryption since it was 

brought up. I’ve had more district attorneys come to me about the 

encryption issue than I have the individuals at this table. The district attorneys have come to me because they’re beginning to get 

to a situation where they can’t prosecute cases. This is town by 

town, city by city, county by county, and state by state. It ranges 

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from Cy Vance in New York to a rural town of 2,000 in North Carolina. 

It’s something we need to take seriously. One of the responsibilities of this committee is to make sure those of you at the table and 

those that complete the complement of our intelligence community 

have the tools through how we authorize that you need. The traditional tools I see as no different than I look at encryption and say 

we need to provide a tool for you to have the access to that information when the courts give you permission to do it. 

I could care less how that’s accomplished. It is I think the priority—and I think I can speak for the Vice Chairman. It is the priority of both of us that this be voluntary. But if in fact it’s not 

something we can achieve the balance on voluntarily, then I feel 

like it’s the committee’s responsibility to pursue it in any fashion 

we can, and I intend personally—I won’t commit the committee to 

do it—to pursue that, because I think it is invaluable in the future. 

I fear that this is not the toughest decision we’re going to make, 

based upon how technology might impact the world we’re in. 

The American people expect us, Director Comey, to this year exceed 72 individuals that you incarcerate before they commit a lone 

wolf event. You’re on track to probably do that, based upon the beginning of this year and based upon intent. I’m not sure that we 

can turn around and say, well, we only got 11 of them because we 

couldn’t see inside the communications of the other 60-some and, 

America, you’re out of luck. You won’t stand for it, I won’t stand 

for it, the American people won’t stand for it. 

So I hope—we’re working with the administration and hopefully 

we can all work towards the same end goal. 

I want to take one last opportunity to thank each of you, but, 

more importantly, the folks that work for you and work for the 

American people. At any given point in time, everybody at the table’s workforce has been challenged to work 24–7 to address events 

that happened over the worst times, I might say. Over the holidays 

as we went through Christmas, I can’t imagine what the Bureau 

was doing. I can’t imagine, Admiral Rogers, what you were going 

through. John, I can’t imagine what the CIA was going through, 

trying to track down the number of threat streams that were out 

there, and that culminates with Director Clapper. So I don’t think 

anybody had a real comfortable holiday season this year. But the 

fact is we got through it without an event, and I don’t think many 

of us would have bet that that would have been the outcome, but 

we did. And now we’re focused on tomorrow, not yesterday. 

My hope is that we will continue to do it and to do it successfully. With that, I will tell you how much we look forward to seeing 

all of you again on Thursday, and this hearing’s adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Æ 

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