### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00334- CV

Je ffre y A . K e ndz ior ski, App e lla nt

v.
Don W. Sau nders, Appellee

F ROM THE COM AL COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2003CV00 37, H ONO RAB LE BRENDA CHAP MAN, JUDGE P RESIDING

O P I N I O N
J eff rey Kendziorski sued R obert Marshall for fraud and was a war ded compe nsatory damag es and c ourt costs. Marsha ll appeale d the justice court’s judg ment to the county court, a nd Don Saunder s signe d as a sur ety on the appe al b o n d
. On appe al, Kendziorski was a war ded compensa tory

damag es, cour

t costs, and exemplary damag es. Afte r Mar shall died, Kendziorski attempted to obtain t he judgment from Saunders. Whil e admitt ing liabilit y for the court costs and
c o mp e n s a to r

y d a ma g e s , Sa

u n d e r s d e n ie d li a

b il it y f o r e xe mp la

r y d a ma g e s . K e n d zi orski sued Saunders on the g rounds that he brea ched the surety ag ree ment and that he fr audulently enter ed the2

su re ty a g re e me nt wi th no int e nti on of pa y ing un de r the te rm s of the bo nd a nd wi th i ns uf fi c ie nt a sse ts to cover the limits of the bond. T h e co u nty court g rante d partial summary judgme nt in favor of Ke nd zior sk i and

c on c lud e d th a t Sa

un de rs wa s li abl e for c omp e ns a tor y dama g e s and

c ourt c os ts. Subsequently , the cour

t gr anted Saunde rs’s motion for summary judgme nt and held that Saunder s was not liable for exemplary damag es or for fraud. Ke ndziorski appeals both the partial de nial of his su mma

ry jud g me nt m oti on

a nd the g ra nti ng of Sa

un de rs ’s su mma

ry jud g me nt m oti on . We wi ll aff irm the co u rt ’s j udg ment reg arding Saunders’ s lack of liability for f raud, r ever se the c ourt’s judgme nt reg arding Saunders’ s liabilit y for br eac h of contra ct claim and f or exemplary

d a mag es, and
rema nd the ca se for

considera

tion of attorney ’s fe es and pr e-judg ment interest.
BACK GR OUND Kendziorski sued Marsha ll for fra ud in a justice court a

nd obtained a judg ment in the
a mo u n t o f $ 2 , 7 6 0
. 5 0
. M a r s h a ll a p p e a le d th e ju d g me n t a n d f il e d a n a p p e a l b o n d for double the amount of the judg ment as re quired by rule. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 571 (allowing 10 day s to p er fec t appea l by filing a

ppeal bond with two or more sureties for double amount of justice c ourt judg ment), 574b (appe al from justice c ourt tried de novo in c ounty or district court)
. Saunders a

nd another

individual signed a s sureties on the bond. The bond stated that both sureties “a cknowledg e ourselves bound to pa y J EFF ERY A. KEND I ORSKI [si c] the sum of $5,521, conditioned that Appellant sha ll prosecute his a ppeal to ef

fec t, and shall pay

off a nd satisfy the judg ment which may

be re ndere d ag ainst him on appeal.”A claim for exemplary damag es was not mentioned in Kendziorski’s orig inal petition, the 1 final judg ment, or the a

ppeal bond. Rul e 57 4a

pr ov ide s, in r e le va

nt p a rt , a s f

oll ow s: 2 Either par

ty may plead a ny new matter

in the county or district c ourt which wa s not presente d in the court be low, but no new g round of r ecove ry shall be set up by the plaintiff . . . . Tex. R. C iv. P. 574a. 3

On a pp e a l and a ft e r S a un de rs sig ne d the su re ty

a g re e me nt, Ke nd zior sk i sp e c if ic a lly pleade d for e x em p l ar y d amag es. Marsha ll filed a spec ial exception objecting to the reque st for 1 exemplary

damag es on the ba sis that it constituted an im permissible new gr ound of re cover y under rule of c ivil procedure 574a. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 574a. 2 A tri a l de no vo wa s h e ld, a nd the co un ty

c ourt a wa rd e d K e nd zior sk i $1 ,3 34 in compensa tory

damag es f

o r fra ud, $1,399.44 in court costs, and $5,000 in e x emplary damag es for fr a ud
. Pr ior to the jud g me nt be ing sig ne d but af te r the jud g me nt wa s ann ounc e d in c ourt , M a rs ha ll died. After making sever al unsucc essful attempts to obtain the judg ment from Mar shall’s surviving spouse , Kendziorski sent a demand letter to Saunders. I n response , Saunders sent a letter statin g that he wo uld

pa y the c omp e ns a tor

y dama g e a wa

rd a nd the c ourt c os ts b ut d e nyinglia bil ity for e x emplary

damag es. Saunder s also proposed a pay ment plan and included a chec k for $250 a s the fi rs t pay

ment. In r e sp on se , K e nd zior sk i st a te d th a t he wo uld a c c e pt t he pa y me nt p lan o nly

if Saunders a g ree d to be liable for the full amount of the a

ppeal bond, $5,521. Saunde rs re fused.4 After filing suit ag ainst Saunders, Kendziorski f iled a motion for summary judgme nt
asser ting that Saunde rs had br eac hed the a ppeal bond by

failing to pay the full amount of the bond. Th e c ounty

c ourt g ra nte d p a rt ia l summa

ry jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f Ke nd zior sk i and he ld t ha t Sa un de rs , a s a su re ty , wa s lia

ble fo r the c omp e ns a tor

y dama g e s and

c ourt c os ts a wa rd e d. Ho we ve r, the c ounty court de nied summary

judgme nt reg arding Saunders’ s liabilit y for e x emplary

damag es. K e n d zi orski then filed a

second a mended petition adding claims that Saunders f raudule ntly

induced Ke ndziorski to a c c e pt the app e a l bo nd wi tho ut a

ny int e nti on of pa y ingon the bo nd a nd tha t Sa un de rs fa lse ly stated he ha d sufficie nt funds to pay the amount spec ified in the bond. I n r e sp on se , Sa

un de rs fi le d a

mot ion fo r sum mary jud g me nt u rg ingdis mis sa l of

a ll of Kendziorski’s new claims and asking the court to e nter judgme nt that Saunde rs was not liable for
e xemp l a r y d a m a g e s. Spe c if

ic a lly , Sa un de rs c on te nd e d th a t he did no t mi sr e pr e se nt t

ha t he ha d a sse ts sufficie nt to satisfy

the principa l of the appe al bond, that he did not misre prese nt his intention to pay the su re ty a g r e e m e n t , a n d

t h a tK e n d z i o r s k i ’ s c l a i m f o r e xe m p l a r y d a m a g e s w a s a n i m p e r

m i s s i b le additional g round of r ecove ry under r ule of c ivil procedure 574a. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 574a. Af t er co n s i d er i n g S au n d er s ’s m o t i o n fo r s u m m ar y j u d gm en t , t h e c o u n t y co u rt j u d ge
se nt a le tte r t o b oth

pa rt ie s th a t r e a d a s f

oll ow s:
After revie w and c onsideration of Mr . Saunders’ Motion for Summary J udg ment, the Court fi nd s th a t it

sh ou ld b e g ra

nte d. Th e Court

fi nd s th a t Mr
. Sa

un de rs is n ot l ia

ble for e x emplary

damag es plea ded af

ter the posting of the bond. The Court finds that Mr
. Sa u n d e r s is n o t l ia

b le f o r f r a u d d a ma g e s a s h e p o s s e s s e d f u n d s a t t h e ti me he po ste d th e bo nd

su ff ic ie nt t o p a y

the jud g me nt. Mr. Saunder s is directed to pre pare an orde r ac cording ly
.5 The c ourt enter ed fina l judgment stating that Saunders wa s n o t l i ab l e for the
e xemp lary dama g e s or ig ina lly iss ue d a g a ins t Ma rs ha ll or fo r Ke nd zior sk i’ s fr a ud c laim s agai ns t Saunders. The court fur

ther found that eac h party was r esponsible for its own a ttorney ’s fe es and
c o s t s “ w i t h o u tc o n t r i b u t i o n f r o m t h e o t h e r ” p a rt y. Kendziorski appea ls the trial court’s pa rtial denial of his motion for summary judgme nt, the trial court’ s g ranting of S aunder s’s motion for summary judgme nt, and the trial c ourt’s entry of final judg ment without awar ding him pre -judg ment interest or attorney ’s fe es.
DI SCU SSIO N Due to t h e co m plex procedura l history of this case , we will clar ify what issues we have be e n a sk e d to c on sid e r i n th is a pp e a l and wh ic h ju dg me nt h a s b e e n a pp e a le d to thi s Co ur

t. Ke nd zior sk i ori g ina lly fi le d s uit a g a ins t Ma

rs ha ll f or fr a ud a nd ob ta ine d a

jud g me nt a g a ins t hi m in the justice court. This judgment wa s appea led to the county court, a nd Kendziorski ag ain obtained
a jud g me nt a g a ins t Ma

rs ha ll. Ho we ve r, thi s a c tio n is no t be fo re us . Our a pp e a l is lim ite d to consideration of the subsequent suit filed by Kendziorski ag ainst Saund er s in which Kendziorski claims Saunders br eac hed the sure ty ag ree ment he sig ned to help per fec t Marshall’s a ppeal. I n this appeal, we are being asked to c onsider whe ther Saunde rs is liable for all or part of the e xemp lary

dama g e s o ri g ina lly iss ue d ag a ins t Mar sh a ll, wh e the r Sau nd e rs br e a c he d th e su re ty ag ree ment by

failing to pay

the l i m i ts specified in the a ppeal bond, whe ther Saunde rs is liable for
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s a nd pr e

jud g me nt int e re st du e to thi s br e a c h, a nd wh e the r Sa unders fraudu le ntl y enter ed into the surety ag ree ment with no intention of paying unde r its terms and with insufficie nt assets to cove r the limits of the bond.6 I n addition to the issues discussed above, we will a lso a dd re s s Kendz iorski’s
asser tions that m an y o f t he def enses to liability

raised by Saunders be low are inapplicable or are imp e rm iss ibl e c oll a te ra l a tta c ks on the or ig ina l ju dg me nt a g a ins t Ma rs ha ll. Furthe rm or e , w e wi ll addre ss Kendziorski’s alterna tive contention that there was no orde r g ranting Saunders’ s motion for
su mma ry jud g me nt, a nd , the re fo re , th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in e nte ri ng fi na l ju dg me nt. F ina lly , w e wi ll addre ss Saunders’s a

rg ument that he is not liable for the ex emplary damag e award beca use t he aw ard exceede d the county

court’s a ppellate jurisdiction and wa s, theref ore, void. We r e vie w the g ra

nti ng of a summ a ry

jud g me nt de novo
. Va le nc e v . D or se tt Operating Co. , 1 64 S.W. 3d 65 6, 66 1 (T e x. 20 05 ). I n r e vie wi ng a su mma ry jud g me nt, we ta ke a ll evidenc e favor able to the nonmovant as true and re solve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor
. Id. A movant is entitled to summary judgme nt if he demonstra tes there are no g enuine issues of material fac t and establishes a ll the elements of h i s cl aim as a ma tter of law
. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(c); Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. G rant , 73 S.W .3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002). When both parties move fo r s umm a ry

jud g me nt, the a

pp e llate c ourt , in

re vi ewi ng the jud g me nt o f t he tr ia l c ourt , mu st consider both pa

rties’ summary

judgme nt evidence , deter mine all questions presente d, and, if the revie wing court de termines the tria l co u rt er re d , rende r the judg ment the trial cour t should have rende red. Valence , 164 S.W .3d at 661.

For org anizational purposes, we will first address Ke ndziorski’s claim that the court
err ed in enter ing f

inal judgme nt without a proper order
. Second, we will discuss Kendziorksi’s fra ud claims. Third, we will a ddress Kendziorski’s brea ch of c ontrac t claim and the e x tent of Saunder s’s liability under the appea l bond. Fourth, we will consider the argument raised by Saunders r eg arding7

the county court’s appellate jurisdiction. F inally , we will discuss Kendziorski’s claim for attorney ’s fee s and pre

judgme nt interest.
Ent r y o f F ina l Ju dgm e nt

On appeal, Kendzi orski asser ts that the cour

t committed rever sible err or by enter ing a fina l judgment whe n no order was sig ned by

the co u rt gra n ting Saunde rs’s summary judgme nt motion and “disposing of all contested issues.” Specifica lly , he argues that the letter issued by the court doe s not c onstitut e an orde r fr om the court be cause the letter dire cted Mr. Saunde rs to prepa re an orde r. The lang uag e used in a judgme nt can make it final. Lehmann v. Har- Con Corp. , 39 S.W. 3d 19 1, 20 0 (T e x. 20 01 ). A jud g me nt is fi na l wh e n the int e nt to fi na lly dis po se of the c a se is unequivoca lly

expressed and when t he judgment di sposes of all re maining pa rties and c laims. Id. Even if the letter did not constitute an order , the cour t’s final judg ment indicated that Saunders’ s motion for summ ary judgme nt had been gra nted. Fur ther, the judg ment specifie d that it “ d is p o s e s o f a ll p a rti e s a n d a ll c la im s in th e ir e n ti r e ty a n d is a p p e a la b le ” a n d c ontained all the
ne c e ssa ry e le me nts fo r a fi na l ju dg me nt i nc lud ingthe name s o f t he pa rt ie s a nd “ fo r a nd a g a ins t whom the judg ment is render ed.” See Te x. R. C iv. P. 3 06 ; see al so City of A us tin v . Ca sti llo , 25 S.W .3d 309, 314 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied). T here fo re , we hold that the judg ment rende red by

the cour t was final a

nd appea lable. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the tr ial court’s issu an ce of a f inal judgme nt was pr op e r a nd ov e rr ule thi s is su e on

a pp e a l.8

F r aud I n addition, Kendzior s k i contends that the trial court er red by g ranting Saunders’ s
s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t m o t i o n o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t S a u n d e r s d i d n o t c o m m i t f r a u d
. S p e c i f

i c a l l y, Kendziorski insist s that Saunders mis represente d his intention t o pay on the appe al bond and misrepre sented that he had suff icient assets to cove r the amo u n t o f the appe al bond. Kendziorski
asser ts that he relied on Saunde rs’s promise to pay and urg es that he w ould have objected to the bond had he know n Saunders did not intend to pay on the bond. A claim for

fra ud is not available unde r the c ircumstance s of this case. T he cour t was not r equire d to obta in K endziorski’s a pproval reg arding the desig nation of Saunders as a surety on the appe al bond. Marsha ll satisfied the re q u i re m en ts for filing an appe al, the cour t approve d the appea l bond, and the appe al was pe rfe cted. See T ex . R
. C i v . P. 571, 573. Kendziorski was not induced into enter ing into an agr eeme nt by a re prese ntation from Saunder s. Cf. J oh ns on & Hi

gg ins , Inc

. v. Kennec o Energy, I nc. , 962 S.W .2d 507, 524 (Tex. 1998) (without misrepre sentation, there is no fraud) . Fur

ther, Saunde rs stated in an a ffidavit that he ha d sufficie nt f unds to pa

y the amount of the a ppeal bond a

nd submitt ed a c opy

of a c ashier’ s chec k made pay able for the f ull amount of the appeal bond and a copy of hi s bank st atement at the t ime the appeal bond was sig ned indicating he had sufficient funds to cover the limits of the appe al bond. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the por tion of the judg ment of the c ounty court that c oncluded Saunde rs was not liable f or fr aud.
Br e ac h of t he Sur e tyAg r e e m e nt

Ke nd zior sk i a lso a sse rt s th a t Sa un de rs br e a c he d th e su re ty a g re e me nt b y

fa ili ng to pay the full amount of the appea l bond. A surety is an individual who has under taken the oblig ation9

of anothe r owe d to an oblige e. See Carter Re al Estate & Dev ., Inc. v . Builder’s Serv . Co. , 718 S.W .2d 828, 830 (Tex. A

pp.—Austin 1986, no writ) (quoting Restatement of Sec urity § 82 (1941))
. When interpreting surety

bonds and d e te r

mi n in g a s u r e ty ’ s liabilit y , we a

pply common law princ iples of contra ct. Pave con, Inc . v. R-Com, I nc. , 159 S.W .3d 219, 222 (Tex. A pp.—For t Worth 2005, no p e t. )
. A p a rty b r e a c h e s a c o n tr a c t if it f a il s to p e r f

o r m a n a c t it p r o mi s e d to p e r f o r m. Met hodis t Hosps. of Dallas v. Corporate Communications, Inc. , 806 S.W .2d 879, 883 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied) . I n the ca se of a judicial bond, the suret y ’s u n d ertaking is a contra ct that the surety will, failing a

reve rsal, pay

the judgme nt r ender ed ag ainst the appe llant. Car te r R e al E sta te , 718 S.W .2d at 830.

The liability

of the sure ty

and the intent of the parties a re g ener ally

deter mined by the lang uag e of the bond. Geters v . Eagle Ins. Co. , 83 4 S. W.2 d 4 9, 50 (T e x. 1992 ); Pave con , 159 S.W. 3d a t 22 2. Sur e ty

a g re e me nts a re str ic tly

c on str ue d, a nd su re tie s are bo un d o nly

by the pr e c ise terms of the c ontrac t they have se cure d. See V

astine v. Bank of Dallas , 8 0 8 S. W. 2 d 4 6 3 , 4 6 4 ( T e x. 1991). Acc ording ly , “sure ties are no further bound than they have contra cted to be .” Am west S ur . Ins. Co. v. Graham , 949 S.W .2d 724, 726 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, wr i t denied) ( quoting Tre nt v . R ho mb e rg , 6 6 T e x. 24 9, 18 S.W. 51 0, 51 2 ( 18 86 )) . I f i t a pp e a rs fr om t

he te rm s o f t

he su re ty contra ct that the sure ty

has contra cted to be bound by a par ticular judg ment that may be re ndere d ag ainst his principal, “‘it is c onclusive ag ainst him, although he was not a pa rty to the suit in which the judgme nt was obtained.’ ” Bo bb itt v . W om ble , 708 S.W. 2d 55 8, 56 0 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t Dist.] 1986, no writ) (quoting Browne v. Fre nch , 22 S.W . 581, 583 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1893, no writ)).Although Saunde rs contende d that he wa s not liable for the e x emplary damag e aw ard f

or 3 the re asons spec ifically

listed, h e d i d not arg ue that a sur ety can ne ver be liable for e x emplary dama g e s. 10

As a sure ty , Saunders wa s liable for up to the a mount specified in the a

ppeal bond. See A .V.A. Serv

s., Inc. v . Parts Indus. Corp. , 949 S.W .2d 852, 854 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 1997, no writ) (unde r rule of

civil proce dure 752, conce rning forc ible entry and deta iner proc eeding s, court may awa rd dama g es up to full amount of appe al bond to cover damag es and c osts).
Saunders’s De

fenses I n response to Kendziorski’s motion for summary j u d g ment, Saunders r aised the following defe nses: (1) the surety ag ree ment was ambiguous a nd, there fore , his belief, as e x presse d in his aff idavit, that he was not liable for exemplary damag es m ay be considered as parole e vidence ; (2) holding him lia b le for a n exemplary

damag e aw ard w ould be unconsc ionable; (3) he was mistake n ab o ut the terms of the a g ree ment when he enter ed it; (4) holding him liable for the exemplary

damag es would violate due proce ss; (5) he wa s not provided notice of the possibilit y

of being liable for e x em p l ar y d amage s; and (6) the county court impermissibly

rende red judg ment
a g a ins t th e e state of

Mars ha ll b e c a

us e Ma rs ha ll d ie d b e fo re the jud g me nt wa s sig ne d a nd be c a us e
e xemp lary

dama g e s ma

y no t be a warded

a g a ins t an e state . In h is m oti on fo r s umm a ry

jud g me nt, Sa u n d e r s c o n te n d e d th a t th e e xe mp la r y d a ma g e c la im w a s a n im p e r mi s s ib le a d d it io n a l g round of
rec overy filed in violation of rule 574a
. On appe al , S aunders asser ts that he is not liable for 3
exe m p l ar y d amag es bec ause the orig inal judgme nt entere d ag ainst Marshall in the county court
e xc e e d e d i t s a

p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n , w h i c h r e n d e r e d t h e e xe m p l a r y d a m a g e a w a r d v o i d
. W e wi ll11

addre ss the first five de fense s in the order g iven and addre ss the rema ining defe nse, the claim ra ised in Saunders’s motion for summary judgme nt, and the re sponsive ar g ument specifie d on appea l toge ther.
Am big uit y I n his response, Saunde rs ar g ued t hat the agree ment was ambiguous re g arding whether he would be liable for e x emplary damag es. Fur ther, he asser

ted that he believed, ba sed on
va ri ou s r ule s and statut e s g ov e rn ingthe a

pp e llate jur isd ic tio n o f the c ounty c ourt , th a t he wo uld

on ly be lia ble fo r e c on omi c dama g e s and c ourt c os ts. F ina lly , h e a rgue s th a t hi s b e lie f, a s e xpre sse d in his a ff ida vit , ma y be c on sid e re d to a sc e rt a in t he int e nt o f t

he pa rt ie s e nte ri ng the a g re e me nt. I n support of these c ontentions, Sa u n d e r s cited to var ious rules and statutes g overning the jur isd ic tio n o f j usti ce c ourt s and g ov e rn inga

pp e a ls f ro m ju sti c e c ourt s and

ins ist e d th a t th e se rules and statutes conflict with one another and rende r a surety ’s liability under an a p p ea l b o nd unclea r. Specifica lly , Saunders a sserted tha t, under the g overning statutory framework, a

surety may be su bje c te d to g re a te r l ia

bil ity tha n a pr inc ipa l be c a

us e the jur isd ic tio na l li mit of a jus tic e c ourt

is $5,000, but an appea l f

rom the justice court is trie d de novo and require s a sure ty to sign a n appea l bo nd fo r tw ic e the a mou

nt of the or ig ina l jud g me nt, e ve n if that a mou nt e xce e ds the $5 ,0 00 lim it. See Tex. Gov’t C ode Ann. § 27.031(a) (West 2004) (spec ify ing $5,000 jurisdictional limi t for justice courts); Te x . Civ. P rac . & Re m. Code Ann. § 31.005 (West 1997) (“[a] judgment or de termination of fa ct or law in a procee ding in
. . . justice of the pe ace court is not res judicata . . . in a county court . . . .”); Te x . R. Civ. P. 571 (re quiring sureties to sig n appea l bond for double amount of judgme nt
r e n d e r e d in justi ce c ourt for pe rfe ction of appe al), 574a (allowing party

appea ling judg ment of justice12

court to plea d any

new matter

not previously

prese nted), 574b (a

ppeal f rom justice court tried de novo). Saunders urg ed that a principal’s liability will not exceed the orig inal jurisdictional limit, but
a s u r e t y m a y b e l i a b l e f o r u p t o t w i c e t h i s a m o u n t
. S a u n d e r s i n s i s t e d

t h a t , g i v e n t h e a

p p e l la te jurisdictional limi t of the county court, the g overning framework cre ates an ambig uity reg arding the
e xten t of a sure ty ’s lia

bil ity a nd a ve rr e d th a t th e te rm s o f t he a pp e a l bo nd

a re su sc e pti ble to h is interpre tation in which sureties a re liable only for c ompensatory damag es and c ourts costs. Fur ther, Saunders c ontended that his belief as to t h e ex t en t of his liability was re asonable g iven that exemplary

damag es we re not specific ally mentioned prior to his signing the surety ag ree ment and
may be c on sid e re d w he n in te rp re tin g the a g re e me nt.

We disag ree . The de termination of whether a contra ct i s ambig uous is a question of law. Gene ral Agents Ins. Co. v. Arredondo , 52 S.W .3d 762, 766 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pe t. d e nie d) . I f a

c on tr a c t is su

bje c t to mor e tha

n o ne re a so na

ble int e rp re ta tion, th e c on tr a c t is
a mbi g uo us . Id. Ho we v er , a c o n t ra ct i s u n am b i gu o u s i f i tca n b e gi v en a d ef i n i t e o r c er t ai n m ea n i n g, and conf licting inter

preta tions of a contra ct, with out more, do not cre ate a n ambig uity
. See id. F u rt h e r , i f

t h e c o n t r a c ti s c a

p a b l e o f b e i n g g i v e n a

d e f i n i t e l e g a l m e a n i n g , p a r o l e e v i d e n c e is g ener ally not admissible to cre ate a n ambig uity
. Lynx Ex

ploration & Prod. Co. v. 4-Sight Operating Co. , 891 S.W .2d 785, 787 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, writ denied)
. The sur ety

ag ree ment specifie d that Saunders a g ree d to “pay off a nd satisfy the judgme nt which may

be re ndere d ag ainst [Marshall] on appea l” up to $5,521. Neither the ag ree ment nor the rule requiringan appe al bond expressly limit s the ty

pe of dama g es that may

be
rec overe d from a sur ety

to actual da

mag es and c ourt cos t s . Cf. Ge te rs , 8 34 S.W. 2d a t 50 (s ta tut e13

pe rm itt e d r e c ov e ry of “ dama g e s” fr om su re ty of mot or ve hic le ’s bo nd ; c ourt

c on c lud e d th a t st a tut e and comm o n m ea ning of word “ damag es” did not re strict ty pe of r ecove ry

to particular

ty pes of damag es and c oncluded that, whe n leg islature has intende d such a limitation, i t p rovides the limit ation by

statute). The ag ree ment is open to only one re asonable interpre tation: Saunders ag ree d to pay up to $5,521 to Kendziorski in t he eve nt Marshall did not preva il on appeal a nd in the event Kendziorski was unable to collect fr om Marsha ll. Be cause the agr eeme nt is capa ble of being g iven
a de fi nit e le g a l me a nin g , w e may no t c on sid e r the be lie fs e xpre sse d in Sa un de rs ’s a ff

ida vit to c re a te
a n ambi g uit

y in a n o the rw ise un a mbi g uo us a g re e me nt. We also disag ree with Saunders’s a ssertion that the statutory framework g overning the jurisdiction of justice cour ts and appe als from justice c ourts rende rs the ag ree ment ambig uous
or ca n be interpr eted a s subjecting sureties to g reater liability th an p ri n ci p als . Be cause an appe al from the justice c ourt is tried de novo, the amount of the judg ment rende red on a ppeal may

be lar g er or smaller than that rende red in the justice court. Howeve r, the county court’s a ppellate jurisdiction is c onfined within the limit s of the justice c ourt’s jurisdiction, Rice v . Pinney , 51 S.W .3d 705, 708 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.), and a county court may

not issue an awa

rd ag ainst a principa l on appea l that e x cee ds the jurisdiction of the justice court unless the additional damag es we re sustaine d
as a r esult of the passa g e of time, Crumpton v. Steve ns , 936 S.W .2d 4 7 3 , 477 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1996, no writ). Although the princip al m ay b e l i ab le for a larg er da mag e aw ard on a

ppeal tha n th a t or ig ina lly

iss ue d a nd fo r a n a mou

nt g re a te r t

ha n th e jus tic e c ourt ’s jur isd ic tio na l li mit in
cer tain circ umstances, the sur ety will not be liable for a

n amount that is larg er tha n what the pr incipal14

would be liable f

or and will not be liable for a n amount over tha t specified in the bond. Cf. Am west , 949 S.W .2d at 726.

For all the re asons spec ified, we hold that the ag ree ment is not ambiguous.
Un c on sc ion ab ili ty

I n his response, Saunde rs al s o as s er t ed that re quiring a sure ty to be liable for
e xemp lary

dama ges wo uld

su bje c t su re tie s to op e n- e nd e d li a bil ity a nd wo uld re nd e r s ur e ty ag ree ments unconscionable
.

Whether a c ontrac t is unconscionable is a que stion of law for the court to dec ide. A r thur’s Garage, Inc . v. Rac al-Chubb Sec. Sy s., Inc. , 9 9 7 S. W. 2 d

8 0 3 , 8 1 6 ( T e x. A p p .—Dallas 19 99 , n o p e t.) . In g e ne ra l, t he te rm “ un c on sc ion a

bil ity ” de sc ri be s a con tr a c t th a t is un fa ir be c a us e of its ove rall one-sidedne ss or the g ross one-sidedne ss of its terms. Id. T h e p ri n ci p l e u n d er l y i n g a de te rm inatio n o f w he the r a c on tr act is unc on sc ion a

ble is the pr e ve nti on

of op pr e ssi on

a nd un fa ir
s u r p r is e , n o t th e r e a ll o c a ti o n o f r is k s. S ee I n re FirstMerit Bank, N.A. , 5 2 S. W. 3 d 7 4 9 , 7 5 7 ( T e x. 2001). The ba sic test for de termining whether a contr act is unconsc ionab l e i s wh ether , g iven the parties’ g ener al commer cial bac kg round and the commerc ial needs of the c ase, the clause involved is so one-sided t h at i t i s unconscionable under the circ umstances e x isting whe n the contra ct was made. See id. None of

the fact ors that might we igh in f avor of a finding of unconsc ionability are prese nt in this case . The a ppeal bond is not so one-sided that it is unfair a nd interpre ting the bond
a s r e qu ir ingSa

un de rs to b e liable for ex e mpl a ry dama g e s d oe s n ot r e su lt i n unf a ir su rp ri se to Saunders. At the time the a ppeal bond wa s made, Saunders was serving as Mar shall’s attorney . The15

terms of the a

ppeal bond and the e x tent of Saunder s’s liability wer e cle ar: Saunde rs was liable for up to $5,521 of a “

judgme nt” re ndere d ag ains t Marsha ll. Nothing in the appe al bond limited Saunders’ s liabilit y

to actual da

mag es and court costs. The amount of t he appe al bond was spe cified by statute, and the lang uag e used in the appea l bond tracke d the lang uag e in rule 571. See id. (under rule 571, a

pp el l an t is require d to file appe al bond pay able to appe llee “c onditioned that appellant shall prosec ute hi s appea l to eff ect, and shall pay

off a nd satisfy the judg ment which may

be re ndere d ag ainst him on appeal” ).

Acc ording ly , we conclude that holding Saunders l iable for exemplary

damag es does not rende r the sure ty

ag ree ment unconsciona

ble.
Unilateral Mistake

I n ad d i t i o n to his previous defe nses, Saunder s raised the aff irmative def

ense of
un ilate ra l mi sta

ke in his re sp on se . He a rgue d tha t he wa s mi sta ke n a bo ut t he e xten t of

his lia bil ity
on the su re ty a g re e me nt an d tha t the mis ta ke wo uld have be e n mad e de sp ite or din a ry c a re be c a us e the mistake could not have been f orese en g iven the ambig uous nature of the contra ct and the alleg ed conflict in laws pr eviously discussed. I n g ener al, a unilater al mistake by one par ty to an agr eeme nt is not a ground f or re lief when the mistake was not know n to the other pa rty or induce d by

the other pa

rty
. J oh ns on v . S

ne ll , 50 4 S. W.2 d 397 , 3 99 (T e x. 19 73 ); W elke ner v. W

elke ner , 71 S.W .3d 364, 366 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). A person who sig ns a contra ct is presumed to know the co n t ents of the contra ct. City of Emerald v. Pee l , 920 S.W .2d 398, 402 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no16

writ). I n g ener al, to be entitl ed to equitable relief on the grounds of unilatera l mistake, the claimant
mus t sh owthat: (1) the mistake is of so g reat a conse quence that to enforc e the c ontrac t as made wo uld be un c on sc ion a

ble ; (2 ) the mis ta ke re la te s to a ma te ri a l f

e a tur e of the c on tr a c t; (3) the mistake must have be en made reg ard l es s o f t he exerc ise of ordina ry car e; [and] (4 ) the pa

rt ie s c a n b e pla c e d in

status qu o in

the e qu ity

se ns e ; i. e ., re sc iss ion

mus t not result in prejudice to the other pa rty except for the loss of his bar g ain.
Northern Nat’l Gas Co. v. Chisos Joint Venture I , 142 S.W .3d 447, 456 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004,
n o p et
. ) ( qu o t i n g J

am es T. Tay lor

& So n, In c . v . A rli ng ton In de p. Sc h. Di

st. , 335 S.W .2d 371, 373 (1 96 0) ; Roland v. Mc Cullough , 561 S.W .2d 207, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.—S an Antonio 1978, writ ref

’d n.r.e.) ). As discussed in the pre vious sections, there is no c onflict in the laws g overning an
a pp e a l f ro m th e jus tic e c ourt , nor we re the te rm s o f t he a pp e a l bo nd

a mbi g uo us . T he bo nd

c le a rl y specifie d that Saunders would be li able for a “judg ment” re ndere d ag ainst Marshall on appe al and lim ite d th e a mou

nt o f his lia

bil ity
. F ur

the r, no thi ng in the a

pp e a l bond sp e c if

ie d tha t Sa

un de rs wo uld be lia ble on ly fo r c ourt c os ts a nd a c tua l da ma g e s. Ke nd ziors ki d id n ot i nd uc e Sa un de rs int o h is mistaken belief, a

nd, as we previously conclude d, holding Saunde rs liable for exemplary

damag es is not unconscionable. Acc ording ly , we hold that Saunde rs is not entitled to equitable re lief on the g round that he w as mistaken about the e x tent of his liability under the surety

ag ree ment.17

Du e Pr oc ess

I n h is r e s p o n se, Saunder s also claimed that holding him liable for exemplary damag es would violate t he due proce ss clause of t he Fourtee nth Amendment of the Unit ed States Constitut ion by subjecting him to open-ende d liability
.

Saunders sig ned a sur ety

ag ree ment, in which he ag ree d to be liable for any judgme nt rende red a g ainst Marshall in the county court. The ag ree ment specifie d that Saunders’ s max imum po ssi ble lia

bil ity wa s $ 5, 52 1. Re g a rd le ss o f t he size of the e xemp lary

dama g e a wa

rd the c ourt

c ou ld have e ntere d, Saunders’ s persona l liabilit y would not have e x cee ded the am ount specified. Acc ordin gl y , as described e arlier , holding sure ties liable for e x emplary damag e aw ards doe s not
su bje c t th e m to op e n- e nd e d lia bil ity
. Th e fa c t tha t the jud g me nt inc lud e d pun iti ve dama g e s a s w e ll
as ac tual damag es does not invoke due proce ss conce rns that would not be prese nt if the judg ment had only included ac tual damag es. Acc ording ly , we conclude that holding Saunders l iable for exemplary

damag es does
no t vi olate his du e pr oc e ss r ig hts
. Notice I n his response , Saunders a dditionally contende d that he wa s not liable for e x emplary dama g e s b e c a

us e he wa s n ot p ro vid e d n ot ice of that po ssi bil ity a nd be c a us e ho ldi ng him

lia ble would alter the terms of the a ppeal bond. I n support of his asser

tion, Saunders cited to Lawy ers Surety Corp. v. Riv erbend Bank , 966 S.W .2d 182, 184 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1998, no pet.), in which the cour t concluded that a sure ty

was not required to pay under the terms of a se ttlement ag ree ment, enter ed into without18

the su re ty ’s kn ow le dg e , that a lte re d th e te rm s o f t he su re ty a g re e me nt w ith ou t th e su re ty ’s c on se nt. Lawyers Surety is inapplicable. I n this case , Marsha ll did not enter into an a g ree ment that altere d the terms of the surety

bon d wi t hout Saunders’s c onsent. Rather, Saunde rs enter ed into an ag ree ment in which he a g ree d to be liable to pay up to $5,521 in the event judgme nt was re ndere d
a g a ins t Ma

rs ha ll, a nd

thi s ag re e me nt wa s not ch a ng e d pri or to t he re nd iti on

of a jud g me nt a g a ins t Mars ha ll. I n addition, as a sure ty , Saunders did not have to rec eive notice of the possibility of be inghe ld l ia

ble fo r e xem pl ary

dama g e s to be lia

ble fo r t he jud g me nt r e nd e re d a g a ins t Ma rs ha ll. Cf. Bo bb itt , 708 S.W .2d at 560 (no noti ce of underly ing suit or oppor

tunity to defe nd suit need be g iven to surety

for sure ty

to be bound by

judgme nt).
Ma rsh all ’s De ath , R ule574a , a nd theJ ur isd ic tio n o f th e Cou nty

Cou rt F ur the r, Sa un de rs c on te nd e d in

his re sp on se that the cou nty c ourt imp e rm iss ibl y rende red judg ment for e x emplary damag es ag ainst Marsha ll’s e state beca use Marsha ll died before the jud g me nt w a s si g ne d. Sa un de rs a sse rt e d th a t e xemp lary dama g e s ma

y no t be re nd e re d a g a ins t the e state of

a n in div idu a l and , th e re fo re , h e is n ot l ia ble fo r t he exemp lary

dama g e a wa

rd . In h is motion for summary

judgme nt, Saunders ar g ued that the e x emplary damag es cla im, which Kendz i o rs k i p l eaded for the first time in the appea l of the orig inal lawsuit, was a ne w g round of
rec overy b ar re d by

the rules of

civil proce dure. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 574a. On appea l, Saunders
a ss e rt s t h a t h e c a n n o t b e h e l d l i a b l e f o r e xe m p l a r

y d a m a g e s b e c a

u s e , i n t h e o r i g i n a l s u it a g a ins t Mars ha ll, the c ounty c ourt e xce e de d its jur isd ic tio n by iss uin g a dama g e a wa

rd that w a s in

e xce ss of $5,000. Ther efor e, Saunder s insist s the exemplary damag es aw ard is void.19 Al l of th e se a sse rt ion s c on sti tut e c oll a te ra l a tta c ks on the jud g me nt p re vio us ly rende red a g ainst Marshall. Cf. Re iss v . R e iss , 118 S.W .3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2003)
. A direc t attack on
a jud g me nt, su c h as an a

pp e a l, i s b ro ug ht f

or the purp os e of

a tte mpt ingto c ha

ng e the jud g me nt. Au sti n I nd e p. Sc h. Di st. , 495 S.W .2d at 881; Ra ng e r Ins . Co. v . R og e rs , 5 3 0 S. W. 2 d 1 6 2 , 1 6 7 ( T e x. Civ . App .—

Au sti n 1 97 5, wr it r e f’ d n .r .e .) . A col la te ra l a tta c k, on the oth e r h a nd , “ ‘i s an a tte mpt to avoid the eff

ect of a judgme nt in a

proce eding broug ht for some other purpose.’ ” Em

plo y e rs C as . Co. v. Block, 7 4 4 S
. W
. 2 d 9 4 0 , 9 4 3 (T ex . 1 9 8 8 ) ( q u o t i n g Ranger Ins. Co. , 530 S.W .2d at 167), overruled on othe r grounds by State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy , 925 S.W .2d 696 (Tex. 1996). I n g ener al, if the c ourt enter ing judg ment has jurisdiction over both the c ase a nd the parties a nd if the cour

t does not act outsi de it s capa city as a court, the judgme nt entere d by the cour t may not be collaterally attacke d. Se e Re iss , 118 S.W .3d at 443. The judg ment of a c ourt of g ener al jurisdiction may

be collate rally

attacke d on the g rounds that the cour t has: (1) no jurisdiction over a par ty or over his property , (2) no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, (3) no jurisdiction to enter the particula

r judg ment enter ed, or ( 4) no ca pacity to a ct as a cour

t. Au sti n I

nd e p. Sc h. Di st. v. Sierra Club , 49 5 S.W. 2d 87 8, 88 1 ( Te x. 19 73 ); Ranger Ins. Co. , 530 S.W .2d at 167. Claims that the judgme nt is incorre ct, other than jurisdictional c laims, ma y rende r a judg ment voidable, in which
c a se the jud g me nt m a y

be c or re c te d thr ou g h th e or din a ry a pp e llate pr oc e ss, bu t ma

y no t be us e d to collater ally

attack a judgme nt. Cf. Re iss , 118 S.W .3d at 443. The c urre nt suit was broug ht f or the purpose of deter

mining Saunder s’s liability for the jud g me nt o ri g ina lly

re nd e re d a g a ins t M ars hal l, n ot t o a pp e a l th e fo rm e r j ud g me nt a g a ins t Marsha ll. E v e n if th e tr ia l c o u rt e r r e d in li g h t o f th e f

ir s t tw o d e f

e n s e s , th e ju d g me n t would be20

voidable, not void, beca

use the trial court had jurisdiction ove r the parties a nd the subject matter

of the ca se. The judg ment ag ainst Marshall wa s final , and Saunder s may not collatera lly

attack the jud g me nt o n th e g ro un ds that the c ourt imp e rm iss ibl y

iss ue d a n e xemp lary

dama g e a wa

rd a g a ins t M a r s h a ll ’ s e s tate o r th a t th e e xe mp la r y d a ma g e c la im w a s a n im p e r mi s s ib le a d d it io n a l g round of
rec overy filed in violation of rule 574a
. Ho we ve r, Sa

un de rs may

c oll a te ra lly

a tta c k th e jud g me nt r e nd e re d a g a ins t Ma rs ha ll on the g round that the c ounty court ex cee ded it s jurisdiction. J ustice cour ts have jurisdiction over “civil m atters in which exclusi ve jurisdiction is not in t he district or c ounty court a nd in which the amount in controver sy i s n o t m o re tha n $5,000, exclusive of interest.” T ex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2 7. 03 1( a )( 1) . T he a mou nt i n c on tr ov e rs y

is g e ne ra lly

de te rm ine d by loo kin g a t the a lle g a tio ns in the petition. Ga rza v . Ch av arria , 155 S.W .3d 252, 255 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.). When the pe tit ion

do e s n ot d e mon str a te the a bs e nc e of juri sd iction, the pe tit ion sh ou ld b e lib e ra lly construed in f

avor of jurisdiction. Id. The judgme nt of a justice court may be appea led to a county court, which will try the
case de novo. Tex
. Gov’t C ode Ann. § 26.042(e) (West 2004); Tex. R. Civ. P. 574b. Howeve r, a county court’s appellate jurisdiction is confine d to the jurisdictional limi ts of the justice cour t; the county court ha s no j u ri s d i ct ion over a n appea l unless the justice court ha d jurisdiction. Rice , 51 S.W .3d at 708. There is nothing in the re cord to indica te that Kendziorski specific ally pleade d an
a mou nt t ha t w a s outs ide the jur isd ic tio n of the jus tic e c ourt or the a pp e llate jur isd ic tio n o f t

he c ounty court. See G arza, 155 S.W .3d at 256 (c ourt may lose ju ri s d i ct i on over ne w ca use of a ction forEx emp lar y dama g e s d o n ot r e su lt f ro m th e pa ssa g e of

tim e ; r a the r, the y

a re a wa rd e d to 4 punish a defe ndant’s past behavior and to deter othe rs from e ng ag ing in a simil ar ma

nner. See , e.g. , Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Malone , 977 S.W .2d 35, 39-40 (Te x . 1998). 21 dama g e s if

pe tit ion a lle g e s dama g e s that e xce e d ju ri sd ic tio na l li mit s) . H ow e ve r, in t he c a se a g a ins t Mars ha ll, the c ounty c ourt iss ue d a jud g me nt in e xce ss o f $ 5, 00 0. As dis c us se d p re vio us ly , a c ounty
c ourt may no t is su e an award t

ha t e xce e ds the jur isd ic tio na l li mit s o f t he jus tic e c ourt

un le ss
a dd iti on a l dama g e s have be e n su sta ine d a s a re su lt of the pa ssa g e of

tim e , s uc h a s a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. See , e.g. , Crumpton , 9 3 6 S
. W
. 2 d a t 4 7 7 ( p l e a d i n g o f a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s o n a p p e a l t o c o u nty

c ou rt in
a mou nt g re a te r t

ha n o ri g ina l juri sd ic tio n d id not de pr ive c ounty

c ourt of jur isd ic tio n) . T he c ounty
c ourt a wa rd inc lud e d c omp e ns a tor

y dama g e s, e xemp la

ry dama g e s, a nd

c ourt c os ts. No ne of

the se damag es ar ose fr om the passag e of time. 4

Fur ther, unlike other simil ar statutes, the s tatute s pecif y ing the jurisdiction of justice courts only

excludes interest fr om the $5,000 limit ation. Compare Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2 7
. 0 3 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) (

ju s ti c e c o u rts h a v e ju

r is d ic ti o n w h e n “ a mo u n t in c o n tr o v e r s y is n o t more than $5,000, exclusive of interest”) , with i d. § 25. 00 03 (c )( 1) (We st 2 00 4 & Sup p. 20 05 ) ( c ounty c ourt s have c on c ur

re nt j ur isd ic tio n w ithdis tr ic t c ourt s o ve r c ivi l c a se s “ in wh ic h th e ma tte r i n c on tr ov e rs y exceeds $500 but doe s not e x cee d $100,000, excluding interest, statutory or punitive damag es and penalties, a

nd attorney ’s fe es and c osts”). B eca use the statute doe s not specifica lly exclude punitive dama g e s o r c ourt

c os ts, the y

sh ou ld b e inc lud e d w he n d e te rm ini ng a c ount y cou rt ’s a

pp e llate jurisdictional limi t. Cf. Ga rza , 155 S.W .3d at 256 (statute doe s not ex clude pun i t i v e d amag es or attorney ’s fe es so they

should be included whe n calc ulating a mount in controversy

).22 Al t h o u gh the judg ment issued by the county

court e x cee ded its jurisdictional limit ations, this did not de prive the court of jurisdiction of the ca se nor r ender

the entire judgme nt void. Cf. Cont inental Coff ee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez , 9 37 S.W. 2d 44 4, 45 0 ( Te x. 19 96 ) ( su pr e me
c ourt state d th a t it

c ou ld n ot c on c lud e that lo we r c ou rt lo st juri sd ic tio n o ve r c la im e ve n th ou g h it iss ue d a wa rd th at w a s 1 50 % o ve r i ts j ur isd ic tio na l li mit ); Kubena v. Hatc h , 193 S.W .2d 175, 177 (T e x. 19 46 ) (

jud g me nt ma y be vo id in p a rt a nd va lid in p a rt ); Oropeza v. V

aldez, 147 S.W .3d 480, 48 2- 83 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio 20 04 , n o p e t.) (c ourt c on c lud e d th a t c ounty

c ourt did no t lo se jurisdiction ove r case by issuing awa rd in excess of jurisdictional limi ts of small claims court and
con clu ded jud g me nt n ot v oid ). Ra the r, on ly the po rt ion

e xce e din g the jur isd ic tio na l li mit a tio n is void. See Carlson’s Hill Country B eve rage v. W estinghouse Rd. Joint Venture , 957 S.W .2d 951, 954, 956 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.) (in for cible detainer action, court c oncluded c laimant appea ling judg ment of justice cour t confined to jurisdictional limits of just ice c ourt for da mag es
corr esponding to r ent befor e orig inal suit filed and re formed judg ment acc ording ly); Dews v. Floyd , 413 S.W .2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App.—Ty ler 1967, no wr it) (co u rt conclude d that portion exceeding jurisdiction of court, not entire awa rd, wa s void). Ac c or din g ly , w e c on c lud e that th e po rt ion of the or ig ina l ju dg me nt i ssu e d a g a ins t Mars ha ll tha t is in e xce ss of $5 ,000 is v oid be c a us e it e xce e de d th e c ourt ’s jur isd ic tio na l li mit
. Fur ther, be cause we have conc luded that non e o f t he def enses r aised by

Saunders r elieves him of liability under the terms of the surety ag ree ment, we hold that Saunder s brea ched the ag ree ment by failing to p ay o n the bond. We there fore reve rse the por tion of the county

court’s judg ment that
c on c lud e d Sa

un de rs did no t bre a c h th e su re ty a g re e me nt a

nd wa s n ot l ia

ble fo r e xemp lary

dama g e s.Saunders’ s liabilit y for $2,266.56 in exemplary damag es is based on the fac ts that we have 5 upheld the county

court’s de terminatio n t h at S au nders wa s liable for $2,733.44 of the judg ment rende red a g ainst Marshall and that Saunders’s total liability is $5,000. 23 I n a dd iti on , be c a

us e we have c on c lud e d the or ig ina l ju dg me nt a g a ins t Ma rs ha ll e xce e de d th e c ounty court’s jurisdiction, we hold that Saunders’s liability as a sur ety

is lim ited to $5,000 and that Saunders’ s liabilit y

for e x emplary

damag es is, acc ording ly , limit ed to $2,266.56. 5
At to r ne y’ s fe e s a nd P r e -j udgm e nt Int e r e st

On a pp e a l, K e nd zior sk i a lso c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in no t awa rd inghim
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s and

pr e -j ud g me nt i nte re st a s a re su lt o f S a

un de rs ’s br e a c h o f t

he su re ty a g re e me nt. S e e Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 38.001(8) ( West 1997) (allowing rec overy of attorne y ’s fe e s in c on tr a c t c la im) ; see also Gre at Am. Ins. Co. v. North Austin Mun. Util. Dist . No. 1 , 908 S.W .2d 415, 427-28 (Te x . 1995) (sure ty on construction bond liable f o r at t o rney ’s fe es for

own fa ilure to p a y

un de r t e rm s o f b on d) ; Gramerc y Ins. Co. v

. Acadia Fin. Ltd. , 96 S.W .3d 320, 327-28 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. denied) (sure ty on bond issued under tra nsportation code liable for attorney ’s fe es for

failure to pay

when judg ment rende red a g ainst principal). Be cause we have re verse d the ju d g me nt of the trial cour t and conc luded that Saunder s brea c h e d th e s u r e ty a g r e e me n t b y f a il in g to p a y a p o rti o n o f th e e xe mp la r y d a ma g e aw ard, w e
rema nd the ca se to the co u n t y co u rt to consider what amount of attorney ’s fe es and pr e-judg ment interest, if a

ny , should be awa

rded.24 CO NC LU SION We affir m the county

co u rt ’s j udg ment reg arding Saunders’ s liabilit y for f raud. Ho we ve r, we re ve rs e the pa rt of the ju dg me nt t

ha t c on c lud e d Sa

un de rs did

no t br e a c h th e su re ty
a g r e e m e n t a n d w a s n o t l i a b l e f o r e xe m p l a r

y d a m a g e s a n d r e n d e r j u d g m e n t t h a t S a u n d e r s is l ia ble fo r $ 1, 33 4 in

c omp e ns a tor

y dama g e s, $1 ,3 99 .4 4 in

c ourt c os ts, a n d $ 2 , 2 6 6
. 5 6 i n

e xemp lary

dama g e s. Fur ther, we rema

nd this case f

or a de termination of whe ther Ke ndziorski i s entitled to attorney ’s fe es
a nd pr e -j ud g me nt i nte re st.

David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med in Part; Reverse d and Remande d in Part Filed: Mar ch 30, 2006