D. Homeless Offenders

i. Tobarv. Kentucky, 284 S.W.3d 133 (Ky. 2009)

Petitioner had properly registered as a sex offender through a series of moves, but failed to
notify Kentucky when he left a shelter and became homeless. He was properly convicted of failure
to comply with his sex offender registration requirements.

ii, State v. Samples, 198 P.3d 803 (Mont. 2008)

Samples registered properly as a sex offender up until he left his residence at a homeless
shelter in June of 2002, and temained homeless after that time. He did not inform registration
officials that he had left the shelter. The statute requiting him to notify those officials was not void
for vagueness, and his conviction was affirmed.

iii, Santos v. State, 668 S.E.2d 676 (Ga. 2008)

The Georgia Supreme Court found that the state registration requirements were
unconstitutionally vague in their application to homeless sex offenders, as the statute did not “give
homeless sexual offenders without a residence address fair notice of how they can comply with the
statute’s registration requirement”. The court was careful to note that only the address registration
tequirement in such cases was unconstitutional, and that homeless offenders remain subject to the
remainder of the sex offender registration requirements.

iv. Commonwealth v. Bolling, 893 N.E.2d 371 (Mass. App. 2008)

Bolling was homeless and occasionally spent the night in the homes of friends, and doing so
without notifying registration officials of a change of address was not a violation of the failure to
register statute.

v. Milliner v. State, 890 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)

When Milliner moved out of his marital home and stayed at various friends’ homes for a
period of weeks, he was still required to register his new residence address. The court found that
“the made his home with others, not that he was homeless”, and that he did not have to live in one
place for seven days or mote to trigger a requirement to register that address.

vi. State v. Crofton, 2008 Wash. App. LEXIS 1283 (June 2, 2008)

Where Washington State required a homeless registered sex offender to appear once a week
to the sheriffs office in the county where they are registered, this was not a violation of either the ex
post facto or equal protection provisions of the Constitution.

vii. Breeden v. State, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2150 (March 26, 2008)
Breeden was transient, and frequently updated his address with the authorities. After living

in a motel for a brief period of time, he checked out and began sleeping in his car in the parking lot
of that hotel. About a week later he checked in at a new motel and updated his registration

Page 17 of 20


Apprendi only applies where “punishment” is implicated—and the registration scheme is civil, not
punitive—thete is no violation of Apprendi.

iv. Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707 (7" Cir. 2008)

Here, Virsnieks had been ordered by a Wisconsin court to register based on a non-sex
offense. He brought an Apprendi challenge. The 7° Circuit did not reach the argument, however,
deciding that it was not cognizable because he was not “in custody” for the purposes of this Habeas
case.

F. Sixth Amendment: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
i. Generally
a. U.S. v. Rose, 67 M.J. 630 (A.F.C.C.A. 2009)

Because the court concluded that Rose’s counsel “affirmatively misrepresented” that he
would not have to register as a sex offender, and he pled guilty at least in part because of that
misrepresentation, it constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, and the findings of guilt were set

aside.
b. U.S. v. Wilson, 2008 CCA LEXIS 296 (A.F.C.C.A. Aug. 11, 2008)

Wilson was convicted of carnal knowledge under the UCMJ and was advised by counsel that
there was a ‘possibility’ he would have to register as a sex offender. The court held that advice was
adequate assistance of counsel. Because “sex offender registration requirements [vary] from state to
state, any more specific advisement would have been excessively burdensome.”

ii. Collateral Consequence
a, Ward v. Tennessee, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 43 (Jan. 14, 2009)

In this Habeas petition, the court found that the requirement to register as a sex offender is a
collateral consequence of the underlying criminal conviction. The trial court did not commit plain
error by failing to advise him of the requirement.

b. State v. Nash, 48 A.D.3d 837 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)

Nash challenged the voluntariness of his guilty plea. He lost his challenge, as “certification
undet the Sex Offender Registration Act is a collateral consequence of the plea, and the failure to
inform a defendant that he or she will be subject to its requirements will not undermine the
voluntariness of a guilty plea.”

c. Mireles v. Bell, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2451 (D. Mich. Jan. 11, 2008)

Even though Mireles was not advised that he would be required to register as a sex offender,
because it is a “collateral consequence of conviction. ..and an attorney is not ineffective for failing to
notify his client of all the collateral consequences of a plea”, his attorney was not ineffective and his
claim was rejected.

Page 11 of 20


iv. “Unlisted” Offenses
a. U.S. v. Jensen, 278 Fed. Appx. 548 (6" Cir. 2008)

Jensen was convicted of Complicity to Commit Sexual Abuse under Kentucky law. Sexual
Abuse is a listed offense requiring registration, and Jensen argued that she should not have to
register. Under an analysis of Kentucky law, a conviction of Complicity to commit the underlying
registration offense was sufficient to require registration.

b. U.S. v. Hahn, 551 F.3d 977 (10" Cir. 2008)

Hahn was convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. §656 (misapplication of financial institution
funds). He was ordered to register as a sex offender as part of his probation requirements under 18
U.S.C. §3583(d) because of a state-level sex offense and conviction which occurred between his
arrest and sentencing on this federal charge. The court upheld the imposition of sex offender
registration requirements on Hahn. The case did not directly address SORNA.

c. State v. Haynes, 760 N.W.2d 283 (Mich. App. 2008)

. Where Haynes was convicted of bestiality, he could not be required to register as a sex
offender. He was convicted under a “crimes against nature”-style offense which only required
registration if “the victim is an individual less than 18 years of age”. Here, the victim sheep was not
an “individual” and, therefore, no registration was required.

d. U.S.v. Ybarra, 289 Fed. Appx. 726 (5" Cir. 2008)

Part of Ybarra’s probation violation was based on an unadjudicated sexual assault against his
girlfriend. His original convictions were for drug offenses. Based on 18 U.S.C. §3583(d), however,
he was properly ordered to register as a sex offender.

e. U.S. v. Byun, 539 F.3d 982 (9" Cir. 2008)

Byun was on probation for convictions which occurred prior to the passage of SORNA, and
was ordered by her probation officer to register as a sex offender after its passage. She challenged
that order. Byun had been originally convicted of alien smuggling under title 8 of the U.S. Code, but
the underlying facts of the case had to do with bringing a minor to Guam for the purposes of
ptostitution. Even though she was not convicted of a listed federal criminal offense under 42 U.S.C.
§16911, the court determined that she was still required to register as a sex offender.

f. Fountain v. State, 103 Ark. App. 15 (2008)
Where Fountain was convicted of an offense not specifically listed in Arkansas’ sex offender

registry scheme, he was still properly required to register under its “catch-all” provision requiting
registration for conviction of a “sex offense even though the offense is not enumerated.”

Page 2 of 20


information. By moving out of the motel room in to his vehicle, that constituted a change of
address which had to be given to the registration authorities. The jury sentenced him to 55 years of
incarceration.

viii. | Commonwealth v. Rosado, 881 N.E.2d 112 (Mass. 2008)

Where Rosado was homeless, but registered as required by Massachusetts law. On one
occasion, he listed his shelter address (where he periodically stayed and where beds are distributed
on a lottery system), and was later prosecuted for providing false information and failing to update.
Rosado’s convictions were reversed because there was insufficient proof of a “knowing” violation of
the sex offender registry statutes.

In addition, the form used by Massachusetts to register its offenders was criticized for not

comporting with the most recent legislation regarding homeless offenders, as it failed to provide a
homeless registrant with the opportunity to show their homeless status.

E. Immigration

i. Plascencia-Ayala v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 738 (9” Cir. 2008)

A conviction for failure to register as a sex offender (under Nevada’s state code) is not a
crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(2)(A)(@)()._ As such, the
Plascencia-Ayala was not removable.

F. Offenses based on Registration Status
i. Iowa v. Mitchell, 757 N.W.2d 431 (Lowa 2008)

In 2005, Iowa passed a provision prohibiting a parent from knowingly cohabiting with a
person requited to register as a sex offender. The provision does not prohibit cohabiting with a
spouse who is a registered sex offender. Mitchell was convicted of this offense for living with her
boyfriend, who had been convicted in 2000 of indecent exposure where the victim was a teenager.
The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the conviction, rejecting Mitchell’s constitutional challenges (two
justices dissented).

G. Removal of Information from Registry
i. Doe v. Merritt, 261 S.W.3d 672 (Mo. 2008)
The plaintiff in this case was a person wrongfully required to register as a sex offender, per
the decision in Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833 (Mo. 2006)(en banc)(retroactive application of sex
offender registration requirements violates Missouri’s constitution). He then asked to have his

information, provided prior to that ruling, removed from Missouri’s sex offender registries. The
court required such a removal.

Page 18 of 20


viii. RL. v. State, 245 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. 2008)

Citing its decision in Doe v. Phillips, 194 SW.3d 833 (Mo. 2006)—which held that “requiring
registration as a sex offender for an offense that occurred prior to the registration law’s effective
date was an invalid retrospective law in violation of...the Missouri Constitution”—the Missouri
Supreme Court concluded that attaching residency restrictions to offenders who committed theit
offenses ptior to the enactment of the residency restriction statute is unconstitutional, as well.

ix. State v. Finders, 743 N.W.2d 546 (Iowa 2008)

Finders was convicted of a sex offense against a minor. After his conviction, Iowa passed a
2,000 foot residency restriction law. Finders’ house was within a 2,000 foot zone, but he was
permitted to stay there because he was “grandfathered” in with the law. However, when he moved
to a new home in that same 2,000 foot zone, he was no longer ‘grandfathered’ and could be
ptosecuted for violating the residency restriction. The ‘grandfather’ provisions are tied to the
residence, not the individual.

I. Standing
i. Gautier v. Jones, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66425 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 29, 2008)

Plaintiff was convicted of a sexual offense that required him to register in Oklahoma for a
period of 10 years. While he was still under that registration obligation, Oklahoma amended its
statute to require him to register for life. Plaintiff did establish standing to sue, based on the recent
Supreme Court case of Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 128 S.Ct. 2759 (2008).

J. Transient Offenders
i. State v. Anderson, 2008 Wash. App. LEXIS 2386 (Sept. 30, 2008)

Anderson had a residence in Washington State but left to travel the country for a number of
months (as a tattoo show attist)—intending to return to reside in Washington. He failed to comply
with his sex offender registration requirements while on the road. He was properly convicted of
failure to register, as he was still requited to register as a sex offender based on his Washington
“residence”.

ii. Smith v. State, 275 S.W.3d 686 (Ark. App. 2008)
Where Smith was a long-haul trucker and claimed that he used his sister’s address “for

registration purposes” (which she denied), he was still properly convicted of failure to register as a
sex offender and to keep his registration current.

Page 20 of 20


D. Notice
Petway v. State, 661 S.E.2d 667 (Ga. App. 2008)

Where Georgia did not strictly comply with the notice requirements imposed upon
incarceration officials, but where Petway was fully aware of his registration requirements and failed
to register as required, his obligation to register was independent of any notice required to be given.
His conviction for failure to register was affirmed.

E. Strict Liability
i. Commonwealth v. McBride, 281 S.W.3d 799 (Ky. 2009)

McBride was convicted of a sex offense in Tennessee and registered as a sex offender thete.
He subsequently moved to Kentucky, and failed to register as a sex offender as required by
Kentucky law. Even though he was not specifically notified of his registration obligations in
Kentucky, the Court held that failure to register was a strict liability offense, and that he had an
absolute duty to register as a sex offender once he became a resident of Kentucky.

ii, State v. T.R.D., 947 A.2d 343 (Conn. 2008)

Held that Connecticut’s failure to register statute was a strict liability offense. The State was
not required to prove any mens rea, whether genetal or specific, to convict T.R.D. In addition,
T.R.D. had no due process right to the State making any further attempts to contact him (so that he
could come in to compliance) prior to his arrest.

iii. Christie v. State, 2008 Ark. App. LEXIS 10 (Jan. 9, 2008)

Arkansas’ failure to register statute does not require proof of a culpable mental state. “Failure to
register as a sex offender is a strict-liability offense and...proof of a particular culpable mental state
is not required.”

F. Sufficiency

i. State v. Moore, 2008 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 416 (April 22, 2008)

Where Moore was ordered to register as a sex offender by Minnesota for a Minnesota
conviction, he was properly prosecuted in a Minnesota court for a subsequent move from Illinois to
Missouri where he failed to update his registration information with Minnesota.

G. Trial Issues

i. McClain v. State, 898 N.E. 2d 409 (Ind. 2008)

McClain was charged with failure to register as a sex offender, and the State sought to
introduce the sex offender registration form which he had signed. That form also contained factual

details about his offense beyond the text of the offense itself. It was admitted at trial without
redaction. The court found that the “prejudicial impact of the details of his [conviction] is clear...

Page 15 of 20


though his probation was transferred via Interstate Compact, the court concluded that he was not
requited to register as a sex offender in California according to California’s sex offender registration
statute. Therefore, he could not be prosecuted for failure to register.

III.Constitutional Issues

A. Article I: Ex Post Facto

i. Doe v. California Department of Justice, 173 Cal. App. 4th 1095 (2009)

Petitioners had successfully had their names removed from California’s public sex offender
registry website via a special statutory procedure in 2005. In 2006, the law was changed to require
that they once again be posted on that public web site. Their civil suit claiming equitable estoppel
and ex post facto violations was dismissed.

ii, Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009)

Relying in part on the decision in Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008), the Indiana
Supreme Court held that the state’s sex offender registration and notification scheme was punitive
under the Mendoza-Martinez factors and, as such, application of its requirements to an offender
convicted and sentenced prior to the initial passage of the law was unconstitutional.

iii. Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384 (Ind. 2009)

Where petitioner was convicted and sentenced in 2001, and the only changes to the sex
offender registration and notification scheme since that time could fairly be characterized as ‘civil
and regulatory’ under the Mendoza-Martinex factors, retroactive application of those amended
provisions was not a violation of the ex post facto clause.

iv. Finnicum v. State, 673 S.E.2d 604 (Ga. 2009)

Finnicum was convicted of a sex offense before Georgia enacted its initial sex offender
registration legislation. It was not a violation of the ex post facto clause for him to be required to
tegister.

v. ACLU v. Masto, 2:08-cv-00822-JCM-PAL (D. Nev., Oct. 7, 2008)

The District Court granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the retroactive application of
the sex offender registration laws passed in Nevada in 2007, concluding that they were punitive in
nature and therefore violated the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution.

vi. State v. Ferguson, 896 N.E.2d 110 (Ohio 2008)

In a 4-3 decision, the Ohio Supreme Court found that the 2003 amendments to their sex
offender registration scheme were not punitive and, therefore, did not violate the ex post facto
clause of the U.S. Constitution or the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution. The majority
did not address the “intent-effects” test of Mendoza-Martinex.

Page 7 of 20


Maryland plea colloquy) satisfied the definition of a Mississippi offense which required registration,
and he was required to register.

e. Doe v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 513 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2008)

Pennsylvania’s registration scheme mandated community notification for offenders with out-
of-state convictions, where those with Pennsylvania convictions were only subject to community
notification after a civil hearing to determine if they were a ‘sexually violent predator’. ‘This disparate
treatment was found to violate the equal protection clause and D’s 42 USC §1983 claim was granted.

f. Commonwealth v. Becker, 879 N.E.2d 691 (Mass. App. 2008)

Becker was convicted of a sex offense requiring registration in New York State in 1995. He
subsequently moved to Massachusetts. He was notified, in person, of his registry obligations once in
Massachusetts. Even though his New York conviction was a misdemeanor, Massachusetts’ “like
offense” was a felony and required registration, despite Becket’s conclusions from reviewing the sex
offender registry statutes to the contrary. The court also rejected his constitutional arguments
regarding right to travel and cruel and unusual punishment.

ii. Classification of Offense
a. People v. Mann, 52 A.D.3d 884 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2008)

Mana, convicted of a prior sex offense in California, moved from California to New York,
and argued that he either (1) shouldn’t be required to register as a sex offender ot (2) shouldn’t be
classified in “risk level III”. The New York court found that his prior conviction, number of
victims, and prior failure to register sufficed to require registration at level III. The court found the
record of the California court reliable hearsay for purposes of determining the issues in the case.

C. Federal SORNA and the Requirement to Register
i. Doe v. Keathley, 2009 Mo. App. LEXIS 4 (January 6, 2009)

Doe was convicted of a sex offense in Iowa in 1994 and moved to Missouri that same year.
Missouri’s sex offender registration laws have been limited to offenders convicted on or after
January 1, 1995, via the holding in Doe ». Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833 (Mo. 2006). This court held that
the Supremacy Clause, SORNA, and the retroactivity regulation of SORNA preempt Doe's holding,
and that the SORNA requirement to register “is an obligation imposed by federal law.” Doe,
therefore, has to register as a sex offender in Missouri.

ii. Hudson v, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86987 (E.D. Mich. Oct.
28, 2008)

Hudson was a federal prisoner incarcerated on non-sex offenses. He had been previously
convicted of a state-level sex offense in Michigan in 1990. The Bureau of Prisons sought to notify
Michigan of Hudson’s requirement to register under SORNA, per 18 USC §4042(c). The federal
court concluded that the state offense was a Tier III offense under SORNA and that the appropriate
notice under §4042(c) must be given.

Page 4 of 20


g. People v. Gutierrez, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1082 (May 22, 2008)

Gutierrez was convicted of an offense which was not listed among those requiring
registration. Michigan had a ‘catch-all’ provision, however, requiring registration for any violation
that “by its nature constitutes a sexual offense against an individual” who is a minor. Under the
facts of this case, the offense did fulfill that definition, and Gutierrez should have been required to
register as a sex offender.

h. U.S. v. Jimenez, 275 Fed. Appx. 433 (5" Cir. 2008)

Where Jimenez was convicted of a non-sexual offense, and had no prior sex offense arrests,
it was not appropriate to order him to register as a sex offender as a “special condition” of
supetvised release under 18 U.S.C. §3853(d) when the only indication of any sexual misconduct was
three unsubstantiated police reports—without more--complaining of child sexual abuse. The Coutt
did indicate that it would likely be appropriate to order a sex offender evaluation to make a
determination regarding treatment and possible future registration requirements.

B. Out-of-state conviction
i, Generally

a. Commonwealth v. McBride, 281 S.W.3d 799 (Ky. 2009)

McBride was convicted of a sex offense in Tennessee and registered as a sex offender there.
He subsequently moved to Kentucky, and failed to register as a sex offender as required by
Kentucky law. Even though he was not specifically notified of his registration obligations in
Kentucky, the Court held that failure to register was a strict liability offense, and that he had an
absolute duty to register as a sex offender once he became a resident of Kentucky.

pb. State v. Werneth, 197 P.3d 1195 (Wash. App. 2008)

Werneth was convicted of child molestation in Georgia in 1992. He subsequently moved to
Washington State. The court concluded that the Georgia conviction was not “comparable” to a
Washington Sex Offense and that Werneth, therefore, was not required to register as a sex offender.

c. Sharma y, State, 670 S.E.2d 494 (Ga. App. 2008)

Sharma was convicted of second degree sexual assault in Texas in 2000. He subsequently
moved to Georgia. The court concluded that the Texas conviction was not the “same or similar to”
a Georgia sex offense which would require registration and that Sharma, therefore, was not required
to register as a sex offender.

d. Stallworth v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 986 So. 2d 259 (Miss. 2008)

Stallworth was a Mississippi resident, convicted of a sex offense in Maryland. The offense
for which he was convicted did not require registration in Maryland. In this civil action he
challenged Mississippi’s requitement that he register as a sex offender. ‘The Mississippi court found
that the totality of the evidence (including Stallworth’s sworn testimony in a civil proceeding and the

Page 3 of 20


[and] the trial court abused its discretion form into evidence” despite McClain’s offer to stipulate his
sex offender status.

ii. State v. Peterson, 186 P.3d 1179 (Wash. App. 2008)

Where Peterson was charged with failure to register, there was no burden on the State to
prove his whereabouts during that period. Washington law provides for certain registration
requirements based on whether a defendant is homeless, moves to a new fixed address, or moves to
a new county.

iii, Martin v. Texas (11), 252 $.W.3d 803 (Tex. App. 2008)
iv. Martin v. State (III), 252 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. App. 2008)

Dual opinions from the same case. A good demonstration of how a poorly-handled
registration procedure can result in an acquittal in a trial for failure to update a registry form. This
county required annual confirmation of the previous year’s information without showing the
previous year’s form to the person.

VII. Miscellaneous
A. Federal Housing
i. Miller vy. McCormick, 605 F. Supp.2d 296 (D. Me. 2009)
Where petitioner had been admitted to the section 8 home ownership program, he could not
be thereafter terminated because he was a lifetime registered sex offender. There is a ban in place

for admission to the program for such offenders, but should an offender somehow avoid the ban,
they cannot be terminated.

B. Governing Law
i. Hazel v. State, 659 S.E.2d 137 (S.C. 2008)
Hazel was convicted prior to the passage of sex offender registration legislation and there
were multiple versions of the law—as it would apply to him—throughout the duration of his

incarceration. The governing registration law is the one in effect when an offender is actually
teleased from prison.

C. Habeas Corpus
i. Hansen v. Marr, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Neb. 2009)
Petitioner filed a Habeas Petition, claiming that he was “in custody” for Habeas purposes
because he was required to register as a sex offender. The court disagreed, stating that “where sex

offender registration statutes are remedial, rather than punitive, the registration requirements...do
not satisfy the ‘in custody’ requirements” for a Habeas Petition.

Page 16 of 20


juveniles adjudicated delinquent of 2241(c). Having held that Pomani was required to register, the
court affirmed his conviction.

iii. In re: Z.B., 757 N.W.2d 595 (S.D. 2008)

In certain cases, South Dakota’s registration requirements for juveniles adjudicated
delinquent are more onerous than those for similarly convicted adults. The court found an equal
ptotection violation under both the federal and state constitutions, and rescinded the order requiring
the juvenile to register as a sex offender.

iv. Clark v, State, 957 A.2d 1 (Del. 2008)

Plaintiff, a juvenile adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense and required to register under
Delawate law, challenged that lifetime registration requirement on the grounds that it conflicts with
other statutory provisions in Delaware that require the juvenile court to take the “best interests of
the child” in to consideration when fashioning a disposition. This argument was rejected, as was the
argument regarding any privacy concerns.

v. Inte: C.P.T., 2008 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 929 (Aug. 5, 2008)

Appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of Minnesota’s statute requiring lifetime
registration for predatory sex offenders—as applied to juveniles—was rejected.

vi. In re D.H., 886 N.E.2d 1209 (Il. App. Ct. 1" Dist. 2008)

Discusses recent legislative actions in Illinois (citing In re Rogelio S., 882 N.E.2d 612 (App. Ct.
Il December 26, 2007)) which eliminated the provision requiting juveniles to register as adult sex
offenders upon becoming an adult.

vii. In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204 (R.I. 2008)

Richard A. was a juvenile adjudicated delinquent required to register as a sex offender, and
he challenged the constitutionality of the sex offender registration statute. The court found that the
registration requirements wete constitutional as applied to juveniles. Of note, though, is their
statement that it was a “significant consideration” in their decision that in Rhode Island juvenile
registration information is only available to law enforcement and is not disseminated to the public.

viii. N.V. v. State, 2008 Ark. App. LEXIS 207 (March 5, 2008)

Per Arkansas’ statutory scheme (in addition to the guarantees made by the judge in this case),
a juvenile adjudicated delinquent of a sex offense was entitled to a due process hearing prior to being
requited to register as a sex offender.

ix. In re Crockett, 159 Cal. App. 4th 751 (Cal. App. 1° Dist. 2008)
Crockett was adjudicated delinquent of a penetration sex offense in Texas. He was placed

on probation and Texas agreed that he could move to California to live with his mother. One of his
probation conditions was that he was required to register as a sex offender in California. Even

Page 6 of 20


Sex Offender Registration and Notification

Case Law Summary

January 2008-July 2009


continuing obligation, Larson could be prosecuted when he committed the same offense (of failing
to register) multiple times, as he did here.

ii. State v. Sparks, 657 S.E.2d 655 (N.C. 2008)

Where Sparks’ suspended sentence was revoked because of his failure to register as a sex
offender (he absconded) it was permissible to prosecute him for the separate criminal charge of
failure to tegister as a sex offender in addition to proceeding on a post-release revocation hearing.

C. Fifth Amendment: Procedural Due Process

i. Doe v. Department of Public Safety, 971 A.2d 975 (Md. App. 2009)

Doe challenged the conclusive presumption of dangerousness (and the attendant registration
and notification requirements for a “sexually violent offender”) that flowed from a conviction for
tape. This presumption was permissible. In addition, his privacy, due process, and equal protection
challenges wete rejected.

ii, State v. Arthur H., 953 A.2d 630 (Conn. 2008)

Arthur H. argued that he should have been entitled to an adversarial evidentiary hearing
before being ordered to register as a sex offender. Connecticut allows a court to order registration
when it makes a finding that a “felony was committed for a sexual purpose”. Relying on settled
sentencing case law, Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), and others, the court concluded that
he had received all of the process which he was due in the proceeding, and was not entitled to an
adversarial evidentiary hearing.

iii. Doe v. Board, 882 N.E.2d 298 (Mass. 2008)

Doe was convicted of Rape in 1979, and finished serving his sentence and supervision in
1981. In 2003, he was notified that he was required to register as a sex offender based solely on his
1979 conviction (the current Massachusetts registration scheme was enacted in 1999), The court
held that the “tetroactive imposition of the registration requirement without an opportunity to
overcome the conclusive presumption of dangerousness that flows solely from Doe’s conviction []
violates his right to due process under the Massachusetts Constitution.”

iv. Utah v. Briggs, 199 P.3d 935 (2008)

Utah’s sex offender registration scheme requited posting of an offendet’s “primary and
secondary targets [on its public registration website], implying that [an offender] is currently
dangerous.” The court held that such information may not be published (including the designation
that he is “currently dangerous” unless an offender has notice and an opportunity to be heard at a

hearing regarding its validity.

Page 9 of 20


vii. Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008)

A significant case out of Alaska involving the same plaintiff as Szith v. Doe, 538 US. 84
(2003). Here, the Alaska Supreme Court found—aunder its State Constitution--that Alaska’s sex
offender registration requirements were punitive, not regulatory, and as such could not be applied to
individuals such as Doe who committed their crimes prior to its enactment.

viii, _ Ridner v. State, 892 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)

Ridner was convicted of an offense in 2006 which, at the time, did not require registration as
a sex offender. The sex offender registration law was subsequently amended to require registration
for that conviction, and he was required to register. This was not an unconstitutional ex post facto
law as applied to him.

ix. Miranda v. Madigan, 888 N.E.2d 158 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)

Because the requirement to register as a sexual or violent offender is procedural, not
punitive, retroactive application was appropriate.

x. State v. Jedlicka, 747 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. App. 2008)

Jedlicka was convicted of an offense that took place in 2003 and was required to register as a

predatory offender. After he was incarcerated for that offense, but prior to his release, the statute

~ was amended to exclude him from registration. The Court held that the amendment should apply
retroactively, and that Jedlicka was no longer required to register.

xi. Doe v. Board, 882 N.E.2d 298 (Mass. 2008)

Doe was convicted of Rape in 1979, and finished serving his sentence and supervision in
1981. In 2003, he was notified that he was required to register as a sex offender based solely on his
1979 conviction (the current Massachusetts registration scheme was enacted in 1999). The court
held that the “retroactive imposition of the registration requirement without an opportunity to
overcome the conclusive presumption of dangerousness that flows solely from Doe’s conviction []
violates his tight to due process under the Massachusetts Constitution.”

xii. Buffington v. State, 2008 Ark. LEXIS 71 (Jan. 31, 2008)

Arkansas’ registration and notification components are regulatory and not a form of
punishment and his Habeas challenge to a requirement to register as a sex offender was rejected.

B. Fifth Amendment: Double Jeopardy
i. Minnesota v. Larson, 2008 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1525 (Dec. 30, 2008)
Larson was incatcerated for a failure to register conviction. Prior to his release, he was
approached three separate times with a sex offender registration form for his signature, and each

time he refused to sign the form. He was properly convicted of two counts of failure to register as a
sex offender (the state had dismissed one of the charges pre-trial). Although the duty to register is a

Page 8 of 20


iii, U.S. v. Rhone, 535 F.3d 812 (8 Cir. 2008)

Rhone was sentenced for a firearms conviction. As a condition of his probation under 18
U.S.C. §3583(d), he was ordered to register as required by SORNA. The court did not specify,
though, the basis for that requirement. Rhone had been adjudicated delinquent of a (presumably)
state-level offense of “assault with intent to commit sexual abuse”. The Eighth Circuit held that,
before the sentencing court could impose a tegistration requirement, it had to affirmatively
determine that the juvenile adjudication qualified for registration under SORNA—and that the
decision could not be delegated to U.S. Probation or the Bureau of Prisons.

iv. Cameron v. U.S., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36587 (E.D. Va. May 5, 2008)

Here, Cameron was convicted of a drug offense, and was ordered to register as a sex
offender as a condition of probation under 18 U.S.C. §3553(d), based on a prior sex offense out of
California. The court upheld this requirement, citing U.S. ». Talbert, 501 F.3d 449 (5" Cir. 2007),
U.S. v, Rosario, 386 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2004), and U.S. ». Dupes, 513 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2008). It also
found that there was no Tenth Amendment violation because of the probation language which
required, in essence, “sex offender registration...if applicable”, making it clear that Cameron was
simply required to comply with whatever state-imposed registration obligations are placed upon him.

D. Subsequent Amendments to Registration Statute
i. Jensen vy. State, 905 N.E.2d 384 (Ind. 2009)

Where petitioner was convicted and sentenced in 2001, and the only changes to the sex
offender registration and notification scheme since that time could fairly be characterized as ‘civil
and regulatory’ under the factors in Kennedy v. Mendoxa-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), retroactive
application of those amended provisions was not a violation of the Ex post facto clause.

II. Juvenile Registration
i. State v. Fletcher, 974 A.2d 188 (Del. 2009)

The two petitioners in this consolidated case had been ordered to register based on juvenile
adjudications for sex offenses. Each successfully completed theit petiods of probation, asked for an
expungement of their convictions, and a termination of their juvenile registration requirement. The
Court held that their convictions could be expunged even though they had been required to register
as sex offenders, and that once those convictions were expunged, they were no longer required to
maintain their sex offender registration.

ii, U.S. v. Pomani, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (D. S.D. 2009)

Pomani was adjudicated delinquent in federal court of an offense which occurred on tribal
lands, namely, an offense similar to abusive sexual conduct (per the opinion, 18 U.S.C. 2241(c)).
The court held that juveniles adjudicated of this offense are required to register by SORNA, failing
to take in to account that SORNA’s final guidelines removed the registration requirement for

Page 5 of 20


H. Residency Restrictions

i. People v. Mosley, 168 Cal. App. 4" 512 (2008), review granted, 203 P.3d 425 (Cal.
2009)

Mosley was convicted by a jury of assault, but acquitted at trial of committing a sex offense
against a minor. ‘The trial court, based on its own fact-finding, ordered him to register as a sex
offender, and thus submitting him to the residency restrictions in place in California. The Court of
Appeals held that the residency restriction is punitive (per Mendoza-Martinez) and, therefore, Apprendi
requires a hearing where facts supporting the imposition of the residency requirement ate proven
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.

ii, People v. Blair, 2009 N.Y.S.2d 890 (CCNY Albany, Feb. 18, 2009); People v.
Oberlander, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 325 (Rockland Cty., Jan. 22, 2009)

Citing the decision in G.H. » Township of Galloway, the court held these local residency
restrictions invalid because they are preempted by the comprehensive and detailed State-level
regulatory scheme regarding the registration of sex offenders.

iii. G.H. v. Township of Gall > 951 A.2d 221 (N.J. 2008)

Two municipal residency restrictions ordinances were invalidated because they were
ptcempted by state law. The court did not reach any constitutional arguments.

iv. Wright v. lowa Department of Corrections, 747 N.W.2d 213 (Iowa 2008)

Even though Wright was not requited to register as a sex offender, he was still subject to
Iowa’ residency restrictions, based on the definitions in lowa’s code. The Iowa Legislature “chose
to make the residency restrictions applicable to a broader category of persons—those who have
committed certain criminal offenses against minors”, not just those who ate required to register.

v. McAteer v. Riley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26209 (M.D. Ala. March 31, 2008)
vi. Parker v. King, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26226 (M.D. Ala. Match 31, 2008)

Rejected the plaintiffs’ ex post facto challenges to the imposition of residency restrictions
(for both residence and employment). Noted that the plaintiffs failed to present any evidence of the
specific punitive effects the law would have on them.

vii. Hyle v. Porter, 882 N.E.2d 889 (Ohio 2008)
Based on Ohio’s rules of statutory construction, the residency restriction found in R.C.
§2950.031 was “not made expressly retroactive [and therefore] it does not apply to an offender who

bought his home and committed his offense before the effective date of the [residency restriction]
statute.”

Page 19 of 20


I. Requirement to Register
A. Conviction Triggering Registration
i, General
a. People v. Hernandez, 166 Cal. App. 4th 641 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2008)

Hernandez (22 at the time of the offense) was convicted of oral copulation with a 14 year
old and ordered to register as a sex offender. Based on the decisions in People v. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d
29 (2006) and People v. Garcia, 161 Cal. App.4” 475 (2008), the court held that there was no “tational
reason” to treat him differently because the victim was 14, as opposed to 16, or 18—and his
mandatory registration provision was lifted.

b. Mayo v. People, 181 P.3d 1207 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008)

Mayo was indicted for sexual abuse of a minor and later civilly committed as a Sexually
Dangerous Person in Illinois in 1988. As part of that process, he stipulated that he committed or
attempted to commit at least one act of sexual abuse. He was never found guilty of the offense and
was teleased from his commitment in 1995. In 2001 he asked to have his release conditions
terminated and the indictment dismissed, and that motion was granted by the court. However, as
part of the original disposition in 1988 he was still required to register as a sex offender.

He then moved to Colorado and challenged the requirement to register under Colorado law.
Colorado concluded that he was “convicted” for purposes of Colorado’s sex offender registration
law, and he was required to continue his registration obligations.

ii, Non-Sex Offense

a. People v. Knox, 903 N.E.2d 1149 (N.Y. 2009)

Knox and her co-petitioners had all been convicted of non-parental kidnapping of a minor.
Their due process challenge to being listed on the New York Sex Offender Registry was rejected.

iii. Elements vs. Facts

a. Duran v. Maryland, 948 A.2d 139 (Md. App. 2008)

Because Duran was not convicted of an offense requiring registration, and the Maryland
offense of Indecent Exposure did not “by its nature [involve] a sexual offense against a person
under the age of 18 yeats”, he could not be ordered to register.

Page 1 of 20


G. Sixth Amendment: Trial by Jury
i. Inte Richard A., 946 A.2d 204 (R.I. 2008)

Richard A. was a juvenile adjudicated delinquent required to register as a sex offender, and
he challenged the constitutionality of the sex offender registration statute. The court found that the
tegistration requitements were constitutional as applied to juveniles. Also found that, because the
registration requirement does not constitute criminal punishment, there is no right to a jury trial for
a juvenile.

ii, Thomas v. U.S., 942 A.2d 1180 (D.C. 2008)

‘Thomas was convicted of misdemeanor child sexual abuse, each offense having a maximum
incarceration of 180 days. Even though he was subject to registration as a sex offender based on his
conviction, he was not entitled to a trial by jury as the offense was “petty” for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment and the registration requirements were not penal in nature.

iii. Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536 (Ariz. 2008)

Because of the seriousness of the consequences of being designated a sex offender, the
Arizona Constitution requires that a defendant be afforded a trial by jury when the State files a
special allegation of sexual motivation in misdemeanor cases. This decision is based on Arizona’s
Constitution and statutory framework.

H. Eighth Amendment
i. Gonzalez v. Duncan, 551 F.3d 875 (9" Cir. 2008)

Gonzalez was convicted of failure to register as a sex offender, and because of his prior
felony convictions, was sentenced under California’s 3-Strikes law. The ninth circuit held that the
sentence was “grossly disproportionate to the offense” under the 8" Amendment and granted his
Habeas petition.

ii. Bradshaw v. State, 671 S.E.2d 485 (Ga. 2008)

Bradshaw was convicted of a second offense of failure to register as a sex offender, and
sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment. The court found that the mandatory sentence violated
the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and remanded for resentencing. The opinion
contains an excellent summaty of the current sentencing ranges for failure to register among the
states.

Page 12 of 20


B. Challenges to Notification

i. Burchette v. Sex Offender Screening and Risk Assessment Cmte., 2008 Ark.
LEXIS 551 (Oct. 23, 2008)

Arkansas’ sex offender registry scheme calls for a risk assessment to determine what level of
community notification is requited for an offender. Burchette wanted to have a hearing (where he
could testify, in person) before that determination was made. The court concluded that because
Burchette was interviewed as part of the assessment process, and could submit a written statement
to the appellate committee, there was no due process violation.

VI. Failure to Register

A. Continuing Offense

i, Longoria v. State, 749 N.W.2d 104 (Minn. App. 2008)

The court held that failure to register is a continuing offense and, as such, Longoria could be
prosecuted. “The offense is a continuing one until such time as a defendant properly registers, as
tequited by the statute.”

ii, State v. Cook, 187 P.3d 1283 (Kan. 2008)

Held that failure to register is analogous to the offense of escape and, as such, is properly viewed
as a continuing crime. Because of this, Cook was subject to the increased punishment which was
enacted while he was in his ‘failure to register’ status.

B. “Knowing”

i. People v. Haddock, 48 A.D.3d 969 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)

Even though New York’s failure to register statute (Correction Law §168-t) does not specify a
specific mens rea requirement, the failute to include a “knowledge” element on the jury instructions
was reversible error.

C. Multiplicity

i. Villanueva v. State, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2958 (April 25, 2008)

Where Villanueva failed to register his new address, he could not be charged with a separate

count for each month that he failed to report that change of address. Villanueva’s six convictions
were amended to a single count, but his 45-year sentence stood.

Page 14 of 20


V. Community Notification ......cssccesseessseeeesesnenecenseeeesnsnseeaesaceeneeseeesnsensesesesessesense 13

A. Posting on Public Registry Website  ...........seseceessssssessnnnnnneneeeeeeeceeeceeeeseeeres 13
B. Challenges to Notification .......:..sssseccecesseeeeeessensecesesseeecesssaceeenseeesaeeeseesenae 14
VI. Failure to Register .........ceesseeeeeeeeeecnneeecneecentenenaeeceeaseeeeeeereeeenaessenesseeee 14
A. Continuing Offense ........:ccccccccccceseseeeeesssseessenssssnnananeaeeceeesceseeeeesenaceeesenaeees 14
B. “Knowing”
C. Multiplicity ........ccceccccesseeeesseeeeesseeeeessaeeeseesseeeeessessseeeesseeeeseseeneseessaeeees 14
D. Notice
E. Strict Liability ......cccccceccecec ec eec een e eee ence cence eee e eee e eee cence eee tees 15
FB. Sufficiency ..... ccs ececseceseeeeeeeeenenereceeeeeceeneeeensnensnecseeneeneeeeeseeeeenene ee 15
G. Trial issues .......scccseccccceeessseeeeeeeecneenesnseceecneesaaeseseeeeesenaaessseseeseeeeaeeeenees 15
VIL. Miscellaneous —..........seseeeesecenece eee eee eee eseseeeeeerscneeeeeeseeeeeeeeeaseaeeeeeeeeees 16
A. Federal Housing ..........0ccccccec cece eee e eee e eee e cee n ence eee e ee ee neces eee EEE 16
B. Governing Law  .........csceeeecececsecececeeneeeneceeneaeeeeeeeeaeeeeneeeeeenseseeeeeeeeee 16
C. Habeas Corpus ....... cee cece eee e eee e ene n ence eee n een neeeeee seen enneeeeneees 16
D. Homeless Offenders ..........0.sccceec eee eec ence eee e nee ne eee een e nese ene ne ene en ene ee 17
E. Immigration ..
F. Offenses Based on Registration Status .............ccceesereeenecseneesceeeneeeeeneeee 18
G. Removal of Information from the Registry ....
H. Residency Restrictions ......... 0. se eee e cece eee eect ence e tence eereen nese eeeeee 19
T, Standing ......cccccsesssssesssseeeessneeeeessseeseenseeeessssaceesesseeeseeeeessnessenseesessaneeeeeregs 20
J. Transient Offenders ...........e.ecees eee eeeeeneeeenceeeneneneeeeeeeeeensneneneeneeeees 20


Il.

I.

Iv.

Table of Contents

Registration SEEPS OSSSSTSETSSETSSESESELEPSE eStore eerereeTeeTecrecererrrereerereeereereetyersees sessed

. Conviction Triggering Registration saeeaeeneeneeneeneeee seeneneeneen sseesesesueesccnsenseneensesseeneenssee eo

i, Generally
ii. Non-Sex Offenses
iii, Elements vs. Facts
iv. Unlisted Offenses

. Out-of-State Conviction .......cscssecsserenereesssnenseeeneeneereneen ssensasensersesconersatecnsteneroneroatenes esos 3

i, Generally .............. seecesserereres tee
ii. Classification of Offense —...........4+

C. Federal SORNA and the Requirement to Register  ........c:ssseccsssesssesesersreestaeeenee 4

mo oO BW >

bee)

G. Sixth Amendment: Trial by Jury ..

. Subsequent Amendments to Registration Statute .

. Article 1: Ex Post Facto

. Fifth Amendment: Substantive Due Process

Juvenile Registration

Constitutional Issues

Fifth Amendment: Double Jeopardy  ......sssssscsssssssssseensessensenscsscnssarsnsennecnssscssssaseneensenseea 8

Fifth Amendment: Procedural Due Process

~ Sixth Amendment: Apprendi sseecsssscsscsecserserensesessensenrensensenessennsenseneensennenenneensennensenses 10

. Sixth Amendment: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel  .........ssssesssessessereseeeeeeneee 1

i, Generally
ii. Collateral Consequence

H. Eighth Amendment ..............seeseeeeeseeneeeeeeeenernenteesesenenreeneeeresereee ween 2
Items Required to be Registered ........ssseeseeessesseeesecenseesneeneneessaceneeeneeesasersnees 13

A. DNA ..

B. Internet Identifiers ........cccceeeeeseseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeessssssnseneaececeeeeeeeseseesesseeeeeeeees 13


v. Burchette v. Sex Offender Screening and Risk Assessment Cmte., 2008 Ark.
LEXIS 551 (Oct. 23, 2008)

Arkansas’ sex offender registry scheme calls for a risk assessment to determine what level of
community notification is required for an offender. Burchette wanted to have a hearing (where he
could testify, in person) before that determination was made. The court concluded that because
Burchette was interviewed as part of the assessment process, and could submit a written statement
to the appellate committee, there was no due process violation.

D. Fifth Amendment: Substantive Due Process
i. Woe v. Spitzer, 571 F. Supp. 2d 382 (E.D. N.Y. 2008)

Plaintiff was a sex offender originally required to register for a period of ten years. Three
days before those ten years expired, the statute was amended to extend his registration requirements
to twenty years. The court held that there was no protected liberty interest with regards to the
length of the registration period standing alone, and that he was not entitled to further “due process’
safeguards upon the extension of his registration period.

E. Sixth Amendment: Apprendi
i. Colorado v. Rowland, 207 P.3d 890 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

Rowland was designated a Sexually Violent Predator by the trial court, and was not given a
hearing in which to contest that designation. He argued that the community notification provisions
which accompany such a designation were additional punishment and that he was therefore entitled
to an evidentiary heating per the decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The court
found that the community notification provisions were not punitive (per the Mendoza-Martinez
factors) and that Apprendi was inapplicable.

ii, People v. Mosley, 168 Cal. App. 4° 512 (2008), review granted, 203 P.3d 425 (Cal.
2009)

Mosley was convicted by a jury of assault, but acquitted at trial of committing a sex offense
against a minor. The trial court, based on its own fact-finding, ordered him to register as a sex
offender, and thus submitting him to the residency restrictions in place in California. The Court of
Appeals held that the residency restriction is punitive (pet Mendoza-Martinex) and, therefore, Apprendi
requires a heating where facts supporting the imposition of the residency requirement are proven
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.

iii, State v. Meredith, 2008 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 324 (April 8, 2008)

Meredith was ordered to register as a sex offender even though his conviction was not for an
offense listed in the statute. Instead, he was subject to the Minnesota law requiring registration for
any “offense arising out of the same set of circumstances [as]...” a listed sex offense. Meredith
challenged the trial court’s determination that his Child Endangerment conviction ‘arose out of the
same set of circumstances’ as a listed sex offense on Apprendi grounds. The Coutt held that, because

Page 10 of 20


IV. Items Required to Be Registered
A. DNA

i. Good v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 125 (Cal. App. 2008)

Held that California’s Proposition 69, passed in 2004, requires “misdemeanants who must
tegistet as sex offenders to provide DNA samples, regardless of whether the conviction triggering
the registration requirement occurted before or after” the passage of Prop 69.

B. Internet Identifiers

i, Doe v. Shurtleff, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73955 (D. Utah Aug. 20, 2009)

This opinion vacates the injunction issued in Doe v. Shurtleff, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73787
(D. Utah, Sept. 25, 2008), which was put in place because of First Amendment concerns
surrounding the collection of internet identifiers from registered sex offenders. Because of
legislative amendments that were made effective in May of 2009, those First Amendment concerns
no longer exist, and the statute may be enforced as written. The opinion also addressed Fourth
Amendment and ex post facto challenges to the collection of internet identifiers.
V. Community Notification

A. Posting on Public Registry Website

i. Doe v. California Department of Justice, 173 Cal. App. 4th 1095 (2009)

Petitioners had successfully had their names removed from California’s public sex offender
registry website via a special statutory procedure in 2005. In 2006, the law was changed to requite
that they once again be posted on that public web site. Their civil suit claiming equitable estoppel
and ex post facto violations was dismissed.

ii. Utah v. Briggs, 199 P.3d 935 (2008)

Utah’s sex offender registration scheme required posting of an offender’s “primary and
secondary targets [on its public registration website], implying that [an offender] is currently
dangerous.” ‘The court held that such information may not be published (including the designation
that he is “currently dangerous” unless an offender has notice and an opportunity to be heard at a
hearing regarding its validity.

iii, Doe v. Phillips, et. af, 259 S.W.3d 34 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)

The plaintiffs in this case successfully argued (in prior litigation) that they were not required
to register under Missouri’s sex offender registration scheme because they were convicted prior to
the enactment of the sex offender registration laws. Here, they sought to enjoin the State Highway
Patrol from publishing their photographs and other identifying information, as they were no longer
required to register. That injunction was granted, though the Highway Patrol was permitted to
retain any information not obtained through the (now prohibited) sex offender registry process.

Page 13 of 20