IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 07–0691 

Filed January 30, 2009 

STATE OF IOWA, 

 Appellee, 

vs. 

BRANDON MONTRESE BROOKS, 

Appellant. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Nancy S. 

Tabor (suppression ruling) and J. Hobart Darbyshire (trial and 

sentencing), Judges. 

 Defendant appeals criminal conviction alleging that evidence 

obtained after a warrantless entry of a motel room should have been 

suppressed. AFFIRMED. 

 Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Jason B. Shaw, 

Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant. 

 Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant 

Attorney General, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, Kelly G. 

Cunningham and Robert E. Weinberg, Assistant County Attorneys, for 

appellee. 

 
2 

APPEL, Justice. 

Brandon Brooks appeals his convictions for drug-related offenses. 

He argues that the district court improperly failed to suppress evidence 

obtained after law enforcement officers conducted a warrantless entry 

into a motel room. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the ruling 

of the district court. 

 I. Factual and Procedural Background. 

On March 18, 2006, the manager of the Motel 6 in Davenport, Iowa 

contacted Scott County Sheriff’s Deputy Gina Lieferman. The manager 

requested that Lieferman investigate a complaint from a motel guest that 

another guest was selling drugs. According to the manager, the 

complaint was that an African-American male had approached the guest 

and asked him if he wanted to “buy some stuff.” 

 Lieferman arrived at the Motel 6, which is L-shaped with room 

doors on the outside facing the parking lot. After speaking to the 

manager, Lieferman learned that the room in question, number 136, was 

rented to a female by the name of Easter Kelly and had been paid for in 

cash on a day-to-day basis. 

 Deputy Lieferman called Special Agent Curtis Carter to assist her 

at the scene. They set up surveillance in room 134, two doors from room 

136. Eventually, a van and car pulled into the parking lot. An AfricanAmerican male got out of the van and entered room 136. A female got 

out of the car, entered room 136 briefly, and then left. After the female’s 

departure, Deputy Lieferman observed individuals enter room 136 and 

leave shortly thereafter. 

 At this point, Deputy Lieferman, who was dressed in civilian 

clothes, decided to conduct a “knock and talk.” She asked Agent Carter 

to stand at the door of room 134 to observe. When Lieferman knocked 
3 

on the door to room 136, a male voice asked, “Who is it?” Lieferman 

responded, “Me.” 

 About thirty seconds later, Brooks, an African-American male, 

opened the door, which swung inside the motel room, and put his head 

and shoulders outside the door. When Brooks opened the door, Deputy 

Lieferman immediately detected the odor of raw cannabis. She could 

also smell a fragrance that she described as a “masking” smell. 

 At this point, Deputy Lieferman told Brooks, “I heard you have the 

hook up,” phraseology that Lieferman testified was commonly used by 

drug dealers. After Brooks twice denied knowing what she meant, 

Lieferman showed him her badge and identified herself as a law 

enforcement officer. Lieferman then asked whether Brooks would talk 

with her and he responded negatively. When Lieferman stated that she 

knew Brooks had marijuana in the room, the defendant replied, “No you 

don’t, I’m not burning it.” 

 After this remark, Deputy Lieferman decided to arrest the 

defendant, put her foot in the door, and grabbed for Brooks’ wrist, which 

was on the outside door knob. Brooks pulled back and attempted to get 

inside the room. Deputy Lieferman then pushed open the door and took 

two steps inside as she continued to struggle with Brooks. When she 

entered the room, she observed a large quantity of marijuana, two digital 

scales, and plastic baggies. Deputy Lieferman placed Brooks under 

arrest and called an on-duty sheriff’s deputy to transport Brooks to the 

county jail. 

 Lieferman next called the county attorney and discussed the 

situation. She obtained permission to seek a search warrant. Lieferman 

then exited the room and waited in her vehicle in the parking lot, 
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observing the area until she was informed that the search warrant had 

been obtained. 

 Thereafter, Lieferman entered the room again and conducted a full 

search. As a result of the search, the police seized a green box cutter, 

multiple grams of cannabis, two digital scales, packaging materials, two 

cell phones, and mail addressed to Easter Kelly. 

 Prior to trial, Brooks filed several motions in limine to suppress 

evidence. Brooks claimed that the initial search was conducted without 

probable cause and without consent. The State resisted, claiming that 

the initial entry into the motel room and Brooks’ arrest were based on 

exigent circumstances. 

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State presented 

testimony from Lieferman regarding the facts and circumstances leading 

to Brooks’ arrest, her observation of marijuana in the course of making 

the arrest, and the subsequent search of the motel room after a warrant 

had been secured. With regard to the motel room, Lieferman testified 

that room 136 was not rented in Brooks’ name and that paying for motel 

rooms on a day-to-day basis in cash was a common practice of 

individuals engaged in the sale of controlled substances. The deputy 

further testified to the course of her surveillance and her belief that 

controlled substances were being sold from the room. The defendant did 

not put on evidence at the hearing. 

After the close of evidence, the State argued that after Lieferman 

smelled raw cannabis and the defendant told her that she could not 

smell the cannabis because he was not burning it, probable cause 

existed to search the room given the exigent circumstances. The State 

argued, in the alternative, that Lieferman certainly had probable cause to 

make the arrest. 
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The defendant countered that there were no exigent circumstances 

to support Lieferman’s warrantless entry into the motel room. According 

to the defense, once Lieferman smelled the cannabis and obtained the 

statement from the defendant, the officer should have simply left and 

obtained a search warrant. 

The district court denied the motion to suppress. The district 

court declared that it was a “close call” as to whether exigent 

circumstances existed to allow a warrantless search. The district court, 

however, noted that there was no evidence regarding the defendant’s 

reasonable expectation of privacy within the motel room. The room was 

not rented in Brooks’ name, the defendant had not offered any evidence 

as to his relationship with Easter Kelly, there was no evidence that he 

was an overnight guest, and there was no evidence that he was more 

than a mere “social” or “commercial” guest in someone else’s motel room. 

According to the district court, the only evidence presented at the 

hearing indicated that Brooks was in the room for a relatively short 

period of time. As a result, the district court found that the defendant 

did not have an expectation of privacy in the motel room and the motion 

to suppress was denied. 

At trial, the State offered evidence found as a result of the 

execution of the search warrant in its case in chief. After the State 

rested, Brooks took the stand in his own defense. The defendant 

testified that he lived at the Motel 6 at the time of his arrest. He asserted 

that Kelly was his girlfriend and that the room was in her name because 

he did not have identification. Brooks testified that prior to coming to 

the Motel 6, he stayed at the Exel Inn, but moved to the Motel 6 because 

it was cheaper. Before that he lived at his cousin’s house. He testified 

that he left his cousin’s house because he and his girlfriend did not have 
6 

privacy and went to the motel to do “adult type of things.” Brooks 

further testified that he had a business breeding pit bull puppies and 

maintained a website associated with the business. Brooks stated that 

while he was living at the Motel 6, he left his dogs in his cousin’s 

basement. 

Brooks was convicted of possession with intent to deliver, 

possession of marijuana, and failure to affix a drug-tax stamp. Brooks 

appealed, asserting that the district court erred in not granting the 

motion to suppress. 

II. Issue of Preservation. 

At the outset, Brooks contends that the State waived the issue of 

whether he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the motel room. 

Citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 

L. Ed. 2d 38 (1981), Brooks maintains that the State had the initial 

burden of showing that he lacked a privacy interest. By failing to raise 

the issue at the suppression hearing, Brooks claims that the State 

waived the matter. 

Brooks further claims that he has been prejudiced by the State’s 

failure to raise the issue of his reasonable expectation of privacy. The 

defendant asserts that if the State had raised the issue in a timely 

fashion, he would have responded by offering evidence at the 

suppression hearing. Because the State did not raise the issue, Brooks 

claims he did not need to make an evidentiary showing regarding his 

expectation of privacy. 

The State disagrees. The State distinguishes Steagald, noting that 

in that case the trial court did not enter a ruling on the privacy issue. 

The State further contends that in Steagald, the government not only did 

not raise the issue, but in fact took the position in the trial court that the 
7 

premise being searched was the defendant’s residence. The State 

contends that under our cases where an issue has been tacitly 

considered and ruled upon by the district court, error has been 

preserved. See State v. Yaw, 398 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Iowa 1987). 

Our review of the record indicates that neither party explicitly 

raised the privacy issue, either in the written filings or at the suppression 

hearing. Nonetheless, after hearing the evidence, the district court 

squarely ruled on the issue, finding that Brooks failed to show an 

expectation of privacy in the motel room. 

We agree with the State that Steagald is not controlling. In 

Steagald, the government acquiesced in the determination that the 

premises searched was the defendant’s home and further argued that as 

a result, the defendant was in constructive possession of cocaine found 

in a suitcase in the closet of the residence. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 209, 

101 S. Ct. at 1646, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 44. Having relied upon the assertion 

that the residence was the defendant’s home to establish constructive 

possession, the Supreme Court refused to allow the government to 

reverse course and claim that the defendant lacked an expectation of 

privacy in the home for the first time on appeal. Id. Here, the 

government did not make any affirmative assertions in the district court 

that are inconsistent with its position on appeal. Nor did the State 

acquiesce to a factual finding that the defendant had a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the motel room. We, therefore, conclude that 

Steagald is not controlling in this case. 

We find the case of Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 92 S. Ct. 

2284, 33 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1972), more pertinent. In Combs, the defendant 

was charged with receiving, possessing, and concealing cases of tax-paid 

whiskey known by him to be stolen from an interstate shipment. Id. at 
8 

225, 92 S. Ct. at 2285, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 310. The whiskey was stored in a 

shed on a farm owned by the defendant’s father. Id. at 226, 92 S. Ct. at 

2285, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 310. A search warrant was issued, leading to the 

discovery of the whiskey. Id. In the district court, the defendant moved 

to suppress the evidence on the ground that there was no probable cause 

to support the search warrant. Id. The district court denied relief on 

this basis. Id. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 

Circuit denied relief on the ground that the petition asserted no 

possessory or proprietary interest in the searched premises. United 

States v. Combs, 446 F.2d 515, 516 (6th Cir. 1971). 

The United States Supreme Court reversed. Combs, 408 U.S. at 

227–28, 92 S. Ct. at 2286, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 311. In a per curiam opinion, 

the Supreme Court noted that the record before the district court was 

“virtually barren of the facts” necessary to determine whether the 

defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the shed where the 

whiskey was discovered. Id. at 227, 92 S. Ct. at 2286, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 

311. The Supreme Court reasoned that the defendant’s failure to 

present evidence of his privacy interest “may well be explained by the 

related failure of the Government to make any challenge in the District 

Court to petitioner’s standing to raise his Fourth Amendment claim.” Id. 

The Supreme Court thus remanded the case to the district court to allow 

the defendant to offer such evidence and the district court to rule on the 

issue. Id. at 228, 92 S. Ct. at 2286, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 311. 

We conclude that Combs is closer to the fact scenario presented in 

this case than Steagald. In this case, the government did not make 

contradictory affirmative assertions in the district court as in Steagald,

but remained silent, as in Combs. See United States v. Hansen, 652 F.2d 

1374, 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure
9 

§ 11.7(e), at 466–68 (4th ed. 2004) (determining that Combs applies 

where government simply remained silent or neglected to raise standing 

in lower courts; Steagald approach applies where government made 

affirmative assertion of facts below that would confer standing or did not 

alert a reviewing court to the issue in a timely fashion). As such, we 

conclude that the State has not waived its ability to challenge Brooks’ 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room. 

We further conclude that remand to the district court for 

additional fact finding is unnecessary. Following Combs, other courts 

have remanded cases for further proceedings where the record below is 

inadequate to determine whether the defendant in fact had a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the searched premises. Moody v. People, 159 

P.3d 611, 616–17 (Colo. 2007); State v. Ramires, 152 S.W.3d 385, 401–

02 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). 

The record presented here, however, does not necessitate remand. 

Under Iowa law, an appellate court reviewing the validity of a search may 

consider not only evidence admitted at the suppression hearing, but also 

evidence admitted at trial. State v. Orozco, 573 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Iowa 

1997). As a result, while Brooks may have been surprised by the district 

court’s reliance on his failure to present evidence at the suppression 

hearing showing his privacy interest in the motel room, the defendant 

had an opportunity to cure such shortcomings in the record at trial. 

Further, the record in this case demonstrates that Brooks, in fact, took 

advantage of the opportunity to offer evidence at trial on the privacy 

issue. State v. Carter, 904 P.2d 290, 292–93 (Wash. 1995) (holding 

where defendant testified fully at trial regarding privacy issues there was 

no need for remand under Combs). 
10 

Finally, we note that on appeal, Brooks has not asked for a remand 

to offer further evidence, but instead stands on the record developed in 

the trial court. The State, moreover, does not challenge consideration of 

the evidence offered at trial and affirmatively suggests that we may 

consider it on appeal. Remand is thus unnecessary and we give the 

parties what they ask for, namely, a de novo review of the validity of the 

search based upon the entire record developed in the district court. 

III. Standard of Review. 

Because the motion to suppress was based on a deprivation of the 

defendant’s constitutional right against unlawful searches, this court’s 

review is de novo. State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Iowa 2002). In 

conducting our de novo review, “we make an independent evaluation 

[based on] the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire 

record.” State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1998). Each case 

must be evaluated in light of its unique circumstances. State v. Legg, 

633 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Iowa 2001). 

 IV. Discussion. 

 A. Introduction. The Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution provides “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 

seizures, shall not be violated. . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV.1 In deciding 

the constitutionality of a search, we undertake a two-step approach. 

First, the defendant must show that he or she has a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in the area searched. State v. Halliburton, 539 

 1Although the defendant has made a parallel claim under Article I, section 8 of 

the Iowa Constitution, the defendant has not asserted that the state constitutional 

provision should be interpreted differently than the Fourth Amendment. As a result, for 

prudential reasons, we assume for the purposes of this case that the Iowa Constitution 

should be interpreted in the same fashion as its federal counterpart. State v. Wilkes, 

756 N.W.2d 838, 842 n.1 (Iowa 2008).
11 

N.W.2d 339, 342 (Iowa 1995); see also United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 

83, 95, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 2554–55, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619, 630 (1980) (holding 

that the exclusionary rule applies only to a defendant whose own Fourth 

Amendment rights have been violated). “Second, if the defendant had a 

legitimate expectation of privacy, we must then decide whether the State 

unreasonably invaded the protected interest.” Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 

at 342. A warrantless search is unreasonable unless it comes within a 

recognized exception such as consent, exigent circumstances, or plain 

view. State v. Eubanks, 355 N.W.2d 57, 58–59 (Iowa 1984). 

B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy. The Fourth Amendment 

unquestionably establishes an expectation of privacy in the home. 

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1379, 63 

L. Ed. 2d 639, 650 (1980). The case law extends this protection to hotel 

or motel rooms. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486, 84 S. Ct. 889, 

891, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856, 859 (1964); United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 

1289, 1296 (8th Cir. 1986). The case law further establishes that a 

social guest in a home, and by logical extension in a motel room, has a 

legitimate expectation of privacy in, at least some areas, of the home or 

motel room of another. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90, 119 S. Ct. 

469, 473, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373, 380 (1998); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 

91, 96, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 1688, 109 L. Ed. 2d 85, 93 (1990) (holding 

overnight houseguest had reasonable expectation of privacy in hostess’ 

home). A mere visitor, however, who is not an overnight guest usually 

lacks an expectation of privacy when present in the motel room of 

another. United States v. Sturgis, 238 F.3d 956, 958 (8th Cir. 2001). 

The mere fact that a premise may be characterized as a residence 

or a motel room does not, by itself, establish that a particular person has 

a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. For example, the 
12 

use of a hotel or motel room as a center for drug transactions and not as 

a residence does not give rise to legitimate expectations of privacy within 

the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. A defendant does not have a 

reasonable expectation of privacy when the motel or hotel room is 

nothing more than “a convenient processing station” for the packaging 

and distribution of drugs. Carter, 525 U.S. at 102, 119 S. Ct. at 479, 

142 L. Ed. 2d at 388 (Kennedy, J., concurring); United States v. Gordon, 

168 F.3d 1222, 1226–27 (10th Cir. 1999); State v. Ortiz, 618 N.W.2d 556, 

561 (Iowa 2000). 

A defendant challenging a search and seizure occurring in the 

motel room of a third person must demonstrate that he personally has 

an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation 

is reasonable. Olson, 495 U.S. at 95–96, 110 S. Ct. at 1687, 109 

L. Ed. 2d at 92. A bald assertion that one has been staying in a hotel, 

without further proof, is generally insufficient; as is the defendant’s mere 

presence in the motel room at the time of the search. United States v. 

Armenta, 69 F.3d 304, 308 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Carr, 939 

F.2d 1442, 1445–46 (10th Cir. 1991). In determining whether a 

defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a motel room, the 

presence of the defendant’s belongings is a relevant factor. Gordon, 168 

F.3d at 1227; United States v. Grandstaff, 813 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 

1987).

In this case we must decide, based upon the unique record 

developed, whether Brooks was using the room at the Motel 6 as an 

overnight guest, thereby giving rise to an expectation of privacy, or 

whether he was using the room for the purpose of selling illegal drugs, 

and thus had no expectation of privacy. At trial, Brooks testified that he 

was staying overnight in the room as a guest of his girlfriend, in whose 
13 

name the room was registered. The room was registered in his 

girlfriend’s name because Brooks purportedly lacked proper 

identification. He further testified that although he had been living 

recently at his cousin’s home, he and his girlfriend decided to rent a 

motel room in order to allow them to engage in “adult type of things.” He 

testified that the couple had been staying at the Exel Inn until a few days 

before his arrest, but had moved to the Motel 6 because it was less 

expensive. Brooks further testified that he left his pit bulls, the breeding 

of which were a source of livelihood for him, at his cousin’s home. 

Upon our de novo review of the record, we conclude that Brooks 

did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the motel room. Aside 

from his own self-serving statements, Brooks was unable to offer 

corroborating evidence to support his claim that he was doing anything 

at the Motel 6 other than selling illegal narcotics. His claim that he 

moved from one motel to another in order to save money is belied by the 

fact that he had over two thousand dollars in his possession at the time 

of his arrest. While there was no evidence in the record that the motel 

room contained clothing or toiletries belonging to Brooks, there was 

evidence that the room contained a considerable quantity of drugs, a 

supply of baggies, and two sets of scales for the weighing of drugs. While 

Brooks was apparently shirtless when he answered the door, the 

evidence showed that a gust of warm air exited the room when the door 

was opened, suggesting that the lack of shirt was for comfort rather than 

indicia of long-term habitation. 

Further, the record developed at trial demonstrates that Brooks 

was an incredible witness. He claimed, for instance, that the thirteen 

baggies of marijuana that were found in the groin area of his jeans were 

for his personal use. The defendant had no explanation for the unusual 
14 

storage technique. He further claimed that the two scales found in the 

motel room were used by him because he liked to precisely measure his 

own marijuana, which he put in “blunts” for consumption. According to 

Brooks, the baggies in the motel room were needed because he liked to 

prepare for himself substantial individual quantities of marijuana in 

advance. 

From the totality of the evidence, we find that Brooks has not 

shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that he was an overnight guest 

at the Motel 6. We reject his self-serving testimony. We conclude that 

Brooks was using the Motel 6 for illicit commercial purposes, namely, 

selling illegal drugs. The motel room was nothing more than “a 

convenient processing station” for the packaging and distribution of 

drugs. Carter, 525 U.S. at 102, 119 S. Ct. at 479, 142 L. Ed. 2d at 388 

(Kennedy, J., concurring). Brooks thus had only a fleeting and 

insubstantial connection to the motel room—he was “one simply 

permitted on the premises.” Id. at 91, 119 S. Ct. at 474, 142 L. Ed. 2d at 

381; accord Ortiz, 618 N.W.2d at 561. 

In light of our findings, Brooks had no reasonable expectation of 

privacy in the Motel 6 room. As a result, the district court properly 

denied the motion to suppress. 

C. Exigent Circumstances. Aside from the question of whether 

Brooks had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room, there 

is a substantial question as to whether a warrantless search of the 

premises may be based upon exigent circumstances where the exigent 

circumstances were caused by police conduct. Similar cases have 

yielded different results. Compare United States v. Cephas, 254 F.3d 

488, 494–95 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding exigent circumstances were present 

to support warrantless search where officers, acting on tip regarding the 
15 

sale of drugs to minors, knocked on apartment door, smelled marijuana, 

viewed young girl inside, and made a warrantless entry to avoid the 

destruction of evidence), with United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 366 

(3d Cir. 2006) (holding exigent circumstances exception to warrant 

requirement not met where police created exigency by knocking and 

announcing their presence), and United States v. Vega, 221 F.3d 789, 

798–800 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding police created exigency when they 

abandoned secure surveillance position without justification and 

approached residence). 

Further, there may also be an issue regarding whether exigent 

circumstances may be found where the underlying crime is not a felony 

or is relatively minor. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 752, 104 

S. Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732, 744 (1984); State v. Hughes, 607 

N.W.2d 621, 629 (Wis. 2000). In light of our resolution of the issue of 

Brooks’ reasonable expectation of privacy, we express no opinion on 

these questions. 

V. Conclusion. 

For the above reasons, the decision of the district court denying 

the motion to suppress is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED.