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S. HRG. 113–139

PROSPECTS FOR AFGHANISTAN’S 2014 ELECTIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 21, 2013

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania, opening statement ...................................................................................................................... 1

Chayes, Sarah, senior associate, South Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace, Washington, DC .......................................................... 22

Boot, Max, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Securities, Council of Foreign Relations, Washington, DC .......................................................... 24

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 27

Pearce, Hon. David, Deputy Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ...................................................... 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Robert P. 

Casey, Jr. ....................................................................................................... 36

Sedney, David, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC ......... 9

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Robert P. 

Casey, Jr. ....................................................................................................... 38

Wilder, Dr. Andrew, director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC ........................................................................... 16

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 18

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1)

PROSPECTS FOR AFGHANISTAN’S

2014 ELECTIONS 

TUESDAY, MAY 21, 2013 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P. Casey, Jr. 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Casey and McCain. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator CASEY. Well, this hearing will come to order. We are 

sorry about the delay. I know our witnesses understood that we 

just had a longer session regarding Syria and important work that 

had to be done. So we are grateful for the patience of our 

witnesses. 

I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. 

I will have a statement I will try to get through as quickly as 

I can. 

I am joined by Senator McCain, and I am grateful for his presence here. 

Today the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs meets to discuss Afghanistan’s Presidential and provincial elections scheduled to take place 

on April 5, 2014. While these elections are almost a year away, 

preparations must begin now, given that their outcome will determine the success or failure of the international effort in Afghanistan. Simply put, the stakes could not be higher. 

These elections come at a pivotal time. A full-fledged security 

transition from international forces to Afghan forces is already 

underway. The United States is deliberating troop levels post-2014 

and negotiating a bilateral security agreement with the Afghan 

Government. The success of the security transition depends in 

large part on political stability and whether a majority of the 

Afghan people see their next government as legitimate and acceptable. If not, we can expect ongoing political strife and possibly a 

return to civil war. 

That is why preparing for successful and credible elections must 

be one of our top priorities in Afghanistan. The American people 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2

and the Congress will be watching this election process closely as 

we determine future investments in this important relationship. 

As we begin this conversation about the 2014 Afghan Presidential and provincial elections, I want to make one thing clear at 

the outset. The United States nor others in the international community should not be seen to interfere in these upcoming elections. 

This is an Afghan exercise, an Afghan election, whose outcome 

should be solely determined by the Afghan people. The U.S. role is 

to support an open, transparent, credible, and inclusive election 

process, but should in no way seek to determine the actual outcome. 

The United States does, however, have a stake in the election 

process, and the equation is quite simple. If these elections are 

seen as transparent, credible, and inclusive, the United States and 

Afghanistan’s allies will continue to support Afghanistan’s development and commitments made in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability 

Framework. If not, we can expect to see many countries, including 

the United States, possibly dramatically reduce funding and support for Afghanistan. After so many years of sacrifice by our service 

men and women, U.S. taxpayers will have no patience for a flawed 

election. United States support for independent electoral administration mechanisms and respect for the Afghan Constitution, reflect 

a respect for Afghanistan’s sovereignty and a desire to ensure that 

hard fought gains for Afghanistan’s democratic system are not lost. 

Furthermore, a transparent, credible, and inclusive election process will be an important determinant of the stability of the country. 

If key blocs in Afghanistan do not believe that the elections are 

inclusive and credible, we could face a similar scenario to the 1990s 

when disaffected factions expressed their political views through 

violence. It goes without saying that the United States and regional 

actors are deeply interested in ensuring that Afghanistan does not 

devolve into a civil war like it did then. 

Today Senator McCain and I introduced a Senate resolution 

which emphasizes our concern that a flawed election process could 

have a significantly negative impact on the stability of the country. 

We hope that this resolution will send a clear message to Afghan 

authorities that the United States is committed to investing in 

Afghanistan’s future and it is largely contingent on the quality of 

the election process. 

So far, the election preparations have been hampered by a lack 

of a legal framework governing electoral bodies, their composition, 

and conduct. Last June, I sent a letter to Secretary Clinton 

expressing my concerns about the Independent Electoral Commission, the so-called IEC, and the Electoral Complaints Commission 

known as ECC. Since then, there has been little progress made by 

Afghan authorities. President Karzai recently vetoed a law passed 

by Parliament which would set the terms for the Independent Electoral Commission and the Complaints Commission. The independence of these bodies is critical because it speaks to the ultimate 

impartiality of the elections and helps to build confidence in the 

electoral process. 

Moving forward, I would recommend that the U.S. administration consider the following measures—only three—to improve the 

prospects for the elections. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3

No. 1, the United States should send a clear message to the 

Afghan people that we consider the integrity of this process to be 

a top priority and have dedicated key personnel to the task. The 

election does not appear to be the sole purview of any one of our 

five Ambassadors on the ground in Kabul. Like we did for the 2009 

elections, the United States should designate a senior-level position 

in Embassy Kabul to focus solely on coordinating policies and programs for the elections. Former National Security Advisor, Stephen 

Hadley, and former White House Chief of Staff, John Podesta, have 

also made this important recommendation to the administration, 

and I hope it is considered seriously. 

No. 2, the United States should continue to reiterate the importance of holding the election on April 5, 2014. Allowing the election 

to slip would diminish public confidence in the process and could 

have security implications if international forces draw down troops 

throughout the course of the year. 

Third, the United States should continue to call for the adoption 

of an election law that establishes a transparent and inclusive 

Electoral Commission and Complaints Commission. 

Fourth, the United States should express its support for the 

appointment of Supreme Court Justices to replace those whose 

terms have expired. 

During President Karzai’s visit to Washington in January, he 

reiterated his intention to step down at the end of the term. The 

President told me in a meeting and he told others at the meeting 

that he wanted to be the first democratically elected President of 

Afghanistan to transfer power to the second democratically elected 

President. This is a powerful and inspiring statement. President 

Karzai has a golden opportunity to cement a positive and long-lasting legacy with these elections, one that I hope—I hope—he will 

seize. 

The United States has sacrificed greatly in support of a stable 

and prosperous Afghanistan free from extremism. Based on these 

sacrifices and any future investments in the country, the United 

States should clearly and unequivocally continue to express support 

in word and deed for a democratic culture based upon transparent, 

credible, and inclusive election processes that protect the rights of 

all Afghans. 

So today, we are fortunate to have with us two witnesses who 

can speak the United States policy in Afghanistan: the State 

Department’s Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, Ambassador David Pearce, who is with us; and Dr. David 

Sedney, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, and Central Asia. I appreciate both being here and we 

will get to your statements in 1 minute, 1 brief minute. 

Our second panel will be Dr. Andrew Wilder, director of Afghanistan and Pakistan programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace; Ms. 

Sarah Chayes, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Mr. Max Boot, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior 

Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign 

Relations. 

We thank all for being with us today, and Ambassador Pearce, 

we will start with your statement. If you can try to keep it to 5, 

I promise my questions will be short. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID PEARCE, DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador PEARCE. Thanks a lot, Senator. It is great to be 

here, and I really appreciate the invitation. 

Senator McCain, good to see you again too. I think the last time 

was in Kabul in Ambassador Crocker’s era when I was the Assistant Chief of Mission there, sir. 

First of all, Ambassador Dobbins was just sworn in on May 10, 

and he tells me that he would like me to convey the fact that he 

is looking forward to working with you as well, sir, in the future. 

And on behalf of both Secretary Kerry and Ambassador Dobbins, 

let me say that we really do appreciate the role of this subcommittee and all the attention that you are bringing to this 

important issue. 

And I would say, Senator, you have already stolen a lot of my 

talking points. So I think it will be easier for me to dispense with 

part of my statement here. 

But as requested, I will try to focus on the elections, and I can 

tell you that Secretary Kerry has no higher priority. A peaceful 

transition of Presidential authority, together with the provincial 

council elections that will happen at the same time, can cement the 

gains of Afghan society and set the trajectory for Afghanistan’s stability long into the future. So as you said, sir, the stakes are high. 

For more than a decade, President Karzai has led the country 

through some very difficult times, but the biggest part is yet to 

come, and that is handing over power next year. He has stated 

repeatedly that he will honor the constitution and step down. And 

as you said, indeed, nothing will do more to cement his legacy than 

that. 

Success requires that the election results be acceptable to a 

broad majority of Afghans, including those who voted for losing 

candidates, this so that Afghan citizens throughout the country 

accept the winner as legitimate President. A peaceful and constitutional transfer of power of this kind will send a strong signal to all, 

including the Taliban, about the resilience of Afghanistan’s democratic institutions. 

As Secretary Kerry said in January right here, if we do not succeed in helping the Afghans administer an acceptable election, it 

will be very difficult to convince the American people and our allies 

to stay engaged in this effort. 

So let me review first what the Afghans themselves are doing 

and then a little bit about what we are doing. 

First of all, in security, the security ministries—and David will 

address this in more detail—in regular consultation with ISAF, are 

engaged in active planning. The Independent Elections Commission 

has produced a list of about 7,000 polling stations which the ministries are reviewing, and the Afghan forces will take the lead on 

election day, as in the past, but we will still have forces on the 

ground to provide appropriate support. 

But meanwhile, with encouragement from the international community, the Elections Commission has outlined a timeline for the 

elections, designed a public relations campaign to educate voters 

about the process, and developed a comprehensive operational plan 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5

to combat fraud and increase participation, including of women. 

The IEC is also undertaking efforts to conduct voter registration to 

ensure that all who are eligible to vote will have an opportunity to 

do so. 

These are all positive developments, but that is not to say that 

there are not some challenges. One, of course, is security. The 

Afghans are holding an election amid an ongoing insurgency in a 

country where institutions are still developing. We expect the 

Taliban to try to disrupt the process both in the lead up to and on 

election day, as they have in the past. 

The next issue, as you mentioned, sir, is the necessary legislation 

to establish a sound electoral framework. It has not yet been finalized, and time is running short as candidates prepare to form their 

tickets and register in September. President Karzai and the Parliament are working on these issues. One of the key tasks is standing up a truly independent electoral complaints body to adjudicate 

electoral disputes and a credible appointment of a new IEC chairperson. While Afghans must decide precisely what these mechanisms should look like and who belongs in these positions, the process must be credible. We believe an electoral framework, based on 

law and founded on broad and inclusive consultations, is the best 

way to do that. 

Finally, as you said, there are Supreme Court Justices whose 

constitutional terms have expired, and it is past time for them to 

be removed and replaced. This will help legitimize the Court’s decisions and solidify confidence in the process. This is significant 

because the Supreme Court may rule, as it has in the past, on constitutional issues related to the elections. 

And as for the United States and the international community, 

well, first let me say what we are not going to do. The United 

States will not take sides or endorse any candidate in these elections. 

On security I will defer to David Sedney, but I will note that we 

are focusing particular efforts on improved access for women to 

polling centers by supporting the IEC gender strategy and recruitment of qualified female election staff, promoting public outreach 

to women, and ensuring that female searchers are available to 

secure polling locations. 

And as I said, we have three near-term electoral priorities: the 

legislation to make sure we have got an independent body to adjudicate complaints, appointment of a credible IEC commissioner, followup on the IEC operational plan. 

And then to advance these, Senator, the Embassy in Kabul is 

engaging intensively with election officials, security ministries, 

Parliament, opposition, political parties, civil society, and women’s 

organizations. We emphasize that all parties should stay engaged 

in the election preparations to ensure a good process and avoid a 

disputed outcome. We speak with political leaders about the importance of our bilateral partnership and the need for this work to 

continue with the next President. We discuss our security relationship, Afghan commitments to the Tokyo Framework, support for an 

Afghan peace process, and preserving the gains of the last 10 

years, including protections for women and minorities. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6

Afghan political players understand that a peaceful political 

transition, following an inclusive, unifying electoral process, is critical not just for Afghan stability but also to sustaining international commitments. 

Senator, we need to remain realistic and recognize that these 

elections will not be perfect. There will be irregularities. Security 

will be such probably in some parts of the country that people may 

not be able to vote. And that is why we have been providing significant financial and program assistance to help our Afghan partners 

build credible and independent electoral institutions. We coordinate 

closely with the United Nations and other donors on training, public information campaigns, fraud mitigation, domestic observation 

efforts, and improved ways to identify eligible voters. 

As the Secretary said in Kabul in February, these elections 

should represent a unifying moment for Afghanistan. They are the 

best chance Afghans will have to heal the wounds of the past decade and to begin the process of putting the conflict behind them. 

So, Mr. Chairman, we look forward to continuing to work with 

you and the committee and the subcommittee and look forward to 

taking your questions today, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pearce follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR DAVID D. PEARCE

INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Senator Casey, for the invitation to appear before the subcommittee. 

Ambassador Dobbins was just sworn in as Special Representative for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan on May 10 and asked me to convey to the members of the subcommittee that he looks forward to working with you. 

On behalf of both Secretary Kerry and Ambassador Dobbins, let me just say the 

Department of State appreciates the helpful role that the subcommittee has played 

in focusing attention on a host of important issues in South and Central Asia, and 

particularly your focus on Afghanistan. Your travel to the region and your continuing conversations with Afghan officials signal congressional attention to all of 

these issues. 

Today, as requested, I will focus on the elections, and I can tell you Secretary 

Kerry has no higher priority. They are at the very center of all that we are trying 

to achieve. In our Strategic Partnership Agreement, Afghanistan reaffirmed its commitment to democratic governance and free, fair, and transparent elections. The 

2014 Presidential election, now less than a year away, will be a milestone in 

Afghanistan’s democratic development. 

The elections will be an opportunity for Afghan men and women to choose what 

kind of country they want to live in, what kind of leaders they want to empower, 

and, ultimately, how they will resolve the conflict that has divided their country for 

so many years. The Presidential election, together with the 2014 provincial council 

elections, will cement the gains of Afghan society and set the trajectory for Afghanistan’s stability long into the future.So the stakes are high. 

The elections are not happening in a void. Today, Afghans are defending their 

country against the insurgents, and our troops are starting the long journey home. 

This transition is extremely challenging—and it is critical we get it, along with the 

election and our long-term partnership, right. That is why we signed the Strategic 

Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan, and it is why we have placed such great 

emphasis on the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. Both link the success of 

the elections to our long-term partnership and to the continued support of the international community. 

For pessimists out there, I’d like to point out that Pakistan just came through an 

election campaign with violence, fraud allegations, and other enormous challenges, 

but few doubt that the results represent the voice of the Pakistani people. While 

the parallels are not precise, Afghans nevertheless can take heart in this democratic 

transition and understand that they control the direction of their future. 

The United States firmly believes that the future stability of Afghanistan rests 

on a peaceful transition of political authority from President Karzai to his successor 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

7

in 2014 following a democratic, inclusive, and credible election. For more than a decade, President Karzai has led the country through some very transformative and 

difficult times, but the biggest piece is yet to come: handing over power next year. 

Today’s hearing takes place exactly 1 year before the last day of President Karzai’s 

term of office. He has stated repeatedly that he will honor the Constitution and step 

down, and nothing will cement his legacy more as an Afghan patriot and democratic 

leader. For our part, we will do all we can to help ensure that a year from today, 

Afghanistan experiences the first peaceful and constitutional transfer of power in 

its history. 

Success requires that the election results be acceptable to a broad majority of 

Afghans—including those who voted for losing candidates—so that Afghan citizens 

throughout the country accept the winner as the legitimate President. Such a 

handover of power will send a strong signal to all—including the Taliban—about the 

resilience of Afghanistan’s democratic institutions and the paramount importance of 

the Constitution and rule of law. 

After years of service in the Senate and frequent trips to Afghanistan, no one understands better than Secretary Kerry the stakes involved. As he said here in his 

testimony in January, if we don’t succeed in helping Afghans administer an acceptable election, it will be very difficult to convince the American people and our allies 

to stay engaged in this effort. 

AFGHAN PREPARATIONS FOR THE ELECTIONS

I would like to report to you on what the Afghans are doing themselves to make 

Secretary Kerry’s words a reality. The Afghan Government, election officials, opposition leaders and civil society understand that having a sound democratic framework 

for the elections in place well in advance of election day is critical to Afghan 

stability, as well as to sustaining international commitments to Afghanistan. With 

encouragement from the international community, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) has outlined a timeline for the elections, designed a public relations 

campaign to educate voters about the process, and developed a comprehensive operational plan to combat fraud and increase participation, including of women. The 

IEC is also undertaking efforts to conduct voter registration to ensure that all who 

are eligible to vote will have the opportunity to do so. 

Security preparations are well under way. The Afghan security ministries, in consultation with ISAF, are engaged in active planning, including for access of women 

to polling stations. The IEC has produced a list of polling stations, which the security ministries are reviewing. Afghan forces will take the lead for security on election day as in the past, but we will still have forces on the ground to provide appropriate support. 

These are all positive developments. And though the planning process can be 

slow, it is achieving results. This is not to say there are not serious challenges. The 

necessary legislation to establish a sound electoral framework has not yet been 

finalized, and time is running short as candidates prepare to form their tickets and 

register in September. President Karzai and the Parliament are working on these 

issues. One of the key tasks is standing up a truly independent electoral complaints 

body to adjudicate electoral disputes and a credible appointment of a new IEC chairperson. While Afghans must decide precisely what these mechanisms should look 

like, and who belongs in these positions, the process must be credible. We believe 

an electoral framework based on law, founded on broad and inclusive consultations, 

is the best way to achieve that. 

Additionally, it is important that the Supreme Court justices whose constitutional 

terms have expired, be removed and replaced. This will help legitimize the Court’s 

decisions and solidify confidence in the process. This is critical as the Supreme 

Court may rule, as in the past, on fundamental constitutional matters related to the 

elections. 

And apropos of security, let’s not forget that Afghans are faced with holding an 

election amid an ongoing insurgency in a country in which institutions are still 

developing. We expect the Taliban to try to disrupt the process both in the leadup to and on election day as they have in the past. We have to be realistic and 

acknowledge that this will be a challenge to the process. 

SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

What are we doing to keep this process on track? First, let me tell you what we 

will not do. The United States will not take sides or endorse any candidate in these 

elections, as ultimately this election belongs to the Afghans. A fair and inclusive 

electoral process and a unifying, widely accepted outcome are key to achieving our 

goal of strengthening Afghan democracy. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

8

We have identified three near-term priorities that we believe will lay a solid foundation for credible elections. First, as I mentioned, this includes Parliament passing 

legislation that to establish a truly independent body to adjudicate complaints. Second, the IEC must be led by a credible and competent commissioner. And third, the 

IEC needs to finalize and begin to implement its operational plan. Our colleagues 

at U.S. Embassy Kabul are engaging intensively with Afghans across the board to 

achieve these goals. This includes election officials, security ministries, parliament, 

opposition, political parties, civil society, and women’s organizations in support of 

Afghan aspirations for elections that are as free, fair, and transparent as they can 

possibly be. 

And while the United States will not support any particular candidate, we believe 

that Afghans will want their next President to be someone who can work in close 

partnership with the international community to achieve our mutual interests. And 

so we are speaking with political leaders on the importance of our bilateral partnership and the need for our important work to continue with Afghanistan’s next 

President. This includes important issues like our security relationship, Afghan 

commitments on the Tokyo framework, support for an Afghan peace process, and 

preserving the gains of the last 10 years, including protections for women and 

minorities. We also emphasize that all parties should stay engaged in the election 

preparations to ensure a good process and avoid a disputed outcome. 

We see signs that Afghans are now working to identify candidates well in advance 

of the elections. Key political leaders from major parties and groupings have been 

engaging with each other about who should run and on what platforms. Civil society 

and women’s groups are actively engaged with government, political leaders, and 

the international community. We applaud efforts to put aside old animosities and 

forge consensus, engage in genuine national dialogue, and place the good of the 

nation ahead of factional or personal interests. That’s what democracy, at its best, 

is all about. 

Of course, we need to remain realistic and recognize that these elections will not 

be perfect—there will be irregularities and security will be such in parts of the 

country that people may not be able to vote. This is why we have been providing 

significant financial and program assistance to help our Afghan partners build credible and independent electoral institutions. We coordinate closely with the U.N. and 

other donors on training, public information campaigns, fraud mitigation, domestic 

observation efforts, and improved ways to identify eligible voters. 

We are committed to supporting IEC plans to combat fraud by better controlling 

ballots and training and vetting its staff. We view transparency is key to reducing 

fraud, and therefore we are also encouraging a strong program of domestic monitoring of elections. 

On security, we are strengthening the capacity of the ANSF to secure the elections with ISAF support. As part of this we are focusing particular efforts on ensuring women have greater access to polling centers than in prior election cycles by 

supporting the IEC’s gender strategy and recruitment of qualified female election 

staff, promoting public outreach to women, and ensuring that female searchers are 

available to secure polling locations. 

Most importantly, we regularly discuss with our Afghan partners the nature of 

our enduring partnership. Afghan political players and members of civil society 

understand that a peaceful political transition following an inclusive and unifying 

electoral process is critical not just for Afghan stability but also to sustaining international commitments to Afghanistan made last year in Chicago and Tokyo. 

CONCLUSION

National dialogue among all Afghans through political processes is critical to ending the decades of conflict. This will take time. But successful elections can promote 

this dialogue and provide a real spark to a peace process, as they will send a strong 

signal that Afghanistan’s democratic institutions enshrined in its 2004 Constitution 

are an enduring reality. Pluralism and tolerance are bedrock principles of democracy. These elections offer an opportunity to bring many Afghans into the political 

process who have previously stayed on the margins. 

As Secretary Kerry said in Kabul in February, the elections should represent a 

unifying moment for Afghanistan. We see the success of the elections as critical to 

our own mission and as giving the Afghans the best chance they have at healing 

the wounds of the past decade and beginning the process of putting the conflict 

behind them. 

Mr. Chairman, we look forward to continuing to work with you, your office, and 

this committee on these important issues in the months ahead. And I look forward 

to taking your questions today.

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

9

Senator CASEY. Thanks very much. 

Mr. Sedney. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID SEDNEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Mr. SEDNEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

McCain. 

I also had the pleasure of hosting you in Afghanistan many years 

ago when we were together in the rocks beneath the destroyed 

bombing and statues. I recall your conversation with a young 

Afghan boy. It was one really inspiring moment. So thank you, sir. 

Today, from the Department of Defense, I am here to review 

where we are in security-related planning for the political transition next year. But first I want to make sure I put this in the context of our overall effort in Afghanistan and the historic transition 

that the security forces are undergoing right now. 

In 2008, after years of underinvestment in Afghanistan, the Taliban had resurged and were at the gates of Kabul and Kandahar. 

In many ways, failure stared us in the face. 

Following a surge to Afghanistan of military and civilians, 

greater investment in the Afghan National Security Forces, we 

have arrived at a point where the Afghan security forces number 

close to 350,000 and are in the process this year of taking the lead 

for security in their entire country, with our continuing support, 

but they are in the lead. Over 90 percent of the operations that the 

Afghan security forces are carrying out—of security operations in 

Afghanistan are now being carried out with Afghanistan forces in 

the lead. That is what is happening this summer. 

This will be preparation for the Afghan security forces taking the 

lead, as you said, Mr. Chairman, for an Afghan-led elections process in the spring of next year. This is a testing time for the Afghan 

security forces as they take up this challenge of the lead. So far, 

the returns are very good in terms that they are meeting that challenge. There are areas of success and areas of failure. So at the 

same time that the election preparation is going on, the Afghan 

security forces are stepping up to this new challenge. 

Wherever the Taliban have taken territory from the Afghan security forces, the Afghan security forces have, in turn, reattacked and 

taken it back. They are in the process of building that security that 

will be necessary for the elections. 

As the Afghan security forces step into that new role, they are 

also working with the Elections Commission and the rest of the 

Afghan Government to prepare for the elections next year. The 

entities involved, primarily the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of 

Defense, have reviewed what happened in 2008 and 2009 and 

2010, and similar to that, a three-tier security model will be used 

with the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and the National 

Director of Security, the intelligence agency responsible for providing security around the polling station in different layers. 

It is important to note that the planning and logistics capabilities 

of the Afghan security forces have improved greatly since 2008, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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2009, and 2010, the last election cycle. They still have, however, a 

lot of challenges. 

This year, however, planning is well ahead of where it was 5 

years ago in 2008. The security ministries are completing security 

assessments, and we expect those to be done before candidate registrations in September of this year. 

In March, the IEC, working together with the security ministries, put forward a comprehensive operational plan, something 

that was not there in the 2009 and 2010 elections. This plan is a 

comprehensive document dealing with all the requirements for the 

elections. While not a security plan, it includes a discussion and a 

setting forth of security requirements that will enable the Ministry 

of Defense and Ministry of Interior to continue their planning and 

do a better job than 5 years ago. 

However, I would like to stress that there are challenges. While 

security planning, as I said, is ahead of where it was 5 years ago, 

levels of violence are much higher in 2013 than they were in 2008 

and 2009. As we draw down our forces, the stakes are higher and 

the complexity of the operation that the Afghan security forces will 

be undertaking is greater than that they faced in 2008 and 2009. 

However, the returns so far of the way the Afghan security forces 

are stepping up to the new tasks they are taking on this year give 

great promise that they will be able to meet the requirements of 

security for the elections in April of next year. 

With that, Mr. Senator, I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sedney follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVID SEDNEY

Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, members of the subcommittee, thank 

you for this opportunity to provide the Department of Defense perspective on the 

current outlook for the Afghan Presidential and provincial council elections in 2014. 

Today, I plan to review the current state of security-related planning for a successful political transition next year. But first, I want to place the discussion in the 

context of our overall effort in Afghanistan and recognize the truly historic transition that is underway. Over 11 years ago, in response to one of the worst attacks 

on our homeland, the United States, together with our allies and partners, initiated 

a campaign in Afghanistan to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates, with the mission to ensure that it would never again become a safe haven from 

which terrorists could launch attacks on the United States and to ensure the 

Taliban did not regain power through force. In 2008, after years of underinvestment 

in Afghanistan, the Taliban had resurged and were at the gates of Kabul and 

Kandahar. Failure stared us in the face. In 2009, after reviewing our Afghan policy, 

President Obama ordered a surge of U.S. troops and civilians to give us the chance 

to reverse the insurgency’s momentum while, for the first time, effectively building 

an Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) capable of defeating the Taliban. The 

President’s message drew strong response from our coalition partners and new commitments from many countries that had previously stood aside from the Afghan 

effort as they saw it as too little and too late. Ever more importantly, Afghans also 

saw new hope and began flooding in to join the Afghan security forces in unprecedented numbers. These forces grew from roughly 170,000 in May 2009 to over 

335,000 today currently fielded or in training, and we went from too few recruits 

to turning away tens of thousands. As a result of the concerted effort by the 

Afghans, U.S. and coalition partners along multiple lines of effort—military, diplomatic, reconstruction, governance, and economic development—we have seen a remarkable turnaround in Afghanistan, most dramatically in the security area. The 

ANSF grew from a static force with severely limited combat capability to a force 

conducting corps-level combined army and police operations, as well as border security enforcement. 

Over the past 12 months the ANSF, particularly the Afghan National Army 

(ANA), have made remarkable progress—now leading over 80 percent of operations 

and carrying out many unilaterally. They have succeeded well beyond expectations 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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and when they have encountered tactical failure—the loss of territory or a battlefield setback—they have re-attacked, retaken territory, and pushed the Taliban 

back. The Afghan Government will soon announce Milestone 2013, at which point 

the Afghans will assume the security lead for 100 percent of the Afghan population 

and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will shift to a support-role. 

The Afghans are entering a fundamentally new phase as they assume the sovereign 

responsibilities that will put them on a path toward self-reliance. Holding a legitimate election process that enables a peaceful transition of power will be a milestone 

in Afghanistan’s path forward. 

The Presidential and provincial council elections, set for April 5, 2014, hold promise to be the first constitutional transfer of power from one President to another in 

Afghanistan’s history. For the first time, Afghans will be solely responsible for administering the process and providing security with international forces in support 

only. A credible process with the fullest possible voter participation is critical. The 

challenge for Afghans will be to demonstrate that elections have qualitatively 

improved since 2009–2010 with the implementation of better fraud-mitigation procedures and more polling stations accessible to eligible voters. Helping Afghans 

achieve a peaceful transfer of authority in 2014 is one of the administration’s highest priorities in Afghanistan, with DOD focused on the security front. However, I 

want to highlight that this will be an Afghan-led process. In accordance with the 

overall security transition and respect for Afghan sovereignty, ISAF, including U.S. 

forces, will maintain a support role during the elections process: ISAF will be prepared to take action only when—and only if—requested by the Afghan Government. 

Support will likely be in logistics, intelligence, route clearance, and in extremis support. As a contingency, ISAF will be prepared to deploy quick reaction forces in the 

event the ANSF are not able to provide for the safety of members of the international community, such as election observers. Together with their Afghan counterparts, coalition forces will have the ability to provide a rapid response in the event 

security deteriorates beyond the ANSF’s ability to control. 

There are several Afghan entities that play a role in security planning for the upcoming election. While the Independent Election Commission (IEC) has the lead in 

election administration and supervision, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) has an overall coordinating role for security of the electoral process, with support from the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the National Directorate of Security (NDS). Similar to 

the 2009–2010 election security model, a three-tier approach will be employed to secure the polling centers, with MoI, MoD, and NDS responsible for providing security 

around the polling stations. It is important to note that the ANSF conducted security for earlier elections, and their planning and logistics capabilities have improved 

considerably since then. Planning has benefited from lessons learned in previous 

elections. Furthermore, the Afghan forces providing security for this election has 

almost doubled in number since 2009. 

Following lessons learned from the 2009 and 2010 elections, the U.S. Government 

has encouraged early and close liaison among the IEC and the security ministries. 

The IEC has already started coordinating with the MoI and MoD on security planning. At the end of February 2013, the IEC provided the MoI with a list of almost 

7,000 polling centers to allow the MoI ample time to conduct security assessments 

for each site, take measures to open stations that had not been accessible previously, and provide adequate time for the delivery of election materials. The security ministries are scheduled to complete security assessments before candidate registration begins in mid-September 2013. In March 2013, the IEC, together with the 

security ministries, released a comprehensive operational plan a year ahead of the 

elections—something that we did not achieve in the run up to the 2009 and 2010 

elections. The IEC operational plan is a comprehensive document detailing voter 

registration and voting procedures, training and fielding of observers, fraud mitigation, and public messaging, both to encourage participation and to explain procedures. While not a security plan, it does include some discussion of security considerations for the main components of the electoral process, the general concept of 

security operations, and processes that support the IEC Security Operations 

mission. 

Although election preparations are progressing, challenges remain. Afghan security institutions have yet to turn their full attention to security planning, having 

focused resources on the current fight and its challenges while also helping support 

voter registration and roll-out of the e-tazkera, the biometrically linked electronic 

national identity card. The MoI began an e-tazkera pilot program in Kabul in midApril, which will expand nationwide once voter registration begins; however, 

progress on the issuance of e-tazkeras has been slow. Public demand for the

e-tazkera has increased as public awareness of the program has become more widespread. This places the MoI under considerable pressure to meet demand and will 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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continue to present a challenge for the MoI, as they work to meet their very aggressive goal of enrolling 14 million Afghans by March 31, 2014. Despite earlier and 

closer coordination between the IEC and security ministries, communication 

between these institutions has been poor and still needs improvement. ISAF will 

continue to support MoI and MoD to prepare effective security plans and facilitate 

closer coordination between the two ministries and with the IEC. While security 

planning for the 2014 election is ahead of the 2009 election, levels of violence are 

much higher in 2013 than in 2008. With the anticipated drawdown of U.S. and coalition forces by the end of 2014, the stakes are much higher, and the political complexity of an election without an incumbent makes the risk greater than in the past. 

The 2014 Presidential election presents an opportunity for the Afghan Government to demonstrate its ability to conduct a peaceful democratic transition of political power; however, the election will also challenge the government to conduct an 

election that is viewed by the Afghan people and international community to be legitimate. The United States continues to urge consultation in these efforts among 

President Karzai, Parliament, the IEC, the political opposition, and civil society 

organizations to help ensure that decisions ultimately have buy-in from the Afghan 

population. Secure, transparent, and orderly elections in 2014 will be important to 

a peaceful transfer of power and, ultimately, the recognition by the Afghan people 

that the government is both legitimate and representative of Afghanistan.

Senator CASEY. Thanks very much, Mr. Sedney. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And it is good to see both of you again, and thank you for your 

years of service as Members of Congress parachute in and out and 

tell you what you ought to be doing. I appreciate your patience and 

your forbearance on those occasions. 

It seems to me that there are several seminal events or situations that will determine success or failure, and let me just run 

through a couple of them real quick. 

One we cannot do a lot about and that is the Pakistan safe 

haven. 

Another, of course, is corruption in the Karzai government. 

Another is the number of troops that we will leave behind in a 

residual force in 2014. 

And, of course, the other is the funding for the Afghan security 

forces in order to maintain a force of 352,000. Now, it is my understanding that that is around $5 billion. And at Chicago, there was 

only $4.1 billion, and of course, these conferences are pretty well 

known for pledges that never really become reality. 

So I think, Mr. Chairman, that we do have a vote coming up. So 

maybe I could just ask them to respond to those so that you would 

have an opportunity. Maybe we could have some responses, your 

views on each of those. Those are not the only issues that face us, 

but I think that you would agree that that summarizes at least 

most of the major challenges. 

Mr. SEDNEY. Thank you, Senator. Everything you have laid out 

is certainly a challenge. 

Taking them in the same order, the Pakistan safe havens exist 

now. My comments about the success that the Afghan security 

forces are having now in holding their own includes operations that 

build upon the layered security along the border, that layer of security design that ISAF put in place with the Afghans now moving 

into the lead on that as well. But it is, nevertheless, a challenge. 

The insurgents get to back into Pakistan for resting, refitting, planning, rearming, all that. And it will be a challenge for the Afghan 

security forces to maintain security this year and during the elections with those safe havens there. They will learn a lot this year 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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about how well they are able to do that and how well they are able 

to do that with less support from us as our forces continue and 

ISAF forces continue to reduce. 

In terms of corruption, I will leave that for my colleague, Ambassador Pearce. But there is certainly corruption in the security 

forces as well. I am not saying it is civilian. 

In terms of the number of United States forces, as you know, 

Senator, President Obama announced at the State of the Union 

that we will withdraw half of the forces we have now, so we will 

have 34,000 forces in Afghanistan in February of next year. Those 

forces will be there for the election period. 

Senator MCCAIN. The key, I think, is the number following that, 

the permanent support force that is going to be there for the foreseeable future. There are estimates ranging from 20,000 down to 

13,000 down to 5,000. And I would argue that the sooner the 

Afghans know that, the more predictable they believe their future 

will be. Would you agree? 

Mr. SEDNEY. I agree that the continuing presence and commitment of the United States and others is really important. In terms 

of the final decision, as you know, that has not been made yet. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you have any idea when that decision might 

be made? 

Mr. SEDNEY. I am afraid I do not, Mr. Senator, but I will take 

your comments and your question back with me. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Mr. SEDNEY. On the funding for the Afghan security forces, you 

are correct about the increased amount. Part of that comes because 

we are looking to provide additional enablers for the Afghan security forces beyond those that we thought we would need last year, 

trying to get such things as helicopters, artillery in place more 

quickly and to give the Afghans the ability to operate independently. Some of that additional amount was reflected in the OCO 

budget that was submitted to Congress for the coming fiscal year. 

That will entail some additional cost beyond the original estimates 

and we are still working on those numbers. 

Senator MCCAIN. Did you want to say anything about corruption 

in the Karzai government? 

Ambassador PEARCE. Well, sir, as you know—you have been 

yourself to Afghanistan so many times—it is a fundamental challenge. It has been for some time and it will be for a while. 

The government has committed to reducing corruption and 

increasing transparency and accountability and building judicial 

capacity and the rule of law. But, of course, there is a lot to do. 

They pledged to fight it at Bonn. They reaffirmed it last July in 

Tokyo. Of course, this is one of the fundamental things that the 

international community is going to be looking at very closely going 

forward. 

We have, as you noted, made substantial undertakings to work 

to secure funds going forward after 2014, both in Chicago at the 

NATO conference for the Afghan National Security Forces and in 

Tokyo. But it is clear that your very question in this setting shows 

what the issue is, that if we are going to be able to follow through 

on the commitments that we have made and which are quite 

sincere, then this is going to be an important factor in that, and 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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the international community is going to be watching that very 

closely. 

I would just say in that regard, though, that it really does tie 

into the political framework, political transition, and the whole 

question of the elections and the reason that Senator Casey called 

this meeting today. 

And I would just note, sir, I have been in SRAP for the last year 

or so, and I was in Kabul for a year before that. And I think that 

there is a lot of attention, first, on the drawdown of troops. There 

is also a civilian drawdown, as you know, that is going to be going 

on at the same time. I would argue that one of the important 

things that has changed in the last couple of years, which does not 

get a lot of attention, is the really patient, block-by-block political 

and diplomatic work that has been done to put in place an architecture of support for Afghanistan that was not there before. Two 

years ago, the kind of support that we have now just was not there. 

And now we have had conferences in Bonn and Berlin and 

Istanbul very importantly for the region to be invested in the 

future of Afghanistan in a much greater degree than they were 

before and Chicago and Tokyo, of course. And I think what that 

has done is—and, of course, more than a dozen bilateral security 

agreements as well, not only ours, but India and the Europeans 

and Japan and Australia, the Scandinavian countries. This means 

that there is an architecture of support for Afghanistan that is a 

new factor, and I think it has changed the equation in the region. 

It has affected the calculations of the regional countries, and I 

think it has affected the calculations of the Afghans. 

And I believe that this has opened up additional political space. 

And that is the backdrop that these elections are going to take 

place in. That is the backdrop that the possibilities for reconciliation and the peace process will take place in, and that is the backdrop for the larger political transition in Afghanistan. 

So, yes, I think, corruption is a problem. Our decisions on the 

post-2014 presence are going to be extraordinarily important. They 

are going to have not only a practical military impact, but a very 

important psychological impact. But there are really opportunities 

too, and I think that some of these things are in the political area. 

Thank you. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Ambassador Pearce, I wanted to get back to something you mentioned and I mentioned as well, the Supreme Court and the concern that has been raised here and in other places about members 

of the Afghan Supreme Court remaining in their posts beyond the 

expiration of their terms. How do we engage in that and how do 

we positively impact that issue? 

Ambassador PEARCE. Well, Senator, I mean, this hearing, I 

guess, is one of those opportunities. 

We engage intensively on not only this issue but all of the issues 

related to the electoral process, on the legislation, the commissioners. The whole complex is something which we are intensively 

engaged in and have been for some time. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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The Embassy, Secretary Kerry—I was with him on his last trip, 

and I can assure you that he raised all these things very directly 

and personally in his own meetings. I think you know how he feels 

about this. His own experience in 2009, of course—he is one of the 

most knowledgeable people there is about this whole issue. I 

remember that before he even was confirmed in his initial prebriefings, but when he came to visit us in Kabul over breakfast at 

the Ambassador’s house and during the briefings we had, he 

always raised this issue. And when he came to the State Department, it was the first thing he mentioned with us. 

So I think that this is really front and center, not only the 

Supreme Court justices, but the quality of the process in general 

because it is fundamental to what we are trying to achieve in 

Afghanistan. 

This is an election which the Afghans are running. We are going 

to support, as best we can, and I think, as you said, that is the 

proper role. We are not going to be picking a horse, not picking a 

candidate. Nevertheless, we are also not indifferent to the outcome. 

And all of these things are important to getting the process right 

and doing everything we can together with the United Nations and 

the other donors to try and do that. So we follow up almost every 

day, I would say, high and low, sir. 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Ambassador, because of our votes and

because we started so late, I think I am going to let both you and 

Mr. Sedney go, and we are going to transition to the second panel. 

But before I run out the door to vote, Mr. Sedney, the report that 

is due pursuant to my amendment in the Fiscal Year 2013 

National Defense Authorization Act, the report that relates to 

women in Afghanistan—the report is due in June, and I hope—and 

tell me if I am wrong—that we can expect that report delivered on 

time. 

Mr. SEDNEY. Mr. Senator, our intention is to have it in on time. 

However, I will note that our report-writing capacity has been 

taxed by the additional requirements for the 1230 report which is 

increasing in size by 40 percent. So we are at a time of reduced 

resources. That increase in the 1230 report requirements may impact the delivery of the report you mentioned on women in Afghanistan, but we are already working on that report and I still hope 

to have it in on time. 

Senator CASEY. Well, I appreciate those efforts and anything to 

make sure that happens because—I guess it was Ambassador. You 

noted about women’s participation in the election and obviously 

well beyond the election is critically important not only for the 

obvious reasons but also because how women fair will largely impact the security environment. 

Both of you have been very patient. We will submit more questions in writing, and maybe as I run to vote, we can transition to 

our next panel. We will take a brief recess. 

Thank you.

[Recess.]

Senator CASEY. OK, we are back. Thanks very much, everyone, 

for your patience. We actually had two votes, so that explains part 

of the time lag. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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But I appreciate the opportunity that each of you presents to us 

to be able to discuss these important issues that relate to the elections in Afghanistan. I know we do not have unlimited time, but 

I did want to hear from each of you, if you can summarize your 

testimony. 

I should also say for the record that, obviously, on our first panel 

both Mr. Sedney and the Ambassador—their full statements will be 

made a part of the record. The same holds for each of you. 

You know the drill, but to the extent that we can try to keep 

your opening statements to 5 minutes, and then we will do a round 

of questioning. But, Dr Wilder, if you want to start. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW WILDER, DIRECTOR, AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN PROGRAMS, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. WILDER. Thank you. Chairman Casey, thank you for this

opportunity to present my views on the upcoming elections. I would 

like to note that the views I express today are my own and not necessarily those of the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not take 

policy positions. 

For the past 2 years, the top priority of USIP’s Afghanistan program, both in Washington and through our office in Kabul, has 

been to raise greater awareness of the importance of the 2014 political transition. We have prioritized this because we strongly believe 

that a credible election that produces a legitimate successor to 

President Karzai is the best way to promote peace and protect the 

tremendous achievements of the past decade. I also believe that 

this is the best way to promote the United States objective of a relatively stable Afghanistan that does not slide back into civil war, 

does not once again become a haven for transnational terrorist 

groups, and does not destabilize its neighbors, especially Pakistan. 

In spite of the problems that Afghanistan continues to face, its 

current constitution has held together a disparate group of political 

elites. Without legitimate elections next year, the fabric of the constitution will be torn and, with it, the existing consensus on how 

to allocate power and determine legitimacy. This would be tragic 

for Afghans, damaging to United States interests in the region, and 

would reinvigorate the Taliban insurgency. 

I was just in Kabul a few weeks ago, and one of the senior 

Afghan political figures I spoke with there said to me if elections 

are not held, it will be a big propaganda victory for the Taliban. 

And I think that is the case. 

Whether we like it or not, the United States plays a major role 

in the electoral calculations of Afghan political actors. However, 

there is currently a politically damaging mismatch of perceptions 

between the signals we think we are sending and the signals that 

Afghans say they are receiving. There is no question that the 

United States has been clear in its official statements and bilateral 

discussions with Afghans about the United States desire for credible elections in 2014. 

Unfortunately, many Afghans continue to question our commitment to their democracy. They note our actions, as well as our 

statements. The recent reports in the media, for example, that 

some parts of the U.S. Government continue to provide President 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Karzai with unofficial cash payments is interpreted as a sign that 

whatever the United States says about elections, it, in fact, remains wedded to supporting the President and his patronage networks. Karzai’s very public acknowledgment that he received these 

funds and the assurance he says he was given that he will continue 

to receive them clearly show that he recognized the political value 

within Afghanistan of highlighting this direct United States 

support. 

In 2009, President Karzai accused the United States of undue 

interference in the electoral process, including favoring certain candidates over others and actively undermining his reelection. Since 

2009, the international community has responded by adopting an 

approach that perhaps has gone too far in the other direction. 

Afghan politicians regularly complain that the international community’s reluctance to push the Afghan Government on electionrelated issues results from a tendency to confuse President Karzai’s 

sovereignty with Afghanistan’s sovereignty. As one Afghan put it to 

me, the United States is interfering in the process as much by staying out of it as it would by being involved. The question is whether 

its interference is positive or negative for the future of Afghanistan. 

While Afghan sovereignty must be taken seriously, it is not a 

violation of that sovereignty for the United States and its international partners to highlight publicly, as well as privately, the 

need for appropriate electoral laws, effective and independent electoral institutions, and robust fraud mitigation measures. 

To summarize my main recommendations, the first one is that 

the top priority of United States policy in Afghanistan for the next 

year should be to support credible elections on April 5 next year, 

which will provide a new leadership team for Afghanistan and preserve the integrity and continuity of the Afghan Constitution. 

The second recommendation is that the United States should 

appoint an official of ambassadorial rank in the Embassy in Kabul 

specifically tasked to focus on elections, echoing the recommendation you made in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman. In addition 

to helping coordinate the various lines of the United States elections-related support, this would also help to send a clear signal to 

Afghans that the elections are, indeed, a top policy priority of the 

U.S. Government. 

The third recommendation is that in actively supporting the electoral process, the United States must avoid the impression that it 

supports any specific candidate. 

And No. 4, the United States should actively support the voter 

education efforts of civil society organizations and the media. Civic 

education and robust support for an independent media will play 

a critically important role in mobilizing and educating voters, especially women voters. It will also help generate demand for the elections and promote transparency and accountability. 

I would like to conclude with a question that an Afghan friend 

posed to me recently. He said, ‘‘We have tried every form of government in the past 100 years in Afghanistan: monarchy, a nonelected 

Presidential republic, anarchy, theocracy, and now democracy. He 

said if democracy cannot work, then what is left?’’ That I believe 

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tion and why they place so much importance on the elections. And 

that is why we must as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Wilder follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW WILDER

Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the subcommittee, it 

is an honor to appear before you today to present my views on the upcoming elections in Afghanistan. Thank you for this opportunity. The views I express today are 

my own and not necessarily those of the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), which does 

not take policy positions. 

INTRODUCTION

I currently direct USIP’s programs on Afghanistan and Pakistan. My views are 

informed by my work at USIP, and by a longstanding involvement in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. I began to work in the region in 1986 with U.S. humanitarian 

and development NGOs assisting Afghans, and spent all but 3 of the following 20 

years in Pakistan and Afghanistan. I saw first-hand the tragic and devastating consequences for Afghans—and eventually the U.S. as well—when peace settlements 

failed, and when the international community lost interest in Afghanistan. While 

much of the press these days is filled with negative stories from Afghanistan, I can 

also attest to the remarkable progress made in Afghanistan during the past decade, 

which stands in stark contrast to the dark days of civil war and Taliban oppression 

of the 1990s. Much of this progress was made possible by generous U.S. financial 

support and the brave efforts of our military and civilian personnel who have served 

in Afghanistan. 

USIP has been working in Afghanistan since 2002, focusing on identifying innovative ways to prevent and mitigate conflict through nonviolent means. Our team, 

based in Kabul and supported by colleagues in our headquarters in Washington, 

DC, implements programs designed to improve understanding of conflict dynamics 

and peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms, supports and strengthens the important work of civil society organizations to prevent and resolve conflict and promote 

the rule of law, and advances peace education in schools and communities. We work 

closely with colleagues at the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID), and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 

Kabul, and through our research and programs help to inform their work and

the work of other organizations and policymakers. USIP also frequently convenes

and facilitates dialogue with key actors from across the Afghan political spectrum, 

as well as with U.S. civilian and military officials, including visiting congressional

delegations. 

For the past 2 years, the top priority of USIP’s Afghanistan program has been 

to conduct research, facilitate discussions, and raise greater awareness through publications, events, and briefings of the importance of, and need to, support the 2014 

political transition in Afghanistan. Throughout 2011, USIP and the Center for 

American Progress supported a high-level working group cochaired by Steve Hadley 

and John Podesta, which highlighted the need for a clearer U.S. political strategy 

in Afghanistan, and in particular stressed the importance of the 2014 political transition. Since 2011, USIP has also been hosting a monthly interagency Afghan Elections Working Group meeting in Washington, DC. In Afghanistan, USIP is currently 

designing a program to help develop the capacity of women to participate in the 

elections, as well as a broader effort to inform and support election-related civic education efforts. 

A Credible Election is Essential for Peace and Stability 

Today’s hearing is critically important and timely. I strongly believe that the single biggest opportunity to protect the tremendous achievements of the past decade 

and to promote the U.S. objective of a relatively stable Afghanistan that does not 

slide back into civil war, once again becoming a haven for transnational terrorist 

groups and destabilizing its neighbors, especially Pakistan, is a credible election in 

2014 that produces a legitimate successor to President Karzai. 

Until recently this critically important political transition in Afghanistan has been 

overshadowed by the security transition—the ongoing process by which international forces are drawn down and Afghan forces take full responsibility for their 

own security. However, many Afghans do not believe it will be possible to have a 

successful security transition without a successful political transition that ensures 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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there is a legitimate civilian government to control and maintain the cohesiveness 

of the Afghan National Security Forces. Furthermore, there is a clear recognition 

among Afghan political elites that cancellation of the election, or a deeply flawed 

election that does not produce a legitimate outcome, will have a very negative 

impact on the willingness of major Western donors to continue generous levels of 

financial support to sustain the Afghan economy and the Afghan National Security 

Forces. They know all too well that it was not the withdrawal of Soviet troops that 

led to the downfall of the Najibullah regime in 1992, and the resulting descent into 

a bloody civil war, but the end to the Soviet subsidies following the collapse of the 

Soviet Union. 

The stakes in 2014 are not simply the election of a new Afghan leadership, but 

the endurance of Afghanistan’s constitutional political order. In spite of the problems that Afghanistan continues to face, its current constitution, ratified in January 

of 2004, has succeeded in holding together a disparate group of political elites. Many 

of these elites still have the means to contest for power with arms, but they have 

accepted that constitutional process and electoral contests are better ways of resolving leadership conflicts. Without elections next year, or with flawed elections, the 

fabric of the constitution will be torn, and with it the existing consensus on how 

to allocate power and determine legitimacy. If this happens, it is likely that some 

of Afghanistan’s major powerbrokers will resort to the only other set of rules for 

power available to them—those of force and violence. This would not only have 

tragic consequences for Afghans, but also seriously damage U.S. interests in the region and reinvigorate the Taliban insurgency. As one senior Afghan political figure 

told me last month in Kabul, ‘‘If elections are not held it will be a big propaganda 

victory for the Taliban.’’

Foundations for a Democratic Future in Afghanistan 

While the last round of Afghan elections in 2009/2010 were problematic for many 

reasons, a focus on the flaws of past elections would overlook some important 

achievements of Afghan democracy. Elections have worked in Afghanistan, at least 

in terms of their most basic function. They have legitimized executive power, elected 

representative parliaments and provincial councils, and have begun to accustom 

Afghan citizens to the rites of democracy. However imperfect, Afghanistan has 

achieved a government that exercises civilian control over its security forces, negotiates trade deals with its neighbors, seeks loans from international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, represents Afghanistan at the United 

Nations, and maintains important bilateral relationships on a sovereign footing. All 

of this is possible because the government is recognized by the international community because it has been established on the basis of the mechanisms prescribed in 

its constitution. 

There is, of course, much room for improvement, but the two post-2001 electoral 

cycles have laid a foundation from which Afghans can continue to grow into their 

democracy. Elections are also accepted by most Afghans as a means of determining 

political power. A recent survey conducted by Democracy International and funded 

by USAID reveals that 76 percent of those surveyed intend to vote in the next Presidential election. In another study published by USIP, Afghans surveyed say they 

recognize the flaws of their electoral system, but also value it. They expressed pride 

in the fact that their country has joined the family of democratic nations. Furthermore, despite past flaws, and undoubtedly future ones as well, they see no better 

alternative. 

At the level of elites, the prospect of next year’s election has led to significant political mobilization. Electoral politics is happening in Afghanistan—the democratic 

politics of coalition-building, platform-drafting, and campaign strategizing. The fact 

that President Karzai is constitutionally barred from running for a third term is the 

most salient feature of the 2014 election. While making predictions about Afghanistan is always a risky business, one possible scenario is the emergence of two strong 

electoral coalitions, one supported by President Karzai, and entrusted by him to protect and carry on his political legacy, and the other formed by an opposition team, 

made up largely of former (and in some cases current) senior office-holders in 

Karzai’s government, though both coalitions will need the support of more traditional sources of power. A strategy being pursued by some political actors is to try 

to generate a consensus prior to the elections among key political elites around a 

post-election national agenda and power-sharing arrangement. If successful, this 

elite consensus-building effort would be followed by a national campaign to endorse 

this effort, with the hope that the 2014 elections would ultimately serve more as 

a referendum on this national agenda and power-sharing agreement rather than a 

highly contentious and divisive electoral contest. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

20

United States Support for Elections 

Whether we like it or not, the position adopted by the United States plays a major 

role in the electoral calculations of Afghan political actors. However, there is a 

politically damaging mismatch of perceptions between the signals we think we are 

sending and the signals that Afghans say they are receiving from us. There is no 

question that the United States has been clear in its official statements, program 

documents, and bilateral discussions with Afghans about the U.S. desire for a credible election process in 2014 that yields a legitimate result. For example, the Tokyo 

Mutual Accountability Framework specifies a credible election as a condition for 

long-term assistance to Afghanistan beyond 2014. The elections were prominently 

mentioned during the press conference that Presidents Obama and Karzai held in 

Washington in January of this year, as well as during Secretary Kerry’s visit to 

Kabul in March. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul is closely following the elections and 

USAID and its partners are actively supporting the electoral preparations. On visits 

to Kabul in February and April of this year, I was struck by the number of Afghan 

political figures who spoke of the significance for Afghans of then-Senator Kerry’s 

remarks about the importance of the elections, made in his confirmation hearing 

before this committee. 

We might therefore conclude that the U.S. Government has said enough and that 

our position is clear. But many Afghans remain hesitant and continue to question 

our commitment to their democracy. They note our actions as well as our statements. The recent reports in the media, for example, that some parts of the U.S. 

Government continue to provide President Karzai with unofficial cash payments is 

interpreted as a sign that, whatever the U.S. says about elections, it in fact remains 

wedded to supporting Karzai and his patronage networks. His very public acknowledgment that he received these funds, and the assurances he says he was given that 

he will continue to receive them, clearly show that he recognizes the political value 

within Afghanistan of highlighting this support. The fact that the U.S. has not been 

more vocal on issues such as Karzai’s recent veto of an electoral law that would ensure a more independent election commission is also seen as a sign by some Afghans 

that credible elections in 2014 are not a top U.S. policy priority. The U.S. refusal, 

along with other donors, to finance a plan last year to improve the voter register—

leaving aside the feasibility of that plan—is similarly interpreted as the U.S. Government’s unwillingness to invest in as credible an electoral process as possible. 

In 2009, President Karzai accused the U.S. of undue interference in the electoral 

process, including favoring certain candidates over others and actively undermining 

his reelection. Whatever the merits of this accusation, Karzai considers it to be fact, 

and that must be accepted by policymakers as a reality of the Afghan political 

scene. Since 2009, the international community has reacted by adopting an approach that perhaps goes too far in the other direction. Rightly or wrongly, many 

Afghan opposition politicians regularly complain to me that the U.S. has been conspicuously absent from involvement in the elections on the grounds of respecting 

Afghan sovereignty—but that too often there is a tendency to confuse President 

Karzai’s ‘‘sovereignty’’ with Afghanistan’s sovereignty. As one Afghan put it to me, 

‘‘The United States is interfering in the process as much by staying out of it as it 

would by being involved. The question is whether its interference is positive or negative for the future of Afghanistan.’’ 

There is no question that Afghan sovereignty must be taken seriously. Active U.S. 

support for a credible election bolsters Afghan sovereignty and reinforces the primacy of the constitution. It is a critical component of the future relationship 

between our two countries. This discussion cannot be held only with President 

Karzai. It must be held more broadly with the Afghan political community and even 

the Afghan public, because they will be the main partners and hopefully beneficiaries in that future relationship. It is not a violation of Afghan sovereignty for 

the U.S. Government and its international partners to highlight—publicly as well 

as privately—the need for appropriate electoral laws and effective and independent 

electoral institutions, and that future levels of external support will undoubtedly be 

affected by the extent to which the elections are perceived to be credible. 

The veto a few weeks ago by President Karzai of the law governing electoral institutions is cause for significant concern. Karzai’s main criticism was that the law 

restricted his so-far unfettered ability to pick the members of the Independent Electoral Commission. His veto of the law will, in the least damaging scenario, cost precious time in the preparation of the elections. At worst, it will result in a situation 

where Parliament adjourns in July without an agreed-upon law, and President 

Karzai will either decree a new law, or the elections will take place according to 

the old law. Irrespective of the merits of the various legislative drafts, and of the 

arguments behind Karzai’s veto, the electoral optics are of great concern. For an opposition already skittish about contesting an election that they fear will be rigged, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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the fact that the President might be the sole decider of the legislation under which 

the election takes place, and the sole appointer of the figures who will oversee the 

contest, is dissuasive to say the least. 

Despite the risks of a destabilizing election, the greatest fear of many Afghans 

is an election that doesn’t take place. Various factors heighten that concern—

a delayed or uncertain legislative framework, an opposition that is ill-prepared to 

contest an election because it doubts the election’s fairness, the security situation 

which could further deteriorate if the Taliban decide to actively target the elections, 

the impact of the drawdown of international military forces on their capacity to provide security and logistical support, questions about how the electoral budget is 

administered, logistical challenges of carrying out a spring election—all lead to a situation where many may conclude that an election cannot be held. Where would that 

leave Afghanistan? It is anyone’s guess, but without question it would create a 

destabilizing constitutional crisis, which I have argued it is imperative to avoid. 

It must be the unwavering policy of the U.S. to support an election in April 2014 

that will provide a new leadership team for Afghanistan and, most importantly, preserve the integrity and continuity of the Afghan Constitution. This policy objective 

should be prioritized above all others, including that of a negotiated solution with 

the Taliban. Working with Afghans to ensure that a credible election is held should 

also take precedence over certain bilateral issues, such as the negotiation of the 

Bilateral Security Agreement that determines the status of U.S. forces in Afghanistan beyond 2014, should these two issues be placed in conflict. 

The U.S. must make very clear to the Afghan Government, political parties and 

candidates, and the Afghan public that a credible election and a peaceful political 

transition to a legitimate successor to President Karzai is currently the top policy 

priority of the U.S. in Afghanistan. This need not be communicated through threats 

or ultimatums. Megaphone diplomacy in Afghanistan often backfires. U.S. officials 

must simply state the obvious—that the U.S. and its international partners would 

find it difficult to sustain a robust and long-term economic and security relationship 

with an Afghanistan that did not have a legitimate democratically elected government. On the other hand, the U.S. would welcome deepening its relationship with 

a new, elected government that sees itself as a strategic partner. 

Recommendations 

In summary, my recommendations are: 

1. The top priority of U.S. policy in Afghanistan should be to support credible elections on April 5, 2014, in accordance with the Afghan Constitution. We have many 

competing interests in Afghanistan and many short-term crises that come up in our 

relationship with the Afghan Government. These should not be allowed to overshadow the fact that our long-term relationship depends on a legitimate post-2014 

government. 

2. The U.S. should appoint an official of ambassadorial rank in the Embassy in 

Kabul specifically tasked with focusing on elections, offering both technical and political guidance. Ambassador Tim Carney played this role in 2009 and it was seen 

as extremely valuable by Afghans and the international community in coordinating 

the various lines of support provided by the U.S. Government. Because the elections 

are taking place in the spring when weather conditions make parts of the country 

difficult to access, the 2014 elections will be more complicated logistically than previous elections, and ensuring efficient lines of support will be more important. 

3. In providing support to the electoral process, both through technical means and 

through our statements to Afghan leaders, the U.S. must avoid the impression that 

it supports any specific candidate. It is extremely important for the legitimacy of 

the process and the government that emerges from it, that the electoral decision is 

an Afghan one. 

4. The U.S. should actively support civic education efforts of civil society organizations and the media. Civic education and robust support for independent media will 

play an important role in mobilizing and educating voters, especially women voters, 

generating demand for the elections, and promoting greater transparency and 

accountability. 

5. Finally, we should work with Afghanistan’s regional partners to improve the 

environment in which the elections take place. The election of a new government 

in Pakistan, for example, creates an opportunity to gain greater cooperation in promoting stability in Afghanistan in the runup to the election. Neighboring countries 

will seek to influence the election, but can be convinced that they also all stand to 

lose if a failed process leads to renewed conflict. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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CONCLUSION

The true value of the efforts of many American service men and women, diplomats, and civilians over the past 12 years will be put to the test a year from now. 

As I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks, the stakes are high for all Afghans, 

but they are also high for us. An Afghan friend recently told me, ‘‘We have tried 

every form of government in the past 100 years: monarchy, anarchy, theocracy, a 

nonelected Presidential republic, and now democracy. If democracy cannot work, 

then what is left?’’ That, I believe, is how many Afghans see the stakes of next 

year’s election, and why they place so much importance on them—and why we cannot let them down. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am happy to take questions.

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Chayes. 

STATEMENT OF SARAH CHAYES, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, SOUTH 

ASIA PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. CHAYES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think all 

of us—I can probably speak for all of us in just expressing appreciation for your initiative with this because I can say, at least, if 

the same foresight had been shown in 2009, we might be in a different place today. 

I would like to just give you a couple of words to give you a sense 

of my own perspective. I was asked to discuss a little bit how 

things went down in 2009, you know, just to provide a context for 

the types of actions that you might be considering proposing at the 

moment. 

At the time, I was the special advisor to the ISAF command. I 

had lived in Afghanistan for 7 years, almost all of that time in a 

regular house in Kandahar, and I speak Pashtu and the people I 

worked with were ordinary Afghans, men and women, from the 

Kandahar area. And so that experience gave me an intimate 

insight into how the massive fraud of 2009 was brought about. And 

what I am going to describe comes from an unclassified analysis 

that I provided to the ISAF command, and that was everyone, 

General McChyrstal, General Rodriguez at the time, the intel and 

ops bosses, et cetera. 

So one of the things we heard today repeated quite often was the 

issue of Afghanizing the election. I think we need, as Dr. Wilder 

suggested, to think carefully about what we mean by that. What 

I found was that the fraud operation was incredibly sophisticated, 

and it began with what I could call a PSYOPS campaign, a psychological operations campaign, against us by Karzai and the key ministers, and by that I mean, you know, the Minister of Defense, the 

Minister of the Interior, the key IDLG, the independent—what was 

it—directorate of local governance. Sorry. And that was a main 

point they were all trying to impress on us, is we need to Afghanize 

this election. And I have to say the international community 

jumped on board with that concept, in particular, the United 

Nations which saw this as a mark of success, the degree to which 

we backed out of—we, the international community—backed out of 

involvement in, again, the process. It is not about picking winners. 

It is about oversight over the process. ISAF, I have to say, was 

delighted to be relegated to third rank security. So not even eyes 

on to polling stations. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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The effect was—so these were concepts that we really were sensitive to. We did not want to impinge on Afghan sovereignty. But 

that was a very effective way for the Karzai machine, more or less, 

to protect itself from observation. In fact, the Afghan Government 

was not neutral. It had been set up to pursue the objective of 

reelecting President Karzai, and that is how every Afghan citizen 

that I interacted with—and that was a lot—saw it. And they saw 

at the time the international community as the sole potential guarantors of the independence of the process. 

And again, I can remember the night before the election getting 

a call from a town on the border with Pakistan. They have started 

stuffing the ballot boxes already. It is at so and so’s house on such 

and such a street, and the implied plea there was send somebody. 

Make it stop. 

And so there was a real disconnect between our sense of we need 

to respect Afghan sovereignty and the Afghan population’s sense 

that we were respecting, as Dr. Wilder put it, Karzai’s sovereignty 

and not their sovereignty. 

The other really important sort of psychological operations effort 

was to reduce the number of so-called black districts. So there were 

a lot of districts that were considered too insecure to open polling 

stations, and there was huge pressure put on the ISAF management to do whatever it could to reduce the number of black districts. And the notion that was handed to us was most of those 

were in Pashtun areas and Pashtuns want to vote for Karzai. So 

Karzai’s voters will have been disenfranchised and therefore he 

could contest the election. That begs the question whether 

Pashtuns were, in fact, supportive of President Karzai. 

But two things happened. A couple of things happened. One was 

there were elections operations which ISAF did not want to conduct 

at the time. The doctrine at the time was you do not do an operation where you do not plan to stay. But the pressure from the 

Afghan Government was such that ISAF decided to do these clearing operations just for the purposes of the elections. 

The second thing that happened that was really interesting was 

deals with the Taliban. And these were briefed to us by the director 

of the national security directorate. And it was offering de facto 

recognition by entering into deals with them. It was sanctuary 

within their districts because in a number of these cases, ANSF 

agreed not to go in. You had money. And again, when we are talking about cash being handed over to Afghan Government officials, 

the question arises what is that cash being used for. Well, one of 

the purposes was paying off Taliban so that they would do what? 

Allow people to vote? No. What they had to do was allow voting 

materials to enter and then return from the district. Now, nobody 

voted in these districts. And I knew people in a lot of them, and 

I checked this. 

So why did Karzai not complain about his voters being 

disenfranchised? The objective was to obtain empty ballot boxes 

that were official ballot boxes, but empty, emanating from districts 

that were believed to be supportive of President Karzai, and that 

is where most of the ballot box stuffing happened. 

Then you had small, weak, underresourced oversight bodies. As 

you mentioned, we have got vetoes on the ECC and the IEC strucFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

24

tures right now, not only vetoes. We have got Karzai there should 

be no ECC. The ECC, in fact, should be the Attorney General 

who—again I know from having followed anticorruption very, very 

closely, this is a guy who answers—Karzai picks up the phone to 

him and tells him what to do. Currently Karzai is standing up for 

being able to simply appoint all the members of the IEC. You could 

not imagine two bodies that are less independent than that. And 

so, again, I find the sort of wishes that were expressed by the earlier panelists a bit—there is a delta between what they were saying 

and what the likely realities are. 

Those were the conditions at a time when United States involvement in Afghanistan was the highest it ever has been in the past 

13 years. So I just leave you to imagine what the level of involvement in the process that would be required from the United States 

in order to bring about something that was better than 2009. 

The upshot at that time was that the Afghan population felt unbelievably betrayed by us because they trusted us to bring about 

a credible process. Surprisingly to me, I am finding that my Afghan 

friends are very excited about the upcoming election. I just think 

we need to be very careful. While I agree that we need to message 

how important this event is, we also have to be careful that if we 

say we consider it to be important, then we need to think through 

what are the concrete steps that we are going to take. 

Senator CASEY. We are going to have to move along. 

Ms. CHAYES. I am already over. Yes. All right. I will stop there, 

and then if you have further questions. 

Senator CASEY. We will have some time. 

Ms. CHAYES. Thanks a lot. 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Boot, thank you very much. 

STATEMENT OF MAX BOOT, JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK SENIOR 

FELLOW FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, COUNCIL OF 

FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BOOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me, 

and congratulations to you and the rest of the committee on the 

passage of what I hope will be a very important resolution on Syria 

earlier in the day. 

I just returned a few weeks ago from my latest trip to Afghanistan where I have been traveling regularly since 2008 at the invitation of our military commanders to assess the situation. And on 

this trip, I saw much cause for confidence in Afghanistan’s future, 

as well as considerable cause for concern. 

The factors that are positive really relate to the security situation in the southern part of the country which was, obviously, the 

focus of ISAF and Afghan operations in the last few years, and 

there is also pretty decent security, I would say, in the west and 

the north, as well as in Kabul in most of those areas not through 

anything that we have done but simply because there are not a lot 

of Pashtuns there and it is largely a Pashtun-based insurgency. 

There was considerable cause for concern for reasons that Senator McCain alluded to earlier having to do with the continued 

existence of Pakistan’s role as an enabler of the insurgency, the 

lack of security, especially in eastern Afghanistan, including provinces like Logar and Wardak which are on the very doorstep of 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Kabul itself, and of course, the corruption which continues to cripple the ability of the government to gain the confidence of its own 

people. 

I think at this point, if I had to prognosticate about the outcome 

in Afghanistan, I think I would have to say it is very evenly balanced, maybe 55/45, maybe 51/49. I think the odds are still in favor 

of a positive outcome but only barely so. And I think a lot of it will 

depend on crucial factors, some of which are not entirely in our 

control. 

What I would like to talk about in the few minutes that I have 

here today is four recommendations for action, one of them focusing 

on the Presidential election in which I will differ from some of what 

you have heard earlier in the day. But before I get to the election, 

let me just mention three other things that I think need to happen 

for a successful outcome in Afghanistan. 

First, I think we need to continue providing at least $5 billion 

a year indefinitely to support the Afghan security forces. If we cut 

down to the $4 billion goal, which was reached in the Chicago 

NATO summit, the result would be to lay off something like 

120,000 soldiers and police at the very same time that we are pulling out most of the international security forces. That would be a 

disaster and would be an invitation to a Taliban victory. So I think 

we need to keep funding the ANSF at at least the level of $5 billion 

a year. 

We need to have a substantial advise-and-assist force there after 

2014 at a minimum, I would say, the level of 13,600 recommended 

by General Mattis, although I would be more comfortable with a 

level of 20,000 to 30,000. 

The third point that I would make is that we need to have a substantial campaign to counter the malign influence of Pakistan and 

the ISI modeled, I would argue, on the campaign we waged in Iraq 

in 2007–2008 to counter the influence of the Iranian Quds Force 

using all of our covert and overt capabilities to identify and target 

Quds Force operatives for capture or deportation or, at the very 

least, to publicize their activities and discredit what they were 

doing. I think we need a similar campaign in Afghanistan. We need 

to get over the illusion that Pakistan is our friend. They are not. 

They are actively supporting our enemies, and we need to recognize 

that and act accordingly. 

The fourth and final point that I would make is in regard to the 

elections, and here I differ a little bit, Mr. Chairman, from what 

you said earlier and from what some of the other witnesses, especially from the official administration witnesses, have said because 

I do believe that we have no choice but to pick winners and losers 

in this election. And effectively we will do that. As Dr. Wilder suggested, even if we take a hands-off attitude, we are effectively picking winners and losers because if we take a completely hands-off 

attitude at this point, we will be seen as endorsing Karzai and 

whoever his hand-picked candidate is to succeed him because that 

is the effect of these bags of cash that the CIA is delivering to him. 

I am not averse to the idea of the CIA exerting its influence 

through the use of money. That is something we have done in the 

past successfully, for example, in the early years of the cold war 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

26

in places like Europe resisting the attempts of Communists to take 

power at the ballot box. I think that is a legitimate thing to do. 

My concern is, from what I understand—and of course, these are 

all highly classified programs that I am not read into, but certainly 

from the public reporting which has occurred, my sense is that 

what the CIA does is very short-term oriented, really designed to 

grease the way for their strike forces, their ability to continue 

counterterrorism operations and to enhance their limited influence. 

My sense is they are not really taking a long-term view of the 

country’s future, and they are not really using their clout to 

enhance the long-term prosperity and stability and security of 

Afghanistan which I think should be our goal. 

We can take what I believe to be a self-defeating attitude of saying, well, all we care about is the sanctity of the electoral process, 

but the reality is, first off, I have very little confidence in the sanctity of the electoral process in Afghanistan especially when it is 

going to happen after we have withdrawn most of our troops from 

that country. The ANSF, I do not think, is going to be interested 

in guaranteeing the sanctity of the outcome. They are going to be 

working for whoever gives them the orders to do so. So the notion 

that there is going to be some pure electoral process I think is a 

myth. 

What is really going to happen and what is happening right now 

in Kabul is that the power brokers and outside players like the 

Iranians and Pakistanis or others are politicking to determine who 

will be the next leader of Afghanistan. I would hope that we would 

be actively casting our vote because we have a large vote in that. 

I think we mishandled the last process in 2009 in part because we 

were so diffident about exerting our influence, and the result of 

that was we gave Karzai the impression that we were opposing 

him without doing anything effective to oppose him. So we got the 

worst of both worlds. We got the leader we did not want and he 

was annoyed at us for seeming to try to block his way. 

But in this instance, I think we need to make clear that we will 

not allow Karzai to abuse the process to entrench himself or his 

relatives in power. This ought to be a redline and we should make 

clear we will not give Afghanistan a dime if the election is not held 

and if Karzai somehow maneuvers to keep himself in power 

through extra-constitutional means. 

But beyond that, I think the succession race right now is wide 

open. There are many candidates. There is no clear front runner. 

I think we have a tremendous opportunity to try to figure out who 

is going to be the strongest and least corrupt candidate, the one 

who is most likely to unite Afghanistan and to move it forward. 

And I think that is a determination that we need to make. We 

should not announce it, obviously, but it is a determination that 

the Ambassador and station chief should be making and we should 

be doing what we can behind the scenes to aid whoever we think 

is going to be the strongest candidate or, put another way, the least 

bad candidate. 

I am sorry that does not comport with civics 101, but I think that 

is the reality of Afghanistan and we need to do that to protect the 

monumental investment in blood and treasure that we have made 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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in that country and to prevent a criminal clique from stealing the 

election which, otherwise, I think is the likely outcome. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Boot follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAX BOOT

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the subcommittee, I recently 

returned from a week in Afghanistan where I have been traveling regularly since 

2008 to assess the state of the military campaign at the request of our military commanders. During this visit I went to Kabul as well as to Regional Command South 

(in Kandahar) and Regional Command Southwest (in Helmand). Along with a delegation from the Council on Foreign Relations, I met with Afghan and American soldiers and officials including Gen. Joe Dunford, Ambassador James Cunningham, 

and Defense Minister Bishmullah Muhammad. I thank you for inviting me to testify 

about the Afghan election in 2014 which is one of the most important factors determining Afghanistan’s future. To place it into context I would like to comment not 

only on the election but on other factors of vital important to the outcome of our 

mission. What follows is closely based on an article I have written for the June 5 

issue of National Review summing up my most recent observations. 

The fundamental question we face is: Will America’s decade-plus effort to bring 

stability and security to Afghanistan succeed? I saw cause for both pessimism and 

optimism as the country hurtles toward a turning point: the self-imposed December 

2014 deadline for all NATO ‘‘combat’’ troops (though not necessarily military advisers and Special Operations Forces) to leave the country. 

The most important reason to think that Afghanistan may turn out just fine is 

the progress being made by the Afghan National Security Forces, now 352,000 

strong. The formal forces are augmented by 20,000 Afghan Local Police, an auxiliary, village-based security force that is particularly feared by the Taliban, who are 

targeting its leaders for assassination. The Afghan security forces, and in particular 

the army, are now in the lead in 80 percent of all security operations, and in June 

they will take control of the entire country. Already the Afghans, not coalition 

troops, are bearing the brunt of the battle as evidenced by casualty figures which 

show that far more Afghan than coalition troops are being killed and wounded—

a reversal of the prevailing trend of the past decade. 

I came away impressed from my meetings with Afghan army officers such as Maj. 

Gen. Sayeed Malook, commander of the 215th Corps in Helmand province, who 

present a professional appearance and convey an unyielding determination to fight 

the dushman (enemy) as they call the Taliban. If the Afghan Army continues to 

receive substantial Western support (a big if, to be sure), it is unlikely to lose a single battle to the ragtag fighters of the Taliban. 

Another cause for optimism is the result of American-led counterinsurgency operations in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, both of which I visited. U.S. troops, 

along with the international and Afghan partners, have routed the Taliban out of 

most of their southern sanctuaries. Enemy-initiated attacks in Kandahar province, 

I was told, fell 70 percent between 2011 and 2012. Kandahar City, the biggest urban 

area in the south, remains more secure than ever despite (or possibly because of) 

the assassination in 2011 of Ahmed Wali Karzai, a half-brother of the President who 

was the de facto political boss of the region. Last summer the Taliban did not succeed in killing a single significant leader in Kandahar where security is now in the 

hands of the much-feared police chief, Gen. Abdul Razik. 

Yet more grounds for optimism can be found in the continuing security and growing economic development of western and northern Afghanistan, the region anchored by Herat in the west and by Mazar-e-Sharif in the north. This has less to 

do with security operations by Afghans or their coalition allies than with simple 

demographics: The insurgency is largely confined to the Pashtun population and 

there are few Pashtuns in the north and west. 

Against these positive factors must be weighed three major negatives. First, and 

most important, Pakistan. The rift in U.S.-Pakistan relations which opened after the 

2011 Osama bin Laden raid has superficially healed—the Pakistanis have reopened 

NATO’s supply line from the port of Karachi and resumed nominal cooperation on 

cross-border security. But in reality the Pakistani Army, the real arbiter of its foreign policy, continues to support the Afghan Taliban even while fighting its counterpart, the Pakistani Taliban. Some factions of the Taliban might want to make peace, 

but the Pakistanis are not allowing it—they see the Taliban as their best bet to 

exert influence in post-2014 Afghanistan. That’s why peace talks, in which the 

Obama administration has invested so many hopes, are going nowhere fast. Given 

that cross-border sanctuaries are a big boon for any insurgency, Pakistan’s role 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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remains a spoiler even though security forces have made considerable progress in 

southern Afghanistan since 2009 in spite of Pakistan’s support for the insurgency. 

A second, and related, negative is the continuing instability of eastern Afghanistan, the region located along the mountainous frontier with Pakistan. U.S. commanders have never had enough troops to do ‘‘clear and hold’’ operations in most 

of this area. While Kabul itself remains secure and bustling (notwithstanding a 

recent suicide bomber attack on a convoy carrying U.S. military advisers and contractors), nearby provinces such as Ghazni, Logar, and Wardak are still infested 

with Taliban and Haqqani Network fighters. This insecurity, if left unaddressed, 

eventually could spill over and threaten the capital, which also happens to be the 

country’s largest and most important city. 

A third and final negative—one too seldom mentioned by U.S. officials—is the 

continuing corruption of the Government of Afghanistan, which is dominated by an 

avaricious clique of warlords, drug barons, and powerbrokers in cahoots with President Hamid Karzai and his family. Afghanistan’s leading clans have robbed the 

country blind over the past decade, stealing billions in foreign aid. Their rapaciousness has alienated substantial sectors of the population and provided an opening for 

the Taliban who, while themselves complicit in the drug trade, promise to deliver 

a harsh brand of Islamic justice. 

The positives and negatives of Afghanistan are closely balanced. The ultimate outcome may well be decided by three upcoming events. 

First, the Afghan security forces must show that security gains in the south are 

sustainable. This summer will be their first major test—the first fighting season 

when coalition troops are not in the lead. If the Afghan Army and police can hold 

onto gains achieved largely by U.S. forces, that will be a major psychological boost 

for them—and a major blow to the Taliban. While U.S. commanders are understandably focused on this immediate challenge, an even bigger test will come in the summer of 2014 when there will be no more than 34,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. 

The ultimate test will come after 2014 when the U.S. presence will be even further 

diminished. 

Second, Afghans must emerge from their April 2014 Presidential election (assuming it occurs as planned) with a new leader who can unite diverse sectarian and 

political factions. A fractious outcome, with ballot-stuffing rampant and no candidate able to claim legitimacy, would be disastrous for the country’s long-term prospects. So, too, would be any attempt by Hamid Karzai to hold onto power beyond 

the length of his current term, whether by postponing the election or simply by 

changing the constitution. On the other hand, a peaceful transfer of power, the first 

in Afghanistan’s modern history, to a new President with widespread support would 

be a major blow to the Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies. 

Third, Afghans must know that the U.S. will provide the support necessary to 

keep their country together. Afghans understandably fear they will be abandoned 

after 2014, just as they were abandoned by the West after the departure of the Red 

Army in 1989. That is why property prices in Kabul are falling and capital flight 

is increasing. Only the announcement of a substantial post-2014 commitment by the 

U.S. can reassure Afghans that the Taliban will not come back. 

What can we do now, at this late date, to ensure that the negatives do not overwhelm the positives? Plenty. For a start, the U.S. and its allies must continue to 

provide at least $5 billion a year to the Afghan security forces, the minimum necessary to preserve a force of 352,000, but more than the $4.1 billion pledged at the 

Chicago NATO summit last year. Unless the $4.1 billion figure is increased, the 

Afghan forces will have to lay off 120,000 soldiers and police at the very time when 

coalition forces are withdrawing. That would be a disastrous combination. 

The Obama administration should also announce that it will keep at least 13,600 

U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014 to assist the Afghan security forces—the minimum number recommended by recently retired Gen. Jim Mattis of Central Command. If the U.S. were to ante up, our allies would probably provide another 6,000 

or so troops, bringing the total coalition presence to around 20,000. That is still 

short of the 30,000 or so troops that ace analysts Fred and Kim Kagan have argued 

would be needed to maintain robust operations in eastern and southern Afghanistan—but it should be sufficient, if just barely, to avert disaster. It is especially important that the U.S. continue to provide air support and medevac capability since 

Afghanistan will not have a functioning air force before 2017 at the earliest. 

Unfortunately the administration is hinting it will send substantially fewer 

troops—the President has told NATO to begin initial planning for a force of 8,000 

to 12,000 troops. The U.S., which has historically provided two-thirds of all coalition 

forces, presumably would provide no more than 5,400 to 8,000 of the total. That is 

such a low figure that U.S. troops would have trouble sustaining and defending 

themselves, much less projecting power to outlying regions. That, in turn, will make 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

29

it hard for the Afghans to fight effectively and thus increase the risk of the army 

fracturing along ethnic lines, with the Pashtuns making common cause with the 

Taliban and the Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks recreating the Northern Alliance. 

Such an outcome would plunge Afghanistan back into the disastrous civil war of the 

1990s which led to the rise of the Taliban in the first place. 

President Karzai can help to avert this dire fate by being more cooperative in 

efforts to negotiate a status of forces agreement with the U.S. that would allow our 

troops legal immunity. He does not want to make the mistake that Prime Minister 

Nouri al-Maliki of Iraq made: He tried to drive a hard bargain, only to have Obama 

walk away from the negotiations and pull all U.S. troops out. That remains a possibility in Afghanistan, too, especially if Karzai continues to bad-mouth the U.S. publically, thereby undermining American support for a continuing commitment. 

In addition to keeping a substantial contingent of advise-and-assist and Special 

Operations troops after 2014, the U.S. must launch an immediate campaign to 

counter Pakistan’s destabilizing efforts in Afghanistan. The model is the covert campaign mounted by U.S. forces in Iraq in 2007–2008 to blunt the influence of Iran’s 

Quds Forces, which involved doing everything from arresting and deporting Iranian 

operatives to publicizing their machinations. The U.S. must recognize that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence is our enemy in Afghanistan and act accordingly, 

instead of clinging to the fiction that the Pakistanis are our friends and allies. Nor 

should we cling to the illusion, so beloved of diplomats, that Pakistan can be 

induced to jettison the Taliban as a part of some kind of regional ‘‘grand bargain’’ 

involving Iran, China, and Russia. That is about as likely to occur as a breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, another chimera pursued by generations 

of diplomatists. 

Given that we have less need of Pakistani support than we once did to target

al-Qaeda’s much-weakened central organization, we should also not be afraid of 

using drones and, if necessary, Special Operations raids to target Taliban leaders 

and arms caches in Pakistan—something we have not done to date for fear of 

offending Islamabad. It is shameful that the Taliban are allowed the free run of 

towns such as Chaman, a Pakistani border crossing facing the Afghan town of 

Spinbaldak in Kandahar province. Coalition air strikes would not defeat the Taliban 

but they would break Taliban leaders’ sense of impunity and keep them balance as 

U.S. troops draw down. 

Finally to the subject you have highlighted in this hearing: I believe the U.S. Government must become more active in shaping the outcome of the Afghan Presidential election. Ballot fraud is likely to be prevalent again, as it was in 2009, but 

that need not be fatal since the outcome is likely to be determined not in the actual 

voting but in backroom deals among political bosses—as was the norm in an earlier 

period of American history. Talks are currently going on among powerbrokers in 

Kabul, what some jocularly refer to as the ‘‘Afghan primary,’’ to sort out a long list 

of Presidential wannabes such as Education Minister Farooq Wardak; former Karzai 

chief of staff Umer Daudzai; former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani; former Interior 

Minister Ali Jalali; the President’s brother, Qayum Karzai; former intelligence chief 

Amrullah Saleh; former Presidential candidate (and Foreign Minister), Abdullah 

Abdullah; and even the Afghan-American former U.S. Ambassador, Zalmay 

Khalilzad. 

The U.S. Government was burned by its experience in 2009 when efforts by 

former Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and the late special envoy Richard Holbrooke 

to encourage a more competitive election were interpreted by Karzai to mean that 

the U.S. was trying to block his reelection, thereby making him even more difficult 

to deal with once he secured a suspect victory. As a result, U.S. Embassy officials 

today are loathe to discuss Presidential candidates, even in private, for fear of 

appearing to choose sides. This crippling reticence only increases the prospect of 

either a deadlocked process or the emergence of discredited front-runner, e.g., 

Qayum Karzai, who would have a hard time winning credibility either in Afghanistan or in the West. Instead of standing on the sidelines, the U.S. needs to use its 

considerable clout—including, if necessary, the bags of cash the CIA has been providing to President Karzai—to ensure the selection of the strongest possible President, one who would take on warlords and the Taliban more effectively than the 

incumbent has done. 

Based on the current situation, I would put the odds at roughly 55–45 percent 

that Afghanistan will be able to avoid a civil war and a possible return to Taliban 

rule. That is more optimistic than the pessimism which prevails in the U.S., where 

most people wrongly assume the war is already lost, but it is hardly a ringing endorsement. With the relatively modest steps outlined above, however, President 

Obama could dramatically increase the odds of success.

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Senator CASEY. Mr. Boot, thank you very much. 

What I am hearing from a lot of the members or several of the 

members of this panel is we better have our eyes wide open, that 

the reality of an election is not always what is in the civics books. 

You are right. And that is why we have these hearings where we 

have not just two panels, but I think in some ways two different 

vantage points. 

Let me go back to this question of either the reality of interference or the perception thereof. Dr. Wilder, you have talked a little bit about this. Mr. Boot, there seems to be some conflict here. 

What is your reaction to, or your comment on, that interference 

question, especially in light of what Mr. Boot said? We try not to 

create arguments within the panel, but sometimes it is helpful and 

illuminating. 

Dr. WILDER. Yes, I think it is helpful to go back to 2009 and look 

at that because I often think that the wrong lessons have been 

learned from 2009. I think trying to pick favorites is not something 

we should be doing, as I mentioned in my testimony, for a number 

of reasons. One reason is we do not have a track record that is terribly good in getting that right. We only have to go back to November 2001 at a conference in Bonn where we actually played an 

instrumental role in picking a winner—now I think we do not feel 

that went according to plan. But there has been a track record of 

actively backing President Karzai in the past as our candidate, our 

man. 

I have actually a lot more confidence in the Afghan voters in 

terms of picking their next leader than in our ability to hand-pick 

the right successor. It is critical that whoever becomes President 

next is perceived as legitimate. The more it is perceived that our 

fingers are on it, trying to determine who the winner will be, the 

greater the risk that whoever ends up in that position will be perceived as less legitimate. 

The lesson from 2009 is do not interfere by picking favorites, but 

do interfere by trying to ensure that this election is going to be 

held on as level a playing field as possible. Do interfere in terms 

of trying to ensure much more rigorous fraud mitigation measures 

for this election, trying to put pressure on in terms of the electoral 

laws, but in particular, signaling that the elections are the U.S. 

Government’s No. 1 foreign policy priority in Afghanistan for this 

coming year. The security transition and the economic transition 

cannot succeed without the successful political transition. If we can 

give more confidence to the Afghans that the United States is 

behind these elections, we will see more Afghans stepping up to the 

plate to actually start contesting. 

Every night in Kabul, the political elite are meeting and wheeling and dealing, and electoral politics is happening. And I think 

that is actually one of the most encouraging things about what is 

happening in Afghanistan today. Many of these elites have done 

fabulously well in the last decade and have a lot of vested interests 

in making sure that the country does not fall apart. 

We should be actively looking at ways to support consensus 

building efforts that are trying to create coalitions to contest the 

next election. Some of them are holding back because they are concerned about whether there will be elections. Why put your life on 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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the line and put your resources on the line to contest an election 

that likely will not happen? There is no confidence that President 

Karzai’s No. 1 objective is to hold elections. That is where we need 

to be continuing to make strong statements that this is our priority. That will give incentives to the Afghan candidates to start 

campaigning. 

I do not like to use the word ‘‘opposition’’ because we are going 

into an election where President Karzai, by the constitution, is not 

allowed to contest. We need to look at all the candidates on an 

equal basis, not government versus opposition. 

So again, do not support individuals but do interfere in supporting the process. 

Senator CASEY. And I want to continue this line of discussion, 

but I have to say for the record probably a lot of Members of Congress over the last couple years have been pretty critical of Mr. 

Karzai. I am one of them. In fact, for a couple of years, I was probably one of the leading critics, and that is on the public record. I 

am sure he does not recall that, but I was. 

The last time I saw him—the first time I met him was in 2008 

and then 2009 within a day or 2 of the election. And I and others 

pressed him on making sure that now that the election had taken 

place, that they take steps to meet the legitimate expectations of 

the people. And of course, he assured us he would. 

I did not have a chance to see him when I went back in 2011, 

but I did see him earlier this year when he came to visit, just a 

brief visit on Capitol Hill. We were actually in Senator McConnell’s 

office, and it was just a small group of us. 

But I said that to him. I said I have criticized you a lot in the 

past, and I am going to try to refrain from that today and say that 

you should use this opportunity to make sure that you have an 

election and it goes well, and that will be your legacy and not 

something else. Of course, he, I guess, somewhat agreed with that 

but then seemed to be critical of us in not interfering in a process 

that he does not seem to conduct very well. 

But, anyway, let me get back to the question of interference. Ms. 

Chayes, I know you have raised a lot of concerns about what happened last time in your testimony and how we prepare for this. 

What is your view on this question of interference? 

I think it is an interesting idea that a really tough, aggressive 

imposition or us having an impact on the rules and how the election is conducted could be seen as interference but might be the 

most constructive way that we have an impact apart from or separated from the question of picking a candidate. Maybe that is an 

area where we can agree that if we institute or push them to institute as rigorous a process as possible, that that might be the best. 

What is your view on what you have heard from your two colleagues here and how you view it? 

Ms. CHAYES. I would probably concur with what you just said 

and what Dr. Wilder said. 

I guess I just have to again try to impress on you and on the 

record what ‘‘rigorous’’ would have to mean. So, again, you just 

phrased the issue of the vetoes by President Karzai of the IEC and 

ECC structures. What do we do? How do we participate in making 

this a credible and free and fair exercise if the two bodies charged 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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with running it belong to President Karzai? Honestly. We are 

really in a bind because, on the one hand, we are saying there has 

to be an election. It has to be Afghan-managed, Afghan-led. And on 

the other hand, if Afghan-managed, Afghan-led means Karzaimanaged, Karzai-led, you know, do we fund the exercise anyway? 

If we decide not to fund it, Karzai is thrilled. Great. No election. 

So I have to say I do not have a great answer to that question, 

but I do not think picking the guy, fundamentally because we do 

not have a great track record, is probably the right solution. On the 

other hand, continuing to pay one of them—so one of the things I 

think is really important, if we care how things work out in 

Afghanistan, is arbitrating between the different USG equities that 

are at play here because if we are paying President Karzai, it does 

not matter what you say to him or what any other member of the 

U.S. Government says to him, including the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff or the Secretary of State, up to the President. Once 

he is getting money from the Central Intelligence Agency, that 

strengthens him to do whatever he wants in spite of anything that 

any other member of the U.S. Government, with the exception of 

the President, could say. 

So I think that is really important issue to think about. If he or 

somebody chosen by him is a candidate—I mean, he will not be, 

but if there is some Karzai proxy who is a candidate, which I think 

is really likely, is that person on the payroll? Does that get debated 

at a principals’ committee meeting? So it is one thing to say we 

should not pick an ‘‘opposition’’ candidate, but therefore we need to 

really be clear about where is our private bags of cash. Where are 

they going? 

I think another really important aspect of this that has not been 

brought up but has to do with the security, which is to say—and 

I did bring it up at ISAF in 2009—are we construing our mandate 

to protect the security of these elections as a mandate to protect 

it from intimidation from the government, as well as intimidation 

from the Taliban? That was not a question that got a very coherent 

answer. I think that is a really important issue to think about this 

time. If we are really about protecting the integrity of the process, 

that means we have to be just as rigorous about violations of that 

integrity, physical violations that are caused by non-Taliban as 

well as ones that are caused by Taliban. 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Boot, if I keep giving you the last word, that 

is an advantage to you. Let me just ask you more precisely because 

you have addressed it. Is the question of interference perceived or 

in reality? A, I guess you would say that that is not a great concern 

for you. I guess what would you place greater reliance on or place 

greater weight on? Actually getting involved in picking a candidate, 

as you seemed to hint at, or being much more focused on the rules 

imposing a free and fair election as best we can? What do you 

think is the preferable path? 

Mr. BOOT. Well, in terms of avoiding the perception of interference in Afghan elections, as my colleagues and Sarah in particular have pointed out, we are interfering right now, and Afghans 

know that. I mean, they know we are giving bags of cash to Karzai. 

So it does not really matter what we do. We are going to be seen 

as interfering. At the moment, we seem to be interfering to 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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buttress a President who is deeply enmeshed in this corruption and 

dysfunctionality that grips his country. 

All I am saying is instead of taking a completely hands-off attitude, let us interfere or try to interfere in a more positive direction, 

and I do not think that is impossible. I mean, it is true that we 

made a mistake in hindsight, I think, in picking Karzai at the end 

of 2001, and it is quite possible we might make another mistake 

in the future. But at least I would draw some solace from the fact 

that at the end of 2001, we knew very little about Afghan politics. 

At least we have had a dozen years since then to hopefully—hopefully—and I am not sure it has happened, but hopefully have a little bit of a learning process within the USG and at least a little 

more familiarity with who the players are, what they stand for, 

and the intricacies of Afghan politics. So I think there is a slightly 

better chance that we might get it right this time than we did last 

time. 

You know, as a historian, I would point you to a historical example which was the way that we defeated the Huk rebellion, the 

Communist uprising in the Philippines in the late 1940s/early 

1950s. The most important thing we did was to send one man to 

the Philippines, Edward Lansdale, who was a CIA operative, as 

well as an Air Force officer. And the most important thing he did 

was to befriend a gentleman named Ramon Magsaysay, who just 

a Filipino state senator when they met, but with Lansdale’s support and the support of the CIA, they managed to get Magsaysay 

promoted, first to Defense Minister, and then Lansdale was virtually his campaign manager to help him win the Presidency of the 

Philippines. And Magsaysay was the best thing that ever happened 

to the Philippines because he was honest. He was strong. He 

fought corruption and abuse in the army, and he managed by those 

methods to defeat the Huk uprising. That is an example that I 

think we need to be cognizant of. 

In the case of Afghanistan, certainly I am not, by any means, 

saying we should give up on the election. I agree with my colleagues. We need to do everything possible to have a free and fair 

election. And I hope I am not being overly cynical here by suggesting that is not likely to happen. I mean, if it did not happen 

in Chicago in the old days, it is not going to happen in Afghanistan 

today I think especially when our troop presence is going to be so 

markedly reduced. 

But just as in this country, I mean, we have free and fair elections, but let us be honest. There is a primary process that happens 

even before anybody casts a vote. In the last election, I think people generally knew that Mitt Romney was going to be the Republican candidate well in advance of the first primaries or caucuses 

because he, in effect, won this preprimary for the backing of donors 

and other power brokers within the Republican Party. 

The exact same thing is happening in Afghanistan right now, 

and certainly Karzai and the ISI and the Iranians and others—

they are casting their votes, and the question is, Are their votes 

going to be decisive? Are we going to do something to try to counterbalance their vote by trying to push forward a leader who will 

truly not be an American puppet—that is not what I am looking 

for—a strong leader who will truly have the interests of AfghaniFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

34

stan at heart? And that leader may well do things that exasperate 

us in the way that DeGaulle did, for example, in France, but nevertheless somebody who would not be a cat’s paw of the ISI or Iranians or the warlords. I think that is what Afghanistan needs, and 

I think in many ways the only chance that the political process has 

to produce somebody like that is with a little outside assistance 

from us. 

Senator CASEY. I am reminded that in this country it took most 

of 100 years before a lot of places, a lot of States got the secret ballot. So it took us a while. 

I know we have to wrap up. But I guess in more of kind of a 

lightning round, if you could just outline the two or three steps—

you might have four or five, but if you could prioritize one or two 

steps that we should take really in the next several months or the 

next 6 months to get the result that we hope for, which is a free 

and fair election. We will set aside the question of who wins or 

what is the optimal, but to get as free and as fair an election as 

possible. Any quick summary of one or two steps that we should 

take. 

Dr. WILDER. I would come back to the point—how do we make 

clear that this is, for the next year, the No. 1 U.S. Government priority? And I think that is where the appointment of an ambassador-rank official in that role would be one way of signaling that, 

but then also following up with frequent high-level statements of 

their importance to the U.S. Government because, as I said, this 

is where there is a mismatch. We do often say that the elections 

are a priority, and we say the right things about them, but Afghans 

still need to hear it more often because they remain skeptical. Just 

in the last two trips I made to Afghanistan in March and April,

it was striking to me how many Afghan politicians referenced

then-Senator Kerry’s confirmation hearings in front of this committee where he very clearly spoke about the importance of the 

elections as a priority issue. That created very positive vibes in 

Kabul and gave a little encouragement to those who do believe in 

the elections. 

Just last week, here at USIP we hosted a fairly prominent 

Afghan opposition figure, and one of his key points was, in terms 

of the priorities in the elections, fight the doubt, because it is easy 

to think of all the reasons why elections will not be possible in 

Afghanistan, and if we really give into that, the skepticism will 

become self-fulfilling. We have to believe the elections can happen 

and then prepare for them with the measures I mentioned. 

Afghans will then take the lead to make sure that they do, indeed, 

happen. 

But the final point to emphasize is that while there is a supply 

side to this which requires financial and technical support to electoral institutions to manage the elections, we also need to focus on 

the demand side, with early support to civic education. The media 

play an incredibly important role. The Afghan public needs to also 

feel that the elections are going to happen and we need to work

on the demand side. Too often, civic education is left as an afterthought until just before the election. We need to be investing in 

and supporting those efforts earlier than in past elections. 

Thank you. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

Ms. Chayes. 

Ms. CHAYES. I am going to change the aperture a little bit. 

I tend to agree with Mr. Boot that it is very unlikely that we will 

supply what it takes to actually make this exercise truly free and 

fair and credible. 

I actually think there is something quite different we could do 

that could help set the conditions which would have to do with 

expanding the scope of the reconciliation process. I think we have 

been stuck in a rut which has been speaking to just one interlocutor or trying to speak. We have not even been speaking to one 

interlocutor, which is to say the armed opposition. But it turns out 

that most Afghan constituencies have severe issues with the Karzai 

government and with the way the Afghan Government has been 

executing its duties or not since 2001. 

I think this reconciliation process needs urgently—and it ought 

to be U.S. Government policy urgently—to expand this reconciliation process to include those constituencies. I would give the current Afghan Government a seat but not a gavel, and I would not 

give Pakistan a seat, and that is a whole other issue, but that has 

the impact of rewarding the deliberate use of violent extremists as 

an instrument of public policy on the part of Pakistan. 

But if you get a process like that going—and there have been a 

couple of experiments of late in France, in Japan, but in particular 

in France over the last few months or last 6 months or so that indicate that this is a doable process. We have not been interested. 

President Karzai has extremely not been interested. And again, it 

has to do with a little bit of political will on our part to force a conversation, a multipolar conversation. And I think a process like 

that could start to work out what a lot of the equities are so that 

an election at the far end of it—there would be less incentive to try 

to rig an election at the other end of it. 

Thank you very much. And thanks again for your interest. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

Mr. Boot. 

Mr. BOOT. Mr. Chairman, I think there is a crisis of confidence 

in Afghanistan right now. At least that is what I saw and heard 

about when I was there a few weeks ago. Property prices are falling. The amount of money exiting the country is increasing. 

Afghans do not have a lot of confidence in their post-2014 future. 

I think the most important thing we can do right now, as early 

as possible, is to signal what our level of commitment post-2014 is 

going to be. I think that will increase confidence. It will also boost 

our influence and our ability to try to influence the future of 

Afghanistan in a positive direction, whether you think all we 

should be doing is trying to protect the integrity of the balloting 

process or whether you believe, as I do, that I think we need to 

take a more robust role. Whatever that role is, I think we will 

enhance our influence by signaling what our level of commitment 

will be because up until now, we have said we will stay committed, 

but there is a big difference between levels of commitment and the 

higher the level of commitment that we express, the more confidence that the government and supporters of the government will 

have and the more we will demoralize and weaken the Taliban. So 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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I think that is the most immediate thing that we can do to affect 

the calculus in Afghanistan. 

Again, I would just stress that I mentioned in my opening statement I think we need to do much more to counter ISI influence. 

As we were discussing earlier, I also believe that we need to play 

a more robust role in helping to select a strong leader for Afghanistan. But the first thing I think is just to signal that we will have 

a robust commitment post-2014. 

And I thank you for inviting me. It is a pleasure to testify with 

two leading experts. I am glad you are interested because I think 

one of the biggest problems we face right now, quite frankly, is 

there is not a lot of interest in the future of Afghanistan in this 

country. So I am glad you are staying focused on it. Thank you for 

inviting me. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. Thanks to all of our witnesses. 

The record will be open for questions for—I think, it is 5 days. 

We will correct the record if it is not. 

And I also wanted to mention—I did not at the beginning—that 

the resolution that Senator McCain and I introduced was cosponsored by Chairman Menendez. So that is good news. 

But we are done for today, but I am sure we will be able to call 

upon each of you for further insight as we get closer to this election 

day, which I realize has a lot of problems connected to it. So we 

have got more work to do. 

But thanks very much. 

We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE DAVID PEARCE TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. In recent Afghan elections, key decisions were determined by the 

Supreme Court. Many have expressed concern that members of the Afghan Supreme 

Court have remained in their posts beyond expiration of their terms and the President has yet to appoint replacements.

• If there are no new appointments to the Supreme Court and that body does end 

up providing judgments related to the elections, how will the Afghan public 

react? • Which regions might you anticipate a need for funding that is not in the current 

budget request?

Answer. Afghanistan and its allies have a common interest in ensuring a peaceful, 

democratic transfer of authority from President Karzai to his successor through 

elections accepted by the Afghan public as credible and legitimate. The Supreme 

Court may play a significant role in the electoral process if it rules, as it has in 

the past, on fundamental constitutional matters related to the elections. 

In his July 2012 decree specifying measures to address corruption, President 

Karzai pledged his support for improving judicial and prosecutorial institutions. Our 

Embassy and international partners have since discussed with senior Afghan officials the need to remove Supreme Court Justices whose constitutional terms have 

expired or will expire before the 2014 elections and to nominate credible and independent replacements. While we do not have a formal response, we continue to raise 

this issue. Legitimately serving Supreme Court Justices will help legitimize all of 

the Court’s decisions, including any on elections, and will help to instill confidence 

in the process. 

Opposition figures and a number of prominent parliamentarians have stated publicly that they would not accept any Supreme Court decision as valid if there are 

Justices sitting on the bench beyond the expiration of their constitutional terms. 

Serious disagreements over the legitimacy of the Court’s composition and, therefore, 

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the validity of its rulings could lead to constitutional gridlock at a time the Court 

could be called to issue critical decisions related to the elections. 

Regarding the potential need for additional budgetary resources, U.S. Government 

advisors are currently working with Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission to finalize operational and contingency planning and determine budget allocations from the Government of Afghanistan and other international donors, including 

the United States.

Question. Will the United States designate an ambassador-level point person in 

the Embassy in Kabul to focus solely on electoral issues prior to April 5, 2014?

Answer. The 2014 elections are the top political priority for our mission in Kabul 

and our diplomats understand that the 2014 Presidential election will determine the 

future stability of Afghanistan and the region. The Embassy regularly consults with 

Afghans throughout the country to help them carry through on their commitment 

to hold credible, inclusive, and democratic elections. Given sustained senior-level 

Embassy attention, we currently do not see a need to appoint a full-time elections 

Ambassador but would consider this in the near future if our regular staffing needs 

assessments determine that such a position is warranted. At present, we are satisfied with our mission structure, which includes five civilians in Afghanistan who 

hold the rank of Ambassador, led by our Chief of Mission Ambassador James 

Cunningham. Ambassador Cunningham, reflecting the Secretary’s own personal 

commitment, is actively involved in our 2014 elections effort and guides our full calendar of engagement efforts to support the 2014 political transition. 

All ambassadors track election developments closely, notably Assistant Chief of 

Mission Ambassador Hugo Llorens, who is the Embassy’s primary point of contact 

on elections. On an almost daily basis he meets with Afghan Government officials, 

political party leaders, Afghan National Security Force commanders, civil society, 

and international partners to assess progress on elections and deliver consistent 

U.S. policy messages of support for all aspects of planning for this historic event. 

Secretary Kerry, who has direct experience with Afghanistan’s 2009 Presidential 

election, has made the 2014 political transition one of his top priorities. He raises 

this issue in all his conversations and meetings with President Karzai and other 

high-level Afghan officials, most recently in Kabul in March and in Brussels in May, 

as Deputy Secretary Burns did during his May visit to Kabul. The elections are likewise a top priority for our newly appointed Special Representative of Afghanistan 

and Pakistan (SRAP), Jim Dobbins, who discussed the elections during his meeting 

with President Karzai May 29.

Question. During his confirmation hearing, Secretary Kerry said the following in 

response to my question about election preparations in Afghanistan: ‘‘Having an 

election that passes muster and is acceptable according to international observers 

and standards will be critical to our ability to have the kind of transition we want 

to have, and to have confidence that the government that succeeds in 2014 has legitimacy. If it does not have legitimacy, if we do not succeed in that effort, it is going 

to be very, very difficult to convince the American people and convince our allies 

in ISAF and beyond to stay engaged in this effort if they are not willing to provide 

for themselves with respect to that.’’

• One of the provisions of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework addresses 

elections. Is the State Department prepared to withdraw, or condition, some 

U.S. assistance to Afghanistan on a transparent, credible election process and 

outcome?

Answer. We have consistently emphasized throughout the past year the statement 

of fact from the July 8, 2012, Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF): 

‘‘The International Community’s ability to sustain support for Afghanistan depends 

upon the Afghan Government delivering on its commitments described in the Tokyo 

Framework.’’ The Afghan Government has not yet enacted new electoral legislation 

that would serve as the framework for the 2014 Presidential and provincial council 

elections and the 2015 parliamentary elections, a TMAF indicator of its commitment 

to ‘‘Representational Democracy and Equitable Elections.’’ Afghan authorities must 

urgently and transparently enact reforms that will inspire widespread confidence in 

the electoral process and enable a free, fair, and credible election. The July 3 Senior 

Officials Meeting in Kabul is the first opportunity to assess Afghan progress on 

TMAF reforms and plan for continued constructive cooperation in the lead up to 

April elections. 

We will reiterate our commitment to the people of Afghanistan and the development of its democracy. In the spirit of mutual accountability, we will also continue 

to press for electoral and other critical reforms to justify our continued extraordinary assistance. We are considering the use of incentive funding mechanisms to 

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encourage action on Tokyo reforms, but in ways that do not jeopardize the progress 

we seek in the Tokyo indicators. As called for in the Tokyo Framework, international donors will gather in London after the 2014 Presidential elections to assess 

progress and review our commitments.

Question. Last June, I sent a letter to Secretary Clinton expressing my concerns 

about the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC). President Karzai’s recent veto of the electoral law demonstrates his 

intransigence and desire to control the electoral process. I understand that the lower 

House of Parliament has passed another draft law and may be considering overriding President Karzai’s veto.

• What is the State Department doing to press President Karzai to work cooperatively with the Parliament to agree on an acceptable electoral law? • What would be the consequences of failure to pass an electoral law before candidate registration is scheduled to begin?

Answer. We are monitoring electoral legislation closely, and have underscored the 

importance of this legislation being adopted as a matter of great urgency. There are 

two laws of particular importance: the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) 

Structure Law, and the Electoral Law. President Karzai vetoed and sent the IEC 

Structure Law back to Parliament on April 27, arguing that a number of the draft’s 

provisions were unconstitutional. Parliament has since been debating whether to 

attempt to override Karzai’s veto or to resubmit a revised draft that addresses 

Karzai’s concerns. We are urging both the Palace and Parliament to adopt the IEC 

Structure Law and the Electoral Law well before candidate registration begins in 

September and preferably before Parliament begins a 6-week recess in early July. 

SRAP Dobbins reinforced this message during his visit to Kabul this week. We have 

and will continue to strongly encourage the creation of independent and credible 

electoral authorities and transparent and credible electoral processes through these 

new laws. Voter registration began this week and time is of the essence for establishing critical institutions necessary to make sure a credible framework is in place, 

especially an independent electoral complaints mechanism. Meanwhile, since this is 

an Afghan-led process, we strongly encourage broad consultations among the IEC, 

the Afghan Government, Parliament, political opposition groups, civil society leaders, and other legitimate stakeholders on important decisions regarding the new 

electoral law framework and the selection of election commissioners. 

Without new electoral laws, the 2010 Presidential decree on elections will govern 

the election process, including the method for candidates to nominate themselves 

and for their nominations to be vetted, a process that begins in September. This 

2010 decree requires the President, in consultation with the Parliament and the 

Supreme Court, to establish an Electoral Complaints Commission to adjudicate complaints. Our strong preference and goal is the adoption of credible IEC and electoral 

laws to further bolster Afghanistan’s democracy. 

RESPONSES OF DAVID SEDNEY TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. What special preparations is NATO Training Mission Afghanistan 

(NTMA) making to ensure that Afghan troops working to safeguard elections take 

special care to ensure that women can safely participate in the 2014 elections?

Answer. In accordance with the overall security transition and respect for Afghan 

sovereignty, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its subordinate 

commands, including the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM–A), will maintain a support role during the elections process. ISAF will be prepared to take action only when requested by the Afghan Government and support will likely focus on logistics, intelligence, route clearance, and 

in extremis support. This support will help promote an inclusive and secure election; 

however, further measures to promote the participation of women are the responsibility of the Afghans. 

Preparations and planning for the 2014 elections, including promoting the participation of women, are an Afghan-led process. Both the Independent Elections Commission (IEC)—which has the lead for administration of the elections process—and 

the Ministry of Interior (MoI)—which has the lead for security—are taking measures to encourage increased female participation in the elections, including the current voter registration and outreach education phase of the election process. 

For the voter registration effort, the IEC was able to recruit a significant number 

of female officials, including for the first time in some insecure provinces. The IEC 

is actively working with civil society and local administrations to engage women in 

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the voter registration process. Additionally, the IEC is carrying out a voter education campaign through public outreach officers and informational broadcasts, 

which will include messaging on female participation. Finally, the IEC plans to 

conduct consultations with community religious leaders, with special attention on 

women’s participation in the elections. 

During previous elections, female participation on election day was limited by insufficient female staffing at the separate women-only polling facilities. Recognizing 

this as a key issue, the Afghans are adjusting their plans to account for this shortfall. The MoI and IEC are considering a proposal to hire women temporarily from 

the private sector to be trained as security screeners for the approximately 7,000 

polling centers.

Question. The United States has provided significant logistical support to past

Afghan elections, and Afghan troops lack the same level of capability. Will the 

United States continue to provide logistical support to the 2014 election, even 

though the coalition troop levels will likely be diminished?

Answer. The current plan to draw down to a level of 34,000 U.S. forces by February 2014 is consistent with Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan’s recommendation and will provide enough forces to support the Afghans through the April 5, 

2014, election. In accordance with the overall security transition and respect for 

Afghan sovereignty, the elections process will be Afghan-led. However, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), including U.S. forces, will be prepared 

to assist if requested by the Afghan Government. ISAF has identified logistics as 

an area where the Afghans will likely need international assistance and is planning 

accordingly. For the first phase of voter registration, ISAF has provided air support 

to the Afghans for the delivery of voter registration materials to a select number 

of provinces. With this assistance, all voter registration materials arrived on time 

to intended destinations to allow for the first phase of voter registration to begin 

at the end of May.

Æ

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