alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Stewart v. Stewart

*J. Boyd Landis,*for plaintiff.

October 30, 1952.

Shughart, P. J.,

The above action in divorce was instituted by the filing of a complaint on November 28, 1950;

The master filed his report recommending that a decree in divorce be entered, on the ground of adultery, on April 27, 1951.

Apparently the case was thereafter placed on the argument list where it remained until October 27, 1952, when it was taken from the argument list and submitted to the court on praecipe by attorney for plaintiff.

*292From the foregoing, it appears that one and one-half years elapsed between the filing of the master’s report and the time that it was submitted to the court. No explanation for the delay in the prosecution of the action appears in the record.

Since the sole ground alleged was adultery it, of course, follows that cohabitation by the parties would result in condonation of the acts and, therefore, prevent the entry of a decree in divorce: Act of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237, sec. 52, 23 PS §52; Davis v. Davis, 145 Pa. Superior Ct. 473; Bowden v. Bowden, 161 Pa. Superior Ct. 150.

Under these circumstances, therefore, we feel that a decree in divorce should not be entered after this long delay without an affidavit by plaintiff, setting forth the reason for the delay and an averment that there has been no cohabitation between the. parties since the action was begun.

And further, so that defendant may have an opportunity to be heard on this matter, it is directed that a rule to show cause why a decree in divorce shall not be granted be issued upon defendant, and that a copy of this opinion be served upon her.

And now, October 30, 1952, at 2 p.m., it is ordered and directed that plaintiff in the above-captioned matter file an affidavit setting forth the reason for the delay in submitting the matter to the court, and including an averment that there has been no cohabitation between the parties from the date of the filing of the complaint to the present time.

It is further ordered and directed that a rule to show cause why a decree in divorce shall not be entered be issued on defendant, this rule to be returnable 10 days after service, and to be served upon defendant together with a copy of this opinion, by registered mail, return receipt requested.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 249 Agreed to Senate (ATS)]

103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. RES. 249

 To authorize testimony by an employee of the Senate and to authorize 
              representation by the Senate Legal Counsel.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

              August 15 (legislative day, August 11), 1994

Mr. Ford (for himself and Mr. Dole) submitted the following resolution; 
                   which was considered and agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
 To authorize testimony by an employee of the Senate and to authorize 
              representation by the Senate Legal Counsel.

Whereas, the Department of Justice has caused a subpoena to be issued for the 
        testimony of Mary Leblanc, an employee of the Senate on the staff of 
        Senator George J. Mitchell, as a witness in connection with a pending 
        investigation into potential fraud by private citizens in Farmers Home 
        Administration programs;
Whereas, by the privileges of the Senate of the United States and rule XI of the 
        Standing Rules of the Senate, no evidence under the control or in the 
        possession of the Senate can, by administrative or judicial process, be 
        taken from such control or possession but by permission of the Senate;
Whereas, when it appears that evidence under the control or in the possession of 
        the Senate is needed for the promotion of justice, the Senate will take 
        such action as will promote the ends of justice consistent with the 
        privileges of the Senate; and
Whereas, pursuant to sections 703(a) and 704(a)(2) of the Ethics in Government 
        Act of 1978, 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 288b(a) and 288c(a)(2), the Senate may 
        direct its counsel to represent employees of the Senate with respect to 
        subpoenas issued to them in their official capacities: Now, therefore, 
        be it
    Resolved, That Mary Leblanc is authorized to testify in conjunction 
with law enforcement investigations or related proceedings, except 
concerning matters for which a privilege should be asserted.
    Sec. 2. The Senate Legal Counsel is authorized to represent Mary 
Leblanc in connection with the testimony authorized by section 1 of 
this resolution.
                                 <all>
```
#### State of Connecticut *v.*John D. Heyward

*Otto J. Saur,*state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

*Herbert J. Bundock,*public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Argued May 5

decided May *5,*1964

The motion by the state to dismiss the appeal from the Superior Court in Fairfield County is denied.
#### Rubino and Company, Inc. *v.*Zoning Board *of*Appeals of the City of Norwalk

King, C. J., Murphy, Shea, Alcorn and Comley, Js.

Argued January 8

decided April 22, 1964

*Robert A. Slavitt,*with whom, on the brief, was *Abraham, D. Slavitt,*for the appellant (plaintiff).

*Edward J. Zamm,*corporation counsel, for the appellee (defendant).

Per Curiam.

The plaintiff seeks a certificate of approval for use as a motor vehicle junk yard of premises on which it now operates a general junk yard business as a nonconforming use in a No. 1 light industrial zone in Norwalk. In this zone, no junk yards or motor vehicle junk yards are permitted. Norwalk Zoning Ordinance, §§ 5 (37), 6 (17) (1929, as amended). A zoning board of appeals, in acting on an application for a certificate of approval of a location for a motor vehicle junk yard, must first certify that the proposed location is not within a district restricted against motor vehicle junk yards before it can consider the suitability of the location for the proposed use. General *707Statutes § 21-16. As the premises in the instant case are within a district restricted against motor vehicle junk yards, the zoning board of appeals could not have granted the plaintiff’s application for a certificate of approval. *Petrillo*v. *Board of Zoning Appeals,*147 Conn. 469, 472, 162 A.2d 508.

There is no error.
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 146 (Friday, July 31, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 38255]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-18370]



[[Page 38255]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 6719]


Culturally Significant Objects Imported for Exhibition 
Determinations: ``Arts of Ancient Viet Nam: From River Plain to Open 
Sea''

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: 
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 
(79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), Executive Order 12047 of March 27, 
1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 
Stat. 2681, et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), Delegation of 
Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, Delegation of Authority No. 236 
of October 19, 1999, as amended, and Delegation of Authority No. 257 of 
April 15, 2003 [68 FR 19875], I hereby determine that the objects to be 
included in the exhibition ``Arts of Ancient Viet Nam: From River Plain 
to Open Sea,'' imported from abroad for temporary exhibition within the 
United States, are of cultural significance. The objects are imported 
pursuant to loan agreements with the foreign owners or custodians. I 
also determine that the exhibition or display of the exhibit objects at 
the Museum of Fine Arts, Houston, TX, from on or about September 13, 
2009, until on or about January 3, 2010; Asia Society, New York, NY, 
from on or about February 2, 2010, until on or about May 2, 2010, and 
at possible additional exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, is 
in the national interest. Public Notice of these Determinations is 
ordered to be published in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, including a 
list of the exhibit objects, contact Julie Simpson, Attorney-Adviser, 
Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: (202-
453-8050). The address is U.S. Department of State, SA-44, 301 4th 
Street, SW., Room 700, Washington, DC 20547-0001.

    Dated: July 24, 2009.
C. Miller Crouch,
Acting Assistant Secretary, for Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
Department of State.
[FR Doc. E9-18370 Filed 7-30-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED JULY 15, 2021

NO. 03

- 19

- 00552

- CR

Jonathan Matthew Maldonado , Appellant

v.

The State of Texas , Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 274TH DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE BYRN E, JUSTICES BAKER AND TRIANA

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE BYRNE

This is an appeal from the judgments of conviction entered by the trial court. Having revie wed

the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error in the

trial court’s judgments of conviction

. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgments of

conviction

. Because appellant is indigent and u nable to pay costs, no adjudica t i on of costs

is made.
|   | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| September 10, 2009 | By:    | /s/ Daniel Pess                                                                |
|--------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|               |   | Daniel Pess                                                                    |
|               |   | President and Treasurer(Principal Executive, Financial and Accounting Officer) |
#### § 1.355-4 Non pro rata distributions, etc.

Section 355 provides for nonrecognition of gain or loss with respect to a distribution whether or not (a) the distribution is pro rata with respect to all of the shareholders of the distributing corporation, (b) the distribution is pursuant to a plan of reorganization within the meaning of section 368 (a) (1)(D), or (c) the shareholder surrenders stock in the distributing corporation. Under section 355, the stock of a controlled corporation may consist of common stock or preferred stock. (See, however, section 306 and the regulations thereunder.) Section 355 does not apply, however, if the substance of a transaction is merely an exchange between shareholders or security holders of stock or securities in one corporation for stock or securities in another corporation. For example, if two individuals, A and B, each own directly 50 percent of the stock of corporation X and 50 percent of the stock of corporation Y, section 355 would not apply to a transaction in which A and B transfer all of their stock of X and Y to a new corporation Z, for all of the stock of Z, and Z then distributes the stock of X to A and the stock of Y to B.

[T.D. 8238, 54 FR 296, Jan. 5, 1989]
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 108 Agreed to House (ATH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 108

  To correct technical errors in the enrollment of the bill H.R. 1594.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 17, 1995

 Mr. Goodling submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was 
                        considered and agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
  To correct technical errors in the enrollment of the bill H.R. 1594.

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That, in the enrollment of the bill (H.R. 1594) to place restrictions 
on the promotion by the Department of Labor and other Federal agencies 
and instrumentalities of economically targeted investments in 
connection with employee benefit plans, the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives shall, in section 5 of the bill, strike ``Nothing'' and 
all that follows through the end of such section and insert the 
following: ``Nothing in this Act is intended to affect the ability of 
the Department of Labor to issue advisory opinions, information 
letters, technical releases, prohibited transaction exemptions, or 
other pronouncements interpreting and applying the fiduciary 
responsibility rules of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 in relation to particular factual situations, or exempting 
specific transactions from the prohibited transaction provisions of 
such Act (pursuant to sections 406 and 408 of such Act (29 U.S.C. 1106, 
1108)).''.
                                 <all>
```
# C_2015089EN.01001001.xml

| 16.3.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 89/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 89/10

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul Sibiu (Romania) lodged on 23 December 2014 — Elena Delia Pondiche v The Romanian State and Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării

(Case C-608/14)

(2015/C 089/11)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Referring court

Tribunalul Sibiu

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Elena Delia Pondiche

Applicant:

Defendants: The Romanian State and Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării

Defendants:

Questions referred

Questions referred

| 1. | May social protection, the rights of the child and the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination as guaranteed in EU law by Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 20, 21(1), 24(1) and (2), 34 and 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Articles 3(1)(b) and 4 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems (1) be interpreted as precluding certain provisions of national law which limit, with no objective and reasonable justification, the amount of the child maintenance allowance on the basis of the date of birth of the child rather than the date of conception, even though that child, if born alive and viable, can be considered to have existed from that date? |
| --- | --- |

1.

May social protection, the rights of the child and the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination as guaranteed in EU law by Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 20, 21(1), 24(1) and (2), 34 and 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Articles 3(1)(b) and 4 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems (1) be interpreted as precluding certain provisions of national law which limit, with no objective and reasonable justification, the amount of the child maintenance allowance on the basis of the date of birth of the child rather than the date of conception, even though that child, if born alive and viable, can be considered to have existed from that date?

1

| 2. | Does Ordonanță de Urgență a Guvernului No 111/2010 introduce a measure discriminating between people who are in identical situations, that is to say, between children conceived and born before 31 December 2010 and children conceived before 31 December 2010 and born after that date? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Does Ordonanță de Urgență a Guvernului No 111/2010 introduce a measure discriminating between people who are in identical situations, that is to say, between children conceived and born before 31 December 2010 and children conceived before 31 December 2010 and born after that date?

---

(1)  Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems (Text with relevance for the EEA and for Switzerland) (OJ 2004 L 166, p. 1).

1

---
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 19

- 00109

- CV
City of Elsa, Texas v. Jesse Diaz
On Appeal from the 398th District Court of Hidalgo County , Texas Trial Cou rt Cause No. C

- 1344

- 12

- I

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this ca use on appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed

. The Court orders the appeal DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion . Costs of the appeal are adjudged against appellant. We further order this decision certified below for observance. April 2, 2020
#### PHŒNIX BRIDGE COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES.

[38 C. Cls. R., 492; 211 U. S. R., 188.]

*On the Claimant's Appeal.*

The claimant agrees to construct the Rock Island bridge according to plans and specifications. The specifications require a “ *draw-span,”*which is carried away, before completion, by a freshet. As the claimant is about to resume work it is advised by the officer in charge to substitute a “ *liftspan,"*so that there shall be no obstruction to navigation. The claimant objects to the advice upon the ground that the liftspan is not required by the contract and will involve serious additional expense. The officer insists. In carrying out the advice of the officer the claimant is put to the additional expense of $6,683. At the time of final payment a controversy exists as to the liability of the claimant for delay in the completion of the work and of the defendants for the extra cost of the liftspan.

The court below decides:

I.Where the ordnance officer in charge of the work of constructing a bridge advises or orders the contractor to put in a temporary “ *liftspan,”*the advice or order being given to meet the exigency of the immediate and unexpected opening of navigation in the river, his action is not obligatory upon the contractor, who, if he performs, can not recover the extra cost to which he has been subjected.

II.An unexpected freshet will not relieve a contractor from completing a bridge within the time within which he has agreed to complete the work. If a party contract to perform that which is possible and does not he is liable. It is only where an obligation is imposed by law and not by contract that an act of God or of the Government will excuse him for nonperformance.

III.Where- at the time of the final payment upon a contract each party asserts a liability upon the part of the other, payment of the full amount of the contract price by the defendants and the giving of a receipt by the claimant which acknowledges it as payment “ *in full for all charges, claims, adjustments, differences, or other alleged indebtedness incident to the work, or related to it,”*constitute a compromise, conclusive upon the claimant.

The decision of the court below is affirmed on a construction now given to the contract.

Mr. Justice "White delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court November 30, 1909.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7850 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7850

   To amend the Food Security Act of 1985 to provide a waiver to the 
payment limitation under the Environmental Quality Incentives Program, 
                        and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 29, 2024

   Ms. Tokuda (for herself, Mr. Moylan, and Mr. Case) introduced the 
   following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Food Security Act of 1985 to provide a waiver to the 
payment limitation under the Environmental Quality Incentives Program, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Eliminating Access Barriers to 
Conservation Act''.

SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON PAYMENTS.

    Section 1240G of the Food Security Act of 1985 (16 U.S.C. 3839aa-7) 
is amended--
            (1) by striking ``Not including payments made under'' and 
        inserting the following:
    ``(a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), not including 
payments made under''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(b) Waiver Authority.--In the case of a contract entered into 
under the program for projects in high-cost areas, including Alaska, 
Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto 
Rico, and the Virgin Islands, the Secretary may waive the payment 
limitation described in subsection (a).''.
                                 <all>
```
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-1318

CALVIN RUFFIN MALLORY, 

 Plaintiff – Appellant, 

 v. 

DEBORAH ATKINSON, Director, VA Hospital; DR. POINDEXTER, 

 Defendants – Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior 

District Judge. (3:09-cv-00139-RLW) 

Submitted: July 30, 2009 Decided: August 4, 2009 

Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. 

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Calvin Ruffin Mallory, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Calvin Ruffin Mallory seeks to appeal the district 

court’s dismissal of his complaint without prejudice because 

Mallory failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

8(a)(2), which requires “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and the 

district court’s October 4, 2002, order enjoining Mallory from 

filing pleadings that do not comport with certain requirements. 

 Generally, a district court’s dismissal of a complaint 

without prejudice is not appealable. See Domino Sugar Corp. v. 

Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir. 

1993) (holding that “a plaintiff may not appeal the dismissal of 

his complaint without prejudice unless the grounds for dismissal 

clearly indicate that no amendment in the complaint could cure 

the defects in the plaintiff’s case”) (internal quotation marks, 

alteration, and citation omitted). However, “if the grounds of 

the dismissal make clear that no amendment could cure the 

defects in the plaintiff's case, the order dismissing the 

complaint is final in fact and appellate jurisdiction exists.” 

Id. at 1066 (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation 

omitted). 

 In this case, Mallory may be able to save his action 

by amending his complaint to comply with Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8 and the district court’s October 4, 2002, order. 

2 
3 

Therefore, the district court’s dismissal of Mallory’s complaint 

without prejudice is not an appealable final order. 

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not air the decisional process. 

DISMISSED