[Cite as Siltstone Servs., L.L.C. v. Guernsey Cty. Community Dev. Corp., 2020-Ohio-3877.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

GUERNSEY COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

SILTSTONE SERVICES, LLC JUDGES: 

 Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

 Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. 

-vs- 

 Case No. 19CA000047 

THE GUERNSEY COUNTY 

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 

CORPORATION, et al., 

 

 Defendants-Appellees 

And 

OHIO PUBLIC WORKS COMMISSION 

 Defendant-Appellant 

And 

DEVON ENERGY PRODUCTION 

COMPANY, LP 

 Defendant-Appellee- 

 Cross-Appellant 

O P I N IO N 

NUNC PRO TUNC 

 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Guernsey County Court

of Common Pleas, Case No. 

17CV000611 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part; Reversed and remanded 

in part; Final Judgment entered in part

 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: October 28, 2020 

 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 2 

APPEARANCES: 

 

For Plaintiff-Appellee Siltstone For Defendant-Appellee Guernsey 

Services, LLC County Community Development Corp. 

 

ANDREW LYCANS MARIBETH MELUCH 

Critchfield, Critchfield & Johnston, LTD Isaac Wiles Burkholder & Teetor, LLC 

225 North Market Street Two Miranova Place – Ste. # 700 

P.O. Box 599 Columbus, Ohio 43215 

Wooster, Ohio 44691 

 For Defendant-Appellee Patriot Land 

MANMEET S. WALIA Company, LLC 

Siltstone Services, LLC 

1801 Smith Street – Ste. #2000 RICHARD V. ZURZ, JR. 

Houston, TX 77002 Slater & Zurz, LLP 

 One Cascade Plaza – Ste. #2210 

 Akron, Ohio 44308 

 

For Defendant-Appellees Synergy For Defendant-Appellee Gulfport Energy

Land Company, LLC and Whispering Corporation 

Pines Land Company, LLC 

 DANIEL C. GIBSON 

CRAIG G. PELINI MATTHEW W. WARNOCK 

PAUL B. RICARD AARON M. BRUGGEMAN 

Pelini, Campbell & Williams, LLC CHRISTINE RIDEOUT SCHIRRA 

8040 Cleveland Ave., N.W. – Ste. #400 Bricker & Eckler, LLP 

North Canton, Ohio 44720 110 South Third Street

 Columbus, Ohio 43215 

 

 ZACHARY M. SIMPSON 

 Gulfport Energy Corporation 

 3001 Quail Springs Parkway 

 Oklahoma City, OK 73134 

 

 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 3 

For Defendant-Appellant Ohio Public For Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant

Works Commission Devon Energy Production Company, LP 

 

DAVE YOST TIMOTHY B. McGRANOR 

Attorney General of Ohio ELIZABETH S. ALEXANDER 

 Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, LLP 

LIDIA MOWAD 52 East Gay Street

JAMES PATTERSON Columbus, Ohio 43215 

RACHEL HUSTON 

CHRISTIE LIMBERT For Cross-Appellee 

CORY GOE Guernsey County Community

MICHELLE PFEFFERLE Development Corporation 

JOSHUA NAGY 

Assistant Attorneys General ERIK A. SCHRAMM 

Executive Agencies Section KYLE W. BICKFORD 

30 E. Broad Street – 26th Floor Hanlon, Estadt, McCormick, & 

Columbus, Ohio 43215 Schramm Co., LPA 

 46457 National Road West

 St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950 

 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 4 

Hoffman, P.J. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Ohio Public Works Commission (“OPWC”) appeals 

the judgment entered by the Guernsey County Common Pleas Court granting PlaintiffAppellee's Siltstone Resources, LLC (“Siltstone”); Defendant-Appellee's Guernsey 

County Community Development Corporation (“CDC”); Cross-Claim DefendantsAppellees' Gulfport Energy Corporation (“Gulfport”), Synergy Land Company 

(“Synergy”),Whispering Pine, LLC (“Whispering Pine”), Patriot Land Company, LLC 

(“Patriot”), Devon Energy Production, LP (“Devon”), and Guernsey County 

Commissioners (“Guernsey County”)1 motions for summary judgment and/or judgment 

on the pleadings, and denying Appellant OPWC's motion for partial summary judgment. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} This case concerns the Clean Ohio Conservation Program and 

approximately 60 acres of property in Guernsey County, Ohio. 

{¶3} In 2000, Ohio voters approved a constitutional amendment to create a taxexempt bond fund to be used for environmental conservation and revitalization purposes. 

Ohio Constitution, Article VIII, Section 2o(A). The amendment permitted the General 

Assembly to enact laws in accordance with the amendment. Ohio Constitution, Article 

VIII, Section 2o(B). As a result, the Clean Ohio Fund Green Space Conservation Program 

was created, and OPWC was tasked with administering the program. 

{¶4} In 2006, CDC applied for a grant of $894,500 from the Clean Ohio Fund for 

its Leatherwood Creek Riparian Project. CDC represented to OPWC it would purchase 

land along the Leatherwood Creek “to allow the riparian corridor to be protected from 

 

1 The Guernsey County Commissioners have not filed a brief in the instant action. 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 5 

encroachment by development and allow the natural beauty of [the] valley to be accessed 

by the public.” CDC represented “the primary emphasis of this project is the preservation 

and restoration of water quality, natural stream channels, functioning floodplains, 

wetlands, streamside forests, and other natural features that contribute to the quality of 

life in Guernsey and Belmont County.” The project included land in both Belmont and 

Guernsey Counties. 

{¶5} OPWC approved the grant and a project agreement was entered into 

between OPWC and CDC in 2006. As part of the agreement, deed restrictions were 

required to be recorded with the deeds for any land purchased by CDC with grant money 

from OPWC. 

{¶6} In February, 2008, CDC purchased approximately 60 acres in Guernsey 

County from George and Autumn Thompson, using grant funds received from OPWC. 

The deed contained the following restrictions: 

 1. Use and Development Restrictions. Declarant hereby agrees, for 

itself and its successors and assigns as owners of the Property, which 

Property shall be subject to the following: This property will not be 

developed in any manner that conflicts with the use of the Premises as a 

green space park area that protects the historical significance of this 

particular parcel. Only current structures will be maintained and no new 

structures will be built on the premises. 

 2. Perpetual Restrictions. The restrictions set forth in this deed shall 

be perpetual and shall run with the land for the benefit of, and shall be 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 6 

enforceable by, Ohio Public Works Commission (OPWC). This deed and 

the covenants and restrictions set forth herein shall not be amended, 

released, extinguished or otherwise modified without the prior written 

consent of OPWC, which consent may be withheld in its sole and absolute 

discretion. 

 3. Enforcement. If Grantee, or its successors or assigns as owner of 

the Property, should fail to observe the covenants and restrictions set forth 

herein, the Grantee or it is successors or assigns, as the case may be, shall 

pay to OPWC upon demand, as liquidated damages, an amount equal to 

the rate of (a) two hundred percent (200%) of the amount of the Grant 

received by Grantee, together with interest accruing at the rate of six 

percent (6%) per annum from the date of Grantee's receipt of the Grant, or 

(b) two hundred percent (200%) of the fair market value of the Property as 

of the date or demand by OPWC. Grantee acknowledges that such sum is 

not intended as, and shall not be deemed, a penalty, but is intended to 

compensate for damages suffered in the event a breach or violation of the 

covenants and restrictions set forth herein, the determination of which is not 

readily ascertainable. 

 OPWC shall have the right to enforce by any proceedings at law or 

in equity, all restrictions, conditions, and covenants set forth herein. Failures 

by OPWC to proceed with such enforcement shall in no event be deemed 

a waiver of the right to enforce at a later date the original violation or 

subsequent violation. 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 7 

 4. Restrictions on transfer of the Property. Grantee acknowledges 

that the Grant is specific to Grantee and that OPWC's approval of Grantee's 

application for the Grant was made in reliance on Grantee's continued 

ownership and control of the Property. Accordingly, Grantee shall not 

voluntarily or involuntarily sell, assign, transfer, lease, exchange, convey or 

otherwise encumber the Property without the prior written consent of 

OPWC, which consent may be withheld in its sole and absolute discretion. 

{¶7} 2008 Deed from George and Autumn Thompson to CDC. 

{¶8} In March, 2011, CDC entered into an oil and gas lease with Patriot. Patriot 

assigned the lease to Gulfport in October of 2012, but retained a royalty interest. Patriot 

subsequently assigned a portion of its royalty interest to Synergy and Whispering Pines. 

The lease included rights of ingress and egress to establish, conduct, and/or maintain 

production operations, and did not prohibit disturbing the surface of the land. CDC did 

not seek written consent of OPWC before entering this agreement, nor did Patriot receive 

consent to transfer its interest in the property. 

{¶9} In August, 2012, CDC entered into a Water and Surface Use Agreement 

with Devon. Pursuant to the agreement, Devon was given the right to withdraw water 

from the ponds on the land incident to Devon’s oil and gas activities. Devon could enter 

the land; draw water from the ponds in such volumes as Devon required; place and 

maintain both surface and subsurface pipelines, equipment, or facilities necessary or 

convenient for Devon’s operations or for drawing, transporting, or storing water; distribute 

on the land earth, rock, or other materials excavated in laying pipelines or installing, 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 8 

repairing, or removing other facilities on the land; and cut trees and other vegetation. 

CDC agreed not to allow third parties to use the ponds for swimming or other recreational 

purposes while Devon conducted operations on or near the pond. Pursuant to an 

amendment to the agreement between CDC and Devon, Devon was permitted to pump 

non-potable replenishment water into the pond, and CDC agreed the pond would not be 

used as a source of drinking water or fish for human consumption. 

{¶10} Devon exercised its rights under the agreement in 2013. After installing 

water pipelines and a portable water pump, Devon withdrew 71,332 barrels of water from 

ponds on the property and from a creek, paying CDC a total of $14,726.40 for the water. 

CDC did not seek written consent of OPWC before entering this agreement with Devon. 

{¶11} In October of 2012, CDC transferred two acres of surface rights to the 

property to Guernsey County for construction of a trailhead, without obtaining the consent 

of the OPWC for the sale. 

{¶12} On April 24, 2013, the Executive Director of CDC, Daniel Speedy, signed a 

right of way letter agreement giving Siltstone the right to use a private road on the property 

to access Siltstone’s adjoining property. In exchange for use of the right of way for its 

commercial oil and gas activities, Siltstone agreed to maintain the road. Eventually, CDC 

erected a gate on the property preventing Siltstone from using the right of way, which 

action gave rise to the instant lawsuit. 

{¶13} Siltstone filed the instant action against CDC on November 1, 2017, seeking 

a declaration the right of way agreement between the parties remained in effect and an 

order directing CDC to specifically perform under the agreement by executing a 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 9 

recordable right of way. Siltstone later amended the complaint, adding a cause of action 

seeking money damages for breach of contract. 

{¶14} OPWC intervened in the action on July 2, 2018. OPWC filed a counterclaim 

against Siltstone and a cross-claim against CDC, alleging the right of way agreement and 

the other interests in the property conveyed by CDC violated the deed restrictions. OPWC 

obtained leave to join Gulfport, Patriot, Synergy, Whispering Pines, Devon, and Guernsey 

County to the action, and filed cross-claims against these new party defendants. OPWC 

sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages pursuant to the liquidated damages 

clause in the deed restrictions. Devon filed a cross claim against CDC, alleging pursuant 

to its water and surface use agreement with CDC, it had a right of defense and 

indemnification from CDC. CDC cross-claimed against OPWC, seeking a declaration 

OPWC is limited to money damages and equitable relief is not available, the transfer 

restriction in the deed is void, the use restriction is limited to the surface of the property 

only, the use restriction only bars activity inconsistent with use of the property as green 

space, and the liquidated damages provision is void as a penalty. 

{¶15} All parties filed dispositive motions. OPWC filed a motion for partial 

summary judgment on all issues except liquidated damages. CDC filed motions for 

summary judgment as to Siltstone’s claims, OPWC’s claims, and Devon’s claim. Siltstone 

filed a motion for summary judgment. Devon filed a motion for summary judgment as to 

OPWC’s cross-claims, and a motion for partial summary judgment on its cross-claim 

against CDC. Patriot filed a motion for summary judgment. Gulfport, Synergy, and 

Whispering Pine filed motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civ. R. 12(C). 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 10 

{¶16} The trial court found Speedy’s actions in signing the right of way agreement 

were ultra vires and not binding on CDC.2 The court found OPWC was not entitled to 

injunctive nor declarative relief pursuant to statute. 

{¶17} The trial court concluded the use restriction in the deed applied only to the 

surface of the land. The court found no evidence the surface was used by Patriot, 

Gulfport, Synergy or Whispering Pine, and therefore the oil and gas leases did not violate 

the use restriction in the deed. 

{¶18} The trial court found OPWC had not established actual damages for the 

withdrawal of water from the pond by Devon, and the liquidated damages clause in the 

Thompson deed was disproportionate to the damage caused by Devon to the ponds, and 

therefore void as a penalty. 

{¶19} The trial court concluded the transfer to Guernsey County did not violate the 

use restriction, as the construction of a trailhead was consistent with green space use. 

The trial court found no structures have been erected, and the transfer augments the 

green space objectives. 

{¶20} Finally, the trial court concluded the transfer restriction is void as a matter 

of law, as it requires perpetual ownership rather than ownership or long-term control. 

{¶21} The court accordingly granted CDC’s motion for summary judgment as to 

Siltstone’s complaint, and denied Siltstone’s summary judgment motion as to CDC. The 

court granted CDC’s motion for summary judgment as to OPWC’s cross claim against 

CDC, and granted CDC’s motion for summary judgment on its cross-claim against 

OPWC. The court granted CDC’s motion for summary judgment on Devon’s cross-claim 

 

2 Siltstone’s appeal from this judgment is the subject of the related appeal, Case No. 19CA00049. 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 11 

against CDC, and denied Devon’s motion for summary judgment on said cross-claim. 

The court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Patriot, and the motions for 

judgment on the pleadings filed by Gulfport, Synergy and Whispering Pine. The court 

denied Siltstone’s motion for summary judgment on OPWC’s counterclaim because the 

right of way agreement was found to be void as ultra vires, and denied OPWC’s motion 

for partial summary judgment. 

{¶22} As to Devon’s cross-claim against the CDC, the trial court found the 

indemnification clause relates to damages to the ponds or personal injury. The court 

found the cross-claims of OPWC against Devon did not relate to either damage to the 

ponds or personal injury, and therefore granted summary judgment to CDC on the crossclaim. 

{¶23} It is from the October 25, 2019 judgment of the Guernsey County Common 

Pleas Court OPWC prosecutes this appeal, assigning as error: 

 I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE COMMISSION’S 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN GRANTING 

APPELLEES’ VARIOUS MOTIONS BECAUSE THE COURT SHOULD 

HAVE APPLIED THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE DEED RESTRICTIONS 

TO FIND THAT APPELLEES BREACHED THE DEED RESTRICTIONS. 

 II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE COMMISSION’S 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN GRANTING 

APPELLEES’ VARIOUS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 12 

BECAUSE THE DEED RESTRICTIONS ARE VALID AND ARE 

ENFORCEABLE THROUGH DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. 

 III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE COMMISSION’S 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN GRANTING 

APPELLEES’ VARIOUS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

BECAUSE THE COMMISSION IS ENTITLED TO MONEY DAMAGES. 

{¶24} Devon assigns a single error to the October 25, 2019 judgment of the court: 

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEVON’S MOTION FOR 

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING THE CDC’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEVON’S CROSS-CLAIMS AGAINST 

THE CDC. 

I. 

{¶25} OPWC argues the trial court erred in granting the various dispositive 

motions of the Appellees herein and in denying its motion for summary judgment 

regarding CDC’s violations of the use, transfer and perpetual restrictions in the Thompson 

deed. 

{¶26} Summary judgment proceedings present the appellate court with the unique 

opportunity of reviewing the evidence in the same manner as the trial court. Smiddy v. 

The Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36 (1987). As such, we must refer to Civ. R. 

56(C) which provides in pertinent part: 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 13 

 Summary Judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, 

transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in 

the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence 

or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary 

judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or 

stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds 

can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party 

against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being 

entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the 

party’s favor. 

{¶27} Pursuant to the above rule, a trial court may not enter summary judgment if 

it appears a material fact is genuinely disputed. The party moving for summary judgment 

bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for its motion and identifying 

those portions of the record demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact. The moving party may not make a conclusory assertion the non-moving party has 

no evidence to prove its case. The moving party must specifically point to some evidence 

which demonstrates the moving party cannot support its claim. If the moving party 

satisfies this requirement, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific 

facts demonstrating there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Vahila v. Hall, 77 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 14 

Ohio St.3d 421, 429, 1997-Ohio-259, citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 1996-

Ohio-107. 

{¶28} A motion for a judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Civ. R. 12(C), 

presents only questions of law. Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 165–166, 297 

N.E.2d 113 (1973). The determination of a motion under Civ. R. 12(C) is restricted solely 

to the allegations in the pleadings and the nonmoving party is entitled to have all material 

allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, 

construed in its favor. Id. Evidence in any form cannot be considered. Conant v. Johnson, 

1 Ohio App.2d 133, 135, 204 N.E.2d 100 (1964). In considering such a motion, one must 

look only to the face of the complaint. Nelson v. Pleasant, 73 Ohio App.3d 479, 597 

N.E.2d 1137 (1991). 

{¶29} OPWC first argues the court erred in granting CDC’s motion for summary 

judgment and denying its own motion for summary judgment on its claim CDC’s transfers 

of interest in the property to Patriot, Devon, and Siltstone violated the use restriction in 

the Thompson deed. 

{¶30} The use restriction in the deed provides: 

 1. Use and Development Restrictions. Declarant hereby agrees, for 

itself and its successors and assigns as owners of the Property, which 

Property shall be subject to the following: This property will not be 

developed in any manner that conflicts with the use of the Premises as a 

green space park area that protects the historical significance of this 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 15 

particular parcel. Only current structures will be maintained and no new 

structures will be built on the premises. 

{¶31} The trial court found the use restriction applied only to the surface of the 

property, and not to the subsurface. The trial court found the Patriot lease has been 

released, and there was no evidence presented concerning any surface use of the 

property under the lease. The trial court found the OPWC did not present evidence the 

withdrawal of “the de minimus [sic] amount of water for a limited period of time” by Devon 

conflicted with the use of the property as a green space. The trial court found the 

Siltstone right of way was invalid on other grounds. 

{¶32} In interpreting the identical use restriction language set forth in the 

Thompson deed, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh District, in a case involving the 

Leatherwood Creek project as it relates to land located in Belmont County and involving 

many of the same parties as the instant case, concluded the term “green space park area” 

in this use restriction applied only to the surface of the land: 

 Since there is no statutory or deed definition for “green space park 

area,” rules of construction indicate we use the common definition. A park 

is an area of land set aside for public use. 

https://www.thefreedictionary.com/park. Green space is “a natural area in 

or around a development, intended to provide buffer, noise control, 

recreational use, and/or wildlife refuge, all in order to enhance the quality 

of life in and around the development.” https://financial-
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 16 

dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/green+space. Green space is often 

intentionally provided in the urban setting; it is nature space in the city. 

However, green space may occur in the rural setting also. Commonly, in 

the rural settings it is preserving areas of nature from development or 

reclaiming areas of nature that were used for industry. In northeast Ohio, 

unused railways are converted to trails and land stripped from mining is 

reclaimed. Both occurred on the property in this case. 

 Therefore, the phrase “green space park area” means the portion of 

the property that one would use in the normal park setting, meaning the 

area on which one actually walks, runs, bikes, and hikes, which is the 

surface, not the subsurface. The trial court's limitation of green space to the 

surface of the property was correct. 

{¶33} Siltstone Resources, LLC v. Ohio Pub. Works Commission, 7th Dist. No. 18 

BE 0042, 2019-Ohio-4916, 137 N.E.3d 144, ¶¶ 42-43, reconsideration denied sub nom. 

Siltstone Resources, LLC v. State of Ohio Pub. Works Commission, 7th Dist. Belmont 

No. 18 BE 0042, 2020-Ohio-729, ¶¶ 42-43, and appeal allowed sub nom. Siltstone 

Resources, L.L.C. v. Ohio Pub. Works Comm., 158 Ohio St.3d 1443, 2020-Ohio-1032, 

¶¶ 42-43 (2020). 

{¶34} Although we agree with the Seventh District’s decision the use restriction 

term “green space park area” refers to the surface of the property only, not to both the 

surface and the subsurface, we find resolution of this issue unnecessary to our analysis 

of whether the Patriot, Devon, and Siltstone property interests conveyed by CDC violated 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 17 

the use restriction. We disagree with the trial court the extinguishment of the property 

interests held by Patriot and Devon rendered this claim moot. OPWC sought declaratory 

and injunctive relief, as well as liquidated damages, on its claim CDC violated the use 

restriction by entering agreements which permitted use of the property in a manner 

inconsistent with its use as a green space park area, whether or not the property was 

actually damaged under these agreements. For the following reasons, we conclude the 

interests conveyed to Patriot, Devon, and Siltstone all violated the use restriction at the 

time the agreements were entered into by CDC. 

{¶35} Patriot: As explained in Siltstone, supra, a lease of mineral rights allows 

the lessee reasonable access to the surface, defeating the purpose of a “green space 

park area:” 

 Appellant OPWC argues that allowing lateral mining still permits 

Appellees reasonable access to the surface and therefore allowing mining 

of any sort defeats the purpose of a “green space park area.” Admittedly, at 

common law the mineral holder was still entitled to reasonable access to 

the surface to reach his or her property. Eastern Mineral Law Foundation, 

The Issues: The Rights and Interests at Play, 23 E. Min. Found. § 9.04, 

2003 WL 22234516 (“Despite the availability of modern directional drilling, 

the development and production of oil and gas in Eastern states most often 

requires reasonable access to and the use and occupancy of some portion 

of the surface.”). See also Skivolocki, 38 Ohio St.2d at 249, 313 N.E.2d 374, 

fn. 1 (“ ‘* * * unless the language of the conveyance by which the minerals 

are acquired repels such construction, the mineral estate carries with it the 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 18 

right to use as much of the surface as may be reasonably necessary to 

reach and remove the minerals.’ See, also, 37 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 18, 

Mines and Minerals, Section 14. This implied right of the mineral owner is 

best explained as a practical attempt to insure that both he, and the surface 

owner, can enjoy their respective estates.”). If the mineral holder was not 

permitted reasonable access, then the minerals would essentially be 

landlocked without means of extraction. Typically when mineral rights are 

leased, the lease usually permits reasonable access to the surface by the 

terms of the lease. For instance, often the lease permits drilling of water 

wells, building access roads, installing fencing, and removing trees and 

brush. These acts affect the surface. 

{¶36} Siltstone, supra, at ¶44. 

{¶37} The oil and gas lease CDC entered with Patriot did not include language 

preventing use of the surface to access the subsurface minerals. Thus, the lease 

impliedly included the right to use the surface to access the minerals, which is in conflict 

with the use of the property as green park space. Further, the language of the Patriot 

lease specifically gave Patriot the right to engage in “core drilling, and the drilling, 

operating for, and producing of” oil and gas on the property, as well as the right to lay 

pipeline, remove timber, dig pits, and construct gates on all access roads on the property. 

The lease further made provisions for possible impacts and effects on the property 

surface, as well as the water on the property, and thus recognized the possibility of 

damage to the surface of the property should Patriot exercise its rights under the lease. 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 19 

{¶38} We find the lease CDC entered with Patriot violated the use restriction in 

the Thompson deed, as it allowed for Patriot’s use of the surface of the land in a manner 

inconsistent with the use of the property as green park space. 

{¶39} Devon: CDC entered into a Water and Surface Use Agreement with Devon. 

Pursuant to the agreement, Devon was given the right to withdraw water from the ponds 

on the land incident to Devon’s oil and gas activities. Devon could enter the land; draw 

water from the ponds in such volumes as Devon required; place and maintain both 

surface and subsurface pipelines, equipment, or facilities necessary or convenient for 

Devon’s operations or for drawing, transporting, or storing water; distribute on the land 

earth, rock, or other materials excavated in laying pipelines or installing, repairing, or 

removing other facilities on the land; and cut trees and other vegetation. CDC agreed not 

to allow third parties to use the ponds for swimming or other recreational purposes while 

Devon conducted operations on or near the pond. Pursuant to an amendment to the 

agreement between CDC and Devon, Devon was permitted to pump non-potable3

replenishment water into the pond, and CDC agreed the pond would not be used as a 

source of drinking water or fish for human consumption. 

{¶40} Devon exercised its rights under the agreement in 2013. After installing 

water pipelines and a portable water pump, Devon withdrew 71,332 barrels of water from 

ponds on the property and from a creek, paying CDC a total of $14,726.40 for the water. 

{¶41} We find the water and surface use agreement violated the use restriction in 

the Thompson Deed. Not only was Devon given rights to disturb the surface of the land, 

the agreement required CDC to ban the public from use of the land during Devon’s 

 

3 Non-potable water is water that is not of drinking quality, but may still be used for many other purposes. 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 20 

operations, which clearly is in conflict with the use of the property as green park space. 

Further, the agreement allowed Devon to damage the ponds on the property by pumping 

non-potable water into the ponds, preventing the use of the pond for fishing. In addition, 

Devon actually laid pipe, installed a water pump, and withdrew water from the property, 

in conflict with the use restriction confining the use of the property to green park space. 

While the trial court characterized the withdrawal of water as de minimis, we find the 

withdrawal of 71,332 barrels of water is in conflict with the use of the property as green 

park space. We find the Water and Surface Use Agreement CDC entered with Devon 

violated the use restriction of the Thompson deed. 

{¶42} Siltstone: The right of way letter Speedy signed with Siltstone allows 

Siltstone, “for consideration paid to CDC the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, 

to have access to the right of way.” The agreement further gives “Siltstone, its affiliates, 

and its third parties full and direct access to the ROW.” Siltstone agreed to service the 

right of way as necessary to maintain it in the same or better condition as when the 

agreement was signed. 

{¶43} Siltstone argues its use of the pre-existing road, which also is used by 

people using the space for green space park purposes, does not conflict with the use of 

the surface of the property as green space, and in fact enhances the roadway because 

of its agreement to maintain the road. We disagree. We find the use of the road 

concomitant to Siltstone’s commercial business enterprise differs from use of the road for 

green space park purposes. The use of the road by Siltstone’s commercial oil and gas 

equipment is different in both purpose and in traffic volume to the use of the road by 

members of the public, who are driving private vehicles to access the property for 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 21 

recreational purposes. Use of the right of way was not necessary for Siltstone to access 

its property, as Siltstone’s property was not landlocked. Accordingly, we find the right of 

way agreement Speedy entered with Siltstone violated the use restriction in the deed. 

{¶44} OPWC also argues the transfers of property interests CDC made to Patriot, 

Devon, Siltstone, and Guernsey County violated the transfer restriction in the Thompson 

deed, which provides: 

 4. Restrictions on transfer of the Property. Grantee acknowledges 

that the Grant is specific to Grantee and that OPWC's approval of Grantee's 

application for the Grant was made in reliance on Grantee's continued 

ownership and control of the Property. Accordingly, Grantee shall not 

voluntarily or involuntarily sell, assign, transfer, lease, exchange, convey or 

otherwise encumber the Property without the prior written consent of 

OPWC, which consent may be withheld in its sole and absolute discretion. 

{¶45} It is undisputed CDC did not obtain the written consent of OPWC before 

selling, leasing, or encumbering the property via its agreements with Patriot, Devon, and 

Siltstone, and Guernsey County. However, the trial court found the transfer restriction 

was void as a matter of law. 

{¶46} We note at the outset, we concur with the Seventh District Court of Appeals 

that the transfer restriction applies to both the surface and the subsurface. Siltstone, 

supra, ¶¶50-51. 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 22 

{¶47} Turning to the issue of whether the restriction is void, where land is devised 

upon condition the devisee shall not sell it, such a restraint is void as repugnant to the 

devise and contrary to public policy. Ohio Soc. for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. 

McElroy, 175 Ohio St. 49, 52, 191 N.E.2d 543, 546 (1963), citing Anderson v. Cary, 36 

Ohio St. 506, 38 Am.Rep. 602 (1881); Hobbs v. Smith, 15 Ohio St. 419 (1864). However, 

such a restraint on alienation of property conveyed to a trustee to be held for charitable 

or other public uses will usually be given effect. Id., citing Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 465, 

65 U.S. 465, 16 L.Ed. 701 (1861); Board of Education of Incorporated Village of Van Wert 

v. Inhabitants, 18 Ohio St. 221, 98 Am.Dec. 114 (1868); Babin v. City of Ashland, 160 

Ohio St. 328, 345 et seq., 116 N.E.2d 580 (1953); Gearhart v. Richardson, 109 Ohio St. 

418, 142 N.E. 890 (1924). “There are two reasons for this: (1) the interest of the public in 

encouraging the creation and the continuation of trusts for charitable or public purposes 

and (2) the power of a court of equity to authorize a prohibited sale where necessary for 

the proper accomplishment of the charitable or public purposes of the trust, thereby 

preventing the trust property from being completely inalienable.” Id. at 52-53. 

{¶48} In the instant case, we find the transfer restriction akin to property conveyed 

to be held for charitable or public use, and therefore find an exception to the general rule 

that restrictions on alienation of property are void. 

{¶49} In 2000, Ohio voters approved a constitutional amendment to create a taxexempt bond fund to be used for environmental conservation and revitalization purposes. 

Ohio Constitution, Article VIII, Section 2o(A). The amendment permitted the General 

Assembly to enact laws in accordance with the amendment. Ohio Constitution, Article 

VIII, Section 2o(B). As a result of the amendment, the Clean Ohio Fund Green Space 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 23 

Conservation Program was created and OPWC was tasked with administering the 

program. CDC applied for grant money from OPWC for the specific purpose of 

purchasing property to be used for environmental conservation and revitalization 

purposes, in order to further the public policy as set forth by the voters in approving the 

constitutional amendment to create the tax-exempt bond fund for environmental 

conservation. While CDC argues Ohio also has expressed a public policy encouraging 

oil and gas production, CDC did not apply for grant funds from OPWC to further the 

State’s public policy interest in oil and gas production. However, CDC did apply for and 

receive grant funds to further the State’s interest in preserving land for environmental 

conservation and revitalization. 

{¶50} The contract between OPWC and CDC, in which CDC agreed to the 

transfer restriction as a condition of receiving grant funds, and the resultant purchase of 

the property from the Thompsons including the transfer restriction in the deed, are not a 

normal land transfer between grantor and grantee. The receipt of grant funds from OPWC 

placed the parties in a unique relationship, both as to each other and as to the public. 

Pursuant to the constitutional amendment passed by the voters of the state of Ohio, 

OPWC became the guardian and “trustee” of the public’s interest in land purchased with 

grant money from the State for the purposes expressed in the amendment, while the 

public was the third party beneficiary of such agreements. In entering into an agreement 

whereby CDC received money from OPWC to purchase property in furtherance of the 

purposes set forth in the amendment, CDC stepped into OPWC’s shoes as trustee of the 

public interest with respect to property purchased with grant funds. OPWC maintained 

an ongoing interest in ensuring the property, which it gave CDC grant money to purchase, 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 24 

was in fact used for the purposes represented by CDC at the time it applied for the grant 

money. OPWC maintained a responsibility to ensure any transfer of any interest in the 

property would continue to meet the purposes for which the grant money was given. As 

such, we find the alienability restriction in this case is not void, as it is similar in character 

to a restraint on alienation of property conveyed to a trustee to be held for charitable or 

other public uses. See Ohio Soc. For Crippled Children & Adults, supra. 

{¶51} There is no dispute CDC violated the transfer restriction in its transfers to 

Patriot, Devon, Siltstone and Guernsey County, as it did not receive the written 

permission of OPWC before making the transfers of interest. Further, we find the fact the 

Patriot and Devon leases are no longer in effect to be irrelevant. The transfer restriction 

was violated at the time of the transfer, entitling OPWC to relief and subjecting CDC to 

liability. 

{¶52} Finally, OPWC argues the transfer to Guernsey County violates the 

perpetual restriction: 

 2. Perpetual Restrictions. The restrictions set forth in this deed shall 

be perpetual and shall run with the land for the benefit of, and shall be 

enforceable by, Ohio Public Works Commission (OPWC). This deed and 

the covenants and restrictions set forth herein shall not be amended, 

released, extinguished or otherwise modified without the prior written 

consent of OPWC, which consent may be withheld in its sole and absolute 

discretion. 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 25 

{¶53} The deed restrictions are not present in the deed transferring two acres from 

CDC to Guernsey County. It is undisputed CDC did not obtain prior written consent of 

OPWC before transferring the property without the requisite deed restrictions. 

Accordingly, we find the transfer to Guernsey County violates the perpetual restriction, in 

addition to the transfer restriction as noted supra. 

{¶54} In sum, we find the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to CDC 

and denying partial summary judgment to OPWC on the issue of violation of the use 

restriction by CDC’s transfer of property interests to Patriot, Devon, and Siltstone; on the 

issue of violation of the transfer restriction by CDC’s transfer of property interests to 

Patriot, Devon, Siltstone, and Guernsey County; and on the issue of violation of the 

perpetual restriction and transfer restriction by CDC’s sale of property to Guernsey 

County. 

{¶55} The first assignment of error is sustained. 

II. 

{¶56} In its second assignment of error, OPWC argues the trial court erred in 

finding it was not entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief. 

{¶57} The trial court found pursuant to R.C. 164.26(A), OPWC’s relief was limited 

solely to liquidated damages, and OPWC could not receive injunctive or declaratory relief. 

R.C. 164.26(A) provides: 

 The director of the Ohio public works commission shall establish 

policies related to the need for long-term ownership, or long-term control 

through a lease or the purchase of an easement, of real property that is the 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 26 

subject of an application for a grant under sections 164.20 to 164.27 of the 

Revised Code and establish requirements for documentation to be

submitted by grant applicants that is necessary for the proper administration 

of this division. The policies shall provide for proper liquidated damages and 

grant repayment for entities that fail to comply with the long-term ownership 

or control requirements established under this division. 

{¶58} The enforcement provision of the deed provides for both equitable relief and 

liquidated damages: 

 3. Enforcement. If Grantee, or its successors or assigns as owner of 

the Property, should fail to observe the covenants and restrictions set forth 

herein, the Grantee or it is successors or assigns, as the case may be, shall 

pay to OPWC upon demand, as liquidated damages, an amount equal to 

the rate of (a) two hundred percent (200%) of the amount of the Grant 

received by Grantee, together with interest accruing at the rate of six 

percent (6%) per annum from the date of Grantee's receipt of the Grant, or 

(b) two hundred percent (200%) of the fair market value of the Property as 

of the date or demand by OPWC. Grantee acknowledges that such sum is 

not intended as, and shall not be deemed, a penalty, but is intended to 

compensate for damages suffered in the event a breach or violation of the 

covenants and restrictions set forth herein, the determination of which is not 

readily ascertainable. 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 27 

 OPWC shall have the right to enforce by any proceedings at law or 

in equity, all restrictions, conditions, and covenants set forth herein. Failures 

by OPWC to proceed with such enforcement shall in no event be deemed 

a waiver of the right to enforce at a later date the original violation or 

subsequent violation. 

{¶59} The Seventh District addressed this identical issue, concluding OPWC was 

entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to liquidated damages provided for 

in the statute: 

 First, nothing in R.C. 164.26(A) prevents equitable relief. That 

section instructs the director of the OPWC to establish policies related to 

the need for long-term ownership or control of property that is subject to 

clean Ohio conservation fund grants. It also states the policies are to 

provide for proper liquidated damages and grant repayment for entities that 

fail to comply with the long-term ownership or control requirements. 

Reading the plain wording of the statute leads to the conclusions that (1) 

the OPWC director must establish policies relating to the need for long-term 

ownership or control of the property that is the subject of the grant and (2) 

some of those policies are to provide for liquidated damages and grant 

repayment for failure to comply with the long-term requirement. 

 Nothing in the statute prevents equitable relief as a remedy for failure 

to comply with the long-term ownership requirement. The statute does not 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 28 

include an exclusive list of remedies. The remedies the statute mentions 

are in regard to instructing the director of the OPWC to establish policies to 

provide for liquidated damages and grant repayment. 

 Second, the Enforcement Restriction clearly and unambiguously 

provides that Appellant OPWC has the right to enforce the deed restrictions 

in equity. Nothing in the language of the Enforcement Restriction can be 

construed to mean anything else. 

{¶60} Siltstone, supra, ¶¶66-68. 

{¶61} We agree with the reasoning of the Seventh District. As this Court has 

previously noted: 

 The Supreme Court of Ohio has consistently held that “[w]here the 

language contained in a deed restriction is indefinite, doubtful and capable 

of contradictory interpretation, that construction must be adopted which 

least restricts the free use of the land.” Houk v. Ross (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 

77, 296 N.E.2d 266, paragraph two of the syllabus, overruled on other 

grounds by Marshall v. Aaron (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 48, 15 OBR 145, 472 

N.E.2d 335. “Where the language in the restriction is clear, the court must 

enforce the restriction. Otherwise, the court would be rewriting the 

restriction. * * * The key issue is to determine the intent of the parties as 

reflected by the language used in the restriction.” Dean v. Nugent Canal 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 29 

Yacht Club, Inc. (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 471, 475, 585 N.E.2d 554, 556-

557. 

{¶62} Morgan Woods Homeowners' Assn. v. Wills, 5th Dist. Licking No. 11 CA 57, 

2012-Ohio-233, ¶ 42. 

{¶63} We find the language in the restriction agreed to by the parties is clear: 

OPWC has the right to enforce the deed restrictions in law and in equity. We find R.C. 

164.26(A) provides for liquidated damages, but does not make liquidated damages the 

sole remedy available to OPWC. 

{¶64} The second assignment of error is sustained. 

III. 

{¶65} In its third assignment of error, OPWC argues the court erred in granting 

summary judgment finding the liquidated damages provision to be a penalty, and 

therefore unenforceable.4

{¶66} The trial court made the following conclusion of law regarding the liquidated 

damages provision: 

 OPWC’s claims relating to the Devon Energy Water and Surface 

Agreements do not establish a claim for damages. The OPWC put forth no 

evidence that the withdrawal of the de minimus [sic] amount of water for a 

limited period of time conflicts with the use of the CDC property as a green 

space park area. Additionally, OPWC’s claim for damages based upon the 

 

4 OPWC did not seek summary judgment on the validity of the liquidated damages provision, but rather 

argues evidence is necessary on the issue of whether the damages clause is a penalty. 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 30 

Enforcement Provision in the Thompson Deed, is disproportionate to the 

alleged damages sustained and rather act [sic] as a penalty. Liquidated 

damages clauses are invalid and unenforceable where the damages clause 

provides for an amount disproportionate to the actual damage. Lakewood 

Creative Customers v. Sharp, 31 Ohio App. 3d 116, Syll. ¶2 (1986). 

{¶67} Judgment entry, October 25, 2019, conclusion of law 9. 

{¶68} The enforcement clause in the instant case provides in pertinent part: 

 3. Enforcement. If Grantee, or its successors or assigns as owner of 

the Property, should fail to observe the covenants and restrictions set forth 

herein, the Grantee or it is successors or assigns, as the case may be, shall 

pay to OPWC upon demand, as liquidated damages, an amount equal to 

the rate of (a) two hundred percent (200%) of the amount of the Grant 

received by Grantee, together with interest accruing at the rate of six 

percent (6%) per annum from the date of Grantee's receipt of the Grant, or 

(b) two hundred percent (200%) of the fair market value of the Property as 

of the date or demand by OPWC. Grantee acknowledges that such sum is 

not intended as, and shall not be deemed, a penalty, but is intended to 

compensate for damages suffered in the event a breach or violation of the 

covenants and restrictions set forth herein, the determination of which is not 

readily ascertainable. 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 31 

{¶69} While generally liquidated damages clauses are enforceable, such 

damages are not enforceable on public policy grounds when the stipulated damages 

constitute a penalty. Lake Ridge Academy v. Carney, 66 Ohio St.3d 376, 381, 613 N.E.2d 

183, 187 (1993). The Ohio Supreme Court has set forth the following test to judge a 

stipulated damages provision: 

 Where the parties have agreed on the amount of damages, 

ascertained by estimation and adjustment, and have expressed this 

agreement in clear and unambiguous terms, the amount so fixed should be 

treated as liquidated damages and not as a penalty, if the damages would 

be (1) uncertain as to amount and difficult of proof, and if (2) the contract as 

a whole is not so manifestly unconscionable, unreasonable, and 

disproportionate in amount as to justify the conclusion that it does not 

express the true intention of the parties, and if (3) the contract is consistent 

with the conclusion that it was the intention of the parties that damages in 

the amount stated should follow the breach thereof. 

{¶70} Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 12 Ohio St.3d 27, 29, 465 N.E.2d 

392, 394 (1984), citing Jones v. Stevens, 112 Ohio St. 43, 146 N.E. 894, 3 Ohio Law Abs. 

164 (1925). 

{¶71} The Supreme Court has provided additional guidance for determining if 

stipulated damages are a penalty: 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 32 

 [I]t is necessary to look to the whole instrument, its subject-matter, 

the ease or difficulty of measuring the breach in damages, and the amount 

of the stipulated sum, not only as compared with the value of the subject of 

the contract, but in proportion to the probable consequences of the breach, 

and also to the intent of the parties ascertained from the instrument itself in 

the light of the particular facts surrounding the making and execution of the 

contract. Jones v. Stevens (1925), 112 Ohio St. 43, 146 N.E. 894, 

paragraph one of the syllabus. “Neither the parties' actual intention as to its 

validity nor their characterization of the term as one for liquidated damages 

or a penalty is significant in determining whether the term is valid.” 3 

Restatement of Contracts, supra, at 159, Section 356, Comment c. See 

Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 27, 28, 12 OBR 

23, 24, 465 N.E.2d 392, 394. Thus, when a stipulated damages provision is 

challenged, the court must step back and examine it in light of what the 

parties knew at the time the contract was formed and in light of an estimate 

of the actual damages caused by the breach. If the provision was 

reasonable at the time of formation and it bears a reasonable (not 

necessarily exact) relation to actual damages, the provision will be 

enforced. See 3 Restatement of Contracts, supra, at 157, Section 356(1). 

{¶72} Lake Ridge Academy, supra, at 381–82, 613 N.E.2d at188. 

{¶73} In the instant case, the trial court did not apply the test set forth by the Ohio 

Supreme Court in Lake Ridge Academy, supra and Samson Sales, supra, nor did it step 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 33 

back and examine the liquidated damages provision in light of what the parties knew at 

the time the contract was formed. Rather, the trial court based its evaluation of damages 

on its conclusion the only potential violation of the deed restrictions by CDC in this case 

was the water and surface lease agreement under which Devon withdrew water from the 

ponds on the property, an amount of water the court classified as de minimis. As we have 

found multiple violations by CDC of the deed restrictions and have found the actions of 

Devon were more than de minimis, we find the trial court’s analysis was flawed. 

{¶74} R.C. 164.26(A) specifically requires liquidated damages, stating, “The 

policies shall provide for proper liquidated damages and grant repayment for entities that 

fail to comply with the long-term ownership or control requirements established under this 

division.” This statute appears to reflect a legislative determination the amount of 

damages for violation of the use and transfer restrictions, designed to further the public 

policy expressed by the electorate of the State in enacting the constitutional amendment 

pursuant to which CDC received grant money in the instant case, are difficult to ascertain 

as to amount and difficult to prove. We find the trial court did not apply the appropriate 

test concerning liquidated damages at the time the agreement was entered, and 

improperly limited its analysis to CDC’s contract with Devon (which it erroneously held 

did not violate the use restriction) instead of all the use and transfer restriction violations 

identified supra. 

{¶75} The third assignment of error is sustained. 

 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 34 

Cross-Appeal I. 

{¶76} On cross-appeal, Devon argues the trial court erred in granting CDC’s 

motion for summary judgment on its cross-claim for defense and indemnification pursuant 

to the Water and Surface Use Agreement it entered with CDC. 

{¶77} We note at the outset because OPWC has abandoned its claim for 

monetary damages against Devon, the issue on cross-appeal concerns only CDC’s 

contractual duty to defend Devon in the instant action, as indemnification is no longer at 

issue. 

{¶78} The relevant clause in the First Water and Surface Use Agreement entered 

into by CDC and Devon provides: 

 5. LANDOWNER AGREES TO HEREBY FOREVER INDEMNIFY, 

RELEASE, ACQUIT, DISCHARGE, AND HOLD HARMLESS DEVON 

FROM ALL EXISTING AND FUTURE CLAIMS, DEMANDS, AND CAUSES 

OF ACTION, WHETHER KNOWN OR UNKNOWN, WHETHER BASED ON 

TORT (INCLUDING STRICT LIABILITY), CONTRACT, OR STATUTORY 

LAW, WHETHER GOVERNED BY FEDERAL, STATE, TRIBAL, OR 

LOCAL LAWS, RULES, OR ORDINANCES, THAT HAVE BEEN 

BROUGHT OR THAT COULD HAVE BEEN BROUGHT IN ANY COURT, 

TRIBUNAL, OR FORUM, IN THIS OR ANY OTHER JURISDICTION, THAT 

RELATE TO OR ARISE FROM (A) DAMAGES TO THE PONDS CAUSED 

BY THE OPERATIONS, OR (B) PERSONAL INJURY OR DEATH 

RESULTING FROM THE PONDS OR THE CONTENTS OF THE PONDS 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 35 

BEING USED FOR PURPOSES NOT PERMITTED BY PARAGRAPH 5 OF 

THIS AGREEMENT. 

{¶79} The trial court found the cross-claim brought by OPWC against Devon did 

not fall within the terms of this clause as a matter of law, as the claim was not for damage 

to the ponds or personal injury or death. We disagree. Given the broad language 

concerning actions arising in tort, contract, or pursuant to statute, we find the instant 

action, based on the contract between Devon and CDC allowing damage to the ponds, 

fell within the scope of this clause. It is clear, OPWC was initially seeking monetary 

damages from Devon. 

{¶80} CDC argues this clause is no longer in effect due to the second agreement 

entered between the parties, which states in pertinent part: 

 This Agreement represents the entire agreement between the 

Parties relating to the subject matter hereof and supersedes any prior 

agreements, representations, or statements, oral or written, relating to the 

subject matter of this Agreement. 

{¶81} This second agreement did not include an indemnification clause. 

{¶82} However, at the same time the parties entered the second agreement, they 

also amended the first agreement. The amendment specifically changed the phrase 

“paragraph 5” in the last line of the indemnification clause cited above to “paragraph 4” to 

correct a typographical error in the first agreement. The amendment provides in pertinent 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 36 

part, “Except as hereby amended, all other terms and conditions of the Agreement shall 

remain in full force and effect as presently written.” 

{¶83} We find because the second agreement did not specifically address or 

otherwise eliminate the indemnification clause, the language in the amendment to the first 

agreement, “all other terms and conditions of the [first] Agreement shall remain in full 

force and effect as presently written” controls. Accordingly, we find the indemnification 

clause remains valid and enforceable. 

{¶84} Finally, CDC argues the above cited language does not include a duty to 

defend. Although Devon argues CDC raises this issue for the first time on appeal, CDC 

raised this issue in a footnote in their reply to Devon’s motion for partial summary 

judgment on this issue, filed September 17, 2019, noting the word “defend” is not utilized 

in Paragraph 5 of the first agreement. 

{¶85} In the insurance arena, the duty to provide a defense to an insured under 

an insurance contract is separate and distinct from the duty to pay a judgment or an award 

of costs against the insured. Pasco v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

04AP-696, 2005-Ohio-2387, ¶15. The language in the indemnification clause in the first 

agreement does not include a duty to defend. Because the duty of a defense is separate 

from the duty to indemnify, and the contract between the parties did not provide for a right 

to a defense but only to indemnification, CDC was not contractually obligated to provide 

a defense to Devon, and the trial court did not err in granting CDC’s motion for summary 

judgment on Devon’s cross-claim. 

{¶86} The assignment of error on cross-appeal is overruled. 

 
Guernsey County, Case No. 19CA00047 37 

{¶87} The judgment of the Guernsey County Court of Common Pleas, granting 

the summary judgment motions of CDC, Siltstone, Devon, and Patriot, and the motions 

for judgment on the pleadings of Gulfport, Synergy, and Whispering Pines, thereby 

dismissing OPWC’s counterclaims and crossclaims, is reversed. Pursuant to App. R. 

12(B), we hereby enter final judgment granting OPWC’s motion for partial summary 

judgment. The judgment of the Guernsey County Common Pleas Court granting CDC’s 

motion for summary judgment dismissing Devon’s cross-claim against CDC is affirmed. 

This cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

By: Hoffman, P.J. 

Wise, John, J. and 

Wise, Earle, J. concur 
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR GUERNSEY COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

SILSTONE SERVICES, LLC : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

THE GUERNSEY COUNTY : 

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT : 

CORPORATION, et al., : Case No. 19CA000047 

 : 

 Defendants-Appellees : 

 : 

And : 

 : 

OHIO PUBLIC WORKS COMMISSION : 

 : 

 Defendants-Appellants : 

 : 

And : 

 : 

DEVON ENERGY PRODUCTION : 

COMPANY, LP : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee- : 

 Cross-Appellant : 

 The judgment of the Guernsey County Court of Common Pleas, granting the 

summary judgment motions of CDC, Siltstone, Devon, and Patriot, and the motions for 

judgment on the pleadings of Gulfport, Synergy, and Whispering Pines, thereby 

dismissing OPWC’s counterclaims and crossclaims, is reversed. Pursuant to App. R. 

12(B), we hereby enter final judgment granting OPWC’s motion for partial summary 
judgment. The judgment of the Guernsey County Common Pleas Court granting CDC’s 

motion for summary judgment dismissing Devon’s cross-claim against CDC is affirmed. 

This cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of 

OPWC’s direct appeal are assessed to CDC. Costs of the cross appeal are assessed to 

Devon.