[Cite as State v. Conlon, 2014-Ohio-107.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

 EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

 

 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 80411 

 

STATE OF OHIO 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

 vs.

PETER CONLON

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

APPLICATION DENIED

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-409242 

Application for Reopening 

Motion No. 469042 

RELEASE DATE: January 15, 2014 

-i- 
FOR APPELLANT

Peter Conlon, pro se 

Inmate No. 409-830 

Grafton Correctional Institution 

2500 South Avon Belden Road 

Grafton, Ohio 44044 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: David Zimmerman 

 James M. Price 

Assistant County Prosecutors 

Justice Center - 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J.:

{¶1} Peter Conlon has filed an application for reopening pursuant to App.R. 26(B). 

 Conlon is attempting to reopen the appellate judgment, rendered in State v. Conlon, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80411, 2002-Ohio-3435, which affirmed his plea of guilty and 

sentence with regard to the offenses of murder and aggravated arson. We decline to 

reopen Conlon’s appeal. 

{¶2} App.R. 26(B)(2)(b) requires that Conlon establish “a showing of good cause 

for untimely filing if the application is filed more than 90 days after journalization of the 

appellate judgment,” which is subject to reopening. The Supreme Court of Ohio, with 

regard to the 90-day deadline as provided by App.R. 26(B)(2)(b), has recently established 

that: 

We now reject [the applicant’s] claims that those excuses gave good cause 

to miss the 90-day deadline in App.R. 26(B).* * * Consistent enforcement 

of the rule’s deadline by the appellate courts in Ohio protects on the one 

hand the state’s legitimate interest in the finality of its judgments and 

ensures on the other hand that any claims of ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel are promptly examined and resolved. 

Ohio and other states “may erect reasonable procedural requirements for 

triggering the right to an adjudication,” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. 

(1982), 455 U.S. 422, 437, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265, and that is what 

Ohio has done by creating a 90-day deadline for the filing of applications to 

reopen. * * * The 90-day requirement in the rule is applicable to all 

appellants, State v. Winstead (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 277, 278, 658 N.E.2d 

722, and [the applicant] offers no sound reason why he — unlike so many 
other Ohio criminal defendants — could not comply with that fundamental 

aspect of the rule. (Emphasis added.) 

State v. Gumm, 103 Ohio St.3d 162, 2004-Ohio-4755, 814 N.E.2d 861, ¶ 7. 

See also State v. LaMar, 102 Ohio St.3d 467, 2004-Ohio-3976, 812 N.E.2d 

970; State v. Cooey, 73 Ohio St.3d 411, 1995-Ohio-328, 653 N.E.2d 252; 

State v. Reddick, 72 Ohio St.3d 88, 1995-Ohio-249, 647 N.E.2d 784. 

{¶3} Herein, Conlon is attempting to reopen the appellate judgment 

that was journalized on July 3, 2002. The application for reopening was 

not filed until October 15, 2013, more than 90 days after journalization of 

the appellate judgment in State v. Conlon, supra. In an attempt to 

establish good cause, for the untimely filing of his application for 

reopening, Conlon argues that: 

At the criminal trial and on appeal, Conlon’s counsel was the 

same law firm and attorney. Because appellate counsel was 

the same on appeal as at trial, appellate counsel was not 

required to argue trial counsel’s lack of effectiveness * * * 

Conlon has no knowledge or understanding of the American 

Judicial system. 

 

{¶4} Conlon has failed to establish a showing of good cause for the untimely filing 

of his application for reopening. Counsel cannot be expected to argue their own 

ineffectiveness on appeal. State v. Lamar, supra; State v. Davis, 86 Ohio St.3d 212, 

1999-Ohio-160, 714 N.E.2d 384. In addition, lack of legal training and ignorance of the 

law do not establish good cause for failure to seek timely relief pursuant to App.R. 26(B). 

State v. Reddick, supra. See also State v. Klein, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 58389, Ohio 
App. LEXIS 1346 (Apr. 8, 1991), reopening disallowed (Mar. 15, 1994), Motion No. 

49260, aff’d, 69 Ohio St.3d 1481, 634 N.E.2d 1027 (1994); State v. Trammell, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 67834, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2962 (July 24, 1995), reopening 

disallowed (Apr. 22, 1996), Motion No. 70493; State v. Travis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

56825, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1356 (Apr. 5, 1990), reopening disallowed (Nov. 2, 

1994), Motion No. 51073, aff’d, 72 Ohio St.3d 317, 1995-Ohio-152, 649 N.E.2d 1226; 

State v. Gaston, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79626, 2007-Ohio-155; State v. Torres, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 86530, 2007-Ohio-9. 

{¶5} Accordingly, the application for reopening is denied. 

_____________________________ 

KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE 

MARY J. BOYLE, A.J., and 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR