An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling 

legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the 

provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-946

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 17 February 2015

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Pender County

Nos. 12 CRS 51464

13 CRS 1531-32

DANIELLE M. WATKINS-PRICE

Review of judgments entered 28 April 2014 by Judge Phyllis 

Gorham in Pender County Superior Court upon grant of Defendant’s 

petition for writ of certiorari. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 

January 2015.

Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney

General Cathy Hinton Pope, for the State.

Winifred H. Dillon for Defendant-appellant.

DILLON, Judge.

Danielle M. Watkins-Price (“Defendant”) appeals from three 

judgments revoking her probation and sentencing her to consecutive 

sentences of 8 to 19 and 6 to 17 months imprisonment and an 

additional concurrent sentence of 6 to 17 months imprisonment for 

convictions of possession of stolen goods, two counts of forgery, 
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and two counts of uttering. Because the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in sentencing Defendant to consecutive terms of 

imprisonment, we affirm.

We note that Defendant’s written notice of appeal did not 

satisfy Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure 

sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon this Court. She has filed 

a petition for writ of certiorari, to which the State does not 

oppose. Accordingly, in the interest of justice and in our 

discretion, we allow Defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari 

and address the merits of her argument on appeal.

Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court 

abused its discretion when it imposed two consecutive sentences. 

We disagree.

It is well established that a trial court may, within its 

discretion, “impose a consecutive sentence when a suspended 

sentence is activated upon revocation of a probationary judgment 

without regard to whether the sentence previously imposed ran 

concurrently or consecutively.” State v. Hanner, 188 N.C. App. 

137, 140, 654 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2008) (quoting State v. Paige, 90 

N.C. App. 142, 143, 369 S.E.2d 606, 606 (1988)); see also N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(d) (2013). An abuse of discretion generally

occurs only “where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by 
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reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result 

of a reasoned decision.” State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 673, 

617 S.E.2d 1, 19 (2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted), 

cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1073, 164 L.Ed. 2d 523 (2006). However, an 

abuse of discretion also occurs where the trial court erroneously 

believed that it lacked the discretion to impose concurrent

sentences. See State v. Nunez, 204 N.C. App. 164, 169-70, 693 

S.E.2d 223, 227 (2010); see also State v. Crain, 73 N.C. App. 269, 

271, 326 S.E.2d 120, 122 (1985).

Here, Defendant argues that the trial court’s inquiry into 

her original sentences shows that the court erroneously believed 

that it lacked discretion to run her sentences concurrently after 

the revocation of her probation. However, we read the trial 

court’s questioning as no more than a simple inquiry into the 

number of sentences Defendant faced and how the sentences were 

originally structured. It is clear from the trial court’s overall 

questions to the State and Defendant’s trial counsel that the court 

intentionally, and within its full discretion, set two of 

Defendant’s sentences to run consecutively in an attempt to give 

Defendant an opportunity to participate in extended substance 

abuse treatment programs available to her while in prison. 
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Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

sentencing of Defendant, and affirm the court’s judgments.

AFFIRMED.

Judges ELMORE and STEELMAN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).