Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB FL 33621

https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

Special 

Operations

Research 

Topics

2017

The JSOU Special Operations Research Topics 2017 represents a list 

of SOF-related topics that are recommended for research by those 

who desire to provide insight and recommendations on issues 

and challenges facing the SOF enterprise. As with the past several 

years’ topics publications, this list is tailored to address priority areas 

identified by USSOCOM. There are five SOF priorities: Ensure SOF 

Readiness, Help Our Nation Win, Continue to Build Relationships, 

Prepare for the Future, and Preservation of the Force and Family. 

This publication also includes another key document that identifies 

critical research topics, the Key Strategic Issues List, developed and 

maintained by the USSOCOM J5 Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate. These topics reflect a consensus of the SOF experts who participated in the Research Topics Workshop as particularly worthwhile 

in addressing immediate SOF needs and in building future capacity 

for emerging challenges.

ISBN 978-1-941715-12-3
Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D., Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

Robert Nalepa, Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Frederick Zimmerman, Master Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps, Ret., JSOU Press Editor

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs; Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence 

Ph.D., War Studies

Director, CANSOFCOM Professional 

Development Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Senior Research Fellow and Adjunct Professor, 

Middlebury Institute of International Studies at 

Monterey and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and Space 

Studies, Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

Louis Alberto Ordóñez Rubio,

Vice Admiral, Colombian Navy, Ret.

Ph.D., Education, Director, Centro Regional de 

Estudios Estrategicos en Seguridad

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joint Special Operations University

and the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Center for Special Operations 

Studies and Research (CSOSR) where effort centers upon the USSOCOM 

mission: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special 

Operations and provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, 

networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command operations 

in order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests.

Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library web 

page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.
The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2016

Special Operations

Research Topics

2017
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to the 

Director of the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research (CSOSR) is currently 

accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For 

more information, please contact the CSOSR Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

On the cover. Members of 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group Airborne, and Indian Army Special Forces conduct a helo-casting exercise at 

Solo Point, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., 21 January 2016. The training 

prepared Soldiers to be inserted into water and make a beach landing. U.S. 

Army photo by Specialist Codie Mendenhall.

Back cover. A Critical Skills Operator with U.S. Marine Corps Forces 

Special Operations Command uses a torch to cut through a metal door to 

gain entry on a building during Marine Special Operation School’s Master 

Breacher’s Course at Stone Bay aboard Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, 

N.C., 5 August 2015. CSOs learn to overcome obstacles such as walls, fences 

and doors using a range of breaching methods including mechanical, ballistic, thermal, and explosive during the course. U.S. Marine Corps photo 

by Sgt. Scott A. Achtemeier.

Printed in June 2016.

ISBN 978-1-941715-12-3
iii

Contents

Foreword .......................................................................................v

Introduction .................................................................................vii

Five SOF Priorities.........................................................................ix

A. Priority Topics ......................................................................... 1

B. Ensure SOF Readiness ........................................................... 11

C. Help Our Nation Win ........................................................... 17

D. Continue to Build Relationships ............................................ 25

E. Prepare for the Future ........................................................... 31

F. Preservation of the Force and Family ..................................... 37

G. USSOCOM J5 Key Strategic Issues List .................................. 43

Appendix A: Acronym List .......................................................... 65

Endnotes ..................................................................................... 67
Research Topics Workshop 2017 participants at JSOU Pinewood Campus 

12 January 2016. Source: JSOU photo
v

Foreword 

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Special Operations 

Research Topics 2017 publication highlights a wide range of topics collaboratively developed and prioritized by experts from across the Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) community. The topics in these pages are intended 

to guide research projects for professional military education (PME) students; 

JSOU faculty, fellows, students; and others writing about special operations 

during this academic year. This research will provide a better understanding 

of the complex issues and opportunities affecting the strategic and operational planning needs of SOF.

These topics will stir creativity and critical thinking among the best and 

brightest in our global SOF network to generate new ideas. These new ideas 

formed after careful research and analysis will lead to the development of 

innovative solutions for the most pressing issues and concerns that face our 

community.

Our research topics are organized to address the five SOF priorities as 

outlined in the SOF Narrative. To develop this list of topics, recommendations were solicited from the USSOCOM headquarters staff, the theater 

special operations commands (TSOCs), component commands, SOF chairs 

from the war colleges, select research centers, and think tanks. Then, the 

topic submissions were reviewed, revised, rated, and ranked at the annual 

Special Operations Research Topics Workshop. That workshop produced the 

first draft of this comprehensive list of issues and challenges of concern to 

the greater SOF community. The list was reviewed and vetted by the headquarters, TSOCs, and component commands prior to publication.

I encourage SOF personnel to contribute their experiences and ideas to 

the SOF community by submitting completed research on these topics to 

the JSOU Press. If you have any questions about this document or ideas for 

future topics, contact the director, Center for Special Operations Studies and 

Research via e-mail at jsou_research@socom.mil. 

As stated in the SOF Narrative, “Years of cumulative experience, expertise 

and special operations know-how form the center of gravity for the success 

of our operators as well as our SOF logisticians, acquirers, educators, communicators, and analysts—The total Special Operations Force. Our people 
vi

are our credentials.” I challenge you to assist the SOF enterprise in shaping 

the future strategic environment by researching critical issues and using that 

research to develop innovative solutions and recommendations.

Brian A. Maher, SES

President
vii

Introduction 

The JSOU Special Operations Research Topics 2017 represents a list of 

SOF-related topics that are recommended for research by those who 

desire to provide insight and recommendations on issues and challenges 

facing the SOF enterprise. As with the past several years’ topics publications, this list is tailored to address priority areas identified by USSOCOM. 

There are five SOF priorities: Ensure SOF Readiness, Help Our Nation Win, 

Continue to Build Relationships, Prepare for the Future, and Preservation of 

the Force and Family. This publication also includes another key document 

that identifies critical research topics, the Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL), 

developed and maintained by the USSOCOM J5 Strategy, Plans, and Policy 

Directorate.

SOF PME students research and write on timely, relevant, SOF-related 

topics. Such activity develops the individual’s intellect and provides a professional and practical perspective that broadens and frames the insights 

of other analysts and researchers in regard to these topics. This list and 

the accompanying topic descriptions are a guide to stimulate interest and 

thinking. Topics may be narrowed or otherwise modified as deemed necessary (e.g., to suit school writing requirements or maximize individual interests and experiences). The researcher should explore and identify doctrine, 

capabilities, techniques, and procedures that will increase SOF efficacy in 

addressing them. At the same time, the research on these topics should be 

used to inform policymakers, the larger military profession, and the public 

of the issues and challenges facing the SOF enterprise.

Section A (Priority Topics) identifies topics of particular importance. 

Sections B, C, D, E, and F each focus on one of the SOF priorities. Section G 

contains the KSIL developed by USSOCOM J5. The KSIL is a set of questions 

relevant to increasing USSOCOM’s understanding of the global security 

environment and is built around trends expected to continue for the next 

10 to 20 years.

These topics reflect a consensus of the SOF experts who participated 

in the Research Topics Workshop as particularly worthwhile in addressing immediate SOF needs and in building future capacity for emerging 

challenges. They have been vetted through the USSOCOM headquarters, 
viii

TSOCs, and components prior to publication to ensure emerging topics were 

addressed. Previous years’ research topics lists provide a repository of issues 

that were highlighted in the past. These topics lists may provide prospective 

researchers with additional ideas for relevant research. Please share these 

topics with fellow researchers, thesis advisors, and other colleagues, and feel 

free to submit additional topics for consideration. You may visit our library 

website to see if JSOU has a publication that relates to your area of interest. 

We encourage you to send us your completed research on these topics.
ix

Five SOF Priorities

Ensure SOF Readiness

The right people, skills, and capabilities ... now and in the future

In an environment characterized by fiscal constraints and ever present security challenges we must balance readiness of the current SOF force with 

investment in the preparedness for the future force—and, we will be excellent 

stewards of the precious resources entrusted to us. First and most critical to 

this balance is ensuring that we maintain superior selection, training, education, and talent management programs for our people. In turn, our people 

must be supported by timely development, acquisition and sustainment of 

service-provided and special operations-peculiar equipment and capabilities. 

We must regain SOF buying power and fiscal agility to allow quick response 

to current and future requirements. We will continue to press the limits of 

research and development in our acquisitions to ensure we are identifying 

the right technologies, equipment, and capabilities required for the future 

SOF operator. We will mitigate the risk associated with making hard readiness decisions by ensuring transparency with our SOF leadership, mission 

partners, and other stakeholders.

Help Our Nation Win

Addressing today’s challenges and keeping the Nation safe

The challenges faced by America and her allies are varied and complex, 

requiring unprecedented agility and situational understanding. It is imperative that we prioritize and synchronize SOF activities globally in order to 

protect the nation in a world that grows more complex every day. To do this 

we must present a coherent and unified portfolio of diverse SOF capabilities 

that meet the immediate needs of our GCCs and complements the contributions of our military, interagency, and international partners. To mitigate the 

risk inherent in the complex strategic environment, we will constantly reassess the authorities, organizations, capabilities, and relationships required 

to accomplish assigned missions.
x

Continue to Build Relationships

Global understanding and awareness that creates options

We will provide strategic options through an enabled and empowered global 

network of partners that are integrated at every level—increasing transparency, collaboration, synchronization; and achieving exceptional cultural, 

regional, and global understanding. With support from the Services and 

in collaboration with our joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners we will build collective capability with global reach—connected through the SOF information environment. As we operate with a 

growing network of partners, we will continually reassess relationships and 

ensure the transparency needed to succeed.

Prepare for the Future

SOF ready to win in an increasingly complex world

While we focus on the challenges of today, we must also prepare for an 

uncertain, dynamic, and rapidly evolving future. We will do this through 

innovative and critical thinking, experimentation, and exercises that identify future challenges and opportunities, and create strategic solutions and 

options for our leaders. We will focus on developing ideas—concepts, training, doctrine, education, and research—that are future oriented and challenge our current operational constructs. Ultimately, preparing for the future 

is about ensuring that we match the right people and capabilities with the 

very best ideas to address our most pressing problems. We must recognize 

the risk inherent in pushing the “edge of the envelope,” both intellectually 

and operationally. While we attempt to lead we must always be good listeners and followers, ensuring we are transparent and inclusive in all we do.

Preservation of the Force and Family

Short and long-term well-being of our SOF Warriors and their 

families

People—military, civilian, and families—are our most important asset. We 

must always take care of our people, but after more than a decade of war 

their resiliency and readiness is a primary concern. We will leverage every 
xi

resource available—SOF, Service, and community programs to ensure our 

people are mentally, emotionally, spiritually, and physically prepared for the 

demanding tasks that we will ask them to execute. We will pay particular 

attention to the hard and often invisible challenges that our people and their 

families face—and ensure that the SOF command environment is one that 

fosters understanding, respect, and support; and allows our people to thrive. 

We will mitigate the risks that high operational tempo poses to our force and 

families by enforcing internal management practices that provide operational 

predictability and by providing relevant and informed programs that build 

resiliency throughout our formations. As our people keep faith with our 

Nation, we will keep faith with them, now and in the future.

1

A. Priority Topics

Note: Topics in this publication with an asterisk (*) are retained from the previous year and indicate an ongoing research 

requirement. They have been updated, if necessary, to reflect new information and emerging research questions.

A. Priority Topics 

Topic Titles

Ensure SOF Readiness

A1. Cyberterrorism: Is it real or hyperbole? 

A2.* How does USSOCOM ensure it has the right people, skills, and 

capabilities now and in the future? 

Help Our Nation Win

A3. Responding early to the enemy’s exploitation of the social media 

environment 

A4. Strategic indicators and warnings in the gray zone 

A5. U.S. Government configuration to address transregional threats 

A6. Modern political warfare/role of SOF in political warfare 

Continue to Build Relationships

A7. Establishing regional hubs or multinational basing as economy of 

force solutions to multi-tiered threats and risks

A8. Understanding USSOCOM and SOF roles in the modern 

interagency construct

Prepare for the Future

A9. Comprehensive deterrence: SOF and the whole-of-government 

approach 

A10. Online recruitment and social network node analysis 

A11. Combating homegrown and lone wolf terrorism in the U.S. by 

understanding and disrupting OCONUS influences

Preservation of the Force and Family

A12.* Mitigating SOF suicides: Susceptibility and risk factors

A13.* Implications and effects of adopting programs to optimize SOF 

human performance: Are there limits to enhanced physical and 

mental capabilities?
2

Special Operations Research Topics 2017

Topic Descriptions

Ensure SOF Readiness

A1. Cyberterrorism: Is it real or hyperbole? 

Cyberterrorism has become a reality for governments, corporations, militaries, and networks. It is a threat that causes destruction 

or disruption of service, but how much of a threat? There is general 

agreement that cyberattacks can target anyone; these attacks can 

be disruptive for multiple reasons. The U.S. Cyber Command was 

created to address such threats by defending Department of Defense 

(DOD) information networks, supporting combatant commands, and 

defending the nation. What is the difference between cyberterrorism, 

vandalism, or war? What is the actual threat of cyberterrorism to 

the United States’ counterterrorist actions? What are the capabilities 

and actions committed by terrorist organizations, and how do they 

affect Special Operations Forces (SOF)? What is the cost of protective 

measures, and are they effective? Can personally identifiable information data really be protected? What is the SOF role in countercyberterrorism activities? How are activities in this area authorized, 

and who is the lead organization? What is the SOF role in attacking 

physical/virtual overseas locations where attacks originate? What is 

the potential for green-on-blue cyberattacks to deployed SOF? 

 A2. How does USSOCOM ensure it has the right people, skills, and 

capabilities now and in the future?

To ensure SOF readiness now and in the future, there must be an 

understanding of current readiness and a plan to develop people, 

equipment, capability, and decision-making. How can SOF leaders 

develop a more holistic and SOF-centric understanding of the current 

readiness of SOF, to include critical Service enablers? What knowledge, skills, and abilities are required by SOF operators, civilians, 

and Service enablers, and how does USSOCOM obtain, manage, and 

maintain them? How does the command develop a creative, leadingedge research and development process that integrates people, skills, 

equipment, and capabilities holistically? For equipment and capabilities, how does USSOCOM maintain SOF buying power and establish 
3

A. Priority Topics

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

fiscal agility? What are the decision-making processes and supporting 

analytics (particularly risk and causalities) that are required for SOF 

to organize effectively to prepare for a future defined by unpredictability and increased use of irregular/hybrid modes of warfare by 

state/non-state actors? How does USSOCOM develop the civilian 

workforce? With the expanding role of SOF and the new relationship 

between USSOCOM and the TSOCs, what would be the impact on 

operations of a cohesive, USSOCOM-managed civilian workforce? 

How would this be implemented? Which other government workforces could be utilized as a model?

Help Our Nation Win

A3. Responding early to the enemy’s exploitation of the social media 

environment

Terrorist threat networks and organizations have rapidly capitalized on the use of social media platforms to recruit membership; 

propagandize friendly, neutral, and opposition target audiences; and 

antagonize foes (primarily in the West). Western responses, particularly U.S. responses, are slow and often unsophisticated. Unhindered 

by bureaucratic approval processes and unfettered by ostensible reticence to conduct aggressive influence operations on the Internet, terrorist propaganda machines operate rapidly and extensively against 

the West, which is burdened by these obstacles. This puts the United 

States and its Western allies at a decided disadvantage in the digital 

information environment. The goal of this research is to determine 

and propose streamlined policies, authorities, and approvals for U.S. 

and Western influence entities, which will result in not only rapid 

response to threat propaganda in social media, but also will allow 

aggressive, proactive engagement in the digital domain. What is the 

current process for identifying and responding to an enemy’s social 

media attack on the United States or its allies? Does the process identify threat attempts early in the cycle? If not, why not? Are responses 

developed early in the cycle? What is the process for responding? 

What are the obstacles and potential solutions? Does mission command offer solutions to the process?
4

Special Operations Research Topics 2017

A4. Strategic indicators and warnings in the gray zone 

The United States and its allies need to recognize the indications 

and warnings of nascent threats far left of a problem (i.e., during 

peacetime steady state operations) and apply appropriate mitigation 

measures before they materialize into national or international crises. 

To address this topic, the following themes need to be considered:

• Gray zone activities largely take place in the human domain. 

There is a need to examine how maneuvering in the cognitive 

space is an important aspect of ‘systematic influence’ on the 

left side of the operational continuum;

• Gray zones present nuanced security and governance challenges demanding proactive comprehensive deterrence 

approaches;

• Perceiving security challenges early requires a paradigm shift 

from passively observing the environment to actively engaging 

with the environment. SOF cannot wait for security challenges 

to become clear. They must interact with the security environment to perceive new patterns; and

• An iterative, multidisciplinary, multimodal approach to understanding indicators and warnings is fundamental to furthering 

understanding of how SOF maneuver in the cognitive space 

and better compete in the human domain.

How can the future joint force and SOF develop human domain indicators and warnings that inform comprehensive deterrence decisions and enable decision makers to prioritize force readiness to meet 

security challenges early, particularly in gray zone environments? 

What political considerations—policies, authorities, ally interests, 

etc.—constrain, limit, or shape the ability to achieve ‘left of bang’ 

solutions either broadly speaking or in a specific geography? Many of 

the crises dealt with originate from a fragility in a gray zone system. 

If fragile systems unravel when disrupted, how do SOF measure the 

fragility or robustness of a system (political, social, economic, and 

environmental)? Can historical case studies be used to help model 

these systems and their robustness in the face of crises? How do gray 

zone conflicts look based on SOF’s doctrinal perspective, or does 

that matter?
5

A. Priority Topics

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

A5. U.S. Government configuration to address transregional threats

Transregional threats have no respect for nation state sovereignty and 

‘official’ borders. To the contrary, they capitalize on seams between 

states and regions. The United States and its allies must develop transregional solutions to close those gaps and perceived opportunities. 

How do they do that? Generally, how do SOF address transregional 

threats using all the elements of national power when most, if not 

all, United States Government (USG) departments and agencies are 

configured along national or regional lines? What constructs exist, 

or should exist, to synchronize USG transregional efforts below the 

National Security Strategy level? What is the role of the U.S. country 

team, who by definition is narrowly focused on a single country, in 

addressing transregional threats? What current agency/departmental cultures exist that hinder this collaboration, and how do SOF 

overcome them? How can partner nations be best incorporated in 

transregional efforts? SOF often operate outside of the theaters of war 

to achieve a TSOC’s campaign support plan objectives. That is often 

accomplished in conjunction with other USG agencies—whether 

officially designated or out of necessity for resources and authorities, to achieve mission success. What are the best practices toward 

attaining interagency cooperation and interdependence? What are 

the objective barriers to success? What defines mission success versus 

the success of cooperation? What challenges do SOF personnel face 

when operating with a whole-of-government approach?

A6. Modern political warfare/role of SOF in political warfare

“Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in 

time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve 

its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. 

They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic 

measures (as an example, the Marshall Plan), and ‘white’ propaganda 

to such covert operations as clandestine support of ‘friendly’ foreign 

elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare and even encouragement of 

underground resistance in hostile states.”1 Economic globalization, 

nuclear stalemate, and U.S. dominance of traditional warfare (force 

projection, major combat operations) change the face of warfare for 
6

Special Operations Research Topics 2017

the foreseeable future. Nation states and non-state groups that possess 

the elements of national power (i.e., diplomacy, information, military, and economics) are adapting to the environment and circumstances to develop and implement strategies and achieve objectives 

that would have previously been accomplished through traditional 

warfare. Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela are executing formal strategies to combat U.S. strengths in order to gain geopolitical concessions, advantages, and advancements. These strategies 

can best be characterized as political warfare. Since George Kennan’s 

State Department Planning staff defined political warfare in a 1948 

memorandum, the United States is still grappling with elements and 

processes associated with political warfare and how to counter them 

when adapted by adversaries. How can the U.S. engage more effectively in political warfare? What changes will need to be made for 

the U.S. to conduct agile political warfare, and what will be the SOF 

role? How do SOF minimize unintended consequences of UW, such 

as empowering possible future adversaries?

Continue to Build Relationships

A7. Establishing regional hubs or multinational basing as economy 

of force solutions to multi-tiered threats and risks 

Current conventional, hybrid, and subnational threats have prompted 

NATO SOF to address security concerns from a regional perspective. As a result of the Crimean annexation, for example, Poland and 

the Baltic States have polarized SOF assets around Polish SOF command and control (C2). Other regions could follow suit. This approach 

allows SOF-capable nations to help mitigate security challenges by 

compensating for a partner nation’s SOF capability limitations (perhaps through multinational SOF capability packages). How would 

historical enmities within a region impact such an approach? Would 

such an approach provide increased effectiveness from a cost-benefit 

perspective? How could the U.S. foreign internal defense (FID) mission set support such an approach? What status-of-forces agreement 

or other legal considerations would need to be addressed? Could 

theme-focused hubs (as opposed to regional hubs) provide a better 

solution when addressing transregional threats? What would be the 
7

A. Priority Topics

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

advantages and disadvantages, constraints, and obstacles associated 

with multinational SOF basing? What countries and regions are best 

suited to multinational basing? What lessons can be learned from past 

joint and multinational basing efforts?

A8. Understanding USSOCOM and SOF roles in the modern 

interagency construct

Today’s interagency configuration is derived from more than a decade 

of transregional conflict featuring an array of threats and non-state 

actors. With increasing emphasis being placed on whole of government and interagency collaboration, how can USSOCOM encourage 

potential interagency and international partners to collaborate more 

effectively? How can gaps in current authorities and capabilities be 

overcome? With regard to the special operations support team/special 

operations liaison officer network, how can USSOCOM ensure the 

right people are being placed in the right agencies and countries? Is 

USSOCOM’s investment in these programs paying off? How can SOF 

work with or through U.S. and international interagency partners to 

more effectively counter foreign terrorist fighter efforts and messaging efforts?

Prepare for the Future

A9. Comprehensive deterrence: SOF and the whole-of-government 

approach

“Comprehensive Deterrence is a whole-of-government approach that 

retains the positional advantage of the U.S. by preventing an adversary’s action through the existence of credible physical, cognitive and 

moral threats by raising the perceived benefit of action to an unacceptable risk level.”2

 Transregional aspects of competition and conflict 

require new planning models for comprehensive deterrence, new 

operational constructs, new ways of thinking, and a fully integrated 

partner network to rescale security challenges earlier in their trajectory (the gray zone) and at a much lower level of national effort. How 

do SOF reframe what constitutes strategic power and strategic risk 

in a complex and unpredictable world? How can these risks, opportunities, and threats be communicated across USSOCOM and other 
8

Special Operations Research Topics 2017

government organizations in a common language to ensure mutual 

support? What is the role of SOF as part of a whole-of-government 

approach to mitigate threats in the nascent stage before they spiral 

beyond their ability to respond?

A10. Online recruitment and social network node analysis

Through social media Salafi jihadist organizations employ global 

recruitment campaigns to both support a caliphate concept and wage 

jihad throughout the world. While thousands of social media handles 

can, in some fashion, connect would-be radicals, there may very well 

be only a select group of nodes serving as key gateways in advancing 

jihadist propaganda. Some of these nodes may be unaware of their 

role and credibility in building a jihadi recruitment base. Defeating jihadi campaigns likely will require identifying these nodes and 

attacking them directly via counter-messaging. While there are a 

number of ongoing studies on jihadist social media, what new analytic approaches can yield additional insight on key nodes? How can 

these approaches better identify and assess threats?

A11. Combating homegrown and lone wolf terrorism in the U.S. by 

understanding and disrupting OCONUS influences

With the recent terrorist events within the United States (Garland, 

Texas, and San Bernardino, California), U.S. citizens have a growing concern over the likelihood of homegrown and lone wolf terrorist attacks. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, although concentrated 

OCONUS, are targeting youth in the U.S. and worldwide to conduct 

jihad wherever they live. How do SOF contribute to U.S. and global 

counter-radicalization efforts? What are the current SOF counterradicalization capabilities? What are the implications of next-generation technology and social media and their capability to disrupt 

external influences on homegrown and lone wolf extremists? What 

are the current shortfalls in policies, strategies, and techniques to 

thwart the influence of OCONUS terrorist organizations and disrupt 

or deter their ability to spread extremist ideologies conducive to these 

types of attacks?
9

A. Priority Topics

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

Preservation of the Force and Family

A12. Mitigating SOF suicides: Susceptibility and risk factors

Suicide in SOF continues to be of concern to senior military and 

government leaders. A January 2016 New York Times article highlighted the suicide of a SOF unit commander, while SOF senior leaders openly addressed it at the 2016 Special Operations Low Intensity 

Conflict Symposium. Suicides for the rest of the active-duty military 

have started to decline after years of steady increases. Data from 2015 

indicates that SOF suicides continue to happen at a higher rate, even 

with focused attention on increasing awareness in order to mitigate 

the risk of suicides throughout the chain of command. What’s driving 

the increase? What has been overlooked? Are the current statistics 

an anomaly or a gauge for concern? What indicators correlate with 

susceptibility to suicide? Are there unique risk factors associated 

with SOF suicides? Are SOF suicides precipitated by different factors 

among the specialties within the SOF community? What preventive 

measures can be taken to reduce suicide in the SOF community? Are 

current outreach programs effective for SOF at risk for committing 

suicide? Are these programs sufficient to meet their need for support? If not, what additional policies, funding, and/or resources are 

needed to make these programs more effective? Are SOF veterans and 

retirees also being considered? Have families been trained on how to 

detect subtle changes, and do they have immediate access to report 

possible problems? Have the recommendations that have come out of 

the numerous suicide studies been implemented? If so, to what effect?

A13. Implications and effects of adopting programs to optimize SOF 

human performance: Are there limits to enhanced physical and 

mental capabilities? 

An extensive study directed by a former USSOCOM commander 

revealed the current operational environment has been more difficult 

than operators and their families expected, leaving little time for 

them to adjust to the daily strains of perpetual absences. USSOCOM 

human performance efforts are currently integrated under the Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) initiative. According to 

POTFF, there is a gap in empirical data in this area. What is the 
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Special Operations Research Topics 2017

value of SOF-specific human performance programs? Should it be a 

stand-alone program more aligned with operational needs? Should 

or will the human performance initiative be considered a USSOCOM 

operational requirement? Why should USSOCOM spend money on 

such additional programs? What are the limits for the program to 

research enhanced or augmented physical and mental capabilities? 

What are the characteristics of human resiliency in SOF operators? 

Can ‘stress resistance capability’ be measured biochemically? What 

are the moral and ethical issues of optimizing mental and physical capabilities through the use of biomechanics, pharmaceuticals, 

and genetic therapies? Explore the utility and effectiveness of differing treatment methods, therapeutic approaches, and linkages to 

human performance as part of said treatment. Examine existing data 

to determine preferred approaches, documented results, and also 

willingness to sustain enhancement treatment.
11

B. Ensure SOF Readiness

Note: Topics in this publication with an asterisk (*) are retained from the previous year and indicate an ongoing research 

requirement. They have been updated, if necessary, to reflect new information and emerging research questions.

B. Ensure SOF Readiness 

Topic Titles

B1.* Training SOF for the future: Identifying skill gaps associated with 

the next fight

B2.* SOF as a strategic instrument of war: How to employ SOF to 

achieve national security objectives

B3.* Beyond stealth to maintain technical overmatch: What do SOF 

need from future/advanced technologies?

B4.* SOF and conventional force integration: How to achieve 

operational and strategic effects while minimizing risk

B5. USSOCOM’s strategic planning process: Preparing for future 

conflict

B6. SOF preparation of the environment: Operational design, best 

practices, and synchronization

B7. USSOCOM’s expanding roles are changing how it sustains the SOF 

operator

B8.* Adapting the acquisition environment: Technology advances at the 

speed of the commercial market

B9. The slippery slope of commercial off-the-shelf

Topic Descriptions

B1. Training SOF for the future: Identifying skill gaps associated 

with the next fight

The future operating environment is defined by an increasingly 

interconnected global commons paired with the increasing effects 

of non-state actors. SOF preparing to operate within this environment 

are bound by fiscal constraint, decreasing resources, and manpower 

limitations amongst an era of expanding SOF requirements. While 

the characteristics of warfare within this environment will continue 

to evolve, what are the skills not yet currently present within special operations that are assessed as necessary for success? How can 

USSOCOM effectively prioritize training efforts while addressing 

the risks assumed with inaction? Given the likely requirement for 

FID and unconventional warfare (UW) missions, how critical are 
12

Special Operations Research Topics 2017

language capabilities? What are the roles of culture and cultural intelligence? Should training be broadened throughout all SOF or focused 

on specific SOF specialties?

B2. SOF as a strategic instrument of war: How to employ SOF 

to achieve national security objectives

SOF have become one of the primary military capabilities for senior 

policymakers and DOD leaders to employ in the uncertain environment of today. This reflects a shift from the use of conventional forces 

(CF) to a heavy reliance on SOF. What are the implications for U.S. 

strategy for senior leader reliance on SOF? How should SOF be best 

employed to achieve national security objectives? What is the effectiveness of SOF: their role, their use as a strategic tool of warfare, and 

their ability to meet the security needs of the United States and the 

international community? What are the impacts of CF budget and 

personnel reductions upon SOF capabilities (equipment and personnel recruitment)? How does the United States determine SOF readiness today? How do SOF improve their capabilities to aggregate and 

disaggregate around the problem only the assets that are needed to 

resolve the problem with customized solutions?

B3. Beyond stealth to maintain technical overmatch: What do 

SOF need from future/advanced technologies?

In the fall of 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced 

the Defense Innovation Initiative, an initiative to develop a ‘third 

offset’ in technology (stealth was part of the second offset). The 

third offset is meant to give U.S. forces technological overmatch of 

its adversaries. Possible examples of this new offset include robotics, 

autonomy, miniaturization, 3-D printing, big data, and/or swarming. 

Innovation is not constrained to the defense industry, and the DOD 

may have to look to the commercial market for breakthrough technologies. What capabilities and/or advances in technologies need to 

occur to ensure SOF maintain a technological advantage over adversaries? How can SOF capitalize on the third offset? What are the 

future technology-based threats to SOF operators across the range 

of military and special operations? Can SOF overcome these threats? 

How can SOF benefit from these same technologies for operators’ 
13

B. Ensure SOF Readiness

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

safety and effectiveness? How can SOF use recent technological 

advances to sustain a force in austere environments, or decrease the 

footprint of a force in a situation that demands low visibility?

B4. SOF and conventional force integration: How to achieve 

operational and strategic effects while minimizing risk 

As budgetary pressure continues to squeeze the military, SOF and CF 

must continue to find ways to maximize effects through combined 

efforts and resources. Command, control, and manning, to include 

type of manning, are important considerations in this process. In 

addition, the ability to advise and fight against an asymmetric enemy 

is a key consideration. Recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan 

provides examples of SOF and CF integrated operations. How can 

SOF and CF better leverage each other? For example, how can SOF 

be value-added to the U.S. Marine Corps’ Marine Expeditionary 

Units (MEUs), and how can the MEUs meet SOF theater logistics and 

mobility needs? How do SOF optimize partnerships and reinforce 

supported and supporting relationships within SOF; CF; and joint, 

interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) structural 

constructs to achieve operational and strategic effects and minimize 

risk in irregular and traditional operations across the range of military operations? How do SOF bridge critical seams between JIIM 

partners to conduct operations under Title 10 Authorities, Title 50 

Authorities, and/or the Ambassador’s Title 22 Authorities to achieve 

success in complex future operating environments?

B5. USSOCOM’s strategic planning process: Preparing for 

future conflict

USSOCOM’s missions, roles, and responsibilities include synchronizing plans for global operations against terrorists and their networks. SOF operate in an ever-changing strategic environment where 

trends and challenges produce changes in the character of conflict. 

USSOCOM must fully understand and explore the next engagement environment. Are SOF mission requirements driving/equipping force capabilities? Where are these requirements coming from? 

Is USSOCOM building the force of the future or continuing legacy 

programs/systems? Are SOF efforts and capacities outpacing their 
14

Special Operations Research Topics 2017

authorities and appetite to use these resources? Are SOF losing their 

formation identities—are they becoming too homogeneous? Are new 

technologies and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) outpacing training programs? What do SOF need from future/advanced 

technologies?

B6. SOF preparation of the environment: Operational design, 

best practices, and synchronization

Preparation of the environment (PE) is “an umbrella term for operations and activities conducted by selectively trained special operations forces to develop an environment for potential future special 

operations.”3 SOF conduct PE in support of geographic combatant 

command (GCC) plans and orders to alter or shape the operational 

environment to create conditions conducive to the success of a full 

spectrum of military operations. Given fiscal constraint, decreasing resources, and manpower limitations, how can SOF continue to 

conduct effective PE operations amongst an era of expanding SOF 

requirements? How do SOF design PE operations to achieve both 

tactical and strategic effects? How do SOF develop a targeting process 

in support of PE operations, and are there best practices that should 

be disseminated? Do PE activities vary when conducting the various 

SOF core operations? If so, how and why? How can SOF leverage 

key partnerships within the USG or partner nations to further PE 

efforts? How are SOF PE operations synchronized with USG or partner nations? How do SOF synchronize special activities with other PE 

efforts? Are joint SOF standardized in how they approach PE so there 

is common vocabulary amongst the various Service components? 

B7. USSOCOM’s expanding roles are changing how it sustains the 

SOF operator

The Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the DOD Authorization Act of 1986 

established USSOCOM with the primary mission to organize, train, 

and equip SOF. Since 1986 the roles and responsibilities of USSOCOM 

have exponentially expanded as counterterrorism operations have 

increased over the past decade. Responsibilities further grew in 2013 

as USSOCOM assumed combatant command of all TSOCs. Though 

USSOCOM now has expanded command and support responsibilities 
15

B. Ensure SOF Readiness

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

over TSOCS, its authorities, funding, processes, and structure did 

not adjust to fully support the TSOCs and ultimately SOF operators. 

How can USSOCOM optimize SOF sustainment operations ensuring 

support to the TSOCs is fully integrated within the GCC and component logistics concept of operations? Given the complexity of the SOF 

environment, what authorities and resourcing changes are required 

to ensure USSOCOM can sustain SOF into the future? What equipment authorization changes are required to sustain the future SOF 

operator, and is there a better way to manage those authorizations? 

What USSOCOM headquarters staff/organization changes (logistics 

leadership rank/grade, logistics operations, engineering, and medical) 

would enable the headquarters to best support TSOCs in their worldwide mission? How can USSOCOM optimize the integration and 

interoperability of SOF sustainment with conventional force logistics 

operations, systems, and infrastructure? GCC concepts of logistics 

support rarely take into consideration SOF requirements which are 

often small, unique, and diverse. How can USSOCOM better ensure 

SOF logistics requirements are being met by GCCs and the CF?

B8. Adapting the acquisition environment: Technology advances at 

the speed of the commercial market

Commercial technology development, and in some cases, government research and development, is occurring at faster rates and often 

by nontraditional companies that have little or no DOD involvement. How can SOF adapt their current skill sets and regulations 

to take advantage of these technology advances and continue to 

upgrade technologies at the speed of the commercial market? How 

can USSOCOM address its processes as well as Congressional constraints? What is the link between research, development, test, and 

evaluation/acquisitions and future capability gaps?

B9. The slippery slope of commercial off-the-shelf 

In the era of fiscal austerity, what is the proper balance between using 

readily available and affordable commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 

solutions versus conducting deliberate research and development 

(R&D) to field cutting edge technology to SOF operators? Is the pursuit of COTS technologies a viable long-term strategy for USSOCOM 
16

Special Operations Research Topics 2017

acquisitions? Is reliance on COTS solutions contributing to an erosion of development, test, and evaluation (DT&E) responsibilities? 

DT&E is the key to improving acquisition outcomes—with COTS the 

command gets minimal DT&E opportunities to engineer improvement. The USG no longer leads the majority of basic science and 

technology (S&T) research. How can USSOCOM leverage and adapt 

COTS technologies for cost savings and unique capabilities? How do 

COTS technologies impact SOF partner building activities? What 

are the implications of COTS technology transfer law and SOF partnership building? How can USSOCOM adapt its S&T future casting to invest in leading edge SOF S&T requirements? Do the rapid 

industry research, development, test, and evaluation efforts unduly 

influence or undermine SOF creative environment when contractors 

are embedded in organizations?
17

C. Help Our Nation Win

Note: Topics in this publication with an asterisk (*) are retained from the previous year and indicate an ongoing research 

requirement. They have been updated, if necessary, to reflect new information and emerging research questions.

C. Help Our Nation Win 

Topic Titles

C1. A study of radicalization: Preventing, countering, and disrupting 

foreign fighter flow

C2. Sealing the seams and defining SOF C2 in the new security 

environment

C3. Digital Green Berets to conduct social media FID: Combating ISIS 

online

C4. Transnational organized crime networks: Exploitation of wildlife 

and other natural resources to fund operations, and use of social 

media and emerging technologies

C5.* How can SOF be optimally employed to shape the strategic security 

environment?

C6. What is the appeal of the Islamic State and its message to Muslims 

in South Asia and Southeast Asia? 

C7. Countering enemy lessons learned to exploit vulnerabilities, block 

remediation efforts, and inform strategy

C8. Targeting the terror networks after Afghanistan

C9. An approach to coalition planning based on the political-military 

agreed end-states and objectives as a critical framework for future 

coalition building and operations

C10. How criminal and terrorist networks exploit free trade zones to 

generate funds

Topic Descriptions

C1. A study of radicalization: Preventing, countering, and disrupting foreign fighter flow 

The steady state of foreign fighter flow (FFF) across and into various GCC areas of responsibility continues to be a concern, as an 

example, into and out of Syria and through neighboring countries. 

This flow has been attributed to a range of factors, including the 

recruiting campaigns orchestrated by violent extremist organizations 

(VEOs) and the ease with which militants from the Middle East, 

North Africa, and Europe can access this region. The same is true of 
18

Special Operations Research Topics 2017

FFF across Southeast Asia and South America, and the relationship of 

VEOs with the FFF phenomenon. This research topic seeks to explore 

the antecedents of FFF with a focus on the social, environmental, and 

psychological factors that deter or motivate foreign fighters to join 

or support extremist causes across GCC areas of responsibility. The 

research should also document previous studies on organizations 

such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Al-Nusrah 

Front to identify similarities/differences in recruitment efforts and 

candidate reasons for joining various organizations, then to look at 

various strategies to counter those efforts. What efforts have been 

made to deter, disrupt, and destroy these foreign fighter threats? Have 

they been successful? Additionally, the study should address FFFdefeat and countering- FFF operations. How do lethal operations, 

such as airstrikes, impact these antecedents? How might influence 

operations weaken these causal factors? What are the information 

environment’s most appropriate leverage points for deterring or disrupting FFF? How do SOF identify, track, and monitor the activities 

of those foreign fighters that return home to do damage to the home 

front?

C2. Sealing the seams and defining SOF C2 in the new security 

environment 

Gray zone security challenges are presenting difficult problem sets 

for U.S. military forces. Strategic problems are no longer confined 

to sovereign borders or specific regions. Rather, these problems are 

transregional, spanning the entire globe. Global SOF operations will 

increasingly involve adversaries who conduct activities and operations across traditional GCC seams within the air, ground, sea, and 

cyber domains. This will challenge SOF to respond in kind. Recent 

examples include C2 of SOF aviation (specifically nonstandard aviation; strike; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets) 

and SOF teams’ pursuits of terrorist networks spanning across GCC 

boundaries. SOF have unique capabilities to address many of the 

issues presented by gray zone security challenges. However, the 

transregional threat presents unique C2 issues as threats cross GCC 

boundaries and responsibilities. SOF must determine if existing C2 

architectures are sufficient to address these challenges. This research 
19

C. Help Our Nation Win

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

should address current SOF C2 structures to either validate them or 

determine if they need modification to more efficiently address current threats. The research should also examine support from other 

functional components such as space, information, and cyber. Does 

current joint doctrine SOF C2 structure sufficiently address these 

challenges and the evolving dynamic of cross-GCC, or seam operations? Are the authorities, leadership traits, and technical capabilities required for success currently available? What are some specific 

recommendations to enhance existing doctrine and/or implement 

new C2 concepts? What can be learned from historical examples of 

how C2 of SOF has been established in different campaigns—SOF 

supporting a conventional force commander, supporting a SOF commander, or supporting the interagency?

C3. Digital Green Berets to conduct social media FID: Combating 

ISIS online

ISIS is extremely adept in using social media and other online venues 

to recruit, encourage, and direct actions against their enemies. Their 

materials and approaches are professional and effective. Despite their 

effectiveness, there are groups such as the Anonymous Hackers who 

have successfully exploited and disrupted ISIS online activity. The 

purpose of this topic is to effectively fight ISIS online strategy. What 

is their strategy, and what are the various online venues that seem 

so successful? How can the USG/USSOCOM counter the ISIS online 

strategy for the United States’ purposes? Can the United States fight 

fire with fire by capitalizing on ISIS’ successes and strategy to develop 

a U.S. online offense? Can the United States enlist the assistance of, or 

team up with, organizations such as Anonymous Hackers to actively 

fight ISIS on their own online turf? Can/should USSOCOM develop 

digital Green Berets to combat ISIS and its affiliates online?

C4. Transnational organized crime networks: Exploitation of 

wildlife and other natural resources to fund operations, and use 

of social media and emerging technologies

Transnational organized crime (TOC) organizations have expanded 

and modernized their business in a number of ways. They have 

expanded beyond their well-known narcotics business to exploit 
20

Special Operations Research Topics 2017

wildlife and other natural resources, and they have modernized their 

operations to capitalize on the benefits of social media. How do SOF 

address those initiatives to stave the development, expansion, and 

prosperity of TOC networks? Specifically:

• Identify where and how criminal/terrorist organizations 

exploit wildlife and nature resources, such as timber, charcoal, etc., to generate funds for their operations. Discuss how/

where/who is creating the demand that encourages this illicit 

activity. Identify the factors that create a permissible environment for wildlife trafficking and the exploitation of natural 

resources. Explain the impact this activity has on the local 

and/or regional populations with regards to their economy, 

culture, and security. Discuss the local, regional, and transnational security threats posed by wildlife trafficking as well as 

the exploitation of natural resources. Identify what measures 

are and/or could be taken by local, regional, and international 

entities to stop/prevent this illicit activity.

• Identify the most recent social media and communications 

applications being used by TOC and/or terrorist organizations 

and explain why (i.e., operational planning, secured communications, financial transactions, etc.). Identify the location 

and the extent to which these applications are being used (i.e., 

by country, region) by TOCs and/or terrorist organizations. 

Highlight any indicators that may be help an analyst identify 

someone who is using these applications (i.e., phone number 

formats, emails, account addresses, etc.). Identify how certain 

applications are utilized for nefarious purposes. Identify any 

application vulnerabilities (i.e., unreliable connections, limited 

use areas, etc.) that can be exploited by DOD.

• Include research on how corruption creates a permissible 

environment that allows TOC networks to operate, addressing the challenge of identifying what persons/entities are complicit in doing so. Also, recommend research of how cultural 

norms associated with different levels of corruption within 

specific countries or regions factor into creating a permissible 

environment.
21

C. Help Our Nation Win

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

C5. How can SOF be optimally employed to shape the strategic 

security environment?

Special operations actions and activities can have disproportionate 

affect for the resources and personnel employed, but SOF are a limited 

resource. How does USSOCOM synchronize and prioritize special 

operations, actions, and activities globally? Does the command present coherent SOF employment options and recommendations? How 

can USSOCOM better provide coherent and unified SOF capabilities 

to the GCCs? How could the command expand the range of available 

options through requisite authorities, capabilities, and relationships?

C6. What is the appeal of the Islamic State and its message to Muslims in South Asia and Southeast Asia? 

Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world but seems 

to be immune to the type of extremism and violent extremist organization groups that other Muslim countries/populations encounter. 

Admittedly, there are groups operating in those areas and attacks do 

occur, but not to the extent that they exist or occur in the Middle East 

and Africa. Is this a true premise or simply a perception? Identify 

the factors within Indonesia that make it immune—or support the 

perception it is immune—to those types of groups or attacks. Is this 

perception true at the regional level with any other countries in South 

or Southeast Asia? If so, are there similar instances in other areas of 

the world? That is, are some areas more susceptible or less susceptible 

to radicalization? If so, why?

C7. Countering enemy lessons learned to exploit vulnerabilities, 

block remediation efforts, and inform strategy

In 2006, the United States Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center published a study, “Harmony and Disharmony,” examining senior jihadi ideologues’ internal assessments of lessons learned 

from jihadi efforts during the 1970s.4 The enemies’ after action 

reports (AARs) provided insights into jihadi macro-strategy. The 

study noted striking parallels of jihadi experiences in Syria in the 

1970s to al-Qaeda sponsored operations in Iraq in 2006. The current 

transregional violent extremist effort demonstrates both the jihadists’ successful adaptation and their continued struggle to address 
22

Special Operations Research Topics 2017

specific lessons learned. For example, Abu Mus’ab Al Suri’s account 

of Muslim Brotherhood operations in Syria over 35 years ago provides considerable insight. Contemporary jihadists appear to have 

learned from Al Suri’s AAR, including lessons on the importance of 

an advanced comprehensive strategy; self-sufficiency; strong internal 

and external public relations; a well-crafted media campaign; and 

the benefits of previous experiences. What lessons are today’s transregional violent extremists learning that will apply to the strategies 

of the fifth-, sixth-, seventh-, and subsequent generation mujahedeen? How can the United States and its partners identify and exploit 

enemies’ lessons learned and preempt their strategic adjustments?

C8. Targeting the terror networks after Afghanistan

On 31 December 2014, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

support in Afghanistan transitioned from combat to a train, advise, 

and assist mission, and is officially known as Operation Resolute 

Support (ORS). The United States military mission in Afghanistan, 

the post-2014 follow-on to Operation Enduring Freedom, is known 

as Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. It is part of the NATO-led ORS 

and consists of two components. One is working with allies as part 

of the train, advise, and assist mission, and the second is to conduct 

counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al-Qaeda to 

ensure that Afghanistan is never again used to stage attacks against 

the homeland.5 The terrorist threat worldwide remains high. How will 

the transition in Afghanistan affect the targeting of terrorist networks 

worldwide? There are numerous strategic and national-level policies 

enacted in recent years governing targeting operations, not only in 

Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan, but worldwide. How will 

they be effected? Are there other considerations for the SOF targeting process? Current events convey significant and violent changes 

around the globe. Which agency should have the lead? How might 

interagency responsibilities and mutual assistance be refined? What, 

if any, authorities gaps exist? How can SOF continue to ensure that 

counterterrorist efforts outpace terror networks’ ability to regenerate? 
23

C. Help Our Nation Win

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

C9. An approach to coalition planning based on the political-military 

agreed end-states and objectives as a critical framework for future 

coalition building and operations

Recent U.S.-led military operations enjoyed large coalitions of forces 

that operated in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. However large 

the multinational participation, there were disparities in national 

goals and objectives of the participating nations; some joined for 

national reasons, while others joined the coalition in support of the 

United States. In addition to goals and objectives, they brought caveats on what they could and would not do, that is “to ensure their forces 

operate in Afghanistan in accordance with their national laws and 

policies.”6 This topic should address ways for tackling future crises 

in which multiple nations have a vested interest and for which the 

nations are willing to commit forces and resources based on agreed 

end-states and strategic diplomatic, information, military, and economic objectives. What ways/mechanisms are available for nations 

to make known objectives, goals, and caveats as input to the strategic 

and campaign planning process before the plan is finalized?

C10. How criminal and terrorist networks exploit free trade zones to 

generate funds

Free trade zones (FTZs), also called foreign trade zones, are areas 

“within which goods may be landed, handled, manufactured or 

reconfigured, and re-exported without the intervention of the customs authorities.”7

 Criminals and/or terrorists exploit those areas to 

their own benefit for smuggling illicit goods in and out of countries, 

and in some countries are known as “smuggler’s havens.”8 Identify 

FTZs with the most impact on the United States, describe how they 

function, and how criminals and/or terrorist networks may be leveraging them to engage in trade based money laundering as well as the 

movement of national security interest goods. Those include: weapons 

of mass destruction, man-portable air defense systems, small arms, 

drugs and their precursors, oilfield equipment, nuclear equipment, 

missile equipment, etc. Discuss how exploitation of FTZs impacts 

the local and regional populations living in the vicinity of FTZs 

with regards to their economy and security. Identify what factors 

within, but not limited to, the political, economic, infrastructure, and 
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Special Operations Research Topics 2017

security sectors, allow criminal and/or terrorist networks to exploit 

FTZs. Identify what local, regional, and/or international efforts exist 

to prevent the exploitation of FTZ by nefarious actors to support 

their illicit trade and financial flow operations. Discuss what additional authorities, resources, and/or cooperation between nations are 

needed to support this effort.
25

D. Continue to Build Relationships

Note: Topics in this publication with an asterisk (*) are retained from the previous year and indicate an ongoing research 

requirement. They have been updated, if necessary, to reflect new information and emerging research questions.

D. Continue to Build Relationships 

Topic Titles

D1. Developing an effective network: How do SOF identify, assess, 

develop, and motivate potential partnerships for various special 

operations?

D2. Define how SOF can improve transregional partner information 

sharing

D3. Institutionalizing partnerships: Getting beyond personalities

D4.* Culture and human nature in building partner capacity of SOF: 

Why are there different outcomes?

D5. Unraveling identity: Assessing multiple levels of personal and 

communal identity and the overlaps within them

D6.* Educating SOF partners: Effectiveness, funding, and human rights 

vetting

D7.* Role of USSOCOM in technology procurement for international 

SOF

D8.* Virtually expanding the SOF network: Capacity building by 

leveraging technology

D9.* Enabling a SOF network under conditions of financial austerity

D10. Air Force Special Operations Command combat aviation advisors 

growth potential

Topic Descriptions

D1. Developing an effective network: How do SOF identify, assess, 

develop, and motivate potential partnerships for various special 

operations?

Most SOF operations require non-SOF support. There are ongoing 

efforts to develop an understanding of the ‘blue,’ or friendly, network to support USG countering weapons of mass destruction operations, actions, and activities. How do SOF develop similar situational 

understanding of CF, USG interagency, and international partner 

forces’ objectives, missions, and purpose to achieve complementary 

effects for other SOF operations? Who is the primary integrator for 

the friendly network at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels? 
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Special Operations Research Topics 2017

Are there best practices and other mechanisms for understanding, 

identifying, assessing, developing, and motivating potential partners’ 

behavior, objectives, organization, and composition to successfully 

partner with SOF? How do SOF mission sets complement the effects 

of GCC CF? What would a community of action for counterterrorism 

in Europe look like, for example? What multinational agreements 

must be in place to allow the network to be effective in times of crisis? 

Which partnership relationships are most effective and most costefficient? What other interests or issues must be considered (stability, 

capability, etc.) when partnering with others in conducting and supporting irregular warfare? What are the policy and authorities issues 

pertaining to SOF interoperability with nongovernmental organizations? What are the second- and third-order effects of partnering 

with a particular actor? What are the left and right limits of such 

partnerships? What are the measures of effectiveness or return on 

investment for such partnerships?

D2. Define how SOF can improve transregional partner information 

sharing

Gray zone security challenges are presenting difficult problem sets 

for U.S. military forces. Strategic problems are no longer confined to 

sovereign borders or specific regions. Rather, they are transregional 

and global. To increase effectiveness, SOF must develop purposeful 

relationships, interact in an informed manner, and facilitate information sharing. How can SOF integrate partner capabilities and 

improve information sharing among partners to more effectively 

counter transregional VEOs using a transregional approach? How 

can SOF share open-source information with partners and encourage 

partners to share their information and insights to more effectively 

counter terrorism? What authorities and issues impact open-source 

and other information sharing? What information can and should 

be shared with partners, what are the barriers to doing so, and how 

can these barriers be addressed? How does military use of commercial systems and databases come into play? What can USSOCOM 

do to establish an effective collaborative information environment 

to enable information sharing, enhance situational awareness, and 

support decision-making?
27

D. Continue to Build Relationships

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

D3. Institutionalizing partnerships: Getting beyond personalities

U.S. and partner SOF now have more than a decade of experience 

fighting in combined operations and coalition contexts. What best 

practices have been learned and developed as a result of these experiences? What doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, 

education, personnel, and facilities changes need to be made to institutionalize these lessons in order to better enable future coalition 

SOF operations and improve interoperability? How can USSOCOM 

enable partnerships at all levels to better allow partner SOF to train 

as realistically as possible? How can a decade of lessons learned and 

best practices inform new directives, initiatives, and partnerships?

D4. Culture and human nature in building partner capacity of SOF: 

Why are there different outcomes?

Competing economic theories (e.g. structuralism, dependency) on 

the development of nations cite different factors that lead to success. 

Cultural explanations are sometimes invoked to explain differences 

in national outcomes. Others have pointed to human nature as a 

critical factor. Which factors are most salient to building partner 

capacity, and how should SOF capacity-building efforts address those 

factors? How do cultural differences affect perceptions of capacity 

and success in capacity building? How does understanding culture 

make a positive difference and enhance SOF military effectiveness? 

Understanding culture frequently refers to the adversary or to other 

actors and institutions who are residents of a given operational environment. Yet, ongoing emphasis on U.S. interagency and coalition 

partners (civilian and military) increases the value of understanding 

the organizational culture and ‘sub-cultures’ of internal partners (e.g., 

U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, 

the intelligence community, U.S. and foreign law enforcement). There 

are dominant cultures that exist for both U.S. and foreign actors.

D5. Unraveling identity: Assessing multiple levels of personal and 

communal identity and the overlaps within them

Identity shapes beliefs about appropriate actions and why they have 

value to a person and a community. As a way of developing greater 

understanding of context and others’ intentions when building 
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Special Operations Research Topics 2017

relationships, especially in the fluid arena of the gray zone, what 

mechanisms exist to locate and assess the importance of competing identities? Why do some identities endure challenges? Why do 

some identities get folded into or subsumed by others and under 

what conditions is that likely to occur? These questions are of great 

importance to combating radicalization among vulnerable populations, as well as building partner capacity to prevent extremist ideas 

from taking root. They also address a broad operational spectrum 

from pre-conflict persistent engagement to identify warning signs 

as they begin, through countering extremist narratives that already 

seek to overwhelm nonviolent identity tendencies that may exist, 

all the way to de-radicalization efforts for those leaving groups like 

ISIS. In order to answer these questions, research into the cultural 

norms found within political, social, and economic institutions will 

build rubrics for assessing identity clarity (specificity of values and 

actions promoted by the identity), predictability (amount and types 

of anticipated actions by others within the identity group), intensity (importance vis-à-vis other identities), prevalence (breadth of 

acceptance within the community), durability (ability to withstand 

counter identities), and flexibility (adaptability with changing contexts). Answering these questions and developing this framework will 

improve SOF efforts to build better relationships by understanding 

others’ intentions more fully.

D6. Educating SOF partners: Effectiveness, funding, and human 

rights vetting

SOF have a lengthy history of involvement in training foreign partners; however, their experience in educating those partners is considerably less extensive. Recent efforts to support education in partner 

nations have encountered political stumbling blocks. How important 

are these educational initiatives, and what can be done to expand 

them? Should SOF support educational initiatives in countries where 

the military has been implicated in human rights violations or problematic behaviors? What funding sources are appropriate—MFP-11 or 

security assistance under international military education and training—and under what conditions? What are the essential SOF network 

partner education requirements for effective partnered operations?
29

D. Continue to Build Relationships

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

D7. Role of USSOCOM in technology procurement for international 

SOF

USSOCOM has numerous opportunities, but few authorities, for 

helping foreign partners obtain technology and equipment. Should 

USSOCOM have a greater role in security assistance when it involves 

procuring technology for international SOF? How would such a role 

contribute to interoperability and the expansion of the SOF network? Should USSOCOM receive additional funding and authorities to facilitate acquisition for SOF partners? Should support be 

limited to SOF in the SOF network? What would be the proper role 

for USSOCOM in the security assistance process, and how would 

this effort be coordinated with other DOD and Department of State 

efforts?

D8. Virtually expanding the SOF network: Capacity building by 

leveraging technology

With increasing demands to counter VEOs, SOF find themselves 

stretched thin. Can SOF satisfy GCC theater security cooperation 

and SOF objectives by conducting capacity building activities virtually? What technologies can facilitate virtual interactions? To what 

extent would it relieve pressure on SOF deployment requirements 

and durations? What activities can be performed adequately by virtual means, and which require physical presence? Has the spread of 

modern communications technology reduced the importance of faceto-face contact? What are the limitations to such virtual engagement? 

How can virtual engagement increase international collaboration at 

the strategic planning level? From a psychological standpoint, are 

virtual relationships with no face-to-face interaction as strong or as 

trusted as those built in person?

D9. Enabling a SOF network under conditions of financial austerity

In the U.S. and most of its partner nations, budgetary pressures are 

constraining the amount of funding available for SOF and international SOF networking. What options are available for sustaining the 

funding of the SOF network? What aspects of the SOF network are 

most deserving of funding, and where can cuts be made without seriously degrading the network? How can partner nations be convinced 
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Special Operations Research Topics 2017

to make greater contributions? To what extent will greater partner 

contributions dilute U.S. leadership of the SOF network, and what 

are the advantages and disadvantages of non-U.S. leadership of the 

SOF network? How do reductions in CF capabilities affect the SOF 

network, and how can these problems be mitigated?

D10. Air Force Special Operations Command combat aviation 

advisors growth potential

Currently, United States Army Special Operations Command fields 

seven Special Forces groups, yet Air Force Special Operations Command has only one active duty squadron dedicated to the FID, 

security force assistance (SFA), and UW missions. This results in a 

mismatch of capabilities and missed opportunities with regard to 

building partnership capacity and partner nation air-to-ground integration. The objective is to determine the feasibility and methodology 

of growing the combat aviation advisor force to more closely match 

that of Army SOF. Also, basing locations, including possible colocation at the TSOCs, should be considered. Many partner nations 

would like additional assistance from SOF in aviation, but budgetary constraints have prevented SOF from completely meeting the 

demand. What role should SOF aviation play in SFA and FID? In 

which operational environments can SOF aviation contribute the 

most? How valuable is SOF aviation assistance to the achievement of 

U.S. national strategic objectives? How can aviation contribute to the 

enabling of the SOF network? How does or should SOF efforts mesh 

with those of other DOD and Department of State efforts?
31

E. Prepare for the Future

Note: Topics in this publication with an asterisk (*) are retained from the previous year and indicate an ongoing research 

requirement. They have been updated, if necessary, to reflect new information and emerging research questions.

E. Prepare for the Future 

Topic Titles

E1. Preparing for future conflict and Goldwater-Nichols reform

E2. Implications of being strategically outpaced

E3. Broadening considerations of strategic risk

E4. Conducting and assessing military information support 

operations: Are old media techniques still viable?

E5. Migration waves and future SOF recruitment and force generation

E6. SOF challenges and opportunities in future operating 

environments: Where and how SOF can be decisive

E7. Hybrid warfare by state and non-state adversaries

E8.* SOF successes in preventing wars: Effectiveness of persistent 

peacetime engagement

E9. Human aspects of military operations analysis

E10.* Agile information systems that enable SOF network partner 

integration and SOF C2

E11. Unconventional warfare: Successes and failures from the Cold War 

to the present

Topic Descriptions

E1. Preparing for future conflict and Goldwater-Nichols reform

In December 2015, the nation’s top military officer, General Joseph 

Dunford, called for the Pentagon to revamp combatant commands 

for the “fight of the future.”9

 Current “old plans,” he indicated, take 

too long to execute. Thus, after 30 years of the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act, the Senate Armed Services Committee is considering reimagining, reorganizing, or consolidating the combatant commands. How 

should USSOCOM and the global SOF network be structured to 

resource and organize U.S. and partner SOF of the future? How can 

USSOCOM ensure unique and varied SOF capabilities are employed 

to their fullest and most enduring effect by the GCCs? Does current 

joint doctrine for SOF C2 structure sufficiently address challenges 

associated with a potential reform? What reorganizing—if any—

should occur to address current China and ISIS issues?
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Special Operations Research Topics 2017

E2. Implications of being strategically outpaced

Terrorist organizations continue to converge and collaborate as affiliates. Now, they successfully share best practices, lessons learned, 

personnel, training, funding, and other resources at unprecedented 

levels. In tandem, the number of under-governed spaces is growing, 

enabling terrorist cells to proliferate. How can affected governments 

in these spaces address primary drivers of terrorism (e.g., poverty, 

inadequate security, poor governance, and lack of employment opportunities) to stop this spread? How do SOF address an enduring threat 

of increased numbers of foreign fighters that may or may not be outpacing U.S. capabilities?

E3. Broadening considerations of strategic risk

Calculating strategic risk (positional advantage, strategic power, 

influence, governance, access, and cumulative effects) can help define 

how the U.S. competes for positional advantage in a disordered world, 

and—with it—determine what strategic success/risk looks like. This 

includes ensuring sufficient strategic depth and options for an acceptable political/operational outcome for the U.S. and its international 

partners. SOF are an important part of this calculation, as they provide a critical operational capability within the human domain to 

expand considerations of strategic risk. Does the U.S. possess sufficient perspective, thinking, and models to consider risk in the 

current and emerging strategic environment? Does the current and 

future strategic environment represent a different context for existing 

threats, or does the U.S. face new threats altogether? Can USSOCOM 

more effectively develop concepts and conduct joint experimentation 

with JIIM partners to tackle emerging threats and opportunities?

E4. Conducting and assessing military information support 

operations: Are old media techniques still viable?

Growing fiscal constraints and shifting communication paradigms 

demand a critical evaluation of traditional military information support operations (MISO)—specifically, a need to reassess application 

of MISO-driven media to ensure SOF continue to provide combatant commanders with cost-effective options for shaping the human 

domain. This includes considering costs associated with production, 
33

E. Prepare for the Future

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

distribution, dissemination, and evaluation for traditional and webbased MISO at all levels of war, and with it the strengths and weaknesses of current MISO methods for targeted audiences at these levels.

E5. Migration waves and future SOF recruitment and force 

generation

The United States, Europe, and Latin America serve as melting pots 

for migration waves, a trend likely to increase. Given that the majority 

of migration waves are triggered by regional instability, these regions 

are likely places for future SOF deployments. Moreover, pools of 

migrants can become a source of future SOF recruitment and forcegeneration. What impacts do these migration waves have on countries 

experiencing large population losses and gains, notably destabilization? What sub-sets of immigrant populations are best suited to support SOF objectives? What risks are associated with recruiting from 

these sub-groups? In what capacity would these potential recruits 

provide the greatest return on investment?

E6. SOF challenges and opportunities in future operating 

environments: Where and how SOF can be decisive

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has inexorably moved to a 

less stable and less predictable global environment. Predicting future 

instability, conflicts, and direct and indirect threats to U.S. interests 

remains profoundly important to USSOCOM. What are the projected 

global hot spots in 5, 10, or 15 years? What future state, non-state, 

social, and technological ‘game changers’ could impact global U.S. 

interests? What do SOF need to understand about the myriad projections and predictions regarding the future operating environment 

so USSOCOM is prepared for the future? Where should USSOCOM 

focus future ‘Phase 0’ activities to enhance stability and prevent conflict? Should there be increased emphasis on campaign planning and 

the application of operational design to help develop strategies for 

activities short of war?

E7. Hybrid warfare by state and non-state adversaries 

Many deem hybrid warfare as the convergence of TOC networks 

and terrorist organizations. While some assess the relationship to be 
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more of a nexus than convergence, most agree there is an increasingly 

more complex threat to national security as a result of criminal and 

terrorist organizations working together. How does the United States 

counter and deter the hybrid warfare employed by state and non-state 

adversaries during both war and peace across the spectrum of conflict? How can the U.S. optimally respond to hybrid and asymmetric 

challenges while simultaneously accounting for fiscal limitations and 

political sensitivity to large-scale operations? What is the best means 

to fully synchronize JIIM responses to hybrid challenges?

E8. SOF successes in preventing wars: Effectiveness of persistent 

peacetime engagement

SOF are active in scores of countries around the world, emphasizing the importance of shaping the environment during ‘Phase 0’ 

operations. What are historical examples of SOF deployments and 

operations in ‘Phase 0’ that prevented instability and conflict, and 

ultimately protected U.S. interests and the homeland? What conflicts 

and crises were prevented or ameliorated through persistent peacetime engagement by SOF? How were SOF flexible and adaptable to 

adjust to changing situations and make valuable contributions in 

unexpected ways? How can past successes be applied toward understanding future problems?

E9. Human aspects of military operations analysis

In the 2013 Posture Statement to Congress, former USSOCOM Commander Admiral William H. McRaven defined the human domain 

as “the totality of the physical, cultural, and social environments that 

influence human behavior.”10 Integrating human aspects of military 

operations analysis into intelligence analysis can better equip U.S. 

forces to understand operating environments and produce more 

informed decisions on forward presence, engagement planning, 

partner building, and influencing hearts/minds/behaviors. What 

are the future advanced technologies and cultural social practices for 

engaging underdeveloped populations in support of partner governments to achieve U.S. interests? What doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, facilities, and policy 
35

E. Prepare for the Future

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

actions need to occur to institutionalize human aspects of military 

operations analysis within SOF?

E10. Agile information systems that enable SOF network partner 

integration and SOF C2

Agile information systems include, but are not limited to: e-mail, 

instant messaging, text messaging, face-to-face stand-up meetings, 

portal pages, etc. Within these systems, SOF and SOF partners arguably continue to lose the battle over narrative—too slow to respond 

and often through ineffective messaging. What are the future agile 

information systems that USSOCOM should be focused on incorporating into the SOF network in the next 15 years? Of these, what 

processes, systems, and mechanisms can be leveraged to share information with international partners to include differing levels of security classification?

E11. Unconventional warfare: Successes and failures from the Cold 

War to the present

UW consists of activities that are conducted to enable a resistance 

movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. UW has 

become an increasingly important tool of U.S. policy as resistance 

forces in many parts of the globe organize to confront oppressive 

regimes. This topic should examine the successes and failures of past 

UW operations and should include: the Office of Strategic Services 

in World War II, Russian UW in the Ukraine/Crimea, the initial 

stages of Operation Enduring Freedom with the U.S. in support of the 

Northern Alliance, Contras in Nicaragua, and the U.S. in Operation 

Iraqi Freedom in partnership with the Kurdish Peshmerga. How can 

SOF be better trained and equipped to capitalize on opportunities 

and enable resistance operations in times and locations of choice as 

approved by U.S. authorities? In each example of successes and failures of past UW operations, describe the conditions. How was success 

defined? What were the best practices? Are the American people and 

political leaders prepared to support UW given ethical questions and 

the long-term demands of UW?

37

F. Preservation of the Force and Family

Note: Topics in this publication with an asterisk (*) are retained from the previous year and indicate an ongoing research 

requirement. They have been updated, if necessary, to reflect new information and emerging research questions.

F. Preservation of the Force and Family 

Topic Titles

F1.* Show no weakness: Addressing the stigma associated with seeking 

medical and mental healthcare for SOF

F2. Preventive medicine specialist core competencies in support of 

SOF in complex environments

F3.* Understanding the challenges of social reintegration for SOF

F4.* Vulnerabilities and threats to the wellbeing of SOF and their 

families through social media exploitation

F5.* The Care Coalition: “We will keep the faith with you”

F6.* Lessons learned from the SOF Family Pilot Program

Topic Descriptions

F1. Show no weakness: Addressing the stigma associated with 

seeking medical and mental healthcare for SOF

The previous USSOCOM Commander, U.S. Army General Joseph 

Votel, was quoted at a 2015 Washington conference as having sought 

out counseling in the past: “I have, with my family, sought counseling and assistance ... I did it an earlier time in my career, but it’s 

been since 9/11, and I encourage everybody to do that,” he stated.11

Military senior leaders publicly encourage forces to seek medical 

or behavioral healthcare; however, surveys indicate there remains a 

stigma associated with it. What else can be done to ‘destigmatize’ SOF 

operators and their families seeking medical and behavioral healthcare? Are there any adverse consequences to ‘destigmatizing’ medical 

and behavioral healthcare treatment? What elements of military and 

SOF culture are present that challenge the effort to balance mental 

fitness with duty performance? Is a culture that rewards personnel 

based on how many hours they work, how many days they deploy, 

and how many sacrifices they make counterproductive to establishing 

programs that support restoring and maintaining reduced levels of 

stress? How can a SOF operator take leave, reduce time away from 

family, and/or seek measures to reduce stress when those efforts are 

possibly stigmatized as non-productive or perceived as a weakness? 
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Special Operations Research Topics 2017

What are the implications of SOF personnel and families seeking 

outside healthcare under the exigencies of non-disclosure agreements? What roles could a ‘SOF-for-Life’ program play in assisting 

active and retired SOF to cope with stressors? Could an analysis of 

the retired SOF population’s coping mechanisms assist in improving current treatment protocols? Are there proactive measures being 

taken, such as required ‘crew rest’ for aviators? This policy was meant 

to be proactive and eventually shifted aviator culture and ultimately 

saved more pilots’ lives and increased mission effectiveness. Could 

the concept of physical/psychological ‘maintenance’ be framed as a 

strategic force multiplier? Even more so, could it be normalized? Is 

the stigma associated with mental health treatment organizationally 

or culturally imposed? To what extent do SOF operators contribute 

to stigmas that prevent them from seeking healthcare or counseling 

for themselves and their families?

F2. Preventive medicine specialist core competencies in support of 

SOF in complex environments

SOF continue to face challenges associated with long-term, forward, 

small footprint operations in austere environments. The durations 

and recurrent nature of these missions pose unique challenges from 

public health perspectives that are not routinely encountered by CF. 

SOF preventive medicine personnel must be well-trained and educated in order to apply rigorous technical and scientific assessments 

and evaluations to develop non-standardized solutions to support the 

asymmetrical battle space that SOF operators work in. Further, the 

long-term and repetitive engagements that SOF conduct, specifically 

in special warfare [FID and UW], require that SOF live and work 

with host nation and partner forces in extremely close conditions to 

be effective. The use of U.S. standards and restrictions, such as only 

authorizing approved food sources for consumption, restriction on 

use of host nation pesticides and vector control measures, mandating U.S. water and waste management standards, and other policies 

can result in U.S. personnel being isolated due to the appearance 

of cultural insensitivity. What additional specialized education and 

training is required to better prepare SOF medics for operations in 

austere environments to be prepared for some of these unusual health 
39

F. Preservation of the Force and Family

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

threats and illnesses? Should foreign language capable preventive 

medicine specialists also become SOF qualified?

F3. Understanding the challenges of social reintegration for SOF

When SOF deploy, they leave they leave the familiar norms of American society and enter into a foreign culture where they must adapt to 

local customs, practices, and environments. They also shift from a 

training status to a fully operational one, which requires them to be 

in a prolonged heightened state of awareness. With the high-tempo 

of in-garrison SOF training and repeated deployments over several 

years, there is no longer a definitive separation of military and civilian lifestyles to decompress; many refer to it as a purely military life. 

What are the social reintegration challenges of returning SOF? With 

what frequency should SOF be assessed? Does successful reintegration differ across marital status, race, religion, gender, or Service? 

If so, how? What makes it difficult to reintegrate socially? What are 

the challenges of social reintegration, especially for single Service 

members who do not benefit from programs supporting family reintegration? Is there a propensity for certain SOF specialties to reintegrate better than others, and what lessons can be learned from these 

successes? What policies, programs, and practices best assist with 

social reintegration?

F4. Vulnerabilities and threats to the wellbeing of SOF and their 

families through social media exploitation

The proliferation of social media over the last decade and the 

increased reliance on it for communications, gaming, entertainment, 

and news has created a potential threat to Service members and their 

families. Not only can SOF members and their families be identified 

through social media, but nefarious actors can use that information 

to harass and threaten them. How does this specifically affect SOF, 

who could be considered targets of higher value? As the millennial 

generation and subsequent generations increasingly rely on social 

media to connect, how will this impact the safety and security of 

SOF and their families? To what extent has social media already been 

exploited to track and seek retribution or revenge against Service 

personnel involved in operations overseas? To what extent does the 
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Special Operations Research Topics 2017

dissemination of information identifying SOF by name through YouTube, Vimeo, and Vine impact the safety and security of the forces 

and their families? What is the threat to the families of SOF based on 

their postings to social media sites, and how will those posts impact 

the Service member and his or her ability to perform the mission in 

an effective manner? With the declassification and release of details 

of previous SOF missions and operations, what are the implications 

for the families and descendants of SOF personnel already retired or 

deceased? How should USSOCOM and the Services address these 

issues and mitigate their impact on SOF and their families?

F5. The Care Coalition: “We will keep the faith with you”

In 2005, USSOCOM established an aggressive program to internally care for SOF wounded, ill, or injured Service members and 

their families. The stated goal of the Care Coalition is to accomplish 

the mission by, with, and through government and nongovernment 

organizations. The program has evolved from immediate care and 

recovery assistance to include a comprehensive recovery plan, a comprehensive transition plan, and intends to provide direct, lifelong 

assistance to SOF personnel who are wounded, ill, or injured. In addition to transition assistance and mentoring, an adaptive sports program and fellowships were added. Documenting its history, evolution, 

and measures of effectiveness are of interest to USSOCOM leadership. 

How effective is the program? Can it be considered a model advocacy 

program for the Services? Has it had a direct affect in increasing 

SOF readiness? What metrics can be considered to measure its effectiveness? With expected future budget constraints, is it a long-term 

sustainable program?

F6. Lessons learned from the SOF Family Pilot Program

Over the last three years, USSOCOM has received unprecedented 

authorities and funding for POTFF initiatives. The SOF Family Pilot 

Program is well underway. What metrics should be used for assessing success and efficacy of the program? How do USSOCOM POTFF 

initiatives compare to U.S. sister Service initiatives? Are there similar 

or comparable programs in place with partner nation SOF? What 

are their best practices that USSOF could adopt? Can the sharing 
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F. Preservation of the Force and Family

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

of POTFF lessons and programs be leveraged to ‘thicken’ the SOF 

network and improve relationships with key SOF partners? Can they 

be used in partnership capacity building?

43

G. USSOCOM J5 Key Strategic Issues List

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

G. USSOCOM J5 Key Strategic Issues List 

Overview

The J5 Strategy Division is responsible for USSOCOM’s understanding of 

the global security environment, which helps articulate appropriate strategy 

and force development requirements. The Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) is 

a set of questions the J5 believe to be relevant in an attempt to support this 

understanding and is built around trends expected to continue for the next 

10 to 20 years. This is a living document and it will change to address other 

questions as the J5 generates satisfactory answers to some, while identifying 

additional questions to explore. If individuals are interested in working with 

the J5 on one of the KSIL topics12 (with your organization or individually), 

please contact the J5 via e-mail at J5KSIL@socom.mil.

Discussion

In addition to using these questions as a method to focus J5 thinking and 

research, the KSIL functions as a tool to conduct engagements with outside 

organizations. The list is used to both spur discussion and notify others 

what USSOCOM interests are. In cases where outside organizations share 

these interests, the KSIL provides a list of potential research topics. The J5 

is building a network intended for sharing insights and research products 

to better inform strategic thinking, while continuing to look for opportunities to become involved with researchers and receive feedback related to 

KSIL questions. In some cases, the J5 has sponsored travel to USSOCOM 

for briefings on the findings of a research project related to the question list 

to general officer-level personnel.

KSIL key points

• Aimed at improving understanding of global conditions and 

trends to enable better strategy for USSOCOM.

• Intended to invite debate among competing perspectives—

multiple perspectives on a single question are valuable.
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Special Operations Research Topics 2017

• Relevant for academic inquiry to encourage participation from 

both civilian universities and professional military education 

schools.

• Focused around: What should be keeping us up at night when 

we think about the future?

What follows is a summary list of the KSIL and individual one-page 

descriptions with objectives and pertinent research themes to support a 

comprehensive understanding of each strategic issue.

Topic Titles

G1. Weapons of mass destruction

G2. Information/digital age

G3. Shifting power distribution and diffusion

G4. Megacities

G5. Tactical actions versus strategic results 

G6. Conflict prevention 

G7. Human nature versus culture 

G8. Risk management 

G9. Interest-based strategies 

G10. Weapons technology proliferation 

G11. Disruptive and game-changing technologies 

G12. Adaptability and agility 

G13. Capability gaps 

G14. Long-term fiscal constraints 

G15. Strategic constraints 

G16. Demographics 

G17. Energy/other resources

Topic Descriptions

G1. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

Are current policies and actions advancing or undermining our 

counter-proliferation intentions? Are the incentives for the acquisition and/or use of WMD rising or subsiding at the state level? What 

about the incentives for transfer of WMD to non-state actors? How 
45

G. USSOCOM J5 Key Strategic Issues List

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

can the U.S. favorably change these incentives? How can USSOCOM 

better contribute to counter-proliferation efforts?

The objective of this research topic is to develop new insights across 

the breadth and depth of counter-proliferation efforts. Enabling technology for WMD is increasingly accessible for a range of actors, and 

counter-proliferation capabilities are not keeping pace. Therefore, 

incentives/disincentives for acquisition remain paramount. Sanctions 

have not proven especially effective in deterring some states from 

developing WMD capabilities. Enforcing global “rules” for possession 

of such weapons is also difficult in an era where states and populations are especially sensitive to any perceived infringement upon 

their sovereignty. The United States’ counter-proliferation effort is 

evolving, and our need for greater understanding of the associated 

issues is growing. The majority of our current counter-WMD efforts 

are aimed at nuclear proliferation, while growing evidence indicates 

that it is other forms of WMD that will be more problematic.13

Themes of interest include:14

• Evolving incentives for transfer.

• Options for preventing or deterring proliferation.

• Systemic evaluation of the United States’ counter-proliferation 

program.

• Evolution of WMD policies, especially those associated with 

rogue states and non-state actors.

• Implications of U.S./United Nations proliferation policies on 

emerging states.

• Options to manage expanding membership to the ‘nuclear 

club.’

• Achieving the appropriate balance between nuclear, biological, 

chemical, cyber, and electromagnetic pulse counter-proliferation efforts.

• Potential advantages of focusing policy on management of 

consequences of possession.

• Evolving definitions of WMD. What is the next possible 

WMD? Most dangerous? Most likely?

• Can we adequately survive/recover from a WMD event? 
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Special Operations Research Topics 2017

G2. Information/digital age

Does the information/digital age impact the nature of stability? What 

are the implications of increasingly numerous empowered individuals? How does information transparency affect the interactions of 

states? What are the implications for our military operations and 

engagements? Are there opportunities? What are the specific implications for SOF in cyberwarfare? 

The objective of this research topic is to develop new insights into 

how the information and digital age is changing the nature of the 

global strategic environment. Cyber tools are changing the relationships among and between individuals, informal groups, non-state 

actors, and states. Individuals and groups have been empowered by 

the accessibility of the Internet and social media, which has in turn 

driven rapid social change. States’ ability to adapt and respond to 

powerful narratives that emerge through these tools has been increasingly challenged by their speed, scope, and reach. Governments are 

also struggling to safeguard state secrets; sensitive information is 

increasingly vulnerable to disclosure. While the information and 

digital age may once have been an advantage to the U.S., it now finds 

itself struggling to keep up with the latest advances quickly spreading 

across the globe through the private sector.

Themes of interest include: 

• Implications for governance and regional stability.

• Falling cost of network development for non-state actors.

• Social media networks and cultural impacts.

• Development and leverage of distributed populations.

• Grievance mobilization; recruitment to causes/networking.

• Influence of ‘virtual’ leaders.

• Effects on state decision cycles.

• Ability of U.S. to influence narrative/information wars.

• Appropriate versus needed USG authorities in the cyber realm.

• Impacts on the relationship between states and non-state 

actors.

• Operations security issues and bureaucratic practices (inability 

to change/update/procure systems appropriately).

• Security of personal information.
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G. USSOCOM J5 Key Strategic Issues List

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

• State secrets and malignant disclosure.

• Cost/benefits of open information sharing.

• Crowdsourcing and intelligence analysis.

• U.S. vulnerability to cyberattack, and appropriate military 

preparation/response.

G3. Shifting power distribution and diffusion

Is the nature of power changing on the international stage? If so, is it 

doing so uniformly (i.e., is there a common understanding of ‘what 

matters’ across regions)? Are power shifts creating a higher likelihood 

of conflict, if so, among and between which groups? Are today’s shifts 

in power unique or largely similar to historical experience? How does 

this change how USSOCOM/TSOCs/SOF conduct engagements and 

the range of SOF activities?

The objective of this research topic is to further develop our insights 

into how new power relationships are shaping the strategic environment. There are two main areas of interest on this question: internal 

and external power shifts. Internally, governments are increasingly 

challenged to meet the demands placed on them by populations 

that are becoming more aware of their relative circumstances. The 

disaffected are better able to organize using modern communications capabilities and pressure governments through either violent 

or non-violent means. Externally, regions with shifting power among 

states are likely to face turmoil. Even if a rising power intends to do 

so peacefully, the established power may act to preserve its position 

through violent means. It becomes more difficult to discern how governments facing multiple pressures both internally and externally 

are likely to interpret their interests and predict their actions. Stable 

relationships may degrade quickly under these conditions. Building 

a stable network of partners requires an alignment of interests; these 

interests may shift dramatically in the current environment and affect 

U.S. strategy. How does the U.S. deal with challenges to its power?

Themes of interest include: 

• Diffusion of power from traditional centers to new players.

• Associated impacts on interest alignment.
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• Changes in the nature/sources of power—regionally or 

globally.

• Implications for U.S. partners in terms of policy and military 

activities.

• The role of relative and/or absolute power gains in today’s 

world.

• Changes in the viability of security umbrellas (conventional 

and nuclear).

• Evolving constraints on power.

• Evolving utility of the use of force.

• Changing utility of types of military power.

• Approaches to resolving power struggles.

• Changes in the role and influence of international institutions.

• Challenges to Westphalian order, and ability of states to 

respond.

• Ability of states to resolve internal power struggles.

• The viability of mediator roles for the U.S.

• The relationship between power shifts and U.S. interests and/

or security.

• The relationship between business and states’ ability, or inability, to exercise power.

• Implementing effective strategies given changing contexts of 

power.

G4. Megacities

Do rapidly growing cities with massive urban slums pose a substantial challenge to vital U.S. national interests? What are the critical distinctions between such cities in developing versus developed nations? 

What is the basis of control/power/influence within a megacity? Who 

is most likely to wield it (governments, gangs, tribes, or anarchy)? Is 

it possible to create advantageous strategic effects under these conditions? Is the megacity environment unique for SOF? If so, what 

capabilities are required for understanding it and conducting the full 

range of SOF activities?

The objective of this research topic is to develop new insights and 

understanding of rapidly growing, hyper-connected megacities. This 
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G. USSOCOM J5 Key Strategic Issues List

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effort is based upon creating an understanding of the major trends at 

work in the early 21st century: population growth, urbanization, littoralization, and vastly increased electronic connectivity. Between 2012 

and 2040, the world population is estimated to grow by 2.2 billion, 

but that growth will not be evenly distributed. Urban environments 

in littoral areas in the developing world will account for a significant 

portion of additional population growth, and draw in almost 1 billion 

rural-to-urban migrants, increasing the developing world’s urban 

population by more than 3 billion. These urban environments will 

consist of large, densely populated under-governed urban areas with 

dramatically increased electronic connectivity. Such an environment 

will account for drastic changes in demographics that are themselves 

sources of conflict for formal governance and wide opportunities 

for corruption, violence, and unrest (youth, unemployment, wealth 

disparity, disease, access to healthcare, sex distribution, etc.). At the 

same time, greater connectivity between individuals able to share 

views and import ideas from regions beyond megacities increasingly allows violence, unrest, and extremist views to rapidly spread 

in densely populated urban areas with negative effects on the stability 

of megacities.

Themes of interest include: 

• Perceptions versus reality on opportunities in megacities.

• Defining U.S. interests in megacities.

• Differences between cities and organized states.

• State’s power versus city’s local influence and power (preeminence struggle?).

• Role/impact of overlapping jurisdictions.

• Relationship between formal city core and informal periphery.

• Immigration integration/culture clashes.

• Competing methods of informal leadership and influence.

• How to develop relationships with informal leadership 

structures/players.

• Ability of the U.S. to balance relationships with cities and 

owning states.

• Role of demographic issues in exacerbating problems (economic, political).

• Natural disaster consequences and response.
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• Potential trends that reverse/increase/change migration to 

cities.

• Stress on surrounding resource system as cities grow.

G5. Tactical actions versus strategic results

Has there been a disconnect between our tactical actions and our 

strategic intentions during the war on terror? If so, are we resolving it? 

What have the strategic lessons been? Can SOF improve their strategic success without making major changes across interagency organizations? What types of strategic metrics should we use? How can SOF 

better assess and operate using measures of strategic performance?

The objective of this research topic is to further develop our insights 

into why tactical programs and activities intended to produce certain 

enduring effects during the U.S. response to the attacks of 9/11 have, 

by and large, fallen short of those objectives. Assessing the effectiveness of operations has been a deliberate activity since World War II, 

with a heavy emphasis on quantitative measures emerging in the 

Vietnam era. Various approaches (systems analysis, effects-based 

operations, etc.) have fallen short in establishing compelling tactical 

metrics to desired strategic effects. There are a variety of factors that 

may contribute to this effect. This topic is intended to spur research 

into discrete areas, such as the effect of using tactical metrics to drive 

strategic effects, as well as into cross-cutting analysis that assesses 

how current thinking on operations assessment may impact strategic 

progress.

Themes of interest include: 

• The benefits and risks of employing immediate/local/objective 

measures of tactical performance to predict strategic progress.

• The benefits and risks of employing measures which are more 

subjective, broader in area, and accrue over time in an effort 

to give a better sense of strategic progress.

• Exploring how prioritizing tactical metrics may undermine 

strategic objectives.

• Exploring how assumptions of rationality may mislead tactical actions.
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Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

• Aspects of human nature as a framework for assessing strategic 

progress.

• The development of a family of indicators of strategic progress 

that is naturally occurring, and easily collected and reported.

• The appropriateness of labels (i.e., regular and irregular warfare) for understanding conflicts.

• Comparing and contrasting measures of strategic performance 

in ‘state-based’ and ‘populace-based’ conflicts. 

• What would a counter-UW strategy consist of? Would it be 

more appropriate than the more traditional responses (e.g., 

counterterrorism, combatting terrorism, irregular warfare, 

etc.)?

• Have policy decisions to preserve regimes deemed as good, 

or remove/replace regimes deemed as bad, created infeasible 

conditions in the current strategic environment for achieving 

the strategic goals desired?

• Is stability of governance (requiring changes that may increase 

short-term risk to U.S. interests) more important than stasis 

of government for long-term U.S. interests?

• How do changes in the strategic environment affect how we 

think about the strategies and tactics best suited to secure our 

interests?

G6. Conflict prevention

Are the deterrence-based theories behind the U.S. National Security 

Strategy adequate to address the current and future strategic environment? Are they appropriate for state and non-state actors? Is the 

competition and conflict we are currently experiencing necessarily 

detrimental to U.S. National Security Strategy? Is prevention of conflict practical? If so, what would a ‘prevention approach’ entail? How 

could USSOCOM facilitate a new prevention approach?

The objective of this research topic is to develop new insights into 

which approaches are appropriate for achieving U.S. national security 

objectives in the current and future strategic environments. It is possible that a heavy emphasis on a deterrence-based security approach 

is not adequate or appropriate, given the current and emerging 
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strategic environment. Further, any potential successes in deterring 

conflict are difficult to measure or even understand, particularly 

given information that has come to light from the Soviet archives 

that indicate our assumptions on their rationality were unfounded. 

Simply deterring an undesirable event does not necessarily address 

underlying causes or grievances that may fester under conditions of 

artificially-imposed stability. The absence of conflict does not indicate 

the absence of threats to U.S. interests, and the costs associated with 

maintaining a status quo that is threatened in multiple dimensions 

grow quickly. A more comprehensive conflict ‘prevention approach’ 

may provide a way to complement or replace the heavy emphasis on 

deterrence. A thorough examination of both approaches is required to 

improve strategy for the current and emerging strategic environment. 

Themes of interest include: 

• Viability of modern deterrence strategies in the current/emerging strategic environment.

• U.S. security costs and benefits from conflicts and competition.

• Elements of a prevention-based approach.

• Determining the costs and benefits of a prevention approach.

• Exploring the relationship of prevention and deterrence. Are 

they complementary or in conflict?

• The role of prevention and deterrence at the tactical and strategic levels.

• Advancing U.S. interests through prevention and/or 

deterrence.

• Appropriateness of systemic assumptions (i.e., rational, unitary 

actors).

• Assessing the success of deterrence and/or prevention.

G7. Human nature versus culture

Have we focused too exclusively on the role of culture in attempting to 

explain recent crises? Are the problems we will face in the future more 

firmly rooted in human nature or human cultures? Is the answer to 

this question important for our strategic approach? For a force that 

distinguishes itself on understanding language, regional expertise, 

and culture, how does SOF incorporate/use aspects of fundamental 

human nature in its activities?
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G. USSOCOM J5 Key Strategic Issues List

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

The objective of this research topic is to further develop our insights 

into a more comprehensive socio-cultural awareness. One must 

understand the culture where one operates to implement effective 

tactical programs, but should also explore the possibility that there 

are common aspects of human nature across cultures that are equally 

necessary to understand. This would assist in developing strategic 

concepts and frameworks that lend context and focus to tactical 

actions. As people become increasingly empowered to informally 

challenge formal power structures through legal means if available, 

or illegal means if necessary, an understanding of human nature may 

help develop a clearer understanding of these types of problems and 

conflicts. 

Themes of interest include: 

• The distinctions and commonalities between societies that are 

stable and unstable.

• The distinctions between ‘naturally’ and ‘artificially’ stable 

societies.

• Commonalities across cultures with origins in human nature.

• The distinction between political and popular legitimacy in 

relation to stability.

• The distinction between political and popular sovereignty in 

relation to stability.

• The sufficiency, value, and role of various legal mechanisms in 

fostering stability across cultures.

• Is political conflict internal to a system of governance distinct 

from political conflict between systems of governance? How 

so, and so what?

• Do aspects of human nature provide strategic indicators for 

the health/stability of a society?

• How can SOF track strategic indicators while concurrently developing cultural awareness to improve tactical 

performance? 

G8. Risk management

In what areas does the U.S. or USSOCOM face a great deal of risk, 

given current and projected resourcing? Which areas are critical? 

In what areas are we able to accept risk? In what areas must we ‘buy 
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down’ risk to maximum extent possible? What are the most effective 

risk-management strategies available?

The objective of this research topic is to develop insights on the best 

practices for managing risk and pursuing a strategy in a rapidly 

changing environment. Globalization has created a more complex 

world, made up of a tangled web of relationships and other interdependent factors. Accurately predicting the types of threats and 

unforeseen events we must contend with is increasingly difficult. 

Current practice across the national security apparatus closely ties 

risk directly to threats; new ‘risks’ (interpreted as threats) require 

new capabilities or programs to counter them. The wider range of 

potential crises, however, leads to a longer list of capabilities and 

capacities to optimally respond. Budget constraints prevent the U.S. 

from mitigating risk simply through identifying additional resource 

requirements. Though there has been a higher emphasis on ‘flexibility’ 

as an approach to mitigate risk in recent years, multi-role platforms 

and capabilities that possess that trait are increasingly expensive. An 

approach that provides a better method of assessing risks associated 

with strategic choices and weighing trade-offs across the options will 

better support decision-making.

Themes of interest include: 

• Opportunity costs.

• Resource management and prioritization. 

• Improving risk assessment methodologies.

• Emerging sources of military and political risk.

• Opportunities for controlling risk.

• Errors in risk assessment and response.

• Organizational issues in effective risk management processes.

• Linking risk to strategy.

• Utility of measurements for levels of risk.

• Options to transfer/share risk with partners.

• National security equivalents of diversification or other risk 

management strategies.

• Multipurpose weapons platforms capabilities and pitfalls.
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Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

G9. Interest-based strategies

How can the U.S. best position itself to preserve and build upon a network of actors with interests that are congruent with our own? How 

do we ensure stability of this network as governments change and 

adjust to the demands of their populations? How should USSOCOM 

posture itself to support an “interest-based” approach?

The objective of this research topic is to develop insights into an 

interest-based approach to strategy (national government, Service, 

or combatant command). This includes examining how interests 

are derived from organizational values, norms, and morals. If some 

interests change over time, shaped by evolving cultures, fortunes, 

and current events, are there vital interests that endure? As the global 

situation shifts due to power distribution and diffusion, a country’s 

interests may change to meet the new power arrangements. This can 

put a country at odds with former “partners” who used to have shared 

interests and bring former “threats” into closer alignment. Another 

aim of this topic is to explore relative advantages of other approaches 

to strategy (e.g., threat-based or influence-based strategies). Lastly, 

documents such as the National Security Strategy and national 

defense and military strategies describe U.S. national interests. As 

a functional combatant command with global reach, USSOCOM is 

in a unique position to support vital national interests in both direct 

and indirect manners. How USSOCOM can best provide this support 

may shift over time as the global environment evolves.

Themes of interest include: 

• Defining interests of states, individuals, and other actors.

• Utility of broad ideological versus narrow pragmatic interests.

• Realism versus liberalism.

• Evolution of U.S. grand strategy.

• Influence of partners’ interests on achieving our own interests.

• Incongruence between values and interests or how to better 

align values and interests.

• Utility of, or problems with, ‘special relationships’ to an interest-based strategy.

• SOF contribution to national interests beyond counterterrorism and counter-WMD.
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• Dangers of over-reliance on threat-based strategic approaches 

to address current events.

• Concept of near-, mid-, and long-term strategy-making to 

address vital and important national interests.

• Reconciliation of divergent interests with partners.

• Can an interest-based strategy compete in the budgetary process with a threat-based approach?

G10. Weapons technology proliferation

How are the proliferation of innovation and the falling cost of weapons and dual-use technology changing military balances of power? 

How does advanced weaponry in the hands of non-state actors change 

the dynamic for SOF activities?

The objective of this research topic is to develop new insights into 

how innovation proliferation, low-cost weapons, and dual-use technologies will impact the changing military balances of power. As 

recent history has proven, innovation and dual-use technologies can 

be stolen or appropriated by hostile military powers. Similarly, certain non-state actors and individuals will seek to acquire and exploit 

dual-use technological innovations and low-cost weapons. As the 

complexity of technological innovations continue to increase at an 

exponential rate, the universal appetite for these advancements is 

unlikely to wane. Existing control mechanisms such as international 

regulations and security arrangements may be insufficient to stem the 

tide of proliferation over time. The risk associated with the proliferation of certain technologies or weapons could potentially jeopardize 

global security and stability. Such an environment may compromise 

the comparative technological advantage enjoyed by the U.S. military 

and eventually tip the scale of power.

Themes of interest include: 

• New applications of emerging technology.

• Impacts of multiple centers of weapons innovation across the 

globe.

• Sufficiency of international agreements to control detrimental 

effects.

• Cost-effective responses to new technological challenges.
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• Appropriateness of exquisite, multi-role weapon platforms in 

a world of rapid innovation.

• Areas of the globe at highest risk due to technological innovation in weapons.

• Potential changes to U.S. industrial base.

• How to adapt DOD to benefit from weapons innovation.

G11. Disruptive and game-changing technologies

What disruptive and game-changing technologies have potential 

global significance? How will these emerging technologies impact 

future conflict? How does USSOCOM leverage game changing technologies to advance SOF operations? Is USSOCOM’s acquisition process positioned to capitalize on rapid fielding of untested, potentially 

disruptive technology?

The objective of this research topic is to develop new insights into 

emerging disruptive and game-changing technologies that could 

have global significance and/or impact on future conflict. Emerging 

disruptive technologies, particularly ones with broad applications, 

have the potential to transform existing markets or create new ones. 

When applied to a military problem, game-changing technologies 

can disrupt existing doctrines or TTPs and radically alter the balance between competitors. As the pace of technological development 

continues to accelerate, competitors will strive to integrate innovative technology to gain an advantage. More broadly, opportunities 

created by new technologies will alter societies in unforeseen ways, 

as social media has.

Themes of interest include: 

• Space exploration.

• Nanotechnology and wetware.

• 3D printing.

• Cyber innovations.

• Human enhancements.

• Multi-nation weapons procurement programs.

• Bioengineering.

• Agro engineering.

• Impacts on position, navigation, and timing.
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• A day without ... (pick a technology).

G12. Adaptability and agility

Is the USSOCOM enterprise an adequately flexible system capable 

of rapid change (in whole or in parts) when required? What ‘best 

practices’ can be implemented to maximize our ability to generate 

capacity and capability when needed? How does USSOCOM position 

itself to provide the widest options possible for policymakers?

The objective of this research topic is to develop new insights into 

USSOCOM’s ability to generate capacity and its capacity to meet, 

protect, and advance U.S. national interests. SOF is commonly viewed 

as the force of choice when considering small footprint, cost-effective 

tactical operations that create strategic effects. In the last 13 years, 

the USSOCOM enterprise has grown from 25,000 to nearly 69,000 

personnel. This growth has enabled SOF to operate further, in greater 

capacity, and in more regions of the world than ever before. However, 

this growth in capacity does not come without consequences ... particularly as the United States enters a period of fiscal austerity. The 

2014 Quadrennial Defense Review is primarily focused on rebalancing the Joint Force, which includes reducing force structure of the 

Service. Special operations rely heavily on the Services to provide 

enabling support. Cuts to the Service’s force structure will impact 

special operations not only in enabling support, but in recruitment 

as well. The degree to which these cuts will impact SOF is yet to be 

determined. However, the USSOCOM enterprise will need to develop 

innovative approaches to not only maintain its own capability and 

capacity, but adapt to a leaner Service capacity that could impede 

USSOCOM’s activities.

Themes of interest include: 

• Bureaucratic and Services preferences.

• Barriers to innovation.

• SOF truths versus evolving strategic landscape.

• Developing capabilities and capacities prior to crisis.

• Effects-based management and development of force.

• Defining a SOF narrative for the future (preparing for and 

preserving peace).
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• Small footprint, cost-effective approaches.

• Integrating SOF into Service, and GCC strategies.

• Alternative structures for optimal organization, management, 

and recruitment of SOF.

• Pushing ‘joint’ down to lower levels in SOF.

G13. Capability gaps

Are the methods the DOD and USSOCOM use to determine gaps in 

required capabilities adequate and appropriate for the current strategic environment? How do we balance effectiveness and efficiency? 

Are there widening gaps in any critical capabilities that we have been 

unable to address?

The objective of this research topic is to develop new insights into 

how DOD in general, and USSOCOM more specifically, might better 

anticipate and respond to identified capability gaps. Although many 

observers of the strategic environment have pointed to fundamental 

changes that are occurring, the processes by which we prioritize and 

procure capabilities (materiel or otherwise) have remained basically 

unchanged for decades. Given lengthening procurement timelines 

and routine budgetary problems with major weapons systems, the 

DOD will eventually need to reexamine the methodologies that we 

employ to appropriately resource our strategies. Further, it is appropriate to explore whether the processes by which gaps are identified 

are adequately connected to a guiding strategy, and not dominated 

by more narrow bureaucratic preferences.

Themes of interest include: 

• DOD/SOF narrative, determining how best to employ forces.

• Balancing current demands against developing future needs.

• How to best determine/measure gaps. Threats? Opportunities? 

Other possibilities?

• Identifying and designing capability requirements.

• Role of understanding and design for capability requirements.

• Controlling bureaucratic preferences.

• Innovation in capabilities during fiscal constraints.

• Current, unaddressed capability gaps.
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• Approaches in prioritization of requirements (no fail missions, 

enhancing capabilities, etc.).

• Balancing effectiveness against efficiency.

• The responsiveness of the requirements process.

G14. Long-term fiscal constraints

Do the growing fiscal constraints in industrialized nations affect their 

perceptions of their interests and appropriate security postures? Are 

military alliances and partnerships likely to undergo changes due to 

fiscal pressures? Will powerful states be less likely to offer security 

guarantees? What types of military commitments will states be willing/unwilling to make for less than vital interests? Should this affect 

U.S. policy and basing? Beyond USSOCOM-specific budgetary pressures, how does the wider financial pressure affect USSOCOM/SOF, 

and are there opportunities upon which to capitalize?

The objective of this research topic is to develop new insights into how 

growing fiscal constraints across developed nations will impact their 

security posture and the security environment writ large. Despite a 

variety of security challenges, the U.S. and other industrial nations 

are reducing defense spending. Economic recovery from the global 

recession of 2007-2009 has not been sufficiently robust to avoid spending cuts. Such an environment may force nations to reevaluate the 

interests for which they are willing to deploy military forces. Reduced 

commitments and security arrangements among partner nations may 

shape the strategic environment in unforeseen manners. 

Themes of interest include: 

• Uneven global economic recovery and security impacts.

• New and shifting regional economic and security agreements 

important to the U.S.

• Trends in responses to pop-up crises.

• Nuclear aspirant states and the changing role/manner of 

deterrence.

• The viability of massive weapons programs (e.g., F-35, K-46, 

Littoral Combat Ship, etc.) in this environment.

• Shifting state perceptions of ‘vital national interests’ versus 

‘less than vital.’ 
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• Emerging multi-polarity, or multiple power vacuums? 

• Shifts in the nature of military responses in lower-intensity 

situations (e.g., air power, special operations forces, drones).

• Impacts on the viability/credibility of security umbrellas.

• The effect of this security environment on incentives for other 

states to acquire conventional or unconventional weapon 

capabilities.

• Cost-effective strategies for the U.S. and partner nations to 

protect interests.

• Changes in support to multinational organizations and associated effects.

• The role and relationship of economic power to military power 

(is this changing?).

• The sufficiency of Goldwater-Nichols today; is there a next step 

for Service interdependence?

• The viability of burden sharing in a world with widely diverging interests and economic disruption.

G15. Strategic constraints

Does our strategic culture blind us to potential threats, sources of 

risk, and opportunities? Does our national security process have 

a similar effect? How can USSOCOM avoid overly restricted solutions to problems that are poorly defined or understood due to these 

constraints?

The objective of this research topic is to develop new insights into how 

the idea of constraints affects strategy development. Constraints can 

either be self-imposed or forced upon us from the system we operate 

in. The cultural biases of the military and the DOD influence our 

strategic performance. Organizational culture theories suggest that 

our point of view on particular issues restricts our ability to perceive the full array of options available. Without the benefit of considering all relevant possibilities, our strategic performance may be 

degraded. Additionally, the United States’ position as a global leader 

ties us to the international political system and its processes which 

put constraints on our actions. Furthermore, our domestic system has 

legal, moral, political, and social constraints that affect our strategic 
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outlook and subsequent plans to address national security issues. This 

topic is intended to assist in identifying sources of potential blind 

spots and constraints and locating effective and acceptable ways to 

provide new perspectives and approaches on enduring problems. 

USSOCOM must recognize the constraints we operate within in 

order to develop better strategic approaches.

Themes of interest include: 

• Definition of constraint and its implications for the military 

and USSOCOM, specifically.

• The impact of organizational culture on decision-making.

• Improving information-search heuristics.

• Current problems and identifying new perspectives.

• Constraints of the international and domestic systems.

• How does an organization develop a holistic strategy that 

accounts for constraints?

G16. Demographics

How does the rise of the middle class in developing nations affect 

the security threats and opportunities in those countries? What are 

the most dangerous population shifts or migrations on the horizon? 

What are the implications of ‘youth in revolt’ in fragile states (situations in which youth lose touch with their culture as families are 

torn apart by conflict and respond in ways that separate them from 

traditional guidance)? Does the changing role of women in unstable 

regions have USSOCOM implications?

The objective of this research topic is to develop new insights into 

global demographic trajectories and the resulting implications for 

U.S. interests. As globalization and other factors create the conditions 

for a rising middle class in developing nations, it can also support 

the expansion of conflict. Immigrants fleeing conflict, or moving 

to regions with better opportunities, can challenge their new governments’ ability to respond. More affluent societies with higher 

educational levels typically have lower birthrates than immigrant 

groups from developing nations, which contributes to social stresses. 

Europe is currently experiencing a range of problems associated with 

an inability to adequately integrate new arrivals. Angry unemployed 
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Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

youths have frequently taken to rioting, and immigrant groups are 

often isolated from both the larger society as well as their heritage. Is 

it possible for the U.S. to favorably shape the trends associated with 

this challenge?

Themes of interest include: 

• Relationship to U.S. interests.

• Interacting system (of demographic trends) or single-factor 

causality?

• Globalization.

• Education relative to birth rates.

• Transnational organized crime.

• Integration and resolving cultural stresses created by 

migration.

• Response of organic population to demographic shifts 

(cultural?).

• Politics of blame and out-groups.

• Perceived opportunities leading to permanent or temporary 

migration.

• Youth bulges, unemployment, and dissatisfaction—relative to 

governance.

• Technological empowerment of isolated immigrants. 

• Changing patterns in connections across diaspora 

communities.

• Needs versus demands versus expectations of the growing 

middle class on basic services, commodities, and energy.

• SOF implications in fragile states and shifting populations.

G17. Energy/other resources

Will changes in energy harvesting and consumption alter the global 

security environment? Will rising energy consumption in emerging nations impact the strategic landscape? Will demand for other 

resources (food, water, etc.) shape conflict in manners that have implications for USSOCOM?

The objective of this research topic is to develop new insights into 

energy and natural resource trends, the associated regional and global 

security impacts, and the implication for special operations. Many 
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consider access to energy and other natural resources a critical element to international relations and assert that it has been a principal 

catalyst for conflict and war. Continued growing global demand for 

resources strains current distribution capabilities and depletes known 

reserves. Other changes in the energy and natural resources strategic 

environment may also impact the international order, perpetuating 

old struggles and possibly conflict among a new set of global actors.

Themes of interest include: 

• Shifts in regional power and world order.

• Political stress points.

• Economic competition.

• Global corporations.

• Nascent, alternative markets.

• Probable technological breakthroughs (enabling new energy 

sources or retrograde fuels).

• Cultural and social aspects.

• Nongovernmental organizations and transnational power 

structures.

• Climate and environmental pressures.

• Developing versus developed nations.

• Trends in self-sufficiency and dependency.

• Sources and distribution networks.

• Vulnerability of critical energy infrastructure.

• Potential humanitarian crisis points.

• U.S. presence and response.

• Opening of ‘new’ frontiers: Arctic; Antarctica; Amazonia; 

Andes; Asia; Pacific; space/lunar; etc.
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Acronym List

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

Appendix A: Acronym List 

AAR after action report

CF conventional forces

COTS commercial off-the-shelf

R&D research and development

C2 command and control

DOD Department of Defense

DT&E development, test, and engineering

FFF foreign fighter flow

FID foreign internal defense

FTZ free trade zone

GCC geographic combatant command

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

JIIM joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational

KSIL Key Strategic Issues List

JSOU Joint Special Operations University

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit

MISO military information support operations
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NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

ORS Operation Resolute Support

PE preparation of the environment

PME professional military education

S&T science and technology

SFA security force assistance

SOF Special Operations Forces

TSOC theater special operations command

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

USG United States Government

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

UW unconventional warfare

VEO violent extremist organization
67

Endnotes

Please send your completed research papers on these topics to the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research.

Endnotes 

1. State Department’s Policy Planning Staff Memorandum 269, dated 4 May 1948 

under George Kennan, accessed 18 January 2016 at: https://history.state.gov/

historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269.

2. United States Army Special Operations Command, “ARSOF Next: A Return To 

First Principles,” accessed at: http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/ARSOF_

Next/ARSOF%20Next.pdf

3. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010 (As Amended Through 15 February 2016), accessed 

at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.

4. United States Military Academy, Combating Terrorism Center, “Harmony and 

Disharmony, Exploiting al-Qaeda’s Organizations Vulnerabilities,” 14 February 2006, accessed 18 January 2016 at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/

a459919.pdf.

5. U.S. Department of Defense News Release Number NR-631-14, 28 December 

2014, “Statement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on Operation Enduring 

Freedom and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel,” accessed 18 January 2016 at: http://

www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/605332.

6. Department of Defense Report to Congress, “Report on Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan,” dated October 2011. The report is submitted every 

180 days and is consistent with Section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended.

7. Encyclopedia Britannica, Free Trade Zone, accessed 18 January 2016 at: http://

www.britannica.com/topic/free-trade-zone. It goes on to say: “Only when the 

goods are moved to consumers within the country in which the zone is located do 

they become subject to the prevailing customs duties. Free-trade zones are organized around major seaports, international airports, and national frontiers—areas 

with many geographic advantages for trade. Examples include Hong Kong, Singapore, Colón (Panama), Copenhagen, Stockholm, Gdańsk (Poland), Los Angeles, 

and New York City. Alternative devices such as the bonded warehouse and associated systems are used in some large seaports (e.g., London and Amsterdam).”

8. “Philippines Free Trade Zones a Smuggling Haven,” Asia Sentinel, 11 April 

2012, accessed on 18 January 2016 at: http://www.asiasentinel.com/society/

philippines-free-trade-zones-a-smuggling-haven/.

9. Rowan Scarborough, “Gen. Dunford: U.S. commands, war plans outdated,” The 

Washington Times, 14 December 2015, accessed at: http://www.washingtontimes.

com/news/2015/dec/14/joseph-dunford-to-update-us-militarys-combat-comma/.

10. “Posture statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN Commander, 

United States Special Operations Command before the 113th Congress Senate 

Armed Services Committee Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee,” 
68

Special Operations Research Topics 2017

accessed at: http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/McRaven_

03-11-14.pdf.

11. Kimberly Dozier, “Top U.S. Commando Tells Troops: Get Counseling, I Did.” 

The Daily Beast, accessed 9 March 2016 at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/03/10/top-u-s-commando-tells-troops-get-counseling-i-did.html.

12. Note that USSOCOM J5 is not currently contracting for work on these questions.

13. With any project undertaken on the topics discussed throughout this paper, or 

variations on these topics, we would be interested in discussing and/or reading 

the authors’ perspectives on the implications for USSOCOM and/or the Department of Defense in general.

14. This list is not exclusive. Fruitful avenues that raise issues not discussed in these 

themes are also of interest and value.