******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
KEVIN SHEVLIN ET AL. v. CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF

BRIDGEPORT ET AL.

(AC 34987)

Lavine, Robinson and Sheldon, Js.*

Argued November 12, 2013—officially released February 25, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of
Fairfield, Bellis, J. [motion to cite]; Radcliffe, J.

[judgment].)

Henry F. Murray, forthe appellants (defendant Scott

Borris et al.).

Thomas W. Bucci, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Opinion

LAVINE, J. This administrative appeal requires us to

construe the Bridgeport City Charter (charter) and the

rules (rules) of the Bridgeport Civil Service Commission

(commission) to identify the date on which eligibility

(eligibility date)to take fire captain promotion examination number 2319 (examination 2319) should have been

determined. To determine the eligibility date, we must

first decide whetherthe trial court properly found that a

certain firefighter was not laid off when he was demoted

from the captain to the lieutenant class. We conclude

that the court properly found that the firefighter was

not laid off and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

The defendants1 appeal, following a trial to the court,

which rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.2 On

appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly

determined the eligibility date for examination 2319 by

misconstruing and misapplying the terms of the charter.

We disagree.

The plaintiffs commenced this action on March 30,

2012, seeking a judicial determination of the eligibility

date for examination 2319. They alleged, in part, that

they were long-standing members of the Bridgeport Fire

Department (department) and that they were lieutenants qualified for promotion to the rank of captain as

of August 1, 2011. They further alleged that the commission improperly set August 21, 2011, as the eligibility

date. More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the

city, through its personnel director, David J. Dunn,

failed to conduct examination 2319 within 120 days of

a vacancy in the captain classification and extended

the eligibility date beyond 120 days of the vacancy. As

a consequence, Dunn permitted sixteen lieutenants to

take examination 2319, although they did not satisfy

the three year time-in-grade requirement as of 120 days

from the vacancy in the captain classification.3 The

plaintiffs sought a temporary injunction barring the

commission and Dunn from conducting a captain examination pending the court’s determination of the merits

of their complaint.

Subsequent to the commencement of the action, the

court, Bellis, J., granted a motion to add indispensable

parties. See footnote 1 of this opinion. Thereafter, the

parties stipulated to certain facts and tried the case to

the court, Radcliffe, J., and submitted posttrial briefs.

On July 16, 2012, Judge Radcliffe issued a memorandum

of decision,rendering judgmentin favor of the plaintiffs.

The court ordered the commission and Dunn to utilize

August 1, 2011, as the eligibility date and that only those

candidates who were qualified to sit for the captain

examination as of August 1, 2011, were eligible for promotion to the rank of captain on the basis of the results

of the examination conducted prior to trial.
The court found that, when a vacancy occurred in

the captain class in April, 2011, and there was no promotion list, Dunn determined that a captain examination

was necessary, and he set August 21, 2011, as the eligibility date. The plaintiffs disagreed with the eligibility

date that Dunn had set and appealed to the commission.

At a February 28, 2012 special meeting, the commission

heard arguments from Dunn, the city attorney, and the

attorney representing the plaintiffs. The commission

debated the provisions of the charter and rules and

voted unanimously to set August 1, 2011, as the eligibility date. The court found that, in doing so, the commission disregarded Dunn’s recommendation that April 23,

2011, was the date from which the eligibility date should

be calculated.

The court also found that, at the commission’s regularly scheduled meeting held on March 13, 2012, Commissioner Willie C. McBride, Jr., moved to reconsider

the commission’s February 28, 2011 decision as to the

eligibility date. The commission retired to executive

session. When it returned to the public meeting, the

commission voted to reconsider its prior decision, and

voted to set August 21, 2011, as the eligibility date for

examination 2319.

The court found that, although the controversy

alleged in the complaint centered on the action taken by

the commission on March 13, 2012,the dispute stemmed

from an incident that had occurred on March 1, 2007,

when Lieutenant John Macnicholl was involved in an

altercation with his superior. Macnicholl was charged

with violating department policies and was dismissed

from employment on July 3, 2007. Prior to being dismissed, however, Macnicholl took a captain examination.4 On the basis of his performance on that

examination, Macnicholl ranked third on the resulting

promotion list.

The court also found that Macnicholl appealed the

termination of his employment to the State Board of

Mediation and Arbitration (board). The board unanimously rejected the city’s claim that Macnicholl’s dismissal was for just cause and ordered the city to make

him whole. The board’s February 11, 2009 decision

noted that Macnichollranked third on the promotion list

for captain at the time of his employment termination.

When Macnicholl was reinstated, promotion list 2214

was in effect and was due to expire on January 20, 2010.5

In addition, the court found that Chief Brian Rooney

conducted a performance review of Macnicholl after

he was reinstated as a lieutenant. Despite the board’s

unanimous finding that Mcnicholl had no prior disciplinary history and that his personnel file contained

commendations, Rooney rated Macnicholl’s performance as unsatisfactory and found that he was not fit

to serve as a captain in the department. On May 26,
2009, five days after Rooney completed his evaluation

of Macnicholl, Captain Robert McLeod was promoted

to the rank of provisional assistant chief, thereby creating a vacancy in the captain class. On June 9, 2009,

pursuant to Rooney’s evaluation of Macnicholl, city personnel director, Ralph Jacobs, declined to promote

Macnicholl to the captain class. Macnicholl appealed

Jacobs’ decision to the commission on July 13, 2009.

On September 1, 2009, while Machnicoll’s appeal to the

commission was pending, Lieutenant Paul Cocca, who

ranked twenty-fifth on promotion list 2214, was promoted to the captain class. The commission sustained

Macnicholl’s appeal on March 18, 2010, and, thereafter,

Macnicholl was appointed to the captain class. The

court found that the department budget and structure,

however, allowed for only eighteen positions in the

captain class. Because there were no vacancies in the

captain class at the time, Cocca was demoted from

captain to lieutenant.

On March 19, 2010, Rooney wrote to Dunn, stating:

‘‘I am requesting you to send . . . Cocca a letter

informing him of his recall rights to the position of

Captain within the next two . . . years when a vacancy

exists.’’ In a March 22, 2010 letter to Cocca, Dunn wrote

‘‘Layoff’’ in the reference line and referred to section

210 of the charter and Rule XIII of the rules. Dunn’s

letter to Cocca further stated in part that ‘‘[y]ou will

retain recall rights until the next available Captain’s

position until March 21, 2012.’’6 Soon thereafter, on April

2, 2011, Captain Luis Rivera retired from the department, and on April 9, 2011, Cocca again was promoted

to the captain class. The court found that at the time

Cocca was reappointed to the captain class, promotion

list 2214 had expired on January 20, 2010.

The court found that on April 23, 2011, Captain Richard Thode was promoted to the assistant chief class,

which created a vacancy in the captain class. Because

promotion list 2214 had expired, Dunn prepared to conduct a captain examination and determined that an

individual had to have been a lieutenant in the department for at least three years as of August 21, 2011, to

be eligible to take examination 2319.7 Dunn calculated

the eligibility date pursuant to the ‘‘Walker Rule,’’8 by

adding 120 days to the date Thode was promoted to

assistant chief, i.e., April 23, 2011, as the date on which

the vacancy occurred.

In addition, the court found that the plaintiffs challenged Dunn’s determination of the eligibility date by

way of an appeal to the commission. The commission

heard the appeal at a special meeting held on February

28, 2012, where the plaintiffs claimed that Cocca’s

demotion to the lieutenant class in March, 2010, was

not a layoff under the charter and rules and that Cocca

should not have been placed on a reemployment list.

The plaintiffs maintained that 120 days from April 2,
2011, the date Rivera retired, was the date to use to

determine the eligibility date and asked the commission

to set August 1, 2011, as the eligibility date. The court

found that the commission unanimously agreed with

the plaintiffs that the correct eligibility date was August

1, 2011. Two weeks later, however, at its regular March

13, 2012 meeting, Commissioner McBride asked the

commission to reconsiderits February 28, 2010 decision

regarding the eligibility date. After the commission met

in executive session, it returned to the public meeting,

agreed to reconsider its prior decision, and adopted the

date of August 21, 2011, as the eligibility date. The

plaintiffs thereafter filed the present action.

In adjudicating count one of the complaint, which

alleged that the commission improperly established

August 21, 2011, as the eligibility date, the court relied

on several sections of the charter and rules that were

placed into evidence. In framing the issue, the court

found that the plaintiffs had not alleged that Cocca had

failed to perform his duties as a captain in a satisfactory

fashion between September 1, 2009, and March 21, 2010.

The question, therefore, was whether Dunn properly

had placed Cocca’s name on a reemployment list in

March, 2010. The court concluded that the answer

turned on whether Cocca had been laid off pursuant

to § 210 (a) of the charter.9 See Bridgeport Charter, c.

17, § 210 (a).

The court found that at the time Cocca was demoted

in March, 2010, the position of captain to which he

had been appointed in September, 2009, had not been

discontinued due to lack of work or lack of funds.

The number of positions in the captain class had not

changed. Moreover, the court found that the rules do

not include demotion in the definition of layoff. It also

found that the right to be placed on a reemployment

list pursuant to Rule XIII (2) applies only in cases of

layoff, reemployment, transfer or vacation. The court

further found that the term transfer did not apply to

Cocca’s demotion as he was at all times relevant a

member of the department. The court also found that

Cocca was demoted due to Macnicholl’s successful

appeal from Jacob’s decision not to appoint him to

the captain class. The court therefore concluded that

Cocca’s demotion was not a layoff and that his name

should not have been placed on a reemployment list.

The court also found that promotion list 2214 expired

in January, 2010, that a vacancy occurred in the captain

class when Rivera retired, and that the commission

properly concluded on February 28, 2012, that the eligibility date for examination 2319 was August 1, 2011.10

In conclusion, the court stated that the eligibility date

for the captain promotion examination 2319 is August

1, 2011, and that an applicant must possess the qualifications to sit for the examination on that date. The court

ordered the commission and Dunn to use August 1,
2011, as the eligibility date and that only those candidates who possessed the qualifications to sit for examination 2319 as of August 1, 2011, were eligible for

promotion to the captain class on the basis of the results

of an examination conducted prior to trial. The court

rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and the

defendants appealed.

On appeal, the defendants claim that the court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous and that its interpretation of the charter and the rules is improper. The

parties submitted stipulations of fact to the court, and

there is no disagreement as to the reasons for, times

of, and names of persons involved. We must determine

then whether the court properly determined, pursuant

to the charter and rules, that Cocca was not laid off in

March, 2010, when he was demoted from captain to

lieutenant. We conclude, as a matter of law, that Cocca

was not laid off and, therefore, that his name was

improperly placed on a reemployment list. As a consequence, Dunn improperly calculated the eligibility date

as August 21, 2011.

The applicable standard of review is well known.

‘‘[T]he scope of our appellate review depends upon the

proper characterization of the rulings made by the trial

court. To the extent that the trial court has made findings of fact, our review is limited to deciding whether

such findings were clearly erroneous. When, however,

the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is

plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions

are legally and logically correct and find support in the

facts that appear in the record. . . .

‘‘As with any issue of statutory construction, the interpretation of a charter or municipal ordinance presents

a question of law, over which our review is plenary.

. . . We turn, therefore, to our usual tools of statutory

construction. In determining whetherthe city’s methodology violates the statutory scheme of the charter, we

seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning

of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the]

case . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Kelly v. New Haven, 275 Conn. 580,

607-608, 881 A.2d 978 (2005). ‘‘In construing the civil

service provisions of the charter, we are always mindful

of the importance of maintaining the integrity of [the

city’s civil service] system.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 608.

‘‘The civil service law provides for promotion in governmental employment according to merit and fitness

ascertained by competitive examination. . . . The primary purpose of these laws is to guarantee that the

meritorious secure jobs and to free public employees

from the fear of personal and political reprisal. . . .

These examinations not only protect the employees

but also benefit the general public in that they tend to

eradicate corruption as well as ensure that the persons
with the necessary qualifications to discharge intelligently their duties pertaining to public office will do

so. . . .

‘‘It cannot be overemphasized that proper competitive examinations are the cornerstone upon which an

effective civil service system is built. Any violation of

the law enacted for preserving this system, therefore,

is fatal because it weakens the system of competitive

selection which is the basis of civil service legislation.

. . . Strict compliance is necessarily required to uphold

the sanctity of the merit system . . . good faith of the

parties will not validate illegal appointments, nor will

continued employment in an invalidly obtained position. . . . To excuse good faith violations of our civil

service law would open the door to abuses which the

law was designed to suppress.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Cassella v. Civil Service Commission, 202 Conn. 28, 34–35, 519 A.2d 67

(1987).

On the basis of our construction of the relevant provisions of the rules and the charter, we conclude that a

layoff occurs if a firefighter is separated from employment when a position is discontinued due to either lack

of work or lack of funds. Rule I provides in relevant

part: ‘‘The several terms hereinafter mentioned shall be

construed as follows: ‘position’ shall mean any office

or employment either occupied or vacant, calling for

the performance of certain duties and the exercise of

certain responsibility by one individual either on a fulltime or part-time basis; ‘class’ shall mean a group of

positions established underthese rules sufficiently similar in respect to their duties and responsibilities . . .

‘transfer’ shall mean the change of any employee with

permanent status from a position in one department to

a position in the same class in another department;

‘promotion’ shall mean a change of an employee with

permanent status from a position in one class to a

position in another class having a more remunerative

salary range; ‘demotion’ shall mean a change of an

employee with permanent status from a position in one

class to a position in another class having a less remunerative salary range; ‘termination’ shall mean the separation from a position in the classified service of an

employee who has been employed under either a provisional appointment, a temporary appointment or an

emergency appointment; ‘lay-off’ shall mean the separation from the service of an employee having probationary or permanent status where the position has

been discontinued because of either lack of work or

lack of funds.’’ (Emphasis added.) Bridgeport Rules of

the Civil Service Commission, Rule I.

Section 210 (a) of the charter provides in relevant

part: ‘‘When any employee in the classified service, who

has been performing his duties in a satisfactory manner

as shown by the records of the department . . . in
which he has been employed, shall be laid off because

of lack of work or lack of funds, or has been on authorized leave of absence and is ready to report for duty

when a position is open . . . the personnel director

shall, on order of the commission, cause the name of

such employee to be placed on the re-employment list

for the appropriate class, for re-employment within two

years thereafter when vacancies in such class shall

occur. . . .’’11 (Emphasis added.)

On appeal, the defendants claim that the calculation

of the eligibility date for examination 2319 should begin

on April 23, 2011, the date that Thode was promoted,

not April 2, 2011, the date that Rivera retired. They

argue that under the charter, the city is not required to

schedule a competitive test when a vacancy in a position

occurs if there is either an active employment list for

the class that is based on a promotion examination or

there are individuals on an active reemployment list for

that class. See Bridgeport Charter, c. 17, § 211 (b).12 An

employment list for a class lasts for two years from

the date the first promotion is made from the list. See

Bridgeport Charter, c. 17, § 211 (a). An employee’s right

to be recalled to the position previously held by the

employee lasts for two years from the date the person

was placed on the list. Bridgeport Charter, c. 17, § 210.

In this case, the promotion list 2214 for captain expired

on January 20, 2010.

The defendants contend, however, that Cocca was

placed on the reemployment list for the captain class

following his layoff from the rank of captain on March

21, 2010. Dunn informed Cocca, at that time, that he

had recall rights to the captain class until March 21,

2012, or the next available position within the class.

The defendants contend that the next available position

in the captain class occurred when Rivera retired and

Cocca was promoted from the reemployment list on

April 9, 2011. From the defendants’ perspective,

because Cocca was not promoted from the promotion

list, there was no vacancy on the promotion list until

Thode was promoted. The fallacy in the defendants’

position is that Cocca was not laid off, and he was not

properly placed on the reemployment list. Although the

defendants argue that there was no work for Cocca in

the captain class when Macnicholl was promoted to

that class, the department command and leadership

structure provided for only eighteen positions in the

captain class. The defendants’ position is contrary to

the definitions set forth in Rule I of the rules and § 210

(a) of the charter. In their brief on appeal no less, the

defendants acknowledge that Cocca’s transfer from the

captain class back to the lieutenant class was a demotion within the meaning of the rules.

Section 210 (a) of the charter provides in relevant

part: ‘‘When any employee in the classified service, who

has been performing his duties in a satisfactory manner
. . . shall be laid off because of lack of work or lack

of funds . . . the personnel director shall, on order of

the commission, cause the name of such employee to

be placed on the re-employment list for the appropriate

class, for re-employment within two years . . . .’’13 The

record discloses that when Macnicholl was promoted to

the captain class, the department structure and budget

allowed for eighteen captain positions. There were no

vacancies in the captain class. As the defendants themselves point out, Cocca was demoted to the lieutenant

class in March, 2010.

The factual circumstances here do not constitute a

layoff. The rules define layoff as ‘‘the separation from

the service of an employee . . . where the position has

been discontinued because of either lack of work or

lack of funds.’’ The evidence supports the trial court’s

findings that Cocca’s demotion was due to Macnicholl’s

promotion, the position was not eliminated, and Cocca

was not separated from service in the department.

There was no vacancy in the captain class because the

position was not eliminated due to lack of work or lack

of funds. There were eighteen positions in the captain

class when Cocca was promoted in September, 2009,

and eighteen positions at that level when he was

demoted in March, 2010. Because Cocca was not laid

off, his name should not have been put on the reemployment list.

Promotion list 2214 expired in January 20, 2012; Rivera’s retirement thus created a vacancy at the captain

class and there was no active promotion list. The date

of Rivera’s retirement, therefore, is the date from which

Dunn should have calculated the eligibility date. We

therefore conclude that the vacancy on promotion list

2214 occurred when Rivera retired on April 2, 2011, and

that the court properly determined that the eligibility

date for examination 2319 is August 1, 2011. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court in all

respects.14

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date of oral argument.

1 The defendants on appeal are Scott Boris, Andrew Ellis, Peter Morotto,

Robert Novak, David Purcell, and Ronald Rolfe, who are fire lieutenants

employed by the City of Bridgeport (city).

The action was commenced against two defendants, the Civil Service

Commission of the City of Bridgeport and David J. Dunn, acting personnel

director for the city. On April 15, 2012, eleven lieutenants in the Bridgeport

Fire Department moved to intervene in the action, claiming that they were

indispensable parties. Those lieutenants are: Lee Williamson, Scott Boris,

Timothy Bottone, Mark Cody, Matthew Deysenroth, Lawrence Donnelly,

Andrew Ellis, Andrew Fierlit, Peter Morotto, and Robert Novak. Darren

Penix, David Purcell, Michael Raffolo, Ronald Rolfe, Giovanni Sanzo, and

Paul Cocca also were made defendants, as their eligibility to take the captain’s examination was date dependent, as well.

Bridgeport Fire Fighters Local 834 of the International Association of Fire

Fighters filed a motion to intervene on June 4, 2012; the motion was granted.

2 The plaintiffs are twenty-one members of the Bridgeport Fire Department

who had attained the rank of lieutenant and were qualified to take the
captain’s examination on August 1, 2011. They are Kevin Shevlin, David

Simon, Shane L. Porter, Peter Mosley, Francis Falanga, Kenneth Domshine,

Everal Wallen, Kevin Higgins, Albert Diaz, Michael J. Filakovsky, Armando

Cora, John McMahon, Carlos Reyes, Lee Taylor, James Elward, Ron

LaFlamme, Ray Lopez, Glen Christie, Mike Meehan, Alsee McCray, and

Dave Acanfora.

3

In their brief on appeal, the defendant members of the department represent that they established ‘‘time-in-grade eligibility as of August 10, 2011,’’

and that forty-seven lieutenants participated in examination 2319. They

also represented that they ranked first, second, sixth, eighth, eleventh, and

sixteenth on examination 2319.

4 The captain examination that Macnicholl took is not the examination at

issue in this appeal.

5 Pursuant to § 211 (a) of the charter, the life of a promotion list is two

years.

6

In the first paragraph of his letter to Cocca, Dunn stated: ‘‘Please be

advised that effective Sunday, March 21, 2010 at 8:00 a.m. you were laid off

as Captain and reinstated as a Fire Lieutenant with the Bridgeport Fire

Department. Your layoff is pursuant to Section 210 of the City Charter and

Rule XIII of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations. You will retain recall

rights until the next available Captain’s position until March 21, 2012.’’

7 The three year eligibility requirement was not an issue at trial nor is it

on appeal.

8 See Walker v. Jankura, 162 Conn. 482, 294 A.2d 536 (1972).

9 Cocca’s promotion to captain on April 9, 2011, has never been challenged

by anyone, and is not an issue in this appeal.

10 The court concluded that, because it found that August 1, 2011, is the

eligibility date, it was not necessary to consider the plaintiffs’ claim that

the commission acted unlawfully on March 13, 2012, when it established

August 21, 2011, as the eligibility date. The plaintiffs have not raised this

issue on appeal.

11 The authorized leave of absence language is not relevant to this appeal.

12 Bridgeport Charter, c. 17, § 211 (b) provides: ‘‘The personnel director

may, from time to time, hold promotion tests for any or all positions in the

competitive division of the classified service which are allocated to class

which have been or shall be established to be at the promotion level by the

civil service commission. When a position in a promotion class shall become

vacant, and no appropriate re-employment list or employment list exists,

the personnel director shall, within one hundred and twenty days of the

date of the creation of the vacancy, hold a promotion test for such class.’’

13 There is no evidence in the record that the commission ordered Dunn

to place Cocca’s name on the reemployment list.

14 The defendants also claim that the city consistently has applied the

charter and rules in a manner identical to its treatment of Cocca whenever

employees are laid off. That issue was not addressed by the trial court, and

therefore is not properly before this court. See Willow Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 33, 717

A.2d 77 (1998).