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Filed 11/19/15 P. v. Holcomb CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Tehama)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RONALD LOY HOLCOMB,

Defendant and Appellant.

C079047

(Super. Ct. No. NCR89904)

Defendant Ronald Loy Holcomb pled guilty to felony possession of ammunition. 

Defendant also admitted to having two prior strike convictions within the meaning of the 

three strikes law. 

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 

his motion to dismiss one of his prior felony strike convictions. Defendant argues this 

abuse of discretion violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law and 

violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Finding no error 

in the trial court’s ruling, we affirm. 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 29, 2013, Tehama County sheriff’s deputies saw defendant standing 

next to the open door of a recently stolen pickup truck. The officers stopped defendant 

when he began to walk away from the truck toward “the back of a nearby apartment 

building.” After apprehending defendant, the officers determined he had a warrant for 

his arrest. The officers subsequently searched defendant and found a single bullet in his 

front pocket. Defendant claimed the ammunition came from change he received at a 

store he recently visited. 

When officers asked defendant about the stolen vehicle, he initially denied any 

knowledge of the truck, insisting he had simply been standing near it. This statement 

contradicted information provided by a woman the officers previously saw in the front

seat of the stolen truck. The woman told the officers that she and a friend asked 

defendant for a ride, and he picked the two of them up in the truck, but got out just before 

the officers arrived. After the officers confronted defendant with the information 

gathered from the woman, defendant admitted driving the truck for a short period of time 

to and from a store. Defendant later renounced his admission and again denied any 

responsibility for the truck. Subsequently, the officers searched the truck and found 

numerous types of ammunition in the driver’s side door pocket, along with a plastic 

replica handgun. The officers also located a pack of cigarettes that contained less than a 

tenth of a gram of methamphetamine and found a baggie containing 19.75 grams of 

marijuana on the center console. 

Defendant was charged with unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, possession of 

ammunition, and possession of a controlled substance. Each of the charges specifically 

alleged that defendant had been convicted of two prior serious or violent felonies under 

the three strikes law. Defendant pled guilty to possession of ammunition in exchange for 

dismissal of the two remaining counts. In his plea, defendant admitted the two prior

strikes, one of which resulted from a 1990 conviction for attempted second degree 
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murder and the second of which arose from a 1995 conviction for assault with a deadly 

weapon. 

Before sentencing, defendant submitted a Romero1 motion, requesting the court

dismiss his 1995 strike. The trial court denied defendant’s motion and sentenced him 

under the three strikes law to 25 years to life in prison. Defendant timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

I

The Romero Motion

Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to dismiss his 1995 

conviction. We disagree. In Romero, our Supreme Court held trial courts have discretion 

under Penal Code section 1385 to dismiss a prior strike when a court finds a defendant 

falls outside the spirit of the three strikes law. (Pen. Code, § 1385; People v. Superior 

Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529-530.) In deciding whether to exercise this 

discretion, the court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of 

his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the 

particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed 

outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he 

had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” 

(People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) 

A trial court’s “failure to . . . strike a prior [felony] conviction allegation is subject 

to review under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 

33 Cal.4th 367, 374.) “[A] trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a 

prior felony conviction allegation in limited circumstances.” (Id. at p. 378.) “In 

reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts. First, 

 

1 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
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‘ “[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing 

decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the 

trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve the legitimate sentencing objectives, and 

its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on 

review.” ’ [Citations.] Second, a ‘ “decision will not be reversed merely because 

reasonable people might disagree. ‘An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor 

warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’ ” ’ [Citation.] 

Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its discretion 

unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with 

it.” (Id. at pp. 376-377.) 

Defendant’s continuous criminal history supports the trial court’s decision not to 

dismiss his 1995 conviction. Defendant’s criminal record includes a 1987 felony 

conviction for receiving stolen property; a 1990 felony conviction for attempted second 

degree murder, for which he was sentenced to 13 years in prison; and a 1995 felony 

conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, for which he was sentenced to five years in 

prison, served consecutive to his 13 year sentence. After being released from prison in 

2003, defendant’s criminal behavior continued, resulting in a 2004 misdemeanor 

conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol; a 2008 misdemeanor conviction for 

reckless driving; a 2014 misdemeanor conviction for violating a domestic violence court 

order; a 2014 felony conviction of possession of a stolen vehicle; a 2014 misdemeanor 

conviction for disturbing the peace while on college or university grounds; and the 

present felony offense of possession of ammunition. While the trial court correctly noted 

a court cannot solely base its decision to deny a Romero motion on a defendant’s prior 

record, “extraordinary must the circumstance be by which a career criminal can be 

deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls once 

he commits a strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation of 

which the law was meant to attack.” (People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 338.) 
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Defendant asserts the combination of his individualized characteristics and 

predominantly nonviolent criminal history warranted a dismissal of his 1995 strike. 

Defendant argues his age (49), history of employment, financial responsibility in paying

off a prior restitution fine and child support obligations, and participation in substance 

abuse treatment and educational programs while in jail awaiting the current charges are 

individualized considerations that take him outside the spirit of the three strikes law. In 

addition, defendant emphasizes the nonviolent nature of the charged offense and the 

majority of his prior convictions. Defendant thus argues a dismissal of his previous strike 

was warranted and a failure to do so constituted an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 

We disagree. 

The record shows the trial court considered defendant’s criminal history and 

personal characteristics when deciding defendant’s motion to dismiss. In denying 

defendant’s Romero motion, the trial court stated defendant’s “background, character and 

prospects, along with his previous record” kept him within the spirit of the three strikes 

law. The trial court acknowledged that “even though the current offense [wa]s certainly

less in the grand scheme of things with regard to the defendant’s prior criminal record” 

and despite the fact “reasonable people could differ with regard to what the defendant’s 

criminal history indicates,” defendant “ha[d] shown a complete disregard . . . to the law 

[and] in following the direction that he [had been] given by the Court, Probation, parole, 

et cetera.” Although we acknowledge defendant has made some “strides toward leading 

a normal, productive life,” we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in 

concluding his continuous “disregard . . . to the law,” despite his attempts at betterment,

warranted a denial of his Romero motion. Given the high level of deference afforded to 

the trial court and defendant’s demonstrated inability to comply with the rules of society, 

we conclude the court’s decision was not “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable 

person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) 
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II

Constitutional Claims

Defendant’s constitutional argument amounts to a one-sentence claim that “[a] 

determination that the sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing essentially a life 

term under the Three Strikes law also requires reversal as a violation of [] defendant’s 

right to due process and the ban on cruel and unusual punishment.” We disagree, and our 

rejection of defendant’s contentions is three-fold. 

First and foremost, other than the cursory, aforementioned statement, defendant 

does not develop an argument for his claims, nor does he cite any relevant authority to 

support his contentions. Because he fails to “elaborate on these separate bases for relief,” 

we may decline to address his claims. (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 537, fn. 

6.) 

Secondly, “[i]t is elementary that [a] defendant waive[s] [an argument based on 

the U.S. Constitution] by failing to articulate an objection on federal constitutional 

grounds below.” (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 886.) After the trial court 

denied defendant’s Romero motion, he failed to bring any Eighth or Fourteenth 

Amendment objection to the attention of the trial court. To the contrary, defendant stated 

“[t]here [wa]s no legal cause why judgment [could not] be pronounced . . . [and he was] 

prepared to submit on the recommendation contained in the report in light of the Court’s 

ruling on the Romero motion.” Thus, the record clearly shows defendant never raised his 

constitutional objections in the trial court, and he has therefore forfeited those objections 

on appeal.

Lastly, defendant premised his constitutional argument upon a finding of abuse of 

discretion by the trial court. Defendant states, “[a] determination that the sentencing 

court abused its discretion . . . requires reversal as a violation of [] defendant’s right to 

due process and the ban on cruel and unusual punishment.” Because we conclude the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion, defendant’s argument is without merit. 
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

/s/ 

Robie, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/ 

Butz, J.

/s/ 

Hoch, J.