NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4973-13T4

CHRISTINE AVELINO-CATABRAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOSEPH A. CATABRAN,

Defendant-Respondent.

____________________________________

Submitted December 8, 2015 – Decided

Before Judges Fisher, Rothstadt, and 

Currier.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,

Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris

County, Docket No. FM-14-791-02.

Newsome O'Donnell, L.L.C., attorneys for 

appellant (Lynn Fontaine Newsome, of 

counsel; Alyssa M. Clemente, on the brief).

Ann Crawshaw Coquin, attorney for

respondent.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

ROTHSTADT, J.A.D.

In this post-judgment dissolution matter, plaintiff 

Christine Ewart, formerly known as Christine Avelino-Catabran,

appeals from the Family Part's May 12, 2014 order recalculating 

child support and holding her responsible for half of the

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

June 16, 2016

APPELLATE DIVISION

June 16, 2016
2 A-4973-13T4

parties' eldest daughter's college expenses. She also appeals 

from the court's May 30, 2014 order that deemed the new child 

support amount retroactive to October 25, 2012.1 Her primary 

argument is that, when determining plaintiff's obligation for 

college costs, the court improperly excluded from the child's 

available financial aid a Federal Direct PLUS Loan (PLUS Loan) 

secured by the parties. Plaintiff also contends that the court 

improperly determined she should be responsible for fifty

percent of those costs. Finally, she challenges the portions of 

the court's order that modified support, arguing the court 

"erred in utilizing a mathematical formula to determine child 

support" and in changing custody and parenting time without a 

hearing.

Defendant Joseph A. Catabran disagrees and argues that the 

court correctly excluded the PLUS Loan from the child's 

contribution to college costs and properly required plaintiff to 

be responsible for fifty percent of those expenses in accordance 

with the parties' property settlement agreement (PSA). He 

further contends that support was correctly calculated and that 

not only did plaintiff fail to raise certain issues she now 

 

1 This issue, however, has not been briefed, and we consider it 

abandoned. See N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Alloway Twp., 438 

N.J. Super. 501, 505 n.2 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 222 N.J.

17 (2015).
3 A-4973-13T4

argues on appeal, but she also "failed to cooperate with 

discovery[, and] withheld information from . . . [and] gave 

false information to the trial court." Defendant avers that 

plaintiff comes before this court with "unclean hands" 

preventing relief being granted to her.

We have considered the parties' contentions in light of our 

review of the record and the applicable legal principles. We 

affirm the court's order as to college expenses, but vacate and 

remand for recalculation of child support.

The salient facts developed in the motion record can be 

summarized as follows. The parties were married on June 18, 

1993, and their divorce was finalized on August 14, 2002. The 

final judgment of divorce (JOD) incorporated the parties' PSA,

which addressed the custody and support of their two daughters —

Catherine, now twenty-one years old, and Isabelle, seventeen.

Pursuant to the PSA, the parties shared joint legal and 

physical custody of the children, with the parent of primary 

residence designated as plaintiff during the school year and 

defendant during the summer. The PSA required defendant to pay 

$137 per week to support both children, though the parties 

apparently agreed to increase this obligation to $800 per month 

in 2009.
4 A-4973-13T4

The PSA also provided that the parties would be equally 

responsible for the children's net college expenses — those 

remaining after the children applied for financial assistance. 

Specifically, it provides:

The minor children shall have an 

obligation to apply for any and all 

scholarships, student loans, grants and 

financial aid that may be available to help 

defray the cost of each child's attendance 

at college. After deductions for 

scholarships, student loans, grants and 

financial aid, the parties agree to be 

responsible for the net college educational 

costs of the minor children. Net college 

cost[s] will be split equally by both 

parties.[2] 

In June 2004, the parties agreed to change their custody 

arrangement, eliminating alternating weekends such that the 

children would live full-time with plaintiff during the school 

year and with defendant during the summer. They changed the 

custody arrangement again in May 2011, when plaintiff and her 

new husband moved to Switzerland with the children. In order to 

facilitate the move, defendant signed a letter stating plaintiff 

had sole custody of the children "[f]or the duration of, and

subject to, their residing in Switzerland."

 

2 Notably, the last sentence was a handwritten addition to the 

provision, initialed by the parties, that replaced stricken 

language that stated "commensurate with their ability to pay at 

the time."
5 A-4973-13T4

After graduating from high school, Catherine decided to 

attend New York University (NYU) beginning in the fall of 2012. 

NYU's total cost of attendance was $62,768, but the school 

offered her an extensive financial aid package, which included a 

$12,720 scholarship, $3000 for work-study, and a total of $7900 

in student loans. It also included $39,148 in PLUS Loans, which 

the award letter defined as "the maximum amount . . . . [a] 

parent may borrow." (emphasis added). Catherine accepted the 

full amount of the scholarship, work-study, and student loans 

available to her. In an email sent to plaintiff on June 21, 

2012, defendant asked plaintiff, "how much Parent PLUS Loan 

should we borrow?," and suggested they borrow $12,770 to cover 

plaintiff's share of the balance owed for college.

3 Plaintiff 

responded by directing defendant to "Please borrow this money on 

behalf of Catherine." Pursuant to this exchange, defendant 

accepted $12,770 of the available PLUS Loan.

On October 25, 2012, defendant filed a motion seeking a 

modification of child support to reflect a split-parenting 

arrangement, an order requiring plaintiff to pay half of 

Catherine's net college expenses, and judgment against plaintiff 

 

3 According to defendant, plaintiff needed the loan because her 

credit was bad. According to plaintiff, that loan was to be 

repaid by Catherine.
6 A-4973-13T4

for the amounts due on the PLUS Loan and owed to NYU for the 

Spring 2013 semester, among other relief. In response, 

plaintiff asserted there were no funds owed by her for 

Catherine's college costs because NYU provided Catherine enough 

financial aid to cover the entire cost. The financial documents 

submitted indicated plaintiff's gross income was approximately 

$225,000 annually and defendant's $113,000, substantially more 

than the approximately $73,000 they each were earning at the

time of the divorce.

On May 1, 2013, the Family Part entered an order, dated 

April 26, 2013, granting in part and denying in part defendant's 

request for contribution for Catherine's schooling, and granting 

his request for a child support modification (May 1 order). The 

order stated, "[t]he Court has determined that the [p]laintiff 

shall make a contribution to the child's college expenses but 

needs the parties to submit their financial documents in order 

to determine how much that contribution should be." The order 

directed them to submit pay stubs and tax returns for that 

purpose and for calculating the parties' support obligations 

moving forward.

In its appended statement of reasons, the court found that 

Catherine's financial aid package did not cover the full cost of 

attendance, that the PLUS Loans were available only to parents, 
7 A-4973-13T4

and that defendant had established changed circumstances 

warranting a support modification. It stated that, based upon 

the parties' email exchanges, "[p]laintiff was well aware of the 

minor child's financial aid package [and] the loans that the 

[d]efendant was taking out to cover her share of the expenses." 

It also found that, based on the circumstances and superior 

employment opportunities offered to NYU graduates, the child 

made a legitimate decision to attend NYU instead of a school 

suggested by plaintiff. As to child support, the court found 

that a change was warranted because the parties' "income[s]

ha[d] changed dramatically since [they] first entered into the

PSA."

On June 4, 2013, the parties moved for reconsideration and 

clarification of the May 1 order.4 The court denied the parties' 

respective motions on January 24, 2014,

5 determining that their 

 

4 In response to the May 1 order, both parties submitted 

letters to the court requesting clarification of certain issues 

raised by the order — namely, the method by which support would 

be calculated and the extent of plaintiff's obligation to 

contribute to Catherine's college expenses. When the court did 

not respond to the parties' letters, they filed their respective 

reconsideration motions.

5 This was actually the second order it entered. The court 

signed an original order on August 15, 2013. However, the 

parties did not receive a copy of this order and did not learn 

of it until January 2014. Upon learning of the order, defendant 

requested the court vacate the August order and enter an 

identical order to protect the parties' rights to seek timely 

(continued)
8 A-4973-13T4

motions were attempts "to re-argue issues that were already 

decided," and were time-barred. Over the next five months, the 

parties submitted multiple letters to the court with additional 

information regarding their finances. In one submission,

plaintiff claimed she could not afford to pay for her daughter's 

college and that she had filed for "Chapter 11" relief in

bankruptcy court in June 2013.

On May 12, 2014, the court ordered plaintiff to contribute 

fifty percent of Catherine's net college expenses and defendant 

to provide proof of such expenses. The court also modified the 

parties' support obligations, ordering defendant to pay $186 per 

week to plaintiff for Isabelle, and plaintiff to pay $281 per 

week to defendant for Catherine, resulting in a net payment of 

$95 per week to defendant.

In the accompanying statement of reasons, the court stated 

it found plaintiff had sufficient resources to contribute to 

Catherine's college expenses in accordance with the parties' 

PSA. In support of its determination, the court considered the 

factors established in Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 545 

 

(continued)

relief from the court's order. The court obliged, and entered 

an order on January 24, 2014, recognizing that a clerical error 

led to the original order not being forwarded to the parties and 

"giv[ing] [the original order] an effective date of January 24, 

2014."
9 A-4973-13T4

(1982), but relied upon the PSA's express requirement that the 

parties contribute equally to their children's college expenses, 

noting also that "both parents share[d] the goal of educating 

their daughter." It concluded that, despite her pending 

bankruptcy petition, which did not impact her support 

obligation, plaintiff had sufficient resources to meet her 

obligation under the PSA.

As to child support, the court noted that "[d]efendant 

[was] seeking a modification of child support based on the 

[p]arties' daughters['] living arrangements. Namely, Catherine 

is in college, and Isabelle lives overseas in Switzerland." The 

court found that "the living arrangements of the children ha[d] 

changed significantly enough to warrant a corresponding change 

in child support." It observed that Catherine lived with 

roommates at college and "primarily visit[ed] [d]efendant during 

her time off from school," and that Isabelle lived in 

Switzerland with plaintiff and her husband "and does not have 

visitation with her father."

Based on those living arrangements, the court determined

the parties' new child support obligations by relying on a 

combination of the court's Child Support Guidelines 

(guidelines), R. 5:6A, and defendant's proposal for support, 
10 A-4973-13T4

without setting forth the details of the proposal in the court's 

decision. The court stated:

Defendant has submitted a well thought out, 

and clearly articulated plan for determining 

child support. His calculations take into 

consideration the incomes of the [p]arties 

including bonuses, income attributable to 

the [p]arties, conversion of Swiss [f]rancs 

to American [d]ollars, a 40% reduction in 

child support for Catherine based on her 

room and board taken into consideration 

above, medical insurance, as well as a 4% 

increase in child support over the 

guidelines to take into consideration the 

[p]laintiff's income being over the 

guidelines threshold for calculation. He 

has calculated the child support from him to 

Isabelle as $186 per week or $806 per month, 

and to Catherine from [p]laintiff of $281.00 

per week or $1,218 per month. His 

calculations are not off the mark. The 

Court accepts the calculations and the 

[p]arties shall pay accordingly. This 

results in a payment of $95 to [d]efendant 

from [p]laintiff weekly.

The court attached to its statement of reasons a "Child Support 

Guidelines-Sole Parenting Worksheet" for two children in a 

"split-parenting situation."6

 

6 "The 'split-parenting' provisions . . . deal with a multichild family in which one parent has custody of one or more 

children, and the other parent has custody of other children." 

Benisch v. Benisch, 347 N.J. Super. 393, 400 (App. Div. 2002); 

see also Child Support Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero, Current 

N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX-A, ¶ 15, to R. 5:6A at 

www.gannlaw.com (2016) [hereinafter Guidelines].
11 A-4973-13T4

As noted, the court later supplemented the order to clarify 

that the support modification was retroactive to October 25, 

2012, the date of defendant's initial motion.

After the court's entry of its orders, plaintiff filed this 

appeal.

We begin by recognizing that our review of the Family 

Part's determinations regarding child support is limited. We 

"do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of 

the [motion] judge unless we are convinced that they are so 

manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, 

relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the 

interests of justice." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. 

Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). Also, "[b]ecause of the 

family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family 

matters, appellate courts should accord deference to family 

court factfinding." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998).

Accordingly, "[t]he general rule is that findings by a trial 

court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, 

substantial, credible evidence." Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 

428 (2015); see also Rova Farms, supra, 65 N.J. at 483-84. 

However, we confer no deference to a trial court's 

interpretation of the law, which we review de novo to determine 

whether the judge correctly adhered to applicable legal 
12 A-4973-13T4

standards. See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J.

366, 378 (1995). Reversal is reserved for only those 

circumstances in which we determine the factual findings and 

legal conclusions of the trial judge went "so wide of the mark 

that a mistake must have been made." N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007).

"When reviewing decisions granting or denying applications 

to modify child support, we examine whether, given the facts, 

the trial judge abused his or her discretion." Jacoby v. 

Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App. Div. 2012); see also J.B.

v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 325-26 (2013). "If consistent with the 

law, such an award will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly contrary to reason or to 

other evidence, or the result of whim or caprice." Jacoby, 

supra, 427 N.J. Super. at 116 (quoting Foust v. Glaser, 340 N.J. 

Super. 312, 315-16 (App. Div. 2001)).

The Family Part's "substantial discretion" in determining 

child support applies equally to compelling a parent to 

contribute to their child's college costs. Gotlib v. Gotlib, 

399 N.J. Super. 295, 308 (App. Div. 2008). We must accept the 

Family Part's determination concerning a parent's obligation to 

contribute toward college tuition, provided the factual findings 

are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record and 
13 A-4973-13T4

the judge has not abused his or her discretion. Gac v. Gac, 186 

N.J. 535, 547 (2006); Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 411-12.

Applying these parameters to our review, we first consider 

plaintiff's arguments regarding the motion judge's conclusion 

that she was obligated to pay fifty percent of her child's 

college costs in accordance with the PSA, rather than 

determining the extent of her obligation using the factors set 

forth in Newburgh,

7 and that the PLUS Loan was not part of the 

 

7 Newburgh provides for the balancing of the following factors:

(1) whether the parent, if still living with 

the child, would have contributed toward the 

costs of the requested higher education; (2) 

the effect of the background, values and 

goals of the parent on the reasonableness of 

the expectation of the child for higher 

education; (3) the amount of the 

contribution sought by the child . . . ; (4) 

the ability of the parent to pay that cost; 

(5) the relationship of the requested 

contribution to the kind of school or course 

of study sought by the child; (6) the 

financial resources of both parents; (7) the 

commitment to and aptitude of the child for 

the requested education; (8) the financial 

resources of the child . . . ; (9) the 

ability of the child to earn income during 

the school year or on vacation; (10) the 

availability of financial aid in the form of 

college grants and loans; (11) the child's 

relationship to the paying parent, including 

mutual affection and shared goals as well as 

responsiveness to parental advice and 

guidance; and (12) the relationship of the 

education requested to any prior training 

(continued)
14 A-4973-13T4

child's independent financial aid resources, relying upon NYU's 

inclusion of PLUS Loans as a type of financial aid available to 

its students and the distinction made in the PSA between 

"student loans" and "financial aid." She warns that the court's 

finding that PLUS Loans are not considered financial aid "will 

undoubtedly have wide sweeping public policy implications," 

namely by "modify[ing] the intent of any Property Settlement 

Agreement containing this language." We find her arguments to 

be without merit.

The trial court correctly enforced the provisions of the 

PSA that obligated plaintiff to be equally responsible for the 

 

(continued)

and to the overall long-range goals of the 

child.

[Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 545.]

Notably, defendant correctly argues that plaintiff did not 

raise these factors to the motion judge as being applicable to 

the parties' dispute, contending instead that the language of 

the PSA supported her position. She now asserts them on appeal 

because they were considered by the motion judge, who, after 

identifying the factors in his written decision, relied upon the 

parties' PSA in ordering plaintiff to contribute towards her 

daughter's education. Under these circumstances we choose to 

consider and clarify the issue rather than, as defendant argues, 

exercise our right to "decline to consider questions or issues 

not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity 

for such a presentation is available unless the questions so 

raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or 

concern matters of great public interest." Selective Ins. Co. 

of Am. v. Rothman, 208 N.J. 580, 586 (2012) (quoting Nieder v. 

Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)).
15 A-4973-13T4

children's college expenses. Absent "compelling reasons to 

depart from the clear, unambiguous, and mutually understood 

terms of the PSA," a court is generally bound to enforce the 

terms of a PSA. Quinn v. Quinn, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2016) (slip 

op. at 36) (enforcing termination of alimony consistent with the 

parties' agreement regarding cohabitation). Consistent with New 

Jersey's "strong public policy favoring stability of 

arrangements in matrimonial matters," id. at ___ (slip op. at 

19) (quoting Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 193 (1999)), 

where matters in dispute in a post-judgment matrimonial motion 

are addressed in a PSA, courts will not "unnecessarily or 

lightly disturb[]" the agreement so long as it is fair and 

equitable. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 20) (quoting Konzelman, 

supra, 158 N.J. at 193-94); see also Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 

N.J. 258, 266 (2007) (a matrimonial agreement is enforceable so 

long as it is not inequitable); Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super.

11, 20 (App. Div. 2006) (PSAs are entitled to "'considerable 

weight with respect to their validity and enforceability' in 

equity, provided they are fair and just." (quoting Petersen v. 

Petersen, 85 N.J. 638, 642 (1981))). If the meaning of the 

agreement is in dispute, "[t]he court's role is to consider what 

is written in the context of the circumstances at the time of 

the drafting and to apply a rational meaning in keeping with the 
16 A-4973-13T4

'expressed general purpose.'" Pacifico, supra, 190 N.J. at 266 

(2007) (quoting Atl. N. Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 302

(1953)).

However, if circumstances have changed in such a way that 

strict enforcement of the agreement would no longer be 

equitable, a court remains free to alter prior arrangements.

See Quinn, supra, ___ N.J. ___ (slip op. at 25-26); see also

Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146-48 (1980). Similarly, "[a] 

narrow exception to the general rule of enforcing settlement 

agreements as the parties intended is the need to reform a 

settlement agreement due to 'unconscionability, fraud, or 

overreaching in the negotiations of the settlement.'" Quinn, 

supra, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 23) (quoting Miller v. 

Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 419 (1999)).

Absent inequity or unanticipated changed circumstances not 

addressed by the agreement, a court is obligated to enforce its 

terms when it was "entered [into] by fully informed parties, 

represented by independent counsel, and without any evidence of 

overreaching, fraud, or coercion." Id. at ___ (slip op. at 35). 

Otherwise, "the court eviscerates the certitude the parties 

thought they had secured, and in the long run undermines this 

Court's preference for settlement of all, including marital, 

disputes." Id. at ___ (slip op. at 36).
17 A-4973-13T4

A court's obligation to enforce marital settlement 

agreements applies to provisions regarding the parents' 

obligation to pay for their children's college expenses. 

Although parents generally are not obligated to support a child 

who has attained the age of majority, "in appropriate 

circumstances, the privilege of parenthood carries with it the 

duty to assure a necessary education for children." Newburgh, 

supra, 88 N.J. at 543. "In general, financially capable parents 

should contribute to the higher education of children who are 

qualified students." Id. at 544.

Accordingly, where parties to a divorce have reached an 

agreement regarding children attending college and how those 

college expenses should be divided, and no showing has been made 

that the agreement should be vacated or modified, the Family 

Part need not apply all twelve factors pertinent to college 

expenses as identified in Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 545. 

Rather, the court should enforce the agreement as written.8 See

Quinn, supra, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 35-36). Cf. Gac, 

supra, 186 N.J. at 544-45 (discussing the determination of 

college contribution in the absence of a PSA or JOD addressing 

 

8 In the absence of an agreement by the parties regarding the 

specific division of college costs, courts should balance the 

factors set forth in Newburgh and the statutory criteria of 

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a), along with any other factors the court 

deems relevant to a fair allocation of expenses.
18 A-4973-13T4

the parents' obligations); Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 534

(requiring consideration of factors where there was no agreement 

regarding college expenses); Gotlib, supra, 399 N.J. Super. at 

307-08 (finding Family Part erred in failing to consider factors 

where JOD provided that college expenses would be divided "in 

accordance with appropriate legal standards"); Moss v. Nedas, 

289 N.J. Super. 352, 354, 360 (App. Div. 1996) (approving 

balancing of factors where PSA allocated costs "in proportion to 

[the parents'] ability to contribute").9

Here, the language of the parties' PSA clearly provides 

that "[n]et college cost[s] will be split equally by both 

parties," and the court considered their abilities to afford 

that contribution before ordering plaintiff to contribute 

equally, thereby ensuring there would be no undue burden on 

either parent. Given that plaintiff's income was at least two 

hundred thousand dollars per year, it cannot be said that the 

court's finding that she has sufficient resources to contribute 

equally, despite her pending bankruptcy petition, is "manifestly 

unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and 

 

9 In Moss, the PSA stated that the parents would pay college 

expenses "in proportion to their ability to contribute," and the 

mother and the child had concealed important facts about college 

attendance from the father and even from the Family Part as the 

dispute was being litigated. Moss, supra, 289 N.J. Super. at 

354-55.
19 A-4973-13T4

reasonably credible evidence." Gnall, supra, 222 N.J. at 414 

(quoting Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412).

We are not persuaded otherwise by plaintiff's contention 

that she is not responsible for payment of the PLUS Loan she 

authorized defendant to secure "for Catherine." Catherine is 

not eligible to apply for or receive PLUS Loans herself. See 20 

U.S.C.A. § 1078-2(a) (defining eligibility for PLUS Loans); 

Office of Fed. Student Aid, U.S. Dep't of Ed., Direct PLUS Loan 

Basics for Parents 8 (2015). Therefore, the PLUS Loans cannot 

be considered a student loan or financial aid available to 

Catherine for which she had to apply, as contemplated by the 

parties. The court correctly determined that plaintiff 

authorized the loan and she was responsible for same.

Turning to child support, we initially reject as being 

without merit plaintiff's contention that the court improperly 

determined, without a hearing, that defendant established a 

change in circumstances warranting modification of support. We 

afford deference to the family court's determination regarding 

the need for a support hearing and review them for an abuse of 

discretion. Jacoby, supra, 427 N.J. Super. at 123. A hearing 

is required only "when the submissions show there is a genuine 

and substantial factual dispute . . . , and the trial judge 

determines that a plenary hearing is necessary to resolve the 
20 A-4973-13T4

factual dispute." Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. 

Div. 2007); see also Jacoby, supra, 427 N.J. Super. at 123.

The court here correctly determined from the parties' 

submissions that Catherine's living at college and spending her 

time off with her father, rather than living in Switzerland with 

her mother, was a change in circumstances warranting a 

modification in support. See Jacoby, supra, 427 N.J. Super. at 

113. We reject plaintiff's contention that by recognizing the 

children's current living arrangements the court changed 

custody. We also agree with the court's undisputed finding that 

the parties' incomes had substantially changed since their 

divorce. "A change in circumstances warranting modification of 

support may . . . result from an alteration in the fortunes of 

either party." Stamberg v. Stamberg, 302 N.J. Super. 35, 42 

(App. Div. 1997). A supporting spouse "is as much entitled to a 

reconsideration of child support where there has been a 

significant change for the better in the circumstances of the 

dependent spouse as where there has been a significant change 

for the worse in the [supporting] spouse's own circumstances." 

Ibid.

Plaintiff also contends the court erred in modifying the 

parties' child support obligations, as it used an incorrect 

method to calculate the award because it considered the factors 
21 A-4973-13T4

set forth in the guidelines rather than those set forth in 

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a),10 as required by Jacoby. Jacoby, supra, 

427 N.J. Super. at 122. Defendant responds, arguing plaintiff 

cannot claim error in the court's calculation, as she neither 

criticized his proposed formula nor provided any alternative 

method of calculation for the court to apply. We reject 

defendant's argument and agree with plaintiff.

 

10 N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) requires the court to consider:

(1) Needs of the child;

(2) Standard of living and economic 

circumstances of each parent;

(3) All sources of income and assets of 

each parent;

(4) Earning ability of each parent . . . ;

(5) Need and capacity of the child for 

education, including higher education;

(6) Age and health of the child and each 

parent;

(7) Income, assets and earning ability of 

the child;

(8) Responsibility of the parents for the 

court-ordered support of others;

(9) Reasonable debts and liabilities of 

each child and parent; and

(10) Any other factors the court may deem 

relevant.

[N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a).]
22 A-4973-13T4

We conclude the motion judge failed to satisfy his 

obligations to properly calculate the child support award and to 

issue a clear statement of his reasons for the court's award. 

The court's reliance on defendant's use of the guidelines for 

calculating child support and its incorporation by reference of 

defendant's calculations were both improper and warrant 

reversal.

When applicable, the guidelines must be used to calculate 

child support awards. R. 5:6A; see also Guidelines, supra, 

Appendix IX-A. However, the support amount provided for by the 

guidelines may be "modified or disregarded by the court" upon a 

showing of good cause. R. 5:6A; see also Guidelines, supra, 

Appendix IX-A, ¶ 2. All support orders, even those relying upon 

a strict application of the guidelines, "must be based on the 

evidence and supported by a statement of reasons." Pressler & 

Verniero, supra, comment 1.2 on R. 5:6A.

If a court determines deviation from the guidelines is 

appropriate, it must nevertheless calculate the guidelines-based 

support award and state the specific findings justifying its 

deviation therefrom — specifically, why deviation is in the best 

interests of the child. R. 5:6A; see also Guidelines, supra, 

Appendix IX-A, ¶ 21. Thus, a court must follow this procedure 

when deviating from the guidelines to fix support in accordance 
23 A-4973-13T4

with an agreement by the parties. See Guidelines, supra, 

Appendix IX-A, ¶ 22. 

When a trial court issues reasons for its decision, it 

"must state clearly [its] factual findings and correlate them 

with relevant legal conclusions, so that parties and the 

appellate courts [are] informed of the rationale underlying 

th[ose] conclusion[s]." Monte v. Monte, 212 N.J. Super. 557, 

565 (App. Div. 1986). The trial court does not discharge that 

function simply by recounting the parties' conflicting 

assertions and then stating a legal conclusion, or, as here,

incorporating by reference one of the parties' arguments. Also, 

a court cannot simply attach a guidelines worksheet in lieu of 

providing a statement of reasons. Fodero v. Fodero, 355 N.J. 

Super. 168, 170 (App. Div. 2002).

When "faced with the question of setting child support for 

college students living away from home," however, the guidelines 

are inapplicable and the court must determine support based on 

the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a). Jacoby, supra, 

427 N.J. Super. at 113; see also Guidelines, Appendix IX-A ¶ 18. 

Reliance exclusively upon the guidelines in these situations 

constitutes reversible error. Jacoby, supra, 427 N.J. Super. at

113.
24 A-4973-13T4

Here, the court was required to consider the factors set 

forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) when calculating support for 

Catherine, as she was a college student living away from home. 

See Jacoby, supra, 427 N.J. Super. at 113. With respect to the 

parties' younger daughter, Isabelle, the court was required to 

apply the guidelines and explain any deviations therefrom. See

R. 5:6A. The court did neither. Instead, the court relied upon 

defendant's "well thought out, and clearly articulated plan for 

determining child support," and accepted defendant's support 

calculations after determining they were "not off the mark." 

The court's statement regarding its abdication to defendant of 

its obligation to calculate support did not satisfy its 

obligation to provide a statement of reasons for its decision. 

See R. 1:7-4.

The court's reliance on defendant's proposed calculations 

for Catherine's support was also improper because the reliedupon calculation was based on the guidelines. R. 5:6A. As we 

stated in Jacoby, 

courts faced with the question of setting 

child support for college students living 

away from home must assess all applicable 

facts and circumstances, weighing the 

factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23a. 

Resort to the [guidelines] to make support 

calculations for college students living 

away from home is error. 
25 A-4973-13T4

[Jacoby, supra, 427 N.J. Super. at 113

(citation omitted).]

Finally, defendant's argument that plaintiff cannot 

challenge the court's method of calculation for the first time 

on appeal is without merit, as the court's support calculation 

was plainly inconsistent with established law. See Nieder, 

supra, 62 N.J. at 235; Jacoby, supra, 427 N.J. Super. at 116.

In sum, due to the court's failure to analyze the factors 

set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) when calculating Catherine's 

support, and to properly calculate Isabelle's award under the 

guidelines and explain any deviation therefrom, we conclude the 

court abused its discretion by calculating the support award in 

a manner inconsistent with established law, and reverse the 

court's order modifying support. We remand for determination of 

child support anew.

In light of our determination, we need not reach the 

parties' remaining arguments.

Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded for calculation of 

child support and the issuance of a statement of reasons 

consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.