UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4397

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

DONALD JAMAL WILSON, a/k/a Cash, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, 

District Judge. (3:07-cr-00034-1) 

Submitted: February 12, 2009 Decided: March 18, 2009 

Before TRAXLER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Jacob A. Manning, DINSMORE & SHOHL, LLP, Wheeling, West 

Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States 

Attorney, R. Gregory McVey, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Donald Jamal Wilson was convicted after a jury trial 

of one count of conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of 

cocaine base, cocaine, and heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 846 (2006), and two counts of managing a residence for the 

purpose of storing cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 856(a)(2) (2006). Wilson was sentenced to life imprisonment. 

Wilson appeals, contending that the district court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered at his 

apartment because the search warrant was not based upon probable 

cause. Finding no error, we affirm. 

 Legal conclusions underlying the denial of a motion to 

suppress are reviewed de novo, while factual findings are 

reviewed for clear error. United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 

551, 553 (4th Cir. 2007). When the district court has denied a 

defendant’s suppression motion, this court construes the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. United 

States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation 

omitted). 

 In reviewing the propriety of issuing a search 

warrant, the relevant inquiry is whether, under the totality of 

the circumstances, the issuing judge had a substantial basis for 

concluding that there was probable cause to issue the warrant. 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The facts 

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presented to the issuing judge need only convince a person of 

reasonable caution that contraband or evidence of a crime will 

be found at the place to be searched. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 

730, 742 (1983). Moreover, “the determination of probable cause 

by the issuing magistrate is entitled to great deference by this 

court.” United States v. Hodge, 354 F.3d 305, 309 (4th Cir. 

2004) (citation omitted). 

 Here, the affidavit supporting the search warrant 

contained four paragraphs. The first and third paragraphs 

described the prior arrests of two other individuals for 

possession of controlled substances, one of whom was arrested 

shortly after leaving the residence in question. The second 

paragraph discussed the surveillance of that residence that was 

undertaken as a result of “prior drug information” received 

about the apartment. During that surveillance, suspected drug 

traffickers were seen entering and exiting the residence. 

Finally, the fourth paragraph articulated information given by a 

“cooperating witness” who had purchased illegal drugs at the 

residence the day before. 

The search warrant was obtained in the late night 

hours of August 7, 2006, and the search was executed in the 

early morning hours of August 8, 2006. Based on this search, 

which turned up amounts of illegal drugs and paraphernalia, 

police obtained arrest warrants for the defendant. Wilson was 

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subsequently arrested, and information obtained during the 

arrest was used to obtain a second search warrant for another 

residence belonging to Wilson. 

 Wilson argues that there was nothing to demonstrate 

that the information provided by the cooperating witness in the 

affidavit was reliable. Wilson also contends that the other 

portions of the affidavit contained conclusory statements devoid 

of stated factual underpinnings, and in sum the affidavit did 

not provide probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime 

would be discovered at his residence. Furthermore, Wilson 

maintains that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule 

did not apply here because the affidavit was nothing more than 

bare bones assertions. Therefore, Wilson argues, the subsequent 

arrest was invalid as the arrest warrants were based on 

information obtained during the search that should have been 

excluded. Consequently, Wilson contends that any evidence 

obtained during not only the first search, but also during the 

arrest and the second search, should have been suppressed. 

 While the information provided by the cooperating 

witness was not verified or shown to be reliable, the remainder 

of the affidavit demonstrated probable cause for the search 

warrant. We therefore conclude the district court did not err 

in denying Wilson’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained 

during the search. As we find probable cause did exist for the 

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issuance of the search warrant, we need not address Wilson’s 

arguments regarding the application of the good-faith exception 

to the exclusionary rule and his arguments concerning the 

subsequent arrest and search. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order 

denying Wilson’s motion to suppress. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED