U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

65–006 PDF 2011

S. HRG. 111–893 

THE PROTECTIVE FORCES AT THE DEPARTMENT 

OF ENERGY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 3, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

THE PROTECTIVE FORCES AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

MARCH 3, 2010

Page 

Aloise, Eugene E., Director, Office of Natural Resources and Environment, 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 3 

Podonsky, Glenn S., Director, Office of Health, Safety, and Security, Department of Energy ..................................................................................................... 57 

Stumbo, Mike, President, National Council of Security Police ............................ 62 

(III) 

(1) 

THE PROTECTIVE FORCES AT THE 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 3, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in room 

SR–232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E. Benjamin 

Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Ben Nelson, Begich, and 

Vitter. 

Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel. 

Minority staff members present: Daniel A. Lerner, professional 

staff member; and Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Paul J. Hubbard. 

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant 

to Senator Byrd; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; 

Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions, and Michael T. Wong, 

assistant to Senator Vitter. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, 

CHAIRMAN 

Senator BEN NELSON. Well, good afternoon. I think we’ll go 

ahead and begin, because we’re going to be up against the full Senate Armed Services Committee beginning at 4:30, and I don’t want 

to delay getting to that. So, I call this hearing to order. 

Welcome to the hearing of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. 

I’d like to thank our witnesses for their flexibility in accommodating the scheduling needs of the full committee. We have an important briefing for the full committee, as I said, that we need to 

make time for, but had some difficulties in somehow getting things 

scheduled, but apparently we’ve been able to succeed. 

It’s with great irony and pleasure that, after a 3-year stint as 

chairman of the Personnel Subcommittee, that I note the first hearing in my new role as chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee is on a personnel matter once again. So, as Yogi Berra 

once said, it’s like deja vu all over again; here we are. 

The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for the security 

of nuclear weapons on DOE sites, tons of weapons-grade materials, 

mostly highly-enriched uranium and plutonium, and various weapons parts at various locations across the country. Even a small 

amount of this material, in the hands of a terrorist, could lead to 

a horrific result. 

2 

After the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the DOE reviewed the 

security of these sites, and their vulnerability to a terrorist attack, 

and came to the conclusion that the security needed to be increased. As a result, DOE adopted a new approach for the protective forces, shifting many of them to tactical response forces akin 

to a SWAT team. These new teams were trained in offensive combat tactics to move, train, communicate, and fight as a team. This 

was a major shift from the previous defensive posture that was 

taken at the sites. With this new focus came new rigorous training 

and other requirements which were not uniformly implemented at 

the various sites and, where implemented, became an issue for the 

protective forces. While the protective forces fully supported the 

need for the increased security, it quickly became apparent that 

the new requirement would be progressively difficult for older 

guard personnel to meet. 

At the same time, DOE had decided to reduce post-retirement 

healthcare benefits and eliminate defined-benefit retirement plans 

for new employees. This misalignment, as the GAO describes it, between the protective force personnel systems and the increased 

physical and other demands of a paramilitary operation, has become a significant concern, and one of the underlying causes for a 

44-day strike at the Pantex plant in 2007. 

The DOE protective forces are all contractors, with the management of the force varying from site to site. DOE orders establish 

the security requirements that each site must meet, but not how 

each site will meet those requirements. As a result of the growing 

concern over the protective forces, the security at the sites, and the 

strike at Pantex, this committee asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a comprehensive study of the management of the forces in the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2008. 

GAO completed this study on January 29, and today we’ll hear 

from Eugene Aloise, GAO Director, Natural Resources and Environment, on the findings and recommendations in the study. Also 

with us, are Glenn Podonsky, the Director of the Department of 

Energy Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS), the DOE Security Policy and Oversight Office, who has worked on these issues 

for many years, and Mike Stumbo, President of the National Council of Security Police, the union representing over 2,600 members 

of the protective force. 

We welcome each of you this afternoon, and look forward to getting a clear understanding of the issues and difficulties of ensuring 

that the Nation’s stockpile of nuclear weapons materials remains 

secure. 

When Senator Vitter arrives, we will ask him for any opening 

comments that we have. 

I would ask that each of our witnesses give a very short opening 

statement, perhaps 5 minutes, or thereabouts. We’ve received your 

prepared statements, and, without objection, they will all be included in the record, in their entirety. 

Mr. Aloise, we’ll begin with you, followed by Mr. Podonsky, and 

later by Mr. Stumbo. 

Mr. Aloise. 

3 

STATEMENT OF EUGENE E. ALOISE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 

NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. ALOISE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased 

to be here today to discuss issues with DOE’s protective forces. 

Over 2,300 heavily-armed protective forces provide security for 

DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) at 

6 sites, with long-term missions to store and process weapons-grade 

nuclear materials, DOE’s highest security threat. 

As mentioned, since September 11, DOE has sought to transform 

its protective forces into an elite fighting force, a tactical response 

force (TRF) with training and capabilities similar to the U.S. military. Protective force unions are concerned that TRF’s more demanding requirements threaten the ability of the forces to work 

until retirement age. 

My remarks today are based on a recently issued report (GAO– 

10–275) which shows that contractor protective forces are not uniformly managed, organized, staffed, trained, equipped, or compensated across the six DOE sites. These differences exist because 

the forces operate under separate contracts and collective bargaining agreements at each site, and because of DOE’s contracting 

approach, which allows each site to tailor security to site and mission needs. 

Since 2005, TRF has raised concerns in DOE security organizations, among protective force contractors, and force unions about 

the ability of the forces, especially older force members, to continue 

to meet DOE’s weapons, physical fitness, and medical qualifications. 

Adding to these concerns are DOE’s efforts to manage its longterm contractor post-retirement and pension liabilities which could 

negatively impact protective forces retirement eligibility and benefits. As mentioned, these concerns contributed to a 44-day strike in 

2007 by protective forces at the Pantex plant, where the assembly 

and disassembly of nuclear weapons occurs. 

According to union officials, failure to resolve TRF and retirement benefit issues could lead to strikes at three sites with over 

1,500 protective forces when their collective bargaining agreements 

end in 2012. 

Now, DOE has considered two principal options to more effectively manage its protective forces: improving the existing contractor system or creating a Federal protective force. 

In 2009, NNSA and DOE officials rejected federalization of protective forces because they believed it would be too costly and 

would provide little increase in security effectiveness. Instead, they 

supported the continued use of contractor forces, but with improvements. 

Our analysis shows that if the forces are well managed, either 

a contractor or a Federal force could result in effective and uniform 

security. Both options have offsetting advantages and disadvantages, with neither option emerging as clearly superior. A key disadvantage of the contractor system is the potential for strikes by 

contractor forces. However, according to NNSA’s Administrator, 

strikes can be effectively managed by the use of replacement forces. 

4 

1GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces’ Personnel System Issues, 

GAO–10–275 (Washington, DC: Jan. 29, 2010). 2We excluded three other DOE Category I SNM sites from our review because they are likely 

to downsize or downgrade their protective forces in the near future. These sites include the Office of Environmental Management’s Hanford Site, near Richland, WA, which recently transferred its highest value Category I SNM off site but will maintain lower value Category I SNM 

for the foreseeable future; NNSA’s Lawrence Livermore’s National Laboratory, in Livermore, 

CA, which plans to transfer its Category I SNM off site by the end of fiscal year 2012; and the 

Office of Science’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory, in Oak Ridge, TN, which plans to dispose 

of its Category I SNM by the end of fiscal year 2015. 

Reliably estimating the cost to compare the two options proved 

difficult and precluded our detailed reporting on it. Because contractor and Federal forces could each have numerous permutations, 

choosing any particular option to assess would be arbitrary. 

In March 2009, DOE commissioned a group to recommend ways 

to improve the protective force contractor personnel system. In 

June of last year, the group made 29 recommendations designed to 

enable protective force members to reach a normal retirement age 

within the forces, take another job within DOE, or transition to a 

non-DOE career. To date, action by DOE on these recommendations has been limited. 

In our view, DOE and its protective force contractors have not 

successfully aligned protective force systems with the increased 

physical and other demands of TRF. Without better alignment, 

there is a greater potential for strikes and potential risk to site security when collective bargaining agreements expire. 

DOE’s study group recommendations are a step forward: However, DOE faces the possibility of more strikes by its protective 

forces at some of its highest security-risk facilities if these issues 

are not resolved. Therefore, it is imperative that DOE resolve these 

issues soon, as recommended by our report and directed by the full 

committee in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2010. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks, and I would be happy 

to address any questions you or other members may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENE ALOISE

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Energy’s (DOE) contractor guards, also known as protective forces. My testimony is based on our recently released report Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces’ 

Personnel System Issues 1 and recent discussions with protective force union officials. 

Protective forces are a key component of security at DOE sites with special nuclear material (SNM), which the department considers its highest security risk. This 

material—including plutonium and highly enriched uranium—is considered to be 

Category I when it is weapons grade and in specified forms (e.g., nuclear weapons, 

nuclear weapons components, metals, and oxides) and quantities. The risks associated with Category I SNM include theft and the potential for sabotage through the 

use of a radioactive dispersal device, also known as a ‘‘dirty bomb.’’ Currently, DOE 

and its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), an agency within DOE 

responsible for the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons 

stockpile, have six contractor-operated sites that possess—and will possess for the 

foreseeable future—Category I SNM (sites with ‘‘enduring’’ missions).2 The six sites 

include four that NNSA is responsible for—the Los Alamos National Laboratory, in 

Los Alamos, NM; the Y–12 National Security Complex (Y–12), in Oak Ridge, TN; 

the Pantex Plant, near Amarillo, TX; and the Nevada Test Site, outside of Las 

Vegas, NV. In addition, DOE’s Office of Environmental Management is responsible 

5 

3The Office of Environmental Management is responsible for cleaning up former nuclear 

weapons sites, and the Office of Nuclear Energy is primarily responsible for nuclear energy research. 4 In 2008, DOE changed the name of its DBT (DOE Order 470.3A) to the Graded Security 

Protection policy (DOE 470.3B). 5DOE announced this initiative, originally known as ‘‘Elite Force’’ initiative in 2004, and 

began to formalize it into policy through the issuance of DOE Manual 470.4–3, Protective Force, 

in 2005. DOE revised this policy in 2006 with DOE Manual 470.4–3 Change 1, Protective Force. 

In 2008, DOE further revised this policy, which is now contained in DOE Manual 470.4–3A, 

Contractor Protective Force. 6Pub. L. No. 110–181 § 3124 (2008). 

for the Savannah River Site, near Aiken, SC, and DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy 

is responsible for the Idaho National Laboratory, near Idaho Falls, ID.3

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOE embarked on 

a multifaceted effort to better secure its sites with Category I SNM against a larger 

and more sophisticated terrorist threat by changing policies, such as its Design 

Basis Threat (DBT)—a classified document that specifies the potential size and capabilities of adversary forces that the sites must defend against.4 Protective forces, 

which accounted for slightly more than 50 percent of DOE’s $862 million for field 

security funding in fiscal year 2008, also have been an important focus of DOE security improvements. DOE has sought to improve the effectiveness of its protective 

forces by deploying security technologies, such as sensors capable of detecting adversaries at long ranges, and through the use of advanced weaponry, such as belt-fed 

machine guns and grenade launchers. In addition, DOE has sought to enhance protective forces’ tactical skills—the ability to move, shoot, and communicate in a combat environment—through its Tactical Response Force (TRF) initiative.5 Among 

other things, TRF revised the application of DOE’s existing protective force categories to emphasize tactical skills and instituted more rigorous weapons and physical fitness qualifications for many of DOE’s protective forces. 

However, protective force unions have been concerned that the planned implementation of TRF—with its potentially more demanding requirements—threatens the 

ability of protective forces to work until retirement age. These concerns contributed 

to a 44-day protective force strike at the Pantex Plant in 2007. The strike raised 

broader issues in DOE and Congress about the continued suitability of DOE’s model 

for managing its protective forces. Unionized protective forces can strike when their 

collective bargaining agreements end, and strikes may create security 

vulnerabilities at DOE’s sites with Category I SNM. In addition, DOE’s practice of 

managing its protective forces through separate contracts at each site could create 

disparities in protective force performance, pay, and benefits. In 2009, a DOE protective forces study group, composed of DOE and union representatives, made a 

number of recommendations that, while maintaining contractor protective forces, 

may better balance protective forces’ concerns over their careers with DOE’s need 

to provide effective security and control costs. 

In this context, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed us to report on the management of DOE’s protective forces at its sites with 

Category I SNM.6 Among other things, we (1) analyzed information on the management, organization, staffing, training and compensation of protective forces; (2) examined the implementation of TRF; (3) assessed DOE’s two options to more uniformly manage DOE protective forces; and (4) reported on DOE’s progress in addressing protective force issues. Our recent report Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to 

Address Protective Forces’ Personnel System Issues presents the full findings of our 

work and includes two recommendations to DOE to fully assess and implement, 

where feasible, recommendations made by DOE’s 2009 protective forces study group. 

DOE generally agreed with these recommendations. 

To obtain information on DOE’s contractor protective forces, we visited three of 

the sites with enduring Category I SNM missions—Pantex, the Savannah River 

Site, and Los Alamos National Laboratory—because each site represented one of the 

three different types of protective force contracts currently in place. We also met 

with protective force contractors, Federal site office officials, and protective force 

union representatives at these sites. We also distributed a data collection instrument to protective force contractors and Federal site office officials at each of these 

sites and at the other three sites with enduring Category I SNM missions—Y–12, 

the Nevada Test Site, and the Idaho National Laboratory. From this instrument, 

we received site information about the protective forces, the status of TRF and DBT 

implementations, views on DOE options for managing the protective forces, and the 

reliability of site data. Prior to this testimony, protective force union officials provided us with updated information. 

6 

7These types of contracts include: (1) direct contracts between protective force contractors and 

DOE or NNSA; (2) a component of management and operating (M&O) contracts between M&O 

contractors and DOE or NNSA; and (3) subcontracts between an M&O contractor and a protective force contractor. 8Other positions, such as trainers and alarm operators, constitute the remaining 3 percent 

of protective force positions. At some sites, personnel in such positions may be SPO qualified, 

and their positions are counted in the appropriate SO categories. All protective force numbers 

were current as of September 30, 2008. 9Pay rates were current as of September 30, 2008. 

We conducted our work from April 2008 to March 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, which require us to plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

PROTECTIVE FORCES ARE NOT UNIFORMLY MANAGED, ORGANIZED, STAFFED, TRAINED, 

OR COMPENSATED

Contractor protective forces—including 2,339 unionized officers and their 376 nonunionized supervisors—are not uniformly managed, organized, staffed, trained, or 

compensated across the 6 DOE sites we reviewed. For example, we found the following: 

• Three different types of protective force contracts are in use. These contract 

types influence how protective force operations are overseen by Federal officials 

and how protective force operations are coordinated with other site operations.7

• The size of sites’ protective forces ranges from 233 to 533 uniformed, unionized officers, and the composition of these forces and their associated duties and 

responsibilities vary based on their categorization. Protective forces are divided 

into four categories: 8

• Security Officer (SO): Responsible for unarmed security duties such as 

checking for valid security badges. SOs represent about 5 percent of total 

unionized protective forces. 

• Security Police Officer-I (SPO–I): Primarily responsible for protecting 

fixed posts during combat. SPO–Is represent about 34 percent of total 

unionized protective forces. 

• SPO–II: Primarily responsible for mobile combat to prevent terrorists 

from reaching their target but can also be assigned to fixed posts. SPO–IIs 

represent about 39 percent of total unionized protective forces. 

• SPO–III: Primarily responsible for mobile combat and special response skills, 

such as those needed to recapture SNM (on site) and recover SNM (off site) if 

terrorists succeed in acquiring it. SPO–IIIs are usually organized into special 

response teams, and SPO–IIIs represent about 19 percent of total unionized 

protective forces. 

• Each protective force has uniformed, nonunionized supervisors, but the duties, responsibilities, and ranks of these supervisors are generally site specific 

and not detailed in DOE’s protective force policies. 

• DOE policy mandates certain protective force training but allows sites some 

flexibility in implementation. For example, newly hired protective forces must 

complete DOE’s Basic Security Police Officer Training class, but these courses, 

offered by each of the sites we reviewed, range in length from 9 to 16 weeks. 

In addition, we found that one site had largely completed the implementation 

of most aspects of the TRF initiative, but others are not expecting to do so until 

the end of fiscal year 2011. 

• Pay, based on the site and the category of protective forces, ranges from nearly $19 per hour to over $26 per hour.9 Overtime pay, accrued in different ways 

at the sites, and other premium pay, such as additional pay for night shifts and 

holidays, may significantly increase protective force pay. 

• While all employers contributed to active protective force members’ medical, 

dental, and life insurance benefits, they differed in the amount of their contributions and in the retirement benefits they offered. In general, new hires 

were offered defined contribution plans, such as a 401(k) plan, that provides 

eventual retirement benefits that depend on the amount of contributions by the 

employer or employee, as appropriate, as well as the earnings and losses of the 

invested funds. At the time of our review, two sites offered new hires defined 

benefit plans that promised retirees a certain monthly payment at retirement. 

7 

10DOE Order 251.1C, Departmental Directives Program, specifies that DOE directives should 

focus on results by specifying the goals and requirements that must be met and, to the extent 

possible, refraining from mandating how to fulfill the goals and requirements. 11Our recent review showed that DOE’s policy for nuclear weapons security provides local officials with greater flexibility than the Department of Defense’s policy for determining how to best 

meet security standards and has a greater emphasis on cost-benefit analysis as a part of the 

decisionmaking process. See GAO, Homeland Defense: Greater Focus on Analysis of Alternatives 

and Threats Needed to Improve DOD’s Strategic Nuclear Weapons Security, GAO–09–828 

(Washington, DC: Sept. 18, 2009). 12GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE’s Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat, 

GAO–05–611 (Washington, DC: July 15, 2005). 13DOE’s combatant standards are defined by specific physical fitness, firearms, and medical 

qualifications. SPO–Is must meet defensive combatant standards, while SPO–IIs and SPO–IIIs 

must meet more demanding offensive combatant standards. 14We reviewed five DOE studies completed between 1992 and 2009, as well as responses to 

our data collection instrument, to identify these criteria. 

Two other sites had defined benefit plans that covered protective force members 

hired before a particular date but were not open to new hires. 

We found two primary reasons for these differences. First, protective forces at all 

six of the sites we reviewed operate under separate contracts and collective bargaining agreements. Second, DOE has a long-standing contracting approach of defining desired results and outcomes—such as effective security—instead of detailed, 

prescriptive guidance on how to achieve those outcomes.10 While creating some of 

the differences noted, this approach, as we have previously reported, allows security 

to be closely tailored to site- and mission-specific needs.11

TACTICAL RESPONSE FORCE IMPLEMENTATION HAS RAISED CONCERNS ABOUT THE

LONGEVITY OF PROTECTIVE FORCES CAREERS

Since its inception in 2005, TRF has raised concerns in DOE security organizations, among protective force contractors, and in protective force unions about the 

ability of protective forces—especially older individuals serving in protective forces— 

to continue meeting DOE’s weapons, physical fitness, and medical qualifications. As 

we reported in 2005,12 some site security officials recognized they would have to 

carefully craft career transition plans for protective force officers who may not be 

able to meet TRF standards. Adding to these concerns are DOE’s broader efforts to 

manage its long-term postretirement and pension liabilities for its contractors, 

which could have a negative impact on retirement eligibility and benefits for protective forces. In 2006, DOE issued its Contractor Pension and Medical Benefits Policy 

(Notice 351.1), which was designed to limit DOE’s long-term pension and postretirement liabilities. A coalition of protective force unions stated that this policy moved 

them in the opposite direction from their desire for early and enhanced retirement 

benefits. 

Concerns over TRF implementation and DOE’s efforts to limit long-term pension 

and postretirement liabilities contributed to a 44-day protective force strike at the 

Pantex Plant in 2007. Initially, Pantex contractor security officials designated all of 

the plant’s protective force positions as having to meet a more demanding DOE combatant standard,13 a move that could have disqualified a potentially sizable number 

of protective forces from duty. Under the collective bargaining agreement that was 

eventually negotiated in 2007, some protective forces were allowed to meet a less 

demanding combatant standard. DOE has also rescinded its 2006 Contractor Pension and Medical Benefits Policy. However, according to protective force union officials, failure to resolve issues surrounding TRF implementation and retirement benefits could lead to strikes at three sites with large numbers of protective forces— 

Pantex, the Savannah River Site, and Y–12—when their collective bargaining agreements expire in 2012. 

EITHER IMPROVING THE EXISTING CONTRACTOR FORCES SYSTEM OR CREATING A FED- ERAL FORCE COULD RESULT IN MORE UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF PROTECTIVE FORCES

To manage its protective forces more effectively and uniformly, over the past decades DOE has considered two principal options—improving elements of the existing 

contractor system or creating a Federal protective force. We identified five major criteria that DOE officials, protective force contractors, and union officials have used 

to assess the advantages and disadvantages of these options.14 Overall, in comparing these criteria against the two principal options, we found that neither contractor nor Federal forces seems overwhelmingly superior, but each has offsetting 

advantages and disadvantages. Either option could result in effective and more uniVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:45 Mar 10, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\65006.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
8 

form security if well-managed. However, we identified transitional problems with 

converting the current protective force to a federalized force. 

When assessing whether to improve the existing contractor system or federalize 

protective forces, DOE, protective force contractors, and union officials have used 

the following five criteria: 

• A personnel system that supports force resizing and ensures high-quality 

protective force members. 

• Greater standardization of protective forces across sites to more consistently support high performance and ready transfer of personnel between 

sites. 

• Better DOE management and oversight to ensure effective security. 

• Prevention or better management of protective force strikes. 

• Containment of the forces’ costs within expected budgets. 

Evaluating the two principal options—maintaining the current security 

force structure or federalizing the security force—against these criteria, we 

found that if the forces are well-managed, either contractor or Federal 

forces could result in effective and more uniform security for several reasons: 

• First, both options have offsetting advantages and disadvantages, with 

neither option emerging as clearly superior. When compared with a possible 

federalized protective force, a perceived advantage of a contractor force is 

greater flexibility for hiring or terminating an employee to resize the forces; 

a disadvantage is that a contractor force can strike. In contrast, federalization could better allow protective forces to advance or laterally transfer to 

other DOE sites to meet protective force members’ needs or DOE’s need to 

resize particular forces, something that is difficult to do under the current 

contractor system. 

• Second, a key disadvantage of the current contractor system, such as potential strikes for contractor forces, does not preclude effective operations 

if the security force is well-managed. For instance, a 2009 memo signed by 

the NNSA administrator stated that NNSA had demonstrated that it can 

effectively manage strikes through the use of replacement protective forces. 

• Third, distinctions between the two options can be overstated by comparing worst- and best-case scenarios, when similar conditions might be realized under either option. For example, a union coalition advocates federalization to get early and enhanced retirement benefits, which are available for law enforcement officers and some other Federal positions, to ensure a young and vigorous workforce. However, such benefits might also be 

provided to contractor protective forces. 

Reliably estimating the costs to compare protective force options proved 

difficult and precluded our detailed reporting on it. Since contractor and 

Federal forces could each have many possible permutations, choosing any 

particular option to assess would be arbitrary. For example, a 2008 NNSAsponsored study identified wide-ranging federalization options, such as federalizing all or some SPO positions at some or all facilities or reorganizing 

them under an existing or a new agency. In addition, DOE would have to 

decide on the hypothetical options’ key cost factors before it could reasonably compare costs. For example, when asked about some key cost factors 

for federalization, an NNSA Service Center official said that a detailed 

workforce analysis would be needed to decide whether DOE would either 

continue to use the same number of SPOs with high amounts of scheduled 

overtime or hire a larger number of SPOs who would work fewer overtime 

hours. Also, the official said that until management directs a particular 

work schedule for federalized protective forces, there is no definitive answer 

to the applicable overtime rules, such as whether overtime begins after 8 

hours in a day. The amount of overtime and the factors affecting it are crucial to a sound cost estimate because overtime pay can now account for up 

to about 50 percent of pay for worked hours. 

FEDERALIZING PROTECTIVE FORCES COULD CREATE DIFFICULTIES EITHER UNDER

CURRENT LAWS OR WITH SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR ENHANCED RETIREMENT BENEFITS

If protective forces were to be federalized under existing law, the current forces 

probably would not be eligible for early and enhanced retirement benefits and might 

face a loss of pay or even their jobs. For example: 

9 

15OPM is the central human resources agency for the Federal government. 16 NNSA’s Service Center provides business, technical, financial, legal, human resources, and 

management support to NNSA site organizations. 

• According to officials at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 15

and NNSA’s Service Center,16 if contractor SPOs were federalized under existing law, they would likely be placed into the Federal security guard (GS– 

0085) job series. Although a coalition of unions has sought federalization to 

allow members to have early and enhanced retirement benefits, which allows employees in certain Federal jobs to retire at age 50 with 20 years of 

service, Federal security guards are not eligible for these benefits. 

• Our analysis indicated transitioning protective force members may receive lower pay rates as Federal security guards. Contractor force members 

receive top pay rates that could not generally be matched under the likely 

General Schedule pay grades. 

• If protective forces were federalized, OPM officials told us that current 

members would not be guaranteed a Federal job and would have to compete 

for the new Federal positions; thus, they risk not being hired. Nonveteran 

protective force members are particularly at risk because competition for 

Federal security guard positions is restricted to those with veterans’ preference, if they are available. 

According to OPM officials, legislation would be required to provide Federal protective forces with early and enhanced retirement benefits because their positions 

do not fit the current definition of law enforcement officers that would trigger such 

benefits. However, if such legislation were enacted, these benefits’ usual provisions 

could create hiring and retirement difficulties for older force members. Older members might not be rehired because agencies are typically authorized to set a maximum age, often age 37, for entry into Federal positions with early retirement. In 

addition, even if there were a waiver from the maximum age of hire, older protective 

forces members could not retire at age 50 because they would have had to work 20 

years to meet the Federal service requirement for ‘‘early’’ retirement benefits. These 

forces could retire earlier if they were granted credit for their prior years of service 

under DOE and NNSA contracts. However, OPM officials told us OPM would 

strongly oppose Federal retirement benefits being granted for previous years of contractor service (retroactive benefits). According to these officials, these retroactive 

benefits would be without precedent and would violate the basic concept that service 

credit for retirement benefits is only available for eligible employment at the time 

it was performed. Moreover, retroactive benefits would create an unfunded liability 

for Federal retirement funds. 

DOE SEEKS TO ADDRESS PROTECTIVE FORCE ISSUES BY REFORMING CONTRACTOR

FORCES, BUT PROGRESS HAS BEEN LIMITED TO DATE

In a joint January 2009 memorandum, senior officials from NNSA and DOE rejected the federalization of protective forces as an option and supported the continued use of contracted protective forces—but with improvements. They concluded 

that, among other things, the transition to a Federal force would be costly and 

would be likely to provide little, if any, increase in security effectiveness. However, 

these officials recognized that the current contractor system could be improved by 

addressing some of the issues that federalization might have resolved. In particular, 

they announced the pursuit of an initiative to better standardize protective forces’ 

training and equipment. According to these officials, more standardization serves to 

increase effectiveness, provide cost savings, and facilitate better responses to potential work stoppages. In addition, in March 2009, DOE commissioned a study group 

to recommend ways to overcome the personnel system problems that might prevent 

protective force members from working to a normal retirement age, such as 60 to 

65, and building reasonable retirement benefits. 

In addition, NNSA established a Security Commodity Team to establish standardized procurement processes and to identify and test security equipment that can be 

used across sites. According to NNSA officials, NNSA established a common mechanism in December 2009 for sites to procure ammunition. In addition, to move toward more standardized operations and a more centrally managed protective force 

program, NNSA started a broad security review to identify possible improvements. 

As a result, according to NNSA officials in January 2010, NNSA has developed a 

draft standard for protective force operations, which is intended to clarify both policy expectations and a consistent security approach that is both effective and efficient. 

10 

For the personnel system initiative to enhance career longevity and retirement options, in June 2009, the DOE-chartered study group made 29 recommendations that 

were generally designed to enable members to reach a normal retirement age within 

the protective force, take another job within DOE, or transition to a non-DOE career. The study group identified 14 of its 29 career and retirement recommendations 

as involving low- or no-cost actions that could conceivably be implemented quickly. 

For example, some recommendations call for reviews to find ways to maximize the 

number of armed and unarmed positions that SPOs can fill when they can no longer 

meet their current combatant requirements. Other recommendations focus on providing training and planning assistance for retirement and job transitions. The 

study group also recognized that a majority (15 out of 29) of its personnel system 

recommendations, such as enhancing retirement plans to make them more equivalent and portable across sites, may be difficult to implement largely because of 

budget constraints. 

Progress on the 29 recommendations had been limited at the time of our review. 

When senior department officials were briefed on the personnel system recommendations in late June 2009, they took them under consideration for further action but immediately approved one recommendation—to extend the life of the study 

group by forming a standing committee. They directed the standing committee to 

develop implementation strategies for actions that can be done in the near term 

and, for recommendations requiring further analysis, additional funding, or other 

significant actions, to serve as an advisory panel for senior department officials. According to a DOE official in early December 2009, NNSA and DOE were in varying 

stages of reviews to advance the other 28 recommendations. Later that month, 

NNSA addressed an aspect of one recommendation about standardization, in part 

by formally standardizing protective force uniforms. In the Conference Report for 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the conferees directed 

the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the NNSA to develop a comprehensive DOE-wide plan to identify and implement the recommendations of the 

study group. 

In closing, while making changes to reflect the post-September 11 security environment, DOE and its protective force contractors through their collective bargaining agreements have not successfully aligned protective force personnel systems—which affect career longevity, job transitions, and retirement—with the increased physical and other demands of a more paramilitary operation. Without better alignment, in our opinion, there is greater potential for a strike at a site, as well 

as potential risk to site security, when protective forces’ collective bargaining agreements expire. In the event of a strike at one site, the differences in protective forces’ 

training and equipment make it difficult to readily provide reinforcements from 

other sites. Even if strikes are avoided, the effectiveness of protective forces may 

be reduced if tensions exist between labor and management. These concerns have 

elevated the importance of finding the most effective approach to maintaining protective force readiness, including an approach that better aligns personnel systems 

and protective force requirements. At the same time, DOE must consider its options 

for managing protective forces in a period of budgetary constraints. With these considerations in mind, DOE and NNSA have recognized that the decentralized management of protective forces creates some inefficiencies and that some systemic career and longevity issues are not being resolved through actions at individual sites. 

NNSA’s standardization initiatives and recommendations made by a DOE study 

group offer a step forward. However, the possibility in 2012 of strikes at three of 

its highest risk sites makes it imperative, as recommended by our report and directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, that DOE 

soon resolve the issues surrounding protective forces’ personnel system. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee have. 

11 


303str1.eps
12 


303str2.eps
13 


303str3.eps
14 


303str4.eps
15 


303str5.eps
16 


303str6.eps
17 


303str7.eps
18 


303str8.eps
19 


303str9.eps
20 


303str10.eps
21 


303str11.eps
22 


303str12.eps
23 


303str13.eps
24 


303str14.eps
25 


303str15.eps
26 


303str16.eps
27 


303str17.eps
28 


303str18.eps
29 


303str19.eps
30 


303str20.eps
31 


303str21.eps
32 


303str22.eps
33 


303str23.eps
34 


303str24.eps
35 


303str25.eps
36 


303str26.eps
37 


303str27.eps
38 


303str28.eps
39 


303str29.eps
40 


303str30.eps
41 


303str31.eps
42 


303str32.eps
43 


303str33.eps
44 


303str34.eps
45 


303str35.eps
46 


303str36.eps
47 


303str37.eps
48 


303str38.eps
49 


303str39.eps
50 


303str40.eps
51 


303str41.eps
52 


303str42.eps
53 


303str43.eps
54 


303str44.eps
55 


303str45.eps
56 

Senator BEN NELSON. Okay. 

Senator Vitter, there are two votes starting at 2:45 p.m., so if we 

could, maybe we could finish the other opening statements, go vote, 

and then come back and you can give us some opening statements. 

Senator VITTER. Sure. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Okay. 

Mr. Podonsky. 


303str46.eps
57 

STATEMENT OF GLENN S. PODONSKY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 

HEALTH, SAFETY, AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. PODONSKY. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Vitter, 

thank you for inviting me to testify about the Department of Energy’s efforts to address the career-related concerns of our protective 

force. 

This hearing comes at a critical junction in the Department’s 

longstanding efforts to evaluate the tactical capabilities of the protective forces supported by career and retirement opportunities 

commensurate with the professionalism we’ve come to expect. 

When the Department was created, protective forces were essentially industrial security gate guards. In the early 1980s, the Department acknowledged the potential for more serious terrorist 

threats, and began a dramatic effort to ramp up the tactical capabilities of its protective forces. This was accompanied by increasing 

performance expectations for the protective force members. Compensation and benefits improved, but did not always keep pace 

with the increasing demands of the job. 

In the 1990s, cuts in the protective force numbers became part 

of the post-Cold War peace dividend. The events of September 11 

ushered in a new focus on security across the DOE and the Nation, 

and a new emphasis on protective forces. The Department needed 

a security posture able to meet much greater challenges, including 

the need for more tactical capability security forces. 

In 2004, I recommended to Secretary Abraham that he create an 

initiative called the Elite Force, which included federalization of 

the protective force. The Elite Force concept is currently known as 

the DOE’s TRF Initiative. The results, in terms of capabilities of 

this initiative, have been impressive, but a practical and affordable 

path towards improving protective force service as a career has not 

occurred. 

Studies conducted in 2004 identified federalization of the Department’s protective force as the preferred option, but acknowledged 

that no realistic path forward toward this goal existed. The National Council of Security Police (NCSP) came to support federalization as a means of advancing its program for improved career progression and retirement benefits, but there still seemed to 

be no viable and affordable means for the DOE to actually implement this concept. 

Among the difficulties was the need for complex changes to legislation and regulations to enable a federalization process that would 

protect incumbents and/or classify personnel as law enforcement. 

At the time, congressional interest in making the complex legislative changes necessary was not apparent, so the Department felt 

that most of the major issues should be addressed in some manner 

under the current contract protective force model. 

In 2009, I chartered a broad-base protective force career options 

study group to address protective force concerns, composed of experts and DOE security professionals and leaders from the NCSP. 

That group made 29 recommendations. The GAO’s January 2010 

study (GAO–10–275) of protective force personnel issues seemed to 

support the recommendations by recommending that the Department respond to each of them. 

58 

We have since created the Protective Force Career Options Committee to assist policy and line organizations in implementing the 

study group recommendations. The Department has drawn together its best expertise to develop an appropriate implementation 

plan for these recommendations. 

I would like to take a moment here just to offer a special thank 

you to the NCSP and the protective force union leaders for their 

dedicated and cooperative efforts over the last year to not only help 

us identify the problems, but also the potential solutions. 

Consistent with Secretary Chu’s management principle to treat 

our people as our greatest asset, the Department’s actions reflect 

a commitment to identify and promote efforts to ensure members 

of the protective forces are treated in a manner consistent with 

their vital role and in recognition of professional demands of that 

role entailing. 

While the Department can cite gains in implementing security 

initiatives that provide more robust asset protection, we have not 

yet made similar progress in efforts to address all concerns of the 

protective force members regarding career prospects and related 

issues. 

Much of the lack of progress actually speaks to the complexity 

and difficulty in resolving these issues. The DOE and NNSA are, 

in fact, addressing the recommendations associated with response 

planning, deployment strategy, force restructuring, training needs, 

and standardization of protective force weapons, equipment, and 

uniforms. Our national training center in Albuquerque is developing the curricula for protective force career progression and career transition training. 

My office is also in the process of reviewing recommendations 

dealing with protective force physical fitness standards, medical requirements, and human reliability program. 

Most of the remaining recommendations involve the very difficult 

issue of retirement, mobility among contractors, disability retirement, and retraining and placement outside the protective force. 

These areas are further complicated because they are mostly defined in collective bargaining agreements between the contractors 

and the unions. 

The Department should explore ways to craft a comprehensive, 

standardized approach to protective force career progression and 

retirement issues that will ensure that protective force members, 

regardless of location, are treated equitably and with the assurance 

that neither age nor injury will unfairly disadvantage them, in 

comparison with the larger departmental workforce. 

For example, Mr. Chairman, the Department could consider pursuing a program similar to the benefits allowed for beryllium workers under 10 CFR 850. That would provide retraining and transfer 

or 2 years’ saved pay benefits to protective force personnel who are 

injured or are otherwise unable to meet physical standards. 

While my office will continue to assist in resolving these complex 

issues, by their very nature and inherent cost and contractual implications, alternate resolution is clearly within the purview of the 

line management. In this regard, I should also emphasize that line 

management is also deeply engaged alongside HSS, my organization, in this task. 

59 

In conclusion, the protective force is critical to DOE’s overall protection, and it is the Department’s and the Nation’s best interest 

to ensure that protective force personnel are treated equitably, and 

that their legitimate concerns are addressed to the greatest possible extent. 

We conducted studies on this topic in 1992, 1997, 2004, and 

2008. DOE is moving to address those issues that can be resolved 

within existing operation on resource constraints. Fair resolutions 

to the more complex and difficult issues will require cooperation 

and compromise by all the principals involved—line management, 

the unions, and Congress. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Podonsky follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GLENN S. PODONSKY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: thank you for inviting me to testify 

on the Department of Energy’s (DOE) efforts to deal with the interdependence and 

complexity of protective force personnel issues, contracting requirements, and security needs at our national security facilities. Specifically, we must fairly address the 

reasonable concerns of protective force personnel for clear and attainable career 

paths to retirement, yet also balance those desires with the Department’s need to 

maintain forces capable of securing our facilities in a cost effective manner. The Department has been pursuing ways to address these overlapping needs for many 

years. 

BACKGROUND

As early as 2003, my office recognized a number of concerns associated with the 

Department’s contractor protective force model. Some concerns were expressed by 

protective force members and their unions, and others by the Department’s security 

and line managers. Personnel concerns included issues such as the lack of a career 

path that protective force personnel could reasonably be assured of until retirement, 

nominally at age 65, as well as the lack of alternative positions available to personnel who, due to job-related injuries, other disabilities, or advancing age, could 

no longer meet the physical standards required for armed positions. Management’s 

concerns with the contractor force model included the very real potential for protective force strikes at the expiration of collective bargaining agreements and the inefficiencies associated with a lack of standardization among protective forces’ weapons, equipment, and training. 

The opportunity to consider and, hopefully, act on these issues was one factor in 

our efforts to have then Secretary Abraham include protective force upgrades prominently in his May 2004 comprehensive package of security initiatives. The protective 

force element of the security initiative was referred to at the time as the ‘‘elite force’’ 

initiative and recognized the need to respond to revised perceptions of the post-September 11 threat environment by transitioning some protective force elements toward a more combat-capable status that included mobile response and increased offensive combat capabilities. 

In response to the Deputy Secretary’s June 2004 direction to develop options to 

implement the elite force initiative—direction which specifically included examining 

possible federalization of protective forces—my office and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) tasked a Protective Force Working Group to study 

the inherent issues. The Working Group issued papers in August and October 2004, 

and their recommendations included federalization of the protective forces. The 

Working Group’s federalization position was based on perceived principles associated with elevating protective forces to levels of equal status and capability with the 

nation’s elite military units; it was not accompanied by a cost/benefit analysis or a 

plan for achieving federalization. Initial analysis of the federalization issue indicated that while federalization offered potential benefits, it also posed significant 

difficulties. 

Based largely on the results of the working group, in January 2005 the Department identified its chosen path forward for implementing the elite force initiative. 

Phase I included actions to enhance policy, tactical planning, training and readiness, physical standards, and use of security technology. The issue of federalization 

was deferred, to avoid creating instability during a time of already profound change 

affecting the protective forces, and also because the Department had concluded that 

60 

the major benefits of federalization could be achieved within the contractor protective forces model so long as the contractors and the unions supported the effort to 

establish and maintain an elite force. 

In March 2006, the Department promulgated major policy changes to implement 

the elite force concept, which had become known as the Tactical Response Force concept. Initial misinterpretation of these changes led to perceptions that a much larger 

proportion of protective force personnel would be compelled to meet the more demanding offensive combatant physical standard. This prospect caused concern 

among some protective force personnel and their unions; the changes were seen as 

exacerbating longstanding concerns regarding the ability of aging or disabled personnel to meet increased physical performance requirements, and hence to remain 

on the job until retirement age. Protective forces unions voiced increasing support 

for federalization in the belief that it would include provisions for an early retirement program as well as other benefits associated with existing Federal law enforcement programs. A strike by the Pantex Guard Union in the spring of 2007 was influenced in part by a narrow interpretation of the new requirements of the proposed 

Tactical Response Force. 

In March 2008, NNSA received the results of a study—‘‘Comparative Analysis of 

Contractor and Federal Protective Forces At Fixed Sites’’—it had commissioned to 

examine the contract force/federalization issue. In June 2008 NNSA received a follow on ‘‘Cost Analysis and Modeling’’ supplement to the initial report. The study and 

supplement concluded that key union assumptions about federalization—such as 20 

year retirement, automatic hiring of incumbents, and portability or grandfathering 

of retirement benefits—could not occur under current law; converting contract protective forces ‘‘en masse’’ to Federal forces would require extensive new legislation. 

As the issue of federalization was examined, it became clear that federalization 

would be difficult and would potentially have negative consequences for many current protective force members. Federalization of the private sector contractor force 

would require more complex legislation, for example, than had an earlier successful 

effort to give nuclear materials couriers, who were already Federal employees, retirement benefits equivalent to law enforcement officers under the Civil Service Retirement System and the Federal Employees’ Retirement System. 

The NNSA-commissioned analyses also confirmed that many of the concerns associated with the contract force model could be addressed constructively within that 

model. DOE management including NNSA, decided not to pursue federalization, but 

rather to address identified problems within the private, contractor force model. In 

January 2009, the Deputy Secretary was informed of the proposed path forward— 

not to federalize the protective forces but to implement standardized procedures and 

practices at NNSA Category I facilities which would provide the major benefits of 

federalization while maintaining contractor protective forces. 

Although the Department does not consider the federalization model the best option for meeting its security needs, it remains committed to addressing the major 

career path and retirement-related concerns of its contractor protective forces, as expressed through their unions and the National Council of Security Police, an umbrella organization made up of DOE protective force bargaining units. Consequently, 

in March 2009 the Office of Health, Safety and Security commissioned a Protective 

Force Career Options Initiative Study Group to examine realistic and reasonable options for improving the career opportunities and retirement prospects of protective 

force members while maintaining a robust and effective security posture. Response 

to this initiative was positive: representation on the Study Group included the National Council of Security Police (represented in the hearing today by Mike Stumbo), 

my office, NNSA, and other DOE headquarters program offices. In June of last year, 

the Study Group made 29 recommendations; 14 are considered to be cost neutral 

and achievable under existing governance structures while the other 15 involve additional program costs and/or changes to existing management and contractual approaches. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the 

Department to develop and submit to Congress by April 30, 2010, a comprehensive 

Department-wide plan to implement the Study Group recommendations. We intend 

to submit that plan on time. 

In July 2009, and consistent with one of the Study Group recommendations, we 

created the Protective Force Career Options Committee as a standing committee 

tasked with continuing the work of the Study Group by assisting DOE in implementation of the Study Group’s recommendations. 

In January 2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) published the results of a Congressionally mandated study of the management of DOE protective 

forces. The GAO study recommends that DOE respond to the 29 recommendations 

of the DOE Study Group by developing and executing implementation plans for 

those recommendations identified as low- or no-cost, and by planning and conVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:45 Mar 10, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\65006.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
61 

ducting research to identify the most beneficial and financially feasible options for 

implementing the remaining recommendations that may involve substantial costs or 

contractual and organizational changes. The Department has concurred with the 

findings and recommendations of the GAO report. 

CURRENT STATUS

This brings us to the current status of our efforts to address the situation and 

my assessment of what we have accomplished and what remains to be accomplished. First, the Office of Health, Safety and Security remains committed to assisting the Department in providing levels of security at our facilities that are consistent with the assets in our custody and our understanding of the most current 

national threat environment. That commitment includes an effort to identify and 

promote the necessary actions to ensure that the protective forces are treated in a 

manner consistent with their vital role and the heavy professional demands it imposes. 

The Department has made significant progress at considerable cost in its efforts 

to provide its protective forces with the tactical and technical tools required to implement the Tactical Response Force concept and ensure mission success; some of 

those efforts remain works in progress. The Department has made significant investments in physical security upgrades such as barriers, advanced sensor systems, 

and hardened defensive positions; in advanced, more capable and longer range 

weapons systems and tactical equipment; in defensive strategies and tactical planning to field the Tactical Response Force concept to advantage; and in tactical training to improve the skills of the personnel who will comprise the Tactical Response 

Force. These upgrades are designed to increase the tactical effectiveness of the protective forces while decreasing their vulnerability to adversary actions. 

Implementation of the Tactical Response Force concept as well as the weapons 

and equipment upgrades and personnel training have varied from site to site, as expected; some sites continue to adjust their implementation efforts to better align 

with local conditions. This remains an ongoing process with more work to be done 

at some sites before they will have fully integrated the old and new approaches. 

The Department has made clear gains in implementing security initiatives that 

provide more robust asset protection and mission-related advantages to protective 

force personnel. The Department has not made similar progress, however, in its efforts to address the concerns of protective force members regarding their career 

prospects and retirement issues. The Tactical Response Force concept includes a requirement for career progression planning for each protective force member, although many individual plans are still outstanding. 

I would like to take a minute here to emphasize that our lack of progress in some 

areas does not reflect a lack of commitment or effort on our part, but rather reflects 

the complexity and difficulty of determining and maintaining the most appropriate 

and fair balance among issues which affect the well-being of the protective forces 

and the success of our mission to provide highest quality, cost effective security. The 

Department’s efforts are and will continue to be aligned with the Study Group’s 29 

recommendations. The Study Group, in fact, has evolved into the Protective Force 

Career Options Committee, referenced earlier in this testimony. 

The NNSA, in whose facilities most of the protective forces serve, began a Zero 

Based Security Review in July 2009. This review is developing detailed analyses of 

security programs and needs at each NNSA facility, and is expected to be completed 

by the end of 2010. It is expected to provide information and analyses directly applicable to many of the Study Group’s recommendations. 

In addition, DOE’s National Training Center is currently conducting analyses and 

a curriculum development effort to support protective force career progression and 

career transition training. In conjunction with this effort, HSS is also working to 

modify an existing complex-wide job register to better accommodate the specific 

needs of protective force personnel. 

Study Group recommendations dealing with protective force physical fitness 

standards, medical requirements, and the Human Reliability Program all involve requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations. To modify these requirements, the 

Department must go through a formal rulemaking process. The Office of Health, 

Safety, and Security has established a task team to oversee this process. The team 

is currently reviewing the physical fitness standards for proposed revision, has nearly completed a set of proposed revisions to the medical standards, and has a proposed revision of the Human Reliability Program regulation under review in the Department. 

Action on a few recommendations—retirement and (financial) retirement planning, portability/mobility among contractors, disability retirement, retraining and 

62 

placement outside of protective forces, and various personnel services and actions— 

is proving difficult. While these recommendations pertain to issues of high importance to the protective forces and their unions, these are also issues covered in the 

collective bargaining agreements between the private sector contractors and the 

unions. Although the Department can establish the overall parameters for future 

contracts, the Department is prohibited by Federal Acquisition Regulations from 

interfering with collective bargaining agreements or dictating the terms of those 

agreements. Since each of the respective protective forces contractors and unions negotiate agreements based on their specific interests, significant differences exist in 

the terms and conditions of various contracts from site to site. The extent to which 

unions would be amenable to negotiating contracts with common clauses is unknown, although the Department would be willing to explore ways to accommodate 

such an effort through the parameters it establishes in future contracts. For example, the Department should consider establishing a program—similar to the benefits 

currently allowed for beryllium workers under 10 CFR 850—that would provide retraining and transfer or 2 year save pay benefits for protective force personnel who 

are injured or otherwise unable to meet physical standards. HSS is currently working with line management with the goal of crafting a comprehensive, standardized 

approach to protective force career progression and retirement issues. 

CONCLUSION

Of the 29 recommendations, the Department is making good progress on those 

that can be resolved within DOE. We are also moving forward on those issues which 

can be addressed through rulemaking, although that process is slower. The Department is still seeking workable solutions to the more difficult problems which variously involve contracting and collective bargaining. As noted above, the Department 

intends to present a plan to implement all 29 recommendations to Congress in 

April. We recognize that the protective forces are a key element in the protection 

of our most sensitive national security assets. Fair resolution of the most difficult 

protective forces personnel issues will necessarily require cooperation and compromise by all parties. The Department also believes firmly that needed changes 

and improvements can be made within the contract protective forces model, and 

that it will benefit both the Department and protective forces personnel to work together to resolve all outstanding issues in as fair and fast a process as possible. The 

Department is committed to finding solutions that ensure the fair and equitable 

treatment of each protective force member. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Stumbo. 

STATEMENT OF MIKE STUMBO, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL 

COUNCIL OF SECURITY POLICE 

Mr. STUMBO. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, 

my name is Mike Stumbo. I’m pleased to be here to testify, at your 

request, on issues relating to the Department of Energy Protective 

Force. 

I proudly serve as a security police officer (SPO) at the Pantex 

site. Those of you that are not familiar with the Pantex site, it is 

the site of final assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons here 

in the United States. 

I consider my job, like many of my fellow DOE SPOs, as continuing service to my country, defending against adversaries who 

are organized to destroy this country. 

I am also the president of the National Council of Security Police, commonly known as the NCSP. Our organization was formed 

by constituent unions as an active collective voice common to all 

DOE SPOs throughout the DOE enterprise. We provide unfiltered 

insight from the field. We call it the ‘‘boots-on-the-ground perspective.’’ 

For the past several years, we have focused on the question of 

Federalizing the protective force, which has been an area of extensive discussion and review within DOE for many years. 

63 

As highlighted in the recent GAO report, there are significant 

personnel issues affecting the ability of the protective forces to perform their mission that cannot be compromised. 

On July 16, 1945, in the early morning hours, near Alamogordo, 

NM, a test code-named ‘‘Trinity’’ refashioned our world forever. The 

new weapon became the very fabric of our national defense and the 

primary deterrent of attack from our greatest enemies. Our government produces these weapons, and it is an inherent government 

function to protect them. 

Currently, the security of our Nation’s nuclear weapons and 

weapons-grade material is contracted out to private security contractors. It is the private structure that has not allowed these exceptional men and women who protect these weapons of mass destruction the ability to enjoy terms and conditions of employment 

that support a shortened career, a career that demands the highest 

physical, medical, and training standards in any law enforcement 

arena. 

Quite frankly, new hires coming out of the military see these jobs 

as a continuation of military service in the private sector. But, 

quickly they find out that there is no incentive to make this a career. After investing time, money, and clearances, many transition 

to the law-enforcement opportunities that are career-based. This is 

not a novel or new issue; the conflicts that exist between profit 

versus security, when private companies protect nuclear assets, are 

inherent. 

It was identified in 1990, by the GAO (GAO/RC8D–91–12), to 

adopt federalization as a potential structure; again in 2004, by the 

Department of Energy, again to adopt federalization as potential 

structure. Shortly after that, the DOE chief health, safety, and security officer commissioned a team composed of DOE line management and NCSP leadership to address career opportunities and retirement prospects for SPOs. The recommended 29 options are captured in the 2010 GAO report. The NCSP commends HSS for having the courage to initiate this action among a great deal of controversy. 

Our jobs require a vigorous physical security force that must 

maintain stringent training and medical standards. It will require 

the best 20 years of our lives. We must maintain the highest level 

of security to protect the most powerful weapons known to mankind. In that 20 years, our bodies begin to break down—knees, ankles; our reactionary skills, target-recognition skills start to decrease—it’s a natural order—not to mention the risk of exposure 

from radiation, chemicals, and beryllium. These hazards are not 

encountered by our other law-enforcement counterparts. 

What I ask of you today is to recognize the uniqueness and nature of our work, and the paramount importance of our mission to 

this country. There are three entities that perform the mission of 

protecting nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon-grade material: 

the military, DOE nuclear couriers, and DOE SPOs. Only one of 

those entities is outside of the Federal structure, and that is the 

DOE SPOs. 

Whether we choose to Federalize or maintain the private security 

contractor structure, we must adopt the Federal retirement compoVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:45 Mar 10, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\65006.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
64 

nents that support this vital mission. DOE SPOs deserve nothing 

less. Too much time has passed. There have been plenty of studies. 

In closing, I wish to thank the committee for giving me the opportunity to present our case on behalf of the NCSP. I’m prepared 

to answer any questions you may have. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stumbo follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MIKE STUMBO

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am Mike Stumbo and am 

pleased to be here at your request to testify before you on issues relating to the Department of Energy (DOE) protective forces. I am one of them proudly serving as 

a security police officer at the Pantex Nuclear Site. I see my job as continuing service to my country by defending against adversaries who are organized to destroy our 

country, Today, I am here to represent all of the Protective Forces who proudly 

serve our country throughout the DOE Complex. I serve as the President of the National Council of Security Police, commonly known as the NCSP. Our organization 

was formed by constituent unions to act as a collective voice on matters that are 

common to all protective forces throughout the DOE Complex. Our mission is not 

to bargain on behalf of labor unions at the sites, but to speak on issues where we 

have first hand personal experience and provide unfiltered insight from the field. 

For the past several years, we have focused on the question of Federalizing the protective force which has been an area of extensive discussion and review within the 

DOE for many years. As highlighted in the recent Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) Report, there are significant personnel issues affecting the ability of the protective forces to perform their mission to standards that cannot be compromised. We 

believe the time is now to take the necessary steps to correct personnel issues which 

will insure a battle ready force; whether it is through federalization or some other 

form of legislative mandate which accomplishes the same results. 

On July 16, 1945 in the early morning hours near Alamogordo, NM, a test code 

named ‘‘Trinity’’ refashioned our world forever. This new weapon ended a war and 

has become the very fabric of our national defense and the primary deterrent to an 

attack from our greatest enemies. Our Government produces these weapons of mass 

destruction as part of our defense posture. There is no greater mission than to assure these weapons, and their components, are secured and protected so that every 

American can be assured our adversaries have NO access to them. The consequences of an event at one of these sites are so dire as to be unthinkable. We 

believe the securing and protection of our nuclear arsenal is an inherent government function and must be treated as such. Anything less is compromising the proper role of our government and in our judgment potentially compromising the security of our nuclear assets. 

Currently security of our Nation’s nuclear weapons and weapons grade materials, 

which are stored at various facilities near population centers throughout the country, is contracted out to private security contractors. It is this private structure that 

has not allowed the exceptional men and women who protect this Nation to enjoy 

terms and conditions of employment commensurate with a shortened career resulting from the many requirements and demands of their jobs. In the field, this means 

many of the protective force become dissatisfied with their job as requirements increase and prospects for career progression or a secure retirement do not exist, As 

it relates to current employment, we are seeing a trend toward lowered job performance and increasing attrition rates. Quite frankly, new hires coming out of the military initially see these jobs as a continuation of military service in the private sector. However, once they have experienced the jobs, the jobs fall out of favor because 

there is very little incentive to make this a career, After investing all the time, 

money, and training necessary to attain full clearances, many of our qualified protective forces opt to transition to local law enforcement careers. 

This is not a new or novel issue. The conflicts of interest, including profit versus 

performance that are inherent when a private security company protects nuclear assets has been the subject of ongoing discussion and review. As far back as 1990, 

a GAO report began to unveil problems with securing nuclear weapons and weapons 

grade material within a private structure. This report resulted in no action after 

identifying the inherent problems. Years later, in 2004, the topic was re-addressed 

by a working group. I quote from the memo issued by the 2004 DOE Protective 

Force Working Group: 

65 

Memorandum: ‘‘The world-changing events of September 11, 2001, decisively subordinated the old industrial security model to a ‘‘combat force’’ model. This new 

standard carries profound legal and practical implications, all of which tend to support adoption of the Federal force option.’’ 

In 2004, the mandate was clear and the reasons were sound. Again, no action. 

Inexplicably, in 2009 the department changed its position yet again with a Memorandum dated January 13, 2009 to the acting Deputy Secretary of DOE stating 

‘‘that Federalizing the protective force is no longer a viable option’’. The apparent 

overriding reasons were budgetary and the lack of any precedent of Federalizing a 

group which has been historically contracted out. What were not adequately addressed are the many serious security issues that relate to the decision to eliminate 

federalization as an option. In our view, the reasoning behind the change in direction is flawed. The time is now to right the ship and take corrective action to address the serious personnel issues faced by DOE. 

Due, in part, to NCSP’s efforts, on March 31, 2009, the Chief Health, Safety, and 

Security Officer (HS–1) of the DOE commissioned a study to examine ‘‘realistic and 

reasonable options for improving the career opportunities and retirement prospects 

of protective force members. With the support of both DOE line management and 

the leadership of the National Council of Security Police (NCSP), a study team was 

assembled under the leadership of the Office of Health, Safety, and Security. The 

result of the report is captured in the January 2010 GAO report’’ Nuclear Security 

DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces’ Personnel System Issues.’’ 

I commend the GAO and its staff who committed approximately 18 months of resources identifying the facts of the current private DOE structure. One point that 

stands out in my mind which is captured in the 2010 GAO report is the advantages 

and disadvantages of a contractor structure. Upon a careful reading of Table 7, you 

will be hard pressed to find any rational basis for concluding that the contractor 

model has any ‘‘real’’ advantage. At the core of Federalizing protective forces is imposing more direct management and standardization throughout the complex. No 

one can argue these objectives will not better prepare protective forces to defend 

against the enemy. Equally important to the men and women who serve at our 

sites, there are Federal benefits which better serve them for a shortened law enforcement type career. I know from experience how the current system impacts my 

brothers and sisters. It is not uncommon for one of us to reach an age, well before 

a normal retirement age, where we can no longer meet the demands of the job. This 

may be because of an injury where we cannot meet medical requirements. Or, it 

may be just middle age setting in and we cannot meet the physical fitness requirements. Many good men and women have found themselves without their job and 

without a real retirement option. After giving the best 15 to 20 years of their working lives, these men and women find it difficult to survive in today’s economy. We 

are looking for a way to give back to them, in some small way, what they have given 

to their country. We now do it for others serving our country and we should do it 

for our protective forces. 

The current protective force is not alone in its struggle to achieve a reasonable 

career path. DOE, in years past had approached the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to determine if ‘‘nuclear materials couriers’’ were eligible for coverage under the ‘‘law enforcement’’ category for enhanced retirement benefits under 

the special ‘‘20-Year’’ benefits under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) 

and the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS). Nuclear couriers transport 

the nuclear materials we protect at the sites. The medical, physical training, and 

weapons requirements are nearly identical to the requirements and qualifications 

we must meet. The only significant difference in employment is nuclear couriers are 

Federal employees. OPM determined that nuclear materials couriers did not meet 

the definition of ‘‘law enforcement’’ for eligibility and coverage under the special 20- 

year retirement benefits. 

Despite this decision, the Department pursued and acquired congressional support 

for including nuclear materials courier positions under the special 20-year retirement provisions. Congress acknowledged the uniqueness and nature of the work 

performed by nuclear materials couriers, and accepted the Department’s rationale 

for including this type of work under the enhanced special 20-Year retirement benefits. Consequently, a bill was introduced (1998 HR 3616) that later was passed and 

resulted in establishment of new legislation under Public Law 105–261. This law 

became effective on 10/17/98. The enactment of this law established a new category 

of positions, ‘‘Nuclear Materials Courier,’’ for inclusion under the enhanced retirement benefits for special 20-Year retirement under the CSRS and FERS retirement 

systems. The law authorized retroactive credit of service, for the purpose of establishing an entitlement to an annuity, back to the date the DOE was established. 

This date was October 1, 1977. 

66 

I come to you today to again acknowledge the uniqueness of and nature of the 

work performed by the current DOE Security Police Force. We are required to maintain the most stringent physical, medical and training standards in the law enforcement area. Like nuclear couriers, we should have our own Federal classification recognizing the important duties and functions we perform for the citizens of our great 

nation. Three entities perform the task of securing nuclear weapons and nuclear 

grade material. They are the military, OST couriers, and DOE Security Police Officers. However only one of those entities is outside of a Federal structure, the men 

and women I am here speaking on behalf of, DOE Security Police Officers throughout the United States. This is not right! 

Our men and women are entrusted to protect the most powerful weapons known 

to mankind. Every workday, no matter how quiet it starts or how routine can turn, 

with or without warning into a terrorist attack. Our mission is to turn back and 

defend such an attack putting our lives on the line. There is no second line of defense. In addition to combat risks; working at nuclear sites exposes us to radiation, 

beryllium, and other chemicals that are potentially harmful to our health. We encounter daily risks not encountered by our counterparts in other law enforcement 

employment. My brothers and sisters who wear the DOE Protective Force badge are 

well aware of these risks and have chosen this service. We train, prepare, and are 

well equipped. We have wives, children, and parents who also know the risks and 

support us knowing how important the job we have is to our Nation. We simply are 

looking for a career path and retirement system which provides some reasonable 

measure of financial security when our job comes to an end. 

The current career structure that DOE security police officers must be reformed. 

Over the last 20 years multiple studies demonstrate the system is broken. There 

is no need for more studies or reviews. The time has come to fix the system by imposing personnel policies that carry out the long-term objectives of our mission. We 

believe the correct fix is Federalizing the protective forces. If that cannot be accomplished through legislation, at the very least there needs to be a legislative mandate 

requiring private contractors provide pension and retiree health and welfare benefits that mirror Federal benefits. For many years, we have been told budgetary restraints drive decisionmaking in this area. We disagree that security in this area 

can be compromised because of funding. However, there is a current opportunity to 

use available stimulus money to fund benefits for the protective force. I believe that 

is exactly what President Obama has in mind by allocating stimulus monies to 

DOE. It would serve the dual purpose of working to raise the level of protection at 

nuclear sites and present better economic conditions to newly retired security police 

officers. 

In closing, I wish to thank those men and women that serve as DOE security police officers and the privilege it has been to serve them as their spokesman in their 

efforts to secure a better career path. I also want to thank this committee for giving 

me the opportunity to present the case on behalf of the NCSP and look forward to 

answering any questions you may have or providing any additional information you 

may need. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

I think if we take a break to go and vote, we’ll be right back. We 

apologize. That’s one thing we have no control over. [Recess.] 

Hearing will come back to order. 

First, before the questions, Senator Vitter, any opening comments you might like to make? 

Senator VITTER. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of getting to some 

questions before we’re all pulled away, I will submit my opening 

statement for the record. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Vitter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I join you in welcoming our witnesses 

today. I welcome you to your first hearing as chairman of this subcommittee and 

I look forward to working with you to strengthen our ability to counter all threats, 

including potential terrorist threats to our defensive nuclear capabilities. 

Today’s hearing focuses on the personnel management of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Protective Force. Responsible for protecting some of our Nation’s most 

sensitive materials, the more than 2,000 brave men and women who comprise this 

67 

force, represent some of the highest quality, best-trained, and best-equipped security 

personnel in the Nation. We are safer and more secure because of their service. 

In its assessment of the challenges associated with the unique personnel management structure of the Protective Force, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

highlights a number of areas that require attention and resolution both at DOE and 

here in Congress and I look forward to beginning that discussion in our hearing 

today. The report identifies discrepancies in management, organization, staffing and 

training of the forces across the complex, as well as inconsistencies in pay and benefits. It also examines the costs and benefits associated with exploring the federalization of the force, to which I conclude is neither a prudent nor viable answer. 

Both DOE and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) recognize that 

the decentralized management of the protective forces creates inefficiencies that 

need to be addressed and that more needs to be done to resolve what GAO calls 

‘‘systemic carrier and longevity issues’’ which are not being resolved thorough contractor actions at individual sites. This hearing presents an opportunity to acknowledge challenges, and I look forward to hearing more from DOE and NNSA on their 

path forward, as well as learning more about workforce concerns. But I remain firm 

in my belief that necessary workforce management improvement efforts can be effectively achieved by management and labor working together without federalizing the 

Protective Force, an approach that GAO acknowledges could result in negative consequences to the capabilities of the force. 

According to GAO, the current privatized management model offers some significant advantages that must not be overlooked. While not perfect, the current model 

provides the flexibility necessary to tailor the forces to the diverse and distinct security requirements spanning the many different sites across the complex. It is a management model that, according to GAO, instills an ‘‘emphasis on cost-benefit analysis as a part of the decisionmaking process.’’ A model which GAO also cites as 

being superior to other government-wide models such as the Department of Defense. 

In January 2009, the NNSA and the DOE Chief Health Safety and Security Officer jointly acknowledging the need for improvements in management of the current 

civilian contracted model but rejected the federalization of the Protective Forces. In 

the memo, the department concludes that the major benefits of federalization can 

be achieved through continued utilization of a contractual based approach; that federalization would not improve implementation nor increase the NNSA security protection posture; and that federalization in the short term would be undeniably costly 

without any indication in the long term of substantial cost savings. 

I concur with the departments findings and agree that personnel management improvements must be achieved rapidly, in a spirit of cooperation, and in a cost-effective manner. Furthermore, such improvements must also be considered with fairness and equity for those employees who have served so honorably in the Department’s Protective Forces in the defense of our Nation. 

The act authorizing this review requires DOE to issue a report on the management of its protective forces within 90 days after the issuance of GAO’s review and 

recommendations. I look forward to reviewing the department’s response and I also 

look forward to further discussing ways to address these issues outside of the context of federalizing the protective forces. The GAO report highlights some significant 

challenges and I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Please start off with some questions. 

Senator VITTER. Right. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Aloise—is that the correct pronunciation? 

Mr. ALOISE. Yes, sir. 

Senator VITTER. Yes. In the GAO report, you state that a federalized force offers no overall advantage to the current model, and 

that, basically, either option could result in effective and more uniform security, if it’s well managed. To that extent, do you assess 

that the cost of implementing a Federalized force, overall, would be 

higher than the cost of fixing the current model? 

Mr. ALOISE. Cost was difficult to analyze. We didn’t come up 

with a cost estimate, because there are so many variables to consider, and we just don’t have that data. For example, would DOE 

hire more guards if they federalized, so they wouldn’t have to 

spend so much on overtime, or would they keep the number of 

68 

guards they have and utilize overtime? What would those overtime 

rates be? We didn’t have that data, and we could not come up with 

a cost estimate. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. 

Mr. Podonsky, do you have any response to the same question? 

Mr. PODONSKY. We also do not have hard data, in terms of the 

cost. But, what we looked at multiple times, as I said in my opening remarks, is, where there would be cost savings and/or effectiveness and security, and each time we’ve looked at it, as a department, we’ve come back in saying Federalizing was going to be more 

difficult than it would be if we cleaned up the current contracting 

situation that we currently have. So, one of the solutions, we believe, is to go to model contracts, with specific clauses in those contracts to take care of the concerns that the security forces are expressing and we agree with. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. Let me ask all of you, in whatever order 

you choose. There are these 29 recommendations that have been 

identified jointly by the Department and the unions. We’re working 

on those, to some extent. If all of those could be accomplished, in 

your opinions, what would be the remaining issues, if any, that 

were far less than ideal, in terms of correcting the current model? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Well, I’ll go ahead and start, if my colleagues 

agree. 

The 29 recommendations was actually a product of the joint 

standing study group that was, as I said, both security professionals and the Department, contractors, and the union. So those 

29 recommendations was the complete smorgasbord of what they 

felt—the complete group that the Department needed to do. My 

staff have told me, if, in fact, all 29 were completed, then there’d 

be very few, if any, issues remaining. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. 

Mr. Stumbo, what would your answer to the same question be? 

Mr. STUMBO. I sit on that standing committee, and in our opinion, based on those 29 recommendations, we identified those areas 

that truly had fractured the structure, that had made it dysfunctional. If we were to implement all of those recommendations, it 

would certainly allow us to have a structure that would permit the 

DOE SPOs to have a livable retirement, respectful of the mission 

that they perform. 

Senator VITTER. So, again, if we can check off those 29 items— 

and I’m not suggesting that’s easy to do or we’d do it overnight— 

would there be any remaining significant categories, in your opinion, of real work to be done? 

Mr. STUMBO. Not in my opinion, no, sir. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. 

Mr. Aloise. 

Mr. ALOISE. We agree that the 29 recommendations, if implemented, would address concerns. The only point I’d like to make is, 

some of those recommendations, as you’re aware, are potentially 

high cost. 

Senator VITTER. Right. 

Mr. Stumbo, as I appreciate it, a big part of your workforce’s concerns are about retirement. 

Mr. STUMBO. Yes, sir. 

69 

Senator VITTER. I’ve also heard, and I want to see if it’s accurate, 

that a big portion of the workforce do not take full advantage of 

investment opportunities. Do you have a sense of what the facts 

are, with regard to the whole workforce? If nonparticpation is any 

significant factor, what can we do about it? 

Mr. STUMBO. Well, the 401(k) system was to be introduced and 

utilized in our collective bargaining agreements as a supplement, 

and only a supplement. So, the baseline, based on the shortened careers that each one of our men and women have to endure, is really 

what needs to be focused on. 401(k) is great, as long as the markets 

achieve the success that they can achieve, but we all recognize, 

based on the history of our recent markets, that if all of our eggs 

were in that basket, regardless of the participation rate, there’s no 

way that our men and women could have retired. 

Senator VITTER. Well, what’s the answer to my specific factual 

question about the participation rate? What is it or isn’t it? 

Mr. STUMBO. I don’t have the exact numbers in front of me for 

you. But, I would say, based on the young men and women that 

come out of the military, the 401(k) is probably a 50–50-type percentage for those personnel. 

Senator VITTER. What could we do, usefully, to push that a lot 

higher, do you think? 

Mr. STUMBO. Well, I think that we are dealing with young men 

and women who, obviously, are not focused on the future. So, I believe that we continue to educate them, and try to place a system 

in place so that the decisions that they do not make as young men 

and women, we have a structure in place that will provide for them 

when they are mature enough and recognize the true need of the 

mission. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. 

Do either of you have a response to those two questions? Number 

one, what are the facts about participation rates? Number two, 

what can we be doing to significantly increase participation rates? 

Mr. ALOISE. The only thing I would add is that it does vary from 

site to site, on the availability of defined benefits versus the contribution plan. We don’t have good numbers on participation. 

Mr. PODONSKY. I have nothing to add to that. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. 

That’s all I have right now, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

Mr. Podonsky, you’ve been involved with the oversight of security 

forces and development of security policy for several years, and, as 

such, I know you’re aware of the contractual evolution from all the 

protective forces. Nothing is static; there are constant changes. As 

such, is there any advantage or any particular reason for having 

different contractual structures today, as opposed to the evolution 

into a common contract, so that there aren’t, in fact, differences? 

Is there something advantageous about having them all separate 

and different? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Mr. Chairman, my office is responsible for independent assessment of the Department’s performance, and we also 

promulgate the policy. Clearly, the line functions are the ones who 

set up the contracts with the various structures that they have out 

there. 

70 

From my professional opinion, the only way there’s an advantage 

to the contractors that are out there is if, in fact, we have a model 

contract. Right now we have a smorgasbord of contracts out there 

that grew up over many, many decades of the way the Department 

is structured. We believe, from an oversight perspective, as well as 

a policy perspective, that the line function should, in fact, take a 

look at a standardized approach; as I said in one of my previous 

answers, to have a model contract that has the contract language 

in there that has clauses to take care of these longstanding issues 

that the Department has been wrestling with since the 1990s. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Aloise, what are your thoughts? 

Mr. ALOISE. Well, our perspective is that DOE should go as far 

as it can toward standardization. We called for that several years 

ago, and we still believe that’s the way to go. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Stumbo? 

Mr. STUMBO. I believe the approach to have a contract that will 

provide those provisions that are necessary for a solid retirement 

structure would obviously be the path that we could take, and I do 

believe that is possible. 

Senator BEN NELSON. That should be a model—everybody treated the same? Or could it be different in each of the contracts? 

Mr. STUMBO. I think it should be the same, based on the retirement structure itself, if we were mirroring something that the Federal law enforcement currently have. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Okay. 

Senator VITTER. Mr. Chairman, can I just pick up on that quickly? 

Senator BEN NELSON. Yes. Please. 

Senator VITTER. Maybe I’m missing something, Mr. Podonsky. Is 

that not within the power of the Department, to clearly, forcefully 

move in that direction? 

Mr. PODONSKY. In all due respect, I’m going to have to defer to 

a second hearing that I understand is going to take place. Because 

we are not the implementers of policy, we create the policy for the 

Secretary. But the contractual piece is governed, clearly, by the 

Federal acquisition rules, as well as the standards of the contracting world, which is not ours. So, in my opinion, yes, I do believe it exists, but that would be better answered by the next panel 

in the next hearing. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Now, my understanding was that the latitude of the contractors was limited by the Department of Energy 

to the amount, type, and nature of the pay and benefits available 

to the protective forces. Mr. Podonsky, are you saying that if DOE 

established a standardization, or, in your case, your words, a model 

policy, would it be possible to include those in the collective bargaining agreements if that was a requirement from the agency to 

the contractors? 

Mr. PODONSKY. I can give you my personal view. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Your personal opinion is all I’m after right 

now. 

Mr. PODONSKY. Okay. I believe people make requirements, and 

people can make the requirements adapt to what the situation is. 

As I just told Senator Vitter, this is really something for the line 

to determine, together with the contracting officials in the DepartVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:45 Mar 10, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\65006.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
71 

ment. But, when you look at the problem, as Mr. Stumbo and Mr. 

Aloise have articulated and we’ve also seen from our organization, 

this is a serious problem that has to be addressed now. It continues 

to be studied, and the actions that I’m sure we will be taking with 

the recommendations will help move the ball forward. But, we’ve 

wasted a lot of time on the same subject, and we haven’t gotten to 

where we need to be. 

So, specifically, to your question, I think anything’s possible if we 

set our minds to it. As I said in my opening testimony, it’s going 

to not only take the union and the line working together, but Congress, to make that happen. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Aloise, are you aware of any particular 

stumbling block, other than just the challenges of getting something accomplished, but any legal impairment or inability of DOE 

to set the requirements to standardization or in model form for the 

contractors to meet with respect to the negotiations on the collective bargaining with the unions? 

Mr. ALOISE. We’d have to look at that more closely. But, from the 

work we’ve done, we don’t see anything that would preclude that. 

But, you’re talking about six or more collective bargaining agreements right now, and many different sites, so it would be a challenge to get that done. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Is that something that, in your opinion, 

you could accomplish over some period of time, recognizing the different contract dates and times for collective bargaining for new 

contracts? 

Mr. ALOISE. It appears it could be done over a period of time. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Would it be advisable to end up with a 

common time for the expiration of such contracts? 

Mr. ALOISE. It would be helpful, but I’m not sure if it’s achievable. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Stumbo, do you think it’s possible that 

some contracts could be for longer periods of time to shorter periods of time to achieve a standard timeframe, so that you would 

have standardization and a model approach for all of the contracts 

with the contractors for their employees? 

Mr. STUMBO. Mr. Chairman, we have discussed that exact situation and we have assured the Department of Energy that we will 

do whatever is necessary; if we need to open up portions of our bargaining agreement now to ensure that we can implement that 

structure, we would do so. 

Senator BEN NELSON. That could include the expiration date, so 

as long as your members were not in some way being disadvantaged in the process. Is that fair, too? 

Mr. STUMBO. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Stumbo, how would your workforce 

react if, in this federalization effort, there was a decision where 

each position would be subject to open competition? 

Mr. STUMBO. Obviously, that would be very negative to the men 

and women that have spent their careers and put their lives on the 

line for so long. Obviously, that would be, basically, a kick in the 

face to us, based on what we have done for this country. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Podonsky, do you have any thoughts 

about that, from the standpoint of DOE? 

72 

Mr. PODONSKY. Mr. Chairman, we looked at both the improvement of the existing contracts, as well as the federalization. As I’ve 

said in my testimony, we felt that the negative side of the federalization, and all that comes with being compliant with OPM 

rules and what the current situation is, whether the Guards would 

be grandfathered in or not, what pay grade they would be coming 

in—it appears to us that the existing legislation governing federalization would be a deterrent for encouraging the existing guard 

force to come into the Federal force. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Senator Begich, would you like to have 

some questions, please? 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just remind me again, how many bargaining units are there? Or, 

first, how many sites are there, again? Remind me. 

Mr. PODONSKY. There are approximately 26 sites, and then those 

are broken up into facilities. 

Senator BEGICH. Is there a certain amount of sites that have the 

highest volume of employees? 

Mr. PODONSKY. What happens, Senator, is, each site has a different mission, and there are different categories of attractiveness 

and materials. You may have a site that’s just manufacturing of 

parts, or you have a site, such as Pantex, that actually has fullup weapons. So, it runs the kaleidoscope. 

Senator BEGICH. Gamut. About 26. 

Mr. PODONSKY. Roughly, in terms of the sites that we’re talking 

about, with security officers. 

Senator BEGICH. Again, remind me, does each site have their 

own, then, contract for each site? 

Mr. PODONSKY. No, sir. 

Senator BEGICH. Some are wrapped together? 

Mr. PODONSKY. There are three different approaches. Some security officers report directly to the Federal entity, some report to the 

management and operational contractor as a part of their company, 

and then a third one is where there’s private security—— 

Senator BEGICH. Okay. Private security. 

Mr. PODONSKY.—that is contracted with the M&O. So, there are 

three different elements in the model. Then there’s the OST model 

that we’ve talked about, which is a Federalized force. 

Senator BEGICH. Right, and then, how many different bargaining 

groups are there, within all these organizations? 

Mr. STUMBO. I’d say, totally, between independents and internationals, you’re probably looking at approximately five groups. 

Senator BEGICH. Five groups. 

Mr. STUMBO. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEGICH. That’s actually very good, if there’s only five. 

Mr. STUMBO. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEGICH. As a former mayor, I had to deal with nine, plus 

another one had eight underneath its one. So, five is a piece of 

cake. So, why I say that is because your comment, ‘‘it may be difficult.’’ To me, five is a dream. Senator Nelson, you were a former 

Governor, you know what I’m talking about. 

Since we did this, in the city where I was mayor, we unified the 

contracts and timetable of expiration, mostly around healthcare 

issues; we weren’t all under the same plan. We had multiple jurisVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:45 Mar 10, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\65006.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
73 

diction issues, and we just staggered out, on the back end; once 

they all got to a certain point, then we had a 3-year—in some 

cases, 5-year deals. So, it created consistency, and so forth. 

Is that, when you say, ‘‘opening it up’’—and I’ve wondered—I 

caught your words very carefully here, as a—I’ve been on both 

sides of the equation here, union and management, so certain parts 

of the contract that you could open up—would you mean how to get 

the timetables adjusted, so everyone can expire at the same time, 

and then get a unified system of when these contracts go in, or all 

the contract terms, meaning that you can start unifying systems, 

pay grades, other things? I want to make sure I heard what you 

said there, because there were very carefully picked words, and I 

want to make sure we’re on the same page. 

Mr. STUMBO. Yes, sir. What I was trying to get across was that 

each of the collective bargaining agreements have certain provisions, particularly those that affect the retirement structure. Those 

particular articles could be opened up, and we could implement the 

correct structures, in our opinion, that would fix our problems. 

Senator BEGICH. Okay. 

Mr. STUMBO. So, by doing that, we could expedite the process 

without waiting for each contract to actually expire before we could 

make that happen. 

Senator BEGICH. Do you believe the groups would allow that to 

occur without triggering any other aspects of the contract and 

awards? I know, sometimes when you go there, it starts a formal 

process. When you open up a contract for a condition, there are 

conditions within the contract that then start triggering timetables. 

Do you think you would be able to do it in such an informal, but 

yet still formal, way that you would not create other issues in the 

contract that would have to be dealt with? 

Mr. STUMBO. Absolutely. Yes, sir, I believe we can. 

Senator BEGICH. So you feel very confident that all bargaining 

groups would do that. 

Mr. STUMBO. Yes sir, I do. 

Senator BEGICH. Okay. The last, if I can—— 

Senator BEN NELSON. Yes, sure. 

Senator BEGICH.—Mr. Chairman, and that is—and your comment that it seems like now’s the time—I’m new to this; I’ve been 

here a year-and-a-half. But, as you were, and others were, talking 

about the multiple years of this discussion, the question I have is, 

who will trigger the action to make this move forward? In other 

words, I know we’ll have another hearing. But, who within the 

DOE, I’ll use as first trigger point—who says, ‘‘we’re going. We’re 

going to do this,’’ and set the timetable to get going and sit down 

with the bargaining groups and say, ‘‘We’re going to try to figure 

out how to unify this system, create a career path, not in-and-out 

or, in some cases, some people who have been there a long time, 

but are kind of stalled out and not able to move forward. Who 

makes that decision? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Well, that’s clearly, Senator, the prerogatives of 

the Secretary of Energy. But, let me say, with our partnership with 

the unions and the line functions that I mentioned, we’re already— 

those 29 recommendations—— 

Senator BEGICH. Right. 

74 

Mr. PODONSKY.—started solidifying some actions that the Department should start taking, and we’re guardedly optimistic that 

the line functions will continue down that path. But, the ultimate 

decision is going to be the Secretary of Energy, as to how far that 

goes, in partnership with Congress. 

Senator BEGICH. Okay. It just made me think of two other 

things, Mr. Chairman, if I can. 

One, on the report, is there a timetable you have set that—not 

to just review and look at the actions, but actually implement these 

actions, and then the ones that you can’t, clearly identify when and 

at what point you can make that decision? Have you set out a time 

schedule? Do you have a working time schedule that you are all 

using within the Department? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Well, two things. We owe a report to Congress 

on April 30 for a comprehensive implementation plan for those recommendations. 

Senator BEGICH. Yes. 

Mr. PODONSKY. But, we’re not waiting for that plan. 

Senator BEGICH. Okay. 

Mr. PODONSKY. We have a committee that was set up to address 

that, with the line functions. Out of the 29 recommendations, about 

17 of them are already underway. The 12 that are remaining out 

of the 29 are those that are very difficult, having to do with the 

bigger issues of retirement and disability and pension and things 

of that nature. 

Senator BEGICH. Well, I’m a believer—when I was mayor and 

when I was on the city council, we dealt with police and fire retirement issues, and there’s nothing more complicated—medical liability, long-term retirement, multiple plans, you know survivor—the 

whole nine yards. We did it. It was no fun. 

The last comment I’d say is, I do believe, and I want to echo 

through the questions that the chairman asked, that I do believe 

if you set the criteria for the contractors, they can do that. We did 

that with security within our community. When we had private security, we said, ‘‘Here’s what we want. Here’s the standards of living we want you to make sure are in those contracts.’’ They were 

paying them 8 bucks an hour. You couldn’t—the rollover rate was 

unbelievable. They had no benefits. We said, ‘‘Here’s the standards 

we want you to adhere to.’’ Of course, that cost, but that was then 

competitively bid to the contractors, and they figured it all out. 

But, at the end of the day, we knew the employee, who was working on behalf of the city, securing buildings in our issues, had a 

standard that we felt very confident was equal or close to if you 

were a municipal employee, but being in a private-sector environment. 

So, I know there is some question if it can be done. If local governments can do it, sure to heck the Federal Government can do 

it, because you have a lot more power. So, I would just encourage 

you to look at that question and clearly define that. Because the 

contractors respond to what you put in the scope of services, and 

the scope of services said, ‘‘here’s the 10 things we want you to do 

for these employees,’’ and they have to adhere to it or they don’t 

bid. So, I’m a believer in this. 

75 

I know you asked it as a question, but I believe that you can do 

it. We did it. Obviously it turned from about a 60-percent turnover 

rate down to 3 percent, and people saw opportunity rather than 

just a part-time job at night and then who knows what else they 

were doing. We wanted to focus on security. So, there’s my two bits 

through your question. I apologize. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Oh, no, that’s quite okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Stumbo, DOE has arranged the protective forces into various 

different categories. Three grades of security police officers are 

SPOs I through III and security officers. Do you have any data that 

shows, generally, when you begin to see an inability to meet the— 

let’s say, the highest and most demanding grades—SPO II and 

SPO III? 

Mr. STUMBO. Yes, sir, I can provide—— 

Senator BEN NELSON. The breakdown of the ability of the individuals in those positions to carry out their duties is what I’m—— 

Mr. STUMBO. I think the best data will represent that it’s the collective years, as I identified in my oral statement. It’s the collective 

years that actually break down the personnel. So, their best years 

are 20 years. So, probably half way into their career, they begin to 

realize and recognize that they cannot maintain that pace. So, from 

their 10th year to their 20th year, obviously they begin to think 

whether or not they should stay in the career, or not. 

Senator BEN NELSON. As a result of that, one of the major concerns that both the DOE and the collective bargaining unit have 

would be early retirement and having retirement benefits commensurate with early retirement. Is that fair to say? 

Mr. STUMBO. Yes, Sir. Based on the inability for us to maintain 

longer careers, that’s absolutely true. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEN NELSON. If you looked at, let’s say, retraining or 

moving into new career opportunities, career fields, Mr. Podonsky 

and Mr. Aloise, what are the pros and cons of a career field that 

includes, let’s say, a retraining option, so that we—as individuals 

who are no longer able to carry out the demanding work requirement for the highest grades, are there any contractual barriers to 

putting something like this together that would satisfy the concerns of being able to continue in employment until retirement at 

some standard age, consistent with the Federal Government employees? Anything contractual that would get in the way of that? 

Or is that really not a wise path to take for bringing the federalization of these employees into being? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Specifically—and I don’t want to sound like a 

broken record, but obviously some of your questions are very much 

geared towards the line, who are implementing and are letting out 

the contracts. I don’t know if there’s a contractual issue there. 

Senator BEN NELSON. You’re not aware, are you—— 

Mr. PODONSKY. I’m not aware of any. However, I would tell you, 

it’s just good, sound management in my opinion, from the policy 

and oversight, if we have protective force individuals, they have 

clearances, they know the sites; we should be able to transition 

them to other positions. In fact, sir, that’s part of the reason that 

we have the three categories of SPOs originally. It wasn’t just for 

safeguards posturing, it was also to give a career path, so as people 

76 

were no longer, say, a SPOs III, which is a very offensive tactical 

group, they could perhaps go to a fixed post. 

Senator BEN NELSON. It might be easier to show the career path 

going up than it is to get people to accept a career path going back. 

Is that a factor, Mr. Stumbo, with your group? 

Mr. STUMBO. Yes, sir, it certainly is. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Podonsky, I understand that, as circumstances change—health changes and what have you—but, that 

apparently is a big stumbling block. 

Mr. STUMBO. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Is it because of salary, or is it just because 

of the nature of people not wanting to, let’s say, move backwards, 

if they don’t have to? 

Mr. STUMBO. A lot of it has to do with a great deal of pride. 

Senator BEN NELSON. That’s what I mean. 

Mr. STUMBO. A great deal of pride for what they feel like the 

commitment that they have made to the United States, risking, potentially, their lives, based on a terrorist attack. It is a great deal 

of pride. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I understand. Okay. 

Mr. Aloise, what did your findings reflect? 

Mr. ALOISE. Well, we thought that a career path makes sense. 

Right now, if they do fall back to the SO, from a SPO I or II, they 

probably will take a pay cut in that lower position. But, a career 

path, training, and retraining is something that we think can be 

done. We’ve invested a lot of money in these people. They’re well 

trained. They have the high level security clearances. They’re valuable resources, and we should keep them as long as it makes sense 

to keep them. 

Senator BEN NELSON. So, we have to deal with pride, as well as 

economic reality and a number of other things. That’s typical of 

what we deal with, isn’t it? 

Well, I think one of the delicate questions is about the actual security of the sites, because that’s what this is all about; the underlying security of the sites. Is there a concern about individuals, who 

have clearance and have knowledge, leaving the employment of the 

contractor, with that knowledge? Is that a major concern within 

DOE, Mr. Podonsky? 

Mr. PODONSKY. There’s always a concern of what we call the ‘‘insider threat.’’ 

Senator BEN NELSON. Yes. 

Mr. PODONSKY. That’s something that clearances are supposed to 

help us protect against, but you can never predict what the individual is going to do. We don’t currently have a high concern about 

people leaving that have clearances to go on to other positions. But, 

occasionally we do have issues, through the clearance process, that 

we find, where people have shared classified when they shouldn’t 

have after they left, or they kept classified. So, like with any organization, you’re going to have people problems, and I have seen, in 

my short 26 years in the Department, not a great deal of that, for 

the numbers of people that we have employed. 

Senator BEN NELSON. If we had this career path, which would 

obviously improve retention, would that also reduce the concerns 

about—what did you call it? The inside—— 

77 

Mr. PODONSKY. The insider threat. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Right. 

Mr. PODONSKY. I believe that a career path for the protective 

force, as I said in my testimony, is something that we absolutely 

need to find. Relative to a insider threat, that’s a whole different 

subject, as to what motivates people to do that. I don’t believe that 

having a career path, or not, is going to add to that or take away 

from that. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Stumbo, do you have any thoughts 

about the career path and retention? 

Mr. STUMBO. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I believe that, obviously, a 

career path is good business for the American taxpayer. But, we 

have to be realistic, as well, to understand and recognize that 

there’s a limited amount of positions that can be made available at 

any given time. So, in my opinion, it is good business. We certainly 

will help facilitate, entertain any method of a career path. At the 

same time, based on the sensitivity and the significance of what 

takes place at these sites, obviously a large output of personnel 

with the knowledge base that they would have would, even in a 

limited scope, certainly be very damaging to the United States. So, 

yes, we’d be very sensitive of that, as well. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Aloise, did the GAO have any opportunity to look at how DOD secures its nuclear weapons storage 

areas, to see if there are any lessons learned from DOD that would 

have some application here in the case of DOE? 

Mr. ALOISE. We focused on the DOE protective forces for this review. 

Senator BEN NELSON. So, any inconsistencies from your particular standpoint? 

Mr. ALOISE. The DOE forces play a unique role, and it’s hard to 

compare them to what the military does because they are guarding 

nuclear materials, nuclear weapons and components and full-up 

nuclear weapons. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I think there was a question raised, as 

well, about the consistent training. Mr. Aloise, can you give us your 

thoughts on how well-trained individuals are, and whether there 

needs to be any improvement in the training of the security forces? 

Mr. ALOISE. In general, DOE protective forces are a robust welltrained force. But, the training varies from site to site. Some have 

more or different training than others. During my visits to DOE 

sites the one thing protective forces were all asking for is more, 

more firearms and tactical training. So, it does vary from site to 

site, and in our view, should be standardized, to the extent that it 

can be. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Podonsky, do you think that, as a result of that recommendation, that DOE can work toward standardization of the training? 

Mr. PODONSKY. We’re already doing that, Mr. Chairman. We 

have a Basic Security Police Officer Training course, we call 

‘‘BSPOT,’’ and it’s run out of the National Training Center, out of 

Albuquerque, which is in my organization. When the officers then 

go back to their site of assignment, they get additional site-specific 

training. But, definitely, we never do enough training. One of the 

things that’s not part of this hearing, but I will tell you, we try to 

78 

introduce technology into the Department for becoming what we 

call a ‘‘force multiplier,’’ to strengthen the security forces, not to 

take away security forces. Part of the advantages of the technology, 

it not only improves our effectiveness, but also gives us the opportunity to increase the training of the security officers that would 

have more time when we have the technology equipment, as well. 

So, there are a lot of advantages and there are a lot of complexities 

to this problem, but nothing that is insurmountable. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Podonsky, DOE has also changed from 

a design basis threat (DBT) to a new term, graded security policy 

(GSP). How are these two policies different? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Without getting into classified nature of the two 

policies, the graded security protection policy was created because 

the design basis threat was predicated on threat statements from 

the intelligence community, and, as a result of every year that we 

review this, we found that the intelligence community was no 

longer standing behind any particular threat statement, in terms 

of numbers. So, I instructed my policy people that we needed to 

come up with an approach that would allow the sites to be effectively protecting against scenarios, as opposed to a set number of 

adversaries. 

So the basic difference is, it gives the sites much more flexibility 

for site-specific protection, as opposed to just the postulated threat 

that we had lived through previously. 

I’d be happy to give you a classified briefing on that. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Sure. 

Mr. PODONSKY. We feel that it’s a much more effective way to 

improve the security posture of the Department right now. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Stumbo, do you agree with that? 

Mr. STUMBO. Yes, I do agree with it, but you have to recognize 

and understand that our threats are in evolution; they evolve. As 

the terrorists become more desperate—and we’ve seen a lot of those 

events of recent times—we have to evolve and we have to increase 

our abilities to be able to defend those threats. So, as far as the 

protective force is concerned, we need to improve daily. It’s not an 

achievement where we ever really ever get there. It’s something 

that we work on every single hour of every day that we are at our 

sites, because the consequences are too great to our Nation to allow 

one slip-up at a site like Pantex. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Aloise, what were your findings in 

conjunction with the changing of the threat approach and how it’s 

being maintained and trained for at the present time? 

Mr. ALOISE. DOE, over the years, has changed the DBT a number of times—it did so in 2003, 2004, 2005, and again in 2008. A 

lot of this is tied to money. It’s very expensive to guard these sites. 

I understand that DOE believes its sites are at a level where DOD 

believes they should be. 

GAO has done numerous reviews on DOE security, and made 

many recommendations, but, in the end, we have always came back 

to believe it was a very robust force, and still is. 

Senator BEN NELSON. What question haven’t I asked that I 

should be asking? 

Each of you. 

Mr. Podonsky? 

79 

Mr. PODONSKY. Actually, no other questions for us, but I’m looking forward to the questions that will be asked of the line, who actually implement the policies and the contracts of the Guard force 

and the security posture of the Department. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Stumbo, have we not asked something 

that we should have? 

Mr. STUMBO. No, Mr. Chairman. I believe that you have asked 

some very good questions. I think, in response from the protective 

force, that we have just waited a very, very long time. Many of the 

men and women are no longer with us, that waited for some resolution, based on the commitment they had to their country. So, those 

that are in the system right now, we continue to wait and feel like 

we are at the mercy of Congress to do whatever is necessary to ensure that we receive the appropriate restructure. 

Senator BEN NELSON. That ‘‘being at the mercy of Congress’’ is 

not necessarily a very secure feeling, is it? 

Mr. STUMBO. No, sir. [Laughter.] 

No, sir, it is not. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I understand. 

Mr. Aloise, anything? 

Mr. ALOISE. I would just add, Mr. Chairman, that the 29 recommendations DOE has come up with for improving protective 

forces causes is a step in the right direction, but it is going to take 

leadership from the Secretary of Energy to get this done. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Any thoughts from any of you about a 

timeframe. If we said, ‘‘today we’re going to do it,’’ are we looking 

at, certainly not days, but months, and many months, to get it in 

place and implemented? 

Mr. Aloise, do you have some thoughts on that? 

Mr. ALOISE. We hope that they start almost immediately, because we want to avoid another strike at another site; DOE needs 

to take action now to make sure that doesn’t happen. 

Senator BEN NELSON. How long do you think it would take, once 

you make the decision to do it, how long would it take to implement it? 

Mr. ALOISE. I believe it would take years, not months. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Podonsky? 

Mr. PODONSKY. I agree with Mr. Aloise, in terms of the actions 

that we’re taking now need to be clear to the unions and the Guard 

forces out there, that the Department is taking action and that 

we’re not just talking any longer. But because of contractual circumstances, it will take quite a long time. We didn’t create this 

problem overnight; it’s taken years for us to create this problem. 

That doesn’t mean that it should take that long to unravel. But, 

clearly, again, as I said, and my colleagues at the witness table 

have said, in partnership, all together, with Congress, we can make 

this right. 

Mr. Stumbo? 

Mr. STUMBO. Mr. Chairman, the only portion that I would disagree from my colleagues is that the necessary resources that could 

be implemented within our collective bargaining agreements could 

be done much quicker if we’re provided the resources to make that 

happen. You would have the full commitment from labor to ensure 

80 

that we could make that happen long before they have to worry 

about the next contract expiration. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Well, as I was getting briefed for the hearing today, I have to admit that this is one of the most byzantine 

set of arrangements I have ever imagined could exist anywhere, let 

alone within the Federal Government. Usually we can find a pretty 

good way of doing things in a byzantine fashion with an awful lot 

of bureaucracy, but I must confess, I’ve never seen anything quite 

like this. 

I understand that there are differences in sites and requirements—and so, obviously, there are some things that absolutely 

need to be patterned after the needs and be specifically tailored to 

what is done, but not everything. So I’m hopeful that, with the next 

hearing, we’ll get more information, and perhaps, together, we’ll 

find a way to make this happen for everyone. 

Uncertainty benefits nobody, and I’m just certain that you’ve 

lived with that constant uncertainty for eons. So if it is possible to 

bring this to some sort of a conclusion or resolution for everybody’s 

benefit, including the people of the United of America, we ought to 

be seeking to do that, and do so in a timely fashion. 

So, I thank you for your participation today, for your candid answers. I thank you all for being here. 

We stand adjourned. 

Thank you. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

FEDERALIZATION

1. Senator VITTER. Mr. Podonsky, in the January 2009 memo from you and the 

Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), you examined the costs and benefits associated with federalizing the protective force. The 

memo asserted that the ‘‘most important factor to consider when determining the 

best organizational structure for protective forces is which model will result in the 

most effective security for the facilities in a cost effective manner.’’ Can you please 

address the role security and cost effectiveness played in reaching your conclusion 

in the 2009 memo that federalization of the protective forces is not a viable option? 

Mr. PODONSKY. The most recent study of these issues, sponsored by NNSA in 

2008, did not draw a conclusion regarding the relative merits of protective force federalization. A joint Department of Energy (DOE)/NNSA study in 2004 recommended 

that the best long-term organizational approach for achieving cost-effective and efficient security of our vital national assets was to convert the existing contractor protective forces to Federal status. The recommendation to federalize was focused explicitly on the provision of a combat-effective protective force, designed to defeat a 

well-armed and dedicated terrorist adversary at any DOE facility involved directly 

in the protection of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material (SNM), or other strategic national security assets. However, upon further consideration, concerns were 

identified regarding near-term consequences of federalization, including near-term 

instability within the existing force and substantial transition costs, while the most 

significant benefits derived from federalization could also be achieved within a contract force arrangement. Additional factors that militated against the conversion to 

a Federal force included the time required to convert, and the difficulty in reconciling the centralized Federal force model with the site-based management model 

used in the Department. Finally, we were sensitive to the possible adverse impact 

on those current members of the force who might not meet some of the Federal employment criteria, and, in general, the employment uncertainties that officers and 

their families would face during a protracted transition. In the final analysis—and 

in the absence of a clear-cut cost advantage in favor of federalization—the Department made its largely for reasons other than cost. 

81 

2. Senator VITTER. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, in the Government Accountability Office (GAO) report you assert that a Federal force offers no overall advantage to the current model and that either option could result in effective and more 

uniform security if well-managed. To that extent, do either of you assess that the 

cost of implementing a federalized force would be higher than the cost of fixing our 

current model? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Earlier cost analyses were limited in scope and, therefore, comprehensive data is lacking. We do not know, for example, what grade level could 

be assigned, or the extent of transitional costs as opposed to the implementation of 

a performance-based contract. It is also not known how many officers would not 

qualify for Federal positions, which would result in an increase in costs for recruiting and training new personnel. For a comprehensive answer to this question, additional study would be needed on a site-by-site basis. 

Mr. ALOISE. We were unable to make the cost comparison needed to answer this 

question. Reliably estimating the costs to compare protective force options proved 

difficult and precluded our detailed reporting on it for two broad reasons. First, 

since contractor and Federal forces could each have many possible permutations, 

choosing any particular option to assess would be arbitrary. For example, a 2008 

NNSA-sponsored study identified wide-ranging federalization options, such as federalizing all or some SPO positions at some or all facilities or reorganizing them 

under an existing or a new agency. Second, DOE will have to decide on the hypothetical options’ key cost factors before it can reasonably compare costs. Either option could be implemented with more or less costly features. For example, adding 

the early and enhanced retirement benefits would increase costs for either contractor or Federal protective forces. 

3. Senator VITTER. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, I understand that if a federalization model were pursued the current forces would risk a loss in pay and perhaps 

their jobs as they would be required to recompete for the same job under a federalized structure. Could one assume that such a transition could have a significant destabilizing effect on the current force? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes. These risks to individual officers are real. If each officer had 

to compete for what is in effect his or her own job, we would expect that uncertainty 

and instability in the workforce would be a major issue. Traditional union rules of 

seniority would not apply and certain requirements within the civil service system 

could further complicate hiring actions and contribute to destabilization. 

Mr. ALOISE. Yes, transitioning to a Federal force could have a significant destabilizing effect on the current force. Under existing laws, not only would current force 

members risk a loss in pay and even their jobs, but they would not receive the enhanced and early retirement benefits that a coalition of their unions had hoped 

would come with federalization. As force members become aware of these likely 

unpalatable consequences, their morale might be significantly lowered-both in anticipation of federalization and after it occurs. 

RETIREMENT BENEFITS

4. Senator VITTER. Mr. Podonsky, the current protective force is well paid, and 

in many cases is better paid than equivalent Federal positions. The current force 

enjoys generous retirement and health benefits including in almost all cases employers contributing to 401(K) retirement plans. I was troubled to hear that one issue 

unaddressed in the report may be that some within the protective force are not taking advantage and/or using the employer contributing vehicles to save for their retirement. I look forward to hearing from you what can be done to emphasize the 

importance of doing so; do you have statistics on the percentage of the force who 

take advantage of their 401(K) benefits? 

Mr. PODONSKY. This has been one of our concerns as well. One of the primary 

concerns of the Protective Force Career Options study initiative that HSS chartered 

last year was how to encourage contractors to offer educational, financial, and career counseling opportunities to contractor workforces. One of the 29 recommendations generated by that group explicitly calls for a DOE-wide program of retirement 

counseling and training that would address such issues as early and consistent 

401(k) participation. This recommendation builds upon similar individual programs 

that already exist at several sites, including classes on long-term financial planning 

in their initial new employee orientation and basic training with periodic refresher 

sessions. A notable example of such an existing program is found at the Savannah 

River Site. Additionally, the National Training Center is now engaged in the development of standardized methodologies for the delivery of these types of materials 

82 

and information at all sites. It should be further noted that available data on protective force member participation in 401(k) plans points to reasonably high levels of 

participation already. 

5. Senator VITTER. Mr. Podonsky, if it is, in fact, correct that a vast majority are 

not contributing to their retirement plans, what can be done to emphasize the importance of doing so? 

Mr. PODONSKY. The figures available to us indicate that a significant majority of 

protective force members are, in fact, currently contributing to their retirement 

plans. For example, at the Savannah River Site, one of the largest protective forces 

in the DOE complex, the DOE contractor employees have a 401(k) enrollment rate 

of 95 percent; Savannah River Site’s protective force contractor has a highly-developed program to encourage participation. The Hanford Site contractor employees 

have an enrollment rate of about 91 percent, the Oak Ridge Complex contractor has 

a rate of 86 percent, the Idaho Complex contractor has a rate of 79 percent, and 

the Headquarters force contractor has a 72 percent rate. DOE and NNSA have 

asked several line management organizations to develop up-to-the-minute participation rate figures for contractors at all sites as part of DOE and NNSA current initiatives, but these preliminary data do not support the impression of widespread nonparticipation. As noted previously, however, we believe that participation can be 

maximized through the development and delivery of standardized materials that 

can be tailored to specific local programs along with more sites implementing mandatory initial participation by new hires. 

6. Senator VITTER. Mr. Podonsky, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 directs the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the NNSA 

to develop a comprehensive, Department of Energy (DOE)-wide plan to identify and 

implement the recommendations of the study group. Furthermore, the legislation 

cites that it is the lack of clear, uniform, and realistic guidance and policy from DOE 

to the various contractors who manage the protective forces that is at the root of 

the problems. Do you agree that the root of the problems with the protective force 

is the lack of clear, uniform, and realistic guidance and policy from DOE to the various contractors? 

Mr. PODONSKY. DOE and NNSA do not believe that formal DOE protective force 

policy—or the lack thereof—is the primary source of these problems, but we do acknowledge that the multiple line management programs and individual sites in the 

implementation of policy has contributed to the problem. Additionally, the situation 

has also been affected by changes in other areas such as the administrative policies 

governing procurement. Also, some other important inconsistencies have evolved 

through the course of successive collective bargaining agreements at the sites, much 

of which is outside the purview of policy officials. Our recent contractor protective 

force career options study noted that these issues are not the result of anyone’s 

overall intentions for protective force members and their careers, but instead as a 

result of the implementation, over time, of patchwork solutions to a wide range of 

individual issues. In this sense, we do agree that the time has come to establish 

clear and consistent performance standards for protective force performance, while 

still maintaining the necessary flexibility to permit adaptation to the special needs 

of line management programs and particular site environments. 

STUDY GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS

7. Senator VITTER. Mr. Podonsky, does the DOE intend to pursue the implementation of all 29 recommendations cited in the June 2009 report on Enhanced Career 

Longevity and Retirement Options for DOE protective forces personnel? 

Mr. PODONSKY. DOE has committed to pursuing a course of action that leads to 

satisfactory resolution of the issues that drove the recommendations. Achieving satisfactory solutions will depend upon close cooperation among all Departmental elements—line management, policy, contractors, unions. 

8. Senator VITTER. Mr. Podonsky, what is the anticipated timeline for implementing those recommendations the Department has already agreed to apply? 

Mr. PODONSKY. The timeline for implementation is one of the actions still being 

developed. This will be discussed as part of the implementation plan due to Congress no later than April 30, 2010. This plan and its due date are a result of the 

Government Accountability Office report of March 3, 2010, ‘‘DOE Needs to Fully Address Issues Affecting Protective Forces Personnel Systems.’’ 

83 

9. Senator VITTER. Mr. Podonsky, has the Department fully estimated the cost implications of doing so, and if so, what is the estimated unbudgeted cost, and if not, 

when will you be able to provide those costs to Congress? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Possible alternatives to address various options are still being developed in coordination with line management and, where completed, costs estimates will be reported in the implementation plan due to Congress by April 30, 

2010. Where necessary, the April 30 submission will also identify cost analyses that 

may require additional time beyond that date for completion. 

RECRUITMENT AND ATTRITION

10. Senator VITTER. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, is the Department having any 

difficulty in the recruitment or quality of the protective force? 

Mr. PODONSKY. DOE contractors do not experience difficulty attracting and recruiting qualified men and women to constitute our protective forces. 

Mr. ALOISE. Preliminary data we collected on protective forces at the six sites we 

reviewed did not appear to show any systemic recruiting problems. In the absence 

of apparent problems, we did not pursue this issue further. We did not collect any 

specific information on the quality of protective forces or recruits, but note that 

armed DOE protective forces (Security Police Officers-I, -II, and III) must undergo 

extensive background checks and ongoing evaluation since they carry high-level security clearances and are enrolled in formal human reliability programs, complete 

extensive initial and annual refresher training, and regularly demonstrate that they 

can meet firearms and physical fitness qualifications. 

11. Senator VITTER. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, are the salaries and benefits 

of the protective force competitive? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Our contractor firms consult Department of Labor wage tables in 

order to ascertain the prevailing local wages for protective force positions. DOE contractor protective forces are well paid in relation to other contractor protective 

forces, but pay is proportionate to the responsibilities inherent in the work. 

Mr. ALOISE. Since comparing the salaries and benefits of the protective forces 

with those of similar positions in the private sector was not in the scope of our 

work, we cannot say whether their salaries and benefits are competitive. However, 

based on our review of protective forces’ pay and benefits, we offer this observation 

that should be considered in such a comparison. Since protective forces’ pay is often 

significantly increased by overtime hours, comparisons of annual salaries with private sector positions should consider potential differences in the number of hours 

worked annually. 

12. Senator VITTER. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, how do attrition rates for the 

protective forces compare to similar positions in the private sector? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Attrition does not appear to be a problem for our protective force. 

Our data indicates that attrition rate for our DOE and NNSA contractor protective 

force officers is well below that of related jobs in the local areas where they reside. 

Mr. ALOISE. Comparing attrition rates for protective forces and comparable private sector positions was not in our scope of work. However, the preliminary data 

on protective forces attrition we collected did not appear to show any systemic attrition issues. Protective forces at all sites, as well as Federal agents that work for 

the Office of Secure Transportation (OST), all experience attrition, but, on the basis 

of preliminary data, there did not appear to be any marked differences, and we did 

not pursue this issue further. 

POTENTIAL FOR A FUTURE STRIKE

13. Senator VITTER. Mr. Podonsky, in the event of a potential future strike at one 

or more SNM I sites and in light of lessons learned during the security force strike 

at Pantex in 2007, what are the Department’s current plans for ensuring continuity 

of security? 

Mr. PODONSKY. From the shared DOE and NNSA perspective and based on lessons learned going back to the Rocky Flats protective force work stoppage in 1994, 

my office has developed and maintained a Contingency Protective Force guide. This 

document provides a model for any site that may have suffered a natural emergency 

or a protective force work stoppage on how to constitute a contingency protective 

force from onsite and offsite nonbargaining unit officers. This guide was utilized at 

Pantex when work stoppages occurred and at other locations while negotiations 

were ongoing but were subsequently concluded successfully. We ensure the docuVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:45 Mar 10, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\65006.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
84 

ment is available to the responsible line management organizations and that it is 

revised based upon lessons learned from each work stoppage or potential stoppage. 

14. Senator VITTER. Mr. Podonsky, does the Department foresee any scenarios 

where security at one or more sites could become an issue? 

Mr. PODONSKY. DOE planners and our contractors are constantly attempting to 

identify potential vulnerabilities and seeking ways to mitigate them. Planning explicitly includes the security implications of strike contingency operations. More details or precision would require a separate classified submission. 

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PROTECTIVE FORCE AND THE DOE SECURE TRANSPORT

FORCE

15. Senator VITTER. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, how do the protective force and 

the secure transport force differ? 

Mr. PODONSKY. At the most basic level, the differences are that the protective 

forces are contractor employees who provide security at our fixed sites for special 

nuclear material and weapons, while the Office of Secure Transportation (OST) consists of Federal agents who transport nuclear weapons and special nuclear material 

on public roads around the United States. In addition, the Federal agents have a 

responsibility to liaise with Federal, State, and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the States through which they perform their transport mission. 

The multiplicity of jurisdictional interactions associated with this ‘‘over-the-road’’ 

mission is in direct contrast to the stable set of interactions required at fixed sites. 

Federal agent status for OST personnel is intended, among other things, to ensure 

that, in the event of an incident, the necessary lines of authority are clear. 

Mr. ALOISE. Broadly speaking, protective forces and agents differ in the following 

respects: 

Characteristics OST Agents Protective Forces 

Numbers 363 2,339 

Employer Federal employees Contractor employees 

Management structure Centralized Federal management Varies based on different contractors and different contracts 

Collective bargaining 

status 

Cannot collectively bargain Covered by different collective bargaining 

agreements (CBAs) 

Pay Single pay system Varies with CBAs 

Benefits Federal Employee Health Benefit Program and 

Federal Employee Retirement System. Eligible for early retirement (at age 50 after 20 

years of service) 

Varies with CBA 

Mission Mobile, public roads Fixed facilities 

16. Senator VITTER. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, are the requirements and 

stresses of the secure transport force more demanding that those of the protective 

force? 

Mr. PODONSKY. The requirements and stresses of the job are different for the Federal agents in several areas. From a personal standpoint, they spend substantial 

time away from their homes and families. From an operational standpoint, they do 

not have the natural advantage enjoyed by officers at fixed sites, such as fixed barriers, hardened fighting positions, deployed technologies, video surveillance and assessment, and local terrain knowledge. The secure transport force is also subject to 

the stresses of a long distance trucking operation. 

Mr. ALOISE. We found that OST Federal agents’ mobile mission differs significantly from that of protective forces that guard fixed sites. OST agents operate convoys of special tractor trailers and special escort vehicles to transport Category I 

SNM. These agents travel on U.S. highways that cross multiple Federal, State, tribal, and local law enforcement jurisdictions. They also travel as many as 15 days 

each month. Agents may also provide security for weapons components that are 

flown on OST’s small fleet of aircraft. In contrast to the public setting of agents’ 

85 

work, protective forces that guard Category I SNM at fixed sites typically have 

elaborate physical defenses and tightly restricted and monitored public access. As 

such, OST agents operational environment appears to be more ambiguous and dynamic than the environment found at Category I SNM sites. 

17. Senator VITTER. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, is the secure transport force 

subjected to a higher level of training than the protective force? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes. Federal agents must qualify under Department of Transportation regulations and maintain their ability to operate 18-wheeled secure transport 

vehicles. Both Federal agents and contractor protective forces must meet the same 

overall firearms and fitness requirements but tactical training for Federal agents is 

dissimilar due to the completely different operating environments. All Federal agent 

training must address the various types of terrain (rural and urban) a convoy travels through. This includes force-on-force; individual, small unit, and convoy tactics; 

advanced live fire; tactical driving; recapture/recovery ops; and Incident Command 

System. 

Mr. ALOISE. We found (pg. 21–22 of GAO–10–275) that OST agents undergo 

longer, more frequent, and more diverse training than do most protective forces. For 

example, OST Federal agents: 

• Undergo longer basic training (21 weeks) at OST’s academy in Fort 

Chaffee, AR; 

• Must complete requirements for a commercial drivers license; 

• Are required to meet DOE’s offensive combatant standard throughout 

their careers; 

• Spend more of their time training, including tactical training, than do 

most contractor protective forces. 

18. Senator VITTER. Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Aloise, does the notion that the secure 

transport force has to transport nuclear materials across State lines and in an inherently mobile fashion constitute any rationale for requiring that they have full 

Federal authorities? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes. As discussed above, Federal agent authority must be 

transjurisdictional. The operating environment leads to the necessity for them to 

have Federal authority. They regularly interact with national, tribal, State, county, 

and local law enforcement authorities as well as various intelligence agencies as 

they seek knowledge of any potential threat to them and their cargoes in the operating environment. 

Mr. ALOISE. OST officials told us that this is an important factor. 

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

Æ